Veiled normalization the implications of Japanese missile defense

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VEILED NORMALIZATION:
THE IMPLICATIONS OF JAPANESE MISSILE DEFENSE

by

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September 2008

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Veiled Normalization: The Implications of Japanese Missile Defense

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Under the broad rubric of missile defense, Japan has had to re-evaluate its position on the military use of space, the export of weapons technology, collective security, command authority, and the conditions under which pre-emption may be warranted. These changes have manifested themselves in many ways, to include statutory changes, restructuring and elevation of the former Defense Agency, an increased emphasis on joint service interoperability, and the acquisition of a broad range of advanced technologies. It is undeniable that the trend towards security normalization began with the inception of the National Police Reserve in 1950, but it can also be asserted that missile defense has provided an umbrella under which the trend has been significantly advanced.

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

Japan’s development of a missile defense system has been accompanied by the acquisition of potentially offensive military assets, an increased command and control capability, significant restructuring of the collective defense establishment, and doctrinal changes that allow pre-emption should an attack be deemed imminent. Regardless of the long-standing Japanese debate on the constitutionality of the use of force, the introduction of missile defense has institutionalized key structural elements within the defense establishment marking a clear milestone in an ongoing trend towards security normalization. This thesis will argue that the attendant policy changes and acquisitions associated with missile defense constitute a significant and enduring step towards the normalization of Japan’s Self Defense Forces (JSDF).

B. IMPORTANCE

The security environment in East Asia is in the midst of considerable change, and it is irrational to assume that the defense arrangements of past decades will remain viable indefinitely. China is taking its newfound national wealth and is undertaking significant military modernization efforts, North Korea has steadily continued its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the U.S. has become heavily committed in other parts of the world. Considered from a Japanese perspective, these factors would collectively suggest a relative reduction in the type of security that it experienced throughout the Cold War. The presumed solution to such a dilemma lies in reducing external reliance and developing the means to protect one’s self.

In the case of Japan, this tends to be more complicated as Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution asserts that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” This places the existence of any type of Japanese military force at the heart of an ongoing debate. Externally, Japanese military advancements prompt historical animosity from regional neighbors who still harbor resentment from World War II. Japanese military advancements invariably foment some degree of regional resistance with or without resolution of internal constitutional issues. Internally, however, there are other implications.

If progress towards security normalization can be demonstrated then the constitutional debate becomes a less significant factor in security discussions than the military reality. As security normalization is approached, the true nature of the internal constitutional debate shifts from whether or not to pursue it and towards acknowledging its inevitable achievement. This implies that a demonstrated, advancing trend might also influence the constitutional debate in support of security normalization. In this context, an examination of security trends within Japan speaks to and potentially influences an issue long at the center of Japanese politics.

While the discussion thus far has been limited to East Asia, the importance of regional stability clearly extends well beyond the region itself. More specifically, the U.S. has direct economic interests that flow from a peaceful and secure East Asia. If this security can be achieved through improved Japanese capabilities and a greater willingness to engage in regional crises, the U.S. gains a significant advantage. If Japan is fully able to provide for its own defense, new regional security options are generated. The U.S. could potentially reduce or eliminate its forces in the region or, should the need arise, ally with a militarily stronger Japan to preserve regional stability and protect national interests. In both cases an openly normalized Japanese military lends itself to greater military economy for the U.S.

Beyond the practical matter of national security, there is also an underlying theoretical component related to the security dilemma. Specifically, how should one view military acquisition in an environment in which the margin between offense and defense is increasingly narrow? To amplify, the detection, tracking, and disabling of inbound missiles is decidedly defensive. However, by acquiring the requisite capabilities to achieve these functions, one may also gain the capacity to observe potential threats,
exercise a complex command and control system, and employ the apparatus in an offensive manner despite the purported defensive role it was developed under. This line of reasoning offers some insight into external criticisms of Japanese missile defense and highlights a key challenge in associating a capability with intent.

Security arrangements are built under a certain set of conditions. Conditions change, and East Asia is no exception. The resulting question for Japan is what type of security arrangement will best preserve national security, and the answer may be found in a more normalized military capability of meeting contemporary security challenges. Moreover, the adoption of missile defense marks a significant step towards normalization without openly asserting it. Article 82-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Measures for the Destruction of Ballistic Missiles, the Prime Minister is afforded the powers to make military decisions without consultation of the Diet. Further, under certain conditions this authority may be passed to the Defense Minister. While these powers are arguably limited in that their applicability exists within the confines of missile defense, they are noteworthy in that they place the authority for military decision making in the hands of a single executive. Of greater significance is the scope of what such a decision entails, as the missile defense initiative encompasses elements of each branch of the JSDF. Considered through this lens, missile defense has provided a galvanizing force consolidating the command authority of the JSDF and improving lateral coordination, both vestiges of a mature force.

C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

The primary method for illustrating that normalization has been achieved will be through comparative analysis of the JSDF against the militaries of other states. This will be supported through open source documents on military resources, spending, organizational structure, and doctrine available through the Japanese Ministry of Defense. Similar documents from other governments will be used as a means to compare Japan’s defense forces against other militaries. The intent in doing so is to demonstrate that, in terms of capability, Japan has met the standard of military normalization held by states without constitutional restrictions on the use of force.
In addition to the force comparison, this thesis will also be supported by a post-World War II historical analysis of addressing the evolution of the JSDF. This is intended to demonstrate a steady increase in Japanese military capability, usage, and prominence in government affairs and capture the impacts of key exogenous events. This will be supported by historical documents that capture elements the key debates that have occurred regarding the roles and missions of the JSDF. By doing so, it can be demonstrated that there is an increasing trend towards military normalization within Japan that culminates with missile defense.

The final supporting element will be an analysis of perception polls addressing current Japanese opinions on the use of military force, the role of the JSDF, and the overall threat environment. By illustrating that public opinion supports the use of military force under certain conditions and proving the presence of a credible military capability, the case for normalization is significantly strengthened. Additionally, the potential impact of a direct security crisis on popular opinion will also be analyzed. This will be accomplished through the use of existing opinion polls.

D. ORGANIZATION

This thesis will begin by tracing the origins of Japan’s current security posture, beginning with how post-World War II Japan was re-forged as a pacifist nation and has steadily returned to a normalized state. This will be accompanied by a brief examination of Japan’s current security context and what it may perceive to be potential threats. Together, these two elements establish the framework for why security normalization has been such a contentious issue with in Japan and why modern circumstances seem to demand a more pragmatic assessment of national security.

The following section will examine the evolution of Japan’s Self Defense Force (JSDF) from its origins to its current state and offer a force comparison against what are viewed as normalized states. This will demonstrate a sustained upward trend in JSDF roles and capabilities since its inception and that when contrasted against other states, Japan’s defense apparatus is quite normal despite any claims to the contrary.
purpose of this is to establish that a trend to normalization exists and that missile defense ushers in a set of changes that significantly advances it.

The evolution of the JSDF will be followed by an examination of what missile defense means in the broader context of a trend towards normalization. The capabilities, policy changes, and defense restructuring that accompanied the development of missile defense will each be considered in terms of their broader implications. These changes formalize the new face of the Japanese defense establishment to such a degree that it is unlikely to revert to its previous incarnation, and collectively constitute a set of advancements that significantly increase Japan’s military apparatus.

Having considered the more empirical aspects of Japanese defense, the next chapter examines internal and external perceptions of Japanese security. While the previous chapters have assessed capability, at this point the intent is to develop a general assessment of perceptions and intent. If Japan is externally perceived to have already achieved security normalization, then from an external perspective the issue is resolved. If internally Japan has yet to formally assert security normalization, then internal polls and opinions of the broader population and specific subsets may offer insight into future behavior. This will be followed by the final chapter, which will summarize key elements of the argument and offer some observations as to what the implications of security normalization may be for Japan and the United States.

E. LITERATURE REVIEW

This review has been developed to support three lines of argument which taken collectively illustrate Japan’s steady advancement towards security normalization. While normalization is a somewhat elusive term, for the purposes of this thesis it will be considered as the capacity and willingness to employ military force in pursuit of national objectives. This will be demonstrated by comparing the JSDF with an accepted, normalized force. The literature review develops this premise by considering the evolution of the JSDF, domestic and international perceptions of the JSDF, and the impact that missile defense has had in advancing Japan’s security posture.
The first section consists of selected works supporting the assertion that the JSDF has steadily increased in terms of size, capability, and its role in national security. By demonstrating the sustained expansion of the force, a clear trend becomes apparent. The second section consists of works that capture the scope of the changes associated with Japan’s missile defense program. These advances are considered separately as they introduce both qualitative and structural advancements that represent a considerable leap in terms of Japan’s military resources.

The next section focuses on works that speak to the possible internal and external perceptions of Japan increasing its military posture. This section examines legal interpretations of Japan’s defense policy, popular and political elite opinions on military matters, and external perceptions of Japanese militarization with the intent of identifying potential outcomes. The intent in exploring these facets is to identify the degree to which they have impacted the expansion of the JSDF and thus ascertain which remaining issues may impede continued progress towards security normalization.

To be sure, not all literature suggests that the growth of Japan’s security force implies an increasing trend towards normalization. The final section presents some opposing views that suggest that the orientation of the JSDF is not indicative of a movement towards normalization. Moreover, the introduction of the changes attributable to missile defense is viewed by some as being strictly defensive in nature. In order to craft a balanced argument and provide logical counters, some dissenting literature is explored.

1. Status, Capabilities, and Trends of the JSDF

From its origins in the early 1950s, the JSDF has experienced steady growth and prompted heated debate. By identifying key milestones throughout its development, it becomes possible to clearly illustrate a trend towards increasing military capability. Buck (1967) contributes to this by effectively capturing the mindset, capabilities, and vision for the force as it was coming into maturity. Buck’s article highlights the regional perspective during a point in Japanese history in which it was regaining standing in the
international community and gaining economic power. These insights are useful to this thesis in that they establish a point of departure from which to assess the expanding roles and missions that the JSDF has assumed and shifts in regional conditions that may have prompted a need for a more robust military apparatus.

While Buck offers insights into elements underpinning perceptions surrounding the JSDF in the 1960s, there is also a more mechanistic component of building a force. This manifests itself in more clearly observable features, such as the size of the force and numbers of weapons systems. In the case of the JSDF, this presents some irony as its growth has occasionally come through less direct means than might be expected. Samuels (2007) illustrates how Japan has grown a capable navy under the auspices of a coast guard.

The author demonstrates how the development of a coast guard has provided Japan with a means to bypass legal, economic, and normative restrictions against force growth. This article underscores both the expansion of Japan’s aggregate military power and a circuitous route to achieve it. In this regard, there are some parallels to missile defense as it crosses into both technology sectors and space exploration. Given that Japan has previously exploited alternative routes of force generation, it is not unreasonable to consider missile defense as serving a similar purpose.

While the preceding works speak to elements of history and alternative means of force generation, a more comprehensive and direct approach is taken by author Jennifer Lind. In developing her arguments, Lind (2004) employs several alternative methods to assess the relative strength of the JSDF. She effectively establishes that Japanese military spending and the breadth of its capabilities characterize it as one of the more advanced militaries in the world. Her article presents strong evidence illustrating what the JSDF has steadily matured into. Establishing that Japan has steadily acquired one of the world’s leading military forces offers strong evidence to support a trend towards security normalization.

Force comparisons offer a very mechanistic means of assessing respective militaries, but what is often more telling is the organization, doctrine and policies that
they employ. The steady growth and expansion of the JSDF has resulted in an organization that is largely indistinguishable from a standing military. While the distinction between an army and a defense force has often been a matter of perception, author Nicholas Szechenyi advances the argument that Japan’s interests may lay well beyond its domestic borders and that the current era requires a more proactive defense policy.

Szechenyi (2006) examines the internal discussions, political challenges, and strategic realities that have collectively shaped what he believes to be a significant juncture for the future of Japanese defense policy. His argument is relevant to this thesis in that as a result of a changing global and regional security concerns Japan has crossed a significant political threshold indicating support for a continuing trend towards security normalization.

Taken collectively, these works provide a basis for considering key elements of the JSDF’s evolution. There is evidence of the early perceptions of what the force was intended to achieve and the issues surrounding it in the 1960’s, alternative means of force generation ostensibly intended to curtail constitutional debate, force comparisons, and an assessment of the reigning security climate. Using this framework it is possible to illustrate the steady expansion of the JSDF in terms of capability and political acceptance.

2. The Nature and Capabilities of Missile Defense

While the preceding section addresses broad trends in the JSDF, the key argument of this thesis is that the adoption of missile defense constitutes a milestone that significantly advances the trend towards security normalization. This is premised on the aggregate capabilities that effective missile defense entails. More precisely, the acquisition of missile defense carries with it the need for increased surveillance, command and control capabilities, acquisition of hardware that can track and destroy high speed projectiles, a degree of force projection for maritime based elements, and an organizational structure that enables swift decision making. When missile defense is decomposed, the constituent pieces are similar to what one would expect from a normalized state.
This thesis is clearly not the first exploration of Japan’s advance towards security normalization. Oberle (2005) develops the position that missile defense is a key step towards normalization. The author reaches the conclusion that the trend towards normalization is clear, but has not yet been reached. Oberle’s line of reasoning is useful in the development of this thesis as it employs much of the same information to illustrate the steady growth of Japan’s armed forces. However, since the completion of Oberle’s thesis there have been additional security policy changes and restructuring of Japan’s defense forces, both of which can be traced to missile defense. In this regard, this thesis expands on Oberle’s line of reasoning and extends it to incorporate new evidence supporting his claim.

Security normalization carries with it a presumption of the ability to project force, and missile defense provides a somewhat surreptitious of developing this. This is addressed by both Urayama (2000) and Xue (1999). The latter author offers an assessment of the technological capabilities that accompany missile defense and concludes that “future achievements in research and development of missile defense will thus have the potential to improve offensive missile technology.” Relative to this thesis, his conclusion supports the assertion that Japan’s forces have illustrated a steady trend towards more offensive hardware while also underscoring the narrowing margin between offensive and defensive military capabilities.

In considering the offensive and defensive characteristics of a missile defense program, it is useful to identify milestones in its development. This evolution is detailed in the Monterey Institute of International Studies 2003 publication, *Ballistic Missile Defense in Northeast Asia: An Annotated Chronology 1990 – present*. Although slightly dated, this reference work offers a synops of the significant events triggering contemporary interest in missile defense and the key capabilities emerging with it. This study is useful to this thesis in that it serves as a key reference for assessing the technological advancements introduced to Japanese forces as part of the overarching rubric of missile defense.

Missile defense is far more complex than “point and shoot.” It involves the acquisition of myriad high tech equipment, streamlined command and control, and rapid
decision making. These capabilities represent a significant advancement for the JSDF and underscore the trend towards normalization. The works introduced in this section offer a means of identifying the components of missile defense that advance this trend.

3. Perceptions of Security Normalization

Perception is a key element in considering security normalization. If an adversary perceives a state as having a capable military, then the risk for a security spiral is heightened. For this reason, external perceptions of Japanese militarization bear scrutiny. Note that this exists exclusive of any internal perceptions and should be considered separately. The essence of the security spiral is a potential adversary’s perception of the second party’s actions. Thus, regardless of Japan’s intent its actions will ultimately be judged by the beholder. In such as external perception matters, the government of Japan faces an additional burden in ensuring that the broader polity, which generally favors the “peace constitution,” is accepting of security actions. If security measures are viewed as too offensive, political risk is heightened. Collectively, Japan has to balance internal and external perceptions such that it presents both a credible, deterrent military force and an otherwise benign domestic defender. Balancing these perceptions weighs heavily in Japan’s force development and employment.

Perhaps one of the most objective ways of assessing defense policy is through a legal interpretation. Some aspects of this can be found in Armstrong’s (2006) examination of Japan’s Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack. The law considers situations in which an armed attack against Japan from the outside has occurred and instances in which an armed attack is deemed imminent. Expressed differently, the law considers actual military attacks and the expectation of attacks.

To this end, some Japanese officials have been quoted as asserting that attacking North Korean missile bases should legally be considered as self-defense. Notwithstanding saber-rattling tactics, the fact that Japan has set legal conditions that
encompass military pre-emption is a marked departure from the renunciation of force and stands as strong evidence that Japan has advanced the trend towards security normalization.

Another indicator of internal perceptions of the military is the degree to which military heritage is embraced. Ryu (2007) sets surveys the opinions of Japanese elites regarding state visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. The shrine, commemorating Japan’s war dead, exists at the center of a longstanding regional controversy involving Japan’s imperial past. Within the PRC and Korea, Japanese state visits to the shrine tend to spark remembrances of past transgressions. In this regard, the Yasukuni Controversy is linked to security normalization. Expressed differently, state visits to the shrine prompt regional concerns over Japan embracing its martial heritage and re-militarizing. In this regard, elements of the debate mirror regional concerns about Japanese security normalization.

Ryu’s work is based on a 2006 survey he conducted of members of the House of Representatives in the National Diet of Japan. Using his survey and press releases of official statements regarding the Yasukuni Shrine made by the Chinese, Korean, and Japanese governments, the author argues that the Yasukuni controversy is a relevant gauge of regional and domestic acceptance of a normalized Japan. This work is relevant to this thesis in that his study offers an indirect view on prevailing sentiment regarding Japanese security normalization.

A more direct indicator of national willingness to employ its military can be found in public responses to the use of military force. Ishibashi (2007) examines the relationship between opinion regarding deployment of the JSDF and its relationship to political action. The author presents evidence indicating that popular opinion has not played a significant role in political decisions regarding force deployments. In essence, this would seem to delink popular opinion from security normalization discussions and suggest that the more telling indicator is the opinion of political elites, addressed more fully by Ryu.

Ishibashi’s work is relevant to this thesis in that it offers insight to where the locus of military willingness resides and whether it is relevant. Thus, if security normalization
is es chewed by the masses but embraced by a minority of political elites, his article would suggest that normalization is not predicated on public acceptance. This frames an argument in which popular opinion polls can be considered in a less definitive fashion, and more focused polls of relevant actors can be weighted appropriately. If it can be illustrated that the decision for security normalization is generally resistant to public opinion, then a key argument against it has been negated.

An opposing view is provided by Paul Midford, who suggests that Japanese public opinion is highly relevant to security policy. Midford’s arguments build on several of his previous works. Midford (2002) considers Japanese public opinion in contrast to that of its regional neighbors and Midford (2003) examines Japanese opinion in response to the deployment of the JSDF to the Arabian Sea in 2001. Midford (2004) notes a pattern found in the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) in which a plan for operations is put forth, controversy unfolds, the mission is accepted, the MSDF performs well, and the controversy fades into obscurity. This trend suggests that the tangible impact of public opinion has been to slow the rate of policy change. While this has allowed for an expansion of the JSDF into an expanding array of defensive or supporting roles, a much harder line is found regarding an offensive versus defensive military orientation, where staunch public opinion has consistently stalled significant advancement.

