Effective or multilateral? The UN-EU partnership in military crisis management

Manuela Scheuermann M.A.¹

Paper für die Konferenz „Effective Multilateralism? - The EU and international institutions“, CSIG, Loughborough University, 13-14 January 2011

¹ Lecturer at the Institute for International Relations and European Studies, IPS, University of Wuerzburg.
Contact: M.Scheuermann@uni-wuerzburg.de
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Introduction

“Effective multilateralism” has been a central political reference point of the European Union’s (EU) external action since the EU’s rebirth after the split over Iraq in February/March 2003. Its premier was in the first proposal of the European Security Strategy (ESS) at the Thessalonica Summit in July 2003. Afterwards it was published in the European Commissions path-breaking communication about the relations between the European Union and the United Nations (UN) which was subtitled “the choice of multilateralism” (10.09.2003, COM [2003] 526 final). Another political directory, the ESS, told us in December 2003 that one of the three main goals of the EU’s foreign policy strategy is the creation of an “effective multilateral system”. In the ESS “effective multilateralism” is used to promise the EU’s strong commitment for a multilateral world order with functioning international organisations. To reach this purpose the EU positions itself as a frontrunner in strengthening the multilateral system in general and the effectiveness of international organisations in particular. For the EU “effective multilateralism” in, with and within international organisations is the foundation of a system of global governance, so is laid down in the ESS. Therefore the term is used to label the EU’s activities in the UN-family and to characterise the relations with the UN in the wider context of global governance. It is the political argument for the EU’s commitment in military crisis management, side by side with UN peacekeepers. The UN in turn speaks of multilateralism to call for the EU’s loyalty and partnership.

This paper questions these rhetorical denominations critically. It goes beyond the political declarations to analyse the degree and quality of “effective multilateralism” in reality in and with international organisations, using the example of UN-EU-relations in military crisis management. The paper aims to present and underline the following thesis: Multilateralism is under strain at all levels of UN-EU relations in crisis management.

In order to provide a conceptual basis for the analysis one has to ask at first: How can multilateralism be operationalised? The theoretical approach of multilateralism serves as the starting point of the analysis and theoretical basis of the paper (Chapter 1). It is combined with some results of inter-organisational theory. The special EU-touch in “effective multilateralism” in comparison to the “UN-touch” is subject of Chapter 2. This analysis is necessary due to the meanwhile inflationary use of the term “effective multilateralism” in almost every CSFP context. Its content fluctuates. At one time it is characterised as the shibboleth of EU’s foreign policy (like in matters of the UN) and at the other time it is nothing more than an instrument for pursuing vital interests, filled with empty promises. Thus, the results of a discourse analysis are presented in this chapter. It shows the huge potential for friction between these partners because of a different focus on “effective multilateralism”. Are the institutional steps to a partnership in crisis
management as well as the operational collaboration in DR Congo (2003/2006/2009) and Chad/CAR (2008/2009) in line with “multilateralism”? is the concluding question that is answered in the paper (Chapter 3).

1 Multilateralism: Theoretical approaches

This chapter introduces the theoretical approaches to multilateralism. It helps to conceptualise the analyses of “effective multilateralism” in the context of UNEU-relations. The neoliberal institutionalists who tried to understand the development of international institutions made the first steps on the way to define and operationalise “multilateralism”. Constructivist institutionalists who recognised that “norms matter” complemented their approach. This method is refined by the paradigms of social constructivism, especially by the construct of role models. Robert Keohane, John G. Ruggie and James Caporaso have been the leading minds in theorizing multilateralism since the early 1990s. Their main arguments are presented and further developed in this chapter.

1.1 The institutionalist model

Robert Keohane published the first internationally recognised definition of multilateralism shortly after the end of the bipolarity. It was the promising climate of a new beginning in world politics, the time to envision the potential of a new world order which motivated him as well as Ruggie and Caporaso to think about the contents of the increasingly used term “multilateralism”. He understood multilateralism as a “practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions”. (Keohane 1990: 731) Keohane’s paradigm is still the common answer if one asks for a definition of “multilateralism” in political or academic circles. How is Keohane’s concept to be understood? Keohane speaks of multilateralism as a specific form of interaction between a specific numbers of actors. Firstly one has to notice that the denseness of the interaction between the actors is marginal. It remains at the level of co-ordinating policies. The actors do not have to cooperate permanently but to interact demand-oriented and on short term. Thus Keohane’s multilateralism includes ad hoc coalitions of the willing (for instance during Iraq 2003) as well as the institutionalised cooperation in international organisations like the UN or NATO. Secondly Keohane concentrates on states as the central actors of the international system. He leaves the door open for further speculation about the quality of actorness of international institutions that have been discussed by the IR community since the early 1990s. Thirdly the haze of ignorance regarding the character of the relations between the states remains veiled.

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2 Institutions understood as “persistent and connected set of rules [...], that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity and shape expectations.” [Keohane in Ruggie 1992: 570]
3 Interview with a German diplomat, August 2009 in Berlin; outcome of a panel discussion about the question „What does multilateralism mean?“, UNA Germany December 2009 in Berlin.
Keohanes “multilateralism” includes all sorts of international hierarchic and non-hierarchic constellations apart from unilateralism and bilateralism: the structural dependency within the Warsaw Pact is per definition as multilateral as the co-laboration of the Triple Entente, the marginally institutionalised Weimar Triangle or the highly institutionalised cooperation in the EU as a system sui generis. An imperial power that interacts “by denying the sovereignty of the subject states” (Ruggie 1992: 571) operates in Keohanes wide interpretation multilaterally too. The only statement that cannot be mistaken is the numeric quantification of multilateralism: It is nothing more than “bilateralism plus one” (Williams 1995: 211).

Such a vague explanation that misses the differentiation regarding the quality and the modi of multilateral interaction has almost no potential to serve as a conceptual framework for the empirical analysis of “effective multilateralism” and the inter-organisational UN-EU-relations.

