The role of framing in counterinsurgency/counterterrorism operations the status of hearts and minds

Anderson, Todd A.

Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
THE ROLE OF FRAMING IN COUNTERINSURGENCY/COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS: THE STATUS OF HEARTS AND MINDS

by

Todd A. Anderson

March 2008

Thesis Advisor: Anne Marie Baylouny
Second Reader: James Russell

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
The Role of Framing in Counterinsurgency/Counterterrorism Operations: The Status of Hearts and Minds

Todd A. Anderson, CPT, U.S. Army

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA  93943-5000

N/A

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Public diplomacy – winning hearts and minds - is increasingly being recognized as integral to the fight against terrorism. Yet we know little about terrorist framing of their operations and its appeal. Is there a pattern in terrorist narratives that can be identified and countered? This thesis will examine how terrorist and insurgent movements frame their actions, delineating how these groups communicate with their public. Framing offers insights into terrorist and insurgent operations that are only recently being addressed but still not widely capitalized on by current U.S. Army operations in Iraq. My focus is on the role of framing in the U.S. counterterrorism effort, and I will demonstrate how insurgent and terrorist messages shape the information operations (IO) battlefield against U.S. and Coalition Forces in the Middle East. The thesis will show that the terrorist’s message is just as important as the act of terrorism itself and these messages provide a window into understanding their operations, their ties to constituencies, and possibly their direction for future attacks.

The concept of framing can serve as an aid to U.S. military leaders in addressing problems that the conventional forces face when tasked to fight an unconventional but highly organized enemy. Framing’s application to military operations could help to better define the IO and PSYOP operations to maneuver commanders who are not as well versed in the use of non-kinetic offensive and defensive operations. Framing, as defined by social mobilization theorists offers a different perspective on the operational structure of insurgent leadership and can demonstrate weaknesses in the insurgent organization that can be capitalized upon with less threat to civilian life.

Information Operations (IO), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), framing, al Anbar Province, Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN)

Unclassified

Unclassified

Unclassified

UU
ABSTRACT

Public diplomacy – winning hearts and minds - is increasingly being recognized as integral to the fight against terrorism. Yet we know little about terrorist framing of their operations and its appeal. Is there a pattern in terrorist narratives that can be identified and countered? This thesis will examine how terrorist and insurgent movements frame their actions, delineating how these groups communicate with their public. Framing offers insights into terrorist and insurgent operations that are only recently being addressed but still not widely capitalized on by current U.S. Army operations in Iraq. My focus is on the role of framing in the U.S. counterterrorism effort, and I will demonstrate how insurgent and terrorist messages shape the information operations (IO) battlefield against U.S. and Coalition Forces in the Middle East. The thesis will show that the terrorist’s message is just as important as the act of terrorism itself and these messages provide a window into understanding their operations, their ties to constituencies, and possibly their direction for future attacks.

The concept of framing can serve as an aid to U.S. military leaders in addressing problems that the conventional forces face when tasked to fight an unconventional but highly organized enemy. Framing’s application to military operations could help to better define the IO and PSYOP operations to maneuver commanders who are not as well versed in the use of non-kinetic offensive and defensive operations. Framing, as defined by social mobilization theorists offers a different perspective on the operational structure of insurgent leadership and can demonstrate weaknesses in the insurgent organization that can be capitalized upon with less threat to civilian life.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## I. INTRODUCTION

A. IMPORTANCE OF THIS STUDY .................................................................1
B. HOW FRAMING APPLIES TO U.S. OPERATIONS ..............................4
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................5
   1. Academic Sources .............................................................................6
   2. Military Sources ................................................................................7
   3. Journalistic Sources .........................................................................8
D. MAJOR QUESTIONS .............................................................................9
E. THE GOAL OF THIS STUDY .................................................................9

## II. ON FRAMING AND ITS APPLICATION TO MILITARY OPERATIONS

A. FRAMING .............................................................................................13
   1. Islamic Framing and Social Movements ........................................17
B. U.S. ARMY PSYOP AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) ..........20
C. IO .............................................................................................................22
D. FM 3-24 THE COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL .............................24
E. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................25

## III. WIELDING THE WORD OF GOD

A. ON WAR: THE TEACHINGS OF THE QUR’AN ...................................29
B. THE QUR’AN’S WAR DOCTRINES APPLIED ......................................35
   1. The Muslim Brotherhood ................................................................35
   2. Osama bin Laden .............................................................................37
   3. Hamas ...............................................................................................39
C. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................41

## IV. FRAMING APPLIED IN CURRENT U.S. OPERATIONS (IO) IN IRAQ:

IO IN THE FIELD .......................................................................................43
A. SCHLEIFER: AN APPLICATION OF IDF LESSONS LEARNED ..........44
B. CHANGES IN U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE: ADAPTING TO THE
   BATTLEFIELD .........................................................................................47
C. REINFORCING SUCCESS IN THE IO BATTLEFIELD .......................49
   2. Operation Al Fajr, Fallujah, Iraq: November 2004 .......................50
   3. 1st BCT-1st Armored Division (AD) in Ramadi 2006-07 ...............52
   4. PSYOP in al Anbar: An Interview with the Company
      Commander 2006-7 ..........................................................................53
D. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................56

## V. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................59
A. THE RIGHT PLACE FOR FRAMING IN THE FM 3-24 ......................60
B. A NEW SECTION TO ACCOMPANY THE FM 3-24: FURTHER
   READING ...............................................................................................62
C. CATCHING UP TO THE INSURGENCY .......................................64
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1  Media Forms Insurgents Use .................................................................61
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am deeply thankful for the guidance given by my thesis advisor, Dr Anne Marie Baylouny. Our conversations over thesis topics and discussions about social mobilization theory helped to focus this work into something more cogent than what it began. I am indebted to my wife and family, without whose support patience I cannot imagine having completed this work. I thank Greg Dotson, my dad and father-in-law, who helped proofread this thesis. Finally, I thank my wife, especially, patiently endured long hours of theory, discussion of ideas, and timelines and gave sound counsel and encouragement when I needed it most.
I. INTRODUCTION

Public diplomacy – winning hearts and minds – is increasingly being recognized as integral to the fight against terrorism. Yet we know little about terrorist framing of their operations and its appeal. Is there a pattern in terrorist narratives that can be identified and countered? This thesis will examine how terrorist movements frame their actions, delineating how these groups communicate with their public. Framing offers insights into insurgent and terrorist operations that are only recently being addressed but still not widely capitalized on by current U.S. Army operations in Iraq. Framing is directly associated with the information battlefield which encompasses media, deception, and the distribution of fliers that shape the battlefield through controlling the support of the civilian population. The focus is on the role of framing in the U.S. counterterrorism effort, and I will demonstrate how insurgent and terrorist messages shape the information operations (IO) battlefield against U.S. and Coalition Forces in the Middle East. The thesis will show that the terrorist’s message is just as important as the act of terrorism itself and these messages provide a window into understanding their operations, their ties to constituencies, and possibly their direction for future attacks. The concept of framing can serve as an aid to U.S. military leaders in addressing problems that the conventional forces face when tasked to fight an unconventional but highly organized enemy.

In politically motivated violence or a terrorist attack, the action of attacking is a billboard exclaiming the resolve and capacity of the organization. After the attack, the organization must garner support for its actions and evade the retaliation of its targeted political opponent while simultaneously appearing to its constituents as a symbol of social justice. Information and messages of such a critical use cannot be haphazardly created without close scrutiny of the target audience. Terrorism is a strategy utilized by rational actors;¹ it is a method of attacking an enemy that is conventionally superior to the terrorists’ own forces by attacking the civilian population, and/or their property, in an attempt to gain a political, religious, or ideological objective desirable to the terrorist

organization. Della Porta, Tilly, Hafez, Wiktorowitcz, and other social theorists have argued quite convincingly that the decision to use subversive violence is not always a foregone conclusion; often it is a response to continued exclusion from the greater power, i.e., the targeted political entity. These theorists’ work approaches the importance of framing to terrorist acts but fails to address and exploit the application of framing to counterterrorism/counterinsurgency operations fully. The purpose of the terrorist attack is rooted in the group’s ideology and the message is how the group meshes their actions to their political goals. Framing is how the terrorist group guards their important message from refutation by the opposition and how the group creates fear in the target and support from their constituency.

Frames or messages from terrorist or insurgent groups directly affect U.S., Coalition Forces, and allied nations in the Middle East as well as the effectiveness of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) by altering the information battlefield and currying support from the local populations against occupying or security forces.

A. IMPORTANCE OF THIS STUDY

U.S. military officers have identified the need to adapt a conventional force to fighting terrorists and insurgents. GEN (Ret.) Krulak (former commandant of the Marine Corps) and LTC Nagl (US Army) have taken great strides in preparing their respective branches of services in the counterterrorism/counterinsurgency fight; both of these officers have highlighted the overemphasis of conventional tactics in the combat training of their branches versus the cultural-centric training needed to conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations that are the current mission for U.S. military operations.


Current operations have taken a turn towards “effects based” operations; and a key element in these operations is the information operations fight. Effects-based operations include lethal indirect fires as well as non-lethal measures to shape the maneuver commander’s battle-space. As operations in Iraq continue to focus on stability and support, the use of lethal fires has slackened and more emphasis has been placed on integrating Iraqi forces and gaining popular support for the fledgling Iraqi government. This paper is meant to explore terrorist framing as an effective form of control of the information battlefield utilized by the forces in opposition to the U.S. and Coalition Forces in order to better understand the complex information environment that U.S. policy makers are currently operating in the Middle East. Counter-Information operations have been an up-hill battle for the conventional forces in Iraq due to the social, cultural, and language barriers between American soldiers and Marines and the indigenous Arab, Persian, Turk, and Kurdish population. A popular saying among soldiers is that “everything is information-operations (IO),” this organizational frustration is not combating the flow of terrorist information nor is it constructing a tactical use of IO that would separate it from the rules of engagement (ROE). A more clear understanding of the terrorist message may yield a more effective response by the U.S. forces in theatre.

Key to the terrorist operations is the ability to deny the occupying force the ability to converse with the general population while turning or maintaining its levels of support from the public opinion in the theatre of operations against the occupying forces and their sponsored indigenous auxiliaries and security forces. The concept of framing best explains this operation’s measure of effect and implementation. Through defining the Islamist, sectarian, terrorist and regional political frames a better understanding of how to counter these frames may gain more legitimacy for the Coalition Forces attempting to stabilize Iraq and may garner more support for the Iraqi government.

As a culture, organization and a political entity, the U.S. military tends to spend time and energy focusing on the actual terrorist act, analyzing the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the


act, but not as much emphasis is placed on the message nor on the subsequent fuel that American policy makes for the opposition. This ‘tunnel vision’ is necessary in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack, when actions are most threatening, but in a stability and support operation such as the operations currently going on in Iraq and Afghanistan, the necessity to out-think the opponent is arguably as important as the ability to act. What are the complaints and positions of the opposition and how do they use framing to secure their own power-base against a large and threatening opponent like the U.S.? Moreover, how can the opposition turn the people who have a good chance to profit on U.S. policies in Iraq? Framing can create a national idea, turn a political or economic issue into a fight to preserve religious values, and vilify an opponent to the point of political impotence. Such a powerful tool for social mobilization plays a major role in creating a stable environment, or disrupting it.

Ron Schleifer’s book, *Psychological Warfare in the Intifada*\(^8\), analyzes the political messages contained in the psychological warfare of both the Israeli military and Palestinian opposition as a part of the overall strategy of either side in the Intifada. His work is unique in that he contrasts the military strategy that the Palestinians used, that closely resembles the strategy used by Iraqi insurgents, with the dominant military force of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), which closely resembles the U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq. Using Schleifer’s model, I argue that understanding the opposing frames from the prominent groups in the region is essential to the American mission success in Iraq. The economic and military power of the U.S. cannot match the innate legitimacy of regional leaders and politically significant parties such as SCIRI, Iran, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, etc. Each of these parties is based on Islamist ideology that uses religion as a way to create resonance within their constituent populations. Without addressing the frames of the opposition, our silence creates a greater space for their legitimacy.

**B. HOW FRAMING APPLIES TO U.S. OPERATIONS**

Islamist leaders utilize their popular support, charisma, long-standing relationships with locals and their intimate knowledge of the human terrain to frame their

---

attacks on Coalition Forces (CF). Current Information Operations (IO) are learning, growing and adapting to the situation, but it is an intrinsically slow process hindered by the size and diversity of the U.S. armed forces as an organization and the alien nature of Arab culture to American culture. For all the innovations and technological advances that the U.S. is accomplishing in Iraq, the opponent still maintains the ‘high ground’ for information output and information reception. Their operations include mass media via television and radio stations and especially the internet. As Psychological Operations (PSYOP) officers have found, the U.S. has only scratched the surface of the effects that can be gained by information denial and delivery via the internet.9 Islamist leaders take great advantage of the media channels to garner support for their cause and it is a channel largely yielded by the U.S.

In a “war among the people,”10 such as an insurgency, the populace is the “center of gravity”11 for operations. As Frank Kitson argued, the "main characteristic that distinguishes campaigns of insurgency from other forms of war is that they are primarily concerned with the struggle for men's minds."12 As such, the populace is the key terrain to be gained as an end unto themselves, not as a means to some other ends. Framing is the tool that leaders on both sides of the political/security spectrum seek to utilize in order to obtain this key terrain.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to apply framing to military operations, an understanding of the literature defining framing and the military doctrine that must apply it is necessary. Little prior work exists on the connection of framing to IO specifically or to counterterrorism in general. Typically, the military writes its manuals in a functional methodology, taking academic work as a basis for writing but not writing as a continuation of academic work.

---

9 Interview by author with MAJ Brian Yarbrough, Commander C Company, 5th POB (PSYOP Battalion) stationed in Al Anbar, Iraq (2006-07) 19 NOV 07 by author.
in itself. Utilizing social mobilization theories such as framing to analyze military operations is a rich field in academia, but not so much with the U.S. military. The literature that will be used in this thesis will therefore fall into three categories according to the source of information: academic, military, and journalistic. In this section a discussion of the academic literature sources will come first, military second, and journalistic last. Literature considered academic is from purely academic sources, for example, Charles Tilly and David Snow. Military literature will encompass all Army field manuals, Joint Publications, generals’/soldiers’ memoirs, officers’ professional forum websites (www.companycommand.com) and commentaries and intelligence sources (unclassified) that deal with the application of information operations within counterterrorism operations in the Middle East. Journalistic sources include all primary sources other than military sources, statements of political actors as they are recorded by different news sources, and print/media sources representing these actors.

1. Academic Sources

Scholarly work on the social mobilization concept of framing can be separated into theory and application. The theorists in social mobilization create the ideas and standards that constitute the concept of framing and, for example, apply the concept on selected societies and regions based on their particular region of interest. The scholarly work focused on application cited in this thesis will be concerned only with the Middle East and North Africa and will be primarily focused on political parties showing a proclivity to utilize terror as a tactic and how they use framing to justify to and gain social momentum from the use of this tactic in their constituency.