Midford also notes that the Japanese public has steadily adopted a defensive realist stance that recognizes the utility of military power in homeland defense, but is particularly resistant to embracing offensive military power. Midford traces these views to the Japanese public’s reaction to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. Whereas the former was understood, the latter was opposed. Placed in the context of Ryu and Ishibashi, Midford’s article presents strong evidence that not only does opinion matter in Japanese security policy, but that public opinion plays as important a role as elite opinion. The diversity of methods and conclusions found by these three authors provide for significant diversity in evaluating the role of popular opinion in Japan.
Perception matters, but it is also highly subjective. The readings of this section offer perspectives from a legal interpretation, from the vantage point of Japan’s political elite, and from Japan’s broader public. These opinions constitute part of a broader array of considerations that, over time, may expedite or hinder the normalization trend. The polls also offer some insight into why missile defense presents such an attractive option to more hawkish policy advocates, as it retains the defensive character that the public is willing to accept while also allows for an increase in offensive capacity. While it is beneficial to consider the empirical aspects of the evolution of the JSDF, developments of this type are driven by political will which is often a manifestation of public acceptance. The trend towards normalization will ultimately advance at the degree to which such forces will allow.

4. Dissenting Views

As might be expected, however, not all are of the evidence firmly supports the claim that Japan’s path constitutes a trend towards normalization. Further, there are also contrasting views on the implications of missile defense in regards to the direction of Japanese security. Hughes (2004) acknowledges that Japan is increasing its military capabilities, but offers a competing explanation in terms of its rationale. Hughes suggests that the nature of Japan’s acquisitions do not indicate a departure from a strictly defensive policy, nor do they imply a more autonomous security posture.

The author argues that the motivations for such capabilities are intended to reinforce its role in UN security missions and that Japan’s missile defense initiative retains U.S. dependencies. As an outcome of this, Japan’s defense doctrine is becoming increasingly intertwined with the U.S., to the point that it would be unable to defend itself absent U.S. assistance, let alone engage in acts of aggression. Taken collectively, this would imply that although the JSDF has increased its capabilities, the balance of the force is such that it does not facilitate independent action. Given these limitations, the alternative explanation would be less of a trend towards normalization and more towards restructuring what remains a defensive security force.
While Hughes’s argument has merit, the counter is found in the ambiguous nature of modern defense technology which carries with it both offensive and defensive potential. The technologies through missile defense enable sweeping changes in the command and control and employment of forces, permitting an operational synergy that belies its size. The technological ambiguity coupled with more permissive changes towards Japanese security policy implies, at the least, a trend towards a Japanese force capable of independent action.

Another argument against a normalizing trend is found in the internal Japanese debate on Article 9. As Article 9 resides at the center of security discussions, its existence as written would seem to pose a barrier to normalization. Difilippo (2002) considers Japanese public opinion regarding security matters and offers evidence suggesting significant contradictions in public sentiment and a Japanese security practice. The opinion polls cited indicates considerable misgivings regarding alliance with the U.S. and consistently strong support for Article 9. However, although the public views the alliance with the U.S. as a key source of East Asian friction, this has not precluded increasing security ties most notably in the realm of missile defense. Article 9 presents a far different case.

Citing Japanese opinion polls from 1997 and 2001, Difilippo presents evidence suggesting sustained and overwhelming support for retaining Article 9. Moreover, while it may be politically feasible for Japanese policymakers to support the practical matters of defense strategy, constitutional issues carry much greater political consequence. This does not directly refute a growing trend towards normalization, what it does suggest is that if such trend exists it will be arrested at the point of constitutional change. Expressed differently, if it is accepted that normalization is achieved at the point of rescinding or altering Article 9, this article offers evidence that this will not easily be achieved.

Difilippo’s argument implies that normalization is centered on Article 9, which may not be accurate. As noted by the author, Japanese security policy has often advanced in a direction inconsistent with public opinion. This would suggest that defense capabilities and policy can mature independently, and with less political risk, than constitutional change. By delinking Article 9 from normalization, it is possible to more
empirically consider the growth of the JSDF and the implications of policy changes associated with missile defense. Ultimately, Article 9 may become irrelevant in the face of aggregate capability and external perceptions of Japan’s military capability.

Other analysis indicates that Japan is following a highly contradictory path with an uncertain outcome. Mulgan (2000) observes that by engaging in missile defense with the U.S., Japan has seemingly stepped away from an autonomous path and positioned itself as a ‘strategic satellite’ of the U.S. In contrast, Japanese defense policy has also become oriented towards the assumption of a regional security role, extending beyond the confines of its own borders. To some degree, Samuel (2006) makes a similar observation by noting that Japan tends to hedge on security matters in search of a security strategy that balances its regional and global interests.

Whereas Samuel considers broader security strategy, the contradiction Mulgan refers to is found the simultaneous pursuit of increased security dependency while also increasing the capacity for autonomous operation. She concludes that while these changes are underway, Japan is positioned to pursue either path and no clearly definitive trend can be ascertained. While elements of this argument remain valid, the body of evidence that has become available since 2000 lends itself to a clearer interpretation of long term strategy.

5. Summary of Literature

Taken collectively, there is a sufficient body of work to advance the key arguments of this thesis. Several authors have developed the argument that the JSDF has evolved significantly since its inception. There are also numerous works on missile defense, exploring it from political, economic, military, and technological angles. Together, these works suggest that missile defense is a far more nuanced issue than shooting down inbound missiles, opening the possibility that one of the nuances is security normalization. In addition to the more empirical discussions on military hardware, the dimensions of international and Japanese perceptions regarding its military heritage and the future of the JSDF are also examined in several works. Alternative views have also been considered, and arguments have been introduced to counter their
efficacy. While there is merit in each of the dissenting works, collectively the literature reviewed lends itself to the argument that Japanese security normalization has continued and is becoming increasingly entrenched.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF JAPAN’S SELF DEFENSE FORCES

A. THE ORIGINS OF “ABNORMALIZATION”

Japan has constitutionally eschewed the use of force to resolve issues since World War II. Further, it has largely placed its security interests in the hands of the U.S. While this has been advantageous for the past six decades, it cannot be taken for granted that U.S. security interests will remain constant in the face of increased economic interest in China and increasing military commitments in other parts of the world. This presents Japan with a somewhat unique dilemma in that it is faced with a future that in which it may very well have to assume a greater responsibility for its own security while constrained internally by constitutionality and externally by regional perceptions of re-militarization. The foremost means of achieving this security is found in Japan’s Self Defense Forces (JSDF). The intent of this chapter is to characterize the strategic factors that have shaped Japan’s perception of what the JSDF should be and trace its evolution from a National Police Reserve to a world class military.

B. JAPAN’S STRATEGIC ROLE

Prior to making a determination of the necessary security apparatus an examination of Japan’s perceived strategic role needs to be considered. A state that is pursuing a strictly defensive position will cultivate military, political, and economic strategy emphasizing defensive principles. Similarly, a state that is intent on regional hegemony or aggressive expansion will shape its forces and policies accordingly. In this regard, even in the absence of an overtly stated strategic role, indicators of intent become apparent. However, there remains the risk that these indicators may be misinterpreted. This presents a unique set of challenges for Japan as there is a general regional bias against Japanese militarization stemming from events preceding and during World War II.

As alluded to, there remains significant historical animosity regarding Japan’s aggressive expansion in the first half of the twentieth century. Thus, any actions taken to
indicate a Japanese desire to expand beyond its borders prompt significant regional concern. Further, for the latter half of the twentieth century much of Japan's strategic role was imposed upon it by the U.S. This has led some scholars to surmise that Japan may not be well-positioned to define a strategic role when compared to other modern nations. This lack of experience has the potential to inadvertently send the wrong strategic signal to other regional actors.

This leaves the question of Japan's strategic role unanswered. With the rise of China and a nuclear North Korea, the status quo does not seem to present itself as a tenable option. Further, within the past decade Japan has dispatched destroyers to the Indian Ocean, fired on a North Korean spy boat, and hosted the Afghan reconstruction conference.1 This would seem to indicate a state that is increasingly capable and willing of assuming responsibility for its own security, acting as a full participant in international crisis, and behaving in an otherwise "normalized" fashion.

While this does not answer the question of Japan's strategic role, it does illustrate that Japan is now stepping beyond its borders and is willing to employ both force and threat of force despite constitutional limitations that would seem to prohibit such actions. Collectively, this frames at least one element of Japan's security challenge. By not participating in crisis response, Japan is assigned the unfavorable moniker of "free rider." By participating in crisis response, Japan risks being construed as aggressive. This frames the competing external pressure in defining Japan's strategic role; it is too engaged for some and not enough for others.

Ultimately, in considering Japan's strategic intent there is no definitive answer. This discussion can be reduced to two directly opposing views. A more skeptical view holds that Japan is steadily acquiring the military capabilities and strategic reach to complement its economic strength and set conditions to achieve regional power aspirations. This is supported by noting Japan's expanding peacekeeping activities, ongoing pressure to revise the constitution, and extensive military cooperation with the U.S. in missile defense and the procurement of offensive hardware. The alternative view

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holds that Japan's use and development of its military forces is wholly defensive in nature and simply another step towards a more "normalized" Japan that is capable and willing to bear a more equitable share of the global responsibilities associated with being a powerful state.² In either case, a clearly emerging trend towards a more capable military has emerged.

C. JAPAN'S REGIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT

Just as a state's vision of its future defines how it employs its resources, so too does the current security environment. In the case of Japan, there are several factors that have a significant impact on its immediate security. The combined factors of a rising China, a "miscreant regime in North Korea,"³ the possibility of eventual abandonment by the U.S., and the relative decline of the Japanese economy have had a significant and adverse impact on the security outlook.⁴ Further, Japan's high degree of dependence on external sources for energy is a recurring challenge. As a consequence of the emergence of China and the modernization of both South Korea and Taiwan, there exists a strong regional competition for these resources.

While one scenario could envision these changes as being completely benign, it is manifesting itself as a case study of the security dilemma. North Korea is gripped by existential fear as an outcome of being branded a pariah by the world's remaining superpower. As an outcome, it moves towards nuclear armament as a means to secure its survival. With its expansive borders and steadfast emphasis on territorial integrity, China has proceeded down a path of extensive military modernization and reform. In response to these activities, Japan proceeds down a path of extensive missile defense and increased force projection. The outcome of this is that as each country takes action to increase its own security, it reduces the security of other regional actors.⁵

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Perhaps even more worrisome is the degree to which the increased militarization is accompanied by increased nationalism throughout the region. In the case of China, this appears to be associated with generational change. A point has been reached in which the political leadership did not directly experience World War II (the Pacific War) or the postwar party struggles. Having enjoyed both peace and prosperity, China seems to have achieved a degree of ideological vindication resulting in conditions that allow nationalism to thrive. In the case of Japan, the collapse of the Japanese Socialist party has facilitated a shift to the right and the increasing power of China has galvanized the reality that regional economic primacy may very well be fleeting. The anxiety stemming from these factors are generally supported more nationalistic policies.  

The combined factors of a more challenging security environment and a degree of generational change have resulted in a Japan that is increasingly more likely to embrace the use of force to protect its interests. This is not meant to imply that Japan has adopted a more hegemonic view of the region, but rather to suggest that the most probable future for Japanese security entails the use of defense forces in a far more visible regional and global role. These activities would potentially entail missile defense, maritime security, humanitarian relief, and other operations consistent with the use of military force as a responsible member of the international community. 

Perhaps the most telling indicator of Japan's shifting attitude towards its security environment is the statements publicly available through the Ministry of Defense. Whereas Article 9 of the Japanese constitution renounces war and the threat or use of force as means of settling disputes, the Ministry openly asserts that “In situations where an armed attack is anticipated, any and all measures must be taken so as to avoid the occurrence of such an attack.” Not only does this statement imply a willing acceptance

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of the use of force in settling disputes, it also carries with it a hint of preemption. Further, the very existence of a defense force is in its own right a deterrent measure through the presence of military force. In response to an increasingly complex security environment, Japan has steadily crafted a deterrent military force and a pre-emption strategy within the constraints of constitutional pacifism. Two of the questions that emerge from this are how was Japan able to generate a force within such constitutional constraints and what capabilities has it been able to develop? The answer to these questions is found in an examination of the origins and steady expansion of the JSDF.

D. JAPAN’S SELF DEFENSE FORCES

1. From Humble Origins

The JSDF of today bears little resemblance the National Police Reserve it was initially conceived as in 1950. Moreover, its very formation was a stark contrast to the tenets of the 1947 peace constitution. The impetus for this force was not borne of a Japanese desire to remilitarize, but rather the U.S. involvement in Korea. In 1950, as conflict emerged on the Korean Peninsula, General Douglas MacArthur was both the supreme commander of the allied powers in Japan and the commander of United Nations (UN) forces in Korea. The swift collapse of South Korean forces prompted an immediate need for U.S. assistance. To that end, occupation forces stationed in Japan were quickly committed to Korea. This presented a new challenge in that Japan was now left with minimal protection and thus highly vulnerable to Soviet invasion. MacArthur’s solution was found in an expanded police force.10

On July 8, 1950, MacArthur “authorized” the establishment of the National Police Reserve. Notably, the authorization is more aptly characterized as an order, as the Japanese government did not request the formation of such a force. Moreover, the U.S. and Japanese interpretation of what such a force would consist of differed significantly. While the Japanese initially viewed this as a requirement to increase the size of existing

police forces, the occupying U.S. forces were oriented towards Japanese rearmament. The disparity was quickly resolved with the publication of the “Framework of the National Police Reserve,” which, among other requirements, established a national command and divided the country into four regional districts, each with a regional division. Not coincidentally, these regional district divisions filled the void left by U.S. divisions which had deployed to Korea. 11 Despite being designated as a police force, its role was clear.

This placed the Japanese government in a politically precarious position. The peace constitution, which renounced the use of force, remained very popular with the Japanese citizenry which had long suffered through years of war. The government found itself politically constrained from rewriting the constitution to allow for rearmament. As a result of this, implementation took place under the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, which required that government orders based on directives from the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the occupying force be treated as law, regardless of public support or Diet approval. 12 This offers a glimpse into three trends that will be visible throughout the development of the now JSDF: a heavy U.S. influence, a capacity to develop the force despite constitutional constraints, and an advancement of the security agenda absent strong public support.

2. Growing the Force

Under the clear direction of GHQ, coupled with MacArthur’s personal impetus, the core of the Police Reserve began to form in October of 1950. Despite its widely recognized military nature, it was clearly not a re-iteration of the former Imperial Army. The new inductees were volunteers vice conscripts, they were loyal to the constitution vice the emperor, and headed by a civilian commandant rather than a former military officer. Initial recruitment was heavily incentivized through comparatively high pay and benefits with opportunity for advancement. These incentives were quite clearly

12 Ibid.
successful, as nearly 400,000 applicants submitted for 75,000 positions. Initially trained under American drill instructors on American bases, equipped with American weapons, and led by American officers the early force was imbued with decidedly American qualities and was generally indiscernible from an American unit. For all intents and purposes, the Police Reserve could more aptly be considered as a reserve for U.S. forces deployed to Korea.

The end state of this initiative was, of course, an army, replete with artillery and tanks provided by the U.S. Additionally, the organizational structure mirrored the U.S. Army, with regimental equivalents, companies, and platoons. Training entailed attacking fortified positions with artillery and incendiary rockets, euphemistically referred to as ‘special instruments’ and ‘special firing devices.’ Perhaps the most telling indicator of its military role was the re-assimilation of former Japanese military officers into the force. While they had originally been excluded, the practical realities of leading a large military force coupled with the urgency U.S. troops departing to the escalating Korean War prompted a new appreciation of military experience. Ultimately, the government and the public were all aware of the Police Reserve’s true function, but it was a lie that everyone accepted.

While the development of the Police Reserve prompted some examination of constitutionality, the development of the maritime arm proved far less controversial. Naval rearmament occurred in such a transparent manner largely because the Imperial Navy was not fully dissolved following World War II. The need to repatriate soldiers and colonists in former territories as well as remove mines in the Japanese archipelago created a need for a functioning navy. So, while clearly reduced from its previous stature, the Japanese navy experienced a shift in function rather than being completely dismantled.

14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
Notably, the mine clearing experience gained by the re-designated Japanese Maritime Safety Agency would be employed during the Korean War. In October 1950, the U.S. was contemplating a land attack at Wonsan and had significant concerns about North Korean mines. Absent sufficient minesweeping capabilities, the U.S. Navy called upon Japan to offer assistance, which was provided. This is significant for several reasons. The first is that Japanese naval assets directly participated in the Korean War and greatly assisted the U.S. effort; the second is that one of the Japanese ships struck a mine killing one sailor and injuring eighteen others. Perhaps most importantly, the Japanese government kept all news of the operation and casualties from the Japanese people. These positive contributions reflected well on the service, and strengthened the case for its continued existence. By 1952, several restrictions on the Maritime Safety Agency were rescinded and the Maritime Security Force was established.16

1952 also marked another milestone in the development of the JGSDF. As an outcome of the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty, Japan was required to play an increasing role in its own defense. As a result, a bill was introduced into Japan’s lower house proposing the integration of the Police Reserve and the Maritime Security Force. Other proposed measures included increasing the capabilities of land and sea forces to provide for the defense of Japan. Article 9 was deftly avoided by the assertion that such a force fell short of war potential and was thus constitutional. The Security Board bill was subsequently passed and in October of 1952 Japan’s de-facto army and navy became the Security Forces. This represented far more than a name change, however, as force size, the number of ships, and weapons were all dramatically increased.17 This increase soon prompted a U.S. re-evaluation of security arrangements.

Given the increased Japanese capabilities and formalization of its Security Force, in 1953 the U.S. proposed that Japan increase its size and participate in a military assistance system based on the Mutual Security Assurance (MSA) act. Under the MSA, Japan would receive financial assistance, but would also be expected to contribute to the

17 Ibid.
collective defense of other states. Additionally, countries accepting MSA assistance would be required to increase defense spending. The U.S. presented a proposal to increase Japan’s defenses, which Japan viewed as wholly unrealistic. Citing Article 9, pacifist values, economic restriction, and manpower limitation, Japan resisted the U.S. push towards a more capable force. The final compromise consisted of a Japanese ground force of approximately 180,000 troops, 17,000 maritime personnel, and an air force of 600 fighting aircraft and 20,000 personnel.  

The size of the force was ultimately based less on force ratios and constitutionality, but reflected an internal political assessment of an acceptable number.

