Equal Pay for all Prisoners / The Logic of Contrition

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Equal Pay for all Prisoners /
The Logic of Contrition

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The pivotal role of evolutionary theory in life sciences derives from its capability to provide causal explanations for phenomena that are highly improbable in the physicochemical sense. Yet, until recently, many facts in biology could not be accounted for in the light of evolution. Just as physicists for a long time ignored the presence of chaos, these phenomena were basically not perceived by biologists. Two examples illustrate this assertion. Although Darwin’s publication of “The Origin of Species” sparked off the whole evolutionary revolution, oddly enough, the population genetic framework underlying the modern synthesis holds no clues to speciation events. A second illustration is the more recently appreciated issue of jump increases in biological complexity that result from the aggregation of individuals into mutualistic wholes.

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Abstract

This report deals with two questions concerning the emergence of cooperative strategies in repeated games. The first part is concerned with the Perfect Folk Theorem and presents a vast class of equilibrium solutions based on Markovian strategies. Simple strategies, called equalizers, are introduced and discussed: if players adopt such strategies, the same payoff results for every opponent. The second part analyzes strategies implemented by finite automata. Such strategies are relevant in an evolutionary context; an important instance is called Contrite Tit For Tat. In populations of players adopting such strategies, Contrite Tit For Tat survives very well—at least as long as errors are restricted to mistakes in implementation (‘the trembling hand’). However, this cooperative strategy cannot persist if mistakes in perception are included as well.
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Equal Pay for all Prisoners

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By prisoners we mean, of course, players of the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma game (to be described presently). We shall show that there exist simple strategies for the infinitely iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma that act as equalizers in the sense that all co-players receive the same payoff, no matter what their strategies are like.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma game, a favorite with game theorists, social scientists, philosophers, and evolutionary biologists, displays the vulnerability of cooperation in a minimalistic model (see [1] to [5]). The two players engaged in this game can choose whether to cooperate or to defect. If both defect, they gain 1 point each; if both cooperate, they gain 3 points; but if one player defects and the other does not, then the defector receives 5 points and the other player only 0. The right move is obviously to defect, no matter what the other player does. As a result, both players earn 1 point instead of 3.

But if the same two players repeat the game very frequently, there exists no strategy that is best against all comers. The diversity of strategies is staggering. If we simulate on a computer populations of strategies evolving under a mutation-selection regime (with mutation introducing new strategies and selection weeding out those with lowest payoff), we observe a rich variety of evolutionary histories frequently leading to cooperative regimes dominated by strategies like Pavlov (cooperate whenever the opponent’s move, in the previous round, matched yours) or Generous Tit For Tat (always reciprocate your opponent’s cooperative move, but reciprocate only two-thirds of the defections). Remarkably, all strategies of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, which can be very complex and make up a huge set, obtain the same payoff against some rather simple equalizer strategies.

More generally, let us consider a two-player game where both players have the same two strategies and the same payoff matrix. We denote the first strategy (row 1) by C (for ‘cooperate’) and the second (row 2) by D (for ‘defect’) and write the payoff matrix as

<table>
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<th>Opponent</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>C</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>T,S</td>
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Such games include the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where $T > R > P > S$, and the Chicken game, where $T > R > S > P$. (In the Prisoner’s Dilemma case, $R$ stands for the reward for mutual cooperation, $P$ is the penalty for mutual defection, $T$ is the temptation payoff for unilaterally defecting and $S$ the sucker payoff for being exploited.)

Let us assume that the game is repeated infinitely often. A strategy in such a supergame is a program telling the player in each round whether to play C or D. The program may be history-dependent and stochastic: it specifies at every step the probability for playing
C, depending on what happened so far. If \( A_n \) is the payoff in the \( n \)-th round, the expected long-run average payoff for a player is given by

\[
\lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{A_1 + \cdots + A_N}{N}
\]

provided it exists. It need not always exist: think of two players cooperating in the first 10 rounds, defecting in the next 100 rounds, then cooperating in the following 1000 rounds, etc.

Memory-one strategies are particularly simple. Such a strategy is given by the probability to play \( C \) in the first round, and a quadruple \( \mathbf{p} = (p_R, p_S, p_T, p_P) \), where \( p_i \) denotes the probability that the player plays \( C \) after having experienced outcome \( i \in \{R, S, T, P\} \) in the previous round. Some of the most successful strategies belong to this class, including Generous Tit For Tat \((1, 1/3, 1, 1/3)\) and Pavlov \((1, 0, 0, 1)\).

**Theorem:** If \( \max(S, P) < \min(R, T) \), then there exist, for every value \( \pi \) between these numbers, memory-one strategies \( \mathbf{p} \) such that every opponent obtains the long-run average payoff \( \pi \) against a player using such a strategy. The vector \( \mathbf{p} \) is given by

\[
(1 - (R - \pi)a, 1 - (T - \pi)a, (\pi - S)a, (\pi - P)a)
\]

where \( a \) is any real number such that \( 1/a \geq \max(T - \pi, R - \pi, \pi - S, \pi - P) \).

**Proof:** The condition on a guarantees that the \( p_i \) are probabilities. Let us denote by \( q_i(n) \) the conditional probability that the opponent plays \( C \) in the following round, given that the \( n \)-th round resulted in outcome \( i \), and by \( s_i(n) \) the probability that the outcome in the \( n \)-th round is \( i \). By conditioning on round \( n \), we obtain:

\[
s_R(n + 1) = s_R(n)q_R(n)[1 - (R - \pi)a] + s_S(n)q_S(n)[1 - (T - \pi)a] + s_T(n)q_T(n)(\pi - S)a + s_P(n)q_P(n)(\pi - P)a.
\]

Similarly,

\[
s_S(n + 1) = s_R(n)(1 - q_R(n))[1 - (R - \pi)a] + s_S(n)(1 - q_S(n))[1 - (T - \pi)a] + s_T(n)(1 - q_T(n))(\pi - S)a + s_P(n)(1 - q_P(n))(\pi - P)a.
\]

