A TROUBLED PAST, A CHALLENGING PRESENT, AND A PROMISING FUTURE: TANZANIA’S TOURISM DEVELOPMENT IN PERSPECTIVE

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Despite the many assets the continent possesses, tourism in Africa has mostly operated below its potential, and its often poorly planned development has had irreversible negative consequences for both people and the environment. In order to develop sustainable forms of tourism, respectful of the rich natural and cultural African heritage, industry leaders and policy makers must consider the broader historical and socioeconomic contexts in which tourism is implanting itself. Inspired by an anthropological perspective, this article takes Tanzania as a case study. Tourism in this East African country, as in other African countries, is firmly embedded in encompassing—and sometimes conflicting—processes of localization, nationalization, regionalization, and globalization. Only by having a solid understanding of how these different scales are connected, disconnected, and reconnected, and by taking into account the interests of all stakeholders involved, can we begin to build an integrated African hospitality industry that is sustainable as well as economically beneficial. Archival records and recent ethnographic data are combined to show the kinds of challenges and opportunities this poses in the case of Tanzania.

Key words: Anthropology of tourism; History; Ethnography; Development; Tanzania

Introduction

It is no wonder that such a vast territory stretching between the Indian Ocean and the great lakes of Victoria and Tanganyika should offer an extremely rich and varied assortment of tourist attractions, ranging from the snow-capped Mt. Kilimanjaro and spacious volcano craters to the vast open plains, and from the arid bush to the rain forests and the warm emerald ocean with its white sand beaches fringed by palm groves. Some of the finest wildlife areas in the world are concentrated in the North and others are scattered all over the country in national parks and game reserves well stocked with animals, in most fascinating scenery. Big game hunting, deep-sea fishing, underwater fishing and goggling in the Indian Ocean, trout fishing, shopping for sculptured ebony and carved ivory, handbags of crocodile, leopard, lion, ostrich, elephant and zebra skins, gold and silver jewelry with locally-mined precious and semi-precious stones, Maasai spears and shields and inexpensive textile printed in striking patterns, will delight overseas visitors and so will the friendliness and innate courtesy of the people. (Popovic, 1972, p. 151)

The quotation above could have come straight out of a promotional brochure. Surprisingly, it is taken from an old report of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), entitled Tourism in Eastern Africa, in which the author vividly describes Tanzania’s enormous tourism potential.
It is commonly believed that the country has the best wildlife parks in East Africa, containing the planet’s greatest remaining concentrations of wildlife. Twenty protected areas cover nearly 13% of Tanzania’s territory (Kahama, 1995, p. 109). Of these, UNESCO declared three zones as biosphere reserves: Lake Manyara (1981), Serengeti-Ngorongoro (1981), and East Usambara Conservation Area (2000). Four areas are protected as World Heritage: Ngorongoro Conservation Area (1979), Serengeti-Ngorongoro (1981), Selous Game Reserve (1982), and Kilimanjaro National Park (1987). There are also 56 controlled areas where humans and wildlife live together. Apart from parks and game reserves, Tanzania has hundreds of miles of pristine Indian Ocean coastline, certainly as attractive as the better known beaches in Kenya, but with the advantage of a slightly cooler climate. It is also home to Mount Kilimanjaro, the world’s highest freestanding peak.

On top of natural beauty, the country hosts two cultural World Heritage sites: the precolonial settlements of Kilwa Kisiwani and Songo Mnara (1981), and Stone Town of Zanzibar (2000). Together with Bagamoyo, the impressive architecture of the German period in Dar es Salaam and elsewhere, and the numerous archaeological finds—particularly those of Olduvai Gorge and Laetoli—Tanzania’s historical interest surpasses that of any other country in East Africa. Besides, the country can capitalize on its wide variety of over 120 ethnic groups and their rich tangible and intangible heritage. Despite these multiple assets, tourism in Tanzania has operated below its potential in the last four decades and it is far from being the top African destination it could be. This article tries to understand why tourism has underperformed by placing the development of Tanzania’s tourism in a broader historical and socioeconomic framework. This holistic perspective helps us appreciate tourism’s role within the encompassing—and sometimes conflicting—processes of localization, regionalization, nationalization, and globalization that affect Tanzania as much as other African countries. The focus of this article is on mainland Tanzania, not the particular case of Zanzibar where tourism is administered by a separate administration (the Zanzibar Ministry of Tourism).

Conceptual Framework

The value of tourism in development has long been recognized internationally (de Kadtt, 1979; Reid, 2003), in Africa (Dieke, 1995; Gamble, 1970; Teye, 1987, 1992; Wright & Poirier, 1991), in Eastern Africa (Akama, 1997; Mitchell, 1970; Popovic, 1972; Sindiga, 1999), and in Tanzania (Curry, 1990; Nelson, 2004). In these and other studies, tourism is discussed mostly in the light of whether it is a viable development strategy or not, usually by focusing on its performance indicators: foreign exchange receipts, employment, government revenues, and regional development. The role of tourism in Africa’s development has become especially urgent because of the continent’s declining economic fortunes. This is certainly true for Tanzania, one of the world’s poorest countries. The quality of Africa’s resource endowment for tourism is exceptional, but most countries have only barely developed their potential (Christie & Crompton, 2001). According to the UN World Tourism Organization (WTO, 2005b), in 2004 the continent as a whole received 33.2 million tourists, merely 4% of international arrivals. In terms of receipts, it cashed US$18.3 billion (corresponding to US$550 per tourist). This amounts to less than 3% of international receipts. Tanzania welcomed 582,800 tourists and cashed US$610 million in receipts. In comparison, the US received 46 million tourists and US$74 billion in receipts.

