2005-06

Intelligence architecture in the Hungarian Special Operations Forces

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http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2192
INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE IN THE HUNGARIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

by

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June 2005

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**Title:** Intelligence Architecture in the Hungarian Special Operations Forces.

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Recent experience has shown that in the GWOT one of the most important requirements is information dominance. Information gathered by human intelligence becomes even more important in asymmetric warfare. The role of the SOF in the collection of important information in theater requires a robust intelligence architecture at the unit level. The final goal should be the complete integration of SOF-based intelligence into the national intelligence community, both as an information provider and as an information user. The aim of this thesis is to address the importance of the proper intelligence structure within the Hungarian SF unit, especially in the current global security environment, as well as its cooperation with other intelligence agencies in the global war on terrorism.
INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE IN THE HUNGARIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

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Recent experience has shown that in the GWOT one of the most important requirements is information dominance. Information gathered by human intelligence becomes even more important in asymmetric warfare. The role of the SOF in the collection of important information in theater requires a robust intelligence architecture at the unit level. The final goal should be the complete integration of SOF-based intelligence into the national intelligence community, both as an information provider and as an information user. The aim of this thesis is to address the importance of the proper intelligence structure within the Hungarian SF unit, especially in the current global security environment, as well as its cooperation with other intelligence agencies in the global war on terrorism.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to thank to Professor Porch and Professor Lober for their helpful advice and support of this thesis. In addition, much is owed to my family for their endless patience and encouragement, which finally led to the end of this thesis and my studies at the Naval Postgraduate School.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

As part of defense reform in Hungary, the transformation of its Armed Forces has begun. One of the consequences of this transformation is that the Hungarian Government has directed the establishment of a Special Forces group within the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF). The government based this decision on an examination of the current security environment, likely threats, and its responsibilities as a member of NATO and the European Union. A working group was set up with the responsibility to analyze the basic principles of Special Forces in the context of Hungary’s military capabilities. The author of this thesis has direct contact with the working group, and the group asked the author to conduct a complete study on the intelligence architecture in a Special Forces unit, based on the U.S. Army Special Forces model. The aim of this thesis is to address the importance of the proper intelligence structure in an SF unit, especially in the current global security environment, as well as its cooperation with other intelligence agencies in the global war on terrorism (GWOT).

B. BACKGROUND

In the current global security environment, especially after the demise of the Soviet Union, the possibility of a major war is very low. However, small-scale wars, insurgencies, and the global war on terror (GWOT) make the environment far less stable than it was during the Cold War. To identify the required military capabilities and the size and structure of the armed forces, a threat assessment is necessary. Based on the challenges of the new global security environment, Hungary conducted a strategic Defense Review\(^1\), which served as the basis of a reform of the HDF. The most important conclusion of the National Security Strategy\(^2\) is that Hungary does not expect any direct attack by conventional means on the country in the next decade. However, other regional

\(^1\) The Defense Review itself is classified; however, a summary of the review was published, which examine the review and its result. Juhasz, Ferenc, Minister of Defense, Shaping an Armed Forces for the 21st Century, – retrieved August 2004 from http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=13869&next=0&archiv=1&next=0

\(^2\) The Hungarian National Security Strategy was retrieved October 2004 from http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/hu/bal/Kulpolitikak/Biztonsagpolitika/
and global threats have increased rapidly in the past few years. The National Security Strategy clearly addressed the expectations from the HDF and defined the necessity of a specialized National Military Strategy. This main concern is also outlined in Hungary’s constitution - defense of the native land has absolute priority.

Other missions, assigned to the HDF, can include the contribution to the collective defense of NATO and other alliances, participation in Stability and Security Operations (SASOs), and support of the GWOT. Based on the direction of the National Security Strategy, a draft of the National Military Strategy has already been circulated in the Ministry of Defense (MoD). Several paragraphs of the National Military Strategy are directly related to the Special Forces capabilities. With the establishment of the SOF capability, the most important requirement is the fulfillment of NATO and the European Union requirements, as well as satisfying national needs. The relevant documents, regarding these requirements, are the NATO Special Operations Policy and the Allied Joint Doctrines. These documents clearly identify the necessary capabilities for Special Operation Forces such as Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance (SR), Direct Action (DA), and Military Assistance (MA). These tasks, however, all require a properly developed intelligence architecture, not only at the unit level, but also at the national level. The purpose of intelligence in Special Operations is “assessing areas of interest ranging from political and military personalities to the military capabilities of friendly and enemy forces. SF must perform intelligence activities ranging from developing information critical to planning and conducting operations or sustaining and protecting themselves and the UW [unconventional warfare] forces, to assessing the capabilities and intentions of indigenous and coalition forces.”

The U.S. model for the organization of Army SF units has been proven successful in combat in Colombia, Philippines, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The Army Special Operations Forces, also known as the ‘Green Berets’ (ARSOF), intelligence architecture is a mature system that is also technologically advanced. It has also been tested in combat in many

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3 The National Military Strategy is a classified document, yet the National Security Strategy clearly gives its framework.

conflicts around the world. Hungary, as a member of NATO, implements many NATO standards that are based on U.S. organizations and operating procedures. Therefore, emulation of the U.S. SF intelligence architecture, at the SOF unit level, will support not only a more valuable contribution to NATO, but will also help to foster better cooperation with the United States. Furthermore, the United States is willing to help Hungary’s effort to establish SOF capability. This support package consists of finances, equipment, and human resources.

Recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has shown that in the GWOT one of the most important requirements is information dominance. Information gathered by human intelligence becomes even more important in asymmetric warfare, because photographic reconnaissance or electronic surveillance is less effective than against a conventional enemy. The role of the SOF in the collection of important information in theater requires a robust intelligence architecture at the unit level. However, to be effective, SOF intelligence must feed into a National level intelligence organization. The final goal should be the complete integration of SOF-based intelligence into the national intelligence community, both as an information provider and as an information user. To understand the importance of the co-operation between SOF and a National security service, it is worth examining the U.S. example, as co-operation between ARSOF and CIA paramilitary units has become a model for the GWOT. The “Afghan Model”, for example, in which U.S. special operations forces served in theater alongside CIA units, is seen by many as a template for SOF-intelligence co-operation.\(^5\) The role of SOF in Afghanistan was to provide targeting information for precision weapons, allowing such weapons to reach dispersed, concealed opponents; training; leading indigenous forces; providing intelligence about the enemy through locals; and conducting man-hunting using the gathered information.

C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The author has developed this thesis by integrating the issues that have been mentioned above. Chapter II is dedicated to the current security policy in Hungary with

an examination of the *National Security Strategy*, security advantages, and obligations as a member of NATO and the European Union (EU), and the role of Hungary in the GWOT. This chapter will argue that the current security situation and the future threats to Hungary have enhanced the importance of SOF capability to the Hungarian and European defense.

In Chapter III, the author examines the intelligence architecture of U.S. ARSOF. The purpose of the examination is two-fold. First, it will help to explain the responsibilities and tasks at different operational levels. Second, it will suggest modification of the U.S. ARSOF model to fit into Hungary’s national characteristics and highlight important issues that should be addressed in order to achieve the integration of intelligence and SOF operations.

Chapter IV is the actual recommendation for the intelligence component. The author makes his recommendations based on the U.S. experience, adjusted for the Hungarian security environment and requirements of the international community. This is a possible solution, based on Hungary’s efforts within the framework of NATO, the European Union, and other bi and multi-lateral agreements. Furthermore, the author describes the current intelligence agencies in Hungary and their role in the country’s internal security and foreign policy, because the final goal is to integrate the SOF intelligence structure into the National level intelligence cycle.

