Strategic utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces

Mellingen, Kjetil
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

STRATEGIC UTILIZATION OF
NORWEGIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

by

Kjetil Mellingen

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Thesis Advisor: Kalev I. Sepp
Second Reader: David Tucker

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Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) are national strategic assets that require certain conditions in order to optimize their strategic utilization. Based on the 2008 NATO SOF Study, and case studies of "lessons learned" from the creation of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command and the Polish Special Operations Command, a "world-class SOF" for Norway requires a national-level joint SOF command. This command can provide coherent, long-term stewardship, authority, and direction over all aspects of Norwegian special operations. Evaluating governing documents and policy, Norway's relationship with NATO, the security environment, and different types of national SOF leadership, this thesis recommends organizational changes to optimize the strategic utilization of NORSOF.
ABSTRACT

Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) are national strategic assets that require certain conditions in order to optimize their strategic utilization. Based on the 2008 NATO SOF Study, and case studies of “lessons learned” from the creation of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command and the Polish Special Operations Command, a "world-class SOF" for Norway requires a national-level joint SOF command. This command can provide coherent, long-term stewardship, authority, and direction over all aspects of Norwegian special operations. Evaluating governing documents and policy, Norway's relationship with NATO, the security environment, and different types of national SOF leadership, this thesis recommends organizational changes to optimize the strategic utilization of NORSOF.
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<td>Canada Command</td>
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<td>CANOSCOM</td>
<td>Canadian Operational Support Command</td>
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<td>CANSOFCOM</td>
<td>Canadian Special Operations Forces Command</td>
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<td>CDI</td>
<td>Chief of Defense Intelligence [Canada]</td>
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<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defense Staff [Canada]</td>
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<td>CEFCOM</td>
<td>Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command</td>
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<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
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<td>CHOP</td>
<td>Change of Operational Control</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>CJFSOCC</td>
<td>Combined Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command</td>
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<td>CJIRU</td>
<td>Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit</td>
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<td>CJSOTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force</td>
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<td>CNA</td>
<td>Computer Network Attack</td>
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<td>Computer Network Defense</td>
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<td>CNE</td>
<td>Computer Network Exploitation</td>
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<td>CNO</td>
<td>Computer Network Operations</td>
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<td>CSOR</td>
<td>Canadian Special Operations Regiment</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
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<td>CTSO</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Special Operations (Canada)</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Direct Action</td>
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<td>DDMA</td>
<td>Defense, Diplomacy, and Military Assistance</td>
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<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defense [Canada]</td>
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<td>EW</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
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<td>Force Development</td>
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<td>Force Employment</td>
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<td>FJT</td>
<td>Fallskjermjegertroppen</td>
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<td>FPOE</td>
<td>Forsvarets PSYOPS-enhet</td>
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<td>FSK-HJK</td>
<td>Forsvarets spesialkommando/Hærens jegerkommando</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>Hærens fallskjermjegerskole</td>
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<td>HJS</td>
<td>Hærens jegerskole</td>
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<td>IEDD</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device Disposal</td>
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<td>INFOSEC</td>
<td>Information Security</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTAC</td>
<td>Joint Terminal Attack Controller</td>
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<td>JTF2</td>
<td>Joint Task Force 2</td>
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<td>KLE</td>
<td>Key Leader Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Military Assistance</td>
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<td>MoND</td>
<td>Ministry of National Defense [Poland]</td>
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<td>MILDEC</td>
<td>Military Deception</td>
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<td>MJK</td>
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<td>MND</td>
<td>Minister of National Defense [Canada]</td>
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<td>NJHQ</td>
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<td>NORNABSOC</td>
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<td>NORNAVSWG</td>
<td>Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORNAVSWTC</td>
<td>Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Training Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORSOF</td>
<td>Norwegian Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSCC</td>
<td>NATO SOF Coordination Center</td>
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<td>NSHQ</td>
<td>NATO Special Operations Headquarters</td>
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<td>NSTEP</td>
<td>NATO SOF Training and Education Program</td>
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<td>NSTI</td>
<td>NATO SOF Transformation Initiative</td>
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<td>OPCOM</td>
<td>Operational Command</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
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<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>Operational Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Presence, Posture, and Profile</td>
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<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Psychological operations [U.S. acronym]</td>
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<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological operations [NATO acronym]</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>RJTF</td>
<td>Regional Joint Task Force [Canada]</td>
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<td>SAS</td>
<td>Special Air Service [United Kingdom]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBS</td>
<td>Special Boat Service [United Kingdom]</td>
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<td>SJS</td>
<td>Strategic Joint Staff [Canada]</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOAS</td>
<td>Special Operations Aviation Squadron [Canada]</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCCE</td>
<td>Special Operations Command and Control Element</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOTG</td>
<td>Special Operations Task Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Special Surveillance and Reconnaissance (U.S. term)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SR&amp;S</td>
<td>Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance (NATO term)</td>
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<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force</td>
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis started as an idea that came up under one of many good discussions I had with my fellow student, colleague, and good friend, Trond Gimmingsrud. The idea was further developed, not without the assistance from many other good men. I would like to thank Professor Doowan Lee for teaching me some basic, but indispensable, research techniques. Christopher Gillies, thanks to you for all the help in facilitating my visit to the Canadian Special Operations Forces personnel in September 2009. I would also like to thank my brother-in-crime, Jaroslaw Jablonski, who made it possible for me to come and visit the Polish Special Operations Forces community in February 2010. Our friendship will last forever! Professor Gordon McCormick: your department’s hospitality and your personal friendship with the Norwegian Special Operations community have been exemplary. Thanks for including us in your exclusive club.

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I. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AS STRATEGIC ASSETS

Today's increasing globalization has made Western countries more aware of and concerned about remote incidents and conflicts, which has forced their respective military establishments to think critically about how to adapt their organizational structures to new challenges. Terrorism, insurgencies, and other types of irregular warfare pose a threat to Western democracies, not because the conflicts necessarily will spread to these countries, but because of the second-order effects that come with these conflicts. Mass migration, massive drug export, diseases, and expanding regional instability are some of the side effects from the conflicts we see today. These contemporary threats and challenges call for a different type of military action than those for which most nations’ forces are organized and trained. Notwithstanding, there are many tasks in such scenarios that conventional forces not only can do, but also must do. Other tasks, however, must be carried out by specially designated, trained, equipped, and organized special operations forces (SOF), because conventional forces do not have the required skills or capabilities, or because the strategic risk is too high.

Utilizing SOF properly has become a debated issue for many nations. SOF are strategic assets, “because of their ability to achieve political, military, psychological, and informational objectives that represent the foundational instruments of national power.”\(^1\) However, the respective strategic levels of the various nations do not always know what the notion of SOF means, and how these forces can be utilized in the nations’ interests. Even though SOF are generally acknowledged as an important asset in contemporary defense structures, each nation seems to struggle to find a good solution where SOF are given the autonomy and flexibility needed to function properly as a strategic asset. While some nations have created a separate SOF command at the

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\(^1\) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Center [NSCC], *North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study [NATO SOF Study]* (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2008), ii.
national strategic level, other nations, like Norway, govern SOF through the services, and coordinate them with a limited capacity within the “conventional” strategic and operational levels.²

At the Riga Summit in November 2006, NATO members agreed to implement several measures that would enhance the Alliance’s capacity to face contemporary threats and challenges. One of these measures was the NATO Special Operations Forces Transformation Initiative (NSTI), which is a program that aims to increase the capabilities of the SOF of NATO nations. Together with the NSTI, the NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) emerged and took the lead in coordinating combined and joint SOF training, education, and operations within NATO. NSCC quickly became a big success in terms of connecting NATO members’ SOF units together, synchronizing and standardizing training and education, and supporting NATO’s ongoing theater special operations. On March 1, 2010, NSCC was re-designated as the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ). Ultimately, NSHQ’s goal is to create a NATO SOF environment consisting of high-level units, capable of conducting combined and joint operations for strategic decision-makers, and with strategic impact. In the NATO SOF Study, NSHQ has identified that “the critical ingredient to optimize [national] SOF is a dedicated national special operations organization to provide coherent, long-term stewardship, authority, and direction over all aspects of special operations.”³

As with all NATO nations, Norway should follow up NSHQ’s endorsements by scrutinizing its own structure and developing arrangements from which both

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² The national strategic level is, in NATO nations, most commonly divided into two sub-levels: the political-strategic level, which usually consists of a Department/Ministry of Defense, and the military-strategic level, which usually consists of a national joint defense staff. Some nations choose to organize their special operations forces directly under the political-strategic level, while others choose to organize them under the military-strategic level.

³ NSCC, NATO SOF Study, ii.
Norway and NATO can benefit. This thesis addresses the strategic utilization of Norwegian SOF (NORSOF) and the pertinent organizational questions that arise.\textsuperscript{4}.

\textbf{A. NORWEGIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES}

Norwegian security policy has changed dramatically over the last two decades, from focusing on an anti-invasion defense to focusing on global influence through employment of political tools, including military forces. During the Cold War, the Norwegian Armed Forces were trained and equipped to fight the Soviet Union, a known and well-defined threat. A potential war was expected to be conventional, as the Soviets had strategic interests in controlling Norwegian territory and its coastline. The military units were trained, equipped, and employed to disrupt the first echelons of a Soviet invasion, and to prepare airfields and landing zones for NATO reinforcements. The roles of the Norwegian special operations forces were marginal, as was the size of the units:

\textit{Marinejegerlaget} [The Naval Commando Team] (MJL) was composed of as few as 16 men (a headquarters section and administration, and three four-man patrols).\textsuperscript{5} Usually, four to eight conscripts made it through the selection each year, and some of them were offered a three-year contract after the compulsory military service. The main tasks of the unit were special surveillance and reconnaissance (SR), and small direct action (DA) missions. The unit was a standing operational unit, and kept one patrol on four hours’ notice-to-move until 1990.

\textsuperscript{4} NORSOF is not a formal term or organization, but an acronym that describes the two special operations communities in Norway, consisting of the Army SOF and the Naval SOF. The 137 Air Wing is considered a part of the NORSOF community, as the unit is responsible for the development and employment of special air operations support from the Air Force. In governing documents, 137 Air Wing is not regarded as SOF, but it is tasked with support missions.

\textsuperscript{5} The Norwegian word “marine” means “navy” or “naval,” and is not equivalent to the English word “marine.” The word “jeger” literally means “hunter,” but is also used to describe commandos, or military soldiers and units that possess specialized skills, e.g., “fallskjermjeger” (paratrooper/parachute commando), “infanterijeger” (infantry ranger/scout), or “kystjeger” (coastal ranger).
Hærens fallskjermjegerskole (HJFS), later Hærens jegerskole [The Army’s Commando School] (HJS), was established in 1962, primarily to train conventional Army reconnaissance units in military parachuting. However, in the mid-1960s, it started to produce its own paratroopers, designed for direct action and surveillance and reconnaissance far behind the enemy’s line.6 These were 20–30 new voluntary conscripts each year, serving their 12 months’ compulsory military service in Fallskjermjegertroppen [The Paratrooper Platoon] (FJT). The missions of the platoon were similar to the ones of MJL, but the platoon was not operational, as it was a one-year educational program. After one year, some of the soldiers were selected for a HJS mobilization/reserve force. The rest of the soldiers were normally distributed to other reserve forces or Heimevernet [the Home Guard].

In 1982, HJS had also assumed the responsibility to create a military counterterrorist force, Forsvarets spesialkommando [The Defense’s Special Commando] (FSK), primarily for use in the event of terrorist attacks on Norway’s numerous oil platforms. The unit was stood up by personnel from both MJL and FJT, and it consisted only of professionals (sergeants and officers) who had completed selection and one year of training in one of the two units.

B. POST-COLD WAR TRANSFORMATION

In the beginning of the 1990s, the absence of the Soviet Union as a dominating threat made Norwegian decision-makers understand that the Norwegian Armed Forces needed a transformation to be able to fill several and different types of roles.7 In order to support the Norwegian national security, the Norwegian Armed Forces was downsized and transformed into smaller, more flexible units, most of them capable of pursuing Norwegian interests both inside


and outside the Norwegian borders. Operations in the Balkans since the middle of the 1990s, and in Afghanistan since 2001, are examples of considerable Norwegian military contributions, far from Norwegian soil but in concert with the new national security focus. The Norwegian strategic concept *Styrke og relevans: Strategisk konsept for Forsvaret* [*Strength and Relevance: A Strategic Concept for the Armed Forces*], highlighted the importance of a holistic approach to potential threats and international conflicts:

Our security cannot be maintained through a one-sided focus on the conventional defence of Norwegian territory. On the contrary, the threat assessment entails that Norwegian security is best maintained through contributing to peace, stability and a [favorable] international environment. By doing so, we help reduce the risk of crises, armed conflicts and war, the spreading of conflicts and expansion of international terrorism.8

During the transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces in the last 20 years, the two NORSOF units went through modernization and growth. In 1992, MJL changed its name to *Marinejegerkommandoen* (MJK) and, in 1997, HJS changed its name to *Hærens jegerkommando* (HJK). In recognition of the fact that the entire unit had to be involved during overseas/"out-of-area" deployments and counterterrorist operations, the name was changed again in 2007 to *Forsvarets spesialkommando/Hærens jegerkommando* (FSK-HJK). The sizes of the units are classified, but their official Web sites refer to organizations that include maneuver squadrons, combat support squadrons, combat service support, and staff elements.9 To a certain degree, there has been some cooperation between the units during these years of development, but this has been limited to SOF-particular purchases and a few operations (e.g., two joint contingents in Afghanistan, in 2002). Their expanding capabilities have largely become redundant; both units share the same missions with only a few

8 Forsvarsdepartementet, *Strength and Relevance*, 7.

9 See [www.fallskjermjeger.no](http://www.fallskjermjeger.no) for information on the Army SOF (FSK-HJK), and [www.marinejeger.no](http://www.marinejeger.no) for information on the Naval SOF (MJK).
exceptions, and can together sustain larger contributions in “out-of-area” operations, such as in the 18-months’ deployment to Afghanistan in 2008–2009.

C. THE PROBLEM

1. NORSOF and the Strategic Realm

The current arrangement with two separate units within their respective services seems to be the model for the future; this has been emphasized repeatedly by political and military decision-makers, and is described in governing documents.\(^\text{10}\) NORSOF, like most NATO SOF units, are considered strategic assets. However, there is no joint NORSOF command at the strategic level in Norway. Parliamentary Bill no. 48 calls for measures that can facilitate better management and follow-up capacity at the strategic level, and some improvements have been made.\(^\text{11}\) In August 2009, staff at the strategic and operational levels doubled their number of SOF-related personnel. The strategic level consists of two sub-layers: the political-strategic (Ministry of Defense) and the military-strategic (Chief of Defense Staff) (see Figure 1). There are no SOF-related personnel at the political-strategic level. However, there are four officers, including a Colonel or Navy Captain (O-6) at the military-strategic level, who are directly related to SOF. These four comprise a Special Operations Section within the structure of the Chief of Defense Staff’s Department of Operations, headed by a major general/rear admiral (O-8). This office has no command authority over NORSOF; they are the Chief of Defense’s advisors and action officers on SOF-related matters within the staff. This arrangement is recognizable in the NATO SOF Study as a small version of the “National Military Staff Element for Special Operations.”\(^\text{12}\) Additionally, there are 12 officers, also headed by an O-6, at the

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\(^{10}\) E.g., Forsvarsdepartementet [Ministry of Defense], \textit{Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier} [A defense for protection of Norway’s security, interests, and resources], Parliamentary Bill no. 48 (2007–2008), 38.

\(^{11}\) Forsvarsdepartementet, \textit{Parliamentary Bill no. 48}, 74.

operational level. These 12 comprise the so-called J-3 SOF, which is part of the Joint Operations. J-3 SOF personnel are the advisors and action officers at Forsvarets operative hovedkvarter [Norwegian Joint Headquarters] (NJHQ), and usually execute OPCOM or OPCON (on behalf of the Chief of Defense and/or the Commander of NJHQ) over NORSOF units abroad or in a domestic SOF operation.\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{The Strategic Level in Norway}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{13} In accordance with NATO terms, OPCOM (Operational Command) is “the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary.” OPCON (Operational Control) is “the authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location.” See NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (AAP-6) (2009), \url{http://www.nato.int/docu/standag/aap006/aap6.htm}, 2-O-3.
2. NORSOF and Jointness

Since FSK-HJK and MJK belong to their respective services, i.e., the Army and the Navy, there are few coordinating arrangements, in terms of force production (force management, force generation, and force development). For operations, NJHQ coordinates the deployments, employments, and logistics. For larger materiel projects/procurements, Forsvarets logistikkorganisasjon [Defense Logistics Organization] coordinates the efforts. Without a coordinating body with the authority to supersede the services’ individual interests, there is little room for unity of effort and harmonization of capabilities. Both units develop themselves independently, and often with a competitive mindset, which does not necessarily benefit NORSOF’s overall interests. The result is redundant capabilities in some areas, and lack of crucial capabilities in other areas.14

3. Questions

Despite the doubling of officers at the strategic level (from two to four) and operational level (from 6 to 12), numerous factors logically raise the question why there is no strategic NORSOF command in Norway. As noted in the NATO SOF Study, the “national military element for special operation” has some downsides. It cannot provide authoritative direction to the SOF units, and it has no direct control over the SOF units in the services.15 Synchronization and coordination of the units is cumbersome (or impossible) in this type of arrangement. The increasing sizes of the NORSOF units and their complex and delicate missions, in addition to the contemporary security environment that includes more irregular warfare-type operations, should call for an assessment of whether a separate command should be one of the measures that are mentioned in Parliamentary Bill no. 48.

14 Author’s own observations, in addition to views expressed through conversations with NORSOF personnel. See also Robertsen, Making New Ambitions Work.

15 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 23–24.
This thesis is meant to be such an assessment, and it will answer the following research question:

“Which organizational changes have to be made to optimize the strategic utilization of the Norwegian Special Operations Forces?”

In order to answer the question above, the research will answer the following supporting question first: “Why is it necessary to change the Norwegian Special Operations Forces’ organizational design?”

4. Methodology

Based on the assumption that NORSOF needs to make changes to its current organizational model, this thesis will use lessons learned from two relevant case studies where recent changes have been made, in addition to an analysis of factors that are relevant for a potential change in the Norwegian organizational model.

First, four factors are identified as relevant to answer the supporting question of this thesis: “why is it necessary to change NORSOF’s organizational design?” The factors validate the hypothesis that NORSOF are not adequately utilized as strategic assets, and that an increased utilization at the strategic level is in the nation’s interest, and in accordance with governing documents. The four factors are:

- Governing documents, doctrine, and policy, including political intentions for NORSOF;
- Norway’s relationship with NATO;
- The security environment; and
- The three main types of national SOF leadership.

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16 The term “strategic leverage” means a particular organization’s influence, importance, and/or impact at the strategic level. No strategic leverage means that the organization’s actions have no effect or impact at the strategic level. Full strategic leverage means that the organization’s actions and advice make a great impact at the strategic level, and that the strategic level to a large degree depends on or benefits from the organization’s advice and/or action.
Second, two case studies of the transformation of Canadian Special Operations Forces (CANSOF) in 2006 and Polish Special Operations Forces (POLSOF) in 2007 examine how strategic leverage can be changed. Before their transformations, Canada and Poland had national staff elements for special operations in their respective defense staffs, similar to the Norwegian organizational design today; the tactical SOF units were governed through their services, and the two staff elements at the strategic level had little authority and no command relationship over the tactical units. By measuring nine indicators on SOF’s strategic stewardship and joint capabilities before and after the transformations in Canada and Poland, variation in the strategic leverage is observed. As the two cases generally show comparable trends in increased leverage at the strategic level, it is assumed that a similar transformation in Norway can increase NORSOF’s leverage equally. Likewise, negative results and discrepancies among the indicators can be studied to avoid a similar outcome in a Norwegian transformation by identifying the origins of the negative trends. Interviews and background research were used to measure the strategic leverage in the two case studies.

Third, the four factors that were identified in Chapter II are analyzed, based on the lessons learned from the case studies of CANSOF and POLSOF and the author’s knowledge on the NORSOF organizational design. Deductions are consecutively derived from the analysis.

Fourth, based on the deductions from the analysis of the Norwegian case and the lessons learned from the case studies of CANSOF and POLSOF, the thesis question “which organizational changes have to be made to optimize the strategic utilization of NORSOF?” is answered. An organizational model for NORSOF is recommended, and additional recommendations that will increase NORSOF’s strategic leverage are listed.
5. Scope

The two foreign case studies, CANSOFCOM and POLSOCOM, were selected for several reasons. For this thesis, relevant cases with available unclassified material were needed. Canada and Poland are both members of NATO, and they have recent experiences from creating their respective SOF commands at the strategic level. Even though both nations today have somewhat bigger SOF communities than Norway, the comparison still is relevant. The size of the NORSOF community does not invoke a different approach on the strategic leadership than those of Canada or Poland. The number of operators who carry out “standard SOF tasks,” such as Strategic Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Direct Action, and Military Assistance, are not very different from the number of NORSOF operators. However, the new SOF organizations in Canada and Poland have added new capabilities after the creation of their respective commands, for instance special air operations capabilities and organic chemical, biological, radiation, and nuclear (CBRN) specialists.

In the case of Canada, this study will examine three books that have been written on the Canadian SOF. In addition, interviews were carried out with CANSOFCOM key players in today’s organization and from the creation of the command. There are many similarities between Canada and Norway, in terms of political issues. They are both “Arctic nations” and engaged in the development of “The High North.” Both nations also put their very good relationships with the United States as a crucial part of their security policy. However, these relationships seem to be challenged in both countries by the desire to posture as “neutral” peacemakers/-keepers, instead of obedient states that always comply with the desires of U.S. decision-makers. Canada’s relationship with the United States also is strongly influenced by their interests in their common borders and the joint North American Aerospace Defense Command.

In the case of Poland, there is little literature on the topic, but the Polish SOF community generously opened its doors for a visit and interviews with key personnel. Poland has a different security policy view than Canada and Norway;
as a new member of NATO, and with a “never again communism” attitude from its time in the Warsaw Pact, it seems prone to lean toward a tighter relationship with the United States than Norway. It seems clear that Poland uses its SOF actively in achieving its strategic aims. For this thesis, it is interesting to determine if the creation of POLSOCOM mattered in contemporary and future strategic utilization of SOF in Poland.

Since NATO nations usually keep information about their SOF organizations at a classified level, little in-depth material is available for this unclassified thesis. However, the NATO SOF Study provides research and analysis, based on visits and interviews on 12 of the NATO members that have SOF, in addition to conversations with personnel from five other nations that provide representatives to the NSCC (NSHQ), and even nations outside the NATO alliance. The NATO SOF Study provides the NATO members the minimum and desired requirements for SOF at all levels, with focus on the strategic level. It does not reveal any of the participation interview objects’ statements, because such statements are classified, or sensitive. Both personnel and nations have been made anonymous, which makes it difficult to know in which context each statement was given. Some interviewees stated that if “what [NSCC] was writing from the conversations were communicated back within their respective defense establishments, [the interviewees] were done.” Still, the NATO SOF Study is presumably the most reliable research there is on NATO SOF, since the interviewees were promised such discretion in return for speaking openly.

Notwithstanding, the NATO SOF Study is written by NSHQ, which is a major stakeholder in a strong NATO SOF community. Its suggestions are not “cheap solutions for low-budget countries,” but optimized organizations that also will benefit NATO (in terms of troop contributions to NATO operations, NSHQ

17 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 3–4.

18 NSCC officer, email message to author, February 20, 2009.
augmentation, etc). However, the Norwegian alignment with NATO directions and guidance is historically well established, so the *NATO SOF Study* is the most reliable and accurate document to use as a standard for Norwegian ambitions.

Three types of SOF leadership are listed in the *NATO SOF Study*, and will be evaluated in this thesis: “National Military Staff Element for Special Operations,” “Special Operations Component Command,” and “Special Operations Service.”¹⁹ These models assume different types of roles and tasks, and the recommendations will include proposals and examples of such tasks for a Norwegian model.

6. Measurements

In order to measure the benefits and drawbacks of different national SOF leadership models, this thesis will use the requirements and standards that apply to NATO members and their SOF as they are described in the *NATO SOF Study*.²⁰ Its list of roles and capabilities for a “world class special operations force” will be used to measure the individual cases before and after the creation of a SOF command.²¹ A full score on a variable means that optimal conditions are present, i.e., the conditions are “as perfect, functional, and effective as possible.”²² The lowest score means that the conditions are not present at all.

7. Translations

Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Norwegian are by the author.

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²⁰ Ibid., 29–30.

²¹ The term “world class special operations force” is used in the *NATO SOF Study*, and lists specific requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to use the term to describe an organization. All these requirements are reflected in the questions that were provided to the interviewees, e.g., “the ability to provide centralized stewardship, authority, and direction to joint special operations and national SOF.”

²² NSCC, *NATO SOF Study*, 3.
II. FACTORS

A. GOVERNING DOCUMENTS, DOCTRINE, AND POLICY

In accordance with NATO, deciding how to govern, develop, and employ national SOF is considered a national concern. However, there are often specific requirements linked to combined SOF contributions, as there are in conventional NATO operations. While national strategic concepts and documents describe the intended use of a national SOF, NATO publications provide guidance on the conduct of allied joint special operations. This chapter will pursue Norwegian documents that are pertinent to the management of SOF, as well as relevant NATO publications that may have an influence on the Norwegian arrangements. It occurs that there is a strong relationship between the Norwegian security policy and Norway’s stake in NATO. Norway’s national interests are somewhat dependent on the country’s ability to comply with NATO requirements and demands. It is therefore relevant to search for congruence between the national strategic concept and NATO’s guidance and requirements for SOF.