The Security Forces were thus re-fashioned as the Self-Defense Force under the Defense Agency in 1954 which was accompanied by the Basic National Defense Policy shortly thereafter. Notably, the policy was written with a degree of bureaucratic ambiguity that has permitted a high degree of flexibility and government reinterpretation. The policy allowed for “developing progressively the effective defensive capabilities necessary for self-defense” and a capacity “to deal with external aggression on the basis of U.S. – Japan security arrangements pending more effective functioning of the UN.”  

The somewhat open interpretation of “necessary” has allowed for a practical upper limit defined by what the prevailing political situation would allow.

Just four years after its original conception, the JSDF had become an entrenched element of Japanese society, but a military consists of far more than force structure. In addition to manpower, equipment is also required. While originally outfitted by the U.S., the 1950’s ushered in the rebirth of the Japanese defense industry. In March of 1952, GHQ rescinded earlier prohibitions on the Japanese production of weapons and aircraft. This was swiftly followed by Japan’s passing of the Law for Production of Weapons in 1953 and the Aircraft Production Enterprises Act in 1954. These laws provided the basis for continued Japanese re-arming, and allowed for equipping a 180,000 man army, 120,000 tons of ships, and an air force of 1,300 planes. From the late 1950s to the early


19 Ibid.

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1970s Japan’s Defense Buildup Program played a significant role in stimulating production to the extent that by the late 1960s over 90% of Japan’s defense orders were domestic.\(^{20}\)

The importance of establishing a defense industry cannot be understated. While it does not speak directly to combat power, it does address a much broader set of factors pertaining to defense normalization. A domestic defense production base allows for Japan to not just produce, but also sustain its assets. Dependence on foreign sources for logistical support and training is reduced. Perhaps most importantly, it creates an economic incentive for maintaining defense production. To assert that a defense industrial base is critical to normalized security may be an overstatement, but its existence is consistent from what one might expect to see in a normalized state.

By the end of the 1950’s, the basic force structure of the JSDF and a supporting defense industrial base had been established. While this establishes that a credible force was raised, it does not speak to either concept of employment or doctrine. One of the more telling indicators of this is found in the Mitsuya exercises of 1963. These exercises were intended to determine what defensive measures would be required in the event of renewed conflict on the Korean peninsula. These exercises had a significant impact in that they revealed a significant rift between civilian and military defense planners. Further, they also displayed a decidedly aggressive approach which included bringing nuclear weapons into Japan and using them.\(^{21}\)

It was reasoned that in the event of renewed Korean conflict the Soviet Union would enter and Japan would face a full scale assault. The use of nuclear weapons was considered as a means of defending Japan. \(^{22}\) While this proved shocking to some and created significant public and political angst, it highlights the point that Japan does not interpret the constitution as prohibiting nuclear weapons. As the JSDF is allowed to maintain the minimum force required for self-defense, there are circumstances in which


\(^{21}\) Ibid.

\(^{22}\) Ibid.
nuclear weapons may be permissible. This interpretation was initially voiced by Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in 1958, and again in the 1970’s when the Tanaka administration asserted that the use of nuclear warheads on defensive weapons would be constitutional.23

It bears mention that Japan’s three Non-Nuclear Principles, stating that Japan will not “possess no manufacture nuclear weapons, nor shall it permit their introduction into Japanese territory” is not a constitutional interpretation, but rather a policy choice.24 While a nuclear Japan would undoubtedly generate an adverse public response, the salient factor is that Japan has delinked nuclear weapons from the constitutional debate. Further, as its regional neighbors are quick to point out, Japan’s domestic H-2 rocket can readily be adapted to launch nuclear warheads, Japan is able to obtain large amounts of plutonium from its domestic nuclear power plants, and the majority of the JSDF’s weaponry can be used as a nuclear or non-nuclear delivery means.25 If we consider this in the context of a security normalization trend, within the first twenty years of its existence Japan has set the physical and legal conditions to become a nuclear power.

While the Mitsu ya exercises were highly controversial in the 1960s, by the 1970s similar evolutions operated publicly and prompted no significant opposition. Japanese concerns over the Soviet Union led to the realization that security issues were better served by reality than ideology. This attitude is perhaps best reflected in a public statement made by Defense Agency director general Shin Kanemaru, “Some say the Self-Defense Forces must not present any threat to foreign nations, but what kind of defense is it if it does not threaten enemies?”26 This was echoed by Ground SDF general Hiroshi Kurisu, who noted that “…the history of war shows that only offense can win. We cannot effectively respond to offensive actions that pose a threat from outside Japan’s sphere through defensive measures alone.”27 Collectively, the voices of the director and at least one senior officer suggest a far more bellicose tone than is found in the peace constitution.

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
As the 1970s came to an end, the hawkish views of that era’s leadership were bolstered from abroad. The Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan coupled with Ronald Reagan’s declaration of an evil empire and Japan’s economic growth served to expand the scale of JSDF exercises and the resources available to it. Further, the JSDF found a strong advocate in Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, who famously referred to Japan as “an unsinkable aircraft carrier,” strongly implying support to U.S. forces in case of conflict with the Soviet Union. Under Nakasone’s leadership, Japan embarked on a defense buildup that quickly exceeded the nominal 1% of GNP limit that had previously constrained defense spending. Japan participated regularly with U.S. forces in combined exercises and technological exchanges with the U.S. occurred regularly. As the eighties ended, however, the Cold War came to an end and new questions emerged.

With the swift decline of Soviet military forces in the 1990s, a moment of peace emerged in which the rationale for the JSDF was challenged at a point in time when it had grown into a military with the third largest defense budget in the world. The JSDF collectively had almost as many tanks as Great Britain, a world-class coastal navy, more Patriot missiles than Israel, and a formidable number of F-15 strike aircraft and AEGIS cruisers. Moreover, Japan’s defense industry was able to produce the majority of this hardware domestically. The challenge, though, was what to do with it. In the search for a new direction, two new futures were considered. The first involved increased participation in UN peacekeeping activities and the other was to focus on the threat potential of a nuclear North Korea, both of which are consistent with observable trends in the JSDF today.

The first fifty years of the JSDF’s existence provide considerable insight into how the Japanese have historically considered the force. This is noteworthy in that it establishes a broad trend of past behaviors that may portend future actions. Based on the evidence presented in the preceding paragraphs, the following are key events that support


29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.
the view of the JSDF as a having the type of offensive potential that may be observed in a normalized force:

a) MacArthur’s edict to create the force was predicated on the vacuum left by U.S. forces deployed to Korea. From the outset Japan’s defense force was envisioned as a military organization.

b) Japan’s deployment of naval assets in support of U.S. actions in Korea absent public knowledge indicate an early willingness to deploy forces when deemed necessary and without open discussion.

c) The establishment of a domestic defense industry capable of designing and producing advanced weaponry would seem to indicate a state seeking eventual defense autonomy and a qualitative advantage over all contenders.

d) The size of the force, while small in comparison to regional neighbors, is offset by the destructive potential facilitated through advanced weapons technology. Size limitations, while politically palatable, cannot be considered as the most significant variable in assessing force ratios.

e) The respective public statements of senior officers, defense directors, and Prime Ministers imply an internal perception of the JSDF has filling an offensive role should circumstance dictate.

f) While the three non-nuclear principles are intentionally re-assuring, they are equally non-binding. The early willingness to conduct exercises that involve nuclear options, the nuclear potential resident within Japan, and the asserted legality of nuclear weapons should defense potential warrant it necessary imply a much greater official acceptance of nuclear options than would be expected from a pacifist state.

f) The force build-up during the Nakasone regime was consistent with a force that was preparing for open conflict with the Soviet Union. In order to do so, the JSDF would have to possess offensive potential. This implies the creation of an offensive force restricted only by policy and not capability.
Collectively, these factors suggest that the intended role of the JSDF has always been that of a regular military. From the outset, it has been structured and trained as a military force. Moreover, the Japanese government has demonstrated a consistent ability to de-link key advancements in the force away from the constitution. Given the build-up during the Nakasone era, the offensive potential of the force cannot credibly be denied. It can reasonably be concluded that Japan has built an offensive apparatus capable of projecting force, employing combined arms, and directly engaging with enemies. The only evidence to the contrary is that Japan has retained the moniker of defense forces. The following section examines the current JSDF, which offers more evidence of a seemingly normalized force.

3. The Contemporary JSDF

The origins of the JSDF have set conditions for the force that exists today. Recognizing that the security environment of the Cold War has long since ended, the JSDF has been reshaped to meet new defense requirements. One aspect of this is the development of a Central Readiness Force (CRF), which was established in 2007 as a "mixture of special forces, aerial transportation, anti-NBC warfare and military training units" intended to support operations on a more global scale. This shift, reflecting the changes set forth in the 2005 National Defense Program guidelines, mark an ongoing trend towards a higher level of more direct military involvement in global crises. This shift in focus has been further reinforced by recent statements from current Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, who stated in March 2008 that he intends to introduce a bill that will allow the JSDF to more deploy troops abroad. Japan currently has to pass temporary laws for each proposed overseas mission.

In addition to revised roles, there have also been significant structural changes within the Defense Agency, most notable its promotion to a full ministry. The 2006 Law


32 Ibid.
on the Establishment of the Defense Agency passed by a wide margin and promptly elevated its status. The newly established position Minister for Defense carries with it the authority to submit bills and convene cabinet meetings, assuming roles previously held by the prime minister. Also of note, this change allows the Ministry of Defense to present its own budget. This final point bears mention as it removes the long withstanding, and seemingly arbitrary, 1% of GNP cap that has long constrained defense spending. Conceptually, this allows the Minister for Defense to submit budgets based on requirements and not a highly politicized and self-imposed cap.

The Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) has also been restructured to meet more contemporary security concerns. Manpower levels have stabilized at approximately 155,000 personnel, but there have been considerable changes in terms of force structure and equipment reflecting an increased emphasis on terrorist response, peacekeeping, and non-conventional warfare. The most notable manifestations of this are the reduction of two infantry divisions, reducing the number of main battle tanks from 900 to 600, and the refinement of the aforementioned Central Readiness Force.

The Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) remains the most prominent element of the JSDF. Its current strength of 43,000 sailors, nearly three times its original size, reflects its increasing importance in Japanese security. Its primary mission, to defend Japan from maritime invasion and secure the safety of maritime traffic around Japan, is virtually unchanged since its inception. Additionally, though, are a host of expanded missions emphasizing "effective response to new threats and diverse situations," and meeting "significant changes in the security environment resulting from the increased proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and the activities of international terrorist organizations."

Expressed a bit more explicitly, the MSDF is in the midst of preparing itself for five specific challenges: ballistic missile attacks, attacks by special operations units,

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34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
invasion of the Japanese islands, warning and surveillance in maritime areas and airspace surrounding Japan, and a response to large, extraordinary disasters. Also emphasized is the need to participate in "co-operative activities to maintain international peace," such as minesweeping operations. Regarding this latter emphasis, in 2006 the MSDF deployed to Iraq where it conducted humanitarian and reconstruction operations, with over 300 MSDF personnel being employed in theatre.36

The modern Air Self Defense Force (ASDF), over 40,000 strong, is tasked with the “air defence of Japan and support of land and naval forces as required.” These intended roles are centered on the ability to provide early warning surveillance and rapid reaction, which manifests itself in an array of interceptor aircraft, multi-purpose fighters, early warning aircraft, and a significant air defense network. In addition to this, there has been a recent emphasis on improving air support to land forces. Also of note is the prominent role that Japanese Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) capabilities play in coordinating missile defense activity.37

When collectively considered, the JSDF has all of the trappings of what one might expect to find in any modern military. It maintains three branches of service and by all outward appearances is what one would consider to be a normal military. Despite this, its defensive character is repeatedly emphasized. The ensuing problem is that if the JSDF is not discernibly defensive and if the assets it is comprised of harbor an offensive potential, can it objectively be considered a defensive force? To resolve this question, the following section will consider the JSDF in comparison to a recognized, normal military.

4. The JSDF in Comparison

As stated previously, normalization is an elusive term which, for the purpose of this thesis, is considered as the capacity and willingness to employ military force in pursuit of national objectives. Arguably, one of the more effective ways of


37 Ibid.
demonstrating the degree to which the JSDF has normalized is to consider it against a normal force. To achieve this, the JSDF will be compared against the United Kingdom (UK), which by all popular accounts, functions in a manner one would expect of a normalized military. While it is recognized that both countries have significantly different security concerns, the intent is to demonstrate the degree to which Japan resembles a normalized force. The basis for comparison will encompass defense spending, organization, force structure, the respective branches of the service, and force deployments.

With military spending at $53 (US) billion in 2008, Japan is the fifth largest spender in the world.\footnote{Jane's Information Group. "Jane's Defence Budgets – Japan."} In contrast, the UK spent $79 (US) billion in 2008, and has the second highest defense budget in the world.\footnote{Jane's Information Group. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Western Europe." (1 August 2008). <http://www8.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/weursu/units090.htm &current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=defence%20spending%20C%20United%20Kingdom&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=WEUR&>. Accessed 3 August 2008.} Of course, as single figures they offer little insight into the meaningful, qualitative aspects of the respective forces. What they do provide, however, is a means of expressing Japan’s defense spending. More specifically, as a country with an espoused defensive posture it spent ~65% as much on military forces as did a state with a normalized force. This figure shifts to ~70% when Japan’s Coast Guard, which has adopted some military roles, is also considered. Suffice it to say that while Japan’s defense spending is considerably less than the UK, it can be considered comparable.

The intuitive question that follows defense spending is how it is spent. In the broadest of terms, this fiscal posture afford the UK a force of nearly 190,000 military personnel, 386 tanks, 319 fighter aircraft, 3 aircraft carriers, and 8 destroyers. In contrast, Japan fields a force of 240,000 personnel, 980 tanks, 338 fighter aircraft, and 43 destroyers.\footnote{Ibid.} While it is recognized that this is far from a comprehensive comparison of the respective forces, it should be remembered that it is not intended to be. The purpose of this very superficial treatment is simply to illustrate that absent any other data to the

\footnote{Jane's Information Group. "Jane's Defence Budgets – Japan."}


\footnote{Ibid.}
contrary the JSDF bears a striking quantitative resemblance to one of the world’s foremost militaries. This will be analyzed in more scrutiny as this section is developed, but for now it is reasonable to assert that a partial comparison of the UK’s military forces and the JSDF are comparable.

To develop this line of reasoning further, the comparative organizational structures need to be investigated. In the case of the UK the Ministry of Defense constitutes the highest level military headquarters. The Ministry of Defense is run by the Secretary of State for Defense who, in addition to exercising political control over military operations, is responsible for Defense policy. In addition to his junior ministers, they are also three service commanders, each of whom exercise command over their respective services. Given the complexity of joint operations, a permanent joint headquarters consisting of all branches of service was established to provide early warning assessments and monitor crisis areas that may be of interest to the UK. The following figure depicts the top-level structure of the UK’s Ministry of Defense.41

![Organization of the UK Ministry of Defense](image)

Figure 1. Organization of the UK Ministry of Defense (From: 39)

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When we compare the organization of the UK Ministry of Defense against the JSDF, there are again noteworthy similarities. In this case the Minister of Defense is supported by three chiefs of staff, each of whom have responsibility for the ground, maritime, and air self-defense forces. The respective service chiefs collectively comprise a Joint Staff Council which is chaired by a senior officer. The joint staff council was restructured in the early 80s to establish strong lines of communications between the respective services. Also of note is that prior to 2007 the Ministry of Defense had been a Defense Agency, subordinated as a Cabinet office with considerably less influence in the Japanese government. Elevating the status of the Defense Agency to a full ministry is consistent with the theory that the JSDF has experienced a steady growth trend, in this case manifesting itself as a significantly increased degree of government prominence.

The following figure depicts the top-level structure of the Japanese Ministry of Defense.

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What becomes abundantly apparent is the striking similarity between their respective structures, which for all intents and purposes are mirror images of each other. While it may be tempting to assert that the similarity is clear proof of a normalized Japanese force, there are some very obvious counters. From the outset the JSDF was established along functional lines, meaning that it had a respective ground maritime and air force. The aggregating of like capabilities is an intuitively logical way to structure any organization. Succinctly, the comparable structures of the UK’s military and the JSDF prove nothing while still serving as a positive indicator that the Japanese military is, by all outward appearances, a normal force.

As might be expected, the similarities do not stop there. Beginning with the respective ground forces, the UK has 105,000 regular personnel organized into infantry battalions, arm or regiments, armored reconnaissance regiments, artillery regiments, air defense regiments, engineer regiments, aviation regiments, signals regiments, and special forces. The policy guidance for the ground forces represents the UK’s strategic reality. In a post-Cold War era, the UK views itself as having a greater range of missions than in past times. While national survival is less of an issue, modern threats tend to be more complex and varied. This reflected in UK defense policy which is centered on the following principles: ensuring the security of the UK and its citizens in peace time, ensuring the security of dependent territories, providing defense support to the country’s wider interests, supporting international order and humanitarian principles under UN auspices, being prepared for regional conflict outside North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and being prepared for a NATO regional crisis and a general war.44

Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force consists of 155,000 regular personnel. The force is organized into armor and infantry divisions, airborne brigades, artillery brigades, air defense brigades, heliborne brigades, engineer brigades, antitank helicopter squadrons, and special operations forces. The force is guided by overarching defense policy. The primary objective is to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and in the event that it does repel it and minimize damage. The second objective is to contribute to

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44 Janes Information Group. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Western Europe."
the improvement of the global security environment to reduce the likelihood of a threat reaching Japan. This will be done through cooperation with the U.S. and the broader international community. Japan will support UN activities supporting global stability. One of the notable differences is that Japan makes it very clear point of asserting the defensive nature of its force highlighting its “modest” nature and civilian control.45

When placed side-by-side, the numbers are again comparable. Moreover, the functional capabilities retained with in both the UK and Japan are highly similar, with differences that are arguably best explained by regional security concerns. However, it should be noted that despite similar functional elements the type units are very and unique to their respective countries. What is meant by this is that a Japanese artillery regiment is not a direct mirror of a UK artillery Regiment. What is established is that Japan’s strictly defensive force as essentially the same functional capabilities as the UK’s normalized force. The following figure presents a side-by-side comparison of the functional capabilities of the respective forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Force Size</strong></td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>155,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Battle Tanks</strong></td>
<td>386</td>
<td>980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-Propelled Howitzer</strong></td>
<td>179</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Towed Howitzer</strong></td>
<td>119</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MLRS</strong></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attack Helicopter</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combat Helicopter</strong></td>
<td>127</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. Comparison of UK and Japanese Ground Forces (From: 31,39)

What is far more illuminating is the relative lack of contrast between their respective defense policies. In both cases in the primary reason for existence is to defend the homeland. Further, both have indicated that they will support operations in support of global stability working in concert with the UN. The two distinct differences are that the UK’s policy reflects its NATO commitment and that Japan has asserted its defensive

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45 Jane’s Information Group. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - China and Northeast Asia."
nature. While the former difference is readily explained as a state specific regional security issue, the latter is a far more dubious claim. When considered against the evidence presented thus far what we see is that Japan is organized very similarly to the UK, its ground force is 30% larger, and the overarching defense policy is virtually identical with the exception of the Japanese assertion that their force is defensive. In the context of the evidence presented thus far this is not fully convincing.

