

QUESTION. In your latest book⁽¹⁾, you write that Europe will never be a great power. Why? First we have to agree on what we mean by a great power. To me, a great power is a great civil and military power, roughly comparable to American power today and Chinese power in the future. This seems to me to be a very remote possibility for a number of structural reasons. The first is that Europe is not a state but a federation of nation states. Consequently, this means that Europe does not reflect the existence of a European people. As long as there is no nation of European people, there will be no European state. And as long as there is no nation of European people, there can be no common representative of its interests before the world and its challenges.

Another reason, which is connected to the first, stems from the fact that Europeans don't consider themselves to be the final guarantors of their own security. Together with Japan, we are the only ones in this situation. The Americans, the Chinese, the Russians and the Brazilians consider themselves to be the final guarantors of their security.

Europeans talk a lot about European forces, make the Petersberg missions⁽²⁾ appear more important than they are, and hold forth about the deployment of forces in Africa. None of this is insignificant, but we should not forget

an essential point: most European nations think that, in the end, the defence of their own territory is not their responsibility but NATO's and, in fact, America's. This perception has not been modified, but has in fact been reinforced, as a result of European enlargement. The Balts and the Poles look to the Americans for their security. The European Union plays an important role, but its function is economic, certainly not military. Things could conceivably change over time. But you really have to be French to believe that "l'Europe-puissance"—Europe as a power—is inevitable, or even an idea that is making headway. As long as Europeans don't consider themselves the final guarantors of their security, any talk of "Europe as a power" will remain merely incantatory. The sixty-four thousand dollar question is whether this attitude will be tenable in tomorrow's world—a world in which China, India and Russia consider themselves the final guarantors of their own security. In today's world, only Europe and Japan find themselves in this situation.

Q. Nevertheless, hasn't the Iraq crisis shown the ability of certain European states to free themselves from American tutelage?

True. The most spectacular aspect of the Iraqi affair is not the French stance but rather Germany's emancipation. But opposing the Americans is evidently not sufficient to formulate a European policy. France and Germany failed to rally a lot of countries behind them; in that respect, they failed. Has this crisis prompted the Germans to attach more importance to military questions and to make a more substantial effort to strengthen their defence capability? Certainly not. The

1. Zaki Laidi, *La Norme sans la force. L'énigme de la puissance européenne* (Norms without force: the enigma of European power), Sciences Po (Les presses), 2005, p. 711.

2. In a historic decision in 1992, at Hotel Petersberg near Bonn, the Western European Union (WEU) defined a range of crisis-management missions to which member governments wanted to respond. The "Petersberg missions" include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and tasks for combat forces in crisis management.

欧洲寄望于规范 而不是武力

扎基·拉伊迪采访录

Europe Bets on Norms Rather Than on Force

An Interview with Zaki Laïdi

Zaki Laïdi • 扎基·拉伊迪

问

题：在您最近出版的书中，⁽¹⁾您写道，欧洲未来不可能成为一个强大的力量。您为何这么看呢？

回答：首先，我们得就“强大的力量”的含义达成一致意见。对我而言，强大的力量是指强大的内政和军事力量，大体相当于今天的美国以及未来的中国的力量。因为存在着很多结构性的原因，所以我认为欧洲成为一个强大的力量的可能性微乎其微。首先欧洲并不是一个国家，而是一个由多个民族国家所组成的联邦，因而，这意味着欧洲并没有反映出作为一个欧洲民族的存在。只要不存在欧洲民族就不会有欧洲国。并且，只要没有欧洲民族，那么在面对世界以及面对世界的种种挑战时就不能有其利益的共同代表。

另一个与此相关联的原因来自于这样一个事实，即欧洲人并没有把他们自己看作是自身安全的最终保障人。我们与日本一起处于这样一种状态。而美国人，中国人，俄国人以及巴西人却都认为他们自己就是其自身安全的最终保障人。

