From apartheid to democracy: the civil-military relations in the Republic of South Africa

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FROM APARTHEID TO DEMOCRACY: THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

by

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The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

This thesis analyzes the civil-military relations in the Republic of South Africa as of the end of apartheid. The analysis is based on the theoretical framework of Charles Moskos et al. Based on the development of the civil-military relations in the US as of the end of the Cold War, the Moskos paradigm uses a number of case studies such as those of the UK, France or Germany to confirm the US patterns and uses the paradigm to predict the development of the civil-military relations in Western type democracies. The basic argument is that a change in the international security environment such as the end of the Cold War and the balance of power has had implications on the perceived threat and consequently on the military’s mission, force structure, the dominant military professional, and the allocated budget. These changes have also resulted in a change of the military’s values and norms. Whereas formerly the politics and society were willing to accept that the military had its own unique values and norms because of the requirement to serve a presumed higher good, this no longer is the case. Moskos uses factors such as the changed relationship between the military and the media, the change in the public attitude toward the military, or the role of women and homosexuals in the military to show how the values and norms of the military are changing and how these changes are closing the gap between civilian society and the military. With regard to South Africa, the thesis will show that the civil-military relation has developed along the lines of the postmodern paradigm. However, the newly elected democratic government was challenged by the need to conduct a balanced transformation in which the South African Defense Force simultaneously had to build an institution that is transparent, accountable and representative of the societal demographics. Furthermore, the Department of Defence had to incorporate eight former statutory and non-statutory armies, guerillas, and African revolutionaries into one force and at the same time reduce the total number of soldiers and all this with a reduced budget in order to allow for social reconstruction and development. Additionally and contrary to the postmodern paradigm, the transformation of the South African National Defense Force and the civil-military relations are not only shaped by external factors but to a large degree by domestic issues such as the rate of poverty, distribution of wealth, crime or HIV/AIDS.
FROM APARTHEID TO DEMOCRACY:
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I. INTRODUCTION

The year 1989 marked the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. The implications on the international system were monumental. The bipolar World Order with its nuclear balance of power had come to an end. The large allied military forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact that had opposed each other found themselves either with a collapsed opponent or in the process of dismantlement without having had to engage each other. The militaries that had been optimized for the Cold War found themselves in a legitimacy vacuum at the beginning of the 1990s, as the general threat perception caused by the nuclear threat was replaced by a widespread feeling of peace. However, this military dilemma did not last very long.

The post-Cold War world order developed to be much more complex than in the previous era. The risk of a nuclear war between the two major pacts was replaced by a large number of interstate conflicts and wars. Classical military operations became exceptionally rare. Instead, an ever increasing involvement of militaries in operations associated to peacekeeping and peacemaking became the norm.

In the course of the 1990s, states redefined their security strategies. This had major implications on military missions, defense budgets, force structure, military professionalism, military culture and values, and the military’s relationship to society. In their study, *The Postmodern Military*, Moskos et al specifically establish a paradigm as to the development of the militaries in western democracies. The underlying theory is that changes in the international environment have implications on the relationship between the military and the civilian society. Examples of such changes are the threat of a foreign invasion before and up to the period of WW II, the nuclear threat of the Cold War and the absence of both with the end of the Cold War. A change in the international environment influences the civil-military relations because the threat perceived by a country and its citizens influences the degree to which the values and norms of the military deviate from those of the civilian society.

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2 Ibid, p. 2
The Moskos framework, which analyzes how the threat perception influences civil-military relations in western-type democracies, is based on the development of the US Armed Forces. The patterns of development are confirmed by a number of other case studies, such as the United Kingdom, France or Germany, and the results are used as a model to predict the development of militaries and their relation to civil society in western democracies. One of the cases used in Moskos’ study is that of the Republic of South Africa.

The Republic of South Africa experienced the end of its White minority rule and the beginning of the transformation to democratic political and military structures as early as 1987, when the National Party (NP) government and the African National Congress (ANC) engaged in the “talks-about talks” to initiate a transition and began to implement an interim government to oversee a transition to a post-apartheid order. The process of transformation coincided with the latest major change in the international environment, namely the end of the Cold War. This had a number of implications for South Africa.

South Africa found itself removed from its former isolated status with regard to its apartheid policy. Instead, it found itself in the centre of the focus of many western countries because of its status as a politically and economically dominant African country with the potential of driving and influencing African politics. Furthermore, although not having been part of the major alliances that opposed each other during the Cold War, its own specific threat perception of that period had ceased to exist, namely its concern of the spread of Soviet influence in southern Africa through its neighboring countries and the resulting insurgencies and counter-insurgencies.

Along with adjusting to its new role in the international context, South Africa simultaneously began with the transformation of the state, its institutions, the society and the military. With regard to the military, the first challenge was to begin the transformation of the military and place it under civilian control during the critical period up to the first democratic elections in 1994 and the phase of consolidating its democracy afterwards.

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This was accomplished by incorporating the former South African Defense Force (SADF), the Armed Forces of the former homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, and the former guerilla forces of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military arm of the African National Congress (ANC), and the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) into the new South African National Defense Force (SANDF). The SANDF was formed on 26 April 1994 on the basis of the Interim Constitution.4

Having said this, the reader could conclude that the factors influencing South Africa’s civil-military relations are comparable to those of the typical western type democracies, as Moskos suggests by selecting South Africa has one of his cases. However, South Africa faced and still faces a range of domestic challenges that do not match the Moskos-paradigm. These relate to South Africa’s apartheid history and its current socio-economic situation.

The civil-military relationship in South Africa has to be analyzed in the context of factors such as its unemployment rate, the distribution of wealth, the poverty rate, the HIV/Aids prevalence rate or such issues as the crime statistics, drug and small arms trafficking and how these relate to the military’s mission and its efforts to downsize and achieve demographic representivity after it had enlarged through the unification. Also, how these issues relate to the development of more common societal and military values and norms, which are the prerequisite for closing the gap in civil-military relations.

This thesis analyzes the civil-military relations in the Republic of South Africa and places these in relation to Moskos’ paradigm of the postmodern military. It will focus on the interaction between the society and the military based on value, culture and attitude. Furthermore, it will also focus on the relationship between the military as an institution and societal institutions such as the media. Contra the Moskos paradigm, this thesis argues that it is not only the threat perception that causes a change in the factors influencing the civil-military relations. Instead, the level of democratic consolidation and associated domestic issues also influence civil-military relations. This implies that the patterns Moskos identifies primarily serve to predict the development of civil-military relations in western type democracies that have comparable domestic issues. These

4 Ibid
patterns can only in part be applied to democracies that do not have comparable domestic issues. In the case of South Africa, the predominating issues are the requirement to simultaneously reduce the number of soldiers, integrate the former statutory and non-statutory armed forces and ensure that the military is representative of societal demographics, as well as coping with the implications of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which has direct influence on the transformation process.

Furthermore, this thesis will question Moskos’ conclusion that the factors leading to changed civil-military relations, such as issues of women and homosexuals in the armed forces or a greater independence of the media, have resulted in a closing of the gap between societies and militaries. Instead, this thesis argues that societies are less inclined to identify themselves with the necessity of militaries and their new missions in view of the absence of an external conventional military threat. Thus the gap between societies and militaries is increasing instead of decreasing. In order to decrease the gap between society and military, it is vital to promote common values and cultures through harmonizing military transformation with domestic issues.

The next chapter will present Moskos’ paradigm and analyze the case of South Africa along Moskos’ factors. Chapter III of the thesis will examine the factors unique to South Africa and put these in relation to Moskos’ paradigm. In Chapter IV, the thesis will make its case and provide a conclusion.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND SANDF’S TRANSFORMATION

A. INTRODUCTION

Moskos et al present a theoretical framework that can be used to predict the development of civil-military relations in western type democracies. The theory is based on the development of the civil-military relations in the US. The cases of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Israel, and South Africa are used to verify the patterns of development of the civil-military relations. Basically, Moskos et al analyze how western type democracies respond to major changes in the international structure and how this response affects the military and its relationship to the civilian society.5

The basic argument is that perceptions of the threats and opportunities presented by the international structure shape the military’s mission, its forces and thus its relationship to society. Furthermore, they argue that a nation’s culture and its shared memories condition both the military and its relation to broader society. In order to make their case, Moskos et al predict the evolution of a number of important civil-military variables such as the “perceived threat, force structure, major mission definition, dominant military professional, public attitude toward the military, media relations, civilian employees, women’s role, spouse and military, homosexuals in the military, and conscientious objection”6, as they are affected by dramatic changes in the international structure.7

Moskos et al base their analysis on two radical transformations of the international structure.8 According to Moskos, the transformations were initialized by the transition from the Modern to the Late Modern era in 1945 and the Postmodern era with the end of the Cold War roughly as of 1990. With regard to the military, the change from the Modern to the Late Modern era went along with a change from being optimized

5 Moskos et al, p. 265
6 Ibid
7 Ibid
8 Ibid
to protecting their own territories against a foreign invasion to preventing a nuclear attack as part of an alliance. The transition to the postmodern era was even more significant as the new world order required completely different military capabilities and skills than in the eras before. This and the next chapter will specifically focus on the implications of the post-Cold War international environment on the perceived threat and its implications on the civil-military relations in the Republic of South Africa.