John G. Ruggie responded to Keohanes definition and coined the term “multilateralism” in the IR. He is not only a political scientist but also a United Nations insider, who served as Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Planning under Kofi Annan. He knows multilateralism from the inside of an international organisation as well as from IR theory. Ruggie modified Keohanes definition in as far as he found out that not only interests but “norms matter!” in international relations. He criticised the core of Keohanes definition: “In short, the nominal definition of multilateralism misses the qualitative dimension of the phenomenon that makes the distinct.” (Ruggie 1992: 566) Led by his normative way of thinking he concluded that the defining nucleus of multilateralism is an intrinsic set of rules that orders the relations among the states. It includes the “generalized principles of conduct”, the “indivisibility among members of the collectivity” and “diffuse reciprocity” (Ruggie 1992: 571). As Ruggie states, any interaction between more than two states must be defined as multilateral if it happens in a rule-led and non-discriminating climate. An institution has to be characterised as multilateral only if it fulfils Ruggies conditions. Thus Newman warns the academic community who analyses international institutional behaviour that “the concept of multilateralism should not be confused with or confined to formal international organizations.” (Newman 2007: 11) With his set of rules Ruggie generates clear test criteria for the study of contested multilateral interaction. But his concept remains in the area of international interactions as well as Keohanes. States are the actors of multilateralism. Moreover, following Ruggies definition, multilateralism is also nothing more than an attribute to an activity (Caporaso 1993: 53 ff.). His way of multilateralism makes high demands on the states behaviour: states have to coordinate

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4 Diffuse reciprocity differs from specific reciprocity because „actors expect to benefit in a long run and over many issues [diffuse r.; M.S.], rather than every time on every issue [specific r.; M.S.].” (Caporaso 1992: 602).
their interests without discriminating the partners and have to interact without the guarantee of immediate and relative gains. Therefore Ruggie identifies the limits of his concept himself and states that he knows "no good explanation [...] why states should complicate their lives in this manner within [...] the currently ascendant logic of instrumental rationality." (Ruggie 1992: 584)

Ruggie and Keohane stay concentrated on inter-state level in their more recent publications and still define multilateralism as a form of interaction in the international system (e.g. Keohane 2006; Ruggie 1993/1998). These concepts help to identify multilateral action in the international system and to categorise the UNEU-Interactions. But both researchers do not look left and right like the social constructivists do. Multilateralism in the institutionalist meaning is only an instrument of state’s actions. But in reality “effective multilateralism” is perceived as a goal of EU´s and UN´s external activity. These conclusions lead to social constructivism.

1.2 The constructivist model

In the late 1990s a new approach found its way in IR theory and gave birth to an entirely new thinking: the social constructivism. The constructivism solved Ruggies instrumental problem in going beyond rational paradigms. Moreover it opened a way to remain not in describing multilateralism as a sort of interaction and a means of states (Martin 1992: 767 and Bertram 2005: 71). It allowed perceiving multilateralism as an attribute to a specific identity (at first Caporaso 1993: 53 ff.) and as an end in itself. Following the constructivist paradigms of co-construction and the endogeneity of norms, some actors become multilateralists because they internalise and habitualise the normative principles of multilateral interaction via endogenous processes of socialisation and discourse. Multilateralism in the mind of these actors is not only a specific form of interaction and an instrument to pursue its interests. It is their core principle of external activity, the central “view of politics” and the natural “way of life” (Voicu 2003: 50 and Groom 2006: 460). The EU as well as the UN can be classified as such mutilateral models. Both are a natu multilaterally organised; both (try to) implement the norms of multilateralism internally; both (try to) confer their internal principles of multilateralism upon the external area; both promote multilateralism as an essential element of a system of good global governance and define it as an end in itself; both perceive themselves and each other as multilateralist role models. Actors with a multilateralist identity understand multilateralism as a core principle of the international system that transports the idea of an equitable world order. Multilateralism is seen as a normative piece of the worlds peace puzzle.
1.3 Synthesis

In synthesis of the institutionalist and constructivist approaches a helpful construct of ideas can be presented:

Multilateralism is a norm-led interaction in the international system. It is an instrument for pursuing interests. Multilateral interaction may appear in form of co-ordination, collaboration or co-operation and more or less institutionalised. Moreover, multilateralism is a political goal for these actors who socialised and habitualised the norm “multilateralism” as constitutive component of their role sets, labelled the multilateralists. Multilateralism becomes therefore an end in itself. All in all one can ascertain, that multilateralism, understood as interaction as well as element of a role model, is a defining principle that constitutes the system of global governance.

This concept helps to differentiate between some forms of interaction, to identify multilateral actions as well as multilateralists. But it has its limits. It is far too unspecific for a detailed analysis. It merely looks after state action and ignores the other actors of global governance, for instance the international organisations. This shortfall is solved by including the theories of inter-organisational governance. During my dissertation project I worked intensively about inter-organisational governance, especially the cooperative and competitive behaviour of organisations. After clarifying the organisations actors’ quality in taking recourse to organisational theories (e.g. Barnett/Finnemore 1999/2004) it emerged that organisations interact if utilitarian incentives and/or common characteristics of the organisational identity occurs. Their cooperative and competitive behaviour is comparable with states behaviour. In today’s dense institutional spaces in the midst of complex global governance inter-organisational relations are not less rivalling than inter-national relations (Biermann 2007: 14). But unlike states international organisations have in most cases one element of their role set in common that may stimulate the willingness to cooperate: they are all a natural multilateralists.

In the context of the paper one has to recognise additionally, that the theoretical approaches explain only the noun “multilateralism” and not the adjective „effective“. The adjective is the key to understand and conceptualise „effective multilateralism“ in and with international organisations. In short, what is missing is the EU/UN-touch.

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5 Due to contents constraints these theories cannot be presented in this paper.
Effective Multilateralism: Empirical concepts

At the time of starting the cooperation in military crisis management, born out of the shared experience of the international split during Iraq 2003 and the common willingness to strengthen themselves and the regime of peace operations, EU and UN began simultaneously to robe their global interests in the cloak of “effective multilateralism”. It has been a central reference for all inter-organisational activities, especially in the young policy field of military crisis management since 2003. Multilateralism is a promising concept for UN-EU-relations: EU’s and UN’s multilaterally organised bodies, their multilateral modus of action and their multilateral thinking combined with their corresponding normative worldviews and comparable political visions of an integrated approach in conflict management are a solid basis to work for peace. Their mutual commitment to multilateralism builds a confident inter-organisational milieu. Weiss explains: “For the European Union, multilateralism constitutes a matter of principle, a nonnegotiable starting point. And the same is true for the role of the United Nations.” [Weiss 2006]

But the contents of the term are less obvious than one may believe in the face of its inflationary use. As I made the case that different understandings of the term sow the seed of frictions in UN-EU-relations at all levels of cooperation, I examined the use of “effective multilateralism” in EU- and UN-documents via discourse analysis to find similarities and discrepancies. The leading questions were: What is the special EU-touch when the EU speaks of “effective multilateralism” in conjunction with “international organisations/UN”? What is the special UN-touch when the UN uses the term in connection with “international partners/EU”? Based upon the results I examined if the variations in understanding effective multilateralism have an impact on the institutional and operational level of UN-EU-relations.

