Special Report: The Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement

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Perhaps one of the most intractable international disputes, the Turkish-Armenian enmity, until recently, seemed incapable even of being discussed let alone brokered. Once called the millet-i-sadika, or loyal millet, the Armenians in the eyes of the Turks became traitors during World War I and during 1915 were ‘deported,’ a euphemism to cover the horrors and massacres that, from the perspective of Armenians, was genocide.1 As a result of the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, which is analyzed in this article, however, the two sides have agreed to establish an historical commission ‘to implement a dialogue on the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations.’2

When the modern Republic of Turkey was established in 1923, virtually all the former Armenian population of eastern Anatolia no longer was present. At least half of the 1915 population had perished during the deportation to Ottoman Syria; the survivors had reached Syria or had fled to the Russian province of Armenia, bordering northeastern Turkey, or to Iran. After 1918, Turkey lost its Arab provinces as a result of being defeated in World War I, and the European victors divided its former province of Syria into the four

1 The Armenians and their supporters claim that what occurred in 1915 was genocide, while Turkey and its supporters claim that the Armenian deaths were part of the World War I struggle that also claimed hundreds of thousands of Muslim lives. Although the issue of whether the deportation tragedy was genocide is beyond the scope of this article, there is considerable literature on the subject. For an Armenian perspective, see, for example, Vahakn N. Dadrian (1997) History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (Providence, RI: Berghahn); and Richard G. Hovanissian (ed.) The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, vol. 2: Foreign Domination to Statehood: the Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martins Press). For accounts that place the deportation within the context of Turkish war policy against Russia during World War I, see, for example, Guenter Lewy (2005) The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press); and Justin McCarthy (1983) Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of Empire (New York and London: New York University Press).


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states of Lebanon and Syria (under French control) and Palestine and Transjordan (under British control). While both Aleppo in Syria and Beirut in Lebanon had large Armenian populations, these communities were minorities, and the concerns and interests of the majority Arabs were the central political issues. In the 1920s (and up to the present day) the Armenian populations in the Arab Middle East and Iran formed part of a large diaspora that included Armenian communities in France, the United States and elsewhere. Meanwhile the Armenians in Russia had experienced the 1917 Revolution that eventually led to the creation of the Soviet Union and of the Armenian Socialist Republic, a state with cultural but not political independence. Consequently, by 1923 the Armenian tragedy of 1915 had become an issue that the international community preferred to forget. However, Armenians, whether in Armenia or in the diaspora, did not forget, and the bitter historical memory of 1915, as well as anti-Turkey animosity, were passed to successive generations. Nevertheless, Turkey and the Armenians pursued their new destinies largely distinct from each other. Their historical hatred seemed frozen because Turkey ignored the issue while Armenia as an independent state did not even exist.

Slowly, however, a new, more secure Armenian generation began to revisit the issue. In 1965, anti-Turkish demonstrations were organized in Beirut by the Lebanese Armenians to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the 1915 deportations and massacres. At this time, the Lebanese Armenians proclaimed April 24 as Commemoration Day. On that day in 1965, thousands of Armenians demonstrated in Yerevan, the capital of Soviet Armenia. The protest became disorderly as rocks were thrown; calm finally was restored only with difficulty. Since then, April 24 has been commemorated annually by Armenians and others throughout the world. During the 1970s and early 1980s, there was even an Armenian terrorist campaign—supposedly to force Turkey to admit to genocide and return Armenian lands—that resulted in the assassination of a number of Turkish diplomats throughout the world.3

Then in late 1991, the unthinkable happened when the Soviet Union unexpectedly collapsed. The 15 constituent Soviet Republics, including tiny Armenia (29,743 sq. km.), became independent countries. Although this new state energized Armenians, unfortunately it also soon got involved in a war with its Turkic neighbor, Azerbaijan, over the latter’s Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno Karabakh.4 This conflict renewed Turkish-Armenian animosities and led to the closing of the Turkish-Armenian border, as Turkey gave its political and economic support to Azerbaijan. The resulting economic problems have affected landlocked and isolated Armenia much more than Turkey or Azerbaijan, and this situation gradually nudged Armenia toward rapprochement.

