

**Towards the ‘Greater West’ or a ‘Post-Western World’?
International Institutions, Integration and Confrontation in
India’s and Brazil’s foreign policy strategy**

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von

Oliver Stuenkel

aus

Düsseldorf

1. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Dirk Messner
2. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Tobias Debiel

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मेरी पी एच डी मेरे माता पिता को समर्पित है | (dedicated to my mother and my father)

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Introduction

All stable societies have to find some agreed process and procedure by which moral conflicts can be adjudicated and managed, if not resolved. Within world politics, the challenge is still more daunting given the diversity and divisiveness of sentiments, attachments, languages, cultures, ways-of-living, combined with the massive inequalities of power, wealth and capacity. A global moral community in which claims about justice can both secure authority and be genuinely accessible to a broad swathe of humanity will be one that is built around some minimal notion of just process, that prioritizes institutions that embed procedural fairness, and that cultivates the shares political culture and the habits of argumentation and deliberation on which such institutions necessarily depend.¹

— Andrew Hurrell, *The State of International Society*

1. A DILEMMA IN MONTEVIDEO

In 2004 I worked as a researcher at the Mercosur Secretariat in Montevideo. I was part of an informal group of young scholars who periodically gathered to explore the possibility of creating an integrated foreign policy for Mercosur, the common market of the Southern Cone. At the time, Mercosur consisted of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay²; and from the South American point of view, its internal power asymmetries posed a dilemma. The essence of the problem was that Brazil dwarfed the other member states. Would Mercosur become a launching pad for Brazil's bid to become a global power? Or a mutually beneficial, EU-like political structure capable of containing its largest member?

This dilemma pointed to a larger question. Would a rising Brazil align itself with the 'West'? Or would it pursue a more independent strategy, and confront the system established by the rich Western nations? Events in 2004, during my time at the Secretariat, proved inconclusive. On the one hand, Brazil pursued a strategy of alignment by leading the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti. On the other hand, President Lula positioned himself as a champion of the poor, adopted what Paulo Roberto de Almeida calls an "evident anti-hegemonic leaning"³, and used a confrontational rhetoric which allied Brazil with the Third World.⁴ In short, Brazil seemed to employ a mix of both integration and confrontation.

¹ Hurrell, Andrew (2006). *The State of International Society*. In: Richard Little and John Williams (eds.) *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006. 191-215

² See, for example: Hirst, Mônica (2005). *The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet Expectations*. New York: Routledge, 2005. Venezuela joined Mercosur in 2006; the Paraguayan Senate has yet to approve Venezuela's entry.

³ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). *Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process*, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

⁴ Juan de Onis notes that "historically, politically and culturally, Brazil is part of the West (...) but in the era of globalization, it has shifted to a more independent position". de Onis, Juan (2008). *Brazil's Big Moment*. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, Issue 6, pp. 110-122, Nov/Dec 2008

I left Montevideo for Harvard in 2005. At the Kennedy School of Government, I studied rising powers for two years, focusing on the countries at the fringes of the international institutions - countries like Brazil and India, where I spent several months in 2006 and 2007 to conduct research. Since then, my research has focused increasingly on the question of whether India and Brazil would choose a course of confrontation, or if they would align with the West.⁵

Brazil's and India's behavior during and immediately after the Cold War has been the subject of numerous insightful studies.⁶ But in more recent years, both countries have undergone such fundamental transformations that we know relatively little about their newfound positions. In 2003, Raja Mohan wrote that “[India] has begun to move towards a new set of assumptions about the nature of its interaction with the world.”⁷ Despite their growing importance, relatively little has been written about Brazil's and India's place in the *twenty-first* century, since many studies focus on China.⁸ In addition, there are still surprisingly few international relations specialists from Brazil.⁹ Studying Brazil's and India's more recent past is therefore of particular interest, especially because both countries' strategic actions could have important consequences for the system as a whole.

So how do rising powers on the periphery of both international institutions and the global distribution of power - countries which seek to change their position in the present context of the internationalization of authority - behave, react and construct a discourse?¹⁰ When trying to resolve this dilemma, liberal institutionalist theorists argue that the rising powers' domestic political system matters. They predict that democracies are more likely to engage in international institutions than non-democratic regimes.¹¹ They expect democratically organized rising powers to become “responsible stakeholders”¹², adapt to the

⁵ Put differently, Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber asked in 2007: “What will be the relationship between these rising powers and an international system still governed by “Western” conceptions of order and based on the primacy of post-World War II U.S.-sponsored rules, drawn from liberal models of capitalism and democracy?” (Barma, Naazneen, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber (2007). *A World Without the West*, *The National Interest*, Number 90, Jul./Aug. 2007)

Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Relations in Brasília, categorizes countries into “normal” and “confrontational” and identifies Brazil as one of the latter. (*Desafios brasileiros na era dos gigantes*. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2006)

⁶ See, for example: Spektor, Matias (2009). *Kissinger e o Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria da Travessa, 2009

⁷ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

⁸ Messner, Dirk and John Humphrey (2006). *China and India in the Global Governance Arena*. Conference Paper. Seventh Annual Global Development Conference: At the Nexus of Global Chance. Pre-Conference Workshop on Asian and Other Drivers of Global Chance. January 18-19, 2006

⁹ Da Cruz, José A. (2005). Review: Brazil's International Relations at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century. *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Spring, 2005), pp. 115-122. Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul argue that the search for major power status and significant role in the international system dominates India's foreign policy making. In: Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul. (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

¹⁰ Herz, Mônica (2007). *New Directions in Brazilian Foreign Relations*. Brazil Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 28, 2007

¹¹ Doyle, Michael (1997). *Ways of War and Peace. Realism, Liberalism and Socialism*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997

¹² Stephens, Philip (2010). *Rising Powers do not want to play by the west's rules*. *Financial Times*, May 20, 2010

existing norms and align with the status quo, the Western-dominated system of liberal internationalism. Specifically, liberals argue that establishing trust between liberal democracies is easier, and that they tend to seek international collaboration to create a more transparent, predictable and stable system, thus maximizing the gains of international collaboration.¹³

Furthermore, there is a systemic liberal institutionalist argument about why rising powers are likely to integrate: They face a Western-centered system that is, as Ikenberry stresses, “open [...] and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations,¹⁴ a force that will enmesh and entrap even the most powerful.”¹⁵ The Western order, which Roosevelt had conceived to “ensure the end of beginning of wars”¹⁶, is “hard to overturn and easy to join.”¹⁷ Emerging actors encounter an environment in which they will be able to rise—a characteristic we shall call ‘intra-institutional mobility’. By seeking to limit other states’ influence in international institutions (“soft balancing”), both liberal and non-liberal states have the luxury of avoiding traditional power balancing, which involves increasing military strength.¹⁸ Finally, due to unprecedented economic interdependence through trade, investment and commercial flows with others, non-established rising powers will seek to strengthen global governance to maintain economic stability.¹⁹

Those in the realist camp, on the other hand, understand the system according to the distribution of power²⁰ and predict that the rising powers will not “play by the West’s rules.”²¹ They generally expect rising powers to use their “newfound status to pursue alternative visions of world order”²² and challenge the status quo, for example by joining hands with other rising powers and mounting a counter-hegemonic coalition.²³ Rising powers

¹³ Ikenberry, G. John (2008). *The Rise of China and the Future of the West*. Foreign Affairs; Jan/Feb2008, Vol. 87 Issue 1, pp. 23-37. In addition, Nolte argues that middle powers (such as Brazil and India) favor a multilateral and cooperative approach, articulating a preference for international institutions to assert their interests in the region and the global level. In: Detlef Nolte (2007). *How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics*, Paper prepared for delivery at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Helsinki 7 - 12 May 2007

¹⁴ Ikenberry, G. John (2008). *The Rise of China and the Future of the West*. Foreign Affairs; Jan/Feb2008, Vol. 87 Issue 1, p23-37,

¹⁵ Hurrell, Andrew (2006). *Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers?* International Affairs, Volume 82, Number 1, January 2006, pp. 1-19(19)

¹⁶ Rubinfeld, Jed (2003). *The Two World Orders, The Wilson Quarterly (1976-), Vol. 27, No. 4 (Autumn, 2003), pp. 22-36*

¹⁷ Ikenberry, G. John (2008). *The Rise of China and the Future of the West*. Foreign Affairs; Jan/Feb2008, Vol. 87 Issue 1, p23-37

¹⁸ Ikenberry, G. John (1999). *Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order*. In Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

¹⁹ Friedman, Thomas L (2000). *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000

²⁰ Modern scholars measure “critical mass” (population and territory), economic capability (GNP), and military capability as objective determinants of power, to which they sometimes add force postures, “strategic purpose”, and “national will”, which are less objective. (Doyle, Michael (1997). *Ways of War and Peace. Realism, Liberalism and Socialism*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997)

²¹ Stephens, Philip (2010). *Rising Powers do not want to play by the west’s rules*. Financial Times, May 20, 2010

²² Narlikar, Amrita (2006). *Bargaining for a Rise*. Internationale Politik, 2006

²³ Sikri, Rajiv (2007). *India’s Foreign Policy Priorities over the Coming Decade*. Opinion Asia, 2007
Guimarães distinguishes between “normal” and “confrontational” states, categorizing Brazil as one of

could create a parallel system with, as Weber puts it, “its own distinctive set of rules, institutions, and currencies of power, rejecting key tenets of liberal internationalism and particularly any notion of global civil society justifying political or military intervention.”²⁴ In the same way, Krasner expects that once the balance of power moves against the West, emerging powers will create different principles²⁵, for example by introducing countervailing power against the U.S.-led Bretton Woods institutions.²⁶

In sum, liberals’ and realists’ arguments dominate how to think about rising powers’ options. Yet, India and Brazil seem to defy theoretical pigeon-holing. Both countries have made integrative moves. For example, they have both turned into IMF lenders, overcoming strong domestic anti-Western sentiment.²⁷ But there has been plenty of evidence over the past decade that Brazil and India are by no means keen on aligning with all of today’s principal institutions. India, for instance, was the only liberal democracy in the world that fundamentally stood apart from (and often against) the West during the Cold War.²⁸ India refuses to sign the NPT, Brazil rejects any additional inspection provisions, and Brazil and India are among the WTO members who most frequently file complaints at the WTO.²⁹ India has, Nayar and Paul write, “serious disagreements with several international-order norms promoted by the status quo powers.”³⁰ Yet the two major theories fail to explain the dilemma in a satisfactory manner. The debate is limited because the terms are not defined, but more importantly, because we struggle to understand and categorize the world properly. Only once we have gained a better understanding of the international system, created a meaningful category for the actors in question, and clarified their options, can we determine to what extent the rising nations located on the fringes of today’s global institutions will confront or align with the West. This is the goal of my dissertation.

2. SEARCHING FOR A CATEGORY

In this context, many scholars seek to find a categorical way of understanding the rising nations and the system in which they operate; so far, no one has succeeded in doing so

the latter. (Guimarães, Samuel Pinheiro (2006). *Desafios brasileiros na era dos gigantes*. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2006)

²⁴ Barma, Nazneen, Ely Ratner and Steve Weber (2007). *A World Without the West*. National Interest, 2007. The authors identify a “third way” between alignment and confrontation, yet their scenario contains many elements of confrontation, as it is hardly possible to simply “ignore” the Western-dominated system without causing considerable friction.

²⁵ Krasner, Stephen D. (1985). *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985

²⁶ Messner, Dirk and John Humphrey (2006). *China and India in the Global Governance Arena*. Conference Paper. Seventh Annual Global Development Conference: At the Nexus of Global Chance. Pre-Conference Workshop on Asian and Other Drivers of Global Chance. January 18-19, 2006

²⁷ Weinlich, Silke (2010). *Die Reform der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Vereinten Nationen: Eine Analyse des Verhaltens und der Positionierung wichtiger Staaten gegenüber Reformoptionen*. Discussion Paper, German Development Institute (GDI), 2010

²⁸ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

²⁹ Narlikar, Amrita (2006). *Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation: Explaining the Negotiation Strategy of a Rising India*, *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1, January 2006, pp. 77-94.

³⁰ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

conclusively. This challenge is not unprecedented. At fairly regular intervals, scholars and policy makers attempt to distinguish between countries according to categories, blocs and groups organized along different variables. In 1946, Winston Churchill successfully established such a new concept when he introduced the idea of an ‘Iron Curtain’, using ideology as the organizing principle. Six years later, Alfred Sauvy, building on the two worlds Churchill had devised, coined the term ‘Third World’ and established a concept that helped human beings across the world understand and analyze the international system.³¹

Today these models are no longer meaningful, and so naturally there have been many proposals since the turn of the century about how to reconceptualize geopolitical reality. Around the turn of the century, many scholars of international politics began to focus on the impact China’s rise would have on the global order. John Ikenberry theorized about what China’s rise would mean for the West³², John Mearsheimer predicted “China’s unpeaceful rise”³³, and Martin Jacques foresaw “the rise of the Middle Kingdom and the end of the Western World.”³⁴ Parag Khanna and Paul Kennedy argued that it is not only the three dominant powers that will shape the global order in the coming decades, but also the so-called “Second World”, composed of the rising “pivotal” actors located on the fringes of the global institutions - such as South Africa, Turkey, Mexico, India and Brazil.³⁵ In the same context, Fareed Zakaria and Kishore Mahbubani predict the “Post-American World”³⁶ and the “rise of the rest”³⁷, expecting that the rise of new actors will have systemic consequences.³⁸

In 2001, Jim O’Neill, head of global economic research at Goldman Sachs, sought to create a category for the large, fast-growing developing countries that he thought could symbolize the current global economic transformation.

An economist by training, O’Neill did not take any political aspects into account, and devised the group purely based on economic indicators. After initially selecting Brazil, India, China, Russia, Mexico and South Korea, he eventually excluded the latter two because they were no longer developing countries. The resulting group, Brazil, Russia, India and China, or

³¹ Sanders, Doug (2010). Brazil and Turkey rush to the middle. *The Globe and Mail*. May 22, 2010

³² Ikenberry, G. John (2008). The Rise of China and the Future of the West, *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb2008, Vol. 87 Issue 1, p23-37

³³ Mearsheimer, John J. (2006). China’s Unpeaceful Rise. *Current History*; Apr 2006; 105, 690. For different theoretical approaches towards China’s rise, see: Walt, Stephen (1998). One world, many theories. *Foreign Policy*, Iss. 110; pg. 29, 1998

³⁴ Jacques, Martin (2009). *When China rules the World*. London: Penguin Group, 2009

³⁵ Chase, Robert, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy (1999). *The pivotal states: a new framework for US foreign policy in the developing world, 1999*. See also: Khanna, Parag (2008). *The Second World: Empires and Influence in the new global order*. New York: Random House, 2008.

³⁶ Mahbubani, Kishore (2008). *The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East*. New York: Public Affairs, 2008. See also: Zakaria, Fareed. *The Post-American World*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008

³⁷ Zakaria, Fareed (2008). *The Post-American World*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008

³⁸ This search is by no means confined to academics alone. John McCain, US Presidential candidate in 2008, sought to create a ‘League of Democracies’, and Charles Kupchan, member of the first Clinton administration, proposed the ‘Atlantic Union’ by fusing the EU and NATO, both of which would have redrawn the way we think of the world. (Kupchan, Charles A. Reviving the West. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1996), pp. 92-104)

BRIC was, as a consequence, very heterogeneous.³⁹ Some examples make this clear. While Brazil and India are democracies, Russia and China are non-democratic regimes. Russia and Brazil are raw material exporters, India and China import them. Brazil is non-nuclear, while the other three possess nuclear weapons, and India is a non-signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Furthermore, China and Russia are permanent members of the UN Security Council, while India and Brazil are still outside.

Initially, BRIC's impact was limited to the financial world in the same manner as the 'Asian tigers' label that had been popular in the 1990s. Banks offered 'BRIC investment models' to the customers who were willing to invest in emerging markets. In 2003, however, Goldman Sachs published the report 'Dreaming with the BRICs: The Path to 2050'. It predicted that by 2050, the BRIC economies would be larger in U.S. dollar terms than the G-6, which consists of the U.S., Germany, Japan, the U.K., France and Italy.⁴⁰ Not only was the impact immediate, but it also surpassed the limits of the financial world and became a buzzword in international politics.⁴¹ The French Prime Minister Védérine's characterization of the United States as a "hyper power", made in the run-up to the Iraq War, suddenly seemed anachronistic. The United States had invaded Iraq but its struggle there exposed the limits of its power, proving Joseph Nye's point that America "can't go it alone".⁴²

Overnight, the BRICs turned into a household name among international policy makers, analysts and academics. In 2010 political and economic observers pointed out that, while the West had plunged into the worst economic recession since the 1930s, the BRICs had in fact "decoupled" from the West economically⁴³, and contributed 36.6% of global growth (purchasing power parity) during the first decade of the century,⁴⁴ calling it the 'BRIC Decade'. Investing in BRIC countries was suddenly considered safer than in some formerly established countries in the European Union. Brazilian, Russian and Indian officials admitted that Goldman Sachs had done them an invaluable marketing favor, and put them at a great advantage relative to other emerging economies such as Indonesia or Turkey.

The newly found category had political implications, too. Brazil's, India's, Russia's and China's heads of state and government had begun to refer to themselves as "BRIC members" and agreed that they needed to strengthen "intra-BRIC" ties.⁴⁵ President Lula and Dimitry Medvedev referred to the BRICs as if it were some kind of strategic alliance. This development culminated in 2008, when Russia invited Brazil's, India's and China's foreign ministers to talks, where they formalized the BRIC summit to strengthen their international

³⁹ Hurrell, Andrew (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global power: What space for would-be great powers?, *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1. January 24, 2006

⁴⁰ Wilson, Dominic. Purushothaman, Rooter (2003). *Dreaming with BRICs: The path to 2050*. Goldman Sachs, 2003

⁴¹ Cheng, Hui Fang, Margarida Gutierrez, Arvind Mahajan, Yochanan Shachmurove, Manuchehr Shahrokhi (2007). A future global economy to be built by BRICs. *Global Finance Journal* 18, 2007, 143-157

⁴² Nye, Joseph (2002). *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002

⁴³ The Economist Correspondent (2009). Not just straw men. The biggest emerging economies are rebounding, even without recovery in the West. June 18, 2009

⁴⁴ Wilson, Dominic, Alex L. Kelston, Swarnali Ahmed (2010). Is this the BRICs decade? Issue No 10 /3, Goldman Sachs, May 20, 2010

⁴⁵ da Silva, Luiz Inácio (2008). Building on the B in BRIC, *The Economist*, November 19, 2008

weight.⁴⁶ In 2009 Brazil's President Lula, Russia's President Dimitry Medvedev, India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and China's President Hu Jintao met for a BRIC summit in St. Petersburg. A second BRIC summit followed in April 2010 in Brasília.

How was it possible that this group had developed seemingly strong ties, a group which had never before considered forming a club? And, did the creation of the BRIC category facilitate our understanding of global politics, or did it complicate things?

The unprecedented reaction to his category in the global media and academia showed that scholars and investors are not the only ones who search for a category that can capture reality. Heads of state longed for a meaningful way to understand the world as well. They had essentially met in St. Petersburg to "try out" the category O'Neill had devised for them. Rather than pointing to their enthusiasm for summitry, their behavior indicated their strong desire to comprehend which category they themselves belonged to. The strong reaction also showed that O'Neill had identified a group of countries whose significance others had understood, yet failed to frame and delineate properly. At the conference in Brasília in April 2010, I debated this phenomenon with other scholars from the BRIC countries. We agreed that there was more that tied the BRIC countries together than merely low per capita income, economic growth, and a large population. In fact, what seemed to become obvious during the summit was that what most unified its members was a common interest in changing the way the world was run.⁴⁷

After initial optimism during negotiations and grand announcements about a 'new world order', the BRIC members realized that their positions were too far apart to agree on any specific measures⁴⁸ and that the BRIC summit would probably never turn into a unified institution. The BRICs' discontent with the system and claim for a greater say, their revisionist and confrontational rhetoric, the vagueness about what should be changed and their eventually reluctant acknowledgement that the system is fundamentally sound showed that reality is more complicated than fiction, and that O'Neill's category was too broad to be meaningful. The same applies to other groupings such as the 'Big Ten'⁴⁹, G20, L20, P21 (proposed by Klaus Schwab),⁵⁰ BRICSAM (BRICs, South Africa and Mexico), BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China), 'E-7' (BRICs, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey), and 'G2' (United States and China).⁵¹

⁴⁶ Sweeney, Conor (2008). BRIC to form official club. St. Petersburg Times, May 20, 2008; http://www.sptimesrussia.com/index.php?story_id=26029&action_id=2 (accessed October 15, 2009)

⁴⁷ Reuters Correspondent (2010). Emerging BRIC powers and the new world order. July 7, 2010; <http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49935720100707> (accessed August 10, 2010). Russia and China are both permanent members of the UNSC, arguably the most important international institution. But Russia is not part of the WTO, China is not part of the G8, and Brazil and India are not part of the UNSC, the G8 and India is not part of the NPT. None of the four is part of the OECD or NATO.

⁴⁸ Aside from strengthening trade and engaging in other confidence building measures.

⁴⁹ Garten, Jeffrey E. (1997). *The Big Ten: The Big Emerging Markets and How They Will Change Our Lives*. New York: Basic Books, 1997

⁵⁰ Cooper, Andrew F. and John English (2005). Introduction: Reforming the international system from the top- a Leaders' 20 Summit. In: English, John, Ramesh Thakur, Andrew F. Cooper (eds.) *Reforming from the top: A Leaders' 20 Summit*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005

⁵¹ Walker, Martin (2006). India's Path to Greatness. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 30, No. 3 (Summer, 2006), pp. 22-30, 2006

3. INSTITUTIONS AS A MEANINGFUL VARIABLE

What all of these categorization schemes have in common is that they are not necessarily descriptive, but rather predictive and normative. When we pay attention to the way these categories are presented, we realize that the creators of such categories often have an interest in the fulfillment of their predictions, hoping to influence reality - unlike researchers who are not part of the matter they study. The case of the BRICs shows that all ‘members’ had an interest in belonging to the dynamic-sounding category and actively sought to turn O’Neill’s classification into reality.⁵² The incident thus serves as a warning that it is nearly impossible to dispassionately divide up the world into categories. In addition, creating static categories is difficult because a nation can be described by many variables, and there are different realities depending on which variable we observe, some of which can change rapidly. Yet most groupings only capture a limited number of variables (‘economic growth’ and ‘overall size’ in the case of the BRICs). To create more meaningful categories, we need a different approach and observe countries’ behavior, rather than attributes.

Instead of looking at economic variables, political systems, or ideology, I will study how these countries relate to and negotiate with the world of international institutions. Institutions serve like a ‘world index’ that helps gauge where nations stand, because behavior towards institutions captures much more than single variables. A country’s behavior towards institutions is influenced, among other aspects, by its power, economic indicators, identity and political system. We are thus not creating categories for countries, but analyzing how countries categorize themselves through their behavior towards institutions.

When we use international institutions as our variable, we are able to make meaningful distinctions and identify a group of non-established rising powers. From this perspective, it becomes clear why the BRIC category is too inclusive. Russia and China are both nuclear weapon states recognized under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and permanent UN Security Council members with veto power since 1945.⁵³ From an institutional point of view, they have been established poles of power since then.⁵⁴ In the same way, we can also identify a group of less recognized, “second-tier” actors that are neither fully part of the West nor squarely opposed to the current global order. These countries deal with the Western World Order through embracing, abstaining from, or confronting global institutions. While scholars have traditionally focused on great powers in international

⁵² India and Brazil were honored to be included in a group with two established world powers. Russia, caught in demographic decline and increasingly autocratic, liked being categorized with three growing democracies, and China was comfortable to be part of a group that included democracies, which would deflect attention from its human rights abuses and its position as the lone challenger of the United States.

⁵³ One of the major disagreements during BRIC summits was Russia’s and China’s refusal to support India’s and Brazil’s quest for a permanent seat on the UNSC. It is precisely this episode that exemplified the major difference between Russia and China on the one hand, and Brazil and India on the other.

⁵⁴ Jackson, Robert and Georg Sørensen (2010). *Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. In the 1989, Henry Kissinger considered that the five great powers were the US, the Soviet Union, Japan, Europe and China. (Joseph Nye (1991). *Bound to lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York: Basic Books, 1991)

politics⁵⁵, John Ciorciari notes that as rising non-established players approach great power status, their strategic choices could have game-changing effects on the international system.⁵⁶ It is these ‘undecided’ countries on the fringe of the Western World Order that will, to an important degree, determine whether today’s institutions will survive fundamental power shifts between nations or not.⁵⁷

How can we best describe these countries? Using institutions as a variable, we can best describe these ‘undecided countries’ as ‘fringe countries’. ‘Fringe’ is not meant to imply isolation and randomness. Quite to the contrary, the countries in question seem very engaged, willing and ready to actively determine their position through their negotiation with the international institutions. They can do so in very diverse ways that exceed the binary options of integration and confrontation.

How these fringe nations relate to the international institutions does thus show how they relate to what we can call ‘Western World Order’.⁵⁸ Ikenberry argues that today’s order is “an international order with deep and encompassing economic and political rules and institutions that are both durable and functional.”⁵⁹ The West’s system of economic openness with social welfare protection essentially served as a template for the construction of today’s international order - the Western domestic system was externalized and applied in the international context.⁶⁰ More importantly, Western countries have played such a crucial role in the conception and maintenance of our current system⁶¹ that we can adequately describe it as “Western” (which does not mean that culturally non-Western nations cannot join, but simply makes a reference to the system’s creators.⁶²) Ikenberry points out that the order the

⁵⁵ Waltz, Kenneth (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1979

⁵⁶ Corciari, John D. (2009). What kind of power will India be? Indo-U.S. alignment and India’s Broader Foreign Policy Orientation. Panel on “Rising Powers”, ISA New York, 2009. Similarly, Khanna and Sikri argue that while they are not as powerful as the “G3” (USA, EU and China), Brazil’s and India’s rise and its importance as “swing states” is likely to be one of the defining characteristics of the international system in the new century. (Khanna, Parag (2008). *The Second World: Empires and Influence in the new global order*. Random House: 2008. See also: Sikri, Rajiv (2007). *India’s Foreign Policy Priorities over the Coming Decade*. Opinion Asia, 2007)

⁵⁷ Profound rearrangements of the global order have taken place historically via post-conflict settlements and orchestrating a rearrangement in times of peace will prove immensely complex, as power shifts usually lead to conflict. (Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001)

⁵⁸ The term ‘order’ is not free of problems. As John Hall and T.V. Paul point out, it carries normative and ideological connotations, as it bears specific conceptions about how political, social and economic systems should be structured. Order and peace to some may be perceived differently by another. (Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) Hedley Bull distinguished between ‘world order’ and ‘international order’, the latter being defined as there is a system of settled expectations. The term Western World Order used here refers to Bull’s ‘international order’. (Bull, Hedley (1997). *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1977)

⁵⁹ Ikenberry, G. John (2010). Ikenberry responds: The Rise of Asia and the West, http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2008/05/g_john_ikenberry/ (accessed May 2, 2010)

⁶⁰ Ikenberry, John G (1996). The Intertwining of Domestic and International Politics. *Polity*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Winter, 1996), pp. 293-298

⁶¹ Ikenberry, John G. and Thomas Wright (2008). *Rising Powers and Global Institutions*. Century Foundation, 2008

⁶² As Charles Maier points out, American efforts to create multilateral institutions involved, aside from idealist Wilsonian ideas, the export of New Deal thinking. In: Maier, Carles (1987) ed. *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987

West established after 1945 is very similar to the order established within Western states.⁶³ This does not imply that openness and rules are a Western invention. Amartya Sen claims that liberal democracy has multiple birthplaces, and that the West wrongly considers itself to be the founder of these principles.⁶⁴ In addition, there have been international rule-systems in several parts of the world, most notably in ancient China, India and Greece.⁶⁵ Rather than arguing that the rules on which the current world order is based have been invented by the West, I will call today's order 'Western World Order' to make a reference to the system's creators after World War II.

4. BRAZIL AND INDIA AS REPRESENTATIVE CASES

Brazil and India are representatives of a group of less recognized and less established rising 'fringe' powers - such as Turkey, South Africa, Mexico and Indonesia.⁶⁶ Neither fundamentally opposed to Western structures, nor considered fully as part of the West, they are part of the 'fringe', and understanding these countries' trajectories properly is of major importance for the future of the international order.⁶⁷ This study will focus on the category of rising fringe powers, which can be distinguished from the 'core', and countries that stand mostly apart from the Western World Order, such as North Korea or Belarus.

There are fundamental differences between Brazil and India.⁶⁸ But their similarities-liberal democratic structures and historic ties with and current ambivalence about the West-are meaningful. Furthermore, they all have large populations and strong economic growth⁶⁹,

⁶³ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of order after major wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

⁶⁴ Sen, Amartya (2006). *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*, New York: W. W. Norton, 2006

⁶⁵ Armstrong, David (2008). *The Evolution of international society*. in: Steve Smith, John Baylis, Patricia Owens. *Introduction, The Globalization of World Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008

⁶⁶ Nayar and Paul write that "India remains less integrated in the international order than most other actors (...)". In: Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. See also: Robert A. Pastor. *The Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*. In Robert A. Pastor (1999)(ed.) *A Century' Journey. How the Great Powers Shape the World*. New York: Basic Books, 1999

⁶⁷ According to E.H. Carr, the "problem of peaceful change" is one of the principal challenges in international relations (Carr, E. H (1964). *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 208–23.). In the same way, Michael Doyle argues that when the leading power begins to lose its preeminence and its followers catch up, a warlike resolution of the international pecking order becomes very likely (Doyle, Michael W. Kant, *Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs*. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer, 1983), pp. 205-235)

⁶⁸ Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

⁶⁹ Already in 1967, Samuel Huntington argued that the most distinctive feature of the last quarter of the 20th century would be the rise of powers such as Brazil and India (Turner, Frederick C. (1991). *Regional Hegemony and the Case of Brazil*. *International Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 3, *Regional Powers* (Summer, 1991), pp. 475-509). In 1988, India had an economy a third of the size of Italy's. Today, India is the fourth largest economy on a purchasing power parity basis and may overtake Japan soon, which is currently third. In a similar fashion, Brazil has shown strong growth and stability, which is expected to continue (CIA Factbook 2009). The existence of both Western and non-Western elements, their pivotal size and their growth thus make Brazil and India good case studies for this category. In a report that coined the term "BRICs", Goldman Sachs published often-cited figures for Brazil and India that relied on optimistic assumptions. (Wilson, Dominic. Purushothaman, Roota (2003). *Dreaming with*

and their decisions are bound to have system-wide implications. They have all shown interest in becoming more significant actors on the world stage.⁷⁰ Brazil's and India's leadership of the G20 developing countries, a group created to serve as a recognized interlocutor in agricultural trade negotiations, is a good example of this development - both countries assumed control and responsibility, while China held on to a more timid posture.⁷¹ The fact that they strongly differ with regard to culture and regional context helps us isolate the meaningful variables we like to focus on. Brazil is located in one of the most peaceful regions and is predominantly Christian, while India is predominantly Hindu but home to all major religions, and located in one of the most volatile regions of the world. This combination makes the study of Brazil and India compelling.

Aside from measurable similarities, they also share, to some degree, a common identity which shapes their behavior. They are ambiguous about their own identity and about their strategy towards the West.⁷² As Hurrell notes, both Brazil and India still partly understand their foreign policy through the prism of North-South relations, positioning themselves as developing countries.⁷³ Both supported conceptions of international order that challenged those of the liberal Western World Order- such as the revisionist Third Worldism in India after 1948 and in Brazil in the 1970s and 80s. India opposed the United States more often in the UN General Assembly than Cuba. As Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, a Brazilian diplomat, points out in his book *Five Hundred Years on the Periphery*, “despite the differences between Brazil and other large peripheral states, inasmuch as they share common characteristics and interests and are far away from one another, they do not have direct competitive interests and are therefore able to construct common political projects.”⁷⁴ On the other hand, both Brazil and India have also supported the United States at times. In addition,

BRICs: The path to 2050. Goldman Sachs, 2003. Goldman Sachs has altered its forecast to reflect the current economic crisis, but general trends remain.

⁷⁰ Brazil and India are the only two large “continental powers” that are not represented in the United Nations Security Council. (Kennan, George, F. *Around the Cragged Hill. A Personal and Political Philosophy*. W.W. Norton & Company, 1993). Furthermore, in both Brazil and India, there is a strong sense of exceptionalism and entitlement to a larger role in international politics. (Lafer, Celso (2001). *A Identidade Internacional do Brasil e a política Externa Brasileira*. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2001. See also: Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)

⁷¹ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). *Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process*, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

⁷² Raja Mohan, an Indian scholar, argues that India is in fact part of the West, while Western scholars such as Andrew Hurrell place it on the fringes of the Greater West (Mohan, Raja C (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's new Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 and Hurrell, Andrew (2006). *Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers?* *International Affairs*, Volume 82, Number 1, January 2006, pp. 1-19(19)). In a similar fashion, while Western scholars sometimes see Brazil on the fringes of the West (e.g. Huntington), Brazilian scholars oftentimes see Brazil as part of the West. José Guilherme Merquior, for example, referred to Brazil as the ‘Other West’: poorer, more enigmatic, more problematic, but not less Western” (Merquior, José Guilherme. *El Otro Occidente*, in Arocena, Felipe. *El Complejo de Prospero- Ensayos sobre Cultura, Modernidad y Modernización en America Latina*, 1993)

⁷³ Hurrell, Andrew (2006). *Hegemony, liberalism, and global order: What space for would-be great powers?* *International Affairs*, Volume 82, Number 1, January 2006, pp. 1-19(19)

⁷⁴ Guimarães, Samuel Pinheiro (1999). *Quinhentos Anos de Periferia*. Porto Alegre: Contraponto, 1999. In: Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni. *Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification*. *Third World Quarterly*, 28:7, 1309 - 1326

both countries are democracies and not ideologically predisposed against Western-style institutions. But realism and liberalism, both rational choice theories, do not account for intangible aspects such as identity and ideology.

We can therefore not entirely rely on rational choice theories, but need to include social constructivist interpretations. Social constructivists argue that liberalist institutionalism and particularly realism are ‘materialist’ theories that focus too much on military and economic power, and that ideas, beliefs and identity strongly impact states’ behavior. Rather than focusing entirely on rationalism, constructivism emphasizes the social and relational construction of what states are and what they seek, and what social meaning is attached to objects or practices.⁷⁵ As mentioned above, identity plays an important role in the context of Brazil’s and India’s foreign policy. For example, as Hurrell points out, a certain ambiguity remains about whether Brazil’s and India’s language of Third Worldism and southern solidarity is simply a rhetorical remnant of the past, interest-driven strategy or a reflection of a deeper set of beliefs. If it is the latter, “what happens if the ‘developing country identity’ conflicts with the aspiring ‘great power identity’?”⁷⁶ Their fringe status puts Brazil and India in a position where they can, in principle, choose between aligning with and confronting the Greater West. The creation of IBSA in 2003, a forum for dialogue established by India, Brazil and South Africa, is a case in point. The three have mutually identified themselves as similar to a degree that justifies the creation of a forum that is gaining political importance. Yet, as several observers have noted, their economic and political interests strongly diverge.⁷⁷

For example, while Brazil wants to liberalize trade, India is decidedly more protectionist.⁷⁸ IBSA seems to be at least partly motivated not only by their similar geopolitical positions as emerging nations on the periphery of the West and their willingness to assume regional leadership, but also by their shared belief that the established institutions of global governance fail to reflect their newfound importance.⁷⁹ There is little else that would justify their coalition. While it is the main purpose of this study to prove that liberal institutionalism can explain reality, I will consider and use constructivist approaches complementarily.⁸⁰ As Ian Hurd points out, there is no reason why the study of international

⁷⁵ Hurd, Ian (2008). Constructivism. in: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

⁷⁶ Hurrell, Andrew (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global power: What space for would-be great powers? *International Affairs*, Volume 82, Number 1, January 2006, pp. 1-19(19)

⁷⁷ Armijo, Leslie Elliott (2007). The BRICs Countries as Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight? *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2007

⁷⁸ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

⁷⁹ Alden, Chris and Marco Antonio Vieira (2005). The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and Trilateralism. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 7 (2005), pp. 1077-1095

⁸⁰ I recognize the importance of constructivist ideas, but I argue that it is insufficient as constructivism does not fully explain how identity and beliefs are the result of some measurable variable, such as economic or military power. For example, India’s belief that it is a great power can be explained by its continental size and hegemonic presence in the Indo-centric South Asia region, and a long nationalist struggle. See, for example: Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul. *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. For a comprehensive critique of constructivism, see: Jervis, R. *Realism in the Study of World Politics*. *International Organization*, 52-4, 1998

norms by constructivists is inherently mutually exclusive with the study of strategic behavior.⁸¹

Realists, liberalists and constructivists make meaningful contributions when trying to explain what rising powers will do. This study argues that liberal theory can, in combination with constructivist approaches, fully account for rising fringe countries' behavior. Yet, the way we discuss these questions shows that we have a limited understanding of rising powers' options. Brazil's and India's foreign policy strategies do not fit well into any categories⁸² because the terms of realists', liberals' and constructivists' disagreement remain undefined. First, how do we define the West, who exactly is "the rest", and how do we judge in which category countries belong? Second, through what means do countries "confront" and "integrate"? And third, what are their options as they do so? Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber argue that "the future of world politics is either systemic conflict or eventual assimilation".⁸³ But a superficial analysis of Brazil's and India's foreign policy shows that their options are certainly more nuanced than the binary choice between integration and confrontation. In order to understand those options, we must first understand what confrontation and integration really mean, and how they relate to other concepts, such as alignment, competition, and neutrality. Is neutrality even an option?⁸⁴ Only once have we successfully answered these questions and established a new paradigm we can analyze specific countries, adequately describe their foreign policy behavior towards international institutions, and understand whether liberalist theory explains the strategy of Brazil and India.

5. OUTLINE

In my dissertation I therefore aim to do five things. First, I study several definitions of how we can define the West (1.1.). I seek to show that traditional definitions of the West are insufficient and do not stand up to rigorous analysis, and that rather than defining what the West is, we need to observe its practical consequences. The best way to capture the West and understand how nations make use of it is by looking at international institutions (1.2.) Given the West's fundamental role in their creation, we can call the order they establish the 'Western World Order'. This concept is 'post-ideological and transcends cultural, civilizational and historic dimensions. But more fundamentally it is the procedures–representation, rules, membership, social mobility, fairness, reciprocity, democracy and economic interdependency and their constitution-like character- that undergirds these

⁸¹ Hurd, Ian (2008). Constructivism. In: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

⁸² Hurrell, Andrew and Narlikar, Amrita (2006). A New Politics of Confrontation? Brazil and India in Multilateral Trade Negotiations. *Global Society*, Vol. 20, Issue 4, 2006. See also: Almeida, Paulo Roberto "O Brasil no Novo Cenário Global: Transformações no Jogo Diplomático Contemporâneo" *Revista Intellector*, 2008

⁸³ Barma, Naazneen, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber (2007). A World Without the West, *The National Interest*, Number 90, Jul./Aug. 2007

⁸⁴ Barma, Naazneen, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber (2007). A World Without the West, *The National Interest*, Number 90, Jul./Aug. 2007

institutions.⁸⁵ I define countries that are partially integrated into the Western World Order as “fringe countries”, a category that includes Brazil and India (1.3). Secondly, I provide some theoretical background on the liberal perspective on democracies and international institutions, and on the international system itself. Here, I show why liberal theory expects fringe countries to collaborate and seek integration into the Western World Order (1.4.). Thirdly, I establish specific categories that allow us to clarify rising powers’ options, such as unconditional integration, revisionist integration, issue-based confrontation and systemic confrontation. I will use these categories as a working paradigm for the analysis (1.5.). Fourthly, I give a general overview over both Brazil’s and India’s relations to institutions which allows me to test whether liberalism can explain Brazil’s and India’s behavior towards international institutions (2.1. and 2.2.). For the cases in which liberalism fails to explain their behavior, I will, with the help of constructivist theory, develop a hypothesis in order to find alternative explanations. Finally, in section 3, I analyze three case studies to test the hypothesis and to explain deviations. These case studies have been chosen for two reasons. First of all, the UN Security Council, Bretton Woods and the NPT are arguably among the three strategically most significant institutions. Secondly, the overview in Part 2 shows that Brazil’s and India’s behavior towards these three institutions is highly complex, providing additional insight. This is particularly the case regarding the NPT, where both countries show more confrontational behavior.

6. HYPOTHESIS

Aside from studying rising non-established powers, this work is essentially about the durability of international institutions.⁸⁶ Contrary to the frequent assertions that non-established rising powers such as Brazil and India are “revisionist”⁸⁷, the thesis is that Kantian liberal theory, which predicts that democracies will seek international collaboration, and liberal institutionalism, which points to the benefits new entrants receive, can fully account for Brazil’s and India’s strategy towards today’s international institutions that constitute the Western World Order.⁸⁸ This always holds true except if the rising power in question considers the order a particular international institution establishes as highly unjust, void of ‘intra-institutional mobility’ and impossible to fix. We therefore need to revert to constructivist theory to explain the exception in a satisfactory manner. Rising powers will therefore integrate and rise within the system, creating a ‘Greater West’ rather than a ‘Post-

⁸⁵ Ikenberry, G. John (1999). Liberal hegemony. In: T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

⁸⁶ While I take into account one domestic factor, namely liberal democracy, this study provides a largely international system-level analysis. This approach has its critics. Yet I exclude most other domestic factors to keep the number of variables as low as possible and achieve meaningful results.

⁸⁷ A former Indian foreign minister argued that “our size, our potential strength, our traditions and heritage do not allow us to become a client state.” *Times of India*, June 17, 1976. In: Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall (1999, eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

⁸⁸ Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall (1999, eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

Western World'.⁸⁹ Contrary to realist thought, institutions do not fundamentally change as the distribution of power between states changes.⁹⁰ This hypothesis excludes any explanations about non-democratic regimes' behavior and about international institutions' impact on domestic politics, such as democratization.⁹¹

7. PERIOD OF ANALYSIS

As mentioned above, there is a particular necessity to further explore Brazil's and India's position in the world in the context of their most recent transformation. I will therefore analyze Brazil's and India's policy towards international institutions from 2003 to 2010, a period that Dominic Wilson called the "BRICs Decade".⁹² There are several reasons why 2003 was significant, and why it is a useful start for our period of analysis.

In 2003, Dominic Wilson and Roota Purushothaman published their Goldman Sachs research paper "Dreaming with the BRICs: The Path to 2050". While Jim O'Neill had created the term in 2001, it was this particular report that initiated what we can now call the 'decade of the BRICs'. The report contributed to a vast and surprising increase in global interest in emerging powers.

Also in 2003, Jacques Chirac became the first Western leader to announce that the G8 was no longer inclusive, lacked legitimacy and therefore "needed to 'hear from those that represent a growing proportion of international economic activity or population'".⁹³ Accordingly, he invited the leaders of several emerging powers, including Brazil and India, to Evian, where the summit was held. It would be the end of exclusive, Western-dominated G8 summits and the beginning of growing inclusiveness, culminating in the G8+5 process which sought to institutionalize the participation of non-established actors such as Brazil and India.

In the same year, Luiz Inácio da Silva assumed the Presidency in Brazil. While there is no consensus in how far Lula's foreign policy constituted a continuation of, or a rupture with, his predecessor's foreign policy⁹⁴, it is accepted that he promoted a more active foreign policy that increased Brazil's visibility in the world, causing an intense debate about what Brazil's role in the world should be.⁹⁵ Lula envisioned, like no President before him, a more

⁸⁹ This will occur in rising states' best interest. The incentive to join institution will increase as problems are ever more difficult to solve without collaboration, such as climate change.

⁹⁰ Martin, Lisa L. (1999). An institutionalist view. In: Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

⁹¹ I do not claim that non-democratic regimes will not integrate. Rather, I have decided to analyze rising democratic countries because I consider that it is with regard to them that the hypothesis is most likely to be proven. If that is the case, a second study should proceed to analyze non-democratic regimes.

⁹² Wilson, Dominic, Alex L. Kelston, Swarnali Ahmed (2010). *Is this the BRICs decade?* Issue No 10 /3, Goldman Sachs, May 20, 2010

⁹³ Cited in Corlazzoli, Vanessa and Janel Smith (2008). *G8 reform: expanding the dialogue*. Paper produced by the G8 Civil Society and Expanded Dialogue Unit of the G8 Research Group, University of Toronto, p. 13, <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca>. in: Thomas Payne (2008). *The G8 in a changing economic order*. *International Affairs* 84: 3 (2008) 519–533

⁹⁴ Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2010). *Brazilian Foreign Policy In Changing Times: The Quest For Autonomy From Sarney To Lula*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010

⁹⁵ Hurrell, Andrew (2008). *Lula's Brazil: A Rising Power, but Going Where?* *Current History*, February 2008, pp.51-57

prominent role for his country in the international system. A year later, the Congress Party under Sonia Gandhi won a resounding victory, and Manmohan Singh became Prime Minister, epitomizing, like Lula in Brazil, India's definitive emergence as a global player on the international stage.⁹⁶

A year later, in 2004, Brazil, India, Japan and Germany formed the G4, whose joint goal was to achieve a UN Security Council reform and obtain permanent seats. This alliance, which ceased to exist in 2006, is seen by many as the first time Brazil and India openly assumed their bid to major power status.

Finally, in 2004, Brazil made the surprising decision to no longer provide the IAEA's inspectors unlimited access to its civilian nuclear power plants, seriously challenging the IAEA's authority, which plays a crucial part in the verification process of the NPT's rules. This move not only had important consequences for the non-proliferation regime, but also changed Brazil's position vis-à-vis the Western World Order.⁹⁷

8. SOURCES

With regard to sources, I use qualitative data for the period of study of 2003-2010. This includes primary sources (government officials' speeches, national plans, treaties, budgets, interviews with diplomats and government officials) and secondary sources (academic literature, media and interviews with political analysts). Furthermore, non-Brazilian and non-Indian diplomats were interviewed who worked with either country during negotiations or any other type of interaction. A large part of the sources used were provided by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations, known as Itamaraty, and the Indian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, responsible for implementing their respective foreign policies.

⁹⁶ Ganguly, Sumit (2010). *India's Foreign Policy. Retrospect and Prospect*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010

⁹⁷ Palmer, Liz and Gary Milhollin (2004). *Brazil's Nuclear Puzzle*. *Science, New Series*, Vol. 306, No. 5696, Gene Expression: Genes in Action (Oct. 22, 2004), p. 617

1. *The Paradigm: International Institutions and the West*

1.1. *What is the West?*

In order to answer how emerging powers such as Brazil and India behave towards the West, we need to understand what the West means. While used frequently in the media, politics and academia⁹⁸, the concept of the West remains abstract⁹⁹ and poorly understood.¹⁰⁰ In addition, it is not static, but in motion, continuously adapting to new realities, and imagined in new ways by different groups with different interests. This chapter will present ways in which scholars have attempted to understand the West, and which perspective is most useful for the purpose of this study.

While sometimes avoided by academics, the concept remains central for a proper understanding of international politics. Several studies, such as those dealing with relations between Islam and the West, are important, and they show that the West can be used as a variable in serious academic studies.¹⁰¹ This is true not only in so-called ‘Western countries’, but also outside. Chinese social scientist Sun Ge, for example, notes that

In the narratives of the Asian intellectuals, the West – an idealistic category with almost no significance to intellectuals of the West—is already there. Historically speaking, this idealistic category functions as the medium that pushes Asians into forming self-recognition.¹⁰²

Yet how do we define the West? Which variables or proxies capture and represent the concept? In order to get a handle on what the West means and how to use it in this study, we need to study the several dimension through which the West is generally defined- the historical/religious dimension, the systemic/policy dimension, the culture/value dimension, and the geographical dimension. This analysis will help us understand which dimension is

⁹⁸ Bonnett, Alastair (2004). *The Idea of the West. Culture, Politics and History*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. In typical opinion article in *The Guardian*, Dominique Moisi finishes by saying that “(India) is not about to become China. (...). That is a further reason for the west to engage and invest in India.” Moisi, Dominique (2010). *India’s international unease*. *The Guardian*, April 18, 2010. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/apr/18/india-china-great-power-role> (accessed April 20, 2010)

⁹⁹ Akhavi, Shahrough (2003). *Islam and the West in World History*. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Jun., 2003), pp. 545-562

¹⁰⁰ See, for example: Schlag, Gabi, Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellmann (2008). *Secur(itiz)ing the West. The Transformation of Western Order*. Conference Paper, 2008

¹⁰¹ See, for example: Fox, Jonathan (2001). *Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West*. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Jul., 2001), pp. 459-472

¹⁰² Sun, Ge (2000). *How does Asia mean? (part II)*. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 1, 2, 2000 In: Bonnett, Alastair (2004). *The Idea of the West. Culture, Politics and History*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

most useful for empirical study. If none of them proves functional, we may need to design a new, more practical, dimension.

1.1.1. Historical-religious dimension

One of the most common dimensions to define the West is the historical-religious dimension, which highlights the importance of Christianity. It is not entirely clear when the concept of the West first emerged.¹⁰³ Alastair Bonnett argues that it is in China where mention of ‘Western Countries’ were first recorded.¹⁰⁴ Most historians, however, say that an initial step towards a delineation between West and non-West was taken during Constantine I’s reign as Roman Emperor in the 4th century B.C.¹⁰⁵ Constantine’s ascendance to power as the sole emperor of the Roman empire and the reconstruction of the city of Byzantium, which was renamed Constantinople, represented the passing of old Rome.¹⁰⁶ Known as the first Christian Roman emperor, he was essential in helping Christianity become the dominant religion across the Roman Empire.¹⁰⁷ The so-called “Constantinian shift” marked the legalization of Christianity.¹⁰⁸ Constantine’s construction of and focus on Constantinople was an essential step in the division between Western Christendom and the Orthodox civilization¹⁰⁹, which would form a separate cultural identity. In a similar fashion, Shahrough Akhavi essentially equates the West to Christianity.¹¹⁰

Christianity split into East and West, and historians identify the Western Christianity as the precursor of the West. In the future, culture - shaping events such as the Reformation, the Counter Reformation, and its intellectual legacy, would impact Western Christendom, but not Eastern Orthodoxy.¹¹¹ Huntington argues that “Orthodox civilizations (...) inherited from Classical civilization, but to nowhere near the same degree as the West.” He further notes that

Western Christianity, first Catholicism and then Protestantism, is the single most important historical characteristic of Western civilization. Indeed, during most of its first millennium, what is now known as Western civilization was called Western

¹⁰³ Winkler, Heinrich August (2009). *Die Geschichte des Westens. Von den Anfängen in der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert. Band 1.* München: C.H. Beck, 2009

¹⁰⁴ Bonnett, Alastair (2004). *The Idea of the West. Culture, Politics and History.* London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

¹⁰⁵ Alternatively called Constantine the Great or, by the Orthodox, Saint Constantine (Pohlsander, Hans A. *The Emperor Constantine*, Routledge, 1996)

¹⁰⁶ Winkler, Heinrich August (2009). *Die Geschichte des Westens. Von den Anfängen in der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert. Band 1.* München: C.H. Beck, 2009

¹⁰⁷ Veyne, Paul (2007). *Quand notre monde est devenu chrétien.* Paris: Éditions Albin Michel, 2007. Christianity became state religion in 391 under Theodosius.

¹⁰⁸ Clapp, Rodney (1996). *A Peculiar People.* Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. p. 23. "What might be called the Constantinian shift began around the year 200 and took more than two hundred years to grow and unfold to full bloom."

¹⁰⁹ Winkler, Heinrich August (2009). *Die Geschichte des Westens. Von den Anfängen in der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert. Band 1.* München: C.H. Beck, 2009

¹¹⁰ Akhavi, Shahrough (2003). Islam and the West in World History. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Jun., 2003), pp. 545-562

¹¹¹ Winkler, Heinrich August (1996). *Der Westen braucht den Streit.* Final lecture, Humboldt University, 14.02.07, <http://www.ksta.de/html/artikel/1171445238540.shtml> (accessed April 27, 2010)

Christendom. There was a well-developed sense of community among Western Christian peoples, one that made them feel distinct from Turks, Moors, Byzantines, and others.¹¹²

Ideas from Athens, Rome and Jerusalem are also said to have contributed to the formation of the West. Jeffrey Hart argues that the “Western being” defines itself through a common history, specifically Greek philosophy, cognition and science (“Athens”) and spiritual aspiration to holiness (“Jerusalem”).¹¹³ In David Gress’ “What is the West? From Plato to NATO”, the author identifies a series of historical events that give rise to Western civilization. He argues that the “Pre-West”, or “Old West”, which started in A.D. 700, went through several phases (Greek civilization, Roman civilization, Christianized Roman civilization, and Germano-Roman civilization) and was a prerequisite to the values that arose around 1500- such as reason and science, economic development and capitalism, and liberty and democracy.¹¹⁴ In “What is the West?” Nemo explains this “cultural morphogenesis” as follows:

From this moment on (the papal revolution), civilization becomes a synthesis of Athens, Rome and Jerusalem. Scientific and legal reason is, henceforth, in the service of biblical ethics and eschatology. Faith expresses itself through the flowering of human nature. Classical antiquity is absorbed into the imagination and identity of Christian people everywhere in Europe. This synthesis gives rise to a spirit – a cultural form- that is without parallel anywhere in the world. It is called the West.¹¹⁵

Beyond Christianity, historians list historic events, ideas and trends - such as liberalism, social pluralism and rationality - as the defining characteristics of the West. Explaining what made the West Western, Samuel Huntington lists the emergence of several phenomena, dating back to pre-Socratic Greek philosophers, to less tangible and non-datable aspects, such as individualism. Huntington names the classical legacy (Greek philosophy and rationality, Roman law), Western Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism), European languages, separation of spiritual and temporal authority, rule of law, social pluralism and civil society, representative bodies and individualism, but he also concedes that individually, “almost none of these factors are unique to the West.”¹¹⁶

Economic transformation and progress is often cited as another key aspect of the West. In “The History of the West”, Heinrich August Winkler adds monotheism, missionary zeal, colonial expansion and especially the industrial revolution as crucial to the Western civilization.¹¹⁷ Several historians also cite John Locke, one of the most influential

¹¹² Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). The West Unique, Not Universal. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 1996), pp. 28-46

¹¹³ Hart, Jeffrey (2001). *Smiling through the Cultural Catastrophe. Towards the Revival of Higher Education*. New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 2001

¹¹⁴ Gress, David (1998). *What is the West? From Plato to NATO*. New York: Free Press, 1998

¹¹⁵ Nemo, Philippe (2004). *What is the West?* Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2004

¹¹⁶ Most scholars of civilization agree that Western civilization emerged in the 8th and 9th centuries and developed its distinctive characteristics in the centuries that followed. Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). *The West Unique, Not Universal*. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 1996), pp. 28-46

¹¹⁷ Winkler, Heinrich August (2009). *Die Geschichte des Westens. Von den Anfängen in der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert. Band 1*. München: C.H. Beck, 2009

Enlightenment thinkers, as a symbol of Western thought.¹¹⁸ He contributed to the emergence of liberalism which is reflected in the American Declaration of Independence of 1776. Finally, Adam Smith's contributions are frequently considered a key ingredient to Western culture.¹¹⁹ Both Huntington and Winkler argue that it is the combination of the factors that allowed the West to modernize, but that modernity as such is not Western. Citing different historic incidents, Bernhard Lewis notes that

...(England) was also the country of Shakespeare and Bacon and, (...) a little later, the parliamentary revolution. All these, too, are surely central to what is specifically Western about the West.¹²⁰

At the beginning of the 20th century the West was synonymous with Western Europe. The United States was, according to Alastair Bonnett, “understood as Western only in the sense that it represented an export or an extension of the real West.”¹²¹ This changed dramatically after World War II, when the United States turned into the center of the West. The US' transition from peripheral to core state can be explained by its economic and military prowess that became visible during the first half of the 20th century. Western Europe remained part of the West, but ceased to be the center of it.

During the Cold War, the West temporarily took on another meaning and turned into a synonym of the “free”, US-led World, finding its counterpart in the Communist World led by the Soviet Union.¹²² After the Soviet Union's demise and the end of the Cold War, several analysts predicted, following a classic realist argument, that the Cold War was the primary source of Western solidarity¹²³, and that the idea of the West would die as well. As Harries argued in 1993, “It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile "East" to bring [the West] into existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now survive the disappearance of that enemy.”¹²⁴ Yet, the concept of the West continued to exist both in the policy world¹²⁵ and in academia - often in a similar form to its pre-Cold War definition. In the same year, Samuel Huntington published *The Clash of Civilization and the New World Order*, which used the concept of the West in a way that it did not need an

¹¹⁸ Cranston, Maurice (1986). Locke and Liberty. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 10, No. 5 (Winter, 1986), pp. 82-93

¹¹⁹ Winkler, Heinrich August (2009). *Die Geschichte des Westens. Von den Anfängen in der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert. Band 1.* München: C.H. Beck, 2009

¹²⁰ Lewis, Bernard (1997). The West and the Middle East. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1997), pp. 114-130

¹²¹ Bonnett, Alastair (2004). *The Idea of the West. Culture, Politics and History.* London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

¹²² Schlag, Gabi, Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellmann (2008). *Secur(itiz)ing the West. The Transformation of Western Order.* Conference Paper, 2008

¹²³ Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry. The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr., 1999), pp. 179-196

¹²⁴ Harries, Owen. The Collapse of 'The West'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 4 (Sep. - Oct., 1993), pp. 41-53. Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry (1993). *The Logic of the West.* *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter, 1993/1994), pp. 17-25

¹²⁵ See, for example: Mahubani, Kishore (1993). The Dangers of Decadence: What the rest can teach the West. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No.4 (Sept.- Oct., 1993), pp. 10-14

Eastern counterpart.¹²⁶ Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the West is often understood in the context of the West vs. Islam debate.¹²⁷

When we look at the idea of the West in its historical dimension, therefore, we can observe its persistency across vast quantities of historical time. On the one hand, the concept of the West has a strong solidity to it that stood the test of time. On the other hand, it shows how strategic and mobile definitions of the West have been across history.¹²⁸ The idea that the West will end with the end of the Cold War ignores history.

Still, this dimension fails to clearly delineate the West from the non-West, because history is not linear and not organized neatly. The events described above that supposedly define the West did not occur in a vacuum. They did not affect peoples on one side of the border, while leaving those on the other side free of their influence. Rather, the impact was strong at the center and gradually diminished with increasing distance.¹²⁹ Christianity, for example, spread across the world, prospering in some regions, failing in others. So did the effects of many other ‘Western’ events such as the industrial revolution. Globalization has allowed Western concepts to spread even more, which makes this dimension inadequate for the purpose of studying contemporary affairs.

The historical dimension provides some insight, but it has no clear verdict on many states. The past two decades have shown that the West has a reality beyond bipolarity.¹³⁰ Western Europe, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Iceland and some overseas territories are part of the West. Eastern-Central Europe, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, are “close”, but not “inside”.¹³¹ But does it count at all that Eastern European states such as Romania or the Baltic States move towards the West? Like most scholars, Nemo makes a distinction between Eastern and Western Christianity and points out that the “papal revolution”, which led to the rediscovery of Roman law and Greek science, did not take place in “Eastern Christianity”. Only predominantly Catholic or Protestant societies are thus, according to this definition, part of the West.¹³² Nemo, a defender of the historical-religious dimension, does not include Argentina into the West, even though it is a society largely made up of Catholic Italian and Spanish immigrants and 97% white.¹³³ It becomes obvious that migration of Europeans into other parts of the world, where they mixed with local populations, makes this definition difficult to apply. Will the United States still be ‘Western’ once whites will constitute the minority in the middle of the 20th century? Is Israel Western? The lack of guiding variables to delineate who is Western and who is not shows that this dimension is of limited use for academic study.

¹²⁶ Huntington, Samuel (1993). Clash of Civilizations? *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, Issue 3, 22-50, 1993

¹²⁷ See, for example: Akhavi, Shahrough (2003). Islam and the West in World History. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Jun., 2003), pp. 545-562

¹²⁸ Bonnett, Alastair (2004). *The Idea of the West. Culture, Politics and History*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

¹²⁹ Osterhammel, Jürgen (2009). *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts*. München: C.H.Beck, 2009

¹³⁰ Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry (1993). The Logic of the West. *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter, 1993/1994), pp. 17-25

¹³¹ Nemo further asserts that “where this fertile intellectual and moral soil is absent - that is, in most non-Western civilizations”, Nemo asserts, “it is doubtful whether democracy will grow roots.” (Nemo, Philippe (2004). *What is the West?* Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2004)

¹³² Nemo, Philippe (2004). *What is the West?* Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2004

¹³³ CIA factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> (accessed May 2, 2010)

As Karl Deutsch's analysis makes clear, it is difficult to separate historic aspects from cultural aspects, because culture is a product of history. But culture may be more useful as a concept to understand what the West is. For example, Deutsch notes that the West is different in that it allowed "the rise and persistence of diverse autonomous groups not based on blood relationship or marriage,"¹³⁴ giving power to monasteries and guilds, and later associations and clubs, allowing the emergence of what we call pluralism and civil society today - during the same periods, strong centralized bureaucracies in Russia, China and elsewhere did not allow civil society to emerge.¹³⁵ While his example is clearly rooted in history, it may be more useful to study the cultural manifestation of this historic process. Clifford Geertz describes culture as the "webs of significance" that people have, over time, created for themselves. Geertz argues that if the observer can successfully interpret these webs, culture can help describe and understand social events.¹³⁶ We therefore proceed to study attempts to analyze the West using culture and values.

