## CONTENTS

*List of Figures and Tables*  
ix

*Acknowledgments*  
ix

**One**  
Introduction: Soft Power, Public Diplomacy, and Democratization  
*Nicholas J. Cull and Francisco J. Rodríguez*  
1

**Two**  
US Public Diplomacy and Democracy Promotion in the Cold War, 1950s–1980s  
*Giles Scott-Smith*  
15

**Three**  
Furthering US Geopolitical Priorities and Dealing with the Iberian Dictatorships  
*Rosa Pardo Sanz*  
37

**Four**  
Modernizing a Friendly Tyrant: US Public Diplomacy and Sociopolitical Change in Francoist Spain  
*Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla*  
63

**Five**  
US Public Diplomacy and Democracy Promotion in Authoritarian Spain: Approaches, Themes, and Messages  
*Pablo León-Aguinaga*  
93

**Six**  
Culture and National Images: American Studies vs. Anti-Americanism in Spain  
*Francisco J. Rodríguez*  
119

**Seven**  
Spain’s First “Re-Branding Effort” in the Postwar Franco Era  
*Neal M. Rosendorf*  
155
Contents

Eight  US Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain: A Practitioner’s View 191
      Ambassador Mark L. Asquino

Nine  Consistency and Credibility: Why You Cannot Collaborate with Dictatorships and Sell Democracy 201
      Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla

Index  229
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction: Soft Power, Public Diplomacy, and Democratization

Nicholas J. Cull and Francisco J. Rodríguez

“Influence can persuade, but power can compel.”
Hans J. Morgenthau, 1948.¹

“Is our power such, that anything we do is a form of intervention?”
Allen Guttman, 1963.²

Among the stories told by the ancient Greek slave and sometime diplomat Aesop is a fable that neatly illuminates the nature of power. In the story the North Wind and the Sun argue as to who was more powerful and resolve to test their strength by competing to remove a cloak from a traveler. The North Wind blew his iciest blast but only succeeded in making the traveler wrap himself more tightly in his cloak, however, when the sun shone the traveler happily removed his cloak. This illustration of the power of friendly persuasion appealed to the ancients and their interpreters down the years. The debate is not theoretical. In our own world international actors regularly face the challenge of ideologically antithetical regimes—for democracies these are typically dictatorships—and wrestle with the best approach to promote change. Today that debate is often couched as a choice between hard and soft power.

These issues were a regular concern of US foreign policy throughout the twentieth century, from Woodrow Wilson’s approach to
revolutionary Mexico down to Bill Clinton’s response to the collapse of communism. They remain hardly less moot in the era of the Global War on Terror. Historically, the results of US democracy promotion have been mixed and explanations of the place of the process among America’s priorities, contradictory. Given the contemporary emphasis on the issue—at the time of writing it—is central to the discussion of approaches to numerous countries including Cuba and Iran—it is doubly important to understand what has gone before. This anthology of historical research will examine and evaluate one of the most important cases of democratization—that of postwar Spain—and consider the extent to which the United States was able to use the tools of public diplomacy and soft power to contribute to one of the most remarkable examples of a democratic transition. It is of special significance as it opens much of the scholarship of that case to English language audiences for the first time.

Before jumping into the historical overview, it is necessary to give a brief explanation of the concepts used in the analysis.

**Public Diplomacy, Soft Power, and Other Concepts**

The term public diplomacy refers to the mechanisms used by an international actor—whether a government, international organization, nongovernmental organization (NGO), or even an individual—to advance their foreign policy by engaging foreign publics. These efforts to “understand, inform, engage, and influence foreign audiences” have historically included information campaigns, personal contacts, and cultural/exchange programs abroad. The term emerged in the mid-1960s and was coined by a former US diplomat named Edmund Gullion. Its practice required a radical rethinking of foreign policy practice. Traditional diplomacy had always been directed at other governments and their agents and tended to require absolute secrecy, but public diplomacy is by its nature open and requires a greater degree of transparency to flourish.

Public diplomacy began in Gullion’s mind as a euphemism for propaganda and for some observers has never lost that pejorative taint. However, public diplomacy as a practice has evolved beyond its origins. The Dutch scholar Jan Melissen notes:

> Public diplomacy is similar to propaganda in that it tries to persuade people what to think, but it is fundamentally different from...
it in the sense that public diplomacy also listens to what people have to say.\textsuperscript{9}

One can go further and note that historically propaganda has typically been deployed for a fixed end, over a short period of time, with a high level of intensity. The main objective is to obtain an immediate benefit. It is not seen as a way to comprehend or engage with a target group, but simply to convince. When propagandists listen, they listen only to target their messages more effectively. Public diplomacy is (or should be) different. While its practitioners seek to export culture or information, they are also open to receiving culture and information from others by way of exchange. Public diplomacy does not always know the end of its policy: its objective might be to discover what its foreign policy ought to be, an exercise that has no parallel in propaganda. It is easier to make these distinctions in theory than in practice: the line separating the two can become thin especially in the minds of those paying the bill, who in the US at least historically have shown little interest in learning from others. Frank Stanton, an American media executive and advocate for the reform of public diplomacy, stated matters succinctly when he complained in 1968: “Congress wants propaganda.”\textsuperscript{10}

The convenience of the single-term public diplomacy conceals the multiple divisions within its practice. In the first instance public diplomacy may be segmented by time between (1) short-term daily (or even “real-time” instant) communication, (2) medium-term strategic communication, and (3) long-term exchanges and intercultural relations.\textsuperscript{11} One of the present coauthors has argued that in its classic form public diplomacy can be divided into five core elements: (1) listening (tracking foreign public opinions), (2) advocacy of a specific policy, (3) cultural diplomacy, (4) exchange diplomacy, and (5) international broadcasting. These elements work over different periods of time: listening, advocacy, and broadcasting being short term; culture being medium term; and exchange working in the long term.\textsuperscript{12} To complicate matters further, each of these elements has a different source of credibility and requires a different kind of infrastructure. Historically, the different elements of a country’s public diplomacy have found co-location difficult and work best when mutually insulated by clear firewalls or even housed in separate agencies as has generally been the case in European public diplomacy.