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3 For detailed accounts, see Michael M. Gunter (1986) “Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People”: A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism (New York: Greenwood Press).
4 The predominantly Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh in Armenian) had declared its independence from Azerbaijan in 1988, before the collapse of the Soviet Union. This political conflict escalated into war in early 1992. Armenia initially denied it was assisting the separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh, but in 1993 it sent its own forces into Nagorno Karabakh, precisely the strip of mountainous land that separated Armenia from Azerbaijan; its forces seized the area, expelled its Muslim population and continue to hold it. A cease-fire has been observed by all parties since 1994, but the issue remains unresolved. For background and further information, see Thomas de Waal (2004) Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War (New York University Press); and Thomas Goltz (1998) Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter’s Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War-Torn, Post-Soviet Republic (Amonk, NY, and London: M.E. Sharpe). The dispute over the status of Nagorno Karabakh continues to complicate the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.
with its neighbor to the west. Indeed, estimates of the total cost to Armenia of the closed border with Turkey range from 10 to 30 percent of Armenia’s gross domestic product. Moreover, the brief war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 further demonstrated to Armenia how vulnerable its position was and served to speed up the rapprochement with Turkey. As Alexander Iskandaryan, the Director of the Caucasus Institute in Yerevan, explained: ‘Geographically, the way to Europe from Armenia lies via Turkey, a fact most [Armenian] politicians realize, with the result that arguments about why this path should remain barred do not convince most of the establishment.’

Since 2002, democratic changes in Turkey also have served to bring the Armenian issue to the fore. Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s AK Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, or Justice and Development Party), with its roots in Islamic politics, first swept to victory in November 2002, defeating a bankrupted opposition on the promise of economic achievement, democratization, honest government and the pursuit of European Union (EU) membership. In harmonizing Turkish laws with the EU acquis, the AK Party implemented a series of important democratic reforms, including the reduction of military influence over politics, abolishment of the death penalty and the State Security Courts, and improvements in freedom of the press and speech, among numerous other initiatives such as movement on the Armenian issue.

At the same time, Turkey also has sought to come out of its traditional Kemalist semi-isolationism in favor of a neo-Ottomanist activism that would stress its ‘soft power’ and facilitate peace, security and cooperation in the Middle East. Specific examples include: sponsoring indirect talks between Syria and Israel in May 2008; establishing the Ankara Forum to bring Israel and the Palestinian Authority together to promote economic development projects in the West Bank; initiating and hosting the Neighboring Countries Process that brings together Iraq and its neighbors for ministerial consultations and which includes the permanent members of the UN Security Council—the P5 countries, the G8 countries, the United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Arab League and the European Commission; and launching the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) to bring together the five regional countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia and Turkey to discuss common issues. As the New York Times concluded after Turkey was elected to the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member on October 17, 2008: Turkey ‘has been seen by other [UN] members as working hard to establish peace in a difficult region.’ Finally, US President Barrack Obama, in his well-received speech to the Turkish Parliament on April 6, 2009, abstained from using the g-word (i.e., genocide) that he earlier had employed, although he did speak about ‘the

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7 For further details about the AK party reforms, see M. Hakan Yavuz (2009) Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge University Press).

8 For further details about these initiatives, see Turkey’s Candidacy for the United Nations Security Council, Embassy Notes: From the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, Washington, DC, September 18, 2008.

terrible events of 1915’ and challenged Turkey to work ‘through the past in a way that is honest, open and constructive.’ Clearly, for AK party leaders, to continue the ancient impasse with the Armenians would hurt the success of Turkey’s new proactive foreign policy for peace.

The Process Begins

As noted above, Turkey and Armenia have no diplomatic relations, and the border between them has been closed since 1993 due to the fighting that occurred in Nagorno Karabakh. However, in 1992 Turkey did grant Armenia a seat in the then newly-established Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) based in Istanbul. Since 2001, Armenia has maintained a senior ambassador accredited to the BSCE in that city. This connection has facilitated a steady flow of visiting foreign, transport, and energy ministers, among others, between the two states despite their formal lack of diplomatic relations.

Hopes that have risen for the normalization of relations have proven difficult to implement. Both sides share the blame for this situation. For example, in September 2005, a Turkish court ruled that a controversial conference on the Armenian question should be suspended. The academic conference had been scheduled to critically examine the official Turkish approach to what had happened during World War I. It was the second time the conference had been called off. The first attempt to hold it had been postponed in May 2005 when Turkey’s minister of justice had called it an attempt to stab Turkey in the back. However, while the opposition to the conference had been spearheaded by a group of nationalistic lawyers, Prime Minister Erdogan called the court decision undemocratic. A little more than a year latter, however, the Turkish government invited Armenian officials and representatives of the Armenian diaspora to participate in the funeral of Hrant Dink in January 2007, but no visible reconciliatory developments ensued. Dink, a well-known Armenian-Turkish editor in Istanbul, had been assassinated by an extreme Turkish nationalist, in part because of the passions aroused by Dink’s writings on the Armenian issue. Although the assassin was quickly apprehended, the shadowy figures behind him remained elusive. To Turkey’s credit, however, the murder immediately was denounced by many of the country’s top officials and institutions, including the president, prime minister, speaker of the parliament and the military chief of staff General Yasar Buyukanit, who declared that ‘bullets fired at Dink also were fired at Turkey.’ The mass-circulation newspaper Hurriyet proclaimed on page 1 that ‘the murderer is a traitor,’ while the popular Sabah ran a headline: ‘The Greatest Treason.’ Moreover, ten of thousands of Turks marched in Dink’s funeral procession, many carrying placards proclaiming ‘We are all Armenians’ or ‘We are all Hrant Dinks.’