1.1.2. *Cultural-values dimension*

Historians argue that the values usually seen as Western are those that emerged 500 B.C. in Ancient Greece until the present day: Individualism, freedom, liberty, democracy, rationality, human rights, and capitalism.¹³⁷ German historian Heinrich August Winkler, describes the West as a "community of values", in which he includes Europe, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and, since 1948, Israel.¹³⁸ Gunther Hellman argues that the West is usually seen as a "culturally defined civilization with a clear and stable essence."¹³⁹ Dean Acheson adds that the West can be defined by commonly held "moral and spiritual values."¹⁴⁰

Two aspects need to be pointed out in this context. First, history is written by the victors - and Western nations have, militarily clearly been on the winning side over the past centuries, most visible during the almost all-encompassing global Western dominance at the beginning of the 20th century, and the creation of the "Western World Order" after World War II. Western history of the West (the story the West tells itself) is therefore likely to suffer from some degree of pro-Western bias. As Claude Lévi-Strass points out, non-Western historical accounts of the West are rare, so we have only a limited capacity to assess the objectivity of the West's account of the West.¹⁴¹

¹³⁴ Deutsch, Karl (1981). On Nationalism, World Regions, and the Nature of the West. in Per Torvik, ed., *Mobilization, Center-Periphery Structures and Nation-Building*, Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1981

¹³⁵ Huntington, Samuel P. The West Unique, Not Universal. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 1996), pp. 28-46

¹³⁶ Geertz, Clifford (1977). *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books, 1977

¹³⁷ Huntington, Samuel (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996

¹³⁸ Winkler, Heinrich August (2010). *Der Westen braucht den Streit*. Final lecture, Humboldt University, 14.02.07, <http://www.ksta.de/html/artikel/1171445238540.shtml> (accessed April 27, 2010)

¹³⁹ Schlag, Gabi, Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellmann (2008). *Secur(itiz)ing the West*. The Transformation of Western Order. Conference Paper, 2008

¹⁴⁰ Jackson, Patrick (2008). *Defending the West: Occidentalism and the Formation of NATO*. The Journal of Political Philosophy. 11, 3, p.223-252, 2003. In: Schlag, Gabi, Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellmann. *Secur(itiz)ing the West*. The Transformation of Western Order. Conference Paper, 2008

¹⁴¹ Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1992). *Tristes tropiques*. London: Penguin Books, 1992

Secondly, as Foucault contends, the self-definitions like the ones above by Heinrich August Winkler are rather to be understood as a kind of aspiration and normative concepts rather than an adequate description of the past.¹⁴² Since when are aspects such as individualism, liberty, democracy, rationality, human rights, and capitalism universally implemented concepts in Western societies? Individualism and rationality may have existed as concepts for a long time, but universal personal liberty remained restricted in many Western nations, such as the United States, until the civil rights movement in the 1960s, and several European countries, such as Portugal, did not grant women suffrage until the 1930s. Human or inalienable rights have been mentioned by thinkers across the ages, such as in Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws* in 1748 and the Virginia Bill of Rights in 1776.¹⁴³ But their full-fledged application was, until recently, the exception rather than the norm. As Amartya Sen points out, similar concepts have been developed in the non-Western world - such as during Akbar the Great's reign in what is today India (1542- 1605).¹⁴⁴ Capitalism was not introduced as an idea until 1776, and socialism and communism are as Western as capitalism. Alastair Bonnett points out that "the assumption that being Western means being law-governed and socially and technologically advanced is relatively recent."¹⁴⁵

In addition, the series of virtues named by Western historians to define their own civilization, such as human rights and democracy, gloss over the Crusades, religious persecution, missionary zeal and World Wars, which bear little evidence of liberty, rationality and respect for human rights. Critics of the West such as Noam Chomsky argue that the West, and principally the United States, cannot be distinguished from any other dominant regimes in world history.¹⁴⁶ The West, according to Chomsky, consistently uses democracy and humanitarian intervention as a pretext to pursue policies that preserve hegemony,¹⁴⁷ and that "no US-president since 1945, judged on the principles of Nuremberg, would have escaped hanging."¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, according to Chomsky, the West's intellectual history is just another chapter in the overall history of imperialist apologia.¹⁴⁹

The same applies to capitalism, which cannot be said to be a construct inherently aligned to Western culture. As Pavan Varma points out as he recounts India's history, "money lending did not incur the reprobation of Hindu moralists, as it did that of medieval Christianity (...)."¹⁵⁰ Across history, foreign observers such as Marco Polo often remarked on the great business instincts of many non-Western cultures.¹⁵¹

¹⁴² Foucault, Michel (1984), Paul Rabinow (ed.) *The Foucault Reader*. New York: Vintage Books, 1984

¹⁴³ Winkler, Heinrich August (2010). *Der Westen braucht den Streit*. Final lecture, Humboldt University, 14.02.07, <http://www.ksta.de/html/artikel/1171445238540.shtml> (accessed April 27, 2010)

¹⁴⁴ Sen, Amartya (2006). *Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny*. New York, W.W. Norton, 2006.

¹⁴⁵ Bonnett, Alastair (2004). *The Idea of the West. Culture, Politics and History*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

¹⁴⁶ Chomsky, Noam (2003). *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003

¹⁴⁷ Chomsky, Noam (1994). *World Orders Old and New*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994

¹⁴⁸ Chomsky, Noam (2003). *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003

¹⁴⁹ Chomsky, Noam (1967). *The Responsibility of Intellectuals*. *The New York Book Review*, February 23, 1967

¹⁵⁰ Basham, A.L. (1971). *The Wonder that was India: A Survey of the Culture of the Indian Sub-continent before the Coming of the Muslims*. New Delhi: Fontana Books in association with Rupa &

Countless events in more recent history caused scholars to argue that while “Western values” may have a normative importance, one cannot argue that Western nations adhered to these values any more than non-Western nations at any given point in history. Colonialism in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East is an example of Western violence of historic scale committed against non-Western peoples. More recent incidents point in the same direction, such as the U.S. led overthrow of Iran’s Prime Minister Mossadegh, the U.S. invasion of Vietnam, which led to over 1 million Vietnamese deaths¹⁵² and the Iraq War, which led to over 100,000 Iraqi civilian deaths.¹⁵³ Some more radical voices, such as German writer and former politician Jürgen Todenhöfer, argue that “the West is much more violent than the Muslim world, and (...) millions of Arab civilians have been killed since colonialism began.” As Todenhöfer points out, no Muslim country has attacked any Western country over the past two centuries.¹⁵⁴ While it is not the objective of this study to evaluate such claims, one must point out that the West cannot be defined or distinguished from the non-West by culture or values.¹⁵⁵

Interestingly, this cultural-values lens has equally often been used by non-Western analysts, and they often ascribe specific negative values to the West. It became particularly popular in 1990s, when so-called “Asian values”, whose supporters attempted to differentiate them from “Western values”, came into vogue, mostly to justify authoritarian regimes in South East Asia. Lee Kwan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore, and Kishore Mahbubani, a Singaporean academic, usually juxtaposition Asian discipline, morality and order with Western chaos. As Lee Kwan Yew pointed out during an interview with Fareed Zakaria in 1994,

I find parts of [the West] totally unacceptable: guns, drugs, violent crime, vagrancy, unbecoming behavior in public- in sum the breakdown of civil society. The expansion of the right of the individual to behave or misbehave as he pleases has come at the expense of orderly society. In the East the main object is to have a well-ordered society so that everybody can have maximum enjoyment of his freedoms. This freedom can only exist in an ordered state and not in a natural state of contention and anarchy.¹⁵⁶

In a similar vein, Kishore Mahbubani writes that

Co., 1971. In: Varma, Pavan K. (2006). *Being Indian. Inside the Real India*. London: Arrow Book, 2006.

¹⁵¹ See, for example: Varma, Pavan K. (2006). *Being Indian. Inside the Real India*. London: Arrow Book, 2006.

¹⁵² The Associated Press Correspondent (1995). Vietnam says 1.1 Million died fighting for North. <http://web.archive.org/web/20071222122211/http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/VA-news/VA-Pilot/issues/1995/vp950404/04040331.htm> (accessed October 10, 2009)

¹⁵³ Iraq Body Count (2010); <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/>

¹⁵⁴ Todenhöfer, Jürgen (2009). *Why do you kill, Zahid?* New York: The Disinformation Company, 2009

¹⁵⁵ For an extensive on the study of culture, see: Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1992). *Tristes tropiques*. London: Penguin Books, 1992.

¹⁵⁶ Fareed Zakaria (1994). Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 1994), pp. 109-126

[In the West] “budgetary discipline is disappearing (...), work ethic is eroding (...) leadership is lacking (...). Any politician who states hard truths is immediately voted out (...) This is massive social decay.”¹⁵⁷

Indian thinkers, on the other hand, at times equate Western culture to rationality. Indian Hindu nationalists often grapple with what they describe as an Indian culture of fatalism, passivity and excessive acceptance of life.¹⁵⁸ George Tanham laments that there is an “absence of strategic planning” in India and blames “the Hindu concept of time, or rather the lack of a sense of time”. He argues that “Indians view life as an eternal present, with neither history nor future.” This, according to him, discourages planning, since “Hindus consider life a mystery, largely unknowable and not entirely under man’s control. In this view, fate, intuition, and emotions play important roles, but how, how much and when is never known. Man’s control over life is thus limited in Hindu eyes, and he cannot forecast or plan with any confidence.”¹⁵⁹ While these analysts clearly associate the West with rationalism, there is no consensus about this in India. Raja Mohan, for example, rejects Tanham’s analysis and says that “India represents the triumph of the values of reason, cosmopolitanism, scientific progress and individual freedom.”¹⁶⁰

These contradictory assertions show that generalizing about cultures leads to void claims. While some non-Western analysts associate the West to inferior values such as promiscuity, decadence, immorality, leisure and racism¹⁶¹, the West is often regarded to be technologically superior - even in Japan, which is itself technologically advanced.¹⁶² This again shows that the West is a term that different groups can use to symbolize virtually anything.¹⁶³

Contrary to Lee Kwan Yee’s claim, Samuel Huntington depicts a strong work ethic as a typically Western (protestant) quality, and argues that the cultures of Latino immigrants with their “lack of ambition” and their “tomorrow culture” would dilute the United States’ Western culture.¹⁶⁴ The only thing both sides agree on is that modernization does not equal modernization. Both Huntington and Lee Kwan Yee agree that the West was Western well before the arrival of technology, but that the West offered a unique environment for the

¹⁵⁷ Mahbubani, Kishore (1993). *The Dangers of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach the West* Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4 (Sep. - Oct., 1993), pp. 10-14

¹⁵⁸ Sagar, Rahul (2009). *State of mind: What kind of power will India be?* International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 801–816

¹⁵⁹ Tanham, George K. (1992). *Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretative Essay*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1992

¹⁶⁰ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

¹⁶¹ Mahbubani, Kishore (1993). *The Dangers of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach the West* Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4 (Sep. - Oct., 1993), pp. 10-14

¹⁶² Gokhale, Rajyashree (1982). *The ‘West’ in Japanese Advertising*. *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 17, No. 22 (May 29, 1982), pp. M57-M59 The reasons for Western technical superiority are very well explained in Lewis, Bernard. *The West and the Middle East*. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1997), pp. 114-130, as well as in Jared Diamond’s *Guns, Germans and Steel*. (Diamond, Jared. *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997)

¹⁶³ Bonnett, Alastair (2004). *The Idea of the West. Culture, Politics and History*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

¹⁶⁴ Huntington, Samuel (2004). *Who are we: The Challenges to America’s National Identity*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004

development and adoption of modern technology. The West has thus had a historic role in promoting technological progress and modernity.¹⁶⁵

As this discussion has shown, defining the West through the dimension of values and culture is logically not sustainable. Non-Western nations adhere to so-called Western nations as much, or as little, as Western nations do. As Amartya Sen points out, “given the cultural and intellectual interconnections in world history, the question of what is Western and what is not would be hard to decide.”¹⁶⁶ We need a better definition to use the concept empirically.

1.1.3. Systemic-policy dimension

Another commonly used way to define the West is by looking at a country’s political system and government policies. During the Cold War, such thinking was particularly widespread.¹⁶⁷ The West was made up of liberal democracies, the rest was not. In addition, many policy analysts implied and still imply that specific foreign policy strategies, such as the promotion of democracy, free trade and the defense of human rights, are essentially Western.¹⁶⁸ This explains considerations that the concept of the West would disappear after the end of the Cold War, because during that period Western nations coordinated many policies against the Soviet Union.

According to Deudney and Ikenberry, Western democracies enjoy “unprecedented levels of trust and reciprocity” and share a political order based on capitalist economies and liberal societies.¹⁶⁹ This shows, they argue, that Western democracies have built more than an alliance of convenience among countries seeking individual gain. In 1996, Huntington argued that “maintaining the unity of the West (...) is essential to slowing the decline of Western influence in world affairs.”¹⁷⁰ All these affirmations imply that the West consists of countries that are aligned because they have the same goals, policies, or political systems. In 2006, for example, Kishore Mahbubani writes about “Western policies” in general, implying that the West is, in fact, a coherent political unity. As Anne-Marie Slaughter pointed out, however, Mahbubani talks about the “West”, but what he really means is the United States.¹⁷¹

The attempt to define the West through its system of liberal democracy is difficult to sustain empirically. While many liberal democracies are Western, many other democratic states such as Colombia, South Africa and Ghana are not. In fact, of the world’s five largest

¹⁶⁵ Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). The West Unique, Not Universal. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 1996), pp. 28-46

¹⁶⁶ Sen, Amartya (2006). *Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2006.

¹⁶⁷ Analysts have sought to identify distinctions prior to the Cold War. For example, in *The Prince*, Machiavelli identifies strongly centralized governments with the “East”, and the looser confederate model with the West (Machiavelli, Nicolò (1992). *The Prince*. New York: Dover Publications, 1992).

¹⁶⁸ Castañeda, Jorge G. (2010). Not Ready for Prime Time. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 5 September/October 2010

¹⁶⁹ Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry (1993). The Logic of the West. *World Policy Journal*, Winter 1993/94, pp. 17-25.

¹⁷⁰ Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). The West Unique, Not Universal. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 1996), pp. 28-46

¹⁷¹ Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2010). The Debate on East vs. West Continues: Anne-Marie Slaughter Challenges Mahbubani; http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2008/05/the_debate_on_e/ (accessed May 2, 2010)

liberal democracies - India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil and Japan, only one is within what we commonly call the West. Yet those who apply this definition rarely include such countries when talking about the West. In the same way, Turkey and Indonesia have stable democratic systems. The argument that Islam and democracy are incompatible is thus unconvincing.¹⁷² Democracy may be a concept that originated in the West, but it is difficult to claim that democracy in Brazil or India is less of a native concept than in relatively young democracies like Germany or Portugal. Neither is it correct to argue that non-Western countries are democratic merely because Western countries implemented such a democratic system. The opposite is true. The British Empire granted no democratic rights to its colonies. They created ruling classes with highly concentrated power that made democratic governance less likely. Democratization in former colonies like Brazil occurred independently from Western influence. Contrary to what Kishore Mahbubani claims, democracy is not a uniquely Western value.¹⁷³ In the same vein, Alastair Bonnett points out that “it is difficult to articulate the principles of democracy and justice as Western.”¹⁷⁴ The argument that democracy is a Western concept can much rather be understood as a Western narrative than as an adequate description of reality. Each group recounts ‘their’ version of the West. As the United States turned into the center of the West, free market principles, typically American, were integrated into the Western narrative.

The definition is equally difficult to sustain when looking at actual foreign policy strategy. The West may have some common civilizational background, but relationships between countries of the West have been marked by conflict and bloody internecine conflicts throughout most of its history,¹⁷⁵ culminating in the “Western civil wars” of the 20th century.¹⁷⁶ The idea of common policies is relatively recent, but even now, aligned Western policies only occur if there is a common threat such as the Soviet Union. Free trade serves as a good example. Western nations may historically have supported free trade, but today there is little correlation between a nation’s “Westernness” and its likelihood to support free trade - the world’s two most open economies are Singapore and Hong Kong.¹⁷⁷ This is not a recent phenomenon. In 1981, Mary Kaldor argued in “The Disintegrating West” that due to reduced competitiveness in comparison to Japan and Western Europe, it was no longer in the United States’ national interest to promote free trade, creating “intra-West” conflicts.¹⁷⁸ In the same

¹⁷² Akhavi, Shahrough (2003). Islam and the West in World History. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Jun., 2003), pp. 545-562

¹⁷³ Mahbubani, Kishore (1993). The Dangers of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach the West. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 4 (Sep. - Oct., 1993), pp. 10-14. See also: C. Raja Mohan (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

¹⁷⁴ Bonnett, Alastair (2004). *The Idea of the West. Culture, Politics and History*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

¹⁷⁵ Harries, Owen (1993). The Collapse of 'The West'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 4 (Sep. - Oct., 1993), pp. 41-53

¹⁷⁶ Mahbubani, Kishore (1993). The Dangers of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach the West. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 4 (Sep. - Oct., 1993), pp. 10-14.

¹⁷⁷ According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Singapore was the most open economy in 2010, Hong Kong was ranked second;
<http://www.asiaone.com/Business/News/My+Money/Story/A1Story20100201-195831.html> (accessed May 2, 2010).

¹⁷⁸ Kaldor, Mary (1978). *The Disintegrating West*. London: Allen Lane, 1978

way, there is no consensus among Western countries on fundamental aspects such as the death penalty, international law and global warming.¹⁷⁹

Many analysts affirm the inadequacy of this approach. As a German diplomat based in Berlin points out, defining the West according to foreign policy strategy is “impossible”, given that so-called Western nations’ foreign policy is increasingly indistinguishable from typically non-Western nations.¹⁸⁰ In a similar vein, Dominique Moisi asked in 2003 “Does the West still exist?,” pointing to a growing political gap between the United States and Europe.¹⁸¹ Since the end of the Cold War, Western countries’ policy positions have shown evidence of significant differences, especially regarding specific events such as the Iraq War in 2003¹⁸², causing Habermas to speak of a “divided West.”¹⁸³

Harries calls the proposal that the West still existed as a political entity a “questionable premise.”¹⁸⁴ Despite the lack of cohesion among Western nations with regard to foreign policy, sweeping comments such as that of Robin Wright, who writes that “(...) the West has two alternatives (...) to press Muslim dominated countries toward political pluralism (...)”¹⁸⁵ are still very common.

So far, we have looked at the West in three of its dimensions: the historical/ religious, the value / cultural, and the systemic/ policy dimensions. We have found out that values are subjective and unsuitable for empirical study. We have also found that the West has a lot of stability in its historical dimension, but it is unstable in terms of short-term policy. It was not until recently that Western countries even aspired towards common policies - it might be that, after the Cold War, such short and medium term policy coherence has ended, but it seems overblown to claim that the West as a concept will come to an end. The past two decades have shown that the West has a reality beyond bipolarity.¹⁸⁶ Despite these findings, all three dimensions studied are inadequate and confusing.

1.1.4. Geographic dimension

The fourth dimension through which one can define the West is geographic. According to this definition, the West is a specific description encompassing principally Europe and North America as well as Australia and New Zealand. Some also include Latin America into the geographic West.¹⁸⁷

¹⁷⁹ Moisi, Dominique (2003). Reinventing the West. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 2003), pp. 67-73

¹⁸⁰ Interview with German diplomat, German Foreign Ministry, Berlin, May 14, 2009

¹⁸¹ Moisi, Dominique. Reinventing the West (2003). Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 2003), pp. 67-73

¹⁸² Moisi, Dominique. Reinventing the West (2003). Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 2003), pp. 67-73

¹⁸³ Habermas, Jürgen (2004). Der Gespaltene Westen. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 2004

¹⁸⁴ Harries, Owen (1993). The Collapse of 'The West'. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4 (Sep. - Oct., 1993), pp. 41-53

¹⁸⁵ Wright, Robin (1992). Islam, Democracy and the West. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Summer, 1992), pp. 131-145

¹⁸⁶ Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry (1993). The Logic of the West. World Policy Journal, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter, 1993/1994), pp. 17-25

¹⁸⁷ Mamadouh, Virginie (2006). Divided We Stand. Plural geopolitical visions of the West. Paper presented at Seminar organised by TAPRI, Tampere, Finland, 2-3 February 2006

The geographic dimension has some merit to explain why some civilizations prospered and others did not. Jared Diamond argues that the gaps in power and technology between human societies originate in environmental differences, refuting the belief that Eurasian hegemony is due to any form of Eurasian intellectual, moral or inherent genetic superiority. The author identifies two principal advantages of Europe's geographical characteristics. Europe had not only the best natural endowments of crops and domesticable animals, but also an East-West axis that provides a large area with similar latitudes and therefore climates, which, in turn, allow populations, plants and animals to migrate. By contrast, America's North-South axis forced Native Americans to get used to new environments as they migrated.¹⁸⁸

While Europe was geographically at an advantage, other regions were less fortunate. Natural characteristics outside of Europe were conducive to large, monolithic and isolated empires vulnerable to technological and social stagnation - until the arrival of Europeans, which caused upheaval. Jared Diamond uses China as a potent example; in 1432, the Chinese Emperor prohibited the building of large ships, which effectively cut off the Chinese Empire from the rest of the world.¹⁸⁹ Europe, in contrast, saw the rise of many small nation states, as natural barriers such as mountains and rivers provided defensible borders. Yet, the proximity of other states and potential threats caused political leaders to constantly correct their mistakes and adapt, favoring technological progress.¹⁹⁰

The geographical dimension is easy to use, but it is fairly arbitrary. Armijo and Sotero, for example, write that “unlike China, Russia, or even India, Brazil is a Western power, securely and nearly inevitably tied with the United States and Western Europe - “by (...) geography.”¹⁹¹ Yet, Russia is much closer to Europe, and should, according to that definition, be more Western than Brazil. Yet there is no consensus about whether Russia is part of Europe or not.¹⁹²

While Australia, New Zealand and North America are fairly easy to delineate, defining Europe geographically is more difficult. Several analysts have drawn a line that designates the Baltic States, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia as Western, and Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Macedonia and Greece as non-Western.¹⁹³ A purely geographic description may seem like a good option, but it cannot account for a more complex reality. If Australians, as descendants of Great Britain, are Western, so should be Argentineans, who are predominantly of Italian and Spanish origin. Spain is certainly no less European than Great Britain. Despite its much higher number of native American, African and Asian populations, the United States is considered a core member of the West, while few would classify Argentina as such. The Argentineans themselves, being part of the Western

¹⁸⁸ Diamond, Jared (1997). *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997

¹⁸⁹ Jacques, Martin (2009). *When China rules the World*. London: Penguin Group, 2009

¹⁹⁰ Diamond, Jared (1997). *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997

¹⁹¹ Sotero, Paulo and Leslie Elliott Armijo (2007). Brazil: To be or not to be a BRIC? *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2007, pp. 43-70.

¹⁹² Baranovsky, Vladimir (2000). Russia: Part of Europe or Apart from Europe? *International Affairs*, 76, 3: 443-458, 2000

¹⁹³ Huntington, Samuel (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996

Hemisphere, often call themselves “American”, and most regard themselves as culturally Western.

The four dimensions presented are all true to some degree, but rather than capturing the entirety of the concept of the West, they show different groups’ narrative about the West. The dimensions analyzed fail to define the West in a satisfactory manner, and they show how complicated it is - it seems to be one of the things so big that it is hard to define. In some dimensions it is a static monolith-like "Asia." In other dimensions it's very ephemeral - in terms of common policy. The West behaves very differently in its different dimensions. In addition, different groups define it differently according to their needs. Kemal Ataturk idealized the West partly because Westernization would help him defeat the remaining power structures from the Ottoman Empire. In the same way, Al-Qaeda portrays the West as evil to create a potent image of a common enemy. The concept of the West is extremely elastic and so flexible that it even thrives on contradictory usage. Throughout history, for example, it was commonplace that the West was pronounced dead by some, while simultaneously regarded triumphant by others. In 1907, for example, Little foresaw the West’s end in *The Doom of Western Civilization*,¹⁹⁴ while Benjamin Kidd’ *Principles of Western Civilization* praised the West in 1902, predicting its victory.¹⁹⁵ The very same contradiction continued throughout the century, when Victor Hanson’s *Why the West has Won* (2001)¹⁹⁶ was matched by *The Death of the West*, written by Buchanan in 2003.¹⁹⁷ While the Bolsheviks associated the West with socialist modernity, the West became a symbol of anti-communism during the Cold War. Its fluidity and malleability is likely to ensure its survival in the centuries to come.

We have seen that it is relatively easy for people in the West to define the West, but their vision of the West is more normative than realistic, highlighting the positive aspects and omitting negative ones. But non-Westerners have a different point of view, and often define their own identity through their opposition to the West. The true difficulty is to find an abstract set, model or description that both Westerners and non-Westerners could agree with.

¹⁹⁴ Little, J. (1907). *The Doom of Western Civilization*. London: W.H. and L. Collinbridge, 1907

¹⁹⁵ Kidd, Benjamin (1902). *Principles of Western Civilisation: Being the first Volume of a System of Evolutionary Philosophy*. London: Macmillan, 1902

¹⁹⁶ Hanson, V. (2001). *Why the West has Won: Carnage and Culture from Salamis to Vietnam*. London: Faber & Faber, 2001

¹⁹⁷ Buchanan, P. (2003). *The Death of the West. How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil our Country and Our Civilization*. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2003. In: Bonnett, Alastair (2004). *The Idea of the West. Culture, Politics and History*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

1.2. *The Western World Order*

The previous analysis shows that the West simply does not have an objective reality to it that withstands scrutiny from all perspectives. To put it differently, the West cannot be described, because it depends on what we mean by it, and whose perspective is used. We will therefore never find a perfect explanation of what the West is or whether a country is Western or not.

But we do have a means to understand the practical consequences. The question can best be addressed by William James's 'pragmatic method', which is "primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable."¹⁹⁸ James's theory allows us respond to the question practically without finding an actual solution. The pragmatic method, James points out, is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences.¹⁹⁹ So practically speaking, the West is not culture, history, policy or values. Rather, the West's practical consequences are institutions. In this case, it is easier to describe what the West does than what the West is. Institutions seem to be a very good way to capture the West and its practical consequences.

More practically speaking, nations, taken as a whole, make use of or interact with the idea of the West through international institutions. These international institutions make up what we can call Western World Order. This makes sense because, when we take all the perspectives into account, the Western World Order is the only thing agreed by all to be the practical consequence of the West.

The Western World Order is therefore not the West. Rather, the Western World Order is its practical consequence and manifestations of the West. It allows us to measure the concept and use it in a meaningful way in empirical study. We can exactly measure a nation's

¹⁹⁸ James, William (1904). What is Pragmatism, from series of eight lectures dedicated to the memory of John Stuart Mill, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, in December 1904, from William James, Writings 1902-1920, The Library of America

¹⁹⁹ The pragmatic method is very well captured in a short anecdote told by James during a lecture: "Some years ago, being with a camping party in the mountains, I returned from a solitary ramble to find every one engaged in a ferocious metaphysical dispute. The corpus of the dispute was a squirrel – a live squirrel supposed to be clinging to one side of a tree-trunk; while over against the tree's opposite side a human being was imagined to stand. This human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly round the tree, but no matter how fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direction, and always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so that never a glimpse of him is caught. The resultant metaphysical problem now is this: Does the man go round the squirrel or not? He goes round the tree, sure enough, and the squirrel is on the tree; but does he go round the squirrel? In the unlimited leisure of the wilderness, discussion had been worn threadbare. Every one had taken sides, and was obstinate; and the numbers on both sides were even. Each side, when I appeared therefore appealed to me to make it a majority. Mindful of the scholastic adage that whenever you meet a contradiction you must make a distinction, I immediately sought and found one, as follows: "Which party is right," I said, "depends on what you practically mean by 'going round' the squirrel. If you mean passing from the north of him to the east, then to the south, then to the west, and then to the north of him again, obviously the man does go round him, for he occupies these successive positions. But if on the contrary you mean being first in front of him, then on the right of him, then behind him, then on his left, and finally in front again, it is quite as obvious that the man fails to go round him, for by the compensating movements the squirrel makes, he keeps his belly turned towards the man all the time, and his back turned away. Make the distinction, and there is no occasion for any farther dispute. You are both right and both wrong according as you conceive the verb 'to go round' in one practical fashion or the other." In: What is Pragmatism (1904), from series of eight lectures dedicated to the memory of John Stuart Mill, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, in December 1904, from William James, Writings 1902-1920, The Library of America.

behavior towards the Western World Order, while we cannot measure a country's behavior towards the amorphous concept of the West. Since the West manifests itself in the Western World Order, countries, practically speaking, negotiate with the West through the institutions, it allows us to study how countries deal with the West. The West has created the Western World Order. We are therefore not talking about the quality of the West, but of the actions of it and the procedures it involves.²⁰⁰ Institutions are rule-based systems, and that is where the West 'lives'. The Western World Order is a set of rules that countries use.

1.2.1. The Western World Order according to the West

This fifth dimension, Western World Order, which is constituted by today's international institutions, is the way through which nations operationalize the concept of the West, and through which the West manifests itself. To a degree, it is a group of institutions- the "public order of the West"²⁰¹. But more fundamentally it is the Western procedures and way of doing business – treaties (constitutionalism), representation, rules, membership, fairness, democracy, economic interdependency²⁰² and embedded liberalism - that undergirds these institutions.²⁰³ Institutions create a system that offers 'intra-institutional mobility', i.e. members can rise within the institutions that make up the system. Mechanisms tie the participating states together through well-anchored international institutions.

This dimension focuses on processes ("the way of doing things" or "rules of the game") and transcends cultural values and ideological aspects used in Huntington's "Clash of Civilization" to define the West. Although international institutions have a set of values at their core²⁰⁴, they are not Western, ideological or exclusive. Fundamentally, the Western World Order consists of a very simple idea: the institutionalization of interactions among sovereign states, which constitutes the major innovation of international politics in the 20th century.²⁰⁵ As Ikenberry argues, it is "dense transnational and transgovernmental networks, and pluralistic channels of politics (that) mark this western liberal order."²⁰⁶ It is an order constituted by 'globally institutionalized political processes by which norms and rules can be negotiated on the basis of dialogue and consent, rather than simply imposed by the most

²⁰⁰ Bradley Klein used a somewhat similar approach when, in 1990, he characterized NATO as a "set of practices by which the West has constituted itself". Klein Bradley S.(1990). How the West was One: Representational Politics of NATO. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 3, Special Issue: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies (Sep., 1990), pp. 311-325

²⁰¹ Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry (1993). The Logic of the West. *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter, 1993/1994), pp. 17-25

²⁰² Ikenberry, G. John (2004). Review: Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2004), pp. 144-154

²⁰³ Similarly, Deudney and Ikenberry speak of the 'West's spirit'- "common norms, public mores, and political identities- is the invisible sinew of the polity." In: Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry (1993). The Logic of the West. *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter, 1993/1994)

²⁰⁴ Deudney and Ikenberry argue that the institutions "embody common values are not simply narrowly instrumental." Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry (1993). The Logic of the West. *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter, 1993/1994), pp. 17-25

²⁰⁵ Martin, Lisa L. (1999) An institutionalist view. In: Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

²⁰⁶ Ruggie, John Gerard (1982). *International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order*. *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2, International Regimes (Spring, 1982)

powerful.²⁰⁷ It is worth repeating here that the Western World Order is called Western not because its institutions are based on “Western values”. Section 1.1.1. has shown that such a concept is empirically not sustainable. Rather, today’s institutions are a Western creation, reason for which we can describe the entirety of the institutions as the Western World Order. The rules and norms that undergird the Western World Order cannot be allocated to any specific culture. Rather than cultural, they are procedural.

The Western World Order is a more meaningful and tangible concept than foreign policy, culture, values or geography, and it is open to countries commonly not seen as ‘Western’. Deudney and Ikenberry follow this logic when, in 1993, they included Japan into the West. “The West”, as they argue, is “a distinctive political order- a civic union.”²⁰⁸ They continue explaining that

“(The West is) bound together by a web of complex institutional links and associations. The peace the West has built does not derive simply or mainly from the fact that its polities are all democracies, but rather from the structural integration of their organs of security, economy, and society. Nor are the political identities in this system primarily national; rather, the dominant form of identity is a civic one, in which rational reciprocity dominates, and nationalism has been muted into pluralist ethnicity.”²⁰⁹

Yet, while we are not defining the West or the fringe as actually constituted by the Western institutions, the concept of the West is captured adequately by looking at institutional status- the Western World Order is a useful proxy for the West.

Institutions have a ‘gatekeeper’ function and come very close to representing the West. The European Union performs this gatekeeper function: the question of who is European and who is not has been largely reduced to the question of membership in the institution. Even though Europe as a concept existed long before the EU, being a member country is a defining characteristic of being European. This may partly explain the fierce debate about Turkey’s accession to the EU. The case of Russia is no different. As Dmitri Trenin points out, Russia “left the West” because the West “offered Russia no real prospect of membership in either NATO or the EU. The door to the West would officially remain open, but the idea of Russia actually entering through it remained unthinkable.”²¹⁰

This example shows how strongly membership in some key international institutions captures the concept of the West. The G7’s decision to include Russia was, after all, principally intended to tie Moscow to the West, underlining the weight of membership. In 1993 political commentator William Pfaff argued that “the West should act through NATO

²⁰⁷ Hurrell, Andrew (2006). *The State of International Society*, in R. Little and J. Williams (eds.), *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006

²⁰⁸ Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry (1993). *The Logic of the West*. *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter, 1993/1994), pp. 17-25

²⁰⁹ Deudney, Daniel. and G. John Ikenberry (1993). *The Logic of the West*. *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter, 1993/1994), pp. 17-25

²¹⁰ Trenin, Dmitri (2006). *Russia Leaves the West*. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006), pp. 87-96

to guarantee existing borders in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe”²¹¹, showing that institutions are, in fact, a useful tool to capture what the West is. Similarly, Charles Kupchan reasoned in 1996 that the West could only be strengthened by broadening and deepening collaborative institutions.²¹² US efforts to reintegrate Germany into the West after WWII consisted largely of inviting the country into the Atlantic and Europe-wide institutions that would bind and commit Germany.²¹³

The case of Turkey is particularly instructive. It shows that a nation’s willingness to integrate in international institutions very well reflects its willingness to become part of the West - the “political West”, that is, as this is unrelated to “Westernization” in the cultural sense. Turkey became part of NATO in 1952, and formally applied to EU membership in 1987. There have been plenty of examples of anti-Western foreign policy and foreign policy rhetoric, but Turkey’s short term political moves cannot conceal its underlying intentions to engage with the West, which only become visible when looking at its behavior towards international institutions. While a nation’s rhetoric or day-to-day foreign policy decisions are highly influenced by short-term political considerations, the decision to join or abstain from joining an institution has many more far-reaching consequences and implications. Few politicians would seek to integrate their country in an international institution merely to win an election. The fifth dimension is therefore more useful than any analysis that seeks to include all types of foreign policy decisions.

NATO is often used as a convenient way to define the West²¹⁴, and Patrick Jackson shows how “occidental language” by policy makers in postwar Europe helped NATO turn into a Western institution.²¹⁵ But most other institutions also capture the concept of the West. In fact, it is the entirety of dominant international institutions that constitute the Western World Order. Institutions as diverse as the European Union, NATO, the World Bank and the United Nations adhere to a common principle - that all member states must agree on how to disagree, thus strengthening peaceful international collaboration. All institutions are based on similar principles and rules of order. Participants agree on these principles, lending fundamental legitimacy to the Western World Order. These “rules of the game” set clear limits on the exercise of power, and resemble domestic politics where the losing side enjoys protection and can continue to participate in the decision-making process.²¹⁶ This promotes stability and reduces the possibility of violence.

²¹¹ See, for example: Sjurson, Helene (2004). On the identity of NATO. *International Affairs*, 80, 4 (2004). Harries, Owen (1993). The Collapse of 'The West'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 4 (Sep. - Oct., 1993), pp. 41-53

²¹² Kupchan, Charles A. (1996). Reviving the West. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1996), pp. 92-104

²¹³ Ikenberry, G. John (2009). Liberal Internationalism 3.0.: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order. *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol.7, pp. 71-87, 2009

²¹⁴ Schlag, Gabi, Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellmann, for example, argue that the term ‘West’ can be used interchangeably with NATO and the Western Security Community. In: Schlag, Gabi, Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellmann (2008). *Secur(itiz)ing the West. The Transformation of Western Order*. Conference Paper, 2008

²¹⁵ Jackson, Patrick T. (2003). Defending the West: Occidentalism and the Formation of NATO. *The Journal of Political Philosophy*: Volume 11, Number 3, 2003, pp. 223–252, 2003

²¹⁶ G. John, Ikenberry (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

But if it does not function according to Western values, why is it not called “rule-based world order”? As Ikenberry and Wright point out, Western countries are the creators, owners and managers of institutions such as the UN Security Council, the G8, the World Bank, the IMF, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the WTO.²¹⁷ A critical characteristic of today’s liberal internationalism is its Western foundation. While American liberal hegemony no longer appears to be an adequate framework to support a liberal international order, the United States remain at the center of today’s order, providing public goods of security protection, market openness and sponsorship of rules and institutions.²¹⁸

A country can integrate into the Western World Order without democratizing or westernizing culturally.²¹⁹ In fact, China is likely to be the next guardian of the Western World Order, and it would not have to undergo any fundamental transformation (such as democratize) to fully engage in and even lead the Western World Order envisioned in this study. This solves frequent tensions between Western and non-Western (particularly, non-liberal) societies caused by liberal norms of universalism vs. respect for diversity and self-determination.²²⁰ The Western World Order is certainly liberal in nature, but, as a system, it exerts no direct pressure on societies to engage in domestic reform.

This approach surely has its weaknesses. It is minimalist, and, more importantly, so inclusive that, when applying this definition, a very large number of countries form part of the West. It surely seems counterintuitive to argue that a country such as India can form part of the West once it joins all major institutions. Yet, in the same way, it would have seemed impossible to consider Japan, now part of the OECD, to be part of the West after World War II, while today, as shown above, scholars frequently do so.²²¹ In addition, it needs to be pointed out here that the Western World Order is not the equivalent of the West; it is merely its manifestation. An analysis several decades in the future may very well show that nearly all of the world’s countries, do, in fact, form part of the West. It would thus no longer be a helpful means to distinguish groups from each other, and effectively lose its utility as an analytic tool. Yet, as the overview has shown above, all other categorizations are analytically flawed and do not stand up to rigorous analysis. Even if we adopted a value-based definition, every country may soon form part of the West once human rights turn into a universally accepted value.

Yet what may be considered a weakness from an analytical point of view reflects the actual strength of the Western World Order: It is easy to join, and most actors can be expected to do so. On the one hand, the type of collaboration international institutions imply reinforce the very Western idea of an open, rule-based system of democracies - the system that is commonly called the Western World Order. But countries with non-Western cultures

²¹⁷ Ikenberry, G. John and Wright, Thomas (2008). *Rising Powers and Global Institutions*. Century Foundation, 2008

²¹⁸ Ikenberry, G. John (2009). *Liberal Internationalism 3.0.: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order*. *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol.7, pp. 71-87, 2009

²¹⁹ A country may or may not democratize in reaction to joining an international institution. The question of whether institutions change states’ domestic behavior, and if so how, is interesting but not the focus of this study.

²²⁰ Richardson, James L. (2008). *The Ethics of Neoliberal Institutionalism*. in: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

²²¹ Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry (1993). *The Logic of the West*. *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter, 1993/1994), pp. 17-25

or non-democratic regimes can very well integrate and rise within these structures established by the West.²²² Even with the presence of a hegemon, the governance of the international economic order is built based on rules. Ruggie argues that their formation and transformation represents a “concrete manifestation of the internationalization of political authority.”²²³ The rise of Germany and Japan after World War II is powerful proof that the system is flexible and easy to join. The emergence of global problems, such as climate change and terrorism, increase the incentives for states to join international institutions as they are the only way to effectively address such problems.

The system is not only easy to join, but also hard to overturn. Given the large number of supporters, it is increasingly difficult for “alternative systems” to emerge, as more and more people all over the world would have to disrupt their lives if a new order emerged. Institutions also have an “increasing-returns” character as they expand, and high “exit costs” as disengaging means giving up many benefits. Also, initial set-up costs for new institutions are very high.²²⁴ Countries join international institutions because they believe that membership allows them to better maximize their interests. Since membership has some cost (that of losing some autonomy due to the institution’s rules), states only remain part of them if the benefits exceed the costs. The World Trade Organization’s membership growth is the irrefutable proof that the benefits of membership outweigh the costs.²²⁵ Overturning a regime members overwhelmingly agree with is very difficult. In addition, the Western World Order creates a status quo bias, and thus promotes order in international politics.²²⁶

As a consequence, hard power remains relevant, but its significance is mitigated through the constitutional nature of the Western World Order. As a consequence, power asymmetries begin to lose their significance.²²⁷ Rising powers who seek to have their status affirmed seek inclusion into the international institutions rather than merely building up hard power. Rather than engaging in power balancing, states can respond to threats by linking states in mutually constraining institutions. India’s quest to enter the UN Security Council and the G8 are good examples.²²⁸ While military strength remains relevant in the Western World Order, the main sources of power - economic growth and soft power - can only be achieved and projected through integration into the Western World Order. As Martin Wolf points out, today’s emerging powers would hardly be emerging without the benefits provided by today’s global order - rules about international trade, development aid, war and finance.

²²² Ikenberry, John G. and Wright, Thomas (2008). *Rising Powers and Global Institutions*. Century Foundation, 2008

²²³ Ruggie, John Gerard (1982). International regimes, transactions and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order. *International Organization* 36.2 (1982): 380.

²²⁴ Ikenberry, G. John (1999). Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order. In: T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

²²⁵ Martin, Lisa L. (1999). An institutionalist view. In: T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

²²⁶ Martin, Lisa L. (1999). An institutionalist view. In: T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

²²⁷ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

²²⁸ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

No matter how large its domestic market, no nation today can progress economically if it does not engage in the system.²²⁹

1.2.2. *The Western World Order according to its critics*

In most accounts written from the proverbial 'centre', the periphery is represented and interpreted in terms and through imagery that both reflect and reify the interests of the core.²³⁰ It therefore seems appropriate to analyze opposing points of view.

Yet, critics of the West are not unified and struggle to establish non-Western ideas. 'Non-Western' scholars have often attempted to establish 'non-Western' ways of interpreting international relations, only to realize that the assumption that the 'non-West' necessarily takes a different view than the 'West' is highly problematic.²³¹ After all, concepts such as the 'Third World', the 'Orient' and 'Africa' are essentially Western inventions. The 'non-West' is thus possibly just a Western idea, and, as will be shown below in more detail, many of the West's fiercest critics are Western themselves. Amartya Sen, an Indian economist, is opposed to developing 'non-Western' ideas and argues that the West has been highly influenced by the 'non-West', absorbing countless things Westerners deemed beneficial without worrying about importing 'non-Western' influence. Sen accuses those who seek to delineate the West of "praising an imagined insularity."²³² He argues that to call ideas of liberal democracies and 'democratic peace' Western is an example of this insularity.²³³

We can categorize the critics of the Western World Order into two groups. The first and most important group consists of those who fundamentally agree with the system yet point out that some of its characteristics fail to live up to Ikenberry's claims about openness and democracy. These moderate critics such as Hurrell, Gray and Rodrik mostly bemoan the economic inequality the system has generated²³⁴, yet all contend that the solution lies in detailed alterations, not in systemic change. The second group is made up of systemic critics, such as Marxists and Islamists, and is largely marginal but at times able to gather disproportionate attention given its radical views. This group contains anti-Americans who lament the country's dominance and accuse America of ruthlessly imposing its standards globally. Marxists regard the economic system as fundamentally flawed, and fundamental Islamic voices criticize Western secularism and modernity. They argue that the Western World Order is no different from previous hegemonic systems and just another form of

²²⁹ Martin Wolf (2004). *Why globalization works*. New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 2004

²³⁰ Alden, Chris and Marco Antonio Vieira (2005). *The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and Trilateralism*. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 7 (2005), pp. 1077-1095

²³¹ Bilgin, Pinar (2008). *Thinking past 'Western' IR?*, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008, pp 5 - 23

²³² Amartya Sen (2006). *Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny*. New York, W.W. Norton, 2006. In: Bilgin, Pinar (2008). *Thinking past 'Western' IR?*, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008, pp 5 - 23

²³³ Amartya Sen (2006). *Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny*. New York, W.W. Norton, 2006. In: Bilgin, Pinar. *Thinking past 'Western' IR?*, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008, pp 5 - 23

²³⁴ Hurrell, Andrew (2007). *On Global Order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. See also: Gray, John. *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism*. New York: The New Press, 1998. See also: Rodrik, Dani. *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* *Public Choice*, Volume 97, Numbers 1-2, 214-217, 1997

domination, in no way different from any other world order that has existed before. Wallerstein, for example, cites the systems led by Venice/Genoa, Holland and Britain. For him and many other critics, today's Western-centered order does not represent an extension of liberal democratic state structures.

1.2.2.1. MODERATE CRITICS

Some of the most prominent critics of the Western system are, in fact, Western themselves and many of them admit that it is the unique Western system which allows them to openly voice such criticism.²³⁵ Anti-Western points of view can, and very often do, come from thinkers from countries that are deeply embedded in the Western World Order. Samuel Huntington, for example, famously argued in 1993 that “the West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact, non-Westerners never do.”²³⁶ But the most widespread criticism is more subtle, mostly regarding distributional issues. Andrew Hurrell recognizes that the system provides benefits for all who participate but contends that “institutions are not, as liberal theory often suggests, neutral arenas for the solution of common problems but rather sites of power and dominance. The vast majority of weaker actors are increasingly ‘rule takers’ over a whole range of issues that affect all aspects of social, economic and political life.” Barnett and Finnemore write that “international organizations often use undemocratic procedures in the pursuit of liberal values, thus creating “undemocratic liberalism” in global governance.”²³⁷ According to Hurrell, this problem does not diminish, but rather increases over time.²³⁸ In a similar vein, Lisa Martin argues that we have rarely seen “fundamental institutional changes that tilt the distribution of benefits substantially in the direction of poor and weak states,”²³⁹ and Dirk Messner and John Humphrey argue that “the marginalization of developing countries in global fora was exacerbated by the events of September 11, 2001.”²⁴⁰ Furthermore, Kalevi Holsti writes the major weakness of the current order is that there is no peaceful mechanism for rising powers to gain acceptance in the system, due to the built-in bias against aspiring powers.²⁴¹ Hurrell admits that

the density of the norms, rules and institutions of international society has increased tremendously, often pushing in the liberal direction. (..) Yet (..) *whose* solidarist or

²³⁵ Chomsky, Noam (1967). The Responsibility of Intellectuals. The New York Review of Books, February 23, 1967

²³⁶ Huntington, Samuel (1993). Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, Issue 3, 22-50, 1993

²³⁷ Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004

²³⁸ Hurrell, Andrew (2007). On Global Order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007

²³⁹ Martin, Lisa L. (1999). An institutionalist view. In: T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) International Order and the Future of World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

²⁴⁰ Messner, Dirk and John Humphrey (2006). China and India in the Global Governance Arena. Conference Paper. Seventh Annual Global Development Conference: At the Nexus of Global Chance. Pre-Conference Workshop on Asian and Other Drivers of Global Chance. January 18-19, 2006

²⁴¹ Holsti, Kalevi J. (1991). Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991

liberal order? What kind of liberal and liberalizing order is it that seeks to promote democracy but ignores distributive justice and brushed aside calls for the democratization of global decision making? How stable and how legitimate can such a liberal order be when it depends so heavily on the hegemony of the single superpower whose history is so exceptionalist and whose attitude to international law and institutions has been so ambivalent?²⁴²

Some of these critics, often from countries that are not fully integrated into today's international order, at times strike more radical tones, such as Nayar and Paul, who affirm that “the entire structure is of Western design and construction, preserves Western power, and serves Western interests.”²⁴³

Many critics of the Western World Order are also critics of globalization. Globalization is, according to this point of view, a tool of Western imperialism, principally aimed at promoting Western interests. A lot of anti-Western sentiment is therefore, implicitly, directed against globalization and modernization in general.²⁴⁴

These critics, often part of the so-called “anti-globalization movement”, are right to point out that the Western World Order and globalization are closely intertwined concepts, and that several, if not all, of the institutions that make up the Western World Order contribute to the institutionalization of global rules and norms. As Nye points out, states are increasingly embedded in a ‘cobweb’ of multilateral institutions such as the WTO and the World Bank.²⁴⁵ Western imperial expansion was the first step towards modern globalization,²⁴⁶ and we can even argue that it is the Western Order which strengthens globalization further. Institutions such as the WTO are for many a symbol of globalization. International institutions are thus an important dimension of globalization.

However, these critics do not appreciate the fact that the Western World Order also helps contain the negative aspects of globalization. The Non-Proliferation Treaty seeks to limit the global spread of nuclear weapons, and the Kyoto Protocol seeks to regulate the damaging effects of industrialization on the environment. While some international institutions promote or even epitomize globalization, some also help manage the phenomenon.

Many critics of the Western World Order mostly equate the West with the system's manager, the United States. As Anne-Marie Slaughter points out, Kishore Mahbubani in his 2008 book “The New Asian Hemisphere” speaks about the West but omits Europe entirely.²⁴⁷ Rather than criticizing the structure of the Western World Order, they criticize US foreign

²⁴² Hurrell, Andrew (2005). Foreword to the Third Edition, 2005. In: Bull, Hedley. *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics* London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1977

²⁴³ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

²⁴⁴ McGrew, Anthony (2008). Globalization and global politics, in: Steve Smith, John Baylis, Patricia Owens. *Introduction, The Globalization of World Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008

²⁴⁵ Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye., Jr. (2000). *Governance in a Globalizing World*. New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2000

²⁴⁶ Jackson, Robert and Georg Sørensen (2010). *Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010

²⁴⁷ Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2008). *The Debate on East vs. West Continues: Anne-Marie Slaughter Challenges Mahbubani Share / Recommend - Comment - Print - Wednesday, May 28 2008, 12:49PM*
http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2008/05/the_debate_on_e/

policy. Mahbubani praises the world order the United States have created after World War II, but chastises the United States for “tearing holes in the fabric of the overall system it created” by violating the very principles it had designed.²⁴⁸

Mahbubani does not engage in systemic criticism. In fact he concedes that “Asians have been among the greatest beneficiaries of the open multilateral order created by the United States after World War II, and few today want to destabilize it.”²⁴⁹ Yet, he criticizes the West’s main protagonist, the United States, for failing to live up to its standards. In detail, he criticizes the United States double standards with regard to a nuclear armed Israel, its failure to disarm as agreed to in the NPT, its decision to invade Iraq without UN authorization, its pro-Israel bias in the Middle East conflict, the West’s failure to liberalize trade further, the West’s failure to assume responsibility regarding climate change, the West’s failure to democratize global governance, the United States’ refusal to sign international human rights treaties, and West’s failure to increase development aid to the poor.²⁵⁰

1.2.2.2. MARXIST CRITICS

While Mahbubani, just like the vast majority of critics, considers the basic structure of the Western World Order as sound and finds fault with specific foreign policy strategies, Marxists, World-System theorists and Neo-Gramscians regard the system in its entirety as flawed. The principal culprit is not Western state craft. Rather, the Western World Order is merely an abusive global capitalist system, while talk of rules and norms is hollow rhetoric.²⁵¹ In a similar vein, Chandra argues that the conventional Marxist theory of imperialism provides strong insight into the “workings of neo-colonialism.”²⁵² Noam Chomsky does not characterize the Washington-led order as open, democratic and rule-based. Rather, he calls it hegemonic, violent, economically coercive and imperialist²⁵³, arguing that “the primary concern of U.S. foreign policy is to guarantee the freedom to rob and to exploit.”²⁵⁴ He calls the “horrors” of American foreign policy, which are, he contests, mostly “so obvious and so self-evident as to be beyond debate”. He characterizes even incidents of Western foreign policy generally regarded as positive, such as the Marshall Plan, as “a device by which the American people gave \$13 billion to American corporations.”²⁵⁵ Western-led globalization is merely the latest stage of Western imperialism. These critics, at times pointing to conspiracy

²⁴⁸ Mahbubani, Kishore (2008). *The Case Against the West*. *Foreign Affairs*, 87(3): 111-124, May/June, 2008

²⁴⁹ Mahbubani, Kishore (2008). *The Case Against the West*. *Foreign Affairs*, 87(3): 111-124, May/June, 2008

²⁵⁰ Mahbubani, Kishore (2008). *The Case Against the West*. *Foreign Affairs*, 87(3): 111-124, May/June, 2008

²⁵¹ Keohane, Robert O. (1984). *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

²⁵² Chandra, Nirmal Kumar (1998). *The Retarded Economies*. Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1988

²⁵³ Chomsky, Noam (2003). *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003

²⁵⁴ Chomsky, Noam (1987). *On power and ideology: The Managua Lectures*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1987

²⁵⁵ Adams, Tim. “Question time: Profile of Noam Chomsky”, *The Observer*, November 30, 2003; <http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2003/nov/30/highereducation.internationaleducationnews> (accessed June 2, 2010)

theories, usually identify the United States as the source of evil, and usually claim that large U.S corporations are in control of the U.S. government.²⁵⁶

1.2.2.3. CLASSICAL THEORIES OF IMPERIALISM

Marx and Engels did not engage in a sustained reflection on geopolitics for history in general, and their interest in geopolitics was rather limited to “ad hoc interventions” in the context of a global communist strategy.²⁵⁷ Yet Marxist theories of imperialism, particularly developed by the second generation of Marxism, represent a more in-depth reflection to explain global political developments (principally colonialism) by the dynamics of capitalism. Second-generation Marxists developed theories of imperialism and pointed to the changing characteristics of capitalism, leading to the rise of “monopoly capitalism.” The quest for raw materials and the search for new export for new export markets forced the industrialized states located in the core are forced to exploit the periphery- hence European nations’ decision to acquire colonies overseas. Since capitalists in the rich world can, thanks to the surplus resulting from exploitation, appease their working classes, the socialist revolution needs to take place outside of the core - rejecting Marx’ expectation, but justifying why it had happened in Russia first.

While liberalism, openness, inquiry and competition may be viable in the political context, it inevitably leads to exploitation in the economic context. The Western rich nations are only able to sustain their economic advantage by exploiting the poor, and the system is geared towards sustaining this inequality. This situation is aggravated by overproduction (due to capitalists’ interest in higher profits) and underconsumption (due to low wages), and the joining of forces of banking capital and industrial capital, two former opposed groups of capitalists. Colonialism is thus a natural and necessary outgrowth of the systemic dominated by this extreme form of capitalism. Similar to Hanna Arendt, who understood totalitarian policies within Europe as a potential continuation of colonialism, Classical Marxist theorists regard the current Western World Order based on freedom and competition in both the political and the economic sphere as unsustainable. Since banks and industry joins hands, forming the so-called interests of “finance capital” turns competition that formerly took place uniquely between firms into political-military competition between states, leading to situations such as the “scramble for Africa”, and eventually leading to world war.

The West was thus able to hold on to democratic principles only by exploiting other parts of the world and keeping them from democratizing.²⁵⁸ The case of military-led development in many parts of the world is a case in point. In the 1950s, it became a US strategy to create alliances with non-Western military regimes to maintain stability in what was then called the ‘Third World’. While military-led modernization was aligned with US national security, it certainly inhibited the adoption of Western liberal democracy in some instances. ‘Non-Western’ international relations theory thus oftentimes did not evolve in a

²⁵⁶ Perkins, John (2005). *Confessions of an Economic Hitman*. San Francisco: Berrett Koehler, 2005

²⁵⁷ Teschke, Benno (2008). *Marxism*. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

²⁵⁸ Bilgin, Pinar (2008). Thinking past ‘Western’ IR?, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008, pp 5

vacuum²⁵⁹, but in reaction to an at times aggressive and interventionist Western foreign policy. This has caused some to question the differentiation between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ thinking about the Western global order.

From the Marxist point of view, even less aggressive US administrations are to be blamed. Chomsky accuses even more idealist US Presidents such as Bill Clinton of using democracy and humanitarian intervention as a pretext to pursue policies that preserve American hegemony²⁶⁰, arguing that no US-president since 1945, “judged on the principles of Nuremberg, would have escaped hanging.”²⁶¹ Chomsky argues that America’s intellectual history is just another chapter in the overall history of imperialist apologia.²⁶² Contrary to supporters of the Western system, he argues that realpolitik has therefore not been an obstacle to Western ideals, but a fundamental part of it. The Western World Order furthers the development of international capitalism, and rather than making the world more alike, it deepens the divide between the core, the semi-periphery, and the periphery. In short, it is the old modernization theory in a new guise.²⁶³ The Western World Order wrongly supplanted what he calls the “natural balance of power” in the world.²⁶⁴ September 11, according to Chomsky, was caused by misguided American activism which caused tensions and exacerbated problems. This is because presidents are puppets controlled by America's corporations who take all key decisions with regard to US foreign policy.

In several instances, Chomsky was right to call US foreign policy unprincipled and opportunistic. In his 1982 collection of essays entitled “Towards a New Cold War”, Chomsky criticizes the tacit support by the United States for Indonesia's brutal war against the people of East Timor²⁶⁵, which would only receive the world’s attention after East Timorese independence in 1999.

Chomsky therefore sees little difference between the Western World Order and previous systems, such as the Roman Empire, in the sense that they are all based on power, not on values. “We are hardly the first power in history”, Chomsky argues, “to combine material interests, great technological capacity, and an utter disregard for the suffering and misery of the lower orders.”²⁶⁶ He thus dismisses the argument that any nation outside of the international institutions would want to join. In a similar vein, Weber questions the attractiveness of the system, arguing that

²⁵⁹ Amartya Sen argues that Western thinking on International Relations has been influenced by non-Western thinking. (Sen, Amartya (2006). *Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2006.). It is unlikely, however, that thinkers presented in section 1.2. such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke and Kant were influenced by thinkers from the non-Western world.

²⁶⁰ Chomsky, Noam (1994). *World Orders Old and New*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994

²⁶¹ Chomsky, Noam (1994). *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003

²⁶² Chomsky, Noam (1967). *The Responsibility of Intellectuals*. *The New York Book Review*, February 23, 1967

²⁶³ Smith, Steve and John Baylis, Patricia Owens (2008). *Introduction, The Globalization of World Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008

²⁶⁴ Chomsky, Noam and Gore Vidal (2002). 9-11; *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: How We Got to Be So Hated*, Seven Stories Press, 2002

²⁶⁵ Chomsky, Noam (1982). *Towards a New Cold War*. New York: Pantheon, 1982

²⁶⁶ Chomsky, Noam (1967). *The Responsibility of Intellectuals*. *The New York Book Review*, February 23, 1967

at least half the world's population simply did not benefit meaningfully from sixty-plus years of Western-led economic growth and technological change. For those outside the West who did benefit, the vast majority attribute their advancement not to liberal ideology, the beneficence of the West or the post–World War II American-led order, but to state-directed capitalism and resource nationalism run by illiberal states. (...) re-surfacing an American commitment to post–World War II style multilateralism with post–World War II institutions is no longer meaningful.²⁶⁷

Several Marxist claims about the global capitalist systems remain relevant, and some problems predicted by Marx himself are more pertinent today than they were at the time of writing. Marx foretold that while capitalism could generate growth, it would fail to benefit the masses. Marx' claims cannot be rejected easily. As Andrew Hurrell points out,

inequality of power and of condition continues to be one of the distinguishing features of international life and the big picture is reasonably clear. Roughly 85% of the world's income goes to the richest 20% of the world's population, whilst 6% goes to the poorest 60%.²⁶⁸

Many of Marx' predictions, however, such as about the importance of the working class in international relations, failed to materialize. Chomsky's and other Marxist theorists' critique of US foreign policy is valuable, but often fails to be constructive as it is not constrained by practical considerations. In addition, several of the arguments used by classical theories of imperialism can be criticized on empirical grounds. For example, the rates of return from capital exports to the colonies have historically not been higher than compared to domestic investments. In fact, investments overseas were exposed to higher risks, and the overall economic effect of the colonies on the core is thought to be relatively small.²⁶⁹

1.2.2.4. WORLD-SYSTEMS-THEORY

The Latin American Dependency School developed Leninist ideas on imperialism further. The so-called *dependistas*, who believe in economic dependency theory made popular by Brazil's former President Henrique Cardoso, Enzo Faletto and Raul Prebisch, argued that there is a natural hierarchy in the international system. An important figure in this context is André Gunder Frank, who bases his claims on Marxist assumptions. According to Frank, it is impossible for peripheral countries (those located outside Western Europe, Canada, the US, and Japan) – to develop economically as they are integrated in the world-capitalist system in a subordinated role.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁷ Barma, Naazneen, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber (2007). A World Without the West, The National Interest, Number 90, Jul./Aug. 2007

²⁶⁸ Hurrell, Andrew (2007). On Global Order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society. 2007, Oxford: Oxford University Press

²⁶⁹ Teschke, Benno (2008). Marxism. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

²⁷⁰ Frank, Andre Gunter (1969). Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil, Revised ed. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969

This approach, called world-systems theory, is most prominently represented by Immanuel Wallerstein, who sought to make up for the deficiencies of previous Marxist theorists by providing a theoretical framework for the interpretation of the entire history of the capitalist world system.²⁷¹ Wallerstein's unit of analysis is the world economy, and he presupposes a single international division of labor. Strong states are part of the core because they have a combination of a high skill and high capitalization regime, while weak states in the periphery have the opposite, which creates a constant surplus transfer from the periphery to the core. This allows the capitalists in the core to pacify their own working class by exploiting the periphery, cementing the hierarchy between core and periphery. The power of a state is thus determined by its integration into the economic structure of the international division of labor.²⁷² The semi-periphery, which contains both economic characteristics of the core and the periphery, is strongly influenced by the economic interests by the core, while retaining an industrial base at home. According to Wallerstein, this system emerged first in Europe when Western Europe was able to develop high-skilled manufacturing capacity, while Eastern Europe and overseas regions continued to focus on low-skilled agriculture, allowing Western Europe to dictate the terms of their unequal relationship. In the process of economic globalization, Western Europe, and later the United States, were able to extend their terms on the entire world. Despite a strong tendency towards maintaining the system, Wallerstein concedes that it is possible for peripheral states to move into the core. In order to do so, states in the periphery must develop the capacity to innovate in the field of capital-intensive production, which will eventually translate into commercial, financial, and then ultimately military superiority. As Teschke points out in his analysis, Wallerstein basically reduces state interests to the interests of the trading ruling class. In addition, Wallerstein's system of states is a direct product of the capitalist system.²⁷³ Since today's system is merely an episode in the never-ending cycle of hegemonic powers, today's system is no different from all the previous ones. As a consequence, world-system theorists have generally expected today's system to be in terminal decline.