Even if tourism has long been linked to socioeconomic development, the ways in which this happens have shifted through time and reflect broader paradigmatic changes. Sindiga (1999, pp. 21–23) reviewed these changing paradigms and their implications for tourism. He distinguishes four different periods: (1) modernization (1960s); (2) dependency (1970s); (3) donor-led development (1980s); and (4) structural adjustment programs (1990s). Applying Sindiga’s theoretical framework to Tanzania helps us understand its historical development of tourism as embedded in and influenced by broader regional and global processes. However, the model has to be slightly adapted in order to make it fit the particularities of the country. It makes not much sense, for example, to distinguish between donor-led development and structural adjustment programs in Tanzania, as both became possible in the
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mid-1980s thanks to a radical national policy shift (see below). It is also necessary to discuss tourism under colonialism, the period when the hospitality industry first developed. The current situation is best assessed through descriptive ethnographic fieldwork.

The qualitative methodology used in this study involves a hybrid archival and ethnographic approach, involving 10 weeks of fieldwork (Salazar, 2006). As the research took place during the height of the tourism season, there were multiple opportunities to engage in participatory observation and interviewing. Information was obtained from semi-structured in-depth interviews with public servants working for the Tanzania Tourist Board, the Arusha director of the Tanzanian Association of Tour Operators, Arusha-based tour operators, teachers and students from a local tour guide school, and experienced tour guides. The researcher also accompanied a group of tourism students on a 2-day practice trip to Lake Manyara and Tarangire National Park and joined tours in Arusha’s city center and to Usa River, Lake Duluti, Ilkiding’a, and Longido. In addition, the author traveled to Dar es Salaam to interview experts from the University of Dar es Salaam, Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), the Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF), the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, and the President’s Economic Policy Advisory Unit. Most interviews were conducted in English and some in Swahili (usually with the help of a local research assistant). Background literature research was undertaken in the libraries of the University of Dar es Salaam and the University of Pennsylvania. Finally, the author consulted secondary sources like locally produced tourism-related websites (tourism directories, safari companies, etc.) and *The Arusha Times* (the Arusha-based newspaper).

A Concise History of Tanzania’s Tourification

**Colonialism: Exploring “Wild Eden” (1884–1961)**

Tourism was first established under colonial rule as an industry catering to the needs of Westerners (mainly Europeans) coming to observe and hunt exotic animals. Tanganyika was a German colony from 1884 until 1918. Following the defeat of Germany in World War I, it was handed over to Britain as a mandate territory by the League of Nations (and later as a UN Trust Territory). Under British rule, tourism in East Africa developed on a regional basis that encompassed all colonies: Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda. It is important to note that Tanganyika was only included in this planning after becoming a British protectorate in 1919, because this marks the initial point of Kenya’s superior position in regional development. The age of Africa’s national parks, specifically designed for tourism, began with a 1933 international agreement (Adams & McShane, 1996, p. 47). In response to the world economic depression of the 1930s, official travel organizations were created worldwide. In East Africa, this led in 1938 to the formation of the East African Publicity Association (EAPA). However, World War II provided it with little opportunity to develop tourism in the region. The matter was taken up by the East African’s Governor’s conference, leading to a tourism conference in Nairobi in 1947 (Sindiga, 1999, p. 154). This meeting led to the formation of a representative committee of the East African High Commission (EAHC) to oversee tourism matters and, in 1949, an interim office of the East African Tourist Travel Association (EATTA), with headquarters in Nairobi. The semi-official EATTA launched various publicity campaigns, mainly focusing on wildlife (Ouma, 1970, p. 10). During the colonial period, the investment environment favored European entrepreneurs. For a long time only they were equipped socially, culturally, and economically to be involved in developing hospitality services largely catering to a European market. Most of the investments came from Europeans and (mainly South) Asians already resident in the region.


Partly a byproduct of the colonial era, the basic premise of modernization theory was that Western culture is world culture. In this view, formulated during Africa’s independence decade of the 1960s, tourism was seen as a modernizing force through which new (Western) ways would diffuse. As such, the proponents of modernization theory supported tourism as an agent of change. Therefore, tourism became a key industry in the development plans of many independent African governments. En-
couraged by rapid rates of growth of international tourism, Tanzania invested heavily in its hospitality industry. For a while, tourism became a major element of the country’s development strategy. The Tanzania National Tourist Board (TNTB), established in 1962, made small-scale grants and loans to productive enterprises. However, the colonial legacy gave Europeans and Asians, who had the most experience in the industry, the advantage over inexperienced Tanzanians. As a result, there were few indigenous entrepreneurs and there was little African capital for investment (Ranja, 2003). Around the mid-1960s, the Tanzanian state itself created hospitality enterprises under a variety of finance and management agreements with foreign companies, mainly through equity funds, budget allocations, and foreign loans. This led to the rapid construction of hotels and game lodges.

Independence as such did not diminish regional cooperation. The East African Community (EAC), for example, was the most promising economic community in sub-Saharan Africa, boasting a common currency, a regionally coordinated infrastructure, harmonized economic policies, a system of common institutions, and labor mobility within the region. The organization also had a special subcommittee on tourism. Among the very successful ventures were a railway system and a common airline, East African Airways, both of which assisted in intraregional trade flows and movement of tourist traffic (Sindiga, 1999, p. 154). The airline in particular became a smooth-running, profit-making venture, capable of competing with world-class airlines. However, it did not take long after the independence of the East African states before cracks began to appear in regional cooperation. Although the EATTA, for example, became successful in promoting East Africa as a destination, Uganda and Tanzania felt that the collaboration was benefiting Kenya at their expense (Sindiga, 1999, p. 155). The unfortunate imbalance led to the withdrawal of Tanganyika and Uganda from EATTA soon after their independence, in 1961 and 1962, respectively. Over the years, Tanganyika—becoming the Republic of Tanzania when it joined with the islands of Zanzibar in 1964—and Kenya pursued autonomous policies that were to magnify, rather than reduce, the differences in the performances of their respective tourism sectors.