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14 Ibid., for this and subsequent quotations in this paragraph.
**TARC**

On July 9, 2001, the US Department of State helped to establish the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC). The purpose of TARC is ‘to employ track-two or civil society, non-governmental, person-to-person diplomacy in an attempt to initiate a dialogue between Turks and Armenians’.15 David L. Phillips, a senior conflict-solving facilitator, served as TARC’s neutral chairman. Founding members from the Turkish side included Ilter Turkmen, a former Turkish foreign minister, Gunduz Aktan, a former Turkish ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, and Ozdem Sanberk, a former Turkish ambassador to the United Kingdom, among others. Founding members on the Armenian side included Van Z. Krikorian, a New York attorney and representative of the Armenian Assembly of America since 1977, David Hovanissian, a former Armenian ambassador to Syria and minister-at-large for regional issues, and Alexander Arzoumanian, a former Armenian foreign minister and ambassador to the United Nations. According to TARC Chairman Phillips:

TARC’s detractors accused it of negotiating whether the Armenian genocide actually occurred. They also maintained that TARC’s existence was used to deter international criticism of Turkey. In addition, TARC was attacked as a pawn of the U.S. government, and TARC members were labeled traitors. [Armenian] President [Robert] Kocharian’s political opponents used TARC to impugn his leadership. Instead of standing by its commitments [to support TARC] the Kocharian government ran for cover.16

The Dashnaks (a right-wing nationalist Armenian political party founded in 1890) opposed TARC because ‘first and foremost Dashnaks use genocide recognition to solicit money from the Armenian Diaspora . . . . To Dashnaks, TARC was an insidious device undermining their reason for being . . . . If reconciliation occurs, they have no reason to exist.’17 Phillips also noted that the ‘[d]iaspora members are typically more hard-line. Having reaped the benefits from peace and prosperity, they have the luxury to assert uncompromising positions.’18 TARC tried to focus initially on culture in an attempt to ‘personalize Turkish-Armenian relations.’19 According to Phillips, ‘cultural events had the desired effect by generating positive media coverage and helping to reduce negative stereotypes.’20 Indeed, ‘prior to TARC, Armenian issues were virtually taboo in Turkey. TARC helped break the ice and a plethora of civil society initiatives ensued.’21

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16 Ibid., p. 61.
17 Ibid., pp. 61–62.
18 Ibid., p. 79.
19 Ibid., p. 75.
20 Ibid., p. 77.
21 Ibid., p. 107.
However, problems soon arose. Although the Turks thought that normalizing the visa regime between Turkey and Armenia was a major achievement, TARC’s Armenian members did not agree. TARC also failed to establish a policy working group. While Armenians wanted to see more results, the Turks wished to go slower. Thus, an expectation gap existed between the two sides that hindered positive momentum. The lack of a secretariat slowed any progress. Merely documenting discussions provided problems as did negotiating the text of joint or chairman’s statements. Some TARC members made premature statements to the press, which were seen as breaches in confidentiality that dissipated goodwill. Other TARC members tended to put aside their unofficial capacities and began to act like state officials. ‘As criticism intensified, TARC’s inability to address the genocide issue raised doubts about the usefulness of continuing the process.’\textsuperscript{22}

Nevertheless, TARC’s chairman felt that ‘significant … advances have been more visible in the field of civil society, where the most difficult barriers to direct contact are no longer present and the reconciliation process is not only underway but has assumed courses independent of TARC and official relations … exactly what TARC was designed to achieve.’\textsuperscript{23} Upon its conclusion in 2004, TARC’s chairman listed the following seven recommendations: (1) official contacts should be improved further; (2) opening of the Turkish Armenian border should be announced and implemented; (3) the two governments should support publicly civil society programs focused on education, science, culture and tourism; (4) standing mechanisms for cooperation on humanitarian disaster assistance and health care should be established; (5) security and confidence-building measures between Turkey and Armenia should be enhanced; (6) religious understanding should be encouraged; and (7) the Turkish and Armenian people need to develop more confidence. Despite these modest accomplishments, the process of rapprochement had begun.