欧洲人对欧洲的军事力量讲得相当多了，“彼得斯堡任务”(Petersberg missions)⁽²⁾的实际作用也被他们夸大了，他们滔滔不绝地谈论着在非洲的军事部署。这些虽然都不能说是没有意义的，但有基本的一点我们不应该忘记：那就是绝大多数的欧洲国家都认为，欧

1. 扎基·拉伊迪, *La Norme sans la force: L'énigme de la puissance européenne* (规范而非武力: 欧洲不可思议的力量), Sciences Po (Les presses), 2005年, 第711页。
2. 1992年在波恩附近的彼得斯堡酒店, 西欧联盟作出了历史性的决定, 定出了成员国政府想要共同承担的一系列危机管理任务——“彼得斯堡任务”, 当中包括人道救援、维持和平以及组成联合军事力量应付危机。

majority of Germans think that the farther away they get from military problems, the better off they will be. I am not judging; merely noting a fact.

Lastly, there is a third, historical, factor, which there is no getting away from: Europe was created in opposition to war and military power. The European project was founded on the idea that war must be sublimated. Naturally, one could think that the world has changed and that Europeans have changed with it. But I am not so sure. In a way, the common feature that binds Europeans is their reticence to use force and their tendency to promote norms, which is not in contradiction to the development of a military force. Besides, these past 15 years have shown that the use of force has, when all is said and done, failed to solve any problems. That's why those who scoff at European naiveté are not necessarily right. After all, the great strategic event of the late twentieth century was the collapse of communism. Yet this collapse was not brought about by a war of conquest, but by the implosion of the system. Let's remember the debate about the Helsinki Accords and its famous Basket III, which was focused on human rights. Many said that the Accords were a fool's bargain between East and West. It was indeed a fool's bargain, but not in the way they thought. Ideas turned out to be stronger than missiles. It is this historical example that leads me to conclude that purely realist visions of the world make no sense.

Possessing a military instrument is not automatically going to turn Europe into a great power. It is the purpose to which power is directed that gives meaning to military power. I'm astonished that this

obvious point is not recognised and that we are still asking ourselves how to build a European force to turn Europe into a great power.

Q. If, as you argue, European power is based solely on norms, isn't it condemned to play second fiddle?

It all depends on how one envisions the world system, on how one looks at its structure and challenges. If you see the world in "realist" terms, that is to say, if you think that what counts is the power and interest of states, and that their values, ideas and opinions don't count, you will be led to think that Europe does not matter. On the other hand, if you believe that the world's problems are never solved by force alone, you will think that Europe stands a chance. Neither the problems of poverty nor of the environment can be solved through force. The same is true of democracy, although in this area matters are more complex. Without external pressure, regimes do not budge. But pressure alone is not enough. That has been true from the conquest of Egypt to that of Iraq.

Thus the question is this: are we moving towards a world organised and regulated by norms—which is what the European project is all about—or are we witnessing the return of *realpolitik*, with the rise in power of China, India and Russia? It is a genuine question. The Europeans are betting that international norms can govern the world. That is what they hope, and it is also in their interest. But I am not sure that the other great states share this vision of the world. Therein lies the ambiguity of the French insistence on a "multipolar world". The French think that a multipolar world

洲国土防御的任务说到底不是他们的责任，而是北约的，并且事实上是美国的责任。随着欧洲在扩大，这一观念不但没有得到改变，反而被强化了。波罗的海国家和波兰人指望美国人来保护他们的安全。欧盟虽然扮演了一个重要的角色，但它的作用却是在经济方面，而不是在军事方面。虽然可以设想事情有可能会随着时间而发生变化，但实际上，你只有作为一个法国人才会去相信“欧洲之强 l'Europe-puissance”——欧洲作为列强之一——乃大势之所趋，或至少是某种不断向前拓展的理念。只要欧洲人不把自己看作是其自身安全的最终保障人，那么任何所谓“欧洲之强”的说法都只能算是画符念咒。一个可以悬个重赏来求解的问题就是，这种态度在未来的世界中是否还撑得下去——那是一个中国、印度和俄国都无不把自己当作自身安全最终保障的世界。在当今的这个世界里，只有欧洲和日本发现自己依旧处于被保护的处境。