In the 1970s, there was a paradigm change in many developing countries from modernization to dependency or world systems theory. These theories were informed by neo-Marxian thought and rejected status quo economic arrangements whereby developing, peripheral economies have a permanent unequal relationship with the capitalist (Western) economy. International tourism was now seen as “an export of peripheral economies” (Sindiga, 1999, p. 22). Like the case of primary raw material exports, peripheral economies were believed to be unable to take full advantage of tourism development (Curry, 1978).

Tanzanian government policy reflected the economy’s dependence on international trade and investment rather than the aspirations of the independence movement. It was the perception of this contradiction that led to a change of direction in 1967. In that year, President Julius Nyerere introduced a strategy of so-called African socialism and self-reliance. His “Arusha Declaration” was based on two principal concerns: the growing inequalities between different groups and the influence of foreign capital on development. Under the Declaration, Tanzania saw international tourism as being incompatible with its socialist ideology. Tourism was now considered as a form of cultural imperialism, undermining cultural life, and being irreconcilable with the principle of self-reliance (Shivji, 1973). In particular, ideologues appeared to protest the presence of rich visitors, a perception that would dramatize inequality between foreigners and Tanzanians, thereby exposing the latter to capitalist forms of consumption. This belief was reinforced by the argument that the cultural richness of traditional rural life would be eroded as well. Tourism was also discouraged on conservation grounds, the view being that visitors would gradually destroy wildlife (Kahama, 1995, p. 155). Already by 1900, the historical record had proved that foreign tourists, not indigenous peoples, were most swiftly and systematically killing off Africa’s wildlife (Honey, 1999, p. 223). These arguments led the government to encourage enclav tourism as a means of limiting cultural and environmental damage.

Tourism became bound up with the growth of the parastatal sector. The industry was put under
the direction of an inefficient public sector that did not see the importance of facility development and maintenance. The Tanzania National Tourist Board (TNTB) was wound up in 1969, and a new (inefficient) parastatal, the Tanzania Tourist Corporation (TTC), was established to oversee the hotel construction program, manage the rest of the state-owned sector, and establish wildlife product marketing, in-bond shops, travel agencies, and ancillary services such as boat excursions. Despite the change of policy, Tanzania managed to increase its tourism capacity at the end of the 1960s. The main hotel expansion occurred during 1970 and 1971 (Kahama, 1995, p. 154). In 1970, a tourism division was added to the Ministry of Natural Resources. Once established, the TTC commissioned a “Tourism Masterplan,” delivered in 1971. In that same year, the Kilimanjaro International Airport was constructed to provide direct landing for jumbo jets from Europe (it was inaugurated in 1972).

In 1969, the Hotel and Tourism Training Institute (HTTI) was established in Dar es Salaam in order to train young Tanzanians basic hotel management skills. Although initially led by a British company, the TTC gradually took over the institute and handed it over to the Ministry of Natural Recourses and Tourism in 1977. Building and operating the tourism sector represented an enormous financial investment for the government. Although the predicted further massive expansion did not occur, the TTC continued to grow, with selected hotels and related investments. However, the priority given to tourism was short-lived because it was not identified as a sector of full state ownership. There was little experience domestically of catering for international guests, and the major foreign hotel companies were reluctant to commit resources to Tanzanian tourism (Curry, 1990). Paradoxically, the country’s state-run hospitality industry was heavily dependent on foreign experts, capital, and imports.

The investments in the sector virtually ceased with the completion of the planned batch of new hotels and lodges in 1973. Maintenance of these facilities was not seen as a priority and they rapidly became dilapidated and fell below international standards. Management was localized, and the new staff was inexperienced and not sensitive to the expectations of international visitors. The roads to the beach hotels north of Dar es Salaam and to the wildlife parks deteriorated. The decline of the economy as the 1970s unfolded saw the introduction of bureaucratic procedures, and controls at airports and other points of entry that subjected visitors to declarations, searches, and demands for form filling. The sector showed significant increases in prices up to 1973 and the overvalued local currency made tourism simply too expensive. Besides, in the banking sector—also a state monopoly—it took up to 2 hours to change a traveler’s check (Kahama, 1995, p. 155). On top of all this, Tanzania surprised the world on September 7, 1973, by issuing an overnight ban on all hunting and photographic safaris within its territory (Herne, 1999, p. 389). All businesses, including the government-owned Tanzania Wildlife Safaris, were closed down. Government authorities moved quickly to seize and impound foreign-registered Land Cruisers, supply trucks, minibuses, aircraft, and equipment. No government refunds were ever made to tourists or to foreign or local safari outfitters. Tanzania was also plagued by the serious global economic crisis that was prompted by the 1973 oil price hike and exacerbated by the deterioration of Tanzania’s terms of trade from 1977, the war with Uganda in 1978, and the second oil price hike in 1979. Domestic conditions were no better. Compounding the first oil price hike, a nationwide drought hit Tanzania in 1973–1974. In addition, the protective, inward looking import substitution policies discouraged export expansion and stifled competition.