1. Political Intentions for NORSOF

In 2008, the Norwegian government submitted its Parliamentary Bill no. 48 Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier [A Defense for Protection of Norway’s Security, Interests, and Resources], proposing a restructuring of the strategic and operational level of the Norwegian Armed Forces (NAF). The subsequent Iverksettingsbrev for Forsvarssektoren [Implementation Letter for the Defense Sector] (2009–2012), issued by the Minister of Defense, instructs the Chief of Defense to implement the recommendations from Parliamentary Bill no. 48. Some of the decisions from this

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process have an impact on NORSOF. A paragraph from the Implementation letter notes that NORSOF consists of [only] FSK-HJK and MJK, and that air assets are support to the two units. Hence, 137 Luftving (137 Air Wing) is not considered as part of NORSOF, but has support duties to the latter.

Parliamentary Bill no. 48 refers to the use of SOF, and states that SOF are defined as “strategic forces, and are in terms of command [& control] associated with the highest practical level.” In addition, it states that “due to the nature of special operations, it is extremely important that the chain of command is clear and unequivocal, and responds quickly, consisting of as few layers as possible.” The Implementation Letter for the Defense Sector notes that the three services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) are responsible for SOF’s force production, even though SOF are strategic joint assets.

The Implementation Letter also states that the “special operations forces will continue developing; with focus on solutions where competence and capacity is maintained and developed, while the arrangement becomes more cost-effective and practical.” Parliamentary Bill no. 48 additionally explains that “measures will be assessed in order to facilitate an improved senior follow-up and management of the SOF at the strategic level.”

In sum, Parliamentary Bill no. 48 expresses a political will and intention to further develop NORSOF, and emphasizes that SOF, including NORSOF, are

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26 Forsvarsdepartementet, Parliamentary Bill no. 48, 63.

27 Forsvarsdepartementet, Implementation letter for the Defense Sector defines Force production as “The total process and activity that conduce to prepare forces ready for effort and includes education and training, human resources management, development of tactics, organization of forces, and materiel procurement,” 38.

28 Forsvarsdepartementet, Parliamentary Bill no. 48, 74.
strategic assets. The document does not explain how NORSOF should develop, but mentions that the strategic management needs improvement. Even though Norwegian documents do not formulate an end state for the development of NORSOF, there seems to exist a tacit desire to support a further development that puts NORSOF among the leading SOF nations in NATO, i.e., “world class SOF.”  

2. Norway’s Strategic Concept

Unlike the United States, Norway does not have a single inter-departmental strategic policy document that spans all means of national power, such as the military, diplomacy, economics, etc. However, the array of strategic documents issued by the Ministry of Defense describes the holistic approach to a national security policy, and reflects the government’s priorities and areas of concentration. While political intentions and guidelines are provided in Parliamentary Bill no. 48, the Norwegian national security policy and Norway’s national interests are described in Evne til innsats: Strategisk konsept for Forsvaret [Capability for Effort: Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Defense]. The latter reflects the main priorities of the national security policy and the national military policy that are stated in the Parliamentary Bill no. 48.

The holistic approach to Norwegian security policy is comprised in five predominant objectives in Capability for Effort:

- To prevent war and the development of various threats against Norwegian and collective security;

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29 This assumption is supported by several statements on NORSOF from Norwegian decision-makers, such as the Minister of Defense and chief of Defense. See for example [http://www.bt.no/nyheter/innenriks/Viser-frem-elitesoldater-437643.html](http://www.bt.no/nyheter/innenriks/Viser-frem-elitesoldater-437643.html).


31 Ibid., 8.
To contribute to peace, stability, and the development of an international legal system that is directed by the UN;

To ensure Norwegian sovereignty, Norwegian rights, interests, and values, and to protect Norwegian freedom of action toward political, military, and other pressure;

Together with its allies defend Norway and NATO against strikes and attacks; and

To safeguard the society against strikes and attacks by governmental and non-governmental actors.

In general, Norway looks beyond the Cold War-era objectives for its defense. It is not enough merely to ensure sovereignty and prevent war and other threats; Norway must influence the global development and stability in a way that supports its national interest.

Recognizing that Norway needs the ability to take responsibility for its own security, the government intends to use military forces as a tool for providing the politicians with good grounds for decision-making and a greater space for freedom of action.\(^\text{32}\) Because the traditional difference between “national security” and “international security” has blurred, overseas operations may have direct or indirect impact on the security in Norway.\(^\text{33}\) It is clearly understood that Norway’s national security depends on the nation’s ability to contribute with relevant forces in multi-national operations.

Norway is a member of NATO, but stands outside the European Union (EU). This special situation makes the country very reliant on NATO. Within the United Nations framework, NATO is considered the “cornerstone of Norwegian

\(^{32}\) Forsvarsdepartementet, *Capability for Effort*, 50.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., 52.
security and defense policy.” Capability for Effort acknowledges that fulfilling NATO’s requirements to its member nations is an important means for the Norwegian Armed Forces to solve their full range of tasks. It is also particularly important for Norway to act as a responsible and compliant member of NATO and to combine its national interests with a solid and continuous contribution to NATO operations. Likewise, Norway seeks to maintain its good relationship with the EU through visible participation in military EU-led operations.

Finally, Capability for Effort recognizes that the overall joint capability has priority, not the individual services’ isolated capabilities. The importance of the services may be reduced in the future, since most military operations are conducted by two or more components in a joint framework. The strategic concept also mentions that crucial competence must be maintained and developed, while organizational structures that are adequately [adaptive to a dynamic environment] must be established.

3. Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine

Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine describes SOF as a “special forces component [that is] commanded and organized on lines similar to those with other Armed Forces components.” It also states, “special operations should be used to achieve aims of high or critical importance at a strategic or operational level.”

34 Forsvarsdepartementet, Capability for Effort, 32.
35 Ibid., 75.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 55
38 Forsvarsstaben [The Defense Staff], Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine 2007 [Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine], trans. The Defense Staff (Oslo: The Defense Staff, 2007), 125.
B. NORWAY AND NATO

NATO repeatedly is referred to as “the cornerstone of Norway’s security policy,” and there is broad popular support in Norway for the country’s membership in the alliance. Following NATO doctrine and development is the Norwegian standard rather than the exception. For instance, the Norwegian Joint Doctrine uses the same terminology and definitions regarding SOF missions and capabilities as NATO did in its allied joint doctrine for special operations. Until recently, there has been no guidance from NATO on national organizational issues regarding SOF. Because of the increased use of SOF in almost any NATO involvement, particularly after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, (9/11) the organization seems to put more emphasis on the development of special operations capabilities within its member nations, in order to pursue a strong SOF capability for NATO operations.

1. Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5)

As earlier described, the Riga Summit in 2006 precipitated several enhancements of the NATO SOF community, such as the creation of NSHQ. This organization provides a flag officer direct link between NATO SOF and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and coordinates and synchronizes NATO SOF force generation and operations. Additionally, it develops and publishes NATO SOF policies and doctrines in order to foster interoperability and standardization within NATO.

One of the first major products issued by NSHQ was the Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5). This unclassified document does not dictate to NATO member nations how to execute national command and control over its SOF, as it is primarily written for an allied joint force and subordinate

component commands. However, AJP-3.5 describes NATO SOF as strategic assets, and suggests certain criteria that should be used when evaluating SOF employment. It also states that “in all cases, commanders exercising command authority over SOF should: a) provide a clear and unambiguous chain of command, and b) provide sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and support the operations.”

2. The NATO SOF Study

A more suitable document for evaluating a national organization for SOF is the *NATO SOF Study*. As mentioned earlier, NSHQ interviewed SOF personnel from 12 different NATO nations, and analyzed the roles and tasks of a national SOF organization. The three different types of national SOF organizational models offered are based on the types of organizations that already exist in NATO countries. The study is clear on the point that it is up to each nation to decide its own organizational model in order to provide “appropriate and optimal stewardship of SOF.” Even though the study does not dictate NATO nations’ decisions, it emphasizes that “[i]t is important to note that SOF are strategic assets that are employed to achieve strategic effect.” Also, it concludes that even though the various nations may find themselves at different stages of development, there are certain common characteristics that “any national special operations organization must possess in order to create a world class SOF.”

40 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5)* (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2009), xiii.

41 Ibid., 1–5.

42 Ibid., 3–6.

43 NSCC, *NATO SOF Study*, ii.


• Direct access to senior defense leadership;
• Structure itself into a lean organizational architecture to facilitate agility;
• Capacity to influence the career development of SOF operators and SOF enabling personnel;
• Establishment of a SOF training and education system;
• Deployable joint special operations headquarters with dedicated enablers; and
• Ability to procure non-standard equipment and services rapidly.

3. **Norway’s Role in NATO**

Through a proactive membership in NATO, Norway has a viable chance to influence more on the global scale than through other organizations. In a speech to *Oslo Militære Samfund* [Oslo Military Society], Minister of Defense Grete Faremo noted that Norway plays a role in the European and global security policy. She said that Norway has pushed for a discussion within the strategic level in NATO on how to balance between out-of-area operations and traditional operations in defense of NATO countries’ territories. Faremo emphasized that Norway does not subscribe to an “either-or” situation, but still wants NATO to refocus and strengthen its core tasks, such as deterrence, cooperation within situational awareness and intelligence gathering, and allied training and exercises. Moreover, NATO should prioritize “deployable capacities that cover the entire spectrum of crisis, including high-intensity operations.”

Faremo proposes a tight relationship between Norwegian interests and the future NATO. A strengthening of NATO’s traditional core tasks will increase Norway’s security, since the structure of the Norwegian Armed Forces is too small to defend Norway’s territory alone. A strong NATO with ready and capable

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46 Faremo, ”Med evne til innsats” (speech).
forces is vital to Norway in territorial defense setting. Simultaneously, Norway can continue its “selective” out-of-area operations within NATO, deploying small contributions to support Norwegian foreign policy. Faremo clearly expresses that Norway must contribute with relevant capabilities, but she also wants the contributions *per se* to facilitate access to the decision-making processes in NATO, so that Norway can influence the global security policies.

The Norwegian political scientist Janne Haaland Matlary describes a viable potential for small states, including Norway, to influence decision-making processes within international organizations, like the United Nations, NATO, and the European Union. Matlary implies that member nations that contribute with relevant forces have some influence with regard to *in bello* decisions, and virtually no influence with regard to *ad bellum* decisions. Since the lead nation of a UN operation most often is one of the major powers, the possibility to gain substantial influence through UN operations is very limited. This leaves Norway with only one practical option in terms of gaining substantial influence through an organization. Relevant contributions to NATO operations can open up opportunities for gaining influence, which can affect Norway’s national strategy and policy. Inherently, a SOF capability governed by a well-functioning organization at the strategic level should precipitate an additional dimension of highly relevant means for Norwegian decision-makers.

C. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

There are no direct conventional military threats against Norway today. The combination of a stable region, Norway’s membership in NATO, and a well-functioning diplomacy are crucial ingredients in the nation’s security situation.

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47 *Ad bellum* decisions refer to the decisions that are made before a war, e.g., whether the operation/intervention is going to take place at all. *In bello* decisions refer to the decisions during a war/operation, i.e., how the operation is being carried out.

However, as part of the globalization, Norway’s security environment is to a large degree shaped outside the country’s borders. Defense and security establishments from all parts of the world describe the security environment as “increasingly complex and unpredictable.”\textsuperscript{49} Insurgencies, terrorism, piracy, and other irregular threats in remote, unstable regions are increasingly a concern for Norway and challenge the nation’s security.\textsuperscript{50} Terrorist growth or insurgency in one region may lead to second-order effects in other regions, e.g., increased support to extreme factions, international crime organizations, drug export, mass migration, and refugee problems. Likewise, an intolerable level of piracy in the Gulf of Aden can affect Norwegian shipping and jeopardize Norwegian lives, as Norway is one of the largest shipping nations in the world and transits a large number of its merchant ships through the gulf.

By deploying military forces to remote regions, Norway seeks to achieve multiple objectives. First, it wants to achieve peace and stability in that region. Also, as mentioned earlier, Norway wants to show the international community that it participates in an effort to prevent irregular threats from increasing and spreading to other regions, and ultimately Norway. Finally, it can participate in the decision-making processes that apply to the \textit{in bello} decisions, to adjust the international effort into courses of action that support Norwegian values and interests. To achieve these goals, Norway needs professional, experienced, and versatile military forces that are trained for all types of environments and challenges.

\textsuperscript{49} NSCC, \textit{NATO SOF Study}, 11.

\textsuperscript{50} The United States, the United Nations, NATO, and other organizations do not have a common term that describes the environments, threats, and conflicts that are antonyms of conventional wars, or state-to-state conflicts. Some of the terms used are \textit{asymmetric threats/warfare}, \textit{irregular threats/warfare}, \textit{unconventional threats/warfare}, \textit{low-intensity conflicts}, \textit{small wars}, \textit{new wars}, etc. Some nuances differ between these terms, and they may be used in a variety of ways to describe different aspects of the environment.
D. THE THREE TYPES OF NATIONAL SOF LEADERSHIP

The *NATO SOF Study* proposes three main types of national SOF leadership models. Even though each nation has its own unique leadership arrangements for its SOF, any model will normally fall under one of the categories below. In this research, the term “custodian” is used. The term means a dedicated superior proponent, i.e., either a command or a staff element that ensures management and oversight over SOF.
1. Model One: National Military Staff Element for Special Operations

Model One (Figure 2) is the most common model in countries where SOF has not been fully developed as a strategic asset, or in countries where the strategic level has a small military staff. The “National Military Staff Element for Special Operations” is a SOF office among other offices at the strategic level, usually located in the Chief of Defense Staff’s operations section or plans section. The staff element has no command authority over national SOF, but functions as the actions officer and senior SOF advisor to the Chief of Defense and/or the Minister of Defense.51

Figure 2. National Military Staff Element

51 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 22.
Figure 3 shows the main responsibilities of a national military staff element for special operations as outlined in the NATO SOF Study.\textsuperscript{52}

**National Military Staff Element for Special Operations**

- Serving as the senior SOF advisor to the Minister of Defense and chief of Defense to educate and inform on the capabilities, limitations, optimal employment, and requirements of national SOF
- Developing a joint SOF vision to serve as a guide for unifying the service SOF units
- Developing national SOF policy, doctrine, training, exercises, operational procedures, and acquisition
- Integrating the SOF perspective and capabilities into defense guidance, strategic plans, joint operational plans, joint publications and doctrine
- Serving as the primary coordinating authority among the service SOF units and with conventional forces
- Working cooperatively with the military services to ensure that SOF units maintain and develop their capabilities
- Monitoring and reporting on SOF operations, activities, joint training, and exercises

\textsuperscript{52} NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 24.
2. Model Two: Joint Special Operations Command

Model Two (Figure 4) is in the NATO SOF Study referred to as a “Special Operations Component Command.”\textsuperscript{53} Notwithstanding, the document also uses the more precise term “Joint Special Operations Command,” as the conventional forces do not necessarily have to be organized in component commands.

![Special Operations Component Command Diagram]

Figure 4. Special Operations Component Command

The joint special operations command is sometimes established in addition to the national military staff element for special operations. In other cases, it is the only staff element at the strategic and operational level. The joint special operations commander, normally a flag officer, is the senior SOF advisor to the Minister of Defense, Chief of Defense, and the Armed Forces Operational Headquarters commander, and is responsible for planning, coordination,

\textsuperscript{53} NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 25.
deployment, and employment of joint special operations. Within its organization, it should also have the capability to deploy a joint special operations task force headquarters, preferably with the potential of forming the cadre of a Combined Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command (CJFSOCC) for NATO or other coalition operations.

Despite having command authority over the tactical SOF units, the joint special operations commander is normally not responsible for certain force production activities (force development and force management), as these still belong to the services. Personnel from the Army SOF, Naval SOF, and Air Force SOF are still part of their respective services, and will be educated, paid, promoted, etc, through these individual services’ systems, unless the joint special operations command has been given specific tasks within some of these areas.
The *NATO SOF Study* lists the following main responsibilities of a joint special operations (component) command:\(^{54}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Joint Special Operations Command</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Serve as the senior SOF advisor to the conventional joint operations commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Developing joint SOF vision, policy, long-term strategy, and doctrine to integrate and harmonize service SOF units and enabling capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Planning, coordinating, and conducting joint special operations independently or in combination with a joint conventional force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identifying operational requirements and the necessary resources (equipment, assets, enablers, logistics support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establishing a standing deployable joint task force headquarters for the command and control of national joint special operations or combined joint force special operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Managing programming and acquisition of SOF-specific equipment, and rapidly procuring mission-specific equipment, supplies, and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Resourcing, planning, coordinating, and conducting joint and combined SOF training and exercises to standardize SOF tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establishing evaluation criteria to certify the ability of the service SOF units to meet the necessary standards for executing designated SOF missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Designing tailored educational opportunities for SOF personnel and those personnel that support or enable SOF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{54}\) NSCC, *NATO SOF Study*, 26–27.
3. **Model Three: Special Operations Service**

Model Three (Figure 6) gives equal status to the SOF commander as to the other service commanders.55

The commander of a “Special Operations Service” is a separate management staff, and holds all force production responsibilities, such as recruiting, educating, training, and paying, in addition to the responsibilities of the joint special operations command in Model Two. The focus of a special operations service often shifts from joint operational matters to force production matters, because of the inherent responsibilities that normally consume service staff capacities. Even though this model should provide a national SOF with the highest degree of flexibility and autonomy, an understaffed or inexperienced headquarters could be hampered by the wrong priorities and cumbersome

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55 NSCC, *NATO SOF Study*, 27.
executive work because of all the force production responsibilities. Notwithstanding, a well-organized and experienced special operations service is the only type of organization where SOF can develop itself and its personnel independently, and make its own priorities within all aspects of operations, force production, and logistics. This model is often perceived as an end state among SOF personnel in most nations, as there seems to be a common discontentment within SOF communities about the conventional services’ lack of understanding for special operations needs.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{56} Author's observations from conversations with SOF personnel from various countries.
The NATO SOF Study lists the following main responsibilities of a special operations service:\(^5^7\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Operations Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Developing the SOF vision and long-term strategy that is aligned with national defense guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Developing SOF-specific policy derived from broader defense policy guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Serve as the senior SOF advisor to the conventional joint operations commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Developing joint SOF vision, policy, long-term strategy, and doctrine to integrate and harmonize service SOF units and enabling capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Planning, coordinating, and conducting joint special operations independently or in combination with a joint conventional force commander</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Designing tailored educational opportunities for SOF personnel and those personnel that support or enable SOF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^5^7\) NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 28–29
III. CASE 1: CANADIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

The next two chapters of the thesis consist of the two case studies of the Canadian Special Operations Forces (CANSOF) and the Polish Special Operations Forces (POLSOF). In both countries, a joint special operations command has recently been created at the strategic/operational level: CANSOFCOM was created in 2006, and POLSOCOM was created in 2007. The purpose of the case studies has been to identify effects that have impact on the strategic leverage of SOF, and examine if there is a potential for a better strategic utilization of SOF in Norway by following some of the experiences made by CANSOF and POLSOF. In both case studies, the NATO SOF Study’s description of abilities of a “world class special operations force” has been used to measure the respective national special operations organizations’ strategic leverage. The two cases have a somewhat different approach. Hence, the methodology used in both cases will be described separately.

The case study of CANSOF discloses that the transformation of the Canadian Forces in 2005–2006 increased CANSOF’s leverage at the strategic level. CANSOF went from being an ad hoc organization with only one tactical unit and a limited staff at the strategic level, to becoming a “world class special operations force.” With only one exception, all indicators showed a better utilization of CANSOF as a strategic asset.

58 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Center [NSCC], North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study [NATO SOF Study] (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2008), ii–iii. The NATO SOF Study also lists, as a requirement, the ability to provide tactical SOF enablers in its Annex A. These are: Air, Maritime, and Ground Mobility, Countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons, Liaison, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), All-Source Intelligence, Medical, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Logistics, Psychological and Information Operations, and Air Force Ground Personnel. A thorough study of CANSOFCOM’s and POLSOCOM’s status within these enablers has not been conducted, because of the inherent classification issues, as well as the problem of defining the levels of “adequate amount” in each case.
A. METHODOLOGY

The case study is primarily based on Canadian literature on SOF and interviews with key personnel. Three relevant books on CANSOF and special operations, which were written in the period between 2004 and 2006, were examined. The history of CANSOF from its participation in World War II was analyzed in order to identify key events that might have had an impact in the development of CANSOF and the present conditions. Additionally, key personnel within the CANSOF community were interviewed in September 2009, during a visit to CANSOFCOM’s Headquarters in Ottawa, Canada. Interviews were conducted with the following personnel:

1. (Name undisclosed), senior CANSOFCOM officer, with service from JTF2
2. (Name undisclosed), senior CANSOFCOM officer, with service from JTF2
3. (Name undisclosed), senior CANSOFCOM warrant officer, with service from JTF2
4. (Name undisclosed), a former commanding officer JTF2, and former member of one of the “Tiger Teams” which did the conceptual work that led to the creation of CANSOFCOM, on behalf of the Chief of the Defense staff
5. Colonel (Ret.) Clyde Russell, former director of Counter Terrorism Special Operations (CTSO) (telephone interview)
6. Colonel Bernd Horn, former Deputy Commander CANSOFCOM, and co-editor/-author of the three books that are the main background literature for this case study

A questionnaire and the NATO SOF Study were sent to all the interviewees (except from interviewee number 4) the week before the interviews took place. However, not all of the interviewees had had the time to review the
documents by the actual interview. All of the interviewees were asked the same questions regarding the strategic utilization of CANSOFCOM, which were based on in the NATO SOF Study. As many of the answers from the different interviewees were identical, and in some cases “too direct,” the source of each sentence has not been identified. Hence, the six interviewees have been cited equally.

Since there have not been interviews with personnel outside the CANSOFCOM community, and because all of the interviewees have a stake in the organization and its history, there is a chance that the sample is biased. However, all the interviewees appeared forthright and unconstrained by political pressure during the interviews, and often appeared critical to various aspects of the organization. Most of them have experience from CANSOF before and after the transformation, and would have a personal stake in both periods. In some answers, there was a big gap between some of the interviewees. This was most often caused by different perceptions from the different levels, for instance: how much should one absent condition in a list of more than one conditions count? These situations sometimes created outliers, and will be commented accordingly, as a summary of the comments from the interviewees is included. Neither of the questions is weighted more or less than others, but a comment is provided in those cases where outliers are identified. The distribution of the answers to each question is depicted in Appendix B—Statistics from CANSOFCOM.

The interviewees were given questions they could answer with their level of agreement/disagreement on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Each question was asked twice: once for the period before the creation of CANSOFCOM and once for the current condition (as of September 2009).

B. HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

The various special activities that were carried out during World War II are generally considered as the starting point of the Canadian Special Operations Forces. Canadians participated in both clandestine operations and guerrilla
warfare, led by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), and uniformed raiding operations under the command of Combined Operations Headquarters. The most famous special operations unit, with a significant participation of Canadians, was the First Special Service Force (FSSF)—once known as the “Devil’s Brigade.” FSSF was a combined U.S./Canadian unit with approximately 1,700 effectives, and it is assessed that one-third of these were Canadians. The FSSF was initially designed, organized, and trained to conduct sabotage missions on large industrial targets deep in enemy territory. During the winter 1942–43, FSSF’s expected mission, “Project Plough,” an assault on the hydroelectric power plant at Vemork, Norway, was cancelled. Subsequently, the existence of the unit was questioned, but General Marshall, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, wanted to keep it as a “special infantry ‘shock’ formation.” In 1943, FSSF was transferred to Norfolk, Virginia, for amphibious training, and it carried out several successful missions in the European/Mediterranean Theater, as well as the Pacific Theater, between August 1943 and November 1944.

In the decades after World War II, Canada did not develop its own SOF capability. Some “special” units were created in the late 1940s: the Canadian Special Air Service was tasked to “keep the techniques employed by [British Special Air Service] persons during the war alive in the peacetime army,” and the Mobile Striking Force, which was a conventional airborne brigade. The former only was operational for one to two years, and the latter was part of the defense

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60 Ibid., 188.


62 Ibid., 11.

63 Ibid., 13.

against large-scale Soviet operations in the Arctic.\footnote{Horn and Wyczynski, \textit{Canadian Airborne Forces Since 1942}, 20–21.} Apparently, the Cold War did not clearly necessitate the use of SOF in Canada or precipitate a Canadian need for such forces with expeditionary capabilities.

In 1976, Canadian Forces formed the Special Service Force (SSF). The unit conducted training exchanges with foreign SOF units like Special Air Service, Special Boat Service, U.S. Special Forces, and U.S. Navy Sea Air Land (SEAL) teams. However, its tasks were not special operations tasks, as the unit was designed for use on NATO’s flank as part of Allied Command Europe (ACE), the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade, and the United Nations Standby Battalion commitment. Hence, the unit was later characterized as a light infantry brigade.\footnote{Maloney, "Who has served the Wind?" 193.} Another unit that has been associated with special operations is the Canadian Airborne Regiment, which was created in 1968. Even though it was “labeled as the nation’s strategic reserve,” the regiment was a light infantry force intended for conventional operations.\footnote{Bernd Horn in Tony Balasevicius, "Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole," in \textit{Casting Lights on the Shadows: Canadian Perspectives on Special Operations Forces}, ed. Bernd Horn and Tony Balasevicius (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2007), 249.} It was disbanded in 1995, as a direct result of the Somalia affair, where a Somali teenager had been tortured and killed by members from the Canadian Airborne Regiment.\footnote{Donna Winslow, \textit{The Parliamentary Inquiry into the Canadian Peace Mission in Somalia}, \texttt{http://www.dcaf.ch/pcaf/ev_brussels_020712_winslow.pdf}.}

In 1993, when the Canadian Forces took over the domestic counterterrorist responsibility from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the first SOF unit, Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2), was created.\footnote{The National Defense, “About JTF 2” in \textit{National Defense and the Canadian Forces}, \texttt{http://www.jtf2-foi2.forces.gc.ca/ajt-sfo/index-eng.asp}.} It is worth noting that a significant number of the personnel who formed JTF2 in 1992–93 were

\begin{itemize}
\item Horn and Wyczynski, \textit{Canadian Airborne Forces Since 1942}, 20–21.
\item Maloney, "Who has served the Wind?" 193.
\end{itemize}
soldiers with service in the Canadian Airborne Regiment. Because of the Somalia affair, this connection turned out to be a burden for the new counterterrorist unit. As with most other new SOF units around the world, JTF2 faced many challenges within its own national system. Senior military and civilian leaders from the conventional environments and the political defense community distrusted JTF2 because of its members’ “unconventional” posture: grooming issues, lack of military behavior, “exaggerated secrecy,” apparent arrogance (“I can’t talk to you, because I’m special”), and alleged links to the Canadian Airborne Regiment during the Somalia affair.