问：然而，伊拉克危机不正表明某些欧洲国家有能力使自己从美国的保护中走出来吗？

答：没错。伊拉克事件中最引人注目的倒不是法国的姿态，而是德国的解放(emanicipation)。但反对美国人显然不足以成为欧洲的一项政策。法德两国没能把众多的国家团结在他们身边，在这一方面，他们失败了。而这次危机是否就促使德国人开始重视军事问题，并做出更

加实质性的努力来加强他们的防卫能力呢？当然没有。绝大多数德国人认为，他们越远离军事问题就越明智。我此刻并没有下判断，这仅仅只是一个事实。

最后，第三个欧洲无法摆脱的历史性因素就是：欧洲正是在反对战争和军事力量这一过程中才得以创生的。“欧洲规划”(The European project)奠定于这一理念之上，即战争必须是高尚的。当然，你可以认为世界已经改变了，欧洲人也要跟世界一起改变。但我对此却不抱肯定。一方面，把欧洲人联系在一起的共同特点，乃是对使用武力的节制以及对规范规则(norms)的推重，这与发展军事力量并不矛盾。而且，过去的十五年业已表明：说到底，使用武力并没有解决任何问题。这就是为什么嘲笑欧洲人天真的那些人并不见得就是对的。毕竟，二十世纪末具有重大战略意义的事件是共产主义的垮台，但这并不是由征服性的战争引起的，而是由其体制的内爆(implosion)所致。请让我们记住关于“赫尔辛基协议”(Helsinki Accords)及其著名的“三框内容”Basket III的争论，该争论的重点是在人权(human rights)方面。很多人说该协议是东西方之间一场傻瓜式的讨价还价。它确实是一场傻瓜式的讨价还价，但并不是以那些人所想象的方式进行的。观念结果比导弹还厉害。正是这一历史事件使我做出了这样的结论：以纯粹现实主义的观点看世界并无意义。

is automatically a multilateral world organised according to strict rules. But this definition is not accepted by all. I am not at all sure that the Chinese see things from this angle. To them, what counts is American recognition; they don't much care about the rest. What they want is to play with the big boys; not to uphold international norms, but to defend their own interests.

What needs to be recognised is that the Europeans have no alternative model. Their political model is "government by norms." They are not about to turn around overnight and say, "This model doesn't work. Let's practise *realpolitik* like everyone else." Europe cannot change its position because, as I said before, it is not a state. Europe can only return to *realpolitik* if its various members decide to go it alone. Collectively, military force is not an option for them. They can only try to convince the others to play according to a binding set of rules that apply to all, including the most powerful.

Q. But hasn't the Iraq war, in fact, proven the failure of this approach?

Yes, of course. The Europeans were divided, and those who did share a number of positions did not succeed in creating a real European dynamic. Nonetheless, subsequent events showed that the American approach was not necessarily the best, and that their way of exporting democracy by force remains highly problematic if there are no local forces to support it. That said, I am not sure that the Europeans have original ideas to tackle these problems. But, so far, the American approach has remained fruitless. After the first elections, one would have thought that the trend

would be reversed. But since then, that optimism has been dashed. In addition, the Syrian crisis—and the international consensus it has produced—shows that the UN remains an institution with a power of legitimacy that is by no means negligible. No one contests the fact that the injunction directed at Damascus to cooperate with the UN to find out who was behind Rafik Hariri's murder was justified, because there is a consensus behind it—including within the Arab countries.

John Bolton, the American ambassador to the United Nations who has also been a leading American anti-UN theorist for 50 years, is pleased to see the UN tackle the Iranian and Syrian questions which the United States can no longer manage on its own.

It is obvious that American unilateralism has reached its limits and that the pronouncements that were made about the demise of multilateralism were premature. International affairs obey the logic of the pendulum.

Q. Does this return of the pendulum favour Europe?

In a way, yes, because it allows Europe to get back in the game and underscores the fact that multilateralism can produce results. Nevertheless, today, Europe is too absorbed in its internal problems to reap even the slightest profit from this situation.