Academic research in social mobilization originally focused on the ideology of the leaders and key historical figures with little to no coverage on the contexts and culture of the time and place where the social movements happened. Quantitative methodologies such as resource mobilization and political processes took the lead in social mobilization until the late 1970s and 80s when ideology and culture were opened to scholarly analysis.13 The new approach to social movements asserts that these movements exist in

---

13 Mayer N Zald. “Culture, ideology and strategic framing” in Mc Adam, et. al. (eds.). *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, UK (1996) 262.
the greater milieu of social norms, cultural definitions, and context. As scholars grew to accept this perspective, the study of ideology and framing in social movements grew.

In studying any operation in Counterterrorism, the prominent and reoccurring opponents of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East are non-state actors that have shown the capacity to carry out terrorist activities are Islamist-led parties within Muslim countries. How Islamists frame their attacks on western and Israeli influence in the Middle East is central to this study, since their capacity to mobilize the society within their respective country is their direct line of supply for political power. Wiktorowicz, in his work Islamic Activism, includes elements of framing relevant to Islamists in the Levant and Egypt. Hafez’ work Why Muslims Rebel, includes various case studies pertinent to the study of Islamist movements in North Africa and Egypt, which are widely accepted as the basis for Islamist social mobilization throughout the Muslim world. On Saudi Arabia, Gwenn Okruhlik has written on the frames that have resonance within the Saudi society based on her research within the country, speaking to leaders on multiple levels about the level of resistance to the government led by Islamists. Williams and Kubal have done much study on the idea of resonance of collective action frames within a society based on the center of gravity of the frames and their cultural repertoire; i.e., the frames must follow the cultural standards in order to speak to a wider audience, thus causing resonance within the society and thereby increasing the power of the collective action. Each of these authors presents a representation of cultural struggles within the Middle East that is more specific to the problems of framing and information operations that military manuals are able to detail.

2. Military Sources

New data coming from the current Army operations has shifted the focus in professional literature towards understanding cultural implications as a part of combat operations. John Nagl’s work Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife reflects this change and is the most recent and pertinent addition to the professional dialogue of military officers with experience in the counterinsurgency fight. He argues that the British in Malaya succeeded where the Americans in Vietnam failed because of the British Army’s ability to learn as an organization and apply a rich cultural understanding as well as a long
history of interaction in their area of operations than the Americans could claim in Vietnam. This study is done with respect to LTC Nagl’s personal experience in Khalidiya, Iraq within the Sunni Tri-angle, between Fallujah and Ramadi.

The increasing importance of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA) is reflected in the 2006 Joint Publications Manual for Information Operations (IO), JP 3-13. In this publication, emphasis on integrating cultural norms into operations increases the likelihood of successful deception, stability and security operations, and psychological operations. The importance of this manual is that it has taken lessons learned by Soldiers and Marines in the field and created a doctrine whereby the continued operations can be improved. The U.S. military is learning that cultural knowledge is the key to defeating insurgents and terrorists with something other than bullets and guided munitions.

Finally, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)\textsuperscript{14} covers the most recent changes to U.S. Army doctrine and the issues that are currently affecting operations in Iraq. This website directly addresses the need for the U.S. Army to be a learning organization by collecting and analyzing data from operations. Specific data from operations has been classified, but the overall lessons learned about the importance of information operations and countering enemy framing is useful to this study.

3. Journalistic Sources

These sources are predominantly on the websites from important printed and satellite/TV media. The importance of the media in framing is well documented by academic sources such as McAdams, Snow, and Schleifer. Arab leaders have used the media successfully in many campaigns to garner support from their constituents through frames that reached more people in less time through print, radio and satellite media. Media sources include al-Jazeera, CNN, BBC, the Saudi Gazette, al-Watan, al-Manar, the Palestinian Information Center (Hamas’ website), Israeli News: Arutz Sheva, and others.

\textsuperscript{14}“Mission” Center for Army Lessons Learned. \url{www.call.army.mil}. Accessed 20 OCT 07.
D. MAJOR QUESTIONS

The U.S. military’s former operations plan ran on conventional methods and sought only to limit the collateral damage to civilian populations, not necessarily to engage them as a “target” for ensuring stability such as PSYOP proposes and IO demands. The purpose of IO is to interrupt the enemy’s message to the population while strengthening friendly messages, thereby winning the hearts and minds of the population. I intend to show that framing can be more aptly applied to this operational fight and can help to organize military planners’ thought processes by identifying key steps that have to be made by the enemy in order to support his frames. These key steps can then be easily identified and interrupted by coalition forces. Thus the phenomenon of framing (by the enemy) can become the operation of counter-framing.

The major question concerning this study is whether or not framing can be applied to U.S. military operations which are characterized by a lack of intelligence about the civilian populations, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the military planners are only beginning to understand the culture and ideologies of the region. Is the insurgency in Iraq a social movement, or simply organized crime? If it is organized crime, then the interaction with the population is strictly business or deception, if it is a social movement, then the concept of framing can be applied. Are frames borrowed from one region and used in another; for example, can the frames used by Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon be successful for Shi’i leaders in Iraq like Muqtada al-Sadr? In other works, can resonance in one society be a platform for resonance in another? Have U.S. Allies in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in the region (i.e., Israel) been able to use framing in their counterterrorism operations with Hamas and Hezbollah?

E. THE GOAL OF THIS STUDY

This thesis seeks to capture the adaptation of the U.S. military to the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight that it currently finds itself fighting. In fighting a counterinsurgency, or as General Rupert Smith termed it, a “war amongst the
people,” the U.S. military has had to associate itself with new forms of warfare that are more complicated, more nuanced than traditional conventional forces, at which the U.S. military excels. It is a true test of resilience for an organization to change not only tactics, but to abandon time-proven successful strategies to adapt to a new battlefield.

The application of the concept of framing to current operations deals directly with U.S. military “soft” power, its power to influence victory on the battlefield through the realization of U.S. foreign policy objectives. These operations fall under the specialization of U.S. Army Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Information Operations (IO) and it is in these branch specialties that the concept of framing is most readily applied.

This chapter serves as an introduction to the thesis and states the literature analyzed the importance of the study and the general goals of the thesis. Chapter II analyzes the current academic literature on framing and the corresponding literature utilized by the U.S. military in forming and supporting doctrine developed during the GWOT in order to align framing with U.S. military doctrine and tactics (focused on the land forces: U.S. Army and Marine Corps) and establish the pertinence of framing to U.S. military operations in Iraq. Chapter III is a study of Islamist uses of the Qur’an as a source for framing their actions and analyzes the early leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Osama bin Laden. It analyzes the verses that are used by Islamists in respect to violent resistance and warfare in order to focus the thesis on what the current enemy is doing in Iraq by drawing on historical data from other movements. Chapter IV addresses the current U.S. military operations in Iraq, specifically Al Anbar Province and the gains in Information Operations (IO) that are being achieved through Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and the integration of IO with conventional maneuver forces tasked with providing stability and support operations in the region. This chapter will address the frames used by the enemy (Al Qaeda in Iraq: AQI) and will rely on the information from Chapter III to make its argument. Chapter V is the

---

conclusion of the argument, proposed modifications to doctrine, and an assessment of the use of framing as a conceptual building block to U.S. operations in the counterinsurgency fight.

This study will show that the U.S. military has adapted its tactics to better facilitate these forms of soft power in order to continue to fight the counterinsurgency fight in Iraq. The adaptation of these tactics falls in line with prerequisites for framing to have its greatest effect on a society. The more that these adaptation allow U.S./CF frames to resonate and deny the insurgent frames resonance, the more successful the IO and therefore the more successful the military operations will be.
II. ON FRAMING AND ITS APPLICATION TO MILITARY OPERATIONS

This chapter analyzes the current academic literature on framing and the corresponding literature utilized by the U.S. military in forming and supporting doctrine developed during the GWOT. In order to accomplish this I will first give an overview of framing with a definition of terms and current academic applications of the concept. Second, I will apply framing to Islamism and how it has been used in past movements in order to ascertain if the concept applies to the region. Finally, I will address the U.S. military doctrine and publications that deal with or could be improved by the concept of framing. The intent for this chapter is to align framing with U.S. doctrine and tactics applied to the Middle East and establish that the concept of framing can and should be applied in current U.S. operations.

Social mobilization theory has much to offer the military in the counterinsurgency fight and in the provision of security to civilian populations. The U.S. military has an innate weakness to overcome when securing a civilian population since its most recent history of doing so in Vietnam was largely forgotten by the organization after the U.S. Army evacuated from Saigon. Since the end of Vietnam, social mobilization theorists have explored more subjective and more subtle elements of social mobilizations. The concept of framing provides a clear definition of a point of tactical leverage used by an insurgency. This concept can help military commanders identify and utilize information as an alternative to kinetic force when that commander is confronted with resistance organizations intent on destabilizing an occupying force or oppressive government through violent means.

A. FRAMING

Framing is a cognitive theory that originally came to sociology from psychiatry. Zald defines frames as “the specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive

cues used to render or case behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action.” Johnston defined it the most succinctly when he defined framing as a function “much the same way as a frame around a picture: attention gets focused on what is relevant and important and away from extraneous items in the field of view.” Acts of oppression or injustice must be illuminated for the population to mobilize into a movement, or an insurgency, which means that people must be convinced of the necessity to move against the regime, occupational forces, or government. Thus collective action frames must not only define the problem, but what must be done about it, and why it must be done.

The concept of framing is relatively new to social mobilization theory. Unlike its more quantitative, resource-based mobilization theoretical predecessors, the concept of framing acknowledges that there are more subjective forces to social mobilization at work. Within the theoretical work surrounding the concept of framing, the academic study is clearly led by Benford and Snow. Their work on framing illuminated the cultural use of symbols, frame resonance, and diagnostic/prognostic frames in order to demonstrate how ideology plays a part in social mobilization. Snow’s theory of framing came from a modification of Goffman’s concept which stated that organizations use “primary framing” in the attempt to “allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms.” Goffman originally picked up the term “framing” from Bateson’s use in the field of psychology where the definitions of a situation are “built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events-at least social ones-and our subjective involvement in them” and ‘frame’ is used in reference to these basic elements.

What Benford and Snow brought to this dialogue, argues McAdam, et. al., was the more refined definition of framing, referring to it as “the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion a shared understanding of the world and of themselves

17 Mayer N Zald. 263.
20 Goffman, 10.
that legitimate and motivate collective action.”21 McAdam, et. al., acknowledged that framing processes encourage mobilization as they define the problems and vulnerability of the system and its illegitimacy in a definition.

Benford and Snow identify four common characteristics to collective action frames that will aid in focusing this study. These characteristics are: problem identification and direction/locus of attribution, flexibility and rigidity/ inclusivity and exclusivity, interpretive scope and influence, and degree of resonance. Problem identification and direction/locus of attribution is considered as the “most obvious”22 way in which frames vary. Gerhards and Rucht studied West German mobilization campaigns in the late 1980s and they hypothesized that “the larger the range of problems covered by a frame, the larger the range of social groups that can be addressed with the frame and the greater the mobilization capacity of the frame.”23 They add the caveat to their hypothesis that it only holds to those frames that can be logically or plausibly connected to each other. With flexibility and rigidity, inclusivity and exclusivity, Benford and Snow explain that the more inclusive and flexible frames are, the more likely they can become “master frames.”24 Master frames are those that are broader in scope and influence and act as a kind of blueprint for the orientation and activities of other movements. According to Swart, “frames that have been adopted by two or more distinctive movement… exist not only because of [their] qualities but also because they are culturally resonant to their historical milieu.25 The transportation of master frames affects U.S. IO and PSYOP as new master frames appear from outlying movements in the Middle East from Iran’s nuclear program to Hezbollah’s victory over Israel in the 2006 Summer War.

The degree of resonance is the fourth way in which frames can vary. Two factors are identified by Benford and Snow as key to the variance in degree of frame resonance:

23 As quoted from J. Gerhards, D. Rucht. Mesomobilization: Organizing and framing in Two Protest Campaigns in West Germany. American Journal of Sociology, vol 98, 588 in Benford and Snow, 618.
24 Benford and Snow, 619.
credibility of the frame itself and its relative salience. The credibility of a frame is a function of its consistency, empirical credibility, and the credibility of the frame articulators. Inconsistency in a frame can be found in contradictions between the frame and beliefs or claims, and in the popular perception of the frame articulators, whether or not their frame conflicts with their tactical actions. Empirical credibility has to do with whether or not the frame can be verified by common experience, or be proven through logical discourse. The credibility of the articulators ties into empirical credibility. The corroboration of experts with social status on a movement-worthy issue creates credibility of fact, since the experts are assumed to know their about their area of expertise, and the relatively ‘elite’ or known qualities of the articulating individual lend credibility to the movement. Benson and Snow use the example of peace groups enlisting former members of the Department of Defense, such as Admiral Eugene Carroll, Daniel Ellsberg, and John Stockwell, to speak at rallies in order to enhance the movement’s credibility. 26

The salience of a frame has to do with its capacity to move through a society at multiple levels, not just through one sub-culture or compartment of society. Benford and Snow identify three dimensions: centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity. Johnston writes that a frame must have amplification, which directly describes a frame’s salience. He illustrates amplification with the bumper sticker; pithy, catchy slogans that cut to the argument in memorable, striking, and fundamental ways. His examples are from the issue of abortion in the U.S.: “I’m Pro-Choice and I Vote,” “It’s a Child Not a Choice,” “Keep Your Hands off My Body,” and “Abortion Is Murder.” 27 These simple yet direct statements leave no question in the mind of any person who is even remotely aware of the issue as to what side the bearer (or driver) ascribes. These simple statements divide the line of battle between the rights of citizens, natural rights as argued by Locke and Jefferson and codified in the U.S. Constitution, and the Judeo-Christian ethical understanding of the sanctity of life.

26 Benford and Snow, 621.
27 Johnston and Noakes, 8.
Johnston and Noakes attempt to simplify academic work on framing by defining frame resonance as consisting of the frame makers (what they called the social movement entrepreneur), the frame receivers, and the frame itself (which Kubal defines as, of necessity, being in the styles, forms, and normative codes of the target audience). Cutting terms and combining nuances makes the memorization of key tenants of framing easier for the student; however, the nuances exist for a reason: framing is a nuanced concept. From these sources and the academic dialogue that they encouraged, a complete understanding of the concept of framing can be applied in this study, but it must be understood that the ‘answer’ to a definition of framing is, by the very nature of framing, that it is not an exact science. The variance in academic studies, proliferation of writing and additions to jargon and terminology can make the study of framing daunting. The extraction of hard numbers from frame analysis is more time-consuming than potentially fruitful; however, one can build the argument, as I will hereafter, that the application of the study of framing can help military operations in stability support operations (SASO) engaging in the counterinsurgency fight.