Summing (4) and (5) yields the probability that you play \( C \) in round \( n + 1 \)

\[
s_R(n + 1) + s_S(n + 1) = s_R(n)[1 - (R - \pi)a] + s_S(n)[1 - (T - \pi)a] + s_T(n)(\pi - S)a + s_P(n)(\pi - P)a.
\]

Hence

\[
a^{-1}[s_R(n) + s_S(n) - s_R(n + 1) - s_S(n + 1)] = Rs_R(n) + Ss_T(n) + Ts_S(n) + Ps_P(n) - \pi[s_R(n) + s_S(n) + s_T(n) + s_P(n)].
\]

Since the \( s_i(n) \) sum up to 1, the right-hand side is just \( A_n - \pi \), where \( A_n \) is the opponent’s payoff in the \( n \)-th round (we must bear in mind that one player’s outcome \( S \) is the other player’s outcome \( T \)). Summing up (6) for \( n = 1, \ldots, N \) and dividing by \( N \), we obtain

\[
\frac{1}{aN}[s_R(1) + s_S(1) - s_R(N + 1) - s_S(N + 1)] = \frac{A_1 + \cdots + A_N}{N} - \pi,
\]

and hence

\[
\lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{A_1 + \cdots + A_N}{N} = \pi.
\]
A few final remarks. Two players using equalizer strategies are in Nash equilibrium, which means that neither has an incentive to change strategy. Nash equilibria exist for every game; for iterated games, they abound. Indeed, the so-called Folk Theorem in game theory states that every feasible pair of payoff-values exceeding the minimax (the highest payoff that a player can enforce, which in our case is $\text{max}(S, P)$) can be realized by a Nash-equilibrium pair [2, p. 373]. Our theorem is related to this: the strategies are equalizers with memory one. Two players using such strategies have no reason to switch unilaterally to another strategy, since they cannot improve their payoff; however, they have no reason not to adopt another strategy either, since they will not be penalised. Since their opponent plays an equalizer strategy, they can switch to any other strategy, and not be worse off. If both players opt for a change, however, they are likely to end up in a non-equilibrium situation.

If $a$ is chosen small enough, the runs of consecutive defections or cooperations can be made arbitrarily long. The condition $\text{min}(R, T) > \text{max}(S, P)$ and its converse are not only sufficient, but also necessary for the existence of such equalizer strategies. It is easy to construct other equalizer strategies. For example, play $C$ until the opponent’s mean payoff is larger than $\pi$, then play $D$ until it is smaller than $\pi$, then play $C$ until it is larger again, etc. However, such a strategy requires monitoring the opponent’s entire payoff sequence. The point is that even within memory-one strategies, equalizers exist.

References


The Logic of Contrition

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Abstract

A highly successful strategy for the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma is Contrite Tit For Tat, which bases its decisions on the ‘standings’ of the two players. This strategy is as good as Tit For Tat at invading populations of defectors, and much better at overcoming errors in implementation against players who are also using it. However, it is vulnerable to errors in perception. In this paper, we discuss the merits of Contrite Tit For Tat and compare it with other strategies, like Pavlov and the newly-introduced Remorse. We embed these strategies into an eight-dimensional space of stochastic strategies which we investigate by analytical means and numerical simulations. Finally, we show that if one replaces the conventions concerning the ‘standing’ by other, even simpler conventions, one obtains an evolutionarily stable strategy (called Prudent Pavlov) which is immune against both mis-perception and mis-implementation.

1 Introduction

Tit For Tat has an Achilles’ heel: it is vulnerable to errors (see Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), Axelrod (1984), Molander (1985), Müller (1987), Axelrod and Dion (1988), Bendor et al (1991), Bendor (1993), Kollock (1993), Nowak and Sigmund (1993b), Nowak et al (1995a)). If a TFT player erroneously plays Defect against another TFT-player, this leads to a long vendetta. There are several ways to overcome this problem. One can, for instance, play Generous Tit For Tat (GTFT): always cooperate if the other player cooperated in the previous round, but defect only with a certain probability if he defected (see Molander, 1985, and Nowak and Sigmund, 1992). Alternatively, one could use the strategy PAVLOV: cooperate if and only if you and your opponent used the same move in the previous round, but defect only with a certain probability if he defected in the previous round (see Kraines and Kraines (1988), Fudenberg and Maskin (1990) or Nowak and Sigmund (1993b)). Both strategies are error-proof: a mistaken defection is quickly corrected, and mutual cooperation resumed.

Another error-correcting strategy has been proposed by Sugden (1986) in his seminal book on 'The Evolution of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare’. This is Contrite Tit For Tat, or cTFT (see also Boyd (1989), Wu and Axelrod (1995) and Harrington and Axelrod (1995)). Like GTFT and PAVLOV, this is a memory one-strategy: it decides according to the outcome of the previous round. However, in contrast to its two rivals, this outcome does not only depend on the moves of the two players (which can be C or D, cooperate or defect), but also on their standing, which can be g (‘good’) or b (‘bad’). A player is in good standing if he has cooperated in the previous round, or if he has defected while provoked (i.e. while he was in good standing and the other player was not). In every other case
defection leads to a bad standing. The strategy \textit{cTFT} begins with a cooperative move, and cooperates except if provoked.

If two \textit{cTFT}-players engage in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, and if the first player defects by mistake, he loses his good standing. In the next round, he will cooperate, whereas the other \textit{cTFT}-player will defect without losing his good standing. Then both players will be in good standing and resume their mutual cooperation in the following round. This strategy is related to Dawkins’ (1989) Remorseful Prober, who defects once in a while but accepts retaliation in the following round without complaint.

As Sugden has shown, \textit{cTFT} is evolutionarily stable. Moreover, it is as good as \textit{TFT} in invading a population of defectors. In contrast, \textit{PAVLOV} and \textit{GTFT} fare both very poorly in such an environment, and need a ‘catalyser’ to create the type of cooperative environment in which they can thrive.

On the other hand, the additional complexity of the \textit{cTFT} strategy has its drawbacks. In particular, while \textit{cTFT} is immune to errors in the implementation of a move, it is not immune to errors in the perception of a move. If, in a match between two \textit{cTFT} players, one player mistakenly believes that the other is in bad standing, this leads to a sequence of mutual backbiting, just as with \textit{TFT}. (Errors in perception – rather than implementation – have been studied in Miller (1989), Kollock (1993), Nowak et al (1995b)).