This introversion is largely due to a total lack of strategic vision regarding its own future, the difficulty of national systems in adapting to the constraints of globalisation, the tendency to renationalise choices and the temptation to make of Europe a constraint rather than an opportunity.

拥有军事手段并不会自动把欧洲变成一个强大的力量。军事力量的意义来自强权力量所欲实现的目的。令我惊异的是：这样一种显而易见的观点竟然没有得到认可，我们仍在继续自问怎样去建立一支欧洲军队来使欧洲成为一强。

问：如果如您所说的，欧洲强权仅以规则规范(norm)为其实力基础，那么它是否就注定只能扮演配角？

答：这就完全要看你是如何去展望世界之体系，如何去看待它的结构和挑战。如果你以“现实主义”的观点来看待世界，也就是说如果你认为有价值的只是各个国家的实力和利益，而它们的价值观、理念和舆论运动都没有价值的话，那么你就会认为欧洲是无所谓的。而另一方面，如果你相信世界的种种问题仅靠武力是无法解决的，你就会认为欧洲还有成功的可能。贫困和环境问题不能通过武力来解决，民主问题也是一样，尽管在该领域问题较为复杂。没有外部压力，体制不会变化，但只有压力也是不够的。从对埃及到对伊拉克的征服中，这一观点一直以来就是正确的。

因此，问题乃在于：我们是正在走向一个由规则规范所组织和管理的世界(这乃是“欧洲计划”的要旨所在)，还是我们正在随着中国、印度和俄罗斯的崛起而见证一种现实政治的回归？这是一个真实的问题。欧洲人寄望于国际规则能统治世界。那就是他们所期望的，并且也是他们的旨趣所在。但

我却不能肯定其他大国对于世界也有这样的设想。这里存在着法国人坚持的“多极世界”所具有的模糊性。法国人认为，多极世界必然就是一个根据严格的规则(rules)所组成的多文化世界。但这种界定并不会被所有人接受。中国人会不会从这个角度看待问题我完全没有把握。对他们而言，重要的是美国人的认可，至于其他事情则并不太在意。他们只想跟大孩子们周旋，目的只是想捍卫他们自身的利益，而并不是想要维护国际规范准则。

而我们必须认识到欧洲人是没有可替代模式的。他们的政治模式是“规范政府”(“government by norms”)模式。他们不可能在一夜之间掉转头来说：“这种模式不起作用。让我们也像其他人那样来试试现实政治(realpolitik)吧。”欧洲无法改变立场，因为，我说过，它不是一个国家(state)。只有在它的各成员国决意各走各路的情况下，欧洲才可能回归现实政治。集体情况下，军事力量非其选项，它只能尽力去说服其他国家遵循一整套具有约束力的规则(rules)行事，这些规则适用于所有国家——包括最为强大的国家。

问：但伊拉克战争不已在事实上证明了这种方法的失败吗？

答：是的。欧洲人意见不统一，而那些在某些立场上一致的国家也未能创造出某种真正的欧洲动力源(a real European dynamic)。而后来发



European feeling and the EU's norms and values celebrated during Europe Day in March 2007 @ AFP

The only place where Europe enjoys real political visibility is in the WTO. But, unfortunately, it is Europe that is wrongly held responsible for the blockages in the Doha Round⁽³⁾ negotiations because of its support for its agriculture.

Q. You show in your book that the Europeans' attachment to norms results in stricter adherence to multilateral rules and that, in this respect, they are different from other great nations. Is this a cultural difference?

No, there's nothing cultural about it.

This preference is part and parcel of the European project in that it aims to transcend a world in which relations between states are defined by conflict and in which all that counts are relations between states. Europe maintains that, in a more interdependent world, the rules of the game ought to be based on norms and no longer just on political arrangements amongst states.

If you want to solve the problem of climate change you have to start with the idea that there is a global public good called the environment and that its preservation requires going beyond strict regulation between states. The Europeans consider that globalisation by its very nature imposes a greater sharing of sovereignty amongst states and that this is not the least of its assets.