Despite these critiques, JTF2 developed as a counterterrorist unit and evolved to meet the contemporary requirements and threats the following years. It conducted special operations within other mission types than counterterrorism, and the unit and its individual soldiers always delivered when a task was given to them.

Little was known about JTF2’s existence outside the Canadian Forces. In general, Canadians did not think of special operations as a Canadian way of conducting military operations. Many Canadians thought of Canadian Forces as a United Nations peacekeeping force, or an “emergency force” that was designed for relief operations and for aiding disaster victims in the Third World. However, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the press and the public strongly criticized the Canadian government for not supporting its brother nation enough. As a response to these aggressive attacks, the Canadian Defense Minister revealed the existence of the secret unit JTF2, and informed that it had already deployed to Afghanistan and participated in Operation Enduring Freedom. The immediate effect of this revelation was overwhelming. Canadians not only were

70 Bernd Horn (author and former Deputy Commander CANSOFCOM), in interview with author, Kingston, Canada, September 1, 2009.
71 Ibid.
72 Maloney, “Who has served the Wind?” 181.
satisfied, but also proud, that their military forces were able to help the United States with competent special operations forces.\textsuperscript{73} Suddenly, special operations were perceived to “fit perfectly with the Canadian way of war.”\textsuperscript{74} In the momentum of general support from the public, the press, and other decision-makers, the Canadian Defense Minister put pressure on the military leadership to double the size of JTF2.\textsuperscript{75} Despite resistance against the doubling, it was hard to stall the enlargement of the unit.\textsuperscript{76} The impetus from the newly appointed Chief of the Defense Staff in 2004, General Rick Hillier, to transform the Canadian Forces, made the expansion almost irreversible.\textsuperscript{77}

Before the transformation, JTF2’s link to the strategic and operational levels was the Counter Terrorism Special Operations (CTSO) cell, which consisted of four men in 2003, and increased its number to 22 by February 2006, when CANSOFCOM stood up. The Director of CTSO was a Colonel, and he reported to “Number Three” in the CF chain of command at that time, the Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff. In accordance with the \textit{NATO SOF Study}, CTSO would fall under the definition of a National Military Staff Element for Special Operations, and had limited capacity to follow up JTF2 in all strategic and operational matters.\textsuperscript{78} The forthcoming transformation would also include the creation of CANSOFCOM, and a completely different organizational focus on SOF.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 14.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} The resistance was directly related to the strong belief held by CTSO and others that quality is more important than quantity. There also existed opinions among personnel outside the CANSOF community that SOF should not expand.
\textsuperscript{78} See the \textit{NATO SOF Study}, 22-24, for the description of National Military Staff Element for Special Operations.
\end{flushleft}
C. TRANSFORMATION OF THE CANADIAN FORCES

In 2005, the Canadian Forces (CF) carried out an organizational transformation that primarily focused on the operational level. While the three traditional “environments” (services, i.e., Army, Navy, and Air Force) still maintained their responsibility for force generation and force development, three (conventional) operational commands were created:

- Canada Command (Canada COM), which is “responsible for Canadian Forces routine and contingency operations in Canada and North America”

- Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM), which is “responsible for the planning and conduct of all Canadian Forces operations outside North America”

- Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM), which “provides operational support for CF activities and missions at home and abroad including functions such as logistics, military engineering, health services and military police”

Ultimately, as an important part of the transformation, CANSOFCOM was created. Today, the command is at the same level as the other operational commands: Canada COM, CEFCOM, and CANOSCOM. However, CANSOFCOM distinguishes itself from the other commands because it is responsible only for force employment; it also performs force generation and force development of its own forces, with a few exceptions (e.g., some responsibilities over the 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron are retained by the Air Force). Hence, CANSOFCOM is regarded as “the fourth environment” of the Canadian Forces. Currently, the Commander of CANSOFCOM is a Brigadier General (O-7), but reports directly to the Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS), like the three-star commanders (O-9) of the other commands. The

interviews revealed that CANSOFCOM is moving toward a status as a special operations service, and can then be seen as Canada’s “fourth environment,” in addition to the fourth command (Figure 8).\textsuperscript{80} There are still some responsibilities left in the other services, but it seems likely that CANSOFCOM has the leverage and capacity to take over more of these in the future, as the organization matures and the other services have less stake in the force production of SOF.

It seems clear from all literature and interviews that three special incidents made the creation of CANSOFCOM possible: the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States; the subsequent deployment of CANSOF to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001; and General Hillier’s power to transform CF’s organization. Particularly, two persons within the CANSOF community, Colonel (ret.) Clyde Russell and Brigadier General D. Michael Day, were repeatedly mentioned as critical for CANSOF’s ability to influence the CF transformation process adequately, in order to obtain an outcome that would turn CANSOF into a “world class special operations force.”

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\textsuperscript{80} Organizational chart is from a CANSOFCOM command brief presented to the author in Ottawa, Canada on September 3, 2009.
With the 2006 transformation of CANSOF, new tactical capabilities were added to the special operations environment: Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR), 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron (SOAS), and Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit (CJIRU).

CSOR was created in 2006 as an enabler for JTF2 “to address a capability gap that existed prior to its creation.” It is located at Petawawa, Ontario, and is the primary CANSOF unit for Defense, Diplomacy, and Military Assistance (DDMA). Its mission is “[t]o provide a high readiness, agile and robust force capable of supporting and conducting a broad range of operation missions both at home and abroad.”

The special operations helicopter squadron 427 SOAS is based at Petawawa, Ontario. Its mission is “[t]o provide CANSOFCOM agile, high-readiness special operations aviation forces capable of conducting special operations across the spectrum of conflict at home and abroad.”

CJIRU is CANSOFCOM’s immediate Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) response capability. The unit has three key mandates: to respond to CBRN events in conjunction with other elements of the National CBRN Response Team, to provide an agile integral part of the CANSOFCOM Immediate Reaction Task Force (IRTF), and to produce a planning, and advisory capability to CF expeditionary operations. Its mission is “[t]o provide timely and agile broad based CBRN support to the Government of Canada in order to prevent, control and mitigate CBRN threats to Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests.”

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82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.
D. INTERVIEWS WITH CANSOFCOM KEY PERSONNEL

In the following section, the answers from the interviewees are compiled, question-by-question, together with comments by the author. The first six questions (1A—1F) indicate the level of CANSOF’s strategic impact before and after the creation of CANOFCOM, by examining indicators on the strategic custodian’s ability to carry out various tasks. Each question is answered by each interviewee twice:

- “Was there a joint strategic custodian before the establishment of CANSOFCOM, with the ability to … (capability)” and
- “Is there a joint strategic custodian after the establishment of CANSOFCOM, with the ability to … (capability).”

The next three questions (2A—2C) indicate the level of CANSOF’s ability to conduct combined and joint special operations, in accordance with the NATO SOF Study’s requirements to a “world class SOF.” Each question is asked twice:

- “Did CANSOF have the ability to … (activity)” and
- “Does CANSOF have the ability to … (activity).”

The findings from both periods appear chronologically under the same heading.

Figure 9 depicts that all indicators, except for one (1D), have improved after the creation of CANSOFCOM. Moreover, the three factors that are assessed as the most important for optimized strategic utilization of CANSOF (1A, 1B, and 2A), show a significant improvement in the CANSOFCOM model, compared to the old organization.

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84 In this research, the term “custodian” means a dedicated superior proponent, i.e., either a command or a staff element that ensures management and oversight over SOF.
Figure 9. CANSOF’s strategic leverage by indicators

1. Questions and Responses—Strategic Stewardship

   a. Question 1A

   Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment of CANSOFCOM, with the ability to provide centralized stewardship, authority, and direction to joint special operations and national SOF?

   Before the transformation in 2006, the CTSO was the element that provided centralized stewardship, authority, and direction to special operations and national SOF with 22 men in the cell. However, there was only one SOF tactical unit (JTF2) at that time, and the main task of that unit was domestic counterterrorism. CTSO was able to carry out its responsibilities mainly because the amount of tasks was manageable, and because all members of the CTSO were experienced personnel. The CTSO did not have a command relationship to JTF2, but a coordinating relationship at the strategic/operational level. With only one tactical SOF unit, this seems to have been a well functioning model, since there were no
prioritization issues between numerous tactical units, and because JTF2 and CTSO were “single point of contacts” for each other at both levels. Two outliers focused on CTSO’s lacking command relationship, and gave this question a low score.

Average score: 3.8

The interviewees indicated that there has been a significant increase in CANSOFCOM’s ability to provide centralized stewardship, authority, and direction to joint special operations and national SOF, compared with the CTSO cell. One part of the explanation is the bolstered manpower in the command. Another explanation is the organizational design from the transformation of CF that allows CANSOFCOM to be a force employer (FE), force generator (FG) and force developer (FD) at the same time, and that the Commander of CANSOFCOM is now at the same level as the commanders of the other operational commands and the environments (services). Some of the interviewees pointed out that the command still suffers from growing pains, and that it consists of very many people who are not familiar and experienced enough in the SOF realm. “It takes ten years to build up ten years of experience,” one interviewee noted.

Average score: 6.3

b. Question 1B

Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment of CANSOFCOM, with the ability to access senior defense leaders directly and advising them on SOF?

The Director of the CTSO reported directly to the Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff (DCDS), who was the number three power in the Canadian Forces’ chain of command. Despite a well-functioning relationship with the DCDS, the interviewees pointed out that the office had a limited exposure and ability to reach out outside of the Department of the National Defense (DND).

Average score: 5.0
While the Director of CTSO reported to number three in the chain of command, the DCDS, Commander CANSOFCOM now reports directly to the number one in the chain of command, the Chief of the Defense Staff, and has routine face time with the Minister of National Defense (MND). This difference has been crucial in the ability to utilize CANSOFCOM at the strategic level, because direct access to the Chief of the Defense Staff increased the confidence in CANSOF dramatically. One interviewee said that the government is more than happy to deploy SOF now, because of the confidence that is a result of the human factor between the actors at the strategic level.

Average score: 6.8

c. Question 1C

Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment of CANSOFCOM, with the ability to control a separate budget for joint special operations and SOF-specific items?

Before the transformation, the budget was held at the tactical unit, JTF2. Hence, CTSO did not control a separate budget, and CTSO’s impact on the use of JTF2’s budget was very limited. Since there was not a particular need for a budget for joint special operations with only one SOF unit, this arrangement appears to have functioned well. The various interviewees perceived this question differently. Some scored it relatively high, because it worked well, while others gave it a low score, because the CTSO did not control the budget itself.

Average score: 3.9

Today, CANSOFCOM has its own budget, and controls it completely. Only two of the interviewees gave a slightly lower score than 7 (strongly agree) regarding CANSOFCOM’s ability to control a separate budget. The main reason was the rigid procurement processes in a larger organization.

Average score: 6.6
d. **Question 1D**

**Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment of CANSOFCOM, with the ability to expedite the rapid acquisition of SOF-peculiar items?**

Because the organization was smaller before the transformation, and because procurements were carried out at the tactical level, where the expertise was, acquisition of SOF-peculiar items was expedited rapidly. CTSO did not control the process; it enabled it.

Average score: 6.3

Some of the interviewees highlighted the “paradoxical situation,” as an expanded staff and a separate budget did not make the rapid acquisition of SOF-peculiar items faster or better. There are now more units to serve within the SOF community, and CANSOFCOM will, in most cases, examine the needs and requirements from all its sub-units before it effectuates any procurement. This “constrained freedom of action” has slowed down the process remarkably for JTF2; however, the other units within CANSOFCOM have easier access to better equipment now, and seem to benefit from the slow, but thorough, procurement processes. The staff for procurement issues has become bigger, and there is a better potential now. One of the interviewees also pointed out that the appetite for equipment has also increased, as the expectations and desires at the tactical level increase in line with the growing CANSOF organization. Procurements that are carried out today were not always attainable earlier, as there now is a better capacity to handle bigger projects. Nevertheless, the issue of slower procurement processes seems to be the most central friction point between JTF2 and CANSOFCOM during the creation of the latter. In sum, it appears that the overall capacity to carry out the total process of procurements for all types of SOF-specific items has been better, but that the “impatient” tactical level
suffers from a lower speed than earlier. The outlier that gave this question a low score emphasized that the acquisition process is far from as rapid and effective as it should be.

Average score: 5.2

e. **Question 1E**

*Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment of CANSOFCOM, with the ability to conduct and facilitate joint SOF training, exercises, and education?*

The CTSO cell did conduct and facilitate joint SOF training, exercises, and education. All these tasks were carried out before the transformation, but from the tactical level. Because the coordination and facilitation that actually existed was adequate, some interviewees gave this question a high score. Others, however, focused on CTSO’s lack of capacity to “own” these processes, and gave the question a low score.

Average score: 3.8

Currently, CANSOFCOM has a small J7 section that has a limited capacity to conduct and facilitate joint SOF training, exercises, and education. Training and exercises are normally planned, coordinated, and executed at the tactical level. However, there seems to be a conscious choice behind this decentralized model. CANSOFCOM avoids a strong focus on harmonizing the training calendars between the tactical units, because it does not want to take away a tactical commander’s freedom of maneuver to be able to surge and flex his training program to accommodate his needs. In case of joint training and exercises, the designated task force commander will plan, coordinate, and facilitate the collective training, but it is eventually certified by the CANSOFCOM J7 staff. One example is the training and preparations related to CANSOFCOM’s security role in the Olympic Games in Vancouver 2010: the task force commander planned, coordinated and executed the training at the tactical and
“low operational” level, which would include maritime and air assets, Regional Joint Task Force (RJTF) commanders, Royal Military Canadian Police (RCMP) commanders, and tactical units. CANSOFCOM would coordinate at the strategic and “high operational” level, which would include CEFCOM, Canada COM, Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS), Strategic Joint Staff (SJS), Chief of Defense Intelligence (CDI), and other departments. There are some limitations in CANSOFCOM’s ability to reach out to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, in order to exercise special operations with support from conventional forces. As the Commander of CANSOFCOM is outranked by the other operational and service commanders, and because he is at the outside of conventional hierarchy, he has little leverage to overrule the conventional CF’s priorities. Therefore, he lacks the ability to exercise joint special operations with external assets.

In terms of professional military education, CANSOFCOM personnel identified the lack of a centralized training establishment as a shortfall. Even though the organization and its units run SOF-related courses, there is no Canadian “SOF school” yet. CANSOFCOM has authority for developing its own SOF training establishment; however, authority has not yet been granted to fill the positions in this establishment (one of the interviewees compared this unsatisfying situation with “you can drive wherever you want, but you can’t have a car”). The interviewees emphasized different aspects of this question. Some thought that the lack of a J7 or a training unit hampers CANSOFCOM’s ability to conduct and facilitate joint training, exercises, and education, while others were generally more satisfied with the force development of the CANSOF units.

Average score: 4.7
f. Question 1F

Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment of CANSOFCOM, with the ability to influence or manage the career development of SOF personnel?

The CTSO did not have the capacity to prioritize career development of SOF personnel. With a very small staff, CTSO would have to focus on economics, manning, and missions, instead of a "systematic cultivation of the human resource."

Average score: 3.3

After the creation of CANSOFCOM, the ability to influence and manage the career development has increased dramatically. With a much bigger staff than what CTSO had, CANSOFCOM has been able to work out arrangements that support the notion of cultivating the human resource within the SOF realm. CANSOFCOM is in the process of establishing SOF “occupations,” and arrangements that prevent the other environments (services) from pulling SOF people back to the conventional units. One of the interviewees said that this is concretized through a “three tier” system. Tier 1 reflects “pure SOF personnel” who have been identified as future commanders and key personnel; tier 2 reflects key personnel who will “come and go” between CANSOF and the conventional CF; tier 3 reflects personnel who temporarily serves in CANSOF, and will return to the conventional CF after his/her assignment in a SOF job. CANSOFCOM has very little influence over the air personnel within its organization (427 SOAS and air personnel in the CANSOFCOM staff), because personnel issues, including career development, are retained by the Canadian Air Force. In sum, CANSOFCOM can fully control “badged” personnel, but still

85 CF MIL PERS INSTR 02/08 defines “Occupation” (or “Military Occupation”) as: “The fundamental grouping of personnel used for the Personnel Life Cycle of Activities. Each Military Occupation comprises a grouping of related jobs having similar duties and tasks and requiring similar competencies. Occupations include one or more entry-level jobs, followed by jobs at several subsequent developmental levels. An Occupation may or may not be sub-divided into Sub-occupations.” [http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/pd/pi-ip/doc/02-08-eng.pdf](http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/pd/pi-ip/doc/02-08-eng.pdf).
has some way to go in order to be able to fully influence and manage the career development of SOF all its personnel. The command is organized to continue to improve these issues.

Average score: 5.9

2. **Questions and Responses—Combined and Joint Capabilities**

   a. **Question 2A**

      Did/does CANSOF have the ability to deploy and employ expeditory SOF tactical units capable of performing special operations in harsh, uncertain, hostile, denied, and politically sensitive environments in concert with other SOF from NATO members and partner nations?

      Even though JTF2 was intended for domestic CT operations, it had some limited capabilities to deploy an expeditary SOF unit to harsh, uncertain, hostile, denied, and politically sensitive environments. The reason why a CT unit had these skills was mainly that the majority of JTF2 initially came from the Canadian Airborne Regiment, and had valuable experience from “green” (field) training and operations. When JTF2 was created, its personnel selection process reflected the unit’s focus on its CT mission, and resembled a U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) type selection. Following JTF2’s first deployment to Afghanistan after 9/11, the decision was made to make the unit look more like the British Special Air Service (SAS) than the FBI. Hence, the selection course went through a transformation, and started focusing more on “green” disciplines, similar to the SAS selection. Deployments would be ad hoc before the creation of CANSOFCOM, but because there was only one unit, this was not very problematic to coordinate. CTSO was able to deploy several SOF lines of operations overseas, and had the ability to command JTF2 operations on behalf of DCDS, as strategic communications allowed a direct line from the TF commander to CTSO. In cases where a larger warfighting TF deployed, such as the one in Afghanistan in 2001, CTSO would have to change (over) operational control (CHOP) to the theater commander.
One interviewee gave this question a low score, because he focused on what he perceived as CTSO’s lack of ability to employ SOF tactical units compared to CANSOFCOM’s ability today, and thought that this was very important to address. The other interviewees disregarded this detail.

Average score: 4.8

Today, CANSOFCOM can deploy and employ expeditionary SOF task forces in all types of environments, all over the world. There are now more people involved in deployment and employment processes; however, the capacity has somewhat diminished, because the amount of tasks has increased. Even though CANSOFCOM has become a much better force employer, the strategic needs and desires to utilize its services has overwhelmed its capacity.

In contrast to the period before CANSOFCOM was created, the strategic level is now capable of employing any type of CANSOF elements abroad. Also, it commands and controls discreet missions, or other missions in the national interest of Canada while CANSOF elements are OPCON to a theater commander; Commander CANSOFCOM will be the one “agreeing to pull the strategic trigger,” after the task force commander has vetted the mission and given his “tactical thumbs-up.”

Average score: 6.5

b. Question 2B

Did/does CANSOF have the ability to establish a deployable joint special operations command element capable of commanding and controlling these SOF tactical units independently or as part of a larger national or multinational force?

CTSO had a limited ability to establish an ad hoc joint special operations command element; i.e., it facilitated a deployment of JTF2, and provided resources to augment the deployed element. An example of this was the initial deployment of JTF2 to Afghanistan in 2001. CTSO never had the
capability to deploy itself. Most of the interviewees gave this question a high score, because CANSOF had repeatedly deployed a joint SOF command element with its tactical operators. However, the single outlier noted that this should be CTSO’s task, not the task of the JTF2 staff.

Average score: 4.4

The interviewees’ scores varied because of their different perceptions of the question. Most interviewees recognized that CANSOFCOM is now capable of establishing multiple deployable joint special operations command elements, as it has formalized a concept of task organizing its forces. However, one interviewee noted that the job of preparing and maintaining a deployable joint SOF command element is CANSOFCOM’s, not the tactical units within CANSOFCOM. Some task forces are pre-designed, and the responsibility for the different types of mission has been given to a commander of one of the tactical units. The organizational design will be based on the type and complexity of the operation. The task force personnel are never from only one single unit, as it will get the required personnel from CANSOFCOM’s total organization.

CANSOFCOM is not capable of deploying or hosting a Combined Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command (CJFSOCC) or a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) in a multinational special operation. This is, however, not a goal for CANSOFCOM, as its priority is to dimension itself for domestic operations. Notwithstanding, the Canadian concept of task organizing its deployed forces includes a staff element that has J-1 through J-8 capabilities, like the one CANSOFCOM currently has in Afghanistan. As noted by one of the interviewees, the command runs operations out of its headquarters in Ottawa, but it does not deploy out of Ottawa. CANSOFCOM’s tactical units are capable of sustaining task forces permanently in-theater, and run multiple lines of operations simultaneously. The task forces are capable of plugging into whichever organization they become a part of, but they are primarily dimensioned to deploy tactical units. The lack of a deployable
command and control element from the strategic/operational (CANSOFCOM) level infers certain shortfalls: communications equipment intended for tactical use may be utilized for operational/strategic communications. One interviewee noted:

> You can’t say that the headquarters has the capability of doing something, and then download the functional responsibility onto the unit . . . You structure units; they’re funded, equipped, mandated, trained, prepared to do certain things. If you start hiving-off something as significant as a C2 node from the unit, you’re depriving it from its ability to do something else.

Another shortfall is the lack of experienced personnel. CANSOFCOM is still nascent, in terms of special operations expertise and streamlined deployments with highly competent and experienced personnel at the operational level for special operations.

Average score: 5.3

c. **Question 2C**

> Did/does CANSOF have the ability to establish SOF combat support and combat support forces and capabilities dedicated to enabling joint special operations and national SOF?

CTSO used to do a lot of shaping work, in terms of providing combat support forces to JTF2, but there were no combat support units dedicated for SOF mission before the establishment of CANSOFCOM.

Average score: 4.3
CANSOFCOM has made some progress after the creation of the command. The implementation of 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron (SOAS) and the creation of Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR) and the Combined Joint Incident Response Unit (CJIRU) have leveraged CANSOFCOM’s flexibility and capacity to conduct special operations at a broader scale than before.\

Average score: 5.3

D. ANALYSIS

Two key factors facilitate an optimal strategic utilization of CANSOFCOM: 1) the organizational design of the new CF structure that allows the Commander of CANSOFCOM to own all SOF processes; force generation, force deployment, and force employment; and 2) the commander’s ability to have direct access to the Chief of Defense and the Minister of National Defense is paramount.

Reporting to number one in the chain of command, Chief of the Defense Staff, has dramatically improved CANSOFCOM’s ability to build the required trust in the senior strategic leadership for a more appropriate and optimized utilization of CANSOF. However, a critical limitation in the model appeared to be the rank of the Commander of CANSOFCOM compared with the other operational commanders (O-9). However, this has been improved somewhat. At the time of the interviews, the rank of Commander CANSOFCOM was colonel (O-6), but he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general as of January 1, 2010. Since CANSOFCOM does not still have experienced badged officers with a higher rank, this limitation cannot be solved immediately. Even though it seems obvious that the Commander of CANSOFCOM must have a higher rank in order to function appropriately at the flag level, the solutions are few: an inexperienced

86 Some of the interviewees included an assessment of combat service support (CSS, i.e., logistics, etc) while they assessed the Combat Support (CS, i.e., operational and fire support). As there are clearly more CS assets available and trained today than before the transformation (427 SOAS, CJIRU and CSOR), and as CANSOFCOM has not established its own SOF CSS Unit, this may have resulted in a lower score than expected in the after condition.
(conventional) commander, or promotion of an experienced SOF officer that is “too young” for a higher level (in accordance with the CF personnel and career procedures). CANSOFCOM is now an operational command, in addition to an “environment”; with a few exceptions, especially within CANSOFCOM’s air personnel, the command can influence and manage the career development of its own personnel.

CANSOFCOM appropriately controls its own budget, but seems to have problems with expediting rapid acquisitions of SOF-peculiar items, as the number of sub-units has increased. High technology and better (lighter, faster, smaller, etc) equipment is often seen as instrumental in the necessary development and improvement SOF units. Not being able to expedite such equipment rapidly enough causes friction and dissatisfaction in the system, especially at the tactical level where adequate equipment (in numbers and quality) is often perceived as one of the most important factors for mission success. “Institutionalized” slow procurement processes may very well cause a degree of mistrust at the tactical level, and can potentially degrade its confidence in the strategic level. In order to ensure an optimized relationship between strategic and tactical level, this issue must be addressed by CANSOFCOM. A world-class SOF must have institutionalized its ability to expedite rapid procurements of crucial equipment.

CANSOFCOM does not yet conduct or facilitate joint SOF training, exercises, and education. However, the tactical units ensure that training and exercises are carried out in accordance with requirements, and the arrangements appear to function reasonably well. Additionally, CANSOFCOM is in the process of establishing a SOF Training Unit, which will be able to assist all levels of CANSOFCOM with training, exercises, and education. This will also support CANSOFCOM in its role to educate defense leadership and personnel from the other environments and commands on the appropriate development and employment of SOF. Thus, the establishment of an SOF Training Unit infers a potential to increase the strategic utilization of CANSOF in the future.
With the implementation/creation of CSOR, 427 SOAS, and CJIRU, CANSOFCOM appears to have a fairly well functioning organization that can provide appropriate combat support to most types of SOF missions. The integration with conventional units for special operations is not adequately developed yet. One of the identified shortfalls was the commander’s disability to influence the conventional forces’ priorities and willingness to exercise support to special operations. This shortfall can be mitigated by some of the measures mentioned above: allow the Commander of CANSOFCOM a more appropriate (higher) rank, and increase the capacity to educate the conventional forces in the importance of proper employment and support of special operations. As CANSOFCOM does not have a dedicated combat service support unit in its organization yet, it will have to rely on the support element in the tactical units, as well as support from the conventional units in the other commands. Again, an appropriate level support from the conventional forces requires a higher rank and the capacity to educate other parts of the CF on the SOF realm.