In this paper, we discuss the relative merits of all (stochastic or deterministic) memory one strategies with or without standing. \textit{cTFT} is not the only evolutionarily stable rule which is Pareto-optimal (and hence yields the maximal payoff if the whole population adopts it). Depending on the exact payoff values, either \textit{PAVLOV} or another strategy called \textit{REMORSE} has the same qualities. A player using the \textit{REMORSE} strategy cooperates if he was in bad standing in the previous round, or if both players cooperated. This strategy, again, is error-correcting. Indeed, suppose that both players use \textit{REMORSE}. If the second player defects by mistake, he cooperates in the next round, whereas the first player defects and remains in good standing. In the following round, both players defect and obtain a bad standing; from then onward, both resume cooperation.

We discuss \textit{cTFT}, \textit{PAVLOV} and \textit{REMORSE} with analytical methods and numerical simulations, embedding them in a large class of stochastic strategies. Finally, we show that by replacing the conventions concerning the ‘standing’ by another set (which is even easier to implement, and only depends on an ‘internal variable’) one is led to a \textit{PRUDENT-PAVLOV} strategy which is an ESS and immune against errors both in implementing and in perceiving moves.

2 Preliminaries on the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma

The Prisoner’s Dilemma (or PD) is a game between two players each having two options, namely to cooperate (play \textit{C}) or to defect (play \textit{D}). If both cooperate, they get a reward \textit{R} higher than the punishment \textit{P} which they receive if both defect. If one player defects and the other cooperates, the defector get the payoff \textit{T} (for temptation) and the cooperator the sucker’s payoff \textit{S}. We shall always assume

\[ T > R > P > S \]  \hfill (1)

so that the option \textit{D} dominates \textit{C} (it is better no matter what the other player chooses). But if both players use \textit{D}, they fail to get the reward.

In the iterated PD, the game is played for several rounds. We shall assume that there is a constant probability \textit{w} for another round. The length of the game is a stochastic variable with mean value $\frac{1}{1-w}$. A strategy for the iterated PD is a program telling the player in
each round whether to chose C or D (this can be a randomised decision: cooperate with such and such a probability). If \( A_n \) is the payoff for one player in the \( n \)-th round, his expected payoff is \( \sum A_n w^n \) (note that \( w^n \) is the probability that an \( n \)-th round occurs). We shall mostly be interested in large \( w \) (close to 1). Frequently, the limiting case \( w = 1 \) is considered (the infinitely repeated PD). In this case, the payoff is the limit of the mean \( \frac{1}{n}(A_1 + ... + A_n) \), for \( n \to \infty \) (if it exists). We shall assume

\[
2R > T + S \tag{2}
\]

so that it is better for the two players to cooperate jointly rather than to alternately defect.

Let us now assume that in every round, each player is provided with a standing, which can be g (good) or b (bad). In the following round, the player acts (i.e. opts for C or D) and obtains a new standing which depends on his action and on the previous standing of both players. As mentioned in the introduction, the rules for updating the standing are the following: if the other player has been in good standing, or if we both have been in bad standing, I receive a good standing if I cooperate, and a bad standing otherwise. If I have been in good standing and the other player in bad standing, I receive a good standing no matter what I am doing.

Thus if I cooperate in a given round, I will always obtain a good standing: but if I defect, I will be in good standing only if, in the previous round, I have been in good standing and my opponent has been in bad standing.

In a given round, a player can be in three possible states: \( Cg, Dg \) and \( Db \): the first means that he has cooperated (which automatically entails good standing), the second that he has defected with good reason, the third that he has wantonly defected. The state of the game in a given round is made up of the states of the first and the second player. There are nine such combinations: \((Cg,Cg), (Cg,Dg), (Cg,Db), (Dg,Cg), (Dg,Db), (Db,Cg), (Db,Dg), (Db,Db)\) and \((Dg,Dg)\). It is easy to check that this last state can never be reached: we therefore omit it, and number the remaining eight states in this order.

\( cTFT \) is the strategy which cooperates except if it is in good standing and the other player is not, whereas \( REMORSE \) is the strategy which cooperates only if it is in bad standing, or if both players had cooperated in the previous round.

### 3 In Search of Stability

A strategy \( \hat{S} \) is said to be an evolutionarily stable strategy, or ESS, if in a population where all members adopt it, no other strategy can invade under the effect of selection. More precisely, if \( A(S, S') \) is the expected payoff for an \( S \)-player in a population of \( S' \)-players, then \( \hat{S} \) is an ESS if for all strategies \( S \) different from \( \hat{S} \) one has \( A(S, \hat{S}) \leq A(\hat{S}, \hat{S}) \) and, if equality holds, \( A(S, S) < A(\hat{S}, \hat{S}) \) (see Maynard Smith (1982)).

It is easy to see that for the infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, i.e. for \( w = 1 \), there exists no ESS.

This is due simply to the fact that two strategies differing only in their first – say – three hundred moves will have exactly the same payoff.

But as shown in Sugden (1986), for \( w < 1 \) the strategy \( cTFT \) is evolutionarily stable in a very important sense: if there is a small, but non-vanishing probability of mis-implementing a move, every strategy that deviates, against a \( cTFT \)-player, from what the \( cTFT \)-rule would prescribe, fares less well than it would have by following this rule. Note that if there is such an error probability, every finite sequence of moves will have a positive
Figure 1: *PAVLOV* is an ESS if $T + wP < R + wR$. Solid lines indicate the moves specified by the *PAVLOV* strategy; dotted lines indicate the alternative moves. See text for further explanation.

probability. (See Selten (1975), Selten and Hammerstein (1984), and Boyd (1989) where the connection with Selten’s concept of a perfect equilibrium is discussed.)

The basic idea of Sugden’s proof allows to decide for every deterministic rule $\hat{S}$ based on finitely many states whether it is evolutionarily stable in the sense defined above. Because of the error probability, every state can be reached with positive probability. Let us start in any of the possible states, assuming for the moment that no error will occur in the following rounds, and let us follow the fate of a player invading a $\hat{S}$ population.