On the regional level, several conflicts arose within the EAC at the end of the 1960s. Its members were politically moving away from one another and this led to the organization’s collapse in 1977, only 10 years after its establishment. Tanzanian isolationist state-run tourism had to endure strong competition with Kenya. The nub of the problem was that Kenya had the tourists and Tanzania had the best attractions (Honey, 1999, p. 231). International visitors often crossed the border—from Kenya to Tanzania—but their dollars did not. The collapse of the EAC made Tanzania close its border with Kenya in 1977. This virtually ended foreign tourist traffic to Tanzania overnight. Although clearly unforeseen by Julius Nyerere, this border closure set in motion a process that gradually led to the privatization of Tanzania’s industry. This privatization proceeded in two stages (Honey, 1999, p. 234).
The first, beginning in 1977, involved mainly new investments with local capital. The second stage, involving substantial investment by foreign capital, began in the mid-1980s, after President Julius Nyerere stepped down.

**Liberalization: SAPs an PRSPs (1985–Present)**

Structural adjustment programs (SAPs), with their emphasis on economic liberalization and removal of trade restrictions, forced developing countries to open up their economies for imports from the developed world. Although SAPs were introduced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the 1980s, they never really became an important part of the economic management of African countries until the early 1990s. Massive privatization of public corporations is still ongoing, leading to government divestiture from business. Publicly owned enterprises are increasingly going into the hands of local elites and foreign interests.

With an increasing economic crisis, and subsequent political reforms, the Tanzanian government decided to change its policy, reopen the border with Kenya in 1985, and begin investing again in tourism. A major step was the enactment of the “National Policy on Tourism” in 1991—the first real tourism planning by independent Tanzania. This policy provided the overall objectives and strategies necessary to ensure sustainable development in the country. The private sector was now seen to be a critical player in accomplishing this role. In 1992, the Tanzanian government launched an ambitious program to reverse its earlier image. It established the Tanzania Tourist Board (TTB) in 1993, started a publicity campaign, and liberalized and privatized its economy, especially the tourism sector. The TTB took over the TTC’s promotional functions. In addition, a number of major TTC hotels were privatized through the Tanzania Hotels Investments Corporation (TAHI). In 1996, the government drew up an “Integrated Tourism Master Plan” with the focus of improving, developing, and refurbishing existing attractions and facilities to attract more visitors into the country. In 1999, a revised policy was issued, as a result of the involvement of various stakeholders through a number of workshops conducted in Arusha and Dar es Salaam between 1994 and 1998 (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism [MNRT], 1999). In 2002, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism launched a new “Tourism Master Plan” (MNRT, 2002).

The major achievements of the new policy included the improvement of private sector participation and the approval of many new tourism-related projects. To strengthen the private sector, the government assisted in the formation of the Tourism Confederation of Tanzania (TCT), an apex body of all subsector associations in the travel and tourism industry. Private investment increased by about 13% since 1993 (Temu & Due, 2000, p. 683). Since the reforms, over 12 foreign companies—including Serena and Sopa Lodges, Hainan of China, Stock Hotels of South Africa, the Gencom Group of the US, and Feraham Holdings of Gibraltar—have indicated interest in Tanzania’s tourism sector (see Brown, 1998, for similar examples elsewhere in Africa). Individual investments by such firms are high, exemplified by Aga Khan’s Serena group, which has invested over US$32.5 million in wildlife resorts (Temu & Due, 2000, p. 709). Most government-owned hotels have now been privatized and many new hotels and lodges are being opened.

However, due to concentration of ownership in the hands of foreigners, Tanzania loses about two thirds of its foreign earnings in the tourism industry (Chachage, 1999). According to data provided by the All Africa Travel and Tourism Association (AATTA), hunting is 95% foreign owned, air travel 99%, land 80%, hotels and lodges 80%, and leisure and recreation 50% (MNRT, 2001). Ownership alone is not enough, control of enterprises is even more important. The management of joint ventures is often left to foreigners. There is little evidence that indigenization was promoted during the privatization of the state enterprises (Ranja, 2003). Tanzanian private entrepreneurs have succeeded in running medium hotels outside the main tourism areas and towns, where transnational corporations have shown limited enthusiasm to enter into these regions and therefore competition is restricted. This could be a niche for local entrepreneurs to concentrate on, especially to cater for the slowly growing domestic tourism. Chances for local entrepreneurs entering into the first class hotel business and succeeding without partnership with transnational corporations are limited.
The major reforms undertaken by the Tanzanian government would have been impossible without external help. The country’s tourism development is being assisted by strategically placed foreign aid, for example from American (USAID), British (DFID), Dutch (SNV), German (GTZ), and Swedish (SIDA) foreign aid programs (Wade, Mwasaga, & Eagles, 2001, p. 100). With the assistance of the World Bank, Tanzania has upgraded its infrastructure, including accommodation in the protected areas, access roads, and passenger facilities at harbors and airports. To a lesser degree, also nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been involved. The proliferation of domestic NGOs, the dramatic increase in foreign investment in tourism, and the continued involvement of international NGOs produce a complicated matrix of often conflicting social processes in the country. Despite all the help, donors’ financial contributions to Tanzanian tourism is only marginal compared to other sectors and regions (Gerosa, 2003, p. 54).

With the liberalizations, Tanzania’s tourism has grown faster than Kenya’s (Kahama, 1995, p. 156). Nevertheless, there is a long way to go before Tanzania catches up to the levels of its neighbor (Akama, 1999; Sindiga, 1999). Renewed regional cooperation might help. The new EAC Treaty, signed in 1999, has an entire chapter devoted to cooperation in tourism and wildlife management (East African Community [EAC], 1999, pp. 127–128). Despite these commitments, the Bologonja tourist gate that joins Maasai Mara National Reserve in Kenya and Serengeti National Park in Tanzania, remains closed since 1977 (Sindiga, 1999, p. 158). Although the two countries agreed to open the land border for all tourist traffic in 1985, the Bologonja gate has never been opened, ostensibly because Tanzania fears losing revenue, as most tourist trips are still based in Nairobi. Similarly, limitations on traffic rights on intra-East African flights seem largely to be motivated by the wish to protect the financially troubled national carrier, Air Tanzania (existing since 1977), in effect offering an implicit subsidy, irrespective of whether this is a cost efficient method of subsidy.