**Joint Committees of Experts**

In 2005, Prime Minister Erdogan sent a letter to Armenian president Robert Kocharian in which Erdogan proposed a joint committee of Turkish and Armenian experts to study the Armenian allegations of genocide.\textsuperscript{24} The Armenians, however, hesitated, replying that the committee instead should be composed of governmental officials. In a speech in Baku, Erdogan reiterated his position that conducting historical research was not an issue for politicians: ‘Let historians, political scientists, archeologists, lawyers and historians of art study this issue.’\textsuperscript{25} He then speculated that the Armenians were not replying because then they would have to answer for the Khojali massacre in which 683 Azeri civilians were killed by Armenians on February 25–26, 1992, during the fighting over Nagorno Karabakh: ‘There is still no answer because then they will have to face the Hocali [Khojali] massacre.’

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 108.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 151.
\textsuperscript{24} The following discussion is largely based on PM Erdogan Attends Turkish Diaspora Meeting in Baku, Briefing (Ankara), March 12, 2007, pp. 4–5.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 4.
However, the Turkish prime minister then declared that ‘if it eventually is understood that there is a grievance, then we will do what we’re supposed to do.’\textsuperscript{26} In other words, Erdogan seemed to be saying that Turkey would admit wrongdoing if the evidence so proved. This was a significant statement by a Turkish prime minister.

At the same time, however, a related possibility of joint Turkish-Armenian research on the issue fell through. In February 2005, Ara Sarafian, the founding director of the Gomidas Institute\textsuperscript{27} in London, accepted the proposal of Yusuf Halacoglu,\textsuperscript{28} the chairman of the Turkish Historical Society, to discuss what had happened on the Harput Plain (where many Armenians had lived in eastern Anatolia) and how many people had died there during the Armenian deportations. Soon afterward, however, Sarafian indicated that he was not willing to proceed with such a study since certain Ottoman records would not be available. The Armenian scholar apparently was referring to Halacoglu’s remarks during a television interview in which he said that Sarafian might not be able to discover what he was seeking in the Ottoman archives. Halacoglu asked Sarafian to reveal exactly what he was looking for and then added that he thought the Armenian scholar had come under heavy criticism from the Armenian diaspora because of his initial willingness to work with Turkish scholars. The Turkish scholar also indicated that Sarafian was disturbed by the Turkish request to study the Dashnak archives. In reply, Sarafian stated:

Primary sources outside of Turkey indicate that the 1915 deportation of Armenians and the liquidation of their properties were regulated by Ottoman state authorities. Armenians were deported under the auspices of Ottoman officials. And most deportees were killed through privations and outright massacres on their way or in their places of exile (most notably Der Zor). Our sources indicate that there never was a resettlement program as historians defending the official Turkish thesis suggest.... [Sarafian then asked Halacoglu to] explain why he thinks that the Ottoman deportation and resettlement registers the Gomidas Institute requested do not exist—especially those on Harput and its environs.\textsuperscript{29}

On a related matter, Halacoglu also announced that he had agreed with David Gaunt, a historian from Soderntorn University in Sweden, to conduct joint research on opening recently discovered mass graves in Nusaybin in the southeastern Anatolian province of Mardin. Armenian historians have said that these graves might contain the remains of victims from the massacres in 1915. Halacoglu declared that he was confident that these graves were from ancient times and not related to the Armenian accusations.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} The Gomidas Institute republishes English translations of Armenian texts related to the events of World War I which otherwise would not be readily available. Turkish institutes have carried out similar roles in recent years. During the 1990s, Sarafian, along with Hilmar Kaiser, had conducted demographic research in the Turkish Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives.
\textsuperscript{29} Cited in \textit{Briefing} (Ankara), March 12, 2007, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
Further Initiatives

In May 2007, Ragmar Naess, a wealthy Scandinavian, invited nine or ten Turkish and Armenian scholars to Oslo, Norway, to discuss the situation unofficially. 31 Hilmar Kaiser read an interesting paper for the Armenians, while Garabed Moumjian, who knows Ottoman Turkish, and Khatchig Mouradian, the current editor of the Dashnak newspaper in the United States, *The Armenian Weekly*, also made substantive contributions. Dennis Papazian, a retired professor and reasonable interlocutor, announced on arrival that he was not interested in discussing whether there had been an Armenian genocide, but would be pleased to discuss any other aspects of Armenian-Turkish relations. On the Turkish side, Justin McCarthy, an American professor of Turkish studies known for his pro-Turkish position, was a prominent participant. Baskin Oran, a noted Turkish professor who has studied ethnic identities in Turkey, read a good paper, which did not please the more nationalist Turks. Kemal Cicek, a member of the Turkish Historical Society, presented the Turkish point of view, but with a pleasant demeanor. Yavuz Baydar also made a favorable impression. The conference participants agreed not to discuss specifics in public, but they did issue a joint statement that said little besides announcing their meeting, a discussion of important matters and agreement to meet again. One Armenian participant said that he did not hold out much hope for the Oslo meeting because the issue of genocide was now a political one between Armenia and Turkey. If the countries were to reach a bilateral governmental agreement, however, then Turkey and Armenia would call on academics to vouch for its accuracy. However, because no Turkish scholar was prepared to address the question of genocide or other sensitive issues unless there would be good representation from Turkey at future conferences, further talks would be difficult.