The conclusion summarizes and highlights again the most important issues. Although there are many, other decisions waiting to be clarified about the Hungarian SOF unit, given the current international security situation, the creation of a proper intelligence architecture within SOF should be paramount. The author hopes this thesis will be helpful for the working group in Hungary, and will provide a solid basis for the further development of the SOF capability.
II. HUNGARY’S CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, FUTURE THREATS AND CHALLENGES, AND PERSPECTIVES WITHIN NATO AND EU REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOF CAPABILITY

When the hour of crisis comes, remember that forty selected men can shake the world.

Yasotay (Mongol warlord)

A. HUNGARY’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

In this chapter, the author examines Hungary’s current security situation based on its NATO membership and as a member of the European Union, as well as the threat assessment according to the Hungarian National Security Strategy and Hungarian Military Strategy. The author’s main purpose of this chapter is to highlight the importance of having a Special Forces capability following the similar efforts made by NATO and the European Union, whereas Hungary, as a sovereign state, has obligations as well.

Hungary, as a member of the European Union and NATO, believes that the new security challenges can be most effectively managed through international cooperation. Thus, the roles of the EU and NATO have become increasingly more important in planning Hungary’s defense posture. “Hungary’s membership in the European Union and NATO entails both obligations to adapt and adjust itself and the opportunity of participating in decision-making and common action.” As support for this line of reasoning, the author will examine how well the establishment of a Special Forces capability in Hungary can fit into the goals and requirements of the NATO and European Union.

B. HUNGARY’S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The transformation after 1989, when Hungary changed its regime, is reflected best by the new National Security Strategy, which was adopted on March 31, 2004, and then took effect on April 15, 2004. The National Security Strategy of Hungary builds on

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6 Hungarian National Security Strategy, Chapter II (Security environment)
and around the basic principles of the country’s security and defense policy. In addition, both of these documents line up with NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept\(^7\) and European Security Strategy\(^8\), including the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)\(^9\). The European Security Strategy was adopted in 2003 by the European Union.

The *Hungarian National Security Strategy* defines and analyzes the country’s security environment, risk factors, challenges, and tasks that have an impact on the national security interests in the international political arena of the 21\(^{st}\) century. The document identifies Hungary’s national security values and interests in ten points. Among these, the fourth and fifth points stress the importance of the European Union and NATO to Hungary’s prosperity and security. As a member country in both organizations, Hungary intends to nurture and preserve these alliances. Point No.9 suggests that Hungary’s interest is to keep a “durable stability in the Euro-Atlantic region, a comprehensive settlement of conflicts in the region and the suppression of threats to the security of the region, in particular terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”\(^{10}\) Against terrorism, Hungary believes that the only effective response is achievable within a framework of international cooperation. Thus, the role of the international organizations such as NATO and the European Union is vital. In the context of the thesis, however, the author will highlight only those issues from the National Security Strategy that are related to the establishment of the Special Forces capability in Hungary or which have an impact on it. In addition, European Union and NATO strategies will be viewed selectively as they relate to the basic argument of the thesis, which is to emphasize the importance of the intelligence architecture within Special Operations Forces, to include the values of having such a unit established within the near future in Hungary.

\(^7\) NATO 1999 Strategic Concept is available at [http://www.fas.org/man/nato/natodocs/99042450.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/nato/natodocs/99042450.htm) retrieved January 2005

\(^8\) The European Security Strategy is available at [http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf](http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf) retrieved January 2005

\(^9\) The European Union’s Security and Defense Policy is available at [http://www.iss-eu.org/books/5esdpen.pdf](http://www.iss-eu.org/books/5esdpen.pdf) retrieved January 2005

\(^{10}\) Hungarian National Security Strategy, Chapter I (Interests and values)
C. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S ROLE ON HUNGARY’S SECURITY POLICY

Since the European Union’s Security and Defense Policy constitutes the framework of Hungary’s National Security Strategy, the author will examine the European Union’s efforts to establish an effective policy and strategy to deal with the current security challenges. Although for members of the European Union, NATO remains the basis of the collective defense, the European Security Strategy claims that “no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own…Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.”¹¹ The war on terror indicates that the traditional concept of self-defense, which was based on the threat of invasion, has changed. These new threats are more diverse, dynamic, less visible, and less predictable and require the first line of defense to be abroad.

European forces have already been deployed abroad; they represent the European Union, for example, in Afghanistan, East Timor, the Balkans, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Among the key threats, terrorism has top priority. “Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable.”¹² This new wave of terrorism is well resourced, and seeks to inflict massive casualties. The worst-case scenario is a weapon of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists. In this case, a small group could cause enormous damage.

The military capabilities of the European Union were identified at the December 1999 Helsinki Council meeting. The document, known as the Headline Goal, requires European Union members to be able to deploy 60,000 troops within 60 days, and the troops should be sustained for at least a year.

These capabilities are to be used in support of Petersberg missions. The Petersberg Tasks presently include humanitarian and rescue tasks;

¹¹ European Security Strategy, Introduction pp 3
¹² European Security Strategy, Chapter I pp 5
peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (referred to as ‘peace enforcement’ in some contexts)...The self-sustaining element is envisioned to include the command, control, intelligence capabilities, logistics, and air and naval assets required to carry out the full spectrum of the Petersberg tasks.13

The missions for the forces are foreseen in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Among the variety of missions, two capabilities are deemed to be especially important:

1. A single corps sized crisis management capability that, nonetheless, spares enough assets to conduct a small-scale operation such as a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO).

2. A long-term operation’s capability at less than maximum level of effort, while conducting another operation of a limited duration.14

The current situation is that the European Union is now capable of conducting some crisis-management operations. In May 2004, however, the EU defense ministers adopted a new plan. Known as ‘Headline Goal 2010’, it calls for the European Union to be able to respond by 2010 with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the European Union.15

The missions assigned to the EU military forces were taken from the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992. For this reason, the concept was outdated, and the European Convention has adopted a new definition. Article 40.1 of the draft Constitutional Treaty adopted by the European Convention (July 2003) states that:

The common security and defense policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on assets civil and military. The Union may

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14 Ibid. Missions, pp1
use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nation Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.16

In addition, the 9/11 terror attack on the United States in 2001 further strengthened the cooperation among the Member States and between the European Union and the United States against terrorism. The Declaration of the European Council (Seville, June 2002), defined the contribution of Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the global war on terror (GWOT).17 One of the significant achievements of the European Council is the implementation of the Plan of Action to fight terrorism. Combating terrorism will continue to be a priority objective of the European Union and a key plank of its external relations policy. International cooperation remains the essential instrument of the GWOT. The Union will continue to maintain the closest possible coordination with the United States and other partners.18 Although the EU military missions support humanitarian and civilian missions, present challenges have caused Secretary-General, High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana to remark, “We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary robust intervention. We should think particularly of operations involving both military and civilian capabilities. This is an area where we could add particular value.”19 In addition, a review was conducted on the European Union’s ‘Niche’ capabilities.20 The support for developing SOF capabilities or improving the existing ones was emphasized. Encouraging the smaller member nations, to develop specialized capabilities within the European Union, such as SOF, mountain units, or any kind of scarce assets was recommended as well. The Military Balance Volume 104 in


17 Ibid. The author quoted the Declaration of the European Council (Seville, June 2002) on the contribution of CSFP, including ESDP, in the fight against terrorism in his paper on the Petersberg tasks.

18 Ibid. Key points of the Declaration of the European Council in Seville.


2004 stated that “Defense Command Denmark has prepared a document that is intend to produce smaller forces for international missions…Netherlands is transforming its force structure to improve flexibility, operational effectiveness, and joint operations capability…Hungary is preparing an elite anti-terrorism unit.”

Nonetheless, the Bonn International Center for Conversion published the Paper 33, which also stress the value of SOF units in the European Union. It states that:

Special Forces are used for a range of operations where technological solutions also need to be combined with human resources…These forces can be used, for instance, to support effective engagement representing HUMINT on the ground…This is particular pertinent to Europeans lacking more technological assets/capabilities for effective engagement and intelligence gathering…Special Forces rely on sensitive national intelligence, which members states are unwilling to pool or share because of jealously guarded sources and the risk of compromising such sources.