Some outcomes of these studies are presented in this chapter.

2.1 The EU touch

The EU identifies “effective multilateralism” as an interaction in Ruggie’s tradition and as a means of foreign policy. The EU underlines the value of non-discriminating cooperation and commitment for the public good. Solana declared in this context: “If we want the world to work, we want multilateralism. But if we want multilateralism to work, then the powerful need to put their power behind it. A complex world needs multilateral bodies.” [Solana 20.12.2004]

Furthermore the EU realizes that multilateralism is an element of its role set, a central political goal and an end in itself. The chapter concentrates on this normative view, on the link to the UN and the explanation of the adjective “effective”.

Normative view: In the ESS, in the EU Council speeches at the UN General Assembly and various other documents on foreign policy the EU emphasises the impact of multilateralism on world order. The EU declares a better world based on an “effective multilateralism” as major goal of its external activities. In the eyes of the EU security and prosperity in a world
of globalising threats and challenges depends more and more on an effective multilateral system (GA62-07.001EN 1.10.2007). Multilateralism is named together with its core values like human rights, the rule of law and the international law (SO45/09 18.02.2009). The documents show that the EU perceives multilateralism as a recipe for curing the international system from the disease of crisis and conflict.

The UN: What is remarkable in the EU’s perception is the strong commitment to the United Nations. The UN is labelled as the “linchpin”, “pivot”, “heart” and “centre of gravity” of the multilateral system (COM [2003] 526 final: 3; Ferrero-Waldner 8.12.2004; SO02/07 24.01.2007). “Effective multilateralism” and “the UN” are mostly named parallel as the two sides of one coin: “The E.U. is deeply committed to the U.N. (...) and to effective multilateralism as a central element of its external action.” (GA59-04-001EN 7.07.2004; GA60-05.001EN 22.07.2005; GA61-06-001EN 18.07.2006). The EU declares to build a solid global system under the umbrella of multilateralism via the support of the multilateral linchpin, combined with its various bilateral relations with powerful actors and on the basis of a more coherent CSFP/CSDP. In defining the UN as global pivot the EU presents a concept of multilateralism that focuses on the revival of the classic system of multilateralism, which was built after World War II.

Effectiveness: The EU has been combining the noun multilateralism with the adjective effective since 2003. Effectiveness is the key to notice the EU-touch of multilateralism in contrast to the UN’s contents. It is used in various ways. Firstly, central to the understanding is the conclusion of the Commission’s communication: “An active commitment to an effective multilateralism means more than a profession of faith.” (COM [2003] 526 final: 3). Multilateralism is effective if it is oriented on pro-active engagement and results. Moreover, multilateral action has to have “teeth” to be effective (Solana 20.12.2004). In regard to crisis management the metaphor “teeth” means that the EU has to be ready and willing to take military measures in the last resort if needed to solve the conflict (ESS 2003). Multilateralism has to be enforceable (Biscop/Drieskens 2005: 2). This interpretation is quite comparable to the US “assertive multilateralism” that was invented by Madeleine Albright during the Clinton administration. Additionally to its pro-active connotation it implied a pragmatic order of action: multilateralism if possible, unilateralism if necessary. Secondly, the term was born out of the conclusion that the classical multilateral system had to become effective. Multilateralism is an instrument to strengthen the weakened international system, e.g. the United Nations. For this reason one has to notice that effectiveness has not to be limited to the economic way of thinking, in short efficiencies.

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6 The EU spoke at the GA 2002 of multilateralism without the defining adjective for the last time: „The European Union reaffirms its strong commitment to multilateralism and the United Nations.” (GA57-02-001EN 22.07.2002)

7 This concept is criticised by Hettne/Soederbaum as old-fashioned and inadequate for a system of global governance where non-state actors take over the efforts of governance (Hettne/Soederbaum 2006: 229).
EU’s commitment to an efficient UN would only be a drop in the bucket. The EU that focuses on efficiency would have no motive to strengthen the UN, which is criticised strongly and persistently due to its inefficiency. Thirdly, the EU perceives itself as being responsible for the effectiveness of multilateralism. This self-perception is grounded in the EU’s image as one of the most powerful and influential “global actors” (ESS 2003: 1). It positions itself as a leader in the multilateral network of global governance due to its image as a model, true promoter and veritable supporter of multilateralism (COM (2003) 526 final 10.09.2003: 9). These three arguments together lead to crucial questions: Would the EU choose to act in and with the UN if this commitment was expected to have small outcomes? Would the EU choose the linchpin UN as the partner in crisis management if the institutional spaces were denser and the forum shopping would provide the opportunity to co-operate with another crisis management organisation? Would the EU choose to interact with the UN if it was able to pursue its interests unilaterally? The answer to these questions must be verified through reality checks. All in all, the discourse analysis brought a glimpse of a utilitarian and economic strategic thinking to the surface. It illustrated that multilateral action must hold the promise of effectiveness to be chosen as adequate instrument of EU’s external action. Multilateralism is only one element of the toolbox of EU’s external action even though it is the preferred one.