Nevertheless, 18 months after the Oslo meeting, approximately 200 Turkish intellectuals used the phrase *Buyuk Felaket* [Great Catastrophe] in an apology issued in December 2008, which was also signed online by 29,500 others: ‘My conscience does not accept the insensitivity showed to and the denial of the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice and for my share, I empathize with the feelings and pain of my Armenian brothers and sisters. I apologize to them.’ 32 Although this apology was criticized to varying degrees by the Turkish prime minister, president, armed forces general staff, conservative retired diplomats and nationalist newspapers, the reaction was much less strident than would have occurred only a few years earlier. Thus, the ‘Great Apology’ demonstrated how far contemporary Turkish opinion was willing to move beyond the earlier sterile denials of any wrongdoing. Indeed, since the groundbreaking work of the TARC in 2001–02, more than a dozen other track-two projects have tried to ameliorate relations by organizing, among other events, joint concerts in Istanbul and Yerevan, art exhibitions, student exchanges, a youth summit, a Turkish-Armenian women’s magazine, reciprocal visits between think-tank officials, and photography exhibits. On March 17, 2009, approximately 40 Turkish and Armenian NGO activists met in a large conference in Yerevan and agreed on the necessity for

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31 The following discussion is based largely on information obtained from an Armenian participant in the Oslo meeting who preferred to be anonymous.

32 See Ozur Diliyorum. Available at http://www.ozurdiliyoruz.com, accessed August 18, 2009. This Turkish term for Great Catastrophe is a virtual translation of *Mets Yeghern*, the frequently used Armenian phrase employed to describe the events of 1915.
an unconditional normalization of links. Although these track-two initiatives have had only mixed results, they still manifest a momentum that would have been impossible even to conceive of during the 1990s.

Finally, there were five Workshops for Armenian/Turkish Scholarship (WATS) held at the University of Chicago in 2000, the University of Michigan in 2002, the University of Minnesota in 2004, Salzburg in 2005 and New York University in 2006. These Workshops have been directed by Professors Muge Gocek of the University of Michigan, Gerard J. Libaridian of the University of Michigan, and Ronald Grigor Suny of the University of Chicago. They have sought to investigate, through scholarship, the history and politics of the deportations and massacres of Armenians in the late Ottoman Empire and related questions. However, because the participants have been mainly Armenian and pro-Armenian scholars, joined by a few Turkish colleagues, these Workshops have not been perceived as neutral venues in which both sides have been given equal opportunities to make their case.

**Soccer Diplomacy**

On September 6, 2008, Turkish president Abdullah Gul accepted an invitation from his Armenian counterpart Serzh (Serge) Sarkisyan (Sarkisian) and journeyed to Yerevan, Armenia, to watch Turkey and Armenia play against each other in a World Cup qualifying soccer match. Gul’s visit was the first ever by a Turkish president and sparked speculation that ‘soccer diplomacy’ might initiate reconciliation between the two historical enemies, just as ‘ping-pong diplomacy’ had done 35 years earlier between the United States and China. In addition to the Turkish president, some 5,000 Turkish fans also traveled to the soccer match on special visas issued by the Armenian government. For its part, Turkey already had permitted free travel for Armenians to Turkey since 1995. Indeed, as many as 40,000 Armenian passport holders are now believed to be working in Istanbul without official permits, but with the tacit approval of Turkish authorities. In the case of Gul’s visit to Armenia, Sarkisyan had invited him the previous July and at that time had expressed a desire for ‘a new phase of dialogue with the government and people of Turkey, with the goal of normalizing relations and opening our common border.’