The last part of the statement is especially important for the context of this thesis and the author will further discuss in Chapter IV the possible problems of integrating the Hungarian SOF into the national level intelligence community.

D. NATO AND ITS ROLE

The GWOT and other security challenges have also prompted a transformation within NATO. At the NATO summit in Istanbul, on June 28-29, 2004, the decision was made to establish “more capable, usable, and responsive forces in support of NATO’s new missions; and strengthening cooperation with partners, especially in beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.”

NATO missions currently exist all over the world in support of the GWOT. The most important are currently in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, NATO forces and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will remain until Afghanistan achieves a representative government and self-sustaining peace and

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security. In Iraq NATO’s position has been slightly different. In the first phase of the war, NATO did not have a direct role in the international stabilization force within Iraq. “So far, it has been providing support to Poland, on the explicit request of this country…In addition to its support to Poland, NATO responded to a request made by Turkey, in February 2003, for defensive assistance from the Alliance in the event of a threat to its population or territory resulting from armed conflict in neighboring Iraq.” This request was made after the Istanbul Summit. There was a meeting in Brussels on 9 December 2004, when Foreign Ministers of the 26 NATO countries agreed to move ahead with expanding NATO’s role in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as maintaining its commitment to the Balkans. “The Alliance currently is preparing to expand the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The so-called ‘phase 2’ expansion will see NATO deploying Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to the West of the country…Foreign Ministers also gave the formal go-ahead for the expansion of NATO’s training assistance to Iraq. The Alliance’s mission in Iraq will be now increased to around 300 personnel, including trainers and support staff, and will step up the ongoing training and mentoring of senior level Iraqi security forces.”

Since the invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on September 12, 2001, NATO member countries have continued to show a strong determination to play their part in the fight against terrorism following the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. The ISAF in Afghanistan, the Operation Active Endeavor, the security operations within the Athens Olympic Games, and the peacekeeping forces acting against terrorists in the Balkans, show the wide variety of tasks conducted by NATO in the GWOT. With special regards to the requests of the United States, NATO provided initial support for coalition operations against the Taliban regime in

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26 NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was interviewed after the meetings. Foreign Ministers agree on expanded NATO roles in Iraq, Afghanistan. http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/12-december/e1209e.htm – accessed December 30, 2004

27 NATO Istanbul Summit Media Guide – Action Against Terrorism
Afghanistan. Generally, this initial package included greater information sharing, increased security for the facilities of the United States and other allies on their territory, blanket over-flight rights, access to ports and airfields.\textsuperscript{28} Also, at the Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO Heads of State and Government adopted the so-called Prague Package, which defined the necessary steps to develop NATO in the GWOT. The package defined, for example, a new military concept for defense against terrorism, the adoption of a Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T), the adoption of measures in the field of weapons of mass destruction, the protection of civilian populations, missile defense, cyber-defense, and the co-operation with other international organizations. In addition to this package, the creation of the NATO Response Force, as well as other initiatives such as the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, was established. A ‘Capabilities Conference’ will be held in Lillehammer, in 15-17 June 2005 to discuss NATO’s SOF capabilities. This unique event will bring together NATO staffs, NATO agencies, commanders and a delegation from the alliance Special Operations Forces (SOF). The goal is a “Top to Bottom” review of important issues and capabilities.

The Conference reflects the significant role that SOF play in shaping pre-conflict environments as well as on the modern battlefield itself, and in post-conflict situations. It also reflects a determination to bring about meaningful transformation in the Alliance and demonstrate the “force multiplying” effects of cooperation and collaboration in complex and multi-dimensional projects. Finally, the Conference is necessary because of the important technological advances, which have been made in recent years directly affecting SOF.\textsuperscript{29}

E. HUNGARY’S ROLE IN GWOT

Hungary, as a member state, has had to adjust itself and find its place within this shifting security environment. It is also very important to be an active player in NATO’s and the European Union’s role in the GWOT. Hungary, as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, enjoys the Alliance’s guarantees to protect the territorial

\textsuperscript{28} Based on the request of the United States, NATO provided initial support for coalition operations against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in October 2001 and agreed on a package of eight measures. Information was retrieved from The Istanbul Summit Media Guide

\textsuperscript{29} Lillehammer 2005, NATO SOF Capabilities Conference, 15-16-17 June 2005, Military Base, Joerstadmoen, this brochure was published at NATO graphics studio
integrity, political independence, and security of its member states. Hungary has a fundamental interest in NATO remaining the primary forum of transatlantic security policy dialogue and co-operation, preserving its effectiveness by adapting to the changing security policy environment of the 21st century, and contributing to the extension of the zone of security and stability.\textsuperscript{30} Hungary, similar to other member states, makes a considerable effort to fulfill the political and military requirements of NATO. The transformation of the Armed Forces, the adaptation of NATO procedures, and the procurement of modern NATO compatible weapons, all serve one goal: enable Hungary to become a reliable partner, with valuable contributions to the Alliance. To fulfill its contribution requirement, Hungary participates in ISAF in Afghanistan and is present in Iraq. The Hungarian contribution to the war in Iraq started in August 2003, when troops arrived as a result of a bilateral agreement between Budapest and Washington. A transportation battalion consisting of 292 people has been working as part of the Multinational Division Central South (MNDCS). Seven officers were assigned to the MNDCS staff, and one person worked for the CJTF-7. This mission was completed in December 2004. With the increased role of NATO however, Hungary will participate in the NATO Training Mission with a contingent of 150 personnel. This mission will consist of force protection, the training of the Iraqi Army, and staff work.\textsuperscript{31}

Regarding the European Union’s effort to become a significant factor within the international security arena, the Hungarian \textit{National Security Strategy} defined a clear course for the country.\textsuperscript{32} The \textit{Common Foreign and Security Policy} (CFSP) of the EU provides the base framework of Hungarian foreign policy.

The objective of the Republic of Hungary as a Member State is to have an effective and strong EU, which is capable to act on the international scene as well, where the equality of rights and the principle of solidarity between Member States are respected, and where the community method strengthens with the institutional balance being preserved... Hungary takes

\textsuperscript{30} Hungarian National Security Strategy, Chapter I (Interests and values)

\textsuperscript{31} The information was retrieved December 2004 from http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=19196&next=0&archiv=1&next=0

\textsuperscript{32} The European Security Strategy defined the role of the EU in the building of global security. The CFSP of the EU gives a framework for the Hungarian foreign policy.
an active part in the realization of the European Security and Defense Policy and in the implementation of military and civilian crisis management operation.\textsuperscript{33}

This thesis supports the author’s belief that Special Operations Forces capability could make a very good contribution to the ESDP and other security building efforts, especially in fighting terrorism. Equally important is that these organizations should have a structured and proper intelligence architecture, which is also compatible with other NATO and EU forces. Due to the wide variety of tasks that Special Force can cover, SOF capability could prove valuable to solidify Hungary’s place in both alliances. The budget and the size of the Hungarian military put a limit on the amount of the country’s contribution to certain missions. For this reason, small but specialized units could be very useful and valuable to missions in the GWOT, and enhance Hungary’s stature at little cost.

Special Forces capability could be used effectively in a wide range of strategic and tactical operations. However, these new security challenges require information dominance and that is possible only through effective intelligence architecture. Although, the primary purpose of this thesis is to recommend intelligence architecture for the SOF of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF), the co-operation between the SOF and the national intelligence community is also very important, especially because of the new security threat.