1. Islamic Framing and Social Movements

Central to the U.S. Army’s fight against AQI are the Islamist leaders’ uses of framing in respect to jihad. The concept of jihad is covered in depth in chapter 3 which discusses the actual uses of the Qur’an when Muslim leaders, namely Islamist leaders, use the religious concept of jihad to mobilize a society to conduct religious warfare against an oppressive regime, or, more typically, against a non-Muslim occupying power. When framing jihad, these leaders rely on a rich historical religious dialogue based on the right leader for, the correct time to conduct, and the correct impetus to wage jihad from Qur’anic sources and from later Muslim scholarship. Their argument is powerful and focused towards a particular target audience (TA) at a particular time. This section will briefly show how framing is applied in Islamist leaders’ efforts to win popular support.

Islamist leaders use political Islam to create a social movement based on religious identity that has had great effect on Muslim versus non-Muslim powers such as in Israel

---

and in Lebanon. Islamic activism is a formidable adversary to U.S. military operations, especially in the information operations arena where they hold the ‘high-ground’ of cultural understanding, immediate common identity, and the trust of their religious followers. The following section applies framing to Islamic activism and will provide a definition of terms and a general application by academics in this field of study. The work of Williams, Kubal, Benford, and Snow form a conceptual academic understanding of framing in a cultural context not specific to the Muslim world. The works of Wiktorowicz, Robinson, and Hafez will then help apply the concept of framing to the Muslim situation in particular; each author addresses social movement leading to warfare and how framing is used by leaders to justify their actions within culturally legal bounds.

Benford and Snow argue that the proliferation of scholarship on collective action frames and framing processes demonstrates the growing regard for this aspect of social mobilization theories as a vital dynamic alongside resource mobilization and political opportunity processes. Studying framing and its manifestations helps to further understanding of the issues relevant to the society, culture and temper of a given community. Islamic scholars have a rich background of academic work from which to extrapolate arguments and apply the religion to current day problems, and Jihad is only one of many topics of discussion. Islamists in particular have, of necessity, opened their own schools to train their own scholars at as high a level of competence as their religious, social, and political opponents. In order to disseminate their message and form a social base from which to influence politics, Islamists have to match wits in a highly competitive religious academic atmosphere.

The Islamists’ measure of effectiveness in this academic arena is their ability to manipulate doubt in the opposition and then fill this void with their own message. Doubt in the opposition is brought about through framing. The idea of framing comes from social mobilization theory, it is a tactic used by movement leaders to rally support for their cause while simultaneously preventing other leaders from ‘bleeding’ their ranks of members. The message used by the framing leader is intended to create resonance,

---

defined by Williams and Kubal as when “frames used by activists fit within the existing repertoire of legitimate ideological constructions” thus providing the movement activists with the cultural resources to dominate the public perceptions on a particular issue.\(^{30}\)

The hope is therefore that the population that will, in turn, be convinced to be led by these activists. Wiktorowicz argues that Muslim leaders are often hindered not by religious facts to support their arguments either for or against *Jihad*; rather, these leaders, when framing, utilize four basic strategies to promote their group of clerics and debunk the credibility of the opposition. These strategies are: 1. vilification or demonizing the oppositions’ popular clerics, 2. exaltation or praise for the “in-group” clerics, 3. credentialing, the emphasis placed on the particular expertise of the in-group’s intellectuals, and 4. de-credentialing, or raising doubts as to the oppositions’ clerics.\(^{31}\)

Wiktorowicz makes the astute observation that, since there is no formal hierarchy within the Muslim world, the religious interpretation within the community is subject to the intellectual experts that are commonly or particularly favored by the community. Unlike the Catholic Church, there is not a living supreme pontiff (an exception to this rule: Twelver Shi’a have the Hidden Imam whose guidance will trump all other religious expertise once he returns) with the organization and authority to control religious doctrine. The academic requirements of a jurist are not codified and the title *alim* or religious scholar is not a formal designation or appointment. Therefore, when *fatwas* are issued, the Muslim community at large relies on the perceived character and competence of the scholar to determine legitimacy.\(^{32}\) It is therefore the nature of Islamic scholarship to rest on the popular perception of the scholar in question, which lends this scholarship particularly susceptible to framing.

The study of framing does not come without detractors. As Williams and Kubal point out, framing is overtly focused on the elites in a movement, what they say and how they organize their campaign of words, and the fact that most framing scholarship has


\(^{32}\) Ibid, 11.
maintained its focus at the interpersonal level and not at the elite level.\(^{33}\) In effect, problem with culture, and therefore framing, is finding a balance between the “influence and processes of the active agency of human actors and the structuring power of cultural forms.”\(^{34}\) The primary problem with scholarship on framing is the lack of focus on the macro-culture and its overwhelming focus on interpersonal resonance.\(^{35}\) Though critical of some of the scholarship around framing, Williams and Kubal are far from throwing the whole concept out. Rather, they point out some of the failures of frames within the United States’ history (such as Marxism and Labor Rights) and relate it to the failure of the movement leaders to apply the intended message to the greater American culture and social ethics regarding labor and rights. Their application of framing to its failures only furthers the influence of frames on a social movement, especially when these frames are not in sync with the popular demands for social change.

Frames, whether intrinsically powerful or not, have to be targeted at social desires, cultural triggers, and a common social problem that a sizeable group of the population demand to see solved. Why people activate, revolt, and form social movements is an important question in understanding the frames used in creating movements. Ted Gurr introduced the concept of relative deprivation which argued that men rebel due to economic reasons. Hafez argues to the contrary that Muslims rebel due to a “defensive reaction to predatory state repression that threatens the organizational resources and lives of political Islamists.”\(^{36}\) Hafez’s research focuses on the Islamist movements in the Middle East and North Africa and finds this commonality which is specifically within the Qur’anic construct of *jihad*.

B. U.S. ARMY PSYOP AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO)

The U.S. Army PSYOP branch is currently the delivery platform of the information battlefield in Iraq. Their operators apply the concept of framing to tactical, regional and theater-wide engagements between the Iraqi populace, the insurgents and

\(^{33}\) Williams and Kubal, 224.

\(^{34}\) Ibid., 244.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 228.

U.S./Coalition Forces. However, the PSYOP manuals do not mention the concept of framing, nor do they address the topic in a list of academic sources to read in addition to the manual. The mission of PSYOP is “to influence the behavior of foreign target audiences (TAs) to support U.S. national objectives.”

This mission set requires flexibility at the organizational level of the Army that has only recently been granted. According to the manual, all PSYOP themes are delegated to the geographic commander by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) who retains PSYOP approval authority following the approval of the PSYOP plan by the President and/or SECDEF. This extreme centralization has caused severe restriction of the information battlefield on the tactical level since delegation of approval authority has been sent down only to division level.

This was during 2005 when a division (for example: the 2nd MARDIV based in CP Blue Diamond, Ar Ramadi, Iraq) covered a span of territory the size of the largest Iraqi province. The human terrain in Iraqi is so differentiated that one street block adheres to different leaders than the next. This complicates the task of simply finding representatives to discuss local problems that need to be addressed, imagine developing a talking theme that would resonate throughout the whole province while lacking the cultural knowledge equivalent to that of an Iraqi child.

In 2005-6, MAJ Gainey, the Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 1st BCT, 1st AD remarked that the time it took to achieve approval for a new theme was three weeks at worst, and three days at best. Through normal operations, a proposed theme would take three weeks to be inspected by the MARDIV commander. In order to achieve three days, MAJ Gainey had to clear airspace, get his PSYOP tactical detachment officer a seat on a helicopter and send his only PSYOP asset to the Marine Division (MARDIV) headquarters to speed up the approval process. This was not an operation that was

---

38 Ibid., 1-8.
39 As per the FM 3-05.30 stipulates on 1-8 “In the case of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM during the post-hostilities phase, the SECDEF authorized PSYOP product approval down to division level.”
40 Brigade Combat Team (BCT); Armor Division (AD).
Note: this BCT was under 1st and 2nd MARDIV based in Ar Ramadi, Al Anbar Province, Iraq.
41 Interview by the author with Major Andrew Gainey, former 1-1AD BDE FSO, Ar Ramadi, Iraq, 29 OCT 07.
feasible to conduct on a daily basis. The nature of the insurgent’s lack of bureaucracy meant that the insurgents’ message could change several times in the span of time that the U.S./CF could achieve approval to amend their messages and themes.

When the U.S. Army asserts itself as a regional leader and a provider of security in a foreign country, it must demonstrate a resilience and flexibility in conducting its operations especially when the nature of its opposition is as flexible as an insurgency. The importance of establishing oneself as a leader worthy of following, and therefore of a source worthy of listening to, is a major part in the PSYOP/IO fight. Establishing credibility can take months of work and can be destroyed in less than an hour. This credibility is essential to the concept of framing, as has been stated before, since it is through leaders that a social movement is created and through a credible source that resonance in a frame can be achieved. Instigating, conducting and succeeding in an insurgency against a government or occupying foreign forces requires either counter-regime leaders with social credibility or a government completely lacking in credibility. Denying the insurgency this political space is the essence of Psychological Warfare in non-conventional operations. Framing is the tool used by both sides to create a focused mobilization, a feeling of unity in the population, a hope in the future of the host country/nation, or a feeling of vulnerability in the case of the insurgents seeking to deny local U.S./CF supporters a foundation for continuing operations.

C. IO

Andrew Garfield, a contractor who provides IO classes to the military officers and trains command and staff groups headed into theater on regional culture and the tactics useful to the application of IO, argues that the U.S. Army is “the worst client I have ever worked for.” He argues this because of what he sees as the innate difference between good information operators and good Soldiers. One is creative, spontaneous and culturally savvy in the host country and generally academically credentialed in this field of study; the other is resourceful, prefers centralized command and control and measurable hard data such as kinetic attacks and body counts rather than “soft” force

42 Telephone Interview by author with Andrew Garfield, 31 OCT 07.
such as passing out leaflets and engaging in regional political dialogue. The advances in IO, Garfield argues, are in spite of the military organization, rather than because of its efforts.

The U.S. Army published in 2003 their Field Manual 3-13 (FM 3-13), which takes IO more toward the tactical implementation. In the introduction, paragraph one, the FM 3-13 defines IO as operations that “encompass attacking adversary command and control (C2) systems (offensive IO) while protecting friendly C2 systems from adversary disruption (defensive IO).”\textsuperscript{43} From its outset and throughout the field manual, the tactics proposed are basically conventional, computer/information warfare tactics meant to prevent electronic disruption of command and control channels (radio/satellite communications between command centers and their subordinate units) and how to interrupt enemy information channels. This proposed\textsuperscript{44} tactical application is predominately kinetic in focus and conventional in application.

The Joint Publication 3-13 (JP 3-13) addresses the doctrinal uses of IO in the operations of U.S. Army, Marines, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard, but is little more than a transference of the contents of the Army FM 3-13 into a Joint Publication. This manual defines the relation of IO to military operations, the capabilities and planning procedures to execute IO, organizational frameworks for integrating IO in a battle staff, and planning considerations for developing an IO career force.\textsuperscript{45} The last of these directly addresses the U.S. military’s force reconstruction to create a force capable of fighting in a media-rich environment such as current military operations are facing. This manual defines information as a strategic resource that is vital to national security. The control of this resource, its use in shaping the battlefield in order to create an information environment conducive to U.S. military operations directly involves the use of framing and the concepts developed by social mobilization academics.

\textsuperscript{43} U.S. Army, FM 3-13 (FM 100-6) Headquarters, Dept of the Army, November 2003. v.

\textsuperscript{44} Soldiers are aware that a ‘field manual’ is a guide meant to propose an idea of how to conduct operations relevant to the scope of the particular manual. It is not a law that Soldiers must abide by, such as an Army Regulation (AR).

\textsuperscript{45} Joint Chiefs of Staff. JP 3-13, (2006) ix.
In reading the JP/FM 3-13, one fact continues to resurface: these publications, written in 2003 and 2006, are only scratching the surface and developing an organizationally focused, internal manual (too long to be called a memorandum) to create a structure conducive to operating in the information environment. The U.S. military has been operating in the GWOT for six years to-date and has only begun at the highest levels to address the deficiencies it faces on this modern battlefield, away from Cold War era tank formations, echeloned artillery and air-power strikes that shape the conventional battlefield of fire and maneuver, and toward the current operational environment where one Soldier, ‘shooting his mouth off,’ can affect brigade or division operations in a whole city. For Example, the sample operations orders (OPORD) on how to integrate IO in the military decision making process (MDMP) list the enemy as “Tiger Corps” with two divisions in strength. These publications are more of a rough guideline for integrating IO as a part of a staff at brigade and above. Their chapter headings list the supporting efforts necessary for IO to occur: intelligence requirements, capabilities that IO lends to commanders, command relationships during the conduct of IO, the educational requirements for IO officers and staff, and advice on how to conduct IO training integrated with current training procedures.

D. FM 3-24 THE COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL

Published in 2006, this manual has become the Army’s guide to current operations in Iraq under GEN Patraeus, who coincidentally was the officer in charge of preparing the manual. The counterinsurgency (COIN) manual differs from the FM/JP 3-13 in that it openly references scholarly works such as Bernard Lewis and Robert Asprey among others, and military references such as David Galula, Mao Zedong and LTC Nagl. The reading list at the end of the manual provides the reader with sources that can help develop an understanding of the subtleties of COIN operations. The manual was written with the purpose to fill a ‘doctrinal gap’ in strategy and tactics revolving around COIN operations. The U.S. Army had trained for twenty years after Vietnam without

46 FM 3-13.


24
integrating the lessons learned and type of warfare carried out during that conflict and thus had to “reinvent the wheel” when post-invasion operations came around in Iraq.

In regards to framing and information operations, the FM 3-24 briefly speaks about “Mobilization and Message”\(^48\) where it identifies that an insurgency in its early stages will often rely on propaganda and intimidation which can be countered by information operations. The paragraph on this topic mentions that appealing to religion in a counter-theme approach (seeking to change a radical message into a moderate message) will work best if a respected local religious leader is used as the advocate. These basic ideas are a step in the right direction, but a reference to the concept of framing, more academic information on this subject and a deeper discussion on the idea of resonance would help to ‘flesh’ out this section even more and would, in turn, greatly aid the Soldier attempting to use this information in the field.

Chapter 3 of the FM 3-24 addresses the cultural implications of fighting a counterinsurgency, viz. military intelligence, and the things that COIN fighters must keep in mind. Among these are “cultural forms”\(^49\) which are defined as “concrete expression(s) of the belief systems shared by members of a particular culture. Cultural forms include rituals, symbols, ceremonies, myths and narratives.” These forms are the mediums for communicating values, group identity and meanings that affect individual thought and behavior. The manual takes the idea only this far: that these forms exist and that they are defined as such.