At the time, senior Turkish foreign ministry officials revealed that they had been meeting secretly with their Armenian counterparts in Switzerland for some time to arrange further initiatives. Despite the Armenian parliament referring to Turkey’s eastern provinces as ‘western Armenia’ in its declaration of independence on August 23, 1990, Turkey had recognized Armenian independence earlier than most other states and also had invited Armenia to join the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization as a founding

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36 Cited in We Are Ready To Talk To Turkey, *Wall Street Journal*, July 8, 2008.
member in 1993, even though it did not have any border on that body of water. Turkey also had been providing energy to Armenia when it faced serious energy shortages during the 1990s, as well as donating 100,000 tons of wheat to it then. In addition, flights between Yerevan and Istanbul continue to run despite the closed border. Turkey even allows in thousands of illegal Armenian workers. In the wake of the brief war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, Turkey offered Armenia membership in its new project, The Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform. Apropos to the initiation of soccer diplomacy, Turkey also had been permitting Armenian soccer (football) teams to organize preparation camps in Antalya, a large Turkish resort city on the Mediterranean Sea.

Gul’s office stated that his visit ‘will be an opportunity to overcome obstacles and prepare a new ground to bring the two people together.’ Sarkisyan declared that ‘without forgetting the past, we must look to the future. If there is a dialogue, we can discuss any, even the most difficult questions. We must shape a mutually beneficial agenda and begin contacts without preconditions.’ Mark Parris, the former US ambassador to Turkey and currently a scholar at the Brookings Institution, said ‘[b]oth capitals have wanted to find a solution for some time, but third parties—including Azerbaijan, in the case of Turkey, and the Armenian diaspora, in the case of Yerevan—have militated against one.’

Nevertheless, in Yerevan, Gul’s motorcade passed hundreds of protesters calling for Turkey to admit its role in the Armenian massacres. His visit, however, enabled him to confer with Sarkisyan, talks which Gul characterized as heralding a breakthrough in relations: ‘Everything will move forward and normalize if this climate continues. I believe my visit has destroyed a psychological barrier in the Caucasus.’ Suren Sureniants, a senior Republic Party member in Armenia, seemingly concurred by stating: ‘The visit of the Turkish president is the most important political event for Armenia. The visit will have an indirect influence not only on our foreign, but also on domestic policy and will lead to the start of new relations.’

Levon Ter-Petrosian, the former Armenian president and current opposition leader, agreed: ‘We should establish normal, good-neighborly relations with Turkey without preconditions.’ Ter-Petrosian elaborated that ‘when I said this [earlier], they [Armenian government officials] would say what treachery it is. And now, they keep repeating it night and day.’ Alexander Iskandaryan, the Director of the Caucasus Institute in Yerevan cited above, said that there was strong political support in Armenia for détente with Turkey for economic reasons. He explained that Armenia’s hope

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42 Cited in ibid.
43 Cited in ibid.
44 Cited in ibid.
was that better relations would lead to a permanent reopening of the Turkish-Armenian border, noting that currently Armenia had no rail links to the West despite the fact that some 70 percent of its trade balance was with Europe.\footnote{Bransten and Rechnagel, Outbreak of ‘Football Diplomacy.’}

Elmar Mammadyarov, the foreign minister of Azerbaijan, added that Azeris ‘welcome this initiative positively.’\footnote{Cited in Grigoryan, Armenia, Turkey Put Differences Aside for Soccer. On the other hand, many Azeris told me during 2009 that they were very wary of any understanding between Turkey and Armenia that would sacrifice Azeri interests.} Most centrist Turkish media outlets were also supportive of Gul’s trip, while EU officials declared that it had enhanced political stability in the region. Important too was the support of Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, the chief advisor on foreign policy to the Turkish prime minister and subsequently the Turkish foreign minister. Mustafa Akyol, the deputy editor of the \textit{Turkish Daily News}, felt it significant that the politically influential Turkish military was not objecting to Gul’s initiative: ‘Right now, the nationalist parties in the parliament are more nationalist than the military on some issues. And probably on this one, I think the military is not disturbed because the military understands that Turkey needs to secure its Caucasus borders and needs to have good relations. So probably the military is not a big obstacle on this issue.’\footnote{Cited in Bransten and Recknagel, Outbreak of ‘Football Diplomacy.’}

Following Gul’s visit, the foreign ministers of the two states held additional talks. Prime Minister Erdogan and President Sarkisyan then met briefly at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2009. Sizing up the results of Gul’s visit and its aftermath, The International Crisis Group concluded: ‘Since then, barely a week goes by without senior officials meeting. Armenia and Turkey ‘have never been closer’ to normalising relations.’\footnote{International Crisis Group (2009) Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders, Europe Report No. 199 (Istanbul/Yerevan/Baku/Brussels, April 14, 2009), p. 1. For further background, see Aybars Gorgulu (2009) Towards a Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement? \textit{Insight Turkey}, 11 (Spring), pp. 19–29.}