1.2.2.5. NEO-GRAMSCIAN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Neo-Gramscian international political economy (IPE), which probably presents the most prominent Marxist theory in the present-day international relations discourse thanks to Robert Cox, essentially argues along similar lines, saying that the United Kingdom and the United States had imposed free trade on the rest of the world, successfully deluding others that this was to the benefit of all, while it in fact benefited the hegemon. International financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and even the UN are seen as tools created by the hegemon to strengthen the current distribution of power. Thinkers such as Cox therefore advise states in the periphery not to engage in such institutions, as they were unsuitable for the construction of counter-hegemony. The hegemon is able to exploit the

²⁷¹ Teschke, Benno (2008). *Marxism*. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

²⁷² Teschke, Benno (2008). *Marxism*. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

²⁷³ Teschke, Benno (2008). *Marxism*. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

periphery, which has a less sophisticated production process. This approach certainly overlooks the fact that US national interests cannot easily be equated to those of transnational capital. Still, this approach remains popular in academic circles, and it has some appeal among Brazilian and Indian foreign policy makers. Neo-Gramscian thinkers reject the notion that the system is fair, open and democratic

1.2.2.6. THE ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE

Several Islamic countries take issue with the values that undergird the institutions that make up the Western World Order. Their reaction to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an interesting example. The Universal Declaration, adopted by the United Nations Assembly in 1948, serves as a symbol for the global extension of a Western rule-based order. Representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, for example, continue to object to the Universal Declaration, arguing that it is a Judeo-Christian construct incompatible with Islamic Sharia.²⁷⁴ In 2000, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam was established at the meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which does not guarantee freedom of religion or gender equality. The Declaration's article 24 says that "All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Sharia."²⁷⁵ This example underlines that the Western World Order is seen, by several members of the OIC, as a form of Judeo-Christian cultural imperialism, implied by calling the Declaration "universal" rather than "Western" or "Christian".

Finally, Al Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalism can be, especially since September 2001, regarded as one of the principal opponents of the Western system. Since then, several analysts have argued that the West is under attack from 'global jihadism'. The topic at times dominated the media to such a degree that it made the discussion about what the non-West thinks about the West more difficult.²⁷⁶ While it is difficult to generalize and dangerous to mix fundamentalist views with Muslim ones, there is some evidence that Muslim leaders regard the promotion of democracy and human rights by the West as a hypocritical strategy of imperialism.²⁷⁷

As Bernard Lewis points out, classic Islam divides the world into the House of Islam, where Muslim law and faith prevail, and the House of Unbelief, which Muslims ultimately need to bring to Islam.²⁷⁸ Just as Christendom regarded Islam as the principal enemy for long periods, Islam has, for the past fourteen centuries, seen Christendom (or the West) as its main rival. After making significant inroads in Sicily, Spain and even France, Muslims suffered a string of defeats: The loss of its European territories, an advancing Russia, the Western

²⁷⁴ Littman, David (1999). Universal Human Rights and Human Rights in Islam. *Midstream* (New York) February/March 1999; http://www.dhimmitude.org/archive/universal_islam.html (accessed February 14, 2010)

²⁷⁵ Organization of the Islamic Conference (1990). Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 1990 <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instreet/cairodeclaration.html> (accessed October 15, 2009)

²⁷⁶ Bilgin, Pinar (2008). Thinking past 'Western' IR?, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008, pp 5 – 23

²⁷⁷ Armstrong, David (2008). The Evolution of international society. in: Steve Smith, John Baylis, Patricia Owens. Introduction, *The Globalization of World Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008

²⁷⁸ Lewis, Bernard (1990). The roots of Muslim rage. *Atlantic Monthly*, 17 (4), 1990, pp 17 – 26

occupation of the Middle East, and the invasion of foreign (mainly Western) ideas, forever changing Muslim culture. In the Muslim World, Europe and America are generally seen as the same unit, as the West is defined through the religious dimension. Anti-Western sentiment in the Muslim World has many causes - the French occupation of Algeria, the British occupation of Egypt, American support for Israel, US support for authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world and Western imperialism (cultural, religious and military-related) and Christian rule over Muslim minorities, an accusation commonly found in the radical Islamist literature.²⁷⁹

But, Islamists fight not against the Western World Order itself; rather, they disagree with Western values such as secularism and modernism that spread through “cultural globalization.”²⁸⁰ The comparison between Islam’s relations with the Soviet Union and the West makes this clear. It is noteworthy in this context why radical Islamist hatred is so much stronger against Christendom than it has been against the Soviet Union, which also subjugated millions of Muslims. The reason may be that the issues that most markedly troubled Muslim culture, such as consumerism, were not present in Soviet culture. In addition, Soviet secularism was not attractive enough to pose any threat to Muslim rulers—contrary to Western secularism and liberty.²⁸¹ Western modernity, once admired and imitated, was later criticized and rejected. When Islamist fundamentalists denounce and fight against the Western global order, they actually fight against Western secularism and Western modernism, not against the institutions that make up the Western World Order per se. As early as 1990, Bernard Lewis identified such a clash of civilizations.²⁸²

These critics are certainly right to make some kind of connection between the Western World Order and Western values such as secularism and modernism. A rule-based, open and democratic Western World Order may be non-ideological, but it certainly is based on secularism and the belief in sensible, man-made rules.

It is striking that regimes opposed to the Western World Order continue to partially participate in it, and fail to propose a viable alternative. North Korea, for example, can be considered one of the nations least integrated into the Western order²⁸³, so it seems appropriate to understand its point of view of the system. North Korea is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO)²⁸⁴ and a US arms embargo against North Korea has been in effect for over 50 years.²⁸⁵ North Korea has withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), North Korea has not ratified the 2000 UN TIP Protocol, and Kim Jong-Il, North Korea’s leader since 1994, has been termed a “serial rule-breaker” by the international press.²⁸⁶ North Korea, which severely restricts freedom of assembly²⁸⁷, has been

²⁷⁹ Lewis, Bernard (1990). The roots of Muslim rage. *Atlantic Monthly*, 17 (4), 1990, pp 17 – 26

²⁸⁰ Wolf, Martin (2004). *Why globalization works*. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2004

²⁸¹ Lewis, Bernard (1990). The roots of Muslim rage. *Atlantic Monthly*, 17 (4), 1990, pp 17 – 26

²⁸² Lewis, Bernard (1990). The roots of Muslim rage. *Atlantic Monthly*, 17 (4), 1990, pp 17 – 26

²⁸³ Cha, Victor D. (2002). Korea's Place in the Axis. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2002), pp. 79-92

²⁸⁴ World Trade Organization (2010). www.wto.org

²⁸⁵ Cha, Victor D. (2002). Korea's Place in the Axis. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2002), pp. 79-92

²⁸⁶ *The Economist Correspondent* (2009). Kim Jong Il's bombshell, May 28, 2009

²⁸⁷ *The Economist Correspondent* (2008). A black hole: North Korea and human rights, January 30, 2008

part of the United Nations since 1991, but it has joined few other international institutions. The government in Pyongyang has written very little about global governance in general, but North Korea's behavior demonstrates that it does not regard participating in international institutions as beneficial to its national interest. North Korea's withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty indicated that its government regards international treaties as invasive and as an excuse to exert influence. Yet, North Korea is still part of the United Nations, which indicates some basic acceptance of the principles of the Western World Order. Iran is no different. Ayatollah Khomeini argued after 1979 that international institutions such as the UN were part of the United States' strategy of oppression.²⁸⁸ Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of Iran since 2005, continues in confrontational rhetoric when alleging that the Western World Order is driven by Zionist and Christian interests.²⁸⁹ However, Iran never retreated from the UN.

To conclude, the West's opponents can be categorized into two groups. The dominant group consists of moderate critics who accept the Western World Order in principle but criticize specific features of it, such as a lack of redistribution. The second group is mostly made up of radical critics such as Noam Chomsky whose critique is much more sweeping. According to them, it is impossible to repair the system, as the system's undergirding principle - the free market - is itself flawed. While supporters of the Western World Order talk about rules and democracy, opponents talk about capitalism and exploitation. This group is largely limited to academic circles, and its proposals are often vague and mostly irrelevant for policy makers. In the same way, Islamist critics who grapple not necessarily with the Western World Order per se, but with the effects it has in their own societies, are unlikely to have a lasting effect on the debate. As Bernard Lewis points out in "What Went Wrong? Western Influence and Middle Eastern Response", once leading peoples in the Middle East struggled to come to terms with modernity introduced by force from the West,²⁹⁰ but they fail to offer a viable alternative.

The vast majority of critics thus does not seek to destroy the system, but doubt that the Western World Order is as rule-based, open and beneficial for all as Ikenberry claims. The key challenge for supporters of the Western World Order will be to meaningfully respond to critics' key charge that the Western World Order does not always provide the benefits to all its members as its proponents claim.

1.2.3. Conclusion

A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.

²⁸⁸ Armstrong, David (1993). *Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993

²⁸⁹ Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud (2005). Speech. *New York Times*, October 30, 2005. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/weekinreview/30iran.html> (accessed March 2, 2009)

²⁹⁰ Lewis, Bernhard (2001). *What Went Wrong*, Oxford University Press; 4th edition (December 2001)

- Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (1997)

So far we have shown that the Western World Order is potentially the best way to represent the West, this order being defined by Western procedures and way of doing business - treaties, representation, rules, membership, fairness, ‘social mobility’ and democracy.²⁹¹ At the same time, moderate critic voices question whether all such claims are true, and radical voices argue that the Western World Order is not defined by fairness, openness and rules, but by economic coercion and exploitation, and that the system is therefore unattractive to outsiders.

Critics are right to point out that not all international institutions are open and democratically structured. While institutions such as the WTO are indeed open, rule-based and democratic, others are closed and club-based, and a mere reflection of power. International institutions that are truly democratic and open, such as UNCTAD, are often avoided by Western nations, who prefer closed and hierarchical, non-democratic institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, where voting rights are tied to financial contributions.²⁹² The composition of the UN Security Council, one of the most important international institutions, is a reflection of the distribution of power after World War II. The five permanent members with veto power - the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom and France - are the only Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has often been criticized as a non-democratic treaty that allows strong nations to “lay down the law on weak ones”.²⁹³ Brazil’s and India’s difficulties to join the UN Security Council show that fringe nations are, in fact, excluded from the Western World Order despite their desire to join. Yet, there is evidence that change is taking place in the few organizations that are not entirely democratic. While the G20, which was designated to deal with the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, is far from being as democratic as ECOSOC, it is more inclusive than the G7, which dealt with previous financial crises. Changing quota shares in the IMF and the World Bank, two key institutions of global financial governance, shows that institutional power structures are not as static as they once seemed. The majority of institutions, such as the WTO, are entirely just and democratic. Even the organizations that are not entirely just strongly moderate the practice of power politics.²⁹⁴ As Ikenberry rightly points out, institutions “reduce the return to power” He explains that

²⁹¹ After the end of World War II, there was agreement in the US administration that its policy should not be seen as an attempt to force ‘the American way’ on Europe. The United States wanted to create an order that was based on democratic principles, and more importantly, that other governments would voluntarily support and seek to be part of. In: Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

²⁹² International Monetary Fund (2010), <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm> (accessed July 19, 2010)

²⁹³ Spektor, Matias (2010). *Why Brazil is a broker with Iran*, Council of Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/22139/why_brazil_is_a_broker_with_iran.html (accessed October 5, 2010)

²⁹⁴ Lisa Martin fundamentally agrees with this point and argues that “the very act of creating an institution binds the hands of powerful states.” Martin, Lisa L. (1999). *An institutionalist view*. In: Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

[Reduced return to power] means that [institutions] reduce the possibilities that a state can turn short-term gains into a long-term power advantage. Taken together, constitutional agreements set limits on what actors can do with momentary advantages. Losers realize that their losses are limited and temporary- to accept those losses is not to risk everything nor will it give the winner a permanent advantage.²⁹⁵

Critics of the Western World Order are numerous. Andrew Hurrell, certainly no opponent of international institutions, admits that “not all is well (...) with the institution the world currently has.”²⁹⁶ More radical critics with less influence on policy makers, like Noam Chomsky, argue that rather than treaties, representation, rules, membership, fairness, social mobility, democracy, the West has established the Western World Order through hegemony, military power and economic coercion. The central focus of “Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance”, published in November 2003 lies on the United States' political, military and economic motives, in contrast to its outward rhetorical support for democracy, the Middle-East peace process, free trade, and human rights.²⁹⁷ Do Western institutions not live up to their Western ideals of rules, democracy and openness?

Critics of the Western World Order also make reference to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is often considered unjust by emerging non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS),²⁹⁸ because nuclear weapon states (NWS) force others to obey harsh restrictions, while they do not fulfill their promise to disarm. Nuclear disarmament is indeed an obligation that ought to be respected, and the treaty will not be fully just until NWS have taken more meaningful steps towards disarmament. Still, the structure of the NPT can be considered just for two reasons. It is open to all parties, and all members will enjoy equal rights to develop peaceful nuclear energy.

In this context, it is important to point out that the principal creator and owner of the Western World Order, the United States, is not part of or obstructs several international regimes²⁹⁹, such as the UNFCCC, the Ottawa Treaty (Mine Ban Treaty)³⁰⁰, or the ICC (International Criminal Court).³⁰¹ Peter Spiro points out that “although the United States has

²⁹⁵ Ikenberry, G. John (1999). *Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order*. In Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall, *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 123–145. See also: Ikenberry, G. John 2001. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

²⁹⁶ Hurrell, Andrew (2007). *On Global Order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*. 2007, Oxford: Oxford University Press

²⁹⁷ Chomsky, Noam (2003). *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance*, *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance*, 2003

²⁹⁸ Spektor, Matias (2010). *How to read Brazil's Stance on Iran, First Take*, Council of Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/21576/how_to_read_brazils_stance_on_iran.html (accessed June 2, 2010)


²⁹⁹ Roberts, Adam (2008). *Variable Geometry: Is anyone in charge of today's non-polar world?* *Internationale Politik*, Fall 2008

³⁰⁰ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. The Ottawa Treaty has been signed by 122 governments so far, but not so by Russia, China and the United States (www.icbl.org)

³⁰¹ Weiss, Thomas G. *The Illusion of UNSC reform*. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 147-166, Autumn 2003

accepted the North American Free Trade Association and participation in the World Trade Organization, it has spurned important multilateral regimes, relating to arms control, the environment, war crimes, human rights, and other emerging global issues”- a strategy critics have called “international law à la carte,”³⁰² while readily assuming the role as exceptional power. As Charles Krauthammer, a conservative commentator put it in 1990, “our best hope for safety in such times (...) is in American strength and will (...) to lead a unipolar world unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them.”³⁰³

Does this mean that the United States is less integrated into the Western World Order than the United Kingdom, a country that is part of virtually all international institution, ranging from the UN Security Council, NATO, the EU, the ICC and the Ottawa Treaty?



Map of all countries that have signed the Ottawa Treaty (Source: <http://www.icbl.org/intro.php>)

The fact that the United States remains outside of a series of international treaties, and its occasional disrespect for institutions (such as President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003) indeed requires further explanation.

A sense of exceptionalism and its preponderant position can explain US behavior to some degree. American uniqueness is a recurring topic in American history; already prior to independence, settlers of the thirteen colonies shared a strong sense of exceptionalism³⁰⁴- due to religious zeal and geographic isolation. While several historians, such as Ian Tyrell, have repudiated the role of American exceptionalism³⁰⁵, it continues to play a major role in both the media and academia.³⁰⁶ There is, as a consequence, a strong tradition of anti-

³⁰² Spiro, Peter J. (2000). The New Sovereignists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 2000), pp. 9-15

³⁰³ Krauthammer, Charles (1990). The Unipolar Moment. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 1, America and the World 1990/91 (1990/1991), pp. 23-33

³⁰⁴ Chaplin, Joyce E (2003). Expansion and Exceptionalism in Early American History. *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 89, No. 4 (Mar., 2003), pp. 1431-1455. Exceptionalism has been a theme in other countries as well, such as the German “Sonderweg” (Jacobsen, Hanns-D. Correspondence on American exceptionalism, *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No.2 (Spring 2000), p.4)

³⁰⁵ Tyrell, Ian (1991). American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History. *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 96, No. 4 (Oct., 1991), pp. 1031-1055

³⁰⁶ Kammen, Michael (1993). The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration. *American Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Mar., 1993), pp. 1-43. See also, for example: Puar, Jasbir K (2004). Abu Ghraib: Arguing against Exceptionalism. *Feminist Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2, The Prison Issue (Summer, 2004), pp. 522-534

internationalism in America, and it can be regarded as an irony of history that a nation that relished political isolation came to create the post-War Western international order. American preponderance complicates matters further. Richardson points out that “the United States may not be hegemonic, but it is preponderant, its influence not just greater than that of others, but different in kind.”³⁰⁷ As the strongest and richest nation on earth, the United States is the only country that can - temporarily, at least - disrespect international institutions and, as anti-internationalists point out, “afford to safeguard its sovereignty.”³⁰⁸ The United States has been in a unique position of the Western World Order since its inception - in the position of owner and manager of the system.³⁰⁹ One can therefore argue that the concept of American exceptionalism is indeed valid in the context of international relations.³¹⁰ Following a classic realist argument, the United States at times abstains from or confronts international institutions due to its exceptional power.³¹¹ Despite the United States’ rejection of a series of international institutions, it remains the provider of the most important global public good, security, vital for maintaining the stability of today’s Western World Order.³¹²

The vast majority of international regimes that exist are purely open, democratic and rule-based. Several take time to change. The International Criminal Court, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention of the Rights of the Child are examples for institutions that allow immediate unconditional integration. Yet, critics rightly point out that some of the key international institutions that make up the Western World Order are not as easy to join as Ikenberry likes to claim. The World Bank and the IMF are often used as examples of non-democratic institutions. When looking at IMF quota shares as a multiple of world GDP share, Belgium is, after Saudi Arabia, the most overrepresented country of all, with a factor of over 2.5.³¹³ Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega said after the IMF meeting in Istanbul in 2009 that “we can only hope that over-represented advanced countries will realize that they may do great harm to the fund if they attempt to block or delay quota and voice reform.”³¹⁴

³⁰⁷ James L. Richardson (2008). The Ethics of Neoliberal Institutionalism. In: The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

³⁰⁸ Spiro, Peter J. (2000). The New Sovereignists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 2000), pp. 9-15

³⁰⁹ Ikenberry, John G. and Wright, Thomas (2008). *Rising Powers and Global Institutions*. Century Foundation, 2008

³¹⁰ As Seymour Martin Lipset points out in “American Exceptionalism- A Double-Edged Sword”, American exceptionalism is also a cultural phenomenon. In particular, he argues that what is so particular about American exceptionalism is the “American Creed”: Liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism and laissez-faire. (Lipset, Seymour Martin (1996). *American Exceptionalism- A Double-Edged Sword*, 1996) The cultural differences between Europe and the United States are a widely discussed topic in both the media and academia. Discussing American exceptionalism and American peculiarities such as the death penalty, Hanns-D. Jacobsen points out that “the United States would not qualify for membership in the European Union” (Jacobsen, Hanns-D. *Correspondence on American exceptionalism*, *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No.2 (Spring 2000), p.4)

³¹¹ John Bolton, Should we take global governance seriously?, *Chicago Journal of International Law*, Vol. 1, p.205- 221, Fall 2000

³¹² Ikenberry, G. John (2004). Review: Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2004), pp. 144-154

³¹³ The Economist Correspondent (2009). *Cosmetic Surgery?* October 1, 2009

³¹⁴ Mantega, Guido (2009). Statement, International and Financial Committee, Istanbul, October 4, 2009; <http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/releases/2009/outubro/Guido-Mantega-Statement-IMFC-04-10.pdf> (accessed December 24, 2009)

Power continues to play a role, but that does not alter the collaborative and liberal nature of the system. Liberal institutionalists do not deny that large powers use bargaining power in multilateral negotiations, sometimes described as the “coordination of the powerful”, to obtain the results they most prefer. Actors, as Stein points out, have different endowments and different possibilities and different bargaining strengths, and institutions cannot entirely undo these differences.³¹⁵ A similar situation occurs when a group of powerful nations create a club, forcing those outside to choose between joining and staying out. A country’s behavior towards the international system thus reflects both a country’s hard power and its view on norms. Lisa Martin is right when she points out that too often, international institutions change too slowly to adequately reflect shifts in the distribution of power between states. But there are plenty of examples that show that change is taking place. Institutions, as Giovanni Sartori points out, are “first and above all instruments which limit, restrain and allow for the control of the exercise of political power.”³¹⁶ Even the system’s critics admit that despite its inadequacies, it succeeds in significantly limiting the returns to power.

Despite the criticism, the Bretton Woods institutions are relatively flexible, and Brazil’s and India’s interest proves their attractiveness. While it is true that both the IMF and the World Bank have been slow to modify their voting structures, there is no legal impediment that prevents non-established powers to assume a more powerful role in either institution. Quite to the contrary, as World Bank President Zoellick pointed out in 2009, adjustments in the voting structure show that the Bank seeks to balance power between developed and developing countries.³¹⁷ In addition, it seems to be only a question of time before the rule that the IMF President must be European and the World Bank President American will be dropped.³¹⁸ If a rising power is willing to increase its financial contributions to the Bretton Woods institutions, as Brazil and India have pledged to do in 2009, they can - with some delay - expect to be granted more powers in the organizations’ decision making process. Both countries’ harsh criticism can possibly be interpreted as a negotiation strategy to increase pressure on the institutions to adopt change faster. This does not mean that there is no room for improvement in the ways these institutions are governed, but it repudiates the claim that the Bretton Woods institutions are closed elitist clubs. In the vast majority of cases, established powers have been willing to put principles of inclusion over cultural cohesion, for example, by integrating Japan into virtually all closed clubs, such as the G7 or the OECD.

The UN Security Council is therefore 'the exception that proves the rule.' It is indeed closed, non-democratic and hierarchical, but can largely be explained not by the United States’ wish to exclude others, but by historical context. The creation of an exclusive, veto-

³¹⁵ Arthur A. Stein (2008). Neoliberal Institutionalism, in: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

³¹⁶ Giovanni Sartori (1994). *Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*. London: Macmillan, 1994. In: G. John Ikenberry, 2001. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

³¹⁷ Zoellick, Robert (2009). Annual Meetings Opening Press Conference, October 2, 2009; <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,print:Y~isCURL:Y~contentMDK:22336798~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html> (accessed January 7, 2010)

³¹⁸ Caroll, Rory (2009). Obama wants Lula as next World Bank President, Brazilian magazine says; <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/02/obama-lula-world-bank> (accessed June 4, 2009)

wielding Security Council was seen as a necessary measure, given the recently failed attempt to establish a more open and democratic League of Nations. Rather than grounding itself on the principle of *vae victis* (“Woe to the conquered ones”)³¹⁹, the post World War II institutions sought to reintegrate the losers of the conflict. The following five decades would prove Roosevelt and his colleagues right, since the United Nations turned out to be more resilient and practical than its predecessor. Despite its relative importance, the UN Security Council can therefore not overshadow the multitude of other institutions whose openness support Ikenberry’s claim. The Western system is, in several instances, inconsistent, but the basic gist of the western system remains valid.

Objections and critics of the Western World Order are frequent but proof of the system’s strength and openness. In addition, objections to the Western World Order of underrepresentation and injustice in international institutions are frequent because there is international diplomatic space within which the critique takes place. That place is a Western creation. The key international institutions of the Western World Order, such as the United Nations, offer a highly visible platform for critics of the very system. System critics such as Fidel Castro, Hugo Chavez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have all used the General Assembly to criticize the manager of the Western system. Global media and universities offer further vehicles for critics to voice their concerns. Institutions thus provide a better space for opposing the greater West because formalized procedures legitimize differences of opinion. The legalistic institutions designed by the West are precisely the vehicles used by fringe nations to most effectively express their grievances. There has never been any comparable safe space in any previous world system. Examples such as the 1989 *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie, issued by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini³²⁰, and the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy in (2005-06), which caused more than 100 deaths³²¹, show that this international space which provides a safe haven for critical voices remains unique. In few other places can one safely rebuke the authorities. This criticism cannot be explained by Marxists, who, as Benno Teschke rightly argues, wrongly characterize peripheral actors as mere “passive recipients rather than as active participants in specific geopolitical encounters (...)”, an assertion which, according to Teschke, raises the charge of Eurocentrism.³²²

Furthermore, given the numerous asymmetries and problems institutions suffer, it would be premature to announce their triumph. Several existing institutions need to undergo reform in order to remain relevant. Rather, it is the institutions’ underlying procedures that have triumphed. Occasional inconsistencies in the Western World Order are unlikely to ever be eliminated entirely. They reflect a natural tension between idealism and realpolitik.³²³ For example, U.S. Presidents Nixon and Reagan were guided by a more Machiavellian rationale and often supported authoritarian regimes that were human rights violators, in order to

³¹⁹ Von Bernstorff, Count (1924). Germany and the League. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Mar. 15, 1924), pp. 390-396

³²⁰ Piscatori, James (1990). The Rushdie Affair and the Politics of Ambiguity Author. International Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 4, 1990

³²¹ Keane, David (2008). Cartoon Violence and Freedom of Expression, Human Rights Quarterly Volume 30, Number 4, November 2008

³²² Teschke, Benno (2008). Marxism. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

³²³ Ikenberry, G. John (2004). Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age. Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), pp. 609-630

secure the greater national interest of regional stability.³²⁴ The Carter and Clinton administrations, on the other hand, have been influenced by idealist ideology, seeking to strengthen international institutions.³²⁵ Realpolitik has historically been an obstacle to Western idealist principles. Yet critics who point to problems with the specific decision-making rules within some institutions fail to appreciate that this discussion can only take place because we have begun to think within a framework based on procedures and rules as the guiding principle for international politics. This proves how strong and effective this procedures-based paradigm has become, and specific problems in some institutions do not weaken the overall argument.

The same argument applies to the institutions' effectiveness. Critics also point out that today's institutions often fail to deliver solutions to global challenges. While the World Trade Organization is highly democratic, its members have failed to strike a comprehensive agreement over the past years. This does not, however, mean that the WTO has lost its legitimacy. Quite to the contrary, in a democratic system, finding solutions naturally becomes more difficult, as is visible in national parliaments across the world.

Fringe states, some of them the system's fiercest critics, inadvertently prove the consistency of the Western World Order. If the critics' claims were true, and institutions were hegemonic, violent, economically coercive and imperialist, non-Western countries would not want to join Western institutions. They would engage in classic power balancing behavior, as realists would expect it. Emerging non-Western powers, such as Brazil and India, however, seem to make a serious effort to join the existing international institutions- they want to be part of an open, fair, democratic, rule-based, law-based world order. In a similar fashion, Lisa Martin points out that "the trend towards institutionalization is not accidental, nor is it something that is being imposed on reluctant governments. It is the result of government choice."³²⁶ They do so because they reckon that joining the system provides maximum benefits. Ultimately, Ikenberry claims, power is based on sustained economic growth. The best way to achieve growth (and thus to become powerful) is by integrating into a system that provides benefits.³²⁷ As Brazil's then-President Fernando Henrique Cardoso pointed out in 2000, "there is little to be gained by clinging to old-fashioned models of autarky and of refusing to integrate (...)." ³²⁸

Critics respond that many developing nations were coerced to join the Western World Order, especially since the 1970s when the first major debt crisis between the West and the developing countries started. Gramscian thinkers argue that poor countries had no other choice but to accept the IMF's help and implement neo-liberalist policies. Lloyd Gruber points out that if a few powerful states create a system, they change the status quo, making

³²⁴ Bell, Cora (1984). *The First Term: From Carter to Reagan*. Foreign Affairs. Special Essay: America and the World 1984

³²⁵ Kaufmann, Burton I. Scott Kaufmann (2003). *The Presidency of James Earl Carter*. Lowrance, KS: Kansas University Press, 2003. See also: Lowry, Rich (2004) *Paying the Price for the Clinton Years*, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Press, 2003

³²⁶ Martin, Lisa L. (1999). An institutionalist view. In: Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

³²⁷ G. John Ikenberry (2008). The Rise of China and the Future of the West, *Foreign Affairs*; Jan/Feb2008, Vol. 87 Issue 1, p23-37

³²⁸ Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (2000). An Age of Citizenship. *Foreign Policy*, No. 119, Summer, 2000, pp. 40-43

non-members worse off. As an example, he argues that Italy was worse off when Germany and France created the European Monetary System (EMS), which forced Italy to join.³²⁹

But coercion cannot explain rising powers' behavior. Gruber may be right regarding to regional financial clubs, but it is unlikely to apply to all global institutions. Quite to the contrary, the structure of many international institutions is such that there is a 'free rider' problem, which benefits non-members. The case of India and the NPT is a good example. India enjoys the benefits of a world without nuclear proliferations, but does not subject itself to inspections. And, while developing countries may have indeed been coerced to accept IMF credit, Brazil's and India's decision to join the IMF as lenders was entirely voluntary and cannot be explained by coercion. In addition to helping nations such as Brazil and India rise, the Western World order helps them protect their interests, symbolized by Brazil's numerous victories in trade disputes. Lisa Martin captures Brazil's and India's rationale when she argues that

Concerns about the distribution of benefits among the members of institutions are real, and are inherent in politics in a world of power asymmetries. But the appropriate response to such concerns seems to lie in more careful consideration of how institutions can be designed so as to provide benefits to the weak, rather than in rejecting the strategy of institutionalization wholesale.³³⁰

The end of the Cold War is perhaps the most powerful example to prove the attractiveness of the Western World Order.³³¹ Rather than excluding a former rival, Western leaders decided to integrate a weakened Russia with the same rationale as Roosevelt towards the end of World War II, when he argued that China be included as a member of the UN Security Council, reasoning that "in 40 or 50 years' time China might easily become a very powerful (...) nation."³³² And, more importantly, the institutions such as NATO continued to function, contrary to what realist scholars such as Mearsheimer had predicted.³³³ This showed that the institution were in fact durable, and that they did not fall apart once the common external threat had disappeared.³³⁴ Furthermore, the Soviet Union acquiesced to a united and strong Germany tied to NATO because Soviet leaders knew that the institutional aspects of the Western World Order made it highly unlikely that NATO would take advantage of the

³²⁹ Gruber, Lloyd (2000). *Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

³³⁰ Martin, Lisa L. (1999). An institutionalist view. In: Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

³³¹ Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry (1991). The International Sources of Soviet Change. *International Security*, Vol. 16, No.3 (Winter 1991-1992) pp.74-118.

³³² Ikenberry, G. John (2008). The Rise of China and the Future of the West, *Foreign Affairs*; Jan/Feb2008, Vol. 87 Issue 1, p23-37

³³³ Mearheimer, John J. (1990). Why we will soon miss the Cold War. *The Atlantic Monthly* 266: 35-50, 1990

³³⁴ Several scholars rightly predicted that NATO would live on. See, for example, Klein Bradley S.(1990). How the West was One: Representational Politics of NATO. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 3, Special Issue: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies (Sep., 1990), pp. 311-325

faltering Soviet Union.³³⁵ Similarly, German reunification was acceptable to Soviet leaders only because the new nations would be deeply enmeshed and tied down in the existing security structures. In fact, some Soviet analysts at the time even argued that a neutral Germany would be more dangerous than a Germany integrated into NATO. During a conference in 1990, James Baker asked Gorbachev: “Assuming unification takes place, what would you prefer: a united Germany outside NATO and completely autonomous, without American forces stationed on its territory, or a united Germany that maintains its ties with NATO, but with the guarantee that NATO jurisdiction or troops would not extend west of the current line?” Embedding Germany into the military structure of the Western World Order seemed to be preferable even to those not integrated into this very order. It was not the US, but NATO that eventually won the Cold War and assured the peaceful transition. US behavior is another indicative behavior for the strength of the constitutional character of the Western World Order. Rather than using unrestrained power, the United States pursued an “institution building agenda”, and promoted NATO extension, the creation of NAFTA, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).³³⁶

The reactions to the US’ unrestrained behavior in 2003 are proof that nations across the world are invested in the system and have the freedom to oppose the strongest nation.³³⁷ The Western World Order is more than simply an American world order.³³⁸ The international backlash, largely channeled through the international institutions (the UN Security Council), contributed to the US’ growing isolation and the election of a President who promised to strengthen America’s insertion into the international system. As Arthur Stein points, out, “the complaint of US unilateralism only makes sense in a world where the presumption is that states do not act unilaterally as a matter of course.”³³⁹ Actors believe in multilateralism because they have developed trust in a system that genuinely promotes such multilateralism. These are, as Doyle had already pointed out in 1983, “the normal workings of a liberal alliance of independent republics.”³⁴⁰ The Western World Order survived even at the height of American unipolarity (when many analysts argued the US suffered from the ‘imperial temptation’ and was intent on ‘world domination’³⁴¹) at the beginning of the 21st century. Yet even then, the United States did not become an empire in the classic sense, but rather the leading actor in “an open and democratic order that has no name or historical

³³⁵ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

³³⁶ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

³³⁷ Ikenberry, G. John (2004). *Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age*. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), pp. 609-630

³³⁸ Keohane, Robert O. (2005). Preface to the 2005 Edition. In: Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

³³⁹ Stein, Arthur A. (2008). *Neoliberal Institutionalism*, in: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008 See also: Martin, Lisa L. *An institutionalist view*. In: Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall (1999, eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

³⁴⁰ Doyle, Michael W. (1983). *Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs*. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer, 1983), pp. 205-235

³⁴¹ See, for example: Johnson, Chalmers. *The Sorrow of Empire. Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004

antecedent.”³⁴² This was largely because America realized that being a major player in a democratic system is both more effective and less costly than an imperialist system of American rule.³⁴³ It is the same logic that leads Ikenberry to predict the system’s survival once China becomes the world’s most powerful nation.³⁴⁴ This prediction may strike many as counterintuitive, as it is hard to imagine an autocratic China to lead and sustain global system that is fundamentally democratic. Yet most likely, the mutual benefits are too large, and the global challenges too threatening to be ignored by China. With regard to specific issue-areas, such as human rights, this may temporarily lead to tensions, but they will unlikely be of a different kind than the ones we are experiencing today.

America’s relative decline and the institution’s continued attractiveness underlines the strength of the very system. The Western World order is not merely an American World Order. Today’s international regimes may have been created under US hegemony, but they are maintained even after the conditions that allowed their rise have disappeared, giving rise to “post-hegemonic cooperation.”³⁴⁵ The weakening of U.S. economic preponderance, Robert Gilpin and Paul Kennedy argued in the 1980s, would eventually cause the public institutions that constituted the Western World Order to collapse.³⁴⁶ They argued that the United States would simply no longer be able to underwrite the institutions.³⁴⁷ Similarly, Michael Doyle argued in 1983 that the decline of U.S. hegemonic leadership may pose dangers for the liberal world,³⁴⁸ and Charles Kindleberger said that “for the world economy to be stabilized, there needs to be one stabilizer.”³⁴⁹ Yet despite the founder’s reduced economic weight, the Western World Order has not lost its attractiveness, which shows that it is more than a purely US-led order.³⁵⁰ Despite an intensification of American power after 1990, the order has strengthened.³⁵¹ While the United States’ participation is still crucial for institutions such as NATO, the Western World Order possesses an integrity beyond American preponderance, and further US decline in the future is unlikely to undo the Western World Order. This is because according to the model developed, what matters are the institutions and the Western-inspired practices they are based on. After China will have become the world’s largest

³⁴² Ikenberry, G. John (2004). Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), pp. 609-630

³⁴³ Ikenberry, G. John (2004). Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), pp. 609-630

³⁴⁴ Ikenberry, G. John (2008). The Rise of China and the Future of the West, *Foreign Affairs*; Jan/Feb2008, Vol. 87 Issue 1, pp. 23-37

³⁴⁵ Keohane, Robert O. (2005). Preface to the 2005 Edition. In: Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

³⁴⁶ Gilpin, Robert (1975). *US Power and the Multinational Corporation*. New York: Basic Books, 1975

³⁴⁷ Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry (1993). The Logic of the West. *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter, 1993/1994), pp. 17-25

³⁴⁸ Doyle, Michael W. (1983). Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer, 1983), pp. 205-235

³⁴⁹ Kindleberger, Charles P. (1973). *The World in Depression, 1929- 1939*. Berkeley: Berkeley University Press, 1973

³⁵⁰ Keohane, Robert O. (1984). *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

³⁵¹ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

economy around 2025, this Western system can very well live on under Chinese leadership.³⁵² In fact, Robert Keohane even argues that the emergence of the Kyoto Protocol and the creation of the International Criminal Court without U.S. leadership show that new global institutions can exist without the United States, arguing that “there is little reason to believe that hegemony is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the emergence of cooperative relationships.”³⁵³ If its rules are widely considered legitimate by nation-states, markets, and civil society, the Western system can very well continue despite the decline of its creator, the United States.³⁵⁴ In the 19th century, liberal order rested, as Albright points out, on British hegemony³⁵⁵, yet the power transition on top went smoothly without systemic upheaval.

Contrary to what Marxist theory claims, the Western World Order is not a hegemonic construct, but a constitutional one.³⁵⁶ It may need a hegemon to create regimes, but they can live on after hegemony.³⁵⁷ After World War II, the dominant power did not divide the world up into spheres of influence as it had happened in imperialist times. The absence of such divisions enabled fringe nations to compete directly with the core, allowing it to become part of the same system.³⁵⁸ The system’s power does not solely rest on one country, but on a sustained network, contrasting the concept of hegemony. Further, more, the “win-win structure” implicit in the Western World Order causes it to be self-replicating, which causes strong incentives for others to take part. As Ikenberry argues, the international system in place since WWII is different from any other system in modern history.³⁵⁹

Ikenberry and Wright stress these differences when they argue that

These multilateral institutions and security pacts are not simply functional mechanisms that generate collective action. They also are elements of political architecture that allow states within the order to do business with each other. The liberal character of the international order provides access points and opportunities for political communication and reciprocal influence. In effect, the political architecture has given the postwar order its distinctive liberal hegemonic character. Rules, institutions, networks, and political relationships are embedded in this order giving it its overall character: an open and expandable liberal order, one in which the powerful capitalist democracies are tied together through alliances and governance

³⁵² Ikenberry, G. John (2008). *The Rise of China and the Future of the West*, *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 2008, Vol. 87 Issue 1, pp. 23-37. See also: Keohane, Robert O (1984). *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

³⁵³ Keohane, Robert O. (2005). Preface to the 2005 Edition. In: Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

³⁵⁴ Guzzini, Stefano (1998). *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: the Continuing Story of a Death Foretold*. New York: Routledge, 1998.

³⁵⁵ Arrighi, Giovanni (2003). *The Social and Political Economy of Global Turbulence*. *New Left Review* 2.20 (2003): 11.

³⁵⁶ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

³⁵⁷ Keohane, Robert O. (1984). *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

³⁵⁸ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

³⁵⁹ Ikenberry, John G. and Wright, Thomas (2008). *Rising Powers and Global Institutions*. Century Foundation, 2008

institutions; an order that, more so than in the past, is built around agreed-upon universal rules that allow access and participation by a wide and growing array of states; and an order in which the material benefits of the open system flow in all directions.³⁶⁰

Types of International Order

	Balance of Power	Hegemonic	Constitutional
Organizing principle	Anarchy	Hierarchy	Rule of Law
Restraints on concentrated power	Counterbalancing coalitions	None	Binding institutions
Source of stability	Equilibrium of power	Preponderance of power	Limits on the return to power

Source: G. John Ikenberry (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

There can be significant variations within each category. Hegemonic orders, for example, can be extreme and take the form of empires, in which weak states are coerced and not fully sovereign. They can also be more benevolent, and built around some consensual, institutionalized principle. There are, naturally, borderline cases in which it is unclear whether a certain political order is a strongly benevolent form of hegemonic order, or whether institutional restraints on the exercise of power are already so strong that we can speak of constitutionalism (“weak constitutionalism”). As Ikenberry points out, in a purely constitutional order, power is tamed by making it less consequential, reducing the incentives for states to move towards classic hegemonic and balance of power orders.³⁶¹

One of the key characteristics of the Western World Order is intra-institutional mobility and flexibility, which proves that the theory of hegemonic stability is misguided. Japan and South Korea rose from poor isolated nations into rich well-integrated actors. So are Brazil and India today, several decades after South Korea’s rise. The theory of hegemonic stability (THS), which presupposes a rigid hierarchy in the system held in place by a hegemonic power, is also mistaken.³⁶² The rise of non-established powers and relative decline of the United States is a powerful riposte to such claims. The system is not rigid, but fluid. It is not hierarchical, but democratic, allowing powers to rise (such as China) and fall (such as the Soviet Union) within the system without causing systemic damage.

The first two decades after the end of the Cold War were marked by a constitutional world order with occasional and limited hegemonic elements due to US unilateralism. Several analysts have, since the end of the Cold War, written about potential combinations between the hegemonic and constitutional world order, and Ikenberry’s concept of “weak constitutionalism” is proof of that discussion. Yet as rising powers such as China, Brazil and India emerge, a hegemonic type of international order is no longer an option in an

³⁶⁰ Ikenberry, John G. and Wright, Thomas (2008). *Rising Powers and Global Institutions*. Century Foundation, 2008

³⁶¹ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

³⁶² For a further discussion, see Gilpin, Robert (1972). *The politics of transnational relations*. in *Transnational Relations and World Politics*. Keohane Robert O. and J.S. Nye (ed.) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972

increasingly multipolar world. Rather, we witness a constitutional order with elements of balance of power politics. Given that our current constitutional order is highly stable, realist analysts' predictions that we are entering a phase similar to that of the 19th century in Europe on a global scale are flawed. Rather, we may experience a stable constitutional system with some influence of balance of power politics. Rising powers engage in balancing behavior (e.g. by increasing its military strength) because they do not fully trust the validity of the constitutional order. Balancing does not mean that they reject the rule-based order; rather, nations see it as an insurance they can resort to if other nations break the rules.

Given this scenario, it will be increasingly important to study the potential tension between constitutional and balance of power elements in the international system and understand the nature of this interaction. In general, we can point out that there are two possibilities for this to take place- balance of power within the constitutional framework, and outside of it. The vast majority of balancing will take place within the institutions, a behavior termed "soft balancing"³⁶³, seen in the World Trade Organization, where developing countries joined to challenge the developed countries' position. This behavior does not prove realist scholars right who expect balancing; rather, it proves the strength of the constitutional system.

Yet when the constitutional order proves too weak, emerging actors will engage in balancing behavior outside of the institutional framework, which will create tension between the two different types of international order, principally because they treat power very differently. This may be particularly true in regions where the institutional density is low, such as in Asia. India, aided by the United States, is already engaging in balancing behavior against China in the security realm. While a sophisticated constitutional system like today's reduces the returns to power, it will not entirely eliminate them. Power thus still matters, and as a consequence, there will be some balancing behavior. Balance of power dynamics outside of the institutions may thus very well pose the major challenge to the deepening of the constitutional system. Modern balancing behavior, however, is likely to be different from traditional cases, such as during the Cold War, since all countries are deeply embedded into the existing structures. India may very well balance China militarily in the future, but it will occur against the backdrop of a plethora of institutions that tie the two nations together- such as the WTO, the G20, possibly soon the UN Security Council, and the institution to deal with climate change. The two types are thus not mutually exclusive. The Western World Order is likely to gain strength as the number of committed members steadily rises, increasing institutions' ability to provide solutions to pressing global problems such as climate change. This will increase the institutions' legitimacy further, creating a virtuous cycle. But it would be overly optimistic to assume that balance of power will disappear entirely.

After introducing the concept of the Western World Order, a question remains. How 'Western' is the Western World Order, i.e., in how far is the Western World Order a product of Western culture? Is the Western World Order merely procedural, as claimed above, or is it also about content? We have shown that Western nations have created the Western World Order after World War II. As Ikenberry points out, many of the institutions created

³⁶³ Paul, T.V. (2005). Soft Balancing in the Age of Hegemony. *International Security*, Volume 30, Number 1, Summer 2005, pp. 46-71

resembled those that had already existed domestically in the United States.³⁶⁴ This suggests that the United States had an advantage since it merely had to copy the structures at home and apply them to the globe. He also shows that the United States established the system in the first place in order to integrate as many nations as possible, and restrain its power to some degree in order to increase acceptance and thus the longevity of the system.³⁶⁵ It is difficult to tell whether a non-Western nation would have been willing and able to create a similar order. There is virtually no historical evidence of non-Western nations who limited their power after winning a war in order to create a more stable order. On the other hand, there is a lot of evidence that Western victors have done so, most notably in 1815, 1919, and in 1945. Yet, this can be explained by the simple fact that Western nations won the large majority of major wars over the last centuries. In addition, a balkanized Europe with frequent wars lent itself very well to the creation of rules and specific types of order after conflicts. There is thus no ultimate proof that non-Western nations could not have created a stable order similar to the Western World Order. The more interesting question is, in how far does it westernize the countries that decide to become part of it?

There are two fundamentally different ways we can think of and theorize on these questions. The first interpretation is that the Western World Order is made up of rule-based institution which have nothing to do with culture. The democratic rules and norms are above culture and purely procedural, not substantive. We shall call this the strong version.

The weak version, on the other hand, would be that the rules and norms established by the United States are historically bound, tied to so-called “Western attitudes”. In his 1835 work *Democracy in America*, the French writer Alexis de Toqueville explored the effects of the rising equality of social conditions on Western society. He argued that a democratic system severely changed culture.³⁶⁶ Accepting this argument, we could expect the countries that join the Western World Order to westernize culturally as well. There is some empirical evidence to back up this claim. Cortell and David, for example, argue that, once a country joins an international institution, domestic actors increasingly frame their argument in the context of the institution.³⁶⁷ In addition, international institutions are more intrusive than ever before. Surprise monitoring of nuclear sites, once unimaginable, has become the norm. Strobe Talbott, former Undersecretary of State, famously argued that expanding NATO would promote democratization in Eastern Europe.³⁶⁸

One cannot deny that the Western World Order has a domestic analogy in Western liberal democracies, and that these democracies, in turn, did certainly not evolve in a vacuum untouched by cultural aspects. But as we have shown in section 1.1.1. (What is the West?), none of these values or political structures can be described as inherently Western. Membership in some institutions, such as the WTO, may have domestic consequences,

³⁶⁴ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

³⁶⁵ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

³⁶⁶ de Toqueville, Alexis (2003). *Democracy in America*. London: Penguin Classics, 2003

³⁶⁷ Cortell, A.P., and Davis, J.W. (1996). How do international institutions matter? The domestic impact of international rules and norms. *International Studies Quarterly*, 40: 451-78

³⁶⁸ Strobe, Talbott (1995). Why Nato should Grow. *The New York Review of Books*, August 10, 1995, pp. 1-2

forcing previously shielded industries to open up, or to accept certain rules regarding labor conditions. But to argue that the success of the Western World Order westernizes its members is to overlook the fact that ‘Western values’ are a largely void concept.

Thus, we can affirm that the Western World Order affects domestic structures and values of countries that integrate, largely by changing the costs and benefits of various alternatives.³⁶⁹ The ‘Western World Order’ is therefore not entirely procedural. There is a relation between procedure and content. However, as our previous analysis has shown, this content does not belong uniquely to the West.

The West has certainly triumphed with regard to procedures, and the procedures are likely to live on no matter which country will lead the international order. Yet while procedures and rules are stable, ways of life and values are malleable and change. During the past centuries, Europe and the United States have been able to define modernity, while peoples in other regions sought to copy their values and behavior. So overwhelming was Europe’s and America’s dominance that analysts struggled to differentiate between modernization and what so-called ‘westernization.’³⁷⁰

There is some relationship between the procedural and the content-related issues, and the success of the Western World Order thus certainly helps those to some degree who are able to define modernity to spread the content and the values they champion. The West still plays a key role in defining modernity. As a consequence, the success of the rule-based Western World Order certainly facilitates the spread of concepts such as democracy, human rights and environmental standards. Yet these are not inherently ‘Western’, and soon countries like China may be able to assume leadership in some areas. The rule-based and open Western World Order may at some point help China disseminate its best practices. For example, emerging powers may, in the near future, set global standards with regard to poverty-reduction programs and agricultural innovation. History seems like a useful guide. Free market principles, for example, have traditionally not been part of the West, yet as the United States began to succeed as a result of free trade, the concept was integrated into the Western narrative, and the Western World Order soon began to promote free trade. In the same vein, the Western World Order will be able to integrate and promote practices from China if they prove successful. This may certainly lead to tensions. But the tensions will largely be limited to the question what best practice is and thus should, through the rule-based Western World Order, disseminated.

The key argument that it is the procedural characteristics that make the West special thus remains intact. Conflicts will take place within the system, not between systems. Within a system, those who can define modernity will succeed, and democracy and human rights are likely to benefit from the success of the Western World Order. Yet, the spread of the Western World Order is fundamentally different from ‘cultural westernization’. As has been shown above, human rights and democracy are not inherently Western values. In addition, the Western World Order is not a one-way street, and once rising powers such as China are able to define modernity, they may use the rule-based, open and democratic system to influence value-systems across the world, including in Europe and the United States.

³⁶⁹ Keohane, Robert O. (1984). *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

³⁷⁰ Jacques, Martin (2009). *When China rules the World*. London: Penguin Group, 2009

1.3. *Introducing the fringe*

1.3.1. *Defining the fringe*

Using the criteria of membership in international institutions, we can identify a group of countries that are increasingly powerful, yet not fully integrated into the fifth dimension of the West - the global institutional network - in a way that would adequately reflect their newfound position. These countries may be called the “fringe” of the Greater West. India’s economic and military might, for example, are increasing - yet India is neither a member of the UN Security Council nor the G8, nor has it signed the NPT or joined a major military alliance system such as NATO. In the same way, Brazil is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it is reluctant to join the OECD³⁷¹, and has repeatedly violated the NPT over the past years. Furthermore, Brazil and India are among the WTO members who most frequently issue complaints at the WTO.³⁷² Finally, neither Brazil nor India are keen to embrace Western notions of liberal internationalism such as conditionality on development aid and the ‘responsibility to protect’.

Yet, needless to say, the term ‘fringe’ is problematic because some associate it to inferiority and economic dependence on the center. It is sensible from the Western-centric point of view; it may be condescending, even inaccurate, from the ‘fringe’ point of view.³⁷³ Dividing the world into a center and a fringe evokes the dependency theory, still popular in Brazil and India, which supposes that the rich center systematically exploits the periphery.³⁷⁴ World-system theorist Immanuel Wallerstein created three zones, with a semi-periphery as a buffer between the core and the periphery.³⁷⁵ Taking up Wallerstein’s concept, Rodrigues Vieira, a Brazilian scholar, argues that the BRIC countries are in the semi-periphery, defining them as “countries that are industrialized but have not yet achieved welfare levels comparable to those in the global north”³⁷⁶- that is, his categorization is based on economic development. Paulo Roberto de Almeida, a Brazilian diplomat, describes Brazil as “peripheral”, and argues that it has been one of the few nations on the periphery that has actively participated in the construction of a new economic international order in various epochs.³⁷⁷ In a similar fashion,

³⁷¹ Barbosa, Rubens (2005). O Brasil e a OECD. Estado de São Paulo. December 27, 2005; <http://www.eagora.org.br/arquivo/O-Brasil-e-a-OCDE/> (accessed May 9, 2009)

³⁷² Narlikar, Amrita (2006). Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation: Explaining the Negotiation Strategy of a Rising India, *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1, January 2006, pp. 77-94.

³⁷³ Hart and Sharma, for example, describe stakeholders on the fringe as “the poor, weak, isolated, non-legitimate, and even non-human“. Hart, Stuart L. and Sanjay Sharma. *Engaging Fringe Stakeholders for Competitive Imagination*. *The Academy of Management Executive* (1993-2005), Vol. 18, No. 1 (Feb., 2004), pp. 718

³⁷⁴ Cardoso, Fernando Henrique and Enzo Faletto (1979). *Dependency and Development in Latin America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979

³⁷⁵ Wallerstein, Immanuel (2007). *The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis*. In: *The Globalization and Development Reader: Perspectives and Development and Global Change*, ed., J. Timmons Roberts, and Amy Bellone Hite. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007

³⁷⁶ Rodrigues Vieira, Vinicius (2009). *Reinventing the Wheel: a Comparative Study of Brazilian Foreign Policy under Cardoso and Lula (1995-2007)* Thesis, University of California, Berkeley

³⁷⁷ de Almeida, Paulo Roberto (1999). *O Brasil e o multilateralismo econômico*. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 1999

Brazil's Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs implicitly identifies a fringe when he argues that "Brazil (...) has to react to the political initiatives of the great powers, especially (...) the United States. Brazil has to articulate political, economic and technological alliances with peripheral states of the international system to defend and protect its interests."³⁷⁸

The concept developed here, however, focuses solely on institutions, not on economics. It presupposes no static dependence, but mobility, and facilitates the fringe's integration through a centripetal force. Contrary to Wallerstein and Dependency Theory, this study does not suggest that the core exploits the fringe in any way. Directly opposed to Marxist views, the central argument of this study is that the Western World Order draws the fringe towards and into the center. Looking at Brazil, we can immediately see that it does not merely trade with "the core". Brazil, once economically weak and dependent, has developed, and its most important trading partners, China, the United States and Argentina, are located in different parts of the world (and are part of different categories of Wallerstein's model).

In the interviews for this study, Brazilian and Indian policy struggled to characterize their countries' positions.³⁷⁹ Many prefer to think of their policies as 'multipolar,' or 'reformist.'³⁸⁰ In the 1960s, Brazil sought to adopt an 'independent' strategy, followed by 'responsible pragmatism' in the 1970s.³⁸¹ The discussion about whether Brazil should seek to join the OECD exemplifies this ambivalence. While Rubens Barbosa, an influential former diplomat, argued that Brazil should join the OECD³⁸², joining the 'club of the rich' that essentially symbolizes the West was rejected by the government for ideological reasons.³⁸³ Yet, Brazil has, in comparison to India, developed its capitalist model in close orientation to the West, in comparison with the varied socialist experiments in India.³⁸⁴ Still, Brazilian diplomats usually reject the claim that Brazil is generally "satisfied" with the current world order. This view is supported by Andrew Hurrell, who points out that

There is (...) broad continuity in Brazil's generally negative view of the international economic and political system: the malfunctioning of the global financial system; the continued protectionism in the developed world and the broken trade promises (...); the extent to which multilateralism is under severe challenge, in terms of both the

³⁷⁸ Guimarães, Samuel Pinheiro (2007). Los tres años del gobierno del Presidente de Brasil Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, La Onda Digital, in: Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni. *Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification*. *Third World Quarterly*, 28:7, 1309 - 1326

³⁷⁹ Interview, Brazilian Diplomat, Itamaraty, Brasilia, July 23, 2010.

³⁸⁰ Seitenfus, Ricardo (2006). *O Brasil e suas relações internacionais*, Fernando Schüler e Gunter Axt (Orgs.), *Brasil contemporâneo: crônicas de um país incógnito*, Porto Alegre, Ed. Artes e Ofícios, 2006, pp. 129-150. - 2/10/2006

³⁸¹ Soares de Lima, Maria Regina (2003). *Na trilha de um política externa afirmativa*. Observatorio da Cidadania, 2003

³⁸² Barbosa, Rubens (2005). *O Brasil e a OECD*. Estado de São Paulo. December 27, 2005; <http://www.eagora.org.br/arquivo/O-Brasil-e-a-OCDE/> (accessed May 9, 2009)

³⁸³ Sennes, Ricardo, Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa. *Brazil's Multiple Forms of External Engagement: Foreign Policy Dilemmas* (2005). In: *Reforming from the Top: A Leader's G20 Summit*. J. English, R. Thakur, A.F. Cooper (eds.), 201-229. Tokyo: United Nations University, 2005

³⁸⁴ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). *Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process*, in: Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

difficulties facing the Doha Trade Round and the crisis within the UN as a result of the Iraq conflict.³⁸⁵

The creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, an intergovernmental organization of states considering themselves not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc was an expression of how states that want to neither align or oppose the Western World Order sought to position themselves.³⁸⁶ In India's case, this turned out to be the singular feature of the country's policy since Independence in 1947. Nehru himself often had existential doubts about whether he belonged to the East or the West.³⁸⁷ In articulating India's views, it turned out to be much more aligned with the Soviet Union than with the West.³⁸⁸ In 1976, a constitutional amendment was passed to make India a socialist republic.³⁸⁹ During interviews for this study, Indian interviewees made affirmations as diverse as "India is not part of the West" and "India is essentially part of the West."³⁹⁰ Raja Mohan, an influential Indian foreign policy thinker, sees India "returning to the West" after a misguided alignment with the Third World after Independence. Mohan laments that India was the only democracy that stood against the West during the Cold War on most issues, and former Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh described the history of India's bad relations with the United States as 'fifty wasted years'.³⁹¹

The reason why there are so many neutral or inadequate terms for what is called 'the fringe' is specifically that such terms avoid the question of how to characterize 'fringe nations.' The apparent success of the BRIC label, a largely void term that merely groups four disparate emerging economies³⁹², in both the media and the academic world³⁹³ shows the yearning for an adequate term. The "Second World", a concept developed by Parag Khanna, is a good example for a concept that specifies a group of countries without characterizing or predicting anything specifically.³⁹⁴ "Second World" delineates emerging powers from the Western established powers, but it does not encompass ideas like independence and

³⁸⁵ Hurrell, Andrew (2005). The United States and Brazil: Comparative reflections. In: Hirst, Mônica (2005). The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet Expectations. New York: Routledge, 2005.

³⁸⁶ The movement is largely the brainchild of India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, president of Egypt Gamal Abdul Nasser and Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito.

³⁸⁷ Varma, Pavan K. (2006). Being Indian. Inside the Real India. London: Arrow Book, 2006.

³⁸⁸ Cohen, Stephen P. (2000). India Rising. The Wilson Quarterly (1976-), Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer, 2000), pp. 32-53

³⁸⁹ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

³⁹⁰ Interviews and phone interviews, Indian diplomats, New Delhi, March, April, May, June 2010

³⁹¹ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

³⁹² Hurrell, Andrew (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global power: What space for would-be great powers?, International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1. January 24, 2006

³⁹³ See, for example: Armijo, Leslie (2007). Brazil, to be or not to be a BRIC. Asian Perspective. Vol. 31, No. 4, 2007, pp. 43-70. Armijo, L. (2007). The BRICs Countries as Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?, Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No. 4 August 30, 2007

³⁹⁴ Khanna, Parag (2008). The Second World: Empires and Influence in the new global order. New York: Random House, 2008

multipolarity. “Swing states”, a term frequently used in domestic US politics³⁹⁵, but also used by several international relations scholars, such as Ciorciari, Ajami and Mohan³⁹⁶, does not characterize a state as a whole, it rather reflects a state’s strategy to occasionally switch sides, however, it does not clearly imply any power relationship to other states. George Kennan’s category of “monster countries”³⁹⁷ or Dirk Messner’s category of “anchor countries”³⁹⁸ refers to the size and importance of a group of nations, but not to their position in the context of the Western World Order. The concept of the fringe therefore adequately captures the countries in question. ‘Fringe nations’, on the other hand, implies a specific relation to the Western world as well as their proximity to the non-West.

There are several other examples that exemplify the fringe metaphor and shed light on some of its characteristics. Marking the first use of the term in 1937, T.L. Smith defined the “urban fringe” as “the built-up area just outside of the corporate limits of the city.”³⁹⁹ Thirty years later, Robin Pryor observed that “the fringe varies from city to city (...) in the Netherlands a fringe is barely recognizable, Paris is somewhat similar to the U.S.A. in the intermingling of scatter and land use, but there is a closer dependence on public transport.”⁴⁰⁰

Similar to international politics, defining the fringe is not straightforward: “(...) differentiations have (...) been made, qualitatively, within the fringe: the “urban fringe” and the “rural-urban fringe”⁴⁰¹; the “limited fringe” and the “extended fringe”⁴⁰², the “suburban fringe zone”, the “outlying adjacent area”⁴⁰³ and the “inner and outer fringe areas.”⁴⁰⁴ These zones are defined along rural and urban characteristics. A fringe zone can therefore remain a

³⁹⁵ Abramowitz, Alan I. and Walter J. Stone. *The Bush Effect: Polarization, Turnout, and Activism in the 2004 Presidential Election*. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2004 Presidential Election (Jun., 2006), pp. 141-154

³⁹⁶ Mohan, Raja C. (2006). *India and the Balance of Power*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4, July/August 2006. Explaining power dynamics in the Middle East in 1977, Foud Ajami gives a good example of the characteristics of a swing state: “On the whole, Syria is more salient to Arab politics today than ever before. It is a crucial swing state: if Syria takes a radical course, the rejectionist current- represented by Libya, Iraq, the Palestinians, and extremist groups within other Arab states-- can increase its weight in Arab politics. Opposition to Saudi and Egyptian designs would then become formidable. Similarly, if Syria insists upon the hegemony of an Arab trilateral scheme, opposition to trilateralism would become marginal.” (Ajami, Fouad. *Stress in the Arab Triangle*. *Foreign Policy*, No. 29 (Winter, 1977-1978), pp. 90-108)

³⁹⁷ Kennan, George, F. (1994). *Around the Cragged Hill. A Personal and Political Philosophy*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994

³⁹⁸ Humphrey, John and Dirk Messner. *China and India in the Global Governance Arena* in Schmitt-Beck, R., Debiel, T. and Korte K.-R. (eds), *Governance and Legitimacy in a Globalized World*, Baden-Baden, 2008

³⁹⁹ Smith, T. L. (1937). *The Population of Louisiana: Its Composition and Changes*. Louisiana Bulletin, 293, November 1937

⁴⁰⁰ Pryor, Robin J. (1968). *Defining the Rural-Urban Fringe*. *Social Forces*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Dec., 1968), pp. 202-215

⁴⁰¹ Andrews, R. B. (1942). *Elements in the Urban Fringe Pattern*. *Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics*, 18 (May 1942), pp. 169-183, in: Pryor, Robin J. (1968). *Defining the Rural-Urban Fringe*. *Social Forces*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Dec., 1968), pp. 202-215


⁴⁰² McKain, W. C. and R. G. Burnight (1953). *The Sociological Significance of the Rural-Urban Fringe: From the Rural Point of View*. *Rural* 18 (June 1953), pp. 109-116, in: Pryor, Robin J. *Defining the Rural-Urban Fringe*. *Social Forces*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Dec., 1968), pp. 202-215

⁴⁰³ Reinemann, M. W. (1960). *The Pattern and Distribution of Manufacturing in the Chicago Area*. *Economic Geography*, 36 (1960), pp. 139-144, in: Pryor, Robin J. *Defining the Rural-Urban Fringe*. *Social Forces*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Dec., 1968), pp. 202-215

⁴⁰⁴ Pryor, Robin J. (1968). *Defining the Rural-Urban Fringe*. *Social Forces*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Dec., 1968), pp. 202-215

mixed zone (with rural and urban characteristics), it can “ruralize” (de-urbanize) and detach itself from the city, or it can urbanize, e.g. by increasing population density or by building mass transit systems that improve the connection to the city. In the same context, Whitehand argues that the fringe areas often “cease to be the fringe.”⁴⁰⁵

“Characteristics of the fringe”, according to Pryor, need not be intermediate nor on a continuum between rural and urban, yet distinctive location and internal heterogeneity and transition do make possible a unitary if not uniform definition.”⁴⁰⁶



SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF LAND USE IN THE RURAL-URBAN FRINGE

Source: Pryor, Robin J. (1968). Defining the Rural-Urban Fringe. *Social Forces*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Dec., 1968), pp. 202-215

Institutional fringe status may coincide with cultural fringe status.⁴⁰⁷ “Fringe countries” such as Brazil and India tend to have much in common with the Greater West - democracy, for instance⁴⁰⁸ - but, at the same time, they share several typically non-Western characteristics⁴⁰⁹,

⁴⁰⁵ Whitehand, J. W. R. (1967). Fringe Belts: A Neglected Aspect of Urban Geography. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, No. 41 (Jun., 1967), pp. 223-233

⁴⁰⁶ Pryor, Robin J. (1968). Defining the Rural-Urban Fringe. *Social Forces*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Dec., 1968), pp. 202-215. Another potentially useful metaphor is domestic politics. The popular US-American political spectrum ranges from conservative Republican to liberal Democrat. Yet, there are also independent candidates. If they position themselves between the two major parties, do they necessarily have to adopt a mixture of Republican and Democratic opinions? Or can they truly be independent?