In recent years the practice and study of public diplomacy has been inextricably linked to the concept of soft power coined by Joseph Nye,
meaning an actor’s ability to make progress in world affairs by means of cultural or political attraction rather than resorting to military or economic coercion. In terms of the famous metaphor of the child motivating a donkey with either a carrot or a stick, military pressure is the stick and the economic leverage of bribes is the carrot. Both are hard power, hinging on the capacity of the actor (in this case the child) to muster actual resources. For the metaphor to extend to the realm of soft power, the child would have to be able to motivate the donkey by repeating a stirring story of how happy donkeys are on his or her farm—singing a song about how any donkey on his farm gets to feel like an Arabian thoroughbred or showing the donkey a movie with the same message. Of course, the metaphor breaks down, but why should a metaphor which fits farm animals extend to human beings with their unique capacity to analyze and imagine alternate futures? In the real world actors need mechanisms to communicate their soft power virtues to international audiences. Those mechanisms require real resources but those resources are not the sole determinant of their effectiveness that hinges on the appeal of the culture and values that they communicate. Public diplomacy provides the mechanism by which international actors communicate their culture and values to an international audience.

Nye believes that any given country may possess greater or lesser reserves of soft power, depending on the attractiveness of its political system and behavioral rules, its economic system, its education, its artistic representations, its cuisine, or even its sport. The British Council develops the concept on its website:

A country’s soft power is its ability to make friends and influence people not through military might, but through its most attractive assets, notably culture, education, language and values. In short, it’s the things that make people love a country rather than fear it, things that are often the products of people, institutions and brands rather than governments.\textsuperscript{13}

Soft power has limitations. It is not a magic wand for the conduct of international affairs. No international actor can function exclusively by charming the citizens of the world. Nye himself concedes that soft power is difficult to quantify and handle.\textsuperscript{14} The results depend on the reactions of foreign audiences that are often slow to emerge, and are usually prone to rapid variations, not always motivated by logic.\textsuperscript{15} For this reason the British scholar Ali Fisher has written of soft power and
public diplomacy in terms of their generating a general atmosphere of favorable understanding, which can exert an indirect influence over certain future events by shortening “the odds of certain behaviors or events occurring.” Finally, it is worth recalling that soft power resources are easily lost. Nye has noted how readily the incautious application of hard power erodes even the most established reserves of soft power. The stories of torture at Guantanamo Bay and pictures of torture at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq eradicated years of patient accumulation of soft power by US diplomats.

There is no shortage of voices endorsing hard power at the expense of soft. Think of Stalin’s famous dismissal of the influence of the Vatican: “The Pope? How many divisions does he have?” Machiavelli—a favorite source for advocates of hard power—was actually more circumspect, warning that a prince must work tirelessly every day to be loved by his subjects but need not do anything at all to be hated, and that while it is easier to make oneself feared than loved, the efficacy of the former approach diminishes over time. In addition, it goes without saying that the strategy of fear is harder to implement in a modern democratic environment where brutalities and excesses of power are so readily relayed by social media.

The reality is that hard and soft power are not mutually exclusive and function best in concert: the concept that Nye dubbed “smart power” and that was much used during Hillary Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State. This interdependence is not new. Historically, it is the deficiencies of hard power that have compelled international actors to embrace soft power in the first place, as Jan Melissen has observed:

Most successful public diplomacy initiatives were born out of necessity. They were reactive and not the product of forward-looking foreign services caring about relationships with foreign audiences as a new challenge in diplomatic practice.

A significant example of this reactive public diplomacy sits at the heart of the case considered in this book. When in 1959 President Eisenhower embraced General Franco, he provoked the hostility in the minds of anti-Franco Spaniards. Many questioned how the same America that presented itself as a champion of democracy could ally with a violent dictator. As we shall see in the following chapters, Washington deployed numerous soft-power initiatives in Spain in an attempt to explain that contradiction, and if possible resolve it by promoting democratization.
External Influence on the Spanish Transition

The near-unanimous appreciation of the specialists in highlighting the relevance of internal factors as opposed to those stemming from the international context, in accounting for Spain’s Transition to democracy, has led to the exclusion of these international factors from the debate. (Manuel Redero, 1994)\(^{22}\)

A transition of such magnitude does not occur in complete isolation (. . .) although the transition took place in Spain, it was helped along and driven forward by external forces. (Frances Lannon, 2005)\(^{23}\)

Initially, historians examining the transformation of the Franco dictatorship into a democratic system focuses on the domestic political process and suggested that external factors played only an indirect and marginal role.\(^{24}\) Since the mid-1990s, this view has been revised in the light of studies paying more attention to the external aspects/influences that might have undermined the legitimacy of the Franco regime.\(^{25}\)

The first steps on this new historiographical path were dominated by the emphasis on military hard power concerns, including the geopolitical competition on the Mediterranean coast during the early 1970s and impact of détente.\(^{26}\) Many scholars have neglected the soft power factors of external ideology and culture. This anthology aims to help remedy that by answering two core questions: To what extent did the various US Public diplomacy campaigns deployed in Spain during the Franco dictatorship contribute to the process of democratization? If not a principal driver, can those soft power effects be understood as a kind of “fertilizer for democracy” preparing the ground in which the domestic experiment with democracy could flourish?