CANSOFCOM has a pragmatic method of employing its forces; no missions are given to one single unit, but to pre-planned or ad hoc task forces with the required personnel for each mission. This method seems to support a good economy of force. However, the command does not have the ability to deploy a sustainable CJFSOCC, CJSOTF, or SOCCE. Key personnel from CANSOFCOM did not express this capability as a requirement or a goal either, as the domestic CT mission denies a deployment of a large amount of staff officers out of Canada.

E. CONCLUSION

After the creation of CANSOFCOM in 2006, Canadian SOF became “world-class special operations forces.” The command naturally still suffers from some growing pains; however, it is noteworthy how far it has developed its role as a special operations component command in only four years. Moreover, the command is moving toward the status as a special operations service.
CANSOFCOM is appropriately utilized at a strategic asset, and it appears to be a Level III SOF in accordance with the NATO SOF Study’s “Criteria for NATO SOF Capability levels.” Only one factor denies it from attaining the highest level (Level IV): its inability to establish and sustain a CJFSOCC for a considerable time without depriving the command’s ability to sustain and/or carry out its domestic counterterrorism responsibilities.

IV. CASE 2: POLISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

The creation of the Polish Special Operations Command (POLSOCOM) in 2007 has increased POLSOF’s influence and importance at the national strategic level.88 Before the creation, only the counterterrorist unit Grupa Reagowania Operacyjno-Manewrowego (GROM) had access to the strategic level and conducted special operations that may have had a strategic impact. Starting in 2007, POLSOCOM develops toward a role as a framework nation for NATO SOF. This will provide Poland with an opportunity to lead NATO special operations, and therefore set the agenda and participate in high-level decision-making within NATO. This research also identifies challenges that may have negative impact on POLSOF’s development timeline and their capability to plan and conduct the entire range of special operations from the operational to strategic level.

A. METHODOLOGY

This case study is based primarily on interviews and conversations with various personnel from the POLSOF community. Some background information was retrieved from POLSOCOM’s official Web site, as well as from briefings that were received by the author during his visit to POLSOCOM. The interviews were conducted in February 2010 at POLSOCOM headquarters in Krakow, and at GROM’s facilities in Warsaw. Most of the POLSOCOM members who were interviewed in Krakow had served in at least one of the three SOF units: the counterterrorist unit GROM, the army SOF unit 1. Pułk Specjalny Komandosów

88 The strategic level in Poland is divided into two sub-levels: the political-strategic level, which consists of the Cabinet of Ministers (the government), including the Minister/Ministry of National Defense, and the military-strategic level, which consists of the General Staff.
(1. PSK), or the maritime SOF unit, *Morską Jednostkę Działań Specjalnych* (often referred to as “Formoza”).\(^{89}\) The following persons from the POLSOF community were interviewed:

1. (Name undisclosed), senior POLSOCOM officer
2. (Name undisclosed), Main Expert Special Operations Matters POLSOCOM and former Commander of GROM
3. (Name undisclosed), senior POLSOCOM officer, with service in 1. PSK
4. (Name undisclosed), senior POLSOCOM officer, with service in 1. PSK and GROM
5. (Name undisclosed), senior POLSOCOM officer, with service in 1. PSK
6. (Name undisclosed), senior POLSOCOM officer, with service in Formoza and GROM
7. (Name undisclosed), senior GROM officer

In order to prepare the interviewees for the questions before the actual interviews, a questionnaire was sent via the Polish liaison officer two weeks in advance. With only one exception (interviewee number 1), adequate time was given to discuss every question thoroughly with the interviewees. The questionnaire was, as well as the interviews, in English. All the interviewees spoke English, but some minor language challenges occurred. These were to a large degree solved by using the liaison officer as an English-Polish “translator,” as he could explain the full meaning of each question in Polish (if necessary), as well as he could help the interviewees with difficult words and terms in English.

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\(^{89}\) In the Polish Armed Forces, the Army is often referred to as “the Land Forces.” This research will use the term “the Army.”
The answers and opinions of the interviewees are firstly described, and then an analysis follows, with a holistic assessment of the POLSOF organization.

Since there have not been interviews with personnel outside the POLSOCOM community, and because all of the interviewees have a stake in the organization and its history, there is a chance that the sample is biased. However, all the interviewees appeared forthright and unconstrained by political pressure during the interviews, and often appeared critical to various aspects of the organization. Most of them have experience from POLSOF before and after the transformation, and would have a personal stake in both periods. In some answers, there was a big gap between some of the interviewees. This was most often caused by different perceptions from the different levels, for instance: how much should one absent condition in a list of more than one conditions count? These situations sometimes created outliers, and will be commented accordingly, as a summary of the comments from the interviewees is included. Neither of the questions is weighted more or less than others, but a comment is provided in those cases where outliers are identified. The distribution of the answers to each question is depicted in Appendix C—Statistics from POLSOCOM.

B. HISTORY OF THE POLISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

As of 2010, POLSOCOM consists of three tactical combat commands of battalion-regiment sizes. Two of them originally were designed to carry out special operations in support of their respective components: the Army and the Navy. The third unit was originally a paramilitary police unit with focus on both domestic and foreign counterterrorism and irregular threats. Even though Poland has had SOF, or “specialized units,” since before World War II, the units that exist today did not evolve into their current form until the 1990s.90

The Army special operations unit was originally a reconnaissance company that was established in 1957 in Krakow. Throughout the next decades,

the unit expanded and changed its name several times. In 1961, it changed its name to 26th Reconnaissance Battalion, and later it moved from Krakow to Dziwnów and changed its name again to 1. Assault Battalion. In 1986, the unit moved to its current location in Lubliniec, and in 1993 it changed its name to 1. Special Forces Regiment. It got its current name, 1. Pułk Specjalny Komandosów [1. Special Commando Regiment] (1. PSK), in 1995, after it had reached operational readiness the year before. The unit is commonly referred to as “the Special Regiment.”

The maritime special operations unit is based on a special marine scuba diving squadron that was established in 1975. The unit developed throughout the years, and changed its name to Special Action Department in 1987. Three years later, it changed its name to Scuba Diving Special Group. The unit’s main mission since its creation has been to conduct special operations in order to support Polish naval operations. When the unit became a part of POLSOCOM in 2007, it changed its name to Morską Jednostkę Działań Specjalnych [Martime Special Action Unit] (MJDS), but is usually referred to as “Formoza.”

\textit{Grupa Reagowania Operacyjno-Manewrowego} [Operational Maneuver Response Group], or GROM (pron. “gromm”), was established as part of the national police force in 1990, and its main focus was to counter terrorism and to carry out other sensitive missions that required covert or clandestine actions. The unit was given a high priority, both economically and operationally, and it was

\begin{footnotesize}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Information is based on a 1. PSK command brief provided to the author from one of the interviewees.
  \item Wojsko Polskie [Polish Armed Forces], “Wojska Specjalne” [POLSOCOM], official Web site. \url{http://www.wojskaspecjalne.mil.pl}.
  \item POLSOCOM’s official Web site in English refers to “scuba diving.” However, it is more correct to use the term “frogman/frogmen.”
  \item Two reasons were provided to explain the nickname “Formoza.” One refers to the unit’s location at a torpedo test platform on a small island outside the coast of Gdynia and its similarity with the location of Taiwan (previously called Formosa) off the coast of China. The other reason given was that “Formoza” is the name of the snake that is depicted in MJDS’ insignia.
\end{itemize}

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allowed to select personnel from other specialized military units and the police to develop its proficiency. In 1999, GROM was transferred from the Police to the Ministry of National Defense. Contrary to other tactical units, GROM did not report through any of the services or to the General Staff, but directly to the Minister of Defense.

Before 2002, there was nobody at the strategic level who was dedicated to SOF subject matters. As the units carried out missions in support of their respective services (1. PSK and MJDS) and for the Ministry of National Defense (GROM), there seemed to be little or no need for jointness between them. They sometimes trained or exercised together, but there were no concepts or organization to conduct joint special operations.

C. THE CREATION OF POLSOCOM

At the NATO Prague Summit in 2002, the Polish Minister of Defense announced that Poland would commit itself to provide special operations forces as the main contribution to NATO in the future. As a result of the Prague Summit, six officers stood up a “Special Operations Forces Cell,” in order to act as advisors to the General Staff on special operations matters.95 The cell was organized under the General Staff’s P-3 (equivalent to J-3, or operations directorate). Later, in 2003, an “Assistant Chief of Staff SOF” emerged, and subsequently the Special Operations Forces Cell merged with this function. After the NATO Riga Summit in 2006, as a result of the Special Operations Transformation Initiative, a new “Special Forces Directorate” was created within the General Staff. This staff took over the Assistant Chief of Staff’s functions, with a two-star flag officer in charge and approximately 30 personnel in the staff. The function of the staff was limited to advising the General Staff on special operations matters.

95 This staff is recognized in the NATO SOF Study as a “National Military Staff Element for Special Operations.” The interviewees who mentioned this staff element were not sure of an English translation of its name. Some of them referred to it as a “directorate,” while others used the more appropriate terms “cell” or “office.”
After the NATO Riga Summit in 2006, Poland incorporated the creation of POLSOCOM in its National Security Strategy for 2007, and two main courses of action for the development of a future POLSOF were submitted:

- The first course of action was developed by the Commander of GROM, Brigadier General Roman Polko, and proposed a build-up around the already-existing “strategic” asset: GROM. This would necessitate a transfer of 1. PSK and MJDS to GROM, and then an expansion of GROM’s staff and organization in order to build a strategic/operational command with all the necessary enablers and support assets.

- The second course of action was developed by the Assistant Chief of Staff SOF, Major General Jan Kempara. He suggested the creation of a strategic/operational special operations command with equal status to the existing services. In this model, GROM, 1. PSK, and MJDS would become subordinate tactical units to the operational command.

The Ministry of National Defense submitted the two courses of action to its principle strategic partner, the United States. The latter replied that it endorsed Kempara’s course of action (number two), and that it would contribute with support from United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to the build-up of that model. Hence, with a significant support from the USSOCOM, POLSOCOM was established in Krakow on January 1, 2007. Some modifications to the proposed model followed; the most important one was that GROM continued to receive its budget directly from the Ministry of National Defense instead of receiving it from POLSOCOM.96

96 For a short period of time after the creation of POLSOCOM, GROM’s budget was part of POLSOCOM’s budget. In 2008, however, the Ministry of National Defense changed it back to the old arrangement, i.e., GROM currently received its budget directly from the Ministry of National Defense, but is organizationally subordinate to POLSOCOM.
Currently, POLSO.COM assumes the status as a special operations service, with force production responsibilities (Figure 10). However, the organization does not include any air assets, which would have made the full responsibility of force production more difficult. In addition to its status as a service and an operational command, POLSO.COM also aims at becoming a NATO framework organization for Combined Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command (CJFSOCC) by the end of 2014.

![Polish Forces structure diagram](image)

**Figure 10. Polish Forces structure**

**D. INTERVIEWS WITH POLSO.COM KEY PERSONNEL**

In the following section, the results from the interviews have been comprised and commented. The first six questions (1A—1F) indicate the level of POLSOF's strategic impact before and after the creation of POLSO.COM, by

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97 Organizational chart is a modified version of a chart e-mailed from a POLSOF officer to the author on April 4, 2010.
examining indicators on the strategic custodian’s ability to carry out various tasks. Each question is answered by each interviewee twice:

- “Was there a joint strategic custodian before the establishment of POLSOCOM, with the ability to … (capability)” and
- “Is there a joint strategic custodian after the establishment of POLSOCOM, with the ability to … (capability).”

The next three questions (2A–2C) indicate the level of POLSOF’s ability to conduct combined and joint special operations, in accordance with the NATO SOF Study’s requirements to a “world class SOF.” Each question is asked twice:

- “Did POLSOF have the ability to … (activity)” and
- “Does POLSOF have the ability to … (activity).”

The findings from both periods appear chronologically under the same heading.

The findings from the interviews show that all indicators have improved after the creation of POLSOCOM. However, the average score still is not high enough to disregard some of the challenges in the POLSOCOM model. Even though the creation of the command appears to have prompted a higher degree of jointness within the POLSOF community and a closer connectivity with NATO SOF, there are still concerns that need to be dealt with in order to optimize the strategic utilization of POLSOCOM. Most of these concerns are rooted in the lack of integration of GROM personnel into POLSOCOM’s staff organization, and POLSOCOM’s lack of personnel with SOF experience and mindset.

The staff elements that existed before the creation of POLSOCOM will be referred to as the General Staff Special Forces Cell (GSSF).

98 In this research, the term “custodian” means a dedicated superior proponent, i.e., either a command or a staff element that ensures management and oversight over SOF.
1. **Questions and Responses—Strategic Stewardship**

   **a. Question 1A**

   Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment of POLSOCOM, with the ability to provide centralized stewardship, authority, and direction to joint special operations and national SOF?

   Before the creation of POLSOCOM in 2007, the GSSF would be the joint body at the strategic level that had something to do with SOF as a subject matter. However, this cell was neither a command nor capable of acting as a custodian. It was largely comprised by personnel with little or no SOF background, and it did not have a mandate to command, control, or even coordinate activities between the tactical units. Its purpose was mainly to advise the General Staff on SOF matters, but the lack of SOF experience rendered the cell ineffective and somewhat superfluous. The GSSF did not assume any command functions or have any impact on the management of the tactical SOF units. Moreover, the vast majority of the staff officers had no SOF background,
little knowledge about special operations, and they were not able to advise the General Staff properly on such matters. Even though the GSSF consisted of an increasing number of personnel, none of the interviewees considered them as useful or beneficial to the special operations community; not even as advisors. Finally, there was little or no link between the tactical units and this strategic level, as GROM reported to the Ministry of National Defense, and 1. PSK and MJDS reported to their services.

Average score: 1.3

The majority of the interviewees assessed the situation as significantly better now than before, while one outlier addressed his concern about a more cumbersome stewardship between the strategic level and GROM today. Most of the interviewees recognized the young command’s growing-pains with inexperienced personnel as the main reason for not functioning optimally. After its creation, POLSOCOM has assumed the role as a joint strategic custodian for all POLSOF units. While 1. PSK and MJDS used to be tasked by the conventional services before 2007, POLSOCOM is now able to safeguard the proper use of its subordinate tactical units. However, there are still some challenges. First, the command is nascent and consists to a large degree of personnel with little knowledge about SOF. In a complex and dynamic environment, POLSOCOM still is not experienced enough to function optimally as a SOF staff, and much effort currently is put into educating POLSOCOM personnel in SOF-specific matters. Second, the command relationship between POLSOCOM and GROM is still a challenge. Since GROM receives its budget directly from the Ministry of National Defense, POLSOCOM is not capable of directing GROM freely. The interviewees largely agreed that POLSOCOM’s ability to provide centralized stewardship, authority, and direction to joint special operations and national SOF is not optimized yet.

Average score: 4.6
b. **Question 1B**

Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment of POLSOCOM, with the ability to access senior defense leaders directly and advising them on SOF?

Even though there was a staff element dedicated to advise the General Staff in special operations matters before the creation of POLSOCOM, the interviewees agreed that it did not fulfill that role, or any other useful role that they knew of. It consisted of personnel without experience and knowledge about special operations, and had little or no leverage at the strategic level. Notwithstanding, GROM had a direct command relationship to the Minister of Defense, and the commander also was authorized to talk directly to the Chief of Defense Staff. Two of the interviewees pointed out that this must be accounted for as “access to senior leaders directly.” Other interviewees recognized this direct contact between the tactical and strategic level as very useful, but disregarded it as a joint strategic custodian.

Average score: 2.6

The majority of the interviewees assessed that the ability to access senior defense leadership has become better after the creation of POLSOCOM. However, most of them also recognized that the GROM Commander still is the only person with direct contact with the Minister of Defense, and that the situation is not optimal from a joint command’s perspective. The commander of POLSOCOM is the only two-star flag officer among the service commanders, as the other commanders have three stars. Some of the interviewees noted that this gives POLSOCOM less leverage at the strategic level. One of the interviewees explained that only two persons from POLSOCOM work in the General Staff in Warsaw as of 2010. However, the plan is to increase this number to approximately ten persons, by establishing “POLSOCOM Warsaw Office” during 2011. This should increase POLSOCOM’s ability to advice and influence senior defense officers in the future.

Average score: 3.6
c. **Question 1C**

Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment of POLSOCOM, with the ability to control a separate budget for joint special operations and SOF-specific items?

The GSSF did not have a separate budget, as the units received their money through their respective services. The fact that GROM’s budget came directly from the Ministry of National Defense is the only reason why some of the interviewees did not answer “condition not present” (0 points).

Average score: 0.7

Today, POLSOCOM controls its own budget, with one significant exception. As mentioned earlier, GROM still has a separate budget from the Ministry of National Defense and is neither monitored nor controlled by POLSOCOM or the General Staff. POLSOCOM’s budget; however, it is scrutinized by the General Staff, and often is subject to interference by the latter. Some of the interviewees expressed their concern about this issue, as it both jeopardizes the operational security, and opens it up for interference from conventional personnel in the General Staff (e.g., officers in the General Staff might question POLSOCOM’s prioritizations, or even refuse a particular purchase or project). Additionally, the high number of personnel without SOF background in POLSOCOM hampers the full effectiveness of controlling the budget, especially with regard to purchase of SOF-peculiar items. In sum, the interviewees generally expressed that POLSOCOM does not control its budget optimally, but that the situation is comfortable.

Average score: 4.6
d. Question 1D

Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment of POLSOCOM, with the ability to expedite the rapid acquisition of SOF-peculiar items?

The GSSF did not expedite any acquisitions or carry out material projects. Except from GROM, the units acquired equipment through their respective services. With its separate budget, GROM carried out rapid acquisition of SOF-peculiar items by itself, and only to its own organization.

Average score: 0.7

Today, POLSOCOM is responsible for acquisition of equipment to the subordinate units. However, three factors were pointed out as the main reason why POLSOCOM’s ability to do this is not flexible or optimal enough. First, the lack of personnel with deep knowledge and experience about SOF tactical equipment and requirements makes the command often turn to GROM for assistance, instead of doing the process itself. Second, the General Staff has the final word in acquisition processes that are carried out by POLSOCOM, and may change or stop these if needed. Finally, GROM's separate budget makes it somewhat cumbersome for POLSOCOM to control all processes within its subordinate units. Even though GROM has almost unrestricted ability to expedite the rapid acquisition of SOF-peculiar items, POLSOCOM has not. In some cases, GROM personnel have to assist or take over POLSOCOM’s tasks when SOF-specific items are being acquired.

Average score: 4.7
e. **Question 1E**

Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment of POLSOCOM, with the ability to conduct and facilitate joint SOF training, exercises, and education?

The GSSF did not conduct or facilitate joint training, exercises, or education. One outlier rated a fairly high score (4), based on the fact that the tactical units actually carried out joint training and exercises before the creation of POLSOCOM.

Average score: 1.1

The situation has become better after the creation of POLSOCOM, but many of the interviewees pointed out the need for a subordinate joint-SOF training center. The two main factors that have made the situation better are the increased support from USSOCOM and its subordinate units, such as Joint Special Operations University, and the support from NATO and its NATO SOF Headquarters (NSHQ). Especially personnel in the POLSOCOM staff benefits from the training and education that is provided by NSHQ, as staff personnel constantly are being sent to NSHQ’s courses at different levels. Notwithstanding, some of the interviewees highlighted that sending personnel to the United States and to other NATO countries is both expensive and time consuming, and that a joint SOF training center that will be established after 2012 will improve this case in the future.

Average score: 3.9

f. **Question 1F**

Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment of POLSOCOM, with the ability to influence or manage the career development of SOF personnel?

GSSF had no capacity to influence or manage the career development of SOF personnel. The individual units’ career development was
managed differently through their respective services. When GROM transferred from the Police to the Armed Forces in 1999, the unit’s personnel kept their Police salary supplements, which resulted in a significantly higher average income than personnel from the other units in the Armed Forces, including MJDS and 1. PSK. Some of the interviewees assessed this fact as relevant, since it plays a role in the situation after the creation of POLSOCOM.

Average score: 1.6

Today, POLSOCOM has a limited ability to influence and manage the career development of SOF personnel, due to several reasons. First, POLSOCOM has since its creation had problems with acquiring experienced SOF personnel to its command. The tactical units had few or none to give away, and the very few who actually came from the tactical level had little understanding in working at the operational/strategic level. Hence, there are few people with adequate insight about SOF and the capability to develop a joint career development for POLSOF personnel. Second, there are national rules and arrangements that are beyond POLSOCOM’s mandate to cope with. One interviewee mentioned that the Armed Forces’ arrangements for commuters are poor, and discourage people from other districts of Poland to commute.\(^9\) Hence, the arrangements favor a situation where only personnel who want to move to the Krakow district work there. As mentioned earlier, GROM personnel have higher salary than the others while working in the tactical unit. If an officer from GROM starts working in POLSOCOM, he will lose the GROM supplements, and subsequently lose a significant amount from his income. This has resulted in a situation where no one from GROM wants to work in the POLSOCOM staff. The majority of the interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that POLSOCOM was not able to help GROM personnel keep their supplements if they are transferred to POLSOCOM. Not being able to integrate GROM personnel

\(^9\) Some of the examples given were poor quarters for commuters; fewer tickets reimbursed than purchased; and time-consuming constraints, such as the requirement to use trains instead of airlines over long distances.
personnel into POLSOCOM often was referred to as the number one reason for not being able to influence and manage the career development of SOF personnel, as the inclusion of such personnel is critical for this effort. The core of experienced SOF personnel in Poland is within GROM, but GROM personnel are hard to include, because there are few or no incentives for them to contribute to this necessary effort. One of the interviewees also explained that it is not enough with only one or a few persons from GROM in POLSOCOM; there needs to be a significant amount of them there in order to “get things done,” and it seems very little likely that this will happen in the foreseeable future.

Notwithstanding, POLSOCOM continuously sends its personnel (mainly operations, plans, and intelligence) to the formalized NATO SOF Training and Education Program (NSTEP), as well as to various courses at Joint Special Operations University, in order to build up their SOF capabilities within the staff. This is the first step to manage a career path for SOF personnel at a higher level than the tactical.

Average score: 3.9

2. Questions and Responses—Combined and Joint Capabilities
   a. Question 2A

   Did/does POLSOF have the ability to deploy and employ expeditionary SOF tactical units capable of performing special operations in harsh, uncertain, hostile, denied, and politically sensitive environments in concert with other SOF from NATO members and partner nations?

   Before the creation of POLSOCOM, GROM was the only unit that was designed for and able to deploy as a tactical SOF unit in any type of environment. However, a transfer of authority to the regional commander was most often required, as the Ministry of National Defense or GROM itself had very limited capacity to employ its deployed detachments from Poland. Additionally, GROM did not have organic or designated air assets with SOF capabilities, and had to rely on external support if these were needed. MJDS’ and 1. PSK’s role
was to carry out special operations in support of their component services’ operations, and they were not traditional expeditionary forces dedicated for strategic out-of-area special operations.

Average score: 3.3

While GROM planned and carried out every aspect of a deployment before, POLSOCOM is now involved in GROM deployments. For GROM, these processes have become more cumbersome. However, POLSOCOM’s existence has made it possible for Poland to employ and deploy more SOF capabilities than before, even though the ability to employ is still not fully developed. POLSOCOM follows up the development of especially MJDS and 1. PSK as expeditionary capabilities, and is also in the process of developing a staff organization that is deployable for Task Force level deployments. This is scheduled to be fully operational capable in 2014. The main obstacle in this process is, again, the lack of experienced SOF personnel within the POLSOCOM staff.

Average score: 4.6

b. Question 2B

Did/does POLSOF have the ability to establish a deployable joint special operations command element capable of commanding and controlling these SOF tactical units independently or as part of a larger national or multinational force?

There was no such capability before the creation of POLSOCOM. The only exception would be the tactical staff in GROM’s organization, which was not considered a joint command element.

Average score: 0.4

POLSOCOM has offered NATO to be a framework nation for NATO SOF, and are in the process of establishing a deployable Combined Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command (CJFSOCC) cadre, capable of
commanding and controlling national SOF, NATO SOF, or other coalition SOF operations. In addition to the preparations of staff personnel, a combat service support unit is being formed, in order to facilitate base set-up and support command and control infrastructure. Most of the interviewees were optimistic about this process, while some of them expressed their concerns about the lack of integration of GROM personnel in this effort, as well as the limited integration of SOF air in POLSOCOM.

Average score: 4.7

c. Question 2C

Did/does POLSOF have the ability to establish SOF combat support and combat support forces and capabilities dedicated to enabling joint special operations and national SOF?

Only GROM had the types of mission that require combat support from external combat support forces before the creation of POLSOCOM. This was done on a case-by-case basis, or by cooperation with preferred units. There were no dedicated combat support units for SOF before 2007.

Average score: 1.6

Today, a combat support and combat service support squadron that will consist of approximately 700 men and women is being developed in Krakow, co-located with POLSOCOM. The new unit will consist of three squadrons with the respective tasks:

- Facilitate command and control infrastructure, including strategic, operational, and tactical communications
- Logistics, including the most typical branches of combat service support
- Various types of intelligence support, including human intelligence and signal intelligence
This new unit will be a significant contribution to POLSOCOM’s efforts, as well as to MJDS and 1. PSK. As most of these enabling capabilities are embedded in GROM’s organization already, there is less use for them in support to GROM operations. The lack of assigned air assets is still a major concern for optimal use in national special operations and operations abroad, and such capabilities are not included in the planned organization.