⁴⁰⁷ In both countries, there is an internal debate on identity in the context of foreign policy. Questions such as “How do we relate to the West?” and “Are we part of the West?” appear in the foreign policy literature in both countries. (Mohan, Raja C. (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Pinheiro Guimarães, S. Pinheiro (2006). *Desafios brasileiros na era dos gigantes*. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2006)

⁴⁰⁸ In 2007, US Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns argued that “rarely has the United States shared so many interests and values with a growing power as we do today with India.” (Burns, Nicholas (2007). *America’s Strategic Opportunity with India*. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 8, p. 130-146, 2007)

⁴⁰⁹ Brazil and India are among the most unequal societies in the world according to the Gini Coefficient. While economic growth has reduced poverty, the World Bank predicts that disparity in Brazil and India will persist in the coming years. (“Global Economic Prospects 2008”, World Bank 2008)

such as the memory of colonization.⁴¹⁰ This is reflected in the fringe nations' struggle to reconcile their identities as developing countries and their new roles as emerging global powers.⁴¹¹ Khanna's definition of these rising fringe nations as the "Second World" is a first step, but he does not provide a developed theory or systematic evidence for his categorization. In 2009, *The Economist* wrote that Brazil was seen as the "most Western of the BRICs", implying that Brazil was, in effect, part of the fringe – not fully Western, but in the West's immediate sphere of influence.⁴¹² Juan de Onis writes that Brazil has long been regarded as a "peripheral country."⁴¹³ Cultural aspects, however, are not the focus of this study, and the concept of the fringe will be used entirely with regard to the concept of the "West" developed here. So, for this study, it is possible and profitable to understand the group of nations that are 'on the periphery' of the West concretely, in terms of their membership (or lack thereof) in Western institutions. They are on the 'institutional fringe.'

An important related question is whether being on the institutional fringe is a temporary or a permanent state. Can fringe nations walk the line without being one or the other, or will they inevitably be pulled in one direction? Both realist and liberal theorists implicitly assume that the institutional fringe is a temporary position; for if "towards" or "away" from the Greater West are the only options for nations on the fringe, we can expect rising powers to either fully integrate and become part of the Greater West, or to turn into clear antagonists.⁴¹⁴ Against this, Ciorciari argues that the combination of being a "swing state" and a rising power allows countries to exercise pivotal leverage and "pick and choose" between the West and the non-West, thus maximizing the benefits by remaining on the fringe.

What is the fringe according to the fringe? Foreign policy pronouncements from fringe countries back up Ciorciari's point of view. Policy makers in Brazil and India frequently call their foreign policy strategy "independent".⁴¹⁵ There is evidence of both countries' growing strategic assertiveness and self-confidence in pursuing an "activist foreign policy"⁴¹⁶ beyond their respective regions.⁴¹⁷ In both societies, there is a predominant assumption that their nation has a destiny that has yet to be fulfilled, which has, inevitably, had a strong influence on foreign policy strategy.⁴¹⁸ In 2005, Celso Amorim, Brazil's foreign minister, expressed the desire to "increase, if only by a margin, the degree of multipolarity in

⁴¹⁰ Hurrell, Andrew (2008). Lula's Brazil: A Rising Power, but Going Where? *Current History*, February 2008, pp.51-57

⁴¹¹ Alexandroff, Alan S (2008). Enhancing Engagement. In: *Emerging Powers in Global Governance*, 2008. See also: Herz, Mônica. *Brasil e a Reforma da ONU*. Lua Nova Revista de Cultura e Política, 1999

⁴¹² Economist Correspondent (2009). Whose side is Brazil on? *The Economist*, August 13, 2009

⁴¹³ de Onis Juan. Brazil's Big Moment. A South American Giant Wakes Up. *Foreign Affairs*, 2008

⁴¹⁴ Former US Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns' assessment that fringe nations such as India will at some point become either decidedly Western or non-Western rests on the implicit assumption that fringe nations are on the fringes only temporarily until gravity pulls them in one direction or the other. (Burns, Nicholas, "America's Strategic Opportunity with India", *Foreign Affairs*, 2007)

⁴¹⁵ Hirst, Mônica (2005). *The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet Expectations*. New York: Routledge, 2005.

⁴¹⁶ Zakaria, Fareed (2008). *The Post American World*, 2008

⁴¹⁷ Ganguly, Sumit (2006). Will Kashmir Stop India's Rise? *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, Issue 6, pp.110-122, July/ August 2006

⁴¹⁸ *New Directions in Brazilian Foreign Relations*, Brazil Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 28, 2007

the world.”⁴¹⁹ Both countries are invested in altering the international system. At the same time, they have a strong interest in rising within and engaging with the established structures. Gregory and de Almeida argue that there is a conception in Brazil’s government that “supposes a fixed “peripheral” status for Brazil.”⁴²⁰ Precisely through their unwillingness to position themselves either as fully integrated or completely detached from the Western World Order, Brazil and India implicitly affirm their fringe status.⁴²¹

What is the future of the fringe? If Ciorciari is right that being on the fringe allows states to benefit disproportionately⁴²², we may assume that countries such as Brazil and India will seek to remain on the fringe. This explanation would account for ambiguous strategies that involve both integrative and confrontational elements.⁴²³ One could argue that rising fringe countries may be quite comfortable on the fringe, careful not to align themselves with either the Greater West or the ‘non-West’.⁴²⁴

Finally, at what point would the term ‘fringe’ no longer be appropriate for today’s ‘fringe’ countries? A fringe country can seek complete integration into all institutions that make up today’s Western World Order. Turkey is a good example. It was a founding member of the OECD (1961), it is member of NATO (since 1952), and signed the NPT (1969). Turkey signed a Customs Union agreement with the EU in 1995 and was officially recognized as a candidate for full membership on 12 December 1999, at the Helsinki summit of the European Council. While Turkey is not yet an EU member, its strong institutional commitment makes it part of the core, rather than the fringe. If fringe countries such as Brazil and India sought similarly strong integration (e.g. if Brazil became part of the OECD, the UNSC and NATO), they would cease to be fringe countries. At the same time, countries can reduce their institutional commitment and withdraw from international treaties, like North Korea did when it withdrew from the NPT in 2003.

1.3.2. The Western World Order according to the Fringe

Brazil and India are good representatives of the fringe category. As was shown in detail in section 1.2., Brazil and India are partially integrated into the Western system (as liberal democracies and IMF lenders), but not enough as to represent a purely Western perspective.

⁴¹⁹ Hurrell, Andrew (2008). Lula’s Brazil: A Rising Power, but Going Where? *Current History*, February 2008, pp.51-57

⁴²⁰ Gregory, Denise, and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process. In Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

⁴²¹ Raja Mohan, an Indian scholar, argues that India is in fact part of the West, while Western scholars such as Andrew Hurrell place it on the fringes of the Greater West (Mohan, Raja C. (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s new Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 and Hurrell, Andrew (2006). *Hegemony, liberalism and global power: What space for would-be great powers?*, *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1. January 24, 2006

⁴²² Ciorciari, John D. (2009). *What kind of power will India be?*, IAS Conference Paper, 2009

⁴²³ Some authors have used the term “distributive strategy”, which describes a strategy of distributing the pie rather than trying to expand it. Distributive strategies can sometimes, but not always, be associated with an ideological adherence to positions such as Third Worldism. (Narlikar, Amrita. *Not all that Glitters is Gold: India’s Rise*. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No.5, July 2007)

⁴²⁴ Gregory, Denise, and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process. In Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

Amâncio Oliveira and Janina Onuki describe Brazil as “peripheral, but with potential to play an autonomous role in international politics.”⁴²⁵ India’s leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement and Brazil’s status as an observer indicate a certain distance to the Western-led world order. Brazil and India have aligned in many instances, but they also belonged at some point to the West’s principal opponents. In the 1930s, for example, the Bengali scholar Rabindranath Tagore appealed to India’s masses when he called for pan-Asian spiritualism to counter “Western materialism”.⁴²⁶

Brazil and India traditionally have seen the world through a North vs. South prism, West vs. non-West, and colonizer vs. colonized prism. They developed their identity and created their foreign policy in between these reference points. The questions of how to relate to the Western World Order has always been tied to the question “Who are we? First world or Third world? Western or not?” Maria Regina Soares de Lima, a leading foreign policy scholar in Brazil, sees Brazil torn between “unconditional alignment” with the United States and “globalist model”, which implies an “independent” and “pragmatic” international orientation.⁴²⁷

In the interviews conducted for this study, Brazilian and Indian academics show a heterogeneous understanding of the Western World Order, mixing ideological criticism with pragmatic affirmation. Rhetoric is often anti-Western and highly critical of international institutions such as the IMF, which is often ideologically regarded as a tool of Western dominance. Mohan points to a strong “anti-imperialist” tradition and to nativist ideologies which put India and the West at opposite poles.⁴²⁸ As Oliveira and Onuki point out there is a widespread opinion among Brazilians that given its position at the periphery, Brazil can only engage in “conformism, subordination, without space for courage.”⁴²⁹ And Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, President Lula’s chief foreign policy strategist, divides the world into sovereign states and subordinate ones, the center vs. the periphery, and “contented” states vs. “contesting,” placing Brazil in the latter category of each juxtaposition.⁴³⁰ US-friendly policies in the 1990s driven by “liberal fascination”, only contributed to more subordination, according to Guimarães. Instead, Brazil should “challenge the giants.”⁴³¹ However, this opinion is by no means generally accepted, but frequently criticized as “third worldish” and “dogmatic”, as a Brazilian diplomat called it.⁴³² More pragmatic voices recognize that India’s fundamental values and interests are broadly compatible with those of the West, pointing to

⁴²⁵ de Oliveira, Amâncio Jorge and Janina Onuki (2006). Resenha de “Uma visão ativa da periferia de Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães”, *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais*, outubro, vol.21, número 062, Associação de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Ciências Sociais, São Paulo, pp.154-157

⁴²⁶ The Economist Correspondent (2009). *Banyan: Come together*. Dec 10, 2009

⁴²⁷ Soares de Lima, Maria Regina (2003). *Na trilha de um política externa afirmativa*. Observatorio da Cidadania, 2003

⁴²⁸ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

⁴²⁹ de Oliveira, Amâncio Jorge and Janina Onuki (2006). Resenha de “Uma visão ativa da periferia de Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães”, *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais*, outubro, vol.21, número 062, Associação de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Ciências Sociais, São Paulo, pp.154-157

⁴³⁰ Guimarães, Samuel Pinheiro (2006). *Brasil na Era dos Gigantes*. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2006

⁴³¹ Guimarães, Samuel Pinheiro (2006). *Brasil na Era dos Gigantes*. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2006

⁴³² Telephone interview with a Brazilian diplomat based in Brasília, Brazil, July 1, 2010

its “deeply entrenched democratic heritage, its successful market economy and its open culture and English language.”⁴³³

At the same time, both Brazilian and Indian scholars have often attempted to counteract against the assumption of a ‘teleological Westernization’ (“they all seek to become like the West anyhow”) - which caused them to find a way to somehow do things differently. Former undersecretary of defense Ashton Carter comments that Indian diplomats are “notorious for adhering to independent positions regarding world order.”⁴³⁴ Pinar Bilgin describes fringe nations’ strategy as ‘almost the same but not quite’, suggesting that “‘mimicry’ may be a way of ‘doing’ world politics in a seemingly ‘similar’ yet unexpectedly ‘different’ way”.⁴³⁵ When Brazilian and Indian scholars align with Western or American points of view, they at times apologetically argue that the spread of US approaches can be explained by the emergence of the US as the ‘dominant producer of both ideas and things’, which coincided with and provided a basis for the modernization and/or Westernization projects of elites in various parts of the world.⁴³⁶

In India, for example, different groups characterize the Western World Order in different ways- some as a menace, some as an opportunity. Rahul Sagar identifies four groups that seek to influence India’s foreign policy making at this point: Moralists, Hindu nationalists, strategists and idealists. Moralists contend that India should play an exemplary role in the world, forming an opposition to Western violence and greed. Hindu nationalists contend that India needs to defend Hindu civilization, against Muslims but also against Western cultural influence such as vagary, secularism and modernity in general. Realists say India should increase its military might and become a global power, essentially adopting Western tools. Liberals seek to promote social progress through trade and greater international interdependence, which implies strong engagement with all nations, including the Western ones. These four groups have distinct foreign policy objectives, being “moral exceptionalism, martial vigor, state power, and wealth.”⁴³⁷ They also strongly differ regarding how they frame and interpret the Western World Order. Moralists seek to create a counter-example to the West by creating a large nation with no military might, which is deemed unnecessary. Tagore articulated this in a well-known letter to Yone Noguchi, a Japanese intellectual, ‘Asia’ intended to contrast its ‘great heritages of culture and good neighborliness’ with the ‘rapacious imperialism which some of the nations of Europe were cultivating’.⁴³⁸ This group regards international institutions often as ploys by Western powers

⁴³³ Babbage, Ross (2009). *India’s Strategic Development: Issues for the Western Powers*. In *India’s Strategic Future*, Babbage and Sandy Gordon (eds.), Houndmills, UK: Macmillan. In: Nayar, Baldev Raj. *India as a limited challenger?* T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

⁴³⁴ Carter, Ashton B (2006). *America’s New Strategic Partner?* *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006), pp. 33-44

⁴³⁵ Bilgin, Pinar (2008). *Thinking past ‘Western’ IR?*, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008, pp 5 – 23

⁴³⁶ Bilgin, Pinar (2008). *Thinking past ‘Western’ IR?*, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008, pp 5 – 23

⁴³⁷ Sagar, Rahul (2009). *State of mind: What kind of power will India be?* *International Affairs* 85: 4 (2009) 801–816

⁴³⁸ Rabindranath Tagore (1938). *Letter to Yone Noguchi*, 1 Sept. 1938, in Krishna Dutta and Andrew Robinson, eds, *Rabindranath Tagore: an anthology* (New York: St Martin’s, 1997) In: *State of mind: What kind of power will India be?* Rahul Sagar (2009). *International Affairs* 85: 4 (2009) 801–816

to cheat a well-meaning and naïve India. For example, India views proposals by developed countries for mandatory universal caps on greenhouse gas emissions as ‘green imperialism’ and the NPT regime as ‘nuclear apartheid.’⁴³⁹ To them, dominant powers use a postcolonial discourse that “takes as its essentialist premise a profound ‘otherness’ separating Third World from Western countries”.⁴⁴⁰ In a similar fashion, Hindu nationalists seek to decouple themselves from the West, and ultimately create a civilization that does not need any alliances. There are some contradictions, though, because they envisage a traditional, non-modern lifestyle, but at the same time call for modern arms that can avoid humiliations the Hindus suffered during Muslim and British invasions. Strategists, on the other hand, believe that it must copy the West and join the Western World Order. They argue that India must modernize culturally combat the Hindu belief system that is fatalistic in nature and keeps people from taking the initiative. ‘Rational analysis, so vital to Western societies,’ it argues, ‘has less influence in Indian society’, where a belief in ‘the inability to manipulate events impedes preparation for the future in all areas of life, including the strategic’.⁴⁴¹ Strategists grapple with the Indian mentality that has been described as “*jugaad*”, a colloquial Indian term that translates as ‘a quick fix’ or ‘a work-around’.⁴⁴² Sagar explains that this mentality has its roots in India’s “uneven encounter with modernity: the forms and institutions have been imported or grafted on, but the spirit of modernity, an innate appreciation of rational thinking, has not taken root.”⁴⁴³ While there are fundamental differences between strategists and realists with regard to how the world works, both agree that India must integrate into the Western World Order. Sagar predicts that this pro-Western, collaborative vision will prevail.

A certain ambivalence about Brazil’s and India’s position towards the Western World Order is visible.⁴⁴⁴ Engaging with the Western World Order has provided benefits, but also caused humiliation. The IMF’s influence in the early nineties was so palpable that one economist claimed that “while the rajputs and princely states had a fair degree of autonomy in relation to the British colonial government (...), under IMF-World Bank tutelage, the union minister of finance reports directly to 1818 H Street NW, Washington, D.C., bypassing the parliament and the democratic process.”⁴⁴⁵ In a similar fashion, Joseph Stiglitz compared India’s agreement to the IMF with the “surrender of Maharajas to the British.”⁴⁴⁶

⁴³⁹ Sagar, Rahul (2009). State of mind: What kind of power will India be? *International Affairs* 85: 4 (2009) 801–816

⁴⁴⁰ Gusterson, Hugh (1999). Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination. *Cultural Anthropology*, 14. 1999. In: Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

⁴⁴¹ Tanham, George. (1996) Indian strategic thought: an interpretive essay’, in Bajpai, Kanti and Amitabh Mattoo, eds, *Securing India: strategic thought and practice* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), p. 43; Singh, *Defending India*, pp. 5–9. In: State of mind: What kind of power will India be? Rahul Sagar (2009). *International Affairs* 85: 4 (2009) 801–816

⁴⁴² Varma, Pavan K. (2006). *Being Indian. Inside the Real India*. London: Arrow Book, 2006.

⁴⁴³ Sagar, Rahul (2009). State of mind: What kind of power will India be? *International Affairs* 85: 4 (2009) 801–816

⁴⁴⁴ Nayar, Baldev Raj (1999). *India as a limited challenger?* T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

⁴⁴⁵ Chossudovsky, M. (1993): *India under IMF Rule*, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 22 Issue 6, March 6, 1993

⁴⁴⁶ Stiglitz, Michael (1998). *Globalization and its Discontents*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998

At the same time, there is, in India and Brazil, a growing consciousness that accepting a multilateral order built on U.S. principles has allowed India to grow phenomenally.⁴⁴⁷ A Brazilian diplomat admitted that IMF intervention in Brazil was “crucial”, but that this was “not a popular thing to say.”⁴⁴⁸ Despite their ambivalence about the Western World Order, and their uncertainty about whether they themselves are Western or not, the fringe is probably the party that most explicitly equates the international institutions with the West - there is an ideological predisposition to criticize and refrain from integration, but a pragmatic necessity to join the system to continue to benefit from it and a desire to rise within it. Both countries are thus in critique of the West, but they also use the Western system to their advantage.

Brazil’s and India’s role in the G77 reflects both countries’ journey from ideological critics to pragmatic (and at times reluctant) supporters over the past decades.⁴⁴⁹ As part of the G77 and as an observer of the Non-Aligned Movement, Brazil has historically sought to promote a more prominent role for the UN General Assembly (GA) by envisioning greater GA involvement on questions regarding military intervention, for example.⁴⁵⁰ Some critics have pointed out that Brazil’s attempt to enter the UN Security Council as a permanent member is not entirely about democratizing the UN, but rather about creating an “expanded oligarchy”, as a former Brazilian diplomat has called it. While Security Council Reform is also one of the Non-Aligned Movements goals⁴⁵¹, Brazil does not have all the developing countries’ support in this project, and it has been at times accused of being a “traitor” by seeking permanent UN Security Council membership, which would make it part of the “global elite.”⁴⁵² While India has a rich history of confronting Western countries and models, Mohan argues that India “woke up” and now rejects anti-Western modes of thinking.⁴⁵³

Rhetorically, Brazil often remains aligned with the principles espoused by most G77 members and nations of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which are more critical of the current global order. The G77’s principal goal was to change the rules of the global economic regime to better serve the interests of the developing world.⁴⁵⁴ In addition, NAM and G77 defend the principle of non-intervention. Nehru harbored contempt for power politics, and his decision to create the NAM was a product of his idealist stance. In the same way, Brazil has been at times strongly aligned with the NAM and G77. For example, the Brazilian government abstained from the UN Security Council resolutions on arms embargos to Yugoslavia once ethnic cleansing had begun, on intervention in Haiti after the coup, and on

⁴⁴⁷ Drezner, Daniel W. (2007) The new new world order, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.86, No.2, March / April 2007

⁴⁴⁸ Interview with a Brazilian diplomat, Brazilian Foreign Ministry, July 1, 2010

⁴⁴⁹ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

⁴⁵⁰ Herz, Mônica (1995). *Brasil e a Reforma da ONU*, *Lua Nova – Revista de Cultura e Política*, no. 46. 1999

⁴⁵¹ Rajamani, L. (1995) Democratisation of the United Nations, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 30, No. 49 (Dec. 9, 1995), pp. 3140-3143

⁴⁵² Interview with Brazilian diplomat at Brazil’s representation to the UN, May 5, 2010

⁴⁵³ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

⁴⁵⁴ Soares de Lima, Maria Regina (2003). *Na trilha de um política externa afirmativa*. Observatorio da Cidadania, 2003

peacekeeping operations in Rwanda and Somalia.⁴⁵⁵ In this respect Brazil continues to side with development countries, and it remains a country with a strongly Westphalian outlook. While it regards interference approved by the UN Security Council as legitimate, it traditionally has been reluctant to vote for any type of measures that violate a country's sovereignty. The Brazilian government is therefore highly critical of the concept of "R2P" (Responsibility to Protect), which it believes can be easily misused as a pretext for aggressive military intervention. In addition, Brazil has rarely openly criticized any human rights abusers over the past decades. This may be partly explained by the fact that the Brazilian foreign policy elite remains concerned about a possible foreign intervention in its Amazon region, which it has difficulty in controlling.⁴⁵⁶

But Brazil and India face a dilemma: There is a growing gap between their critical rhetoric, aligned with G77 members, and their pragmatic engagement, aligned with their national interest. Traditionally critics of the system and defendants of the poor, they have benefitted enormously from the Western World Order. Brazil has quietly departed from the G77's more radical calls for "total democracy", a proposal that seeks to replace the UNSC with the General Assembly. Despite continuous rhetorical support for reform, Brazil has not assumed leadership in reviving ECOSOC⁴⁵⁷, indicating that it does not regard this as a priority.

In a similar fashion, India's rhetoric is often not aligned with actual behavior. India's representatives have called for revitalization of the UN General Assembly for years. In April 2010, for example, Hardeep Puri, Permanent Representative of India to the U.N., said that "The General Assembly should take the lead in setting the global agenda and restoring the centrality of the United Nations in formulating multilateral approaches to resolving transnational issues".⁴⁵⁸ Indian representatives usually argue that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which, despite its pre-eminence in the charter, has proved too weak to provide coherence to the work of the specialized agencies, should be at the heart of international efforts of development.⁴⁵⁹ India's foreign policy is still influenced by its ties to the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77. Yet despite the confrontational rhetoric, Indian policymakers have long realized that systemic confrontation does no longer serve their interests, and it increasingly finds itself "between the two worlds", as an Indian ambassador in Europe points out.⁴⁶⁰

Brazil and India are thus engaging with the Western World Order, while at the same time criticizing some of the system's norms and procedures. For example, both countries also remain reluctant to accept Western notions of liberal internationalism—particularly ideas

⁴⁵⁵ Herz, Mônica (1999). *Brasil e a Reforma da ONU*. Lua Nova Revista de Cultura e Política, 1999

⁴⁵⁶ de Souza, Amaury (2009). *A Agenda Internacional do Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro: Relativa, 2009

⁴⁵⁷ When the United Nations was founded, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was designed similarly to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Unlike the UNSC, however, ECOSOC was placed under the authority of the General Assembly. ECOSOC has therefore always been a "second-class" body, merely recommending policies. Strengthening ECOSOC has been one of Brazil's goals in the past, but the government now wishes to aim higher, focusing entirely on the Security Council.

⁴⁵⁸ RTT News Correspondent (2010): 'Security Council Undermining General Assembly': India', April 28, 2010; http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php/government_statements/?theme=alt2 (accessed May 22, 2010)

⁴⁵⁹ Phone interview, Indian embassy in a European country, March 11, 2010

⁴⁶⁰ Phone interview, Indian embassy in a European country, March 11, 2010

like political conditionality on development aid and the “responsibility to protect.”⁴⁶¹ Yet, while non-Western international relations scholars regard attempts to “think past Western IR” as praiseworthy, they recognize the difficulty to separate Western from non-Western thinking. After all, fringe nations’ thinking has been strongly influenced by Western ideas. As Pinar Bilgin points out, “there may be elements of ‘non-Western’ experiences and ideas built in to ‘Western’ ways of thinking about and doing world politics. The reverse may also be true. What we think of as ‘non-Western’ approaches to world politics may be suffused with ‘Western’ concepts and theories.”⁴⁶² Fringe countries’ efforts to search for a proper strategy have resulted in the emergence of ways of thinking and doing that are - according to HK Bhabha - ‘almost the same but not quite’⁴⁶³

⁴⁶¹ Barma, Naazneen. Ely Ratner and Steven Weber (2007). A World Without the West, *The National Interest*, Number 90, Jul./Aug. 2007

⁴⁶² Bilgin, Pinar (2008). Thinking past ‘Western’ IR?, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008, pp 5 – 23

⁴⁶³ Bhabha, HK (1994). *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge, 1994.

1.4. Liberalism and international institutions: Theoretical considerations

What have we learned so far? In section 1.1., we started off with the question of how to define the West and the non-West. We analyzed several dimensions through which we can understand the West, understood that most of them are difficult to sustain empirically, and came to a pragmatic conclusion. We understood that rather than identifying something that is the West, it is a certain behavior, a “way of doing things” that represents the West well: It is the institutions in which nations engage and where agreements are made that makes a country Western or non-Western (1.2.) We also identified a fringe category of nations that is not fully integrated in the Western World Order (1.3.) Identifying institutions as the viable proxy allows us to make explanations about Brazil and India.

Section 1.1. also showed that supporters of the Western World Order look at it in a different way than its opponents do. While supporters predict an expansion of the Western World Order and interpret history against the backdrop of ever growing freedoms, the system’s critics see at times an expansion of hegemonic power, which uses international institutions as a thin veil of colonialism and the drive towards global dominance. The fringe countries’ perspective is more nuanced.

The arguments made by the supporters of the Western World Order are more convincing. Many non-established nations seek fuller participation. Just by their engagement, they are becoming more integrated into the Western World Order, and rules are spreading. Some of the institutions are far from the Western ideal, but they remain attractive. Even if some governments of non-established powers criticize specific aspects of the international system (such as during the annual World Bank and IMF meeting in Istanbul in 2009)⁴⁶⁴, they largely support the system. Independently of what each organization seeks to do, or by whom it is led, it is the nature of the institutions that is part of the liberal tradition, and the fringe countries’ participation in them is, in itself, a movement towards what we define as the West.

This section seeks to highlight the origins of the liberal tradition and to build up theoretical depth to strengthen the case. Does Kantian liberal theory support the argument that even if a non-established country criticizes the system, its engagement strengthens the very system? Can liberal theory explain why non-integrated nations seem to affirm the institutions?

What is the inner structural logic that makes institutions attractive? What exactly is the structure of Western institutions that has the effect of drawing in other nations? Why have some institutions failed in the past? The League of Nations, for example, failed to create this logic. What were the factors that kept this institution from developing this inner logic? There is something of today’s structure that makes them easy to join and hard to overturn. Why is this system easier to join than the system in the 19th century? That will be one of the

⁴⁶⁴ Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega said after the IMF meeting in Istanbul that “we can only hope that over-represented advanced countries will realize that they may do great harm to the fund if the attempt to block or delay quote and voice reform”. Mantega, Guido. Statement, International and Financial Committee, Istanbul, October 4, 2009; <http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/releases/2009/outubro/Guido-Mantega-Statement-IMFC-04-10.pdf> (accessed December 24, 2009)

key questions discussed in this section. We are thus moving from a historical argument towards a political science argument, searching for a deeper claim from political philosophy.

1.4.1. The history of liberalism and the emergence of liberal institutionalism

There is no canonical description of liberalism, or a definite consensus about who the most important theorists of liberalism are.⁴⁶⁵ Jeremy Bentham, Adam Smith, Schumpeter, Immanuel Kant and John Locke- who argued that men had inalienable ‘natural rights’ to life, liberty and property⁴⁶⁶- are often regarded as the major liberal thinkers who have shaped the study and practice of international diplomacy.⁴⁶⁷ Other scholars have included Montesquieu, David Hume, Thomas Jefferson, Karl Popper and John Rawls in the group of key liberalist thinkers.⁴⁶⁸ Of all of them, Immanuel Kant is probably most often considered the most important liberal philosopher.⁴⁶⁹ This section seeks to give a brief overview of the history of liberalism in the context of international relations, and proceeds to show in how far one of liberalism’s modern manifestations, liberal institutionalism, can explain Brazil’s and India’s behavior.

Liberalism is a wide field, and liberalist thinkers’ views on whether the dominant causes are found in the nature of the human being, domestic society or international relation differ.⁴⁷⁰ They do, however, agree in that they believe that the most adverse effects of anarchy in the international system can be surmounted by individual and domestic factors, and that stable peace on a global scale is possible.⁴⁷¹ And, despite some contradictions, for example between liberal pacifism and liberal imperialism, Doyle argues that liberalism leaves “a coherent legacy” on foreign affairs.⁴⁷² It seems appropriate, however, to situate the origins of liberalism historically.

⁴⁶⁵ Doyle, Michael W (1986). Liberalism and World Politics. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 1151-1169

⁴⁶⁶ Maurice, Cranston (1986). Locke and Liberty. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 10, No. 5 (Winter, 1986), pp. 82-93

⁴⁶⁷ Michael Doyle (1997). *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*, W. W. Norton & Company, 1997

⁴⁶⁸ Michael Doyle (1997). *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*, W. W. Norton & Company, 1997

⁴⁶⁹ See, for example: Doyle, Michael W. (1983). Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer, 1983), pp. 205-235. Doyle calls Kant “one of the greatest of all liberal philosophers (...) for he is a source of insight, policy and hope.”

⁴⁷⁰ Doyle, Michael W. (1986). Liberalism and World Politics. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 1151-1169

⁴⁷¹ Doyle, Michael W. (1997). *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*, W. W. Norton & Company, 1997

⁴⁷² Doyle, Michael W. (1986). Liberalism and World Politics. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 1151-1169

1.4.1.1. MAGNA CARTA (1215)

The Magna Carta is an important herald of liberal thought. Although there is some dispute among historians about the details of the creation of the document, the Magna Carta, conceived shortly before, during or shortly after a meeting between barons and King John of England in Runnymede in 1215⁴⁷³, constitutes one of the earliest legal charters. The Magna Carta (Great Charter) required the king to declare a series of rights and respect legal procedures (such as habeas corpus), allowing freemen to appeal against unlawful detention. During the first four centuries the document's influence was confined to England and the British Isles, but later it contributed to the establishment of constitutional law in the English-speaking world. As Hazeltine points out, it had a strong effect upon the constitutions and laws of the American Colonies and the Federal Union after the American War of Independence.⁴⁷⁴ The essence of the Magna Carta is also reflected in the United States Bill of Rights, which established specific rights for citizens that limited government power: “No person shall be (...) deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”⁴⁷⁵

The document has thus been, indirectly, an important precursor to parliamentary sovereignty, democracy, and human rights. Several liberal scholars, such as Jeremy Bentham, in his *Fragment on Government* (1776), used and developed ideas articulated in the Magna Carta.⁴⁷⁶ The influence of the Magna Carta can be tracked all the way to the creation of today's liberal Western World Order. Eleanor Roosevelt, one of the important proponents of human rights legislation in the 20th century, frequently referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, as a “Magna Carta for all mankind.”⁴⁷⁷

1.4.1.2. MACHIAVELLI (1469 – 1527)

Nicolò Machiavelli's *The Prince*, published in 1532, made a major contribution to political thought, because his was among the first works to clearly distinguish between political realism and political idealism.⁴⁷⁸ Although Machiavelli himself was not a liberal theorist, he set the state for the emergence of liberalist thinkers, and he is said to have strongly influenced, among others, John Locke, David Hume, Montesquieu, and most of the principal American founding fathers - Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams and Alexander Hamilton.⁴⁷⁹ Yet, Sullivan concedes that Jefferson and his fellow Americans at the time did not see any major differences between liberalism and

⁴⁷³ Holt, J. C. (1957). The Making of Magna Carta. *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 72, No. 284 (Jul., 1957), pp. 401-422

⁴⁷⁴ Hazeltine, H. D. (1917). The Influence of Magna Carta on American Constitutional Development. *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Jan., 1917), pp. 1-33

⁴⁷⁵ United States Bill of Rights, Amendment V, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html (accessed October 9, 2008)

⁴⁷⁶ Bentham, Jeremy. *Fragment on Government*, <http://www.efm.bris.ac.uk/het/bentham/government.htm> (accessed October 10, 2008)

⁴⁷⁷ Nurser, Canon John (2003). The "Ecumenical Movement" Churches, "Global Order," and Human Rights: 1938-1948. *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Nov., 2003), pp. 841-881

⁴⁷⁸ Machiavelli, Nicolò (1992). *The Prince*. New York: Dover Publications, 2010

⁴⁷⁹ Rahe, Paul (2006, ed.) *Machiavelli's Liberal Republican Legacy*. Cambridge University Press, 2006

republicanism, but rather thought of them as essentially the same.⁴⁸⁰ Also, Benjamin Franklin objected to politics oriented by the pursuit of glory Machiavelli had proclaimed⁴⁸¹, and Thomas Adams, despite frequently reading Machiavelli's accounts, strongly objected to the philosopher's claim that it was impossible to form a constitution on the basis of popular reflection and choice.⁴⁸²

Scholars do not agree on whether Machiavelli merely unearthed an older type of republicanism present in the Ancient Roman Republic and Aristotle, as Pocok (1981) argues, or whether, as Rahe contends, Machiavelli's republicanism was not rooted in antiquity but is entirely novel and modern.⁴⁸³ Machiavelli focused on republicanism, mostly in the form of civic virtue. This became an important theme in modern political philosophy, and there is a general consensus that it became a central part of American political values.⁴⁸⁴

Machiavelli's influence on liberalism was more subtle than that of Locke and Kant. While classic thinkers such as Aristotle, Cicero and Aquinas assumed that the human being was essentially good, and that politicians should be virtuous, Machiavelli argued that there was a large gap between "how one lives and how one should live." He called citizens in general "wicked" and claimed that only those would be successful in politics who violate moral traditions whenever necessary.⁴⁸⁵ This caused Cardinal Pole to argue in 1532 that *The Prince* had been "written by the hand of Satan."⁴⁸⁶

The fact that Machiavelli wrote "what men do rather than what they ought to do", as Francis Bacon put it, also made him the founder of political realism. In this dimension, he anticipated Hobbes in his understanding of nature, which would later influence realist thinkers. His views on foreign policy underline this point. Similar to modern neorealist thought, Machiavelli argues that republics are constrained to wage war due to several domestic reasons, but more importantly, to preempt foreign threats.⁴⁸⁷ Neutrality is, according to Machiavelli, not an option, as the neutral actor will be despised by both the winner and the loser of a conflict in the region. Since war cannot be avoided, every nation must constantly prepare for it, and attack if the opportunity arises. As merely defeating an enemy in battle brings only temporary relief (he will regroup and attack again), the complete annihilation of the enemy is necessary, and territorial expansion the logic consequence. His views on foreign policy thus radically differ from Kant's, who would, three centuries later, proclaim the pacific union of democratic and peaceful states.

⁴⁸⁰ Sullivan, Vickie B. (2006). Muted and manifest English Machiavellism: the reconciliation of Machiavellian republicanism with liberalism in Sidney's Discourses Concerning Government and Trenchard's and Gordon's Cato's Letters. In: Machiavelli's Liberal Republican Legacy. Cambridge University Press, 2006

⁴⁸¹ Benjamin Franklin (2002). An Autobiography. New York: Great Space, 2002

⁴⁸² Thompson, C. Bradley (2006). John Adam's Machiavellian moment, in: Machiavelli's Liberal Republican Legacy. Cambridge University Press, 2006

⁴⁸³ Rahe, Paul (2006, eds.) Machiavelli's Liberal Republican Legacy. Cambridge University Press, 2006

⁴⁸⁴ Rahe, Paul (2006, eds.) Machiavelli's Liberal Republican Legacy. Cambridge University Press, 2006

⁴⁸⁵ Machiavelli, Nicolò (1992). The Prince. New York: Dover Publications, 2010

⁴⁸⁶ Apologia ad Carolum Quintum (1539), in Epistolarum Reginaldi Poli, S.R.E. Cardinalis et aliorum ad ipsum collectio, ed. Angelo M. Quirini (Brescia: J.M. Rizzardi, 1744- 57), in: Fischer, Markus. Prologue in: Paul Rahe (2006, eds.) Machiavelli's Liberal Republican Legacy. Cambridge University Press, 2006

⁴⁸⁷ See, for example: Mearsheimer, John J. (2006). China's Unpeaceful Rise. Current History, April 2006, 105, 690, pg.160

Yet, despite his realism that transcends Aristotle and the other classic thinkers' assumption that virtue and politics are ultimately incompatible, Machiavelli does touch upon liberal ideas such as due process when arguing that accusations “have need of true corroborations and of circumstances that show the truth of the accusation.”⁴⁸⁸ And, while he never mentioned the existence of (then common) natural, God-given law, he stressed the importance of men-made law and justice; a concept liberals after him took up and developed further.

1.4.1.3. HOBBS (1588 –1679)

Hobbes' analysis of the state of nature, articulated in his 1651 *Leviathan*, was so important that it remains the defining feature of realist thought until this day.⁴⁸⁹ Hobbes lends, along with Machiavelli, his name to the realist tradition of thought in international relations, and is often categorized together with Thucydides, Morgenthau and Churchill.⁴⁹⁰ In the book *Leviathan*, which was strongly influenced by Hobbes' perception of chaos and disorder during the English Civil War, the author argued for the necessity of a social contract between the citizens and the absolute ruler. A strong central state was necessary to avert the “state of nature”- a situation Hobbes described as *Bellum omnium contra omnes* (“War of all against all”), in which life would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”⁴⁹¹ Peace, in Hobbes' view, is “a period of recuperation from the last war and preparation for the next.”⁴⁹² Hobbes has been called a classic realist in that he sees the source of anarchy in the nature of human beings and in the state itself- rather than, as structural realist Kenneth Waltz, in the nature of the international system of states.⁴⁹³

Rational (Hobbesian) citizens will accept the absolutist sovereign principally because they are aware of the disastrous consequences of the system's dissolution. Citizens do not accept the sovereign because of admiration, but because of a strong interest in self-preservation. Once the ruler fails to provide order, or proves “negligent”, his legitimacy will vanish and citizens will start a rebellion. They will start a rebellion because self-defense, according to Hobbes, is one of men's natural rights- an idea liberal scholars would build on. This poses formidable constraints on the absolute sovereign, and causes the ruler to be sensitive to his or her constituents' needs.⁴⁹⁴

A somewhat similar logic applies to external relations. Hobbes argued that since there is no central authority in international relations, the relations between nations are marked by total anarchy and fear of war; and states are “upon the confines of battle, with

⁴⁸⁸ Fischer, Markus (2006). Prologue in: Rahe, Paul (eds.) *Machiavelli's Liberal Republican Legacy*. Cambridge University Press, 2006

⁴⁸⁹ Williams, Michael C. (1996) *Hobbes and International Relations: A Reconsideration*. *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring, 1996), pp. 213-236

⁴⁹⁰ Boucher, David (1990). *Inter-Community & International Relations in the Political Philosophy of Hobbes*. *Polity*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter, 1990), pp. 207-232

⁴⁹¹ Mearsheimer, John J. (2006). *China's Unpeaceful Rise*. *Current History*; Apr 2006; 105, 690

⁴⁹² Bull, Hedley (1977). *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics* London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1977

⁴⁹³ Waltz, Kenneth (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1979

⁴⁹⁴ Hobbes, Thomas (1993). *De cive*, [1651]. Reprint, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993

their frontiers armed, and canons planted against their neighbors round about”⁴⁹⁵. Without a common sovereign to control them (an “international Leviathan”), there is neither justice nor injustice in the international system.⁴⁹⁶ The Law of Nations, Hobbes contends, is the Law of Nature.⁴⁹⁷ Confederations of Nations are conceivable, not only in response to outside threats—there is always the danger of reverting back to hostility. Hobbes deemed all-encompassing institutions, like the United Nations, impossible.⁴⁹⁸

Yet, it is not entirely clear that Hobbes is a foundational figure in the neorealist tradition.⁴⁹⁹ After all, contrary to Machiavellian logic, Hobbes did not glorify war, and saw it as his objective to find mechanisms to avoid it altogether - hence his social contract theory. Scholars of the “English school” argue, contrary to realists, that Hobbes’ analysis of the world implicitly calls for the creation of international rules and norms to avoid the state of war.⁵⁰⁰

While it remains a controversial argument, the way Hobbes characterizes constituent-ruler relations, war remains a costly and thus rare incident. As Michael Williams argues, “since the sovereign may be asking (and potentially compelling) the citizens to put their lives at risk at war (and thus potentially allowing them to rebel on the grounds of self-preservation, which is their right by nature) it can do so only if the vast majority of the population continues to trust in the sovereign’s adjudication of the situation (risk) and the necessity to risk citizens’ lives.”⁵⁰¹ Hobbes’ Leviathans are therefore not necessarily aggressive to one another or bent on attacking, since the rulers do not want to risk losing the constituents’ support. Hobbes believed citizens must go to war if the sovereign wants them to, but he reckons war greatly increases the risk of domestic rebellion. This idea was picked up and further developed by Kant, who argued that empowered citizens would never support war. He thus agreed to one of the basic liberal principles that domestic politics and foreign policy are strongly intertwined. Williams further argues that Hobbes probably did envision the existence of transnational norms. Despite fundamental differences between Hobbes and liberal thought, for example with regard to the ‘state of nature’, several of his ideas can be found in later liberal thinking.

1.4.1.4. LOCKE (1632 – 1704)

Aside from Kant, Locke’s emergence is a key definitive moment of the liberal intellectual trajectory, and he is often regarded as the “Father of Liberalism” and the influential

⁴⁹⁵ Hobbes, Thomas (2009). *Leviathan*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009

⁴⁹⁶ Boucher, David (1990). *Inter-Community & International Relations in the Political Philosophy of Hobbes*. *Polity*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter, 1990), pp. 207-232

⁴⁹⁷ Hobbes, Thomas (2009). *Leviathan*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009

⁴⁹⁸ Boucher, David (1990). *Inter-Community & International Relations in the Political Philosophy of Hobbes*. *Polity*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter, 1990), pp. 207-232

⁴⁹⁹ Williams, Michael C. (1996). *Hobbes and International Relations: A Reconsideration*. *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring, 1996), pp. 213-236

⁵⁰⁰ Williams, Michael C. (1996). *Hobbes and International Relations: A Reconsideration*. *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring, 1996), pp. 213-236

⁵⁰¹ Williams, Michael C. (1996). *Hobbes and International Relations: A Reconsideration*. *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring, 1996), pp. 213-236

Enlightenment thinker. Robert Faulkner called him the “first liberal democrat.”⁵⁰² Locke strongly diverged from Hobbesian logic as he rejected absolutist rulers, promoting political legitimacy based on individual consent instead.⁵⁰³ These demands were possibly influenced by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the Bill of Rights a year later, two events that would mark the end of absolutist rule in the country. While constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy were already incipient at the time, Locke’s ideas could be considered revolutionary.

While Locke, like Hobbes, developed a social contract, his work can be seen in direct response to Hobbesian absolutism. His support of religious tolerance, liberty, property, and the importance of education, on the separation of the church and the state, and his conviction that all men –in their natural state- are equal and independent had a great influence on America’s founding fathers. Indeed Maurice Cranston argues that Locke’s influence on the founding fathers and on American attitudes towards life itself exceeded that of any other thinker.⁵⁰⁴ Locke’s natural right for everyone to defend his “Life, health, liberty, or possessions” became the basis of the phrase in the US Declaration of Independence that allows the right to “life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.” Locke’s ideas in general received a warmer reception in the United States than in Europe, where traditional, feudal power structures remained strong.⁵⁰⁵

Locke’s ideas need to be understood in the appropriate historical context. When he was 29, and the Restoration had reinstalled the ousted King Charles II’s son on the throne, Locke’s views on authority were still very much aligned with those of Hobbes, causing several scholars to ask whether “Locke was Hobbesian.”⁵⁰⁶ As Coby points out, Locke frequently came to similar conclusions as Hobbes. Locke agreed in principle that man’s life in nature, if not “solitary”, is “poor, nasty, brutish and short.”⁵⁰⁷ Over the next years, Locke became associated with the leading figures in Amsterdam around the Dutch Prince William of Orange who planned and eventually succeeded in toppling King James II in 1688.⁵⁰⁸ Locke’s major piece, *Two Treatises*, captured the growing sentiment in England that absolutism was no longer acceptable. Locke built on Hobbes’ social contract and justified rebellion (“right to revolution”) if citizens were not granted a political voice. Citizens entrusted power to a ruler, but they could take back their support at any time if the ruler did not respect the citizens’ natural “inalienable” rights.⁵⁰⁹

⁵⁰² Faulkner, Robert (2001). The First Liberal Democrat: Locke's Popular Government. *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Winter, 2001), pp. 5-39

⁵⁰³ Scott, John T. (2000). The Sovereignless State and Locke's Language of Obligation. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No. 3 (Sep., 2000), pp. 547-561

⁵⁰⁴ Cranston, Maurice (1986). Locke and Liberty *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 10, No. 5 (Winter, 1986), pp. 82-93

⁵⁰⁵ Cranston, Maurice (1986). Locke and Liberty. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 10, No. 5 (Winter, 1986), pp. 82-93

⁵⁰⁶ Coby, Patrick (1987). The Law of Nature in Locke's Second Treatise: Is Locke a Hobbesian? *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter, 1987), pp. 3-28

⁵⁰⁷ Coby, Patrick (1987). The Law of Nature in Locke's Second Treatise: Is Locke a Hobbesian? *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter, 1987), pp. 3-28

⁵⁰⁸ Cranston, Maurice (1986). Locke and Liberty. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 10, No. 5 (Winter, 1986), pp. 82-93

⁵⁰⁹ Cranston, Maurice (1986). Locke and Liberty. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 10, No. 5 (Winter, 1986), pp. 82-93

1.4.1.5. KANT (1724 – 1804)

Following chronological order, Kant's theory of the pacification of foreign policy among liberal states and the creation of a "pacific union" (also called "democratic peace"⁵¹⁰) is one of the most significant contributions of liberalism to international affairs, and later, liberal institutionalism.⁵¹¹ It is intriguing how permanent his influence is, how accurate his predictions are, and how valid his claims remain. Kant's vision stands in direct antithesis to Hobbes' argument that anarchy best accounts for "the competition, the fear, and the temptation toward preventive war that characterize international relations."⁵¹² From the realist point of view, international peace is only possibly through the abolition of international relations- through the creation of one world state or through complete isolationism- two hardly viable options.

Since Kant, liberalist thought was split into two major schools: a laissez-faire-oriented "conservative liberalism" and a social democratic "liberal liberalism."⁵¹³ Despite their differences, they agree on the necessity of four institutions: First, all citizens should be equal before the law and enjoy all civil liberty (freedom of expression, assembly, religion). Second, those who govern must be elected by the people. This is particularly important in the context of foreign policy- a country's decision to go to war, for example, must be backed by the voters, and it cannot be motivated by a monarch's or military elite's wishes. Third, both sides respect private property and privately held business, excluding the possibility of socialism or state capitalism. Fourth and finally, economic action is directed by supply and demand, and not by state bureaucracies. The difference between laissez-faire liberalism and social democratic liberalism ("welfare liberalism") are that supporters of the latter argue that the state should play a larger role assuring equal opportunity for all citizens to exercise freedom.⁵¹⁴

1.4.1.6. LIBERALISM IN THE 20TH CENTURY

In the 20th century, policy makers for the first time thought about applying liberal ideas in foreign policy. Despite liberalism's occasional prominence among intellectuals, realism had remained the most influential form of thinking for political decision-makers at all times.⁵¹⁵ Centuries after the liberal discussion culminated in the articulation of a liberal international

⁵¹⁰ Starr, Harvey (1997). *Democracy and Integration: Why Democracies Don't Fight Each Other*. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (May, 1997), pp. 153-162. See also: Mintz, Alex and Nehemia Geva. *Why Don't Democracies Fight Each Other? An Experimental Study*. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Sep., 1993), pp. 484-503

⁵¹¹ Franceschet, Antonio (2002). *Kant and Liberal Internationalism*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp.164

⁵¹² Doyle, Michael W. *Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs*. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer, 1983), pp. 205-235

⁵¹³ Doyle, Michael W. *Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs*. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer, 1983), pp. 205-235

⁵¹⁴ Doyle, Michael W. *Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs*. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer, 1983), pp. 205-235

⁵¹⁵ Smith, Steve, John Baylis, Patricia Owens (2008). *Introduction, The Globalization of World Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. See also: Ikenberry, John G. (1996) *The Intertwining of Domestic and International Politics*. *Polity*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Winter, 1996), pp. 293-298

order, without any tangible impact on the real world, these ideas came to pass in the 20th century, when liberal thinking in international relations reached a high-water mark.

Propelled by the horrors of World War I, many liberal scholars began to think about how to avoid war in the future.⁵¹⁶ Realists called them, somewhat condescendingly, ‘idealists’.⁵¹⁷ During World War I, Woodrow Wilson, political science professor⁵¹⁸ and probably the most famous liberal advocate at the time, used Lockean arguments to justify the use of force against tyranny.⁵¹⁹ In his “War Message” of April 2nd 1917, he proclaimed that

our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles.⁵²⁰

After World War I, Wilson sought to promote a “liberal international order.”⁵²¹ At that point, most liberal thinkers had accepted the idea that peace was not a natural condition, but one which must be actively constructed.⁵²² This infused liberalism with the necessary pragmatism to propose more constructive ideas policy makers could apply. The result was the creation of the League of Nations, the first real world manifestation of liberal thought in international affairs. The principle idea behind the League, collective security, stood in a marked contrast to the classic alliance system which responds to external threats, called ‘collective defense’.

The extraordinary failure of the grand idealist experiment, the League of Nations, changed liberal idealist thinking fundamentally, infusing another dose of pragmatism. The ability to yet again influence policy makers was proof that the lessons learned during the failure of the League of Nations were crucial to build a more viable, sustainable World Order after World War II.

Liberalism may have had its strongest moment after World War II, when America built a postwar international order around an array of governance institutions. These were most notably the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank,

⁵¹⁶ Richardson, James L. The Ethics of Neoliberal Institutionalism. In: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

⁵¹⁷ Carr, E.H. (1940). *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. London: Macmillan

⁵¹⁸ Jackson, Robert and Georg Sørensen (2010). *Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010

⁵¹⁹ Maurice Cranston (1986). Locke and Liberty. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 10, No. 5 (Winter, 1986), pp. 82-93.

⁵²⁰ *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Volume 72, 1917

⁵²¹ Ikenberry, G. John (2009). Liberal Internationalism 3.0.: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order. *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol.7, pp. 71-87, 2009. In a memorandum to President Wilson written in 1919, Herbert Hoover (then one of Wilson's advisers), recommended that the President speak out against the danger of "world domination" the "Bolsheviki" -a "tyranny that is the negation of democracy" - posed to free peoples. In: Doyle, Michael W. (1983). *Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs*, Part 2. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Autumn, 1983), pp. 323-353

⁵²² Dunne, Tim (2008). Liberalism. In: Steve Smith, John Baylis, Patricia Owens. *The Globalization of World Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008

the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and regional security alliances.⁵²³ In his State of the Union address on January 6, 1941, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed “the four freedoms”, which people “everywhere in the world”⁵²⁴ ought to enjoy. He strongly influenced other leaders such as Churchill, who proclaimed “the enthronement of human rights” after World War II.⁵²⁵ The creation of the postwar order in 1945 was by no means a purely liberal enterprise. As Ikenberry writes, “‘realist’ lessons from the League of Nations debacle in the 1920s were combined with ‘liberal’ lessons from the regional imperialism and mercantilist conflict of the 1930s.”⁵²⁶

Roosevelt’s four freedoms, (freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom from fear), and the institutions the United States would build, reflected Kant’s definitive articles in his 1795 *Perpetual Peace*.⁵²⁷ Rather than realizing short-term gains, the United States seized the opportunity to embed a series of liberal principles that benefited all members of the system. As proof of their commitment, the United States created and participated in institutions that constrained its freedom, defying realist thought.⁵²⁸

Why did liberal ideas come to pass after World War II? To some degree, this may be historical contingency: The effective application of large scale violence during both World Wars created a compelling vision to adopt the vision Kant had developed two centuries earlier. Yet, this is not entirely true. Rather, the emergence of a liberal international order is the product of a Hegelian process in which each historical event is the product of the lessons learned in the past. The intellectual effort that helps create understanding of an era bears fruit towards the end of that era, and this understanding will impact the next era.⁵²⁹ From this perspective, the construction of the liberal world order in the 20th century can be seen as the product of trial and error and uneven progress, like Kant had predicted in “*Perpetual Peace*.”⁵³⁰ The Magna Carta could be seen as a starting point of a long road that culminated in a series of conferences in 1945 that would create the foundations of the first functional liberal world order- there was thus clearly something systemic at work, and the establishment of the Western World Order cannot be explained by the extreme violence applied in World War I and II alone.

During the Cold War, liberals increasingly focused on the importance of international institutions. They were called liberals essentially because by focusing on international

⁵²³ Ikenberry, John G. and Wright, Thomas (2008). *Rising Powers and Global Institutions*. Century Foundation, 2008

⁵²⁴ Roosevelt, Franklin D. (1941). *Speech on Four Freedoms*;
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5iHKtrirjY> (accessed August 27, 2009)

⁵²⁵ Cranston, Maurice (1986). *Locke and Liberty*. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 10, No. 5 (Winter, 1986), pp. 82-93

⁵²⁶ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

⁵²⁷ Russett, Bruce (1996). *Ten Balances for Weighing UN Reform Proposals*. *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111, No. 2, Summer, 1996, pp. 259-269

⁵²⁸ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

⁵²⁹ Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (2000). *An Age of Citizenship*. *Foreign Policy*, No. 119 (Summer, 2000), pp. 40-43

⁵³⁰ Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (2000). *An Age of Citizenship*. *Foreign Policy*, No. 119 (Summer, 2000), pp. 40-43

cooperation and institutions, they accepted the possibility of change and improvement, which are fundamental liberal notions. In addition, the argument that international institutions are a mutually beneficial agreement builds on the classical liberal argument about self-interested individuals engaging in mutually beneficial exchanges, an argument brought forth by Adam Smith.⁵³¹ What began as the study of international institutions and regional integration in Europe transformed in the 1980s into regime theory, which was later renamed ‘neoliberal institutionalism.’⁵³² Initially defined narrowly to international organizations with a physical presence (staff, offices, etc.), the definition slowly broadened to what we today understand as an international institution- norms, rules and decision-making procedures in a specific area. At the same time, regional integration in Europe strengthened the transformation of liberalism from a normative to a theoretical school of thought. In 1972, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye contended that states could no longer take merely other states into account, as institutions were growing increasingly powerful, and a growing interdependence between different kinds of actors.⁵³³ This line of thought was vigorously attacked by realists of the time such as Kenneth Waltz.

This new institutionalist literature broke with liberal tradition and borrowed a lot from realist theory⁵³⁴, but was categorized as ‘liberal’ because it focuses on mutually beneficial cooperation⁵³⁵, and because it is fundamentally optimistic. As Doyle shows, liberal institutionalists carry with themselves the conviction that constitutional governments will eventually create a pacific union where war is no longer necessary.⁵³⁶ Neoliberal institutionalists admitted that states were driven by power and interests, but argued that international institutions fitted into that equation very well. Contrary to traditional liberals, liberal institutionalism defines itself solely in empirical terms, no longer normatively.⁵³⁷ Game theory became a principal tool to prove that in some instances, the establishment of institutions could be in states’ best interest. Despite these agreements, Jervis points out that ideological differences between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism remain.⁵³⁸ For example, contrary to realism, the liberal vision of how the world should be organized fundamentally rests on the domestic analogy. Just like domestic affairs should be regulated

⁵³¹ Stein, Arthur A. (2008). Neoliberal Institutionalism, in: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

⁵³² Stein, Arthur A. (2008). Neoliberal Institutionalism, in: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

⁵³³ The idea of interdependence was strengthened by the oil shocks in the 1970s. Keohane, Robert O. (1975). *International Organization and the Crisis of Interdependence*. Vol. 29, No.2, Spring, 1975. See also: Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

⁵³⁴ Richardson, James L. (2008). The Ethics of Neoliberal Institutionalism. in: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

⁵³⁵ Ikenberry, G. John (2009). *Liberal Internationalism 3.0.: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order. Perspectives on Politics*, Vol.7, pp. 71-87, 2009

⁵³⁶ Doyle, Michael (1983) Kant, Liberal Foreign Affairs. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, 3 (1983), pp. 5-35.

⁵³⁷ Richardson, James L. (2008). The Ethics of Neoliberal Institutionalism. in: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

⁵³⁸ Jervis, R. (1999). Realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation: understanding the debate. *International Security*, 24: 42-63

by rules and norms, global affairs should be regulated as well.⁵³⁹ In addition, Francis Fukuyama, who, influenced by Hegel, argued that the victory of liberal democracy represents transformation in world affairs⁵⁴⁰, was pilloried by neo-realists. More recently, analysts like Karl Kaiser reflect this argument when they declare that “a democratic form of government is the most reliable guarantee that a state will adopt prudent and peaceful behavior in external politics.”⁵⁴¹

The continued success of the Western World Order after the Cold War strengthened liberal institutionalism as realists struggled to explain the phenomenon. Realists had unanimously predicted the end of NATO because the alliance no longer faced an external threat. Quite to the contrary, NATO blossomed and even engaged in “out-of-area operations” in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, which looked a lot more like collective security than collective defense.

1.4.2. Why democracies are more likely to integrate

As the previous section has shown, the development of liberal thought began with Machiavelli about five centuries ago, found its high point with Kant three hundred years later, and had a major impact on global politics another two hundred years later with the articulation of a liberal international order, initially promoted by the United States after World War I and then successfully implemented after World War II - culminating in a system of global governance built around the United Nations, which the then US Secretary of State Cordell Hull hailed as the key to “the fulfillment of humanity’s greatest aspirations.”⁵⁴²

1.4.2.1. REALISM, LIBERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Realism sees little connection between domestic and international politics.⁵⁴³ The explicit purpose of realist theory, the dominant type of international relations theory in the United States since World War II, was to extract the study of international relations from the study of domestic and comparative politics.⁵⁴⁴ According to Waltzian realist thought, international politics is carried out in anarchy, while domestic politics is carried out in a hierarchical system - two fundamentally different organizing principles. The system is made up of states (‘units’) that are alike in character, undifferentiated by function. States’ behavior may differ because of their varying material capabilities, but anarchy remains the defining influence on all states.⁵⁴⁵

⁵³⁹ Suganami, H. (1989). *The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. In the case of the European Union, the ties between domestic and international structures are even institutionalized.

⁵⁴⁰ Fukuyama, Francis (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Free Press, 1992

⁵⁴¹ Kaiser Karl (1996). Reforming NATO. *Foreign Policy*, No. 103, Summer, 1996, pp. 128-143

⁵⁴² Glennon, Michael J. (2003). Why the Security Council Failed. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 3, May - Jun., 2003, pp. 16-35

⁵⁴³ Waltz, Kenneth (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1979

⁵⁴⁴ Ikenberry, John G. The Intertwining of Domestic and International Politics. *Polity*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Winter, 1996), pp. 293-298

⁵⁴⁵ Waltz, Kenneth (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1979

Liberalist scholars, on the other hand, assert that one cannot neatly separate international politics from domestic politics.⁵⁴⁶ Ikenberry points out that in some countries, domestic politics can be anarchical, whereas international politics in some areas is strongly institutionalized.⁵⁴⁷ Stein, for example, argues that “it is increasingly recognized that international relations have domestic roots and domestic consequences.”⁵⁴⁸ According to them, domestic politics and international politics affect each other. Democracies’ foreign policy behavior is different from non-democratic regimes’ foreign policy. On the other hand, the international context has an impact on the domestic situation. Foreign policy at times impacts elections. The Cold War serves as an example of how international politics affected domestic politics in both the United States and the Soviet Union, centralizing and strengthening their respective state apparatus.⁵⁴⁹

1.4.2.2. LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACIES’ FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

There is a series of assertions liberalist theory makes about democracies’ behavior in international politics.⁵⁵⁰ Democracies are less likely to fight wars against each other⁵⁵¹, they are more likely to conclude trade agreements⁵⁵², and they are more likely to cooperate in general and seek membership in international organizations. This section will focus on international institutions and trade to understand why, according to liberalist thought, democracies are in fact more likely to integrate in international institutions than non-democratic regimes.

As Milner, Mansfield and Rosendorff argue, the probability of states cooperating on trade policy strongly depends on their regime type. The more democratic a state, the more likely it will be to conclude trade agreements. According to their analysis, “the superior ability of elections in democracies to constrain leaders prompts democratic rulers to be more cooperative internationally than their non-democratic counterparts.”⁵⁵³ Autocratic leaders, on the other hand, face fewer worries about re-election, so they have fewer incentives to

⁵⁴⁶ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

⁵⁴⁷ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

⁵⁴⁸ Stein, Arthur A. (2008). Neoliberal Institutionalism, in: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

⁵⁴⁹ Ikenberry, John G (1996). *The Intertwining of Domestic and International Politics*. *Polity*, Vol. 29, No. 2, Winter, 1996, pp. 293-298

⁵⁵⁰ The presence of competitive and regular elections is largely seen as the best indicator of a functioning democratic system. In: Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, B. Peter Rosendorff (2002). *Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements*. *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer, 2002), pp. 477-513. See also Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (2000). *An Age of Citizenship*. *Foreign Policy*, No. 119, Summer, 2000, pp. 40-43

⁵⁵¹ This does not mean that democracies are more peaceful in general. In: Russett, Bruce and William Antholis (1992). *Do Democracies Fight Each Other? Evidence from the Peloponnesian War* *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 4, Nov., 1992, pp. 415-434

⁵⁵² Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, B. Peter Rosendorff (2002). *Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements*. *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer, 2002), pp. 477-513

⁵⁵³ Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, B. Peter Rosendorff (2002). *Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements*. *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer, 2002), pp. 477-513

relinquish policy autonomy and sign trade agreements, making them less likely than democratic leaders to seek commercial cooperation.