The comparisons of the respective air forces bear out this emerging trend. The UK maintains an air force of nearly 46,000 personnel. These personnel collectively operate a fleet of aircraft consisting of multi-role fighters, air defense fighters, striking ground attack fighters, maritime patrol, airborne early warning and control, and tanker transport functions. These aircraft are organized into three broad groups, under which our squadrons typically consisting of three to four subordinate units referred to as flights. Additionally, the Royal Air Force (RAF) is also able to organize and expeditionary air wings to better facilitate swift deployment. As might be expected, the RAF has been highly involved in operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.46

The Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) is comparable in size with approximately 45,000 airmen. It also possesses multi-role fighters, interceptors, airborne early warning and control, reconnaissance aircraft, and tanker transport platforms. These personnel in assets are organized into eight aircraft control morning groups, nine interceptor squadrons, three fighter squadrons, one reconnaissance squadron, three transport squadrons. The ASDF also contains surface to air missile groups. While a bit less ambitious in scope then the RAF, the ASDF has recently supported operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Kuwait, and Iraq.47 The ASDF has adapted tactical doctrine from the U.S. Air Force to fit in Japan’s vision of a defensive force. Also of note is the high degree of cooperation and training that the ASDF conducts with the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy.

As we examine the RAF and ASDF the trend continues. Both air forces are comparable in size and possess aircraft with a high degree of functional similarity. In

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46 Janes Jane’s Information Group. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Western Europe."
addition to this both have been rather extensively involved in operations across the globe. The degree of training that ASDF conducts with U.S. forces also bears emphasis. Accepting that Japan has adapted U.S. doctrine for strictly defensive purposes, by virtue of having trained fairly routinely with the U.S. in a variety of venues it can reasonably be expected that the ASDF has been exposed to numerous offensive roles. Moreover, a distinction between offense and defense in aerial combat and close air support is somewhat of a dubious claim. These are competencies that one would find to expect in either an aggressive air force or a purely defensive one.

A final point for consideration between the respective air forces is the number of fighter aircraft owned by each of the forces as depicted in the following figure. On a purely quantitative basis Japan possesses a significantly larger number of combat aircraft. Considered in aggregate, both the normalized and defensive force are comparable in size and function, both have recently deployed in albeit in different capacities, and the defense to force maintains a larger quantity of fighter aircraft and the normalized one. Our examination of the air forces again suggests that the two are comparable to the degree that there is no discernible difference.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Force Size</td>
<td>45,550</td>
<td>44,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter - Multirole</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter - Interceptor / Air Defense</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter - Ground Attack / Strike</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance / Surveillance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainer</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4. Comparison of UK and Japanese Air Forces (From: 31, 39)

The final branches of service to be considered are the two navies of the respective countries. As island nations is not surprising that both would place a premium on a strong naval force. In the case of the UK’s Royal Navy, there are nearly 40,000 regular personnel manning some thirteen submarines, three aircraft carriers, one helicopter
carrier, to assault ships, seventeen frigates, eight destroyers, and sixteen mine warfare vessels. The Royal Navy also encompasses the Royal Marines of which there is one brigade. Additionally there are twelve naval aviation squadrons. Following the Cold War, the Royal Navy saw significant shift in operational roles which now consists of eight primary defense missions. It is charged with peacetime security functions such as fisheries protection and the security of oil and gas platforms, supporting operations in overseas possessions, security and confidence building programs, peace support and humanitarian operations, and regional conflicts within and external to the NATO alliance. The Royal Navy maintains a reasonably high deployment profile, having conducted recent operations in the Mediterranean, North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Iraq, and Afghanistan.48

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) has 43,000 sailors who operate and maintain a fleet of 20 submarines, 43 destroyers, 12 frigates, and 35 mine warfare ships. Of all of Japan’s forces it is considered to be the most important and powerful, charged with the protection of Japanese waters and in providing maritime security. To achieve these functions the MSDF has developed a high degree of competency and anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare, mine warfare, electronic warfare, surveillance, transport, and search and rescue. These skills have been deemed necessary to support an expanded role against “new threats and diverse situations.” These new threats have focused MSDF efforts on been prepared to respond to ballistic missile attacks, attacks by guerrillas, an invasion of the Japanese islands, intrusion upon Japanese maritime areas or airspace, and responding to natural disasters. MSDF sailors recently deployed to Iraq and ships of regularly been dispatched to the Indian Ocean in support of counterterrorism operations.49

The two navies present both high degree of similarity and a few points of stark contrast. Both are comparable in size and possess similar types of naval assets in significantly different numbers. The glaring difference is that the Royal Navy maintains aircraft carriers and the MSDF has considerably more destroyers and mine warfare ships.

48 Jane’s Information Group. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Western Europe."
49 Jane’s Information Group. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - China and Northeast Asia."
That Japan maintains such a large number of destroyers and minesweepers intuitively reflect
the practical reality of assembling a force that will enable freedom of navigation in the region
given multiple chokepoints. Interpreting Japan’s lack of aircraft carriers is a bit more
difficult.

Aircraft carriers clearly provide a means of projecting force well off one’s own
shores. Given this it is reasonable to construe the existence of a carrier as being offensive in
nature. In the case of Japan the absence of a carrier may limit global power projection, but
this is regionally offset by the large quantity of destroyers. Expressed in a regional context,
Japan constitutes what former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone referred to as “an
unsinkable aircraft carrier” protected by this large quantity of destroyers. This would suggest
that the Japanese absence of aircraft carriers may be of limited relevance in projecting force
within the region. While it would be difficult to argue that the existence of Japanese aircraft
carriers would be for anything other than offensive purposes, the lack thereof has little
bearing in considering the degree of normalization in the existing force. In the final analysis,
although the Royal Navy and the MSDF do have some disparate capabilities they are
outweighed by the number of similarities. The following figure highlights the primary
disparities between the two.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Force Size</td>
<td>38,550</td>
<td>43,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines - Strategic Missile</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines - Attack</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carrier</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeper</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5. Comparison of UK and Japanese Naval Forces (From: 31, 39)

The preceding paragraphs have provided evidence that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces are virtually indiscernible from the forces of a normalized state that is widely acknowledged as having a competent and skilled military. The organizational structures, the number of personnel, war fighting functions, and types of assets are each highly comparable. While this constitutes a reasonable amount of data to support claims that Japan’s forces are trending towards normalization one other aspect will be considered. One of the foremost domestic
and external issues surrounding the JSDF is their deployment beyond Japan’s borders. This tends to represent one of two points of view, the first is that deploying troops abroad constitutes an act of aggression in the second is that today’s security context may require action abroad to defend Japan. In continuing our comparative analysis the question becomes to what extent are elements of the JSDF deployed and is this consistent with what we might see in a normalized force such as found in the UK. The following figures depict recent UK and Japanese force deployment profiles.\(^{50,51}\)

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Figure 7. Recent JSDF Deployments (From: 51)
The preceding figures illustrate some surprising similarities. The UK has nearly 41,000 personnel deployed in various locations. Japan has nearly 30,000 personnel deployed in a very similar fashion. This gap shrinks considerably when you extricate the UK’s 21,000 personnel who are permanently stationed in Germany. This is an important distinction as this reflects basing strategy rather than an operational deployment. When viewed through this lens, Japan has one and a half times as many forces deployed as the UK. Considered on a strictly numerical basis, Japan’s operational commitments appear quite comparable to that of the normalized UK.

Another significant difference that bears mention is the number of forces that the UK has deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. While Japan has forces deployed to these areas, they are in significantly smaller quantity. The debate over the role in which they are serving is certainly relevant, and while Japan may not be committing frontline combat troops, it is undeniable that they have established a significant global footprint well beyond Japan’s domestic borders. Further, the distinction between combatant and noncombatant is increasingly narrow in many conflict areas. JSDF personnel deployed overseas in any capacity could easily find themselves under attack and very quickly become the front line. The relevant point remains that for a force developed strictly for the defense of Japan, the JSDF has cultivated a significant global presence.

To be clear, the intent of this analysis has not been to determine whether or not UK forces are superior to JSDF, but rather to demonstrate that the latter bears a striking resemblance to an accepted, normalized force. Based on the factors of organization, size, capability, and deployments it becomes apparent that the similarities heavily outweigh the differences. The most recurring contrast is the degree to which the JSDF asserts its defensive nature. This contrast is significantly reduced when the roles and missions of the respective forces are considered. The UK has very clearly established that the primary purpose of its forces is to protect UK property and citizenry, which infers a heavily defensive role without characterizing itself as a defensive force. By continually asserting its defensive role in the face of these similarities, Japan draws a great deal of attention to the offensive potential of the JSDF.
Note that while this chapter has emphasized the relative similarities between the JSDF and UK forces, a broader analysis further reinforces Japan’s normalization trend. Considered along the dimensions of defense spending, air power, and naval capabilities Japan compares favorably on an international scale. The following figures illustrate Japan’s relative military standing from a broader perspective:

Figure 1. Leading Defense Spenders, Excluding the United States (U.S. $ billion, 2000)

Figure 8. Comparative Defense Spending (From: 52)

### Table 1. Relative Air Capabilities of the Major Powers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Current-Generation Combat Aircraft</th>
<th>Airborne Early Warning Aircraft</th>
<th>Pilot Flying Hours per Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2,267</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,569</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9. Relative Air Capabilities (From: 52)

### Table 2. Relative Naval Capabilities of the Major Powers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Major Surface Combatants</th>
<th>Fleet Air Defense Capabilities (nautical miles)</th>
<th>Aircraft Carriers (&gt; 20,000)</th>
<th>Total Tonnage, Major Surface Combatants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>high (to 90 nm)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,971,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>low (13 nm)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>169,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>high (90 nm)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>224,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>moderate (20 nm)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>157,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>moderate (25 nm)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>201,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>moderate (48 nm)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>332,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>moderate (20 nm)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>88,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>moderate (20 nm)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57,360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10. Relative Naval Capabilities (From: 52)

### E. CONCLUSIONS

The preceding analysis has allowed us to consider multiple facets of the JSDF, from which certain conclusions can be drawn. If the path towards a modern military is considered as a trend line with a starting point of pacifism and an endpoint of an integrated sea, air, and land force capable of quickly deploying to multiple locations, it becomes apparent that the JSDF has steadily advanced along this axis. If this path is characterized as security normalization, it is still apparent that the JSDF has progressed significantly since its inception as a police reserve. The emerging question becomes one
of what will be the next significant milestone on this assumed path towards normalization. The answer to this is found in part under the broad rubric of missile defense.

The introduction of missile defense entails far more than simply shooting down missiles. To such an initiative a viable counter, significant changes have had to be made to Japan’s defense apparatus. These changes span legal, technical, and operational domains. The following chapter will identify the scope of the changes associated with missile defense and articulate why they have enhanced the trend towards normalization.
III. ENTER MISSILE DEFENSE

A. THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE MISSILE DEFENSE

In the previous chapter a trend line towards Japanese security normalization was developed. From its origins as a police reserve to a capable military force serving in a global capacity, the JSDF has quite clearly moved well beyond its origin. The subsequent question is what direction Japanese security will take from this point on. The answer to this is found in part in Japan’s missile defense initiative. While it is simple to conceive of missile defense is simply a “point and shoot” system, the reality is far more complex. To implement missile defense Japan had to introduce a significant number of security milestones that when taken collectively advance the normalization trend. This chapter will delineate key milestones in the development of Japanese missile defense and identify specific elements that have broader implications.

From the Japanese point of view, the “BMD system is the only and purely defensive measure, without alternatives, to protect life and property of the citizens of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, and meets the principle of exclusively defense-oriented national defense policy.”\(^{53}\) Others take a far dimmer view, suggesting that the capabilities associated with missile defense provide may in fact provide Japan with an offensive capacity. Ultimately, the issue of all of offensive or defensive capability is relegated to perception. However, what can be treated as fact is that Japan is clearly pursuing missile defense.

The Japanese missile defense program has steadily progressed since the concept was introduced in the mid-1980s. From its inception, it has gained budgetary support, overcome technical hurdles, and has experienced several successful test events. This is not meant to imply that it has developed without incident. Cost, technical risk, and

impacts on the regional balance of power have each prompted some degree of internal and external dissent. None of these factors, however, have proven substantive enough to halt development.

The Japanese commitment to missile defense can largely be attributed to its long-standing security relationship with the U.S. and the potential missile threat from both the People’s Republic of China and, more prominently, North Korea. In the context of the U.S., Japanese interest in missile defense programs dates from the mid-1980s, when the Department of Defense solicited participation by allied countries in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Japan declined to participate but did partially relax arms export bans to facilitate sharing technology with the U.S. Subsequently, Japan shared technology with the U.S. for several weapons systems, including surface to air missile systems, ship construction, rocket engines, and fighter aircraft.54

This collaboration proved highly frustrating to all parties as technology transfer issues had become entwined in the U.S.-Japan trade deficit issues. While this resulted in an increased Japanese aversion to joint development with the U.S., missile defense studies continued through the early 1990’s. To this end, Japan and the U.S. initiated a missile defense system study under the SDI initiative entitled Western Pacific Basin Architecture Study. Following the completion of the study in October 1994, a “Bilateral Study on BMD” was conducted to better understand the ballistic missile threat and to study alternative architectures.55

Despite pre-existing missile threats, North Korea’s test firing of its Taepo Dong ballistic missile in August 1998 prompted a much more concerted effort by the U.S. and Japan. This event clearly illustrated Japan’s vulnerability to North Korea’s missile threat and drew public concern about the country’s vulnerability to missile attacks. In December 1998, the Japanese government made an internal decision to engage with the U.S. in cooperative research and development of a ballistic missile defense system.56

55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
Today, all indications are that Japan is committed to this course of action and is doing quite well in achieving it. The following is a brief synopsis illustrating Japanese progress and commitment towards missile defense:\textsuperscript{57,58}

1990: North Korea test launches ballistic missile into the Sea of Japan
1992: Bush administration proposes Japanese TMD deployment
1993: Started consultations with the U.S. on BMD
1993: Japan purchases Aegis combat systems
1993: North Korea test launches for ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan
1994: Japan and South Korea agreed to cooperate on North Korean missile threat
1995: JDA commenced BMD feasibility study
1998: North Korea test launches ballistic missile over Japan
2002: Japan-U.S. Defense Summit meeting
2003: Japan launches IGS satellites
2003: Japan-U.S. Defense Summit meeting
2003: JDA requested BMD budget for FY 2004
2003: GOJ decision to introduce BMD system
2004: Japan and the U.S. signed BMD Framework MOU
2005: GOJ decision to start SM-3 Joint Cooperative Development
2006: SM-3 Block IIA Cooperative Development Project started
2007: Transition from Defense Agency to Ministry of Defense
2007: PATRIOT PAC-3 deployed at Iruma Air Base - Japan’s first interceptor


2007: Successful completion of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) intercept flight test in Hawaii

This timeline illustrates the degree of Japanese commitment to the program. What is perhaps less explicit are the security milestones that have been entrenched in the pursuit of missile defense. The following section will elaborate on what has had to occur to make missile defense a potential reality.

B. THE ATTENDANT FEATURES OF MISSILE DEFENSE

1. Command and Control

Missile defense is an inherently complex activity. In order for it to be effective, there needs to be a high degree of coordination between multiple entities. Expressed differently, missile defense requires a fast and accurate command-and-control (C2) system. In considering Japan’s post-Cold War C2 structure it quickly becomes apparent that far less complex mechanisms were sufficient. As might be expected, the JSDF developed along service lines oriented towards complementing U.S. forces. During the Cold War era the U.S. was the deterrent against potential Soviet aggression, with Japan playing a secondary role. While the JSDF did participate in combined exercises with the U.S., it was still within the confines of a single service channels. As a result of this there was never an impetus to develop a truly joint C2 structure within the JSDF.59 When considering the demands of an effective missile defense system, the shortcomings of this approach become readily apparent.

Effective missile defense presents a far more substantial C2 challenge. The decision to deploy a missile defense capability is almost invariably predicated on the detection and dissemination of early warning information. In practical terms any asset detecting an indication of launch must be able to pass that information to a platform that is capable of acting upon it. This entails space-based systems, ground-based systems, and...

aerial systems, and sea-based systems. Moreover, given the benefits of interoperability with U.S. resources, there is a need to ensure that the C2 apparatus can also function in a multi-national capacity.60

This reality is reflected in Japanese defense planning. Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines have placed in increased emphasis on effective joint operations and increased command-and-control capabilities. In defining the critical elements of defense Japan has established the enhancement of joint operation capabilities as a number one priority. The following extracts from Japan’s 2007 Defense Planning Guidance illustrate the importance of the Japan places on these two elements:

In order to have three services of the self-defense forces work integrally and to enable them to execute their missions swiftly and effectively, we will employ them jointly whenever possible. We will create a central organization to facilitate joint operations, and establish infrastructure for training and education as well as intelligence and communications. In doing so, we will re-examine existing organizations so as to enhance the efficiency.61

…in particular we will develop the command-and-control systems and agile intelligence sharing systems that are indispensable for joint operations, and to information and communication technologies available at home and overseas. In addition, will create advanced systems for command and communications in a network for information and communications, with sufficient protection against possible cyber attacks, to enhance operational and organizational efficiency.62

It is arguable that improved “jointness” and C2 systems could simply be attributed to the desire to be able to conduct more effective defense operations and that missile defense was not a significant driver. The counter to this is found in the same planning

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62 Ibid.
guidance which addresses the means by which improvements will be implemented. The document highlights the close coordination between command-and-control systems as critical to effective missile-defense. Placed in the context of combined Japanese-U.S. missile defense, Japan’s Air Defense Command was designated for co-location with the U.S. Fifth Air Force at Yokoda air base in order to strengthen coordination between missile defense C2 elements and facilitate the sharing of relevant sensor data. In addition to this, the structure of Japan’s missile defense encompasses space, air, sea, and ground assets so it is somewhat intuitive that they would need to effectively communicate across service channels. While this realization may have occurred absent a missile defense initiative, it is missile defense that made it imperative.