B. THREAT PERCEPTION, DOMINANT MILITARY MISSION AND FORCE STRUCTURE

1. Theoretical Framework

The underlying theory is that the basic relationship between the military and society is shaped by the likelihood of war and the perception of threat. Since the end of the Cold War, Western democracies are not typically apprehensive of a military invasion or a nuclear threat by an enemy. Instead, the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia or in various African states such as Somalia or in the Congo show that tensions and violence occur within states. In addition, Western states are threatened by terrorism, either in unconventional form or with the potential of being served through the use of nuclear, chemical or biological means of destruction. The most recent and impacting attack was the terror act against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Although militaries in general tried to maintain their traditional war fighting capabilities, they found themselves ever more involved in operations other than war.

The fundamental shift in military missions with the end of the Cold War evolved from conventional territorial defense to multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Furthermore, armed forces are increasingly involved in transnational issues such as monitoring and taking action against drug trade, uncontrolled immigration, and environmental degradation.

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9 Ibid, p. 265
10 Ibid, p. 16
11 Ibid
12 Ibid, p. 17
13 Ibid
14 Ibid
The new mission profile has implications on the force structure. During the early Modern era up to the end of WW II countries depended on mass armies, which in most cases were recruited through conscription. The armies of the Cold War era were still large, however, more professional and in many cases consisted of all-volunteer forces. At the end of the Cold War, almost all Western democracies had decided to abandon conscription because there was no need for large armed forces. Consequently, the force structure of the postmodern military is characterized by smaller and more mobile armed forces. The implication of this trend is that the postmodern military is not as representative of society as it used to be when young men from all parts of a society were recruited for military service. The armed forces now have to compete with the economy and civil service sector in recruiting skilled personnel. The threat perception furthermore influenced the dominant military professional.

“The military’s genetic self image is that of a specialist in violence, ready for combat.” This statement certainly is true for the pre-Cold War period, in which military leaders were expected to be experts in the arts of war and leadership. As it is in the inherent nature of the profession, leaders will also in the future have to be skilled in their capacity of war-fighting and leadership. However, additional types of military professionalism, such as the “soldier-scholar” or the “soldier-statesman” will be required in the officer corps of the postmodern military. Keeping in mind the missions related to peacekeeping and peacemaking, military leaders will have to be more broadly skilled in order to gain regional, legal, sociological, public relations, and diplomatic expertise. Although military academies provide a certain amount of education, military leaders are required to attend civilian educational institutions to obtain the required degrees. The educational requirements in the postmodern era thus result in an increased interaction between military and civilian educational facilities, more comparable curricular and consequently a basis for a common understanding between citizens and soldiers.

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15 Ibid
16 Ibid
17 Ibid, p. 19
18 Ibid
19 Ibid
Concluding from the above, Moskos provides a framework that shows how the change in the international environment and the resulting threat perception has influenced the major mission definition, the force structure and the dominant military professional. In his approach, he reflects on how the threat perception influences the state as an institution with regard to the factors mentioned above. This certainly is the right approach to answer the question as to how formal civilian control over the military is exercised. It is the political realm that responds to a changing environment and assigns the respective missions to the military and approves the force structures, budgets and the military education. Through this formal civilian control of the military and the associated laws the state provides the basis for the interaction between the society and the armed forces.

However, for the underlying question of this thesis and for the factors Moskos goes on to analyze, namely the social factors, it is more important to pose the question of how societies react to the change in the international environment and how they perceive the threat that is posed upon their country. Considering that all political activity is mandated by the population, popular demand can apply severe pressure on political decisions such as budgeting issues. The threat perceived by the population thus also is of significance for the societies’ acceptance of the military.

2. The South African National Defense Force

South Africa’s strategic threat environment experienced a significant change in the course of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The end of the Cold War resulted in the ending of communist influence in Southern Africa. The country was in a situation of international isolation because of its apartheid policy and even countries that were supportive of South Africa, such as the US, the UK or Germany, were insistent that it give up its White minority rule. This in combination with the internal and external resistance to the state finally led to talks about unifying the country under a democratic rule. The prearrangements and first agreements began as of 1987 and South Africa conducted its first democratic elections in 1994. Although South Africa’s neighbors still were skeptical, specifically in view of South Africa’s economic and military potential, the probability of a direct military intervention had ceased.

According to Cilliers and Heineken, the mission of the South African military changed profoundly in the few years from 1990 to 1994. Whereas its mission was aimed
at “forward defense in depth to counter enemy invasion and to weaken the neighboring countries ability to support the ANC’s low-level insurgency campaign, it now became a military in search of a mission.”20

In the early 1990s the Sub-council on Foreign Affairs of the Transitional Executive Council acknowledged the existence of regional and national interests and that these could be threatened by deteriorating relations stemming from refugee migration, drug trafficking, arms transfers, and cross border ethnic, nationalist, and extremist activities.21 Based on this analysis, South Africa defined conflict prevention, the monitoring of events, involvement in preventive diplomacy, and the participation in developing a constructive new order on the African continent as its strategic aims.22 With regard to the armed forces, the interim constitution defined the protection of the nation, the fulfillment of international obligations, the preservation of life, health and property the provision of essential services, the maintenance of law and order, and social improvement as its functions.23

The White Paper on Defense of 1996 defined further special requirements for the future.24 It notes that South Africa has been welcomed into numerous international organizations such as the UN, the African Union, and the Southern African Development Community and that South Africa is expected to take an active role in these forums and with regard to peace and security in Africa and particularly Southern Africa.25 Furthermore, the White Paper specifically acknowledges that South Africa is not in danger of an immediate conventional threat and does not anticipate an external military aggression in the short- to medium term period. This threat assessment consequently leads to the conclusion that SANDF’s size, design, structure, and budget will therefore be determined by its primary function.26

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22 Ibid, p. 46
23 Ibid
24 Ibid
25 Ibid
26 Higgs, p. 46
On the basis of the South African Defense White Paper and the South African Defense Review, the primary mission of the SANDF is to preserve the country’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity. Since the strategic threat analysis rejects a short- and medium military threat and predicts that domestic, regional and global issues will influence South Africa’s security environment, it seems contradictory that the primary mission is oriented towards the defence of its territory. This has implications for the civil-military relations because the primary mission is not synchronized with the perceived threat. How should the South African society be willing to accept a military and the respective budget allocation if the military is an institution that is not oriented towards a perceivable threat? However, it should be kept in mind that the process of South Africa’s strategic reorientation was influenced by the Western school of thinking and direct influence of Western countries in the process. Thus, the major mission definition has to be seen with the backdrop of “preventing the involvement of the military in too many secondary functions and thereby its politicization and the incremental usurpation of the authority of elected civilian government by the armed forces.”

A number of secondary functions have been defined for the SANDF such as to support the police services, countering internal threats to the constitutional order, or border protection. The thesis will show that the SANDF is primarily conducting secondary tasks. If South Africa is able to maintain formal civilian control over the military as suggested above and at the same time finds popular support for its conduct of secondary tasks, then it is not conceivable why its mission statement is not adjusted to reflect South Africa’s real security needs. Why is the defence of South Africa’s territory the SANDF’s primary mission if it actually is tasked to conduct peace missions or support the police?