Not all parties, however, were as pleased with these sudden developments. The Dashnaks vowed to carry out protests against Gul’s visit. Ruben Safrastian, the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Armenian National Academy of Sciences, insisted that Turkey would not deviate in any meaningful way from its current policy toward Armenia and that Gul had come to Armenia due to regional tensions connected to Russia’s war against Georgia and because of a possible upcoming debate in the US Congress over yet another pro-Armenian resolution: ‘There may be some small change that will result in some thaw between the two countries, however, Gul will try to use the visit to strengthen his positions in the region. The Turks will use this visit to prove their goodwill. However, in reality, they will do everything to use it in their interest.’\footnote{Cited in Grigoryan, Armenia, Turkey Put Differences Aside.}

Moreover, nationalistic Turkish leaders felt that the trip bordered on the betrayal of their country. For example, the leader of the opposition Republican Peoples’ Party, Deniz Baykal, sarcastically opined that Gul should lay a wreath at the Yerevan genocide monument.\footnote{Turkish-Armenian Soccer Diplomacy, Reuters, September 5, 2008. Available at http://blogs.reuters.com/global/2008/09/05/turkish-armenian-soccer-diplomacy/, accessed October 9, 2008.} Devlet Bahceli’s Nationalist Action Party also criticized Gul’s initiative.\footnote{Aras and Ozbay, Will Football Diplomacy Work?} The genocide issue had not even been broached. A careful Turkish think-tank study
concluded: ‘There is not much change in the Armenian attitude overall. Despite Sarkisyan’s “mild tone, ... it is doubtful ... whether such an approach alone will solve the direct problems between Turkey and Armenia.’”\(^{53}\)

**The Breakthrough**

Following the soccer diplomacy initiative, the above mentioned confidential talks between Turkey and Armenia in Switzerland gained new impetus. On April 22, 2009, the parties arrived at a ‘roadmap’ document toward establishing diplomatic relations. At first, however, the roadmap seemed to flounder as both sides renewed hard-line positions. However, Turkey’s desire to promote its ‘zero-problem’ policy in the Middle East and to further its EU candidacy, especially while its supporter, Sweden, held the rotating presidency, encouraged Ankara to reach an accommodation. For its part, Armenia, badly in need of economic stimuli and a breakout from its geographic isolation, finally agreed to two major concessions: the establishment of a historical commission to analyze the events of 1915 and acceptance of the present borders. In addition, at least one scholar believes that pressure on Sarkisyan for this bilateral agreement came from the perception that the Armenian president would not be able to reciprocate Turkish president Gul’s attendance at the World Cup qualifying soccer match by attending a game between the two countries in Turkey on October 14, 2009, unless progress had been made by that date.\(^{54}\)

Finally, on August 31, 2009, the two sides issued a joint statement that they had agreed ‘to start political negotiations aimed at establishing diplomatic relations.’\(^{55}\) After six more weeks of internal political negotiations and with the Swiss government’s assistance, Foreign Ministers Ahmet Davutoglu (Turkey) and Edward Nalbandian (Armenia) finally signed two separate protocols at Zurich University in Switzerland. The first document was a Protocol on Development of Relations and the second document was a Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. However, what UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon termed a ‘historic decision’\(^{56}\) almost was derailed by a last-minute dispute over the final statements that each country wanted to make. US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, US diplomat for Europe Philip Gordon and Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey interceded to resolve this final hurdle, and they persuaded both the Armenian and Turkish foreign ministers to agree that there would be no oral statements that might be construed as deal-breaking reservations.\(^{57}\) For example, when the problem regarding the statements first arose, Clinton abruptly left the ceremony venue where the signing was to occur and from a sedan in the hotel parking lot spoke three times with the Armenians and four times with the Turks. Escorted by a Swiss police car with lights and siren blazing, a Turkish diplomat finally arrived with a new draft of his government’s statement. Clinton and Nalbandian then met in person at the hotel and drove back

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\(^{53}\) Ibid.


\(^{57}\) Ibid.
to Zurich University where the signing finally took place three hours later than originally scheduled.58

Along with the individuals already mentioned, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and Slovenian Foreign Minister Samuel Zbogar also attended the signing. Significantly perhaps for Turkey’s EU hopes, Solana thanked Turkey and declared: ‘This is an important cooperation, no doubt, of Turkey, to solve one issue that pertains to a region which is in our neighborhood.’59 In Turkey, Prime Minister Erdogan declared that Turkey was demonstrating its ‘goodwill’ and added that it also was keen on seeing Armenian troops withdrawn from Nagorno Karabakh. He added that ‘we are trying to boost our relations with Armenia in a way that will cause no hard feelings for Azerbaijan.’60 Armenian president Sarkisyan said that his state was taking a ‘responsible decision’ in normalizing relations with Turkey, despite what he maintained were ‘the unhealable wounds of genocide.’ He added that ‘there is no alternative to the establishment of relations with Turkey without any precondition. It is the dictate of time.’61