3. The fourth ministerial conference of the WTO was held at Doha, Qatar, from 9 to 14 November 2001. At the conference, 121 governments presented a large number of proposals for negotiation. The negotiations were conducted within the framework of the Doha Declaration, which set a series of deadlines. Almost all the negotiations concerning agriculture were supposed to be completed no later than 1 January 2005. The unofficial objective is now the end of 2006.

生的一些事件表明，美国人的那种做法也不见得是最好的办法。他们以武力输出民主的那种做法，假如没有本土军事力量配合的话，是很成问题的。当然，话说到此，我也不能够肯定说欧洲人有什么新的想法来处理这些问题，但直到目前为止，美国人的办法是不成功的。你可能会认为第一次选举后，伊拉克的局势会有改观，但从那以后，乐观主义却销声匿迹了。此外，叙利亚危机——以及它所产生的国际共识——表明联合国仍是一个具有合法权力的机构，这种合法性决不能被忽视。没有人置疑这一事实，即让大马士革与联合国合作寻找拉菲克·哈里里(Rafik Hariri)谋杀案幕后真凶的命令乃是正确的，因为它的背后存在着共识——包括在阿拉伯国家亦是如此。

美国驻联合国大使约翰·博尔顿(John Bolton)做过50年的反联合国重要理论家(anti-UN theorist)，但对于联合国着手解决伊朗和叙利亚问题，他是乐见其成的，因为美国再靠单干已无法解决问题了。

很显然，美国的单边主义已走到了尽头，而宣称多边主义终结则尚属言之过早。国际事务遵循的是钟摆定律。

问：钟的回摆对欧洲有利吗？

答：从某个角度讲是有利的。因为这使得欧洲得以重返游戏，同时也突出表明多边主义也是可以有所作为的。然而，欧洲现在过于为其内部问题所吸引，以至于

无法从这种状态中获得哪怕是最小的一点好处。

这种内向性(introversion)很大程度上是由以下一些原因造成的：对欧洲的未来完全缺乏战略眼光；各国在国家制度层面难以适应全球化的要求(constraints)；在面临各种选择时有一种重新国家化的倾向(the tendency to renationalise choices)；以及把欧洲当成一个约束体(a constraint)而非一种机遇的诱惑。

欧洲唯一可以展示其政治风采(political visibility)的地方就是在WTO当中。但不幸的是，恰恰是欧洲因农业补助方面的问题而被错误地当作了“多哈回合”谈判的障碍。³⁾

问：您在著作中提出，欧洲对规范的依恋心态是其更为严格遵守多边规则的一个原因，从这个角度看，欧洲不同于其他大国。难道这是一种文化上的差异吗？

答：不，这里面不存在着文化因素。这种对规范的偏好是“欧洲计划”(European project)最重要的组成部分，因为它的目标是超越这样的世界：即国家之间的关系是由冲突所勾勒的，并且也只有国与国之间的关系才是重要的。欧洲认为，在一个相互间依存性越来越强的世界中，游戏规则应以规范为基础，而不应仅仅只是建立在国家之间的政治安排上。

3. 世贸第四次部长级会议在2001年11月9至14日，于卡塔尔首都多哈举行。会上121个政府提出了大量需要谈判的建议。谈判内容和限期包括在“多哈宣言”的框架之内，而几乎所有关于农业谈判的限期都设在2005年1月之前。但现在非官方的目标则是在2006年底完成。

After all, what is the European Union if not a political system founded on the sharing of sovereignty? This idea was very strong, and even dominant, throughout the 1990s. There was the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Rio Summit, the Kyoto Protocol and the creation of the International Criminal Court. This cycle has clearly been reversed since September 11th. People have not only discovered that globalisation is multifaceted but also that the deregulation of markets calls for the strengthening of states as sovereign actors. Some people imprudently thought that this return of the states would lead to a retreat of neo-liberalism, but they were mistaken. The two dynamics are quite different. Ultra-powerful markets and equally powerful security states can coexist. To understand this one need only look at the United States. The market lies at the heart of American society, but the sovereign State is equally powerful in America, often more so than in Europe, because it is quick to react. After September 11th, the Bush administration went overnight from a budget surplus to an enormous budget deficit, because it was not bound by the Maastricht criteria.