Average score: 4.0

E. ANALYSIS

The creation of POLSOCOM appears as a necessity to develop the special operations forces for the Polish strategic ambitions for its SOF. The arrangements before the 2007 were not viable, partly because the services had too strong impact on the force production processes of their respective SOF units, and jointness was hard to nurture; only a joint strategic SOF command could provide centralized stewardship, authority, and direction to joint special operations. The GSSF did not have the knowledge, mandate, or leverage to do any of this. Today, POLSOCOM fulfills these tasks, with one significant exception: it does not fully control GROM, because of the latter’s separate budget from the Ministry of National Defense. Before the creation of the command, Poland had to choose between two options that both had their advantages and disadvantages: breed the existing, well-functioning link between GROM and the Ministry of National Defense, or build a service-size superstructure that would include GROM, but diminish the existing link between the tactical and strategic level. In order to fully provide a centralized stewardship, authority, and direction, POLSOCOM must take over (or share) GROM’s good relationship with the Minister of Defense. However, this cannot be done yet, and it should only happen if certain organizational criteria are met first: GROM personnel must be included in the POLSOCOM staff structure, and the future POLSOCOM Warsaw Office must earn the trust and confidence of the Ministry of National Defense, the General Staff, and the tactical SOF units.
The current POLSOCOM organization is a “correct” type of special operations service or special operations component command, in accordance with the *NATO SOF Study*. It has separate headquarters with subordinate tactical units with either equal status, or tasks and priorities that are defined by the strategic/operational command. However, the lack of SOF-experienced personnel, especially personnel with operator background from GROM, impedes POLSOCOM in performing its role as a joint strategic custodian. The fact that very few arrangements are set up to facilitate a significant impact of GROM personnel in POLSOCOM is alarming. An optimized joint POLSOF depends on a significant number of GROM personnel in POLSOCOM, including officers in decision-making positions. Into the foreseeable future, the POLSOCOM staff will probably not be able to plan and carry out all types of special operations; for instance, time-sensitive counterterrorist operations, without experienced GROM personnel in the right positions. On the other hand, today’s organization might be more suitable for planning and conducting typical contemporary NATO SOF operations, such as non-kinetic operations (strategic reconnaissance and surveillance, military assistance, faction liaison, etc.) and traditional direct actions.

With hindsight, one can contemplate the effects of the alternative option for POLSOF. If all units had been organized under GROM, as proposed by Brigadier General Polka, the result could very likely have become a big, “tactical” unit with suboptimal arrangements. The two other tactical units, MJDS and 1. PSK, might have been marginalized by GROM’s institutionalized mindset and prioritizations. However, GROM already had the needed experience and strategic leverage, and could also very well have been able to facilitate a strategic/operational command with support from the other units. Since GROM already was a separate unit outside the conventional structure, POLSOF could have earned the strategic leverage cheaply if all SOF units had supplemented GROM’s organization instead of today’s model; GROM was already “there.” Notwithstanding, this research did not focus on all the details of the rejected proposal; there could have been other, more important reasons for the turndown of that option.
The future of POLSOCOM’s organization seems like a dilemma because of the mentioned situation: should POLSOCOM take over GROM’s budget, and then eliminate the only direct link between the Minister of Defense and the SOF community, or should GROM continue to be treated differently from the other units in the future? One example would be if GROM functions as a Tier 1 unit with special, separate missions and command relationships outside POLSOCOM. Notwithstanding, the build-up of the POLSOCOM Warsaw Office appears to be a step in the right direction. If this office has the right personnel, with the experience, credibility, and SOF knowledge, it has the potential to forge a better relationship between POLSOF and the strategic level. It might, however, take some years before the Warsaw Office reaches the same level of trust and confidence as GROM already has at the strategic level today. POLSOCOM should therefore not oppose the current relationship between GROM and the Ministry of National Defense, but rather support it as long as the future Warsaw Office does not have the desired leverage at the strategic level yet.

It would appear POLSOCOM has a hard time getting access to the senior military leadership in Poland, even though the command is equal to the other services. Today, the Commander of POLSOCOM has direct access to General Staff personnel, including the Chief of Defense Staff, and the GROM commander has access to the Minister of Defense. In order to exert leverage at the strategic level, more personnel from POLSOCOM should have direct access to senior military and political leaders. Advising non-SOF personnel on SOF matters is always a challenge, and requires both insight and integrity. POLSOCOM’s main problem today is that its staff does not have the capability (or, more likely, the possibility) to exert access to all necessary parts of the Polish Armed Forces structure. The physical distance between Warsaw and Krakow serves as an obstacle for an optimized communication between POLSOCOM and the strategic decision-makers. The future POLSOCOM Warsaw Office will provide an opportunity to improve this situation. The proximity to the Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff is paramount, but the Warsaw Office will still
depend on personnel with the right qualifications and personal skills, and with the ability to communicate well with both the strategic level in Warsaw and the POLSOCOM staff in Krakow. Sending personnel with little or no SOF background will not automatically give POLSOCOM the desired and necessary access to senior defense leaders, or the ability to advise decision-makers properly on SOF.

POLSOCOM’s ability to expedite the rapid acquisition of SOF-peculiar items is promising, even though it is far from optimal yet. The POLSOCOM staff’s knowledge about the rapidly increasing technology in the SOF realm is limited, and the staff sometimes has to ask especially GROM for assistance, since there are more experienced personnel there. POLSOCOM needs dedicated personnel with good links to the tactical units, and with the right experience on the above-mentioned processes. Additionally, POLSOCOM needs to overcome the challenges it has with interference from General Staff personnel; the final approvals for acquisitions should stay at POLSOCOM’s level, or at least be limited to a formal and very limited approval process, where for instance the Chief of Defense signs the approval after POLSOCOM’s Warsaw Office has given him POLSOCOM’s recommendations. Hopefully, POLSOCOM’s ability to control its own budget and expedite all types of acquisitions for its units will improve, but it will probably take years before the Polish bureaucracy is outmaneuvered, and the POLSOCOM logistics personnel have acquired adequate experience and streamlined connections with the tactical units.

The establishment of a joint training center in 2012 appears necessary for improved jointness between the units. Even though the tactical units have somewhat separate missions, the need for joint SOF deployments and operations seems inevitable, just as it does in other NATO nations. In order to optimize the preparations and conducts of such joint deployments, arrangements need to be in place to facilitate jointness between the units. A crucial part of the training center’s mission should be education, not only training and exercises. Hopefully, the future training center will be able to concentrate on conceptual
issues, rather than operators’ techniques and procedures. It seems the tactical units maintain good skills at the tactical level, while there is no SOF-peculiar education earmarked at the junior officers’ level and up, except for the education that is provided by USSOCOM and NSHQ. The future training center should have the capacity to educate its instructors in the United States and at NSHQ, and then form its own instructor base with enough expertise and integrity to teach the rest of the POLSOCOM community. Hence, the training center provides a good opportunity for POLSOCOM to connect the units, and to create and develop operational concepts and SOF personnel pipelines. However, the future center is probably just as dependent on integrating GROM personnel as the POLSOCOM staff itself. Without GROM personnel (as well as MJDS and 1. PSK personnel), the training center will very likely lose its credibility among the tactical units.

POLSOCOM needs to develop a thorough plan for its future training center. The plan must address the level of expertise of the instructors, the center’s prioritized activities (education, exercises, or training), the target audiences (only SOF, or combat service support, etc.), the level of training (operational, tactical, technical, etc.), and issues like audits, certifications, and personnel pipelines/career paths. Such a plan must be developed in concert with the tactical units, in order to assure jointness and credibility throughout the process of establishing and operationalizing the training center. Simultaneously, arrangements should be developed so that enough experienced personnel from GROM, MJDS, and 1. PSK are motivated to fill the billets at the center. An important issue would be that GROM personnel can keep (or even raise) their salary supplements even though they are transferred to another unit (the POLSOCOM staff or the training center). Economic incentives are probably not enough, however. Other aspects should be assessed, such as the location of the training center; permanent detachments to the tactical units; commuter arrangements; and rank and career promoting arrangements for the instructors.
Since a large part of the POLSOCOM staff consists of non-badged personnel, and even personnel without any background from the tactical SOF units, some changes seem essential: a certain percentage of the billets in the POLSOCOM staff should consist of badged personnel with operational experience. Also, some of the most important positions in the staff, especially decision-making positions, must be reserved for badged personnel from GROM, MJDS, and 1. PSK. Personnel at the lower levels need to understand that there are jobs that are earmarked for personnel with a particular background at the higher levels. In order to motivate the personnel to plan their career path early toward special positions in POLSOCOM, they must understand that they are wanted and that such a plan is necessary for promotions and a life-long career in the SOF community. It is therefore important that career plans are developed to secure that special personnel have special rights and opportunities all the way up to the flag officer level. Again, inclusion of the tactical units in this development process seems to be paramount for its success. Unfortunately, POLSOCOM’s main challenge continues to be how to motivate enough personnel from the tactical units to participate in such an effort.

Polish SOF has a good reputation within NATO and the United States for its ability to provide expeditionary SOF tactical units capable of performing “any” type of special operation, and in “any” environment. GROM’s ability to “plug and play” into U.S. operations was well known before the establishment of POLSOCOM. Today’s organization will result in more forces to choose from, and increase POLSOF’s ability to send tactical units anywhere in the world. Since GROM now has an extra layer to report through, however, the processes before and during a deployment might seem more cumbersome today than before. Being able to employ its units while deployed is probably POLSOCOM’s biggest challenge in this matter. Again, experienced personnel with SOF

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100 In the NATO SOF community, “badged” means that a candidate has passed a SOF unit’s selection process, and often some additional required training that is seen as necessary to function as an operator in the unit. Different units have different selection processes and criteria for their definitions of “badged.”
background are needed throughout the organization, in order to optimize POLSOCOM’s ability to both employ and deploy its forces.

In addition to employing and deploying its national forces, POLSOCOM has announced that it will be able to provide NATO with a framework nation cadre for a CJFSOCC in 2014. POLSOCOM seems very compliant toward NATO’s requirements and develops the CJFSOCC capabilities exactly in accordance with the proposed documents from NATO. Nations with framework nation capability for SOF are needed in NATO, and the Polish contribution will be welcomed. POLSOCOM must assure that it has the capacity both to deploy a CJFSOCC and a national Joint Special Operations Task Group headquarters independently (e.g., for another area of operations). This can be very personnel consuming in the future, and is dependent on experienced personnel.

Apparently, POLSOCOM takes NATO’s requirements for enabling capabilities very seriously. The creation of a combat support and combat service support unit will improve POLSOCOM’s flexibility in terms of supporting its combat units, and enable joint or single service operations. GROM probably does not need much of this support, as it has its own enablers. Subsequently, it will be important that GROM’s and POLSOCOM’s enablers develop side-by-side, and avoid fighting for the same resources (personnel, equipment, etc.).

The lack of air assets dedicated for POLSOCOM is disturbing, especially since POLSOCOM needs the assets and the expertise as a framework nation for all types of special operations. Examples from other nations’ special operations organizations show that it is difficult to include air assets into a joint special operations command or a special operations service. The national air force almost always will have a strong opinion about such a transfer of forces, and there are force production issues that come with airplanes and air personnel and operations that require a highly “air specialized” organization. Even though many of the interviewees expressed a desire to own all facets of the air assets and the
pertinent force production processes, examples from other NATO nations suggest that alternative arrangements sometimes are preferred.\textsuperscript{101}

POLSOCOM’s compliance with NATO requirements is positive, especially since it pursues the status as a framework nation. Following NATO publications and guidelines makes it easier for the organization to create the right types of enablers and combat support capabilities immediately, rather than spending valuable time and resources on trials and errors.

F. CONCLUSION

Indicators show that the creation of POLSOCOM in 2007 has improved Poland’s ability and means to utilize SOF at the strategic level. The main difference between the situations before and after the creation of POLSOCOM is that GROM was a unit utilized by the strategic level, while POLSOCOM has the potential to influence the national strategy by giving Poland leverage at the global arena.

GROM’s situation before 2007 was comfortable, as the unit had direct access to the Minister of Defense and Chief of Defense Staff, and was directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense. The unit had ample means for its own management and procurements, good arrangements for rapid acquisition of SOF-peculiar items, good salary arrangements for its personnel, and a number of operational successes on its record. The creation of POLSOCOM changed GROM’s hegemony as a strategic asset, but seems to facilitate an opportunity for Poland to have a global reach, i.e., at the strategic level in NATO. As a future framework nation for NATO SOF, Poland may get access to more decision-

\textsuperscript{101} One of the models is that the national air force retains the entire force production processes, but dedicated airplanes and personnel are assigned for special operations. Another model is that the SOF command/service takes over the forces and the force production processes, but the air force retains certain parts of the latter, for instance flight safety, pilot education, aircraft maintenance, and so on.
making processes within NATO, including *ad bellum* and *in bello* decisions. Additionally, Poland has more strategic capabilities to offer its primary strategic partner: the United States.

However, there are some challenges in the Polish model that need to be addressed. GROM’s leverage at the strategic level is slowly diminishing, as the unit now is organized under POLSOCOM, and not directly under the Minister of Defense, as before 2007. The lack of experienced personnel with SOF background in POLSOCOM may have negative impact on the staff’s ability to take over GROM’s well-developed relationship with the strategic level in Poland. Since the Commander of POLSOCOM answers to the Chief of Defense (in a General Staff that is in a different city), it is difficult to maintain an equally good leverage at the strategic level, especially before the POLSOCOM Warsaw Office has been established.

GROM’s existing budget relationship with the Ministry of National Defense may seem like an organizational dysfunction. However, as long as POLSOCOM is a nascent command that still lacks the expertise and integrity that GROM already has, the mentioned relationship between the Ministry of National Defense and GROM is a strong link between the POLSOF community and the strategic level, and should continue to exist. Only when POLSOCOM recognizes that it undoubtedly has adequate abilities to access senior defense leaders, and advise them on SOF, alternative arrangements for GROM’s budget should be discussed. If GROM’s missions and status turn out to be separate from the rest of POLSOCOM, the strong link with the Ministry of National Defense should not be touched.

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102 *Ad bellum* decisions refer to the decisions that are made before a war, e.g., whether the operation/intervention is going to take place at all. *In bello* decisions refer to the decisions during a war/operation, i.e., how the operation is being carried out.
This research has identified four crucial challenges that need to be addressed properly in the future, in order to make POSOCOM a world-class special operations force. Failing to do so may even result in a reduced ability to utilize POLSOF as strategic assets:

- Arrangements that motivate personnel from the tactical units, especially GROM, must be established, in order to increase the number of experienced personnel in the POLSOCOM staff, the Warsaw Office, and the future training center. If GROM personnel are neither included in the processes nor the future organization, POLSOCOM’s ability to plan and conduct national and expeditionary special operations from an operational level may be limited to so-called “white SOF operations.” Additionally, POLSOF’s reputation among other NATO nations may even get hurt if the amount of “SOF-inexperienced” personnel is conspicuous. POLSOCOM should spend a lot of effort to solve this problem. The most significant issues in this case are to allow GROM personnel to keep, or even increase, their supplementary salary if they work in POLSOCOM, and to construct career paths that have distinct incentives for potential career officers in the tactical units. Notwithstanding, it seems that additional measures also are considered necessary to motivate GROM personnel. A project to identify such measures would be appropriate.

- POLSOCOM needs to consolidate and guard an organization or a network that has the ability to access and advise senior military and political decision-makers on SOF. The POLSOCOM Warsaw Office

103 The terms “white SOF” and “black SOF” are not official. However, they are regularly used to distinguish SOF units that focus on counterterrorist operations and hostage release operations (black SOF) from the other SOF units that focus on the principal special operations tasks, such as SR&S, DA, and MA (white SOF). Several nations also use the terms Tier 1 and Tier 2 (and sometimes Tier 3) to differentiate between the tasks, readiness, and/or priority between SOF units.
is a step in this direction, but it is paramount that this body consists of experienced staff personnel with SOF background, and the integrity to address and challenge strategic decision-makers.

- The establishment of a training center and a combat support/combat service support squadron seems important for the development of POLSOCOM. These two units are also dependent on highly qualified personnel, in order to develop and function properly. Finding qualified personnel for these billets might be difficult, as the tactical units struggle to keep their best officers and enlisted personnel already. Especially a labor shredding from the tactical units to the training center is painful and sometimes dangerous, as every unit has a limit in terms of vacancies and experience/inexperience among its personnel. A careful choice of the location and salary arrangements for the training center might have a significant impact on the success of its establishment and development.

- The Commander of POLSOCOM must possess the same rank as his equivalent service commanders, in order to achieve the same level of influence and trust at the strategic level as the other services. Even though the commander is a flag officer, this is normally not enough. POLSOCOM suffers from the fact that the other service commanders have a higher rank, as the former will always be the junior officer in any discussion in the General Staff. The other services might argue that the rank is irrelevant, but almost every special operations force in the world has experienced that it in the end of the day, it is not.
V. CASE 3: NORWEGIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) currently are not optimally utilized as strategic assets, and organizational changes should be made to improve Norway's special operations capabilities for the future. A different organizational design for NORSOF can give Norwegian political and military decision-makers a better tool to support national interests, by controlling and coordinating NORSOF efforts more deliberately through a joint special operations command at the strategic level.

A. METHODOLOGY

The case study is based on the author's inside knowledge of the subject matter, and his personal relationships with NORSOF personnel and processes. It is likely that most stakeholders inside and outside the NORSOF community already have their personal opinions that make them biased. Since NORSOF has not been through a transformation like the Canadian Special Operations Forces (CANSOF) or the Polish Special Operations Forces (POLSOF), potential interviewees are likely to judge the current organizational arrangements for NORSOF and compare them either with existing organizations in other countries, or with perfect solutions, rather than realistic ones. While CANSOF and POLSOF interviewees have had the opportunity to evaluate their respective organizations both before and after the transformations, it is likely that stakeholders in Norway would compare their current organization with hypothetical alternatives that might amplify the low or high score of the latter. Hence, interviews with Norwegian stakeholders would reflect the interviewees' desires, and not their real observations. A case study based on such interviews would not have been

104 "Stakeholder" means any person or organization that has a stake in NORSOF, its tactical units, their economy, acquisition projects, bases, etc. For example, the Army, the Navy, the Defense Staff, and the Chief of Defense. "Inside the NORSOF community" means all the personnel within the tactical units, in addition to the four NORSOF personnel working in the Defense Staff and the 12 NORSOF personnel working in the Norwegian Joint Headquarters (Forsvarets hovedkvarter).
analogous to the before-after design that is used in the two former case studies. Three types of biases could have been expected if a research method similar to the case studies of CANSOF POLSOF had been used:

- Some NORSOF representatives might fear that a low score on the current organization is perceived as lack of confidence in their “conventional” senior officers, rather than dissatisfaction with the model. In this case, interviewees might be prone to give the current model a higher score than their actual perception indicates.

- NORSOF representatives who want a different model for NORSOF (either a joint command or a special operations service) are prone to give the current model (national military staff element for special operations) a lower score.

- Stakeholders outside the NORSOF community, for instance decision-makers in the Army, the Navy, or the Defense Staff, are likely to disfavor a change that gives NORSOF more power, money, or personnel than what it has today, i.e., a model that gives themselves less influence and power over NORSOF.

This case study firstly describes the current 2010 organizational design for NORSOF within the Norwegian Armed Forces structure. Secondly, the four factors that were listed in Chapter II are analyzed. Deductions are derived consecutively from the factor analysis, as well as from congruent findings from the case studies of CANSOF and POLSOF, if these apply. As a result of the analysis based on the three case studies, a recommended organizational model for NORSOF frames the conclusion of this thesis in Chapter VI, as well as pertinent policy recommendations that are based on the recommended organizational model.
B. THE CURRENT NORWEGIAN DEFENSE STRUCTURE

1. The Ministry of Defense

_Forsvaret_ (the Defense, or the Norwegian Armed Forces) is one of four establishments/agencies under the Norwegian Ministry of Defense. The other establishments/agencies are _Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet_ (Norwegian National Security Authority), _Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt_ (Norwegian Defense Research Establishment), and _Forsvarsbygg_ (Norwegian Defense Estates Agency). The Chief of Defense is the only active duty four-star flag officer in Norway.\(^{105}\) There is no assigned office or billets with special focus or responsibility on special operations matters within the Ministry of Defense.

2. The Norwegian Armed Forces

The Norwegian Armed Forces is organized with 11 commanders who are directly subordinate to the Chief of Defense (Figure 12). Three of these are three-star flag officers: Chief of Defense Staff, Chief of Armed Forces Operational Headquarters, and Chief of Norwegian Intelligence Service. The other eight flag officers are two-star generals or admirals, and among these are the chiefs of the services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Home Guard).\(^{106}\) The respective services assume administrative control over the NORSOF tactical units.\(^{107}\) In addition to the above-mentioned units, ten administrative units are subordinate to the Defense Staff, but not considered directly subordinate to the Chief of Defense.

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\(^{105}\) In accordance with the Norwegian constitution, the King of Norway is the Commander-in-Chief of Norwegian Armed Forces. He is therefore also a four-star general in the Army and the Air Force, and a four-star admiral in the Navy. Retired generals keep their rank after retirement.

\(^{106}\) The Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Home Guard, and Defense Information Infrastructure are called _generalinspektør_ (Inspector General) in Norwegian. However, their responsibilities are not similar to U.S. inspectors general. They are responsible for all force production, i.e., force generation, force development, and force providing, within their respective domains. Their command relationship is referred to as _administrative control_.

\(^{107}\) NATO (AAP-6) defines administrative control as “exercising authority over subordinate or other organizations (or other activities) in areas such as personnel administration, finance, logistics and other areas not included in the operational missions of subordinate or other relevant units.”
Figure 12. Commanders directly subordinate to the Chief of Defense

3. The Defense Staff

The Defense Staff is headed by the Chief of Defense Staff, a three-star flag officer who is also the Armed Forces’ second in command. The staff is divided into four divisions: Personnel, Operations, Finance and Management, and Organization. The Special Operations Section is one of five sections in the Operations Division and consists of four officers (as of June 2010): an O-6 (Section Head), an O-5 (Army representative), and two O-4s (Navy and Air Force representatives). The section functions as the action officers and advisors on special operations matters to the Chief of Defense and the Defense Staff. It is worth noticing that the Special Operations Section reports to number three in the chain of command, similar to the arrangement in Canada before the creation of CANSOFCOM (the Counter Terrorism Special Operations cell reported to their number three, the Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff).

4. The Norwegian Joint Headquarters

The Chief of Norwegian Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) is a three-star flag officer who is directly subordinate to the Chief of Defense. As depicted in Figure 12, the SOF element at the headquarters is subordinate to Chief J-3 (one-star), who is subordinate to Chief Operations (two-star). The Chief of J-3 SOF is an O-6, and his responsibilities span all operational issues pertinent to special operations, such as planning and execution of live operations and exercises, creation of operation plans (OPLAN) and standing orders, and coordination of
joint exercise schedules. Additionally, the Chief of J-3 SOF is Commander NJHQ’s advisor on special operations matters. On August 1, 2009, J-3 SOF increased its number of billets from six to 12 officers. The number is a minimum requirement to maintain an adequate 24/7/365 manning.

Figure 13. NORSOF units and representation at the three levels

C. ANALYSIS

1. Governing Documents, Doctrine, and Policy

Like Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5) and the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine, Parliamentary Bill no. 48 clearly states that NORSOF are strategic assets and associated with the highest practical level, even though reality shows that this may be disputed.\textsuperscript{108} The current use of these forces does not seem to have a particular strategic impact, other than the inherent political profit at the national or international arenas that

comes with the announcement of a deployment, or during the deployment itself (e.g., "we have special operations forces deployed in a NATO operation, therefore we contribute").

The Parliamentary Bill no. 48 also states that “it is important that the chain of command is clear and unequivocal, consisting of as few layers as possible.”109 There is, however, little practical interface between the two units and the strategic realm. During exercises and operations, the tactical SOF units are usually OPCOM to Commander NJHQ. This command relationship is executed by J-3 SOF, but the latter has little power to decide or influence the development of the tactical units, budget priorities, training objectives, etc., because these issues are owned by the force providers, i.e., the services. Exercises are usually planned within the respective services, as the force providers are responsible for “the total process and activity that conduce to prepare forces ready for effort and includes education and training, human resources management, development of tactics, organization of forces, and materiel procurement.”110 Some exercises, particularly joint counterterrorist exercises and allied (NATO or Partnership for Peace) exercises, are planned and conducted by NJHQ. In these cases, the FSK-HJK and MJK reports directly to Chief of J-3 SOF, who may function as a joint special operations component commander.111

Through the administrative chain of command, Commander FSK-HJK is one of eight commanders who reports directly to the Chief of the Army. The Chief of the Army is located at Bardufoss, Northern Norway, so there is less face-to-face interaction between the two commanders than if they were co-located. With the current organizational design for the Army, FSK-HJK’s command relationship within the service is appropriate. It could have been

109 Forsvarsdepartementet, Parliamentary Bill no. 48, 63.


111 The other components are the land component, the maritime component, and the air component.
optimal if the Chief of the Army and his staff were located somewhat closer
to FSK-HJK (Rena), for instance Oslo.

MJK, however, has four layers of commanders/staffs up to the Chief of
Defense. Commander MJK’s rank is O-5, but he reports to the Commander
Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Group, who is also an O-5. The latter reports
to the Commander of the Fleet, a one-star (O-7), who finally reports to the Chief
of the Navy (O-8). These three commanders and their staffs are all located at the
same naval base as MJK: Haakonsvern, Bergen. The Norwegian Naval Special
Warfare Group consists of three conventional units in addition to MJK and a
SOF/conventional training center, and may be headed by a Commander with
service from any of these units (i.e., he does not necessarily have any special
operations background). Remaining three levels below the Chief of the Navy, and
four levels below the Chief of Defense, MJK is, in fact, as far away from the
strategic level as a command unit can get in Norway. This organizational
structure is cumbersome, and counters what the Parliamentary Bill no. 48
expresses about a “chain of command [that] is clear and unequivocal, consisting
of as few layers as possible.” If done properly, all synergies from the existing
organizational model can be exploited in a future reorganization: the remainder of
the Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Group would still be organized, equipped,
and trained to conduct combat support and combat service support to both
special operations (i.e., MJK) and to conventional naval operations.