Four days later, the Armenian president journeyed to Turkey where the Turkish president hosted him in the ancient Ottoman capital of Bursa for a final round of soccer diplomacy. There, Sarkisyan specifically explained that his recent meeting with representatives of the powerful but skeptical Armenian diaspora was merely a briefing process, and that he was not ‘seeking permission’ from them to reconcile with Turkey.62 Turkish president Gul declared: ‘We’re not writing history, we’re making history.’63

The first document, Protocol on Development of Relations, is significant. In it the two sides agreed to open their ‘common border within two months after the entry into force of this Protocol.’64 They also agreed to establish an ‘intergovernmental commission and various sub-commissions at ministerial level’ on political consultations; transport, communications and energy infrastructure and networks; legal matters; science and education; trade, tourism and economic cooperation; environmental issues; and the historical dimension ‘in which Turkish, Armenian, as well as Swiss and other international experts shall take part.’ A working group headed by the foreign ministers of the two parties was tasked ‘to prepare the working modalities’ of these different bodies. Specific timetables of one, two and three months were established for their implementation. Both protocols had to be ratified by the respective parliaments of Armenia and Turkey.

**Conclusion**

Given the 100-year history of bad will between Turks and Armenians, their current rapprochement holds the distinct possibility of being of major historic significance.

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58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
However, it would be premature to pronounce their problems solved. Indeed, Jennifer Lind has shown how attempts at apologies sometimes can be a risky tool for well-meaning peacemakers, causing more harm than good. For example, post-World War II attempts at Japanese contrition have triggered domestic backlash resulting in conservative politicians, intellectuals and patriots either justifying or denying past Japanese atrocities. Apologies can impugn wartime leaders, veterans and those who died fighting for their country. Even in Britain, proposed apologies for former actions in Ireland as well as complicity in the slave trade have sparked backlash. In the United States, a proposed Smithsonian exhibit to discuss the horrors of Hiroshima and question the necessity of using the atomic bomb triggered widespread backlash from Congress, veterans’ groups and the media.

On the other hand, both Britain and the United States established close relations with West Germany without apologizing for firebombing German cities. Japan and the United States built a positive postwar relationship despite neither side apologizing for their wartime actions. West Germany and France reconciled soon after World War II, despite very few initial apologies from the former. Bonn’s fulsome expressions of contrition only came later. German apologies did not provoke much backlash largely because of the unique strategic circumstances in which Germany found itself regarding its need to reassure NATO and the West and thus earn their protection from the Soviet Union.

The West German-French approach offers a non-accusatory strategy of shared catastrophes. Instead of singling out German brutality, the Franco-German memorial at Rheims Cathedral and the cemetery at Verdun highlight the suffering that militarism and ultra-nationalism brought both sides and thus emphasized their need for unity. Such multilateral approaches focus beyond blaming only one side by considering atrocities committed by many states in numerous wars. Since such multilateral themes do not accuse just one side, they are less likely to elicit backlash. Of course, if one side continues to see itself as uniquely innocent and requiring retributive justice, such multilateral approaches remain premature.

In the matter of the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, several problems remain. First, as already mentioned, their agreements in Zurich need to be ratified by their respective parliaments before they can take effect. Opposition yet may prove successful, especially in Armenia, where the powerful Armenian diaspora as well as the ultra-nationalistic Dashnaks are influential. Ultra-nationalistic groups in Turkey are also certain to object to what has been accomplished. Second, Azerbaijan is likely to object to Turkey’s reconciliation with Armenia without any resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh problem. Although ultra-nationalists in Turkey will add this issue to their distrust of Armenians, in the end Nagorno Karabakh is not likely to stymie the accords, as the AK Party government already has calculated that it could proceed in the matter and even use the understandings with Armenia to create some movement on the matter of Nagorno Karabakh. Third, even though a historical commission is to be established to study what happened in 1915, it is difficult to see how it will be able to convince both sides whether genocide occurred. The ongoing dispute simply will move to this commission. However, once each side has to listen to the other’s position instead simply of preaching to the choir, it is possible that

66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
some type of agreement will gradually emerge. As mentioned above, the two sides might be able to forego employing the g-word in favor of the term Buyuk Felaket/Mets Yeghern or Great Catastrophe. Of course, only time will tell whether the present rapprochement will lead to a cordial peace or only to a cold peace as has existed between Israel and Egypt since their peace treaty was signed in 1979. Nevertheless, even though it now seems unlikely that the protocols signed in October 2009 will be ratified in the near future, impressive progress towards eventual rapprochement has occurred.

References
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