Since the next move of his adversary is always specified, there are only two possible states that can be reached in the next round, depending on whether the invader uses $C$ or $D$. From each of these states, two states can be reached in turn, etc. Since there are only finitely many states, each branch of the game-tree must eventually return to a state it had visited before. Therefore, it is possible to compute the payoff along every branch, discounting by the factor $w$ at every step.

One of the two branches issued from each state describes what happens if I use $\hat{S}$ myself. If this always yields the highest payoff, and no alternative does, then $\hat{S}$ is evolutionarily stable, provided the probability for mistakes in implementation is sufficiently small.

In Fig. 1 we check this for *PAVLOV*. Two arrows issue forth from each state, depending on whether the invader plays $C$ or $D$ against his $\hat{S}$-adversary. The vertices of the graphs describe the invader’s state in the first (or upper) position, and the state of his opponent in the second (or lower) position. The arrows describe the possible transitions, which only depend of my choice, since the opponent’s moves are specified by $\hat{S}$. The solid arrow indicates the move the invader would choose if he were also a $\hat{S}$-strategist. We see in Fig.1 that *PAVLOV* is an ESS if and only if $T + wP < R + wR$, as has been shown by Harrington and Axelrod (1995). The critical decision occurs when we are in $(D, D)$ or $(C, C)$ and I have to decide whether to get two $R$’s in succession, or a $T$ followed by a $P$. On the other hand, Fig. 2 shows that *TFT* is never an ESS: in $(C, D)$, my best move leads to $(C, C)$. 
In Fig. 3, we see that cTFT is always an ESS, and in Fig. 4 that REMORSE is an ESS if and only if $T + w_P > R + w_R$ (the opposite as with PAVLOV). The critical case, here, comes when in state $(Dg, Db)$ or $(Cg, Db)$. Defecting twice (as REMORSE specifies) will get me $T + w_P$. Cooperating twice yields $R + w_R$. We note that REMORSE can handle AllD very well and is threatened by more cooperative strategies; PAVLOV exploits AllC to the hilt, but is endangered by AllD.

One can use the same method to verify, for instance, that AllD and GRIM are evolutionary stable rules (GRIM cooperates only if both players cooperated in the previous round. If one defects against a GRIM-player, that player will never revert to cooperation.) For certain payoff values, the strategy WEAKLING is also an ESS: it cooperates if and only if it is in bad standing. However, these strategies are far from optimal. If a population is stuck with such a strategy, it does very poorly (the average payoff is $P$ for AllD and GRIM, and $\frac{R+2P}{2}$ for WEAKLING). In contrast, if a whole population adopts PAVLOV, GTFT, cTFT or REMORSE, it will on average obtain the payoff $R$ per round.

So far, we looked at errors in implementing a move. But there also exist, as we know from everyday life, errors in understanding which can threaten cooperation. cTFT is not immune to misperception of the other’s move, as can be seen from the following table, where the first row is the sequence of my states, as I perceive them; the second the sequence of the opponent’s states, as I perceive them (my error occurs in the second round, indicated by the asterisk) whereas the third and fourth row are the sequences of my (resp. my opponent’s) true moves.

\[
\begin{array}{ccccccc}
Cg & Cg & Dg & Cg & Dg & ... \\
Cg & Db^* & Cg & Db & Cg & ... \\
Cg & Cg & Db & Cg & Db & ... \\
Cg & Cg & Cg & Dg & Cg & ...
\end{array}
\]
Figure 3: $cTFT$ is an ESS.

Figure 4: $REMORSE$ is an ESS if $T + wP > R + wR$. 
The average payoff, after the mistake, is \( \frac{T+S}{2} \), which is less than \( R \).

Similarly, \( \text{REMORSE} \) is not immune to misperception of the other’s move:

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
Cg & Cg & Dg & Db & Cg & Dg \\
Cg & Db^* & Cg & Db & Db & Cg \\
Cg & Cg & Db & Db & Cg & Db \\
Cg & Cg & Cg & Dg & Db & Cg \\
\end{array}
\]

The average payoff, after the mistake, is \( \frac{T+S+2P}{4} \), which is less than \( R \).

In contrast to this, \( \text{PAVLOV} \) is immune to misperception of the other’s move (or the own, for that matter):

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
C & C & D & D & C & \ldots \\
C & D^* & C & D & C & \ldots \\
C & C & D & D & C & \ldots \\
C & C & C & D & C & \ldots \\
\end{array}
\]

The error is quickly corrected and the average payoff remains \( R \). (For a precise computation of the effect of the errors in perception, we refer to Nowak et al, 1995b).

4 Stochastic Strategies with Standing

If we assume that each move can be mis-implemented with a certain probability, we are encountering stochastic strategies. As the example of \( \text{Generous Tit For Tat (GTFT)} \) shows, such strategies can be important in their own right, not just as imperfect realisations of deterministic strategies (see e.g. May (1987) and Sigmund (1995)).

Within the huge class of strategies for the iterated PD, we shall concentrate on the memory one strategies, where the decision, for each move, is uniquely based on the outcome of the previous move. Let us first omit the ‘standing’. The outcome in every round, then, can be completely characterised by the payoff for the first player, which is \( R,S,T \) or \( P \). We shall number these outcomes by 1 to 4 (in this order) and consider strategies given by \( p = (p_1, \ldots, p_4) \) where \( p_i \) is the probability to cooperate after outcome \( i \). For instance, All\( D \), the strategy that always defects, is given by \((0,0,0,0)\) and TFT by \((1,0,1,0)\). These are so-called reactive strategies, where the decision depends only on the other player’s previous move, not on the own, i.e. where \( p_1 = p_3 \) and \( p_2 = p_4 \) (see Nowak (1990) and Nowak and Sigmund (1990)). Examples of non-reactive strategies are GRIM \((1,0,0,0)\) and PAVLOV \((1,0,0,1)\). These are deterministic strategies, where the \( p_i \) are 0 or 1. If we assume that errors occur, we obtain stochastic versions, for instance \((1-\epsilon, \epsilon, 1-\epsilon, \epsilon)\) as an approximation to TFT (cf. Nowak and Sigmund (1993a) and (1995)).