While previous publications have focused on the involvement of the US government in the Spanish transition during the period 1975–1978, this book adopts a longer-term approach, beginning with the end of World War II. Given that the fruits of public diplomacy often ripen slowly, it is misleading to evaluate its efficacy by examining only a short period of time. Those who have adopted the short-term perspective, or who focused their attention on the military aspects of the Spain/US relationship, have concluded: “The United States’ main concern with regard to Spain in the early 1970s was the defense of their [U.S.] geostrategic interests (. . .) the promotion of democracy was a secondary aspect—an important one, but a secondary one nevertheless.” Trying to contextualize the American position more fairly, they assert, however, that European governments also failed to place
democratization before stability in Spain, and much less before their own national interests.  

European influence in Spain makes an interesting counterpoint to that of the United States. The influence of the Common Market countries as they were at the time was not exercised directly; instead, it was typically exercised through political parties or foundations. The change in direction came in the wake of the revolutionary events in Portugal in April 1974. European and American diplomats feared a repetition in Madrid of the events in Lisbon, which seems to bear out Melissen’s idea of “reactive public diplomacy.” The role of Europe in promoting Spanish democracy has received more scholarly attention. Key questions include whether Brussels served as a magnet and encouragement for the anti-Franco forces? Whether the European democracies became a concave mirror, which magnified the blemishes on the face of the Franco dictatorship by comparison? Whether European prosperity attracted the people of Spain toward change? We can also ask if Europe’s effort to promote political liberalization in Spain surpassed that of the United States? Such questions still require further research.

The Contributions to This Book

Giles Scott-Smith’s chapter two covers the period from the 1950s to the end of the Cold War with a flash-forward to the Arab Spring of 2011, and considers the role of democracy promotion within US foreign policy. Scott-Smith examines the highs, lows, and contradictions of that process, not the least being its incompatibility with America’s recurring tendency to isolationism. The author wonders whether or not the means and strategies to promote democracy deployed by the State of the Department all over the globe have been consistently democratic. Put differently: did the American self-perception of being a Messianic forerunner of democracy clash with the unembellished reality of a superpower ready to work with a repressive dictatorship, as in the case of Spain? Were the short-term anomalies always absorbed by the long-term narrative? Scott-Smith argues that while the United States presented itself as a beacon of freedom, it was not always seen that way by those at the receiving end of that beacon’s light. The Spanish case also raises the issue of anti-Americanism rise on both the right and the left of the political spectrum, which challenged the successful delivery of US public diplomacy’s messages. Scott-Smith also reflects
the degree of autonomy and relative importance of public diplomacy within the US foreign policy machinery, all of which serves as a necessary background to the particularities of the Spanish case.

Rosa Pardo (in chapter three) enlarges the framework by probing the way in which United States communicated with Portugal and Spain during the Cold War. Both Iberian dictatorships were anchored in similar ideological roots of Catholicism and anticommunism, but there were significant dissimilarities too. From the very beginning, the special–historical connection between Portugal and Great Britain set the case apart from Spain with the hostility between Madrid and London caused by the Gibraltar issue. World War II played out differently for the two countries. Franco’s proclivity toward the Axis was not matched by Salazar. This and the strategic value of the Portuguese islands of Azores insured that the Portuguese dictatorship received a more benevolent treatment than the Spanish one. Portugal joined North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, while Spain had to wait until 1986; Portugal benefitted from the Marshall Plan and expanded its international alliances through bilateral engagement with France; and West Germany in exchange for a German airbase in Beja (1963). Spain signed a military pact with United States in 1953, but it was by Executive Agreement only and not approved by Congress as a Treaty until 1976. Pardo’s essay addresses the question: Did the US government prioritize strategic factors over ideological considerations, such as consistency in defending democratic values in other Western European countries or the other way around?

Lorenzo Delgado’s chapter (number four) discusses how US public diplomacy tried to solve the difficult equation of justifying an alliance between the main democracy of the world and a dictatorship forged in a bloody civil war. Franco’s political longevity allowed plenty of opportunities for the United States to adjust its approach to the Spanish tyrant. At first the United States prioritized engagement with the ruling classes, who controlled the country and sustained the dictatorship. In the mid-1960s, a more balanced strategy emerged, shifting the approach to the emerging middle classes and opposition sectors, students and trades unions, but without alienating the Franco establishment. Delgado explains how this new outlook was easier to imagine than its implementation, especially during an era of widespread global public revulsion against the US conduct of the Vietnam War. In these circumstances, the hope of winning popular acceptance in Spain was relegated to second place behind the need to preserve the advantageous terms access to US military bases in the country.
During the final stages of Franco regime, Washington relied on policy of calculated ambiguity: “to avoid involvement, while maintaining sufficient flexibility to protect our interests.” This political balancing act sought to maintain cordial relations with Francoist elites, without distancing the United States too much from opposition, and by doing so prepare for the political change that time (and Franco’s advanced age) would inevitably bring. Delgado concludes that, in the short term at least, this public diplomacy failed. Anti-Franco Spaniards read America’s light touch as a lack of commitment to the restoration of democracy in Spain.

Pablo León-Aguinaga’s contribution (chapter five) examines the messages of democracy promotion and democratization deployed by US public diplomats in Spain during and immediately after the Franco dictatorship. León-Aguinaga argues that even if democratization was not the foremost American objective, the promotion of democracy remained a significant theme of US engagement with the Spanish public. American messages fell, like a persistent drizzle, onto the Spanish political scene, eulogizing rights, elections, free political parties, and debate in an attempt to saturate Spanish public (following the idea of public diplomacy acting as a “fertilizer for democracy”) with a sense of what a political system should be, even without explicitly pointing out Franco’s obscuring of such a system. We may ask why greater importance was not given to those messages? Why did the US take a low profile? Or stepping back from the Spanish case, why was US public diplomacy so seldom prioritized within the US foreign policy apparatus? It was not until the death of Franco and the arrival of the Carter administration that the United States Information Agency’s messages were more openly committed with the democratization in Spain. León-Aguinaga points to a watershed memo in October 1977 which emphasized the need to “give serious support to the democratization process in Spain, while stressing the viability of American pluralistic society by highlighting U.S. Political, social and economic achievements.”