The crux of the matter is this: the United States is a state; Europe is not a state. Everything follows from this difference, which is political, not cultural. To the Europeans, norms are the means to rein in states, of subjecting them to discipline, of restraining them. That is why norms are omnipresent in the construction of Europe. Europe is betting that it is possible to envision equivalent norms at a global level: to apply norms in the greatest number of

domains in the world system to make it more predictable, more manageable, less erratic and easier to monitor. In the global arena, the European project seeks the normalisation of the international system. But this preference for norms is not purely aesthetic; it corresponds to Europe's interests because it reflects its preferences. We need strong environmental norms because we want to protect our environment. We seek to institute fundamental social protections because we fear that competition from low-wage countries could end up determining our social model. We make every effort to defend multifunctionality in agriculture because we don't want to see our farmers disappear en masse. We want more political conflict resolution because we are unwilling to go to war...

Q. In your book you, by and large, equate the defence of the European model with the defence of non-market preferences. Is agriculture part of this? And by protecting our agriculture aren't we harming developing countries?

At the moment this is a central question at the WTO, and Europe is at the heart of the controversy. At one level, the issue appears simple enough: the rich ought to stick to the high added-value sectors—such as the service industries—to give developing countries an advantage in the agricultural sector. This is related to the concept of comparative advantage, which makes no sense in this context. There are two difficulties with this. The first is almost philosophical in nature: is agriculture an activity like any other? Should we give up agriculture like we gave up coal and like we will give up

如果你想解决气候的问题，你就不得以这样的一个观念为你的出发点，即存在着一个全球性的公共利益，那就是环境，并且环境保护需要超越国家间的严格界限。欧洲人认为，全球化就其本质而言是在对各国提出更加广泛的主权共享的要求(a greater sharing of sovereignty)，这也算是全球化的一种益处。毕竟，如果欧盟不是建立在主权共享(sharing of sovereignty)的基础上的话，那么它会是什么样子呢？在整个1990年代，这一观念曾一度很强劲，甚至成了主导性的。柏林墙倒塌、里约峰会(Rio Summit)、《京都议定书》、国际刑事法院都出现了，但9·11后这一趋势出现了逆转，人们不仅发现全球化是多面性的，而且还发现取消市场管制反而需要强化国家主权地位(sovvereign actors)。有些人想当然地认为，这种国家地位的回归将导致新自由主义的败退，但他们错了。这两种动力(dynamics)是截然不同的。超强的市场(ultra-powerful markets)与同样具有超强安全的国家是能够共存的。要理解这一点，你只须要看看美国。虽然美国社会的核心基础是市场，但它作为主权国家(sovvereign State)同样是强有力的，并且在很多情况下强过欧洲，因为它能迅速地做出应对。“9·11”以后，布什政府一夜之间从预算盈余转向了巨大的预算赤字，因为它并不受“马斯垂克准则”(Maastricht criteria)约束。

事情的关键在于：美利坚合众国是一个国家；欧洲则不是一个国家。这种差别是政治方面而不是文化方面的差别，其余一切皆源自于此。对欧洲人而言，规范是约束各国，使之有章可循、有所限制的手段，这就是规范在欧洲社会结构中无所不在的原因。欧洲相信，可以展望在全球层面建立相应规范，并有可能在最大范围内使之适用于整个世界体系之中，让它变得更便于预测、更好管理，减少它的不稳定性，更易于监控。虽然“欧洲计划”在全球范围内寻找着国际体系的规范性(normativity)，但这种对于规范的偏好并不纯粹是美学意义上的，而是对欧洲利益的回应，因为它反映了欧洲的需要。我们需要强有力的环境规范，因为我们想要保护环境。我们试图建立基本的社会保障制度，因为我们担心与低工资国家的竞争可能会终结我们社会模式的标准。我们应竭尽全力去捍卫农业的多功能性，因为我们不希望看到我们的农业人员大规模地消失。我们更愿政治冲突能得到解决，因为我们不希望走进战争……

