

**LA PARTICIPATION POLITIQUE DES
JEUNES EN France (Anne Muxel, Cécile
Riou, Viviane Lehay)**

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1. Introduction: Description of the national sample

Between early November and mid-December 2004, a total of 1010 young people, aged between 15 and 25 years old, have been interviewed in France. For the following analysis, the data base has been adjusted for specific variations by taking an average of results on the basis of 1000 interviewees.

As illustrated by table 1.11, the main socio-demographic characteristics of the sample show the specificity of the social experience of the French youth today. Most of the young people are still in the educational system (64%): 42% are at school and 20% have entered university. Those who are already concerned by working life are less numerous : one third of the sample (34%) has already left school (26% have a paid work and 8% are unemployed). Within this working group , 60% do not have any high-school diploma (Baccalauréat).

This social and educational cleavage among the French young people creates some specific conditions regarding their political experience and participation. To be or not to be educated has a strong impact not only on the chances to get a job, a stable status , a social autonomy, but also on the process of the political socialization during this period of life.

The majority of the respondents (64%) declares that their standard of living is on average while 19% estimate that their income is below average. The majority of the respondents live in an urban area (44% in big cities, 30% in small or medium ones). Only 26% live in a rural area. Most of them still live together with their parents (69%). More than half of the respondents have parents who do not have a high-school diploma.

Almost all the respondents are French citizens (97%), and 94% are born in France. As we have no information about the citizenship of their parents, it is not possible to identify those with immigrants origins. Nevertheless 7% of the people declared themselves as being Muslims. This group is less favoured than the rest of the sample. Among the young Muslims, 31% declare to have a low or very low standard of living, 25% are in paid work and 10% are unemployed. One third (33%) is not educated, and 78% have parents who are not too.

Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics

	Number	Percentage
Gender		
Male	510	51
Female	490	49
Age in 4 categories		
15-17 ans	297	30
18-20 ans	299	30
21-23 ans	231	23
24-25 ans	173	17
Nationality		
French	970	97
Other	30	3
Citizenship		
French people born in France	941	94
French people born abroad	32	3
No French citizenship	27	3
Actual Household		
Alone	105	11
With parents	693	69
With partner	156	16
Other	46	5
Do you have children ?		
No	931	93
Yes	69	7
Type of settlement		
Urban area	438	44
Small or medium city	304	30
Rural area	257	26
Status		
In paid work	260	26
College or high school	422	42
Students	198	20
Unemployed	80	8
Other	40	4
Diploma in 4 categories		
Still at school < maturity	433	43
Still at school >= maturity	204	20
Working < maturity	236	24
Working >= maturity	125	12
Diploma- gender - activity		
Young men working/no diploma	133	13
Young women working/no diploma	102	10
Young men working/diploma	58	6
Young women working/diploma	67	7
Young men still at school	318	32
Young women still at school	320	32
Age when finished education		
Still at school	638	64
Finished at age between 12 and 15	13	1

Finished at age 16	44	4
Finished at age 17	52	5
Finished at age 18	76	8
Finished at age 19	45	5
Finished at age between 20 and 25	131	13
Higher diploma of both parents		
Don't know/answer refused	89	9
Diploma<maturity	533	53
Diploma>=full maturity	378	38
Actual standard of living		
Very low/low	192	19
Average	635	64
High/Very high	165	17
Religion in 4 catégories		
Catholics	461	48
Muslims	72	7
Other religions	42	4
No religion	391	40
Religiousness		
Very religious	75	8
Somewhat religious	195	20
A little religious	301	31
Not at all religious	394	41

2. Political Interest, Competence and Knowledge

2.1 Political interest and competence

Young generations are always suspected to be less interested in politics and less politicised than their elders. But this observation is not really founded. They are more or less as interested in politics than the rest of the population. What they keep at distance is politicians and political affairs concerning partisan quarrels and electoral competition. But they are concerned by national issues and international problems. So their answer to this question depends on what we consider as politics.

Political interest (%)

Very, fairly interested	35
Not very interested	35
Not at all interested	29
DK-AR	1
Total	100

35% of the respondents declare to be very interested or interested in politics, 64% are not very interested or not at all interested. Young men are more interested than young women (38%/33%), and the oldest more than the youngest (40%/25%).

The level of education has a strong effect. The more they are educated, the more they are interested. Educated young men are the most interested whereas not educated young women are the least (47%/21%).

Table 3: Interest in politics and competence

		Political interest	Political competence
		Very, fairly interested	Rarely-never
	Total	36	21
Political interest	<i>Khi-deux</i>		0,000
	Very, fairly interested (n=354)		30
	Not very interested (n=348)		13
	Not at all interested (n=290)		17
Gender	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,297	0,014
	Young Man (n=510)	38	24
	Young Woman (n=490)	33	17
Age in 2 categories	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,027
	15-17 years (n=297)	25	19
	18-25 years (n=703)	40	21
Diploma/gender/activity	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,111	0,009
	YM working/no diploma(n=133)	34	15
	YW working/no diploma(n=103)	21	14
	YM working/diploma(n=58)	47	34
	YW working/diploma(n=67)	42	22
	YM still at school(n=318)	38	25
	YW still at school(n=320)	34	18
Status	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,006
	In paid work (n=260)	36	20
	At school (n=423)	29	21
	Higher studies(n=198)	52	23
	Unemployed(n=79)	33	18
	Other (n=40)	28	15
Left right scale	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000
	Left (n=359)	55	26
	Neither nor(n=356)	21	14
	Right (n=123)	54	27
	DK (n=114)	6	17
	AR (n=35)	36	31
Parental non conventional participation	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000
	Both at least once(n=154)	55	21
	Only one parent at least once(n=81)	56	26
	Both never(n=678)	31	20
	Unknown (n=87)	14	20
Parental electoral participation	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,006
	Both always(n=577)	42	21
	Only one parent always(n=68)	42	20
	Both not always(n=305)	25	18
	Unknown (n=51)	14	29

To have a left wing or a right wing orientation is correlated to a higher level of interest (respectively 55% and 54%, around 20 points more than the average level). Young people who have no political orientation, neither left nor right are also the least interested in politics (21%, 15 points less than the average).

Parental influence has an important effect. When the young have parents who are also interested in politics, who participate to demonstrations or who vote at each election, they are themselves more interested in politics than the average. 55% declare they are very interested and interested among those who have both parents having already demonstrated, 42% when their both parents are regular voters (when their parents don't vote regularly, they are only 25% to be interested).

Impression that politics is something complicated (%)

Always	17
Often	29
Sometimes	32
Rarely-never	20
DK	2
Total	100

Asked about their feeling that politics is something too complicated to understand it easily, eight out of ten do agree and only 21% feel competent and not disoriented. Politics is not very accessible, even for young people who are very interested in politics : only 30% among them feel competent. Gender makes again a difference, whatever the high level of education : 34% of the young men having the baccalaureate feel competent, only 22% of the young women with the same level of education.

2.2 Political knowledge

This gender gap is even more visible concerning political knowledge. The sample is equally divided in two parts : 50% have a weak knowledge (16% very weak, 34% middle weak) and 50% have a strong one (12% a very strong, 38% a middle strong). But 55% of the young women have a weak knowledge (46% of the young men) whereas 54% of the young men have a strong knowledge (45% of the women). Even when their level of education is high, their political knowledge is always lower than the young men ones.

Table 4: Political knowledge

		Weak	Medium weak	Medium strong	Strong	
Total		16	34	38	12	
Political Interest	<i>Khi-deux</i> 0,000					
	Very, fairly interested (n=354)	5	28	47	21	
	Not very interested (n=348)	17	37	36	9	
	Not at all interested (n=290)	27	40	28	5	
Gender	<i>Khi-deux</i> 0,078					
	Young Man (n=510) Young Woman (n=490)	14 18	32 37	41 34	13 11	
Age In 2 categories	<i>Khi-deux</i> 0,067					
	15-17 years (n=297) 18-25 years (n=703)	20 15	36 34	35 39	9 13	
Diploma	<i>Khi-deux</i> 0,000					
	Still at school-maturity (n=433)	20	36	35	9	
	Still at school-maturity (n=204)	7	27	44	22	
	Working-maturity (n=235) Working-maturity (n=125)	22 7	39 31	32 46	7 15	
Diploma/gender activity	<i>Khi-deux</i> 0,003					
	YM working/no diploma (n=133) YW working/no diploma (n=103) YM working/diploma (n=58) YW working/diploma (n=67) YM still at school (n=318) YW still at school (n=320)	20 25 8 7 13 18	38 40 34 28 30 37	35 28 44 46 42 34	8 7 14 18 14 12	
	Left/right scale	<i>Khi-deux</i> 0,000				
		Left (n=359) Neither (n=355) Right (n=123) DK (n=114) AR (n=35)	7 20 6 39 15	31 36 30 38 47	45 35 46 21 24	16 8 19 3 15

Interest in politics and ideological orientation have a direct impact. More young people are interested in politics more they know about politics. Among those who are very interested and interested 21% have a high score of political knowledge ; when they are not at all interested they are only 5% in the same case.

Young people who locate themselves neither left nor right, are more numerous to have a weak knowledge (56%) ; those who locate on the left or on the right have a higher level of political knowledge (respectively 61% and 65%). To have ideological and political orientations is directly linked to the interest and to the knowledge young people can express towards politics.


2.3 Attitudes towards politics

This first overview of French young people interest and competence in politics gives an idea of the way politics takes place in their daily life. Politics is not out of their experience and of their

concerns. 56% declare their fathers are interested in politics, 47% their mothers, 27% their best friend. They are used to get some political news : 64% follow the news every day or several times a week. Television is the media the most used to get it : 68% watch TV first, the others media come far away behind (5% use the radio, 7% the newspapers, 7% the Internet). They are more concerned by national (48%) and international (41%) aspects than by local (33%) and European (33%) ones.

Nevertheless, when they are asked about what is politics for them, the image they give of the political universe is firstly negative: 69% of the young people believe that politics means empty promises, 64% think it is a game played by old men, 57% believe that politics is only about corruption and 50% think that politics does not address their expectations. A majority of the young people seems very disillusioned by politics. Only 38% believe it is a way to create a better world... Nevertheless, if politics is mainly associated with negative items, it is also linked to conventional understanding: “party activities” and “voting” reach the highest level of agreement (69%), to describe what they understand by politics. Moreover, more than half of the sample perceives politics as a way to solve international problems (58%) or societal conflicts (52%) and to take care of social issues (50%).

Figure 1: Attitudes towards politics: “politics is...” (sorted by agreement)



To better understand why the French youth is so disappointed and critical about politics, we built an indicator of political distrust based on answers given to question 23 item 7 (empty promises) and item 11 (corrupted)¹. Half of the respondents (46%) are strongly distrustful of politics.