Hence, the “practically short chain of command” exists during some
exercises and operations, but most often is limited to a monitoring function by the
NJHQ J-3 SOF during operations. The strategic level is seldom involved during
SOF exercises, but has a distinct decision-making role before deployments. It

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112 Forsvarsdepartementet, Parliamentary Bill no. 48, 63.

113 Marinens jegervåpen (Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Group) consists of MJK,
Kystjegerkommandoen (Coastal Ranger Commando), Minedykkerkommandoen (Norwegian
Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Commando), Taktisk båtskvadron (Tactical Boat Squadron),
and Marinens jegervåpen treningssenter (Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Training Center).
also has a monitoring function during operations, since the operational level (NJHQ) usually is delegated OPCOM over deployed forces. FSK-HJK is at the appropriate level within its service, while MJK’s situation is not optimal; the commander has too many layers of other commanders and staffs between himself and the Chief of the Navy, and cannot have direct contact with the latter (or others at the strategic level) without consent or presence from his superior commanders or staffs. A shorter chain of command is also in accordance with NATO doctrine for special operations, as well as findings from the NATO SOF Study.\textsuperscript{114}

The special operations air component, \textit{137 Luftving} (137 Air Wing) is responsible for providing air support to the two former.\textsuperscript{115} The government’s Implementation letter to the Defense sector states that NORSOF consists [only] of FSK-HJK and MJK. The letter mentions 137 Air Wing as a supporting unit, and not a part of NORSOF, as the air wing also conducts conventional operations.\textsuperscript{116} Not having air assets that are fully dedicated to special operations is not optimal, as a big portion of all special operation requires air support. Norway has a reduced ambition for its special air operations capabilities, as it does not have \textit{dedicated special air operations} assets, but \textit{capable special air operations} assets.\textsuperscript{117} With such a reduced ambition, organizational arrangements must be optimized in order to facilitate as good support as possible to NORSOF. Currently, both Special Operations Section and NJHQ J3 SOF have one O-4 billet each earmarked for air force personnel. Special air operations personnel must be implemented in the future NORSOF organization, in order to ensure compliance with NATO requirements for special operations capabilities and to ensure a flexible and proper use of the air assets. Hence, a future NORSOF

\textsuperscript{114} See, for instance, AJP-3.5, 3–6.

\textsuperscript{115} Forsvarsdepartementet, \textit{Parliamentary Bill no. 48}, 74.

\textsuperscript{116} Forsvarsdepartementet, \textit{Implementation Letter}, 38.

\textsuperscript{117} Definitions in accordance with AJP-3.5, C8-C9.
command or service should have a limited number of force production responsibilities over the special air operations assets, and ensure a well-functioning relationship with the Air Force, in order to optimize the use of these limited assets.

- Deduction 1: MJK’s level in the Navy’s administrative chain of command should be similar to FSK-HJK’s level; the Commander of MJK should report directly to the Chief of the Navy.

- Deduction 2: Commander MJK’s rank should be the same as Commander FSK-HJK’s rank, i.e., Navy Captain (O-6).

- Deduction 3: Special air operations capabilities must be optimized by including competent Air Force personnel in the NORSOF community, including a future joint special operations command or service. The division of force production and operational responsibilities between the joint NORSOF leadership and the Air Force must be as perfect and functional as possible. Further assessments are necessary to ensure the proper use of special air operations capabilities.

*Evne til innsats: Strategisk konsept for Forsvaret [Capability for Effort: Strategic concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces]* emphasizes that Norway’s security policy depends on NATO, and that joint capabilities have priority over the individual services’ capabilities. The strategic concept sees out-of-area operations as instrumental to Norway’s national interests, and calls for flexible forces with the ability to operate in domestic and international environments, as well as the creation of “organizational structures that are adequately dynamic.”118 The current organizational arrangement for NORSOF is based on compartmentalized representation at the different levels, but without a unified, 

The cohesive power that functions as a proponent for joint development and efforts. Unfortunately, the current relationship between the two tactical units can be described as competitive, rather than cooperative. Without a strong joint NORSOF custodian with executive power and authority, the two units are likely to continue to compete, rather than cooperate. Their orders and budgets come from the services, and usually are followed by instructions that benefit the respective services, not a joint effort. In order to assure an organization that is able to operate in a joint, dynamic environment, a national military staff element at the strategic level is not adequate. One of the national staff element’s most important tasks is to coordinate special operations plans, activities, and requirements with the services and the other military and defense political establishments.  

After two of the Norwegian chiefs of services (Army and Navy) moved from Oslo (out of the Defense Staff) to their respective main bases (Bardufoss and Bergen), such coordination has become more difficult for the Special Operations Section. Increasing the manning of the Special Operations Section might improve its coordinating capability, but it still lacks the authority for joint efforts. As the NATO SOF Study indicates, and as the two case studies in this thesis confirm, only a SOF commander has the authority to establish “unity of effort among the service SOF units, by integrating and harmonizing their individual capabilities.” Such a command is seen as a milestone in every NATO nation that has created one, and is the appropriate model for national SOF that need to achieve national security objectives. Notwithstanding, the NATO SOF Study also explains that a joint special operations command most often exists in addition to a special operations staff element, not necessarily in place of one. If a joint special operations command is not co-located with the national defense staff, SOF

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120 NSCC, *NATO SOF Study*, iii.

121 NSCC, *NATO SOF Study*, 27.
representation still is important. In order to maintain a daily relationship with the strategic level, there needs to be a permanent representation by SOF in the Defense Staff, either by an embedded special operations staff element, or by a permanently detached liaison element from the joint special operations command.

The NJHQ J-3 SOF is dimensioned to deploy NORSOF units to areas of operation, and to follow up administrative issues pertinent to NORSOF operations. As it is not yet fully manned, as of 2010, it is difficult to know if the J-3 SOF will be capable of employing NORSOF units and conducting out of area special operations, as well as maintaining its counterterrorist responsibility and capability. J-3 SOF can report directly to the Chief of NJHQ if necessary (i.e., it can bypass the Chief of J-3 in sensitive cases). During the bi-annual exercise COLD RESPONSE, J-3 SOF normally assumes the role as a cadre for a Combined Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander (CJFSOCC) for the participating nations.\textsuperscript{122} Even though the effort throughout the years is known as a success, the exercises show that such a task is time and personnel consuming, and that the J-3 SOF is not dimensioned to function as a joint special operations command over a long period of time. Moreover, NJHQ’s geographical location is in Bodø, Northern Norway, and a 90-minute flight from Oslo. This necessitates an extensive use of video teleconference (VTC) with the Defense Staff, in order to provide the desired impact at the strategic level. However, the two previous cases show the importance of a geographical proximity between SOF and strategic decision-makers. In the Canadian case, CANSOFCOM personnel were satisfied with the arrangements: they were within walking distance from the Defense Staff and the Ministry of Defense (in the same building, but on different floors). In the Polish case, it was obvious that the distance between

\textsuperscript{122} Sometimes the exercise has had a different name than COLD RESPONSE. Also, before 2007, the special operations component was called a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF).
Polish Special Operations Command (POLSOCOM) in Krakow and the General Staff in Warsaw is a challenge. POLSOCOM’s solution is to increase its Warsaw Office to approximately ten officers.

- Deduction 4: The Norwegian Defense organization should develop a separate special operations command at the strategic level, as this would provide politicians and senior defense decision-makers with better grounds for decision-making and a greater space for freedom of action than with the current structure.

- Deduction 5: Combat support to special operations (as well as conventional operations) should be formalized in the Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Group’s mission statement and in its subordinate units’ mission essential task lists.

- Deduction 6: Even if a joint special operations command is established, the roles as advisors and SOF action officers should persist within the strategic and operational levels; either as liaison officers from the joint special operations command, or as part of the Defense Staff and NJHQ, like the current arrangements.

2. Norway and NATO

NATO’s importance in Norway’s security policy is noteworthy, because NORSOF is a budding agent to enhance this relationship. NORSOF has a good reputation within NATO for its efforts in operations; however, there is a potential to utilize NORSOF better at the strategic level, and actively include NORSOF actions in Norway’s security policy. NORSOF can be a tool for Norwegian decision-makers to participate in and influence NATO’s in bello decisions. Additionally, NORSOF can develop its network with other SOF units that may have access to senior defense leadership within their respective countries. Of course, all member nations in NATO want to influence the decision-making processes within the alliance, but an important factor for all of them is to contribute with relevant forces. A required capability within NATO is special
operations framework nations.\textsuperscript{123} If Norway develops such a framework nation capability within a national special operations command, NORSOF can facilitate and lead special operations within an area of operations that Norway considers a national security interest. A joint special operations command acts as the link between national decision-makers at the strategic level and the deployed combined joint forces special operations component command (CJFSOCC); it advises its national decision-makers on the appropriate employment of its forces, and it facilitates, mans, and instructs the CJFSOCC cadre in accordance with national strategic intentions. Notwithstanding, developing such a capability is neither cheap nor quickly and easily done. When the Polish Special Operations Forces Command was created in 2007, one of its main objectives was to build a special operations framework nation capability within 2012. In 2010, Poland was forced to postpone the due date for its readiness to 2014.

For a small nation like Norway, developing a special operations framework nation capability is complex, but achievable. It can either be done alone or in cooperation with another nation (or nations), but it has to be a long-term goal. It takes time to develop the adequate mass of personnel, and the required knowledge and experience on special operations and CJFSOCC staff responsibilities. Norway’s role as a special operations framework nation during big NATO exercises demonstrates that NORSOF already has a potential. The long-term profit from such a goal is clear: a direct access to in-theater operational and strategic levels, and an opportunity for Norway to influence \textit{in bello} decisions and NATO SOF’s modus operandi. An example would be to influence the degree of kinetic versus non-kinetic operations, or the focus on compliance with international law at the tactical level.

Another similar approach to increase Norwegian influence within NATO is to take on additional decision-making billets at the NATO SOF Headquarters

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{AJP}-3.5 defines “special operations framework nation” as “[a] special operations force troop contributing nation that is capable of providing the framework for a combined joint force special operations component command.” See \textit{AJP}-3.5, LEX-6.
(NSHQ), or at in-theater SOF headquarters. In order to claim such billets, NORSOF must continue to contribute with relevant SOF assets to NATO operations. Norway should have an organization that can rotate qualified personnel into these positions. The remarkable momentum in the development of NATO SOF, after NSHQ was created in 2006, demonstrates that NSHQ is the only viable hub for a successful development of national SOF communities in NATO. NSHQ provides a common NATO SOF doctrine, certification programs, operational support to current operations, etc. Norway must continue to comply with NATO SOF requirements and participate actively in the development of NATO SOF. This includes participation in NATO SOF exercises, implementation of NATO SOF standards (e.g., planning procedures, certification processes), and providing qualified personnel to prioritized NATO SOF billets.

An important, but less recognized, SOF strength is the recognition within the SOF network worldwide. Respected SOF units or nations may get access to other highly respected SOF units, i.e., one might get access to units that play a strategic role for their nations, or to information that may not be shared through other channels. Such information could be related to operations and intelligence during planning and operations, or development of new equipment and capabilities that are not accessible to conventional forces yet. MJK and FSK-HJK have good relations with preferred foreign SOF units, but these relationships and networks are not fully exploited at the operational or strategic levels, since the SOF staff officers at the Defense Staff and NJHQ are too few and have too many tasks to fulfill within their own organizations. A separate special operations command with an SOF commander is likely to prioritize facilitation and maintenance of such “strategic” networks, and exploit the benefits from them. Its officers will be able to move away from the primary role as advisors and action officers for senior defense leaders, toward a role as national SOF representatives, with a wider range of responsibility and an increased flexibility to prioritize such network-building. Notwithstanding, the roles as advisors and action officers must be maintained, but these roles are easier to fulfill in a less
cumbersome organization: a separate special operations command will have to permanently send its “liaison officers” to the appropriate levels (like POLSOCOM’s Warsaw Office), and/or the Special Operations Section and J-3 SOF must continue to exist within their respective staffs.

- Deduction 7: In order to increase the nation’s influence within NATO, Norway should consider developing a special operations framework nation capability for NATO operations. A national joint special operations command can facilitate the personnel and infrastructure of a future Norwegian-led CJFSOCC and coordinate national strategic interests with the deployed assets.

- Deduction 8: In order to increase the nation’s influence within NATO, NORSOF should increase its focus on fostering adequate NORSOF personnel for decision-making billets throughout the NATO SOF community, such as NSHQ and in NATO operations. A joint special operations command must be able to prioritize, control and coordinate NORSOF’s relationship with other nations’ SOF commands and units, and develop these relationships in a manner that supports Norway’s national interests.

3. The Security Environment

The predicted security environment has an impact on both SOF and conventional forces. It is very likely that Norwegian military forces will continue to deploy to foreign areas and operate in complex and unpredictable environments. The borderline between special operations and conventional operations is not always clear during irregular warfare, and an inappropriate use of either can have
counterproductive or even fatal outcomes.\textsuperscript{124} There have been, and will most likely always be, requests for SOF in missions that do not really need SOF. Likewise, there will be conventional units that want to conduct SOF-like missions or start using SOF procedures to improve their operational results. Even though Norwegian forces tend to do a good job in out-of-area operations (e.g., Afghanistan, Sudan, and Gulf of Aden), general knowledge about the contemporary non-conventional environments, dominated by insurgencies, terrorism, and non-state actors, is still lacking in Norway. At some point, a special operation may change into a conventional operation, for instance if the enemy changes its tactics, or if special equipment has been made available for conventional units. It is paramount that SOF are not improperly used, either being retained unnecessarily in-theater or, even worse, being returned unnecessarily to the theater, based on “old political habits” and lack of proper advice on the correct use of SOF. SOF are valuable resources that have little endurance, especially if they are repeatedly misused. Strategic decision-makers need direct and continuous advice from knowledgeable personnel on the appropriate employment and deployment of SOF.

Other crossover areas between SOF and conventional forces are combat support and combat service support to SOF. Properly managed, such support from conventional forces can be crucial in future operations, since NORSOF are not big enough to embed every required asset in terms of combat support and combat service support. However, these forces need to be organized, trained, manned, and equipped to support special operations. Developing such capabilities requires guidance and sometimes demands from SOF. This can be properly executed by a joint special operations commander who coordinates such efforts with the supporting services.

\textsuperscript{124} The United States, the United Nations, NATO, and other organizations do not have a common term that describes the environments, threats, and conflicts that are antonyms of conventional wars, or state-to-state conflicts. Some of the terms used are asymmetric threats/warfare, irregular threats/warfare, unconventional threats/warfare, low-intensity conflicts, small wars, new wars, etc. Some nuances differ between these terms, and they may be used in a variety of ways to describe different aspects of the environment.
Recent operations in irregular environments have demonstrated the increasing demands for information operations capabilities within the special operations realm. Capabilities like psychological operations (PSYOP), computer network operations (CNO), and electronic warfare (EW) are repeatedly demonstrated as vital in contemporary operations, like counterinsurgencies and counterterrorist operations. While other parts of the Norwegian Armed Forces have developed information operations capabilities, the main focus within NORSOF is the development of capabilities that are needed in direct action missions. In order to provide Norwegian decision-makers with a more versatile NORSOF, information operations capabilities should be integrated in the future NORSOF organization. Appendix A will examine how information operations may be included and/or integrated in the NORSOF organization.

- Deduction 9: A national special operations command should have the capacity to focus on the differences between special operations and conventional operations, and to educate and advise national decision-makers and the conventional services on the proper use of SOF, as well as the improper use of conventional forces in irregular warfare. Developing special operations-like capabilities within the conventional forces, including combat support and combat service support to NORSOF, must be carefully monitored and guided by the SOF custodian.

- Deduction 10: NORSOF should include and/or implement information operations capabilities within its future organization. Some capabilities should be organic, while others may be supported by dedicated conventional units.

4. The Three Types of SOF Custodian

The NATO SOF Study lists three models of national SOF leadership. The current Norwegian organizational arrangements for NORSOF are a combination of two of them: the Special Operations Section in the Defense Staff is a national
military staff element for special operations (Model One) and the J-3 SOF in NJHQ resembles a special operations component command (Model Three). However, neither of these two is dimensioned to conduct the respective duties that are listed in the *NATO SOF Study*. The numbers of officers within the two above-mentioned entities have developed independently, and the distribution is probably not optimal for NORSOF. Additionally, they are too few all together, and therefore not able to provide appropriate leadership for NORSOF. There are three main courses of action to further develop a NORSOF custodian in accordance with the *NATO SOF Study*:

**a. Bolstering the Current Arrangement**

The first course of action is to bolster the Special Operations Section within the Defense Staff with additional personnel, so it has the capability to follow up all the responsibilities of a national military staff element for special operations. This might turn out to be the easiest and cheapest course of action, since the organizational arrangements already exist, and the main effort is to find more billets in the Defense Staff. The downside with this model is clear: the two case studies of CANSOFCOM and POLSOCOM indicate that it is difficult to utilize SOF optimally with this model, since the staff element is not given the required power to coordinate, or rather command, the efforts. Not reporting directly to the Chief of Defense causes a systemic inertia, since more layers need to be involved in the strategic decision-making processes. The analysis so far in this study strongly indicates that a national military staff element for special operations is not an appropriate model for Norway.

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125 NJHQ J-3 SOF is not a special operations component command in accordance with the *NATO SOF Study*, but functions as an “organic” component under Commander NJHQ, who normally assumes operational command (OPCOM) over all Norwegian military forces that are either employed or deployed.

126 It is more accurate to say that the Special Operations Section does a little bit of everything, but is not adequately manned to continuously follow up all its tasks. NJHQ J-3 SOF generally focuses on preparation and conduct of SOF deployments and combined and joint SOF exercises.
b. Creating a Joint Special Operations Command

The second course of action is to create a joint special operations command that reports directly to the Chief of Defense, while the respective services are still responsible for some of the force production. The model calls for more personnel than what the Special Operations Section and NJHQ J-3 SOF have today, but the main challenge is to remove power and authority from the services. However, this model is preferable to NORSOF, in terms of integrating and harmonizing the individual capabilities of the units, and to increase NORSOF’s leverage as a strategic asset. Creating a joint special operations command, headed by a SOF commander, would give NORSOF a unified power that has the authority to promote jointness and cooperation. This model ensures jointness better than the two other models, since it combines a joint focus with a service-oriented force production. This means that the services still have a strong stake in the focus and the development of their respective units, and will focus on their own requirements, in terms of support and coordination with SOF. Including special operations air assets in the NORSOF organization is less problematic with this model than with the two other models. A joint special operations command should either be co-located with the Defense Staff, or at least within “walking distance” from the latter (i.e., within the Oslo region), in order to maintain the relationship with the strategic levels. As the two case studies mentioned above indicate, the rank of a NORSOF commander should be in accordance with the equal commanders at his level (i.e., two-star).

c. Creating a Special Operations Service

The third course of action is to create a special operations service that reports directly to the Chief of Defense, and has equal force production responsibilities as the other services (the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Home Guard). The advantage of this model is that SOF becomes its own entity, and can focus entirely on developing a common NORSOF culture. NORSOF would be responsible for its own career management, but this also implies that this new service has to assume responsibilities that are well-established in the
“conventional” services today, such as professional military education, human resource management, and project management. As the NATO SOF Study indicates, the focus may shift from an operational to an administrative mindset, since the amount of obligatory administrative tasks often consumes the organization. Moreover, such a model may weaken the links between SOF and the conventional services in a negative way; as soon as the latter have no influence in SOF’s focus areas, operations, and force production, they lose interest in cooperation and joint operations with SOF. The high standards for operations security, personnel security, etc., will additionally create a distance between SOF and the other services. Going directly to Model Three from the current model is not recommended; the two cases of CANSOFCOM and POLSOCOM point out the drawbacks of creating a big SOF organization that assumes all the duties of a service. The organization will quickly need a high number of personnel without any knowledge about, or relationship with, SOF. This may hamper crucial processes within the community, and result in dissatisfaction among the tactical units and lack of confidence in the staff.

d. Recommending a Model

Of the three models mentioned above, Model Two, joint special operations command, according to this study appears to be the best option for Norway. The model should be combined with representation in the Defense Staff and the Norwegian Armed Forces Operational Headquarters (NJHQ), similar to the representation that exists today, i.e., the Special Operations Section and the J-3 SOF. Further research should be conducted to examine if the two should be liaison officers, permanently detached from the special operations command, or if they should belong to their respective host units, like today. A joint special operations command can both deploy and employ NORSOF independently for domestic and out-of-area operations, or it can support Commander NJHQ if the Chief of Defense delegates OPCOM to the latter.
Model One, National Military Staff Element for Special Operations, is not suited to provide coherence and proper authority and direction over the NORSOF units. The units would continue to conduct high-level special operations like before, but the organizational design and the limitations of the model would prevent NORSOF from functioning optimally as strategic assets. Increasing the number of SOF personnel in the Defense Staff and NJHQ will definitely improve NORSOF’s situation, in terms of increasing the capacity of the action officers. However, just an increase of personnel probably will not change NORSOF’s leverage or ability to influence decision-making at the strategic level.

Model Three, special operations service, is not a bad model for NORSOF, as it would provide the SOF commander with the authority to develop and exercise all aspects of special operations. However, several uncertainties and challenges deny it from being the recommended model. First, being fully responsible for all aspects of NORSOF’s force production, as well as planning and execution of all special operations, requires manpower that is difficult to find. Such personnel need a minimum of experience from special operations, and they cannot be taken from the two SOF units (or three, if one includes 137 Air Wing) or other conventional units, without hurting unit strength severely. Second, such a model may isolate the SOF community from the conventional community more than desired, as the other services most likely would lose interest in supporting a newly created service that focuses on its own development rather than joint cooperation. Third, the primary focus of the special operations service will have to be administrative issues, such as personnel management, logistics, and other non-operational responsibilities that have been taken away from the other services. Ultimately, this might hamper the organization’s goal: to optimize the strategic utilization of NORSOF. It a special operations service becomes a long-term goal, it should only develop from an already established and experienced joint special operations command and at a point when the latter has the capacity to take over the full range of force production responsibilities.
• Deduction 11: Norway should establish a joint special operations command (Model Two). This command should be located within the Oslo region, and the commander should have the appropriate rank of his level of command, which is O-8 (major general or rear admiral).

5. Countering Some of the Counter Arguments

Traditional counter arguments always have been mentioned when the issue of a separate joint special operations command or service has been addressed in Norway. The main arguments are that such an additional command is unnecessary and expensive. The NATO SOF Study makes good counter-arguments in these cases. The point about necessity is thoroughly explained in this thesis; in order to properly utilize NORSOF as strategic assets, a separate command is necessary. In contemporary environments, SOF most often operates as a separate component, it is joint by nature, and depends utterly on organizational mechanisms that allow the forces to function properly. Many people have argued that it is natural that NJHQ directs all Norwegian Armed Forces domestic and out-of-area operations to coordinate and synchronize all operational efforts. However, the effect of this arrangement is that SOF is not utilized as a strategic asset. It is important to remember that even though NORSOF has been deployed to somewhat “conventional” theaters, like the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Gulf of Aden, future special operations may not look like any operations Norway has deployed its forces to before. Monitoring operations where NORSOF is detached to a joint force commander is “easy,” but future special operations could be far more complex, sensitive, and politically risky. The example of Norwegian Intelligence Service can be used to understand the necessity of autonomy to be a strategic asset. The intelligence service plans, deploys, and employs its own forces independently, but in liaison with NJHQ where this is necessary. In order to ensure synchronization between NORSOF and Norwegian conventional forces in a future model, the existing J-3 SOF must persist as a part of NJHQ, or be redesignated as a permanently detached liaison
element from SOF to NJHQ. Notwithstanding, the creation of a joint special operations command does not mean that NORSOF cannot be commanded from NJHQ, if that continues to be the prevailing model. Creating a SOF command will facilitate more jointness, better coordination, and better economy of force; moreover, it will supply the Chief of Defense and Commander NJHQ with more versatile and robust SOF than those available today.

The argument about costs needs some additional attention. Expenditure to a proper development of SOF as a national strategic capability is only a small fraction of a nation’s larger defense budget when compared to “conventional” defense systems and platforms. The NATO SOF Study also points out that the critical difference between the latter investments and SOF investments is the capability achieved relative to the security environment that is anticipated. “For a relatively inconsequential investment, a nation can equip a world class SOF organization and enable a significant national strategic capability.”

127 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 32.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSION

Norway needs to optimize their special operations forces (SOF) as strategic assets to support national interests and to provide the national political leadership with better grounds for decision-making and a greater space for freedom of action. For optimal utilization of the Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) as strategic assets, the Norwegian Armed Forces should establish a joint special operations command, resembling the model that the NATO SOF Study refers to as a Special Operations Component Command (Model Two).\textsuperscript{128} Governing Norwegian documents, as well as NATO doctrine, support organizational improvements that facilitate more effective special operations capabilities. The current organizational design is not optimal because the NORSOF representation at the strategic and operational levels is fragmented, and remains without authority to develop and coordinate Norway’s national special operations efforts. The NATO SOF Study concludes that “the critical ingredient to optimize SOF is a dedicated national special operations organization to provide coherent, long-term stewardship, authority, and direction over all aspects of special operations.”\textsuperscript{129} Only a separate joint special operations command or service can execute effective authority and directions over NORSOF. A strengthening, but continuation of the current organization is not sufficient; the NORSOF community will continue to suffer from lack of proper stewardship, coordination, and economy of force. Going from the current organizational arrangements directly to a special operations service (Model Three) is not recommended, as the total portfolio of force production responsibilities would most likely overwhelm the organization.


\textsuperscript{129} NSCC, \textit{NATO SOF Study}, ii.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS

In accordance with the conclusion, multiple actions should be taken to optimize the strategic utilization of NORSOF. The following recommendations are based on the deductions from the case study of NORSOF and the analysis of the indicators that were used in the case studies of the Canadian Special Operations Forces (CANSOF) and the Polish Special Operations Forces (POLSOF).