E. CONCLUSION

Neither the Army FM 3-13 nor the JP 3-13 contains academic references that would lead military personnel reading these publications to sources outside the Department of Defense. Since the conventional forces that are conducting “a war among

\(^{48}\) FM 3-24 .1-17 section 1-97.
\(^{49}\) FM 3-24 . 3-8 section 3-49.
the people”50 are out of their conventional element in so far as the GWOT in Iraq is concerned, it is not far-fetched or illogical for these personnel to be exposed to academic theories that have been developed in support of social, economic, and political areas of study. The JP/FM 3-13, and the PSYOP manual (FM 3-05.30) list other government sources, Department of Defense memorandums, other JPs, FMs, training manuals (TMs) and the like, but do not reference academic work that would help military personnel seeking to engage in the nuanced counterinsurgency fight to understand the basic tenants of social mobilization which directly affect the power base of insurgencies. Only in the past year, with the FM 3-24 (counterinsurgency), have academic sources been listed at the end of the manual for further reading. This is a step in the right direction, adding the concept of framing will further this initiative and provide a clearer understanding for the military personnel conducting COIN operations.

Social mobilization theory, and framing in particular to this paper, offers insights that are either thought of as ‘self evident’ and so evidently left out of the professional manuals, broadly summarized, or overlooked completely. The professional pride of scholars and Soldiers aside, there is no reason why military personnel cannot read and learn from these academic sources lessons that will ultimately help prevent or disrupt the insurgency in Iraq.

50 Smith, xiii.
III. WIELDING THE WORD OF GOD

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the basis of Islamist framing in the Qur’an. The Qur’an as a document provides a rich medium for cultural understanding, immediate veracity as the word of God through the Prophet Mohammed, and immediately provides Islamist leaders with legitimacy through common faith in Muslim societies. Casting the ills of the society in a religious light is a “tried and true” tactic for social mobilization, and the purpose of this chapter is to examine just how the Qur’an is used by Islamist leaders to create resonance in Muslim societies. The direct application of this chapter to current operations in Iraq is clearly seen through Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) information operations, through their actions against U.S./CF forces, and the documented use of mosques by the insurgency.

The Qur’an, as the message of God sent to the Prophet Mohammed, is a guide to better human living through religion, faith, and improved interpersonal relations within the religious community. The Hadiths are accepted sayings of the prophet handed down orally until several centuries after the Prophet’s death. The Muslim communal faith in the Qur’an and Hadiths creates a powerful bond of common language, law and understanding that can make the these scriptures a tool in the hands of resourceful religious leaders who can use the Qur’an to galvanize the resolve in a given community by framing actions within the religious understanding of the community. The Islamist movement has made an art-form of Qur’anic framing from Egypt to Lebanon. What specific verses within the Qur’an directly address the ideas of Jihad and legal warfare? How are these verses used to create resonance within the umma? How has the Qur’an been used to frame violent-resistance Islamist movements in the 20th and 21st centuries?

The message given to the Prophet Mohammed that later became the Qur’an formed a religious foundation on which a state could be built. As an instrument of state, the Qur’an addresses the lawful justifications for warfare, the just conduct of the fighters in the war, and, most importantly, the return to a state of peace. In order to answer the questions of this study, one must first examine the Qur’an’s specific rules concerning

---

51 An assumption is made that the reader is at least familiar with the basic tenants of Islam.
warfare, what verses regulate the Islamic state entering, conducting and concluding war as well as how and where the concept of *Jihad* enters into this equation? Supporting this study, the works of Noor Mohammed, Majid Khadduri, and Reuven Firestone will provide the academic foundation primarily focused on *Jihad*. Each of these authors is concerned with the concept of Islamic war and how the Qur’an outlines God’s definition of just cause for war, methods while in combat, and the just ends of warfare.

Once the Qur’anic verses concerning warfare and martyrdom are covered, a study of the Islamists in particular will provide case-by-case analysis of their uses of the Qur’an in their justification of waging righteous war. It is the intent of this study to focus on the Salafi/Wahabbi schools of Muslim jurisprudence for two reasons, first, it simplifies the paper to study one Islamic school of jurisprudence and, second, the choice of the Salafi school is made for their doctrinal focus on the Qur’an and the lives of the Prophet and his companions as the primary guides to ethical, just and religious behavior which further simplifies the paper by maintaining focus on the Qur’an and Hadiths. Other schools such as Shi’a, Druze, and Hanbali, to name a few, have different approaches to the interpretation of *jihad* and the uses of the Qur’an in these policies. With this in mind, we will look at the beginnings of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Osama bin Laden, and the collected teachings and policies of Hamas in Gaza. The studies of these primary sources will be based on their published works, analysis from open source websites, and websites set up by the group or individual. The selection of these particular Islamic scholars and Islamist organizations is based on their relation to current events in the Middle East. Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and others, were the foundational Islamist thinkers that created the structure of current Islamist ideological thinking in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its many off-shoots. Osama bin Laden is a textbook case of Qur’anic framing for his cause: his is an attempt to unite the global Muslim *umma* in order to throw off the yolk of Western religious oppression. Finally, Hamas, the newborn pseudo-state who continues to pursue a state of armed conflict with Israel and its

---

52Such as [www.opensource.gov](http://www.opensource.gov) and MEMRI.org which are the primary sources used due to the researcher’s lacking Arabic.
Palestinian political competitor Fatah. Hamas’ rhetoric encapsulates the Islamist fight and the Islamic right to wage war as a state in terms that are making headlines today.

A. ON WAR: THE TEACHINGS OF THE QUR’AN

Before an analysis of the social/political uses of the Qur’an can be made, a suitable study in the Qur’anic provisions for warfare must be established. The Western paradigm of the Middle East is still burdened with traces of 19\textsuperscript{th} century romanticism: war-like Sheikhs in flowing robes brandishing scimitars and dying for honor. This stereotype feeds the image of Islam conquering rather than converting, subjugating rather than liberating, through hundreds of years of seamless warfare and violence. Reuven Firestone notes that the Middle East is no more war-torn than any other human-populated area, and probably a lot less so than others. He sites Quincy Wright’s tally of 278 wars fought worldwide from 1484 to 1945 based on a constant set of definitional criteria. Of the wars counted, 187 were fought in Europe and 91 were fought everywhere else.\footnote{As cited by Reuven Firestone. \textit{Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam}. Oxford University Press, New York (1999). vi; from Wright, Quincy, \textit{A Study of War}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 636.} On the other hand, Majid Khadduri, in his book dedicated to Quincy Wright, also quotes the famed military historian in a paragraph arguing that the use of \textit{Jihad} was a tool of the rapidly expanding Islamic state used in order to transform the \textit{Dar al-Harb} (realm of War) into the \textit{dar al-Islam} (the realm of Islam). Quincy Wright said that “the primitive nomad of the desert and steppes, has a hard environment to conquer . . . his terrain . . . leads him to institutionalize war for aggression and defense.”\footnote{As cited by Majid Khadduri. \textit{War and Peace in the Law of Islam}. Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore (1955). 55 from Quincy Wright, \textit{A Study of War}. Vol. I. Chicago (1942), 42.} Even from one academic to another, quoting the same intellectual source, \textit{Jihad} is a multifaceted and complex religious idea that has pragmatic, political, religious and social implications.

The word \textit{Jihad} has become negatively charged in the West and immediately associated with radical Muslims, suicide bombers and threats to peace and stability. This association is less informed as it is reactionary to the symptoms of the idea of \textit{Jihad},
which is to “struggle or exertion of one’s power in Allah’s path”\textsuperscript{55}, rather than the actual doctrine of \textit{Jihad} which can be the internal spiritual revitalization of the self, society, political structure or against an oppressor. Noor Mohammed argued that a key misunderstanding of the West is that secular warfare is morally unacceptable within Islam. He states that early Muslim thinkers, such as Ibn Khaldun, postulated that wars had existed from the beginning of human history, and were rooted in humanity’s vengeful nature.\textsuperscript{56}

There are many forms of \textit{Jihad}, Firestone describes the \textit{Jihad} of the heart, of the tongue, etc., but the Prophet focused on two: the lesser and the greater. Firestone cites the Prophet as saying that the best \textit{Jihad} is “speaking a word of justice to a tyrannical ruler.”\textsuperscript{57} Although this last quote comes from the Hadiths gathered and scrutinized by Abu Dawud in his travels during two centuries After \textit{Hijira} (A.H.)\textsuperscript{58}, it is characteristic of two elements where the Qur’an deals directly with the subject of warfare: first, the established right for Muslims to speak out and even fight against religious oppression, second, the moral obligation of the true believer to defend the faith and the faithful.

Dealing with warfare, the Qur’an can be split into two time periods, first, during the Prophet’s time in Mecca when his political clout was not very strong and the infant Muslim community had to tread lightly lest it be destroyed and the message lost. The second period is after \textit{Hijira} when the Prophet had set up a more vibrant state within Medina. Both Firestone and Noor Mohammed agree that the tone of revelations proceeding \textit{Hijira} are more passive and that, as the Muslim community grew more autonomous in Medina, the revelations became more conducive to conquest. Illustrating this, Noor Mohammed quotes Surah 22: 78\textsuperscript{59} “... strive in His cause, as ye ought to strive (with sincerity and under discipline)” to which he argues that the propagation of


\textsuperscript{56} Noor Mohammed., 380.


\textsuperscript{58} The Muslim date celebrating the exile of the Prophet Mohammed from Mecca from which the years of Islam are counted; corresponds to 622 A.D.

\textsuperscript{59} NOTE: all references from the Holy Qur’an will be cited as “Surah CHAPTER : VERSE” ex. Surah 8:60-1 for Surah chapter 8 verses 60 and 61.
Islam was more important than the battlefield victory.® Surah 9: 20-22 of the Qur’an promises that those believers who suffer for their beliefs and give of themselves and their ‘goods’ will “have the highest rank in the sight of God, they are the people who will achieve salvation.” Yusuf Ali, a respected and well known Muslim scholar whose translations and commentaries on the Qur’an have shaped Islamic studies in the West, said that the verse from Surah 9 “may require fighting in God’s cause, as a form of self-sacrifice” but that the verse shows the true essence of Jihad, that the sincere faith focused on God melts all worldly thoughts of gain away and that the earnest striving is completely in the service of God. Fighting alone is not the true spirit of Jihad, the scholar’s writings, a man’s wealth, and the preacher’s voice may bring the most valuable Jihad.®

The Qur’an does address actual fighting as a Jihad, too, Surah 2: 190-195 is probably the most remarked upon verse as it delves into detail the prohibitions and allowances for the uses of force under God’s law.® According to Noor Mohammed, this verse belongs in the Medina period, the time in which the new Muslim community had established itself as a political entity and could function as a state against the Meccan pagans. Yusuf Ali states that Muslims know that war is an evil, but that Muslim men will not shrink from it when honor, courage, obedience, discipline, duty and a righteous Imam command that war be done in order to preserve the faith.

Reuven Firestone’s work, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam, examines the social and political motives to the creation of Jihad. Although the purpose of this paper is not to delve into the history of Jihad, rather it is to see where the Qur’an is used to frame the execution of violence by Islamists within the span of the last one hundred years, Firestone’s work is applicable in finding the Qur’anic references to the use of holy war and he does well to provide examples, though they are certainly buried under several

---

® Noor Mohammed, 385.
® See Appendix for a full quote from Yusuf Ali’s translation of the Qur’an Surah II, 190-195.
centuries of history. The origins of *Jihad* are also part of the definitions for its use in social movements and settings because history, like religion, is the property of the community in which it is shared.

Islamic law on warfare and controlled violence naturally grew with the size and vitality of the *umma*, the need to consolidate the faithful and clarify the message placed the Prophet at the forefront of policing his growing religion in Mecca, but he had less constraints after the *Hijira* when he was the head of Medina. Firestone separates the Qur’anic legislation on war into four traditional stages: 1. non-confrontation, 2. defensive fighting, 3. initiating attack is allowed within ancient strictures, and 4. the unconditional command to fight all unbelievers, referred to hereafter as stages one-four respectively.63

Stage one quotes Surah 15 “Therefore expound openly what thou art commanded, and turn away from those who join false gods with Allah, for sufficient are We unto thee against those who scoff.”64 This verse is a comfort to the oppressed that are not in position to fight. Much like Psalms 23:4 “Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil, for you are with me . . .”65 In both verses, the fact that God is sufficient and that one’s faith is correctly placed in Him; Firestone, citing Muslim scholars such as Tafsir Muqatil b. Sulayman and Tabari agree that this verse came from the early days of Islam, maybe even the first two years of the Prophet’s preaching the message.66 Surah 16:125 commands that the faithful open dialogue with the non-believers and, through one’s wisdom and command of language, inform them of the ways of God. Interestingly, Surah 16:126, the very next verse, claims that if the believer decides to punish, then he should punish equally to the affliction, i.e., *lex talionis* ‘an eye for an eye.’ However, verse 127 and 128 admonish that it is best to “. . . be patient, for thy patience is but from Allah. Nor grieve over them and distress not thyself because of their plots. For Allah is with those who restrain themselves, and those who do

63 Firestone, 51-65.
65 BibleGateway.com From key word search “valley of death” [http://www.biblegateway.com/keyword/?search=shadow%20of%20the%20valley%20of%20death&version=1=31&searchtype=all](http://www.biblegateway.com/keyword/?search=shadow%20of%20the%20valley%20of%20death&version=1=31&searchtype=all). Accessed 12 AUG 07.
66 Firestone, 51.
good.”⁶⁷ Firestone notes that several Muslim exegetes, namely Ibn al-Jaqzi, claim that this verse is abrogated by the Sword Verse, but that all together, the believers should argue with the non-believers, and those who do not agree should get the sword.⁶⁸

Stage two, defensive fighting, begins with Surah 22:39-40 claims that “to those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight)”⁶⁹ Those who are attacked are the wronged party and Allah will be most powerful in His aid to those who are expelled from their homes for proclaiming that their faith in God. Ibn Zayd recorded that the permission to fight was withheld from the Muslims for ten years and that this verse is considered to be the first verse allowing Muslims to use physical force.⁷⁰ Ibn Zayd and other exegetes argued that the allowance of Surah 22:39 abrogated verses that admonished more passive means of conflict resolution such as Surah 7:180 which states that the believer should simply leave the company of those that misuse the name of God.⁷¹ The allowance of violence is a slippery slope in religious wars and the regulation of zealots and radicals who would sway or slay non-believers has to be clear and to the point. Surah 2:190 accomplishes this regulation by allowing Muslims to fight against those who attack, but demands that their actions be limited to the paths that God defines; His wrath is against those who transgress His laws.