Oldest people are more disillusioned (the rate of defiance is 38% within 15-18 years group and 52% within 24-25 years group). Working people are more cautious than students (53% vs. 42%). In addition, diploma and standard of living are also explicative variables: working people with a high level of education are less disillusioned than those who have no diploma (48% vs. 56%). Working young men are the most critical, 59% of them have a strong distrust.

Moreover, people who are not at all interested in politics are those who are the most cynical, indeed, 52% of them are strongly distrustful. Politicised young people are less inclined to have such a distrust, especially if they locate themselves on the right; whereas 71% of the people who refuse to give their political position are strongly distrustful. Such a suspicion expresses their distance towards politics and the partisan game.

		No distrust	Medium	Strong
	Total	24	30	46
Political interest	<i>Khi-deux</i>		0,033	
	Very, fairly interested(n=354)	29	31	40
	Not very interested(n=348)	21	32	47
	Not at all interested (n=290)	21	27	52
Age in 4 categories	<i>Khi-deux</i>		0,004	
	15-17 years (n=297)	31	31	38
	18-20 years (n=298)	19	33	48
	21-23 years (n=231)	25	26	49
	24-25 years (n=173)	18	30	52
Standard of living	<i>Khi-deux</i>		0,002	
	Very low, low (n=193)	20	26	54
	Medium (n=635)	23	30	47
	High, very high (n=165)	31	36	33
Diploma	<i>Khi-deux</i>		0,000	
	Still at school < maturity(n=433)	27	33	40
	Still at school >= maturity (n=204)	28	25	46
	Working < maturity (n=235)	14	29	56
	Working >= maturity (n=125)	23	28	48
Workers/students	<i>Khi-deux</i>		0,000	
	Workers(n=360)	18	29	53
	Students (n=638)	27	31	42
Diploma/gender/activity	<i>Khi-deux</i>		0,017	
	YM working/no diploma (n=133)	14	27	59
	YW working/no diploma (n=103)	16	32	52
	YM working/diploma (n=58)	28	29	43
	YW working/diploma (n=67)	20	27	53
	YM still at school (n=318)	27	31	42
	YW still at school (n=320)	28	31	42
Status	<i>Khi-deux</i>		0,000	
	In paid work (n=260)	16	28	56
	At school (n=423)	28	33	39
	Higher studies (n=198)	28	26	45
	Unemployed (n=79)	23	32	46
Left right scale	<i>Khi-deux</i>		0,001	
	Left (n=359)	20	35	46
	Neither nor (n=356)	25	26	49
	Right (n=123)	34	28	38
	DK (n=114)	25	35	40
	AR (n=35)	11	17	71

No distrust = respondent disagree with all items – Medium = respondent agree with one item – Strong = respondent agree with both items.

Table 5: Political distrust

Three important cleavages have been identified to understand the way young people interest in politics and feel competent.

The first one is related to the age. Competence and interest grow according to the age. Youth is a period of intense political socialization and aging gives more knowledge and experience.

The second one concerns the gender gap. Young men have always more familiarity and more competence with politics and feel more concerned.

The third one is due to the level of education. More young people are educated more they are interested in politics.

But general attitudes towards politics are for most young people negative. And French politicians have to face a strong distrust and a lack of confidence, which are particularly problematic among the not educated young but also significant among educated ones.

3. Ideological Orientations and Partisan Choices

The French youth is more left wing oriented than right wing. This ideological orientation among young people is a constant specificity for almost several years now. And except the middle of the 90's, at the end of a long period of cohabitation between left and right which has crumbled the political and ideological marks and has disenchanted a bit the population, the youth has always given more support to the left than to the right. Today 36% of the entire sample locate themselves on the left, only 13% on the right. Among the oldest, having the right to vote, the left has the preference of 40% of the 18-25 years old, the right only of 13%. Among the entire population in France, the preference for the left is actually relatively equivalent (38%). We can note that Muslim French young people seem to be more leftist and radical : 49% locate themselves on the left and none on the right.

But if the preference for the left is still dominant, we can notice an erosion of the capacity to locate on a left-right scale, among the youth, and more generally among the entire population. The left-right cleavage still functions as a basic ideological mark to interpret the political life and the political issues. But it is less and less relevant. In the survey barely half the sample clearly identify to the left or to the right (49%, and only 39% among the youngest, 15-17 years old). A large proportion answers neither left nor right (36%), or are not able to answer to the question (12%, and 22% among the youngest), and consequently give not a relevant signification to this distinction.

The possibility to locate between left and right strongly depends on the level of the interest in politics. More the young people are interested in politics more they locate themselves between left and right : 64% who are very interested and interested choose the left (55%) or the right (19%) and are really less numerous to give the answer neither left nor right (only 21%). A contrario, young people who are not interested in politics, and especially those who are not at all interested, are few to locate on the left or on the right. To locate oneself within the ideological and political space is strongly correlated to the interest and to the competence you feel towards politics. And this competence itself depends on the level of education.

Table 6: Left-right orientation

		Left	Neither left nor right	Right	NSP	RR
Total		36	36	13	12	3
Political interest	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000				
	Very, fairly interested (n=354)	55	21	19	2	3
	Not very interested (n=348)	32	43	9	14	1
	Not at all interested (n=290)	18	46	8	20	7
Age in 2 categories	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000				
	15-17 years (n=297)	28	36	11	22	2
	18-25 years (n=703)	40	36	13	7	4
Diploma	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000				
	Still at school < maturity (n=433)	32	38	9	18	3
	Still at school ≥ maturity (n=204)	44	28	17	6	4
	Working < maturity (n=235)	34	43	11	8	4
	Working ≥ maturity (n=125)	44	30	19	4	3
Diploma/gender/activity	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,018				
	YM working/no diploma (n=133)	39	38	11	8	4
	YW working/no diploma (n=103)	27	50	11	9	4
	YM working/diploma (n=58)	41	24	22	5	7
	YW working/diploma (n=67)	45	35	15	3	2
	YM still at school (n=318)	35	33	13	15	4
	YW still at school (n=320)	37	36	10	14	3
Status	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000				
	In paid work (n=260)	40	36	14	6	4
	At school (n=423)	32	38	10	18	3
	Higher studies (n=198)	44	28	17	7	4
	Unemployed (n=79)	36	42	10	10	1
	Other (n=40)	24	42	13	16	5
Religion	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000				
	Catholic (n=461)	33	35	18	11	2
	Moslem (n=72)	49	33	0	14	4
	Other religion (n=43)	38	43	17	2	0
	No religion (n=391)	39	38	9	11	4

We have seen before the link between interest in politics and education. And we verify again the importance of the level of education on the ability to produce political opinions and attitudes. Those who have a low level of education, and especially those who have left school without the baccalaureate, are more numerous to not locate between left and right : 43% (only 30% among young people who have interrupted their studies later and who have a minima the baccalaureate). This effect is particularly visible among not educated young women : 50% say they are neither left nor right (38% of young men in the same situation). According to the status and the level of education, the highest gap is between unemployed and students (42% of the first don't locate between left and right only 28% of the students answer the same, - 14 points).

According to their dominant left wing orientation, young people express partisan proximities which give advantage to the left camp : 13% are very close or close from the extreme left, 10% from the Communist Party, 27% from the Socialist Party, 27% from the Green. Only 6% say they are very close or close from the UDF, 8% from UMP, 6% from extreme-right.

Partisan closeness, whatever the party (extreme-right), is always higher among young people who are interested in politics, and is also more expressed among the oldest. The very young have more difficulties to situate themselves on the left-right scale and also among the political and partisan area. They are still more distant and less concerned.

Table 7: Partisan proximity

		Ext.Left	PC	PS	Greens	UDF	UMP	Ext. Right
	Total	13	10	27	27	6	8	6
Political interest	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	Very, fairly interested (n=354)	21	17	43	41	10	14	6
	Not very interested (n=348)	12	8	21	25	3	7	5
	Not at all interested (n=290)	5	3	14	13	3	2	5
Age in 2 categories	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	15-17 years (n=297)	9	7	19	25	2	5	4
	18-25 years (n=703)	15	11	30	28	7	10	6
Diploma	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	Still at school < maturity (n=433)	11	7	22	24	3	5	5
	Still at school >= maturity (n=204)	13	12	39	38	10	12	3
	Working < maturity (n=235)	16	13	20	23	5	7	9
	Working >= maturity (n=125)	14	10	38	30	12	15	7
Diploma/gender/activity	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,347	0,117	0,055	0,687	0,002	0,007	0,217
	YM working/no diploma (n=133)	14	12	23	26	4	6	10
	YW working/no diploma (n=103)	17	15	17	20	6	8	7
	YM working/diploma (n=58)	15	10	31	32	19	24	9
	YW working/diploma (n=67)	13	11	43	29	6	6	5
	YM still at school (n=318)	12	12	27	27	5	9	6
	YW still at school (n=320)	12	6	28	30	5	7	3
Status	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,001	0,001	0,007	0,000	0,000	0,000
	In paid work (n=260)	15	12	27	26	8	11	7
	At school (n=423)	11	7	22	23	2	5	5
	Higher studies (n=198)	13	13	39	37	11	12	3
	Unemployed (n=79)	20	16	26	29	6	9	11
	Other (n=40)	8	0	20	27	5	3	10
Left right scale	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	Left (n=359)	28	23	64	45	3	3	2
	Neither nor (n=356)	6	3	8	20	2	2	3
	Right (n=123)	3	1	3	17	30	50	29
	DK (n=114)	5	3	5	17	3	3	3
	AR (n=35)	3	3	3	0	3	3	0

NB:

Extreme Left = LO, LCR, PT

Extreme Right = FN, MNR

The level of education and the status introduce some distinctions which reveal the political cleavages present in the entire population and which explain the actual political game in France. Among the left camp, some divisions are visible. Young people, not educated, already at work or who are looking for a job, are more in favour of extreme-left and communist left than students who express more closeness to the socialist left and to the Green. Among unemployed young people, 20% feel very close or close from extreme-left (13% among the students). Among the students, 39% feel very close or close from the Socialist Party (26% among unemployed), 37% from the Green (29% among unemployed).

These divisions reveal a social fracture within French young people which crosses the left, but which is also visible at the opposite of the partisan spectrum. The electoral capacity of the extreme-right in France for almost twenty years to gain some support from social categories particularly touched by precariousness and by changes on the market labour, has created a scission within the right camp and a tripartition of the political space. Young men, not educated, having a job or unemployed, are more numerous to feel some closeness to extreme-right than the rest of the youth (10% of the young men having a job, 11% of the unemployed).