If the rule \( p \) is matched against a rule \( p' = (p_1', p_2', p_3', p_4') \), this yields a Markov process where the transitions between the four possible states \( R,S,T \) and \( P \) are given by the matrix

\[
T = \begin{bmatrix}
p_1 p_1' & p_1(1-p_1') & (1-p_1)p_1' & (1-p_1)(1-p_1') \\
p_2 p_3' & p_2(1-p_3') & (1-p_2)p_3' & (1-p_2)(1-p_3') \\
p_3 p_2' & p_3(1-p_2') & (1-p_3)p_2' & (1-p_3)(1-p_2') \\
p_4 p_4' & p_4(1-p_4') & (1-p_4)p_4' & (1-p_4)(1-p_4')
\end{bmatrix}
\]

(3)

(Note that \( p_2 \) is matched with \( p_3' \) and vice versa; one player’s \( S \) is the other player’s \( T \). If \( p \) and \( p' \) are in the interior of the strategy cube, then all entries of this stochastic matrix are
strictly positive, and hence there exists a unique stationary distribution \( s = (s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4) \) such that \( p_i^{(n)} \), the probability to be in state \( i \) in the \( n \)-th round, converges to \( s_i \) for \( n \to \infty \) \((i = 1, 2, 3, 4)\). The components \( s_i \) are strictly positive and sum up to 1. They denote the asymptotic frequencies of \( R, S, T \) and \( P \). The stochastic vector \( s \) is a left eigenvector of \( T \) for the eigenvalue 1, i.e. satisfies \( s = sT \).

It follows that for \( w = 1 \), the payoff for a player using \( p \) against an opponent using \( p' \) is given by

\[
A(p, p') = Rs_1 + Ss_2 + Ts_3 + Ps_4. \tag{4}
\]

If, for instance, a TFT player is matched against another TFT player, and if errors occur, the payoff is reduced to \( R + S + T + P \), which is less than \( R \). On the other hand, two \( PAVLOV \)-players receive \( R \) (up to an \( e \)-term) because their errors are quickly corrected. We note that the \( s_i \) and hence also the payoff in (4) are independent of the initial condition, i.e. of the moves of the players in the first round. For \( w < 1 \), the payoff has a more complicated expression and depends on the initial move, see Nowak and Sigmund (1995).

Let us now take the 'standing' into account. A stochastic strategy based on the outcome of the previous round is now given by a vector \( q = (q_1, \ldots, q_8) \) where \( q_i \) is the probability to play \( C \) if the state in the previous round was \( i \) (we keep the ordering as described at the end of section 2). There are \( 2^8 = 256 \) deterministic strategies (where all \( q_i \) are 1 or 0).

The strategies \( p = (p_1, \ldots, p_4) \) considered previously do not depend on the standings, but only on the actions of the two players in the previous round. Such a \( p \)-strategy can be viewed as a \( q \)-strategy, with

\[
q = (p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4, p_3, p_4, p_3, p_4). \tag{5}
\]

Tit For Tat, for instance, is \((1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0)\) and Pavlov is \((1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1)\). The strategy \( cTFT \) is given by \((1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1)\) and REMORSE by \((1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1)\).

If the first player is a \( q \)-strategist and the second a \( q' \)-strategist, the transition probabilities from one state of the game to the next are given by the following matrix \( T \):

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
q_1q_1' & 0 & q_1(1-q_1') & 0 & 0 & (1-q_1)q_1' & 0 & (1-q_1)(1-q_1') \\
q_2q_2' & 0 & q_2(1-q_2') & 0 & 0 & (1-q_2)q_2' & 0 & (1-q_2)(1-q_2') \\
q_3q_3' & 0 & q_3(1-q_3') & (1-q_3)q_3' & (1-q_3)(1-q_3') & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
q_4q_4' & 0 & q_4(1-q_4') & 0 & 0 & (1-q_4)q_4' & 0 & (1-q_4)(1-q_4') \\
q_5q_5' & 0 & q_5(1-q_5') & (1-q_5)q_5' & (1-q_5)(1-q_5') & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
q_6q_6' & q_6(1-q_6') & 0 & 0 & 0 & (1-q_6)q_6' & (1-q_6)(1-q_6') & 0 \\
q_7q_7' & q_7(1-q_7') & 0 & 0 & 0 & (1-q_7)q_7' & (1-q_7)(1-q_7') & 0 \\
q_8q_8' & q_8(1-q_8') & 0 & 0 & 0 & (1-q_8)q_8' & 0 & (1-q_8)(1-q_8')
\end{bmatrix} \tag{5}
\]

Note that, due to the rules about standing, there are four vanishing entries in each row of this \( 8 \times 8 \)-matrix. In spite of these zeros, \( T \) is irreducible, and even mixing, provided all \( q_i \) are distinct from 0 and 1; indeed, the entries of \( T^n \) are all strictly positive for \( n > 2 \). It follows that there exists a uniquely defined strictly stochastic vector \( s \) such that \( sT = s \), yielding the stationary probabilities of the eight states. The payoff obtained by the \( q \)-player against the \( q' \)-player is

\[
Rs_1 + S(s_2 + s_3) + T(s_4 + s_6) + P(s_5 + s_7 + s_8). \tag{6}
\]
Let us compute this, for example, if a REMORSE-player (whose strategy, if the error probability is $\epsilon$, is given by $(1-\epsilon, \epsilon, \epsilon, \epsilon, 1-\epsilon, 1-\epsilon)$) confronts a cTFT-player with strategy $(1-\epsilon, 1-\epsilon, \epsilon, 1-\epsilon, 1-\epsilon, 1-\epsilon)$. The transition matrix $T$ is given by

$$
T = \begin{pmatrix}
(1-\epsilon)^2 & 0 & (1-\epsilon) & 0 & 0 & \epsilon(1-\epsilon) \\
\epsilon(1-\epsilon) & 0 & \epsilon^2 & 0 & 0 & \epsilon(1-\epsilon) \\
\epsilon(1-\epsilon) & 0 & \epsilon^2 & (1-\epsilon)^2 & (1-\epsilon) & 0 \\
\epsilon(1-\epsilon) & 0 & \epsilon^2 & 0 & (1-\epsilon)^2 & 0 \\
(1-\epsilon) & (1-\epsilon)^2 & 0 & 0 & \epsilon^2 & \epsilon(1-\epsilon) \\
(1-\epsilon)^2 & 0 & \epsilon(1-\epsilon) & 0 & \epsilon^2 & 0 \\
\end{pmatrix}
$$