Hungary, as a member in NATO and the EU, has advantages as well as obligations towards these security organizations. The new and dramatically changed security environment has a huge impact on these institutions, and as an active member, on Hungary as well. The transformation of NATO and the EU has also influenced Hungary. The need to have Special Forces capability is clearly defined. Yet, an effective intelligence architecture within SOF is equally important, because the current threat requires information dominance most of all. Although, international cooperation and coordination is important to achieve an effective response to the terrorist threat, an extended cooperation between the National Security Services in Hungary and the

\textsuperscript{33} Hungarian National Security Strategy. III.1.2 The European Union
Military, including the SOF, is also a required step toward success. In the next chapter, the author will examine the U.S. ARSOF intelligence model in order to better understand the requirements that make it possible to emulate the system and adjust it to the Hungarian SOF capability.
III. THE INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE WITHIN U.S. ARSOF

There is another type of warfare – new in its intensity, ancient in its origin – war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It preys on unrest.

President John F. Kennedy, West Point, New York, 1962

A. NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the Cold War reached its end. At the same time our security environment also changed entirely. Today, leading defense planners and strategists say that international terrorists, insurgencies, and regional conflicts are going to threaten our way of life for the next two decades. Long gone are the days when a linear battlefield could be identified in doctrinal graphics and map icons as rigid, defined and certain. This school of thought kept the conventional warfare planners comfortably assured in their intelligence estimates and planning matrices. Current security challenges consist of unpredictable and unconventional threats, motivated by cultural, religious, and ethnic differences. This type of unconventional threat is today often called “fourth-generation warfare.” Special Operation Forces were designed to fight in this type of environment. Their training and skills make them unique and allow them to operate in situations where conventional units cannot be used for political or military reasons.

No other formations are permanently organized, equipped, and trained for foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, and other highly sensitive missions. In addition, SOF has called on unparalleled interagency and international expertise. Their skills offer unique, cost-effective, low-profile, and direct as well as indirect measures that enhance international stability...

35 Collins, John M. Special Operations Forces in Peacetime, JFQ/Spring 1999
36 Ibid.
Due to this reason, countries all over the world are developing, or in some cases, like Hungary, establishing SOF capability. Hungary does not expect conventional threats either in the next decades. However, Hungary, as a member of NATO and European Union, has to be able to participate in future, or possibly even present operations. Under the current force transformation Hungary wants to establish SOF capability. In this effort the United States is willing to help Hungary. Through bilateral agreements between the two countries, Hungary will be able to get financial, equipment, and human support. Therefore, the author argues that when such reasons as willingness to help, experience, and the reputation of the ARSOF are taken into account, Hungary should emulate the U.S. ARSOF intelligence architecture. Thus, in this chapter, the ARSOF intelligence system will be examined in order to get a clear picture of what Hungary can or can’t acquire and apply to its own structure.

B. ‘WAR IN THE INFORMATION AGE’: THE ROLE OF SOF IN GATHERING INTELLIGENCE

“Special Operation Forces (SOF) are elite, specialized military units that can be inserted “behind the lines” through land, sea, or air to conduct a variety of operations, many of them clandestine.”\(^{37}\) Knowing their areas of responsibility (AORs), their ability to work closely with indigenous forces and other institutions gives SOF an advantage over conventional forces in operations that demand cultural awareness and special intelligence information.\(^{38}\) The success of these missions, clandestine direct-actions aimed at capturing or killing specific individuals or groups, depends, to a large degree, on having timely, high-quality intelligence about the targets.\(^{39}\)

Because of the importance of highly accurate information in asymmetric warfare, SOF intelligence is also under transformation. The SOF already has a far more robust and independent role in intelligence and undercover operations. In addition, their numbers, deployments, and funding were recently increased. “A robust cadre of humint [human

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\(^{38}\) Collins, John M. Special Operations Forces in Peacetime, JFQ/Spring 1999

\(^{39}\) Special Operations Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report, October 15, 2001
intelligence] forces organic to SOF [Special Operation Forces] would give us perhaps the most important aspect of operations-intelligence fusion that one could get in the field, in direct support of counter terror.” The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is already getting more authority under Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in the GWOT. The war in Iraq, for example, exposed the insufficient personnel problem. In the next five years, SOCOM wants to add 4,000 people to the SOF. This personnel increase includes Navy SEALs, Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs soldiers, and a new Marine Special Operation unit. In addition, the command in Tampa, Florida is expanding its intelligence capabilities and adding 700 people to its US and overseas regional headquarters to analyze the information gathered by SOF, CIA agents, spy satellites, and other means. Based on the analyzed information, they also plan Special Operations-led missions. “The nexus of the effort is a new Center for Special Operations, a ‘warfighting hub’ with the sole responsibility for ‘planning, supporting, and executing Special Operations in the war on terrorism.’” There is another way of expanding SOF intelligence capabilities, which involves strengthening the cooperation with foreign counterparts. “Intelligence-sharing agreements are also in the works between the Pentagon and close allies, says Thomas O’Connell Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-intensity Conflict. We are pushing very hard…starting with the UK, Australia, and others, to get them access to the Sipernet [classified internet], break down these barriers, and we will start seeing the type of access and exchange that we need.” Besides this cooperation at the operation level, US SOF at the tactical level will be stationed overseas for longer rotations in order to achieve stronger bonds with foreign counterparts and to gain better local access. This goal was based on the “street-level intelligence-gathering skills” that were demonstrated by SOF in Iraq and

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43 Ibid.
Afghanistan. “They’ve developed their own intelligence networks. They’ve gone out, they’ve grabbed people, and they’ve effectively shut down a tremendous portion of the problem that exists today, O’Connell argues.” Special Operations Forces gathering human intelligence may be as vital to defeating terrorists, as are combat skills.

In regards to the situation in Hungary, obviously there are certain steps that have to be completed before we start thinking about cooperation at this kind of operation level. However, even these first steps in establishing the SOF capability should include the foundation of the final goal. This includes integration at higher levels of cooperation and access to resources such as the Sipernet, which will provide valuable contributions to the GWOT. Among officers who had access to the Sipernet while serving at the operation level in Iraq, such as the MNDCS G2 staff or the National Intelligence Cell (NIC), many have claimed that this type of access had tremendous benefits. This would be especially useful if Hungary wants to have SOF capability like the U.S. ARSOF. It would also enhance the interoperability of the unit.

Yet, before the establishment of the operation level capability, we should first focus on the tactical level capability. The next part of the chapter will be devoted to the intelligence architecture of the U.S. ARSOF or, as they are more generally called, the “Green Berets.” The FM 3-05.20 introduces the Special Forces as a unit that, along with other special operation forces, “conducts special operations (SO) across the operational continuum. SO are actions that specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces take to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas of the world. SF represents the United States (U.S.) Army’s only unconventional warfare (UW) capability.”


45 FM 3-05.20 Chapter I. 1-1 pp.
C. INTELLIGENCE WITHIN ARSOF

FM 34-36 discusses the role of intelligence within Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), and focuses on the missions and functions of the intelligence elements and organizations that provide all of the necessary intelligence and electronic support to ARSOF. The manual is especially important for the SOF S2s, military intelligence commanders, and other intelligence elements that support them. ARSOF includes Special Forces (SF), Rangers, Special Operations Aviation (SOA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units, and Civil Affairs (CA) units (for CONUS ARSOF organizational chart see Appendix B). The ARSOF commanders primarily use the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) system to achieve the desired goal of the operation. The IEW system includes virtually every individual soldier and operational element at every level of command. It is capable of collecting and processing information, disseminating intelligence, providing CI support, and managing or executing EW operations. Although the system’s resources are connected with other resources from higher and lower levels, the system is integrated and independent. Every echelon focuses on different intelligence information and adds different intelligence data.\(^{46}\) Within the ARSOF, the IEW system also provides intelligence support from the national level down to the tactical soldier in the field.

However, the information in asymmetric warfare is completely different in its nature from the information needed by conventional forces. Furthermore, the information required by the ‘Green Berets’ is different from information required by other ARSOF units (see Appendix C).