问：您在书中把捍卫欧洲模式大体上与捍卫非市场性偏好等同起来，其中也包括农业这一部分吗？我们在对自己的农业进行保护的同时是否损害了发展中国家的利益？

答：当前这个问题也正是WTO的核心问题，欧洲就处在这一争论的中心。在某个层面上，该问题似乎很简单：富国应把力量集中在高附加

textiles tomorrow? Because we need to recognise that if we open our agricultural market to global competition, our farmers will disappear. There is a second difficulty in addition to the first one. If we open our markets to Brazil, that country will profit handsomely but it will go on to crush the African countries. Is that the solution?

The problem is even more complex than that, because the protection of agriculture remains very unequal at the social level and has very little transparency at the political level... If the French knew who profits from the Common Agricultural Policy would they defend the protection of farming as much as they do? I don't know the answer to that but the question evidently deserves to be asked.

Q. Therefore, globalisation ought to encourage Europe to come together. But we are seeing the opposite happening. Why?

I've always thought that globalisation was very good at revealing the strengths and weaknesses of every nation, and thus also of Europe. First of all, one must understand that with enlargement, Europe has become more diversified in character and consequently also in timetables. Not all Europeans feel that they are living in a unique historical moment. Of course they face the same global challenges but that does not change how they perceive these constraints.

Take the new member countries. For them, joining Europe means returning to history, the opportunity to join again with their own history, to rediscover a political sovereignty that was undermined by the Soviet system. The concept of shared sovereignty that lies at

the heart of the European project is not axiomatic as far as they are concerned. And while they are willing to accept shared sovereignty in the economic sphere, they certainly don't want it to spread to the social or diplomatic spheres. Their priority is to protect, and even to promote, their autonomy within a European whole. For them Europe is not so much a project as a mechanism that is meant to help them get back in the game of European national powers. Their relationship to Europe is also different at both the economic and social levels. They consider the logic of social and fiscal harmonisation to run counter to their national interests. Like the British, they believe in competition amongst European states. People always believe in competition when they profit from it. Besides, the idea of harmonising social policy smells suspiciously of Sovietism to them. Lastly, in the area of security, the issue is even more clear-cut: NATO remains the best rampart against the Russians.

In these three areas the differences are widening. To this, one would have to add Franco-British rivalries—to say nothing of the temptation amongst some Europeans to insist that Europe is not qualified to confront globalisation. This is notably the case with the British: in their eyes, Europe will henceforth be too small to confront global problems and too big to face local challenges. This is evidently not an innocent argument, because by insisting on Europe's inability to adapt to globalisation on various levels, they are casting doubt on its pertinence and usefulness. Following this line of thinking, they also reject European regulation, particularly in the

值的部门，比如服务业，以便把农业部门上的优势留给发展中国家。这一看法是与比较优势的概念相联系的，而这在我们所探讨的背景中却是没有意义的。它有两方面的困难：第一点在本质上几乎有点形而上学的味道。农业是像其他行业那样的一种活动吗？未来我们会像放弃煤炭业和纺织品那样放弃农业吗？我们应意识到，如果我们把农业市场向全球性的竞争开放，那么我们的农业工作者就会消失。第二个困难是随着第一个困难而来的。如果我们把市场向巴西开放，虽然那个国家会大规模受益，但那将摧毁非洲国家。那是解决之道？

问题比这还要复杂，因为保护农产品在社会层面上是不平等的，在政治层面上也是不够透明的……如果法国人知道谁从“共同农业政策”（Common Agricultural Policy）中收益的话，他们还会像现在那样去捍卫农业保护政策吗？对此我不知道答案，但仍值一问。