South Africa’s strategic environment and the newly defined missions impacted the SANDF’s force structure and the budget allocated to the Ministry of Defense. The newly elected government ended the conscript system in 1994, which had compulsorily


28 Ibid, p. 212

29 Ibid, p. 216 - 217
militarized 600 000 Whites. Apart from this huge reserve force, the new government inherited a full time component of 100 000 and additionally 36 000 liberation force combatants.\(^{30}\) By March of 2003 the full-time force had been reduced to 75 192 from an interim highpoint of 101 353 in 1996; a reduction of 25.9\%.\(^{31}\) It is expected that the targeted strength of 70 000 will be reached in 2004/5.\(^{32}\) Whereas the defense spending in 1989 was 4.5\% of GDP, it had been reduced to 1.4\% of GDP by 1999.\(^{33}\) This peace dividend allowed the government to redirect substantial resources toward social reconstruction and development programs.\(^{34}\)

The SANDF’s key policy developments and present real world tasking are directed toward and driven by the government’s foreign policy initiatives. The South African military consequently focuses on external deployments and specifically peace missions.\(^{35}\) In 2003, over 3 000 members of the SANDF were deployed in peace support operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Liberia as part of the AU or UN missions and in various roles such as part of the peace support missions or as observers.\(^{36}\)

Furthermore, the department renders humanitarian and other support to other departments such as to the South African Police Service in assistance of crime prevention, stability restoration, rural security and border line control.\(^{37}\) In the time from 2001 until June 2003 the territorial reserve has been tasked in 92 888 urban and rural activities in support of the SAPS. Characteristically, these tasks consist of farms visits,

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\(^{30}\) Modise, Joe, Realising our Hopes – Address by the Minister of Defence on the Defence Budget Vote, 9 March 1999, [http://www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za/articles03/defence_budget_vote.html](http://www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za/articles03/defence_budget_vote.html) (06-07-2004), p. 2


\(^{32}\) Ibid

\(^{33}\) Modise, p. 2

\(^{34}\) Ibid


\(^{36}\) Ibid

\(^{37}\) Ibid
foot patrols, motorcycle and equestrian patrols.\textsuperscript{38} The Full-Time forces were involved in following operations in support of SAPS from January to March 1999: the Air Force flew 951 hours, 678 illegal weapons were recovered, 16 628 illegal immigrants were arrested, 255 vehicles were recovered, 1 991 suspects were arrested, 93 461,688 kg of dagga was confiscated, 859 livestock recovered, and 526 hours were flown for border protection operations.\textsuperscript{39} With reference to an announcement of the South African President in February 2003, SANDF’s support for SAPS is to be phased out by 2009.\textsuperscript{40} At present it seems unlikely that the SAPS will be able to provide police services in both the urban and rural areas in view of its manpower and budget. Whether the territorial reserve forces, which provide the largest part of the support for the SAPS, will be taken over into SAPS is not clear yet. It also has not been decided if they will operate under the SAPS or SANDF chain of command.\textsuperscript{41}

These figures clearly show that the SANDF is tasked along its secondary missions and not its primary mission. The smaller part of its manpower is dedicated toward the government’s strategic outline and its new international interests and responsibilities, namely peace missions. I regard this kind of mission as being rather abstract to South Africa’s general society and thus potentially the kind of mission that sooner would increase the gap between the military and society than vice-versa. Furthermore, the data above indicates that the majority of the military activity is focused toward supporting the police in domestic issues. Politically, it is understood that this is the only course of action to maintain domestic law, order and stability for the period of South Africa’s transformation and also that of the police force. However and with regard to civil-military relations, the military should in general be kept out of the domestic realm because it is not trained to conduct peace functions, does not have the same legal rights as the police. Although the role of the military in support of the SAPS seems to be appreciated in


\textsuperscript{39} Operational Statistics of the SANDF for Period 01 Jan to 31 March 1999, \url{http://www.mil.za/News & Events/MediaStatements/Statements1999/operational statistics of the sa.htm}

\textsuperscript{40} Schmidt, p. 1

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid, p. 3-4
In general, it is only a question of time until this has negative implications on civil-military relations because of possible controversies in the military’s conduct versus their legal rights and the question of the budget allocated to the military for such tasks versus a stronger support to develop the police force.

In conclusion, the SANDF is focusing its strategy primarily on two issues. First, it is tasked for operations in the domestic realm in support of the SAPS and is thus taking a stabilizing role in interior affairs. Second, it is tasked in support of AU, SADC and UN missions, which gives it the character of an expeditionary force with the need to project power far beyond South Africa’s borders. Apart from focusing on these secondary missions, the SANDF is maintaining its capacity to conduct its primary task, which is to defend the territorial integrity of the country; a deterrence role. At present, the accomplishment of SANDF’s primary mission is inherent in the achievement of its secondary functions. Considering the missions that the SANDF has been involved in so far, none of them have been in the context of its primary mission. All of SANDF’s missions were secondary missions and in the majority of the cases in the interior. Of course one could argue that the achievement of the primary mission is inherent in the secondary missions. This would be in line with the postmodern paradigm because most of the case studies also have defined the defense of their territorial integrity as their primary mission. The question is, is there a need for the definition of specifically this primary mission definition? If the basis for the postmodern paradigm is the absence of a conventional threat, then what is the need for conventional forces?

Considering the need for social reconstruction and development and the need to ensure stability and security, South Africa should define tasks in support of the AU, SADC, and UN missions as SANDF’s primary mission. This would be a huge step towards a postmodern strategy and military. The defense of the territorial integrity would

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42 Schmidt, p. 1-4
44 Ibid
be inherent in this mission definition because preventive diplomacy and defence in the sub-regional and regional alliances would ensure South Africa’s security. Furthermore, it would also prevent a further involvement of the military in interior affairs. This is a prerequisite for sound civil-military relations because it would end the involvement of military personnel with its lack in policing qualifications, jurisdiction and debatable chains of command, all of which are harmful for civil-military relations. With regard to recruiting and equipping personnel, a much smaller military that is optimized for expeditionary purposes as part of an alliance should be easier to man and equip. The consequence would be that it could concentrate its budget to form the necessary small and qualified expeditionary force. This would be acceptable for the society because the military would not be involved in controversial tasks in the interior or maintaining a force structure that is not in line with the currently perceived threat.

South Africa’s threat environment consists of those factors that might destabilize its political, economic, and societal structures, which is poverty, crime, and the possible implications of HIV / AIDS. These are the same factors that threaten the regional stability and security. The future will show whether a truly postmodern security strategy will aim at containing these external threats through preventive political and economic diplomacy and an armed force with a mostly expeditionary character to back up the policy. Furthermore, that the internal destabilizing factors will be encountered by political, economic, and societal means, backed by a police force that has the capability to cope with the issues. This certainly would have severe implications on the SANDF’s present mission, force structure and the allocated budget. It also would have further implications on the civil-military relations.

The less the armed forces have interaction with the society, the more difficult it becomes to close the gap between the society and the armed forces. The SANDF consists of an all-volunteer force that has been drastically reduced in size and might be further reduced as suggested above. If the capacity of SAPS is increased and the support by SANDF is phased out by 2009, the SANDF will hardly be present in society and certainly not to the extent that it has been for the last ten years. The result will be that the SANDF is a highly specialized, highly mobile and small force consisting of volunteers that
operates outside its own country. This unfortunately is the best prerequisite to develop an attitude of ambivalence at the maximum on behalf of society.

The profession as a soldier will be seen as equivalent to any other profession. The death of a soldier in the course of a peacekeeping mission consequently will be valued comparable to any accident in any company. This assumption is underlined by the observation that the death of six SANDF soldiers in the course of an accident during the peacekeeping mission in the DRC was not even worth a headline or front page coverage because this accident coincided with the elections and the dominant themes of the elections were domestic and not foreign policy.46 Finally, the civil-military relations will thus not be guaranteed by a common understanding between civil society and the military based on common values and norms but primarily based on the formal oversight through the executive and the legislative. However, this observation makes it even more important for the legislative and the executive to ensure that there is no deviation between societal and military values and norms.

C. PUBLIC PERCEPTION AND MEDIA RELATIONS

1. Theoretical Framework

Moskos makes the case that the public attitude toward the military changes in the course of time and depends on the perceived national threat. However, the change in public attitude is more complex than just described. Moskos points out that although the public support for the military as an institution and its budgetary demands was positive during both world wars, in the case of the US the public was much less supportive during the Korean and Vietnam War. Furthermore, the public attitude in general is one of indifference since the end of the Cold War.47 The phenomenon described as complex and inconsistent is valued as quite logical from this point of view and has implications for the situation of the postmodern military.

The American public was supportive of the military in both world wars and the Cold War because it perceived a direct threat. In the case of the Korean and Vietnam War

46 Esterhuyse, p. 1 - 4
47 Moskos, p. 19-20
it is suggested the threat was rather abstract and not directly perceivable. As to the postmodern military, most military involvements are conducted out of national interests and humanitarian reasons. Thus, there certainly is no threat that can be perceived by the public. Why then should the public be anything else than indifferent at maximum toward a military operation that for most of the public serves abstract national interests? Furthermore, since postmodern armed forces do not consist of conscripted citizens but of all-volunteer forces, the society generally is inclined to regard these forces as carrying out a duty of their choice and one for which they are being paid. This point of view can only result in societal indifference toward the military. The personal identification with the military or someone serving in them has ceased to exist with the end of conscription for most parts of society. At least the discourse between the military and society was more intense and widespread when many citizens had own family members or someone they directly knew in the military. Apart from the threat perception, the media plays a vital role in forming public’s opinion.