In addition to their general missions, SOF can also conduct collateral activities, such as humanitarian assistance, security assistance, search and rescue, counter-drugs, antiterrorism, and other security and special activities. There is no question that the effective execution of these missions depends on an accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence. Furthermore, each of these missions has its own intelligence requirement that is unique from the other, and completely different from a conventional force.

intelligence requirement.\textsuperscript{47} Therefore, an organic IEW support is crucial to execute the infiltration, exfiltration, survival, and mission successfully in any kind of hostile environment. Intelligence assets organic to SF are organized according to operational and analytical needs. IEW assets are located at the group, battalion, company, and operational detachment – A (ODA) levels. Each intelligence asset has its own missions, functions, and limitations.\textsuperscript{48} Hungary does not have an IEW type resources system. At the establishment of SOF capability, it would be an urgent need to develop a similar resources center, at least, for the SOF structure.

At the tactical level, it is imperative that the group S2 officer gets timely and accurate intelligence information (Appendix D shows the intelligence database for ARSOF). Depending on the commander’s orders, the S2 sets up the intelligence collection missions and tasks subordinate elements along with the organic and support MI units. In the group S2 section, there can be found an S2, assistant S2, SSO, SF technician, senior NCO, and other NCOs for operations, intelligence, C-SIGINT, imagery analysis, and intelligence analysis (see Appendix E for SOF mission planning).

The next level is the battalion level; the battalion S2 is responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence (see Appendix F to see MI detachment to SF battalion). The tasks are similar to the group S2, as the battalion S2 also provides special security representative support for the battalion. The S2 section includes the S2 officer, a senior intelligence NCO, an intelligence analyst sergeant, and a junior intelligence NCO.

At the company level, the operations warrant officer is responsible for all issues of the organization, training, intelligence, and counterintelligence activities within the unit. He is not only responsible for the intelligence training of the unit, but he is also the senior warrant officer advisor to the company commander for intelligence related issues.

\textsuperscript{47} FM 34-36 Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, retrieved December 2004 from http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-36/loc.htm, Chapter I (The Intelligence Cycle)

\textsuperscript{48} FM 34-36 Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, retrieved December 2004 from http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-36/loc.htm, Chapter II (Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support)
The base of the SF is the twelve-man team of the Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFODA). All other organizations within the SF build up to command, control, and support the A team. The A team is the base of the Special Forces. The reason is that the SFODA, as it was defined earlier, is designed to organize, equip, train, advise, direct, and support indigenous military or paramilitary forces engaged in UW or FID activities (see Appendix G for the structure of SFODA). The commanding officer of the team is a captain. His major assistants are the assistant detachment commander, a warrant officer, and an operations and intelligence sergeant who is usually a master sergeant. The team has one assistant operations and intelligence sergeant and two of each specialist, such as weapons, engineering, medical, and communications. The reason for having two of each specialty is to allow the team to operate as a split-team if the circumstances are required.

For all the intelligence aspects of the A team, and during deployment of the indigenous forces, the assistant operations and intelligence sergeant is responsible. His duty is clearly defined:

In garrison, he plans, coordinates, and conducts continuous collection planning and intelligence analysis in support of the detachment’s area study and intelligence reference files effort. During the mission planning, he analyzes the detachment mission and evaluates the unit intelligence database. The intent of this analysis and evaluation is to identify intelligence gaps and to conduct a detailed IPB in support of the development of the plan of execution (POE). The assistant operations and intelligence sergeant also requests imagery, maps, weather information, topographic terrain analysis products, and intelligence updates from the battalion S2.

In addition to the organic IEW support, there are also non-organic IEW supports to the Special Forces (see Appendix H for IEW structure). These could include support from higher headquarters, HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, or TECHINT support. It could also cover the support from Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units, as well as support from other intelligence services. The support with other intelligence products

49 FM 3-05.20 Special Forces Operational Detachment A, pp. 3-29
50 FM 3-05.20, Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeant, pp. 3-31
means, for example, that each SF group and battalion has a continuously updated DIA account, which guarantees the automatic distribution of the intelligence information, reports, or studies depending on the unit requirements.

D. HUNGARIAN CONSTRAINTS

No doubt that the development of these systems and organizations cannot be completed overnight. Furthermore, there is no need to develop everything that the ARSOF structure includes because each country’s national interests and operational requirements are completely different. The United States is a world power and its national interests should be protected all over the world. Meanwhile in Hungary, the initial goals are to establish SOF capability that meets with NATO and EU requirements, provide a stable base to the contribution in the GWOT, and, of course, serve the national interests. Certain elements, however, have indispensable roles within special organizations that are vital right from the beginning, thus Hungary should plan with these factors in mind. These elements are, for example, the IEW system or the non-organic support of the SOF. In order to achieve a properly prepared and trained SOF unit in Hungary, we should also establish a central intelligence resource that can directly support every level within the SOF. Second, among the non-organic elements, the author believes the most important is the support from the intelligence services, as it has been shown that the cooperation between the SOF and the CIA or other intelligence services (in the case of the United States) is the key for asymmetric warfare. The establishment of a similar cooperation in Hungary should be achieved as well. Nonetheless, to have access to the Sipernet also has enormous benefits, not only for the SOF structure, but also for the country itself. Hungary, based on its geographical location, is a transit country for organized crime as well as for terrorists. In addition, because of our support of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, it could easily be a target country in the future, as it has already had signs of this in the present. The effective responses for the current security challenges should include the pursuit of information dominance and the development of specially trained military and paramilitary units. The establishment of SOF capability, as well as a proper intelligence architecture within the structure, in Hungary are vital. In the next chapter, the author will recommend one possible idea of how the intelligence architecture should look in the Hungarian SOF.
IV. RECOMMENDATION FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE WITHIN THE HUNGARIAN SOF STRUCTURE

A. WORKING WITHIN THE NATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

As we saw in the previous chapter, the role of intelligence inside the SOF units is crucial. In addition, we could see that as a response to the current challenges, this role is both increasing and changing.

Moving into an area of clandestine activity that has traditionally been the domain of the CIA, the Pentagon has secured new authority that allows American special operations forces to dole out millions of dollars in cash, equipment and weapons to international warlords and foreign fighters. Under the new policy, the U.S. Special Operations Command will have as much as $25 million a year to spend providing support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups or individuals aiding U.S. efforts against terrorists and other targets. Previously, military units were prohibited from providing money or arms to foreign groups.51

In Hungary, the problem is two-fold: at first we have to establish a SOF capability, yet right away we have to adjust it to the requirements of the current challenges. In this chapter, the author recommends one possible solution for the intelligence architecture within the SOF structure in Hungary.

The complete copying of the US system is impossible for the Hungarian Special Force because of size, capabilities, and budget differences. Nevertheless, to be able to answer the current security challenges, Hungary’s SOF structure also needs a competitive intelligence architecture that is integrated into the national intelligence community and works closely with them in the war on terror.

B. TACTICAL/SFODA LEVEL

To start at the unit level, one can understand easily how every chain in the system connects to each other and for what purposes. The structure of each Special Force element is almost the same as the structure within the U.S. Army Special Forces. An article on the website of the Ministry of Defense in Hungary, states that: “The special

operational battalion will be prepared to fight non-conventional and anti-terrorist combat. The force possessing unique arms and equipment will be able to perform special recce [reconnaissance] tasks in the areas of operations as well as to carry out direct interventions. The US Special Forces are to help it in its preparation by providing the logistical background besides assistance in training and methodology.  

To follow a logical sequence, first the lowest unit level of Special Forces, which is the Operational Detachment Alpha or A-team, will be examined from the Hungarian perspective. At the team level, the only difference between the U.S. and Hungarian teams is that the second in command is a first lieutenant. In both instances, the captain is of course the team leader. According to the draft structure, there is also one intelligence NCO whose rank is E-8 or E-7. To have the proper and current information at the lowest unit level is very important. As CW3 Jeffrey L. Hasler wrote in his article:

The enemy is not conveniently in front of you on the other side of a traceable line. The enemy (and potential friends) can be anywhere. Death (or support) can come from any direction. You can’t always rely on waiting for the latest information from “Higher.” You may have to react to events in your small unit’s individual reality. If you value the success of your unit’s mission, your life, and those of your comrades, you had better be as informed about that threat environment as you can.  