When this evidence is placed on the normalization trend line, two factors stand out. The first is that C2 improvements have manifested themselves as a post-cold war adaptation to a regional threat. The fact that the shift towards greater interoperability has occurred in response to a local concern implies that Japan is increasing its ability to provide for its own defense which is a significant departure from complete reliance on the U.S. security umbrella. The second factor is that the nature of the threat is missile attack from North Korea. Given that the exogenous threat is of a specific type, namely missile attack, the actions taken by Japan can be interpreted as steps to increase its organic ability to deter and defeat said attack.

2. Decision-making Authority

Command-and-control is not strictly a matter of having the right hardware. Effective C2 rests in part on well-established lines of authority. In the case of Japan, missile defense has again proven to be the impetus to change long-standing policies. The speed with which missile attacks can occur coupled with their destructive potential prompt a requirement for swift decision-making. To facilitate this, in 2005 the Japanese Diet revised the Self-Defense Forces Law through the addition of Article 82-2. The following is the applicable excerpt:

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Despite the intuitive necessity and exceedingly cautious wording, Article 82-2 is noteworthy in that it allows the Defense Minister to respond to the immediate threat absent a government order for defensive action. To expand the context, this is the first time since World War II that such authority has been delegated.\(^{65}\)

While the establishment of a Defense Minister and the delegation of this degree of authority are somewhat profound in their own right, it is of limited utility in conditions are not otherwise set for swift execution of his order. As alluded to in the preceding section, to defend against ballistic missiles all branches of the JSDF must cycle through a complex set of procedures. It is necessary to detect, track, classify, and identify targets. It is necessary to make a decision on whether to intercept or not and if so to execute the interception. It is necessary to assess the results and make a subsequent determination on interception. It is necessary to confine damage from debris in case of a successful intercept and for missile impact in the case of an intercept failure. These activities collectively require that all branches of the JSDF work in concert.

To facilitate the desired synergy, at the same time Japan added Article 82 – 2 to the Self-Defense Forces law, a revision was also made to the Defense Agency Establishment Law. This revision allowed for the establishment of the Joint Staff Office

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to facilitate the unified, joint operational structure necessary for missile defense. Further joint task units consisting of elements of each branch of service are formed as required under the command of the ASDF.\footnote{Hideaki Kaneda, Kazumasa Kobayashi, Hiroshi Tajima, Hirofumi Tosaki. \textit{Japan’s Missile Defense – Diplomatic and Security Policies in a Changing Strategic Environment}. Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2007.} New guidelines were established in 2007 authorizing the Defense Minister to give commanders in the field the discretion to fire interceptors at incoming missiles in situations where there has been a clear sign of a missile attack.\footnote{“Japan amends Emergency Missile Defence guidelines.” \textit{BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific}, 24 December 2007, 2007, sec. Political. \url{http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/inacademic/results/docview/docview.do?doc}. Accessed 11 August 2008.}

Japan’s decision to delegate this authority reflects both pragmatism and resignation. It is pragmatic in the sense that a missile defense initiative that is wholly reliant on a single decision-maker is almost invariably doomed to failure. The resignation is found in the acceptance that high ideals offer little defense against an incoming missile. Considered against the normalization trend line, this is far from “loosing the dogs of war,” but does represent a loosening of the reins that was not present a decade ago.

Given that the authority granted to the Defense Minister is restricted to missile defense, we can reasonably infer that missile defense necessitated a shift in policy. Given that this reflects a relaxation of security policy it can further be inferred that the trend line has advanced as a result of missile defense.

3. Partial Repeal of Weapons Export Ban

As a testimony to the degree to which missile defense has challenged the status quo in Japanese defense policy, one need only consider its impact on long-standing principles regarding weapons export. The issue of arms sales has long been controversial in Japanese politics. In 1967 the Sato Cabinet adopted a broad policy banning weapons exports to communist nations, nations subject to various UN resolutions, and nations involved in international conflict. This was reinforced in 1976 when the Miki Cabinet called for restraint in weapons exports to those nations not covered under the 1967 policy. This position was softened somewhat in 1983 when the Nakasone Cabinet...
permitted the export of weapons technology to U.S., but reaffirmed a long-standing ban on the export and joint production of weapons.68

These policies remained unchanged for the next 20 years. However, in 2004 the Koizumi Cabinet made substantial changes to these long-standing policies. The most notable exception is that the joint development and production of missile defense system between Japan and the U.S. was deemed permissible. The change also allowed for the consideration of defense projects in support of counterterrorism and anti-piracy operations. The repeal of the ban on weapons exports subsequently made it possible to proceed with the development of a missile defense initiative. Expressed differently, Japan’s commitment to missile defense was sufficient enough to revisit nearly four decades of standing policy on weapons export and development.69

In this instance, the relationship between the policy change and missile defense is quite explicit, but what bears further extrapolation is the degree to which this advances the security normalization trend. While the primary objective was to advance the missile defense initiative, there are two other facets that set conditions for the future expansion of the Japanese weapons industry. The first is that the decision allows the government to consider other defense projects, not necessarily associated with missile defense, with the U.S. Further, the Japanese government can also consider exports to other nations in support of counterterrorism and anti-piracy operations. In principle, the types of weapons and the nations to which they can be exported to is quite broad.70

The nature of modern weapons development entails a great deal of technical risk, which can quite often be quantified as a dollar amount. Considered from this perspective, partnering with the U.S. reduces this risk and is quite pragmatic. Moreover, the dual use nature of many technologies allows for increased competitive advantage in the private sector. So while it could be argued that the decision to modify long-standing policy on


69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.
arms exports could be attributed to financial motives, missile defense served as the galvanizing impetus to make such changes a reality.

4. Use of Space for Military Purposes

In 1969, the Japanese Diet banned the use of space for military purposes. Considered in a literal and very strict sense, this ban conceptually precluded the use of space based assets for such seemingly mundane functions as communications. However, as with many facets of Japanese security, alternative interpretations have allowed for much wider spread use. In this instance, the Defense Agency has been authorized to employ space capabilities that are otherwise commercially available. This dual-use caveat has effectively allowed for the use of virtually any space based capability that is not uniquely military. Since the 1980s, the Japanese Defense Agency has been able to make use of a wide variety of commercial satellite applications, to include communications and imagery. This interpretation has also served to set conditions for more expansive use of space-based systems, which are inextricably related to Japanese missile defense.

To place this in a more specific context, in August of 1998 North Korea conducted a test launch of a Taepodong missile over Japan. This event served as the impetus for Japan to begin the development of reconnaissance satellites and adopt a more expansive view of what constituted an acceptable use of space-based systems. By March of 2003, Japan had launched two reconnaissance satellites. While officially designated with the somewhat vague title of Information Gathering Satellites (IGS), this program effectively enabled Japan to watch for similar North Korean launches.

At the time of the 1998 North Korean test, Japan’s sole indicator of the launch with advance notice provided by the U.S. Department of Defense. The depths of this dependency proved to be very unsettling to the Japanese Diet and the Prime Minister’s office. While Japanese political entities claimed surprise and drew significant public criticism, the Japanese Defense Agency had been the beneficiary of the U.S. advance

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72 Ibid.
notice. As evidence of this, a Japanese AEGIS destroyer was positioned near the flight path and collected substantial data on the launch. The combined impacts of political embarrassment, a credible missile threat, public support, and an obvious schism between agencies provided the immediate impetus for the IGS system.

By November of 1998, just three months after North Korea’s missile test, Japan had committed to the development of a national capability to provide advance warning of launch indications. Within the year, funds were appropriated for a system designed to “collect imagery information necessary to ensure the national security of Japan.” The IGS system would significantly reduce Japan’s dependency on the U.S. to provide for advance warning and allow Japan to indigenously monitor for such threats. The collective system would consist of two optical sensor satellites, two synthetic aperture radar satellites, and the necessary ground stations for satellite control, data collection, analysis, and dissemination. For the system to work as conceived, the Japanese government also established the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSIC), an organization manned by 320 persons of which nearly one third are imagery analysts. By the end of 2003, all four satellites were in orbit.

While the previous paragraphs illustrate a shift in Japan’s views on the use of space, recent legislation is even more explicit. In July of 2008, Japan passed the Basic Space Bill, which provides the JSDF direct control of the Japan’s reconnaissance satellites and increase the level state of technology employed by the satellite programs. Notably, Article 14 of the bill requires the government to take “necessary measures to promote space development and use that would promote both national and international security,” marking a clear departure from previous legislation. More specifically, the JSDF can now “manufacture, possess and operate its own satellites to support its

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76 Ibid.
terrestrial military operations, including ballistic missile defense (BMD). Immediate candidates for SDF procurement would be satellites for reconnaissance, early warning and tracking and communications - all to enhance BMD capabilities.”

One of the first steps for a successful missile defense initiative is the ability to effectively forecast or detect a launch event. In the case of Japan, the IGS program provides the means to observe for threats while associated missile defense capabilities would provide a means to effectively respond. Although Japan has always benefited by a fairly liberal interpretation of security legislation, there are two elements of this program that warrant distinction. The first is that the system was conceived and employed with the specific purpose of national security. This is a significant step beyond the long accepted practice of dual-use space applications, and can readily be construed as an advancement of the normalization trend. The second is that IGS was developed in direct response to a perceived missile threat and in the context of a broader missile defense initiative. Detection of a launch event may facilitate some protective measures, but is insufficient to eliminate the threat. Used in concert with a missile defense capability, IGS becomes an integral component of a much more comprehensive system.

5. Pursuit of Offensive Capability

The debate over whether a weapons system is of offensive or defensive is clouded between intent, perception, and capability. As a result, a conclusive answer is not easily reached. However, when planned Japanese procurements are placed in the context of the role they would play in a missile-defense scenario a clearer picture can be derived. In this instance, the platform in question is the planned Japanese acquisition of the F-22 raptor from the U.S.

The F-22 is arguably the world’s most advanced combat aircraft. It was developed primarily to defeat the Soviet adversary in air to air combat. This is achieved through the utilization of stealth technology, increased maneuverability, and avionics integrated with sensors into a single display. Because of the advanced nature of the

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technology, the U.S. was somewhat noncommittal in regards to whether or not it should be exported. Within Japan one of the unresolved issues is whether or not the F-22 is in fact an offensive weapon. In the U.S. it’s a far clearer issue, as the Department of Defense justified the F-22 on the basis of its offensive capabilities. While this issue remains open to discussion, it is not unreasonable to characterize the F-22 as an offensive platform as that served as the basis for its original funding.

The counter to this offensive characterization would be found in Japan’s planned use of the aircraft. The intuitive rationale for purchasing a fighter aircraft with these capabilities is to fill a critical gap in missile defense, specifically the ability to “penetrate enemy air defenses and strike missiles before they can be launched.” Expressively differently, Japan has recently pursued the acquisition of an aircraft defined by the state which designed it as offensive with the presumed purpose of striking missiles prior to launch.

The broad justification of missile defense makes it possible for Japan to justify the purchase of offensive aircraft. It makes it possible to conceive a preventive attack of an adversary’s launch capability. While these are eminently practical measures for a missile defense program, they are also another advance on the security normalization trend line. When placed in the context of a constitution that eschews war as a right of the state, these features of missile defense stand on the edge of aggressive posturing.

6. Collective Security

One aspect of missile defense that offers a direct challenge to the Japanese interpretation of their Constitution is the degree to which it almost inextricably links the defense of Japan and the defense of the U.S. This stems from Japan’s long-held interpretation of Article 9 which asserts that Japan is not allowed to participate in

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collective defense as such an initiative would go beyond the minimal force necessary to defend the country. The following is an excerpt from the Japanese Diet’s 1981 interpretation of the right of collective self-defense.

It is self-evident that Japan has the right of collective self-defense under international law since it is a sovereign state, but that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is not permissible under the Constitution, since the exercise of the right of self-defense is authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution is confined to the minimum necessary level for the defense of the country and the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds the limit.80

This interpretation presents itself as a significant challenge to the missile defense initiative. Japan is currently not bound to support the U.S. in the event of conflict, although the opposite does not hold true. The issue that presents itself is that in the event of a missile attack flying toward U.S. troops operating outside of Japan or towards U.S. positions in the Pacific, Japan cannot legally use its intercept capabilities to shoot down said missile. Further, there is some question as to whether or not Japan would provide the U.S. with any tactical information on such a missile attack. While this course of action may exist within the legal constraints Japan is imposed upon itself, such a sequence of events would certainly do irreparable damage to the security relationship with the U.S.81

This interpretation goes a bit beyond the hypothetical. During Abe’s tenure as Prime Minister he established a review panel to consider the collective defense issue. One of the scenarios reviewed involved a North Korean missile attack which was predicted to pass over Japan and strike Guam or Honolulu. The review panel determined that the existing government interpretation would not legally allow the shoot down of the

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missile. One of the more ironic aspects of this scenario is that Guam and Honolulu both have U.S. bases that contribute to the defense of Japan.82

This has proven to be a highly controversial issue in Japan, where much of the population is concerned that if the country becomes fully engaged in collective defense the JSDF would become far more actively engaged in U.S. military operations. While previous Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe were staunch supporters of revisiting the constitutional interpretation, current Prime Minister Fukuda has adopted a much more conservative stance. Further, recent polls have indicated that a majority of the Japanese population support the current constitutional interpretation thereby adding a degree of political liability to any opposing actions.83

While the current Prime Minister has adopted a more centrist view on the issue it is worth noting that Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba has openly encouraged and open debate on collective defense.84 This is relevant in that reflects a new element in Japanese security dynamics. The Prime Minister can adopt a very centrist view and thereby mitigate some political risk, whereas the Defense Minister can adopt a slightly more hawkish demeanor and thereby advance security concerns. This reflects one of the second order effects of the elevation of the Defense Agency to a Defense Ministry. By virtue of being imbued with more power, the Defense Ministry is better positioned to advance security concerns a bit more autonomously.

Whether or not Japan will alter its interpretation in the near term remains uncertain. Although the current administration does not seem inclined to press for constitutional change, it is faced with new challenges in the form of U.S. pressure on the domestic defense industry. The U.S. very clearly has a vested interest in Japan coming to its assistance in the case of missile attack and Japanese weapons manufacturers have a

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very clear interest in ensuring that defense funds continue to flow. What can be said with some certainty though is that the issue of missile defense has prompted serious constitutional debate and while it has not yet yielded a constitutional reinterpretation it remains at the center of the issue.

7. Preemptive Self-Defense

There is another aspect of missile defense has been alluded to in several of the preceding sections, specifically developing the capacity to prevent a missile attack by destroying it prior to launch. Not surprisingly, a new legal precedent has emerged that would allow Japan to conduct such an attack should there be an “imminent and illegal invasion of Japanese territory.” In 2003, Japan passed the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in the Situation of Armed Attack. This law addresses various situations under which an attack might occur and defines one such situation as one where “an armed attack against Japan from the outside (including a case where an armed attack is imminent) has occurred or one where an armed attack is anticipated as tensions rise.” This law effectively encompasses both actual military attacks and the expectation of attacks.85

From a tactical perspective, this is perfectly logical. However, placed in the context of the peace constitution it appears to be far more aggressive. Public comments made by then chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe offered at least one interpretation of how a preemption scenario may unfold:

If we accept that there is no other option to prevent a missile attack," he told reporters, "there is an argument that attacking the missile bases would be within the legal right of self-defense.

Mr. Abe’s comments came a day after the head of the Defense Agency, Fukushiro Nukaga, said Japan should consider pre-emptive strikes "if an enemy country definitely has a way of attacking Japan and has its finger on the trigger."86

To be certain, the scenario was examined in a purely hypothetical light and the statements were quite probably intended to offer a deterrent in their own right. The more relevant feature though, is the degree to which certain segments of elite political thought within Japan have migrated away from the presumed intent of the still popular peace constitution. Viewed through this lens, Pearl Harbor could be construed as existing within the bounds of contemporary Japanese law.

Specific to this thesis, the two most relevant features are the role of missile defense and advancement of the normalization trend line. Regarding the former, the discussion of preemption is framed around potential missile attacks and as such resides under the overarching umbrella of missile defense. This argument gains additional merit when considered in the context of Japan’s keen interest in, and presumed plans for, the F-22. Regarding the latter, this clearly constitutes another step towards security normalization. When high-ranking Japanese public figures accept what can only be construed as preemption than the threshold of first strike has been reached. This is clearly not a position that would have been palpable when the Japanese Constitution was adopted.

8. From Agency to Ministry

One recent action that demonstrates a reciprocal benefit in Japanese security advancements is the elevation of the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) to the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD). This advancement came about due in part to a perceived need for a more effective defense apparatus fueled by fears of North Korean missiles. Considered as such, the need for a more effective defense against missiles set conditions for elevating the agency. Once elevated, the MOD became better positioned to advocate security concerns.

Executed in 2007, this elevation in status marked a considerable increase in the role of Japan’s defense organization. During the Cold War, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) played a leading role in matters of security policy. In contrast, the JDA was relegated primarily to the management of the JSDF and coordinating basing issues. The nature of their respective duties illustrates the gap in relative power. Whereas the
MOFA served as a policy agency, the JDA was largely a management agency. The post-Cold War era introduced new challenges that could not readily be accommodated by this system.\(^87\) One of Japan’s adaptations to contemporary security considerations has been the elevation of the JDA.

In 2006, then Prime Minister Koizumi introduced a bill to expand the primary duties of the JSDF and elevate the JDA to a ministry. Later that year, Koizumi’s successor, Shinzo Abe, made the defense bill one of his top priorities and pushed the legislation through. Prominent features of the revised laws are that they allow the MOD to convene cabinet meetings and submit bills to the Japanese Diet.\(^88\) While there is certainly a symbolic undertone to the increase in status, more practically it cedes a great deal more power to the long suborned JDA. Further, while the bill calls for an “expansion of the primary duties” of the JSDF, it is far less explicit in fully characterizing said duties thus setting conditions for a fairly broad loophole should the need arise.

While the elevation of the JDA is consistent with the observed trend towards normalization, its relation to missile defense warrants further explanation. There are two notable aspects that illustrate the degree to which missile defense has impacted and benefited from the recent legislation. Foremost is the “Japanese public’s growing desire for a sturdier national-defense system, especially amid North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities.”\(^89\) The likelihood of a defense reform bill such as this passing absent some type of compelling threat is substantially reduced. The public’s desire for security, borne of fears of North Korean missile attacks, reduced the political liability of what at one time would have appeared to be overly hawkish behavior.

The second, less direct correlation is found in the impacts on the budgeting process. By allowing the Defense Ministry to submit its own budget to the Diet rather

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than submit it via the Prime Minister, the defense budget is delinked from the political mainstream. Conditions are set to advocate for defense spending with far less political liability. Despite recent declines in defense spending, the cumulative costs of missile defense, standard procurement of weapons systems, Japan’s increased role in UN missions, and the long-suffering Japanese economy, it can be expected that ministry endorsed budget increases will be forthcoming.