Positions on the left-right scale are coherent with the partisan proximities. Closeness to the parties is always higher when young people can locate between left and right. But it is interesting to note that among those who answer neither left nor right, there is one party which gains more than the others their favour, the Green, 20%.

To look at which parties young people reject the most confirms the relative consensus about the acceptance of the socialist left and of the Green. Both are the less rejected. 31% of the young answer they feel very distant or distant from the Socialist Party and 28% from the Green. Within the left camp, extreme-left is less rejected than the Communist Party, a result which confirms the general sympathy within the French youth for some radical movements, coming from the troskyst and revolutionary tradition. Extreme-right is the party which they reject the most : more than two third (69%) declare they feel very distant and distant from it. Young people who locate themselves on the left are the most numerous to reject the extreme-right (91%). Those who locate on the right are only 58% to express the same distance.

Classical right parties are more rejected than classical left parties (except the Communist Party), a result which confirms the more leftist political orientation of the youth today.

Table 8: The most rejected parties

		Ext.Left	PC	PS	Greens	UDF	UMP	Ext. Right
	Total	45	52	31	28	50	50	69
Political interest	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	Very, fairly interested (n=354)	47	54	27	22	58	59	76
	Not very interested (n=348)	43	51	30	26	49	47	71
	Not at all interested (n=290)	46	51	36	37	43	45	57
Age in 2 categories	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	15-17 years (n=297)	41	46	29	26	39	40	62
	18-25 years (n=703)	47	55	31	29	55	55	72
Diploma	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	Still at school< maturity(n=433)	44	49	30	28	44	44	63
	Still at school>=maturity(n=204)	51	58	28	24	56	56	80
	Working<maturity(n=235)	39	49	33	32	56	54	66
	Working >= maturity(n=125)	53	59	34	27	55	56	77
Diploma/gender/activity	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,347	0,117	0,055	0,687	0,002	0,007	0,217
	YM working/no diploma(n=133)	41	49	30	29	57	56	66
	YW working/no diploma(n=103)	38	49	36	36	53	52	65
	YM working/diploma(n=58)	51	58	32	25	49	51	72
	YW working/diploma(n=67)	54	61	34	29	59	61	80
	YM still at school(n=318)	48	53	30	26	47	48	69
	YW still at school(n=320)	44	51	28	27	49	48	68
Status	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,001	0,001	0,007	0,000	0,000	0,000
	In paid work (n=260)	45	52	32	29	55	54	72
	At school (n=423)	44	50	30	29	44	45	62
	Higher studies(n=198)	52	58	28	24	56	55	79
	Unemployed(n=79)	40	49	37	31	60	59	66
	Other (n=40)	43	55	30	27	43	48	63
Left right scale	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	Left (n=359)	43	48	12	22	73	77	91
	Neither nor(n=356)	43	54	38	28	45	44	63
	Right (n=123)	78	84	72	52	33	23	58
	DK (n=114)	35	38	27	23	30	30	47
	AR (n=35)	17	20	17	18	14	14	21

NB:

Extreme Left = LO, LCR, PT

Extreme Right = FN, MNR

According to the status and to the level of education, we can observe the same cleavages than before. More young people are educated, more they express a distance towards extremist parties, above all towards extreme-right (79% among students), but also towards extreme-left (52% among students/45% within the whole sample). Unemployed and not educated young people are less reticent to extremism. But we can observe a difference according to the gender : young women are less distant from the extreme-left and young men from the extreme-right.

This overview of ideological attitudes and partisan proximities among the French young people give an idea of their acceptance of the political game and of the partisan space. We will point three main results, which are linked to the political behaviours we will examine later.

The first one we have to keep in mind is the prevalent leftist orientation among young people who continue to give some signification to the classical left-right cleavage, and who, more or less, continue to interpret the political space with this elementary marker. But half of the young people, and particularly the youngest, don't recognize this traditional partition. By answering they are neither left nor right, they also have more difficulties to adopt the partisan game and to play with it. A part important of the youth is not concerned by politics, partisan identification, and stay out of the game.

The second one is the gap between educated and not educated young people. Attitudes and political choices are strongly linked to the educational background. The level of education is the most discriminating variable to explain the political attitudes and orientations. Sympathy for extremism, on the right or on the left, is more important among not educated who encounter more difficulties and precariousness on the labour market.

The third one is the weakness of the classical right parties (UDF, UMP), which have actually the executive and the parliamentary powers in France) and the attractiveness of the Socialist Party and of the Green. Especially among the educated youth and among the students, these two parties, develop some consensual attitudes.

4. Voting, non voting, electoral participation

Since recently, the registration on the electoral lists of the young people were not automatic. And an important proportion of the French youth was not registered, around a quarter between the age of 18 and 20 years old. In 1997, a new preview makes the registration automatic at the age of 18. The number of not registered in France has been reduced and has dropped from 9%, a constant proportion during the last twenty years, to 4% today.

If we consider, as a basis to know how many young people are registered in our sample the declaration of those who were eligible at the last European elections, only 7% are not. Among them there is a strong proportion of young men, not educated. Compared to the quarter they were before 1997, registration has really progressed among the youth. But compared to the whole population, there is still a difference between the young people and their elders, probably due to the fact they move more and change of address.

Around six young people out of ten (59%) consider the act of voting as effective. Only 13% think it's not effective It's even the most effective political action to take decisions concerning the society, before to work in an association (42%) or to participate to a demonstration (26%). So voting is still considered as a real democratic tool to weight on the political system, to orientate policies, to maintain democracy.

But if they are now numerous to be registered and if they think that voting is important and efficient, they also can abstain at the elections. In France, whatever the type of elections, young people abstain always more than the elders.

In the survey, we have an over representation of voters, around 10 points more than in the reality. This is probably due to the fact that young people have been asked a long time since the date of the elections (two years and a half from the first round of the last general elections 2002 and six months from the European elections June 2004). But it shows also the difficulty for the young people to acknowledge their abstention. Voting is still considered as a normative behaviour which engages responsibility and consciousness, and to not vote can be seen as a fault regarding the obligation of a citizen.

Near half of the sample (48%) aged 18-20 years has already voted, 74% of the 21-23 years old, and 73% of the 24-25 years old. The experience of voting seems familiar.

In 2002, at general elections, 47% of the sample were eligible, and two third of them (62%) have voted. Among the voters, women are more numerous than men (64%/59%), and educated people more than not educated ones (71% of the students, 51% only of the unemployed). We can count more non voters among the leftist than among the rightist (32%/19%), a gap which confirms the lack of support Jospin has encountered among his own camp.

In 2004, at European elections, 61% were eligible, half of them has voted (52%). Again, there is a difference according the gender, young women have voted more than young men (55%/49%), and according the status, students have voted more than unemployed (57%/44%). Young people who are neither left nor right have voted less than those who locate themselves between left and right (37%, 62% among the leftist, 74% among the rightist).

Constant non voting is usually more important among young people than among their elders, and strongly correlated to sociological and political parameters. But it is the alternance of voting and non voting which is more and more widespread and indicates an new kind of electoral behaviour, especially among people who are educated and also interested in politics. Looking at the participation at the two last elections, General 02 and European 04, 44% of the sample in age to vote at the general elections 2002, have voted to each election, 38% have abstained twice, and 18% have voted at only one. Constant non voters are more numerous among people not at all interested in politics (57%), among young men (42% whereas only 34% among young women have abstained twice), and also among those who have not the baccalaureate (51% among the young already on the labour market without it, only 33% when they have the baccalaureate). Constant voting is more widespread among young people very interested in politics (58%), among young women n (49%, only 39% among men) and among educated. But intermittent voting concerns 21% of the young very interested in politics, and most often students (23%), some scores which indicate the attendance of a political abstention among the youth.

Some characteristics distinguish voters and non voters at these two last elections in France.

Table 9: Abstention at General elections 2002 and at European elections 2004

		Abstention 2002	Abstention 2004
	Total	38	48
Political interest	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000
	Very, fairly interested(n=354)	25	31
	Not very interested(n=348)	44	56
	Not at all interested (n=290)	56	66
Diploma	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,020	0,204
	Still at school < maturity(n=433)	36	46
	Still at school >= maturity (n=204)	29	43
	Working < maturity (n=235)	47	54
	Working >= maturity (n=125)	37	48
Status	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,008	0,105
	In paid work (n=260)	40	50
	At school (n=423)	32	44
	Higher studies (n=198)	28	42
	Unemployed (n=79)	49	56
	Other (n=40)	58	64
Type of settlement	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,029	0,002
	Urban area (n=438)	44	55
	Small or medium city (n=304)	36	45
	Rural area (n=257)	30	39
Left right scale	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000
	Left (n=359)	31	38
	Neither nor (n=356)	53	63
	Right (n=123)	19	26
	DK (n=114)	57	77
	AR (n=35)	5	46
Parental electoral participation	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000
	Both always (n=577)	28	36
	Only one parent always (n=68)	37	40
	Both not always (n=305)	56	71
	Unknown (n=51)	70	81

Young people who abstain are usually less interested in politics. At European elections 2004, among those who were very interested and interested only 31% have not voted, and 25% at the first round of general elections in 2002, expressing with their abstention a protest attitude towards the political game and the partisan offer. Among those who are not at all interested, they represent the double in 2004 and in 2002 (respectively 66% and 56%), and their abstention has another signification, it is less political and shows more distance and more indifference towards politics. Again, the effect of the educational background is important and corroborates this distinction between these two kinds of abstention, political one and sociological one. Non voting is well known among not educated young people, and especially among unemployed (56%).

Young people in rural areas, where the social control is more important, abstain less than in urban areas. The context of the socialization seems to be important. Within the family, the fact to have parents who always vote develop, as an example, a strongest link to vote too.

At the last European elections 2004 when young people have two parents who not always vote, their abstention climbs to 71%, when their parents always vote it downs to 36%.

Among young people who vote, what are their choices ? Looking at their partisan proximities we have found a general and dominant support for the socialist left and for the Greens, but also some sympathies for extremist parties among not educated young people. Do we find a similar distribution of their preferences when they vote ?

At the last general elections 2002, six out of ten young people have given their suffrages to the left camp : 6% for the extreme-left, 7% for the Communist Party, 26% for the Socialist Party, 19% for the Greens. The right camp is deserted : 4% for UDF, 13% for UMP and 7% for Extreme-right. We can note that 11% have voted white, a significant proportion which expresses a certain difficulty to make a choice among the partisan offer.