Apart from these general questions and assumptions, the focus on the UN in combination with the spotlight on effectiveness raises doubts on the concept’s consistency. Rationally argued, even the attempt to strengthen the UN profoundly has small chances to succeed. The history of UN peacekeeping teaches this lessons hundreds of times. Dealing with the UN means filling the huge capability gaps with the expectation of achieving not much. Therefore some questions come to mind: Is the link to the UN only an empty phrase? The study of the institutional and operational level sheds light on this issue. And even further: Will the EU stand by its (political) commitment to the UN? To respond to this question, one has to go back to the beginnings of the term “effective multilateralism”. It was created out of the globally shared experience of the deadlock of the UN during the differences over Iraq 2002/2003 and the success of US-unilateralism. The UN perceived itself to be on the crossroads between rebirth and downfall (Annan 23.09.2003). The UN resounded throughout the international system. Even PR China declared the UN and multilateralism as an essential element of the globalising world order (Wei 2008). So did the EU. This UN-focus was definitely created out of this atmosphere. The EU always reacts very sensitive to external pressure and crises, since it is a vulnerable economic power that remains in a very status nascendi, still searching for an external identity. Since 2008 the documents show a moderate rhetorical shift: After the waves of UN hysteria ebbed away and a new crisis, the economic breakdown in 2008 emerged, the EU concentrated more and more on the international bilateralism, especially the relations with Obama’s USA and the new emerging powers (BRIC). Due to these observations one may entertain some doubt on the
reliability of the EU’s focus on multilateralism and the UN. The doubts are confirmed by studying the report about the implementation of the ESS, published in December 2009. Multilateralism and UN ranks second in the central chapter about the implementation of a more effective multilateral world order - after the US, which is called the main partner (ESS 2009: 24). But one has to admit the UN is still within the priorities of EU’s foreign policy, right after the USA.

2.2 UN touch

The UN, especially its “face”, the UNSG, verbalise multilateralism in almost every politically important speech in various contexts. As the discourse analysis shows, the normative views of multilateralism and the UN’s place in the multilateral system are the defining attributes of the UN’s multilateralism. Multilateralism is used almost exclusively without an adjective. Sporadically the UN speaks of "effective multilateralism" and "open multilateralism".

The chapter concept is similar to the EU chapter. Firstly the normative view is presented, followed by the focus on the UN. The third issue deals with "open and effective multilateralism", which includes the EU as partner in multilateralism.

Normative view: If one asks what multilateral commitment inheres in the eyes of the UN, he/she will receive an answer comparable to the EU’s multilateralism, filled with "universal norms" such as respect for the UN Charter, for the principles and norms of international law, for civilian and military measures authorised by the UN (A/RES/58/317 13.08.2004?). Multilateralism is seen as one of the main pillars of the normative global governance (i.e. the CGG report 1995). The SG enumerated them and mentioned multilateralism together with collective response, global solidarity, the rule of law and mutual accountability (SG/SM/10793 11.12.2006). The UN declares the need for multilateralism to build an equitable and democratic world order over and over again (E/CN.4/2005/L.73 15.04.2005). Annan put it into impressive words after the disaster of American unilateralism: “The choice is not between multilateralism and unilateralism. It’s between cooperation and catastrophe.” (SG/SM/8022 8.10.2003) These few insights into UN rhetoric show that the norms are of the highest importance. But this conclusion is not build on solid ground because it is only the first glance. The second view, when it comes to the UN’s role in the multilateral system, is less normative and altruistic than egocentric.

The UN: The UN positions itself as irreplaceable pole of the multilateral system and characterises itself as the symbol of multilateralism. In the UN’s eyes there is no reason to doubt this position as the UN is the only universal organisation in the international system (A/RES/55/2 8.09.2000; A/RES/58/317 13.08.2004; A/RES/59/204 20.12.2004; SG in NY 18.10.2008). When the UN is in trouble, the international system is in trouble too; when the international system is under strain, the UN is under strain too. This logic of
consequences is deduced from the UN’s position. In 2003 the UN declared its decline and the descent of the whole multilateral system. Annan and his experts of the High Level Panel discussed this topic and called on the international community to engage in revitalising the multilateral system to revive the UN and vice versa (HLP 2004). This call for a stronger commitment to multilateralism that has been sounded through the UN’s halls since 2003 is nothing less than a strategy of self-preservation. Additionally, the SG places the UN as the linchpin in facing the global problems: “The pendulum of history is swinging in our favour. Multilateralism is back. An increasingly independent world recognizes that the challenges of tomorrow are best dealt with through the UN. Indeed, they can only be dealt with through the UN.” [SG in NY 25.09.2007 and SG/SM/11236 v. 24.10.2007] His words illustrate the strong egocentrism that stands beyond the sermons about multilateralism. Surely, this instrumentalist view does not bar the norms from UN’s multilateralism. It does not reduce the normative weight of the UN’s touch. One has to notice that by strengthening the UN the multilateral norms are strengthened simultaneously. But some doubt remains regarding the credibility of the strong normative course of the UN’s multilateralism. One may find reasons to characterise the UN as a little (instrumentalist) wolf in (multilateralist) sheep’s clothing.

Openness and effectiveness: To achieve effectiveness of its internal skeleton and its external actions, to consolidate its position as a linchpin of the global system, the UN needs all sorts of partners. Therefore the UN promotes “open multilateralism” as a multilateralism in which every actor, state, non-state or institution gets the chance to participate in facing the global challenges. [CEV/2004/HLCP/VIII/CPR.6/Add 1 and HLP 2004: 17/18]. The UN formulates its urgent request for burden sharing and resource pooling via this positive connotation. To pursue its interests the UN first and foremost wants strong partners like the EU, especially for support in crisis management, an area in which the UN is always scarce. Annan refers to this UN-EU-partnership as a common destiny. He combines the demand with responsibility on one hand and effectiveness on the other: “As organizations, the United Nations and the European Union embody a belief in the power of multilateralism. […] But our institutions are under strain. […] So we share the responsibility that multilateralism works […]. If we are not effective, or seen as compromised, competing visions based in more traditional balance of power concepts would take hold.” (Ban 26.09.2008) Effectiveness is filled with the appeals of pro-active and result-oriented engagement - comparable to the EU’s understanding (Ban 25.05.2008). The UN presents profound reasons for the EU to join the UN’s commitment in crisis management. The UN underlines the similar normative principles and political goals to create the picture of a natural UN-EU-partnership, similar to the relationship between relatives [SG/SM/9290 5.05.2004; DSG/SM/308 15.03.2007; Ban 25.05.2008]. In the eyes of the UN, UN and EU complement one another: “The United Nations brings to this relationship its unique global legitimacy and impartiality, its long standing presence […]; and its deep expertise […].
The European Union brings the admirable solidarity of its citizens with the plight of the world’s poor and with the agenda of the United Nations. You (the EU) bring resources, creativity, innovation and the inspiring example of a continent that has proved the world that peace, stability and human security can be reached through cross-border cooperation.” (DSG/SM/207 14.03.2007) With these words the Deputy Secretary General gives normative as well as utilitarian reasons to join in the name of multilateralism. But the quote exemplifies also the high expectations regarding the power, coherency and effectiveness of the EU from UN side. Against this background, the EU as an unstable entity with no military capacities of its own, in search for internal coherence and external identity, must fail the reality check in the policy field of crisis management.