Several thinkers, including Kant, have pointed out that liberal democracies are inherently peaceful because politically empowered citizens are, contrary to autocratic monarchs, unwilling to bear the cost of war. Montesquieu, Paine and Schumpeter have argued that capitalism and trade leads to rationality and makes war less likely. In addition, Doyle points out that regular elections in liberal democracies cause frequent changes of leadership. That reduces the chance that personal animosities between heads of state cause long-term friction.⁵⁵⁴ Weart argues that tolerance and compromise are central aspects of democratic culture, so diplomats from democratic countries will seek to find negotiated agreements rather than engage in conflict.⁵⁵⁵

Yet, while these arguments may explain to some degree why democracies do not fight other democracies, they fail to explain why democracies engage in war with non-democratic regimes. Historical evidence that democracies in general are more peaceful than non-democratic regimes is weak.⁵⁵⁶ In *Perpetual Peace*, written in 1795, Kant argues that his vision of a pacific confederation can only turn into reality if all states have agreed to the three “definitive articles” the author postulates (republican civil constitution, commitment to pacific union, cosmopolitan law).⁵⁵⁷ Cosmopolitan law includes moral-ethical considerations (foreigners cannot be expelled if they face persecution abroad), but also commercial interests (promoting division of labor and free trade). As a consequence of the alliance between two liberal states, economic interdependence eventually follows. There exists a separate peace between liberal democracies, and there is strong empirical evidence that supports Kant’s claim.⁵⁵⁸ Liberalism has succeeded in its creation of a zone of peace, but failed in guiding foreign policy outside the liberal world.⁵⁵⁹

⁵⁵⁴ Doyle Michael W. (1986). Liberalism and World Politics. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 1151-1169

⁵⁵⁵ Weart, Spencer R. (1998). *Never at war: Why democracies will not fight one another*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.

⁵⁵⁶ Leblang, David and Steve Chan (2003). Explaining Wars Fought by Established Democracies: Do Institutional Constraints Matter? *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), pp. 385-400

⁵⁵⁷ The three definitive articles are, in detail: 1) “The civil constitution of every state should be republican”, 2) “The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states”, 3) “The law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality”. Kant, Immanuel. *To perpetual peace, a philosophic sketch*. Kant, Immanuel. *To Perpetual Peace. A philosophical sketch*. Translated by Ted Humphrey, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003

⁵⁵⁸ Several analysts have questioned whether Kant’s claim is supported by empirical evidence. Some have argued that the determinant is not “democracy”, but “wealth”. Others have contended that there was no war between democratic states before 1945 because there were too few of them. Finally, there exists an argument that the Cold War created an environment in which democracies focused on their common enemy, the Soviet Union, rather than fighting each other. (Mearheimer, John J. (1990). *Why we will soon miss the Cold War*. *The Atlantic Monthly* 266: 35-50, 1990)

⁵⁵⁹ Doyle attempts to explain liberalism’s failure to guide foreign policy towards non-liberal states making two arguments. First, he argues that outside of the pacific union, liberal states are, like all other states, caught in the realist trap- the international anarchy and Hobbesian state of war. The second argument is that the factors that cause good relationships with other democracies (constitutional restraint) exacerbate conflicts between liberal and non-liberal states. For example, mutual ignorance may complicate relations: “When the Soviets refuse to negotiate, they are plotting a world takeover. When they seek to negotiate, they are plotting even more insidiously“ For example, liberalist America took ten years to appreciate and exploit the Sino-Soviet split. In: Doyle, Michael W. (1983). *Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2. Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No.

Why are democracies more likely to engage in a democratic, rule-based and open international system? According to Kant, it should be one of liberal states' foreign policy goals to preserve, strengthen and expand the pacific union-⁵⁶⁰ or, as Doyle has put it, to build a "steady worldwide pressure for a liberal peace."⁵⁶¹ Ikenberry argues that elites who work in the context of democratic domestic state structures try to engage in an international order that is congenial with their domestic system.⁵⁶² Democracies will prefer to exist in the midst of an international system imbued with democratic values, strengthening the importance of democratic polity on a global scale. The "stickiness" of interlocking institutions is thus greater between democratic regimes than between non-democratic regimes, because democracies' promises are more reassuring.⁵⁶³ The decentralization and openness of democratic states provides opportunities for all states to consult and make representations directly, thus strengthening their willingness to make serious commitments.⁵⁶⁴ This brings us back to a previously mentioned argument: After World War II, the United States created today's system because they sought to enlarge the modern liberal welfare state, thus creating an international order fully aligned with their own system. The IMF and the World Bank, set up to solve problems inherent to liberal capitalism, can be seen as the direct extension of welfare systems as they exist in liberal democracies:⁵⁶⁵ economic openness with social and welfare protection, a system John Ruggie has called "embedded liberalism" (economic liberalism qualified by certain overarching political goals).⁵⁶⁶ There is evidence that the democratic structure of the principal states involved in the creation of the postwar order in 1945 facilitated the process. Both American and European leaders argued that their

4 (Autumn, 1983), pp. 323-353, see also: Klein Bradley S. (1990). How the West was One: Representational Politics of NATO. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 3, Special Issue: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies (Sep., 1990), pp. 311-325. Finally, the United States have often supported dictators in smaller countries to avoid the rise of communism, thus failing to promote individual rights at the core of liberal philosophy. Nothing makes this clearer than President Kennedy's assessment of the situation in the Dominican Republic: "There are three possibilities in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can't renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third." In: Schlesinger, Arthur. *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*. Mariner Books; 1 edition (June 3, 2002), also quoted in: Chomsky, Noam. *The Responsibility of Intellectuals*, *The New York Review of Books*, February 23, 1967, and: Doyle, Michael W. *Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs*, Part 2. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Autumn, 1983), pp. 323-353

⁵⁶⁰ Kant, Immanuel. *To Perpetual Peace. A philosophical sketch*. Translated by Ted Humphrey, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003

⁵⁶¹ Doyle, Michael W. *Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs*, Part 2. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Autumn, 1983), pp. 323-353

⁵⁶² Ikenberry, John G (1996). *The Intertwining of Domestic and International Politics*. *Polity*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Winter, 1996), pp. 293-298. See also: Ikenberry, G. *John After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of order after major wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

⁵⁶³ Ikenberry, G. *John (2001). After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of order after major wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

⁵⁶⁴ Ikenberry, G. *John (2001). After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of order after major wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

⁵⁶⁵ Ikenberry, John G (1996). *The Intertwining of Domestic and International Politics*. *Polity*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Winter, 1996), pp. 293-298

⁵⁶⁶ Ruggie, John Gerard (1982). *International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order*. *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2, *International Regimes* (Spring, 1982)

commitment to collaboration was based on their shared democratic institutions. Democracy was, according to Ikenberry, “both an end and a means.”⁵⁶⁷ After the end of the Cold War, the same principle applied. Despite the disappearance of a common threat, the asymmetries of power among the Atlantic community provided incentives to increase rather than lessen their mutual commitments. The democratic structure of these states increased their capacity to do so.⁵⁶⁸

Table: Democracy and Institutional Agreement

Characteristic	Implication
Transparency	Reduces surprises Generates higher confidence information
Decentralized policy process	Policy viscosity Opportunities for enforcement
Open and decentralized system	Access and voice opportunities Transnational and transgovernmental connecting points

Source: Ikenberry, G. John. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

This system also helps avoid confrontation. By setting up international institutions, liberal states practice ‘co-binding’, that is, “they attempt to tie one another down by locking each other into institutions that mutually constrain one another.”⁵⁶⁹

Liberal democracies have thus, because of their domestic political system, an inherent interest in engaging with international institutions. As Kant points out, the citizens across the world, including in liberal democracies, would benefit enormously if the natural evolution of world politics reached its endpoint: a global pacific union of liberal states.⁵⁷⁰ International institutions can be seen as a crucial vehicle in the project of reaching this endpoint. Kant foresees setbacks and disappointment, but points to several possibilities of how the pacific union can be expanded. The “transnational track” is particularly interesting. According to this idea, the pacific union will expand one by one, with each ‘candidate country’ presenting a different project.

There is significant historical evidence for Kant’s prediction of the pacific union. Despite Anglo-French rivalry, liberal France and liberal Britain created an alliance against illiberal Germany prior to World War I. Liberal Italy, member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria, ended up supporting Britain and France, which allowed it to avoid

⁵⁶⁷ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

⁵⁶⁸ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

⁵⁶⁹ Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry (1999). *The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order*. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr., 1999), pp. 179-196

⁵⁷⁰ Kant, Immanuel. *To Perpetual Peace. A philosophical sketch*. Translated by Ted Humphrey, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003

war against other liberal states. And, despite tensions between the United States and Britain, America ended up supporting Britain in its war against Germany.⁵⁷¹

While Kant's pacific union was never supposed to be an official alliance—he develops no systematic embodiment of his treaty⁵⁷²- international institutions have, to some degree, formalized this group of nations. He did conceive some sort of mutual non-aggression pact, and the implementation of his third definitive article - cosmopolitan law - requires the creation of international institutions to monitor these rules.⁵⁷³

Several realist scholars, such as Joseph Grieco, Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer, criticize the liberal approach. Walt, for example, argues that “strong statistical support for the proposition is limited to the period after World War II, when both the US-led alliance system and the Soviet threats to Western Europe's democracies discouraged conflict between republics.”⁵⁷⁴ Grieco points out that, aside from the risk of being cheated, states are unlikely to engage in cooperative behavior because of the relative gains of other actors.⁵⁷⁵ According to this logic, states refuse to cooperate if they believe that the other side may gain more from the cooperation than they will. Yet Grieco's basic assumption is not entirely sound. States are not as concerned about relative gains logic as he claims. They are willing to accept if their counterpart occasionally gains more if they gain more in other instances.

Realists fail to take international institutions into the equation: Relative gains logic may play some role in a fictitious world where one state can only engage with another once in history. In such a world, states may try to cheat the other side as they do not have to fear any retribution. In a world regulated by international institutions, however, states meet not only twice, but infinite times. In fact, they meet all the time, creating a constant “multiple-play” character of the game.⁵⁷⁶ They have both adhered to the same principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, so there is enough trust that cheating is no longer an issue. In addition, states may cooperate in one area with little benefit, in order to build sufficient trust to find partners in another area, where they obtain higher payoffs from collaboration. International institutions play a key role in this aspect, as they constitute safe and rule-based means to engage in such collaboration. This is not only true once a strong state is declining and too weak to uphold a hegemonic system, as Keohane argued, but also as systems are created in postwar settlements, as Ikenberry as shown.⁵⁷⁷

State actors are less interested in short-term gains than realists believe. Brazil's decision to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state is a case in point.

⁵⁷¹ Doyle, Michael W. (1986). Liberalism and World Politics. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 1151-1169

⁵⁷² Doyle, Michael W. (1986). Liberalism and World Politics. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 1151-1169

⁵⁷³ International refugee law, for example, requires a supranational body such as UNHCR.

⁵⁷⁴ Walt, Stephen M. (1999). Never say never: Wishful thinking on democracy and war. *Foreign Affairs*, 148, 1999. In: Lee Ray, James (2001). *Democracy and Peace: Then and now*. *The International History Review*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Dec., 2001), pp. 784-798

⁵⁷⁵ Grieco, J. (1988). Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institution, *International Organization*, 42 (August), p.485-507, 1988

⁵⁷⁶ Keohane, Robert O. (2005). Preface to the 2005 Edition. In: Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

⁵⁷⁷ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of order after major wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

Immediate gains for Brazil in the security realm were virtually non-existent. Some argue the treaty even harmed Brazil's national interest, as it lost its right to develop nuclear weapons. The Brazilian government was motivated by more subtle, less measurable benefits, such as trust building and a slow reintegration into the Western World Order after democratization in 1985. Brazil assumed that greater integration would provide it tangible benefits at a later stage.

Realists exaggerate the importance of gains or advantages achieved by other states they cooperate with. There is ample historic evidence that countries that engage in cooperation are most concerned with absolute gains logic - they care about their benefits irrespective of the other side.⁵⁷⁸ Furthermore, as measuring one's own gains against those of another state is increasingly complex, cross-issue cooperation is very difficult.⁵⁷⁹ If institutions provide mutual benefits, states are likely to shift loyalty and resources to institutions. As Stein points out, there is a lot of institutionalized cooperation and much of it has differential payoffs.⁵⁸⁰ This shows that even if states are purely rational, self-interested actors, collaboration is indeed possible and likely.⁵⁸¹

With the arguments shown above, we can provide a predictive account of the strategy fringe countries will employ regarding international institutions. If this proposition is true, we would expect both Brazil and India to seek integration on all counts. If we apply Kantian liberal theory to Brazil and India, two liberal democracies that have accepted all three of Kant's "definitive articles" of peace, they should have a strong incentive to engage in multilateral institutions and integrate into the Western World Order. If they do as we predict, we may also be able to construe that as evidence of what the West is.

⁵⁷⁸ Keohane, Robert O. and L.L. Martin, (2003). Institutional theory as a research program, pp. 71-107 in *Progress and International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*, ed. C. Elman and M.F. Elman. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2003

⁵⁷⁹ Hurrell, Andrew (2007). *On Global Order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*. 2007, Oxford: Oxford University Press

⁵⁸⁰ Stein, Arthur A. (2008). Neoliberal Institutionalism, in: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

⁵⁸¹ Keohane, Robert O. (2005). Preface to the 2005 Edition. In: Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

1.5. *How do fringe nations relate to international institutions?*

In this section, we seek to develop categories that help us define fringe nations' strategies towards international institutions. Before we talk about these categories, however, we must better understand the relationship between a nation and an international institution.

1.5.1. *Fringe nations and the Western World Order*

How do we define institutions? We can differentiate between international institutions (the equivalent of international regimes) and international organizations. International institutions are issue-specific. They provide rules, norms and decision-making procedures that specify how states should behave in a specific area. International organizations, by contrast, are physical entities with staff and offices, i.e. with an organizational structure. There are international institutions without an organizational structure (e.g. the Ottawa Treaty against landmines), and some international institutions for which an organizational structure emerged (e.g. the WTO), then turning into an international organization. This differentiation is only of minor importance for the purpose of this study.⁵⁸²

Institutions are not simply implicit rules of the game, as some realists argue.⁵⁸³ Stein points out that all recurrent behavior is guided by some rule, so the entire study of international politics could be renamed as the study of international institutions.⁵⁸⁴ Both social constructivism and the English School fall into this trap, failing to delineate the role of institutions in international relations.⁵⁸⁵

Krasner, using a more pragmatic approach, therefore identifies four fundamental elements of an international institution: Principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.⁵⁸⁶ An institution must be based on a series of principles (i.e. “the proliferation of nuclear weapons is bad”), assuming that global welfare will be maximized by the pursuit of

⁵⁸² The nature of international regimes is highly diverse. The World Bank and the IMF are large organizations whose bureaucracies engage in strategic action, which is not always rule-bound. These differences will not be considered here for the sake of simplicity. Keohane, Robert O. (2005). Preface to the 2005 Edition. In: Keohane, Robert O. (1984). *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

⁵⁸³ This view is not uncontested. Lisa Martin, for example, calls the Concert of Europe or the gold standard institutions. (Lisa L. Martin. *An institutionalist view*. In: T.V. Paul and John A. Hall (1999, eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) For the purpose of this study, my definition of an international institution is more rigorous.

⁵⁸⁴ Stein, Arthur A. (2008). *Neoliberal Institutionalism*, in: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

⁵⁸⁵ Arthur A. Stein (2008). *Neoliberal Institutionalism*, in: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

⁵⁸⁶ Krasner, Steven. (1985). *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press. See also Krasner, Stephen D. (1982). *Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables*. *International Organization*, 36: 185-205, 1982. This definition has also been adopted by other neoliberal institutionalists such as Robert O. Keohane. (Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984)

this goal.⁵⁸⁷ Norms spell out general standards of behavior, while rules specify, at a more detailed level, what members can and cannot do.⁵⁸⁸ The rules of a regime are difficult to distinguish from its norms, and at the margin they merge.⁵⁸⁹ Rules can be altered more easily than norms, because there may be more than one set of rules that can achieve a given set of purposes.⁵⁹⁰ Finally, explicit decision-making procedures stipulate who holds power in the institution, how to take joint decisions, how to take in new members and how to punish rule breakers.⁵⁹¹

Now that we have properly defined institutions, the following question must be, why do they exist in the first place? What causes two or more states to establish an international institution? Liberal scholars argue that states create institutions to facilitate collaboration and avoid coordination problems (aptly shown in the prisoner's dilemma)⁵⁹², which is difficult in a purely anarchic system.⁵⁹³ The fundamental motivation behind the creations of institutions is to help states reach the Pareto frontier, the situation at which no more joint gains are possible.⁵⁹⁴ Institutions that provide mechanisms of inspection and surveillance make it more difficult to cheat.⁵⁹⁵ Furthermore, international institutions act like a regulator in a market, assuring that actors do not destroy public goods- by overfishing the ocean or polluting the air (although some institutions such as the WTO deal with private goods). Hurrell writes that “global governance is best understood as a response to the increasingly serious collective action problems generated by growing societal, ecological, and economic interdependence.”⁵⁹⁶ States may also create international institutions to reduce the governance costs that autonomous decision-making creates - it is cheaper to act through an

⁵⁸⁷ Keohane says that “the principles of regimes define, in general, the purposes that their members are expected to pursue. For instance, the principles of the postwar trade and monetary regimes have emphasized the value of open, nondiscriminatory patterns of international economic transactions.” Keohane, Robert O. (2005). Preface to the 2005 Edition. In: Keohane, Robert O. (1984). *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

⁵⁸⁸ For example, the WTO does not force members to resort to free trade right away.

⁵⁸⁹ Some scholars even equate rules and norms. Barnett and Finnemore, for example, define rules as “explicit or implicit norms (...) that define the social world and the behavior of actors in it.” (Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). *Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004)

⁵⁹⁰ Keohane, Robert O. Preface to the 2005 Edition. In: Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

⁵⁹¹ John Mearsheimer offers a similar definition: According to him, an institution is “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with one another. They prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior, and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior.” (Mearsheimer, John J. (1994). *The False Promise of International Institutions*, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No.3, (Winter 1994, 1995), pp.5-49)

⁵⁹² In: Kuhn, Steven (2009). “Prisoner's Dilemma”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/prisoner-dilemma/> (accessed December 1, 2009)

⁵⁹³ Axelrod, Robert and Robert O. Keohane (1985). *Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions*. *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Oct., 1985), pp. 226-254

⁵⁹⁴ Martin, Lisa L. (1999). An institutionalist view. In: T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

⁵⁹⁵ Richardson, James L. (2008) *The Ethics of Neoliberal Institutionalism*. in: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

⁵⁹⁶ Hurrell, Andrew (2007). *On Global Order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*. 2007, Oxford: Oxford University Press

institution than to assemble a coalition of the willing for every single problem.⁵⁹⁷ Both neoliberal institutionalism and realism agree that states create or join institutions out of self-interest. The key difference is that realists contend that once the regime no longer provides these benefits, rising powers will create other institutions. Institutions are thus similar to alliances.

The question whether international institutions have, in fact, any impact on nations' behavior is a major contention between realist and liberal thought. Realists and neo-realists argue that institutions have no impact at all, while liberal scholars disagree and contend that institutions strongly affect nations' behavior, generally contributing to peace. They agree however, on a series of basic assumptions. The international system is fundamentally anarchical, states are unitary actors, regimes promote international order, and they are the product of rational self-interested actors.⁵⁹⁸

Realist scholars argue that international institutions are an epiphenomenal component of international relations, reducible to state power and interests, and thus no real actor in international relations at all.⁵⁹⁹ International organizations work within the framework of inter-state relations, not vice versa.⁶⁰⁰ In addition, they are usually disguised alliances between states and thus ephemeral. As realist thinker John J. Mearsheimer points out in "The false promise of International Institutions", there is no evidence that global governance has any influence on states' behavior.⁶⁰¹ International institutions do not mitigate the anarchy of the international system. States are the only actors on the international arena, so the study of the relations between the state and an institution is entirely futile. According to Mearsheimer, what explains war and peace are not institutions, but 'balance of power'. The most powerful states in a system create and shape international institutions, which are then primarily used to "act out" these power relationships. Realists point to the fact that most institutions were created by hegemony, and that the current system rests on the political hegemony of the United States.⁶⁰² States may build alliances and decide to cooperate, but they

⁵⁹⁷ Robert O. Keohane gives a good example of why institutions reduce transaction cost: "An extreme example is provided by the settlement between Iran and the United States in 1981, in which American diplomats held hostage by Iran were liberated in return for the release of Iranian financial assets in the United States. Elaborate arrangements were made, involving Algeria and Britain, to ensure that neither side could double-cross the other by withholding its part of the bargain after receiving what it wanted. In the complete absence of an international regime linking the United States with the revolutionary government of Iran, laborious negotiations were necessary to set up an ad hoc arrangement to permit a balanced reciprocity that benefited both sides." Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

⁵⁹⁸ Little, Richard (2008). *International regimes*. In: Smith, Steve, John Baylis, Patricia Owens. *The Globalization of World Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008

⁵⁹⁹ Stein, Arthur A. (2008). *Neoliberal Institutionalism*, in: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008. See also: Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of order after major wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

⁶⁰⁰ Smith, Steve, John Baylis, Patricia Owens (2008). *Introduction, The Globalization of World Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008

⁶⁰¹ Some notable realists, such as Joseph Grieco, however, have admitted that international institutions do have some impact on states' behavior. (Grieco, Joseph (1993). *Cooperation among Nations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993)

⁶⁰² Stein, Arthur A. (2008). *Neoliberal Institutionalism*, in: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008. See also: Keohane, Robert O. *After*

will change their strategy when it seems convenient.⁶⁰³ All realist theoretical concepts, such as ‘bandwagoning’ or ‘balancing’ therefore refer to a nation’s behavior towards other states.⁶⁰⁴

Liberal scholars disagree. While the underlying assumption remains the same (the system is anarchical and states want to maximize power), international institutions alter the way states aim to maximize their power. Institutions have an “ordering capacity”⁶⁰⁵, they facilitate and thus increase cooperation between states because they offer a safe and rule-based means to doing so - they thus overcome the problem of anarchy. Furthermore, international institutions exercise power by “fixing the meaning of issues (“e.g. genocide is unacceptable”) and diffusing norms.⁶⁰⁶ In an increasingly interdependent world, the state loses its status as the privileged sovereign institution. The state becomes one of many actors, and international institutions are a key feature of this new, complex system.⁶⁰⁷

Institutions also promote trust building. Each member state agrees to forswear actions that, without guarantees that other members will play by the rules, it would be prudent to pursue.⁶⁰⁸ States are less willing to disregard institutions because their behavior may hurt them at a later point in a different issue area. Liberal institutionalists call these phenomena the “shadow of the future”⁶⁰⁹ and “issue-linkage”, pointing to the fact that issue areas are increasingly interdependent. Effective monitoring thanks to technology and reduced transaction costs are further reasons that make cooperation an attractive option for most states.⁶¹⁰

International institutions are independent actors in international relations as they mitigate the constraining of anarchy in the international system.⁶¹¹ Barnett and Finnemore

Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

⁶⁰³ Mearsheimer, John J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No.3, (Winter 1994, 1995), pp. 5-49

⁶⁰⁴ see, for example, Ciorciari, John D. (2009). What kind of power will India be? ISA Conference Paper, New York, 2009

⁶⁰⁵ Ikenberry, G. John. (1999). Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order. In Paul and Hall, *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, pp. 123–145.

⁶⁰⁶ Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). *Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004

⁶⁰⁷ Hurrell, Andrew (2007). *On Global Order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*. 2007, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore argue that understanding international organizations as social creatures and bureaucracies helps show that they are, while also influenced by states, fairly autonomous entities. (Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). *Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.)

⁶⁰⁸ Ikenberry, G. John (1999). Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order. In Paul and Hall, *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, pp. 123–145.

⁶⁰⁹ Ruzicka, Jan, Nicholas J. Wheeler (2010). The puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. *International Affairs* 86: 1 (2010) 69–85

⁶¹⁰ Keohane, Robert O., Joseph Nye (2000). *Governance in a Globalizing World*. New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2000

⁶¹¹ The example of UNHCR is telling and shows that international institutions often take on a proper dynamic states no longer closely control. Barnett and Finnemore write that “when states created UNHCR in 1951, they gave it a three-year life span, almost no autonomy, and a very circumscribed mandate. UNHCR was to provide legal, not material, assistance only to people who had been displaced by events in Europe prior to 1951. Yet the agency was able to capitalize on refugee-producing events and use its institutional position and moral authority to expand the concept of refugee, to widen its assistance and protection activities, and to significantly extend its sphere of operations. By the late 1970s it was no longer a small European refugee agency but a global humanitarian organization.”

argue that “while state demands are extremely important” for international institutions, “state action by no means determines all, or even most, IO behavior.”⁶¹² They are also the best means for state actors to deal with the complex phenomenon of globalization. Relations between states and institutions are therefore important.

Section 1.4. on liberalism has shown that ideological affinity increases states’ propensity to create durable strategic ties by including a sense of trust and shared purpose.⁶¹³ Yet international institutions also affect non-democratic regimes’ behavior. Independently of the regime type, it is easier to break a verbally made promise than a written contract. Empirical studies have found that states mostly comply with the agreements they make.⁶¹⁴ Large and powerful countries such as China undertake domestic reform and change their behavior in order to join the WTO. The United States attempts to change other countries’ behavior by working through the UN Security Council - as evidenced by more than one hundred UN Security Council resolutions sponsored by the United States since the UN’s inception.⁶¹⁵ While structural realists would expect other countries to actively balance against the United States, reality shows that they mostly balance within the system - a behavior termed “soft balancing” by T.V. Paul.⁶¹⁶ They do so because they have sufficient trust in the international institutions. As Ikenberry points out, the logic of balance is to check power with power; the logic of institutional binding is to restrain power through the establishment of an institutionalized political process. But institutions also take on a life on their own and shape and constrain the dominant states that created them - the WTO, for example, has constrained US behavior on several occasions.⁶¹⁷

Liberal theory thus is correct in assuming that international regimes increase the chance for sustained international cooperation and commitment, no matter whether a country is democratic or not. Institutions are therefore an entity states can independently relate to- confronting, integrating, etc. Yet, given the complexity of relations between a state and an institution, these relationships are often misunderstood.

Relations between a state and international institutions are unlike interstate relations, and contrary to realist thought, a country’s policy towards an international institution is not the same as the country’s policy towards the governments that form part of this particular institution. We thus cannot be reductive, as the institution is something other than the sum of its members.

(Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). *Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004)

⁶¹² Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). *Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004

⁶¹³ Ciorciari, John D. (2009). *What kind of power will India be? ISA Conference Paper*, New York, 2009

⁶¹⁴ Stein, Arthur A. (2008). *Neoliberal Institutionalism*, in: *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008

⁶¹⁵ United Nations (2010). www.un.org

⁶¹⁶ Paul, T.V. (2005). *Soft Balancing in the Age of Hegemony*. *International Security*, Volume 30, Number 1, Summer 2005, pp. 46-71

⁶¹⁷ As Ikenberry points out, there is a historical misconception that the policies and institutions that supported free trade and economic openness are the stuff of “low politics”. In fact, peace and security would have been impossible in a postwar world of closed and exclusive economic regions. Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of order after major wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

India's behavior towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), for example, is confrontational: It refused to sign the treaty which was meant to be a global standard. That does not mean, however, that it confronts all the countries that joined the NPT, such as the United States. Quite to the contrary: While India continues to refuse to sign the NPT, its relations to the US have strengthened since 2005, when the United States acknowledged India as a nuclear power.⁶¹⁸ That means there is a way to confront an institution without severing all ties to the institution's members.

Given the complexities, what is the best way to think about relations between a state and an institution? As the above example with India, the United States and the NPT has shown, we cannot think of the relations between a state and an institution with the same framework we use for state-state relations. Yet, there certainly is some relation between the two. The current world order has been described as an "American project,"⁶¹⁹ and the United States can be seen as the "gatekeeper" of many of the clubs, sitting atop of a global hierarchy, countries critical of the global order are often critical of the United States as well.⁶²⁰ A country that decides to consistently undermine all institutions, such as North Korea, can hardly be close to a government that chooses to integrate into all institutions, such as Germany. Yet, the approximation in 2009 and 2010 between a NPT-obliging country- Brazil- and a country that violates the NPT- Iran- show that we cannot safely infer from state-institution relations to state-state relations.

We can thus state that when fringe countries deal with many institutions, they are grappling with the Western World Order. Rather than thinking about the case of India and the NPT in the context of state-state relations, or of India vs. the NPT's member states, we can understand the situation in the context of the Western World Order. By refusing to sign the NPT, India made a confrontational move against the non-proliferation regime, and with it the Western World Order based on rules and norms. A country's strategy towards international institutions reflects a government's beliefs in how it should relate to the current world order. As will be discussed, this does not mean that India seeks to undermine the Western World Order in general. It may be that another aspect, as such India's need to assure regional security, trumps its desire to strengthen the Western World Order.

So how can fringe countries interact with the Western World Order? On the one hand, they are not yet fully integrated into the system, so they can seek integration to be invited to participate in and influence important decisions. On the other, they may also build counter-hegemonic alliances and create a parallel system—an extreme form of confrontation. The traditional perspective is that fringe nations are "in or out", that they can either seek to become part of the system or confront it.

⁶¹⁸ Carter, Ashton B (2006). America's New Strategic Partner? *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006), pp. 33-44. As other NPT signatories such as Brazil pointed out, the United States effectively 'rewarded' India for engage in highly confrontational behavior.

⁶¹⁹ Ikenberry, G. John (2004). Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), pp. 609-630

⁶²⁰ Ciorciari notes that the United States have the power to issue "superpower approval". Relations to the United States therefore matter, even when analyzing a nation's strategy towards international institutions.

Yet, a more careful analysis shows that they can also pursue a plethora of other, more subtle strategies that are harder to categorize.⁶²¹ For example, does Brazil's and India's quest for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council constitute "confrontational" or "integrative" behavior?⁶²² While many may call it revisionist, it shows that both countries accept the Security Council in principle- theoretically, they could also call for an abolition of the Security Council and argue that the General Assembly, or an entirely new organ should replace it— which would be a far more confrontational move.⁶²³ Thus, the campaign for a permanent seat certainly contains parts of both integration and confrontation, yet neither label adequately captures the essence of the strategy. Ricardo Seitenfus and Baldev Raj Nayar have described Brazil's and India's strategy as "reformist", saying that Brazil does not question the overarching principles (such as the veto power in the UNSC), but it seeks low-key reform (such as seeking a permanent seat).⁶²⁴ Seitenfus argues that Brazil's strategy towards the UN Security Council reflects the country's strategy towards international institutions in general.⁶²⁵

Similarly, if South America, led by Brazil, were to establish a unified, EU-like structure based essentially on 'Western' norms and procedures, neither 'integration' nor 'confrontation' would adequately describe Brazil's strategy. "Alignment" could be more fitting.

While established powers such as the United Kingdom and Italy confront the Western World Order only in specific instances, emerging fringe countries such as Brazil, China and India are less integrated into the system and thus seem to engage in confrontational behavior more frequently. Brazil and India have pushed for UN Security Council Reform, India has refused to sign the NPT, Brazil has not signed any additional inspection provisions, and Brazil and India are among the WTO members who most frequently issue complaints at the WTO.⁶²⁶ India has, Nayar and Paul write, "serious disagreements with several international-order norms promoted by the status quo powers."⁶²⁷

Do rising powers oppose international regimes more often than established powers? To begin with, they are less integrated and their foreign policy is thus naturally less aligned with the Western World Order. When the present order was conceived, Brazil and India were not considered, so there is no space for them. In addition, as Paul argues, international

⁶²¹ Ciorciari, John D. (2009). What kind of power will India be? ISA Conference Paper, New York, 2009

⁶²² The Hindu Correspondent (2004). India, Brazil to back each other for permanent Security Council seats. *The Hindu*, January 28, 2004

⁶²³ Sukarno, Indonesia's first President, frequently characterized the UN as a tool of Western hegemony. He withdrew Indonesia from the UN membership in 1965 when, with US backing, the nascent Federation of Malaysia took a seat in the UN Security Council.

⁶²⁴ Nayar, Baldev Raj (1999). India as a limited challenger? In: Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

⁶²⁵ Seitenfus, Ricardo (2005). *Le Sud devient le Nord: Fondements stratégiques de l'actuelle diplomatie brésilienne*. In S. Monclaire, J.F. Deluchey, *Gouverner l'intégration*, 2005

⁶²⁶ Narlikar, Amrita (2006). Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation: Explaining the Negotiation Strategy of a Rising India, *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1, January 2006, pp. 77-94.

⁶²⁷ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

institutions may be seen as a tool by rising powers to limit the dominant power's options.⁶²⁸ But other factors may cause Brazil and India to confront more often. As rising powers, they feel they deserve more weight in international institutions, and they argue that their participation is necessary to legitimize existing institutions. They are not “status quo” powers as their strategies harbor revisionist elements. Abdul Nafey and Raja Mohan therefore call India a “revisionist” power.⁶²⁹ Yet, what looks like confrontational behavior does not necessarily constitute actual confrontation, but may be explained by the fact that these nations are located on the fringe of the Western World Order.

Fringe nations appear to be constantly confronting established states through their institutions. But in fact they are in a complicated negotiation not with those states, but with the Western World Order generally. If Brazil and India integrate and then confront within the system, they may do so merely to win their rightful place within the institutions, not to undermine the institutions themselves. There is thus a danger of misinterpreting benign confrontation within the system with systemic confrontation. This stems from an oversimplification and reduction of rising powers' options to integration and confrontation. But, it is more complicated than that. There are many options. There are strategies that are not unconditional integration, but they are not confrontation, either. There are strategies in between.

It is becoming clear that we cannot make progress on either adequately explaining the past or predicting the future with realist or liberal theories until we have a better way of defining the terms for the options fringe powers have. Analyzing a nation's behavior towards international institutions is more complex, and it cannot fully be captured by confrontation vs. integration. International institutions are highly diverse, which makes analyzing a country's policy towards institutions in general - towards the Western World Order - highly complex.⁶³⁰

Several scholars have attempted to characterize rising powers' behavior, but it usually involves their behavior towards the established powers rather than the institutions created by the established powers. Paul and Pape, for example, have called rising powers' strategy “soft hedging” or “soft balancing” respectively, which involves using political ententes and multilateral institutions to constrain the United States, while avoiding security arrangements that, from a US perspective, could be considered counter-hegemonic alliances.⁶³¹

⁶²⁸ Paul, T.V. (2005). Soft Balancing in the Age of Hegemony. *International Security*, Volume 30, No.1, pp. 46-71, Summer 2005. See also: Pape, Robert A. (2005) Soft Balancing against the United States. *International Security*, Volume 30, No. 1, pp. 7-45, Summer 2005

⁶²⁹ Nafey, Abdul (2008). India and the G8: Reaching out or out of reach? In: Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008. See also: Mohan, C. Raja. *Crossing the Rubicon* (2004). *The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

⁶³⁰ Most institutions represent a particular policy area – such as nuclear proliferation, economic development, international finance, or trade, while others act in a multitude of disciplines, such as the United Nations.

⁶³¹ Paul, T.V. (2005). Soft Balancing in the Age of Hegemony. *International Security*, Volume 30, No.1, pp. 46-71, Summer 2005 See also: Pape, Robert A. (2005) Soft Balancing against the United States. *International Security*, Volume 30, No. 1, pp. 7-45, Summer 2005

1.5.2. *Integration strategies*

1.5.2.1. UNCONDITIONAL INTEGRATION

Regimes can be defined as (...) principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of act, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.⁶³²

- Stephen Krasner,

Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables

1.5.2.1. UNCONDITIONAL INTEGRATION

Integrative behavior vis-à-vis an international institution can take place in several forms. First of all, a country can seek membership in an institution and actively support it in its entirety. As Krasner has convincingly argued, an institution is defined by its principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures.⁶³³ 'Principles' can also be understood as the 'spirit' of the institutions. If a new member seeks integration and fully accepts the institution's principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, we can speak of "unconditional integration". Turkey's decision to seek membership in NATO in 1952, its decision to apply to the European Union in 1987, emerging powers' decision to lend more money to the IMF, or any countries' decision to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) are examples for integrative behavior.

This strategy is at times accompanied by domestic worries about losing one's sovereignty or foreign policy independence. As India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh moved India's closer to the institutional mainstream, he saw himself forced to promise that "nothing will be done that will compromise, dilute, or cast a shadow on India's full autonomy in the management of its security and national interests."⁶³⁴ In the same way, John Bolton argues that treaties like the Ottawa Treaty (Mine Ban Treaty) impair America's sovereignty.⁶³⁵ We can call this strategy "unconditional integration." Unconditional integration into a particular institution implies that the new signatory or member country fully accepts the rules and values that undergird the international institution or regime.

⁶³² Krasner, Stephen D. (1982). Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables. *International Organization*, 36: 185-205, 1982

⁶³³ Krasner, Stephen D. (1985). *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. See also: Krasner, Stephen D. (1982). Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables. *International Organization*, 36: 185-205, 1982

⁶³⁴ Dormandy, Xenia (2007). Is India, or Will It Be, a Responsible International Stakeholder? *Washington Quarterly* 30:3 (2007), p. 126

⁶³⁵ John Bolton, Should we take global governance seriously?, *Chicago Journal of International Law*, Vol. 1, p.205- 221, Fall 2000

Countries give up some degree of autonomy, but they also gain something in return. In the case of the World Trade Organization (WTO), nations adopt a variety of rules that have a large influence of how they conduct their trade policy. Membership in the WTO means a balance of rights and obligations. As the WTO rightly observes, nations “enjoy the privileges that other member-countries give to them and the security that the trading rules provide. In return, they had to make commitments to open their markets and to abide by the rules.”⁶³⁶ Several international regimes, such as the WTO, the CTBT or the Ottawa Treaty are structured in a way that members can only engage in the institution through unconditional integration. Countries interested in joining are usually not granted special rights.

1.5.2.2. REVISIONIST INTEGRATION

Opposed to unconditional integration is revisionist integration. It seems adequate here to once again remember Krasner’s point that institutions are defined by principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures.⁶³⁷ If countries agree on an institution’s principles and norms, but seek to reform its rules and decision-making procedures prior or after their entry, we can speak of revisionist integration. Revisionist integration thus aims at some reform, but seeks to preserve the so-called ‘spirit’ of the organization. Revisionist is important and often strengthens an institution. Using different categories, Keohane argues that discord helps stimulate mutual adjustment in international affairs.⁶³⁸

Germany’s strategy towards the UN Security Council is a classic example. Germany does not seek to undermine the UN Security Council- quite to the contrary, it seeks inclusion in the institution, underlining the importance it assigns to the body. However, Germany’s entry requires a change in the rules and decision-making procedures of the UN Security Council. Germany’s strategy has been called “revisionist” and “anti-status quo”.⁶³⁹ German policy makers call their own strategy “reformist”⁶⁴⁰, yet there is certainly a confrontational element involved. Germany seeks to put pressure on current members to change the institutions’ decision-making procedures, which implies confronting them to some degree.

Other examples are several countries’ campaign to replace the G7 with the G20 to address the world’s most urging challenges. Among others, India has been one of the leading advocates for a stronger G20, attempting to break the G7’s long-standing grip on key decisions of global finance. While these countries called for the actual abolition of the G7 as

⁶³⁶ World Trade Organization (2010). http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org3_e.htm

⁶³⁷ Krasner, Stephen D. (1985). *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. See also Krasner, Stephen D. *Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables*. *International Organization*, 36: 185-205, 1982

⁶³⁸ Keohane, Robert O. (2005). Preface to the 2005 Edition. In: Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

⁶³⁹ Schirm, Stefan A. (2009). *Brazil’s rise as an emerging power: Implications for the U.S. and Europe*, Paper prepared for the conference ‘Brazil’s Rise: A U.S.-European Assessment’, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, June 1-2, 2009

⁶⁴⁰ Nass, Matthias (2004). *Wir wollen da rein! DIE ZEIT 16.09.2004 Nr.39* <http://www.zeit.de/2004/39/UN-Sicherheitsrat> (accessed October 2, 2009)

the world's principle forum for debate, their behavior did not constitute "radical confrontation" as it merely implied an expansion of an already existing mechanism that would not exclude any current members.

In the same way, Brazil's and India's desire to expand their voting rights at the World Bank constitutes revisionist integration. Both countries see to change the way the institution operates. All the categories so far presented are "institutionalist"⁶⁴¹ strategies as they constitute the engagement with existing institutions, not an anti-institutionalist, realist strategy.

Revisionist integrator is often wrongly understood as systemic confrontation. The examples given above are often cited in the media and academic studies to prove rising powers' interest in undermining the institution. The contrary is true. Revisionist integration has a positive effect as it allows additional states to engage, increasing its reach and legitimacy. As will be shown in section 2 and 3, in most cases, states' revisionist strategy is justified, so their strategy also contributes to the institution's openness, fairness and social mobility.

1.5.2.3. SYSTEM-STRENGTHENING INTEGRATION

Once a country has made a contract with an institution and is part of it, it can engage in another type of integration, which we shall call "system-strengthening integration." The first one is like making a contract. In the second one, members are not making a contract; they are making a pledge to lend more support to the organization. As member or signatory of an international regime or institution, it can increase or reduce support through several mechanisms. A member can, for example, support an institution through high financial contributions or troop provisions. India, Bangladesh and Pakistan are the world's largest troop providers to United Nations peace-keeping missions and thus increase the peacekeeping regime's effectiveness and reach. This is particularly important because the Department of Peacekeeping Operations' (DPKO) ability to engage in conflicts is directly related to the number of troops member states are willing to provide. The three nations' troop deployments therefore fortify the system and allow the UN to provide more effective peacekeeping. We shall call such a behavior "strengthening integration".

What motivates a country to engage in each one of the strategies, and how are they related? The strategies are, to some extent, dependent on the type of institution. As noted above, there are some institutions and regimes that only allow unconditional integration, such as the Ottawa Treaty against the use of land mines. A member cannot employ revisionist integration because the regime is reduced to a contract on one issue area, such as land mines. International contracts thus only allow for unconditional integration. More complex international institutions with a larger portfolio and actual procedures such as voting and policy engagement, allow room for revisionist behavior. Strengthening integration is possible in all types of regimes. While it is possible to strengthen the UN through financial help and troop deployments, states can exert pressure on others to sign certain treaties.

⁶⁴¹ Soares de Lima, Maria Regina (2003). *Na trilha de um política externa afirmativa*. Observatorio da Cidadania, 2003

Why would a country integrate into an institution but not engage in strengthening integration? As nations seek to maximize benefits, they may see benefits in unconditional integration, but not in strengthening integration after that. Or they may have difficulties assuming a leadership role and exposing themselves too much. This may be particularly the case for fringe nations that are relatively recent members of international institutions.

How do scholars from emerging powers interpret their options? Several Brazilian scholars have created the two categories of “autonomy through participation” vs. “autonomy through distance.”⁶⁴² Autonomy through participation, as used in the Brazilian context, is similar to unconditional integration, and is often criticized as “subordination”. Autonomy through participation does not foresee any ability to reform the system as described in the category ‘revisionist integration’. “Autonomy through distance” is, as shown below, similar to “passive confrontation”.

This Brazilian juxtaposition does not include “revisionist integration” because Brazil’s perspective is based on the assumption that the Western World Order is marked by “American unipolarity”⁶⁴³, and that emerging powers cannot change the structure of it. This vision interprets the Western World Order as a less flexible, more rigid structure. This is a fundamental difference from the way the Western World Order has been described in this study.

While several Brazilian authors suggest that participation implies acceptance of and resignation to the system as it is, and that the United States is interested in stopping emerging powers’ rise, this study argues, similarly to Ikenberry, that the system is open, rule-based and democratic, and that emerging powers are welcome and able to join and rise within the system.⁶⁴⁴ The traditional Brazilian definition overlooks the crucial fact that rising powers are rising in the first place because the system allows and encourages them to do so.⁶⁴⁵ Implicitly, however, even those who consider the system as characterized by American domination recognize the system’s unique strengths. When Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães recommends that Brazil “challenge the giants” and be a “revisionist power”, he calls on Brazil to push for reform of the UN Security Council - a key component of the Western World Order. Once Brazil becomes a permanent member of the Council, as Guimarães hopes for, it will be more deeply integrated into a newly fortified Western World Order than ever before. His claim thus affirms the claim that today’s system is easy to join and hard to overturn. “Revisionist” strategies do, in fact, constitute “revisionist integration” as long as a country does not seek to destabilize the existing world order.

⁶⁴² Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2010). *Brazilian Foreign Policy In Changing Times: The Quest For Autonomy From Sarney To Lula*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010

⁶⁴³ Soares de Lima, Maria Regina (2003). *Na trilha de um política externa afirmativa*. Observatorio da Cidadania, 2003

⁶⁴⁴ Ikenberry, G. John (2004). *Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age*. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), pp. 609-630

⁶⁴⁵ Ikenberry, G. John (2008). *The Rise of China and the Future of the West*, *Foreign Affairs*; Jan/Feb2008, Vol. 87 Issue 1, p23-37

1.5.3. *Alignment strategies*

How does an alignment strategy differ from an integrative behavior? A strategy of alignment does not necessarily imply integration. A country aligns with an international institution if it actively supports the same principles and norms, but if it does not become a member. In this case, the rules and decision-making procedures do not apply to it. In most cases, integration does not take place because the institution is limited to a geographic region, and the country in question lies outside of that region. Alignment also takes place if a regional organization is created that pursues the same principles and norms as those promoted by the existing institutions that form the Western World Order. Characterizing regionalization on similar principles as those stipulated in global institutions as ‘alignment’ departs from the Wilsonian perspective, which regards regional alliances in general as prone to create instability.⁶⁴⁶

Japan’s goals and values may be aligned to those of NATO- for example, in Afghanistan, but it is not part of NATO and thus does not actively participate in its missions. Alignment is therefore more common when speaking about regional organizations such as the European Union, ASEAN or NATO. A nation that lies outside of the institution’s region, but pursues the same goals, or even collaborates with the institution, can thus be said to be aligned. The United States, for example, can be said to be aligned with the European Union on issues such as nuclear proliferation. In the same way, the creation of the European Union is not an alternative to the US-led Western World Order, but a “filling” of it.⁶⁴⁷

While realist scholars have argued that the creation of the European Union may pose a threat to the United States⁶⁴⁸, the EU is complementary, as it is guided by the very same principles that undergird the Western World Order. The creation of the EU or of any other regional bodies that support rule-based and open principles can thus be described as alignment. Brazil’s and Argentina’s decision to form Mercosur together with Uruguay and Paraguay can equally be seen as alignment as it is based on the same rules and norms that undergird the Western World Order. In this respect, Mercosur can similarly be seen as a regional manifestation of the Western World Order, because it promotes similar principles. The same seems to be true for IBSA, an alliance of India, Brazil and South Africa.⁶⁴⁹

⁶⁴⁶ Herz, Mônica (1999). *Brasil e a Reforma da ONU*. *Lua Nova Revista de Cultura e Política*, 1999

⁶⁴⁷ Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry (1993). *The Logic of the West*. *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter, 1993/1994), pp. 17-25

⁶⁴⁸ See, for example: Bolton, John (2010). *Don’t mourn the euro*. *New York Post*, May 25, 2010; http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/don_mourn_the_euro_C6l9m6v8UNPMBTnAJ3P7rO (accessed June 1, 2010)

⁶⁴⁹ Alden, Christopher. and Marco Antonio Vieira (2008). *India, Brazil and South Africa, a Lasting Partnership? Assessing the Role of Identity in IBSA*" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th Annual Convention. Bridging multiple divides. Hilton San Francisco, Mar 26, 2008

1.5.4. *Confrontation strategies*

To confront international institutions implies opposing the rules that undergird the institutions and to directly or indirectly undermine their effectiveness. There are three confrontational strategies countries can adopt with regard to international institutions.

1.5.4.1. SYSTEMIC CONFRONTATION

First, a nation can seek to create a counter-institutional alliance aimed at limiting or hindering the institution's activities. This takes place when an institution not only opposes an institution's rules and decision-making procedures, but also its norms and, most importantly, its principles (i.e., its 'spirit'). North Korea's behavior towards the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can be described as confrontational. Not only did it withdraw from the organization in 1994, but it has also actively sought to hinder the institution's work, for example by expelling international observers in 2002.⁶⁵⁰ Such a behavior is particularly grave as it is in the nature of the NPT that if at least one state confronts the treaty, the entire systemic logic embodied in the NPT will be reduced and possibly fatally undermined.⁶⁵¹ This is what we may call "radical / systemic confrontation." States can create parallel institutions to balance the power of an already existing (usually regional institution). The Warsaw Treaty serves as another historical example.

Sometimes it is difficult to tell whether a strategy constitutes alignment or systemic confrontation. After the Kosovo Crisis in 1999, for example, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov proposed the creation of a "strategic triangle", consisting of Russia, China and India, to create a counterweight to NATO⁶⁵²- an initiative that eventually failed. In 2001, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan created the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a regional club designed to confront Islamic fundamentalism and promote economic development. In these specific cases, we cannot immediately tell whether states engage in alignment or confrontation. If the alliances mentioned are based on freedom, openness and fairness, there is no reason why states like Russia and China cannot be part of an alignment strategy. The rules and norms that underlie the institutions are decisive in this context.

States seem to engage in systemic confrontation if they consider the institution unjust. The case of Germany's decision to leave the League of Nations on September 19, 1939 may be instructive. After having applied for membership in 1926, Germany had been admitted to the institution in 1933. Why did Germany engage in systemic confrontation against the League of Nations, which represented the heart of the international system at the time? When Germany and France were engaged in a dispute over the payments stipulated in the Versailles Treaty and the French occupation of the resource-rich Ruhr Basin, the German government

⁶⁵⁰ Harrison, Selig S. (2005). Did North Korea Cheat? *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2005), pp. 99-110

⁶⁵¹ Ruzicka, Jan, Nicholas J. Wheeler (2010). The puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. *International Affairs* 86: 1 (2010) 69–85

⁶⁵² Marshall, Tyler (1999). Anti-NATO Axis Poses Threat, Experts Say. *Los Angeles Times*, September 27, 1999

preferred bilateral negotiations. As Count von Bernstorff pointed out in 1924, Germany decided not to ask the League of Nations to help settle the dispute because Germany had lost confidence in the institution's impartiality. He furthermore notes that "the League, indeed, has hardly ever shown justice to Germany."⁶⁵³ Wolfgang Schwarz expressed a similar sentiment in 1931 when he argued that "Germany (...) is like a fellow who has been hit below the belt too often, and feels it is time he left the ring."⁶⁵⁴ Specifically, he called for disarmament rules that would apply to both Germany and the rest of Europe. Furthermore, he argued that Germany had no choice but to be an "unsatisfied" revisionist power given that many Germans lived separated from Germany by the Versailles Treaty.⁶⁵⁵ Germany regarded the international regime not as democratic, fair or transparent, but as a "Diktat"⁶⁵⁶ and perceived itself as an unfairly treated victim. From the German point of view, the League of Nations provided virtually no possibility to rise within the system, i.e., no 'intra-institutional mobility'. By retreating from the League of Nations in 1935, Germany actively sought to destabilize the existing international system.⁶⁵⁷

India's and Pakistan's behavior in the context of nuclear non-proliferation fall into the same category. Swaran Singh writes in 1998 that "India's May 1998 tests violated no international treaty obligations."⁶⁵⁸ While it may be true that both countries never signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and thus did not break international law, the nature of the non-proliferation regime is such that not signing the NPT amounts to systemic confrontation. Specifically Pakistan's behavior weakened the non-proliferation regime. Accordingly, other countries interpreted India's behavior as confrontational, evidenced by the condemnations and sanctions the country endures in the tests' aftermath.⁶⁵⁹

1.5.4.2. PASSIVE CONFRONTATION

Confrontation is not necessarily a proactive strategy. The failure to act can also constitute confrontation. This is particularly the case with large nations such as Brazil and India. Their size and international importance is such that their decision not to engage in an international institution, or its decision to not engage constructively, as seen during the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009, amounts to confrontational behavior. While India's environment minister maintained in 2009 that "India is not part of

⁶⁵³ von Bernstorff, Count (1924). Germany and the League. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Mar. 15, 1924), pp. 390-396

⁶⁵⁴ Schwarz, Wolfgang (1931). Germany and the League of Nations. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939), Vol. 10, No. 2 (Mar., 1931), pp. 197-207

⁶⁵⁵ Schwarz, Wolfgang (1931). Germany and the League of Nations. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939), Vol. 10, No. 2 (Mar., 1931), pp. 197-207

⁶⁵⁶ Duffy, Colum Gavan (1950). The League of Nations. The Irish Monthly, Vol. 78, No. 922 (Apr., 1950), pp. 166-174

⁶⁵⁷ Blum, Yehuda Z. (2005). Proposals for UN Security Council Reform.. The American Journal of International Law. Vol.99, No. 3, Jul. 2005, p.632-649

⁶⁵⁸ Singh, Jaswant (1998). Against Nuclear Apartheid, Foreign Affairs, Vol, 77, No. 5, September/October 1998

⁶⁵⁹ Due to its strategic importance in the face of a rising China, the United States to acknowledge India's nuclear status in 2005. (Carter, Ashton B. (2006). America's New Strategic Partner? Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4, Jul.- Aug., 2006, pp. 33-44)

the problem”⁶⁶⁰, India’s emissions projections are such that any agreement without India’s participation will not have the desired effect, given that India is poised to become one of the world’s major polluters.⁶⁶¹ India emissions currently make up around 4% of the total, but with an economy expected to grow around 8% per year over the coming decades, India plays a great role in the climate debate.⁶⁶² India’s role can be described as “passive confrontation”.

Small countries’ passivity is often inconsequential, but large countries’ passivity often implies, in practice, systemic confrontation. The Maldives or Paraguay may decide not to participate, but as their decision not to participate in a global problem solving mechanism rarely affects the overall picture, it cannot be described as confrontation. Ikenberry claims that “for better or for worse, states must operate in, come to terms with, or work around (the Western) World Order.”⁶⁶³ In a nation of Brazil’s and India’s weight and responsibility, even working around today’s order constitutes a confrontation.

1.5.4.3. ISSUE-BASED CONFRONTATION

Finally, a country can actively partake in an international organization (and thus agree with its core tenets), but disagree with the mainstream opinion, or behave in a non-constructive way. India, for example, has been called a “nay-sayer” with a “rejectionist approach”⁶⁶⁴ given its intransigence during trade negotiations, and Cohen argues that India’s foreign ministry is most skilled at “getting to a no”.⁶⁶⁵ Narlikar and Hurrell discern an emerging confrontation between the North and the South.⁶⁶⁶ At the same time, India would never consider leaving the World Trade Organization (WTO), and Indian policy makers rightly claim that, as long as they respect the rules, it has every right to defend its national interest.⁶⁶⁷ It is therefore not confronting the framework or the system, but a specific issue within the system. Helio Jaguaribe, an influential Brazilian sociologist, essentially made his case for issue-based confrontation when we argued that the Brazilian government should not engage in “antagonistic confrontation”, but merely in “autonomy-driven confrontation”, disagreeing on content, not on the framework within which the discussion was taking place.⁶⁶⁸

⁶⁶⁰ Financial Express Correspondent. India to be deal-maker in climate pact: Ramesh, <http://www.financialexpress.com/news/indiatobedealmakerinclimatepactramesh/520245/> (accessed April 25, 2010)

⁶⁶¹ Majumder, S. (2009). India’s emissions triple by 2030, BBC News, September 2, 2009; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8234822.stm (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

⁶⁶² Wilson, Dominic. Purushothaman, Roota. (2003). *Dreaming with BRICs: The path to 2050*. Goldman Sachs, 2003

⁶⁶³ Ikenberry, G. John (2004). Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), pp. 609-630

⁶⁶⁴ Anant, T.C.A. (2001). India and the WTO: Flawed rejectionist approach. *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 36, No. 45 (Nov. 10-16, 2001), pp. 4243-4245

⁶⁶⁵ Cohen, Stephen P. (2000). India Rising. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer, 2000), pp. 32-53

⁶⁶⁶ Hurrell, Andrew and Narlikar, Amrita (2006). A New Politics of Confrontation? Brazil and India in Multilateral Trade Negotiations. *Global Society*, Volume 20 (4), 2006, pp. 415-433

⁶⁶⁷ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

⁶⁶⁸ Jaguaribe, Helio (2003). Entrevista con Helio Jaguaribe. *El Debate Político*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Buenos Aires, 1, no.1, 2003

This may be called “issue-based (non-systemic) confrontation.” T.V. Paul and Robert Pape argue that second-tier powers engage in “soft-balancing” against the United States, which involves “the formation of limited diplomatic coalitions or ententes, especially at the United Nations.”⁶⁶⁹ This behavior may be interpreted as confrontational by US analysts, but it poses no systemic challenge. Quite to the contrary, the fact that rising powers use international institutions as a vehicle for their foreign policy goals (e.g. constraining the United States) shows, if anything, their acceptance of the Western World Order based on rules and norms - a system that offers them to specifically agreed-upon ways to disagree. Both liberal and non-liberal states have eschewed traditional balancing because of their proven ability to influence American foreign policy through international institutions⁶⁷⁰ - proof that the Western World Order provides a rule-based and open platform to articulate policies.

“Issue-based confrontation” within international institutions has become the norm and the trademark of the Western World Order - for example, by denying the UN stamp of approval on U.S.-led interventions.⁶⁷¹ In 1999, China opposed the U.S.-led NATO invasion of Kosovo, (rightly) arguing that it lacked UN approval. Throughout the crisis, China worked through the UN Security Council to uphold the sovereignty norm, which it considered essential to “counter U.S. hegemony in the post-Cold War era.”⁶⁷² When countries engage in issue-based strategies, they decide to disagree ‘within the system’, i.e. according to the rules and norms established by the institutions, because they regard this as the most effective strategy to defend their national interest. It is the ability fringe nations have to successfully defend their national interest through issue-based non-systemic confrontation that sets today’s Western World Order apart from any previous global system in history. By contrast, previous systems, like the system after the Napoleonic Wars, were hierarchical inside Europe and imperial in the rest of the world.⁶⁷³

1.5.5. Conclusion

This exercise provides us with a paradigm we can use as we proceed to analyze Brazil’s and India’s strategy towards the Western World Order. The seven options presented allow us to categorize and evaluate both countries’ behavior regarding international institutions since 2000. It is noteworthy that of the seven strategic options emerging fringe countries face, five strengthen the Western World Order: unconditional integration, revisionist integration, strengthening integration, alignment and issue-based confrontation. Pursuing any of these

⁶⁶⁹ Paul, T.V. (2005). Soft Balancing in the Age of Hegemony. *International Security*, Volume 30, No.1, pp. 46-71, Summer 2005. See also: Pape, Robert A. (2005) Soft Balancing against the United States. *International Security*, Volume 30, No. 1, pp. 7-45, Summer 2005

⁶⁷⁰ Ikenberry, G. John (1999). Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order. In Paul and Hall, *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, pp. 123–145.

⁶⁷¹ Paul, T.V. (2005). Soft Balancing in the Age of Hegemony. *International Security*, Volume 30, No.1, pp. 46-71, Summer 2005. See also: Pape, Robert A. (2005) Soft Balancing against the United States. *International Security*, Volume 30, No. 1, pp. 7-45, Summer 2005

⁶⁷² Ong, Russell (2002). *China’s Security Interests in the Post–Cold War Era* (London: Curzon, 2002), p. 142.

⁶⁷³ Armstrong, David (2008). The Evolution of international society. In: Steve Smith, John Baylis, Patricia Owens. *Introduction, The Globalization of World Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008

five strategies strengthens the Western World Order and leads to what we shall call the ‘Greater West’, and not the ‘Post-Western World.’ The ‘Greater West’ is not an ideological or cultural concept. As shown in section 1.1., we understood that rather than identifying something that is the West, it is a certain behavior, a “way of doing things” that represents the West well: It is the institutions in which nations engage and where agreements are made that makes a country Western or non-Western. This includes culturally non-Western countries and non-democratic regimes.

This analysis makes clear that what is often described as “confrontational” in the academic literature is, in fact, integrative behavior. Amrita Narlikar and Andrew Hurrell, for example, call Brazil’s and India’s strategies at the World Trade Organization “politics of confrontation.”⁶⁷⁴ Their description adequately describes the two countries’ behavior in the WTO. From a systemic perspective, however, their behavior is far from confrontational. Quite to the contrary, they actually strengthen the WTO by frequently making use of its institutionalized dispute mechanism. The possibility of engaging in controlled “issue-based confrontation” empowers fringe countries to engage, and fringe countries strengthen the Western World Order in turn. As mentioned above, this is the trademark of today’s order.

Liberal theory as presented in section 1.2. predicts that fringe nations will chose one of these five strategies that strengthen institutions. Section 2 and 3 will review Brazil’s and India’s strategy vis-à-vis international institutions and analyze whether liberal theory is able to explain both countries’ behavior. Given the high number of cases (n), and the vast cultural domestic differences between Brazil and India, we consider that if both countries’ behavior can be fully explained by liberal theory, we can apply it to other countries in this category as well.

Fringe countries’ options with regard to the Western World Order
1. Unconditional integration
2. Revisionist integration
3. System-strengthening integration
4. Alignment
5. Systemic (radical) confrontation
6. Passive confrontation
7. Issue-based confrontation

⁶⁷⁴ Hurrell, Andrew and Amrita Narlikar (2005). A new politics of confrontation: developing countries at Cancún and beyond?, paper presented at DESTIN LSE seminar series on 8 March 2005, available at <http://www.crisisstates.com/News/seminars4.htm> (accessed 15 June 2005)

2. Brazil's and India's policy towards the Western World Order

After we have created an adequate framework in section 1, we can, in Part 2, proceed to analyze Brazil's and India's strategy towards the Western World Order. Part 2 is meant to provide a general overview over both Brazil's and India's strategy towards the most important institutions that make up the Western World Order: the UN, the WTO, the NPT, the IMF and the World Bank, the G8, the G20, and NATO.⁶⁷⁵ Each subsection consists of one country's strategy towards one particular institution. Based on this, a country's respective strategy towards an institution will be characterized according to the categories established in section 1.5. Aside from conventional research and interviews, diplomats from India and Brazil were asked to classify their own country's behavior based on the categories above. The next two subsections (2.1.1. and 2.1.2.) will give an overview over Brazil's political and economic background and foreign policy decision-making in Brazil.