To understand more precisely the significations and the uses of voting we have distinguished on one side the votes for some governmental parties (Socialist Party, UMP, UDF) and on another side the votes for parties which stay usually out of the governmental system and which have a function of protestation (Extreme-left (LO,LCR,PT), Communist Party, Greens, CPNT (Chasse Pêche Nature et Tradition), Extreme-right (FN,MNR)), plus white votes.

Young people in 2002 have voted more for a party belonging to the second type (47%) than for a party of the first type (35%). This confirms the “negative politicisation”, actually very present and relevant in the political context in France, using vote more to protest than to signify an adhesion to a political project or an identification to a party. This protest voting contributes to the crisis of the representative democracy which is deeply installed in France for some years now, whatever the colour of the political power. For the first time in France, at the first round of a presidential election, extremist parties on the left side and on the right side have together gained quite a third of the suffrages in the whole electorate (30%).

It reveals a real political unrest and a growing lack of confidence towards the classical and governmental parties.

Table 10: Electoral choices in 2002

		Government parties	Others parties + invalid votes	DK	AR
	Total	35	47	3	15
Political interest	<i>Khi-deux</i>		0,004		
	Very, fairly interested (n=150)	41	47	0	11
	Not very interested (n=88)	26	45	7	22
	Not at all interested (n=46)	33	50	7	11
Genre	<i>Khi-deux</i>		0,032		
	Young Man (n=41)	41	44	1	14
	Young Woman (n=29)	29	50	5	15
Diploma/gender/activity	<i>Khi-deux</i>		0,014		
	YM working/no diploma(n=52)	29	62	0	10
	YW working/no diploma(n=38)	21	66	3	11
	YM working/diploma(n=35)	46	40	3	11
	YW working/diploma(n=39)	36	44	8	13
	YM still at school(n=49)	53	27	0	20
	YW still at school(n=71)	30	46	6	18
Left right scale	<i>Khi-deux</i>		0,000		
	Left (n=135)	41	49	1	9
	Neither nor(n=75)	12	61	7	20
	Right (n=57)	61	33	2	4
	DK (n=9)	11	44	11	33
	AR (n=10)	0	0	0	100

NB:

Government parties = PS, UMP, UDF

Others = LO, LCR, PT, PC, Greens, other green movements , FN, MNR, Chasse, pêche, nature et tradition

Gender on this aspect makes differences. Young women are less attracted by governmental parties (29%/41%) and use more voting to protest than young men (50%/44%). This protestation is still more developed among young women not educated: only 21% of them have voted for a governmental party and 66% have voted for a party out of the representative system.

The ideological orientation produces also some effects. Protest voting is more widespread among leftist than among rightist (49%/33%), but above all concerns young people who have some difficulties to locate themselves between the left or the right (61%). Those latter are also more instable with their political choices and contribute to the general growing of electoral volatility, another characteristic of the crisis of political representation in France.

Young people who have already voted white or who have abstained to protest represent a quarter of our sample (24%). These forms of protest concern more the oldest, but also educated people more than non educated. They define a kind of behaviour which characterizes a more critical citizenship, having a certain political competence and an interest in politics, but expressing a critical distance towards the partisan game. With this kind of behaviour they want to weight on the electoral results and to have an impact on the decisions.

Electoral choices of the young people at European elections 2004 are quite similar. Only 41% have voted for a governmental party : 26% for the Socialist Party and 15% for UMP and UDF. The others, more considered as protest voting, represent a majority, 51%.The Greens had a score of 18% ; Extreme left 6% and Communist Party together 8% ; Extreme-right gains 7%. Others votes and white votes totalise 12%.

		Ext Left	PS + DVG	Greens	UMP, UDF, DVD	Ext right	Others	Invalid votes	DK	AR
		11	24	14	13	6	3	10	2	17
Political interest	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,251								
	Very, fairly interested(n=178)	13	26	13	14	7	4	8	1	14
	Not very interested(n=91)	5	21	19	12	7	1	10	4	21
	Not at all interested (n=48)	13	17	10	10	4	2	19	6	19
Gender	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,437								
	Young man (n=153)	7	23	14	16	7	4	10	1	18
	Young woman(n=166)	14	24	15	11	5	2	10	4	16
Diploma/gender/activity	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,140								
	YM working/no diploma (n=51)	8	30	12	6	10	8	12	12	12
	YW working/no diploma (n=38)	26	16	13	8	8	5	8	5	11
	YM working/diploma (n=28)	4	18	18	25	7		11	4	14
	YW working/diploma (n=35)	9	20	20	9	6		11	9	17
	YM still at school (n=71)	7	23	14	18	6	1	7		24
	YW still at school (n=92)	10	29	14	13	2	2	10	1	19
Left right scale	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000								
	Left (n=153)	17	44	18	3	1	1	2	1	13
	Neither nor (n=80)	6	8	14	1	8	9	29	6	20
	Right (n=62)	3	2	3	58	18	2	6	2	6
	DK (n=7)			43				14	14	29
	AR (n=13)									100

Others = other green movements, MPF and others

Table 11: Electoral choices in 2004

To conclude this point on electoral participation, we have to keep in mind three main results.

The first one is the importance that young people still give to voting. It is not only considered as the most effective political action but also as a symbolic link to guarantee democracy.

The second one is the importance of the abstention among the youth, even if in our survey it appears minimised. A part of this abstention has a political signification and is used as a new democratic tool to weight on the political system, especially among educated young people and students. Another part is more sociological, and expresses less critical attitudes than distance and disinterest towards politics. This sociological non voting is more developed among the less educated youth, having already left school, and experiencing difficulties regarding their social integration within the labour market.

The third one concerns the growing number of protest votes, giving suffrages to extremist parties or to non governmental parties. Gender has a real impact, and young women express more choices outside the classical partisan game. The weakness of partisan identification maintains a high level of electoral volatility and contributes to the general crisis of the political representation which is deeper among the youth.

5. Political Participation and Various Types of Involvement

1.1 Effectiveness of participation

French young people believe that voting is the most effective way to influence decisions in society (60% believe it is effective). Among those young people who believe in effectiveness of voting, we can note that the more people experience social difficulties, the less they are inclined to believe in the effectiveness of voting (51% of those who have a low or a very low standard of living compared to 77% of those who have a high or very high standard of living). Moreover, people who have a low education level less believe that voting is an effective way to influence decisions (55% within young working people without diploma compared to 61% within young working people with a higher education level). Young working men without diploma are less numerous to think that voting is effective (52%). Independently from their education level or social situation, young women are more confident in voting than young men. Respondents interested in politics are more inclined to believe in voting effectiveness (80% within very/fairly interested people compared to 40% within not at all interested group). Young people who declare a political orientation are also more entrusting in voting, especially rightists (78% of the rightists, 72% of the leftists and 49% of neither nor group). At least, when respondents are politically competent, they believe that voting is effective to influence decisions (75% within those who have a strong political knowledge compared to 40% of those who have a weak knowledge).

Associations also play a prominent role. Indeed 45% of French young people believe it is an effect they are favoured, the less they are inclined to believe in associations. When they are politicised, they are more inclined to believe in associations' effectiveness. Nevertheless, we can note some specificities: students are more inclined to believe that working in associations is an effective way to influence decisions, maybe because they have more time than working young people to be involved in such organisations or maybe because they are more in contact with them (students associations are very numerous in French universities). Young women are also more confident in associations than young men (48% vs. 41%). At least, leftists are more entrusting in associations than rightists or neither nor group (respectively 52%, 42%, 40%).

The others forms of participation have a similar effect, as we can see on table 12. After voting and being a member of associations, working to get attention from the media and petitions are the most effective way to influence decisions, according to French young people (33%),

followed by demonstrations (28%). We can note that young people believe in effectiveness of political actions such as petitions or demonstrations, even if they are not very involved in these activities...

Political actions, such as working in a political party or contacting politicians are less effective according young people (21% and 19%). Only very/fairly interested people and politicised people are inclined to be confident in such actions.

Illegal and violent protest activities are, by a clear majority, regarded as inefficient ways to influence decisions (61% of the respondents believe that illegal protest is not effective and 73% believe that violence is ineffective).

Figure 2: Effectiveness of ways of participation (11 point scale – recoded)




Table 12: Effectiveness of political participation and socio-demographical and political variables

		Work in party	Work in associations	Vote	Political men	Media	Boycott	Demonstrations	Signing petitions	Illegal protest	Violent protest
	Total	21	45	60	19	33	22	28	33	12	8
Political interest	<i>Kfi-cbuk</i>	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,454
	Very, fairly interested (n=354)	32	56	80	24	46	29	44	40	18	10
	Not very interested (n=343)	18	39	55	15	28	22	22	31	7	6
	Not at all interested (n=290)	12	38	40	16	22	15	13	25	9	7
Standard of living	<i>Kfi-cbuk</i>	0,017	0,493	0,000	0,169	0,131	0,206	0,042	0,000	0,339	0,089
	Very low/low (n=193)	19	41	51	17	36	26	26	36	16	11
	Medium (n=635)	22	45	58	20	31	20	26	32	11	7
	High very high (n=165)	22	50	77	16	39	27	37	33	10	5
Diploma	<i>Kfi-cbuk</i>	0,003	0,065	0,101	0,537	0,130	0,146	0,136	0,441	0,307	0,657
	Still at school <naturity (n=43)	18	47	59	18	30	22	26	34	9	7
	Still at school >=naturity (n=204)	30	50	66	20	40	24	33	34	15	10
	Working <naturity (n=235)	17	38	55	19	30	19	24	32	12	9
Diploma/gender/activity	<i>Kfi-cbuk</i>	0,169	0,040	0,082	0,660	0,341	0,535	0,153	0,040	0,649	0,278
	YW working no diploma (n=133)	19	39	52	19	28	19	24	30	12	10
	YW working no diploma (n=103)	14	38	59	18	31	19	24	36	12	6
	YW working diploma (n=63)	28	36	59	25	46	31	35	33	20	10
	YW working diploma (n=67)	25	41	63	16	30	26	26	29	8	6
	YW still at school (n=318)	20	44	60	18	31	23	26	30	10	8
Status	<i>Kfi-cbuk</i>	0,026	0,419	0,312	0,666	0,373	0,622	0,703	0,960	0,365	0,960
	In paid work (n=260)	22	42	58	17	32	21	26	31	12	7
	At school (n=423)	18	47	59	18	30	22	26	33	10	7
	Higher studies (n=193)	30	49	66	20	41	24	33	34	15	10
	Unemployed (n=79)	17	35	57	21	29	23	32	33	13	9
	Other (n=40)	17	38	50	22	37	22	21	39	9	5
Left right scale	<i>Kfi-cbuk</i>	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	Left (n=359)	27	52	72	20	41	30	42	37	18	9
	Neither nor (n=353)	13	40	49	14	23	16	17	29	7	5
	Right (n=123)	31	42	78	32	46	23	30	42	12	14
	DK (n=114)	22	46	41	18	24	18	15	23	6	7
	AR (n=35)	18	28	37	7	31	21	17	38	10	7

1.2 Political participation of French young people

During the last twenty years, non conventional political participation has been developed. To sign petitions, to demonstrate, to participate to some meetings, or to make strike, have grew up and have get progressively more and more legitimacy. In 1981, 31% of the French 18-29 years old had already done two or three of these protest actions, in 1999 they were 37%. In the whole French population, the increase is even more important : in 1981, 60 years old and more were only 13% to have participated to those types of political action, in 1999 they were 31%.² The whole French society gives more and more space to protestation and to participative democracy.