Stage three, making the initiating attack is allowed within the ancient strictures, begins with Surah 2:217 which mitigates breaking old Arabic codes of warfare in the name of saving the religion and the believers from losing their faith, thereby dying as unbelievers and destined for hellfire. Firestone’s evolutionary theory of Islam ties this revelation to the raid led by Abdallah b, Jabsh al-Asadi in which a Meccan caravan driver named was killed in the year 624 C.E. on either the last day of Rajab or the first day of Jumada al-Akhira, one of the four sacred months (which prohibit fighting). Likewise, Surah 2:191 states “Kill them wherever you find them and turn them out from where they

---

⁶⁸ Firestone, 53.
⁷⁰ Firestone, 54.
⁷¹ Firestone, 52.
have turned you out, for fitna\textsuperscript{72} is worse than killing, but do not fight them at the Sacred Mosque unless they fight you there. But if they fight you, kill them. Such is the reward of the unbelievers.”\textsuperscript{73} The right to self-defense is therefore paramount to any social understandings no matter how ancient or accepted. The protection of the faith and the umma abrogate all other calls to discourse or leniency.

In stage four, the unconditional command to fight all unbelievers, Surah 2:216 is invoked which states that fighting is commanded of the believers even though it may seem disagreeable to the individual. The verse reasons that it is possible that a man may dislike that which is good for him and love that which is bad. The empirical truth to this argument is in no other way tied through reason other than God knows that which the believer does not. Forefront in the Islamic rules of engagement is the Sword Verse, Surah 9:5\textsuperscript{74} states that, once the sacred months are through, fighting and slaying the non-believers (Pagans) wherever they are found is allowed. The one proviso in this verse is that once peace is sought (and conversion immanent if not beginning) then mercy must be given as Allah is “Oft-forgiving.”\textsuperscript{75} Scholarship is split on the meaning of the verse on four issues: 1. the meaning of the ‘Sacred months,’ whether they refer to the original Arab sacred months, 2. prohibitions of killing non-believer prisoners of war, 3. why only three of the five pillars of Islam may be construed from the verse, and 4. the purpose for fighting.\textsuperscript{76}

Similar to Christianity, in Islam one can find text to support a multitude of conclusions. Those exegetes that border on the militant interpretation of the Qur’an argue the abrogation of more compassionate treatment of non-believers whereas more moderate scholars will provide their own Hadiths to support their interpretations. The war-like language grows in intensity as the new Islamic state progresses in size and physical power through military victories against the Meccans. The meaning of \textit{Jihad} in a

\textsuperscript{72} or civil strive, war, riots, heretical uprisings; from University of Southern California-MSA compendium of Muslim texts. \url{http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/reference/glossary/term.FITNAH.html}. Accessed 05 SEP 2007.

\textsuperscript{73} Qur’an Surah 2:191 as cited in Firestone, 59.

\textsuperscript{74} See Appendix.

\textsuperscript{75} Yusuf Ali, Holy Qur’an, Surah 9:5.

\textsuperscript{76} Firestone, 62.
military sense implies the use of mandatory violence in order to subjugate the unbelievers, limiting warfare only to combatants, compassion when the enemy is converted, and focusing on the aims of God and not the desires of man (e.g., wealth, remuneration and/or revenge). These themes as well as the verses from where they originate are necessary in formulating how the Qur’an is used to frame political, social and military actions today.

B. THE QUR’AN’S WAR DOCTRINES APPLIED

1. The Muslim Brotherhood

The early 20th century forced hard facts on the Muslim community. The fall of the Ottoman Empire removed the last vestiges of Islamic Shar’iah Law in the heartland of Islam. Much of the Muslim world was ruled, if not directly as in India and Algeria then through proxy as in Iran and the Hashemite Dynasty in Jordan, by Western powers. This turn of events led to deep internal scrutiny in the Muslim community. Muhammed Hadi al-Birjundi asked Rashid Rida (a modernist) in 1913 about the nature of jihad, whether it was defensive when it so aggressively spread its borders from India to Spain. Al-Birjundi continued his line of questioning to a more personal issue: if Islam conquered ‘defensively’ as it says that it did, then how is it any better than the Western colonists who do the same in the name of economics and ‘civilization?’ Rida’s answer was that the Muslim’s non-believing neighbors prevented the proclamation of the truth and therefore obligated the faithful to fight them. “Our religion” Rida claimed “is not like others that defend themselves . . . but our defense of our religion is the proclamation of truth and the removal of the distortion and misrepresentation of it.” Thus the definition of Jihad was the proclamation of the truth and when applied to fighting, it was only in the defense, which Rida had conveniently contorted into a semi-offensive/pre-emptive theory.

Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 at the age of 22 in an attempt to lead a revival of Islam and return to a study of its primary texts. In a pamphlet

77 Cook, 94-95.
78 Cook 96 from Rashid Rida, Fatwa (Beirut, 1970), III, 1156.
he responds to the question of why Muslims fight. Al-Banna responds with a quote from the Qur’an, Surah 8:61,79 he argues that God’s obligation of Jihad is neither a means to personal gain, nor a means of aggression; rather, it was meant to protect the proclamation of Islam which guides people to justice.80 The inclusion of Surah 8:61 grants that peace must be given where asked so that the truth of Islam can be spread. With this in mind, fighting should not be avoided simply because it is fighting; rather, the intention of the Muslim fighter must be secured in the right reasoning.

Sayyid Qutb (executed in 1966) can be argued to be the founder of radical Islam. During a two year academic visit to the United States, he was so disgusted with the lack of morality, decency and self restraint that he witnessed in the capitalist system and American culture that he completely rejected all of Western ideology. His basic argument is that all ideologies other than Islam, and particularly the West, have failed. Essentially, Islam has come full circle and now, globally, is beset by the ignorant (Jahiliyya) just as the Prophet Mohammed and his early congregation were beset by the Meccan pagans and idolaters. His answer is a revival of Islam through simplifying all teachings back to the “unique Qur’anic experience” of the original Muslim community who had nothing more than the revelation of the Qur’an to guide them.81

On Jihad Qutb says that, first, the entirety of Islamic religious and social teaching is a realistic one, jihad is a part of that system; therefore, Jihad is a reality making realistic demands on the followers. Second, jihad is a rational doctrine. That is to say, minus the manipulating exegetes, the Qur’an’s teaching on Jihad has a logical progression, an escalation of force, from peaceful proclamation to unlimited warfare. Essentially, Jihad is the “means by which Muslims ensure that the proclamation of Islam is heard.”82 The caveat, however, is that “there is no compulsion in religion”; therefore the nature of Jihad is not the same as that of modern warfare, nor are its methods and aims similar since Jihad was given to the followers of Islam in order to carry out the will

79 See Appendix, Surah 8:60-1.
80 Cook, 98 from Rashid Rida, Fatwa.
81 Cook, 103.
82 Cook, 104.
of God.83 Therefore there is no need of an apologia for *Jihad*, nor is there a need for a defense of the religion because of this doctrine; rather, Qutb argues that *Jihad* removes the material and physical barriers to the spreading of Islam within either the community or the individual.

Sayyid Qutb’s call to revive Islam as the cure-all to Western decadence was neither a command to destroy the West, nor a ‘Luddite’ rebellion against the advances of science and economics. Rather, Qutb said that Islam was the cure for the West’s decadence and religious poverty that was causing its gradual loss of world power and influence.84 His thorough understanding and teaching of the Qur’an framed the relationship between the Islamists and their imposter-governments in the simple, concise and clear forms defined by the Prophet as the Muslims, those with which there is peace bartered, and those that continually wish to fight against Islam; these ideas he took directly from the Qur’an and applied them to the world during his time. The need to fight, therefore, is only manifest when the peace of the *umma* is threatened by an un-Islamic force (e.g., the authoritarian governments throughout Muslim lands).

2. **Osama bin Laden**

By far the most infamous and clearly proven advocate for the Sword Verse (Surah 9:5), Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda blasted their way to notoriety on 11 September 2001 but their struggle against the Western powers began in 1989. Their basic tenant is the unification of all Islamic peoples and countries, forcing the conversion or migration of all non-Muslims within mixed societies and unifying the community of the faith under a new caliphate in order to protect the faithful from the decadent and secular West. The vast sea of coverage and focus on bin Laden as the face of *Jihadi* terrorist attacks on innocent civilians makes and study of bin Laden an attempt to tame an academic leviathan. However, there is much to be said on his position as a key leader in the Islamic resistance to Western interference in Muslim lands and how he uses that position to frame attacks on civilians as a just war.

---

83 Sayyid Qutb. *Milestones*. Mother Mosque Foundation; Cedar Rapids, IA (Library of Congress Catalog no. 81-50776) 57 from Surah 2: 256.

84 Qutb, .8.
Framing is a tactic used by a leader to get his message across; by studying the ‘echo’ of this message from supporters and the dissonance caused by opponents can demonstrate just how well the frame penetrated. In a popular Al-Jazeera talk show “The Opposite Direction,” Osama Safar, a Kuwaiti columnist who opposed Osama bin Laden and Abdallah bin Matruk Al-Hadd, a Saudi preacher from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs in Saudi Arabia and supporter of bin Laden stated their points for and against bin Laden’s attacks. Al-Hadd remarked that:

...There is no doubt that Osama bin Laden waged *Jihad* against the infidels, against the aggressor and the oppressor. America does not want Islamic principles [to exist] on the face of this planet. It does not want the full implementation of Islam's values and principles... It does not want there to be a free Islamic economy.85

and

Like all other Muslims, bin Laden wanted to apply the Shari'a fully with its values, principles, economics, media, and education. Even in sports there should be Shar'i sport.86

Al-Hadd’s support of Osama bin Laden’s attacks on America was in defiance of a Saudi mandate prohibiting any support of the former Saudi businessman.

In response to the U.S. air-strike that resulted in the death of Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi, Osama bin Laden jeered at President Bush claiming that, though he struck down a lion of *Jihad*, another was sure to take his place. Bin Laden claimed Zarqawi’s defense of Islam, his fight for the restoration of Palestine and his avenging of the oppressed as a part of this warrior’s *Jihadi* accomplishments. Bin Laden said, 'Our Muslim nation has lost its intrepid hero - the lion of jihad, a man of resolve and action, Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi - Ahmad Al-Khalayla - who was killed in a criminal American attack, 'To Allah we belong, and to Him we return.' [Surah, 2:156] May Allah grant his wish and accept

---

85 MEMRI.org. Special Dispatch Series-No. 343 Feb 8, 2002. 

86 Ibid.
him as a martyr, reward him generously, and comfort his family and relations...”87 His quoted verse is preceded by verses 2:153-15588 which claim the good tidings for those who suffer for their faith in God. The verses claim that faith in God will not be without tests of “fear and hunger”89 but that the losses of goods and possibly lives will only yield glad tidings to those who have patient faith in God’s reciprocity. Thus the loss of Zarqawi is a sacrifice that the Jihadi take as a sign of testing from God and a boding of good returns in the future as the wages of this suffering for the defense of the faithful.

Bin Laden reiterates three frames in his campaign that have a tested and proven capability to resonate with the Muslim society and are reminiscent of Qutb and al-Bannah: 1. that Islam is beset by a secular and irreligious enemy that will not accept the Prophet’s message and desires to fight, thus Surah 9:5 justifies the slaying of the non-believers ‘wherever you find them.’ 2. that those who fight for the religion and suffer the consequences of their faith are bound to reap the favor of God himself (Surah 2:153-56). Finally, 3. that Islam is the only answer to the social ills of secular governments and that the Qur’an is sufficient for the faithful. His is a minimalist approach to religious literature and commentary which conveniently cuts down on bin Laden’s reading list as he and the majority of his followers are engineers rather than clerics.

3. Hamas

The Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (Hamas also means “zeal” in Arabic) emerged in 1987 in competition with the secular Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Originally a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas derives much of its political ideology from its parent organization. It is an organization with multi-level objectives. Regionally, their objective is to negate the Jewish state of Israel and reinstate the original Palestinian state under Islamic Shar’iah law. They base this on the perception (not wholly unfounded) that the Israeli government is increasingly war-like in its interactions with Arabs who were forced out of their native lands by “Zionists.” Hamas’

88 See Appendix.
89 Surah 2:155.
relations with their Jewish neighbors is best illustrated through a commentary article referring to the Tel Aviv soccer team and its fans singing songs insulting to Islam and the Prophet Mohammed on 29 August 2007, that was posted on their website, www.Palestinian-Info.co.uk.

However, it is also true that the obnoxious incident expressed and reflected to a large extent an increasingly hateful and xenophobic culture bordering on fascism, which explains why the bulk of the Israeli Jewish society is so numb and callous toward the nearly daily killing by Israeli soldiers of Palestinian children and civilians. (five Palestinian children were murdered last week.)90

Globally, Hamas perceives itself as the frontlines and frontrunner of the pan-Islamist international movement. Khaled Mishal, the head of Hamas’ political bureau said “Hamas is not a local organization but the spearhead of a national project, which has Arab, Islamic and international ambitions as well.”91 Hamas is organized into three political wings, social welfare (dawa) and the political wings (A’alam is a publications/media branch that distributes leaflets and propaganda) are the public face of the organization; the military wing (Mujihadeen al-Filastinun and the security branch Jehaz Aman is responsible for finding, interrogating, and punishing collaborators) is mostly engaged in clandestine and guerrilla operations.

While Hamas’ fight is certainly more political in nature, it frames its right to rule and its right to resist in the Qur’an. As a primarily Salafi movement, Hamas believes in the purity of the Prophet’s message and his companions who helped form Islam in the beginning. Their religious goal of establishing a true Islamic state, ruled by Shari’ah law as the Prophet dictated thirteen-hundred years ago, has internal political implications: if Hamas is ‘righteous’ in the eyes of God, then the PLO is not. The Western inclusion of the PLO in peace talks and exclusion and vilification of Hamas only reinforces the religious iniquity of the PLO to Hamas and its followers. To Hamas’ credit, it follows

90 Khalid Amayreh. “When will Zionist Jews stop cursing other religions?”, reporting from East Jerusalem, Stable URL: http://www.palestineinfo.co.uk/en/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUXJEpmOM%2bi1s78%2fuH8kzsvFJLH4R%2bZNwqaoJhHTDm0pMD9gSmKEKNNWQ6dxihwv5OFx8Dl5PGf8HwuIPrANYNIyhMkyG70AHASu%2bt7PljBsrdoOG%2b8hvWve40%3d. Accessed 10 SEP 2007.

more closely to the patterns of just war and peace that the Qur’an outlines and adheres to its cease-fires made with Israel across the organization, which is something that the PLO cannot accomplish in its present fractured state.

Treating Hamas as a different religious ideology from Sayyid Qutb and Hassan Al-Bannah’s Muslim Brotherhood is a difficult task and results in ‘hair-splitting.’ The real difference is the political aims of Hamas which is a function of the different nature of Hamas’ fight to the Muslim Brotherhood’s fight in the 1940s-70s. Hamas’ victory in the 2005-6 elections forced it to moderate its strictly Islamic policies to appeal and apply to the multi-religious/multi-ethnic reality that is the Palestinian state. With the 2007 fissure opened between Hamas and Fatah (the PLO’s lead party), Hamas will continue to be under scrutiny internally as well as internationally.