The role of the media in relation to the military has changed considerably from the modern to the postmodern period. Initially, the media used to be integrated and incorporated in the military system through WW II.48 During the Cold War period, the media was no longer incorporated in the armed Forces.49 However, the armed forces still exercised a high degree of control over the media by pooling the press and choosing journalists who would be given access to the troops.50 In the post-Cold War era, the media is autonomous and free in the choice of its contents and the time of transmission to the outside world.51 As opposed to the Late Modern period, the media is courted by the military in the postmodern era.”52 However, this change in the relationship between the media and the military is not a result of the change in the threat perception.53

48 Moskos, p. 20
49 Ibid
50 Ibid, p. 21
51 Ibid
52 Ibid
53 Ibid
Technological advance such as the World Wide Web or direct voice and picture transmission allows the media to cover events almost from any spot of the earth at any time, as the news coverage of Somalia, Bosnia or Iraq has shown. This not only makes the media independent from technological assistance but also from the choice of the topics and incidents. The reporting of the US soldier who had been pulled through the streets of Mogadishu clearly still is very fresh in the minds of the international public and provides a clear case of how such news can influence the public’s opinion with regard of the nature of the operations their country is involved in and up to which degree the public is willing to lend support.

The change in the threat perception has resulted in a changed primary mission for the Western militaries as indicated above. The involvement of militaries in foreign countries as part of peacekeeping or peacemaking missions to serve national interests is being questioned and discussed controversially by the media as the case of the US involvement in Iraq shows. However, more and more social issues have also shifted into the centre of media focus. These issues involve all aspects of the military that directly interrelate with society such as crime and violence through soldiers, racial misconduct, or equal opportunity. As it is in the nature of the media to report news and sensations, the coverage seldom will address issues that function well but those that are out of the norm. This signifies a change of roles in the relationship between the military and the media in which the military takes the reactive part.

The new relationship between the military and the media, which coincides with the change from the late modern to the postmodern era, has placed a significant strain on the military institution and contributes to civilian control over the military. Regularly, the military finds itself in making the headlines on social related issues. As opposed to the proactive and controlling function during the former era, the military is in the reactive role. It has to justify itself and when a headline is made, has the weaker position. In most cases, and as will be addressed later on, such headlines most often result in parliamentary investigation committees.

2. Public Perception and Media Relations in South Africa

The public perception of the military in South Africa before 1994 has to be seen with the background of South Africa’s ethnic and cultural divisions and the historic
differences between English and Afrikaner understanding of patriotism. Generally, most Whites supported the military in the 1980s. This primarily was a result of an evident increase in a communist and communist-inspired insurgency threat, which had implications such as militarization of the society through the media, the educational system and through conscription. In contrast, the African population openly resented the South African Defense Force (SADF) because they considered the SADF to be a racist system that aimed at preserving White supremacy.

A study by the Human Sciences Research Council indicates that the interest in the armed forces and the willingness for personal involvement is linked to the perceived threat. The questioned persons were very willing to commit themselves for the protection of the country in case of a direct threat or to maintain law and order as part of the Past-time Services. However, they generally were unwilling or very unwilling to get involved for the sake of international reasons such as in peacekeeping missions. This is a clear indicator that a direct threat clearly influences the public attitude in favor of the armed forces and also mobilizes the public towards involvement, whereas an indirect or abstract threat rather distances society from the military. However, the postmodern paradigm is based on the premise that the era of mass- and homeland defense armies is a matter of the past because of a missing conventional threat. This also is the case for South Africa. If the South African government as a consequence decides to reshape its military into a small expeditionary force that operates beyond the country’s borders in pursue of national interests and as part of supra-national organizations, as suggested earlier on, then it will face an increasing civil-military gap that it will have to take special care of. Considering the postmodern threat environment and the budget constraints, it is likely that the South African military will develop along the lines as previously indicated and face the civil-military issues that are characteristic of western democracies.

54 Cilliers and Heinecken, p. 247
55 Ibid
56 Cilliers and Heinecken, p. 247
58 Ibid
Although the SANDF is almost representative of societal demographics and its mission definition and force structure have developed along the lines of the Moskos framework, the public attitude towards the military in South Africa deviates from that of the postmodern paradigm. Whereas the public attitude with regard to the postmodern paradigm has changed from one of either support or opposition to a general ambivalence, the SANDF still enjoys a supportive public attitude because of its involvement in combating domestic crime and conflict in support of the police.59 However, the future of the military is no longer one of the major issues that it used to be at the beginning of the transformation process at the beginning and the middle of the 1990s.60

It is only a matter of time until the public attitude towards the military in South Africa will evolve to be one of ambivalence in line with the postmodern paradigm. The factors in favor of this development also correspond with Moskos’ framework. Conscription was abolished in 1994, which reduces interaction and interest between society and the military. Furthermore, the society does not perceive an immediate external threat that would encourage a public debate about the development of the military’s structure and capabilities. The defence budget has been reduced and resources are being redirected in favor of social reconstruction and development, which are of higher importance to the public than the development of the military.61 The plans to phase out SANDF’s support of the SAPS by 2009 will most probably lead to a change of the still supportive public attitude to a stance of ambivalence.

In contrast, the relation between the media and the military has evolved exactly along the lines of the postmodern paradigm. The incentives for the change in the relationship were the rights ensuring the freedom of speech and information that were inaugurated with the interim constitution of 1993 and the constitution of 1996.62 Whereas in former times the Afrikaans-controlled media was incorporated in the military and had been politically controlled and the English press was much more ambivalent in its reporting on the armed forces, the media has become independent since the end of 1993

59 Cilliers and Heinecken, p. 247
60 Ibid
61 Ibid
62 Ibid, p. 249-250
and consequently finds itself courted by the military.\textsuperscript{63} The new military finds itself in the situation in which it has to provide information as freely as possible and is cooperating with the media.\textsuperscript{64}

The media coverage of SANDF’s intervention in Lesotho in 1998 as a part of Operation Boleas underlines the new media independency and the impacts that news reports have on the military institution and the government.\textsuperscript{65} The SANDF’s intervention in Lesotho was widely covered in the media, especially because the mission characterized the new nature of South African military involvement.\textsuperscript{66} The nature of the news coverage was predominantly negative and focusing on issues such as the lack of intelligence, poor coordination in the chain of command, too fast military engagement and too little focus on preventive diplomacy, a poor status of combat readiness, and that the military had underestimated its task.\textsuperscript{67} The media’s interpretation of the events with regard to the intervention caused strong responses by the government and the military, primarily indicating that the coverage was biased and did not place the issues into the whole context.\textsuperscript{68} However, the news coverage induced an open debate in which the government and the military actively participated in order to resolve questions and biases and to draw the necessary conclusions for future military engagements.

In conclusion, the postmodern relationship between the media and the military is desirable but also goes along with a negative influence on the civil-military relations because it strongly influences the public attitude. Again, this is clearly underlined by the

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid, p. 250

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid

\textsuperscript{65} Operation Boleas was a Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) operation to deal with the deteriorating security situation in Lesotho in September 1998. The civilian and military uprising in Lesotho was caused by oppositional parties who demanded that King Letsie III dismantle the parliament because its election had been a fraud. SADC mandated the operation after it was requested to intervene by Lesotho’s Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili. 600 SANDF soldiers and 200 Botswana Defense Force soldiers were tasked to intervene, create a stable environment and restore the necessary law and order to allow negotiations between the political parties in that country. It was the first such operation for the SADC and for South Africa. The development of the situation in Lesotho, the mandate and South Africa’s conduct has been the basis for various controversial discussions and articles. Summary from Theo, Military Intervention in Lesotho: Perspectives on Operation Boleas and Beyond by Theo Neethling, footnote 66.

\textsuperscript{66} Neethling, Theo, Military Intervention in Lesotho: Perspectives on Operation Boleas and Beyond, in The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Tabula Rasa Institute, Issue 2.2, May 1999, ISSN 1522-21XX, \url{http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/p2_2neethling.htm} (06.10.2004)

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid, p. 3

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid, p. 4
case of the death of the soldiers in the DRC. Because domestic issues were predominant during the elections, the death of the soldiers was not worth a headline. Previous reporting on the military in context with domestic issues was predominantly negative and focused on issues such as racial tensions, a high HIV-infection rate, disciplinary problems, or the controversy concerning the procurement of new equipment.\textsuperscript{69} The postmodern SANDF finds itself in a situation in which is not a unique institution that deserves very specific media attention because of a possible higher cause but simply is a part of society just like any other. It is thus treated by the media just like any other, meaning that the media will report whatever can make a headline, and these headlines will most often not be positive and will not be placed into the context of all those other issues in which the military is doing well. This in turn requires the military in turn to be proactive and market itself through its public relations departments in order to counterbalance the media, which is necessary to maintain good civil-military relations as a basis for approved budgets and recruitment opportunities.