(7)

We write $T = P + \epsilon Q_1 + \epsilon^2 Q_2$ and $s = x + \epsilon y + \epsilon^2 z$, where $x$ is a stochastic vector, so that the components of $y$ and $z$ both sum up to 0. Developing $sT = s$ in powers of $\epsilon$ we obtain $xP = x$, $xQ_1 + yP = y$ and $zP + yQ_1 + Q_2 = z$. The first equation yields $x = (1-2a, a, 0, 0, a, 0, 0)$ for unknown $a$. Hence $xQ_1 = (-2+6a, -2a, 1-2a, 0, 0, 1-4a, a, a)$ so that the second equation yields $a = \frac{2}{7}$. Hence $x = (\frac{2}{7}, 0, 0, 0, \frac{2}{7}, 0, 0, 0)$. It follows that the payoff for REMORSE against cTFT is given, up to $\epsilon$, by

$$
\frac{3}{7}R + \frac{2}{7}(S + T)
$$

(8)

which is the same as the payoff for cTFT against REMORSE. Since both cTFT and REMORSE are error-correcting, and therefore obtain payoff $R$ against their like, the competition between these two strategies leads to a bi-stable situation which is symmetric: both basins of attraction are equally large. If it had been otherwise, this would have suggested that one strategy is stronger than the other.

A similar situation holds between cTFT and PAVLOV, i.e. $(1-\epsilon, \epsilon, \epsilon, 1-\epsilon, 1-\epsilon, 1-\epsilon, 1-\epsilon)$. The stationary distribution (up to $\epsilon$) is now $(\frac{2}{9}, 0, 0, \frac{2}{9}, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ so that the payoff for PAVLOV against cTFT is now

$$
\frac{1}{3}R + \frac{2}{9}(S + T + P)
$$

(9)

We can easily compute the perturbation term for the payoff: in the above case, for instance, it is $\frac{2}{9}(-6R + 13S + 23T - 4P)$.

If a PAVLOV-player plays against REMORSE, the payoff is $R$ (up to $\epsilon$). Indeed, this interaction is error correcting. The reason is that the two strategies (which both are error-correcting against their own) obey quite similar rules: as long as both players are in good standing, they follow the same program. (However, REMORSE does not exploit suckers, i.e. AllC-players, whereas PAVLOV does.)

We mention in passing that there exist equalizers within the class of q-strategies. More precisely, every payoff between $P$ and $R$ can be written as $P + \pi$. Against a strategy of the form

$$
q = (1 + \pi a - a(R - P), 1 + \pi a - a(T - P), 1 + \pi b - b(T - P), 1 + \pi a + a(P - S), \pi b, \pi a + a(P - S), \pi a, \pi a)
$$

(where $a$ and $b$ are real parameters such that all $q_i$ lie between 0 and 1) every strategy obtains the same payoff, namely $P + \pi$. This can be shown by a computation similar to that in Boerlijst et al (1996), but considerably more tedious. For $a = b$ we obtain the ($p_1, ..., p_4$)-strategies described in Boerlijst et al (1996).
5 Numerical Simulations

In this section we present results of random mutation experiments in order to enhance the understanding of the dynamics and attainability of the different ESS’s. In these experiments a population of strategies is simulated for 1 million time steps (and more, if no steady state is reached). Payoff values between strategies are computed on the assumption that \( w = 1 \). The next fraction of a strategy \( X_i \) is computed by:

\[
X_i(t + 1) = X_i(t) \frac{\sum_j X_j(t) A(i, j)}{\sum_k X_k(t) \sum_j X_j(t) A(k, j)},
\]

where \( A(i, j) \) is the payoff that strategy \( i \) gets when playing against strategy \( j \) and \( X_i(t) \) is the frequency of strategy \( i \) at time \( t \). In Eq. (10) the change of a fraction is determined by the average score of the strategy divided by the average score of the population (comparable to replicator dynamics, see Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988)). Whenever a fraction drops below 0.001, it is regarded as extinct and set to zero. Therefore, the total number of different strategies can never exceed 1000. Mutant strategies are introduced at a fraction of 0.0011. The chance of the appearance of a mutant is 0.01 per time step. After mutation and extinction events the population is rescaled to 1. Strategies are given by a vector \( q = (q_1, ..., q_8) \). There is a background noise \( \epsilon = 0.001 \). Mutants have a random set of \( q \)-values, with a bias towards pure strategies. \( q \)-values are set to \( \epsilon \) or \( (1 - \epsilon) \), each with probability \( 1/3 \), or to the U-shaped distribution \( (1 + \cos(\pi \rho))/2 \) (with random variable \( \rho \) uniform between 0 and 1), if necessary rounded to \( \epsilon \) or \( (1 - \epsilon) \). In this way the chance of obtaining a particular pure strategy is \( (1/3 + \cos^{-1}(1 - 2\epsilon)/\pi)^8 \), and hence the chance that a particular pure strategy appears within a simulation exceeds 99%.

We simulate for two different sets of payoff values, which differ in dynamics. The first set of \((S = 0, P = 1, R = 3, T = 5.5)\) is at high temptation to defect, whereas the second set of \((S = 0, P = 1, R = 3, T = 3.5)\) is at low temptation. The two sets differ on whether \( 2R > T + P \) or not.