9. Permanence

Several actions had to take place to make missile defense a viable Japanese security option. However, actions that are taken can often be readily undone. What confers a degree of permanence on the actions taken to facilitate missile defense is the degree to which they are now entrenched in Japanese law. Previous sections have referenced changes to various Japanese policies and laws precipitated by a desire for missile defense capability. Considered individually, these appear to be a simple legal necessity required to support a given initiative. However, when the changes to law and policy are considered collectively the depth of the structural change associated with missile defense becomes far more apparent. The following is a synopsis of laws and policy changes enacted under the broader rubric of missile defense.

(2003) Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security: In 2003, the Japanese parliament passed a law concerning measures to ensure national independence and security in a situation of armed attack. The following is an excerpt from Article 76 of the law:

When there is an armed attack to our nation from the outside our windows considered that there is an infinite and clear danger of an armed attack the prime minister, and he or she considers it necessary from the standpoint of defending the nation, he or she may order the whole or part of the self-defense forces in operation.90

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What prompts concern about this law is the ill-defined nature of “imminent.” While this is generally construed as meaning some type of preventive action in the event of detected missile launch activity, it is not restricted to this interpretation. The trend in the growth of the JSDF has been one of liberal interpretation when convenient, and restrictive when not. Considered in this context, it is not unreasonable that this stipulation may prompt regional concern.

(2004) Repeal of Weapons Export Ban: On December 10, 2004 the Japanese Cabinet approved revisions to the National Defense Program outline loosening arms export restrictions. This change has generated a wide variety of options in terms of international weapons development, production, and exportation. While it is focused on missile defense, this is not a strict limitation. This represents the most significant policy shift regarding Japanese arms exports since 1983.91

Beyond missile defense, the modification has also made it possible to consider a litany of products designed for use against terrorist attacks. Helmets, body armor, and other forms of personal protective equipment are all viable candidates for government approval. While a case-by-case examination will take place for any proposed export the overall criterion remains vague. In addition to missile defense, Japan is also engaged in joint development with U.S. electronic equipment for patrol aircraft.92

The aforementioned represent the overall intent of the modification. However, the degree of ambiguity in terms of what constitutes an acceptable item sets conditions for considerable controversy. To that end, several countries in the region have expressed interest in buying used naval assets from the Maritime Self-Defense Force or the Japanese Coast Guard. The intended use of these assets would be to prevent terrorist action and piracy in the Straits of Malacca. The challenge of exports such as these is that from the moment the weapon is sold, Japan loses positive control and has relatively

92 Ibid.
limited means to ensure that the exported arms do not fall into the hands of less than reputable states. While some legal assurances can be provided, this is a perpetual risk in entering the arms market.93

(2006) Self Defense Law 82-2: In 2006, a significant milestone was made in regards to the delegation of authority to military commanders. Notably, the air defense command or would be granted the authority to order the launch of interceptors in the event of missile attack. This measure was undertaken to finalize an effective command and structure to support the missile defense system. The Air Defense Commander will also be appointed to the commander of missile defense task forces. In this capacity, he will receive direct support from Japanese naval assets. In the event that the commander is not available, launch authority is deferred to the commanders of Japan’s Aegis destroyers. This is notable in that reflects a significant degree of delegation previously unseen in Japanese forces.94

(2007) Defense Agency Establishment Law: In December 2007, Japan’s Defense Agency was formerly re-designated as a Defense Ministry. As a result, military officials put a much more significant role in Japanese strategic planning. Prior to this change, the Defense Agency was subordinated under the Cabinet office. The security threat presented by North Korea over the past decade has steadily given rise to increased Japanese concerns about defense. Concerns about security steadily elevated the prominence of Japanese defense officials in terms of engaging with the U.S. Department of Defense and negotiating viable security arrangements. As an outcome of its newly elevated position, Japan’s Defense Ministry will be much more heavily involved in policy planning and defense budgeting than previous eras. The failure of previous attempts to upgrade the Defense Agency has been attributed to residual anti-military

94 "ASDF General to have Keys to Interceptors." The Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 May 2005.
sentiment among the Japanese public. This sentiment shifted with North Korea’s 2006 test launches. As a result over 90% of the lawmakers in the Diet backed the promotion of the former Defense Agency.95

(2008) Basic Space Bill: In 2008 Japanese parliament made substantial changes to acceptable uses of space established in 1969. The Basic Space Bill eliminated the long-standing principle of the nonmilitary uses of space and set conditions for the further use of space-based defensive systems, to include spy satellites. The most notable shift is the change from nonmilitary to nonaggression which gives the government much broader leeway in the employment of space-based systems.96

To be sure, with effort and time laws can be changed. However, in the case of Japanese security change has consistently manifested itself as an increase in the relative prominence, capabilities, and latitude of the JSDF. Expressed differently, the direction of security legislation has clearly trended towards a higher degree of freedom in Japanese security actions. Even prior to the advent of missile defense Japan’s security apparatus experience substantial growth. With a missile defense there has been an added impetus to overcome a multitude of restrictive laws and policy. Given that the post-World War II trend has consistently moved towards a normalized Japanese military and that Japan invested a legislative time and effort to enact sweeping changes and defense policy and law is reasonable to conclude that these changes will remain in effect.


C. CONCLUSIONS

Missile defense is far more than “point and shoot.” To make it work, Japan has had to undertake several significant changes to its defense establishment. Collectively, these changes have lent themselves to a burgeoning missile defense capability, but perhaps more importantly they have significantly advanced Japan’s position on the security normalization trend line. These changes have encompassed the elevation of the Japanese Defense Agency to a full ministry, a technical orientation intended to heighten the degree of coordination between the respective services, the repeal of weapons export bans, the launching of satellites, the acquisition of less ambiguous offensive hardware, the delegation of command authority, and a re-v isitation of multilateral security cooperation.

Perhaps most significantly, the majority of the changes to Japanese defense posture have been accompanied by law. While it is possible that some or all of these laws can be changed, this is a time-intensive, laborious, and uncertain process. This would imply that these changes are of an enduring nature. Based on the observations in the preceding chapter, the Japanese government has become quite adept at making defense modifications strictly through reinterpretation. Given that the effort was made to capture this latest round of changes in law it can be inferred that they were intended to be permanent. Further, each of these changes either resides under the missile defense rubric or is directly related to it.

The Japanese peace constitution aspires to the highest ideals and still retains a high degree of public support. Further, the residual animosity in the region stemming from Japan’s wartime atrocities still lingers. As a result, Japanese security issues foment a high degree of domestic debate and regional concern. This chapter has illustrated that the pursuit of missile defense has significantly advanced Japan’s security normalization posture. This observation and these conclusions are also easily reached by Japan’s neighbors. As a state, Japan has every right to arm itself, but to maintain such a capable force and not acknowledge why it may be perceived as threatening does little to invite cordial relations.
IV. PERCEPTIONS AND OBSTACLES

A. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE TREND

The preceding chapters have identified what would seemingly appear to be unstoppable trend towards normalization. This is by no means a certainty. Any action taken to improve Japan’s security posture invariably carries with it both internal and external criticism. Internally, resources committed to defense come at the expense of other programs. Externally, any shift in defense posture alters the military options available to other states. Resistance to change of this type may eventually manifest itself as political action taken either in support of or in opposition to a planned action. As the outcomes of these political actions speak directly to the success of a given security measure, any political action thus warrants careful consideration. Adding to the complexity is that issues are never truly resolved. In this sense, any given military or political action sets conditions for the next round of military and political moves. Moreover, actions taken on one front have the potential to impact on another.

As a case in point, Chinese opposition to Japanese missile defense may manifest itself in various types of economic sanctions and thereby reduce the degree of economic interdependence. Reduction of missile defense may tend to limit the degree of Japanese-U.S. military interaction and weaken the security alliance. A weakened security alliance and a lack of missile defense may serve to embolden North Korea. Succinctly, no action can be taken in isolation. While this hypothetical example has focused on external concerns, the same set of considerations is presented when examining internal pressures. This chapter will examine several of the factors that may serve to impede continued progress toward full security normalization.

1. The Regional Repercussions of U.S. Entanglement

In examining any Japanese alliance with the U.S., the issues surrounding China and Taiwan must also be considered. As a key component of U.S. and Japanese security cooperation is missile defense, another exacerbating factor is put into play. Although it would seem that Japanese missile defense would be viewed as benign in that it does not
present an offensive threat, it is not the case in the view of other regional actors. So, while Japan’s alliance with the U.S. offers some reassurance from attack, it also entwines Japan in a set of broader regional concerns.97

Two of the factors that shape China’s view of security are aggressive Japanese actions prior to and during World War II and the “Taiwan issue.” Regarding the former, there remains an enduring concern about how a re-militarized Japan may behave. Regarding the latter, China views Taiwan as its sovereign territory and takes strong objection to any overtures towards independence and any parties that otherwise support it.98 The nature of these issues shapes a set of Chinese views that, not surprisingly, are concerned with Japan’s security apparatus and alliances.

Expressed differently, U.S. relations with Taiwan limit China’s freedom of action regarding how it behaves towards Taiwan. U.S. relations with Japan have a similar effect which is further exacerbated in the event that Japan is able to maintain an active missile defense. This would serve as a significant counter to one of China’s primary deterrent measures, specifically missile forces. The nature of a security alliance of this type brings to the forefront China’s concerns regarding potential for support for Taiwan’s independence and Japan’s autonomy within the region.99

Accepting China’s concerns over Taiwan and Japan’s history of aggression, a framework has been established to more broadly consider the political consequence of Japan’s security alliance with the U.S. In the event of significant cross-strait tension between China and Taiwan the U.S. would almost certainly request Japanese assistance in establishing missile defense. Were Japan to decline this request, it would invariably have a negative impact on the existing security alliance. In contrast however, if Japan were to support the U.S. request and position its forces to actively defend Taiwan it would be construed by China as a Japanese act of aggression in regards to a sovereign territorial matter and risk escalation.100

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98 Ibid., 52-53.
99 Ibid., 64-69.
100 Ibid., 67-69.
Viewed through this lens, while there are undoubtedly benefits to maintaining a security alliance with the U.S., there are also significant risks. One of the most contentious friction points in the region, Taiwan, has the potential to draw in Japan given that missile defense constitutes a key component of security cooperation between the U.S. and Japan. Any Japanese action taken in support of Taiwan, defensive or otherwise, taps a degree of historical animosity that has never truly subsided. While it is reasonable to assert that access to U.S. military capabilities is to Japan’s benefit, it is also worth noting that an alliance with the U.S. has the potential to heighten the likelihood of conflict.

The high priority Japan places on missile defense is predicated on the potential missile threat present in North Korea and China. Initiatives of this type have produced strong responses from other regional actors. Notwithstanding lingering animosity over past Japanese aggression, other reasons have emerged for actively opposing Japanese missile defense. Notably, China has voiced strong opposition based on the possibility that the missile defense initiative would extend to encompass Taiwan and that it would serve to undermine China’s deterrence capability.\(^{101}\)

China’s concerns carry with them a basis of validity. Many Chinese officials reject the Japanese position that its missile defense is focused towards North Korea, as they view the North Korean threat as being highly exaggerated. In contrast, China tends to view Japanese missile defense as having the potential to protect Taiwan in the event of a direct military confrontation. If missile defense were to be extended to Taiwan, Japan would effectively nullify one of the primary deterrence measures available to China to preclude Taiwanese declarations of independence. China also has a set of secondary concerns in that the transfer of theater missile defense technology to Taiwan may set conditions to integrate it into U.S. led command and control systems. This would constitute an independent and de facto military alliance of sorts, which is precisely the kind of behavior China seeks to preclude from Taiwan.\(^{102}\)

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102 Ibid., 601-605.
The extension of missile defense to include Taiwan is not China’s only concern. China also worries that the modernization of its missile forces would be rendered obsolete in the face of an effective Japanese missile defense. While this may imply that Japan is being targeted by China, this is a highly plausible scenario. In the event of Chinese-American conflict, Japan would almost certainly come under attack. As the Taiwan Relations Act implies U.S. support to Taiwan in the face of Chinese aggression, and as Japan hosts significant numbers of U.S. forces on its territory, it is not improbable to consider a scenario in which Japan would face a missile attack from China due to its military ties with the U.S., regardless of any offensive actions.103

Missile defense for Japan does not necessarily equate to strictly Japanese security. If extended to cover Taiwan, it serves to strengthen Japan’s position as a regional military actor while also undermining what China views to be its sovereign territory. Further, while it is in part the U.S. security alliance that enables a missile defense, it is the U.S. presence in Japan that increases its target potential in the event of Sino-American conflict. Collectively, Japanese missile defense touches upon domestic political issues within China, domestic political issues within Taiwan, regional security issues between Japan and China, the security alliance between the U.S. and Japan, and Japanese domestic politics regarding the presence of U.S. forces.

One of the more vehement detractors of Japan’s missile defense initiatives is China. The essence of their concern stems from the possibility that, if successful, the defensive shield could be extended to cover Taiwan. As China’s missile forces constitute a critical component of their military and could conceivably play a significant role in a forcible seizure of Taiwan, a capability of this type has the potential to limit policy options.104 This position is, of course, predicated on a successful missile defense capability, and given the sheer numbers of Chinese missiles, some doubt its efficacy and thus refute China on this point. As might be expected then, this is not China’s sole objection.

104 Ibid., 600-602.
In a similar vein, China has established its objections on the further basis that its own deterrence capability might be undermined, concerns over the threat of Japanese remilitarization, further strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the potentially negative impact it would have on the global arms control process. Undermining deterrence is not dissimilar from the objections surrounding Taiwan, except with a broader, regional consideration. The other three, however, carry with them some degree of further validity.

In order to achieve the desired missile defense capabilities, Japan has had to reorganize key aspects of its military to respond more quickly and integrate with U.S. command and control systems. Further, Japan has had to acquire assets that, despite a purported defensive role, also carry with them an offensive potential. Collectively, these actions suggest that Japan is taking a step towards re-militarization and is becoming more aligned with the U.S. in the military domain. While not speaking to intent, on the surface this would seem to support China’s interpretation of events.

As to China’s final objection, that missile defense would have a negative impact on the global arms control process, some exploration of the logic is warranted. The potential lethality of a single warhead is such that in order to be successful missile defense has to have a consistently high shoot-down rate. Absent this, even a small percentage of total missiles launched can have disastrous consequences. Therefore, it becomes beneficial to create more missiles as a means to defeat a missile defense system. While certain logic is present in this argument, it seems to speak more to China itself rather than global arms control.

Given the regional focus of Japan’s effort, the only regional actor with sufficient resources to pursue this course of action is China. This has been considered external to China where it has been suggested that missile defense will antagonize China, “whose relatively few nuclear missiles would be rendered impotent were an anti-missile shield ever to work. The mere threat of deployment would therefore encourage China to build

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more missiles, setting off an arms race in Asia, and this will play into the hands of those within Beijing’s leadership that are looking for an American enemy’ to solidify their own domestic political positions on the basis of uncompromising nationalism.”

This ultimately leads to a single point: China does not approve of Japan’s missile defense efforts. This invites the question of what actions, if any, will China take to impede Japan’s efforts. At this point, the answer seems to be very little. Other than expressing their concerns, China and Japan continue their economic engagement and while China’s military modernization efforts remain underway, they have been underway for quite some time. Over the longer term, as missile defense capabilities mature, this may become more of a concern. For the interim, it seems to be a recurring catalyst for arms control debates and a reasonable Japanese rationale for taking a more cautious approach towards continued normalization activities.

These concerns may serve to slow the trend, but certainly no more than Japanese domestic politics. While international concerns may inform the decision on security normalization, it is ultimately grounded in what is politically viable to the Japanese polity. Further, given the volume of missiles possessed by China and the aggressive tendencies of North Korea, Japan has adopted a very pragmatic approach towards defending itself should the need arise. Given the nature of this potential threat, missile defense is the required counter. The only state with the technology and resources to assist in this development is the U.S. Although there are some associated risks in such alignment, these invariably have to be weighed against the aforementioned regional factors. Expressed differently, the risks associated with two neighbors each possessing a credible missile forces have to be weighed against those of taking no defensive action and basing national security on the generosity of others. In this instance, missile defense was determined to be preferable and the security trend line was advanced.

2. Internal Political Economy

Not all considerations regarding security are external. In a post-World War II environment, the concept of militarization quickly evolved into a highly politicized issue within Japan. Following World War II, Japan adopted the Yoshida Doctrine which served as the basis for much of Japan’s subsequent foreign-policy. This approach relies primarily on the U.S. for defense and focused on rapid economic growth in order to reintegrate Japan into the international community. Over the next five decades, Japan steadily became portrayed as a “free rider”, as it bore little of its security costs. During the first Gulf War this came to a head as Japan provided financial support rather than troops. This type of checkbook diplomacy drew significant criticism and prompted a significant reevaluation of the Japanese approach toward security.

The first Gulf War had a significant impact on the politics of Japan. This event brought to light questions of constitutional interpretation, approaches to Japanese–U.S. relations, and the need to better define the position of the self-defense forces. The most significant, however, were the debates regarding the Constitution? Changes to the constitution invariably speak to the basic principles of political structure, which in turn has the potential to introduce sweeping change into a state. While this issue was prominent during the 1950s, for the next five decades economic development and sustained economic growth tended to dominate the political agenda. 108 Following the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new conflict in the Middle East questions were again asked.

For those opposing the fundamental principles of the existing system the basis for dissent stems from the means by which the Japanese constitution was adopted. While it is comprised primarily of the standard features of Western democracy, it contains two very unique provisions. The first is the symbolic role of the emperor and the second is a renunciation of war. Although this was notionally a revision of the Meiji Constitution

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and with the broad support of the Japanese people, opposition parties hold that the constitution was in fact forced upon Japan by the Allied powers and thus question its legality.  

The conservative powers that originally pursued this agenda did so without coming to terms with a consequence of prewar militarism. As they pursued revision to Article 9, which renounces the use of force, they also sought to transform the emperor from a figurehead to a sovereign ruler. As Article 1 of the Constitution asserts that the position of the emperor is derived from the will of the people, this type of sweeping change ran directly counter to the basic principle of the system, specifically popular sovereignty. In this regard the issue of Japanese rearmament became closely linked to the larger principles of the political system.

Throughout the 1950s, fears of being en broiled in U.S.-Soviet armed conflict resulted in a strong peace movement which staunchly advocated neutrality. Further, by the time of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1960, the Japanese peace movement had sufficiently broad appeal to force the withdrawal of the Kishi government. Kishi’s successor, Ikeda Hayato, was a bit more attuned to the times. He tended to steer away from larger constitutional issues and focus on rapid economic growth. Ikeda limited the constitutional controversy by simply asserting that it was acceptable for Japan to possess a minimal force necessary for defense. Moreover, by allowing the U.S. to burden security costs, Japan was free to focus its national income on economic development.