Tourism development in Tanzania is increasingly stimulated through regional, continental, and global alliances (Chachage, 1999). Since 1995, Tanzania has been a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which has two tourism-related bodies, the Tourism Coordination Unit (TCU) and the Regional Tourism Organization of Southern Africa (RETOSA). In addition, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), to which Tanzania belongs as well, has some tourism-related activities. On a continental scale, tourism development is encouraged on different levels. Tanzania is member of the Africa Travel Association (ATA) and the African Economic Community (AEC), which has a special committee on transport, communication, and tourism (AEC, 1991, p. 21). Even the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the latest strategic plan to foster Africa’s economic growth, pays attention to tourism (NEPAD, 2001, pp. 42–43). Where NEPAD could play an important factor is in putting pressure on African governments to commit themselves for the inclusion of tourism in poverty reduction plans, something which Tanzania is already doing (Gerosa, 2003; Luvanga & Shitundu, 2003). On a global level, Tanzania is a member of the UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) and other, more general bodies like the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) that have tourism-related programs.

Following the reforms in its foreign tourism policies discussed above, tourism is now the country’s fastest growing industry and has become Tanzania’s second leading foreign exchange earned, after mining (Wade et al., 2001). In the latest Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), tourism is indicated as a major sector for pro-poor growth and poverty reduction (United Republic of Tanzania [URT], 2000, 2001, 2003). However, while contributing 14% to the GDP, the Tanzanian tourism sector employs less than 1% of the labor force (17 million people), which is about 170,000 people (URT, 2003, p. 21). The government is currently exploring ways for making the sector more pro-poor, although the strategy to be followed is not well explicated.

Tourism Today: “Northern Circuit”

Wildlife Tourism

The broad historical picture sketched above has to be kept in mind when scrutinizing the so-called “Northern Circuit.” As the country’s most popular and well-known tourist track, the challenges and opportunities in this region are illustrative of
Tanzania’s overall tourism development. Of the 210 travel agencies that operate in Tanzania, 148 are based in the northern town of Arusha, and the majority are run by foreign entrepreneurs. Only 48 agencies are actually run by Tanzanians, mostly local Indians. Even fewer are owned by indigenous Africans. Most of them are small operators with limited personnel and standard tour packages, offering a similar range of safaris and not specializing in any particular domain. Tour packages in Northern Tanzania usually consist of a safari from Arusha to Lake Manyara and Tarangire National Parks, Ngorongoro Crater, and on to Serengeti National Park (Fig. 1). Upon completion, most visitors drive back the same route in which they came, to return to Arusha.

Tanzania, Authentic Africa?

Many of the Northern Circuit’s wildlife landscapes, especially the wide plains of the Serengeti, have become popular icons for Africa as a whole and have provided nature documentaries (Serengeti Shall not Die, Wild Africa, People of the Forest: The Chimps of Gombe), and Hollywood entertainment (The Lion King, Tarzan, Hatari, George of the Jungle) and true-life movies (Out of Africa, Gorillas in the Mist, Born Free) with their perfect romantic and nostalgic vision of an unexplored and time-frozen “wild Eden” (Adams & McShane, 1996; Bruner, 2001). Not surprisingly, Tanzania capitalizes on this well-known iconology. The country’s latest promotional campaign for the global market, “Tanzania—Authentic Africa,” powerfully encapsulates it all. Arusha, founded as a German garrison in 1900 and, due to its central geographical location, the main gateway to the region’s national parks, is often called “the safari capital.” The city strategically markets the fact that, being situated halfway between Cape Town (South Africa) and Cairo (Egypt), it is “the center of Africa.”

Tourism in northern Tanzania is closely linked to the development and sustainability of natural parks, game parks, and other protected areas, as wildlife viewing contributes a great proportion to the industry. Not surprisingly, the increasing num-

![Figure 1.—Tanzania’s northern circuit.](image-url)
bers of tourists in the area are beginning to damage some of the national parks (Adams & McShane, 1996, p. 70). Historically, game park tourism was the consequence of a deliberate policy to expand the National Parks system from the early 1960s that attracted an increasing number of international visitors (Kahama, 1995, p. 154). The history of the Serengeti National Park (SNP), created in 1940 under the Game Ordinance, can serve as a cautionary tale for contemporary efforts to establish and maintain parks and protected areas in Africa. SNP, a 5,700-square-mile swath of the African continent, contains some 4 million animals and birds, giving it the greatest concentration of wildlife in the world (Honey, 1999, p. 220). This one area—only a dot on the African continent—has come to embody the ideals of pristine wilderness and wildlife conservation (Norton, 1996). The Serengeti has been the focus of Western fascination since the early part of the 20th century, the heyday of the great white colonial hunters—an image reinforced by Hollywood features, nature documentaries, coffee table picture books, and tour packages (Adams & McShane, 1996, p. 38).