In the United States, the Special Forces groups concentrate on their own specific area. Therefore, at the team level, the intelligence NCO has to focus only on a certain operational area along with all the other intelligence NCOs within the SF group. In Hungary, most probably only one battalion will be established. Nevertheless, to educate individual Hungarian SOF soldiers in regional matters would give operational flexibility to the unit.

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52 Special Operation Battalion, this article available on the website of the Ministry of Defense http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=14943&next=120&archiv=1&next=120 accessed December 2004

53 Hasler, Jeffrey L. CW3. A Self-Directed Program For Survival: The Use of Open-Source Material in Preparation for Deployment to Unusual Places, yet unpublished article, Monterey, 2004 The author, Hasler is a Special Forces Warrant Officer with several years serving as an intelligence NCO and as a second commanding officer in an A-team
Based on the *Hungarian National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy*, the current examined security environment, and possible areas for deployment for NATO forces, there are three strategic areas that have to be covered. These are the Middle East, Europe, and East Africa.

**The SOF’ Tasks based on strategic environment**

**Division of the tasks by the strategic environment:**

1. **National Interests**
   a. At home
   b. Abroad
2. **Within Alliances (NATO/EU)**
3. **Within the framework of bi- and multilateral operation**

![Map of strategic areas]

Figure 1. The SOF Tasks Based on Strategic Environment

In this case, the three areas of responsibility (AOR) can be divided among the three companies and the teams within each company can focus on only one AOR. At team level, the intelligence NCO has to know his AOR on a very high and detailed level. He has to speak the language, know the culture, religions, and customs. He also has to be able to inform and educate his team members. Because achieving this kind of preparedness takes time, building up this capability should be among the first steps for Hungary. To keep the team focused, it is very important not only mentally, but also operationally, that in an ideal situation the team will be prepared with the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), for a certain AOR. The logistical questions
of how and from where to gain this information are of paramount importance. This is especially true because the plan calls of the battalion to be combat ready at the end of 2010. The original plan states that the first company will be combat ready by the end of 2007 and that the battalion will consist of two companies. Thus, to plan first only with one company and its intelligence capability is both reasonable and prudent.

Not to be specific on the other side is also unacceptable, as a “Jack for all trades, master of none” is not a solution. The author’s recommendation is to keep the A-team NCOs focusing on one part of the world and let the battalion intelligence officer (S2) and his team keep their eye on the broader world. The question of how this should be executed on a day-by-day basis is our next focus.

Based on the direction of the Hungarian National Security and Defense Strategy, the current examined security environment, and the NATO’s forces possible areas for deployment, one or two “hot spots” must be designated for the Special Force. Looking at the present political and security situations, the Middle East will be a likely source of problems. For example, at the team level, the intelligence NCOs will have to be experts on both Afghanistan and Iraq. They will have to speak the language, know the culture, behaviors, and customs, and they must be able to inform and teach their team members. To keep the team’s focus is very important not only mentally, but they will also have to be prepared with tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for certain areas. It would be impossible to expect the teams to be familiar with the whole world in addition to their other trainings. The author believes, especially at the beginning, that the Hungarian SF battalion should take more care about their combat readiness and less focus on the intelligence aspects. There should be a certain amount of time set aside before deployment, and during this time, it should be possible to prepare the team for the necessary cultural and local information about the target area. Yet, again, these recommendations are only for the initiation phase. Of course, the final goal is to achieve a high language and cultural readiness simultaneously with the other aspects of their trainings. From how and where to gain the needed information about the target area is our next area of concern.
In his article, Hasler points out the difference between *intelligence* and *information* and talks about the importance of personal initiative. He states that, “information which is properly evaluated, classified, and disseminated by intelligence professionals is intelligence…Although not necessarily intelligence information that helps you avoid making culturally-derived mistakes, and enhances your understanding of the environment may be life-saving. You must appreciate that unit information available on the prospective AO, and you must take the initiative to gather much of it yourself.”

In agreement with Hasler, there is certainly useful and necessary information coming from the company and battalion intelligence officers and from higher-level intelligence organizations. The individual level, however, is also very important. First, for the intelligence NCO position in the team, a person should be selected who has an interest in different cultures, history, and geography. Here the person’s initiative becomes very important, as a person who is very interested in his specialty could find that his job could also be his hobby. To be an expert on a country or on an AOR takes a lot of time. This is time, specifically out of office time, that the person would have to spend to keep himself up-to-date on the target area’s political, economic, and military situation, currently, in the past, as well as perspectives for the future. The person also has to be familiar with the traditions, customs, and family or tribal bonds of the area. Everyone can see that this is infeasible to do within office or duty hours in addition to the completing one’s regular training. As Hasler says, information is disseminated to the team intelligence NCO from the company and battalion intelligence officers; however, to have a central source for the teams is absolutely necessary. Here, it can be important to have a source similar to the US IEW system; likewise, access to the Sipernet, as was discussed in the previous chapter, could offer an important research tool. At the initial stage, it may be enough to have a couple computers with high-speed internet in a separate room where the NCOs can print out information, file it, and then organize the information according to countries and topics. In this way, information is up-to-date, while researchers can interact with each

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54 Hasler, Jeffrey L. CW3. *A Self-Directed Program For Survival: The Use of Open-Source Material in Preparation for Deployment to Unusual Places*, yet unpublished article, Monterey, 2004 The author, Hasler is a Special Forces Warrant Officer with several years serving as an intelligence NCO and as a second commanding officer in an A -team.
other in order to maintain a broader knowledge. In addition, they can analyze information together and come to conclusions regarding future trends, which they should be able to report to the battalion S2 via the company intelligence NCO. Yet again, it has to be stressed that this type of information gathering is independent from the regular Information Preparation for Battlefield (IPB). Before deployment, the necessary information regarding the mission comes from the battalion S2 officer. This information collection can be just an extra; however, as Hasler states, sometimes it can save the team’s life in the field.

C. COMPANY LEVEL

The company HQ or SFODB is a very important level within the SF structure in the United States. That is a multipurpose C2 element and can cover from one to six SFODAs. The FM 3-05.20 states its primary missions are: “to act as an advanced operational base (AOB), a SOCCE, or an isolation facility (ISOFAC)…The SFODB can also deploy to conduct SF operations in a specified AO or JSOA.”55 In Hungary the significance of the company level is also very important considering the country’s budget and deployment capability. Since the company level will be deployed quite frequently, it is going to be responsible with all the C2 and intelligence tasks for the teams. In the SF Company Headquarters (HQ), according to the draft structural plan, will be assigned one operation officer (O2) and four operation NCOs. One of the operation NCOs has the responsibility for dealing with intelligence issues. As was examined previously, three target areas can be assigned to the SF in Hungary. One per each company, thus in the case of the company level intelligence NCO, he can be assigned one area and gather as well as disseminate information within the company or, in some cases, within the battalion. He has to cooperate and coordinate intelligence tasks through the designated channels. Using these channels, he has to be prepared to deal with other national or foreign intelligence organizations or military intelligence personnel when the company is being deployed abroad.

55 FM 3-05.20 Chapter III (Special Forces Organization)
D. **BATTALION LEVEL**

The intelligence team in the battalion staff has enormous intelligence responsibilities. They have responsibilities to manage all of the intelligence requests and requirements for the battalion. The planned number of intelligence personnel in the battalion is four. Besides the chief S2 officer, who is a major, are assigned a captain as an intelligence officer, an intelligence NCO, and a geo specialist NCO. As opposed to the team and company levels, which should be area specific, the battalion S2 and its team should cover all the possible areas where the unit could be deployed. Concerning these areas, the S2 team has to have the most updated open and classified information with the analyzed future and possible outcomes of certain issues that could influence the unit’s activities. At present, the number of the S2 personnel is not sufficient to achieve this objective. The ideal would be four or five area specialists who could focus on certain parts of the world, collect and analyze the available information (open or classified) about the area, and be prepared to disseminate information to the teams if and when they have to be deployed there. They must be able to set up the AOR specific information requests that can go to the intelligence agencies (civilian as well as military) via the S2 officer and through the intelligence channels. The primary goal for the battalion is to have its own updated information database for all possible missions conducted by the unit.