To present the essence of the UN touch in short: Multilateralism is indispensable for the continuity of the UN. Strengthening the multilateral system is the way to implement the universal norms as much as to rebuild the UN per se. Therefore the UN’s thinking that is covered by the rhetorical declarations is strongly instrumental and utilitarian. Multilateralism is the key to an effective UN.

2.3 Conclusion

Both concepts deliver insights into two organisations that are perceived as the multilateral role models of the international system. Both the EU and the UN are seen as bonfires of freedom and justice, as guarantors and fighters for positive peace. The UN is the central civilian force. The EU has been considered as civilian power since 1972 (Duchêne 1972). But their way of thinking “multilateralism” is less normative than these identities promise. The concepts of effective multilateralism, the UN’s even more than the EU’s are created with a concentration upon themselves and their well-being. Multilateralism, through its specific interaction as well as by normative statement, is far more a mean to get what the organisations want than an end in itself, especially when it comes to the revival of the UN. The EU’s focus is less egocentric but must be seen as a response to the short-term crisis over Iraq. In contrast to the UN’s strong and lasting commitment to multilateralism the EU’s multilateral statements must be gauged as less obliging than one may assume without incorporating its identity. The differences in defining multilateralism may open the door to friction, misunderstanding and frustration on an institutional and operational level of UN-EU-relationships. The partnership is far less natural than the rhetorical phrases give word to at first glance.
3 UN and EU in Military Crisis Management: Veritable Partners in Effective Multilateralism?

The following chapter deals with the UN-EU relations in the policy field of security with the example of military crisis management (CM). It is based on the theoretical and empirical results of analysing (effective) multilateralism. It shows whether the UN and the EU follow their respective understanding of multilateralism within and through their partnership or not. It studies all levels of UN-EU-partnership, e.g. the political level that is linked to the institutional one and the cooperation in peacekeeping in Africa. Due to the complexity of these issues combined with the widely known paper constraints, the article can present only a few significant insights into the partnership.

3.1 Political Co-operation and its Institutional Results in Crisis Management

The lessons learnt from MONUC/Artemis 2003 and MONUC/EUFOR DR Congo 2006 were manifested by two common political documents about EU-UN cooperation in the field of (military and civilian) crisis management. On 24.09.2003 the Italian Councils Presidency and the UN Secretary General signed the first written manifestation of their newborn co-operation, titled “Joint declaration on EU-UN-Cooperation in Crisis Management”. The second document that was published on 7th June 2007 was labelled “Joint statement” for reason of document’s hierarchy. It repeats the main topics of 2003 at a first glance. But after studying it intensively and after speaking with some of the creators one notices little but significant differences to the 2003 paper that demonstrate the shift of the EU’s multilateralism. For their high level of concurrence these documents are presented together.

Before introducing the main topics of the documents, the attention must be turned to the fact that both path-breaking papers were initiated and created by the EU, more precisely by the EU member states Italy (2003) and Germany (2007). CIVCOM, COREPER, PSC, Secretariat and Commission as well as the leading member states worked intensively on the draft. Their efforts were based on the EU’s former documents that dealt with the conceptualisation of a potential UN-EU-cooperation in crisis management. They were created from 2000 on. Steady inter-organisational consultations on working level and high level (EUHR and UNGS) have been coming along with the paper work since 2000. From 2001 on, UNSG and PSC have been participating in the inter-organisational meetings on high level. The implementation of the UN-EU-declarations is verified periodically by substantial reports of the EU Secretariat that review the co-operation and suggest ways to strengthen the relationship further. The UN on the other side remained in the background.

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8 For example “Implementation of the Joint statement on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management” [13609/07 16.10.2007]; “CivCom advice on the paper ‘Implementation of the Joint Statement on EU-UN Co-operation in Crisis Management’” [15070/07 13.11.2007]; “Military Advice on
during preparing and formulating the declarations. From today’s standpoint it is almost impossible to identify the UN’s handwriting. The documents are filled with the EU’s rhetoric. Due to this fact it is difficult to identify the UN’s impact not only during the phase of preparing the documents (regarding the quality of inter-organisational exchange) but in the documents as well. Therefore, the chapter concentrates on the EU more than an analysis of co-operation may tolerate. Possible explanations of this way of task sharing between EU and UN are discussed at the chapters end.

Both documents address all levels of cooperation but concentrate mostly on the development of the inter-institutional relations. They start with normative statements. In 2007 the paper began with the affirmation of their “mutual commitment to an international order based on effective multilateralism”. The first sentences of both papers highlight the central position of the UN in the international system. The UN is introduced as the organisation with the primary responsibility and legitimacy to authorise military operations, which is laid down in Article 24 UN Charter. The EU pledges its support to the UN. To quote the EU in full: “Within this framework, the European Union reasserts its commitment to contribute to the objectives of the United Nations in crisis management.” In 2007, a watchful observer identifies a little shift in the UN’s "primary" position. The document announces the mission of the new EU battle groups in UN-EU-crisis management but explains in the same breath that this EU-led mission must receive an UN mandate only “where appropriate”. What may one deduce from this statement? Is Article 24 not sacrosanct anymore – even for the EU? Tardy gives a plausible explanation: “Simply put, the EU intends to seek a UN mandate for an EU-led operation when the operation contemplated is coercive […] and/or outside Europe […], but assumes that a UN-mandate is not legally required when the operation is non coercive and in Europe” (Tardy 2003: 54).

The document includes nothing more than the Kosovo-Scenario. With regard to the strong commitment to the UN, the “effective multilateralism” of the EU is put into perspective. The question of UN-authorisation may be the litmus test of UN-EU-partnership in particular and effective multilateralism in general. But one has to recognise that the inclusion of such a scenario is a way to have the freedom to decide pragmatically when it comes to the reality check.