One of the challenges facing the United States through the post-war period was Europe’s resistance to the spread of US culture, often labelled as cultural anti-Americanism. USIA and the Cultural Bureau of the Department of State responded by promoting American Studies in European classrooms. Francisco J. Rodríguez’s chapter (number six) examines that “Cultural Cold War mission” in Spain, analyzing initiatives including work to promote a “balanced” view of the US History, Poetry, Art, or Literature in their own right rather than as a byproduct of British Culture or low-quality imitations of European
cultural achievements. Rodriguez directs attention to English teaching and American Studies programs within the Spanish university system, mainly funded by the Fulbright Commission and the US–Spanish Non-Military Agreements of 1970: the two main channels by which American Studies were promoted among Spanish citizens. American Studies in Spain emerge as a soft-power maneuver designed both to produce greater sympathy toward US leadership and to reduce the anti-Americanism of the Spanish people, which was one of the most intense rejections of the United States anywhere in Europe.

When rethinking the impact of public diplomacy on postwar Spain, it makes sense to also consider the question of the Franco regime’s own use of public diplomacy and soft power. Neal Rosendorf’s illuminating essay (chapter seven) explores how the dictator tried to engage with international audiences to counter the legacy of his “dangerous friendship” with Hitler and Mussolini. His objective was to sell the idea that his was merely an authoritarian regime and not a totalitarian one. Franco promoted a narrative of modernization and economic growth. He relied on three pillars: tourism, filmmaking, and public relations. Rosendorf’s analysis contests the notion that Spain emerged with a new modern image fully formed in the late 1980s. Spain’s national rebranding effort did not begin from scratch with Franco’s death. It began in the immediate aftermath of World War II and ran through the end of the 1960s, with its apotheosis the very expensive and highly successful Spanish pavilion at the New York World’s Fair of 1964–1965.

Public diplomacy is built from personal relationships so it is fitting that the final chapter is a personal reflection on US public diplomacy in Spain by a distinguished practitioner, Ambassador Mark Asquino. Asquino began as a visiting lecturer in 1975 in Spain but went on to serve as director of the US Cultural Center/Washington Irving Library (1982–1984) and then as US Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer (1984–1986) in Madrid. His memoir is frank on the objectives of US cultural engagement, including prompting young Spaniards to develop the critical thinking skills on which any successful democracy depends. His recollections affirm the value of some of the best-known elements of US public diplomacy including the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) and music diplomacy.

The conclusion by Lorenzo Delgado (chapter nine) looks back over the essays, reviewing the geopolitical priorities of the US foreign policy in Spain and role of public diplomacy. He considers especially the impact of the stark inconsistency between US government rhetoric and US government action in Spain. Delgado questions whether
Introduction

Public diplomacy can reconcile the contractions of this. It is plain that US democratization efforts were uneven and suffered many ups and downs. The ambiguity of the US foreign policy was maintained until the end of the Franco regime. The centrality of the strategic factor and collaboration with the dictatorship undermined the consistency and credibility of the American democratic message. As to the ultimate issue of whether or not the US promotion of democracy was a determinant factor in Spain’s change, a comprehensive answer would require comparison with the French, German, or CEE efforts in this regard. This volume chooses to leave the issue open.

What does this collection mean for US diplomacy today? One message is that it is clear from these essays that elements of public diplomacy are impactful forms of soft power, especially leader programs and educational initiatives. Secondly, it is evident that the democratic ideas on which the United States is founded are inherently powerful and attractive and serve to build expectations of American behavior; however, the ideas their raw form doesn’t come with caveat about strategic priorities that leaves the United States vulnerable to falling short of its own standards (as was the case with the race question in this period). Thirdly, it is obvious that American inconsistency (or hypocrisy) in democratization is a significant problem. There was a cost to the US image in Spain and beyond when the country failed to support democratization in Spain and simply supported General Franco. This might be imagined as negative soft power—behavior that not only fails to attract but actively repels. Democratization emerges as an activity that by its nature recommends the best methods for its perpetuation. As peace is hard to secure by war, so democracy, whether in the Spain of the 1970s or the Middle East of today, is best advanced by discussion and not dictation.

Notes


10. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (WHCF Oversize Attachment 3615) Task Force on Communication Policy, E. Gullion (Murrow Center, Fletcher School) to D. Cater (White House), May 9, 1968 with “Outline of May 6 Advisory Commission Luncheon Discussion.”


20. The concept was first articulated in the 2007 “Smart Power” report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) co-chaired by Nye and available online at: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf


27. The original quote is “la principal preocupación de Estados Unidos con respecto a España a principios de los años setenta era la protección de los intereses geoestratégicos (…) la promoción de la democracia quedaba como un asunto secundario, importante, pero secundario.” Damián González, “Actores y factores,” pp. 41–46 and 50.

28. Antonio Sánchez, El Amigo Alemán: el SPD y el PSOE de la dictadura a la democracia, Barcelona: RBA, 2012; Pilar Ortuño, Los socialistas europeos.