High temptation \((T = 5.5)\): At high temptation we find the ESS’s: \textit{ALLD, GRIM, cTFT} and \textit{RE-MORSE}. Simulations starting with just one of these strategies show that populations of \textit{ALLD} and \textit{GRIM} do not persist for a long time, whereas populations consisting of \textit{cTFT} and \textit{RE-MORSE} do persist. This still holds if \( w \) is slightly smaller than 1. The apparent contradiction that an ESS population can be invaded by mutants can be explained by the fact that in our model the score of a newly introduced mutant is (marginally) influenced by the mutant playing against itself. We argue that ESS’s that are not stable against such small perturbations are structurally unstable: biologically, we assume that mutant strategies invade in small clusters, or clones.

Simulations starting from \textit{ALLD} sooner or later end up in populations of either \textit{cTFT}(-like) or \textit{RE-MORSE}(-like) strategies. Fig. 5 shows two typical runs: Fig. 5a settling in \textit{cTFT}, and Fig. 5b settling in \textit{RE-MORSE}. The average population score very quickly approaches 3, indicating cooperation. Before the population reaches the steady state, periods of relative stasis alternate with periods of rapid change, comparable to e.g. Lindgren (1991). In Fig. 5b the population initially shows alternations between \textit{PAVLOV}(-like), and \textit{RE-MORSE}(-like) dominance. In fact, these two types of strategies behave similarly in most cases.

Some \textit{cTFT}(-like) and \textit{RE-MORSE}(-like) strategies play almost neutral against pure (up to \( \epsilon \)) \textit{cTFT} and pure \textit{RE-MORSE}. Often the final state is composed of a mixture of either these \textit{cTFT}(-like) or \textit{RE-MORSE}(-like) strategies. Fig. 6 shows a simulation that ends in a \textit{cTFT}(-like) population. The scores within such a mixture are all alike, so that the dynamics are governed by the score against ‘background mutants’. This explains the
Figure 5a: Settling in cTFT. Evolution of a population of strategies starting from pure ALLD with high temptation to defect ($T = 5.5$). In the upper panel the solid line indicates the average population score whereas the dotted line indicates the number of different strategies.

Figure 5b: Settling in REMORSE. After Lindgren (1991). Evolution of a population of strategies starting from pure ALLD with high temptation to defect ($T = 5.5$). In the upper panel the solid line indicates the average population score whereas the dotted line indicates the number of different strategies.
drift and the accumulation of neutral mutants. Note that pure cTFT is also present in Fig. 6, but it fails to dominate the population.

To explore the basins of attraction of the ESS’s we ran 100 simulations starting from ALLD: 68 ended in cTFT-like mixtures, 11 ended in pure cTFT, 15 ended in REMORSE-like mixtures, and 6 ended in pure REMORSE. It seems that competition is decided on the base of which strategy first exceeds a certain threshold. The fact that there are more neutral mutants around cTFT than around REMORSE explains the bias towards the former strategy. Simulations starting from 100 random mutants show similar statistics.

Low temptation (T = 3.5): Known ESS’s at low temptation are ALLD, GRIM, cTFT, PAVLOV and WEAKLING. Again, ALLD and GRIM are easily invaded, whereas the other strategies persist. Starting 100 simulations from ALLD we get 63 cTFT-like mixtures, 8 pure cTFT, 17 PAVLOV-like mixtures, 3 pure PAVLOV, 6 WEAKLING-like mixtures, and 3 times pure WEAKLING. The dynamics resembles that as described for high temptation. Fig. 7 shows a simulation that ends in pure WEAKLING. It can be seen that the appearance of WEAKLING-like strategies causes a drop in the score. Pure WEAKLING will slowly outcompete the other WEAKLING-like strategies, and the population stays fixed in a sequence of alternating mutual cooperation and defection, giving a score of \((R + P)/2\). Only 9 out of 100 simulations end in this non-cooperative mode, PAVLOV(-like) and cTFT(-like) populations both reach a score close to R.

Other payoff values: Results for other payoff values resemble the results of either of the above described situations. At the bifurcation point \(T=5\) the main attractor of simulations is again pure cTFT or cTFT-like mixtures. At this value also stable REMORSE or REMORSE-like mixtures, and PAVLOV-like mixtures are observed. Pure PAVLOV is no longer an ESS for this \(T\)-value. Another bifurcation point is at \(T=4\). Above this \(T\)-value WEAKLING is no longer an ESS (more generally, the condition is \(T + S < R + P\)).

To conclude, we see that the addition of a standing in the Prisoner’s Dilemma facilitates the evolution of cooperation. Populations with random mutations in most cases
quickly adapt to a cooperative mode, and only rarely the population is trapped in the WEAKLING strategy. Surprisingly, this suboptimal trapping is only observed in situations with low temptation to defect.

6 The Alternating PD

One can also investigate cTFT in the context of the alternating Prisoner’s Dilemma (see Boyd (1988), Nowak and Sigmund (1994) and Frean (1995)). In the strictly alternating case, the two players take turns in deciding which move to chose: either to offer or to withhold assistance (C or D). As shown in Nowak and Sigmund (1994) the payoff values must then satisfy \( T - R = P - S \). In the alternating game, not only the state \((Dg, Dg)\) but also the states \((Db, Db)\) and \((Cg, Dg)\) are unreachable. (The state \((Cg, Db)\) for instance means: the first player has cooperated – he is by definition in good standing – and then, in the following round, the second player has defected, but nevertheless is in good standing, clearly an impossibility. We shall only consider the states where the first player’s move has been answered by a move of the second player.) We denote the remaining states \((Cg, Cg)\), \((Cg, Db)\), \((Dg, Cg)\), \((Dg, Db)\), \((Db, Cg)\) and \((Db, Dg)\) by 1 to 6 (in this order), and consider stochastic strategies of the form \(q = (q_1, ..., q_6)\). If a \(q\)-player meets a \(q'\)-player, the transition matrix is given by

\[
T = \begin{bmatrix}
q_1q'_1 & q_1(1-q'_1) & 0 & 0 & (1-q_1)q'_2 & (1-q_1)(1-q'_2) \\
q_2q'_2 & q_2(1-q'_2) & (1-q_2)q'_6 & (1-q_2)(1-q'_6) & 0 & 0 \\
q_3q'_3 & q_3(1-q'_3) & 0 & 0 & (1-q_3)q'_2 & (1-q_3)(1-q'_2) \\
q_4q'_4 & q_4(1-q'_4) & (1-q_4)q'_6 & (1-q_4)(1-q'_6) & 0 & 0 \\
q_5q'_5 & q_5(1-q'_5) & 0 & 0 & (1-q_5)q'_2 & (1-q_5)(1-q'_2) \\
q_6q'_6 & q_6(1-q'_6) & 0 & 0 & (1-q_6)q'_4 & (1-q_6)(1-q'_4)
\end{bmatrix}
\]  