D. WOMEN’S ROLE AND HOMOSEXUALS IN THE MILITARY

1. Theoretical Framework

The evolution of the role of women in the armed forces and their acceptance provides evidence as to the degree in which the military has evolved along the paradigm of postmodernism.\textsuperscript{70} This also applies to the role and acceptance of gays and lesbians. Whereas women initially were excluded from the armed forces, except from serving in separate corps, they were integrated in various supporting roles during the Late Modern period of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{71} Although already beginning in the middle stages of the Late Modern period, pressures to incorporate women in all assignments and levels of command have grown since the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{72} The integration process was a gradual one from admitting women to the military academies in the middle of the 1970s,

\textsuperscript{69} Esterhuyse, p. 1
\textsuperscript{70} Moskos, p. 22
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid

21
through conducting gender-integrated basic training in the early 1990s up to incorporating women into all assignments, including combat roles as of 1995.\textsuperscript{73}

These changes had both positive and negative implications on the military’s reputation. The benefit without doubt was that the armed forces, as the last bastion in society, had taken on societal development and allowed women access to all services and ranks. However, events of sexual harassment or abuse such as those involving navy fighter pilots in Nevada in 1991 or an army training camp in 1996 were the downside.\textsuperscript{74}

The factor homosexuality is indicative as to how the military institution struggles to meet the postmodern paradigm and how these struggles are representative of issues that are contentious in society. Truly the policy toward homosexuals in the armed forces has only changed in that it has been addressed. The implications are the same as they have been in the past: once a member has ousted him- or herself, he or she will be discharged. As long as there is no knowledge of a service member’s sexual preference, it will have no consequences. With regard to the current contentious US discussion about same sex marriages for example, should it surprise that the military’s policy is not more liberal? However, it is worthwhile questioning the open-mindedness of the military institution.

The postmodern military is not being accepted as an institution with overly distinct moral and ethical values by society. It had to adapt to societal pressures, allow women in the armed forces, as well as having to cope with the factor homosexuality. On the other hand, the military has different demands on their soldiers a company has towards its employees. Eventually, the members of a unit will have to rely on team cohesion, be it in a war situation or in a peacekeeping / peacemaking operation. This is not said to return to the male dominated myth of the modern and late modern era. The underlying understanding is that women or homosexuals perform just as well as men would in a purely male environment. There is no doubt there is a clear potential for conflict in a gender mixed group. Furthermore, the impact on team cohesion and discipline in the case of a female-male constellation is no different from a male-male or

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid
female-female constellation. The point is that soldiers have to live up to moral codes that respect gender, race and religion. The way out for the military is not to exclude certain groups but to include and respect them as it is also done in society. Instead, harassment and abuse should consequently be penalized according to the respective laws.

2. **The Role of Women and Homosexuals in the SANDF**

The SANDF meets the postmodern paradigm as far as the integration of women and homosexuals is concerned in terms of legality. The legal and political integration is based on the country’s Constitution and consequently the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review, which do not allow any discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. According to the White Paper on Defence, women have the right to serve in all ranks and in all functions. The White Paper on Defence also declares that the armed forces have to be representative of society in terms of gender and race in order to ensure its legitimacy, specifically in the armed forces’ leadership. To ensure that these policies are implemented, a Gender Sub-Directorate has been established within the Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate, which monitors the advancement of women and ensures that women are properly represented, and also ensures that women have every opportunity to participate equally with male colleagues. As a result, salary scales, income-tax provisions, housing, medical aid, pensions, and group insurance benefits throughout the South African Department of Defence have been fundamentally revised. Furthermore, the recruiting process and opportunities of fast-tracking women are being monitored.

As of the end March 2003, the ratio of women in the Department of Defence has increased to 20.99% from 19.8% in 1994. Roughly 13% of these were in the armed forces in 1999 and serving in the Artillery, the Armored Corps of the Army, the Air Force...

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75 Heinecken, The Silent Right: Homosexuality and the Military, p. 2
76 Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence, 1996, p. 36
78 Col Motumi, p. 5
79 Frankel, Philip, Soldiers in a Storm, Westview Press, 2000, p. 130
as trainee pilots or in the infantry on operational duties.\textsuperscript{81} These figures are higher than most of the Western democracies. However, women are still underrepresented in the leadership level, which has implications on their influence on policy issues in the armed forces. Only five of the 150 brigadiers twenty of 654 colonels were women.\textsuperscript{82} In the Annual Report 2002 / 2003, the Department of Defence declares that the highest female composition per rank group occurs in the junior officer group. This is a suitable prerequisite for a better gender representivity in the leadership ranks in the future.\textsuperscript{83}

The legal basis described above is very liberal and also allows for a full integration of gays and lesbians in the SANDF. It has not been possible to obtain any statistical data, so that the discussion can only be theoretical and based on SANDF’s policy. The standing policy is such that homosexuality per se is no reason for exclusion from service in the armed forces in all functions and ranks. However, atypical or immoral behavior that affects military discipline or effectiveness will result in disciplinary action such as detention, reprimand, fine, or discharge.\textsuperscript{84} Although it has not been possible to find any definition of what is understood to be atypical or immoral behavior, the understanding here is that the implications on moral discipline, cohesion and effectiveness are the basis of reference. Thus, homosexuals underlie the same system of judgment and punishment as heterosexuals for the implications of their sexual behavior, be it immoral or atypical.

In general, the controversies surrounding the integration of women and of homosexuals in the armed forces are very much alike. They center around the questions of the impact on discipline, cohesion and morale, especially in the context of combat units in which success and survival heavily depends on these factors. With regard to the role of women, the question of psychological and physical capacity is raised. In the context of homosexuals, their sexual preference is generally characterized as a matter of choice and not so much as a biological feature. Consequently, homosexuals are

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\item \textsuperscript{81} Col Motumi, p. 4
\item \textsuperscript{82} Frankel, p. 131
\item \textsuperscript{83} Department of Defence, South Africa, Annual Report 2002/2003, p. 25
\item \textsuperscript{84} Cilliers and Heinecken, p. 257
\end{itemize}
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characterized to have a weak character and thus are not suitable for the specific requirements of the military environment.85

In general, the arguments that center on the issues of psychological, physiological, and character inadequacies are not very convincing. Firstly, all candidates have to undergo a series of tests and training to qualify for their respective areas of interest, irrespective of gender and sexual preference. Secondly, the change in the military mission, military professional and technological advancement opens much more opportunities for women, in which physiology is not the main or only determining factor, which it has not been in the past anyhow. Thus, the reason for the exclusion of women and homosexuals from the service in the armed forces has not primarily been their capacity and capabilities but the issue of acceptance in this environment which has been and still is dominated by men. Furthermore, the mindset in the military is reflective of the general mindset in society. Legal provision alone is no substitute for the necessary attitude and support that is required for a full acceptance and integration.86

The larger part of South African army officers officially identify themselves with the idea of women serving as combatants and also have understood the importance of equal opportunity as a factor that legitimizes the armed forces in society. However, this attitude still has to be fully internalized, just as it also has to be in the wider South African society.87 Generally, South African society has the attitude that the role of women in the society is not consistent with the exposure to the risks associated with serving in the security sector and thus opposes the idea of women in the armed forces. On the basis of this societal attitude, the seminars and lectures on gender equality have not resulted in a general attitudinal change.88 Furthermore, general society has not yet accepted the professionalization of women. This too is projected into the military.89

87 Frankel, p. 133
88 Ibid, p. 134
89 Ibid
Women generally are not able to compete with men for the higher echelons because issues such as marriage and raising children prevents them from staying in their career-track on a long-term and continual basis, achieve the necessary qualification and be promoted on equal terms.

In legal and numerical terms the integration of women and homosexuals into the SANDF meets the postmodern paradigm and is more liberal than most of the case studies. However, societal attitude reflects into the armed forces and poses the major obstacle for a full integration. The new nature of the SANDF’s mission, technological change and the shift in the nature of the military professional provide better prerequisites for the integration of women into the armed forces than in former times and will thus be a factor that makes the military more attractive for women. Generally, it is assessed that a change in attitude will still take time. However, the legal provisions and the educational efforts will influence the attitude of the men in the armed forces and might even turn out to place the military in the situation in which it will be the driving force for an attitudinal change for the role of women in society. The various interest groups, women or homosexuals, obviously have a better leverage to influence the military as an institution than they have of influencing general society.

The military has no leverage to prevent a general public attitude of indifference with regard to the changed security environment because the society has little contact with an all-volunteer force that primarily operates as an expeditionary force. However, it can very well use social factors such as gender and racial equality to improve the civil-military relations. It is easier for the military as an institution to promote truly postmodern attitudes and moral codes because it can directly influence people and control the outcome. The military is thus in a situation in which it can set the precedent for future societal development.

This chapter has provided an insight into the development of the civil-military relations in western type democracies since the end of the Cold War. The development of the civil-military relations from the modern to the postmodern military is based on a theoretical framework by Moskos et al. Moskos’ underlying argument is that a change in the international security environment, such as the end of the Cold War, influences the
threat perception, which in turn has implications on military missions, force structure, the dominant military profession, and the defence budget. These are all either defined or granted by the legislative and the executive, which also ensure the formal civilian oversight over the military.

On the basis of the postmodern paradigm, this chapter has then explained how the changed threat perception has led to a popular understanding in which politics and society are not willing to accept that the military has a different culture, and different values and norms than society. The military was able to claim its own values and norms in former times because it was created to defend higher values and goods, namely the existence of a society. This is no longer the case. The postmodern paradigm uses factors like the independence of media from military, the change in public perception toward the military or the changed roles of women and homosexuals in the military to make the case.