Hunting: Profitable but Problematic

Initially, tourism in Tanzania meant hunting. During colonial times, the gathering spot for hunters was the New Safari Hotel, a rambling inn surrounded by English flower gardens in the center of Arusha. The first game park hotel, Ngorongoro Crater Lodge, was built in 1934 (Honey, 1999, p. 226). In 1973, Tanzania’s government banned all commercial hunting in an unsuccessful effort to curb poaching. Hunting was reopened in 1978 as a state monopoly run by the Tanzania Wildlife Corporation (TAWICO). TAWICO’s domination ended in 1988, with the liberalization of business under pressure from the IMF and the World Bank and also from private hunters (Honey, 1999, p. 243). Tanzania not only possesses one of Africa’s fastest growing tourism markets, but also its largest safari hunting industry. By 1999, there were 35 tourist-hunting companies registered, of which 15 were wholly foreign owned, 16 Tanzania wholly owned, and four were joint ventures (Kulindwa, Sosovele, & Mashindano, 2001). The country currently has 14 game reserves where licensed hunting is permitted. Considering the number of people hunting brings annually to Tanzania, this industry remains marginal. However, regarding the financial gains for the Tanzanian government, it largely leads the list. The revenues directly paid to the Wildlife Department (amounting to US$10 million annually) are game fees, conservation fees, concession fees, handling fees, hunting permits, and professional hunter’s licenses. Indirect revenues include corporation tax, V.A.T., business licenses, etc.

Sport hunting might well be the ultimate paradox for sustainable tourism. Although most of those involved in conservation and nature tourism find hunting distasteful, cruel, and ethically reprehensible, many admit that if properly managed, trophy hunting helps curb poaching, does less environmental damage, and brings in much more foreign exchange than do photographic safaris. However, not all experts agree with the latter argument (Adams & McShane, 1996, p. 172). Because the Tanzanian government believes that a hunter brings in 100 times more revenue than does a nonhunting visitor, the country is trying to attract big-game hunters. Unfortunately, because a lot of money is involved in hunting, corruption is common. Local politicians have been accused of granting ownership transfers of large tracts of land without following legal procedures, producing great tensions between the government and local people. Nowhere have these tensions been more intense than in the Loliondo Game Controlled Area, an expanse of land including about half a dozen villages lying along the eastern border of SNP. In 1992, Loliondo erupted into international controversy—the so-called “Loliondogate” scandal—when a hunting concession was granted to the Ortello Business Company, which belongs to a member of the royal family of the United Arab Emirates. Local community members have spent much of the past 15 years protesting this central government allocation of resource use and access rights, with little success.

Land frauds like “Loliondogate” have reverberated throughout rural areas and have significantly influenced the structure of political organizing in Tanzania, particularly among displaced pastoralists. Loliondo has not been the only area affected by land–tourism–hunting conflicts. In the northern Monduli District, in Sinya village, conflicts between the locally granted tourism concession
and the centrally managed tourist hunting concession erupted into a near-violent clash. Similar conflicts have occurred throughout northern Tanzania. Fortunately, Loliondo’s communities, like many others, have increasingly exploited tourism activities as a way of generating alternative sources of income. Ololosokwan village in northwestern Loliondo, for example, is Tanzania’s foremost case of ecotourism, earning over US$50,000 annually from several concessions and campsites on the village’s lands (Akunaay, Nelson, & Singleton, 2003). These operations have come into repeated conflict with the hunting concession, but thus far, the village has been able to maintain the tourism income, despite the many outside pressures.

Maasai-Mania and Marginalization

Although hunting has largely been replaced by photographic safaris, most tourists still travel to Tanzania hoping to see the “Big Five,” a hunting term historically used to denote the five most dangerous African animals: lion, leopard, rhinoceros, elephant, and buffalo (Chachage, 1998). However, Tanzania is not only inhabited by wild animals, but also by people. Foreigners visiting East Africa often solely associate “local people” with the Maasai (Spear & Waller, 1993). Due to countless coffee-table books and tourist snapshots, everybody seems to “know” the Maasai. They might well be the largest pastoralist ethnic group in Tanzania, but are by no means the only one. The Maasai, together with five other tribal groups, have occupied the pastoral niche in the Serengeti ecosystem for at least 4 centuries (Adams & McShane, 1996, p. 41). To most visitors, the sight of the Maasai warriors, dressed in colorful red blankets and beaded jewelry, evokes a romantic image (Bruner, 2001). The Maasai’s lasting place in the imagination is partly due to the common belief that they still live in harmony with nature. While true to a degree, this idea leads to the attitude—reinforced by marketing and promotion—that the Maasai are part of the landscape, not so unlike the wild animals.

Many of the problems the Maasai are facing relate to the special, internationally significant conservation and tourism status accorded to their home. Since the colonial period, they have been barred from using prime grazing lands and water sources within the Serengeti, and in recent years they have witnessed the growth of tourism bypassing their impoverished and exploited communities (Honey, 1999, p. 222). The well-documented case of Maasai displacement in national parks illustrates how indigenous people often bear the cost of tourism development initiated by central governments (Neumann, 1998). In 1959, with the establishment of SNP as a game park, the Maasai who lived there were evicted and moved to the Ngorongoro Conservation Area. In 1974, they were forced to evacuate some parts of Ngorongoro as well, because their presence was believed to be detrimental to wildlife and landscape. In the 1980s, they faced further restrictions as the conservationist attitude of the government stiffened. Maasai who lived within the conservation area found themselves subject to a series of rules and regulations that limited their herding activities and that did not apply to populations who lived outside the conservation area. In 2006, the Tanzanian government gave an ultimatum to Maasai communities living inside Ngorongoro, around 60,000 people, to vacate the area by end of the year.

The Maasai see the tourist dollars flowing in and out of what they contend is their land, and yet they receive almost no benefit. Participation by Maasai in tourism is extremely low, despite their proximity to the major attractions. There are also marked differences in the opportunities afforded by the hospitality industry for Maasai men and women (Coast, 2002, p. 97). The greatest irony is that it is Maasai women’s handicrafts and jewelry that are most associated with the Maasai by the international visitors, but few women benefit directly from this trade (Coast, 2002, p. 101). Issues of marginalization of the majority of Maasai from the income-generating opportunities provided by tourism are increasingly being raised (Kipuri, 1998). The Maasai living around Serengeti and Ngorongoro have been smart enough to organize themselves to demand a sizable slice of the tourism pie and the return of their rights to use land and water within the parks (Honey, 1999, p. 84).