INDEX

Acheson, Dean, 96
Actualidad Económica, 218
Adams, John Quincy, 16
Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, 28
Africa, 48
and Cold War, 50, 206
and democratization, 19, 30
independence/nationalist movements in, 49, 50
Portuguese colonies in, 38, 40
Spanish colonies in, 46
US policies in, 27, 39, 50, 54, 206
see also Algeria; Angola; Congo; Guinea; Morocco; Mozambique, South Africa
African National Congress, 27
African-Americans, 26, 110
see also race
Alcazar, El, 194
Aldrin, Buzz, 171
Algeria, 52, 54
Allende, Salvador, 21
Alliance for Progress, 51, 107
Alliance Française, 128
Almería, Spain, 166, 194
Almodóvar, Pedro, 178–9
American Council of Learned Societies, 22
American Council on Education, 22
American Field Service, 82
American Studies Institute of Barcelona, 100
Americanization, 121, 204
Amodia, José, 176
Anderson Plan, 50
Angola, 49
anti-Americanism, 7, 9–10, 24–5, 49, 55, 58, 65, 66, 70, 81, 83, 101, 120–3, 125, 128, 130, 133, 140–2, 144, 192, 207–8, 210
anticommunism, 8, 16–17, 18–19, 21, 24, 25, 27–8, 41–3, 46, 48, 51, 63, 68, 73, 93–4, 96, 101–2, 105, 160, 168, 207–8
see also communism, communists
Arab countries, Arabs, 42, 46, 54
and nationalism, 48
see also Middle East
Arab Spring, 7, 31
Arab-Israeli War (1967), 49, 50, 53, 57
Areilza, José María, 177, 222
Armour, Norman, 96
Armstrong, Neil, 171
Aronczyk, Melissa, 155–7
Arpan, Floyd, 23
Asia
and democratization, 19, 30
US policies in, 16, 101, 203–4, 206
see also China; Indonesia; Japan; Korean War; Malaysia; Philippines; Vietnam War
Index

Asociaciones de Investigación, 76
Asquino, Mark L., 10, 191–8
Atlántico, 70, 93, 97–8, 108
authoritarian regimes, authoritarianism, 10, 18–19, 24, 30, 74–6, 96, 101–2, 105, 107, 155, 158, 179, 191, 193, 203–4, 206, 208, 218–19, 223
Azores Islands
air/military bases on, 24, 38–9, 43, 48–50, 52, 58
strategic value of, 8, 56
Bangura, Zainab Hawa, 30
Barnett, Lew, 193
Basques, 221
Beacon of Hope, A, 28
Beirut, 22
see also Lebanon
Bell, Daniel, 107
Beltran, Cesar, 193
Blair, Tony, 159, 179
“Bob y María,” 98
Boletín de Radio, 99
Book Translation Program (BTP), 106–7
Borman, Frank, 171
Borrell, Josep, 137–8
Brazil, 39, 51
Bridoux, Jeff (and Milja Kurki), 15
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 98
British Council, 4, 125, 128
Bronston, Samuel, 172–3
Brown v. Board of Education, 110
Byrnes, James F., 96
Caetano, Marcelo, 37, 56
Cairo, 22
see also Egypt
Camba, Julio, 123
Canada, 53
Canary Islands, 41, 171
“Carnation Revolution” (Portugal), 219
Carnegie Corporation, 22
Carothers, Thomas, 30
Carrero Blanco, Luis, 41
Carroll, Wallace, 95
Carter, Jimmy, 9, 109, 197
Carvajal, Javier, 164, 172
Casas Americanas, 64, 67–8, 95, 97–8, 100, 101, 102, 111
Castiella, Fernando María, 51–2, 56, 133, 162, 167, 171, 172–3, 174–5, 177
Catalans, 110, 221
Catholicism, Catholics, 8, 30, 41, 42, 43, 53, 56, 64, 67, 73, 123, 128, 175, 218
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 27, 28, 101
Centro Cultural de los Estados Unidos y Biblioteca Washington Irving. See Washington Irving Center
Centro Nacional de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo de la Educación (CENIDE), 85
Chapultepec Conference, 40
Chile, 20, 21, 203–4
Chillida, Eduardo, 194–5
China, 16, 45, 50, 177
Clark, Patricia, 43
Clinton, Bill, 1–2, 31
Clinton, Hillary, 5, 31
Cold War, 7, 8, 15–21, 30–1, 37, 41, 50–1, 56–7, 63–4, 94, 96, 97, 109, 120–2, 203–4, 208
cultural aspects of, 9–10, 22–3, 101, 122
Colección Estados Unidos, 67–8
Collins, Michael, 171
Comisión Asesora de Investigación Científica y Técnica, 76
Comisión Nacional de Productividad Industrial, 76
Comisiones Obreras (Workers’ Commissions), 107, 222
Committee on Public Information, 17, 18
Common Market, European. See European Economic Community
communism, communists, 44, 54, 56, 71, 107, 141, 168, 205, 211–12, 220, 222
see also anticommunism
Index

Communist Party, Spanish, 107, 220
Congo, 50, 203–4
Conrad, Pete, 171
Contact Program, 67
Cooper, Gordon, 171
Coy, Javier, 141
Creel, George, 17
Cruz, Penelope, 178
CU. See State, US Department of,
   Bureau of Educational and
   Cultural Affairs
Cuba, 2, 50, 51, 53, 54, 101, 205
Cyprus, 49, 53, 57, 219
Czechoslovakia, 53