This chapter has then analyzed the development of the post-apartheid civil-military relations in South Africa on the basis of the postmodern paradigm. As the end of apartheid and South Africa’s transition to democracy has roughly coincided with the end of the Cold War, South Africa’s threat perception has changed comparable to that of the western democracies. Consequently, the factors major mission definition, force structure, dominant military professional, and defence budget have also developed along the postmodern paradigm. With regard to values and norms, the development in the South African military can be regarded as more liberal than in most western democracies, at least in legal terms. Regulations and mechanisms have been put in place to ensure and control equal opportunity on gender and racial basis.

The postmodern paradigm is based on the premise that the change in the international structure and the perceived threat are the cause for the change in civil-military relations. This might be the case for western democracies that have all been consolidated and have reacted to the change in the international environment on a comparable domestic basis.

Post-apartheid South Africa was not only confronted by a change in the international security environment but also challenged by having to transform the country from a White-led repressive regime to a democratic system of transparency,
accountability and equal opportunity. Simultaneously it had to transform its military on the same basis and by integrating eight statutory, non-statutory, guerrilla, and African revolutionary armies. At the same time it had to decrease its defence budget in order to prioritize in favor of social reconstruction and development. Furthermore, the newly elected government additionally has to cope with issues such as the high crime rate, unjust level of education, poverty, and a high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate.

This all is said to make the point that South Africa as a consolidating democracy has a large amount of different domestic issues in terms if variety and intensity than the consolidated democracies have. Thus the case is made that for consolidating democracies like South Africa, the degree in which they get hold of their pressing domestic issues is equally important and causal for the change in the civil-military relations. The next chapter will analyse the influence of HIV/AIDS and affirmative action and their impact on civil-military relations in order to prove the case.
III. DOMESTIC FACTORS OF INFLUENCE

A. INTRODUCTION

Chapter II has provided an introduction into Moskos’ theoretical framework and attempted to show that the civil-military relations in South Africa have developed along the postmodern paradigm. The South African Constitution, the White Paper on Defence and the Defense Review provide the legislative and executive basis for the formal civilian oversight over the SANDF. Furthermore, they provide the platform for civil-military interaction on the basis of common values and norms.

Chapter II has hinted at issues that are not typical for Western democracies and pose an additional challenge for the development of the civil-military relations in South Africa. As opposed to consolidated democracies, the new South African government was challenged with transforming the state, the societal patterns and the military. Whereas racial and gender equality also are issues in many consolidated democracies, specifically racial equality has a specific value for South Africa. With the hindsight of the apartheid legacy, White dominance in the military will always have a different connotation and be associated with White supremacy. Thus, racial representivity is a major prerequisite for a general acceptance of the military in society. South Africa furthermore faces the challenge of simultaneously having to reduce the armed forces to meet its new force design, cope with a reduced budget and incorporating eight former statutory and non-statutory soldiers into one army. The transformation of the military is furthermore influenced by a wide range of different norms and values of the incorporated soldiers and from the different parts of society with their traditional patterns. Finally, domestic issues such as the impact of the crime or HIV/AIDS rate have direct implications on the transformation of the military and consequently on the civil-military relations.

The former South African Defense Force was directly tied to the apartheid-policy of the White ruling minority. The creation of SANDF was a very delicate process of institution-building and represented a task confronting the whole country.90 The social needs for greater legitimacy required the combination of the different statutory and non-

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90 Higgs, p. 46
statutory forces, transforming the apartheid state’s institutional culture into one of transparency, accountability and representivity and simultaneously reducing the defence budget in order to meet the demands for social reconstruction and development. Initially this process was focused on personnel issues. It concentrated on integrating a conventional White-led high-technology force with irregular, guerrilla, and mostly African revolutionary forces.91

South Africa is not facing a foreseeable conventional military threat. Instead, it is confronted by pressing domestic and regional issues such as an extremely high criminal rate, high rates of poverty in the country, and massive HIV/aids prevalence. These issues have the potential of destabilizing the country and the region. Naturally, these factors will be in the focus of politicians and society alike. The implications could be that the transformation of the armed forces becomes an administrative process that is only a sideline for the society that focuses on other, more pressing issues, and that the administrative process additionally is hampered by budget constraints.

B. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND INTEGRATION

The transformation of the armed forces in South Africa has to be seen in light of the need to integrate eight statutory and non-statutory forces into one force that is to serve the interests of the South African society. In order to establish the SANDF’s legitimacy, it had to be representative of all the various forces that were integrated. Furthermore, the transformation had to consider the different military cultures and norms and establish a new mindset that is representative of the whole South African society. With regard to affirmative action and equal opportunity, the aim is for SANDF to be representative of society in terms of racial proportionality. Racial proportionality and the associated issues per se are not unique to South Africa. With regard to the apartheid legacy, however, it has a specific and unique pressure with implications on civil-military relations. A new South African military would most certainly not find popular support if it gave the hint of maintaining features of the former White supremacy.

91 Ibid
Proportionality is not only to be seen as an average proportionality but in all levels of the hierarchy and in the various services. Thus the aim of affirmative action and equal opportunity also is to fast track those that formerly were disadvantaged. Those who have the qualifications for higher levels of command but were discriminated against in the past are to be promoted. Those who did not have the privilege of obtaining a higher qualification are to be qualified.

The aim to achieve greater representivity, especially in terms of race has made very satisfactory progress since 1994 as recruiting, post assignments, promotions and career development are executed according to the respective criteria for representivity.\(^92\) In order to ensure the right-sizing of the SANDF, the Department of Defence’s baseline target for race is 65% African, 10% coloured, 0.75% Asian and 24% White. By March 2003, the SANDF had 62% African, 12% coloured, 1% Asian and 25% White.\(^93\) The change of representivity from 1994 to 2003 thus is as follows: the ratio of Whites has decreased from 45.7% to 24.7%, Africans have increased from 37.5% to 61.58%, Coloureds have decreased from 15.7% to 12.41%, and Asians have increased from 0.1% to 1.27%. The racial distribution for the 20.99% of women for March 2003 was as follows: Africans 46.72% with a decrease of 3.24%, Asians 1.21% with a decrease of 0.12%, Coloureds 11.02% and an increase of 2.78%, and Whites 41.05% and an increase by 0.6%. Of the 79% of men 65.53% were Africans with an increase of 0.24%, 1.29% were Asians with a decrease of 0.13%, 12.78% Coloureds with an increase of 1.83%, and 20.4% were Whites with a decrease of 1.93%.\(^94\)

In a number of specialized functions and in the middle management level representivity has not yet been achieved or is difficult to achieve because the Department of Defence is competing against the private sector, which also aims at achieving representivity and is able to pay higher premiums specifically for qualified African personnel.\(^95\) Furthermore, the training of officers and non-commissioned officers takes years until they have grown through the various levels of rank and command. The most

\(^{92}\) Department of Defence, South Africa, Annual Report 2002/2003, p. 21  
\(^{94}\) Department of Defence, South Africa, Annual Report 2002/2003, p. 25  
\(^{95}\) Ibid, p. 21
significant shift has occurred on the junior level with an increase of Africans from 37.75% to 57.78% and a decrease of Whites from 45.7% to 12.36% in the last eight years. These figures represent the average in the Department of Defence.

An analysis of the figures of enlisted versus officers provides a different and more unbalanced picture than looking at the military as a whole. During a briefing of the National Assembly’s defence committee in March 2003 the Chief of the Army, Lieutenant-General Gilbert Ramano provided a somewhat different statistic. He stated that 92% of the privates were African, while just two percent were White. The disinterest of Whites to opt for this entry level has to be seen in light of their generally better education and the better options they have in the private sector. In contrast, White officers were overrepresented in the senior ranks. Although challenged with having to improve African representation and also having to rectify the skewed rank and age pyramids, the army has progressed. The number of African colonels has increased from 13% in 1998 to 31%, lieutenant-colonels have increased from 11% to 33%, majors from 27% to 38%, captains from 35% to 41%, and lieutenants from 39% to 57%. This statistic clearly shows that Africans make up roughly one third of the officers in the rank of major and above although the baseline requires a proportion of roughly two thirds. The research has not given any indication as to how critical this development is seen in the public and by the media. However, it is an issue for the Parliamentary Monitoring Group and the Department of Defence. The SANDF can not be interested in an overrepresentation of Whites in the higher ranks because of the arguments related to its apartheid legacy. The fast tracking of more junior African officers seems to be the solution to overcome this skewed proportionality. Although this would clearly be favorable for the civil-military relations, it would have a negative impact on the SANDF’s operational capability. Fast tracking of too many young soldiers into leadership positions invariably results in a loss of leadership and operational qualification.