1. Create a Joint Special Operations Command
   a. Norway should establish a joint special operations command (Model Two) at the strategic/operational level. The division of force production responsibilities between the other services and the joint special operations command must be agreed upon in the process of establishing the command. The size of the command should be based on availability and development, and not on absolute requirements. The division of billets between the services needs to be balanced, in order to avoid skewed interests from the start. All decision-making positions need to be filled with experienced SOF personnel. It is not recommended to fill up a large number of billets with inexperienced personnel, but rather to develop the command in line with what the NORSOF community has available and is able to comprehend (“evolution, not revolution”).
   b. This command should be located within the Oslo region, close to the political- and military-strategic decision-makers. The Polish case shows that only a few hours of travel distance from the decision-makers hampers the relationship between the strategic level and the SOF command. The Canadian case demonstrates the opposite: co-location fosters a good and daily relationship with the military strategic level.
   c. The commander of the joint special operations command must have the appropriate rank of his level of command, which is O-8
(major general or rear admiral), and he must be directly subordinate to the Chef of Defense, like the chiefs of the services. Both the Canadian and the Polish cases confirm that even if the SOF commander is only one or two ranks below the equally leveled commanders, SOF loses a lot of influence and prestige among the other commanders and services, and will always be viewed as the junior service/component, despite its high relevance in contemporary operations and its strategic importance.

2. Roles of the Joint Special Operations Command

d. The joint special operations command should normally be delegated OPCOM over NORSOF assets, and be able to deploy and employ NORSOF, both independently and in cooperation with NJHQ. The division of labor and responsibilities for SOF deployments between the joint special operations command and NJHQ must be scrutinized, and subject to national interests, not a turf war between commanders. In some operations, OPCON may be delegated to NJHQ, or OPCOM/OPCON over support assets may be retained, e.g., special air operations assets or submarines. In other cases, especially in covert and/or clandestine operations, the command may deploy and employ SOF independently, and informs NJHQ or other units as appropriate. It is important to note that the establishment of a joint special operations command does not exclude a potential continuation of the current command and control arrangements: the Chief of Defense may continue to delegate OPCOM to Commander NJHQ over all national assets, including the joint special operations commander.

e. The roles as advisors and SOF action officers should persist within the strategic and operational organizations; either as permanent liaison officer detachments from the joint special operations
command, or as part of the Defense Staff and NJHQ, like in the current arrangements. The current NJHQ J-3 SOF may be redesignated as a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE), subordinate to the Joint Special Operations Command, but permanently detached to NJHQ to “synchronize, deconflict, and coordinate operations with conventional [air,] land or maritime forces.”

f. A national special operations command should have the capacity to focus on the differences between special operations and conventional operations, and to educate and advise national decision-makers and the conventional services on the proper use of SOF, as well as the improper use of conventional forces in irregular warfare. Developing special operations-like capabilities within the conventional forces, including combat support and combat service support to NORSOF, must be carefully monitored and guided by the SOF custodian. A joint special operations commander will be the services’ primary advisor on understanding special operations and to facilitate good rapport between the communities, as well as the development of new capabilities, enablers, special operations combat support, and combat service support capabilities within the services.

g. The joint special operations command should control a separate budget for joint special operations. The case studies of CANSOFCOM and POLSOCOM demonstrate the significant advantage of a separate budget. The SOF commanders can make decisions that leverage the joint capabilities instead of suboptimal

\footnote{North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5)* (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2009), LEX-5. Normally, a Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) would do the same tasks as a SOCCE, but to the air component commander. In a Norwegian model, a SOCCE with experienced special air operations personnel would be adequate.}
service-biased capabilities. A separate budget also protects operational security issues, since it only goes through the SOF chain of command. The parent services can still have force production responsibilities, such as professional military education, base management, and safety quality control, but the SOF units must be allocated a certain amount of funds that cannot be redistributed or cut by the services.

h. The joint special operations command should have the authority and means to expedite the rapid acquisition of SOF-specific items. However, the case studies of CANSOFCOM and POLSOCOM demonstrate that this issue requires particular attention. The current procurement arrangements for NORSOF are already elevated from the tactical level and should be better prepared for a creation of a joint special operations command. The latter will make the cross-service decisions on what and how much to procure, and which procurements be prioritized. The current procurement organization is undermanned, especially the action officers in the Defense Logistics Organization, and has little capacity to follow up multiple rapid procurements at the same time as multiple project timelines are maintained. Hence, the procurement organization should be augmented, and key personnel in the current organization must be kept to maintain continuity as well.

i. The joint special operations command should consist of a training and education branch (J-7) that assumes the responsibility to facilitate and/or direct joint training, exercise, and education. The case studies of POLSOF and CANSOF indicated that joint training is a means, not the ends. Facilitating joint concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures through training and exercises is important, but a critical aspect is to ensure that a sufficient number of special operations personnel get relevant professional military
education. The training centers/wings in the tactical units should have some joint responsibilities, in addition to the responsibilities they have within their own services. For instance, one training center/wing is responsible for facilitating annual operations planning process courses, while another training center/wing is responsible for annual sniper courses, etc. J-7, together with the tactical units/training centers, should derive the division of labor and responsibilities between the units and the command.

j. The joint special operations command must have the ability to either manage or influence the career development of SOF personnel. Career paths that are flexible and do not discourage personnel from choosing special operations as a branch must be established. Personnel should from the start of their careers know that there actually are career paths, and incentives that make personnel choose positions outside the traditional operator realm (such as operations, command staff, training wing, etc.) must exist.

k. Job descriptions and requirements for billets at the joint special operations command should be carefully developed. In order to maintain integrity within the NORSOF community, as well as with other nations' SOF communities, some billets must have "badged" personnel, while other billets need "experienced" SOF personnel, i.e., personnel with service in one of the units, but not necessarily badged. Finally, some billets may not need such requirements, and should rather call for experts within the job's domain (e.g., roles within finances, administration, that are not key roles). The two case studies from Canada and Poland emphasize the importance of having a sufficient number of badged and experienced SOF personnel within their respective commands. In order to sustain integrity, it is recommended that
the commander and the deputy commander of a joint special operations command are badged officers.

3. **Increase Norway’s Influence in NATO**

   l. In order to increase the nation’s influence within NATO, Norway should consider developing a special operations framework nation capability for NATO operations. A national joint special operations command can facilitate the personnel and infrastructure of a future Norwegian-led CJFSOCC and coordinate national strategic interests with the deployed assets.

   m. In order to increase the nation’s influence within NATO, NORSOF should increase its focus on fostering adequate NORSOF personnel for decision-making billets throughout the NATO SOF community, such as NSHQ and in NATO operations. A joint special operations command must be able to prioritize, control and coordinate NORSOF’s relationship with other nations’ SOF commands and units, and develop these relationships in a manner that supports Norway’s national interests.

4. **Ensure Special Air Operations Capabilities**

   n. Special air operations capabilities must be optimized by including competent Air Force personnel in the NORSOF community, including a future joint special operations command or service. The division of force production and operational responsibilities between the joint NORSOF leadership and the Air Force must be as perfect and functional as possible. Further assessments are necessary to ensure the proper use of special air operations capabilities, including special air operations contribution to domestic and out of area operations.
5. **Reorganize the Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Group**

   o. MJK’s level in the Navy’s administrative chain of command should be similar to FSK-HJK’s level; the Commander of MJK should report directly to the Chief of the Navy.

   p. Commander MJK’s rank should be equivalent to the Commander FSK-HJK’s rank, i.e., Navy Captain (O-6).

   q. Combat support to special operations (as well as conventional operations) should be formalized in the Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Group’s mission statement and in its subordinate units’ mission essential task lists.

   r. In concurrence with Recommendation o, The Special Division in the Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Training Center should be dispatched from the latter, and transferred to MJK as an organic training wing, but with direct access to the Joint Special Operations Command’s J-7, in terms of joint responsibilities.\(^\text{131}\)

6. **Establish Combat Support and Enabling Capabilities**

   s. NORSOF should include and/or implement information operations capabilities within its future organization. Some capabilities should be organic, while others may be supported by dedicated conventional units.

   t. With the creation of a joint special operations command, a thorough assessment must be carried out to map the future combat support forces and enabling capabilities for NORSOF. Certain forces within the current conventional organizations might have capabilities that are better utilized if they are directly subordinate to the SOF

\(^{131}\) The Special Division is one of four divisions/training wings at the Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Training Center. The other four serve the conventional units in the Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Group. The Special Division is responsible for selection of special operators and special boat operators, as well as advanced special operations training for MJK.
commander, or if they have a formalized dual-hatted role toward both special operations and conventional forces (like 137 Air Wing has currently). Examples of directly subordinate or dual-hatted forces could be improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD) experts, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons experts, computer network operations (CNO) experts, the Coastal Ranger Commando (combat support) and dedicated medical support units.

Figure 14 shows the recommended model, where the Commander of Joint Special Operations Command is the twelfth commander directly subordinate to the Chief of Defense. For special operations, the Chief of Defense will delegate OPCOM to the joint special operations commander over the tactical SOF units, as well as supporting units. In some cases, e.g., special air operations conducted by 137 Air Wing or submarine support operations, OPCOM/OPCON may be retained by the Norwegian Joint Headquarters, and coordinated by a SOCCE (see command relationship in Figure 15). Alternatively, Commander NJHQ may continue to assume OPCOM (delegated from Chief of Defense), and be supported by the joint special operations commander.

![Diagram showing command relationships](image)

Figure 14. Joint Special Operations Command: the Twelfth Commander
Figure 15 shows the recommended model with NORSOF representation at all three levels:

- **Strategic level**: A Special Operations Section, similar to the current arrangement in the Defense Staff. Its primary roles are advising and action officers.

- **Operational level**: A separate joint special operations command, with delegated operational command over national SOF.

- **Operational level**: A Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE), subordinate to the joint special operations commander, or a SOF cell subordinate to the Norwegian Joint Headquarters. Its role is to coordinate and deconflict special operations and conventional operations. In the SOCCE model, the joint special operations command may delegate OPCON to the SOCCE when appropriate.

- **Tactical level**: FSK-HJK (NORASOC) and MJK (NORNAVSOC).

![Diagram of NORSOF Representation in the Recommended Model](image-url)
APPENDIX A. INFORMATION OPERATIONS FOR NORSOF

Information operations should be a seamlessly integrated capability in every special operations forces (SOF) organization, because such capabilities are necessary for strategic assets to possess in order to conduct the full range of special operations. In today’s irregular warfare environments, with the inherent battle for the “hearts and minds” or, more precisely, the “trust and confidence” of a population, the psychological and informational aspects are vital, and often referred to as more important than combat actions.\textsuperscript{132} By utilizing their own information operations capabilities, SOF can to a much larger degree separate insurgents from the local population and neutralize terrorists with non-lethal means instead of lethal means. Additionally, information operations are also an important part of conventional warfare, and cannot be disregarded as capabilities that are highly needed by SOF during their conduct of special operations in such types of war. Regardless of the warfare’s nature, today’s globalization and numerous channels of communication have made control over the information one of the most strategically important parts of warfare.

As with many other SOF organizations within NATO, Norwegian Special Operations Forces’ (NORSOF) comprehension of information operations is still nascent. Although assumed future threats and recent experience from operations should precipitate a broader focus on information operations, NORSOF selection, training, education, and organization are primarily optimized for traditional special operations tasks. \textit{Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations} (AJP-3.5) lists three “principle tasks of Allied Joint Special Operations Forces”: Direct Action, Strategic Reconnaissance and Surveillance (SR&S), and Military Assistance.

\textsuperscript{132} North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Center [NSCC], \textit{North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study [NATO SOF Study]} (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2008), A9.
AJP-3.5 also lists four “Additional Activities of Allied Joint Special Operations Forces”: support to counter-irregular threat activities; countering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons; hostage release operations; and faction liaison. Recognizing that NATO SOF organizations do not have the full range of capabilities needed to conduct all the activities above independently, the NATO SOF Study has identified a number of enablers and force structure implications for SOF. The NATO SOF Study notes that ad hoc attachments of enabling capabilities fail to function appropriately, and that habitual relationships with the supported SOF units are necessary. This appendix will suggest measures to implement some information operations capabilities within NORSOF, while current special operations capabilities are maintained.

A. DEFINITIONS

NATO, Norway, and the United States define and explain information operations differently. The main difference is in how the doctrines of the three entities perceive information operations. The United States sees them as integrated military capabilities, while NATO and Norway see them as coordinated activities in support of political and military objectives. Moreover, there are some differences in the subdivision of activities/capabilities between the three entities.

1. NATO: Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations

NATO defines information operations as “a military function to provide advice and coordination of military information activities in order to create desired

133 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 2–1; 2–3.
134 Ibid., 2–3; 2–5.
135 The identified enablers from the NATO SOF Study are: Mobility (Air, Maritime, and Ground); Countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons; Liaison; Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV); All-Source Intelligence; Medical; Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD); Logistics; Psychological and Information Operations; and Air Force Ground SOF Personnel. See NSCC, NATO SOF Study, A1–A10.
effects on the will, understanding and capabilities of adversaries and other [North Atlantic Council] approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives.”

NATO sees information operations as an integrating function that focuses on the information environment, and not as a capability in its own right.\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations} (AJP-3.10) does not divide information operations into sub-categories, but lists “examples of capabilities, tools, and techniques used in support of information objectives”:\textsuperscript{139}

- Psychological operations
- Presence, Posture, and Profile
- Operations Security
- Information Security
- Deception
- Electronic Warfare
- Physical Destruction
- Key Leader Engagement
- Computer Network Operations
- Civil-Military Cooperation

AJP-3.10 recognizes that “civil-military cooperation is a capability that can be used to achieve information objectives.” Public affairs, however, is considered as a related, but separate function.\textsuperscript{140}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], \textit{Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (AJP-3.10)} (2009), 1–3.
\item NATO, \textit{AJP-3.10}, 1–8.
\item Ibid., 1–8; 1–12.
\item Ibid., 1–12; 1–13.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
2. Norway: Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine

The Norwegian definition of information operations is stated in the *Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine*. The doctrine delineates information operations as coordinated activities, and emphasizes that these activities support strategic objectives:

Information operations are coordinated activities and which are implemented to achieve desired effects on the understanding, will and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other target groups. Information operations support the strategic objectives by influencing other parties’ information, information-based processes and systems, while at the same time making use of and protecting own information, information-based processes and systems.141

The Norwegian doctrine lists six information operations core activities:142

- Psychological operations
- Deception
- Information security143
- Electronic Warfare
- Computer Network Operations
- Physical destruction of the information infrastructure

The Norwegian doctrine states that public affairs and civil affairs are related to, but not part of, information operations, as it is paramount to preserve the integrity and credibility of these two activities.144

141 Forsvarsstaben [The Defense Staff], *Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine 2007* [Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine], trans. The Defense Staff (Oslo: The Defense Staff, 2007), 134.

142 Ibid., 137–138.

143 *Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine* refers to Information Security as an important part of OPSEC. See p. 137.

144 Forsvarsstaben, *Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine*, 139.
3. United States: Joint Publication 3-13 – Information Operations

The U.S. definition of information operations is stated in Joint Publication 3-13–Information Operations (JP 3-13). While NATO uses the term “examples of capabilities, tools, and techniques in support of information objectives,” and Norway refers to the term “information operations core activities,” the U.S. doctrine divides information operations into core capabilities. Moreover, it does not emphasize that information operations have to apply specifically to the strategic level:

The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.145

The U.S. doctrine refers to five distinct core capabilities within information operations:

- Psychological operations
- Military Deception
- Operational security
- Electronic Warfare
- Computer Network Operations

JP 3-13 also refers to supporting capabilities and related capabilities. Supporting capabilities are information assurance, physical security, physical attack, counterintelligence, and combat camera.146 Related capabilities are public affairs, civil-military operations, and defense support to public diplomacy.147


146 Ibid., x.

147 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-13, x.
4. **Scope**

In this research, information operations will be considered as capabilities, since the purpose is to map out additional capabilities for NORSOF that require organizational changes to NORSOF and other units in the Norwegian Armed Forces. The capabilities that will be examined are:

- Psychological operations
- Computer network operations
- Military deception

The above-mentioned core capabilities are represented in all three doctrines, either as capabilities or as activities. Some capabilities have been omitted due to classification reasons, particularly EW. Additionally, this research will focus on the information operations capabilities that can enhance NORSOF’s efforts to become a “world-class special operations force,” not the capabilities that are supposed to protect one’s own forces from an adversary. Hence, capabilities like operational security (OPSEC) and computer network defense (CND) will not be discussed in this research, even though they are very relevant capabilities for NORSOF to possess. Other capabilities have been omitted because they are either already implemented in NORSOF, or they are only matters of activities, for instance:

- Physical attack/destruction of the information infrastructure has always been a part of SOF’s core tasks (DA), and does not need to be examined as an additional capability.

- Presence, posture, and profile (PPP) are not capabilities, but activities. Knowledge about the importance and impact of PPP is crucial, also to SOF, but this should rather be implemented as part of the Norwegian professional military education pipeline.
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS PERSONNEL

Due to restrictions in the Norwegian Armed Forces’ personnel policy and its budget limitations, a crucial question is how new capabilities can be implemented to NORSOF. In general, there are four avenues to implement additional information operations capabilities:

1. Extra personnel are added to NORSOF
   - Within the tactical units
   - As an additional tactical unit (requires a joint special operations command)

2. The NORSOF organization learns, assimilates, and develops the new capability with the existing personnel. Personnel modify their tasks by either adding or changing them.

3. The NORSOF organization utilizes existing environments outside its own. Designated personnel from external units are earmarked for special operations, and are subject to NORSOF requirements in terms of selection, training, notice-to-move, etc.

4. The NORSOF organization utilizes existing services and/or units outside itself, but on ad hoc basis.

These four different approaches come with advantages and disadvantages, and adding new units to NORSOF is not always a viable option, even though it usually appears to be the best one. Of course, adding sufficient information operations personnel and/or units would benefit NORSOF most. By giving NORSOF the full authority over such units/personnel, an implementation would not depend on other entities. NORSOF could organize, train, and tailor its information operations capabilities, and good OPSEC would be maintained. On the contrary, adding more personnel or creating new units costs more money, counters the stringent personnel limitations, and requires adequate priority and
supervision from the NORSOF (or tactical units’) leadership, in order to prevent
the new capabilities from being sub-optimized.

The NATO SOF Study notes that NATO SOF units often find augmented
conventional psychological operations augmentees “completely unsuited to the
operational environment.” Moreover, the document states that SOF units need
trained information operations personnel with the required expertise to assist
special operations.148 Hence, it is very likely to believe that ad hoc
augmentations from the conventional forces are inappropriate for special
operations.

As mentioned earlier, the defense budget and the personnel situation in
the Norwegian Armed Forces do not allow an unconditioned build-up of required
information operations capabilities within NORSOF. Therefore, smart solutions
must be sought, and an acceptable organizational design that allows NORSOF to
carry out high-quality information operations integrated with special operations
must be facilitated. The three core capabilities must be implemented and
developed individually, based on the required skills and knowledge that are
necessary in the special operations environment in each case. The challenge is,
of course, to find the very few people who have exactly what NORSOF needs;
the appropriate traits, skills, knowledge, and special operations mindset.

C. TRAITS, SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE

All human beings are different, and cannot become experts, or at least
equally good, at every type of activity. Several theories have been proposed to
explain how humans differ from each others: While traits can be seen as
personality qualities or characteristics (e.g., introvert/extrovert, honest, shy, and
impatient), skills are knowledge and abilities that can be learned over time and
eventually utilized (e.g., read maps, drive a car, or solve mathematical

Moreover, skills can be seen as the ability to utilize knowledge. In general, there are two types of knowledge:

- **Explicit knowledge**, which is knowledge that can be explained in written language, like manuals and mathematical expressions.
- **Tacit knowledge**, which is personal knowledge that is hard to share or describe to others, for instance how to ride a bike.

If information operations capabilities are being added to NORSOF’s portfolio, it is important to understand that the special operations realm requires high-quality personnel with the traits and skills that are necessary in sensitive operations at the strategic and operational levels. Finding the right personnel to do the right job, and organizing these wisely, will be a challenge. In order to successfully implement information operations capabilities, NORSOF must to a large degree look for other types of personnel than those they have today.

Special operators in the two tactical NORSOF units have been carefully picked out through a number of selection processes and forged into assaulters with the proficient skills of conducting offensive, lethal operations. The selection processes in the two units continuously develop, based on the lessons learned from previous selections, and feedback from the operational squadrons on what the required skills of a new operator should be. The two units have somewhat different selection criteria, as well as different selection processes. Still, they both seem to be able to identify and develop personnel who have the skills and knowledge required to be assaulters in the units. The units also divide the assaulters into more subtle roles, based on their traits and skills. Hence, there will be operators who are excellent communicators, but maybe not fit to be good snipers. Others may turn out to be supreme breachers, but they lack what it

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takes to be a certified joint terminal attack controller (JTAC). The NORSOF units usually spend some time during and after the selection period to identify the individual operators' interests, skills, and traits, in order to find out what types of specialties each individual should get.

The problem occurs when some assaulters are told to carry out tasks that are completely different from direct action (DA) or some of the other tasks that have been focused on during selection and training, for instance raids or reconnaissance missions. Even though a “traditional” special operator might be perceived as computer savvy among his peers, it is not likely that he will be able to develop the skills that are required to carry out a delicate computer network attack (CNA) on a terrorist’s computer. In order to carry out such a task, one will need to utilize personnel with the traits and skills that go beyond “computer savvy.” In fact, what NORSOF would need for such operations are people with the skills of a hacker.151 And, just as it is difficult to tell someone how to ride a bike, it is almost impossible to teach someone how to conduct sophisticated cyber attacks. When information operations capabilities are implemented in a SOF organization, the need for traits, skills, and especially tacit knowledge will be different from those that exist among the assaulters. In some cases, special operators can be trained to carry out new tasks. In other cases, however, NORSOF must find its experts externally.

151 There is no official definition of the terms hacker, hack, and hacking. Even though most people might associate hackers and hacking with illicit activities, this research does not necessarily assume that all hackers conduct illegal activities. Professor Dorothy E. Denning of The U.S. Naval Postgraduate School describes a hack as “tinkering with hardware or software,” “clever programming trick,” and “breaking security controls—hardware or software.” Dorothy E. Denning, (Conflict and Cyberspace, course in Joint Information Operations Curriculum, The U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, July—September 2009). Professor Brian Harvey at University of California tries to explain the meaning of the word hacker: “A 'computer hacker’ . . . is someone who lives and breathes computers, who knows all about computers, who can get a computer to do anything. Equally important, though, is the hacker's attitude. . . . A hacker is an aesthete.” http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~bh/hacker.html
D. INFORMATION OPERATIONS CORE CAPABILITIES

This research will explore NORSOF’s demands for the various information operations capabilities, and the organizational potential that exists in Norway. This section recommends where or how to find the right personnel within each capability, and also how the personnel can be implemented in NORSOF’s organization. The recommendations are based on the assumption that one cannot create separate information operations units, and that the economic situation does not allow a large increase in the number of personnel. Notwithstanding, it is important to note that the recommendation of adding capabilities does not imply exchanging current capabilities with new ones. The number of personnel dedicated for core special operations activities (DA, SR&S, and MA) still needs to be developed in accordance with NORSOF’s own plans, and should not be affected by recommendations from this research.

1. Implementing an Information Operations Environment in NORSOF

As defined in the three doctrines above, information operations are coordinated and/or integrated activities, and should be seen as a holistic system that applies additional capabilities to the decision-makers. Therefore, knowing how to use these capabilities in concert with the other special operations capabilities must be manifested within the whole organization, and especially within its leadership. A creation of a NORSOF joint special operations command would facilitate integration of dedicated external (outside the tactical units) information operations assets, as well as leverage information operations as an integrated and force-multiplying component within Norwegian special operations. Moreover, an implementation of information operations capabilities would require personnel with general knowledge about information operations, and specialized personnel with skills and knowledge within particular information operations activities.

Information operations knowledge should be implemented at all levels of professional military education, in order to increase the general understanding of
the subject matters. For instance, the Norwegian Naval SOF community has already established special operations curricula at various levels of its professional military education. The Special Operations Curriculum at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy produces future platoon leaders and junior operations officers, and the one-year Special Operations Curriculum at the Principle Warfare Officers Course educates senior staff officers and future squadron (and platoon) commanders. By implementing/increasing the impact of information operations in these curricula, NORSOF (especially the Naval SOF community) can raise its number of personnel with general knowledge on information operations capabilities.

a. **Personnel Required**

As the Norwegian Armed Forces does not have an information operations service or component, NORSOF will have to find suitable officers within the small communities that possesses one of the capabilities, or current special operations personnel that have special interests or talents within information operations. Some staff members should be designated as information operations officers, and possess a comprehensive knowledge about utilization of information operations and its integration with special operations. These staff officers should have extensive education, training, and operational experience from information operations. An example of relevant education could be the master's degree program in information operations at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (18 months). By introducing information operations to naval cadets and Principle Warfare Officers Course students, it is likely that the increased amount of relevant education also leads to increased understanding and interest of the subject matters. The appropriate locus of an information operations officer would be in the operations section and the plans section, but having other officers with information operations interest and understanding throughout the entire organization would be of significant value.
All personnel within NORSOF should a minimum of knowledge that explains the characteristics, employment, and integration of the various capabilities within information operations. The higher up in the organization, the more understanding is required. The commander, deputy commander, central staff members, as well as the leaders within the assault squadrons, should have a basic level knowledge about information operations. Examples of relevant education for commanders and staff members could be NATO Planners Information Operations Course (two weeks) at NATO School Oberammergau, Joint Information Operations Course (one week), or Joint Information Operations Planning Course (four weeks), both at Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. Examples of education for all members of NORSOF could be internal courses or seminars (one to five days), occasionally arranged by the respective training wings in the units, or the information operations officer in the staff. This type of education could be in concert, or a part of the education that is recommended at the special operations curricula at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy and the Principle Warfare Officers Course. Designated NORSOF personnel should get relevant on-the-job training with external SOF units that use information operations to solve their missions, to learn how NORSOF can apply similar activities to its own operations.