问：因此，全球化应当是激励欧洲走到一起。但我们却看到相反的情况在发生。这是为什么呢？

答：我总是认为全球化很好地把每一个国家的优缺点（自然也包括欧洲）都暴露了出来。首先，你应该晓得，随着欧洲的扩大，它已在气质上变得更加多样化，并且因此也在时间观念上显出了多样性。并不是所有欧洲人都认为他们生活在独特的历史时刻之中。当然，虽然他们面对着上述全球化的种种挑战，

但这并不会改变他们对全球化的制约因素的理解。

以欧盟新成员国为例，对它们来说，加入欧洲意味着回归历史，也意味着一种机会：即把它们自身的历史再一次地纳入欧洲，重新找回一个被苏联体系侵蚀了的政治主权。“欧洲工程”的核心是共有主权的概念（the concept of shared sovereignty），但对这些新成员国来讲，这种观念并非公理。尽管在经济领域，这些新成员国乐于接受共有主权，但它们显然不希望它扩大到社会和外交领域。它们优先考虑的事情是在全欧洲的范围保护、甚至是促进自治。对它们来说，欧洲与其说是一个计划，还不如说是一个旨在帮助它们回到欧洲国家权力游戏之中的机制。它们与欧洲的关系在经济和社会层面也是各不相同的。它们认为社会和谐与财政和谐的逻辑与它们的国家利益是背道而驰的。就像英国人一样，它们相信欧洲国家之间存在着竞争。当人们从竞争中有所收益的时候就总会相信它的作用。此外，对它们而言，把社会政策整合在一起的观念散发着苏维埃主义的味道。最后，在安全区（area of security），这一问题甚至会更为清晰：北约仍是对抗俄国的最好堡垒。

在这三方面，差异正在扩大。对此你可能不得不加上英法之间的竞争——更不要说有些欧洲人认为欧洲在面对全球化时是不够格的。英国人尤其持此看法：在他们眼中，欧洲在面临全

social and fiscal fields...

That's where we are, and I don't have the impression that the failure of the referendum is going to alter this situation, which is extraordinarily worrisome for Europe.

Yet nothing is written in stone. That is why the hastily written death certificates for Europe are not very persuasive. Differences do exist but they are all likely to fade over time. I think, for example, that ten years from now the gap between the "two Europes" will be much narrower on several levels than it is today. Factors favourable to harmonisation do exist in Europe, and should not be neglected. What is more problematic is the deficit in leadership. Since the Maastricht Treaty, Europe has

been running idle and has kept moving through sheer inertia. In a sense, the failure of the referendum signalled to Europe that this situation could not be sustained. The Franco-German duo no longer has the propulsive force it once had; and Britain, contrary to what is said, has no project for Europe. There is a British project in Europe. But there is no British project for Europe. ❀

Translated from the French original by
Paul Frank

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球化的种种问题时显得过小，而在面对内部种种挑战时又显得过大。这种观点显然不能说是没带点私心杂念的，因为通过坚持欧洲在各个层面都适应不了全球化这种观点，他们使人们对欧盟的恰当性和有益性 (pertinence and usefulness) 产生了怀疑，循此而论，他们也就拒绝了欧洲的规则 (European regulation)，尤其是在社会和财政领域……

这就是我们所身处的境况。我不认为全民公投的失败会使欧洲这种极其堪忧的状况发生改变。

然而没有什么是一成不变的。所以说匆忙开就的欧洲死亡证明书也没有那么多的可信性。差异的确存在，但它们很可能会随时间而褪色。比如，我就认为从现在起十年的时间之内，“两个欧洲”之间的差异比起今天来在很多方面都会变小。对欧洲和谐有利的因素依然存在，并且不该被忽视。成问题的是在领导力方面的亏缺。自从“马斯垂克条约” (Maastricht Treaty) 以来，欧洲一直无所作为，仅凭一种惯性在运转。就某一方面而言，公投失败表明欧洲目前这种状况不能再持续下去了。法国和德国搭档已经没有了从前那样的推动力。英国与其所称相反，并无欧洲计划 (project for Europe)，它所有的只是在欧洲实行的英国计划 (British project in Europe)，而不是英国提出的欧洲计划 (British project for Europe)。

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孙怀亮译

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