Apart from that this issue, UN and EU agree upon a stronger and deeper institutionalisation at the working level and on daily basis. They plan to institutionalise a desk-to-desk dialogue to boost the inter-organisational learning. Since the time of

publication, a wide network between the various EU- and UN-organs at high level and the bureaucracy at low level has been established. A stronger cooperation in planning the operations, in communication at all levels and at all times of a mission, a joint instruction of the mission’s staff and best practices was laid down in the documents as well. These measures were the direct outcome from the lessons identified during the operations in the DR Congo.

All in all, one has to conclude that the content of these documents is thin. But put in contrast to the recent NATO-UN declarations on crisis management as well as the AU-UN statements the result is satisfying. Moreover, the EU went concrete steps to build on that outcome and to make further suggestions to strengthen the partnership. For instance, the EU defined its own list of objectives for an effective common crisis management, which are implemented in the field missions.

As stated in the beginning of the chapter the EU was the catalyst and promoter of these political declarations. It made a veritable effort to deepen the ties between the partners as well. Practitioners who were part of the preparation processes confirmed the EU’s role as a lone fighter for the institutionalisation of the UN-EU-relations. The UN, however was reluctant at this level of the relationship.

“Effective multilateralism” may explain the behaviour of both partners:

The EU learnt that institutionalisation enhances effectiveness by its successful experiences with multilateralism during its long history of integration. It simplifies coordination and stimulates cooperation. The EU experienced, that in the end long standing co-operation on the basis of diffuse reciprocity is a profitable way. For this reason, the EU includes its internal politics of institutional integration in its external identity (intern-extern-analogy). Therefore, the EU is eager to build confident, long lasting partnerships with all its allies, the NATO and AU as well as the UN. Especially in the new field of CM the EU longs for such an institutional network, perceived as the reliable basis of its actions. In the end, by mutual exchange and deepended institutional ties multilateralism becomes more effective.

The UN on the other side does not give much attention to constant exchange and institutionalisation. It concentrates on the present crisis situation and prefers ad-hoc collaboration with regional organisations (Fawcett 2003: 16; Pugh/Sidhu 2003: 1). It is not in its interest to engage exclusively. It is not in its mindset to strengthen all the ties with all its possible partners. Some solid arguments must be made against a commitment to one special partner and/or deeper institutionalisation in the eyes of the UN: 1) as linchpin organisation in CM the UN can [try to] choose out of a range of partners if it is in need for task sharing, burden sharing or resource pooling. In the past it reverted to nation-led coalitions of the willing, NATO or operated alone. 2) In the UN’s perception, the UN-EU-relations are covered already through Chapter VIII UN-Charter. The UN perceives the EU as a regional partner. In the UN’s logic there is no reason to go a Sonderweg with the EU via
such documents like the declarations.\textsuperscript{9} 3) In order not to risk the decline of its position in CM as nucleus of international CM the UN tries to avoid durable relationships with organisations that may have the effect of demonstrating the chronic weakness of the UN peacekeeping. With organisations that are weaker than the UN, it is the promoter of such declarations.\textsuperscript{10} It perceives itself as the player who has to strengthen these organisations, e.g. the AU. 4) In 2003, when the declaration was published, the UN had first and foremost to understand the EU’s new role as a military and civilian crisis manager. The GSDP was operational in 2003 for the first time ever. In the decades before the EU was no player in peacekeeping. Therefore one may argue it was the EU’s responsibility to offer or to allocate its new instruments to the UN. 5) At last, the question rises who or which organ shall initiate such a declaration or the institutionalisation within the UN. The UN bureaucracy is overstretched. It is a way of task sharing that the EU initiated.

All things considered, the EU fulfilled its promise to strengthen the international organisations via veritable multilateralism with these declarations. They must be seen as a complement to the cooperation at political and operational level. The UN was passive, but pursuing multilateralism in the UN’s sense too. The UN recognised that these political and institutional commitments had no immediate positive impact on the UN’s status. So it took a backseat. But in contrast to the EU, since it is not eager to institutionalise the inter-organisational relations, the UN did not act multilaterally in Ruggie’s understanding. It seems that the UN concentrates more on immediate gains than on the outcome of long standing relations based on diffuse reciprocity.

\textbf{3.2 Examples of Co-operative Operational Military Crisis Management}

The next step is to study the quality of “effective multilateralism” at the operational level of the UN-EU relations in military crisis management. The article concentrates on the conceptualisation of cooperation in the field.\textsuperscript{11} It passes on the analyses of the inter-organisational decision and planning processes as well as of the informational and personal exchange during co-operation even though they show the high complexity of inter-organisational multi-level governance, the various conflict lines and sources of rivalry and mismanagement. But the results of these studies are less significant regarding “effective multilateralism” than the operational concepts.

\textsuperscript{9} But there is a rub in UN-EU-relations, which the UN may not have noticed yet. The classification as a “regional organisation” does not fit for the EU that operates in the middle of Africa. Additionally, the EU does not identify itself as a regional organisation only but a global one, in geographical and political spheres. Unlike other organisations, e.g. the AU, the NATO or ASEAN, the EU perceives itself as a global actor who thinks and operates globally.

\textsuperscript{10} See i.e. A/RES/61/296 5.10.2007.

\textsuperscript{11} The field level, that is of utmost interest as well, was analysed in my GRASP-working paper [see references].
To gauge the quality of “effective multilateralism”, one has to operationalise the meaning of “effective multilateralism” in this context. After that the concepts of co-operation are presented. Some examples give further insights into the co-operation in DR Congo and Chad/CAR.

3.2.1 “Effective multilateral” crisis management
To begin with the UN-touch, the UN, eager to be strengthened it its most pressing issue, the peacekeeping, identifies the cooperation in line with “multilateralism” if the EU shares burdens with the UN. Thus the key to multilateralism is the question whether the EU is a veritable supporter of the UN’s peacekeeping. Additionally, the UN aims to preserve its central role as the world’s peacekeeper. Therefore it avoids a concept of operation that looks like the EU is replacing the UN. The UN underlines its autonomy as well. It is not ready to agree upon a concept that reduces its visibility and legitimacy. It accepts no cooperation that shows the weakness of UN peacekeeping. Apart from the self-centered model of multilateralism, the object to secure a conflict region is an effort in the name of multilateralism as well.