De Gaulle, Charles, 49, 50
de Maeztu, Ramiro, 123, 124
Defense, US Department of, 42, 50, 216–17
Del Amo Foundation, 124
del Castillo, Pilar, 137–8
Delgado, Humberto, 44
Détente, 6, 28, 57, 101–2
Diamond, Larry, 30
Díaz Hochleitner, Ricardo, 133–4
Dominican Republic, 54, 101
Duke, Angier, 131, 140
education, and US foreign policy, 4, 11, 17, 22–8, 48, 50, 64, 66, 68–9, 72, 75–80, 82, 84–5, 100–3, 120–1, 127–44, 191, 221
Education and Science, Spanish Ministry for, 82, 134
Educational Exchange Program, 68–9 see also education, and US foreign policy
Egypt, 21, 49, 54
Eisenhower Doctrine, 48
Elias Ahuja Scholarship Program, 82
Elshtain, Jean Beth, 30
Emphasis on Youth program, 28
Enders, Thomas, 197
English, teaching of, 10, 25, 55, 66, 79, 84, 125–6, 132, 139–40
see also education, and US foreign policy
Central/Mediterranean, 30, 37–8, 42, 204
Eastern, 30, 38, 42
Western, 8, 28, 38–9, 42–3, 46, 48, 54–5, 57, 58, 73–4, 80–1, 95, 100, 106, 110, 159, 175, 207–9, 213, 219
European Association of American Studies (EAAS), 141
European Economic Community (EEC), 7, 52, 53, 100, 157, 209, 219, 220
European Recovery Program (ERP, or Marshall Plan), 8, 39, 42, 43, 47, 63, 69, 96, 159
European Union, 177, 218
Facetas, 82, 102, 108, 111
Falange, 65, 124, 125, 218
Fan, Ying, 180
Federal Republic of Germany.
   See West Germany
Foltz, Charles, 96
Fondo Nacional para la Investigación Científica, 76
Ford, Gerald R., 104, 135, 219
Ford Foundation, 79, 82, 85, 103, 110, 134, 215
Foreign Affairs, Spanish Ministry of, 51–3, 55–6, 133, 167, 168
Foreign Information Service, 95
Foreign Leader Program, 55, 68, 132, 140
Foreign Office, British, 179
Fraga Iribarne, Manuel, 101, 131, 162, 166, 167, 171, 177
France, 43, 47, 49–50, 56, 57, 95–6, 129–30, 178
as a colonial power, 48
postwar conditions in, 38
relations with Portugal, 8, 39–40, 50–1
relations with Spain, 10, 42, 52, 53–4, 220
relations with US, 66
American diplomatic perceptions of, 70–1, 77, 160
death of, 55, 94, 100, 102, 104, 129, 135, 157, 191, 192–3, 220–1
overtures to the US, 160–1, 163
popular opposition to, 7, 9, 46, 55, 67, 71–2, 80–1, 83, 95, 98, 100, 104, 125, 133–5, 140–1, 211–12
see also Spain; US–Spain relationship
Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriótico, El, 191–2
Fukuyama, Francis, 16
Fulbright, J. William, 143
Fulbright Program, 10, 24, 26, 48, 55, 69, 78–9, 82, 85, 100–1, 120, 122, 127, 128–44, 191–3, 198, 215
Galbraith, John Kenneth, 107, 108
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), 96
Germany, 43, 137
Nazi, 40, 64, 95, 161
postwar conditions in, 23
see also West Germany
Gibraltar, 8, 46, 53–4
see also Strait of Gibraltar
Gilmore, Fiona, 178–80
gobierno monocolor, 176
Gonzalez, Filipe, 191
Good Neighbor policy, 18
Goya, 127
GRAPO, 104
Great Britain, 4, 30–1, 38, 41, 43, 53, 95
as a colonial power, 48–9
relations with Portugal, 8, 38–40, 44, 51, 56
relations with Spain, 8, 38, 42, 124–6, 140, 220
relations with US, 30–1, 47, 49, 66, 130
Greece, 23–4, 43, 47, 51, 53, 56, 57–8, 219
postwar conditions in, 38
relations with Spain, 42
relations with US, 43, 46, 49, 53, 57
Guatemala, 29, 203–4
Guinea, 49, 54
Gullion, Edmund, 2
Hamas, 21
Hawā’īi, 16
Hayes, Carlton J. H., 41, 95, 97
Hermida, Jesús, 104
Herrera, Paloma, 197
Hill, Robert C., 103, 140
Hispanic Society of New York, 124
Hitler, Adolf, 10, 127, 160
Hollywood, and Spain, 164–6, 179
Hollywood Reporter, 166
Hussein, Saddam, 31
Iberia, Iberian Peninsula.
See Portugal; Spain
IEN (Barcelona), 108–9
India, 45
Indian Union, 49
Indonesia, 26–7
Information and Tourism, Spanish
Ministry of, 101, 166–7
Informational Media Guarantee (IMG) Program, 106–7
Index