Community-Based Initiatives

Although often praised by the industry and authorities, promising community-based initiatives
are few in number and hard to sustain (Akunna et al., 2003). One of the most well-known Tanzanian examples is the award-winning Cultural Tourism Program (CTP), launched in 1995 by the Dutch aid agency Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (SNV) in response to local calls for help. CTP was set up as a network of local communities, mainly Maasai, operating independently from each other and offering their individually developed tour packages. SNV financed the CTP, controlled its expenditures, and organized training for local tour guides. The TTB financed all of the CTP’s advertising efforts and helped promote the program to both local and international travel agencies (De Jong, 1999). Due to its perceived economic and institutional sustainability, SNV withdrew from the project in 2001. Since then, there has been a declining cooperation between the different groups (van der Duim, Peters, & Wearing, 2005). The intended Tanzania Cultural Tourism Organization (TACTO), created with the aim of coordinating the 18 community-based tourism modules, broke down before it even started. Besides, not everybody in the participating villages seems to be happy with the presence of tourists. In some places, the revenues are not distributed properly and there are escalating conflicts over land and natural resources (see Nelson, 2003, 2004, for examples). This example serves as a cautious reminder that even successful tourism development programs are extremely fragile.

Discussion and Implications

Tanzania seeks to offer a low-density, high-quality, and high-priced experience to tourists (Wade et al., 2001). It has the comparative advantage of being endowed with unique attractions and a government devoting 4% of its current budget to preserve the country’s natural heritage. Considerable untapped potential is found along the coast and within the underdeveloped southern wildlife sanctuaries. In addition to the popular “Northern Circuit” discussed above, the alternative “Coastal Circuit” or “Southern Circuit” includes Mikumi National Park, Ruaha (Lake Rukwa National Park), the Selous Game Reserve, Dar es Salaam, Bagamoyo, Kilwa, and Zanzibar. A rarely traveled “Western Circuit” exists as well, including Gombe National Park (where Jane Goodall conducts her famous research on chimpanzees), and Mahali and Katavi National Parks (Fig. 1). Tanzanian tourism development undoubtedly has good prospects, and receipts have been steadily growing (Table 1). Europe remains the biggest tourist market, but more and more (mainly South) Africans are visiting Tanzania, not only for business or family matters but increasingly for leisure as well.

The hospitality sector is currently being boosted by extensive construction and rehabilitation of hotels and lodges, improvements in roads to the game parks, and tourists’ misgivings about security in neighboring rival Kenya (Chami, 2002).

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Tourism Indicators for Tanzania</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tourism expenditure (US$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>377,000,000</td>
<td>432,000,000</td>
<td>444,000,000</td>
<td>461,000,000</td>
<td>594,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger transport</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>12,000,000</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
<td>16,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>381,000,000</td>
<td>444,000,000</td>
<td>448,000,000</td>
<td>468,000,000</td>
<td>610,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of tourism expenditure in the gross domestic product (GDP) Percent</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrivals of nonresident visitors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>201,934</td>
<td>213,013</td>
<td>249,601</td>
<td>267,940</td>
<td>256,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>49,001</td>
<td>45,544</td>
<td>59,077</td>
<td>49,781</td>
<td>53,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>38,299</td>
<td>46,605</td>
<td>30,087</td>
<td>27,208</td>
<td>22,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>157,470</td>
<td>162,225</td>
<td>191,982</td>
<td>191,025</td>
<td>221,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>30,339</td>
<td>29,675</td>
<td>16,682</td>
<td>13,742</td>
<td>11,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>24,626</td>
<td>28,060</td>
<td>27,867</td>
<td>26,502</td>
<td>16,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>501,669</td>
<td>525,122</td>
<td>575,296</td>
<td>576,198</td>
<td>582,807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, tourism is an extremely competitive industry, at both regional and international levels. In Tanzania, it is constrained by various factors, including: (1) inadequate accessibility to the attraction sites; (2) insufficiently trained local personnel; (3) a weak legal and regulatory framework; and (4) lack of communication facilities, which are crucial for development. The development of tourism in Tanzania definitely requires a more integrated approach than has so far been the case. Given the large number and diverse nature of attractions and destinations on offer in the world today, Tanzania needs to upgrade and consolidate its industry to withstand the international competition. The country needs to bring its standards up to international levels, or the recent rapid growth rate will not be maintained (Barron & Prideaux, 1998; Salazar, 2006). Whatever strategies are chosen, there should be a clear division of responsibilities. The government should remain responsible for the wildlife parks and conservation, and should take the lead in promoting tourism overseas. High-quality personnel should be engaged to undertake these tasks. Hotels and other hospitality services should be the responsibility of the private sector. The government has already divested itself of most of its hotels and other assets (parastatals). Until Tanzania gains expertise in running and managing hotels, foreign investment will remain an important factor in building up capacity.

In the area of marketing and promotion, where Tanzania lacks experience, hiring outside expertise is still recommended. Moreover, there is a need to promote greater national participation to increase the domestic value added. It is a good sign that the government recently started a campaign that aims to encourage Tanzanians to visit the country’s attractions. Although the industry has not yet diversified enough into areas beyond wildlife, like beach tourism, the country is making the right move by broadening its target international audience. German and the UK have been earmarked as the best market targets for Tanzania, while France, Italy, Sweden, and Belgium take the second lead as market hot spots. Looking ahead for new European markets, the country is now campaigning to attract Polish tourists. Japan and South Korea are the leading Asian states bringing in many visitors. In 2004, Tanzania was accredited and registered by the China National Tourism Administration (CNTA) as a qualified nation to invite Chinese citizens. The government is currently taking drastic steps in lobbying the Chinese market, which many travel trade business stakeholders see as one of the fastest growing sources of tourists. A newly designed Sino-Tanzania agreement is expected to place China on top of the key markets. Tanzania is also projected to be the biggest host for South African outbound visitors thanks to over a decade of campaigns to promote its attractive sites through highly developed South African channels.