E. **STRATEGIC LEVEL**

Above the battalion level should be some type of Special Operations Forces Command, similar to the SOCOM in the United States. During the start-up phase of this program, this responsibility will be assigned to the Joint Special Forces Capability Planning Group (JSFCPG), which should be ready for operations in early 2005. Foremost, this joint group will be a bridge that connects all the organizations at every level that have a role in the establishment of the SOF capability in Hungary. Its missions and connections in Hungary are outlined in the next chart.
It also includes the U.S. component represented by the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC). The ODC is responsible for all the financial, equipment, and human support that comes from the United States. The Hungarian components include all of the National Intelligence Services, the Joint Operational Center (JOC), the Joint Logistics Center (JLC), the Strategic Defense Research Institute (SDRI), the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Obviously, the group’s main task will be to cooperate with these elements and coordinate the cooperation amongst these elements. The group and their partners are shown in the next chart.
The final goal is to develop this group into a SOCOM type organization. The main task of the group, and later the command, will be to represent the SF unit at the strategic and decision making level in order to coordinate the cooperation between the unit and the intelligence services in Hungary and abroad in the GWOT.

In Linda Robinson’s book *Masters of Chaos*, one can read that the Army Special Forces are an essential element in the defense of the United States in the war on terror. Their role can be found in both overt and covert operations. Their capabilities and skills in low-visibility, clandestine missions in America’s interest are indispensable. In the case of Hungary, a final goal after the achievement of the SF unit’s combat readiness is to integrate it into the National Intelligence Community through the designated channels. The existence of such a unit in Hungary should not be seen as another rival organization within the intelligence community. The cooperation between the unit and other organizations could be the basis of Hungary’s contribution to the war on terror.
When Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs met with Secretary of State Colin Powell in Budapest, he declared that, “We are allies in the fight against international terrorism, and I believe we shall also be allies in supporting democratic tendencies around the world, because this is what really prevents terrorism.”\(^{56}\)

There is no doubt, however, that fighting against terrorism is only possible with an effective information network. This network is found not only inside the country, but also outside, through international cooperation. The SF battalion in Hungary will be able to contribute greatly to what Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs has stated. It can participate in the military aspects of the GWOT, and build democracies if it receives the mission and trust from the government and military leadership. It will be able to work together with not only the Military Intelligence Bureau, but also all of the other intelligence organizations in Hungary and of NATO. Based on their special capabilities, SOF battalion can exchange information on a daily basis with these organizations.

In conclusion, the intelligence architecture within a Special Forces structure is one of its most important components. In a constantly changing security environment, if one can be well informed and prepared, one can achieve victory over the enemy. The enemy in this era has many faces and fights in an unconventional manner; the response, therefore, cannot be achieved conventionally. Currently only the Special Force units are able to fight effectively within this modern battlefield. Intelligence has much more value now; this is especially true of human intelligence, which has received more attention after the Afghanistan and Iraq experiences. The purpose of the SF unit in Hungary has been defined and building an effective intelligence structure is a long process, yet the first phase of this process has to be initiated if we are to be prepared for the modern battlefield.

However, as it was already mentioned in a previous chapter, SOF represents HUMINT on the ground and for this reason depends heavily on sensitive national intelligence. Furthermore, it should be fully integrated into the national intelligence community as an information user and provider. In the last part of this chapter I will

\(^{56}\) [http://www.mfa.gov.hu/Kulugyminiszterium/EN/Archives/New_Site/News/040727_Kovacs-Powell.htm](http://www.mfa.gov.hu/Kulugyminiszterium/EN/Archives/New_Site/News/040727_Kovacs-Powell.htm) accessed November 18, 2004
introduce the intelligence community in Hungary, briefly analyze the community’s role at the national level as well as in the GWOT. Finally yet importantly, I will highlight some possible chokepoints that could have an influence on this integration process as well as on a daily routine between SOF and the intelligence services in Hungary.

F. INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN HUNGARY

The current composition and role of the intelligence services was defined by the Act No. CXXV, in 1995. “The general mission of the security services is the protection of the national security interests of the Hungarian Republic by performing tasks defined by the law of the constitutional democracy.”\(^57\) The protection of Hungarian national security is defined in a comprehensive way:

- The detection of efforts to attack the independence and territorial integrity of the country,
- The detection and prevention of clandestine efforts which may injure or threaten the political, economic and military or defense interests of the country,
- The acquisition of information about foreign countries or information of foreign origin that is important for governmental decisions,
- The detection and prevention of clandestine efforts to change or disturb through unlawful means the constitutional order that ensures basic human rights, the multi-party representative democracy and the functioning of constitutional institutions,
- Detecting and preventing terrorist acts, illegal weapon and drug trafficking, and illegal traffic in internationally controlled goods and technologies.\(^58\)

This Act defines five security services in Hungary as well (see Appendix A). These are the following:

- Intelligence Bureau (IB)
- National Security Bureau (NSB)
- Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB)
- Military Security Bureau (MSB)

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\(^58\) Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, (Budapest, 1995), § 3-8.
• Special Service for National Security (SSNS)

The five services can be separated into two main groups. Under the “civil national security services” can be found the IB, NSB, SSNS, and the MIB. The MSB belongs within the “military national security services.” The role of these services in the GWOT is vital. Hungary has devoted herself to democratic ideas and denouncing terrorism. Hungary’s Ambassador to the United Nations in New York, André Erdős, stated that: “The barbaric acts of September 11 have proven with elementary force that, in fact, terrorism knows no boundaries (...) their act is an attack against all we stand for, we believe in, against the very foundations of our civilizations.”

Hungary’s role in the GWOT is best defined by the National Security Strategy. Hungary believes that the solution can be found within enhanced bilateral and regional cooperation, joining forces on a broad international level and the coordinated action of international organizations. “The fight against terrorism requires an integrated approach that should include, inter alia, means of prevention and intervention, joint international efforts aimed at eliminating the material basis of terrorism, and the protection of critical infrastructure.”

Hungary’s determination in the GWOT, relative to the vital part of the intelligence services, did not start out after 9/11. As a consequence of the terror attacks in the mid 90’s, in 1998, Hungary and the United States developed a comprehensive plan to attack international organized crime and terrorism in Central Europe. Money laundering was also a significant problem in the country. In order to solve that problem Hungary endorsed the Act on Aggravation of the Provisions for Fighting Against Terrorism and for the Prevention of Money Laundering and on the Establishment of Restricting Measures on 27 November 2001.

Aware of the significance of regional and international co-operation: Hungary has concluded a set of bilateral treaties on terrorism with twenty-eight States, including most of its neighbors. In 1996, Hungary acceded to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism in the


60 Hungarian National Security Strategy III.3.1. Terrorism
With this in mind, today, one of the most important issues for the Hungarian intelligence services is to contribute effectively to the international effort against terrorism. The newly established SOF unit in Hungary will also have a large role in the GWOT. Their effective co-operation is vital to success at the end. The intelligence services are also facing with difficulties that can influence this desired co-operation with SOF. Although, it is not the purpose of this thesis to find the solution to these difficulties, the author would like to highlight them as a possible problem related to the Hungarian SOF unit’s future.