Institución Libre de Enseñanza, 124
Institute for International Education, 22
Instituto de Estudios Norteamericanos, 128
Institutos de Ciencias de la Educación (ICEs), 85
Inter-Agency Committee on Youth Affairs (IAYC), 27–8
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 71, 96
see also World Bank
International Cooperation Administration (ICA), 76
International Monetary Fund, 29–30, 47, 71, 73, 96, 214
International Visitor (Leadership) Program, 10, 23, 82, 103, 197
Iran, 2, 20
Iraq, 5, 30–1
Istanbul, 22. See also Turkey
Italy, 21, 47, 48, 130
fascist, 64, 161
postwar conditions in, 21, 38, 56
terrorism in, 219
Japan, 16, 38
postwar conditions in, 23
Jefferson, Thomas, 16
Jews, Judaism, 158, 160, 162, 174–5, 179
Jiménez de Parga, Manuel, 132
Johnson, Lyndon B., 50, 55, 74, 101–2, 110–11, 132, 171, 213
Jordan, Shari, 193
Juan Carlos de Borbón, Prince, 56, 103, 176, 217, 222
Junípero Serra, Fray, 250th birthday (1963), 168
Kennan, George, 42, 96
Kennedy, Edward, 170
Kennedy, John F., 49, 51, 74, 213
assassination of, 111
Kennedy, Robert F., assassination of, 111
King, Martin Luther, Jr., assassination of, 111
Kirk, Russell, 173
Kirkpatrick, Jean, 19
Kissinger, Henry, 21, 28, 56–7, 217–18, 222
Korean War, 21, 43, 45, 56–7, 65, 208
Kubrick, Stanley, 170
Kurki, Milja, 15
Latin America, 16, 18, 41, 120
and democratization, 19
and Spain, 42, 46, 54, 172, 178, 207–8
and the US, 93–4, 102, 107, 202–3, 206
see also Brazil; Chile; Cuba;
Dominican Republic; Mexico
League of Nations, 17
League of Women Voters, 110
Lebanon, 51. See also Beirut
Lequerica, José, 43
Ley General de Educación y Financiamiento de la Reforma Educativa, 84
liberalism, 16, 21–2, 110
Life, 173
Linz, Juan José, 110
Lipset, Seymour Martin, 74, 107
López Rodó, Laureano, 170
Luce, Henry, 20
Macao, 45
Maghreb, 46, 48, 51
Malaysia, 204
Manuel de Falla Cultural Center, 194–5
Marias, Julián, 110
Marquesa de Villaverde, 166
Marshall Plan. See European Recovery Program
Masons, oppression of, 160
McC cracker, Paul, 108
McNamara, Robert, 156, 170
Melissen, Jan, 2–3, 7
Mexico, 53
Middle East, 11, 19, 21–2, 30, 38, 48–9, 206, 219
see also Egypt; Iran; Lebanon;
Syria; Turkey
Military Assistance Training Program, 69
Miró, Joan, 155–6, 178, 179, 180
modernization theory, 17, 20, 23, 25–6, 58, 68, 72–5, 78, 80–6, 94, 102, 105, 107, 134, 205–7, 214, 217, 219
Moniz, Botelho, 49
Morocco, 52, 54, 58, 219
Morsi, Mohamed, 21
Moses, Robert, 172
Mozambique, 49
Multi-National Foreign Journalists Project, 23
Muñoz Grandes, Agustin, 171
Muslim Brotherhood, 21
Mussolini, Benito, 10, 160
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (US and Portugal), 43, 44, 69
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 49, 54
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 171
National Catholic Welfare Conference, 68
National Endowment for Democracy (NED), 28
National Scientific and Technical Information Service, 85
National Security Council (NSC), 42, 48, 74, 98
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 45
NO-DO, 97–8
Non-Aligned nations, 54
Non-Military Agreements (NAMs), 10, 103, 122, 134–5, 220–1
Non-Theatrical Film Program, 107, 111
Noticias de Actualidad, 67–8, 70, 97–8, 99, 105–8, 110
nuclear power, 47, 68, 79–80, 105, 170
nuclear weaponry, 28, 43, 47–8, 52–3, 223
Nye, Joseph, 3–5
Office of War Information, US, 95, 97
Olins, Wally, 159, 179–80
Open Door (trade policy), 17–18
Opus Dei, 71, 78, 81
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 73, 75–6, 85, 103, 134, 158, 179, 214
Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), 39, 47, 73, 75–6, 96, 214
Palomares, nuclear accident in (1966), 53, 81
Pavilion of Spain. See World’s Fairs
Peace Corps, 27
Pentagon. See Defense, US Department of
Peyre, Henri, 121–2, 143
Philippines, 16, 19–20, 29
Pius XII, Pope, 160
Pleasure Seekers, The, 165–6
Podhoretz, Norman, 110
Poland, 29
Portugal
and “Carnation Revolution,” 7, 219–20
and colonial issues, 49, 53–4, 57, 213
and democratization, 29, 30, 219–20
economic changes in, 44, 46–7
and the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), 39, 43
and NATO, 8, 24, 40, 44, 50
and the OEEC, 39
relations with the US, 8, 24–6, 37–8, 40, 43–7, 49–51, 55, 57–8, 213
and the United Nations, 39, 44, 45
see also Africa, Portuguese colonies in; Azores; Caetano, Marcelo; France, relations with Portugal; Great Britain, relations with Portugal; Salazar, António de Oliveira; West Germany, relations with Portugal
Potsdam Conference, 38–9, 40, 96
Powers, Richard Gid, 19
Preston, Peter, 179
Index 235

Pride and the Passion, The, 165
Protestants, Protestantism, 41, 123, 158, 160, 167, 174–5, 179
public diplomacy, 2–5, 10
  in the Cold War, 20–8, 120–2
defined, 2–6
effects of, 10–11, 86, 130, 139–41, 198
historic uses of, 17
in Portugal, 7, 25
see also American Studies programs;
democracy, promotion of;
education, and US foreign policy;
Portugal, relations with the US;
US–Spain relationship; youth, and
US foreign policy

Radio Nacional de España (RNE), 97–8
Reagan, Ronald, 28
Rhodesia, South, 51
Robles Piquer, Carlos, 166, 177
Rockefeller, Nelson, 170
Rockefeller Foundation, 22, 124
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 31
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 18, 31, 41, 124, 160
Rostow, Walter, 107
Rota (Spain), 45, 48–9, 52–3
Rowan, Carl, 26
Royal, Robert, 194–5
Rusk, Dean, 170