(11)
If \( s \), again, denotes the stationary vector, then the payoff for the \( q \)-player is

\[
s_1R + s_2S + (s_3 + s_5)T + (s_4 + s_6)P.
\]

We note that again, \( cTFT \) is evolutionarily stable. In this case \( ALLD \) is the only other ESS. Numerical simulations (as described in the previous chapter) show that \( ALLD \) populations do not persist. All simulations settle in \( cTFT \)-like mixtures, making the alternating Prisoner’s Dilemma a favourite playground for \( cTFT \).

7 Discussion

All strategies considered in this paper can be implemented by finite automata. For the extensive theory in this field, we refer to Binmore and Samuelson (1992). One might ask whether the \( cTFT \)-strategy can be implemented by a strategy uniquely based on a finite (but possibly very long) memory of the moves of the two players, and not using the notion of standing. This however is not the case. If, for instance, a sequence of alternating defections occurs, only the player that started to defect will have a bad standing. The next move is not specified by a finite memory of previous moves in case the initial defection happened prior to the memorised moves.

The concept of a ‘standing’ introduces an interesting new twist to the theory of iterated games played by finite automata. The most immediate step, there, is certainly to study decision rules based on the outcome of the previous round, and the most immediate extension is to consider rules based on two, three or more previous rounds. Both Axelrod (1987) and Lindgren (1991) have studied by means of genetic algorithms the evolution of strategies with memory two or three. In particular, Lindgren has pointed out the very robust success of a class of memory-two strategies which usually cooperate with each other and where a unilateral defection (due to a mistake in implementation) entails two rounds of mutual defections (a kind of domestic row) before bilateral cooperation is resumed. Such strategies are similar to \( PAVLOV \), but use the outcome of the last two rounds.

\( cTFT \) and \( REMORSE \) are of a different nature. They only depend on the outcome of the previous round, but this outcome, now, is more complex: it does not consist only on the actions \( C \) or \( D \) of the two players, but on the standing – good or bad – after a defection. The rules for determining this standing seem quite natural: we can identify with a player who feels bad after having committed erroneously a defection, or who feels provoked by the unilateral defection of the co-player after a string of mutual cooperation. The rules embody a certain notion of ‘fairness’ which seems to be rather common. If it should indeed turn out that this notion is a human universal, we would have to explain how it emerged.

In principle, one could apply other rules of ‘standing’. To start with, we should replace this term by a more neutral one, in order not to get trapped by its connotations, and think only of an arbitrary ‘tagging’ of the states \( C \) or \( D \), without specifying which is ‘good’ or ‘bad’. A strategy now is specified by the probability to cooperate and/or change the standing in the next round, depending on the current state (including the current standing) of both opponents. It is plausible that we can obtain some evolutionarily stable strategies for many such codes.

Here is, as an intriguing example, the strategy \( Prudent-PAVLOV \) (\( pPAVLOV \)). This strategy follows in most cases the \( PAVLOV \)-strategy, as the name suggests. However, after any defection it will only resume cooperation after two rounds of mutual defection. This is achieved by normally playing defections with standing \( D_1 \), and only playing \( D_0 \) after a mutual defection or an erroneous defection. Suppose that two \( pPAVLOV \)s are
engaged in a match. They usually both cooperate. If one defects by mistake, the state is $(C, D_0)$. In the next round, the state is $(D_1, D_1)$; in the second-next round, it is $(D_0, D_0)$, and hereafter mutual cooperation is resumed. This strategy, which depends only on the previous round, acts to all purposes like Lindgren’s (1991) memory two strategy. An erroneous defection against its like entails two rounds of mutual defection, and then leads back to mutual cooperation. An AllC-opponent will be exploited ruthlessly; but against an AllD opponent, $pPAVLOV$ will be suckered every third round. It is easy to see (cf. Fig.8) that this strategy is an ESS whenever

$$R + wR + w^2R > T + wP + w^2P$$

and numerical simulations show that it attracts very well.

Moreover, $pPAVLOV$ has the big advantage to be immune to errors in perception, as can be seen from the following table, which shows the evolution first from my (erroneous) point of view (first row: my moves, including my standing; second row: my opponents moves) and then from my co-player’s point of view (third row: my moves; fourth row: his moves, including his standing). The mistake occurs in the second round (indicated by the asterisk).
This is what happens if one of the $pPAVLOV$-players mis-interprets the other player’s $C$ for a $D$. Something similar happens if he mis-interprets his own $C$ for a $D$ (a less likely, but not completely impossible occurrence).

Altogether, we can interpret $pPAVLOV$ as a sophisticated offspring of $PAVLOV$.

An interesting point about this strategy is that it distinguishes between $D_0$ and $D_1$ only for the own defections, but not for the other player’s defection. We can view the ‘tagging’ by 0 or 1 as an internal action. The $pPAVLOV$ strategy does not monitor the standing of the adversary. This seems simpler than strategies like cTFT or REMORSE, which also keep track of the other fellows standing.

It seems highly plausible that there exists a wide variety of workable ‘taggings’ which yield interesting ESS’s. The question is whether an evolution based on mutation and selection would tend to lead to one form of ‘tagging’ rather than another. This could ultimately shed light on why humans developed a sense of fairness, feelings of guilt, and highly effective social norms (see also Sugden (1986) and Young (1993) on the evolution of conventions). The sheer combinatorial complexity of encompassing all conceivable codes, or ‘tags’, is enormous, and the costs (in fitness) for reckoning with these ‘tags’ seem difficult to evaluate. But it is a tempting problem.

References