² Pierre Bréchon, « Moins politisés mais plus protestataires », in Olivier Galland et Bernard Roudet (eds), *Les valeurs des jeunes. Tendances en France depuis 20 ans*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2001.

The protest action the most widespread among the French youth is to sign a petition. Two third of them have already done it (36%). A quarter has already demonstrated or made a strike (respectively 26% and 25%). The boycott is less used (17%). Violent political actions stay very marginal : only 6% have already blocked a street or a railway, 2% have already participated to a demonstration with damages.

Age makes difference : the oldest have more participated to all types of actions than the youngest. Gender not so many. But the strongest effect is due to the level of education. Educated people and students demonstrate and protest more : 43% of the young who are still students after the baccalaureate have already demonstrated, 47% of them have signed a petition, 31% have already boycotted a product.

Table 13: Types of political participation (%)

	Has already ...
1) voted in elections	44
2) cast an invalid vote	13
3) not voted out of protest	8
4) contacted a politician	5
5) attended a public meeting dealing with political or social issues	10
6) signed a petition	36
7) collected signatures	8
8) held a political speech	2
9) distributed leaflets with a political content	4
10) boycotted certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons	12
11) bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons	13
12) written political messages or graffiti on walls	3
13) worn a badge with a political message	4
14) participated in a legal demonstration	26
15) participated in an illegal demonstration	8
16) participated in a strike	25
17) donated money to support the work of a political group or organisation	5
18) contributed to a political discussion on the internet	6
19) written an article, e.g. in a students newspaper, organisation journal, or the internet	5
20) written or forwarded a letter/an email with a political content	9
21) participated in a political event where property was damaged	2
22) participated in a political event where there was a violent confrontation with the police	3
23) participated in a political event where there was a violent confrontation with political opponents	2
24) occupied houses, school/university buildings factories or government offices	7
25) blocked streets or railways	6

Political attitudes and orientations are strongly correlated to those kinds of participation. Young people more interested in politics participate always more. Among those who are very interested and interested 44% have already demonstrated, 55% have signed a petition and 31% have made a strike. Leftists protest more than rightists. 42% among those who locate themselves on the left have already demonstrated, only 20% among those who locate on a right position. Those who are neither left nor right always participate less.

Parental participation has also an impact. Young people whom parents have already demonstrated demonstrate more than the others (50%). Best friend participation seems still more correlated : 59% of those who have a best friend having participated to a demonstration do demonstrate. The political homogeneity of the affective and personal context has a great influence on the political participation of individuals.

Protest activities depend also on the attitudes and judgments towards the government. Young people who express dissatisfaction are more disposed to protest and to demonstrate than the others : 37% among young people who are not satisfied with the government Raffarin have already demonstrated, only 24% when they are satisfied.

Table 14: Types of political participation crossed by socio-demographical and political variables

		Attended a meeting	Signed a petition	Boycotted or bought	Legal demonstration	Illegal demonstration	Strike	Political mail
	Total	10	36	17	26	8	25	9
Political interest	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	Very, fairly interested (n=354)	22	55	37	44	13	31	24
	Not very interested (n=348)	5	34	9	23	5	27	2
	Not at all interested (n=290)	2	17	3	10	5	14	1
Age in 2 categories	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,005	0,000	0,001	0,000	0,005	0,004	0,234
	15-17 years (n=297)	5	26	11	14	3	18	8
	18-25 years (n=703)	12	41	20	31	9	27	10
Diploma	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,073
	Still at school < maturity (n=433)	7	30	13	18	4	20	8
	Still at school >= maturity (n=204)	19	47	31	43	15	38	14
	Working < maturity (n=235)	7	31	10	22	6	17	7
Status	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,004	0,036	0,000	0,000	0,002	0,002	0,059
	In paid work (n=260)	10	38	16	27	7	23	11
	At school (n=423)	6	31	13	18	4	20	8
	Higher studies (n=198)	18	46	31	42	15	37	14
	Unemployed (n=79)	10	36	16	35	10	25	6
Other (n=40)	10	35	10	15	5	20		
Left right scale	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,264	0,003	0,000
	Left (n=359)	17	50	30	42	11	32	15
	Neither nor (n=355)	5	31	11	20	6	20	5
	Right (n=123)	11	41	15	20	7	26	15
	DK (n=114)	2	12	3	11	4	18	2
AR (n=35)	12	18	21	12	3	15	3	
Parental non conventional participation	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,138	0,000	0,000
	Both a least once (n=154)	21	53	33	50	10	46	17
	Only one parent at least once (n=81)	21	55	32	45	12	34	21
	Both never (n=578)	7	32	14	20	7	20	7
Unknown (n=87)	2	22	5	18	3	11	6	
Demonstration of best friend	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	Au moins une fois (n=189)	26	62	37	59	17	48	26
	Jamais (n=651)	6	31	13	18	6	19	6
DK - AR (n=142)	6	32	11	24	4	18	4	
Satisfaction towards government	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,017	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,365	0,024	0,000
	Very, fairly satisfied (n=167)	11	32	13	24	5	22	11
	Neither nor (n=355)	6	33	11	19	7	24	4
	Not very, not at all satisfied (n=409)	14	45	27	37	10	29	14
DK - AR (n=69)	6	14	3	7	4	12	3	

Participation at school is quite important in France. Demonstrations against reforms of the educational system are regular. And most of the pupils have already get the opportunity to experience this kind of political participation. In the survey, 38% of the young respond they have already participated to a demonstration or to a strike at school. These last weeks, French pupils have organized a lot of demonstrations against a reform proposed by François Fillon, actual Minister of the Educational System. And they have gained. For twenty years now, the young people's protest is so strong that each reform proposed is blocked, whatever the colour of the government, left or right. Young people still at school do have a real political weight on the governmental decisions concerning the educational system.

Democratic activity is present in French schools : 40% of the young people have already been elected to represented their class. Participation of young people still at work is less developed.

Youth involvement into political organizations or associations is very marginal. Only 1% declare to be members of a political party, 1% are members of a trade union, 2% of a human rights association, 2% of an environmental association. In France, there are not any more militants among the youth. Traditional political engagement is over and is replaced by non formal and spontaneous forms of participation, more specified, with more pragmatic goals, and firstly concerning new politics issues.

Youth organizations (10% of members), cultural (11%) and sport associations (31%) are more attractive, especially among students. Young men are more numerous to be member of a sport club (40%/22%) and young women are more frequently in a cultural association (14%/9%). The level of education makes no difference concerning the sport. In return, youth organizations and cultural associations are more attractive among young educated people.

Table 15: Involvement in organisations

	Member	Participated in activity	Done voluntary work
	Yes	Yes	Yes
1) Youth association or youth organisation	10	10	6
2) Youth organisation of a political party	1	1	1
3) Religious or church organisation, including religious youth organisation	2	2	1
4) Trade Union, including youth organisation of a trade union	1	1	0
5) Political Party	1	1	1
6) Environmental organisation	2	3	1
7) Animal rights or animal protection group	2	3	1
8) Peace organisation	1	2	1
9) Human rights or Humanitarian Aid organisation	2	3	1
10) Charity or social-welfare organisation	3	6	3
11) Consumer association	1	0	0
12) Cultural, music, dance or theatre group	11	11	4
13) Women's organisation	1	0	0
14) Anti-globalisation organisation	1	1	0
15) Sports club	31	29	8

Three main results characterize the political involvement of the French young people today.

First, the survey confirms the fall of traditional militancy. Political parties and trade unions are not any more attractive, and the youth is more suspicious about them. They don't want to be prisoner of an organization, they don't want any more to adopt all their obligations and their political objectives. They probably want more to stay free, even free to participation according their own views, ideas, and methods. There is a kind of privatisation of the political participation. But it does not mean they don't participate.

Second, according to this last point, protest participation is more and more used and legitimated among the population, and especially among the youth. Young French people can be described as a protest generation, demonstrating regularly and spontaneously. Most of them have demonstrated already at school.

Third, there is still a cleavage between educated and non educated young people, between students and those who have already attended a professional life, most often without any diploma. Those who participate the most are the first one. Young people who know some difficulties to enter into adulthood and to integrate social life with good conditions are less ready to participate, stay more far away from the political system. Their dissatisfaction and their protest don't conduct them to a collective mobilization, and even to a personal implication.

6. Attitudes towards society, confidence in social and political institutions

1.3 Attitudes towards society

1.3.1 Standard of living

In our questionnaire we asked young people to tell how they apprehend their actual standard of living. This subjective actual standard of living enable us to analyse the way young people position themselves in society.

The majority of French young people estimate that their standard of living is on average. 19% say they have a low or very low standard of living.

Women seem to be below average standard of living, but percentages are not statistically significant (see Khi-deux).

Older respondents have a lower standard of living than younger. This can be explained by the fact that younger people still live together with their parents and by the fact that older young people have more frequently to experience working life and autonomy. Students enjoy a higher standard of living, especially if they make higher studies.

Young active people who have a low level of education are more numerous to face a low standard of living (35%). Moreover, young active women without diploma are more inclined to say they have a very low standard of living. As we have already noticed during the qualitative study, young women with a low education level are a very fragile population.

In general, we can say that diploma and activity status are discriminating variables with negative impact on standard of living.