The incredible overrepresentation of Africans at the entry level should similarly be a cause for worry. It is not so much the fact that 92% of the soldiers at the entry level...
are African and a mere 2% are White that gives the cause for worry but the reason. Lieutenant-General Gilbert Ramano argues that the White population that could opt for the entry level is generally better educated and thus decides for a career in the private sector. The implications for the SANDF is that it is not able attract well educated young people at the entry level because these opt for the private sector. With regard to the civil-military relations, these figures and observations indicate that the White population is still advantaged in terms of education and the military may be regarded as an institution that serves as an existence alternative for the not so well educated African youth. This invariably will increase the gap between the White population and the military as well as between the White and African population.

In summary, representivity in all regards is difficult to be achieved in the short- to medium term. Although huge progress has been made, certain areas still need attention. These are the specialized musterings such as those for pilots or technical engineers and the middle-management level that are dominated by Whites or the trend that the entry-level is dominated by Africans. With regard to the skewed numbers related to the specialized musterings, the legacy of the old school order, which did not place a primary focus on the study of mathematics or physics, has to be overcome. In response, the Department of Defence has embarked on a Youth Training Program, which provides additional education to disadvantaged school leavers so that they can improve their Mathematics, Physical Science and Biology through re-writing these Grade 12 subjects, and thus qualify for possible assignments in the Regular Force.98

The composition of the former forces in the SANDF is decreasing in light of natural attrition. In 2003 the ratio of members in the Department of Defence with no association to any of the former forces was 23.6%. This figure is increasing rapidly with each new intake and symbolizes the new SANDF.99

The question now becomes: what implications does a more representative military have on the cultures and norms of the military and how do these relate to the society? The

99 Ibid, p. 22
new South African society consists of citizens with different political, societal and especially historical backgrounds. The fact that parts of the population have historically been directly opposed certainly impacts societal culture and will continue to do so for the next generation. Thus, it also invariably affects the SANDF’s culture.

Since racism is an issue in society, it also is an issue in the Department of Defence. However racism may be defined, it exists in the armed forces. Racism can take forms of true discrimination but it can also be subjective in the sense that the interaction between superiors and subordinates of different races might under certain circumstances be felt as being discriminatory. What is more important though is the aspect of interaction that remains unrecorded and is not spoken about. For every incident of racism there are numerous unrecorded incidents of open and honest interaction and understanding.

The Setai-Report suggests that the soldiers who have directly joined the SANDF and did not serve in any of the former forces are largely racism and bias free. This had been evidenced in units such as the Army Gymnasium and 3 SAI Training Department where new intakes of the Voluntary Military Service are trained annually.\(^{100}\) This observation obviously is indicative of the fact that there is a change in societal attitude among the younger generation that is spilling into the military.

Besides accepting this encouraging societal spill-over, the Department of Defence is taking a top-down approach to assist this change in attitude as well as to influence and change the attitude of the personnel that has been integrated from the various different forces and have stronger biases. While recognizing the existence of different political outlooks based on historical and racial differences, the SANDF is conducting a number of programs to encourage mutual understanding and promote reconciliation such as inclusive recreation days. Furthermore, it has put a mechanism in place that will allow it to deal with racial biases in a consistent manner. These mechanisms include measures like disciplining negative behavior, post trauma counseling and assistance of victims and bystanders as well as transparent public relations methods to cooperate with the media with the aim of achieving balanced and accurate reporting.\(^{101}\)

\(^{100}\) Ibid, p. 43
\(^{101}\) Ibid, p. 44
Here again, racism is not unique to South Africa. Almost all countries experience racism in various forms and intensity. However, in these cases they are a part of consolidated societal patterns and dynamics. In the case of South Africa, it has clear implications on the civil-military relations. In hindsight of the apartheid-legacy and the effort to overcome White domination, all institutions that symbolize White supremacy are in the focus of the general public, as is the military. Reports of racism in the South African military can have severe impacts on the civil-military relations because it might be regarded as an institution that still is dominated by the former White ruling elite.

Finally, the Department of Defence has promulgated its policy on a Shared Value System, the Codes of Conduct, and the Vision and Mission of the Department of Defense. These policies were distributed for popular input before approval and promulgation. Furthermore, Leadership and Ethics are included in the Human and Cultural development Curriculum.102

C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF HIV/AIDS

UNAIDS estimates that five million people in South Africa were infected with HIV at the end of 2002, which makes South Africa the country with the highest infection rate in the world.103 According to Kaczor, militaries have higher infection rates of sexually transmitted infections than surrounding populations, which means that the infection rates for SANDF are most likely higher than those for the South African population as a whole.104 These figures raise questions as to the readiness of the SANDF. With regard to this thesis, it raises questions as to which degree the epidemic might hollow out the SANDF’s structure and disrupt the fragile process of building a democratic and representative military as one major part of the national transformation.

102 Ministerial Committee of Inquiry (Setai Report), p. 44
HIV/AIDS in the military also has to be seen in the context of its potential of eroding and destabilizing South Africa’s development. It thus raises the question of what implications HIV/AIDS has on civil-military relations.

With reference to Nancy Mock, Kaczor presents conventional knowledge about HIV prevalence in African militaries. She primarily argues that soldiers are particularly vulnerable to HIV infection because they belong to the most sexually active age group, often are assigned posts away from their families, are absent from home for long period of time, regularly have cash to purchase sex, and that often sex can be purchased near military installations.105 Furthermore and with reference to UNAIDS estimates, she found that the HIV rate amongst soldiers is two to five times higher than amongst the civilian population.106 With the hindsight of this UNAIDS estimate and the fact that in 1999, 19.14% of the South African population was infected with the HIV virus, the SANDF should have a HIV prevalence rate of at least 40%.107 According to a health survey of the SANDF in July 1999, the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate averages that of the general society. However, an infection rate of 50% for soldiers in the age bracket between 23 and 29 years of age was observed.108 This finding has critical consequences for operational readiness and for the democratic development of the SANDF. It is this age group that provides the bulk of the operationally deployable soldiers. Furthermore, it represents the middle management group that is skilled for specific duties and has leadership functions.109 The hollowing out of this critical group has grave consequences on operational readiness. According to Heinecken, younger and less experienced soldiers will replace officers and non-commissioned officers dying of HIV/AIDS.110 However, the lack in leadership and operational skills and knowledge will be vast.

With reference to affirmative action, equal opportunity and the new corporate identity, this age group represents that part of the new SANDF that is racially most

105 Kaczor, p. 1
106 Ibid
108 Ibid, p. 110
109 Ibid
110 Ibid
representative of society. It is that group on which the society’s and the SANDF’s hope rest to grow up into the higher management level and ensure qualified and demographic representivity. It also is that group of the new SANDF that is fairly free of racial biases and represent the new corporate identity as suggested by the Setai-Report. If, as suggested by Heinecken, at least 50% of this group should have a maximum life expectancy of 35 years, then HIV/AIDS would strike a most serious blow to the fragile process of transforming and democratizing the SANDF. With regard to the transformation process, the influence of the older and integrated soldiers will dominate in the absence of a group that could counter-balance them. The top-down approach of controlling the societal dynamics as expressed earlier in the thesis will once again become important.

Furthermore, I argued earlier that the representivity figures at the entry level are skewed in favor of Africans. The figures for the army were roughly 90% Africans versus 2% Whites in the lower ranks with the reason being that Whites are generally better educated and thus were more competitive in the public sector. This phenomenon will be multiplied through the impact of HIV/AIDS. It can be assumed that the age group between 23 and 29 is not only most affected in the SANDF but also in civil-society and that the public sector will be very attractive for young South Africans in light of the higher remuneration. The public sector will be even more of a competitor in terms of contracting human resources since 25% of the South African workforce is estimated to be HIV infected by 2005. A possible implication could be that the SANDF generally might be experiencing difficulties in recruiting young and qualified candidates and might possibly have to revert back to compulsory service, which was abandoned in 1994. This certainly would not be the worst alternative with regard to the civil-military relations because the military would once again be more embedded in the society.

As indicated earlier in the thesis, the primary mission of defending South Africa’s territorial integrity and sovereignty is inherent in the accomplishment of its secondary functions, namely preventive diplomacy combined with peacekeeping involvement and the support of the SAPS. In order to contribute to peacekeeping operations, the SANDF

\[\text{Ibid}\]
\[\text{Ibid, p. 113}\]
aims at having two battalions available at all times. One battalion is to be ready for a short-notice deployment and one for reserve and rotation purposes. Furthermore, South Africa is keeping in line with the UN policy to only commit physically fit soldiers for such operations because the necessary vaccinations of HIV positive soldiers and their medical support in foreign environments is potentially problematic. Additionally, the participation in peacekeeping operations is on a voluntary basis only in South Africa. The consequence is that the SANDF is experiencing difficulties in ensuring the readiness of its two peacekeeping battalions.113 Presently, this seems to have no immediate consequences on the civil-military relations. Both the media and especially the general population are more focused and in approval of SANDF’s support of the SAP’s to maintain domestic stability and security.