The EU’s touch of multilateralism applied to crisis management fits with the UN’s interests in principal. The EU promises to strengthen the UN in its most challenging policy field, the peacekeeping. It emphasises in various documents that it must not risk replacing the UN through its commitment to and within the UN. The EU is also keen to secure the international environment and asks if the outcome of a mission will be a win for the multilateral system. Apart from the focus on the UN, the commitment must fulfil the rules of effectiveness. The mission must have the capabilities and facilities as well as the mandate for the EU to be a reliable partner for the weakened UN. It has to have these means to be accepted by the EU member states that watch the new GSDP efforts critically as well. It has to have the military power to act decisively to not risk the life of EU troops and to save the image of a successful GSDP. It must be pro-active in building a safe and secure environment or filling a security vacuum. The adjective “effective” includes the fact that the setting must assure to have an impact on the conflict solution. That is a pre-condition to even think about planning a GSDP mission. In short: the co-operation must warrant the EU’s success. Moreover, the EU’s concept is oriented on increased benefits of the inter-organisational work. Thus duplication in the field or unnecessary doubled bureaucracy must be strictly avoided, as stated in a paper of the EU Secretariat, which was discussed with the UNUSG of the UNDPKO already in 2001 (9526/1/01 REV 1 11.06.2001: 48/49). At least, the operation must contribute to the EU’s external identity. The EU has to position itself in the system of security governance too. Therefore, the EU must be visible and its autonomy must be safeguarded (9526/1/01 REV 1 11.06.2001: 48/49). The Council exemplified “autonomy” in 2001 in a paper about UN-EU relations in crisis management and conflict prevention: “no automatic supply, cooperation on case-by-case, [...] PSC political
control and strategic direction, no instantly deployable resources, etc.” [12969/01: §4, 7.11.2001]. Like the UN, the EU is focused on its own benefit and costs.

3.2.2 The concepts of co-operation

The missions’ concepts are based on models that were invented by the EU in its report “EU-UN Co-operation in military crisis management operations – Elements of implementation of the EU-UN joint Declaration” (9638 9.06.2004), which recurred mostly on the Swedish presidential Non-Paper of 2001 (8533/01 ANNEX 10.05.2001), the Council’s decision at the Gothenburg Summit (SN 200/1/01 REV 1 15./16.06.2001) and the Council’s Document 12969/01, dealing with EU-UN relations in crisis management and conflict prevention (12969/01 7.11.2001). The graphic shows the variations in EU operations and the concepts of UN-EU co-operation:

As my analysis focuses on the dyad between EU and UN a case was selected if it met the criteria of pure inter-organisational co-operation. The criteria are as follows:

1) The UN subcontracts the GSDP mission. In contrast to the first option that existed before the EU’s integration into security policy via national support to UN troops, the subcontracting model emerged with the development of the GSDP. The central argument for sub-contracting is the political authority that remains in the hands of the PSC. In option I the political authority lies in the hands of the UNSG. The subcontracting has been discussed since the end of bipolarity, especially after the proposal of a Regional-Global-Peace-Mechanism in 2000 (...). A motive to choose option II might be mistrust in the leadership qualities of the UN Secretariat (Novosseloff 2004: 6). Anyway it answers to the EU’s interest to guard its recently won authority in security policy.
The mission must be led by the EU to speak of UN-EU-cooperation in the field.

It must be labelled EU-mission to the core. Therefore must be free of NATO assets.

The GSDP mission operates parallel to an UN mission in the field.

This case was met in DR Congo 2003 and 2006 as well as in Chad/CAR 2008/09.

The graphic presents two ways for the EU, to support the UN: the “over the horizon capacities on standby” and the “bridging an UN operation”. The standby-model was invented by the UNDPKO as an answer to the crises in Africa. The EU Council criticised it as too complex and challenging with regard to the inter-organisational co-ordination. It was evaluated as ineffective. Nevertheless, it became reality in Congo 2006. The bridging model includes the rapid deployment of EU troops. This was the concept of Artemis/MONUC in 2003 and Chad/MINURCAT 2008/09. In such a case, the EU troops function as a bridge for an UN mission to gain time for a [re]-deployment of UN peacekeepers or the [re]-organisation of the UN operation. It ends when the redeployment or reorganisation of the UN mission is implemented (but not necessarily completed). In contrast to usual peace operation schedules, the end-date is oriented on the end-state of the UN, not on the situation in the theatre. This model answers to the recent developments in peace operations. Tardy observed an specific burden-sharing between the UN and the regional organisation which is applicable to the UN-EU task-sharing as well: the regional organisations “go first to a crisis zone for a limited period of time before the UN takes over for a longer term.” (Tardy 2005: 62) The bridging model opens the possibility to re-hat the EU troops to the UN peacekeeping mission. Both models were implemented during the EU-UN cooperation in DR Congo and Chad/CAR, even though if the co-operation in Chad/CAR is a special case.

See the chart that shows the data and main facts of the co-operative missions:

12 One has to reiterate that the UN has to operate parallel with the EU not after the EU ended its mission.
These concepts of cooperation inherit some of the main elements of "effective multilateralism". They create a task and role sharing that avoids the duplication of efforts as well as the replacement of the UN. The pattern of burden sharing remains the same: The UN is the longstanding and multidimensional stabilisation force; the EU is the short-term and robust emergency force. This is a solid fundament for a mission’s success.

3.2.3 Insights in the co-operation
But the co-operation in DR Congo and Chad/CAR had some deficits in “effective multilateralism”. Without going into details, three short examples are presented here. Two of them deal with the situation at the end of the co-operation. ¹³The third example shows the EU’s behaviour when the operation is not show promising results.

Example 1: The priority of the end-date
The EU-operations in DR Congo were criticised for their concentration on the end date of the mission since this way the EU risked the security of MONUC and the Congolese population as well as the success of the co-operation. In 2003, as Artemis began to withdraw its troops within its schedule, MONUC was not in a position to take over from Artemis. Therefore Artemis risked a huge security vacuum in a very unstable environment. Although Artemis helped MONUC to implement its DDR measures during the three month of co-operation and to build up security, it preferred to “send the boys back home” on time. The EU did not even think of extending the end-date for a few weeks even if this was discussed by some northern EU member states and NGO’s. The quality of its multilateralism must be questioned. In 2006 the EU acted the same way in a different setting. During its co-operation with MONUC it supported the latter in its efforts to build a stable and secure environment during the presidential and parliamentary elections.