⁶⁷⁵ This selection does not imply that other institutions are not of importance as well. However, the eight institutions surveyed in this section reflect both the significance and diversity of today's international institutions.

2.1. Historical Review and Integrative Analysis: Brazil and international institutions

2.1.1. Political and Economic Background: Brazil

Before analyzing Brazil's foreign policy strategy towards the Western World Order, it seems adequate to give a brief overview of Brazil's domestic political and economic situation. This can provide a better understanding of the context in which Brazil is making decisions, and the interests that stand behind them. India is an instructive example that focusing on foreign policy decisions by itself is insufficient.

Considering India's foreign policy alone, for example with regard to trade liberalization and nuclear non-proliferation, the country can be described as a stubborn "nay-sayer" unwilling to make any concessions.⁶⁷⁶ Shedding light on domestic political and cultural issues, however, reveals that domestic constraints related to food security and to a very large and inefficient agricultural sector limit India's room for maneuver in trade negotiations. In addition, "civilizational pride" and a "colonial mindset" have created a culture in which "it is easier for a minister to come back home empty-handed as a wounded hero, rather than to come back with something after having had to make a compromise."⁶⁷⁷ This view has been indirectly confirmed during several interviews with diplomats based in Delhi.⁶⁷⁸

Brazil's socioeconomic profile cannot be categorized easily.⁶⁷⁹ It possesses both characteristics of rich and poor countries, which puts it in a hybrid position between the developed and the developing world. Brazil's industry is booming, and its agricultural industry is highly competitive. At the same time, it suffers from problems that normally characterize the social infrastructure of much poorer countries, such as a lack of social cohesion and a poverty rate of about 20%.⁶⁸⁰ This somewhat schizophrenic role is reflected in Brazil's international standing as a country that is torn between a developmentalist outlook, its ties to rich nations, and the ambition to become a global player.⁶⁸¹ Nobody epitomizes this ambiguity better than Brazil's President Lula (2003-2010), who, in 2005, was warmly welcomed both at the World Social Forum (WSF) in Porto Alegre (an event organized by the

⁶⁷⁶ Hurrell, Andrew and Narlikar, Amrita (2006). A New Politics of Confrontation? Brazil and India in Multilateral Trade Negotiations. *Global Society*, Volume 20 (4), 2006, pp. 415-433

⁶⁷⁷ Narlikar, Amrita (2006). Peculiar chauvinism or strategic calculation? Explaining the negotiation strategy of a rising India, *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1. January 24, 2006

⁶⁷⁸ Phone interview with a former Indian diplomat, Delhi, August 2, 2010

⁶⁷⁹ Soares de Lima, Maria Regina, Hirst, Mônica (2006). Brazil as an intermediate state and a regional power: power, action, choice and responsibility, *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1. January 24, 2006. See also: Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida, (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008, and Reid, Michael (1999). The devaluing of a Presidency. *The Economist*. March 25, 1999

⁶⁸⁰ Neri, M. (2009). Pobreza: A Evolução Recente, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, 2009; http://www.fgv.br/cps/pesquisas/Políticas_sociais_alunos/2009/Site/Handouts/11Evolu%C3%A7%C3%A3o_Recente_da_Pobreza.pdf (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

⁶⁸¹ Hurrell, Andrew (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global power: What space for would-be great powers?, *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1. January 24, 2006

so-called ‘anti-globalization movement’), and the G8 Summit in Gleaneagles and the World Economic Forum in Davos, two exclusive summits for the rich and powerful.⁶⁸²

Brazil’s relations with the IMF reflect its domestic transformation. In 1999, Brazil faced a dramatic currency crisis⁶⁸³, and needed help from the Fund. Until 2002, the IMF lent money to Brazil, which had a significant impact on the way the country saw itself in the world. The government’s decision to lend \$10 billion to the IMF, announced in September 2009 was interpreted by many Brazilians as a big step away from that traditional role. As Hurrell notes, Brazil still partly understands its foreign policy through the prism of North-South relations, positions itself as a developing country, and feels a strong loyalty to other poor nations.⁶⁸⁴ It supported conceptions of international order that challenged those of the liberal West- such as the revisionist Third Worldism in Brazil in the 1970s and 80s.

Yet, after years of being on the receiving side, Brazil is slowly turning into a noteworthy provider of development assistance and has lent money to the IMF since 2009. While Brazil, like most non-DAC development actors, does not report its financial outflows for development cooperation, estimates of Brazilian aid range from \$345 million to \$1275 million⁶⁸⁵, and development aid can be expected to rise further. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação⁶⁸⁶, commonly referred to as “ABC”) is the center piece of a growing effort that reflects greater global aspirations, such as for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Despite these developments, the Brazilian government refuses to be considered a “donor”, calling itself a “partner in development.”⁶⁸⁷ Brazil’s development assistance programs are still fairly uncoordinated, but we can expect them to professionalize in the coming years.⁶⁸⁸ Its reluctance to be called a ‘donor’ but a ‘partner’ may be a symbol that Brazil is comfortable in a position between the developed and the developing world.

Over the past years, Brazil has experienced a historic period of economic growth and political stability, paired with greater confidence and a more active and assertive foreign policy. Growth is expected to continue, and, despite the relatively recent democratization in the second half of the 1980s, political institutions have reached an unprecedented level of stability. While President Lula’s highly active and personalized foreign policy strategy is unlikely to continue under the next President,⁶⁸⁹ Brazil’s new status will inevitably give it more international influence and responsibility.

⁶⁸² Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2007). Lula’s Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification. *Third World Quarterly*, 28:7, 1309 - 1326

⁶⁸³ Hirst, Mônica (2005). *The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet Expectations*. New York: Routledge, 2005.

⁶⁸⁴ Hurrell, Andrew (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global power: What space for would-be great powers?, *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1. January 24, 2006

⁶⁸⁵ de Sousa, S.L.J. (2010). Brazil as an Emerging Actor in Development Cooperation: A Good Partner for European Donors?, Briefing Paper, German Development Institute (GDI), May 2010. See also: Maihold, G, Elisa Kochskaemper, Sebastian A. Mueller (2010). Brasilien und Mexico als “emerging donors” in Haiti, *SWP Aktuell* 39, May 2010

⁶⁸⁶ The Brazilian Cooperation Agency is part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁸⁷ de Sousa S.L.J. (2008). Brasil como nuevo actor del desarrollo internacional, la cooperación Sur-Sur y la iniciativa IBSA, *Comentário, FRIDA*, July 2008

⁶⁸⁸ Rowlands, Dane (2008). *Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: A Synthesis Report*, Partnership and Business Development Division, IDRC, January 2008

⁶⁸⁹ Interview, Brazilian Ambassador in a Latin American country, Rio de Janeiro, March 2, 2010

Both President Cardoso and Lula pursued largely conservative economic policies. After President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, of the Social Democratic Party (PSDB) had successfully created a solid economic framework, Brazil underwent an important power transition that further strengthened its institutions. When President Lula from the left-wing Worker's Party (PT) became President in 2003, he agreed to continue Cardoso's pragmatic policies, creating a broad policy consensus.⁶⁹⁰ As a consequence, economic policy differences between the two major candidates to succeed Lula in January 2011 (Dilma Rousseff, Lula's preferred replacement, and José Serra from the Social Democratic Party, PSDB) were minor.⁶⁹¹

While there is an unsolved dispute among academics about whether the transition from Cardoso to Lula constituted more of a rupture or a continuation⁶⁹², it is fair to say that foreign policy is one of the only areas in which Cardoso and Lula have differed most. While President Cardoso sought to align Brazil with established powers such as the United States, President Lula aimed to strengthen South-South cooperation.⁶⁹³ Lula focused on Brazil's relations with other emerging countries such as India and China. He also frequently visited Africa and aimed to intensify economic and political ties with countries such as South Africa and Angola. This involved increases in development aid, mostly to Portuguese-speaking Africa. Lula's conception of the "South" is ideological, vaguely encompassing all poor developing countries, and Brazil has aimed to position itself as the "leader of the South". In several instances, Lula sought to coordinate developing countries' positions to maximize benefits, most notably regarding trade.⁶⁹⁴ Brazil's foreign policy is the result of the traditional "rich vs. poor" dichotomy habitually adopted by Brazil's Workers Party's (PT). Yet, there is also an economic rationale to it. Apart from strengthening Brazil's reputation in the developing world, Brazil is seeking to access new markets and promote Brazilian companies such as Petrobras (oil), Vale (mining), Odebrecht (engineering and construction) and Embraer (aviation).⁶⁹⁵ Aside from agricultural products, the Brazilian government believes that demand in developing countries for Brazilian biofuel could grow strongly in the future.⁶⁹⁶ President Rousseff is likely to continue Lula's foreign policy strategy with a strong focus on South-South cooperation.

Similar to India, maintaining autonomy has historically been an overarching goal of Brazil's foreign policy.⁶⁹⁷ In Brazil's case, this can be explained by a profound discontent with

⁶⁹⁰ Barber, L., Wheatley, J. (2009). The Real Reward, *Financial Times*, November 8, 2009; <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a1ed46c2-cc8d-11de-8e30-00144feabdc0.html> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

⁶⁹¹ Dilma Rousseff is Lula's chief of staff, and José Serra formerly served as the governor of São Paulo, Brazil's most populous state.

⁶⁹² Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2010). *Brazilian Foreign Policy In Changing Times: The Quest For Autonomy From Sarney To Lula*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010

⁶⁹³ South-South cooperation is by no means a new concept. Already in the 1960s, China provided assistance to other poor countries to foster South-South solidarity and to isolate the Nationalist government in Taiwan. While the Taiwan issue continues to play a role, commercial interests dominate since the end of the Cold War.

⁶⁹⁴ Narlikar, Amrita (2006). *Bargaining for a Rise*, *Internationale Politik*, August 2006

⁶⁹⁵ Busch, Alexander (2009). *Wirtschaftsmacht Brasilien*. München: Hanser Verlag, 2009

⁶⁹⁶ de Sousa, S.L.J.: *Brazil as an Emerging Actor in Development Cooperation: A Good Partner for European Donors?*, Briefing Paper, German Development Institute (GDI), May 2010

⁶⁹⁷ Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni (2010). *Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification*. *Third World Quarterly*, 28:7, 1309 – 1326, 2010

the United States' dominance in the Western Hemisphere and worries of US dominance. Brazil's Foreign Minister Dantas (1961-1963) created the so-called "Independent Foreign Policy" tradition. Since then, governments have used different approaches to manifest the country's independence. Autonomy has been such a pervasive theme that foreign policy analysts have divided Brazil's strategy into three periods: Autonomy through distance, autonomy through participation, and autonomy through diversification.⁶⁹⁸ Prior to democratization, Brazil remained fairly isolated and employed an economic strategy of import-substitution.⁶⁹⁹ After democratization in the late 1980s, the country liberalized and began to engage more actively in international institutions, symbolized by the Cardoso administration's decision to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Finally, in 2003, under the Lula administration, Brazil actively sought to diversify its partnerships, focusing on South-South diplomacy in particular.

The next President, Dilma Rousseff, will continue to seek to enhance Brazil's international role. This includes a stronger insertion and weight in international institutions that deal with development- such as the IMF, the World Bank and the UN Security Council. Rousseff is likely to continue Lula's at times anti-Western rhetoric, and she sees a contradiction between climate change and economic development, and believes that rich countries have a "historic responsibility" to deal with climate change.

Until recently, foreign policy remains a topic only discussed among Brazil's elites.⁷⁰⁰ Yet, due to Lula's more politicized foreign policy, international issues are increasingly visible in the domestic political debate, and there is a growing consciousness about Brazil's role in the world among Brazil's middle class.

⁶⁹⁸ Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2010). Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification. *Third World Quarterly*, 28:7, 1309 – 1326, 2010

⁶⁹⁹ Fausto, Boris (2006). *História Concisa do Brasil*. São Paulo: EdUSP, 2006

⁷⁰⁰ Cason, Jeffrey and Timothy Power (2006). Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy from Cardoso to Lula. Conference Paper. "Regional Powers in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Near and Middle East" December 11 and 12, 2006, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg

2.1.2. *Foreign policy decision-making in Brazil*

This subsection will provide a brief overview about the foreign policy making process in the Brazilian government.

Itamaraty, Brazil's Foreign Ministry, has traditionally been Brazil's key foreign policy decision maker.⁷⁰¹ Prestigious, traditional, highly opaque, and bureaucratically insulated, Itamaraty has held a quasi-monopoly on foreign policy since World War II.⁷⁰² With regard to foreign policy, senior diplomats were thought to be able to strongly influence the Presidents, who rarely traveled abroad.⁷⁰³ Ernesto Geisel, the most imposing figure of the military regime (1964-1985), left Brazil only twice per year on average, and most international trips had symbolic value, while Itamaraty had negotiated the details. Former diplomats, most notably the Baron of Rio Branco, the "father of Brazilian diplomacy", are among the most revered figures in Brazilian history.⁷⁰⁴

Brazilian diplomacy was guided by the realist principles that domestic and international politics are two separate disciplines, often isolating foreign policy making from any domestic influence. The main argument used by traditionalists was that foreign policy was of national interest and should therefore be protected from special interests.⁷⁰⁵ This approach was first proposed in the 1930s by President Vargas, who sought to separate foreign policy from civil society since he believed stakeholders confused public interests with private ones.⁷⁰⁶ Parliamentarians, who are too close to the daily political struggle, and lack specific knowledge about international politics, should therefore be excluded from the decision-making process. This process was widely accepted until recently.⁷⁰⁷

Since the early 1990s, however, Itamaraty has steadily lost influence due to a series of reasons. The first is democratization and the pluralization of interests and growing public scrutiny. The Foreign Ministry's structure and tradition to take decisions behind closed doors and shielded from the press may have been adequate during a military dictatorship. Yet, after the end of the military dictatorship and democratization in the 1980s, Itamaraty's procedures

⁷⁰¹ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

⁷⁰² Hirst, Mônica (2005). *The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet Expectations*. New York: Routledge, 2005. See also: Rosenbaum, H. Jon and Glenn M. Cooper (1970). Brazil and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. *International Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1970

⁷⁰³ Cason, Jeffrey and Timothy Power (2006). *Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy from Cardoso to Lula*. Conference Paper. "Regional Powers in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Near and Middle East" December 11 and 12, 2006, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg

⁷⁰⁴ D'Ávila, Felipe (2010). *O Desafio de tornar relevante a Política Externa do Brasil*, CLP Papers, No.2, São Paulo, 2010

⁷⁰⁵ Figuiera, Ariane C. Roder (2007). *O processo de tomada de decisão em política externa no Brasil: Uma análise preliminar*, 1º Encontro Nacional da ABRI Política Externa, Brasília, Brazil, 25-27 July, 2007

⁷⁰⁶ Figuiera, Ariane C. Roder (2007). *O processo de tomada de decisão em política externa no Brasil: Uma análise preliminar*, 1º Encontro Nacional da ABRI Política Externa, Brasília, Brazil, 25-27 July, 2007

⁷⁰⁷ Figuiera, Ariane C. Roder (2007). *O processo de tomada de decisão em política externa no Brasil: Uma análise preliminar*, 1º Encontro Nacional da ABRI Política Externa, Brasília, Brazil, 25-27 July, 2007

were, while often highly effective, no longer viable in a vibrant democracy where different stakeholders fight for influence. As Maria Regina Soares de Lima points out, Presidents had to start explaining foreign policy decisions to voters, which led to a politicization of foreign policy natural in democratic regimes.⁷⁰⁸ NGOs and business, local government (on state, city and municipal level) and interest groups began to openly vie for influence, dramatically increasing the number of stakeholders.⁷⁰⁹ While parliamentarians are still often unaware of foreign policy issues, they have begun to participate in the foreign policy discussion. NGOs have gained extraordinary influence during the Lula administration, especially in areas such as human rights and the environment.⁷¹⁰ Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, one of the chief foreign policy strategists, argued in 2006 that international and domestic policy are intimately interdependent.⁷¹¹

The second aspect that caused Itamaraty to lose influence is the growing issue linkage in modern foreign policy. Contrary to traditional diplomacy, today's foreign policy often consists of complex negotiations that diplomats alone cannot grasp. It is increasingly necessary to engage specialists who are located in other ministries- such as the Ministry for Environment, Labor, Trade, etc. To preserve power, Itamaraty decided to set up international relations departments within other ministries and to fill them with its own diplomats to maintain the *modus operandi*.⁷¹² Still, growing complexity has made it more difficult for Itamaraty to keep foreign policy in a black box.

The third aspect is that given Brazil's rise, the country's interests all over the world expanded, which made foreign policy making more challenging. As Brazilian firms begin to engage in different parts of the world, trade relations diversify, and global responsibilities increase, a relatively small cadre of diplomats is no longer able to control Brazil's foreign policy making process. This tendency has only increased since President Lula engaged in a more active foreign policy, taking interest in regions and disciplines Brazil had rarely before shown interest in issues such as negotiating with a defiant Iran in June 2010. As Castro and Valladao de Carvalho point out, Lula attempted to assume a protagonist role in both South America and outside of the region.⁷¹³

Fourthly, there has been a presidentialization of foreign policy in Brazil.⁷¹⁴ Both President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva

⁷⁰⁸ Lima, Maria Regina Soares de (2000). *Instituições Democráticas e Política Exterior*. In: *Contexto Internacional*, vol. 22, n. 2, julho-dezembro., 2000

⁷⁰⁹ Hirst, Mônica, Lima, Maria Regina Soares de (2002). *Contexto internacional, democracia e política externa*. *Política Externa*, vol.11, n.2, 2002

⁷¹⁰ Figuiera, Ariane C. Roder (2007). *O processo de tomada de decisão em política externa no Brasil: Uma análise preliminar*, 1º Encontro Nacional da ABRI Política Externa, Brasília, Brazil, 25-27 July, 2007

⁷¹¹ Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (2006). *Brasil na Era dos Gigantes*. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2006

⁷¹² Figuiera, Ariane C. Roder (2007). *O processo de tomada de decisão em política externa no Brasil: Uma análise preliminar*, 1º Encontro Nacional da ABRI Política Externa, Brasília, Brazil, 25-27 July, 2007

⁷¹³ de Castro, Marcus Faro and Maria Izabel Valladao de Carvalho. (2003) *Globalization and Recent Political Transitions in Brazil*. *International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Oct., 2003), pp. 465-490

⁷¹⁴ Cason, Jeffrey and Timothy Power (2006). *Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy from Cardoso to Lula*. Conference Paper. "Regional Powers in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Near and Middle East" December 11 and 12, 2006, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg

(2003-2010, henceforth “Lula”) used foreign policy as their signature issue and personally engaged in many foreign policy decisions. Mônica Hirst notes that “Presidential diplomacy” became particularly important since the Cardoso years.⁷¹⁵ President Lula was the first head of state to place a foreign policy advisor between himself and Itamaraty, further diminishing the Foreign Ministry’s influence, and allowing domestic party politics to influence foreign policy making.⁷¹⁶

Finally, the resulting popularization and multiplications of opinions has caused the media and academia to engage in foreign policy analysis, further increasing opinions. The 1990s have seen an unprecedented increase in university programs on international affairs. An increasing number of think tanks, such as the Fundação Getúlio Vargas, help bridge the gap between academia and policy making, further adding to the pluralization of the foreign policy discussion.

During the period of analysis of this study (2003-2010), Itamaraty is thus not as powerful as before, and the President supervised and controlled an increasingly complex foreign policy making process influenced by a multitude of stakeholders from different parts of society. Despite these changes, diplomats remain the best sources for information for scholars of foreign policy.

⁷¹⁵ Hirst, Mônica (2005). *The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet Expectations*. New York: Routledge, 2005.

⁷¹⁶ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). *Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process*, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

2.1.3. *Brazil and the UN*

In order to analyze Brazil's strategy towards the United Nations between 2003 and 2010, it will be useful to apply Krasner's definition to the United Nations. As mentioned above, Krasner identifies four fundamental elements of an international institution: Principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.⁷¹⁷ An institution must be based on one or more principles, which is like a fundamental belief ("avoid war"). Norms spell out general standards of behavior, while rules specify, at a more detailed level, what members can and cannot do. Finally, decision-making procedures stipulate who holds power in the institution, how to take joint decisions, how to take in new members and how to punish rule breakers.

How can we define the United Nation's principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, and how does Brazil behave towards them? The United Nation's overarching principles and norms are very general to such a degree that every country on the planet agrees with them. Its rules and decision-making procedures are, given the institution's varied tasks, very diverse, so we will analyze them one by one.

A country such as Brazil does not have one single strategy towards the United Nations. Its strategy to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council may figure prominently, but it does not reflect Brazil's behavior in other areas. This section will therefore be divided in seven subsections:

- 1) Brazil's views on the UN's overall responsibilities and its financial contributions,
- 2) the UN Security Council,
- 3) the UN General Assembly
- 4) Peacekeeping Operations and
- 5) the UN's activities in Brazil

Each section will give an overview over Brazil's strategy and evaluate which description of the ones developed in 1.5. best describe the Brazilian government's behavior. Subsection 6) will conclude. There are many other parts of the United Nations that deserve attention, such as the UN Global Conferences, UNHCR, the ILO, ECOSOC, UNCTAD and the WHO, which will not be considered here due to the limited space.

2.1.3.1. BRAZIL'S VIEWS ON THE UN'S OVERALL RESPONSIBILITIES AND ITS FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Brazil fundamentally agrees with the principles and norms espoused by the United Nations⁷¹⁸, which are to avoid war, defend human rights, combat poverty and promote social progress.⁷¹⁹ Brazil has been a charter member of the United Nations since its foundation in 1945, and it participates in all of its specialized agencies. Brazil's engagement in the UN and its criticism of it shows that the Brazilian government has a sense of ownership of the organization, and it regards the UN as the most legitimate international institution. Brazil also regards the UN as

⁷¹⁷ Krasner, Steven D. (1985). *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. See also: Krasner, Stephen D. (1982). Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables. *International Organization*, 36: 185-205, 1982

⁷¹⁸ Herz, Mônica (1999). *Brasil e a Reforma da ONU*. *Lua Nova Revista de Cultura e Política*, 1999

⁷¹⁹ Charter of the United Nations. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml>

the most adequate organization to deal with security issues, climate change, and the fight against poverty. Brazil has fully embraced the United Nations since its very inception, when it failed to convince the other members to be granted a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. As a consolation prize, Brazil has the right to speak first during sessions at the UN General Assembly. Between 2003 and 2010, this commitment and belief in the United Nations has remained unchanged.⁷²⁰

Brazil's financial contributions have increased and are now reflecting enthusiastic rhetoric, constituting strengthening integration. Between 2003 and 2007, Brazil contributed on average \$340 million per year for the UN's operational activities. This is a lot more than fellow developing countries such as India, which contributed \$35 million per year in the same period,⁷²¹ but it can largely be explained by the cost-sharing mechanism (see section 2.1.3.5.), through which most of the money is spent on self-supporting activities within the country. Brazil is one of the countries with the highest percentage of contributions tied to a specific activity, which reduces the organization's agility and increases dependence. Historically, Brazil called for a larger role in the UN not due to its financial contributions, but due to its large population. In 2005, Brazil contributed a little over 1.5% to the total budget.⁷²² In 2009, Brazil's net contribution to the UN's regular budget barely exceeded \$20 million, compared to Japan's \$405 million.⁷²³ This may be low, but support for specific agencies has increased strongly. Aside from \$25 million for UNDP, Brazil has pledged to support the World Food Program with \$300 million.⁷²⁴ Brazil still spends a lot more bilaterally, which raises questions about both Brazil's seriousness about strengthening the UN. But that can be explained by its interest in increasing the political impact on recipient countries, which is arguably lower if money is spent on the UN.⁷²⁵ To conclude, we can affirm that Brazil agrees with the United Nations principles and norms and supports the institution adequately financially. Thus, on a macro level, we can certainly speak of unconditional integration.⁷²⁶

2.1.3.2. BRAZIL AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

Brazil has occupied a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for two years nine times. In October 2009, it was elected a tenth time to occupy a seat from 2010 to 2011. Brazil

⁷²⁰ Phone interview with Brazilian representative to the UN, New York, June 29, 2010

⁷²¹ Weinlich, Silke (2010). *Die Reform der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Vereinten Nationen: Eine Analyse des Verhaltens und der Positionierung wichtiger Staaten gegenüber Reformoptionen*. Discussion Paper, German Development Institute (GDI), 2010

⁷²² Blum, Yehuda Z. (2005). *Proposals for UN Security Council Reform*. *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol.99, No. 3, Jul. 2005, p.632-649

⁷²³ *Assessment of the Member States' contributions to United Nations regular budget for the year 2009*; http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=ST/ADM/SER.B/755 (accessed July 19, 2010)

⁷²⁴ *The Economist Correspondent* (2010). *Speak softly and carry a blank cheque*, July 15, 2010

⁷²⁵ Estimates of Brazil's aid per year range from \$ 85 million to more than ten times this amount, making its structure especially difficult to understand. However, one analyst pointed out that given the political sensitivity of international development aid, the government may have an interest in maintaining a certain lack of transparency, shielding the government from criticism that it is wasting money abroad it should spend to solve domestic social problems.

⁷²⁶ Systemic confrontation against the UN is admittedly quite rare, and no country has ever left the United Nations voluntarily in the institution's history. Taiwan left the UN after being substituted by the People's Republic of China. Several countries, however, have contemplated leaving the UN, such as Indonesia after World War II, when Sukarno called the UN a "Western project."

is thus, together with Japan, the country that has held a non-permanent seat for the longest period of time (18 years in total as of January 2010).

A permanent seat on the UN Security Council has been the objective of Brazil's foreign policy since 1995, when Fernando Henrique Cardoso assumed the Presidency.⁷²⁷ This was based on a simple observation: since Brazil lacks significant military power, it regards multilateralism as the only way to project its power and influence outside of its borders. Since Brazil lives in an exceptionally peaceful neighborhood, it is unlikely that Brazil will ever engage in a military build-up. The United Nations, and a permanent seat on the UNSC, are therefore seen, largely out of necessity, as one of Brazil's best bets to turn itself into a global actor.⁷²⁸ Assessing Brazil's strategy regarding the UNSC has been widely popular among scholars, while few have analyzed reform proposals of the UN's other entities⁷²⁹, and it at times seemed as though this particular topic eclipsed all other matters related to the United Nations.⁷³⁰

Brazil's efforts are also motivated by the belief that Brazil deserves a more prominent role as the South American representative and the belief that international institutions are more legitimate and effective if developing countries are adequately represented.⁷³¹ While some conservative voices have denounced the quest for UNSC as an "unnecessary adventure", there is now a solid consensus that Brazil deserves a permanent seat.⁷³² For Brazil, a reformed Security Council reflects on the legitimacy and thus on the effectiveness of the entire UN organization, and no UN reform is thus complete without a reform of the UN Security Council.⁷³³

In 2004, Brazil, India, Japan and Germany formed the G4, whose joint goal was to achieve a UN Security Council reform and obtain permanent seats. In 2005, the UN Assembly voted on a reform proposal, which also included two permanent seats for African countries. The proposal failed, largely because African countries were unable to agree who would

⁷²⁷ Herz, Mônica (1999). *Brasil e a Reforma da ONU*, Lua Nova – Revista de Cultura e Política, n°46. 1999

⁷²⁸ When Lula became President in 2003, he maintained this foreign policy objective. While President Cardoso sought closer ties to the United States and Europe, Lula hoped to achieve UNSC reform and entry by aligning with and gaining support from other emerging powers and African countries (Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2007). *Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification*. *Third World Quarterly*, 28:7, 1309 – 1326, 2007)

⁷²⁹ See, for example: Avelar, R. (2003). *O Brasil no contexto das reformas das Nações Unidas*, FHDSS-UNESP - Franca, 2003; <http://www.franca.unesp.br/revistari/Renata%20Avelar%5B1%5D.pdf> (accessed May 16, 2010)

⁷³⁰ Lacerda, A. (2009). *Lula espera reforma do Conselho de Segurança em 2009*, Estado de São Paulo, October 15, 2009; <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/nacional,lula-espera-reforma-do-conselho-de-seguranca-em-2009,451128,0.htm> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

⁷³¹ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). *Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process*, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

⁷³² Saraiva, J.F. (2010). *Internacional: O Brasil e a reforma da ONU*, Teoria e Debate n° 62 - abril/maio de 2005, Fundação Perseu Abramo; <http://www.fpabramo.org.br/conteudo/internacional-o-brasil-e-reforma-da-onu> (accessed May 23, 2010)

⁷³³ See G4 (2007). *The United States' decision to invade Iraq without a UN Security Council resolution caused some to call the quest for Security Council reform irrelevant, as it would not be able to constrain US power* (Weiss, Thomas G. *The Illusion of UNSC reform*. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 147-166, Autumn 2003), yet, for Lula, the Iraq War only strengthened his argument for reformed and more legitimate UN Security Council.

occupy the two permanent seats.⁷³⁴ While the G4 has, for now, ceased to exist as a vehicle for achieving Security Council Reform, Brazil continues to press for expansion.

Brazil's behavior with regard to the UN Security Council seems to be a case of revisionist integration. Brazil fundamentally agrees with the UNSC's principles (the prevention of war), its norms and rules (pass resolutions by a majority to allow interventions), but it disagrees with the Council's exclusive decision-making procedures, which establish five permanent members with veto powers and seven non-permanent members without veto power. Brazil's strategy towards the UNSC will be analyzed more comprehensively in Part 3.

2.1.3.3. BRAZIL AND THE UN ASSEMBLY

The United Nations General Assembly is the only principal organ of the United Nations in which all members have equal representation, and Brazil has historically taken it very seriously. Yet, despite its negative reputation as a powerless and ineffective organ, it has significant responsibilities, such as overseeing the budget and appointing the non-permanent members to the UN Security Council.⁷³⁵

As part of the G77 and as an observer of the Non-Aligned Movement, Brazil has historically sought to assign a more prominent role for the UN General Assembly (GA) by envisioning greater GA involvement on questions regarding military intervention, for example.⁷³⁶ Some critics have pointed out that Brazil's attempt to enter the UN Security Council as a permanent member is not entirely about democratizing the UN, but rather about creating an "expanded oligarchy", as a former Brazilian diplomat has called it. With regard to Security Council Reform, the Non-Aligned Movement is torn⁷³⁷, and Brazil does not have all the developing countries' support in this project.

Despite Brazil's leadership role in the G77 and its ability to influence other members⁷³⁸, Brazil has quietly departed from the G77's more radical calls for "total democracy" which includes proposals to limit the UNSC's freedom through the General Assembly.⁷³⁹ Despite continuous rhetorical support for reform, Brazil has not assumed

⁷³⁴ Okouma, G.O. (2007). UN Security Council Reform: A Transitional Approach, UN Chronicle Online Edition, 2007
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2007/webArticles/120307_security_council_reform.html (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

⁷³⁵ United Nations (1945). UN Charter of the United Nations;
www.un.org/en/en/documents/charter/index.shtml

⁷³⁶ Herz, Mônica (1999). Brasil e a Reforma da ONU, *Lua Nova – Revista de Cultura e Política*, n°46. 1999

⁷³⁷ Rajamani, L. (1995). Democratization of the United Nations, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 30, No. 49 (Dec. 9, 1995), pp. 3140-3143. See also: Weinlich, Silke. Die Reform der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Vereinten Nationen: Eine Analyse des Verhaltens und der Positionierung wichtiger Staaten gegenüber Reformoptionen. Discussion Paper, German Development Institute (GDI), 2010

⁷³⁸ Weinlich, Silke (2010). Die Reform der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Vereinten Nationen: Eine Analyse des Verhaltens und der Positionierung wichtiger Staaten gegenüber Reformoptionen. Discussion Paper, German Development Institute (GDI), 2010

⁷³⁹ Herz, Mônica (1999). Brasil e a Reforma da ONU. *Lua Nova Revista de Cultura e Política*, 1999

leadership in reviving ECOSOC⁷⁴⁰, indicating that it does not regard this as a priority. While Brazil aligns with developing countries on security issues, its position resembles that of liberal democracies regarding issues such as women's rights and gay rights, where it is at odds with most developing countries. It actively collaborates with the NAM concerning questions of disarmament. This strategy shows that Brazil's strategy today is much more pragmatic than its at times ideology-driven rhetoric may indicate. Brazil never actively supported revisionist integration, its action with regard to the UN General Assembly is mere issue-based confrontation, not only towards developed countries (on issues such as disarmament), but also against developing countries (for example, on women's rights).

Brazil's strategy can best be described as system-strengthening integration, as it has consistently promoted a stronger role for the UN General Assembly, without engaging in confrontational behavior. It fundamentally agrees with the UN General Assembly's principles (assuring peace and security, maintaining the functionality of the United Nations), norms, rules and decision-making procedures (equal representation of states, voting on resolutions). This analysis will not analyze Brazil's voting behavior in the UN General Assembly, as such an analysis is unlikely to produce meaningful results. In the period of analysis, Brazil has often voted in a bloc with other G77 members. For example, it has supported a condemnation of the United States' economic embargo against Cuba. However, rich nations' voting behavior is too disparate to convincingly argue that Brazil has consistently voted against the established powers, which would constitute issue-based confrontation (and thus constitute integration).⁷⁴¹

2.1.3.4. BRAZIL'S TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS

⁷⁴⁰ When the United Nations was founded, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was designed similarly to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Unlike the UNSC, however, ECOSOC was placed under the authority of the General Assembly. ECOSOC was therefore always been a "second-class" body, merely recommending policies. Strengthening ECOSOC has been one of Brazil's goals in the past, but the government now wishes to aim higher, focusing entirely on the Security Council

⁷⁴¹ While voting behavior showed an East-West-NAM division during the Cold War, a North-South cleavage emerged in the early 1990s. (As Holloway points out, East-West-NAM division was not the only characteristic of the Cold War. He argued that, with the expansion of membership in the 1960s, a Third World voting bloc developed, and that the emergence of a new majority of former colonies shifted the agenda in the General Assembly away from security. In: Holloway, Steven. *Forty Years of United Nations General Assembly Voting*. Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 279-296.) As Kim and Russett pointed out in 1993, "the North-South division now overwhelmingly defines the terms of political debate in the General Assembly." Studies that analyze voting behavior in the General Assembly usually seek to identify voting blocs that emerge regarding to so-called "super-issues". In a major study in 1965, for example, Alker identified 'Muslim questions' and 'colonialism' as two super-issues along which voting blocs formed. Each issue creates different voting blocs. In a 1993 study by Kim and Russett, 'self-determination and disarmament' and 'human security' (development, human rights, international security) were the main super issues. (Self-determination, according to the authors, reflects the South's concern with neo-colonialism and classic colonialism) Brazil has, according to them, consistently voted with the Non-Aligned Movement between 1991 and 1993. (Kim, Soo Yeon and Bruce Russett *The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly*. International Organization, Vol. 50, No.4 (Autumn, 1996), pp.629-652) The Non-Aligned Movement has often been called confrontational from Western countries, while non-aligned members would refer to Brazil's strategy as integrative or aligned.

Peacekeeping missions consist of observers, police and troops. A country's decision to provide troops is crucial for the United Nations to carry out peacekeeping missions. Although providing troops is not tied to financial obligations, it constitutes a significant commitment to peacekeeping operations and the United Nations in general. Sending troops into conflict zones represents a political risk, as peacekeepers are at times hurt or killed during missions. The four tables below provide the numbers of personnel Brazil, Argentina, India and Bangladesh (for comparison) have provided.

Table: Brazil

Year	Personnel (Observers, Police and Troops) ⁷⁴²
as of Dec 31	
2000	95
2001	100
2002	77
2003	82
2004	1367
2005	1270
2006	1252
2007	1278
2008	1352
2009	1344

Table: Argentina

Year	Personnel (Observers, Police and Troops) ⁷⁴³
as of Dec 31	
2000	522
2001	634
2002	631
2003	554
2004	1103
2005	897

⁷⁴² United Nations (2010). Peacekeeping contributions per year, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributions/

⁷⁴³ United Nations (2010). Peacekeeping contributions per year; www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributions/

2006	899
2007	897
2008	893
2009	861

Table: Bangladesh

Year	Personnel (Observers, Police and Troops)⁷⁴⁴
as of Dec 31	
2000	3285
2001	6010
2002	4211
2003	4730
2004	8024
2005	9529
2006	9681
2007	9856
2008	9567
2009	10427

Table: India

Year	Personnel (Observers, Police and Troops)⁷⁴⁵
as of Dec 31	
2000	2738
2001	2883
2002	2746
2003	2882
2004	3912
2005	7284
2006	9483

⁷⁴⁴ United Nations (2010). Peacekeeping contributions per year; www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributions/

⁷⁴⁵ United Nations (2010). Peacekeeping contributions per year; www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributions/

2007	9357
2008	8693
2009	8757

The analysis shows that Brazil's troop contributions clearly constitute system-strengthening integration. Brazil has some tradition of sending peacekeepers abroad. In 1956, Brazil's President Kubitscheck sent peacekeepers to Sinai, and it continuously sent soldiers into conflict zones after that, for example, to Yugoslavia and Timor Leste.⁷⁴⁶ It also sent 1,300 peacekeepers to the UN mission in Angola, the largest military force it had sent abroad since World War II.⁷⁴⁷ Yet, in comparison to June 2004, Brazil's troop contributions remained small in comparison to the world's large providers. We can detect a sharp rise in Brazil's troop contributions in 2004, when Brazil assumed the leadership of the MINUSTAH peacekeeping mission in Haiti.⁷⁴⁸ In 2004, the amount of Brazilian peacekeepers exceeded the number of Argentinean peacekeepers, who are also active in Haiti.

Brazil's engagement can be explained both by a genuine belief in the utility of the peacekeeping missions, by its interest in obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and by a general desire to affirm its rising power status. In 2006, former President Cardoso affirmed that "Aside from making the Brazilian position in the region clear, and this without arrogance, I am convinced that leadership is exercised, not proclaimed."⁷⁴⁹ This date marks a significant departure from introversion to international participation. Brazil remains far behind India and Bangladesh, who are among the world's most important providers of peacekeeping troops. Yet, leading a peacekeeping mission, however small, requires not only trained soldiers, but also more political responsibility and risk. Brazil's decision to head the mission in Haiti is a first step towards assuming more responsibility in the global system of peacekeeping. Brazil's behavior can therefore be regarded as system-strengthening integration, as it fundamentally agrees and supports the peacekeeping missions' principles (maintain or enforce peace), its norms and rules (internationally sanctioned intervention) and decision-making procedures.

2.1.3.5. THE UN'S ACTIVITIES IN BRAZIL

The United Nation's activities in Brazil show that Brazil supports the Millenium

⁷⁴⁶ Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2007). *Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification*. *Third World Quarterly*, 28:7, 1309 – 1326, 2007

⁷⁴⁷ Hirst, Mónica (2005). *The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet Expectations*. New York: Routledge, 2005.

⁷⁴⁸ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). *Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process*, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process, Waterloo*: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008. See also: Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2010). *Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification*. *Third World Quarterly*, 28:7, 1309 – 1326, 2010

⁷⁴⁹ Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (2006). *A Arte da Política. A História que Vivi*. Rio de Janeiro: *Civilização Brasileira*, 2006 In: Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni. *Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification*. *Third World Quarterly*, 28:7, 1309 - 1326

Development Goals (MDGs). The United Nations' activities in Brazil take place in several different areas. There are currently three "joint programs" in which two or more UN agencies work with local partners to design, implement, accompany and evaluate activities geared towards achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).⁷⁵⁰ These programs deal with a) the promotion of race- and gender-related equality, b) public safety, crime and vulnerable youth, c) Social Services and Education. As the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Brazil (2007-2011) points out, the UN's activities in Brazil have the following overarching objectives (with share of financial resources): 1. Expand access to public services (69,6%), 2. Reduce gender- and race-related inequality (4,3%), 3. Reducing violence (10,2%), 4. Improving governance (8,1%) and 5. Promoting equitable and environmentally sustainable economic development (7,9%).⁷⁵¹

Given its stable economic development, UN funds allocated to Brazil have been sinking since the late 1970s, but Brazil continues to use UN services in an unorthodox way.⁷⁵² In the face of pressure to improve governmental services and a relative lack of human capacity and an apparent inability to modernize labor laws, the Brazilian government and UNDP have developed the so-called "cost-sharing mechanism".

Contrary to traditional approaches, where the UN provides funds, this mechanism involves governments providing resources to UN agencies for development activities in their own countries. The top self-supporting countries in 2007 were mostly Latin American, led by Brazil.⁷⁵³ The mechanism involves providing the funds and essentially hiring UNDP staff to do both secretarial and managerial work public employees would normally do. Brazilians hired through the UN system are more expensive, but they are temporary consultants. This allows the government to avoid the cumbersome bureaucratic process of hiring public employees.⁷⁵⁴ In 2000, the Brazilian government paid \$180 million to UNDP for hiring consultants and coordinating projects, while around half of this amount was financed by the World Bank and the IADB.⁷⁵⁵ Critics have pointed out that while such a mechanism ensured financial sustainability for UNDP, it undermined the Brazilian government's ability to develop sustainably. Despite attempts to curb the excessive use of the mechanism, little has changed over the past decade. In 2005, the government paid \$191 million to UNDP⁷⁵⁶, in 2007 Brazil paid \$388 million in self-supporting contributions for operational activities.

⁷⁵⁰ United Nations (2010). *Ações Conjuntas do Sistema das Nações Unidas no Brasil*; http://www.onu-brasil.org.br/acoes_conjuntas.php (accessed May 24 2010)

⁷⁵¹ United Nations Development Assistance Framework (2005). *Marco de Assistência das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento (2007-2011)*, UNCT Brasil, December 2005

⁷⁵² Galvani, F. and Morse, S. (2004). Institutional sustainability: at what price? UNDP and the new cost-sharing model in Brazil', *Development in Practice*, 14: 3, 311 - 327, 2004

⁷⁵³ United Nations (2010). *Comprehensive statistical analysis of the financing of operational activities for development of the United Nations system for 2007*, Report of the Secretary-General, UN document A/64/75-E/2009/59, New York: UN (www.un.org/en/ecosoc/julyhls/oa2009.shtml) (accessed May 3 2010)

⁷⁵⁴ Weinlich, Silke (2010). *Die Reform der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Vereinten Nationen: Eine Analyse des Verhaltens und der Positionierung wichtiger Staaten gegenüber Reformoptionen*. Discussion Paper, German Development Institute (GDI), 2010

⁷⁵⁵ Galvani, F. and Morse, S. (2004). Institutional sustainability: at what price? UNDP and the new cost-sharing model in Brazil', *Development in Practice*, 14: 3, 311 - 327, 2004

⁷⁵⁶ United Nations (2010). *Comprehensive statistical analysis of the financing of operational activities for development of the United Nations system for 2007*, Report of the Secretary-General, UN

Brazil's agreement risks diluting the UN's mission, but it helps the UN survive financially. The cost-sharing mechanism, widely in used in Brazil, does not contribute to the strengthening of the United Nations. Rather, it pulls the organization away from its *raison d'être*, which is to alleviate poverty in the world's poorest nations.⁷⁵⁷ Still, the cost-sharing mechanism was not found to directly damage the UN's performance elsewhere. It would be exaggerated to claim that this behavior constitutes confrontation.

Despite engaging in the cost-sharing mechanism to put off difficult reform, Brazil signed up to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and promotes this goal domestically. Brazil's engagement with the UN in Brazil can therefore be characterized as system- strengthening integration.

2.1.3.6. CONCLUSION

Area	Activity	Brazil's strategy
UN's overall responsibilities and financial contributions to the UN	Brazil regards UN as the most legitimate international institution	System-strengthening integration
UN Security Council	Seeks UNSC expansion	Revisionist integration
UN General Assembly	Full participation, some engagement in strengthening institution	System-strengthening integration
Peacekeeping	Small number, but increasing; leadership in MINUSTAH mission in Haiti	System-strengthening behavior
The UN in Brazil	Projects supporting the MDGs, cost-sharing mechanism	System-strengthening integration

To conclude, we can say that the United Nations as a whole is regarded in Brazil as an international institution legitimate to take important decisions, for example with regard to military intervention and climate change⁷⁵⁸, and that Brazil seeks to enhance its role in the organization, symbolized by its quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Contrary to this claim, however, Brazil's financial contributions have been fairly insignificant, and the cost-sharing mechanism raises questions about why the UN is so

document A/64/75-E/2009/59, New York: UN; <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/329/74/PDF/N0732974.pdf> (accessed May 3, 2010)

⁷⁵⁷ Galvani, F. and Morse, S. (2004). Institutional sustainability: at what price? UNDP and the new cost-sharing model in Brazil, *Development in Practice*, 14: 3, 311 - 327, 2004

⁷⁵⁸ In addition, Brazil's President Lula is said to eye the top job of the organization once he leaves office in 2011.

massively engaged in a country that is no longer one of the world's poorest.

Brazil's policy towards the UN contains elements of system-strengthening integration (UN in general, UN General Assembly, Peacekeeping, UN in Brazil), and revisionist integration (UN Security Council). With the exception of the financial aspect, then, we can argue that Brazil's strategy towards the UN is overwhelmingly integrative.

2.1.4. *Brazil and the WTO*

The WTO is one of the most important international institutions. While each institution represents a part of the Western World Order, the WTO plays a special role as the major institution to represent the economic dimension of this Western World Order. The WTO has radically changed the world's trade environment, creating a level playing field and reducing America's ability to take action unilaterally.⁷⁵⁹ A country's decision to join or not to join this system (as Russia, for example) has a major impact on the way it conducts economic policy. Becoming a member forces domestic interest groups to organize and create channels into influence politics, which can democratize internal procedures and make them more transparent.⁷⁶⁰ The WTO is so all encompassing, with almost every country seeking to join, that it virtually constitutes compulsory jurisdiction in international trade law.⁷⁶¹

The WTO constitutes a good example of how well-functioning institutions engage nations through a mixture of benefits and obligations.⁷⁶² It seeks to increase trade by setting up binding global rules that equally apply to all members, notwithstanding economic strength, and it is constantly at work adjudicating and attempting to resolve trade disputes among its member states.⁷⁶³ It is often named as an institution that not only restrains weaker members, but also its most powerful one, the United States.⁷⁶⁴

Despite these positive traits of the World Trade Organization, the global trade regime faces severe problems. The Doha Round of the world trade talks, initiated in Qatar in November 2001, has been in deadlock for eight years, and it seems unclear how to ease the blockades and revive the negotiations. The recent proliferation of regional and bilateral agreements may make success of the Doha talks even less likely, although past agreements have also emerged amidst pessimism. It would be therefore wrong to praise the World Trade Organization without pointing to the global trade regime's significant limitations. Yet even when the Doha Round will fail to be concluded, the World Trade Organization maintains its utility, for example through the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM).

Using Krasner's definition, what are the WTO's principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures? The WTO principles, captured in their normative framework are, above all, about facilitating market access. Behind that stands the larger belief that international trade in general creates benefits for all and that it can help reduce poverty. Among its norms is making sure that the market made available is "appropriately and fairly" accessed. For

⁷⁵⁹ Noland, Marcus (1999). Learning to love the WTO, *Foreign Affairs*, Vo. 78, No.5, September / October 1999

⁷⁶⁰ Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian: From Doha to the Next Bretton Woods: A New Multilateral Trade Agenda, *Foreign Affairs*, January/ February 2009

⁷⁶¹ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

⁷⁶² Despite these benefits, the World Trade Organization is one of the most frequently criticized of all international institutions. (See, for example: Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian: From Doha to the Next Bretton Woods: A New Multilateral Trade Agenda, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 88, No. 1, January/ February 2009)

⁷⁶³ Esserman, Susan and Robert Howse (2003). The WTO on Trial. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2003), pp. 130-140

⁷⁶⁴ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001

example, the WTO provides for anti-dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures.⁷⁶⁵ The WTO's rules and decision-making procedures are based on consensual democracy. A trade deal can only be ratified if all countries agree. In addition, the dispute mechanism is the principal tool countries have to make their voice heard and challenge other countries, no matter how big. On the other hand, states lose some autonomy.

While many criticize the WTO for being too slow, Paul Blustein argues that it is precisely the slow pace and the difficulty of getting everybody on board that lends the organization its legitimacy.⁷⁶⁶ Brazil's membership is proof of that legitimacy, and several Brazilian diplomats have shown pride in how well they know the details of the WTO's complex informal rules of diplomacy.⁷⁶⁷ Amrita Narlikar even points to systemic issues, arguing that "the root causes of the failure at Cancun relate to the design and workings of the WTO as an international institution, and substantive imbalances in its agreements."⁷⁶⁸ In addition, Robert Keohane admits that some of the provisions of the Uruguay Round can worsen the situation of poor countries particularly if their negotiation teams are poorly staffed.⁷⁶⁹ Despite that, the fact that developing countries have been voluntarily joining the WTO in large numbers is proof that they consider the organization as fundamentally just, rejecting claims that the rules of the international trading system are stacked against the developing countries.⁷⁷⁰ The low returns of power in the WTO are such that "losers are more likely to agree to their losses and prepare for the next round."⁷⁷¹

The trade dispute mechanism, created with the WTO, is a way for countries to exercise their rights. Each member can initiate a trade dispute at the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement body (DSB) if its government believes another state is breaking the rules. Furthermore, there are few barriers to initiate a trade dispute. Between 2001 and 2008, half of all disputes were initiated by developing countries.⁷⁷² In order to engage in a trade dispute mechanism, a country must trust the system and believe its judges to be impartial. 70% of all disputes are solved by negotiation and without the imposition of retaliation. Even Brazil and Argentina, two countries that have developed a lot of mutual trust, usually prefer to solve trade disputes through the WTO rather than solving it bilaterally. Brazilian diplomats pointed out during the interviews that the establishment of

⁷⁶⁵ Qureshi, Asif H. (2003). Participation of Developing Countries in the WTO Dispute Settlement System *Journal of African Law*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (2003), pp. 174-198

⁷⁶⁶ Blustein, Paul (2009). *Misadventures of the Most Favored Nations: Clashing Egos, Inflated Ambitions, and the Great Shambles of the World Trade System*. New York: Public Affairs, 2009

⁷⁶⁷ Interview, Brazilian Diplomat, Itamaraty, Brasilia, July 23, 2010, and Phone Interview, Brazilian Diplomat based in Brasília, July 1, 2010. See also: Hurrell, Andrew (2005). *The United States and Brazil: Comparative reflections*. In: Hirst, Mônica (2005). *The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet Expectations*. New York: Routledge, 2005.

⁷⁶⁸ Narlikar, Amrita and Rorden Wilkinson (2004). *Collapse at the WTO: A Cancun Post-Mortem*. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2004), pp. 447-460

⁷⁶⁹ Keohane, Robert O. (2005). Preface to the 2005 Edition. In: Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984

⁷⁷⁰ Cooper, Richard N. (2003). *Developing Countries in the WTO*, *Capsule Review*, May/June 2003

⁷⁷¹ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

⁷⁷² The Economist Correspondent (2010). *Settling trade disputes: When partners attack*. February 11, 2010

the trade dispute mechanism during the Uruguay Round was a significant victory for Brazil.⁷⁷³

Brazil signed the so-called “Final Act” of Marrakesh in 1994, which created the WTO.⁷⁷⁴ Brazil’s decision to engage is thus conscious and by no means automatic. Russia, a fellow BRIC country, has decided not to join the World Trade Organization. After 16 years of negotiating with the WTO, Vladimir Putin announced in 2009 that Russia would no longer seek to enter, forming a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan instead. Russia, which exports mainly oil and gas, two items that are not covered by the WTO⁷⁷⁵, thus has more freedom to raise import tariffs arbitrarily for political reasons, something WTO members cannot do.

As Andrew Hurrell points out, Brazil is a frequent user of the dispute settlement mechanism, which shows that it agrees with and has trust in the WTO’s rules and decision-making procedures.⁷⁷⁶ As countries trade more, the scope for trade friction increases. China, for example, which had negotiated for 13 years prior to joining the WTO⁷⁷⁷, overtook Germany as the second largest exporter in 2009, and, as a consequence, half of the trade disputes discussed at the WTO now involve China. In the same way, the number of Brazilian complaints has been growing: It is the fourth most frequent complainant after the United States, the European Community and Canada (India is in sixth place). Mônica Hirst notes that U.S.-Brazil trade disputes are particularly noteworthy.⁷⁷⁸ This has not always been the case. Over the past decade, Brazil altered its trading patterns, became less dependent on trade with the global north, while fighting more in the WTO to attain its trade interests in the global arena. In the list of members subject to trade complaints, Brazil is in the eighth position (India is third).⁷⁷⁹ As Vigevani and Cepaluni point out, “The WTO panels against the USA and the European Union regarding cotton and sugar demonstrate the meaning of the use of legal mechanisms.”⁷⁸⁰ States that win trade disputes are usually allowed to retaliate against the other party and increase tariffs. While states often do not impose all the tariffs they are entitled to, Brazil usually retaliates aiming to inflict maximum economic damage. After winning a dispute over cotton in March 2010, Brazil may be the first country to follow through and impose retaliatory tariffs in several industries and also inflict harm in the area of intellectual property rights and services - as stipulated by the WTO. According to Celso

⁷⁷³ Interview, Brazilian Diplomat, Itamaraty, Brasilia, July 23, 2010, and Phone Interview, Brazilian Diplomat based in Brasília, July 1, 2010.

⁷⁷⁴ Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2007). *Lula’s Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification*. *Third World Quarterly*, 28:7, 1309 – 1326, 2007

⁷⁷⁵ Oil is the world’s most important traded commodity, but there are no formal rules to prevent collusion by oil-producing countries. (See, for example: Mattoo, Aaditya and Arvind Subramanian (2009). *From Doha to the Next Bretton Woods: A New Multilateral Trade Agenda*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No.1, January/ February 2009)

⁷⁷⁶ Hurrell, Andrew (2005). *The United States and Brazil: Comparative reflections*. In: Hirst, Mônica (2005). *The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet Expectations*. New York: Routledge, 2005.

⁷⁷⁷ Noland, Marcus (1999). *Learning to love the WTO*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No.1, September / October 1999

⁷⁷⁸ Hirst, Mônica (2005). *The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet Expectations*. New York: Routledge, 2005.

⁷⁷⁹ World Trade Organization (2010). *Overview of Trade Disputes*. www.wto.org

⁷⁸⁰ Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2007). *Lula’s Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification*. *Third World Quarterly*, 28:7, 1309 – 1326, 2007

Lafer, Brazil's former Foreign Minister, the dispute settlement body is fundamental for the success of the multilateral system of commerce as established by the WTO, which has as its function to prevent unilateral interpretation and self-help in the application of norms by means of economic retaliation and repressions.⁷⁸¹

Why does Brazil like the WTO? Marcus Noland gives a convincing answer when he argues that

Although a country can still try to exploit legalistic loopholes, the WTO has proven in many cases - including the notorious transatlantic banana dispute - that it can serve as a relatively objective judge and jury. That point ties in with a second advantage: because the WTO is a genuinely multilateral body, other countries do not view it as a proxy for American interests.⁷⁸²

Several Brazilian diplomats have confirmed this view during interviews,⁷⁸³ supporting the view that thanks to the WTO, disputes are solved largely on the basis of the rule of law instead of power politics.⁷⁸⁴ Celso Lafer, a strong supporter of the WTO, invokes Immanuel Kant and argues that the WTO contributes to the creation of “perpetual peace”, because “the principle of transparency contributes to greater expectations of security.”⁷⁸⁵

As Vigevani and Cepaluni point out, the Lula administration's major initiatives are situated in the framework of international trade negotiations⁷⁸⁶, and the G20 is regarded as a major showcase of the results of these initiatives. The G20 emerged at the 5th Ministerial WTO Conference held in Cancún in September 2003.⁷⁸⁷ While coalitions of developing countries at the WTO usually have a limited duration and impact, the G20 has been able to live on and to solidify. Developing countries continue to use the G20 to coordinate their policies because they reckon it maximizes their benefits. It is the first time developing nations

⁷⁸¹ Lafer, Celso (2005). *Comércio, desarmamento e direitos humanos. Reflexões sobre uma experiência diplomática*. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2005. In: da Cruz, José. (2005). *Review: Brazil's International Relations at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century*. *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Spring, 2005), pp. 115-122

⁷⁸² Noland, Marcus (1999). *Learning to love the WTO*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No.1, September / October 1999

⁷⁸³ Phone interview with a Brazilian diplomat, Brazilian foreign ministry, Brasília, July 1, 2010

⁷⁸⁴ Esserman, Susan and Robert Howse (2003). *The WTO on Trial*. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2003), pp. 130-140

⁷⁸⁵ Lafer, Celso (2005). *Comércio, desarmamento e direitos humanos. Reflexões sobre uma experiência diplomática*. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2005. In: da Cruz, José (2005). *Review: Brazil's International Relations at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century*. *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Spring, 2005), pp. 115-122

⁷⁸⁶ Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2007). *Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification*. *Third World Quarterly*, 28:7, 1309 - 1326

⁷⁸⁷ The G20 developing countries, not to be confused with the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors, includes 23 members: 5 African countries (Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe), 6 Asian countries (China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand), 12 from Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela). It was created to increase developing countries' weight in agricultural negotiations and represents almost 60% of the world's population and 26% of the world's agricultural exports. In: Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). *Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process*, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

have been able to coordinate their policies sufficiently to fundamentally change the context of future trade negotiations, and their behavior constitutes a classic form of “soft balancing”.⁷⁸⁸ Brazil’s behavior during trade negotiations, especially in Cancún, has frequently been described as ‘confrontational’. Yet, as shown in section 1.3., issue-based confrontation does not constitute systemic confrontation, and Brazil does not consider leaving the WTO. The majority of WTO members are developing nations, so it seems logical that they, after traditionally failing to influence the outcome of negotiations significantly, would attempt to coordinate in a more effective way.⁷⁸⁹

As this brief analysis shows, in the WTO Brazil frequently engages in issue-based confrontation through the dispute settlement mechanism. It thus strengthens the institution. Brazil fundamentally agrees with the WTO’s principles (reducing trade barriers increases welfare), its norms and rules (dispute settlements, multilateral trade negotiations, summits), and decision-making procedures (one vote per country, necessity to obtain consensus to achieve new trade deal).

⁷⁸⁸ Paul, T.V. (2005). Soft Balancing in the Age of Hegemony. *International Security*, Volume 30, Number 1, Summer 2005, pp. 46-71

⁷⁸⁹ Botelho, Marcio (2003). *The G-20: Aims and Perspectives of a New Trade Alliance*. Dissertation, 2005; <http://www.bookpump.com/dps/pdf-b/1123000b.pdf> (accessed January 3, 2009)

2.1.5. *Brazil, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)*

The NPT is the centerpiece of the global non-proliferation regime. Having come into force in 1970, it has three pillars that seek to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promote disarmament, and enhance the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council are the five recognized nuclear weapon states (hereafter NWS), the other 184 members have signed as non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).

Brazil has historically been a prominent actor in the context of nuclear energy and non-proliferation. In the 1960s already, it assumed leadership in the disarmament discussion, arguing that rich nations should spend money on development aid instead.⁷⁹⁰ However, Brazil saw its efforts largely thwarted as rich countries were unwilling to reduce their nuclear stockpiles.

Brazil opposed the NPT early on and described it as a ‘colonialist threat.’⁷⁹¹ Paradoxically, Brazil had signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which declared Latin America as a nuclear free zone, shortly before the creation of the NPT. Brazil rejected the treaty for a variety of reasons. Nationalists argued that the country should retain the ability to develop nuclear weapons. They also fundamentally disagreed with a treaty that put Brazil in a lower category than the five established nuclear powers, and one that would limit the country’s sovereignty but allow inspectors into the country. Finally, opponents often falsely argued that signing the NPT would somehow limit Brazil’s ability to develop nuclear energy. In 1975, Brazil signed a historic nuclear deal with West Germany, buying the technology to complete the entire fuel cycle.⁷⁹²

In the following decades, Brazil secretly attempted to develop nuclear arms. Brazilian diplomats and military officials continued to call the NPT “iniquitous and discriminatory.”⁷⁹³ This development that abruptly ended as the military dictatorship drew to a close and the democratically elected President Collor openly rejected any nuclear ambition to reintegrate Brazil into the international community.

After the 1990s, Brazil turned into a responsible stakeholder, signing both the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the NPT. Brazil’s and Argentina’s willingness to forgo the right to develop nuclear weapons and the subsequent strategic collaboration between the two in the form of Mercosur was seen as a model to be emulated by rivals across the world, particularly for India and Pakistan.

In the context of growing assertiveness, the Lula government changed strategy yet again and sought to strengthen Brazil’s nuclear capacities. Brazil attempted to achieve

⁷⁹⁰ Rosenbaum, H. Jon and Glenn M. Cooper (1970). Brazil and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. *International Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1970

⁷⁹¹ Redick, John R. (1981). The Tlatelolco Regime and Non-proliferation in Latin America. *International Organization*, Vol. 35, No. 1, Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain, Winter, 1981, pp. 103-134

⁷⁹² Gall, Norman (1976). Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All. *Foreign Policy*, No. 23, Summer, 1976, pp. 155-201

⁷⁹³ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle - a goal it quickly achieved - and began building nuclear-powered submarines.⁷⁹⁴

In 2004, Brazil for the first time violated the NPT as it did not allow IAEA's inspectors enter its nuclear plant in Resende near Rio de Janeiro.⁷⁹⁵ The Brazilian government vigorously denied that it was planning to build nuclear bombs and explained that it sought to protect industrial secrets from the inspectors. This claim, however, is specious as there is no known case of IAEA inspectors stealing commercial secrets.⁷⁹⁶ The government also points out that it would never develop bombs as this goes against the NPT, the Tlatelolco Treaty, and Brazil's constitution. Yet, during his election campaign, Lula frequently lambasted the NPT as unjust⁷⁹⁷, and several policy makers have argued that it has lost its significance. Changing the constitution is indeed not easy, but no serious obstacle if a President knows how to appeal to emotional nationalism. In addition, high-ranking policy makers and some army generals have continuously called for the development of nuclear weapons, even though official denials usually follow promptly.⁷⁹⁸

In conclusion we can say that Brazil's behavior seems to constitute systemic confrontation. Given the centrality of the inspections, this brief analysis shows that Brazil may agree with the overarching principle of the NPT (nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation) on an abstract level, but it confronts the rules and decision-making procedures of the treaty, and disagrees with the principles and norms of the treaty itself. This behavior has been confirmed during the NPT conference in 2010, where Brazil refused to sign any new rules that would strengthen the inspection regime. A more exhaustive analysis of this Brazil and the NPT will be provided in Part 3.