Table 16: Actual standard of living

		Very low - low	Average	High - very high
Total		19	64	17
Gender	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,486		
	Young Man (n=510)	18	64	18
	Young Woman (n=490)	21	64	16
Age in 4 categories	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000		
	15-17 years (n=297)	13	63	24
	18-20 ans (n=298)	15	67	18
	21-23 ans (n=231)	25	62	13
	24-25 ans (n=173)	29	64	8
Diploma	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000		
	Still at school< maturity(n=433)	13	66	21
	Still at school>=maturity(n=204)	15	60	25
	Working<maturity(n=235)	35	60	6
	Working >= maturity(n=125)	18	73	10
Diploma/gender/activity	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000		
	YM working/no diploma(n=133)	32	61	7
	YW working/no diploma(n=103)	39	57	4
	YM working/diploma(n=58)	15	75	10
	YW working/diploma(n=67)	20	71	9
	YM still at school(n=318)	13	64	24
	YW still at school(n=320)	15	64	21
Status	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000		
	In paid work (n=260)	22	69	9
	At school (n=423)	13	67	20
	Higher studies(n=198)	15	59	26
	Unemployed(n=79)	42	52	6
	Other (n=40)	54	44	2

1.3.2 Pessimism in apprehending the future

In general, French young people express optimistic feelings when they compare their future situation to the actual situation of their parents: 63% think they would have a better income than their parents, 66% a better job and 44% a better quality of life and a better education. Social security is the topic that raises concerns: 37% of the respondents estimate they will have a worse social security and 36% say they will have the same social security as their parents. Younger people are more optimistic than older.

People who experience a low or very low standard of living are rather pessimistic when they forecast their future: 21% think they will have a worse income, 17% a worse job, 47% a worse social security, 38% a worse quality of life and 27% a worse education (for people who have a high or very high standard of living, rates are respectively 8%, 7%, 30%, 17% and 13%).

Diploma and activity status are significant explicative variables regarding apprehension of the future. Young active people who have a low education level are more pessimistic: 18% say they will have a worse income than their parents and 15% a worse job (the rates are respectively 11% and 10% for young active people with higher level of education). Of course, unemployed young people are also very pessimistic: 20% estimate they will have a worse income than their parents and 16% a worse job (rates are respectively 13% and 12% for in paid work people). NB: Regarding quality of life and education percentages are not statistically significant.

The apprehension of the future social security is quite different. Indeed, contrary to the other items, it is the most educated and the most politicised young people who are the most pessimistic. 45% of those who make higher studies think that they will have a worse social security than their parents. Among the respondents who have a paid job, those who have a high-school diploma are more pessimistic than those who have no diploma (42% of working men with full maturity vs. 40% of working men without diploma and 45% of working women with full maturity vs. 34% of working women without diploma). The question of social security is also a more politicized issue : young people who are leftist are more inclined to be pessimistic (40%) than the rightists (34%), we find here the traditional political cleavage, with a left-wing more concerned by social problems. We can also note that the more people are interested in politics, the more they are anxious for their future social security: 40% of those who have a political interest filiation and 48% of those who move to political interest say they will have a worse social security than their parents.

Moreover, 42% of the young people having a medium strong political knowledge say they will have a worse social security than their parents (vs. 35% of those who have a medium weak knowledge). Political participation is also an explicative variable: those with at least one parent having already taken part in a demonstration or being regular electors are more pessimistic than those with parents non politically involved or voting sporadically (41% and 40% vs. 37% and 37%).

Table 17: Pessimism in apprehending the future

		Income	Professional situation	Social security	Quality of life	Education
	Total	14	11	37	27	19
Age in 2 categories	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,003	0,057
	15-17 years (n=297)	11	8	30	24	17
	18-25 years (n=703)	15	12	41	28	20
Standard of living	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,003	0,000	0,008
	Very low - low(n=193)	21	17	47	38	27
	Medium (n=635)	13	10	37	26	18
	High - very high(n=165)	8	7	30	17	13
Diploma	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,002	0,001	0,527	0,083
	Still at school< maturity(n=433)	12	9	31	24	18
	Still at school>=maturity(n=204)	12	10	46	28	20
	Working<maturity(n=235)	18	15	38	29	20
	Working >= maturity(n=125)	11	10	44	28	18
Diploma/gender/activity	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,002	0,030	0,826	0,867	0,820
	YM working/no diploma(n=133)	20	18	40	32	21
	YW working/no diploma(n=103)	17	13	34	24	19
	YM working/diploma(n=58)	10	10	42	29	17
	YW working/diploma(n=67)	12	11	45	27	20
	YM still at school(n=318)	10	7	36	25	19
	YW still at school(n=320)	14	11	36	26	18
Status	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,001	0,003	0,369	0,048
	In paid work (n=260)	13	12	40	28	20
	At school (n=423)	13	9	32	24	18
	Higher studies(n=198)	13	10	45	27	19
	Unemployed(n=79)	20	16	41	33	26
	Other (n=40)	18	10	29	23	8
Left right scale	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,009	0,000	0,000
	Left (n=359)	13	11	40	27	19
	Neither nor(n=356)	13	11	38	27	19
	Right (n=123)	13	7	34	22	19
	NA (n=14)	21	14	50	29	29
	DK (n=114)	18	12	27	26	17
	AR (n=35)	18	12	50	26	18
Political knowledge	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,006	0,017	0,063	0,874	0,191
	Weak (n=161)	14	11	34	26	14
	Medium weak (n=343)	16	13	35	26	22
	Medium strong (n=375)	11	9	42	29	19
	Strong (n=121)	12	10	36	22	14

1.3.3 France's main problems

For French young people, unemployment and poverty are the most important issues that France is facing today . Immigration is the less important. This result is not surprising, when we know that economical and professional situation of young people in France is particularly alarming. According to the latest published statistics, the unemployment rate within 18-25 years old raises 21%. French young people are the first victims of the economical crisis. Young women seem to be more concerned than young men (except for immigration).

Concerning unemployment, young people aged between 18 and 25 years old are the most concerned by this issue (82%), surely because contrary to the younger they are or will be soon in paid work and have to face this problem concretely. Young people who experience social difficulties are also more worried by unemployment, thus 81% of those who have a low or a very low standard of living think it is a very important issue. Young people who are less educated or whose parents have no full maturity degree are more inclined to think that unemployment is a very important problem (86% and 80%). Among the less favoured young people, working women with low education level are the most worried by unemployment (87%). We can note that political variables are not statistically significant regarding unemployment, it is a social problem which goes beyond traditional political cleavages.

Concerning crimes and violence, which is the third most important problem (72% of the respondents think it is a very important problem) we can note both a social and a political cleavage. Working young people with low education level are more concerned by this problem than students or working high educated people (79% of working people without diploma think it is very important vs. 70% of working people with diploma or students). Moreover, 79% of the young people whose parents have no full maturity degree think that crimes and violence are very important problems, whereas 65% of those whose parents have a full maturity degree share the same opinion. Young women seem more worried than young men. While violence is more frequent in the urban areas, only 64% of the young people who live in these areas think that it is an important problem; whereas 79% of the young people living in a rural area feel concern by crimes and violence. It is a well-known phenomenon that people who do not actually face violence or crimes meanwhile being influenced by media coverage, are more frightened than people who are confronted to them. The less young people are interested in politics, the more they tend to think that crimes and violence are very important problems (75% of not very interested people and 72% of not at all interested people vs. 68% of interested people). Moreover, if their parents are politically active, they tend to be less concern by these problems (only 62% of the young people whose both parents have already taken part in a demonstration think it is a very important problem). In addition, 81% of the young people who have a weak political knowledge consider that violence is a very important problem, they are only 67% to think the same among those who have a strong political knowledge. We can also note a left-right cleavage regarding this problem: young rightist people are more inclined to consider it as a very important issue than leftists (81% of rightist young people and 86% of those who have a right filiation vs 63% of leftist young people and 61% of those who have a left filiation).

Concerning the cut down on the welfare state benefits (55% of French young people think it is a very important problem), we can note that both less favoured people and leftists feel more concerned by this problem. 60% of those who have a low or a very low standard of living consider it is a very important issue and young working women without not diploma are particularly worried by it (69%). Whereas only 41% of the rightist young people think that reduction of the welfare state is an important issue, they are 60% within the leftist.

Less educated people and less favoured people tend to consider that number of immigrants is an important issue that France has to deal with: more than half of the working people without full maturity degree think it is important and 45% of those who experience a low or very low standard of living.

At least, we can note that young Muslims tend to be more concerned by poverty, unemployment, racism, drug and the reduction of welfare State, than other young people; probably because they are more touched by these problems, as they are a less favoured population. On the contrary, Catholics, who are, for a majority of them, more favoured, tend to be more worried by violence and terrorism.

Table 18: The most important problems in France

		Pollution	Poverty	Immigration	Racism	Welfare state	Unemployment	Drug	Gender violence	Terrorism
Total		64	75	45	62	55	77	63	72	66
Gender	<i>Khi-sq</i>	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.003	0.008	0.001	0.005	0.013
	Young man (n=510)	59	72	46	58	51	75	59	68	64
	Young woman (n=490)	69	78	44	65	59	79	68	75	69
Political interest	<i>Khi-sq</i>	0.703	0.238	0.001	0.216	0.006	0.000	0.012	0.982	0.953
	Very, fairly interested (n=554)	64	79	45	58	60	81	65	73	66
	Not very interested (n=346)	65	75	47	61	55	78	65	72	67
	Not at all interested (n=290)	63	71	37	67	47	73	54	71	64
Diploma	<i>Khi-sq</i>	0.864	0.315	0.654	0.882	0.000	0.006	0.049	0.179	0.006
	Still at school < nativity (n=433)	65	74	44	64	50	71	62	70	67
	Still at school > nativity (n=204)	61	75	39	60	56	81	55	68	58
	Working < nativity (n=235)	63	79	52	60	64	86	72	79	75
	Working > nativity (n=125)	69	70	45	60	50	77	66	70	62
Diploma gender/activity	<i>Khi-sq</i>	0.100	0.143	0.910	0.701	0.001	0.024	0.004	0.005	0.003
	Y/Working/no diploma (n=133)	56	78	50	58	61	84	68	80	72
	Y/Working/no diploma (n=103)	73	79	54	62	69	87	76	78	78
	Y/Working/diploma (n=58)	61	68	49	51	54	83	61	69	56
	Y/Working/diploma (n=67)	76	71	41	67	45	72	70	71	66
	Y/Still at school (n=318)	60	71	43	60	46	70	55	64	62
	Y/Still at school (n=320)	67	78	42	66	58	78	65	75	67
Religion	<i>Khi-sq</i>	0.156	0.057	0.000	0.020	0.001	0.910	0.000	0.000	0.001
	Catholic (n=461)	66	71	48	60	50	76	67	75	71
	Muslim (n=72)	54	85	38	78	68	81	71	74	60
	Other religion (n=43)	60	74	51	65	60	81	57	74	67
	No religion (n=391)	64	77	42	61	59	77	58	68	62
Left/right scale	<i>Khi-sq</i>	0.159	0.005	0.000	0.313	0.000	0.604	0.002	0.002	0.000
	Left (n=339)	67	80	38	62	60	78	55	63	54
	Neither (n=356)	62	73	43	63	52	76	62	74	70
	Right (n=123)	63	65	62	54	41	78	76	81	80
	NA (n=14)	79	79	71	71	86	79	86	79	86
	DK (n=14)	61	74	49	64	54	76	75	78	74
	AR (n=35)	56	77	51	57	65	77	74	85	74

1.4 Political trust

1.4.1 Trust in political institutions

65% of the French youth do not trust politicians at all or a little bit, which is not very surprising as, in France, politicians are not highly regarded. Political parties and the government also don't enjoy esteem as people tend to feel distrust for them respectively 58% and 54% of the young people do not have confidence in those institutions.