MONUC and EUFOR worked together smoothly, even during the riots that occurred in August and November. As an officer of the EUFOR mentioned during interviews, the EU looked out to respect the UN’s field of activities for matters of non-duplication and non-replacement. The Concept of Operation made clear that the EU must act robustly only if the UN would ask for support. There was a clear hierarchy, a clear line of activity that was respected by both partners: the UN comes first, supported first and foremost by the National Army. But this undisturbed partnership ended when the EU began to withdraw its troops in a critical phase of the run-off ballot. Riots broke out, but EUFOR went home. Politicians of UN and EU as well as the Congolese Presidential Candidate and various influential NGO appealed to the normative duty of the EU to extend its mandate. But the end date had priority over the end state.

Example 2: The Re-hat
Since the EU was not extending its operation, the UNSG and some EU member states asked for the re-hat of EU troops to MONUC in 2003 and 2006. In both cases, the EU sent the demand to the member states that were contributing troops to EUFOR. They had to decide about the re-hat on national level. But every member state denied the UN’s request for help. With a closer look at the participation of EU member states in UN peacekeeping operations this reaction was not surprising. The EU member states are the most reluctant troop contributors of all member states of the UN. They doubt the regime of UN peacekeeping. They find no reason to operate in a zone of non-vital interest, first of all in Africa. They concentrate on their commitment to NATO and EU. Only nations with special interests in the Africa and the pro-active neutral and northern states join UN peacekeeping, in a noteworthy way. But in this special case, where the member states were already in theatre and the effort to re-hat was marginal, rejecting the request to re-hat weakened the credibility of the EU’s commitment to the UN as the multilateral lichpin. A re-hat would have strengthened the system of UN peacekeeping directly, not only indirectly as inter-organisational co-operation does.

In 2009, most member states of EUFOR CAR/Chad re-hatted as the military element of MINURCAT was in delay. Big contributors like France re-hatted for the critical phase only, some of the member states were contributors until the missions end date. There was no discussion in the EU regarding the possibility of rejection. As France declared its readiness to re-hatt, the other EUFOR members joined in. Without EUFOR’s re-hatting the military arm of MINURCAT, which saved the lifes of civilians, the safe return of thousands of refugees as well as the security of the sandy borders to Sudan would have never existed.

Example 3: The EU says “No!”
The third example deals with a request of the UNSG that was rejected by the EU. The UNSG asked for support to MONUC in a conflict in the North-Kivu that escalated in autumn 2006. The stream of refugees and IDPs and the level of the violence overextended the
MONUC. It tried to safeguard the population from violence, but became a target of the rebels attack itself. MONUC was not prepared to act as a robust enforcement force. The Indian Commander of MONUC in the North-Kivu said in 2008: “I have not been equipped to fight. If I am going to fight, I need an expeditionary force.” (in Boucher 2008) The UN called for support for over two years. The UNSG as well as its Special Representative in DR Congo requested a quick reaction force to function as a bridge builder for a reinforced MONUC (that was authorised already). But the EU refused to help. The “No” was a result of friction within the EU. Almost no member state agreed to participate in such an operation. Therefore, the international community questioned the credibility of the EU’s multilateralism. The criticisms were based on the fact that the EU was the player who had the experience of two military missions [one in the Northeast!] and two ongoing civilian-military missions, EUSEC and EUPOL, in DRC. It was the player who had the battle groups on standby as well. Therefore, one might assume, it was in EU’s duty to act in support of the UN.

But are these criticisms relevant regarding the “effective multilateralism”? The answer is “yes”, when argued with “multilateralism”. Focusing on the noun “multilateralism” one has to notice that the “No” breaks the promise to strengthen the UN if it is in need. It is not in line with the EU’s vow to build a peaceful world order. But including the adjective “effective” the “No” makes sense. The EU’s analysis of the situation, especially the visit of Kouchner to the region [who is seen as the initiator of the request first and foremost], showed a picture of a conflict where the concept of a bridging operation had no impact on resolving the conflict. Moreover, the EU would have had to risk the lives of their troops in North-Kivu. Therefore most member states rejected the request. The EU stated also, that there was enough external support in North Kivu. It called on the internal and regional actors to activate their capacities for solving the conflict. A military EU commitment would have been counterproductive since the internal players were off the hook of taking responsibility for their very own problem. All in all, the EU said “No” because here “multilateralism” had no chance to be “effective”.

Conclusion
The analysis aimed to challenge the UN and EU’s commitment to “effective multilateralism” via the inter-organisational partnership in the policy field of crisis management. Based on the theoretical definition of multilateralism and the operationalisation of “effective multilateralism” it was asked whether the inter-organisational co-operation in crisis management was in line with “multilateralism” or not. In chapter 1 it became clear that multilateralism is not only a specific way to interact, but also an element of an identity. Therefore EU and UN are perceived as identities who act not only multilateral for instrumental reasons but in principal. Moreover, they are perceived as players who link multilateralism to the normative global governance. In this view, multilateralism has a positive impact on the international system and becomes an end in itself.
Chapter 2 focused on the EU’s and UN’s meaning of “[effective] multilateralism”. Both actors declared multilateralism as one of their major political objects and used it to label their partnership. On one side, the analysis showed that both actors understand multilateralism as a component of their identity, as a central element of their political norms and goals and therefore as an end in itself that must be pursued. On the other side, multilateralism, combined with the adjective “effective” by the EU, was identified as an instrument and means to enforce vital interests of the UN and the EU. The UN used the term to call for its revival even more than the EU. The line of argument shifted from the constructivist and normative content, to which one ties the UN and EU at first glance, to the instrumental and utilitarian content, which was the driving force to inter-act multilaterally, as postulated by Keohane as well as Ruggie. On the basis of these results the question of the quality of “effective multilateralism”, especially with regard to the balance between the normative and the utilitarian sides of multilateralism, became important even more.

Chapter 3 gave insights into the political and institutional as well as the operational level of the co-operation in crisis management. At all levels of the partnership both organisations demonstrated that the utilitarian cost-benefit analyses rank before normative motives, even when the organisations act in the name of multilateralism. To speak in the words of the EU, "effectiveness" is the litmus test when it comes to inter-organisational cooperation, not "multilateralism".
References


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