C. CONCLUSION

Islam was born a social movement; it was an answer to an unfulfilling, fractured, pagan existence that created a unified Arab nation of believers, as an immediate consequence, and an empire of new converts from the Iberian Peninsula to the Indian Subcontinent. The Prophet’s message of salvation utilized existing Arab cultural messages, linguistics and norms that are codified in the Qur’an and understood by all Arabs in order to further Islam’s legitimacy and religious palatability to the Arab community. Jihad is a call to arms, in effect a social movement, organized by accepted leaders. As David Cook’s definition of Jihad, in reference to that contingent of today’s Muslim community who associate the idea with warfare, explains that it is

warfare authorized by a legitimate representative of the Muslim community for the sake of an issue that is universally, or nearly universally, acknowledged to be of critical importance for the entire community against an admitted enemy of Islam.92

The Qur’an has the structural capacity to build an Islamic state and all the regulations to guide that state with internal and international affairs and policies. Warfare is one of the international political tools of the state and is covered in detail within the Qur’an. As a source of the supreme religious authority with the Muslim community, the Qur’an has power that can be easily tapped into by enterprising leaders who are intent on creating a social movement. Entwined in the Qur’anic doctrine of warfare is the individual’s faith, that the devout are ready and willing to risk property, security, life, and welfare for the will of God and that that sacrifice will yield a more righteous end in one’s life. The Prophet Mohammed was a movement leader who lived in violent times and often had to resort to warfare in order to accomplish his divine mission. As such, the writings of the Qur’an address and reflect the political obstacles placed before the newborn Islamic faith, these principles mirror social movements’ obstacles today and can therefore create a ready narrative to compare modern plights to the holy plights of God’s last messenger on earth. Is this also part of the quotes?

The struggles of the faithful are timeless; suffering and misery are recognizable and create immediate sympathy within a population. The Qur’an presents a form of warfare that yielded absolute victory and a glorious past to the Prophet and his companions that naturally creates a sense of common pride and community for Muslims. Tapping into this common narrative has bolstered the Islamists’ right to be the arbiters, or rightful instigators, of holy war. Why is this a single spaced?

A clear line of success from Afghanistan in the 1980s against the Soviet Army to “martyrs” in the Lebanese-Israeli conflict (1982-2002) and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts has only given more legitimacy and leverage to Islamist leaders when they call for war. They no longer need to call solely on the example of the Prophet; rather, they can and do use his fight as the model for religious warriors in opposition to infidel occupiers and armies to create a simple story wherein popular perception of reality can be curbed into social activation and insurgency, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan.
IV. FRAMING APPLIED IN CURRENT U.S. OPERATIONS (IO) IN IRAQ: IO IN THE FIELD

Social mobilization theory’s application to military doctrine is not directly associated with kinetic operations, such as those operations that are traditionally associated with conventional warfare. In conventional operations, the use of IO and PSYOP are considered as part of the ‘shaping’ of the battlefield through fires and effects. In counterinsurgency operations (COIN), however, the use of pure kinetic force often jeopardizes the larger mission which is to secure the civilian population and prevent further support of the insurgency.

The concept of framing applies to military operations in the areas of PSYOPS and IO. The counterinsurgency fight currently being waged in Iraq relies heavily on these tools in order to bring about victory on the battlefield. The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the U.S. military fighting in Iraq is adapting to the information-based fight in order to meet its enemy, namely al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), on his own battlefield and defeat him in the arena of hearts and minds. This process of adapting to non-conventional warfare by a conventional army is currently changing doctrine, developing a new generation of warriors and leaders, and creating a greater organizational awareness on information warfare. This chapter is a combination of scholarly work on IO/PSYOPS and framing, and the result of information collected from primary sources through interviews by the author with U.S. Army officers who have fought the IO fight and their perceptions of the current state of U.S. information operations as an organization and as a useful tactic.

This chapter applies framing to U.S. military operations in Iraq in three sections: the first section is a vignette focused on Ron Schleifer’s lessons learned by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during the Palestinian Intifada where a conventional force conducted stability operations without an in-depth IO campaign and how their opponents, the Palestinians, were able to mobilize using their dominance of the IO battlefield. The second section begins the analysis of U.S. IO/PSYOP integration by addressing the changing force structure in the brigade staff that is facilitating the use of IO in daily operations.
operations. The third section addresses the successes that have happened since the command-driven integration of IO in U.S. operations and includes three vignettes: Operations Al Fajr, 1-1AD operations in Ramadi, and PSYOP in al Anbar Province based on an interview with the PSYOP detachment commander. This chapter argues that, as IO and PSYOP are important to the COIN mission currently set in Iraq, framing as a cognitive theory applicable to military operations countering social mobilization (i.e., insurgency) is therefore important for the edification of the Soldiers and Marines tasked with executing COIN operations.

The focus of this chapter is to see where the U.S. is achieving success in Iraq, if any, in the IO battlefield and where framing is applied in this fight. The ability of the conventional forces to adapt to this unconventional battlefield is a secondary objective of this paper. This focus directly engages the concept of framing and counter-framing as it is used by U.S. and CF to combat AQI and other insurgent groups by denying them the support base within the local population. Since this paper is unclassified, detailed analysis of the frames used (such as verbatim messages) and exact percentages on their effect will not be included. However, much can be learned about the importance of framing to these operations through the changes in the U.S. force structure at the tactical level (brigade and below), through the changing focus of U.S. commanders at theater to tactical levels, and the gains being accomplished through the application of PSYOPS and IO within Al Anbar Province, Iraq.

A. SCHLEIFER: AN APPLICATION OF IDF LESSONS LEARNED

Military doctrine is shaped by experiences gained on the battlefield. Much of U.S. doctrine is based on the experiences of past generations of Soldiers and the lessons learned from allied nations as well as enemy tactics that have been analyzed and incorporated. This being said, a short vignette on the Palestinian Intifada is applicable to this chapter because of its relevance to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

Ron Schleifer’s book, Psychological Warfare in the Intifada93, applies Psychological Warfare and IO tactics used by the Palestinians during the Intifada

---

(December 1987-December 1989). Important to this study, Schleifer’s work uses U.S. military manuals on PSYOP as measure for his analysis. Therefore, it is based on his model and analysis of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) presented in this section that following analysis in this chapter will be conducted of the U.S. and CF in Iraq’s use of IO and PSYOPS as a force multiplier in combat at the tactical level.

Schleifer’s work analyzes the use of media in the Intifada and the application of the media that each side (Israeli and Palestinian) used in support of their operations, the Israelis in securing and pacifying, the Palestinians in activating the population and painting the global response to the Intifada. This conflict can be easily applied to current U.S. operations in Iraq since the U.S./CF are arrayed similarly to the IDF, a conventional force utilizing hierarchical command structure and information/intelligence flows, and seeking to secure a foreign population. Whereas the Palestinian forces are arrayed more like AQI94 where they are attempting to mobilize the population against these conventional security forces, gather resources and support from the population, and launch successful attacks on security forces which achieves two goals: it damages U.S. public opinion who dislike loss of American lives and equipment and it denies the U.S./CF claim to be providing security for the young Iraqi state.

Political warfare, or PSYOP as Schleifer defines it per U.S. military doctrine, presupposes the planned execution of warfare in the political arena; however, the Palestinian activists most likely did not begin the Intifada with a plan clear enough to wage political warfare.95 Though the beginning of the Intifada was arguably spontaneous, the movement was sustained for two years despite the best attempts of an experienced and well funded IDF to intervene and disrupt the movement. This level of organization occurring suddenly in response to political gains is indicative of insurgent operations as well as simple mobilization. The difference being that an insurgency is a political grab for power, a mobilization can simply be a demonstration of unified concern in order to gain attention from the regime and to ask the regime to address the problem.

94 This is not to say that AQI is in anyway politically like the Palestinians per se; on the tactical level alone, their fight based on force structure and their methods employed against a kinetically stronger and technologically superior IDF makes the Palestinians and AQI similar.

95 Schleifer, viii.
Palestinian political warfare during the Intifada had two goals in respect to the Palestinian people: to maintain high morale to withstand IDF attacks and Palestinian casualties and to maintain the impression of a knowing and capable leadership. Towards the Israelis, the Palestinians desired to lower the morale of society and within the IDF ranks themselves. Second, they sought to persuade the IDF that their actions were futile and thereby shake the IDF’s confidence in their ability to control the territories while decreasing the Israeli fear of a Palestinian state. Towards neutral target audiences, Palestinians sought to reinforce the notion that the IDF were immoral and that justice should be done.96

These goals are important choke-points in the information battlefield. Schleifer argues that the Palestinians succeeded in capturing the IO fight because of their willingness to reveal their tactics to the public eye. Being weaker in conventional terms of men and arms, the Palestinians painted the IDF as the oppressor through the most familiar form of semi-violent protest: throwing stones. The news media published countless photos and footage of young Palestinian males hurling stones at heavily armed, advancing IDF troops to the growing condemnation of the world. Prior to the Intifada, the Israelis were thought to be surrounded by conventional Arab threats. The 1948, 1967 and 1973 wars all placed Israel on the defense or matched against equal forces and emerging decisively victorious. This is one example how Israel had control over the information battlefield prior to the Intifada. Schleifer argues that the IDF spent too much time attacking Palestinian leaders, utilizing their technologically superior intelligence capabilities to ‘snatch’ movement leaders, and not enough time on telling their story on the Intifada. The Palestinian successful IO and PSYOP revealed an Israeli weakness and has paved the way for Palestinian state-building.

There are two lessons from Schleifer’s study that are directly applicable to U.S. military operations in Iraq: first is that the target for COIN operations is neither the leaders of the insurgents, nor the insurgents themselves; rather, it is the populace that must be addressed. The Intifada was successful because it utilized symbols that were convincing and resonated both within the Palestinian society and to the outside world.

96 Schleifer, 188-90.
Furthermore, the preferred Palestinian method of engagement with the IDF was throwing rocks. This certainly was not an effective way to engage heavily armed troops if the purpose was to defeat them conventionally; rather the rocks were symbols of resistance and the rock-wielding Palestinian became the ‘poster-child’ of the Intifada.

Second: the messaging needs to address the specific target audiences (TA). The Palestinians created a PSYOP plan that addressed their own population, the Israeli society, the IDF and the global media with specific messages that they developed through trial and error. These specified messages shaped the information battlefield and resonated within the target audiences turning each IDF use of force into a further injustice. Framing directly applies to these lessons, as chapter two describes. Applying these concepts in COIN operations forces the commanders involved to address the IO battlefield and increases the possibility that the insurgency could be denied its greatest asset: global vindication.

B. CHANGES IN U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE: ADAPTING TO THE BATTLEFIELD

The importance of IO to the COIN fight is evident in the force structure modifications that are occurring in the Army. Prior to 2007, Brigade (BDE) staffs handed the IO responsibilities to the BDE Fire Support Officer (FSO) as an ‘extra hat.’ FSO’s conventional duties are to plan and coordinate fires into a combined arms operation between the maneuver elements in the BDE and the fire support assets (artillery, aviation, naval gunfire, close air support). The FSO’s duties are conventionally focused on combining battlefield intelligence, maneuver firepower, and the available fire support assets together in order to accomplish the maneuver commander’s mission.97 There is nothing the Field Artillery’s Officer Basic or Advanced Courses that deals with Information Operations until January 2006. However, Field Artillery Officers in BDE FSO roles were taking on the role of IO officer as a part of the maneuver commander’s effects planning.98

MAJ Andrew Gainey was the BDE FSO for COL MacFarlane’s 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Armored Division (AD) in Ramadi, Iraq from 2006-7. As the BDE FSO, his commander gave him the IO job and it was up to him to find out how to do it. Basically, MAJ Gainey learned IO from ‘scratch’ and how to apply it through on the job training. As the defense analyst Andrew Garfield commented, the success of men like MAJ Gainey are in spite of the system, not because of it. Many of the IO officers that MAJ Gainey came in contact with had no clue as to how to do their job, much less instruct MAJ Gainey.

On his Fires and Effects Staff, MAJ Gainey had his BDE Fire Support Element (usually consists of a senior lieutenant/junior captain, a sergeant first class (E7) and two to four soldiers), the PSYOP team leader (a captain), the battalion air officer (Air Force), and a civil affairs (CA) officer (USMC). The PSYOP team leader was the subject matter expert in IO and how to use it on the battlefield. The PSYOP team would send Soldiers into sector in order to gather data on the messages, target audiences (TAs), and messaging methods of the enemy. Although MAJ Gainey worked well with his PSYOP and CA officers, neither he nor his commander rated these men. Thus, the organizational loyalty was to their chain of command and they simply worked with 1-1AD.

The communications channels were different for the PSYOP officer, too. While on a mission, the PSYOP teams would gather data, bring it back to the base and process a report that would be consolidated at Camp Fallujah where the PSYOP detachment commander was. Usually, the PSYOP team leader was very good at reporting to both his commander and the BDE commander, which, out of professional courtesy, he would make sure the BDE commander was aware of the reports. On one occasion, the PSYOP team leader neglected to report to the BDE commander, but still sent in his report to his detachment commander who reported directly to the division commander. When the division commander questioned COL MacFarlane about some graffiti in his sector, reported by the PSYOP detachment, COL MacFarlane was not aware of the situation. Fortunately the incident was not significant enough to warrant an emergency response; however, the incident caused friction within the unit thereby reducing its effectiveness in an unforgiving combat environment.
As of 2007, the BDE staff has been augmented with an IO trained and qualified officer, the “S7.” The BDE IO officer works as a part of the Effects Coordination Cell (ECORD) along with the BDE FSO. According to MAJ Munsey, the ECORD is a “major sustain”\(^9\) from the after-action review comments from previous deployments. Extending the scope of the staff better addresses the battlefield in total and allows the BDE commander to focus the efforts of his staff on winning in the COIN environment. The U.S. Army is adapting to the COIN fight and learning, but the nature of military adaptation is that it is explicitly command driven. The focus on IO and its integration with kinetic operations was not a priority prior to the arrival of GEN David Petraeus. Likewise, the successes in al Ramadi under COL MacFarlane were due to the command climate which forced subordinate commanders to apply IO to their operations.\(^1\)0 The importance of commanders to the conduct of COIN operations is that they are the ones that set the pace for their subordinates and the criteria for success on a battlefield that is completely without immediate or decisive results to actions. Conventionally trained and generally resistant to the fluidity of the COIN environment, commanders are hesitant to exercise the patience required to conduct COIN operations. The addition of academic works regarding framing could help foster a better understanding of the measures of success for conventionally trained Soldiers fighting in an unconventional environment.