As the Japanese economy grew, the U.S. began to more closely consider the expansion of Japan’s organic defenses. To counter this, Japan would occasionally invoke Article 9 as a political tool to minimize defense spending. This resulted in a mainstream policy “of light armaments plus rapid economic development.” This continued until the oil crises of the 1970s prompted the U.S. to consider its own security strategy. To this end, the U.S. effectively increased the pressure on Japan to increase its share of the defense burden. Under the Nakasone government in the 1980s, defense spending

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110 Ibid., 158.

111 Ibid., 159.
increased significantly, implying that Japan had turned a corner in which the preservation of good relations with the U.S. were more important than a strict interpretation of the Japanese Constitution. Of note, the actions taken during this era were done within the bounds of the constitution and effectively de-linked from the more contentious issue of the overall political structure.

Japanese defense spending continued to increase throughout the 1980s, eventually reaching a point where its military expenditures were third largest in the world. Constitutionality was preserved by characterizing all forces as purely defensive. So while Japanese forces were significantly increased, the debates surrounding the self-defense forces and the constitution remained generally untouched. A re-visitation of the issue was forced by the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

The end of the Cold War dramatically altered the underpinnings of U.S.-Japanese security. Further, the outbreak of the Gulf War clearly illustrated that regional disputes were far from over. The constitution was ill-suited to address what actions Japan should take to contribute to the preservation of international society given the presence of an aggressor. The government chose to stress the universal ideals implicit within Article 9, specifically “an international peace based on justice and order” and sought to deploy self-defense forces abroad. In this regard, the Japanese government found its justification within the language of the constitution rather than dramatically altering it.

In practice, this interpretation drew harsh criticism from Japanese opposition as they viewed deployment of forces as unconstitutional. Further, the legislation allowing for the deployment of forces was introduced at a point in time where the opposition comprised the majority in the upper house, significantly reducing the possibility that the bill would be passed without significant compromise. As the Japanese political drama unfolded, the Gulf War began and quickly ended. The swift conclusion of the war

113 Ibid., 163-164.
114 Ibid., 164-166.
ameliorated much of the discussion regarding the use of self defense assets in the region. Following the close of hostilities, Japan was able to deploy minesweepers to the Middle East on the basis that minesweeping was a peaceful activity. In this regard, there was some modest expansion of the role of Japanese forces, but largely after the fact and in a much less controversial role.

In contrast, following the events of 11 September 2001, Japan quickly employed non-combat forces in support of operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. One of the primary drivers behind this change was Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro. From 2001 to 2006 he significantly altered Japanese foreign policy and displayed a significantly less recalcitrant attitude regarding the events of World War II than did his predecessors. In addition to the dispatching of troops abroad, during his tenure, the U.S. and Japan completed a defense policy review initiative to strengthen the bilateral alliance, Japan assumed a more assertive role in regards to North Korean missile testing and abduction of Japanese citizens, and much to the chagrin of neighboring countries Koizumi made a highly publicized visit to the Yasukuni Shrine commemorating Japanese war dead. These unprecedented actions represent a significant domestic transformation in addressing security issues through the Japanese political system.

Prior to Koizumi becoming prime minister, the position had significantly limited power. The long dominant Liberal Democratic Party was characterized by a significant number of factions. Thus, any potential prime minister had to develop coalitions in order to come to power. In order to achieve this, many political concessions had to be made which diluted the power one might expect to find in the office of the prime minister. In addition to concessions of this type, the Japanese political apparatus also maintains the

117 Ibid., 157–160.
118 Ibid., 158.
zoku, which serves as a filtering mechanism prior to policy reaching the cabinet. In this regard, the zoku wields significant power in that they can modulate what policies are presented.

Given this set of circumstance, it is difficult to envision a singular leader achieving the relative prominence that Koizumi enjoyed. However, prior to Koizumi coming to power, electoral reform dissipated some of the factional power. Further, mass media became more prominent in crafting a personal image allowing for individuals to achieve greater popularity among voters. Koizumi would deftly manage these resources to his advantage. His position was significantly strengthened as an outcome of postal reform initiatives, which collectively encompassed not only mail, but also banking and insurance. As his reforms were stalled by the zoku, Koizumi capitalized on the use of media, public support for the issue and swift political action to effectively oust opposition and centralize the party. In doing so, the power of the zoku was diminished and the party gained significant unity. This combination and sequence of political action not only cemented Koizumi’s domestic popularity, but also set conditions for much greater political autonomy.

In the context of security, these political actions have significant ramifications. In order for substantive change to be made in security policy, some mechanism for breaking through the political gridlock has to occur. The actions of Koizumi did precisely this and set conditions for subsequent security changes. Koizumi’s penchant for swift and bold policy making based on the support of both the public and the party enabled a range of options that his successors simply did not enjoy. The actions taken during his tenure clearly reflect a distinct transformation in Japanese foreign policy.

Immediately following the events of 11 September, the Japanese Diet passed an Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law which dispatched self-defense forces to the Indian Ocean in support of coalition operations in Afghanistan. The speed with which this law was enacted is unprecedented in recent Japanese history. Whereas previous security

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120 Ibid: 159-161.
legislation required months of deliberation, this law was passed within four weeks. On
the basis of this law, Japan would proceed to dispatch forces in support of non-combat
operations in Iraq.\textsuperscript{121}

Koizumi’s actions did not stop there. He made two visits to North Korea in order
to seek resolution on the issue of abduction of Japanese citizens and contribute to the
resolution of the North Korean nuclear armament. Further, he was actively engaged in
the realignment of U.S. bases in Japan, fostered political debate regarding Article 9 of the
Japanese constitution, and committed Japan to the pursuit of ballistic missile defense.\textsuperscript{122}
The introduction of the latter brought about significant changes in the composition and

In order to achieve the technically challenging objective of missile defense,
significant military capabilities would be required. Given the complexity of the system,
an extensive command-and-control apparatus would need to be developed. This
prompted a need for a restructuring and increased emphasis on joint capabilities within
Japan’s Self Defense Force. The nature of these changes also included the introduction
of legislation to more specifically address civilian control over the military. These
changes were significant in that for the first time since World War II, both the Prime
Minister and military commanders have been afforded the latitude to make real-time
military decisions without the oversight of the cabinet and the Diet.\textsuperscript{123}

Taken collectively, it is difficult to envision such a substantial shift in Japanese
security policy absent the actions of Prime Minister Koizumi. Notwithstanding historical
animosity and the constitutional issues surrounding the Japanese use of force, his political
acumen and judgment enabled him to maneuver through significant impediments and
facilitate change on a scale not often seen in Japanese politics, particularly in matters of
national security. While this is an impressive political feat, it should be noted that these
actions did not garner unanimous support and continue to face opposition from numerous
fronts.

\textsuperscript{121} Christopher W. Hughes and Ellis S. Krauss. “Japan’s New Security Agenda.” \textit{Survival: Global
Politics and Strategy} 49, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 161-162.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 161-162.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
While there are numerous obstacles to current Japanese security initiatives, the domestic challenges tend to center on the issues of defense spending, legal barriers, and public acceptance. The issue of defense spending is a challenge faced by all states. As Japan limits defense spending at 1% of its gross domestic product, a significant portion will invariably be tied to missile defense. This in turn limits the amount of money that can be committed to other defense initiatives, specifically the expansion of the SDF on other fronts. Additional financial considerations come into play as Japan has agreed to provide approximately $6 billion to facilitate the transfer of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam.\(^{124}\) Given these defense commitments and financial limitations, Japan has assumed a path characterized by high technical risk along a single threat axis, specifically missile defense. The investment in missile defense precludes its capacity for developments on other fronts. The intuitive means of addressing a broader range of operations invariably entail additional defense spending, which comes at the expense of other government initiatives.

The legal framework for defense actions is also under constant scrutiny. As recently as 2005, the Japanese government interpreted that “the use of armed force is permissible as a means to exercise the right of self-defense under Article 9 of the Constitution only when there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan; there is no appropriate means to deal with such an act of aggression other than by resorting to the right of self-defense; and the use of armed strength is confined to the minimum necessary level.”\(^{125}\) This interpretation significantly limits Japanese participation in any capacity and in some instances creates an additional burden for the forces of other states. As a case in point, Japanese forces engaged in reconstruction efforts in Iraq had to be provided security by Australian forces. This set of conditions limits the conditions in which Japanese forces may be employed to such a degree that their participation may not be welcome.\(^{126}\)


\(^{125}\) Ibid., 144-145.

\(^{126}\) Ibid.
Also lacking in regard to security is clear public consensus. While a slim majority favor constitutional revision, of those that do 70% hold that the constitution should clarify the existence of the SDF. Nearly half of the respondents hold that the constitution cannot adequately address new issues, 27% view that more explicit language is required to address collective self-defense, 23% hold that the existing language is sufficient, and 44% are of the opinion that government policy towards collective defense should not change.127 These somewhat ambiguous results tend to reflect a very diverse set of public opinions. While constitutional revision could clarify both the mission of the SDF and Japanese security policy, dramatic changes to Japan’s pacifist tradition also introduces the risk of public outcry and damage regional perceptions of Japan, both of which constitute political risk.

Japanese security, to include missile defense, is a politically charged arena. While polling data indicates a desire for security, popular support for the peace constitution tends to stall aggressive advances in security measures. Further, the most recent Prime Minister did not pursue as aggressive of a security agenda as his predecessors. Absent this top level advocacy, itself a partial reflection of public opinion, it is not likely that the next decade will see the degree of normalization progress made during Koizumi’s tenure. However, while the trend may slow, it is not likely that it will reverse. The pursuit of missile defense speaks directly to public concerns over North Korea, and therefore presents little political liability increasing the potential for program success. As long as this initiative continues, the attendant features identified in the previous chapter will remain in place as a matter of necessity. Subsequent systemic shocks, such as a dynamic political leader with an aggressive defense agenda, sustained aggressive behavior by North Korea, or focused pursuit of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, would each have the potential to advance the trend line further.

3. Technical Risk

The discussion thus far has centered on the various political elements of the missile defense initiative while ignoring the underlying technical feasibility. The development of “high tech, low density” systems are expensive, risky, and require a sustained commitment. Given this set of circumstances, Japan has invested heavily in an initiative that may or may not achieve all its purported objectives. As a result, the technical feasibility of missile defense systems and the type of architecture required to adequately meet the conceivable missiles threats confronting Japan remain a subject of considerable debate.\textsuperscript{128}

There is also a secondary consequence associated with technical risk, specifically the costs associated with mitigation. As missile defense is absorbing a disproportionate amount of the Japanese defense budget, other initiatives suffer. Collectively, the high cost of missile defense and the cap of 1% defense spending significantly constrain Japan’s investment options.\textsuperscript{129} This has a significant impact on Japan’s army and navy as the cabinet significantly cut account levels in order to afford missile defense.\textsuperscript{130}

The changes have begun to manifest themselves in several ways. The Maritime Self Defense Forces has had to reprioritize operations and cut its numbers of escort ships and fixed wing aircraft. The Air Self Defense Force’s acquisition of the PAC-3 missile defense system has come at the expense of reducing its numbers of tactical interceptor aircraft. The Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF) procurements will have also been cut at a time where it is facing increased pressure to restructure to deal with low intensity


threats such as insurgency and terrorism. This collectively reinforces the single point that Japan has invested heavily in something that may not work well at the direct expense of other security priorities.

While this impediment has been heavily voiced by those opposed to missile defense, there are a few key elements that stand to refute it. The first is that the technical hurdles have steadily been overcome, culminating in a well publicized test event in which Japanese naval assets were able to successfully shoot down a missile in flight. Further, although Japan’s procurement of missile defense is coming at the expense of other programs, the sunk cost already invested is of such magnitude that cancelling the program would require a significant reversal of course. Given the promising test results to date, as well as the potential for future profit given the partial repeal of the export ban, there are sufficient reasons to suggest that this perceived barrier is steadily becoming less relevant.

B. CONCLUSIONS

The progress that Japan has made in regards to its security initiatives is not a guarantor of further advancements. There are several attendant risks surrounding missile-defense, any one of which could prompt a re-v isitation of the program. Further, there is significant amount of public support for the peace constitution that present a domestic political concern for elected officials. While Prime Minister Koizumi was able to a rush through security advances with relative ease, his short-lived successor Shinzo Abe did not occupy office long enough to continue this agenda. The most recent administration, under Prime Minister Fukuda, has tended to favor a more conservative approach in security matters, opting to maintain the status quo rather than proceed with modifications to the Constitution. Considered collectively, however, there are equally compelling circumstances under which the trend line could advance. What can be treated for fact, however, is that the initiatives undertaken in conjunction with missile defense remain unchanged, are grounded in legal revisions, and show no signs of receding.

V. CONCLUSIONS

A. CONSIDERING THE TREND

1. Assessing the Trend

The preceding chapters have identified key events in the evolution of Japan’s Self Defense Forces (JSDF) with the intent of illustrating that a trend towards normalization exists and that missile defense initiative has contributed significantly toward its advancement. While these events have been identified, they have not been placed in a context that clearly illustrates the relative degree to which missile defense has impacted Japanese defense. In order to better assess these impacts, the following methodology has been developed using the event characterizations of force expansion, organizational shift, capability increases, statutory milestones, and forward deployments. Each of these events is assigned an associated weighting value reflecting the degree to which they have lent themselves to the advancement of the normalization trend. Specific milestones falling into these aggregations are subsequently evaluated in terms of individual significance and then plotted in time. The end result is a normalization trend line that graphically portrays a steady advancement in Japan’s defense posture.

To be sure, this reflects one of many possible ways to consider Japanese security. The intent in employing this assessment mechanism is not to provide an incontrovertible framework from which all security evolutions can be considered, but rather to capture a distinct subset of events relevant to Japan and introduce additional context from which more informed conclusions can be reached. Certainly additional aggregations could be employed to capture a broader range of event types, greater fidelity could be applied to the weighting and ranking structure, and events that have stalled or retarded the trend could also be considered. However, for the purpose of illustrating a normalization trend and that missile defense has advanced it, a top level characterization is sufficient. The following tables provide a more detailed breakout of the event aggregations and events identified for inclusion in the trend line.
Type Event | Rationale for Event Inclusion | Weighting Factor (0 - 1) | Rationale for Weighting
--- | --- | --- | ---
Force Expansion/Reduction | A commonly used metric for comparing the military forces of respective states is their size. While this does not account for any technological asymmetry that may exist, it does reflect the degree of manpower commitment that a given state has made to its defense establishment. | 0.5 | Shifts in manpower commitments equate directly to enlarging or reducing a force. Force ratios can, however, be overcome through technological advantage. For this reason, it is weighted at the median.
Significant Capability Increases | Similar to force expansion, the introduction of new capabilities generates options that would not otherwise be available. Further, a state’s decision to invest significant amounts of capital in a given direction can be considered as an indicator of its defense priorities. | 0.7 | Technology often enables a relatively smaller force to achieve greater effects with less manpower. Given the premium that Japan has placed on incorporating advanced technology in its forces, it is weighted higher than the median.
Organizational Shift | Shifts in organizational structure tend to reflect a shift in organizational focus. As this can be interpreted as a necessary precursor to redefining the perceived function of the organization, they warrant consideration. | 0.6 | The manner in which a force is organized is a significant factor in harnessing the potential of its manpower and capabilities. Given the synergy that organizational structure can enable, it is weighted slightly higher than the median.
Statutory Milestone | Establishing shifts in defense policy as a matter of law reflects a degree of formality, state legitimacy, and permanence. Legislation regarding military matters tend to reflect how a state views military roles and functions, thus warranting consideration. | 0.8 | Defense law reflects a significantly higher degree of state commitment to a course of action than a ministry policy or generally accepted practice. With such commitment, it becomes possible to impact force size, capability, and deployment. Given the broader impacts of legislation, it is weighted substantially higher than the median.
Forward Deployment | The deployment of forces indicates a state’s willingness to employ its military and either project power abroad or intervene in regional crises. This aspect of willingness speaks to the overall credibility of the force and bears consideration. | 0.4 | In the case of Japan, individual force deployments tend to be smaller in scope, occasionally a response to external pressure, and under the auspices of the UN. This is considerably different than large scale unilateral military action and is weighted lower than the median.

Figure 11. Security Event Aggregations and Weighting

Figure (8) establishes the baseline for general evaluation. Figures (9) through (11) will identify significant events occurring under these aggregations. Each event will be assigned a numeric value based on its relative significance. Again, there is an admittedly subjective quality to the scoring mechanism as a matter of necessity. As a

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crude case in point, a decision to increase force structure by 10,000 or by 100,000 both reflect force expansion, but quite clearly of a different scale. While numeric examples are fairly intuitive, less clear examples are found in legislation. To clarify, a law passed with the express purpose of permitting a single deployment, while relevant in trend mapping, has a less far reaching and enduring impact than a decision to permit the military uses of space. While both statutory milestones, they require additional context which for the purposes of this thesis will be found by assigning a quantitative value to each event.