The national parliament, the European Community and the European Parliament generate a medium level of confidence. The fact that French young people trust more the European institutions than the national ones is quite surprising.

Amnesty International (36%) and Greenpeace (31%) are the organizations that the French youth trusts most. In general they are more confident in NGO's than in political institutions.

Table 19: Trust in political institutions

Trust in....	Not at all/a little bit	Neither-nor	Very much/much
Politicians	65	27	8
Parties	58	34	8
Government	54	34	12
Parliament	52	34	14
European Community	48	36	17
European Parliament	47	35	18
Attac	43	38	19
Greenpeace	37	32	31
Amnesty International	32	32	36

We built an indicator of trust in political institutions with the answers given to question 51 item 1 to item 6 (political institutions): we counted people who choose to answer "not at all", and we obtained a scale ranging from 0 (very strong trust in political institutions) to 5 (very weak trust in political institutions). In this part of the report, we analyse the profile of the young people who have a low level of confidence in the political institutions.

12% of our sample have no trust in the political institutions (see table 18). Less favoured people and a-political people are less inclined to be entrusting.

Regarding socio-demographic variables, older young people are less confident than older (13% vs. 9%). People who experience a low or a very low standard of living are more circumspect about political institutions (15%). Young women are less confident than young men, especially

young working women without diploma (20%). Young people in paid work or unemployed people do not trust political institution very much (15%). Less educated young people also tend to be less confident than those who have a high education level (11% the students under full maturity degree and 19% of working people without a maturity degree).

Confident they are (20% of those who are not at all interested in politics have a very weak trust in political institution whereas the rate is only 6% for those who are very or fairly interested). Linked with political interest, people who have no political orientation have also a weaker trust in political institutions (14% of those who are neither rightist nor leftist and 35% of those who refuse to give a political orientation). Moreover, young people who have a weak or a medium weak political knowledge are those who are the most circumspect about political institutions (16% and 13%).

1.4.2 Satisfaction towards the French government

Only 2% of the French youth is very satisfied with the French government. Most of them, 41% are dissatisfied/very dissatisfied with the government.

Young people at the age of 15-18 years are a little bit more satisfied than the average of the French youth (30%).

People who have a low or a very low standard of living and working people without diploma are more dissatisfied (respectively 53% and 50%). Within these less favoured young people, unemployed are the most discontented (55%). In addition, we can see that the less the people are politically competent, the more dissatisfied they are (55% of those who have a weak political knowledge and 46% of those who have a medium weak knowledge).

Regarding political variables, we can note that the more the people are involved in politics and the more leftist they are, the more dissatisfied they are. 50% of people who are very or fairly interested in politics are discontented with the government (compared to 36% for those who are not very or not at all interested). 55% of the young people who position themselves on the left are critical towards the government, which is not surprising as insofar as the French government is rightist. Maybe it is more surprising to see that 23% of the rightist are also discontented. Political involvement is also a significant variable, indeed, young people whose parents have already taken part in a demonstration or always vote are more inclined to be critical towards the government.

Table 20: Trust in political institutions and dissatisfaction towards government

		No trust in political institutions: Strong	Satisfaction towards government Not very – not at all satisfied
	Total	12	41
Political interest	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000
	Very, fairly interested (n=354)	6	50
	Not very interested (n=348)	10	36
	Not at all interested (n=290)	20	36
Age in 2 categories	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,006	0,000
	15-17 years (n=297)	9	30
	18-25 years (n=703)	13	45
Standard of living	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000
	Very low - low(n=193)	15	53
	Medium (n=635)	13	38
	High - very high(n=165)	2	40
Diploma	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000
	Still at school< maturity(n=433)	11	31
	Still at school>=maturity(n=204)	6	48
	Working<maturity(n=235)	19	50
	Working >= maturity(n=125)	9	45
Diploma/gender/activity	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,005
	YM working/no diploma(n=133)	19	50
	YW working/no diploma(n=103)	20	50
	YM working/diploma(n=58)	3	46
	YW working/diploma(n=67)	14	44
	YM still at school(n=318)	8	40
	YW still at school(n=320)	11	34
Status	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000
	In paid work (n=260)	15	50
	At school (n=423)	11	31
	Higher studies(n=198)	6	48
	Unemployed(n=79)	15	52
	Other (n=40)	23	30
Left right scale	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000
	Left (n=359)	8	55
	Neither nor(n=356)	14	36
	Right (n=123)	9	27
	NA (n=14)	14	8
	DK (n=114)	12	25
	AR (n=35)	35	59
Political knowledge	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000
	Weak (n=161)	16	31
	Medium weak (n=343)	13	35
	Medium strong (n=375)	9	46
	Strong (n=121)	10	55

Three main results characterize the French young people's attitudes towards society and confidence in social and political institutions.

Even if they express optimistic feelings when they forecast their future, they are very worried by unemployment and social security. Concerning these issues, social status

and education are particularly cleaving: more young people are educated, more they have an optimistic apprehension of the society and of the future. Young people who encounter social difficulties tend to be more pessimistic and more concerned by socio-economical problems.

Political institutions suffer from a deficit of confidence: young people do not trust them, especially politicians. They give more trust to NGO's such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace. Trust in political institutions is strongly linked to social background and political interest. Young people who experience social difficulties tend to be more defiant, whereas young people interested in politics seem a little bit more trustful.

At least, young people are not very satisfied with the actual French government and this dissatisfaction is generalised. People who have a low standard of living and a low education level tend to be the most discontented. We can also note, that the more the respondents are politically competent or interested and the more they are dissatisfied.

7. Belongings, beliefs and values

7.1 Identity

An analysis of the sense of identity shows that :

- Young French feel first and foremost to be part of their family (91% position themselves on point 5 or 4).
- National and regional identity follow familial identity (respectively 80% and 66%).
- Then come the identification with the school/university (57%) and with the work place (45%).
- The supra-national dimensions – Europe and world – come last (respectively 43% and 33%)

Regarding national identity, we can see that Muslim young people do not have a strong feeling of belonging to the national community (47%); they are also more inclined to declare themselves as being citizens of the world (43%). This may be explain by the fact that they probably are from immigrant origins, so they may have a dual cultural background. They are also less favoured people, so they may feel a little bit excluded from the national community.

18-25 year old respondents have a stronger sense of trans-national identity (World citizen: 36% “very strong/strong” compared to 29% in the younger age group)

The more the respondents have a high level of education, the more inclined they are to feel European (for instance, 59% of those who made higher studies feel European).

Political interest and ideological orientation are also significant variables: the less the respondents are interested in politics, the less they feel to be part of the world or of the European Union (World citizen: 24% “very strong/strong” within not at all interested people compared to 45% within very/fairly interested people; European: 28% “very strong/strong” compared to 57% in the very/fairly interested group). Young people who declare an ideological orientation tend to be more European than those who are neither rightist nor leftist, and the leftist are a little bit more European than rightist (54% “very strong/strong” within the leftists compared to 48% within the rightists and 34% within neither-nor). The leftists are more inclined to declare themselves citizens of the world than the rightists, who are more “patriotic”. (Citizen of the world: 44% “very strong/strong” among the leftists compared to 29% within the rightists; French: 80% “very strong/strong” within the leftists compared to 91% within the rightists).

Table 21: Identity

		World	Europe	France	Region
	Total	33	43	80	66
Political interest	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,060	0,028
	Very, fairly interested (n=354)	45	57	83	63
	Not very interested (n=348)	30	42	82	69
	Not at all interested (n=290)	24	28	75	68
Age in 2 categories	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,005	0,527	0,861	0,084
	15-17 years (n=297)	29	42	80	71
	18-25 years (n=703)	36	44	81	64
Diploma	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,425	0,595
	Still at school< maturity(n=433)	30	41	79	67
	Still at school>=maturity(n=204)	44	58	81	63
	Working<maturity(n=235)	26	34	80	70
	Working >= maturity(n=125)	42	45	82	63
Diploma/gender/activity	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,117	0,003	0,227	0,326
	YM working/no diploma(n=133)	29	32	76	64
	YW working/no diploma(n=103)	24	38	85	77
	YM working/diploma(n=58)	44	53	84	59
	YW working/diploma(n=67)	42	38	82	68
	YM still at school(n=318)	35	48	83	66
	YW still at school(n=320)	34	45	77	66
Status	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,044	0,002	0,335	0,088
	In paid work (n=260)	34	40	81	69
	At school (n=423)	30	41	79	67
	Higher studies(n=198)	44	59	82	62
	Unemployed(n=79)	33	35	78	59
	Other (n=40)	24	30	88	80
Religion	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,197	0,063	0,000	0,026
	Catholic (n=461)	34	48	87	71
	Moslem (n=72)	43	33	47	59
	Other religion(n=43)	36	35	76	57
	No religion (n=391)	32	40	79	63
Left right scale	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,183	0,045
	Left (n=359)	44	54	80	63
	Neither nor(n=356)	27	34	77	68
	Right (n=123)	29	48	91	74
	DK (n=114)	27	37	81	67
	AR (n=35)	41	38	83	54
Political knowledge	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000	0,548	0,828
	Weak (n=161)	20	30	76	66
	Medium weak (n=343)	28	37	78	66
	Medium strong (n=375)	40	48	83	67
	Strong (n=121)	50	64	83	68

7.2 Religion

In France, Catholicism is still the major religion, 48% of the respondents declare themselves as being Catholics. Nevertheless, an increasing number of people declare to have no religion, and among the respondents the percentage raises 40%. 7% of the respondents are Muslim, so Islam is the second French religious denomination.

French young people are not very religious, 70% of the respondents declare themselves as being a little religious or not at all religious. Only 8% of the respondents are very religious. Muslim young people are the most faithful (78% of them are very religious or religious). Catholics are the less religious people (37%), this may confirm the fact that in France a majority of people declares themselves as being Catholics, but the religious observance falls down.