C. REINFORCING SUCCESS IN THE IO BATTLEFIELD


Al Anbar Province is seated at the southwestern point of the ‘Triangle of Death,’ as it has been labeled by the media. It was a hotbed of support for Saddam Hussein and includes the cities of (from West to East) Hit, Ramadi, Habbina, and Fallujah. Al Anbar is the largest province in Iraq and its terrain consists of the Euphrates River basin and desert. Demographically, al Anbar is mostly Sunni, with some Kurdish settlements and Shi’a neighborhoods. The relative lack of sectarian differences poses the

\(^9\) Interview by author with MAJ Thomas Munsey. 15 NOV 07.

\(^1\)0 Interview by author with MAJ Andrew Gainey, 29 OCT 07.
threat of easy unification of the society under an insurgent cause and the promise of simplicity in composing IO talking points and PSYOP messages for the U.S. forces. Al Anbar shares borders with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria, which makes it much more susceptible to foreign influence. Al Ramadi and Fallujah are settled along a direct highway to Jordan and Syria and have a long history of smuggling with the neighboring states that has posed a threat to the growth and maintenance of indigenous police and security forces in Al Anbar.101

2. Operation Al Fajr, Fallujah, Iraq: November 2004

The importance of the second battle of Fallujah is not simply that it was another high-intensity contact between the insurgent and U.S. forces; rather, the battle was a fusion of IO and maneuver that was developed after the first attempt to take Fallujah, without an IO plan, failed miserably to quell the insurgency or impose U.S./Coalition Forces (CF) messages throughout the region. The first battle, in fact, actually reinforced the frames of the insurgents and clerical leaders who had made the town ungovernable by the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) or CF.

The first attempt on Fallujah began in April 2004 with a cordon of the city and weak attempts to coax the fledgling Iraqi security forces to attack hardened insurgent positions. The rapid response of the IIG/Bremer government to the execution of four U.S. contractors left little time to plan and little desire to attack on the part of the maneuver commanders who received the order to assault the city resulting in a hastily constructed and resourced attack called Operation Vigilant Resolve. Essentially, the task force assembled had had little time to plan, coordinate, or research the best way to take the town, minimize civilian casualties, and nullify the leadership of the clerics who were leading the insurgents from within the city.102 Even though the U.S./CF had clear military dominance against the insurgents in Fallujah during Operation Vigilant Resolve, the operation was a failure because “operations in the information domain were not

integrated into the battle plan.”

Steps to integrate IO into the battle plan would have included “engaging numerous and varied Iraqi leaders, removing enemy information centers, and rapidly disseminating information from the battlefield to worldwide media.”

The mistakes made in Operation Vigilant Resolve were avoided in the second battle of Fallujah, code named Operation Al Fajr (New Dawn). The operation was planed and coordinated under the auspices of Iraqi leadership and taken with IO in mind. The planners at Multi National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) created the “IO threshold” in order to prevent another informational defeat. The planners knew that the best way to prepare the battlefield was not through conventional artillery and air strikes; rather, it would be through gaining a dominant position on the information battlefield and nullifying the insurgent leadership through coercing them to leave or proving them wrong. The very name of the operation, Al-Fajr, was chosen because it put an Iraqi face on the assault and was intended to leave no doubt in the mind of the enemy that the attack had the license of the IIG.

I have first-hand experience with the second battle of Fallujah as a Mechanized Infantry Company Fire Support Officer (FSO) and was a part of the planning and execution of lethal and non-lethal fires used during the battle. For example, my company was augmented with a Forward Air Controller (or FAC, which is a pilot trained to call in air-strikes from the ground) and a PSYOP loudspeaker team prepared to play harassment and non-intervention messages throughout the battle. Throughout our time in Fallujah, the company sought to fight the insurgents and provide for the civilians who had stayed. We provided medical aid to wounded civilians, license to come and go along the streets to families trying to get to their homes, and security from insurgent reprisal.

The importance of IO was evident during the preparation for the battle. Prior to the attack, the IO plan was briefed down to the platoon and squad level with each unit knowing their part and the restrictions on their actions that were emplaced in order to win a victory not just over the fighters, but over the insurgency in the area. The purpose of the

---

103 LTG Thomas F. Metz et. al., 5.
104 Ibid., 5.
attack was not to destroy the city; rather it was to remove the insurgents. Several weeks prior to the initial attack, leaflets had been dropped and a ‘whisper campaign’ initiated that warned fighters in Fallujah that the Iraqi and U.S. forces were going to attack. Many of the insurgents and leaders fled the impending invasion, but, more importantly for CF, so did many of the civilians which would vastly reduce the chances of collateral damage. The commander’s intent was to raise the IO threshold and gain the ‘high ground’ of information, not just the temporary control of the city.

Using this intent as a guideline, MNF-I, MNC-I, and Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) developed courses of action to mass effects in the information domain, thereby raising the IO threshold and creating additional ‘maneuver’ room for combat operations in Fallujah. We deliberately countered enemy information campaigning, planned and executed IO shaping operations, and executed carefully planned senior leader engagements, military diplomacy, and public diplomacy, and public diplomacy activities. As a result of these synchronized, integrated, and complementary actions, we were able to mass information effects and build a strong base of support for combat operations in advance of the operation.105

3. 1st BCT-1st Armored Division (AD) in Ramadi 2006-07

Under the command of COL MacFarland, 1-1AD has been primarily recognized as the unit that helped to turn Ramadi from one of the most violent areas in Iraq into a success story for U.S.-Iraqi combined COIN operations. His method is surprisingly simple: first he regained control of the town through kinetic operations. He ordered his subordinate battalion commanders to break out of the Brigade and Battalion sized Forward Operating Bases and to create smaller, platoon sized, combat outposts throughout the city. Next, he enlisted the support of Iraqi forces, Army and police, and the support of the sheikhs to launch information operations in the area. Finally, he emplaced a system wherein the CF’s voice could be heard above the threats and messages of the insurgents and Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) forces’ voices. This system is called the TAVWAVE system and it is basically a sort of closed circuit radio-broadcasting system with a centralized broadcasting station controlled by U.S. and Iraqi security forces that

105 LTG Thomas F. Metz et. al, 6.
broadcasts to large speakers secured within each of the platoon-sized combat outposts and the Iraqi police stations around the city. These speakers broadcasted alerts for CF operations, daily news, and alerts to AQI activities within the area.\textsuperscript{106} Previously, AQI had held the ‘high-ground’ of information operations; they would simply talk to the people and inform them that the CF were conducting all the attacks in the area, causing all the damage to infrastructure, buildings, and civilian casualties and that AQI’s forces were the ones providing for the population of Ramadi.

Essential to the use of the TACWAVE system is the cultural repertoire that it intrinsically built on: namely the local custom of receiving news from mosque loudspeakers.\textsuperscript{107} The TACWAVE enabled CF to begin daily interaction with the populace and established the Iraqi police and army as legitimate authorities in the area. The fact that 1-1AD used local Iraqis to broadcast on the radio gave further legitimacy to cooperative local leaders, such as the chief of police, and by-passed the awkward differences in Iraqi dialect that CF interpreters used. This integration of IO uses tenants of the concept of framing but had to be brought about in a slow and painstaking way. The success of the TACWAVE system and the employment of information in Ramadi by 1-1AD happened in spite of the Army organization; it was not brought about because of doctrine, training, or standard operating procedures (SOPs) inherent in the CF organization.\textsuperscript{108}

\textbf{4. PSYOP in al Anbar: An Interview with the Company Commander 2006-7}\textsuperscript{109}

IO officers on brigade staffs are rarely on the execution end of IO; rather, they are the planners and coordinators of higher level IO themes and the tactical application from the brigade and lower levels. U.S. Army PSYOP detachments and teams bring the IO

\textsuperscript{106} Interview by author with MAJ Andrew Gainey, 1-1AD’s BDE FSO and head of the IO cell, conducted 29 OCT 07.

\textsuperscript{107} Interview by author with MAJ Brian Yarbrough, C Co CDR 1\textsuperscript{st} PSYOP Battalion responsible for PSYOP operations in Al Anbar Province, conducted 15 NOV 07.

\textsuperscript{108} Interview by author with Andrew Garfield, U.S. based contractor who trains U.S. Commanders and Staffs in the use of IO and cultural awareness, conducted 31 OCT 07.

\textsuperscript{109} Interview by author with MAJ Brian Yarbrough, Commander C Co (POB) conducted 15 NOV 07.
message to the battlefield and gather information on the insurgents’ themes. In this section an interview with MAJ Yarbrough will be broken into two sections: the duties and capabilities of the PSYOP detachment in al Anbar, the IO battlefield in al Anbar, and messaging operations. The purpose is to apply the lessons learned from Schleifer to actual PSYOP in Iraq.

MAJ Yarbrough’s PSYOP company was split into three detachments, responsible for coordinating with U.S. Army brigades’ and Marine regimental headquarters’ operations. Each of these detachments consisted of three teams, which equals out to a total of nine teams responsible for carrying the message and analyzing the IO battlefield. At any one time, MAJ Yarbrough had to support up to 18-20 maneuver battalions within the whole of al Anbar Province. With so few teams and so many maneuver units to support, MAJ Yarbrough found that his assets were the most sought after and utilized combat multipliers in the region. His detachment was responsible for propagating and analyzing coalition forces’ (CF) themes and to analyze the effects of those themes, as well as the themes generated by the insurgents. PSYOP messages are generally long-term, running months to years. An example of a long term message is ‘support the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).’ Short term messages range from immediate appeals, e.g., surrender appeals, instructions to civilians on the battlefield, to month-long ISF recruiting messages. Much like Schleifer argued, the U.S. PSYOP teams are capable of running multiple TA messages based on the demographics, events and location. Within al Anbar, C Co ran the gamut of TAs and messages from province-wide to the more specific; which were the more prevalent messages.

PSYOP operators measure their effects and the insurgents’ message vitality on the battlefield through their measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOE).\footnote{U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. \textit{Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations}, 13 Feb 2006, xv.} MOPs are essentially what the unit did versus MOEs which is a measurement of how well the unit did the action. For MAJ Yarbrough, the most reliable MOPs came from the situation reports (SITREPs) that he received from the teams in the field informing him of how many and what type of information products they disseminated. The least reliable MOPs were the opinion polls that the teams conducted.
throughout al Anbar. These polls had questionable results since the surveyed population was small and therefore did not adequately reflect a significant percentage of the population. MOEs, on the other hand, were most reliable when the teams reported visible action/behavioral change that could be attributed to a product. MAJ Yarbrough’s example for an MOE spans two of his deployments. In April 2004, in support of Operation Vigilant Resolve (Fallujah), PSYOP teams dropped leaflets telling the TA to listen to radio stations, one AM, one FM, on which stations they broadcast two different messages, each with similar themes and the same end-state. During MAJ Yarbrough’s second tour, he noted an increase in reporting of anti-Iraqi forces (AIF), improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and caches; but this MOE was less reliable because the actions of the TA could not be directly attributed to the radio disseminated products or the handbills passed out in the area of operations (AO) throughout the three years covered by MAJ Yarbrough’s deployment experience.

C Co (PSYOP) had total autonomy in message tailoring and execution within al Anbar due to the trust that MAJ Yarbrough was able to build with the MNC-W commander. This autonomy coupled with the capacity to conduct thorough TA analysis throughout the AO significantly improved the control of information in the region. MAJ Yarbrough employed many techniques from the TACWAVE system set up in Ramadi to leaflets handed out by tactical and PSYOP units. His opinion of the best method of IO engagement was simple face-to-face interaction. He is adamant that the best way to control the information battlefield is to be consistently out among the population, “in their neighborhoods, on their streets and in their markets.”111 The necessity to engage with the population is well known by the PSYOP teams, but these teams are simply too small and limited in their outreach capacity to meet the demands of the population. MAJ Yarbrough argues that each owner of battle-space, i.e., maneuver commander from Infantry squad-leader to the brigade commanders, must understand and execute in order for IO to be effective.

Current operations in al Anbar are addressing this need to remain in the public eye through platoon-sized combat outposts throughout Ramadi, through the expansion and

---

111 Interview by author with MAJ Yarbrough. 15 NOV 07.
reinforcement of the Iraqi police and expanded autonomy of the Iraqi Army, and the success that these operations are bringing to the region reinforced by the command climate under GEN Petraeus, and others, that are requiring maneuver commanders to engage the populace and win the information fight against the insurgency. MAJ Yarbrough does identify one aspect where U.S. PSYOP is consistently being defeated: the media arena. Even at the tactical level, the global media and the internet are proving to be fast-paced and highly responsive. MAJ Yarbrough admits that the internet is still an uncharted territory for PSYOP, but simple radio and TV platforms are also missing from the IO fight.

D. CONCLUSION

This chapter built on the concept of framing discussed in chapters two and three and addressed where U.S. operations in Iraq are currently using tactics where framing could be applied doctrinally. Schleifer’s analysis of the IDF’s response to the Palestinian Intifada raised two lessons that have only been applied to U.S. operations in Iraq since 2006: namely that, first, the populace is the true center of gravity in COIN operations. That means that no amount of killing insurgents will, by itself, end the insurgency. The most effective course of action is to engage the populace, provide security and services, and win the population’s consent which thereby denies the insurgents their hiding place and their control of information. Popular support is the first line of defense against the overwhelming conventional force wielded by the U.S. and CF in Iraq and it is self-invigorating. Because the insurgents hide among the populace, the conventional forces must engage the populace to engage the insurgents. When this happens, Soldiers invariably cause friction with the locals; this friction is intensified when culture, language and personal interests are in complete opposition, such as they are between U.S. forces and Iraqi nationals. Second, an information campaign that targets audiences by their respective interests is the key to winning the information battlefield. Controlling the initiative of information is the ‘high ground’ in counterinsurgency because it denies the insurgents the ability to recruit new fighters, refit their equipment using community resources, and resupply their operations with ‘beans and bullets.’
US PSYOPs in Iraq have applied the first of Schleifer’s tactical lessons in al Anbar through the integration of the TACWAVE system, increased face-to-face patrols, and support of indigenous law-enforcement agencies. The second lesson is applied only over time. Just as MAJ Yarbrough’s MOE was gathered over a period of three years, and even then it was unsure which tactic was the actual cause to the measured effect, it is the nature of the IO fight that the CF must remain consistent and predictable, if at the very least, it must remain so in policy.