⁷⁹⁴ Ruehle, Hans (2010). Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America: Is Brazil developing the bomb? *Der Spiegel*, May 7, 2010

⁷⁹⁵ Palmer, Liz and Gary Milhollin (2004). Brazil's Nuclear Puzzle. *Science*, New Series, Vol. 306, No. 5696, Gene Expression: Genes in Action (Oct. 22, 2004), p. 617

⁷⁹⁶ The Economist Correspondent (2009). Nuclear Non-Proliferation Entreaty. November 13, 2009

⁷⁹⁷ Ruehle, Hans (2010). Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America: Is Brazil developing the bomb? *Der Spiegel*, May 7, 2010

⁷⁹⁸ Glüsing, Jens (2010). *Der Spiegel*. Baut Brasilien eine Atombombe, Herr Minister? May 10, 2010

2.1.6. *Brazil and the IMF/ World Bank*

2.1.6.1. BRAZIL AND THE IMF

Brazil has been a major client for decades, and similar to many recipient countries, the IMF's behavior has often been controversial in Brazil.⁷⁹⁹ As recently as 1999, a \$41.5 billion rescue package was set up by the IMF, and a new exchange regime was adopted which caused a dramatic depreciation of the currency and high public debt.⁸⁰⁰ Yet, due to a successful monetary reform under Brazil's President Cardoso and a strong economic performance in the following years, Brazil was able to repay its debt (approx. \$15.6 billion) in December 2005, two years ahead of schedule.⁸⁰¹

Brazil's relationship with the IMF has thus changed dramatically during the past decade. This fundamental change became obvious during the yearly IMF meeting in Istanbul in 2009, where Brazil's finance minister, Guido Mantega, announced that Brazil would spend \$10 billion (€6.8 billion) to buy IMF bonds to boost the fund's resources. The Brazilian representatives at the meeting went out of their way to stress the symbolic importance of that contribution.⁸⁰²

Brazil's decision to lend money to the IMF is tied to Brazil's desire to reform the institution in two areas. The first is vote reform: Brazil believes it is necessary to enhance emerging powers' weight in the decision making process, and to reduce richer countries' influence. In Istanbul, developed nations proposed to increase developing countries' voting share in the IMF by 5%, which would bring the developing countries' total share to 48%.⁸⁰³ Promises to increase developing countries' voting share further were made at the G20 summit in South Korea in October 2010.⁸⁰⁴

Secondly, Brazil seeks to modify the way the fund operates. As a recent recipient of IMF credit and subject to its policy recommendations, Brazil seeks less stringent conditionalities.⁸⁰⁵ Conditionalities today are already less rigid than they were before. Brazil called the FCL (Flexible Credit Line), a tool recently created by the IMF with few strings attached,⁸⁰⁶ a "breakthrough."⁸⁰⁷

⁷⁹⁹ Llana, Sara Miller and Matthew Clark (2007). Latin America's answer to the World Bank and IMF . Christian Science Monitor, July 12th 2007

⁸⁰⁰ Hirst, Mónica (2005). The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet Expectations. New York: Routledge, 2005

⁸⁰¹ International Monetary Fund (2006). IMF Survey, January 23, 2006, Vol. 35, No.2; <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/2006/012306.pdf> (accessed June 4, 2008)

⁸⁰² Rodriguez, A. (2009). Brazil joins emerging-nation boost to IMF funds,. Agence France Presse, October 5, 2009; <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hQ8r19HEHMHVd2zurIgbCuZhvqQ> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

⁸⁰³ Cermak, C. (2009). G-innovations: Major powers jockey for influence, Earth Times, October 4, 2009; <http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/288641,g-innovations-major-powers-jockey-for-influence-feature.html> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

⁸⁰⁴ CNN Wires Staff (2010). G20 Ministers agree to change IMF structure, October 24, 2010; <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/BUSINESS/10/24/g20.imf.reforms/> (accessed October 24, 2010)

⁸⁰⁵ da Silva, Luiz Inácio (2009). Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 23.9.2009; http://www.un.org/ga/64/generaldebate/pdf/BR_en.pdf (accessed July 19, 2010)

⁸⁰⁶ The Economist Correspondent (2009). Springing into action: Finance ministers gather for unusually significant spring meetings of the World Bank and IMF. April 25, 2009

Brazil's behavior clearly shows that it seeks to strengthen the fund through its engagement and financial support. It is quite natural that the Brazilian government seeks vote reform in this context. The Brazilian government rightly argues that developing countries' contributions, such as from Brazil, Russia, India and China, will boost the fund's legitimacy and its ability to convince countries in trouble to adopt its recommendations.⁸⁰⁸ Brazil's strategy towards the IMF can therefore be classified as revisionist integration.

2.1.6.2. BRAZIL AND THE WORLD BANK

The World Bank has a long history in Brazil, starting to finance projects shortly after its inception. In the 1970s, the Bank turned into one of the largest funding sources of social projects in Brazil.⁸⁰⁹ The Bank continues to finance a large number of projects there, in areas such as infrastructure.⁸¹⁰ Despite this engagement, the World Bank still has a negative reputation in Brazil, just like in many other developing countries.⁸¹¹

Brazil rightly points out that the World Bank remains dominated by established powers and seeks more influence in the World Bank for itself and other emerging powers. During the 2009 G20 Summit in Pittsburgh, heads of governments agreed to shift voting power within the World Bank, increasing developing countries' weight by 3%. It was unclear at that point whether Brazil was set to push for further reform, but there are signs that the most recent shift will not satisfy policy makers in Brasília. Prior to the summit, Brazil had asked for a bigger increase.⁸¹²

This brief overview shows that while Brazil seems to seek change in some of the World Bank's procedures and gain influence in the institution, it also seeks to strengthen the regime. Critics have rightly pointed out that Brazil's push towards more responsibility can be explained by its desire to obtain more power. At the same time, however, the Brazilian government points out that the World Bank would gain much more legitimacy if emerging powers had a greater say in the institution. This shows that Brazil agrees with the principles of the Bretton Woods institutions (global financial stability), its norms (lending upon conditionalities), but disagrees with some rules (the type and strength of conditionalities), and the decision-making procedures (quotas and voting shares). Brazil's strategy towards the Bretton Woods institutions will be analyzed more in-depth in the case study in Part 3.

⁸⁰⁷ Mantega, Guido (2009). Statement, International and Financial Committee, Istanbul, October 4, 2009; <http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/releases/2009/outubro/Guido-Mantega-Statement-IMFC-04-10.pdf> (accessed July 19, 2010)

⁸⁰⁸ Mantega, Guido (2009). Statement, International and Financial Committee, Istanbul, October 4, 2009; <http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/releases/2009/outubro/Guido-Mantega-Statement-IMFC-04-10.pdf> (accessed July 19, 2010)

⁸⁰⁹ Fonseca, M. (1998). O Banco Mundial como referência para a justiça social no terceiro mundo: evidências do caso brasileiro, *Revista da Faculdade de Educação*, Rev. Fac. Educ. vol.24 n.1 São Paulo Jan./Jun. 1998

⁸¹⁰ World Bank (2009) Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Brief, 2009; <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/0,,contentMDK:20340156~menuPK:258561~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258554,00.html> (accessed July 19, 2010)

⁸¹¹ Llana, Sara Miller and Matthew Clark (2007). Latin America's answer to the World Bank and IMF. *Christian Science Monitor*, July 12, 2007

⁸¹² Mantega, Guido (2009). Statement, International and Financial Committee, Istanbul, October 4, 2009; <http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/releases/2009/outubro/Guido-Mantega-Statement-IMFC-04-10.pdf> (accessed July 19, 2010)

2.1.7. *Brazil and the G8 / G20*

The G8⁸¹³ started as a meeting of a small number of heads of state or government of the leading post-industrial democracies.⁸¹⁴ Then still with five members, (G5) it had been promoted by the United States as an acknowledgement of US decline and the need for a trilateralist (US, Europe, Japan) management of established countries' interests.⁸¹⁵ The US also preferred the new group to the already existing G10, which it thought contained too many European powers.⁸¹⁶

The institution used to attract very little attention until 2005, when it came to be considered no longer as a mere regular meeting of powerful politicians, but one of the most notable institutions of today's global governance. By then it had added Russia as a full member in 2003 to coax it into aligning with the established powers. This does not necessarily have to do with the summit itself, but rather with the fact that civil society identified the G8 as a meaningful institution, change agent, or culprit for global problems. In 2005, famous musicians such as Bono and Bob Geldof led the "Make Poverty History Campaign" prior to the G8 summit in Gleneagles in Scotland, which led to the gross exaggeration of the G8's perceived power.⁸¹⁷ Since then, meetings are so visible that they have been forced to address all of the major global issues. While the leaders used to discuss macroeconomic issues, discussions have diversified and now include everything from poverty reduction to terrorism and climate change. Critics have pointed out that it remains unclear in how far the G8 summits have been able to effectively deal with global challenges, and that its effect so far has been, at best, divisive.

As the G8 came to be seen increasingly as "the centre of global governance"⁸¹⁸, criticism mounted. One of the most frequent criticisms leveled at the organization was its focus on established powers (at times called "Western-centeredness") and its failure to represent emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil. In addition, critics pointed out that all G8 members, with the exception of Canada, had an imperial past.⁸¹⁹ It was thus in a classic dilemma of legitimacy vs. efficiency.⁸²⁰

⁸¹³ The G8 (Group of Eight) was formerly known as the G6 or Group of Six and also the G7 or Group of Seven. The last time it changed its name was in 1997, when Russia was added as a member.

⁸¹⁴ Payne, Thomas (1987). The G8 in a changing economic order. *International Affairs* 84: 3 (2008) pp. 519–533

⁸¹⁵ Putnam, Robert D. and Nicholas Bayne (1987). *Hanging together: cooperation and conflict in the seven-power summits*. London: Sage, 1987

⁸¹⁶ Baker, Andrew (2006). *The Group of Seven: finance ministries, central banks and global financial governance*. London: Routledge, 2006

⁸¹⁷ Payne, Anthony (2006). Blair, Brown and the Gleneagles agenda: making poverty history, or confronting the global politics of unequal development? *International Affairs* 82: 5 (2006) pp. 917–935

⁸¹⁸ Kirton, John J. (1999). Explaining G8 effectiveness, in Michael R. Hodges, John J. Kirton and Joseph P. Daniels, *The G8's role in the new millennium*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999

⁸¹⁹ Cooper, Andrew F. and John English (2005). Introduction: Reforming the international system from the top- a Leaders' 20 Summit. In: English, John, Ramesh Thakur, Andrew F. Cooper (eds.) *Reforming from the top: A Leaders' 20 Summit*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005

⁸²⁰ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

To increase its legitimacy, the G8 leaders included emerging powers' leaders at the Evian summit in 2003. In 2005, after Tony Blair had invited Brazil, China, India, Turkey and Mexico to discuss climate change, a 'G8+5 process' was initiated with the plan to involve the 'outreach group of 5' more frequently.⁸²¹ These countries have since then been called 'anchor countries'.⁸²²

In 2007, the German government hosted the G8 meeting and initiated a process that later became known as the 'Heiligendamm Process', named after the town where the summit was held. Brazil, India, China, South Africa and Mexico were invited to participate in the summit. The motivation for this inclusive process was the recognition that major emerging powers would have to become active partners in shaping global governance, and that global problems such as global warming cannot be solved by a small group.⁸²³

Does Brazil seek integration in the G8? As Anthony Payne argues, it remains to be seen whether Brazil and the other "early twenty-first century winners" will work within this "framework of western leadership", symbolized by the G8,⁸²⁴ or whether it will pursue options outside of the G8, "including championing the traditional solidarity with the developing world".⁸²⁵ President Cardoso (1995-2002) often seemed to prioritize inclusion into the G7 over inclusion into the UNSC as he regarded it as a more realistic undertaking.⁸²⁶ Brazil has accepted invitations to participate in the 'Outreach Group', but it has been highly critical of the G8's lack of legitimacy and remains skeptical about joining.⁸²⁷ Along with India and China, it considered it somewhat humiliating to be placed at a side table or to be "invited for breakfast and lunch", while not being admitted to the most important discussions.⁸²⁸ As a response to their only partial inclusion during the Heiligendamm meeting in 2007, the 'Outreach Group' decided to meet separately and drafted their own position paper. This paper showed their fundamental interest in a more active role in the international institution

⁸²¹ Myatt, Timothy et al. (2007). 'Outreach Group 5' Country Objectives Report. 2007 Heiligendamm Summit. G8 Research Group- Oxford University, 2007. See also: Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

⁸²² The outreach group was not the first move by the G8 to become more inclusive. After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, a meeting of 20 finance ministers was organized to discuss financial matters. This came to be called G20, although it has not yet turned into a regular summit. See John Humphrey and Dirk Messner (2006). *China and India as emerging global governance actors: challenges for developing and developed countries*, *Institute of Development Studies Bulletin* 37: 1, 2006, pp. 107–14.

⁸²³ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). *Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process*, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

⁸²⁴ Thomas Payne (2008). *The G8 in a changing economic order*. *International Affairs* 84: 3 (2008) pp. 519–533

⁸²⁵ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). *Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process*, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

⁸²⁶ Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (2006). *A Arte da Política. A História que Vivi*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2006

⁸²⁷ Sennes, Ricardo, Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa. *Brazil's Multiple Forms of External Engagement: Foreign Policy Dilemmas* (2005). In: *Reforming from the Top: A Leader's G20 Summit*. J. English, R. Thakur, A.F. Cooper (eds.), 201-229. Tokyo: United Nations University, 2005

⁸²⁸ da Silva, Luiz Inácio (2008). *Building on the B in BRIC*, *The Economist*, November 19, 2008

and a desire to pursue an integrative strategy.⁸²⁹ At the same time, they showed that they were not willing to engage as second-class participants and accept all of the rules defined by the big powers, which indicates a classic example of revisionist integration.

Brazil rejects the G8 (if it remains static) and seeks to replace it with the more inclusive G20. As Gregory and de Almeida point out, the Brazilian government under Lula rejects the G8 and seeks to create a more inclusive system. While it has never rejected invitations to participate in the G8 summits, it has made clear that it is its desire to come for the “main course”, rather than merely “desert”, when all important decisions have already been made.⁸³⁰ Brazil’s strategy therefore contains some confrontational elements, as it rejects the G8’s exclusive approach. At the same time, the Brazilian government may be reluctant to join a highly exclusive club such as the G8 as it does not want to be seen by other developing countries as being part of the global rich. A similar argument keeps Brazil from joining the OECD.⁸³¹

In 2009, the G20 for the first time turned into a meeting for heads of state, for the first time receiving more media attention than the G8 meeting. It is difficult to predict whether the G20 will fully replace the G8 or whether both will continue as parallel institutions.

Brazil’s Finance Minister Mantega sees the G20 “at the top of the pyramid, providing guidance and support to international financial institutions.”⁸³² While the Brazilian government is content to have a seat on the G20-table, it continues to ask for the addition of a permanent seat for the Group of 24, a forum for developing nations from Latin America, Asia and Africa. Finance Minister Mantega stressed that this was necessary to counter the excessive influence of European nations, whose weight is larger due to a permanent seat for the European Union.⁸³³

This brief overview shows that Brazil has a strong interest in working with the G8 and in integrating in the G20. It engages in revisionist integration because the changes Brazil desires would either radically expand the G8 or empower the G20. Brazilian diplomats are quick to point out that Brazil will not accept any type of second-class participation. Rather, it is likely that Brazil will only accept a spot on the table if it is granted full membership. There is thus fundamental agreement about the G8’s and G20’s principals (addressing global challenges) and its norms (summit-based communication), but disagreement with specific rules (exclusive invitation-based participation) and decision-making procedures (exclusive creation of joint statement).

⁸²⁹ Heiligendamm Summit (2007). Joint Position Paper of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa participating in the G8 Heiligendamm Summit, June 2007

08/06/2007 <http://www.indianembassy.de/news/pmvisit4.htm> (accessed June 2, 2010)

⁸³⁰ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

⁸³¹ Barbosa, Rubens (2005). O Brasil e a OECD. Estado de São Paulo. December 27, 2005; <http://www.eagora.org.br/arquivo/O-Brasil-e-a-OCDE/> (accessed May 9, 2009)

⁸³² Mantega, Guido (2009). Statement, International and Financial Committee, Istanbul, October 4, 2009; <http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/releases/2009/outubro/Guido-Mantega-Statement-IMFC-04-10.pdf> (accessed July 19, 2010)

⁸³³ Goodman, Joshua (2009). BRICS insists on greater voice at IMF, Mantega says, Bloomberg, October 3, 2009; <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=arQEKenVkRAG> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

2.1.9. *Brazil and Latin America*

This section will analyze Brazil's regional policy and analyze how its attempts to institutionalize regional cooperation fit into the categories presented in this model. There are a large number of regional institutions, but four are of strategic significance: Mercosur, UNASUR, the Inter American Development Bank (IADB), and the Bank of the South. The principal question here will be whether regional institutions constitute a form of alignment (if principles and norms are similar) or systemic confrontation (if principles and norms are opposed).

2.1.9.1. BRAZIL AND MERCOSUR

Ideas of regional integration have a long history in Latin America, dating back to the days of independence in the 1820s.⁸³⁴ The creation of a free trade agreement or even a customs union had been propagated since the 1930s, but 'import substitution industrialization' (ISI) policies by several countries in the 1960s, which involved protectionist measures, made integration difficult.⁸³⁵ Economic stagnation in the 1980s, the apparent success of regional integration in Europe, and the end of the military dictatorships in several countries made Latin America's political elites more amenable to new ideas.

Furthermore, the end of the Cold War forced both Brazil and Argentina to rethink their place in the world. In a new international order dominated by one power, both Argentina and Brazil saw their role diminished, and there was a fear among foreign policy elites that South America would become irrelevant in the Post Cold War order.⁸³⁶ With military rule having ended in 1983 and 1985 respectively, Argentina and Brazil saw regional integration as the best way to prevent this scenario, speak with one voice and protect strategic interests.⁸³⁷ In addition, integration got a boost by both Brazil's and Argentina's shared belief that open and liberalized markets, privatization and fiscal discipline – personified by the 'Washington Consensus' – would enhance economic growth.⁸³⁸ Regional integration was thus, since the 1980s, one of the most important subjects of Brazilian diplomacy.⁸³⁹

Recognizing the opportunity created by their predecessors' confidence-building measures, Brazil's Fernando Collor de Melo and Argentina's Carlos Menem decided to develop Mercosur, the Common Market of the Southern Cone. Both Uruguay and Paraguay

⁸³⁴ Mecham, Michael (2003). Mercosur: A failing project? *International Affairs*, 79, no. 2 (2003): pp. 369-87

⁸³⁵ Earlier attempts of economic integration include the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1960 and the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) in 1980. (Lafer, Celso. *A Identidade Internacional do Brasil e a politica externa brasileira*, 2001)

⁸³⁶ Vigevani, Tullo (2007). *Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era: The Search for Autonomy through Integration*. *Latin American Perspectives*, 2007

⁸³⁷ Ayerbe, Luis Fernando (2002). *Estados Unidos e América Latina: A construção da hegemonia*, 2002

⁸³⁸ Vigevani, Tullo (2009). *The Influence of International Changes on the Brazilian Perception of Regional Integration.* ISA Conference Paper, New York, 2009

⁸³⁹ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). *Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process*, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

joined the new club. Its foundation treaty was signed in Asunción in 1991 and included a schedule of tariff reductions.⁸⁴⁰ Aside from the occasional lapse, all members adhered to the new rules, and a free trade area was established in 1994. Nevertheless, numerous exceptions that were supposed to be eliminated over time, persisted, and Mercosur turned into a customs union, albeit imperfect, in 1995. Despite its shortcomings, it became the most ambitious project of regional integration in the region.⁸⁴¹ Several countries have since become associated members, such as Chile, Bolivia and Venezuela.⁸⁴² Mercosur is also sustained by a democracy clause, which indicates that we can easily categorize Mercosur not as an anti-hegemonic alliance, but as an expression of alignment. Mercosur is based on the same rules as those that sustain the Western World Order.

Economic integration continued as South American economies grew during the 1990s, which made South American business elites look favorably upon Mercosur. The pie continued to grow for all until Brazil devalued its currency in 1999, which strongly reduced Argentinean exports to Brazil.

Argentina's traumatic currency crisis and default in 2001 brought further economic integration largely to a halt. Mercosur's star seemed to fade as neither Brazil nor Argentina were willing to scrap protectionist measures. This caused some business groups to call for the abolition of the flawed customs union, which was riddled with exceptions, and return to a free trade area. The failure to agree on an effective mechanism to settle disputes further slowed progress. Particularly Brazil insisted that Mercosur should remain an intergovernmental organization rather than a supranational body.⁸⁴³ Political integration, such as the creation of a regional parliament, now seemed highly unlikely and the idea was largely kept alive by small groups of academics across Latin America, Europe and the United States.

Yet, rather than abandoning Mercosur after the economic turmoil, it remained high on the presidential agenda. In his inaugural address in 2003, Lula even called for regional political integration, arguing that economic integration was just the beginning.⁸⁴⁴ Mercosur is often seen as a strategic alternative to close ties with the United States.⁸⁴⁵ But since Mercosur is based on the same rules and norms as the Western World Order, these are complementary strategies.

⁸⁴⁰ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

⁸⁴¹ While a free trade area eliminates tariffs, a customs union takes integration to higher level by creating a common external tariff.

⁸⁴² Venezuela applied for full membership in 2006. Its entry has yet to be ratified by Brazil's and Paraguay's Congress. See Reuters Correspondent (2007). *Venezuela's Mercosur entry unlikely- Brazil senator*. Reuters, July 4, 2007

⁸⁴³ Mecham, Michael (2003). *Mercosur: A failing project?* *International Affairs*, 79, no. 2 (2003): pp. 369-87

⁸⁴⁴ Cason, Jeffrey and Timothy Power (2006). *Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy from Cardoso to Lula*. Conference Paper. "Regional Powers in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Near and Middle East" December 11 and 12, 2006, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg

⁸⁴⁵ Soares de Lima, Maria Regina (2003). *Na trilha de um política externa afirmativa*. Observatorio da Cidadania, 2003

But despite grand rhetoric that “Mercosur is our destiny”, the Brazilian President was not willing to elevate Mercosur’s constitutional status or bear the costs of its consolidation.⁸⁴⁶ Since the Argentine crisis in 2001, there have been some efforts and even success. In 2004, for example, Brazil pushed through a free trade zone between Mercosur and the Andean Community. This achievement, however, seems insignificant given how much time South American presidents have spent talking up Mercosur.⁸⁴⁷ At present, Mercosur is stuck in a “suspended transitional phase”, comparable to where the European Union was in the 1960s.⁸⁴⁸

There are several other institutional outfits like CAN and UNASUL, none of which are very meaningful yet. Further North, the Andean Community (CAN, formerly Andean Pact), which consists of Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru, has existed since 1969, but integration has not moved beyond free trade and free travel for its citizens. Due to its comparatively small size, it generally has been eclipsed by Mercosur, which has been regarded as the most likely candidate to emulate the European Union in South America.⁸⁴⁹ In May 2008, the Union of the South American Nations (Unasur) was founded after twelve Presidents from both Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay), the Andean Community (Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Colombia) and four other countries (Chile, Venezuela, Guyana, and Suriname) signed the Constitutive Treaty in Brasília.⁸⁵⁰ While Unasur has the explicit goal to emulate the European Union, it does not have an administrative body of its own yet, rather using Mercosur’s and the Andean Community’s existing bureaucracies.⁸⁵¹

Andrew Hurrell argues that Mercosur could be intended to be a counterweight against the United States⁸⁵², yet Mercosur’s principles are fundamentally aligned with those of the Western World Order. Mercosur seeks to strengthen relations between its members, promote trade and thus elevate living standards, and promote social progress. It also contains a democracy clause, which, although not properly enforced, points to the fundamental alignment with the Western World Order, promoting foreign policy making based on norms, rules and respecting international regimes.

2.1.9.2. BRAZIL AND THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (IADB)

We cannot fully comprehend Brazil’s views on international financial institutions without a discussion about the Inter-American Development Bank. Many of Brazil’s demands with

⁸⁴⁶ Vigevani, Tullo (2009). Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era. Presentation at the ISA Conference, New York, 2009

⁸⁴⁷ The Economist Correspondent (2008). Brazil’s foreign policy: The Samba beat, with missteps. The Economist, December 18, 2008

⁸⁴⁸ Klom, Andy (2003). Mercosur and Brazil: A European Perspective. International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 2, 2003

⁸⁴⁹ Vigevani, Tullo (2007). Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era: The Search for Autonomy through Integration. Latin American Perspectives, 2007

⁸⁵⁰ South American Union of Nations (2008). South American Union of Nations Constitutive Treaty”, Brazilian Embassy, 2008 (brasilemb.org)

⁸⁵¹ www.comunidadandina.org

⁸⁵² Hurrell, Andrew (2005). The United States and Brazil: Comparative reflections. In: Hirst, Mónica (2005). The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet Expectations. New York: Routledge, 2005

regard to the Bretton Woods institutions (such as more decision-making power for recipient nations) have been implemented in the IADB, which makes Brazil's behavior in this institution an interesting subject.

The IADB⁸⁵³, founded in 1959, seeks to strengthen the process of economic and social development in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is the largest source of multilateral financing in the region, although it is only slightly ahead of the World Bank.⁸⁵⁴

While the IADB's mission is largely similar to that of the World Bank in fundamental aspects, it differs slightly regarding its internal distribution of power. Aside from its regional focus on Latin America, its power structure gives more rights to developing countries, which control the majority of the decision-making bodies of the Bank.⁸⁵⁵ Some argue that if developing countries had more decision-making power in international lending institutions, developed countries would have less leverage to coerce the borrowers. Others argue that peer pressure creates a strong motivation not to default. Yet, this peer pressure did not stop Argentina from defaulting in 2001. In any case, the borrowing countries' larger influence has an impact on how the IADB is perceived by Latin American policy makers. Hugo Chavez, who has fiercely criticized the World Bank, has never spoken out against the Inter American Development Bank, and Venezuela continues to benefit from the IADB.⁸⁵⁶

The IADB is larger than the World Bank in Latin America. It has disbursed loans of approximately \$8.1 billion in the past year (ending October 31, 2009). With 25% of the total funds, Brazil received most of the loans. Brazil does thus receive less per capita than other nations, considering that 35% of all Latin Americans (200 out of 570 million) are Brazilians.⁸⁵⁷ Given the IADB's different power structure, it is not perceived as a tool of imperialism by Brazilian politicians. Rather, the organization regularly appears in the local news when Bank President Luis Alberto Moreno and local politicians inaugurate new projects.⁸⁵⁸ Furthermore, the IADB's work is not affected by political instability in several Latin American countries. As Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay strengthen their institutions and pursue centrist policies, Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador and Bolivia are

⁸⁵³ The Inter American Development Bank is often called IDB, which at times leads to confusions as IDB also stands for Islamic Development Bank.

⁸⁵⁴ Inter American Development Bank (2010). Research and Data, 2010.
<http://www.iadb.org/research/home.cfm> (accessed July 19, 2010)

⁸⁵⁵ The United States is the most powerful member with 30% of the shares, but the Latin American and Caribbean countries hold 50% in total. Brazil is, together with Argentina, the second most powerful member, with 10.75% of the total vote. Several European countries, as well as Israel, China, Japan, the United States and Canada, are non-borrowing members, while all Latin American countries except Cuba are borrowing members (IADB). The United States have a significant say in the leadership selection process, and US influence was crucial when the IADB had to choose a new leader in 2005. Yet, contrary to the World Bank, the IADB is traditionally led by a Latin American. From 1988 to 2005, the Uruguayan economist and former foreign minister Enrique V. Iglesias led the institution. In 2005, Colombian diplomat and entrepreneur Luis Alberto Moreno succeeded him (IADB).

⁸⁵⁶ Inter American Development Bank (2010): Research and Data.
<http://www.iadb.org/research/home.cfm> (accessed July 19, 2010)

⁸⁵⁷ Inter American Development Bank (2010): Research and Data.
<http://www.iadb.org/research/home.cfm> (accessed July 19, 2010)

⁸⁵⁸ Reforming the IADB is therefore not an issue at this point. Improving infrastructure is considered one of the few aspects that could hold Brazil back from realizing its full potential, and the IADB is seen as a crucial player in helping Brazil make a leap in areas as diverse as roads, public transport, and telecommunication. Yet, the IADB is also seen as a powerful tool in helping the poorest countries in the region, such as Bolivia and Haiti, and as a talking shop for the region.

increasingly unpredictable and dominated by populist policies. While these political developments may have negatively affected chances to coordinate policies across the continent, the IADB is one of the few regional bodies that work properly.

The IADB is not meant to undermine or replace the Bretton Woods organizations. Rather, they are complementary, and an integral part of the Western World Order. Brazil fully supports the IADB and its strategy can be categorized as unconditional integration.

2.1.9.3. BRAZIL AND THE BANK OF THE SOUTH (BANCO DEL SUR)

The Bank of the South, on the other hand, is an attempt to replace the World Bank and the IMF, so we can categorize it as systemic confrontation. The project, promoted by Venezuela's increasingly autocratic Hugo Chavez, is a reaction to ongoing crises of relevance in Latin America confronting the IMF and the World Bank.⁸⁵⁹ In April 2007, Ecuador's President Rafael Correa expelled the World Bank representative in the country, declaring him a "persona non grata."⁸⁶⁰ In the same month, Venezuela's President Chavez announced his country's withdrawal from both the IMF and the World Bank. Venezuela was later forced to reverse its decision to prevent default clauses in the country's sovereign bonds.⁸⁶¹ An Ecuadorean government official stressed that "Latin America has been impoverished and harassed long enough that we have no other choice [but to] start Banco del Sur."⁸⁶² This episode shows that both Venezuela and Ecuador are engaging in systemic confrontation.

The Bank of the South is a Venezuelan project. After a summit in Cochabamba in 2007, Hugo Chavez announced that the Bank of the South had raised \$7 billion in paid-in capital from member countries that now number six (Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador, Brazil and Paraguay, with Nicaragua, the Caribbean and possibly some Asian countries conveying interest). While this is \$2 billion more than the Latin American contributions to the Inter-American Development Bank, it is uncertain how serious the members' pledges have been. In addition, many questions remain unanswered, such as the Bank's infrastructure, lending framework, and types of guarantees.⁸⁶³

Brazil has lent rhetorical support, but the Brazilian government has not assumed any leadership in the process. With the biggest and richest member on the continent so reluctant to support the project, there is reason to believe that the Brazilian government quietly hopes that the project will fizzle out, like so many previous regional projects. Its behavior is therefore not confrontational. According to Michael Shifter, vice president of the Inter-

⁸⁵⁹ McElhinny, Vince (2007). Banco del Sur: A reflection of declining IFI relevance in Latin America, Bank Information Center, May 1, 2007, <http://www.bicusa.org/en/article.3299.aspx> (accessed June 9, 2009)

⁸⁶⁰ Llana, Sara Miller and Matthew Clark (2007). Latin America's answer to the World Bank and IMF . Christian Science Monitor, July 12th 2007

⁸⁶¹ Buncombe, Andrew (2009). Chavez pulls out of IMF and World Bank, The Independent, May 2, 2007; <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/chavez-pulls-out-of-imf-and-world-bank-447087.html> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

⁸⁶² Llana, Sara Miller and Matthew Clark (2007). Latin America's answer to the World Bank and IMF . Christian Science Monitor, July 12th 2007

⁸⁶³ McElhinny, Vince (2007). Banco del Sur: A reflection of declining IFI relevance in Latin America, Bank Information Center, May 1, 2007, <http://www.bicusa.org/en/article.3299.aspx> (accessed June 9, 2009)

American Dialogue, the Bank of the South is unlikely to gain sufficient significance to become a tool of systemic confrontation.⁸⁶⁴

To conclude, Brazil's engagement with regional bodies clearly constitutes alignment with the principles and norms supported by the Western World Order. Both Mercosur and the Inter American Development promote the free flow of goods in the region, the combat against poverty and for political stability. While the Bank of the South would, if successful, constitute a confrontation, Brazil is unlikely to assume leadership in the process.

⁸⁶⁴ Llana, Sara Miller and Matthew Clark (2007). Latin America's answer to the World Bank and IMF . Christian Science Monitor, July 12, 2007

2.1.10. Brazil and NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most important security organization in the world.⁸⁶⁵ Its traditional *raison d'être* was to protect the United States and Western Europe during the Cold War from the Soviet Union.⁸⁶⁶ Since the end of the Cold War, however, NATO has changed fundamentally, and is no longer limited to the Northern Atlantic. As Karl Kaiser points out, NATO's first shots were fired in Bosnia, which is not connected to the potential conflict for which it was once created. In addition, in Bosnia, NATO was allied with Russia, its traditional adversary.⁸⁶⁷ It has also supported AU peacekeepers in Darfur, assisted tsunami victims in Indonesia and earthquake victims in Pakistan.⁸⁶⁸ The organization has expanded eastwards significantly, and the discussion remains about how far it should advance, with some even arguing for Russia's inclusion⁸⁶⁹, which would fundamentally change the alliance.⁸⁷⁰

NATO's mission in Afghanistan to combat Al Qaeda reflects the tendency that threats are increasingly unrestricted by geographic boundaries.⁸⁷¹ NATO was therefore forced to "go global."⁸⁷² Daniel Fried, former US assistant secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, argued that the security challenges facing NATO are violent extremism, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, failed states, cyber attacks and insecurity of energy resources, none of which are entirely limited to a geographic region.⁸⁷³ Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier argue that NATO should open membership to "any democratic state in the world that is willing and able to contribute to the fulfillment of NATO's new responsibilities." Daalder and Goldgeier mention, among others, Brazil and India as potential new members, whose inclusion would turn NATO into a "legitimate and capable adjunct to the UN by helping to implement and enforce its decisions."⁸⁷⁴ This opinion is far from accepted. In 2009, German Chancellor Angela Merkel argued that a "global NATO" does not make sense, elaborating that "it can provide security outside its area, but that does not mean membership

⁸⁶⁵ Brzezinski, Zbigniew (2009). An Agenda for NATO, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 5, September/October 2009

⁸⁶⁶ Kaiser, Karl. Reforming NATO (1996). Foreign Policy, No. 103, Summer, 1996, pp. 128-143

⁸⁶⁷ Kaiser, Karl. Reforming NATO (1996). Foreign Policy, No. 103, Summer, 1996, pp. 128-143

⁸⁶⁸ Daalder, Ivo and James Goldgeier. Global NATO. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2006), pp. 105-113

⁸⁶⁹ Gidadhlibi R. G. (2004). Expansion of NATO: Russia's Dilemma. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 19 (May 8-14, 2004), pp. 1885-1887

⁸⁷⁰ Kydd, Andrew (2001). Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement. International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 4, The Rational Design of International Institutions (Autumn, 2001), pp. 801-828

⁸⁷¹ Brzezinski, Zbigniew (2009). An Agenda for NATO, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 5, September/October 2009

⁸⁷² Daalder, Ivo and James Goldgeier. Global NATO. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2006), pp. 105-113. See also: Brzezinski, Zbigniew (2009). An Agenda for NATO, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 5, September/October 2009

⁸⁷³ Bhadrakumar, M K. (2007). India holds key in NATO's world view, Asia Times, October 6, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IJ06Df03.html

⁸⁷⁴ Daalder, Ivo and James Goldgeier (2006). Global NATO. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2006), pp. 105-113

across the globe is possible.”⁸⁷⁵ Yet, the discussion shows that NATO is becoming increasingly relevant for non-members, particularly fringe countries such as Brazil.

NATO’s difficulties to define its identity are not new. In 1962, Alastair Buchan criticized Senator Fulbright for using NATO as a synonym for the “free world”, pointing out that Brazil and India were similarly free.⁸⁷⁶

But the recent array of new missions in very different regions and conflicts, and its uncertainty about to whom it should extend membership reflects NATO’s new type of struggle to define its mission and its identity.⁸⁷⁷ Karl Kaiser argues that after the Cold War, NATO’s main task is no longer to contain Russia, but global crisis management, peacekeeping, non-proliferation and support for collective security.⁸⁷⁸ If NATO truly aspires to be an instrument of global collective security, it matters for fringe nations as well.

So how does Brazil see NATO? And how can we best characterize Brazil’s relations with NATO? As an emerging power with global ambitions, NATO plays an important role for Brazil, as several Brazilian diplomats based in Brasília attest.⁸⁷⁹ Liberal theory predicts that Brazil, as a democratic country, will eventually join NATO. This possibility has been discarded by Brazilian government officials.⁸⁸⁰ The last such attempt was made under President Reagan, who informally proposed to Brazil a South Atlantic Pact that would cover the Southern limit of NATO. This proposal was rejected by officials in Brasília.⁸⁸¹ But this needs to be seen in its historical context, in which the Brazilian government was suspicious of the United States. Today, the situation looks different. If NATO opened itself up to the possibility of expanding geographically and made an offer to Brazil, there would be little reason to expect Brazil to categorically reject it. The Rio Pact, to which all nations on the Western hemisphere are signatories, constitutes a collective security clause.⁸⁸² On September 11, all American nations condemned the terrorist attack and, invoking the Rio Pact, pledged support and willingness to help the United States defend itself.

How did Brazil, a country that has traditionally espoused the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference⁸⁸³, react to NATO’s decision to intervene in Kosovo? In the Declaration of the Rio Group on March 25, 1999, its members lamented that the parties had failed to reach a diplomatic solution, but they refrained from condemning the NATO bombings. The Declaration also expressed worry about NATO’s decision to proceed without

⁸⁷⁵ Brzezinski, Zbigniew (2009). An Agenda for NATO, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 5, September/October 2009

⁸⁷⁶ Buchan, Alastair (1962). The Reform of NATO. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Jan 1962), pp.165-12

⁸⁷⁷ Talbott Strobe (2002). From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk., *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 6 (Nov-Dec 2002), pp.46-57

⁸⁷⁸ Kaiser, Karl. Reforming NATO (1996). *Foreign Policy*, No. 103 (Summer, 1996), pp. 128-143

⁸⁷⁹ Telephone interviews with a former Brazilian ambassador to a Western European country and a Brazilian diplomat based in Brasília, June 1, 2010

⁸⁸⁰ Telephone interviews with a former Brazilian ambassador to a Western European country and a Brazilian diplomat based in Brasília, June 1, 2010

⁸⁸¹ Brooke, Jim (1981). Dateline Brazil: Southern Superpower, *Foreign Policy*, No.44 (Autumn, 1981), pp.167-180

⁸⁸² Talbott Strobe (2002). From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk., *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 6 (Nov-Dec 2002), pp.46-57

⁸⁸³ Serrano, Mónica and Lorena Murillo S. (2001). La crisis de Kosovo y América Latina: el dilema de la intervención. *Foro Internacional*, Vol. 41, No.1 (163) (Jan-Mar 2001), pp.5-34

UN Security Council approval.⁸⁸⁴ According to Serrano and Murillo, the document's authors thus attempted to find a compromise between protecting human rights and respecting state sovereignty. Brazil rejected Russia's proposal of calling NATO's intervention an "international threat to peace and stability", but several Brazilian officials criticized NATO's "double standards" and the strategy of "selective intervention."⁸⁸⁵ The Brazilian government also decided not to follow Chile's initiative to send police forces to the Balkans to help stabilize the situation. Brazil thus chose a middle way, neither fully condemning nor supporting NATO's campaign.⁸⁸⁶

How did Brazil react when, two years later, the United States invaded Afghanistan, a move that in 2003 turned into the most extensive military campaign in NATO's history? Despite its pacifist outlook, Brazil did not oppose the US invasion of Afghanistan, which was not authorized by the UN Security Council. It also did not oppose the UN Security Council when it established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to secure Kabul in December 2001. In 2003, NATO assumed control of ISAF. At the same time, several Brazilian diplomats affirm that Brazil "never" considered deploying troops or engaging otherwise in Afghanistan.⁸⁸⁷ They explain this not necessarily with the country's opposition to NATO's efforts in general, but with the Brazilian tradition of not interfering in armed conflict.⁸⁸⁸ A Pew Poll in 2010 showed that 37% of Brazilians thought it was worthwhile to keep NATO troops in Afghanistan.⁸⁸⁹

This brief overview shows that Brazil remains on the sidelines with regard to NATO over the past years. Brazil did not participate in either NATO's mission in Kosovo or Afghanistan, but it also did not create any obstacles, as for example in 2003 when it opposed the US invasion in Iraq. While Brazil has historically been a large arms exporter⁸⁹⁰, as Amaury de Souza, a Brazilian security analyst points out, Brazilian support for the Afghanistan mission would be inefficient due to the large geographic distance and Brazil's logistic limitations.⁸⁹¹ Most importantly, however, all diplomats interviewed point to Brazil's aversion to and lack of experience of engaging in military conflict. This does not mean, however, that there is no potential for engagement with NATO. Brazil's leadership in Haiti in the context of MINUSTAH shows that Brazil shares the values and ideals embraced by NATO. As Brazil is not located in the same region as NATO, its lack of engagement does not constitute any type of confrontation. As a signatory of the Rio Pact, which establishes a similar concept of collective security as NATO's article 5, Brazil pursues an alignment

⁸⁸⁴ Hurrell, Andrew (2005). *The United States and Brazil: Comparative reflections*. In: Hirst, Mónica (2005). *The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet Expectations*. New York: Routledge, 2005.

⁸⁸⁵ Serrano, Mónica and Lorena Murillo S. (2001). *La crisis de Kosovo y América Latina: el dilema de la intervención*. *Foro Internacional*, Vol. 41, No.1 (163) (Jan-Mar 2001), pp.5-34

⁸⁸⁶ Hirst, Mónica (2005). *The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet Expectations*. New York: Routledge, 2005.

⁸⁸⁷ Hirst, Mónica (2005). *The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet Expectations*. New York: Routledge, 2005.

⁸⁸⁸ Phone interview with Brazilian senior diplomat based in Rome, July 5, 2010

⁸⁸⁹ Pew Research Center (2010). <http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=9&ccountry=31> (accessed Jan 1, 2010)

⁸⁹⁰ Brooke, Jim (1981). *Dateline Brazil: Southern Superpower*, *Foreign Policy*, No.44 (Autumn, 1981), pp.167-180

⁸⁹¹ Phone Interview with Amaury de Souza, July 5, 2009

strategy.

2.2. *Historical Review and Integrative Analysis: India and international institutions*

2.2.1. *Political and Economic Background*

Before analyzing India's foreign policy strategy towards the Western World Order it seems adequate to give a brief overview of India's domestic political and economic situation. This can provide a better understanding of the context in which India is making decisions, and the interests that stand behind them.

Like Brazil, India is difficult to categorize.⁸⁹² At times, India plays the role of a developing country with an “anti-Western” mindset, in other moments, that of a democratic and global player aligned with the established powers.⁸⁹³ Edward Luce aptly described India as “one country, two planets”- referring to the vast inequality between Westernized urban elites and the poor rural population.⁸⁹⁴ Some basic figures make this clear. On the one hand, India's economy is the fourth largest in the world by purchasing power parity, with \$3.297 trillion, and the 12th largest using by nominal GDP, with \$1.21 trillion.⁸⁹⁵ India has grown by an average rate of more than 7% in the decade since 1997, which has reduced poverty by about 10 percentage points.⁸⁹⁶ On the other hand, over 300 million people - around 60% of India's labor force, virtually all of them under the poverty line - work in the agricultural sector and contribute only 18% to national GDP. India has by far the largest agricultural workforce in the world. In China, by comparison, only 80 million people work in agriculture. Along similar lines, India's urbanization is low, at 30%, and roughly 40% of Indians over 15 are illiterate. Every year, 25 million people leave the countryside and move into urban areas, increasing the size of the city's sprawling slums. Its large and inefficient agricultural

⁸⁹² Luce, Edward (2007). *In spite of the Gods: The Rise of Modern India*, London: Brown Book Group, 2007. See also: Varma, Pavan K. (2006). *Being Indian. Inside the Real India*. London: Arrow Book, 2006. and Tanham, George K.(1992). *Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretative Essay*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1992

⁸⁹³ Raja Mohan, an Indian scholar, argues that India is in fact part of the West, while Western scholars such as Andrew Hurrell place it on the fringes of the Greater West (Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 and Hurrell, Andrew (2006). *Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers?* *International Affairs*, 2006). In a similar fashion, while Western scholars sometimes see Brazil on the fringes of the West (e.g. Huntington), Brazilian scholars oftentimes see Brazil as part of the West. José Guilherme Merquior, for example, referred to Brazil as the ‘Other West’: poorer, more enigmatic, more problematic, but not less Western” (Merquior, José Guilherme (1993). *El Otro Occidente*, in Arocena, Felipe. *El Complejo de Prospero- Ensayos sobre Cultura, Modernidad y Modernización en America Latina*, 1993)

⁸⁹⁴ Luce, Edward (2007). *In spite of the Gods: The Rise of Modern India*, London: Brown Book Group, 2007

⁸⁹⁵ International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2010). *IMF Data Mapper*; <http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php>, (accessed July 19, 2010)

⁸⁹⁶ India has 1.166 billion inhabitants, and it grows every year by over 150 million people. It is set to overtake China and become the most populous country on earth within the next decade. 25% of the population, however, continues to live under the poverty line. It has been one of the few countries not to enter recession during the recent global economic crisis.

workforce explains India's sensitivity about opening the country to international trade of agricultural goods.

India has undergone liberalization and strong economic growth since the 1990s.⁸⁹⁷ The reforms included industry deregulation, privatization of state monopolies, and easing of foreign trade rules. Prior to that, it had essentially been a state-led economy, since the Congress Party, India's most dominant political group, had traditionally been deeply influenced by British Fabian socialism.⁸⁹⁸ Although Amrita Narlikar argues that important policy changes have been made before⁸⁹⁹, the liquidity crisis of 1991 and the subsequent deal with the IMF is usually seen as the beginning of reform which laid the groundwork for today's economic growth. Stephen Cohen argued that while it was still unclear whether reforms would have the desired impact during the 1990s, it became clear in 2000 that "the specter of collapse had passed", and that India was finally emerging as a great Asian power along with China and Japan.⁹⁰⁰

India's historic transformation is reflected in its new role as IMF lender. As described in more detail in Section 3.2., India has received large IMF loans that had a considerable impact on the way India perceives itself, often causing humiliation and a feeling of impotence.⁹⁰¹ Repaying IMF debt and, in 2009, starting to lend money to the IMF is having a strong impact on India's collective self-esteem. Confidence grew so much that the BJP-led government decided, before the 2004 election, to refuse to accept foreign aid except from a handful of major donors.⁹⁰²

India's success is tied to Manmohan Singh's policies. As Minister of Finance (1991-1996) in the Rao administration, Singh dismantled the 'License Raj', which is seen as the single most important step in the economic reform process India underwent in the 1990s. In 2004, the BJP-led government coalition "National Democratic Alliance" (NDA), which had continued liberalization, was unexpectedly ousted. The Indian National Congress, led by Sonia Gandhi, obtained the highest number of votes.⁹⁰³ Rather than making herself Prime Minister, Gandhi chose the technocrat Manmohan Singh as Prime Minister, who continued to pursue his prudent economic policies initiated in the 1990s.

Despite innumerable critics who point to large-scale corruption, personality cults in Indian politics and a "crisis of values"⁹⁰⁴, India's political institutions are stable. Contrary to all predictions, Indians adapted to both self-rule and democracy very quickly, and except for

⁸⁹⁷ Cheng, Hui Fang, Margarida Gutierrez, Arvind Mahajan, Yochanan Shachmurove, Manuchehr Shahrokhi (2007). A future global economy to be built by BRICs. *Global Finance Journal* 18, 2007, 143-157

⁸⁹⁸ Cohen. Stephen (2002). *India. An Emerging Power*. New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2002

⁸⁹⁹ Narlikar, Amrita (2007). All that glitters is not gold: India's rise to power. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 5 (July 2007)

⁹⁰⁰ Cohen Stephen P. (2000). India Rising. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer, 2000), pp. 32-53

⁹⁰¹ Chossudovsky, M.(1993) India under IMF Rule, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 22 Issue 6, March 6, 1993

⁹⁰² Nayar, Baldev Raj (2005). India in 2004: Regime Change in a Divided Democracy. *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2005), pp. 71-82

⁹⁰³ Nayar, Baldev Raj (2005). India in 2004: Regime Change in a Divided Democracy. *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2005), pp. 71-82

⁹⁰⁴ See, for example: Varma, Pavan K. (2006). *Being Indian. Inside the Real India*. London: Arrow Book, 2006, and Luce, Edward (2007). *In spite of the Gods: The Rise of Modern India*, London: Brown Book Group, 2007

a short and mild authoritarian stint during Indira Gandhi's reign, India's democracy has survived, defying many political theories that see a correlation between per-capita income and democratic governance.⁹⁰⁵ As Baldev Raj Nayar points out, the Indian elite's insistence on the subordination of the military to civilian authority is noteworthy.⁹⁰⁶ The transfer of power in 2004 was surprising, but went smoothly.⁹⁰⁷ India's Congress Party, led by Sonia Gandhi, won a convincing victory in May 2009, winning a further and stronger mandate to continue the reforms undertaken over the past five years. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, a former Economics minister and architect of widely hailed economic reform in the early 1990s, is the first Prime Minister since Nehru to be appointed for a second five-year term. He is expected to serve for at least three years, if not until the end of the term, before 39-year old Rahul Gandhi takes over if Congress remains in power. Despite the presence of smaller anti-globalization parties that form part of the government, India's foreign policy strategy is therefore unlikely to change radically in the medium term.⁹⁰⁸

Over the next decade, India thus faces much larger domestic development challenges than Brazil. In desperate need to accommodate a growing population, the Indian government should greatly improve urban infrastructure. Yet, the state of rural infrastructure is even more precarious, and large-scale improvements are needed to give the rural population a chance to escape poverty. Prospects for sustained growth are strong⁹⁰⁹, and if India succeeds, the rewards will be plentiful: According to Goldman Sachs, the Indian economy is set to become the third largest in the world by 2050.⁹¹⁰ Despite economic progress, domestic economic development is likely to be the major challenge for decades to come.

Aside from the conflict with Pakistan, foreign policy remains an elite topic. Several regional parties, especially caste-based parties, have no foreign policy at all. The conflict with Pakistan remains the exception, which is a frequent topic both in the national media and in schoolbooks.

⁹⁰⁵ Cohen, Stephen P. (2000) India Rising. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer, 2000), pp. 32-53

⁹⁰⁶ Nayar, Baldev Raj (1999). *India as a limited challenger?* T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

⁹⁰⁷ Nayar, Baldev Raj (2005). *India in 2004: Regime Change in a Divided Democracy*. *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2005), pp. 71-82

⁹⁰⁸ Walker, Martin (2006). *India's Path to Greatness*. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 30, No. 3 (Summer, 2006), pp. 22-30, 2006. See also: Nayar, Baldev Raj. *India in 2004: Regime Change in a Divided Democracy*. *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2005), pp. 71-82

⁹⁰⁹ Messner, Dirk and John Humphrey (2006). *China and India in the Global Governance Arena*. Conference Paper. Seventh Annual Global Development Conference: At the Nexus of Global Chance. Pre-Conference Workshop on Asian and Other Drivers of Global Chance. January 18-19, 2006

⁹¹⁰ Wilson, Dominic. Purushothaman, Rooter (2003). *Dreaming with BRICs: The path to 2050*. Goldman Sachs, 2003

2.2.2. Foreign Policy Decision-Making in India

The Prime Minister traditionally takes all key foreign policy decisions in India. The country's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, occupied the post of Foreign Minister at the same time for seventeen years.⁹¹¹ While no Prime Minister after Nehru occupied both positions, most Indian Prime Ministers dominated foreign policy, leaving virtually no decision-making power to their Minister of External Affairs. Aside from Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister since 2004, Shiv Shankar Menon, Singh's National Security Advisor (NSA), is believed to be the key foreign policy decision maker in the Indian government.⁹¹²

Four competing groups seek to influence India's foreign policy: Moralists, Hindu nationalists, strategists and idealists. Moralists argue that India should play an exemplary role in the world. Hindu nationalists contend that India needs to defend Hindu civilization, mostly against Muslim threats. Realists say India should increase its military might and become a global power. Liberals seek to promote social progress through trade and greater international interdependence. As Rahul Sagar points out, these four groups have distinct foreign policy objectives, being "moral exceptionalism, martial vigor, state power, and wealth."⁹¹³

Moralists historically had strong influence, but the results proved ultimately unsatisfactory. They argued that the basis of all foreign policy should be principles, rather than interests. India should lead on the basis of *soft power*, based on ideological appeal, rather than *hard power*. The decision to create and lead the Non-Alignment Movement was the result of an orientation that was seen as nobler and free of balancing of power considerations. India's leadership is all the more noteworthy because the country lacked any significant economic or military capacities after independence, so it possibly thought to make up for this lack by exercising "value-leadership".⁹¹⁴ Nehru argued against a quick military build-up and Gandhi even asked the NCI to implement a law that would rule out any military action from the Indian side, a request which was rejected. China's attack on India in 1962, for which India was wholly unprepared, destroyed Nehru's hopes that it could turn into a major power without building up serious military force. Personally shattered, he never recovered physically and died less than two years later.⁹¹⁵ Nehru's policy towards China was marked by naive sentimentalism, envisioning a political federation between the two countries he saw as carriers of the world's two greatest civilizations.⁹¹⁶

⁹¹¹ Ramchandra Guha (2008). *India after Gandhi. The History of the World's Largest Democracy*. London: Macmillan, 2008

⁹¹² This view was confirmed separately by two Indian diplomats during interviews in Delhi. (Phone interview, Indian foreign ministry, March 26, 2010) and a non-Indian senior diplomat in Delhi. (Interview, Foreign Embassy, April 2, 2010)

⁹¹³ Sagar, Rahul (2009). State of mind: What kind of power will India be? *International Affairs* 85: 4 (2009) 801–816

⁹¹⁴ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

⁹¹⁵ Tanham, George K. (1992). *Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretative Essay*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1992. See also: Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul. *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

⁹¹⁶ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

Yet, the moralists' influence subtly persists. There are few instances of Indian expansion outside of its region, and all major wars have been fought on Indian territory. In addition, India's political leadership has historically been diplomatically skilled but inept with regard to the use of violence.⁹¹⁷ As realist former foreign minister Jaswant Singh laments in 1999, "there has been a near total emasculation of the concepts of state power", facilitated by excessive piety and *ahimsa* (non-violence).⁹¹⁸ In a way, India continues to fight its honorable struggle for freedom by defending poor nations on the international stage through argumentative diplomacy. Alliances in the realist sense continue to be looked down upon, compromising India's independence and slightly nobler stance. As a consequence, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was heavily criticized for a nuclear deal he made with the United States in 2006. In the same way, Indian policy makers have accused developed countries of exercising 'green imperialism' by proposing mandatory universal caps on greenhouse gas emissions. More recently, there has been growing tension between principles (defending poor countries from exploitation) and interests, which are increasingly aligned with developed countries. Where the moralists' influence is most visible is in India's foreign policy rhetoric, where every move is justified by some high-sounding principle.⁹¹⁹

Hindu nationalists stand in direct opposition to Nehruvian moralist thinking. Using an argument quite common in neighboring China, Hindu nationalists seek to revive the ancient Hindu civilization and restore old glory. They point out that unlike Europe and the United States, the subcontinent constitutes a single civilization which has endured over three millennia, making it one of the most ancient in the world.⁹²⁰ In practice, this means massive rearmament, not necessarily to attack, but to be able to defend itself without others' help. Hindu nationalists have therefore highly criticized the NPT, which would leave India vulnerable to other nuclear powers.⁹²¹ The Baratiya Janata Party (BJP), which adheres to this ideology, has been able to dominate in some regions, but generally fails in creating national appeal in a society which is, with four major religious groups and a dozen major languages, the most heterogeneous in the world.⁹²² In the context of foreign affairs, Hindu nationalists' arguments often have a realist rationale.

Realists promote India's military build-up, but without civilizational undertones. They follow an ancient Indian realist tradition initiated by the "Indian Machiavelli" Chanakya, alternatively called Kautilya and Vishnugupta (c. 340-293 BC), and their fundamental argument is that force is the sole arbiter in international politics. Contrary to Hindu nationalists, who are skeptical of modernity but seek a traditional society imbued with

⁹¹⁷ Nayar, Baldev Raj (1999). *India as a limited challenger?* T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

⁹¹⁸ Singh, Jaswant (1999). *Defending India*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. In: Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

⁹¹⁹ Sagar, Rahul (2009). *State of mind: What kind of power will India be?* *International Affairs* 85: 4 (2009) 801–816

⁹²⁰ Nayar, Baldev Raj (1999). *India as a limited challenger?* T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

⁹²¹ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

⁹²² Nayar, Baldev Raj (1999). *India as a limited challenger?* T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

‘Hindu virtues’, realists argue that military power will be unsustainable without rapid economic growth and modernization. Indira Gandhi was probably the Indian leader most strongly influenced by realist thinking. Realists argue that ‘Hindu fatalism’ has historically prevented ‘rational thinking’ and proper planning. Instead, what is common is “jugaad”, a colloquial Hindi term that can be translated as “a quick fix” or a “work around”.⁹²³ India’s decision to test nuclear weapons in 1998 was seen as a realist move in order to obtain major-power status.⁹²⁴

Idealists seek economic progress through trade and international collaboration. This line of thinking got a boost in 1991, as India was forced to accelerate deregulation and integrate more into the world economy due to a severe liquidity crisis, which almost caused India to default on its debt repayments.⁹²⁵ This opening, however, was also motivated by a fear of falling behind China.⁹²⁶ Liberals argue that India’s economic development will eventually lead to better relations with Pakistan, as the Pakistani government will no longer be able to reject the benefits of trading with India. With regard to China, idealists have been able to strongly influence the Indian government. As a result, trade between India and China has surged, reaching \$40 billion in 2010.⁹²⁷ In addition, India has sought greater trade ties in the region, through regional agreements such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which it is a ‘full dialogue partner’.

Irrespective of these four schools of thought, there is an overarching conviction that India is destined to be a world power again. Nehru pointed out that India should be the fourth power after the US, the Soviet Union, and China. And, as one foreign minister declared in 1976, “Our size, our potential strength, our traditions and heritage do not allow us to become a client state.”⁹²⁸ This aspiration to become a major power explains the importance of self-reliance under all Indian governments after 1947, even when these policies failed to bring positive results.⁹²⁹ Policy makers are keenly aware of the fact that India is the second most populous nation on earth, and that it is expected to overtake China at some point during the next decades. This makes it hard for Indians to accept situations in which

⁹²³ Sagar, Rahul (2009). State of mind: What kind of power will India be? *International Affairs* 85: 4 (2009) 801–816. George Tanham supports this view, arguing that “[Indians] accept logic as one influence on life, but only one. Other influences include emotion, tradition, intuition, and fate. Accordingly, life is unknowable, but man must strive to follow his dharma. Fate is something to be dealt with, but also to be accepted. In: George K. Tanham (1992). *Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretative Essay*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1992

⁹²⁴ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

⁹²⁵ Nayar, Baldev Raj (1999). *India as a limited challenger?* T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

⁹²⁶ Alamgir, Jalal (1999). *India’s Trade and Investment Policy: The Influence of Strategic Rivalry with China*. *Issues and Studies*, 35 (May-June, 1999)

⁹²⁷ Cross-border investment, on the other hand, has been low, often due to security concerns. State of mind: What kind of power will India be? Rahul Sagar (2009). *International Affairs* 85: 4 (2009) 801–816

⁹²⁸ *Times of India*, June 17, 1976, In: Baldev Raj Nayar (1999). *India as a limited challenger?* T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

⁹²⁹ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

small countries hold more power in international institutions, such as the IMF.⁹³⁰ The fact that small countries such as the Netherlands or Belgium have more votes than India is an often used argument to symbolize the inequality of the Bretton Woods institutions.⁹³¹ Indian analysts have called India a “status-inconsistent nation”, pointing to the gap between the weight India has in today’s international institutions and India’s actual weight. “No country”, Nayar and Paul point out, “views itself as a rising power more than India does,” arguing that “India is perhaps *sui generis* (...)”, justifying a sense of ‘Indian exceptionalism’.⁹³² This opinion is not limited to India’s elite. Stephen Cohen points out that Indians in general believe, unlike people in other countries such as Brazil, that their country has “both a destiny and an obligation” to become a major power.⁹³³ Pavan Varma argues that, given the extremely high importance Indians ascribe to status, “they are very insulated if denied the esteem that they believe is their due.”⁹³⁴ Raja Mohan points to India’s ideological claim that it is the “world’s most important democracy” and welcomes that fact that India is turning from a defensive ‘porcupine’ (“vegetarian, slow-footed and prickly”) to a ‘tiger’.⁹³⁵

Brazil, India and IBSA

IBSA, which stands for India, Brazil and South Africa, is a forum created in 2003 to exchange ideas of mutual interest in areas such as trade, security, technology and social development.⁹³⁶ Previously, India, Brazil and South Africa had been known as the G-3, a group that had jointly decided to break the patent of an HIV / AIDS drug and to provide generic drugs to domestic patients. The Lula administration has continuously stressed that IBSA’s interests go beyond the expansion of individual economic benefits and that it should have a common identity.⁹³⁷ An example for developing countries’ attempt to institutionalize South-South relations, IBSA has generated significant interest in the academic community. IBSA’s depth,

⁹³⁰ Nayar, Baldev Raj (1999). *India as a limited challenger?* T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

⁹³¹ Gurumurthi, S. (2009). *IMF quota formula needs reality check*, *The Hindu*, September 23, 2006; <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2006/09/23/stories/2006092300821000.htm> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

⁹³² Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

⁹³³ Cohen, Stephen P. (2000). *India Rising*. *Wilson Quarterly*, 24 (Summer 2000). This attitude has at times caused problems, particularly with the United States. As Selig Harrison explains, “[Indians] are confident that India is on the way to great power status and want others to treat them as if they had, in fact, already arrived. By the same token, to many Americans, India’s ambitions are pretentious nonsense (...)” In: Selig. S. Harrison (1988). *A Nuclear Bargain with India*. Paper presented at the conference *India at the Crossroads*. Southern Methodist University, Dallas, March 27, 1998. In: Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul. *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

⁹³⁴ Varma, Pavan K. (2006). *Being Indian. Inside the Real India*. London: Arrow Book, 2006.

⁹³⁵ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

⁹³⁶ Alden, Chris and Marco Antonio Vieira, G. (2005) *The New Diplomacy of the South*, *Third World Quarterly*, Volume 26, Issue 7 October 2005

⁹³⁷ Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2007). *Lula’s Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification*. *Third World Quarterly*, 28:7, 1309 - 1326

however, should not be overestimated, especially given the three countries' different interests on matters such as trade.