The accommodation of HIV infected soldiers is one more issue with implications on operational, structural and resource considerations. The policy in the SANDF is to test and decline HIV positive candidates at the entry level or at the time of contract renewal. However, HIV infected soldiers will not be dismissed from active duty. In view of the restructuring of the SANDF, the civilianization of large parts of the supply and logistics branch and the outsourcing of numerous services, the accommodation of soldiers who are too ill for operational assignments is becoming increasingly challenging.114 The fact that the SANDF refuses to contract soldiers at the entry level or renew expiring contracts is being considered to be controversial in the public opinion and thus straining the civil-military relationship. The question raised here is comparable to that of the differing norms and values in the military. Why should the military be allowed to deny citizens the entry into the armed forces if other organizations and the private sector employ HIV infected people? Should the entry criteria for the military be so much different than those for other organizations? I think yes. As suggested earlier in the thesis, military personnel are highly mobile, are transferred regularly and one part of their operational readiness is determined through physical fitness. Just as certain intellectual capability are a requirement for certain levels of command in and outside of the military, physical fitness is a general requirement for a service in the military.

114 Heinecken, Lindy, Strategic implications of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, p. 111
The Department of Defence has embarked on a comprehensive strategy on various levels to prevent a further spread of HIV in the military and to support and protect the family members of soldiers. These entail the distribution of posters and information pamphlets, articles in military magazines, pre-employment counseling, sex and life-style education, and free condom provision. Furthermore, it has established structures that ensure the distribution of information, education of the personnel and the collection and evaluation of relevant data. A HIV committee has been created at the headquarters level that develops policies, controls and evaluates training and education, and gathers and analyses reports for the Surgeon General and the Department of Defence. Medical command units implement SANDF’s HIV/AIDS strategy and coordinate with educational officers on the unit level. As part of their pre-deployment training, soldiers are lectured and involved in discussions on how to prevent an infection with HIV or other sexually transmitted diseases.

The SANDF has put the necessary structures in place to contain the spread of HIV/AIDS by informing soldiers of the risk sources of obtaining the virus, the risk that soldiers themselves pose to society through unprotected occasional sex with changing partners and by providing means of protection and counseling. Further organizational measures could be to reduce the amount of regional transfers, especially in view of separating soldiers from their spouses. These structural and organizational measures are the best vehicle to achieve a change in attitude and behavior, which is the prerequisite for successfully containing a further spread of HIV/AIDS.

The military environment provides a favorable environment to positively influence a large group of citizens and reach attitudinal and behavioral change because soldiers have no choice but to participate in lectures and briefings. In so far it is a good starting point. The overall turn around of the trend is only achievable if the attitudinal and behavioral change can also be accomplished in society. Apart from possible setbacks through societal influence, the preferred treatment that soldier and their families enjoy in

115 Ibid, p. 112
116 Ibid
117 Ibid
118 Ibid
terms of education, health treatment and financial security increases the gap between the military and society. This is to be seen specifically in the context to the roughly 50% of the African population that has to live of the existence minimum, is cut off from most health benefits and is most vulnerable to HIV infection.
IV. CONCLUSION

Moskos’ paradigm has shown the transition from the modern to the postmodern era and how this has influenced the civil-military relations. Whereas the modern military was the hallmark of the nation-state and was “legitimated in terms of values and norms based on a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good.”119, the transformation to a postmodern military was influenced by the absence of a direct conventional threat as a result of the end of the bipolar world order and the Cold War. Based on the development of the US Armed Forces, Moskos’ paradigm is based on the premise that evolutions in threat perception lead to a change in a country’s security strategy, which in turn influences the military’s mission, its force design, the allocated budget, and the military professional.

Moskos implies that the formal civilian control over the military is given in that the legislative provides the definition of a country’s strategic interests, the military’s mission, and approves the force structure and the budget. Furthermore, the executive exercises civilian control over the military through its respective institutions and on the basis of the approved legislature. In the absence of a direct and conventional threat, neither the legislature nor the society are prepared to accept that the military has unique values and norms with regard to the specific requirements of protecting a presumed higher good. Consequently, the legislature provides the platform for civil-military relations and interaction on the basis of laws that are to ensure a common culture, and common values and norms. In Moskos’ paradigm, these are issues such as the independence of the media with regard to military matters and equal opportunity.

The civilian control over the military through the society is given through the information in military matters by the media or personal experience and approval of policy and budgetary issues through the society’s respective vote or protest by democratic means. The gap between the society and the military depends on the degree to which the military culture, value and norm is reflective of that of the society, and the degree up to which the society identifies itself with the role of the military.

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119 Moskos, p. 27
The South African security strategy and the military’s mission, its force design, and the allocated budget have developed along the line of Moskos’ paradigm. In the absence of a short- to medium term threat, the primary mission of protecting the country’s sovereignty has become inherent in the secondary missions of providing peacekeeping forces for UN-, AU-, NEPAD-, and SADC-missions, and assisting the SAPS in maintaining domestic law and order. The defence budget has been cut considerably in favor of redeveloping the country and providing basic social services. The SANDF, which constitutes the amalgamation of eight statutory and non-statutory forces, has been reduced considerably to meet the demands of its new mission and the budgetary constraints.

However, specifically with regard to the major mission definition South Africa has had and spoiled the chance of becoming truly postmodern. South Africa, just like all the other case studies in Moskos’ paradigm, has defined the defence of its territory as the primary missions for its military although the White Paper on Defence acknowledges that the country is in no immediate or medium term conventional danger. All the strategic documents acknowledge that the main policy development for the armed forces is focused on supporting AU, NEPAD, SADC, and UN initiatives. Instead, South Africa could have defined operations in support of the above mentioned organizations and in coordination with preventive diplomacy as the military’s main purpose. The result would have been that the Department of Defence could have more easily concentrated on what is becoming its main task anyway and would have spared the process of eventually having to redefine its major mission. This process will most certainly have implications on the civil-military relations as it will lead to controversial discussions and to a disruption of the presently still favorable public attitude.

Moskos’ paradigm also applies with regard to the societal factors. The media is independent of the military’s influence and the military has established public relations services that court the media in order to ensure objective reporting from its point of view. Although the military might often find itself in a reactive situation toward negative headlines, the media is a very ideal instrument to ensure civilian oversight of the armed forces. Of course the media generally reports what can make headlines, which means popular or sensational issues of public interest such as racism or gender issues. Even if
often times uncomfortable, media reports always invoke investigations and enquiries. This not only ensures that the dynamics in the military are in accordance with the given law. It also questions the legislative, which can be quite favorable for the military.

As to the role of women and homosexuals in the SANDF, the regulations, oversight mechanisms and structure can be considered to be truly postmodern and more liberal than most of Moskos’ case studies. Here again, Moskos suggests the gap between the military and the society decreases in the postmodern era because all the social factors induce more common values and norms. I am convinced that the military can not have norms and values that differ from those of society, which is absolutely in line with the paradigm. However, this does not automatically lead to improved civil-military relations. The death of the South African soldiers in the DRC and the fact that this incident did not make the headlines clearly indicates that the new mission profile of the armed forces is very distant from the media and general public interest. It will only shift into the center of the public focus if this new mission profile requires a budget allocation higher than what can be spared without impact on other issues and programs.

Moskos’ paradigm has turned out to be a valuable guide to the development of the civil-military relations in South Africa. However, his paradigm and case studies are based on the transformation of the civil-military relations in consolidated western-type democracies. Western-type democracies could transform their militaries and reshape their civil-military relations on the basis of existing structures, military and societal culture, and on a sound economic basis. South Africa, on the contrary, not only had to transform the military but also its society. This process was and still is heavily influenced by the apartheid-legacy with its societal and economic impacts, and its extremely high crime and HIV/AIDS prevalence rate.

Equal opportunity in the South African context not only applies to the equal rights of gender and sex but also of race. The process of creating a SANDF that is representative of societal demographics has developed very well. The statistics are skewed in specific areas such as the entry level in favor of Africans and at the management level in favor of Whites. The mechanisms in place to ensure equal representation in the management level seem sound and will solve the issue. However, it
is doubtful that equal representation at the entry level will be achieved in the short- to medium term because Whites have better opportunities in the public sector because of their educational benefit and their demographic proportion.

Finally, the apartheid-legacy with its attached issues have given the transformation of the SANDF a different and more challenging prerequisite compared to Moskos’ paradigm. However, the impacts HIV/AIDS pose a real challenge and threaten to destruct the promising basis that has been established so far. The danger of losing a large part of the young men and women that represent South Africa’s new culture and who were to counterbalance the older and biased generation would be a sever setback. The pandemic could place the SANDF in such a severe competition with the public sector for skilled young people, that the goal of achieving a truly representative and competent armed force would be projected well into the future.
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