The first problem can be described with the regime change in 1989 in Hungary. As Tibor Babos summarized:

Before 1989, Hungary’s strategic responsibility was being the first line of defense as the most important country of the Warsaw Pact’s southern theater...The main target countries therefore, were Western Germany and Italy as well as the UK and USA. With the new internal and international environment, the whole previous defense and intelligence strategy collapsed overnight. The previous doctrines became irrelevant: the target countries, the enemies, the controlling authorities, the driving ideas and methods, the financial resources, external and internal relations, and the goals of these organizations changed as well...Though new services were created, they were still based on the previous system. Most people did not realize that the Hungarian military and intelligence services, under the Warsaw Pact, had virtually the same doctrine and objectives as the USSR, which were to defend the Soviet Union first and Hungarian security and defense needs only secondarily.62

In addition to this problem, not only the enemy has changed overnight, but the ‘face of the enemy’ has changed as well. As the National Security Strategy stated, Hungary has no conventional threat within the near future. However, terrorism, organized crime, regional conflicts are making this security environment less stable than it was

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61 Babos, Tibor, Regulating the intelligence system and oversight in the Hungarian constitutional democracy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2003 pp. 25
62 Babos, pp. 44
during the Cold War. At the same time these problems also present completely different intelligence requirements. On the top of this SOF have also specific intelligence requirements that should be provided by the national intelligence assets.

To exasperate the problem, Hungary could not easily turn to NATO for a solution, because of the fundamental nature of the communist-type intelligence services, and the antagonistic former relationship between intelligence services of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Hungarian services were interested in maintaining their autonomy, while the Western services did not trust their Eastern counterparts… the global role of intelligence in the more complex international environment and multinational (UN, NATO, OSCE and other) operations has expanded…The transition process is more complicated for intelligence since NATO has no common intelligence system. Hungary was left without a model readily to copy and therefore had to create a hybrid system combining what they already knew, the old Soviet style, and what they were learning about the new Western system. Due to the sensitive nature of classified information and compartmentalized data that is common to intelligence, information sharing is very cumbersome and more difficult compared with other services.\textsuperscript{63}

The problem of the information sharing even among member states in NATO and European Union was analyzed in \textit{Paper 33} published by the Bonn International Center for Conversion regarding especially the role of SOF. “Special Forces rely on sensitive national intelligence, which member states are unwilling to pool or share because of jealously guarded sources and the risk of compromising such sources.”\textsuperscript{64}

A final possible problem can occur because SOF is going to be a newly established organization in Hungary. Although, the idea of specially trained unit is not completely strange to military and political leaders, in this form it is going to be unique at first. In the beginning, a lack of understanding regarding the role of SOF can exist. Not knowing the needs of SOF, by intelligence or by missions, can cause confusion.

Nonetheless, the current international security requires specially trained units in order to achieve victory. SOF units require an effective, well-organized intelligence

\textsuperscript{63} Babos, pp. 48

structure, which can be integrated into national level intelligence. National intelligence services and SOF co-operation is vital in this new type of warfare that based on information dominance.
V. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARIZING THE CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

After the Soviet Union’s demise and the end of the Cold War, new problems emerged. Current experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate that a so-called “fourth-generation warfare” or asymmetric warfare has developed and become the new threat. This new threat, international terrorism, is seriously challenging our global security. Terrorism itself is not new; however, it has fundamentally changed in nature. In the past, terrorism was used as a bargaining strategy by certain groups and was usually only a problem for local authorities. Now it has become an international network with a global agenda posing a considerable threat for Western democracies. In contrast, during the Cold War, the belligerents were more or less rational. Today’s enemies, such as terrorists, none-state actors, and insurgents are willing to pursue high-risk destructive strategies. Thus, traditional diplomacy, deterrence, and coercion may not always be effective. Insurgents are fighting unconventionally, in a way that huge conventional armies cannot fight effectively against; this is a “war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It preys on unrest.”

The U.S. Army Special Forces or so called “Green Berets” were designed and trained for unconventional warfare. They have proven their skills in wartime as well as in peacetime and have proven their reputation as an effective fighting force all around the world. For today’s challenges, they are the correct response to today’s changing environment as was proven in Afghanistan. Information dominance is one of the key factors in asymmetric warfare, especially information gathered by human intelligence. The ARSOF intelligence architecture is a mature, technologically advanced system. Nothing proved better in the war in Afghanistan than when ARSOF, along with CIA paramilitary units, achieved enormous

65 President John F. Kennedy’s speech at West Point, New York, 1962, the author found this quote in the FM 3-05.20 manual at Chapter I
success in the first phase of the fighting. Their success, and generally the vast capabilities of SOF, led the military and political leaders in the United States to increase the SOF personnel for the next five years.

B. ADVANTAGES OF ORGANIZING SOF CAPABILITY IN HUNGARY

Besides the United States, countries everywhere have realized the importance of the Special Operations Forces capability and have either started to strengthen or in case of Hungary, made serious efforts to establish such a force. Hungary’s goal with the SOF capability is two-fold. First, as a member of NATO and EU, Hungary has to be able to contribute effectively to the future operations of the Alliances. Second, it is in Hungary’s own national interests to have specially trained and equipped forces that are able to defend the country, yet also designed to deal with the current security challenges. The author’s aim with this paper is to recommend the emulation of this intelligence architecture within the SOF structure in Hungary. This recommendation is supported by three relevant points. First, the ARSOF intelligence has proven effective, and it has built a very good reputation all around the world. Second, most of the NATO’s standard procedures are based on the U.S. model; therefore, the emulation of this system helps Hungary to achieve a better compatibility with other NATO members and supports the country’s full integration into the Alliance. The last, yet possibly the most important, is that the United States is willing to help and support our effort to establish SOF capability in Hungary. This support includes financial, equipment, education, and human resources. Human resources is defined as Mobile Military Teams (MTTs) that come to Hungary and help in training or contribute to set up the basic principles and doctrines of the Hungarian SOF capability.

The author recommended one possible solution for the intelligence architecture within the SOF structure; moreover, the final goal should be the integration of the SOF into the National Security Services via designated channels, as both an information user and provider. In addition, it should be examined as to what is the best means the SOF in Hungary can work with these Security Services.

The Hungarian National Security Strategy claims that Hungary does not expect any conventional attacks in the next decade; small-scale wars, insurgencies, and terrorism
are, however, currently presenting major security challenges for Hungary. The establishment of SOF capability in the Hungarian Defense Forces is an urgent need. Yet, because the role of intelligence within SOF has been increased, Hungary should keep up with the current changes by starting to develop intelligence architecture simultaneously with other structural adjustments during the first phase of SOF capability development.
APPENDIX A. CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICES
APPENDIX B. CONUS ARSOF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Figure 1-1. CONUS ARSOF organizational structure.
APPENDIX C. SOF IEW REQUIREMENT SYSTEM

Figure 4.5. SOF IEW requirements system.
APPENDIX D. ARSOF INTELLIGENCE DATABASE

Figure 18. ARSOF data bases.
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NOTE: Correlation of SOF Command, Intelligence, Operations, and Logistics; arrows indicate directions of major influences.

Figure 1-9. SOF mission planning.
Figure 4-2. Organization, Military Intelligence Detachment, Support Company, Special Forces Battalion.
## APPENDIX G. IEW ASSETS

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**Legend:** * Conflict of War  ** Peace time

Figure 2-1. IEW assets by organizations and echelon.
APPENDIX H. STRUCTURE OF SFODA

- Commander
  CPT, 18A00
- Assistant Detachment Commander
  WO, 180A0
- Operations Sergeant
  MSG, 18Z50
- Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeant
  SFC, 18F40
- Weapons Sergeant
  SFC, 18B40
- Weapons Sergeant
  SSG, 18B30
- Engineer Sergeant
  SFC, 18C40
- Engineer Sergeant
  SSG, 18C30
- Medical Sergeant
  SFC, 18D40
- Medical Sergeant
  SSG, 18D30
- Communications Sergeant
  SFC, 18E40
- Communications Sergeant
  SSG, 18E30
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