Despite the broader mix of investors, and a modern Kilimanjaro International Airport, which has attracted some direct flights from Europe, Tanzanian tourism remains heavily linked to Kenya (Honey, 1999, p. 234). The government is currently looking for donors to finance the construction of an international airport in Lake Victoria’s city of Mwanza as a possible solution to serve the growing number of air travelers. Competition is not necessarily contradictory to collaboration. Actually, one of the best strategies for increasing the competitiveness of African tourism is regional cooperation, in order to encourage the easy movement of travelers across common borders and to establish joint packages for multidestination tourists (Sindiga, 1999, pp. 146–161). As discussed in this article, prior to the mid-1970s East Africa was marketed relatively successfully as a single tourism region. Afterwards, each country established administrative barriers that made it impossible to make cross-border trips. The reinvigorated EAC can help East African countries to tear the barriers down again, and to stimulate regional tourism. During their 2006 summit, the East African Heads of State pledged to eliminate cross-border travel barriers, which exist within their states since 1977, as a way forward to speed up regional integration. The three countries also launched a joint strategy marketing East Africa again as a single destination and are working on a common tourist visa and standardization of hotels and other facilities.

An extremely important factor in tourism development is political stability (Richter, 1992; Teye, 1986, 1988), or at least the perception of stability (Brown, 2000). Tourism is very sensitive and vulnerable to political issues, even of a minor nature, like a deportation of a foreigner by the country of destination. Tanzania has been fortunate that dur-
ing the past 40 years it has been one of sub-Saharan Africa’s most peaceful and politically stable nations. However, the 1998 bombing of the US Embassy in Dar es Salaam shattered the country’s international image as a safe and stable destination. When the US State Department responded by warning Americans against travel to East Africa, the industry was seriously hit. Even remote events like the Persian Gulf War adversely affected international tourism to Tanzania (Honey, 1999).

Following 9/11, the economy of Tanzania experienced various adverse shocks. The tourism sector, especially in the “Northern Circuit,” was severely affected, following the cancellation of bookings, mainly by potential visitors from the US and Europe (URT, 2001, p. 56). Security goes hand in hand with sustainability. Recent policy initiatives by the government have started paying off, but it is important to see whether these gains can be sustained over a long period. Although there has been a tremendous increase over the years, overall, tourism contribution to poverty reduction among the local communities has remained marginal and isolated. Local economies in most of the destination area have not improved in tandem with the development of tourism witnessed in those areas.

Conclusion

As a tourism region, Africa is rather poorly developed and the economic impact of tourism is still relatively small (Sindiga, 1999, p. 6). Because of the growing overseas demand, promoting tourism seems to be a very attractive development option for many countries (Christie & Crompton, 2001). Nevertheless, tourism’s contribution to the African economy has been frequently overestimated (Dieke, 2000; Mowforth & Munt, 2003). The current structure, organization, and management of international tourism and travel favor multinational corporations from the developed world or local elites. This assures a very large outflow of the resources generated by tourism in the continent. When the leakages of foreign exchange are discounted, and the local resources invested in tourism, the net economic impact is rather small. Increased foreign investment might be necessary for development, but it adds new urgency about questions of who gains and who loses from it. The idea that foreign investment in luxury lodges, for example, will lead to community development is typically based on a naive faith in an economic trickle-down process (Neumann, 1995, p. 377). Little of the gross earnings remain in the country, most of it being siphoned out of the economy in the form of inputs and expatriate salaries and allowances. Rarely are mechanisms for the redistribution of profits to local communities formulated. Besides, even if tourism might offer an alternative livelihood strategy for local people, it must be complemented by alternatives so that people can choose which strategy to adopt (Goodman, 2002).

Tourism in Tanzania, as elsewhere in Africa, should have a developmental role in tune with the aspirations of local people. As Mwalimu Nyerere once said: “You cannot develop people. You must allow people to develop themselves.” The continuous development of tourism alone will never solve all of the country’s problems. However, it can at least provide some jobs, diversify the local economy, and improve the quality of life (Kweka, Morrissey, & Blake, 2003). In the past, the often unplanned development of tourism has had serious costs for both the Tanzanian people and the environment. A critical lecture of the latest policy documents reveals that the new politically correct discourses in Tanzania are devoid of terms such as exploitation, class, and imperialism. Instead, keywords like participatory/grassroots development, economic liberalization, and donors/partners in development have become ubiquitous. However, a holistic analysis of tourism development, as the one presented in this article, shows that more is needed than a mere change of discourse to make tourism more successful and sustainable.

In order to understand the impact of tourism development, we should see it as part of a complex network of economic, social, racial, legal, and cultural relationships that operate on local as well as national, regional, and global scales. The author of this article has briefly touched upon some of these issues in the case of Tanzania, not with the aim of being comprehensive but to support the argument that processes on all these different levels need to be considered to facilitate the construction of a truly sustainable agenda for tourism development. Such a program requires serious collaboration across disciplines and across the multiple divides that separate academics, policy makers, industry lead-
ers, and other stakeholders. For tourism to reach its sustainable potential in terms of local livelihoods and biological conservation, one of the key issues is how to support efforts to empower local communities to control these economic activities. As the case study of Tanzania shows, a long way still lays ahead.

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References