One of the most important things is to implement an understanding of the importance of information operations throughout the entire organization. Assigning and developing only one staff officer, and leaving the rest of the organization without any knowledge about the use of information operations, is not a viable solution. Information operations are a critical part of NORSOF operations in the future, and the understanding of its importance and characteristics should be implemented at all levels of the NORSOF community.

b. Organizational Issues

As recommended earlier, a joint special operations command should be established for NORSOF, also because it can synchronize the
information operations efforts in the special operations sphere. A centralized NORSOF command can control and coordinate all assets that support special operations, even though they are administratively controlled by other parent units. Limited parts of external units can be designated for special operations support, and maintain their standards based on the requirements that are issued by the joint special operations command. A command will facilitate memorandums of agreement or understanding between supporting units and NORSOF’s tactical units, facilitate OPSEC measures, facilitate joint exercises, and streamline the communication between the communities. A command will also be responsible for developing the standards within information operations that the different levels of NORSOF personnel must obtain and maintain. Finally, a joint special operations commander will be a crucial advisor to the strategic and operational levels, including the Minister of Defense, Chief of Defense, and Commander of Norwegian Joint Headquarters, and assist these with more versatile employments of special operations, to include information operations activities, in support of strategic objectives.

2. Implementing Psychological Operations Capabilities

Even though correctly applied psychological operations (U.S. acronym is “PSYOP,” while NATO acronym is “PSYOPS”) is a very effective way to employ influence and other non-lethal impacts on a large and important audience, Norway has no units or capabilities that are dedicated to carry out PSYOP. It can be assumed that the term PSYOP is (wrongly) viewed as lying and brainwashing, or confused with the term deception, and often perceived as perfidy or deceitful actions. In fact, PSYOP is a very useful tool that could support Norwegian values (non-lethal) in out-of-area operations. It is necessary in both conventional and irregular warfare, but the use of SOF in PSYOP activities may differ.

PSYOP is described somewhat differently in the U.S. and the Norwegian doctrines. The Norwegian doctrine focuses on the processes that facilitate PSYOP, while the U.S. doctrine focuses on the target audience and the impact
PSYOP has on it. Interestingly, the Norwegian doctrine, which is based on the NATO doctrine, does not mention that PSYOP only can be directed toward a foreign audience, like the U.S. doctrine does.

JP 3-13 defines PSYOP as:

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\text{planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.}
\]

The *Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine* leans to NATO in its description of PSYOP. Interestingly, the Norwegian doctrine states that only the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decides which target audiences PSYOP is to be directed at.

Psychological operations (PSYOPS) has the objective of influencing perceptions, attitudes and conduct and in this way achieving desired political and military effects. Influence can be actively exerted both clandestinely and openly – in times of peace, crisis and armed conflict. In NATO the political leadership ([NAC]) lays down guidelines for psychological operations and approves which target groups such operations are to be directed against. In order to carry out an effective psychological operation it is necessary to have a thorough knowledge and understanding of the target groups. It is often necessary to possess competence in such fields as psychology, sociology, anthropology, linguistics, graphic design, printing and publishing, and to have the capability for broadcasting or mass distribution in some other way. [PSYOP] messages can be disseminated using all forms of printed matter, radio, TV, loudspeakers directed at the adversary, direct conversations, the Internet, fax and mobile phones.\(^{152}\)

PSYOP is a crucial capability for NORSOF to possess, especially in counterinsurgencies, where the objective is to earn a population’s trust and confidence. Overt movements around in Afghanistan, for instance, require NORSOF attitudes and actions that convey carefully selected information to the

\(^{152}\) Forsvarsstaben, *Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine*, 137.
local population that supports the strategic objectives of International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) or Norway. Assets with PSYOP capability can convey such messages correctly, and in accordance with these objectives.

a. Personnel Required

Norwegian Armed Forces has a limited PSYOP capability. The Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College has a pool of approximately 15 men and women complementing its Forsvarets PSYOPS enhet [Joint Norwegian PSYOPS Group] (FPOE). FPOE is a stand-by unit, which means that its personnel have other jobs (military or civilian), but can be tasked to participate in PSYOP deployments when needed.

In general, there are four ways NORSOF can develop its PSYOP capability.153 The first way is to create a new, joint PSYOP unit within the NORSOF organization with external practitioners and the pertinent extra funding required to develop such a unit. The natural place would be to create such a unit within the Army SOF unit, Forsvarets spesialkommando/Hærens jegerkommando (FSK-HJK). Even though there might be several good arguments why the Norwegian government should reallocate resources from other parts of the military forces to a PSYOP capability build-up, it is not likely that that will happen soon. The next two ways of developing NORSOF PSYOP capabilities are described in Commander Petter Hellesen’s Counterinsurgency and Its Implications for the Norwegian Special Operations Forces. He notes that NORSOF either can give some of its own personnel adequate PSYOP training, or it can utilize other nations’ PSYOP capabilities.154 Of course, the latter implies a bilateral agreement with a nation that has available PSYOP forces that can carry out operations that concur with Norwegian values and objectives. This


154 Petter Hellesen, Counterinsurgency and Its Implications for the Norwegian Special Operations Forces (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 68.
might not always be feasible, and can in most cases not be developed beyond *ad hoc* arrangements with somewhat random relationships between the two communities. Moreover, this option was based on the situation in Norway in 2008, when Norway did not have a designated PSYOP group. The last way to implement PSYOP in NORSOF is to utilize personnel from FPOE’s pool, and select and train these for special operations support.

A viable option seems to be to select and utilize personnel from FPOE, but NORSOF should also develop a limited capability within its own personnel. As earlier suggested, not all assaulters will possess the traits and skills needed to be an efficient PSYOP operator. Developing good PSYOP assets within NORSOF might take some time, as the domestic resources are lacking. In order to start the development of such assets, NORSOF should send some of its personnel to countries that have well-established PSYOP organizations, either to attend a full version of a PSYOP specialist course, or at least get insight in how such personnel are selected and trained. Historically, the NORSOF units have sent some of its personnel to some short PSYOP courses (one-to-two weeks), domestically and abroad. These courses have merely been superficial, and are supposedly not adequate to build tactical assets that are supposed to support strategic objectives.

In his research, Hellesen also suggests additional steps to build up a NORSOF capability. He emphasizes that there is a need to increase regional expertise, as well as to cultivate cultural understanding and awareness. This can be done by connecting external expertise, such as anthropologists, sociologists, and regional experts to the NORSOF community. Hellesen notes that extra efforts should be made to recruit NORSOF candidates among Norwegians with cultural background from areas that NORSOF is likely to operate in.  

\[155\] Hellesen, *Counterinsurgency*, 69–70.
should be circumstances where NORSOF can connect itself to personnel with regional expertise and/or relevant education, for instance cultural anthropologists. These could either function as advisors to the task group commander (requiring some preparation) or be embedded in the operational squadrons (requiring thorough preparation, including combat training).

b. Organizational Issues

As mentioned above, the optimal solution, a designated NORSOF PSYOP unit, might not be feasible, due to budget constraints and limitations on NORSOF personnel. A viable option is to select, educate, and train a few special operators to become PSYOP specialists within the tactical units. The way to organize PSYOP capabilities will strongly depend on the number of personnel the units are able to select and train for these tasks. A good start could be to dedicate an existing patrol/team or create a small task force to PSYOP development, and give it specific tasks and a timeline. They can attend national and external PSYOP officer or specialist education (for instance at U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School), seminars and courses, connect with FPOE and other military and civilian experts (anthropologists, sociologists, regional experts, research institutes, etc.). Because the team needs to keep up with other core skills (shooting, medic, mobility, etc), it is recommended that the project is given a timeline that renders flexibility and long-term investments possible. The team must come up with recommendations on how NORSOF can further develop PSYOP in its capability portfolio, and how connections with external actors and experts, like FPOE personnel, can be formalized. Additionally, the team should be able to develop a limited PSYOP capability that can be utilized in current operations, if needed.

If none of the tactical units have the resources to designate some of its personnel to a PSYOP development program, efforts should be made to formalize a relationship with FPOE, so it can provide NORSOF with PSYOP personnel qualified for special operations support.
3. Implementing Computer Network Operations Capabilities

Computer network operations (CNO) capabilities have become a necessity for NORSOF. The Russo-Georgian War in 2008 demonstrated that computer network attacks were carried out from the Russian side, even though it has not been officially proved that the military forces were behind the attacks. It should be clear, though, that CNO tends to be a crucial part of almost any nation’s military capabilities and is likely to be used in any conflict. Moreover, the use of computer networks among terrorists and insurgents has become increasingly sophisticated and supposedly made them more effective. Notwithstanding, this has also opened up for additional avenues to target them. Access to any of the adversary’s computers can reveal significant amounts of crucial intelligence, and his use of communication in cyberspace leaves compromising footprints that can be traced. By not being able to exploit the overwhelming source of intelligence that the use of computers and cyberspace create, NORSOF will be forced to limit its actions to more dangerous activities while gathering intelligence and targeting adversaries. CNO allows units to discover, monitor, and disrupt terrorist or insurgent networks, and therefore complements (and sometimes substitutes) lethal activities that jeopardize the lives of special operators and civilians, infrastructure, and public attitude.

The Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine defines CNO as measures to influence the adversary’s computer network and to protect own networks. In the NATO context, the terms used are attack, exploit and defence. Such operations can be used both as strategic and as operational tools, and in recent years have gained increased significance as a contribution to joint operations. Computer Network Attack (CNA) involves attacking the adversary’s computer system for the purpose of disruption or manipulation. The attack may include infiltration of the adversary’s computer system with incorrect or infectious code, so-called “viruses” and “Trojan horses”. The impact of this type of operation has increased due to the widespread use of civil standards and civil software for military purposes. Computer Network Exploitation consists of measures to gain access to the adversary’s computer system, tap it for information and then make use of the information without the
adversary being aware of it. Computer Network Defence (CND), consists of measures for the active protection of information by monitoring, analyzing and implementing countermeasures to defeat attacks on own information systems. Increased use of information infrastructure brings increased complexity and thereby a greater risk that foreign CNA will disrupt the Armed Forces’ operations and so prevent achievement of the desired effects. It is essential that one should have one’s own CND in order to counter foreign CNA.\textsuperscript{156}

As earlier described, this research will focus on the CNA and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) capabilities needed within NORSOF, even though CND capabilities are inherently required to protect NORSOF’s own capabilities and forces.

\subsection*{a. Personnel Required}

CNO is capability that most likely cannot be developed within NORSOF’s current human resources. To be able to conduct CNA or CNE in special operations, very special traits and skills are required among the CNO operators. As mentioned above, a lot of the knowledge needed to conduct CNO as part of special operations is tacit knowledge, and is not easily acquired through regular education. NORSOF needs to search for those individuals who meet the minimum requirements to become members of the special operations community, as well as the requirements that are needed to conduct time sensitive, high-end CNO as part of, or in support of, special operations.

Unfortunately, acquiring competent personnel for such jobs raises several questions, and some of them are ethical: unless the candidate has extensive service from a similar job in the police, defense, or other governmental agencies, it is possible that he or she has a background as an illicit hacker. In order to find the right type of personnel that fits the SOF community and requirements, dialogues between NORSOF and relevant institutions should be established. Some of NORSOF’s partner units abroad that have established

\textsuperscript{156} Forsvarsstaben, \textit{Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine}, 138.
CNO capabilities would provide useful information on how their personnel is selected and trained, while various Norwegian units and establishments, such as Forsvarets ingeniørhøgskole (Norwegian Defense Engineering Academy), Innovasjon, nettverkskapasiteter og informasjonsstruktur (Innovation, Network Capabilities, and Information Infrastructure), Etterretningstjenesten (Norwegian Intelligence Service), Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet (Norwegian National Security Authority), and Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (Norwegian Defense Research Establishment), can assist in developing an overview over potential Norwegian CNO personnel for NORSOF, and in creating and developing a personnel selection and training program. The tactical units will have to develop their own requirements for physical and psychological aptitude, as well as special operations skills that are needed for CNO operators to join a tactical team on missions (for instance parachute jumping, immediate action drills, and medical training).

Lastly, a recruitment program that targets young CNO talents should be developed, in order to motivate potential candidates to make the correct and lawful efforts to become future operators. Serving in a special operations unit and doing what one likes to do the most would probably inspire young computer talents to take appropriate actions to prepare themselves for CNO service in NORSOF. Since Norway has compulsory military service for all males who meet the armed forces’ minimum requirements, it should be easy to identify and select potential candidates from the large number of personnel that is subject to the draft. NORSOF could develop further test systems to narrow down the amount of candidates to a small number of people with qualities that are required to continue in a training program. It is likely that an instrumental factor in the success of a recruitment campaign will be that the SOF-related CNO program is publicly known.
b. Organizational Issues

There are many ways to integrate CNO capabilities into the NORSOF organization, but the most important organizational issue is to create a community that is able to maintain and develop the high skills that are needed. Since maintenance and development of operator skills require live training on big networks, arrangements to avoid illegal training on real networks must be established. Such training could be training with and observation of national agencies with CNO capabilities, on-the-job training with allied forces that currently utilize CNO capabilities, and laboratory training. The latter might call for a centralized CNO organization within NORSOF, since such laboratories are complex and supposedly very expensive. Moreover, a small CNO community would probably benefit from centralizing its personnel and activities, since this creates better grounds for effective and unified efforts in the development of the capabilities. However, since CNO should be an inseparable part of special operations in support of counterterrorism, counterinsurgencies, and other types of conflicts, there are good arguments claiming that both NORSOF units should have these capabilities permanently embedded for regular training and in order to achieve unit cohesion. CNO will not be some capabilities that are being used occasionally or seldom; they are more likely to be an important part of most exercises and operations in the future. Hence, it will be difficult to find the right solution on how to attach CNO capabilities in a way that benefits both tactical units and that also develops the CNO personnel properly. Under a joint special operations command, this can be solved by tasking the existing CNO community in Norway to support the development of NORSOF assets by creating a unit that is earmarked special operations. This unit could be administratively controlled by its parent unit, but operational commanded (OPCOM) or controlled (OPCON) by the joint special operations command or Norwegian Joint Headquarters when NORSOF is employed.
4. Implementing Military Deception Capabilities

The Norwegian Armed Forces does not have a designated deception capability at the strategic or operational level. Although deception has been (and probably will be) used in almost every conflict, western military organizations tend not to create separate units that are solely dedicated to plan and carry out military deception. Deception is part of standard military tactics, and both conventional and special operations forces constantly conduct deception through the use of camouflage, concealment, feints, and the like. At the operational and strategic levels, however, deception often appears to be a capability that is being utilized too late, and is seldom systematically integrated in the military structure as a branch, or looked upon as an art.

The U.S., NATO, and Norwegian doctrines define deception somewhat differently. U.S. doctrine differs between deception and military deception. Deception is defined as “those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s interests.”157 Military deception, however, is defined more narrowly, and describes the target audience only as the adversary’s decision-makers. Moreover, the deceiving message is restricted to “friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations.”158 The JP 3.13 defines military deception as:

Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly forces mission.159

157 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-13, GL-7.
158 Ibid., GL-10.
159 Ibid., GL-10.
The Norwegian doctrine does not define military deception specifically. However, the definition of deception states that it involves influencing the adversary’s decision-makers:

*Deception* has the objective of misleading an adversary through the manipulation, distortion or falsification of information. Deception involves influencing the adversary’s decisionmakers in order to give them a false understanding of the actual situation, or a false understanding of the kind of intentions one has. For example a deception operation can mislead the adversary into taking measures against what he believes (wrongly) is coming. By taking such measures the adversary will in the first place either disperse or gather his resources on an incorrect basis.\(^{160}\)

The NATO definition does not specify that deception is exclusively aimed at the adversary’s decision-makers, and borders to a certain degree to the definition of PSYOP, particularly since it uses “influencing perceptions of adversary audiences” as an example.\(^{161}\) NATO’s definition states that:

Deception involves measures designed to mislead adversaries by manipulation, distortion or falsification. Deception is a complex art, which demands considerable effort, a high level of security and a sound understanding of an adversary’s way of thinking. In operations, it can directly contribute to the achievement of surprise and, indirectly, to security and economy of effort. Within a deception plan both information and traditional physical means and methods (such as demonstrations and show of force) can be applied. Consequently, deception is not considered exclusively an Info Ops responsibility, but coordinated information activities can contribute to deception operations at all levels, for example, by influencing perceptions of adversary audiences. Info Ops planners must be involved in deception planning in order to ensure that deception objectives and information activities are employed in support of Information Objectives.\(^{162}\)

The Norwegian Armed Forces, like any modern military forces, should have deception capabilities that are able to provide the decision-makers at the


\(^{161}\) NATO, *AJP-3.10*, 1–9.

\(^{162}\) Ibid.
strategic and operational levels with viable deception plans, as well as with counter-deception capabilities. As mentioned in Chapter II, the Norwegian Minister of Defense, Grete Faremo wants NATO nations, including Norway, to balance between out-of-area operations and traditional operations in defense of NATO countries’ territories.”163 As history proves, most wars over territory have been carried out and won by an extensive use of deception. As described by the defense strategist, Professor Walter Jajko, deception should be inseparable from all parts of military planning and operations, both in peacetime and wartime.164 Moreover, he states that “[d]eception is an exceptional instrument of national security policy and an essential element of military operations that can contribute significantly to the achievement of policy and the success of operations.”165

With a joint special operations command, NORSOF can have a role as deception advisors, planners, and operators at the strategic and operational levels. Of course, they cannot be the only deception practitioners, as deception is not a core SOF task. However, NORSOF can supplement other strategic and operational deception planners, and contribute with operators when particularly sensitive or difficult deception operations are carried out. Jaiko describes deception practitioners as hand-picked personnel with the exceptional combination of practical skills, mental talents, and operational craft.166 These characteristics are often found among SOF operators, as the latter are selected and trained to meet those criteria. Moreover, deception can only be successfully carried out in organizations where the leadership is tolerant of unorthodoxy.167 A


166 Ibid., 355.

167 Ibid.
joint special operations command would provide the strategic and operational decision-makers with advisors, planners and operators who have the mindset that is required for such unorthodox thinking and methods.

Even without a goal to develop deception capabilities at the strategic level in Norway, NORSOF should increase its academic approach to deception as an art, and not only a tactic. Tactical deception is constantly being used during planning and execution of special operations; however, as NORSOF takes part in counterterrorist operations and counterinsurgencies, operational deception is also required.

a. Personnel Required

As mentioned above, one can assume that NORSOF already consist of creative personnel who possess many of the traits and skills that are required from deception practitioners. Notwithstanding, NORSOF personnel have usually focused on planning and performing tactical deception. While it is likely to believe that the tactical deception capabilities are well developed, there is a large potential to develop capabilities that go beyond the tactical level. A joint special operations command, as well as the tactical NORSOF units should have some staff officers with special education and training within strategic and operational deception, as well as counter-deception, embedded in their operations and/or plans sections. Some deception related courses are offered as part of the various master’s degree programs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.168

b. Organizational Issues

A joint special operations commander and his staff would be an important deception advisor to the Chief of Defense and the Chief of Norwegian Joint Headquarters. Strategic or operational deception operations should always

168 See The U.S. Naval Postgraduate School’s official Web site for Foreign Military Sales (FMS). 595 (Information Warfare), 698 (Joint Information Operations), and 699 (Special Operations), are some of the curricula that offer deception-related courses. http://www.nps.edu/adminsrv/igpo/Content/FMS.html
be centralized and controlled by the highest level, in order to “paint a complex and delicate picture” that one wants the adversary’s decision-makers to see.169 These efforts, to synchronize the employment of multiple messages through multiple channels, and to tightly monitor feedback coming back through intelligence, should be done by the highest level in the pertinent area of operation, to avoid uncoordinated activities or messages that may blow the cover story and damage the entire deception operation. Although SOF are not supposed to be the only service dedicated to carry out deception operations, a NORSOF command would have some of the assets required to plan, conduct, and monitor deception operations of strategic or operational importance.

Within the special operations command staff, military deception should be an integrated part of the operations (J-3) and planning (J-5) directorates, but not necessarily its own section within the staff. It is rather recommended that the entire staff gets familiar with military deception through the continuous use of it during planning and execution of exercises and operations. With the recommended designated information operations staff officers mentioned above, a few additional staff officers with deception education and training would increase the level of NORSOF’s deception capabilities. These deception proponents would elevate NORSOF ability to advise or augment the strategic and operational levels in deception planning, as well as lead or support the planning and execution of NORSOF operations when deception is needed. Moreover, by studying and practicing various techniques, like Richards J. Heuer Jr.’s *Analysis of Competing Hypotheses*, staff officers should also develop necessary skills within counter-deception.170 Such techniques are valuable tools in counterterrorist and counterinsurgency operations, as well as in traditional warfare.


Since the art of deception by its nature cannot always be trained like standard operations procedures, NORSOF should rather develop and maintain the special mindset that is needed for staff members to thrive as military deception planners and operators. By studying military deception and counter-deception from history, as well as including strategic and operational deception during exercise planning and execution, the level of deception skills within NORSOF will increase.

E. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to meet the intrinsic challenges of the information age, NORSOF should implement its own information operations capabilities. The NATO SOF Study lists psychological operations and information operations as critical enablers for successful execution of special operations, and suggests force structure modifications for NATO nations’ SOF organizations to meet contemporary and future demands. It is of high importance that the NORSOF community understands the inevitability of information operations capabilities in support or in concert with special operations, and that future organizational changes, as well as educational measures, reflect the importance of these capabilities.

Acknowledging that budget constraints and personnel limitations in the Norwegian Armed Forces deny an optimal development of enabling capabilities for NORSOF, some low-cost solutions are recommended. NORSOF should implement information operations capabilities through several courses of action, depending on the types of traits, skills, and knowledge that are required in each discipline and the available capabilities within NORSOF and the Norwegian Armed Forces’ structure. NORSOF cannot afford to spend time and money on unqualified personnel or an inappropriate organizational design. Therefore, the implementation of information operations capabilities should be taken very seriously, and given extra attention.
This appendix underscores the importance of the establishment of a joint special operations command, since such a command would have the authority to proactively direct, coordinate, and harmonize NORSOF capabilities, including its information operations capabilities. Moreover, it would have the overall responsibility to coordinate the implementation of information operations assets from the other services within the Norwegian Armed Forces, and to assist and advise senior leadership on special operations and its use of information operations.

NORSOF should develop four different information operations capabilities that would increase combat efficiency, reduce risk of own lives, and mitigate unwanted violent impact on civilians and adversaries, in almost any type of operations that NORSOF is involved in:

1. General information operations capabilities within the staffs at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This will increase the general understanding of information operations and indirect approaches, and teach the NORSOF community to operate as a more versatile capacity.

2. General and specialized PSYOP capabilities that are mainly self-developed at the tactical level, and possibly a formalized relationship with selected FPOE personnel. This will increase the NORSOF community’s opportunity to influence local populations in the areas of operations and to conduct low-profile influence operations in support of strategic and operational objectives.

3. Specialized CNO capabilities that are carefully selected from various external environments, and trained at the highest level of relevant competence to conduct and support special operations. CNO operators should be organizationally attached to the unit(s) or facilities where they can maintain their high-end skills through appropriate training and relationships with similar national
capabilities. It is also important, however, to establish a well-functioning relationship with the tactical NORSOF operators that the CNO capabilities will work closely with during training and operations. These two diametrical opposites (centralized vs. decentralized) should call for a discussion on how CNO should be organized and interact with the rest of the NORSOF community.

4. General deception capabilities, built on the special operations mindset that already exists within the NORSOF community, but with an additional academic application of the subject matter. An increased focus on deception and counter-deception as an art would increase NORSOF’s ability to carry out tactical deception operations, as well as to advise and assist national and NATO decision-makers in their planning and conduct of strategic and operational deception operations.

Finally, it is recommended that the NORSOF community makes its own efforts to find out how far it wants to go in the implementation of information operations, and how heavily these capabilities and activities should impact its organization and missions. The above-mentioned recommendations are based on certain assumptions regarding the economic and personnel situation in the Norwegian Armed Forces, and should only be seen as examples of low-cost implementations, not optimal solutions.
APPENDIX B. STATISTICS FROM CANSOFCOM INTERVIEWS

The graphs below (Figures 13 to 30) show the distribution of answers to each question given to the Canadian interviewees in Chapter III. The bottom line shows the scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (0 = not applicable), and the colored bars indicate the number of interviewees who gave the indicated score. In the cases of half numbers, one or more of the interviewees could not decide between two numbers (e.g., Question 2C—After: an interviewee responded 3-4, as he could not decide whether he wanted to give a “3” or a “4.” His answer was then distributed with 0.5 on “3” and 0.5 on “4”).
Figure 16. CANSOF—1A Before

Figure 17. CANSOF—1A After

Figure 18. CANSOF—1B Before

Figure 19. CANSOF—1B After

Figure 20. CANSOF—1C Before

Figure 21. CANSOF—1C After
APPENDIX C. STATISTICS FROM POLSOCOM INTERVIEWS

The graphs below (Figure 31 to 48) show the distribution of answers to each question given to the Polish interviewees in Chapter IV. The bottom line shows the scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (0 = not applicable), and the colored bars indicate the number of interviewees who gave the indicated score. In the cases of half numbers, one or more of the interviewees could not decide between two numbers (e.g., Question 1B—After: an interviewee responded 3-4, as he could not decide whether he wanted to give a “3” or a “4.” His answer was then distributed with 0.5 on “3” and 0.5 on “4”).

Question 2A was answered by only six interviewees, as interviewee number 1 did not have the opportunity to continue the interview after Question 1F.

Questions 2B—2C were answered by only five interviewees, as interviewee number 6 abstained from answering the two questions. As mentioned above, interviewee number 1 did not answer any of the questions 2A—2C.
Figure 46. POLSOF—2A Before

Figure 47. POLSOF—2A After

Figure 48. POLSOF—2B Before

Figure 49. POLSOF—2B After

Figure 50. POLSOF—2C Before

Figure 51. POLSOF—2C After
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