Table 22: Religious denomination in France

Denomination		Number			Percentage	
Catholics	Very religious	Religious	A little religious	Not religious		
Muslims	7	30	46	7	17	
Catholics	44	34	18	4	4	
Muslims	19	29	39	1	22	
Other religions	1	4	16		79	
No religion						
Total	10	20	30		40	

Table 23: Religiousness (%)

We can note some socio-demographical differences among the religious groups. Muslim young people are the less favoured group: 31% declare themselves as having a low or a very low standard of living and 10% of the Muslim respondents are unemployed. Whereas only 7% of the young working Muslims have a high education level, the rate reach 14% among the young working Catholics and 10% among the other religions group.

7.3 Political values and attitudes

In order to analyse French youth's values and attitudes we built 3 indicators with the answers given to question 50.

7.3.1 Economical liberalism

The first indicator is related to economical liberalism. We counted the answers given to item 10 to 18 (items 11, 17 and 18 were recoded in order to be in the same direction as the others). If respondents disagree with all items, they are not at all liberal; if they agree with one item they are a little liberal; if they agree with 2 or 3 items they are almost liberal and if they agree with 4, 5 or 6 items they are liberal.

French young people are not very liberal, indeed, as shown in table 22, only 15% of them are liberal whereas 30% are not at all liberal, and we can note that no respondent agree with all the 8 items.

Concerning liberalism, gender and age are not statistically significant. The social situation and the left-right cleavage are the most significant variables to explain attitudes towards liberalism. 16% of the young people who experience a high/very high standard of living are liberal compared to 9% of those who experience a low/very low standard of living.

As expected, leftists are more inclined to be not at all liberal (37%) whereas rightists are strongly liberal (29%). The left right cleavage is still relevant, but probably less and less cleaving, as 39% of the leftist have liberal attitudes.

Table 24: Economical liberalism

		Not at all liberal	A little liberal	Almost liberal	Liberal
Total		30	25	30	15
Standard of living	<i>Khi-deux</i>	<i>0,055</i>			
	Very low - low(n=193)	38	25	27	9
	Medium (n=635)	28	26	30	16
	High - very high(n=165)	28	22	35	16
Left right scale	<i>Khi-deux</i>	<i>0,000</i>			
	Left (n=359)	37	24	28	11
	Neither nor(n=356)	28	26	33	13
	Right (n=123)	15	24	32	29
	DK (n=114)	40	25	25	10
	AR (n=35)	20	29	29	23
Filiation politique	<i>Khi-deux</i>	<i>0,000</i>			
	Filia Right (n=81)	17	20	33	30
	Filia Left (n=267)	38	22	27	12
	Filia Neither nor(n=338)	32	25	29	14
	Incohérence (n=90)	22	27	37	13
	Changement (n=44)	30	34	20	16
	Décrochage (n=101)	27	25	36	12

7.3.2 Tolerance

The second indicator measures the capacity of young people to be tolerant towards immigrant people and other cultures. It is based on answers given to item 5 (recoded) to item 7. Respondents are tolerant if they disagree with all items or if they only agree with one item; they are intolerant if they agree with 2 or 3 items.

More than half of the respondents express tolerance towards others. Young women seem to be more open-minded than the young men (60% vs. 57%, but the khi-deux is not very significant). Younger people are more tolerant than people aged between 18-25 years old (63% vs. 56%). Diploma is a discriminating variable which can explain variation in the opening to others: the more the people are educated, the more opened they are. For instance, young working people without diploma are only 46% to be opened, whereas 56% of young working people with higher diploma are tolerant. Young people who are still in the educational system, at every level, are more opened than those who work (64% of the students are opened compared to 50% of the working people). People who live in urban area are more opened than people living in rural area, that can be explain by the fact that urban area are more mixed. We can note that Muslim young people are the most tolerant, 88% of them are opened to others, maybe because they are from immigrant origins. Attitudes towards politics are also explicative variables: the more interested the people are, the more opened they are (65% of the very/fairly interested people compared to 48% of the not at all interested people). The left right cleavage is very significant: 72% of the leftists are opened to others, whereas only 28% of the rightists are tolerant.

7.3.3 Authoritarianism

The last indicator measures authoritarianism. It based on the answers given to items 1 to 4. If respondent agree with 3 or 4 items, they are authoritarian. 48% of the respondents are authoritarian, which is quite surprising for young people... We do not note any differences related to age, but gender is more effective. Young women are more authoritarian than young men (52% vs 48%), while at the same time they seem to be more opened to others. The young women facing social difficulties are the most authoritarian (65%). In general, social status and diploma may explain the variations: the less educated the people are, the more authoritarian they are (59% of working people those who have a low education level are authoritarian whereas only 46% of working people with higher diploma are authoritarian). Working people are more authoritarian than students.

Like for tolerance towards others, the political variables explain the majority of the variations. The more interested in politics the people are, the less authoritarian they are (39% vs. 61%). The left right cleavage is even more important, indeed 70% of the rightists are authoritarian

whereas only 36% of the leftists reach a high level of authoritarianism. Nevertheless, even among the leftists, the rate of authoritarianism is quite important.

At least, political competence is also an effective variable: 58% of the young people who have a weak political knowledge are authoritarian, they are only 39% among those who have a strong political knowledge.

This high level of authoritarianism is an unexpected, and quite alarming, result of our survey. Since few years, we have to face a new tendency: French young people are more and more in demand of authority, especially among the lower social classes.

Table 25: Tolerance and authoritarianism

		Authoritarian	Tolerant
	Total	48	58
Political interest	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000
	Very, fairly interested (n=354)	39	65
	Not very interested (n=348)	47	59
	Not at all interested (n=290)	61	48
Gender	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,028	0,653
	Young Man (n=510)	48	57
	Young Woman (n=490)	52	60
Age in 2 categories	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,595	0,82
	15-17 years (n=297)	51	63
	18-25 years (n=703)	51	56
Standard of living	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,012	0,210
	Very low - low(n=193)	48	59
	Medium (n=635)	51	53
	High - very high(n=165)	37	66
Diploma	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,008	0,000
	Still at school< maturity(n=433)	48	63
	Still at school>=maturity(n=204)	37	65
	Working<maturity(n=235)	59	46
	Working >= maturity(n=125)	46	56
Diploma/gender/activity	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,117	0,000
	YM working/no diploma(n=133)	54	49
	YW working/no diploma(n=103)	65	42
	YM working/diploma(n=58)	50	44
	YW working/diploma(n=67)	42	66
	YM still at school(n=318)	41	64
	YW still at school(n=320)	49	63
Status	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,080	0,000
	In paid work (n=260)	53	50
	At school (n=423)	46	62
	Higher studies(n=198)	37	66
	Unemployed(n=79)	48	56
	Other (n=40)	66	40
Left right scale	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,000
	Left (n=359)	36	72
	Neither nor(n=356)	51	56
	Right (n=123)	70	28
	DK (n=114)	46	63
	AR (n=35)	66	31
Political knowledge	<i>Khi-deux</i>	0,000	0,633
	Weak (n=161)	58	60
	Medium weak (n=343)	53	55
	Medium strong (n=375)	43	60
	Strong (n=121)	39	62

To conclude this point on identity and political values, we can keep in mind three main results.

French young people feel more to be part of their country than of Europe. European identity is not yet very firmly rooted in French people mind. Only people with an higher education level tend to really feel European.

Even if only 15% of the respondents are liberal, we can note an increasing acceptance of the liberal economical model among French society.

Unexpected result of our survey was the almost high level of authoritarianism within French youth. It is a new tendency which appears since some years: whereas French young people are almost tolerant , they are also more and more in demand of authority, especially within the lower social classes.

8. Conclusion

The political picture we have given of the French youth shows different characteristics and specificities we would like to underline.

The first one concerns the general attitude French young people have towards politics. A strong distrust and a very deep lack of confidence are more and more widespread. This negative perception causes a great distance towards politics and a general suspicion towards politicians, or at the very least, a critical attitude which is more and more spread even among young educated and politicised young people. These both reactions indicate the importance in France of the crisis of the political representation and of the partisan system, which is especially problematical among the youth. Partisan identification is very weak and traditional political organizations are not attractive any more.

Despite of this strong distrust, French young people are still somewhat politicised. Their interest in politics is equivalent to this one we can notice among the elders. But a gender gap is significant. Young men have more familiarity with politics and more knowledge about it than women.

If young people do interest in politics more or less like the elders they feel less concerned by the institutional system and by the partisan game. They are more preoccupied by issues directly connected to the social life and to new politics, as human rights, antiracism, social justice, equality...Most of them can spontaneously participate to collective protests and demonstration defending such reasons. Despite of this aptitude for protestation and the attention they give to these universals, their engagement in associations or new politics organizations stays low.

The second one is the attachment French young people still have for the representative democracy. They do consider voting as the most effective democratic tool. Even if they abstain more than the elders, voting is still the most symbolic link to guarantee democracy.

Abstention is growing among the whole French electorate. Nevertheless it does not mean only indifference towards politics. Non voting is also more and more used as a protest tool, especially among young educated people who are interested in politics and even who can have a partisan proximity. The alternance of voting, non voting and demonstrating is more and more widespread among the French educated youth and define new kinds of citizenship. Political participation combines representative democracy and participative democracy. Young people

express their choices and their political behaviours according to this enlargement of the political action.

The third one concerns their ideological orientations. Despite the fact more and more young people do not situate themselves between the left and the right, among those who still choose a camp, there are more leftists than rightists. Socialist Party and the Greens are the most attractive. Classical rightists parties (UDF,UMP) are less popular at the moment, and most of the young express dissatisfaction towards the actual government. We can notice that gender has a real impact. Young women express more often some electoral choices outside the classical partisan game and are more numerous to choose alternative parties.

The fourth result of our study , and may be the most relevant to understand the relationship between French young people and politics today concerns the social fracture within they do experiment. The gap between educated and not educated young, having already left school and experiencing difficulties to enter on the labour market, is huge. This educational gap has a strong impact on their political attitudes and behaviours. Less young people are educated, less they are interested in politics and also less they feel competent. If general attitudes towards politics are for most young people negative, the lack of confidence and the distrust are particularly problematical among the not educated ones.

Political participation also depends on the level of education. Less young people are educated less they do participate, whatever the type of participation. They vote less and they also demonstrate less. They stay more distant and more indifferent towards the political game. They do not use any democratic tools, conventional or unconventional ones, to express their demands or their opinions. This critical distance conducts some of them to feel more attracted by extremists right parties and by authoritarian issues.

Lastly, we can notice some trends which reveal recent new cleavages within the French society:

- the acceptance of the economical liberalism is more and more widespread, even among the young leftists
- the demand of authority is quite high, even among young people who are used to be more tolerant

These new trends produce new political attitudes and behaviours which can have middle-dated unexpected effects on the electoral game, and more largely on the democratic system.