The U.S. Army has struggled to adapt to the COIN environment, but is learning and applying its lessons learned steadily. The advancement of doctrine and battlefield experience go hand-in-hand, several instruments have aided in the process, such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned. The nature of insurgencies is their rapid reaction and decentralized decision making; the nature of the U.S. Army is its centralized authority and decentralized execution. While the Army has proved itself conventionally, it is not organized to be responsive enough to the information environment of COIN operations and has appeared awkward and slow to learn. Much like the IDF against the Intifada, the U.S. Army has been more willing to commit troops to kinetic operations in Iraq, such as Operations Vigilant Resolve and Al Fajr, than to addressing the information battlefield. IO is, itself, not a decisive operation, rather, it is a supporting operation. This distinction is one of the reasons why maneuver commanders are so hesitant to rely on it in the COIN environment. Most would rather base their metrics of success on more tangible things such as IED attacks, insurgent caches found, U.S. equipment destroyed and personnel killed/wounded in combat, etc. The metrics for COIN, however, are more akin to the number of schools rebuilt, the number of hours of electricity provided, and the number of jobs/unemployed per capita in each village. Modifying the tactical attitude of maneuver commanders, and thereby their staffs and subordinate commanders, is the purpose of this thesis. Integrating the concept of framing from social mobilization theory into COIN doctrine directly adjusts the focus of information away from pure kinetic operations and towards the heart of the matter: how insurgencies gain support from the local population.
V. CONCLUSION

Throughout this thesis a constant refrain has been that the U.S. military has had to play ‘catch-up’ with the insurgency, not only in tactics, but also in doctrine. Honestly, what would happen if framing were not applied to U.S. Doctrine? Does this thesis pass the ‘so what’ test? Doctrine is the way that the U.S. military applies its lessons learned on the battlefield and incorporates those actions that are most effective in fighting and winning in land warfare. The thesis has shown that framing is a cogent theory and has been tested over time and across several different cultures, thus it passes the theory requirements for generalization, and has therefore been utilized academically for almost three decades in the analysis of revolutions, insurgencies, and social movements encompassing the total gamut of the use of force from violent to non-violent on the part of the insurgency and the regime. Furthermore, this thesis has shown that framing can be applied to the COIN battlefield and that it is relevant to current operations in Iraq and specifically relevant to IO and PSYOP. The purpose of field manuals is to provide a guide for Soldiers and Marines while they operate; therefore, they are not laws unto themselves to be strictly followed. Clearly, COIN operations surpass conventional operations in battlefield complexity where the nuances and meanings of otherwise trivial actions can cause severe repercussions to friendly forces. If the Army and Marine Corps intend to guide combat leaders engaged in COIN operations, then providing these Soldiers and Marines with the mental wherewithal, and therefore the academic background, to accomplish their mission means incorporating framing in the doctrinal language.

This chapter continues the argument of the thesis by proposing changes to U.S. doctrine, specifically to the FM 3-24 (COIN) manual that will broaden it to incorporate framing. This will be accomplished in three steps: first identify and address the section of the FM 3-24 where framing can be most easily applied. Second, propose amendments to the FM 3-24. Finally, a suggested list of authors to be cited in a new section labeled Further Reading that will guide Soldiers and Marines utilizing the manual to academic sources.
A. THE RIGHT PLACE FOR FRAMING IN THE FM 3-24

While this thesis has discussed the IO and PSYOP manuals and their lack of reference to the concept of framing, it is the opinion of the author that the most effective way to introduce framing to the tactical fight, and therefore to the battlefield organizational level that will be most likely to need the concept, is to insert framing into the FM 3-24. Two observations support this opinion. First, the level of discussion of the FM 3-24 among officers of different branches of service far surpasses the knowledge of branch-specific manuals such as the IO and PSYOP manuals. Second, the newness of the FM 3-24 (published Dec. 2006 under GEN Petraeus and LTG Amos, U.S.MC) makes it more expedient to alteration as new observations from the battlefield in Iraq and Afghanistan are incorporated into the military doctrine and professional writings.

Chapter one of the FM 3-24 lays out a general opening and discussion of what an insurgency is, how they generally work, and what a counterinsurgency is and how it works. Even from this early stage in the manual, framing can be applied. Section 1-38 describes one of six proposed approach “mobilizing support based on the common identity of religious affiliation, clan, tribe, or ethnic group.” This identity-based mobilization plays on the social psychological constructs that are the basic building blocks to frames. While this section is small and is meant as a brief overview, the relative weight given to a previous section, ‘protracted popular war,’ delved into Mao Zedong’s Theory, and the Vietnamese modification called ‘Dau Tranh’ or ‘the struggle.’ A similar approach to describing how leaders can play on the identity of the populace, their use of social ties among community leaders, and the frames that immediately modify actions taken on the COIN battlefield that further insight the

113 Ibid., 14.
population to support the insurgents. A suitable reference to Hafez’s\textsuperscript{116} work on Muslim rebellion or Schleifer’s\textsuperscript{117} study of the Palestinian Intifada would round out this section.

The FM 3-24 briefly addresses the use of cultural knowledge in the counterinsurgency as a basis for generating messages (CH 3), but does not use ‘framing’ specifically. The problem with eschewing academic terms within doctrinal texts is that it limits the field of study for Soldiers who have to self-train and ‘catch-up’ to the COIN environment wherein they find themselves. It is foolish to ignore academia and academic terms when one has passed from the conventional threshold, owned by the U.S. military since the beginning of the Cold War, and into unconventional warfare where academia has led in the field of study for almost forty years.

\begin{itemize}
  \item Word of mouth
  \item Speeches by elites and key leaders
  \item Flyers and handouts
  \item Newspapers
  \item Journals or magazines
  \item Books
  \item Audio recordings
  \item Video recordings
  \item Radio broadcasts
  \item Television broadcasts
  \item Web sites
  \item E-mail
  \item Internet
  \item Cellular telephones
  \item Text messaging
\end{itemize}

\textbf{Figure 1} Media Forms Insurgents Use\textsuperscript{118}

Chapter three section 3-97 of the FM 3-24 addresses insurgent information and media activities and identifies how the insurgency uses these media sources to gain popular support and to deny COIN forces entrance onto the information battlefield. The manual stipulates that insurgent forces’ messages need not be factual. Framing could easily provide this small section with more about information/framing tactics; for example, Wictorowicz’s studies show that social movements (e.g., insurgencies) use de-credentialing, credentialing, vilification and exaltation as strategies to turn the public opinion in their favor. Breaking insurgent messages into such clear categories streamlines

\textsuperscript{116}Mohammed Hafez. Why Muslims Rebel. Lynne Reinner Publishers; Boulder, CO; (2003).


\textsuperscript{118}Table 3-5, FM 3-24. 107.
the planning process necessary to counter these messages by COIN combat leaders. This leads into determining the threat’s course of action, which is addressed in chapter three, section 3-114.

The importance of the information fight in COIN operations is noted throughout the COIN manual, but the tools to address insurgent messages and frames are glossed over. Table 3-7 listed under section 3-120, “Tactical Courses of Action,” generalizes the information fight as ‘propaganda’119 and places it near the end of a list of insurgent tactics that are more easily quantifiable to conventional maneuver mindsets.

Chapter five of the FM 3-24 addresses in depth the execution of COIN operations. Sections 5-19 through 5-34120 address IO specifically as an integral tactic among several logical lines of operations (LLOs). This section argues that IO must be integrated into all actions and that messages and themes in support of the host nation and COIN forces must be centered in the local cultural dialogue. All of these lessons are part of framing; however, the chapter neither discusses framing nor acknowledges the academics who have studied these very principles for years. While the discussion within the chapter is clear and concise, more direction for the IO executor is necessary for his/her own edification. Simply listing framing as a direction for more information and study on these types of operations would give the IO executor a broader field of review and knowledge from which to generate plans and themes to counter insurgent IO.

B. A NEW SECTION TO ACCOMPANY THE FM 3-24: FURTHER READING

Good Soldiers and Marines are naturally curious creatures; they want to know what makes their enemies ‘tick’ and, more importantly, how to make that ticking stop. Providing these busy minds with knowledge is the key to preparing combat leaders for COIN operations. The introduction to the FM 3-24 notes the characteristics and actions of armed forces that effectively learned and executed COIN operations. Of the nine characteristics or actions it listed, four apply to this section. Successful COIN operators:

---

119 FM 3-24, 116.
120 Ibid., 160-164.
“Regularly challenged their assumptions, both formal and informal.

Learned about the broader world outside the military and requested outside assistance in understanding foreign political, cultural, social and other situations beyond their experience.

Established rapid avenues of disseminating lessons learned

Proved open to soliciting and evaluating advice from the local people in the conflict zone.”

Most important to this section is the second bullet; however, this begs the question, to whom do we turn for knowledge? Preferring one academic is as good as arguing against another in some cases. Thankfully, framing is a broad enough topic that a general listing of articles, most of which are thankfully no longer than 10 pages of reading, is enough to get the idea across to Soldiers and Marines concerned with the IO and PSYOP spectrum of operations. Why use academics? The strongest argument is that they are the ones who have thought about and studied up close the phenomena of political warfare, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, etc. As is noted in the FM 3-24 in the Preface, Introduction and the Foreword, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have shelved the lessons they learned in Vietnam and have not bothered to study or apply these lessons in subsequent conflicts.

A projected list of references that would help illuminate framing would include selections from Benford and Snow, Johnston, Hafez, and Schleifer that are cited in this thesis’ bibliography; these scholars’ works could accompany COIN related manuals so that Soldiers and Marines may explore the field of study and get a feel for the nuances in the field. The U.S. Army is well equipped, trained, and mentally prepared for conventional warfare and has proven itself as a supreme power in this regard, even against a weakened enemy such as Iraq, U.S. forces have proven their conventional capacity to the world. The problem is that the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have moved beyond the conventional scheme of fires and maneuver and into a peace-keeping, stability and support, counterinsurgency operations that have been kept well

---

outside the doctrinal and professional dialogue since Vietnam.\textsuperscript{122} Chapter 1 of the FM 3-24 (section 1-8) warns that the conventional prowess of U.S. forces will only ensure the use of irregular warfare in future enemies of the United States and its allies.\textsuperscript{123} The prevailing feeling among the Army and Marine officers is that the GWOT will not be the last time U.S. forces will be committed to a COIN environment and this feeling is only beginning to filter into doctrine and training.

If the U.S. military is going to be the tool selected for COIN, then it had better get sharp. The U.S. military needs to get smart on COIN operations; in order to do this it must break the time-honored tradition of conventional thinking and start out-thinking the insurgency. It cannot do this without study, experience, and support. Academic sources provide these relatively free of bloodshed. The insertion of a suggested reading list allows the FM 3-24 to guide Soldiers and Marines to new information that will insure U.S. COIN operations will continue to be innovative and responsive to whatever battlefield environment service-members may find themselves in future warfare or within current areas of operation.

C. CATCHING UP TO THE INSURGENCY

In light of the doctrinal gap identified by GEN Petraeus (USA) and LTG Amos (USMC),\textsuperscript{124} social mobilization theory, and framing in particular, stands at the forefront of academic disciplines that can immediately help foster an understanding of counterinsurgency operations conducted by a coalition of foreign troops and fledgling indigenous security forces by its cogent study of mobilization that spans culture and time. The focus that framing places on the formation of messages, cultural repertoire, organization and leadership used by insurgent organizations to rally support from the population can better align conventionally organized U.S. forces to attend to the true center of gravity in military operation within Iraq; namely the civilian population.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 3.
Controlling the flow of information, e.g., the frames produced by the insurgency, reduces the effect of enemy supply chains and constrains his ability to operate. This tactic has been proven successful in al Anbar Province since 2006 as was discussed in Chapter IV.

What would happen if the U.S. military doctrine did not incorporate framing into its COIN operations? Absolutely nothing; there would simply be a continuation of the current policy that ‘hopes’ a COIN-focused and capable commander, such as COL MacFarlane or GEN Petraeus, would assume command and find these facts for themselves. It is foolish to ‘hope’ for the best when there is knowledge available to help steer service members in the right direction. Fostering an understanding of framing and applying it to military doctrine concerning COIN operations is providing an academic background to train the Soldiers and Marines who are tasked with fighting and winning in a COIN environment.

D. FURTHER STUDY

The following bullets are suggested topics for further research that I have come across in my studies:

- Framing is simply one concept from a whole discipline under political/social sciences that can aid the U.S. military’s planners and executors in the COIN fight. More research into social mobilization theory could help military officers identify insurgent movements and to breach the intelligence gap that insulates these politically motivated groups. As the FM 3-24 states, “some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot,” finding these weapons and using them quickly on the radicalized portion of the population is essential to COIN.

- Irregular warfare and guerrilla tactics utilized by insurgents have long been the area of expertise of the Special Forces; breaking the organizational lines of communication between ‘conventional’ and ‘special’ forces can only make the COIN operations more effective.

- Developing a way to train Soldiers and Marines on IO during peace time would seriously shorten the learning curve in times of war.

---

125 FM 3-24, section 1-153, 49.
APPENDIX

Surah 2: 190-195

190. Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors.
191. And slay them wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have Turned you out; for tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter; but fight them not at the Sacred Mosque, unless they (first) fight you there; but if they fight you, slay them. Such is the reward of those who suppress faith.
192. But if they cease, Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.
193. And fight them on until there is no more Tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah. but if they cease, Let there be no hostility except to those who practise oppression.
194. The prohibited month for the prohibited month,- and so for all things prohibited,- there is the law of equality. If then any one transgresses the prohibition against you, Transgress ye likewise against him. But fear Allah, and know that Allah is with those who restrain themselves.
195. And spend of your substance in the cause of Allah, and make not your own hands contribute to (your) destruction; but do good; for Allah loveth those who do good.

Yusuf Ali, translation of the Qur’an “Surah 2. Al-Baqara (The Cow)”

The Sword Verse

Surah 9:5

“5. But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war); but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practice regular charity, then open the way for them: for Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.”

Yusuf Ali, translation of the Qur’an “Surah 9:5. At-Tawba”

Surah 8:60-1

“60. Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but
whom Allah doth know. Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of Allah, shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly.

61. But if the enemy incline towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace, and trust in Allah. for He is One that heareth and knoweth (all things)."

Yusuf Ali, Holy Qu’ran “Surah 8:60-1 Al-Anfal”

Surah 2:153-55: The promise of God’s faithfulness to those that persevere
153. O ye who believe! seek help with patient perseverance and prayer; for Allah is with those who patiently persevere.
154. And say not of those who are slain in the way of Allah. "They are dead." Nay, they are living, though ye perceive (it) not.
155. Be sure we shall test you with something of fear and hunger, some loss in goods or lives or the fruits (of your toil), but give glad tidings to those who patiently persevere,
LIST OF REFERENCES


Amayreh, Khalid. "When Will Zionist Jews Stop Cursing Other Religions." Palestineinfo.co.uk. http://www.palestineinfo.co.uk/en/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s78%2fuH8k2svFJLH4R%2bZNwqaQJhHTDn0pMD9gSmK EKNWQ6dxihwv5OFx8D15PGhf8HwuIPrANYNlyhMkyG70AHASu%2bt7PljB SrdOG%2b8hyWye40%3d (accessed August 2, 2007).


FM 3-05.30 PSYOPUS Army, 2005.


*Title 22 United States Code*. Vol. 22.


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California