To be sure, both the identification of key events and the respective values assigned could easily be contested on an individual basis. The intent, however, is not to create an incontrovertible value ranking of the evolution of the JSDF, but rather to identify sufficient data points to allow for a more empirical interpretation of the trend. While each event and value could be debated, what quickly becomes apparent is that the overall trend of the JSDF is one of advancement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Event Type</th>
<th>Weighting Factor</th>
<th>Magnitude of Event (1 - 5)</th>
<th>Event Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Establishment of National Police Reserve authorized</td>
<td>Force Expansion</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>National Police Reserve Ordinance promulgated</td>
<td>Statutory Milestone</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Maritime Guard established within Japanese Coast Guard</td>
<td>Force Expansion</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Defense Agency Establishment Law promulgated</td>
<td>Statutory Milestone</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Self Defense Forces Law Promulgated</td>
<td>Statutory Milestone</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>First domestically produced F-86 fighter delivered</td>
<td>Organizational Shift</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>First Defense Build-up Plan adopted</td>
<td>Capability Increase</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>ASDF begins measures to protect territorial airspace</td>
<td>Statutory Milestone</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 12.** Security Event Ranking: 1950 – 1960 (From: 132)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Event Type</th>
<th>Weighting Factor</th>
<th>Magnitude of Event (1 - 5)</th>
<th>Event Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Second Defense Build-up Plan adopted</td>
<td>Statutory Milestone</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Defense Facilities Administration Agency established</td>
<td>Organizational Shift</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Icebreaker Fuji dispatched to assist Antarctic observation</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Third Defense Build-up Plan adopted</td>
<td>Statutory Milestone</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Domestic production of F-4E approved</td>
<td>Capability Increase</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aggregate Score: 1960 - 1970</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>12.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Fourth Defense Build-up Plan adopted</td>
<td>Statutory Milestone</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>ASDF air defense mission on Okinawa commences</td>
<td>Capability Increase</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Introduction of F-15 and P-3s approved</td>
<td>Capability Increase</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>First ASDF/USAF joint training exercises</td>
<td>Capability Increase</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Introduction of E-2C approved</td>
<td>Capability Increase</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aggregate Score: 1970 - 1980</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>14.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>MSDF/USN joint exercises</td>
<td>Capability Increase</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>GSDF/US joint communications exercise</td>
<td>Capability Increase</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>US/Japan combined command post exercise</td>
<td>Capability Increase</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Transfer of military technology to US initiated</td>
<td>Statutory Milestone</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Security Council Establishment Law enacted</td>
<td>Statutory Milestone</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Initial development of FS-X in conjunction with US</td>
<td>Capability Increase</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aggregate Score: 1980 - 1990</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>14.8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Deployment of MSDF vessels to the Persian Gulf</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>JSDF personnel assist in inspections of Iraqi chemical weapons</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>JSDF units deployed to Cambodia in support of UN operations</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>JSDF personnel deployed to Zaire to assist Rwandan refugees</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>JSDF support to UN observer force</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Establishment of Defense Intelligence Headquarters</td>
<td>Capability Increase</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Establishment of JSDF ready reserve</td>
<td>Force Expansion</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>JSDF deployed to Honduras to support disaster relief</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>First JSDF joint exercise</td>
<td>Capability Increase</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Japan - US cooperative research on missile defense approved</td>
<td>Capability Increase</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>JSDF personnel deployed to Turkey for disaster relief</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>JSDF personnel deployed to Indonesia for refugee support</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aggregate Score: 1990 - 2000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>20.6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 13. Security Event Ranking: 1960 – 2000 (From: 132)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Event Type</th>
<th>Weighting Factor</th>
<th>Magnitude of Event (1 - 5)</th>
<th>Event Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>JSDF personnel deployed to India for disaster relief</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>JSDF personnel deployed to UNMOVIC</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law promulgated</td>
<td>Statutory Milestone</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Self-Defense Forces Law promulgated</td>
<td>Statutory Milestone</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>MSDF vessels begin &quot;cooperation and support&quot; activities with US in the Indian Ocean</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>MSDF vessels begin information gathering operations in the Indian Ocean</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>MSDF vessels begin &quot;cooperation and support&quot; activities with UK in the Indian Ocean</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>JSDF personnel deployed to East Timor</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>JSDF research group deployed to Iraq</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Government introduces ballistic missile defense system</td>
<td>Statutory Milestone</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>JSDF personnel deployed to Kuwait</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>JSDF advance team deployed to Iraq</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>JSDF deployed to Thailand to assist in disaster relief</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>JSDF deployed to Indonesia to assist in disaster relief</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>JSDF deployed to Pakistan to assist in disaster relief</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Security Council approves joint US development of interceptor missiles</td>
<td>Statutory Milestone</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>JSDF deployed to Golan Heights</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Defense Agency Establishment law is modified to allow for destruction of ballistic missiles</td>
<td>Statutory Milestone</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>JSDF deployed to Indonesia to assist in disaster relief</td>
<td>Forward Deployment</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Defense Agency transitioned to Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>Organizational Shift</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Aggregate Score: 2000 - present** 38.6

Figure 14. Security Event Ranking: 2000 – present (From: 132)
2. Plotting the Trend

The preceding sections have introduced a methodology for assessing key milestones in the evolution of Japanese security and have identified significant events over the past sixty years. When placed in the context of relative time and magnitude, the trend becomes more readily apparent. The following figures illustrate how the normalization trend line has advanced over time based on the data points introduced in the preceding section:

![Security Normalization Trendline](image)

Figure 15. Security Normalization Trendline
What becomes readily apparent after even a cursory examination of the tables is that following the initial spike attributable to the introduction of the JSDF precursor organizations and legislation in the 1950s, there was a significant lull in activity followed by a steady increase through the 1980s and a marked increase from the 1990s and beyond. Notably, the data is arranged relative to time in order to frame the degree of advancement in a given context. In practice, however, the events tend to be cumulative. Expressed differently, the security gains achieved in the 1960s could justifiably be added to those of the 1950s. Even though progress varies between decades, it is consistently advancing.

3. **Forecasting the Trend**

The preceding section has provided a graphic depiction of the Japanese security trend to date, begging the question of what will occur next. The future cannot be predicted with high reliability, but based on what has occurred to date and what would ostensibly be required to further advance the trend some reasonable assumptions can be made. The following are facets of what a continuation of the normalization trend line
may entail and the conditions that may precede their adoption. Note that in some instances, these advancements may be exclusive of missile defense and represent other facets of the normalization trend.

a) “Routine” force deployments: while Japan maintains a considerable deployed footprint in support of UN operations, each evolution is considered separately and requires its own legislation. Given the regularity with which Japan has committed forces to UN operations since the early 1990s, it is reasonable to expect some type of blanket legislation allowing for forces to be deployed as a matter of course rather than by exception. Legislation such as this has been discussed previously and has a reasonably high probability of being adopted within the next decade simply because it eliminates debate over what has become a generally foregone conclusion.

Note that this is not linked to missile defense per se. The motivator for such an action is most probably found in Japan’s desire to shed its “free-rider” image and strengthen its position in regards to the UN Security Council. Notably, the latter would bolster Japan’s position in regards to championing missile defense efforts thus adding justification to its recent actions and potentially setting conditions for the future sale of missile defense technology.

b) Increased arms exports: by positioning itself as a strong U.S. partner in the development of missile defense systems, Japan is positioned to become a world leader in this niche security industry. Given the ostensibly defensive nature of the system, the partial repeals on weapons export currently enacted, and the financial incentives to spread the costs of the defense industry by gaining larger economies of scale it is not unreasonable to expect that Japan will both sell more weapons and modify legislation to make it easier. The
conditions under which this is likely to occur are characterized by continued successful testing of Japanese missile defense and increased proliferation of missiles.

One of the fundamental motivations for Japan’s partial repeal of the export ban was to spread load development costs of missile defense. Clearly, the more costs are spread, the more cost effective the system. Having already taken the stance that missile defense is “purely” defensive in nature, there is an embedded justification for the sale of missile defense technology to other parties. Given the combined factors of missile proliferation, improved missile defense technology, and Japan’s relative positioning as an industry leader, within the decade more substantial exports of Japanese weapons technology can be expected.

c) **Proportionately increased defense spending**: in recent times, Japan has made a concerted effort to limit defense spending to 1% of the GNP. While this has generally been met, it is not inviolate. As modern defense systems generally involve high technology and a commensurately high risk, costs can easily mount. Considered in this context, the primary factor driving the need for a larger defense budget is the cost of missile defense. For Japan to remain at the forefront of increasingly prolific defense technology, it can be expected to both partner in defense development as well as commit additional funds as required. In practice, this has very likely occurred but under the auspices of separate budget authority. So, while defense spending may be restricted to the 1% cap, the Ministry of Defense may reap the benefits of funds allocated to the Space Agency or Coast Guard. This is not an uncommon practice for any government, and the lines blur even further given the fungible nature of technologic breakthroughs.

In all likelihood, efforts will continue to keep defense spending beneath the limit but there are conditions under which this could change. By investing
heavily in missile defense, Japan has less working capital to support the operations and maintenance of the JSDF. However, it is necessary for Japan to sustain the existing force to support current UN commitments and better position itself for a seat on the UN Security Council. Given the relative prestige and comparative power of this position, it is not unreasonable to expect Japan to increase proportional defense spending as required to remain a viable candidate. Given the ever growing crisis locations, this change could also be expected within a decade.

d) Shifts to offensive doctrine: the challenge of a defensive force is that it has to absorb the first blow. This is particularly problematic when the lethality of the first strike is sufficiently overwhelming to preclude retaliation. While existing Japanese security policy speaks to both prevention and preemption, what is necessary to make such policy effective is a capacity to deliver the first blow. While the hardware within the Japanese arsenal has the potential, the accompanying doctrine tends to be defensive in tone. In an era where offensive and defensive characterization of a weapons system is increasingly less meaningful, the advantage is gained in how it is used. Given the limited utility of a defensive characterization and a steady increase in multi-national exercises with the U.S. in support of missile defense, it is not unreasonable to expect a Japanese shift to a more offensive doctrine, beginning with the ASDF and steadily permeating the broader force.

Missile defense is again a factor in this scenario. The ideal of preemption was introduced as part of the fundamental premise that missiles are easiest to destroy before they leave the ground. To accomplish that, tactics need to be modified to allow for the surreptitious entry of forces, typically aircraft, through threat defenses and fire before being fired upon. This is a marked departure from the tactics associated with a defensive combat air patrol, and a favorable option for effective missile defense.
e) **Constitutional modification**: this is ostensibly the pinnacle of Japanese security normalization. By modifying the constitution to accept that the use of force is sometimes necessary would be a clear domestic and international signal that Japan has taken a major step towards normalization. Given the popular appeal of the “peace constitution,” this is unlikely to occur without some type of exogenous shock and cannot readily be placed on a timeline. Were another Koizumi-like Prime Minister to emerge it is possible that this threshold could be crossed. The condition under which this becomes more probable, though, is a North Korean act of aggression, intentional or otherwise. Should a North Korean missile test fall short and strike Japan, public sentiment would presumable turn more hawkish and more critical of the government’s failure to protect its citizenry. This would reduce the political liability of advocating constitutional change, and potentially increase the likelihood of enacting it. Note that while this is not envisioned as an outgrowth of missile defense, per se, it is a potential outcome of the missile threat.

f) **Employment of military forces in support of national objectives**: the employment of Japanese military force to secure a national objective would be a clear indicator of normalization regardless of constitutional debate. To be sure, this is not a probable event, but as an island nation with limited natural resources, to include high energy dependencies, there are conceivably conditions in which Japan would be tempted to employ its military. Conceptually, these conditions include territorial disputes, preemption against North Korea, freedom of navigation, and access to oil reserves in Central Asia. The main point, however, is that should Japan use its military in such a capacity, it will have advanced the normalization trend. This scenario does
reside outside the missile defense rubric, as it envisions the use of force to seize an objective of some type rather than preclude or prevent damage to Japan itself.

The preceding paragraphs have identified events that would advance the security normalization trend line established throughout this thesis. While some events are more probable than others, they share a common thread in that any one of them constitutes a change from the status quo. Japan has come to realize that modern security cannot be achieved through the methods of the previous generation, and has steadily adapted to this reality. However, these changes do not occur in isolation. As Japan modifies its security posture, there are also ramifications for the U.S.

B. U.S. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Japan’s current security situation is evolving. Over the past few years adaptations have occurred that would have been unthinkable in the early 1950s. As Japan maps out its future security apparatus, the U.S. is also affected. The resultant question becomes one of how the U.S. should engage Japan relative to its own interests. The following are policy recommendations that consider Japanese security in the context of U.S. concerns.

1. Sustained Pursuit of Japanese Constitutional Revision

The U.S. is investing a considerable amount of time and effort assisting Japan develop a missile defense capability. Further, while not as pronounced as the very proximal threat that North Korea presents to Japan, the U.S. also has missile vulnerabilities. Given the ranges and trajectories that may be involved with a potential missile attack against the U.S., there exists a very real possibility that Japan may be best positioned to destroy the missile. Under the current interpretation of the Constitution Japan would not legally be bound to do so. This presents itself as a largely one-sided arrangement which does not best represent U.S. interests.

The impediment at this point is Japan’s interpretation of the Constitution. As this interpretation is the impediment to enhance missile security for the U.S., it stands to reason that the U.S. should take some action to facilitate Japanese changes to either the
interpretation or to the Constitution itself. This is perhaps best achieved through sustained and gentle coercion, as a more direct approach may prompt much stauncher nationalism and defeat the overall purpose. While this approach to be a very intrusive means of achieving U.S. interests, it is a far more palatable option than not addressing an issue at the heart of a security matter.

Japan ultimately has to consider two political scenarios. The first is one in which domestic political concerns preclude constitutional change. Advocates for said change place at risk their political careers and are otherwise unsuccessful in ushering in a modified constitution. The second is the international political consequence of willfully allowing a missile to strike the U.S. despite having had the capability to stop it. While both of these are unattractive propositions, the latter impacts far more than careers. A scenario such as this, if widely known, could reasonably be expected to prompt a scathing rebuke from the broader U.S. population. In this context, a new set of U.S. domestic pressures emerge that can reasonably be expected to have a severe and immediate adverse impact on Japanese relations.

2. Inextricable System Linkages and Redundancy

The preceding section addressed an element of legality, but there are alternative means to address the challenge. Accepting that the current interpretation of the Japanese Constitution would preclude assisting the U.S. in the event of a missile attack another way of solving the problem would be through engineering the missile defense system such that the sensors are so inextricably linked all parties share a common picture. With sufficient advance warning and characterization of the trajectory the legally acceptable firing unit could be notified without prompting undue legal drama.

While the sharing of sensor information could itself be interpreted as an encroachment upon the Japanese constitution, it is more practically a systemic feature and limitation. This could be construed as a feature in that for Japan’s own security to be achieved it derives very direct benefit from U.S. sensors. The operating picture cannot be complete unless reciprocating data from Japan’s own sensors are provided and correlated.
For the practical matter of tracking and shooting, this is a positive attribute. From the matter of constitutional interpretation, it is a limitation.

What this suggests is that an alternative way for the U.S. to derive benefit from Japanese elements of missile defense is to engineer it in such a manner that the benefits are transparent. While this has a tinge of subterfuge about it, it is practical and arguably far less intrusive than advocating for Japan to change its constitution.

3. Press for Overt Normalization

The preceding sections have considered possible options for the U.S. to extract greater benefit from Japan’s missile defense assets. Notably, the proposed U.S. advocacy of constitutional modification was restricted to the very narrow confines of missile defense. While this would offer benefit to the U.S., it fails to address a more overt Japanese declaration of normalization. One of the fundamental issues surrounding Japan’s current security ideology is that it is asked despite its transparency. As contradictory as this may sound, it captures the irony of a state that is constitutionally prohibited from having a military maintaining one of the world’s most technologically advanced military forces. The issue is the consequence that is associated with this irony.

To frame this a little bit more broadly, consider one possible interpretation of the existence of the JSDF. A state that is constitutionally prohibited from maintaining a military develops a national police reserve originally trained by the U.S. Army. Over the years it comes to be equipped with tanks and armored personnel carriers and artillery. The maritime and air forces are among the best equipped and trained in the world. The defense budget is consistently among the top five in the world. While Japan is very open about what is procuring it has closed its eyes to the perception that accompanies the existence of such a formidable military capability.

By continually asserting the defensive nature of the JSDF, Japan simply draws attention to its offensive potential. This mask of defense introduces a degree of ambiguity that is otherwise inconsistent and appears to be a ladder of escalation. By asserting that it has become a normalized state that fully asserts the right of war far lesser ambiguous signals can be sent and a far clearer interpretation of Japan’s planned use of
force under certain circumstance can be provided. The existing circumstance in which Japan’s military behaves much like a normal military while asserting that it is not present itself as a type of hypocrisy and proves as an impediment in signaling between states.

No state views itself as a blatant aggressor. In this regard, all militaries are defensive in nature and so much as they defend the interests of the state. That these interests are defended through the seizure of territory or the destruction of an adversary does not refute the fundamental rationale for such actions. For Japan to acknowledge such a standpoint, the U.S. could conceivably reduce or further spread security responsibilities in the Pacific theater. Sustained diplomatic pressure over time offers the best chance of success in prompting Japan to further increase its security role.

C. FUTURE RESEARCH

The preceding pages have demonstrated that the JSDF has steadily evolved and that missile defense has played a significant role in that evolution. While the body of evidence presented supports this case, there are areas in which additional research would prove beneficial. The following are specific topics for future research which would expand this thesis and invariably highlight other topics of interest.

1. Trend Mapping

   For the purposes of this thesis, elements of the evolution of Japan’s defense apparatus were highlighted. Admittedly, this history is far richer than the subset of events explored in this document. A more extensive review and assessment of this history would be of some value in assessing the relative magnitude of subsequent security events. While the basic methodology presented is reasonably sound, it could easily be expanded upon.

2. Trend Projection

   While the preceding paragraph speaks to characterizing what has occurred, it is also possible and beneficial to make a more concerted effort towards identifying what will occur next. This thesis has identified a set of events that could be interpreted as
advancing the security trend without conducting a detailed study of their probability. By examining these events more closely, it may be possible to better assess their relative likelihood. Depending on the event being examined, this could conceivably entail a closer look at domestic politics and prevailing political sentiment within Japan, or the degree of political rhetoric and actions being taken by North Korea. In all cases, however, each event could be scrutinized and assessed more closely.

3. Economic Motivations of the Japanese Defense Industry

For the most part, this thesis has assumed that security advancement has been the driving impetus behind missile defense. However, the Japanese defense industry also has the potential to benefit from this initiative. Largely limited to a domestic market, the Japanese defense industry has often assumed significant risk and has not benefitted from the economies of scale found in other states. Viewed from this vantage point, a new stakeholder emerges. Given the ingrained nature of Japanese business and its political system, it is not unreasonable to assume that the defense industry played some part in advancing the missile defense initiative. It would be of some benefit to identify the degree to which economic motivations influence the Japanese security dialogue.

4. Technical Feasibility of Missile Defense

Detractors of missile defense initiatives frequently asserted that it is simply not technically viable. However, over the past few years several promising tests have indicated that in time it may achieve the potential originally envisioned for it. In addition to assessing the technical feasibility of Japanese missile defense, it would also be worthwhile to assess the potential regional impacts should Japan develop a robust means to defend itself from the potential missile threat found in both North Korea and China.

D. CONCLUSION

Following World War II, Japan has had to steadily redefine its position in the international system. One aspect of this is the evolution of the JSDF. From its initial inception as an element of the National Police Reserve to its current incarnation as a
world class military, the JSDF has followed a consistent trend which indicates a path towards security normalization. While this trend finds its origins in the early 1950s, the Japanese pursuit of missile defense has played a significant role in its continued advancement.

Under the broad rubric of missile defense, Japan has had to re-evaluate its position on the military use of space, the export of weapons technology, collective security, command authority, and the conditions under which pre-emption may be warranted. These changes have manifested themselves in many ways, to include statutory changes, restructuring and elevation of the former Defense Agency, an increased emphasis on joint service interoperability, and the acquisition of a broad range of advanced technologies. It is undeniable that the trend towards security normalization began with the inception of the police reserve, but it can also be asserted that missile defense has provided an umbrella under which the trend has been significantly advanced.


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