Saez, Miguel, 174
Salamanca, University of, 126
Salazar, António de Oliveira, 8, 24, 37–40, 43, 49, 50, 57, 58, 160
  outlook of, 39
Samuelson, Paul A., 108
San Francisco Conference, 37–8, 40
self-determination, 15, 19, 49
Seminario Gráfico, 96
Shumpeter, Joseph A., 107
Skard, Sigmund, 126, 132
Socialist Party, Spanish, 155–6, 177, 191, 197
soft power, 1–6, 10–11, 18, 122–3, 125, 136, 141, 143, 155, 157, 161, 173, 176, 180
see also Portugal, relations with the
US; public diplomacy; US–Spain relationship
Solana, Javier, 137–8
Sotelo, Joaquin Calvo, 124
South Africa, 27, 51
Soviet Union, Soviets. See Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
space programs, 79–80, 170–1, 206
Spain
  economic development of, 46–8, 55, 69–70, 75–6, 100, 103, 123, 206–7, 210, 214
  and Economic Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan), 42, 47, 96
  and national rebranding, 10
  and NATO, 8, 52, 53, 96, 157, 209, 219–21
  and other European countries, 7–8, 42, 46, 48, 51–4, 56–7, 63, 65, 71, 157, 209, 218–20
  position in World War II, 40–1, 160
  protests in, 80–1, 106, 131, 133, 191–2
  rebranding efforts of Franco regime, 160–75, 180
  religious minorities in, 39, 41, 43, 158, 160, 162, 174–7, 179, 216
  Republican Government in exile, 40
  Second Republic, 124
  student movements in, 8, 70, 72, 78, 79, 80–1, 84, 85, 100, 101, 111, 131, 133, 210, 213
  transition to democracy, 6, 9, 10, 29, 31, 155–7, 176–7, 179–80, 191, 222–4
Index

Spain—Continued
workers in, 8, 66, 67, 70, 72, 79, 80–1, 100, 102, 106–8, 131, 210, 213, 216
see also Africa, Spanish colonies in; France, relations with Spain; Franco, Francesco; Great Britain, relations with Spain; Spanish Civil War; US-Spain relationship; West Germany, relations with Spain
Spanish Civil War, 71, 124
Spanish Lobby, 43
Spanish National Tourist Office, 164
Spanish Newsletter, 168–71
Spanish Pavilion. See World’s Fairs
Spanish Trade Union Organisation, 97
Sputnik I, 205
Stabilization Plan (1959), 47
Stalin, Joseph, 39, 41
Stanton, Frank, 3
State, US Department of, 17, 27, 97, 120, 125–6, 216–17
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU), 9, 77, 100, 102, 103, 105, 108, 221–2
Division of Cultural Relations, 18
Policy Planning Staff, 42
Strait of Gibraltar, 42
see also Gibraltar
Suárez, Adolfo, 222
Suez crisis, 45, 48
Suharto, 26–7
Sukarno, 26–7
Taylor, Gen. Maxwell, 170
Technical Assistance Program, 55
Technical Exchange Program, 69, 107, 108
Televisión Española (TVE), 104
Termis, Fernando, 46
Time, 194
Timor, 38
totalitarianism, 10, 19, 38, 107
tourism, 47, 68, 157, 161–4, 172, 176, 177, 179
see also Information and Tourism, Spanish Ministry of
Truman, Harry S.
Campaign of Truth, 21
and Francoist Spain, 40–1
Turkey, 43, 46, 47, 56, 57, 58, 219
Ullastres, Alberto, 172–3
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 28, 38, 39; 48, 57, 66–7, 107, 120, 121, 134, 203, 205, 207
see also anticommunism; Cold War; communism, communists
United Nations, 19, 37–9, 44, 46, 56, 71, 96, 97, 158, 179, 207
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 75–6, 85, 134, 214
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 27–8, 30
Office of Democratic Initiatives, 28
United States Information Service/Agency (USIS/USIA), 9, 25, 26, 67–8, 70, 72, 76, 77, 78, 93, 97, 98, 100, 102, 193, 198, 206, 215, 216–17
and Country Programs, 97, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 107, 109, 110–11, 140
United States of America
and the “American Way of Life,” 21, 48, 82, 218
and Global War on Terror, 2, 5
and ideas of exceptionalism, 21, 31, 202
national security interests of, 16–19, 29, 42, 48, 71, 201–3
objectives of foreign policy, 15–19, 29, 55, 58, 63–5, 69–75, 77, 80–5, 100–2, 131–2, 202–24
race problems in, 20, 26
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 31
Universidad Autónoma, 85
University of Oviedo, 191–3
Index 237

USIE Country Paper, 66
US-Spain relationship
and military bases, 8, 24, 25, 41–2, 45–6, 48, 52–3, 57, 63, 65, 67, 70, 75, 78, 80, 83, 85, 103, 123, 133–7, 142–3, 161, 167, 191, 197, 202, 207–8, 210–11, 218
negative American attitudes toward Franco regime, 24–6, 40–2, 64–5, 95–7, 160–1, 207–10
Pact of Madrid, Pactos de Madrid (1953), 8, 45, 105, 122, 207, 222–3
rapprochement after World War II, 43, 45–58, 63, 65, 96–9, 209–10
Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation, 84, 135, 139, 222–3
see also American Studies programs; anti-Americanism; Cold War; English, teaching of; Franco, Francisco; public diplomacy; soft power; Spain; United States of America

Vietnam War, 8, 50, 81, 82, 101–2, 133, 136, 206
Villar Palasí, José Luis, 133–4

Viñuela, Urbano, 194, 198–9
Voice of America (VOA), 67–8, 95, 97, 98, 103, 105
Wallace, Henry, 20
Warren, Earl, 168, 170
Washington Irving Center, 10, 102, 104, 108, 110
Welles, Benjamin, 162
West Germany
relations with Portugal, 8, 29, 51
relations with Spain, 11, 29, 53, 54, 220
relations with US, 23, 130
see also Germany
Westad, Odd Arne, 16
White, Barbara M., 99
Wilson, Woodrow, 1–2, 15, 17
Wireless File, 70
World Bank, 47, 85, 103, 134, 156, 158, 170, 179, 214
World War II, 8, 18, 41, 64, 68, 94–5, 97, 160, 172, 174
aftermath of, 6, 10, 16, 18–22, 37–8, 73, 96–7, 105, 180, 207
World’s Fairs, 161, 173
New York, 1964–65, 10, 162, 164, 168, 172–4

youth, and US foreign policy, 17, 22–8, 82–3, 100–1
see also education