IBSA coordinates two UNDP-financed projects; one in Haiti and one in Guinea-Bissau; their impact, however, remains symbolic.⁹³⁸

Thus, no matter how IBSA will evolve, it will not replace established mechanisms of development cooperation such as the World Bank - neither is it supposed to in its current form.

India seems least committed to IBSA, possibly due to the numerous strategic threats the country faces in its region. Still, the Indian government is likely to continue to rhetorically support the alliance, even though interests may at times diverge.⁹³⁹ For example, while Brazil wants to liberalize trade, India is decidedly more protectionist, given its large and inefficient agricultural sector.⁹⁴⁰ In the same vein, India continues to oppose the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), while Brazil is one of its principal defenders.

Brazil's and India's commitment to IBSA shows that they both believe the current international power structures do not grant them the respect they deserve - one of the few areas in which they agree.⁹⁴¹ Yet, few policy analysts in India take IBSA seriously. Several academics bemoan that the student exchange programs announced as part of IBSA have never been implemented. Given the lack of coherent interests among its members, it is certain that IBSA will not propose a 'new type' of development cooperation based on values different than those of the traditional development model used by established powers.⁹⁴² While this may have been a vague idea and motivation for the foundation of IBSA, its implementation remains uncertain.

IBSA is therefore still too insignificant to be meaningfully categorized. If it is to grow in its current form, it is certainly an example of alignment with the current world order.

⁹³⁸ de Sousa S.L.J. (2008). Brasil como nuevo actor del desarrollo internacional, la cooperación Sur-Sur y la iniciativa IBSA, Comentario, FRIDA, July 2008

⁹³⁹ Armijo, Leslie (2007). The BRICs Countries as Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?, Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No. 4 August 30, 2007

⁹⁴⁰ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

⁹⁴¹ Alden, Chris and Marco Antonio Vieira, G. (2005). The New Diplomacy of the South, Third World Quarterly, Volume 26, Issue 7, October 2005

⁹⁴² Manning, R. (2006). Lecture, Overseas Development Institute, 9.3.2006; http://www.odi.org.uk/events/apgood/international_development/9thmar/odi%20lecture%20%282%29.pdf (accessed July 19, 2010)

2.2.3. *India and the UN*

It will be useful to apply Krasner's definition to the United Nations and analyze India's strategy towards the United Nations between 2003 and 2010 accordingly. As mentioned above, Krasner identifies four fundamental elements of an international institution: Principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.⁹⁴³ An institution must be based on one or more principles, which is like a fundamental belief ("avoid war"). Norms spell out general standards of behavior, while rules specify, at a more detailed level, what members can and cannot do. Finally, decision-making procedures stipulate who holds power in the institution, how to take joint decisions, how to take in new members and how to punish rule breakers.

How can we define the United Nations' principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, and how does India behave towards them? The United Nations' overarching principles and norms are very general to such a degree that every country on the planet agrees with them. Its rules and decision-making procedures are, given the institution's varied tasks, very diverse, so we will analyze them one by one.

The United Nations' mission is ample, and its organizational structure highly diverse. A country such as India does not have one single strategy towards the United Nations. Its strategy to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council may figure prominently, but it does not reflect India's behavior in other areas. This section will therefore be divided into seven subsections:

- 1) India's views on the UN's overall responsibilities and its financial contributions,
- 2) the UN Security Council,
- 3) the UN General Assembly
- 4) Peacekeeping Operations and
- 5) the UN's activities in India

Each section will give an overview over India's strategy and evaluate which description of the ones developed in 1.5. best describe the Brazilian government's behavior. Subsection 6) will conclude.

2.2.3.1. INDIA'S VIEWS ON THE UN'S OVERALL RESPONSIBILITIES AND ITS FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS

India fundamentally agrees with the principles and norms espoused by the United Nations, which are to avoid war, defend human rights, combat poverty and promote social progress. India regards the United Nations as the most important international organization and it regards the UN as an institution that can bestow legitimacy on controversial international

⁹⁴³ Krasner, Stephen D. (1985). *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. See also: Krasner, Stephen D. (1982) Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables. *International Organization*, 36: 185-205, 1982

action.⁹⁴⁴ It never supported Sukarno's initial ambition for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to create an alternative world order to that of the “Western-dominated UN”.⁹⁴⁵

At the same time, India has, for many years, been one of the leading voices calling for a democratization of the United Nations in order to make it more effective.⁹⁴⁶ Already in 1960, India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, addressed the General Assembly and raised the issue of reform, arguing that

The structure of the UN when it started was weighted in favor of Europe and America. It did not seem to us to be fair to the countries of Asia and Africa but we appreciated the difficulties of the situation and did not press for any changes. With the growth of the UN and with more countries coming into it, that structure today is still more unbalanced. Even so, we wish to proceed slowly with agreement and not to press for any change which would involve an immediate amendment of the charter and raising of heated controversies. Unfortunately, we live in a split world which is constantly coming up against the basic assumptions of the UN. We have to bear with this and try to move ever more forward to that conception of full co-operation between nations.⁹⁴⁷

For India, one of the main roles of the United Nations is to serve as a platform that allows it to criticize the Western World Order. Aside from the ideological dimension, the UN also serves to pronounce its claim for leadership to both the international and domestic audience.⁹⁴⁸ Criticizing the established powers is therefore often a political calculation, to gain votes at home or to pledge allegiance to the other members of the G77 and Non-Aligned Movement. India's basic notion of the necessity of reform has not changed fundamentally since then. Despite the UN's inability to engage in more comprehensive reform, India remains committed to the organization. In 2006, the Indian government nominated then-UN Under Secretary Shahshi Tharoor as a candidate for UN Secretary General, and Indian diplomats actively promoted his campaign, which ultimately failed.⁹⁴⁹

India's frequent criticism is proof that it highly values the United Nations. The Indian government remains convinced that the United Nations are the most adequate organization to deal not only with poverty reduction, but also with climate change and peacekeeping. It considers the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto

⁹⁴⁴ Weinlich, Silke (2010). Die Reform der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Vereinten Nationen: Eine Analyse des Verhaltens und der Positionierung wichtiger Staaten gegenüber Reformoptionen. Discussion Paper, German Development Institute (GDI), 2010

⁹⁴⁵ Alden, Chris and Marco Antonio Vieira, G. (2005). The New Diplomacy of the South, *Third World Quarterly*, Volume 26, Issue 7 October 2005

⁹⁴⁶ Nafey, Abdul (2008). India and the G8: Reaching out or out of reach? In: Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

⁹⁴⁷ Katyal, K.K. (1994). Nehru's Vision for the UN, *The Hindu*, November 21, 1994

⁹⁴⁸ Weinlich, Silke (2010). Die Reform der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Vereinten Nationen: Eine Analyse des Verhaltens und der Positionierung wichtiger Staaten gegenüber Reformoptionen. Discussion Paper, German Development Institute (GDI), 2010

⁹⁴⁹ Secretary-General Watch (2006). Choosing Kofi Annan's Successor; October 19, 2006; http://www.unwatch.org/site/c.bdKKISNqEmG/b.1867287/k.F23A/SecretaryGeneral_Watch_Choosing_Kofi_Annans_Successor.htm (accessed May 23, 2010)

Protocol as the most appropriate framework for addressing climate change.⁹⁵⁰ India is currently ambivalent on how to approach the challenge of climate change. While the Indian government initially refused to even consider emission targets, India announced, in October 2009, a joint plan with China to cut Greenhouse Gas emissions, even though the government's principal goal remains economic development, clearly trumping the environment.⁹⁵¹ Despite its shortcomings and India's view that its power structures are outdated, the UN thus continues to occupy an important spot in Indian discussions about global governance. While the World Bank and the IMF are considered more important with regard to development aid, the UN is thought to be of major importance in the area of climate change and international security, such as peacekeeping.

These findings, however, cannot conceal India's relatively modest financial contributions to the United Nations' budget. Its financial contributions for operational activities by the UN have risen from \$13 million (2003) to \$52 million (2005), or 0.4% of the UN's total budget⁹⁵², but decreased to \$37 million in 2007.⁹⁵³ Brazil, in comparison, contributed ten times as much on average.⁹⁵⁴ In 2009, India's net contributions to the UN's regular budget \$10.9 million, half of Brazil's contributions, and less than 10% of the United Kingdom's contributions.⁹⁵⁵ In 2009, India contributed less than 0,02% of UNICEF's regular budget. While India disburses ever growing sums for South-South partnerships, its voluntary contributions to the UN budget remain very small. Rather than making the UN system more coherent, India's contributions contribute more to its fragmentation.⁹⁵⁶ But there have been positive aspects too. Over the past decades, the World Food Program (WFP) provided India with around \$1 billion. More recently, however, India has turned into one of the major donors to the WFP, providing assistance through the WFP to Afghanistan (over \$10 million), Iran and Iraq.⁹⁵⁷ India is also a major contributor to the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) and to UNHCR. This has largely domestic reasons as India seeks to prevent refugee inflows from bordering unstable states.

India's financial contributions are incompatible with the rhetoric about the United Nations' importance, but it can be explained by India's low per-capita income. Critics charge

⁹⁵⁰ Devraj, R. (2009). India-China nudge forward on climate issues, *Asia Times*, October 29, 2009; http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KJ29Df03.html (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

⁹⁵¹ Devraj, R. (2009). India-China nudge forward on climate issues, *Asia Times*, October 29, 2009; http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KJ29Df03.html (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

⁹⁵² Blum, Yehuda Z. (2005). Proposals for UN Security Council Reform. *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol.99, No. 3, Jul. 2005, p.632-649

⁹⁵³ Weinlich, Silke. (2010). Die Reform der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Vereinten Nationen: Eine Analyse des Verhaltens und der Positionierung wichtiger Staaten gegenüber Reformoptionen. Discussion Paper, German Development Institute (GDI), 2010

⁹⁵⁴ However it must be noted here that the vast majority of Brazil's UN contributions are spent domestically. Weinlich, Silke. Die Reform der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Vereinten Nationen: Eine Analyse des Verhaltens und der Positionierung wichtiger Staaten gegenüber Reformoptionen. Discussion Paper, German Development Institute (GDI), 2010

⁹⁵⁵ Assessment of the Member States' contributions to United Nations regular budget for the year 2009; http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=ST/ADM/SER.B/755 (accessed July 19, 2010)

⁹⁵⁶ Weinlich, Silke (2010). Die Reform der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Vereinten Nationen: Eine Analyse des Verhaltens und der Positionierung wichtiger Staaten gegenüber Reformoptionen. Discussion Paper, German Development Institute (GDI), 2010

⁹⁵⁷ Price, G. (2005). Diversity in donorship: the changing landscape of official humanitarian aid, Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI, September 2005

that India's bilateral aid has increased sharply over the past years, to over \$1billion, which indicates that India does have the necessary financial resources. As Grimm et al point out, India is one of the most important "emerging donors"⁹⁵⁸ who could change the landscape of development aid in general. Yet, it is common that countries spend more money bilaterally than through multilateral organizations.

2.2.3.2. INDIA AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council is the most powerful organ of the United Nations.⁹⁵⁹ Given its prominence, UN Security Council Reform has traditionally been regarded as a crucial part of any wider UN reform.⁹⁶⁰ Similar to Brazil, UN Security Council Reform has been one of India's key objectives over the past decade. The fact that India is one of the few member states that has been elected six times to the body underlines the importance of the entity for the Indian government.⁹⁶¹ In the Indian ministry of external affairs' annual report in 1992/93, the government pressed for the expansion of the UN Security Council (though not the revision of the veto). In the same document, it also argued that the UN Security Council should be answerable to the General Assembly.⁹⁶² According to the Indian government's national priorities, the UN's principal goal in India at this point is to promote "social, economic and political inclusion for the most disadvantaged, especially women and girls".⁹⁶³ The UN's vast activities show that despite India's recent economic progress, it will, for a long time to come, be in need of the UN's assistance.

India believes its permanent presence on the UN Security Council would lend this institution greater legitimacy, which shows that it fundamentally agreed with the UNSC's principals of promoting peace and security. It also agrees with its norms, a relatively exclusive meeting of the powerful to pass binding resolutions with the ability to call for military intervention. It does not agree, however, with the exclusive decision-making process and the veto-power the P5 members enjoy (specific rules and decision-making procedures). Its strategy constitutes revisionist integration. The Indian government bemoans that governance structures, particularly in the UNSC, "had not been able to keep up with contemporary realities."⁹⁶⁴ Indian politicians believe that India should have been granted a permanent seat

⁹⁵⁸ Grimm, S., J. Humphrey, E. Lundsgaarde, S. de Sousa (2009): *European Development Cooperation to 2020: Challenges by New Actors in International Development*, Working Paper No. 4, 7th Framework Programme, May 2009

⁹⁵⁹ von Freiesleben, Jonas (2008). *Reform of the UN Security Council*. Paper, Center for UN Reform, 11 November 2008

⁹⁶⁰ Kennedy, Paul. and Bruce Russett (1995). *Reforming the United Nations*. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 74, No. 5, September/ October 1995

⁹⁶¹ Nafey, Abdul (2008). *India and the G8: Reaching out or out of reach?* In: Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

⁹⁶² Kumar, J.D. (1994). *Democratisation of the UN*, *Deccan Herald*, January 3, 1994

⁹⁶³ United Nations (2010). *United Nations in India*, UN Resident Coordinator's Office; http://www.un.org.in/_layouts/UNDP/pTeam.aspx (accessed May 24 2010)

⁹⁶⁴ United Nations (2009). *Urging faster UN reform, India says world body should lead response to key challenges*. September 26, 2009. UN News Centre; <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=32300&Cr=General+Assembly&Cr1=> (May 7, 2010)

on the UNSC in 1945.⁹⁶⁵ After failing to obtain a seat in 2005, when India was part of the G-4 (together with Germany, Japan and Brazil), the Indian government is determined to continuously press for expanding the Council, even though short-term success is unlikely. China is seen as a crucial gate keeper in India's attempt to advance in the UN Security Council, and this - together with an appreciation of China's growing economic importance - is one of the reasons that India aims to improve relations with China, despite an ongoing border dispute in Arunchal Pradesh. In the future, India is more likely to team up with Brazil in its attempt to obtain a seat, as Germany and Japan weaken India's claim that developing countries need to be better represented. India's behavior towards the UN Security Council will be analyzed in-depth as a case study in Part 3.

2.2.3.3. INDIA AND THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

For years, India's representatives have called for a revitalization of the UN General Assembly, seeking to strengthen the system. In April 2010, for example, Hardeep Puri, Permanent Representative of India to the U.N., said that "the General Assembly should take the lead in setting the global agenda and restoring the centrality of the United Nations in formulating multilateral approaches to resolving transnational issues."⁹⁶⁶ In a similar fashion, Indian representatives usually argue that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which, despite its pre-eminence in the charter, has proved too weak to provide coherence to the work of the specialized agencies,⁹⁶⁷ should be at the heart of international efforts of development. Yet, developed countries largely avoid ECOSOC and prefer less democratic institutions. In the same vein, the UN General Assembly is much less powerful than the exclusive and non-democratic UN Security Council.

India fundamentally agrees with the UNGA's principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. India's foreign policy is still influenced by its ties to the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77.⁹⁶⁸ During the 2003 trade negotiations in Cancún, for example, India assumed, together with Brazil and China, a leadership role and convinced other developing countries to maintain a relatively rigid posture.⁹⁶⁹ India seeks to represent, in Nehruvian tradition, other developing countries, and it remains strongly committed to multilateralism. As a consequence, India speaks out for a stronger UN General Assembly and ECOSOC. However, similar to Brazil, there is reason to doubt India's pro-poor policy once it has a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This points to the larger question of whether

⁹⁶⁵ Sud, H. (2009). Commentary: India and the UN Security Council, UPI Asia, 11.9.2007; http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2007/09/11/commentary_india_and_the_un_security_council/1443/ (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

⁹⁶⁶ RTT News Correspondent (2010). Security Council Undermining General Assembly: India', April 28, 2010; http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php/government_statements/?theme=alt2 (accessed May 22, 2010)

⁹⁶⁷ Boutros-Ghali, G. (1992). Empowering the United Nations, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/ 1993

⁹⁶⁸ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

⁹⁶⁹ The so-called G21 consisted of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, South Africa, and Venezuela.

rising powers such as India are truly interested in more democratic global institutions, or whether they merely seek to join an “extended oligarchy”.

Aside from a stronger role for the United Nations General Assembly, India has traditionally argued for UN Security Council Reform - in accordance with the 1992 Accra Declaration of the Non-Aligned Movement.⁹⁷⁰ India’s position has thus traditionally been part of the Non-Alignment Movement, although the NAM never reached the cohesion of a power bloc. Furthermore, India has diverged increasingly to the pragmatist side. India, a co-founder of the NAM in 1955, has always pledged adherence to the movement, and Indian political leaders continue to mention it frequently.⁹⁷¹ However, there has been growing internal criticism of India’s NAM stance⁹⁷², and India’s foreign policy over the past decade indicates that it at times diverges from its traditional, multilateralist strategy - for example when it signed a bilateral nuclear deal with the United States.⁹⁷³ A former Indian diplomat argued that India exerts considerable influence over both the G77 and NAM, a leadership position India will attempt to hold on to as long as possible. He admits, however, that India’s economic development may make India’s adherence to both clubs increasingly untenable.⁹⁷⁴ In a similar fashion, Nayar and Paul argue that “emotionally though not formally, India has (..) already left (...) the Non-Aligned Movement.”⁹⁷⁵ Raja Mohan adds that “by the late 1990s, [India] was compelled to look for ways to ease out of the political straightjacket the NAM had become on its external relations.”⁹⁷⁶ This points to a deeper mismatch between India and the G77. According to George Tanham, “India argues for the legal and moral equality of all nations, yet it looks down on smaller states and seeks a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.”⁹⁷⁷ This view is confirmed by Pavan Varma, who writes that “Indians are exceptionally hierarchical in outlook, bending more than might be thought to be required before those who are perceived to be ‘superior’, and dismissive or contemptuous of those accepted as ‘inferior’.”⁹⁷⁸

2.2.3.4. INDIA AND TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS

India is one of the world’s principal contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping missions since

⁹⁷⁰ Rajamani, L. (1995). Democratisation of the United Nations, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 30, No. 49 (Dec. 9, 1995), pp. 3140-3143

⁹⁷¹ See, for example: Singh, M. Statement by the Prime Minister at the XV Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, July 15 2009; http://www.un.int/india/india_nam.pdf (accessed May 24 2010)

⁹⁷² Thakur, R. (1997). India in the World: Neither Rich, Powerful, nor Principled, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 1997), pp. 15-22. See also: Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

⁹⁷³ Carter, Ashton B. (2006). America’s New Strategic Partner? *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4, Jul.-Aug., 2006, pp. 33-44

⁹⁷⁴ Phone interview with a former Indian diplomat, Delhi, August 2, 2010

⁹⁷⁵ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

⁹⁷⁶ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

⁹⁷⁷ Tanham, George K.(1992). *Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretative Essay*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1992

⁹⁷⁸ Varma, Pavan K. (2006). *Being Indian. Inside the Real India*. London: Arrow Book, 2006.

the end of the Cold War⁹⁷⁹, so its strategy clearly constitutes strong system- strengthening behavior. India has recently contributed \$2 million to the UN peacekeeping fund. As tables 3 and 4 below show, India contributes slightly less than Bangladesh, but still a very large number of personnel. Indian peacekeepers do by no means avoid dangerous missions. In 2000, for example, India sent a battle-experienced contingent to Sierra Leone authorized to use deadly force.⁹⁸⁰

Considering that political leaders who send peacekeeping troops take a significant political risk as they deploy their soldiers in dangerous regions, how can we explain such a strong commitment to UN peacekeeping? India's leadership in this regard needs to be understood in the context of high-minded Nehruvian idealism. Rather than playing the American game of realist power politics, Nehru continuously sought to assert India's leadership through ahimsa (non-violence), and all leaders since have made their mark by strengthening the UN's peacekeeping operations with significant manpower. In addition, contributing soldiers to missions is regarded as an opportunity to strengthen India's claim for a more prominent position both in the UN and the world. Given that India's financial contributions to the UN are low, Indian diplomats often point to India's leadership in the context of peacekeeping when arguing for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Yet even aside from these strategic considerations, the Indian government strongly agrees with the UN peacekeeping operations' principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.

Table: Bangladesh

Year	Personnel (Observers, Police and Troops)⁹⁸¹
as of Dec 31	
2000	3285
2001	6010
2002	4211
2003	4730
2004	8024
2005	9529
2006	9681
2007	9856
2008	9567
2009	10427

⁹⁷⁹ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

⁹⁸⁰ Cohen, Stephen P. (2000). *India Rising*. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer, 2000), pp. 32-53

⁹⁸¹ United Nations (2010). *Peacekeeping contributions per year*; www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributions/

Table: India

Year	Personnel (Observers, Police and Troops)⁹⁸²
as of Dec 31	
2000	2738
2001	2883
2002	2746
2003	2882
2004	3912
2005	7284
2006	9483
2007	9357
2008	8693
2009	8757

2.2.3.5. THE UN'S ACTIVITIES IN INDIA

India allows the UN to operate freely in India, collaborating with the organization's work to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Given the countless development challenges India faces, the United Nations' activities in India take place in a wide array of areas, with 25 UN entities active in India.⁹⁸³ There are four joint programs in the areas of strengthening public management with regard to planning, budgeting, implementing and monitoring, preparing the implementation of India's decennial population Census in 2011, combating HIV/ AIDS, and increasing inclusion of poor and marginalized groups. While India has asked donors from smaller countries to leave, it continues to collaborate with, and support the United Nations' activities in the country. Given that India's stance towards development is increasingly self-confident, India's decision to allow the UN to operate in India shows the trust the Indian government continues to have in the organization.

2.2.3.6. CONCLUSION

This brief overview of India's behavior towards the UN shows that India's strategy is a mixture of different types of integration. India's contributions are relatively small, but need

⁹⁸² United Nations (2010). Peacekeeping contributions per year; www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributions/

⁹⁸³ United Nations (2010). United Nations in India, UN Resident Coordinator's Office; http://www.un.org.in/_layouts/UNDP/pTeam.aspx (accessed May 24 2010)

to be put in context of a still very low per capita income.⁹⁸⁴ In all other areas, however, India engages in integrative behavior and strengthens the United Nations. There is a strong overall agreement with the United Nations' principles and norms. In the context of the most prominent reform, of the UN Security Council, India engages in revisionist integration (disagreeing with decision-making procedures) thus strengthening the United Nations.

Area	Activity	India's strategy
UN's overall responsibilities	India regards UN as most legitimate international institution	System-strengthening integration
UN Security Council	Seeks UNSC expansion	Revisionist integration
UN General Assembly	Full participation, some engagement in strengthening institution	System-strengthening integration
Peacekeeping and financial contributions	Financial contributions low, but very large troop contributions	System-strengthening behavior
The UN in India	Projects supporting the MDGs	System-strengthening integration

⁹⁸⁴ Weinlich, Silke. (2010). Die Reform der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Vereinten Nationen: Eine Analyse des Verhaltens und der Positionierung wichtiger Staaten gegenüber Reformoptionen. Discussion Paper, German Development Institute (GDI), 2010

2.2.4. *India and the WTO*

Given the institution's structure, India has integrated unconditionally - as all the other WTO members. As Esserman and Howse point out, the WTO has reduced the role of international diplomacy and strengthened the rule of law. There has been, in short, a judicialization of international trade⁹⁸⁵, a development described positively by most Indian diplomats interviewed for this study.⁹⁸⁶ Despite these improvements, the shortcomings of the global trade regime, described in more detail in section 2.1.4., also need to be pointed out. Global trade talks, initiated in Doha in November 2001, have been marked by blockade and stagnation, and it is uncertain whether they can be revived.

Just like Brazil, India is a frequent user of the dispute settlement mechanism. It is the fourth most frequent complainant, the United States, the European Community, Canada and Brazil being on top. Despite India's relatively low participation in global trade, it is ranked third in the list of nations subject to trade complaints, Brazil being in the 8th position. Using the dispute mechanism is fundamental to reaping the benefits the WTO provides. While some argue that it is difficult for least-developing countries to initiate trade disputes due to the high legal cost⁹⁸⁷, this restriction does not apply to India.⁹⁸⁸ Despite the cost-related problems, the past fifteen years of judicial dispute settlement have therefore been a success overall.

Since 2001, India has filed seven claims with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), two against the United States; three against the European Communities; and one each against Brazil and Argentina.⁹⁸⁹ In the case of local trade disputes, India certainly seems to substitute the WTO's DSB with a regional dispute settlement⁹⁹⁰, which may point towards the creation of stronger trade links with India's neighbors.

Despite its combative stance during negotiations, India considers the WTO to be fundamentally just.⁹⁹¹ Similar to this view, Esserman and Howse argue that the WTO judges have "displayed levels of integrity and independence that rival those found in the best domestic court systems."⁹⁹² In addition, multilateral trade negotiations allow emerging countries to work together, which makes them much stronger than when negotiating with the United States on a bilateral basis.⁹⁹³

⁹⁸⁵ Esserman, Susan and Robert Howse (2003). *The WTO on Trial*. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2003), pp. 130-140

⁹⁸⁶ Interview, Indian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 26, 2010

⁹⁸⁷ Qureshi, Asif H. (2003). Participation of Developing Countries in the WTO Dispute Settlement System. *Journal of African Law*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (2003), pp. 174-198

⁹⁸⁸ Esserman, Susan and Robert Howse. (2003). *The WTO on Trial*. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2003), pp. 130-140

⁹⁸⁹ www.wto.org (accessed July 8, 2010)

⁹⁹⁰ Carstens, Laura (2009). *India, Asia and the World Trade Organization: Are Regional Initiatives Moving into Global Governance's Territory?*, Paper prepared for the workshop "Regional Integration in Comparison" June 19-20, 2009, Bamberg

⁹⁹¹ Phone interview with an Indian diplomat, Indian embassy, Washington, D.C., July 7, 2010

⁹⁹² Esserman, Susan and Robert Howse (2003). *The WTO on Trial*. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2003), pp. 130-140

⁹⁹³ Narlikar, Amrita and Rorden Wilkinson (2004). Collapse at the WTO: A Cancun Post-Mortem. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2004), pp. 447-460

Furthermore, during interviews for this study, Indian policy makers pointed out that they believe the WTO allows India to progress economically and expand its power.⁹⁹⁴ Nayar and Paul recommend that “for the sake of higher economic growth, it is necessary for India to participate fully in rule-based international economic organizations, such as the WTO.” They continue arguing that “the critics who advocate quitting WTO are mistaken in their position, since rule-based organizations work more to the benefit of weaker economic players than power-based ones.”⁹⁹⁵

India’s behavior during trade negotiations, such as in Cancún, is described as confrontational, but it is merely issue-based confrontation. After the failure in Cancún, European and American analysts mostly blamed the G20, and India as one of its leaders. Bergsten, for example, argues that “ironically, it was China and India - the largest and most successful developing countries - that triggered Doha's demise because they were unwilling to open their own markets sufficiently to permit an agreement.”⁹⁹⁶ It is true that of all the groups of developing countries that were created before the negotiation, the one that received most attention was the G20 (actually G22) led by India, Brazil and China.⁹⁹⁷

Why did India engage in issue-based confrontation? As Amrita Narlikar and Rorden Wilkinson point out, “key to the emergence of the group was the disillusionment of many developing countries with the EU-US text on agriculture and a memory of similar collusion in the past by the developed countries.”⁹⁹⁸ This shows the importance of perspective. Developing countries regarded developed countries’ behavior prior to Cancún as confrontational, and their behavior in Cancún as the adequate response.⁹⁹⁹ In fact, Narlikar captures developing countries’ diplomats’ memories of the failed talks well when she argues that “the fact that they were able to maintain their positions in the endgame suggests that, finally, after years of signing agreements that they did not understand and that were reached through fuzzy processes of negotiation, developing countries had finally put their foot down.”¹⁰⁰⁰ India’s leadership in Cancún can thus be seen in the context of confrontation, but also in the sense of empowerment.

Does signing bilateral trade deals mean that a country engages in systemic confrontation? Laura Carstens points out that India is more successful in reducing trade barriers through regional trade blocks such as SAFTA and IAFTA, and thirteen bilateral trade deals, than through the WTO.¹⁰⁰¹ According to our definition, a country engages in systemic confrontation when it actively undermines an institution. We would thus describe

⁹⁹⁴ Phone interview with an Indian diplomat based in New Delhi, April 25, 2010

⁹⁹⁵ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

⁹⁹⁶ Bergsten, C. Fred (2008). *China and the Collapse of Doha*. Postscript, *Foreign Affairs*, August 27, 2008

⁹⁹⁷ Narlikar, Amrita and Rorden Wilkinson (2004). *Collapse at the WTO: A Cancun Post-Mortem*. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2004), pp. 447-460

⁹⁹⁸ Narlikar, Amrita and Rorden Wilkinson (2004). *Collapse at the WTO: A Cancun Post-Mortem*. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2004), pp. 447-460

⁹⁹⁹ Phone interview, Brazilian Foreign Ministry, July 1, 2010.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Narlikar, Amrita and Rorden Wilkinson (2004). *Collapse at the WTO: A Cancun Post-Mortem*. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2004), pp. 447-460

¹⁰⁰¹ Carstens, Laura (2010). *India, Asia and the World Trade Organization: Are Regional Initiatives Moving into Global Governance’s Territory?*, Paper prepared for the workshop “Regional Integration in Comparison” June 19-20, 2009, Bamberg

India's strategy towards the WTO as systemically confrontational if it actively sought to undermine multilateral trade negotiations, for example, by tempting other nations to move away from the WTO and pursue exclusively bilateral deals. This is obviously not the case. India does, like many other countries, bilateral trade deals. That does not indicate, however, that India seeks autonomy from the WTO, ceasing to use its dispute mechanism or leaving the WTO, as several diplomats confirmed.¹⁰⁰²

India engages in an extreme form of issue-based confrontation and thus strengthens the system. This issue-based confrontation becomes most visible during trade rounds and trade disputes, which fortify the institution. India agrees with the WTO's principles (reducing trade barriers increases welfare), its norms and rules (dispute settlements, multilateral trade negotiations, summits), and decision-making procedures (one vote per country, necessity to obtain consensus to achieve a new trade deal).

¹⁰⁰² Phone interview, Indian Foreign Ministry, July 7, 2010, July 14, 2010.

2.2.5. *India and the NPT*

India assumed leadership in the context of nuclear proliferation at an early stage. Under the leadership of Homi Bhabha, a world-renowned nuclear scientist, India sought to ready itself for the nuclear era in 1944, three years prior to Independence from the United Kingdom.¹⁰⁰³ Bhabha would later become the President of the UN International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva in 1955.

India has long pursued the schizophrenic policy of promoting disarmament and secretly developing nuclear weapons at the same time. This was due to the peculiar combination of an idealist mindset and the desire to seek the moral high ground paired with a rapidly deteriorating security situation in Asia. At the same time, Indian policy makers felt that the NPT's fundamental principles were unjust and did not provide India with the position it deserved in the world. They called the NPT 'nuclear colonialism.'¹⁰⁰⁴ When its attempts to promote actual disarmament failed, India proceeded to test nuclear weapons in 1974.

The nuclear tests in 1974 and India's behavior in the following two decades put India at odds with the international non-proliferation regime, as well as both superpowers.¹⁰⁰⁵ The tests were essentially a response to China's invasion in 1962 and its transformation into a nuclear state in 1964. Facing the latent military threat from both China and Pakistan, the mainstream security analysts equated signing the NPT with vulnerability and impotence. India did not openly assume nuclear weapons status, however, and said it had merely conducted "peaceful explosions", but had no intention to build nuclear weapons. 24 years later, in 1998 however, India once again exploded nuclear weapons, this time fully assuming nuclear weapons status, causing international condemnation and economic sanctions.

Reaching out towards an isolated India, the United States signed a historic nuclear deal with India in 2005. After several years of confidence building measures, the United States recognized India as a nuclear power, a recognition India had felt entitled to for several decades.¹⁰⁰⁶ The deal was fiercely criticized, particularly by powers who had decided not to pursue nuclear arms, such as Brazil. The Brazilian government complained that while it had adhered to the rules and accepted international inspections since joining the treaty, India was rewarded for failing to sign and continuing to refuse inspections in its military nuclear facilities.

India's behavior seems to constitute passive confrontation, which, given the structure of the proliferation regime, amounts to systemic confrontation. India may agree with the overarching principle of the NPT (in fact, it is a strong supporter of a world free of nuclear weapons), but it fundamentally disagrees with the NPT's norms and rules, which caused it to refrain from signing the treaty. India's behavior significantly destabilizes the non-

¹⁰⁰³ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

¹⁰⁰⁴ Singh, Jaswant (1998). *Against Nuclear Apartheid*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 5, September/October 1998

¹⁰⁰⁵ Nayar, Baldev Raj (1999). *India as a limited challenger?* T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

¹⁰⁰⁶ Carter, Ashton B. (2006). *America's New Strategic Partner?* *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006), pp. 33-44

proliferation regime. In 2006, Ashton Carter, former US undersecretary of defense, argued that the US-India nuclear deal would not damage the NPT, pointing out that North Korea and Iran were already breaking the rules, no matter what India did.¹⁰⁰⁷ Yet, Carter did not take into consideration how other emerging democracies such as Brazil and Turkey would interpret the deal. Contrary to what official government sources indicate, there is a vibrant internal discussion inside the Brazilian government about the merits of obtaining nuclear arms.¹⁰⁰⁸ Due to India's decision to build them, Brazil remains as the only non-nuclear BRIC. The fact that a rising power can "get away" with systemic confrontation and maintain and strengthen crucial partnerships may cause others to behave in a similar way. There is an additional aspect that explains why India's behavior is so serious. The world can only make significant progress towards non-proliferation if all countries join and obey the treaty. A single country is, in theory, enough to undo the benefits. As long as at least one state stays outside the treaty, the trusting relationships that are embodied in the NPT will be diminished and may even be fatally undermined.¹⁰⁰⁹ While India is not the only country to remain outside of the treaty (Israel, Pakistan, North Korea are the others), integrationist behavior would strongly increase the pressure on the other three.

This interpretation of India's nuclear strategy has been contested by both Indian diplomats and Indian policy makers, who generally see no confrontational element in India's policy. They argue that India would very much like to join the NPT, but cannot because it does not allow it to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state (NWS). They argue that India is a "conscientious abstainer", underlining that India has been a responsible guardian of its nuclear weapons policy since its second nuclear explosion in 1998.¹⁰¹⁰ Yet, irrespective of whether the NPT is just or not, India's behavior is clearly not system-strengthening. Even if we categorize India's behavior as passive confrontation, this ultimately amounts to systemic confrontation given India's importance and the nature of the NPT. India's stance towards the NPT will be analyzed more in-depth in Part 3.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Carter, Ashton B. (2006). America's New Strategic Partner? *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006), pp. 33-44

¹⁰⁰⁸ Interview, Brazilian Diplomat, Itamaraty, Brasilia, July 23, 2010.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Ruzicka, Jan, Nicholas J. Wheeler (2010). The puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. *International Affairs* 86: 1 (2010) 69–85

¹⁰¹⁰ Phone interview with an Indian diplomat based in New Delhi, April 25, 2010

2.2.6. *India and the IMF/ World Bank*

2.2.6.1. INDIA AND THE IMF

Similar to Brazil, India has been an IMF recipient for decades but repaid its debt ahead of schedule. And, similar to Argentina's debt crisis in 2001 and its effects in Latin America, the Asian crisis in 1997 has eroded the IMF's legitimacy in the region.

The IMF's role in India has often been controversial, and many policy makers criticized the World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) signed in December 1991 for increasing poverty levels in the country.¹⁰¹¹ The intervention caused political tension inside the government as measures were highly unpopular among the poor, who had voted for the ruling Congress Party in the previous elections.

When Indian officials announced that their country would turn into a lender to the IMF, it represented the end of a long transformation, led by Manmohan Singh first as Finance Minister, then as Prime Minister. Narlikar rightly argues that India's current growth is not merely the result of good policies since the mid-1990s, but of fundamental changes well before that.¹⁰¹² Still, the impact of Singh's efforts to dismantle the "license raj", a complex system of state licenses that stifled economic innovation, cannot be underestimated. In a similar fashion, he convinced Indians that some aspects of the Nehruvian and the Gandhian beliefs about economic development had to be reconsidered.¹⁰¹³

With 1.89% of total voting rights at the IMF, India feels its newly found economic strength is not adequately reflected. As in Brazil, the fact that small countries such as the Netherlands or Belgium have more votes than India is an often used argument to symbolize the inequality and pro-Europe bias of the Bretton Woods institutions.¹⁰¹⁴ As Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian point out, the IMF lost its status as an interlocutor in emerging markets after having failed to provide enough money and imposing unnecessarily tough conditions, which Asians believe aggravated the crisis.¹⁰¹⁵

During the IMF meeting in Istanbul, the Indian government proposed a quota shift of 7% towards the developing countries.¹⁰¹⁶ India thus seems to be engaging in revisionist integration.

¹⁰¹¹ Chossudovsky, M. (1993). India under IMF Rule, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 22 Issue 6, March 6, 1993

¹⁰¹² Narlikar, Amrita (2007). All that glitters is not gold: India's rise to power. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 5, July 2007

¹⁰¹³ Swaminathan, S. (2010). The Nehruvian paradigm - A sham homage, *The Hindu*; <http://www.hinduonnet.com/2000/12/06/stories/0606000c.htm>, accessed May 16, 2010 (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹⁰¹⁴ Gurumurthi, S. (2009). IMF quota formula needs reality check, *The Hindu*, September 23, 2006; <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2006/09/23/stories/2006092300821000.htm> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

¹⁰¹⁵ Mattoo, Aaditya and Arvind Subramanian (2009). From Doha to the Next Bretton Woods: A New Multilateral Trade Agenda. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No.1, January/ February 2009

¹⁰¹⁶ Mukherjee, P. (2009). Statement by the Governor of the Bank and the Fund for India, at the Joint Annual Discussion, Board of Governors, 2009 Annual Meetings, Istanbul; <http://www.imf.org/external/am/2009/speeches/pr25e.pdf> (accessed July 19, 2010)

2.2.6.2. INDIA AND THE WORLD BANK

India and the World Bank have a long history of collaboration and today India is the Bank's largest client.¹⁰¹⁷ The World Bank strategy proposed the lending of \$14 billion for the period of 2009 to 2012 to India. In the context of the financial crisis, the World Bank provided a total of \$14 billion to India.¹⁰¹⁸ In a formerly colonized country concerned about defending its sovereignty, Bank intervention is traditionally contentious¹⁰¹⁹ and criticized by the opposition and the media.¹⁰²⁰

In addition, there is an increasing tension between India's identity as a great power and its 300 million people under the poverty line who still require massive outside intervention to reduce their plight. Those who propagate India's great power status find it increasingly inadequate to have international institutions such as the World Bank deal with internal issues.

Similar to Brazil, India seeks more influence in the World Bank for itself and other emerging powers. Indian government officials have frequently called for the developing nations share in the World Bank to increase to 47%.¹⁰²¹

Tied to this quest for more influence is an interest in changing the Bank's approach, which India considers to be 'humiliating'. In this respect, its position is similar to that of Brazil, which also has recent memories of being a developing nation dependent on outside help. Rowland argues that this recent experience may cause India to reform the way the World Bank deals with its clients. However, this change may not be technical, but rhetorical, which may indeed change the World Bank clients' perception of the Bank's behavior.¹⁰²²

India therefore agrees with the principles of the Bretton Woods institutions (global financial stability), and considers a well-capitalized Bank necessary to confront future challenges.¹⁰²³ It also agrees with the institutions' norms (lending upon conditionalities), but disagrees with some rules (the type and strength of conditionalities), and the decision-making procedures (quotas and voting shares). India's strategy towards the World Bank seems to be a classic case of revisionist integration, but will be analyzed more in depth in Part 3.

¹⁰¹⁷ World Bank (2010). Country Lending Summaries, India. World Bank, 2010. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,countrycode:IN~cntry:82602~menuPK:64819306~pagePK:64392398~piPK:64392037~theSitePK:40941,00.html> (accessed June 10, 2010)

¹⁰¹⁸ World Bank (2010). Country Lending Summaries, India. World Bank, 2010. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,countrycode:IN~cntry:82602~menuPK:64819306~pagePK:64392398~piPK:64392037~theSitePK:40941,00.html> (accessed June 10, 2010)

¹⁰¹⁹ See, for example: Chandra, Nirmal Kumar (1988). *The Retarded Economies*. Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1988

¹⁰²⁰ Kumar, S. (2009). Why India does not need the World Bank loan, October 7, 2009; <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2009/10/07/stories/2009100750350800.htm> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

¹⁰²¹ Zoellick, Robert (2009). Annual Meetings Opening Press Conference, October 2, 2009; <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,print:Y~isCURL:Y~contentMDK:22336798~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html> (January 7, 2010)

¹⁰²² Rowlands, Dane (2008). *Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: A Synthesis Report*, Partnership and Business Development Division, IDRC, January 2008

¹⁰²³ Mukherjee, P. (2009). Statement by the Governor of the Bank and the Fund for India, at the Joint Annual Discussion, Board of Governors, 2009 Annual Meetings, Istanbul; <http://www.imf.org/external/am/2009/speeches/pr25e.pdf> (accessed July 19, 2010)

2.2.7. *India and the G8 / G20*

As section 2.1.7. (Brazil and the G8/ G20) has made clear, the G8 has been facing ample criticism over the past decade.¹⁰²⁴ Critics mostly point to the ‘democracy deficit’ of the G8 and argue that it can hardly solve crucial problems without the participation of rising powers such as China, India and Brazil.¹⁰²⁵ These critics are often from established countries. Robert Zoellick, World Bank President, argued in 2008 that the G7 was “not working” and that “We need a better group for a different time,” asking for the inclusion of several emerging countries, including India.¹⁰²⁶ Despite, or because of this criticism, the G8 summits are, together with WTO negotiations, the most visible events in the context of global governance. In the same context, the G8 fell in the trap of vastly overestimating its power when Tony Blair and Gordon Brown suggested in 2005 that they could ‘make poverty’ history’- to which Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank, ironically responded that the summit could not even bring about ‘the end of the beginning of ending poverty’.¹⁰²⁷

India has left the question about how emerging powers should deal with the G8 to other rising actors such as Brazil and China. This may be due to India’s strong interest in UN Security Council reform, and entry into the G8 is regarded as less valuable than entry into the UN Security Council. In this regard, it strongly differs from Brazil, whose President Cardoso (1995-2002) at one point even prioritized entry into the G8 over that of UNSC reform.¹⁰²⁸ Abdul Nafey points out that India is not under pressure to obtain a seat at the table, knowing that time is on its side.¹⁰²⁹ There is a sense among Indian policy makers that it is the developed countries’ responsibility to invite emerging powers, and that “if the G8, especially the US, fail to (...) realize that the folly of leaving out emerging economies, the loss is theirs, not of India or China.”¹⁰³⁰ This “wait and see-strategy”¹⁰³¹ does not necessarily point to a lack of interest, but rather to hurt pride and frustration. An Indian diplomat admitted that the Indian government found it “offensive” that they had not yet been invited as full members.¹⁰³²

¹⁰²⁴ The G8 (Group of Eight) was formerly known as the G6 or Group of Six and also the G7 or Group of Seven. The last time it changed its name was in 1997, when Russia was added as a member.

¹⁰²⁵ Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

¹⁰²⁶ Rediff correspondent (2008). *Worldbank wants India in G7 panel*. October 7, 2008; <http://www.rediff.com/money/2008/oct/07bcrisis2.htm> (December 29, 2008)

¹⁰²⁷ Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2005). *The end of the beginning of ending poverty*, Statement to Project Syndicate, July 2005, available at <http://www.globalpolicy.org> (accessed 28 April 2006). In: Payne, Anthony (2006). *Blair, Brown and the Gleneagles agenda: making poverty history, or confronting the global politics of unequal development?* *International Affairs* 82: 5 (2006) 917–935

¹⁰²⁸ Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (2006). *A Arte da Política. A História que Vivi*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2006

¹⁰²⁹ Nafey, Abdul (2008). *India and the G8: Reaching out or out of reach?* In: Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

¹⁰³⁰ Chaulia, Sreeram (2008). *India, China Hold G8 Options*. *Asia times*, 29 of April in: Abdul Nafey. *India and the G8: Reaching out or out of reach?* In: Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

¹⁰³¹ Myatt, Timothy, and Carlos Sayao, Diarmuid Torney, Zinta Zommers (2007). *Outreach 5 Country Objectives Report: 2007 Heiligendamm Summit*. G8-Research Group Oxford, 2007

¹⁰³² Phone interview, Indian foreign ministry, March 26, 2010

While India regarded the 2006 Summit in St. Petersburg positively, the Indian government did not hide its disappointment when the G8 issued a joint statement before consultation with the “Outreach 5” (consisting of Brazil, India, China, Mexico and South Africa) had taken place. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that if India were invited again, he would like to interact with the G8 leaders before they interact amongst themselves, not afterwards.¹⁰³³ Still, India remains keen to engage in the G8, as it gives it a chance to leverage it for its own internal economic transformation.

India welcomed the creation of the G20 and seeks to assume a leadership role.¹⁰³⁴ “The G8 had become redundant because it was not a representative of the world”, Rediff, an Indian news agency, announced triumphantly. “It included only wealthy nations like Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States.”¹⁰³⁵ While policy makers frequently point out that the G20 can be no substitute of the UNSC, it was received as an important signal in Delhi that the structures of the Western World Order are not set in stone. The continued existence of the G8, however, has caused some Indian diplomats to wonder whether the G20 would be relegated to a second-tier meeting again once the financial crisis was over. Other diplomats are more confident and predict that the G8 will become less and less important as it did not contain India and China.¹⁰³⁶ The G20 summit in Pittsburgh in 2009 received unusually high attention in the Indian press, and Indian policy makers are said to regard the summits as very important - this may also have to do with the fact that India is a full member (unlike the G8, which Indians dislike because it failed to grant India full membership).¹⁰³⁷ At the G20 summit in the United States in 2009 and in Canada in 2010, India’s position was strengthened by the fact it was one of the participants with the best economic growth indicators, along with China.¹⁰³⁸ As Eswar Prasad pointed out, “India’s response to the crisis has been far more mature than that of many developed economies, without reflexive moves towards financial protectionism or a reversal of initiatives towards financial market development. This gives India credibility that should allow it to punch beyond its weight class.”¹⁰³⁹ India is currently advocating that future G20 Summits should be held by rotation in a developed country and an emerging market, showing that it seeks to engage further and assume responsibility.

¹⁰³³ Nafey, Abdul (2008). *India and the G8: Reaching out or out of reach?* In: Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

¹⁰³⁴ Economic Times Correspondent (2009). *G-20: India to seek greater role in managing global economy*. September 24, 2009; <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/G-20-India-to-see-greater-role-in-managing-global-economy/articleshow/5049608.cms> (accessed April 11, 2010)

¹⁰³⁵ Rediff Correspondent (2009). *Advantage China, India, as G-20 replaces G-8*. September 26, 2009; <http://business.rediff.com/report/2009/sep/25/advantage-china-india-as-g-20-replaces-g-8.htm> (accessed December 24, 2009)

¹⁰³⁶ Interviews and phone interviews, New Delhi, March, April, May, June 2010

¹⁰³⁷ Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

¹⁰³⁸ Chang, Arlene (2009). *India Sits Pretty at the G20 in Canada*. Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2010; <http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2010/06/25/india-sits-pretty-at-g-20-in-canada/> (accessed August 1, 2010)

¹⁰³⁹ Prasad, Eswar (2009). *India must lead the G-20 Agenda*. Financial Times, April 2, 2009; http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0402_g20_prasad.aspx (accessed April 15, 2009)

As this short overview shows, India is more reluctant to enter the G8 than other emerging economies such as Brazil. India's reluctance can be explained by its fear of being given G8 membership in compensation for not being offered a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. If offered a spot, India could be expected to seek to implement some changes in the agenda and work of the G8. This could complicate negotiations, but also broaden the G8's scope. As Abdul Nafey points out, India convinced the United States at Heiligendamm to engage in further negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).¹⁰⁴⁰ There is thus fundamental agreement about the G8's and G20's principles (addressing global challenges) and their norms (summit-based communication), but disagreement with specific rules (exclusive invitation-based participation) and decision-making procedures (exclusive creation of joint statement).

¹⁰⁴⁰ Nafey, Abdul (2008). India and the G8: Reaching out or out of reach? In: Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

2.2.8. *India and Asia*

India's neighborhood is dangerous, characterized by the conflict with Pakistan.¹⁰⁴¹ It is regional context where Brazil's and India's realities differ most strongly. Interstate warfare is rare and unlikely in South America. Asia, and South Asia in particular, is considered to be one of the most unstable regions in the world.¹⁰⁴² This conflict began with the creation of the two states and the conflict over Kashmir in 1947. Of the four wars that occurred since then (using a definition of at least 1,000 battlefield deaths) between the two states, all were initiated by Pakistan.¹⁰⁴³ The reason for the ongoing conflict is captured well by Ashley Tellis when he argues that "Pakistan regarded partition as necessary and inevitable. ... but incomplete (without Kashmir), while India regarded partition as unnecessary and tragic, but fundamentally complete."¹⁰⁴⁴

Yet aside from the conflict with Pakistan, a border conflict with China and political instability in Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar cause further instability in the region. For example, estimates are that 16 million Bangladeshi refugees currently reside in India, mostly in the states of Assam and West Bengal.¹⁰⁴⁵ Pakistan and Afghanistan, both semi-functional or failed states, complete the picture. India is, as one diplomat called it, "an island of stability in a sea of mayhem."¹⁰⁴⁶

As a consequence, India has not been able to assume the regional leadership one would expect considering its demographic and economic dominance. Raja Mohan points out that India is "frustrated by the extreme difficulties of dealing with its neighbors" and argues that India has a "Gringo problem", causing similar resentment in the region to what the United States face in the world.¹⁰⁴⁷ This points to the fact that despite India's preponderance in the region, its smaller neighbors are not inclined to accept India as a leader. Elites in neighboring countries frequently lament the corrupting cultural influence of India's Bollywood movies, and any attempt India has made in the past to articulate its own 'Monroe Doctrine' were rejected by smaller states.¹⁰⁴⁸

This section will analyze India's strategy in the regional institutions and evaluate it according to the categories created in section 1.5. Given political instability, there are fewer

¹⁰⁴¹ Cohen, Stephen P. (2001). *India: emerging power*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001

¹⁰⁴² Bill Clinton called South Asia the "most dangerous region in the world" in 1998. See, for example: Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

¹⁰⁴³ Thakar, Milind (2006). Review Essay: Identity, Institutions, and War: A New Look at South Asian rivalry. *India Review*, vol. 5, no. 2, April, 2006, pp. 233–254

¹⁰⁴⁴ Tellis, Ashley (2006). Stability in South Asia, Study DB-185-A (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1997), p. 8. in: Milind Thakar. Review Essay: Identity, Institutions, and War: A New Look at South Asian rivalry. *India Review*, vol. 5, no. 2, April, 2006, pp. 233–254

¹⁰⁴⁵ Sagar, Rahul (2009). State of mind: What kind of power will India be? *International Affairs* 85: 4 (2009) 801–816

¹⁰⁴⁶ Phone interview, Indian foreign ministry, March 26, 2010. See also: Lavoy, Peter R. (2007). *India in 2006: A New Emphasis on Engagement*. *Asian Survey*. Vol. XLVII No.1, January-February 2007

¹⁰⁴⁷ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

¹⁰⁴⁸ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

regional institutions than in Europe, and of those that exist, India is not well-integrated. We will therefore give a brief overview over India's strategy towards the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

The Asian Development Bank can be seen as a regional version of the World Bank. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) was established in 1966 to promote economic and social development in Asian and Pacific countries through loans and technical assistance. The Bank is financed by its 67 member states, of which 48 are from the region, and 19 are donor states from other regions of the world - such as the United States, several EU-members and Turkey.¹⁰⁴⁹ Seeking to implement its vision of a region free of poverty, the ADB's main instruments comprise loans, technical assistance, grants, advice, and knowledge. The Bank mostly lends to governments, yet also at times to private companies through equity investments, guarantees and loans. Similar to the Inter American Development Bank (IADB), the ADB has a AAA-rating which allows it to borrow at cheap rates. Last year, ADB approved \$10.5 billion of loans for 86 projects, which makes it an influential institution in Asia. The ADB's voting structure is similar to that of the IADB. Recipient countries in Asia hold 65% of the votes, against 35% for non-regional members, of which the United States (12.75%) and Canada (4.47%) are the most powerful. Of the Asian countries, Japan has most weight (12.75%), followed by China (5.44%) and India (5.32%). As one of the Bank's biggest shareholders, the President of the Asian Development is traditionally Japanese. The current Bank President is Haruhiko Kuroda.¹⁰⁵⁰

The conflict between India and China is reflected in the ADB. In early 2009, the Bank initially endorsed a \$2.9 million water project in Arunchal Pradesh, a region in India that is also partly claimed by China. The Chinese government severely criticized the project, accusing the Bank of interfering in the political affairs of its members.¹⁰⁵¹ The project was eventually cancelled.¹⁰⁵²

As the only genuinely Asian institution, the ADB plays an important role in the context of the creation of an Asian identity. The concept of "Asian Values", propagated by Singapore's former Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew and political writer Kishore Mahbubani¹⁰⁵³, has always strengthened the ADB's position. Although India does not subscribe to so-called "Asian values", it recognizes the ADB as a distinctly Asian organization and therefore seeks to be part of it.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2010): Projects; <http://www.adb.org/Projects/> (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹⁰⁵⁰ Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2010): Projects; <http://www.adb.org/Projects/> (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹⁰⁵¹ Xin, Z (2009). China slams ADB over India funding, China Daily, June 19, 2009; http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009focusonchina/2009-06/19/content_8302930.htm (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

¹⁰⁵² Similar to China, India is no longer dependent on the ADB's financial help. Yet, India does have a continued interest in the ADB, as the Bank is one of Asia's most important regional talking shops. India's relations with the rest of Asia remain brittle, and India remains a second-tier player in Asia, failing to assume leadership. Other Asian countries still regard India with a certain suspicion, fearing it may some day attempt to promote democracy across the continent.¹⁰⁵² The Indian government is therefore eager to use the ADB to strengthen its role in the region and gain confidence.

¹⁰⁵³ Mahbubani, Kishore (2008). The Case Against the West, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 3, pp. 111-124, May/ June 2008

The importance India attributes to the ADB can also be explained by the relative dysfunction of most other regional bodies it participates in. The East Asia Summit, first held in Kuala Lumpur in 2005, has not yet achieved much, and ASEAN-plus-6 seems unlikely to become a reality anytime soon.¹⁰⁵⁴

India's behavior can therefore be classified as alignment. India will continue to support the Asian Development Bank as a tool to deal with development challenges. Aside from its effectiveness in fighting poverty in the region, India sees the ADB as an important vehicle to maintain a dialogue with its Asian counterparts, a project of major importance given India's fragile ties with the region.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Economist Correspondent (2009). Distant dreams, *The Economist*, October 29, 2009

2.2.9. *India and NATO*

NATO's activities are increasingly global. As described in section 2.1.9. (Brazil and NATO), the Cold War eliminated the military alliance's *raison d'être*, which was to defend the 'free world' against the Soviet Union. Contrary to what many analysts, mostly from the realist camp, predicted, NATO did not disintegrate - quite to the contrary, it prospered, took on new missions, and France decided to reintegrate its forces into NATO command.¹⁰⁵⁵ In its mission in Bosnia, NATO was allied with NATO, and it has engaged in disaster relief in Africa and South Asia, which caused Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier to describe the organization as 'Global NATO'.¹⁰⁵⁶ This seems somewhat premature, as NATO's engagement in Africa, Latin America and Oceania is very small. Yet, there is a notable eastward orientation, symbolized by the discussion of whether to include Russia as a member.¹⁰⁵⁷ NATO's decision to engage in Afghanistan symbolized the end of any regional focus of the organization, as its focus now lies fully in Central Asia.¹⁰⁵⁸

In this context, India is becoming a significant partner for the world's foremost military alliance. Its sudden large presence in Afghanistan, where it took over the mission in 2003 after the US invasion in 2001 has strengthened the importance of India for the alliance. In fact, India has become one of NATO's most important strategic allies. During the Munich Security Conference in 2001, NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen argued that New Delhi had a "stake" in Afghanistan as he sought "a stronger, more inclusive security coalition" of countries like India, principally in order to "tackle terrorism, cyber attacks, energy cut-offs, piracy and climate change."¹⁰⁵⁹ Sonali Huria points out that NATO sees India as an "anchor state in Southern Asia."¹⁰⁶⁰ India's participation in the effort to stabilize Afghanistan and combat the Taliban is considered crucial by the NATO command.¹⁰⁶¹ India possesses considerable soft power in Afghanistan, and it enjoys a better reputation than the ISAF forces, partly because India does not engage in military action but merely in reconstruction

¹⁰⁵⁵ Daalder, Ivo and James Goldgeier (2006). Global NATO. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2006), pp. 105-113. See also: Brzezinski, Zbigniew (2009). An Agenda for NATO, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 5, September/October 2009

¹⁰⁵⁶ Kaiser, Karl (1996). Reforming NATO. *Foreign Policy*, No. 103 (Summer, 1996), pp. 128-143, Daalder, Ivo and James Goldgeier. Global NATO. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2006), pp. 105-113

¹⁰⁵⁷ Gidathubli, R. G. (2004). Expansion of NATO: Russia's Dilemma. *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 39, No. 19 (May 8-14, 2004), pp. 1885-1887

¹⁰⁵⁸ Brzezinski, Zbigniew (2009). An Agenda for NATO, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 5, September/October 2009

¹⁰⁵⁹ Times of India Correspondent (2010). India has a stake in Afghanistan: NATO chief. *Times of India*. February 7, 2010; <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-has-a-stake-in-Afghanistan-NATO-chief-/articleshow/5545918.cms> (accessed February 24, 2010)

¹⁰⁶⁰ Huria, Sonali (2009). India and the 'Global NATO': Expectations and Reservations. *Military-Articles*, #2790, 26 January 2009, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/military/india-and-the-global-nato-expectations-and-reservations-2790.html>; (accessed July 10, 2010)

¹⁰⁶¹ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

efforts. Military collaboration has been particularly strong between India and the United States, and the two armies regularly train together.¹⁰⁶²

First, India is a liberal democracy that shares the same goals as NATO in the region, namely stabilizing and democratizing Afghanistan and combating terrorism. Even without the mission in Afghanistan, democratic and rising India would be of growing importance as NATO is increasingly facing threats on a global level.¹⁰⁶³ In 2007, the US ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland stressed that the "post-Cold War honeymoon" is over and NATO needs to develop capabilities "wherever and whenever they may arise".¹⁰⁶⁴ The US government is therefore keen to institutionalize a NATO-India partnership, which would complement the strategic partnership established in 2005 after the US-Indian nuclear deal.¹⁰⁶⁵ While most of NATO's partners in the Middle East are autocratic regimes, creating stronger bonds with India would strengthen NATO's claim that it seeks to align with countries with "common values."

In the light of these developments, several leading strategic thinkers have called for India's inclusion in NATO. Ivo Daalder, now US ambassador to NATO, has argued prior to taking office that NATO should open membership to "any democratic state in the world that is willing and able to contribute to the fulfillment of NATO's new responsibilities." They argue that members such as India would turn NATO into a "legitimate and capable adjunct to the UN by helping to implement and enforce its decisions."¹⁰⁶⁶ Although European and American officials have not openly backed such a claim, Washington genuinely seeks a NATO-India partnership which would involve increased coordination of security matters.¹⁰⁶⁷ Rasmussen argues that NATO should become "the hub of a network of security partnerships and a center for consultation on international security issues" with countries such as India.¹⁰⁶⁸

Others reject NATO's institutional globalization. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, for instance, argued that the inclusion of members outside of its core area was impossible.¹⁰⁶⁹ Particularly countries that depend on NATO's protection are unlikely to support its radical expansion as that could undermine Article 5, under which an attack on one member is considered an attack on all members. The more members are accepted, the more likely it is that the alliance would be pushed into wars it does not consider to be crucial for its strategic interests.

¹⁰⁶² Walker, Martin (2006). *India's Path to Greatness*. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 30, No. 3 (Summer, 2006), pp. 22-30, 2006

¹⁰⁶³ Daalder, Ivo and James Goldgeier (2006). *Global NATO*. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2006), pp. 105-113

¹⁰⁶⁴ Bhadrakumar, M. K. (2007). *India holds key in NATO's world view*, *Asia Times*, October 6, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IJ06Df03.html

¹⁰⁶⁵ Bhadrakumar, M. K. (2007). *India holds key in NATO's world view*, *Asia Times*, October 6, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IJ06Df03.html

¹⁰⁶⁶ Daalder, Ivo and James Goldgeier (2006). *Global NATO*. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2006), pp. 105-113

¹⁰⁶⁷ Bhadrakumar, M. K. (2007). *India holds key in NATO's world view*, *Asia Times*, October 6, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IJ06Df03.html (accessed September 7, 2009)

¹⁰⁶⁸ *Times of India Correspondent* (2010). *India has a "stake" in Afghanistan: NATO chief*. *Times of India*. February 7, 2010; <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-has-a-stake-in-Afghanistan-NATO-chief-/articleshow/5545918.cms> (accessed February 24, 2010)

¹⁰⁶⁹ Brzezinski, Zbigniew (2009). *An Agenda for NATO*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 5, September/October 2009

Yet, despite a potential partnership, India is unlikely to officially align with NATO, or become a NATO member. The Indian public, used to Non-Alignment, does not support any type of unconditional alignment, and signing up to NATO would be like giving up sovereignty. Any type of NATO-India consultation was therefore held without making any public announcements.¹⁰⁷⁰ The political risk of approaching the established powers is so high that Manmohan Singh's government almost collapsed after signing the nuclear agreement with the United States in 2005. No government will therefore take the risk of applying for NATO membership (an application NATO could accept).¹⁰⁷¹ In any case, it seems improbable for India to engage militarily in Afghanistan, fearing that its reputation would suffer among the Afghan population.¹⁰⁷² In addition, India seeks to avoid antagonizing Pakistan, which may feel encircled by an Indian military deployment in Afghanistan. Still, India is bound to become one of NATO's key allies in the region.

Strategic considerations with regard to Afghanistan overlook that India is still fundamentally opposed to outside military intervention, explained by its fear of the internationalization of the conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir. When, on the third day, the UNSC refused to condemn the NATO bombings in Yugoslavia, the trio Belarus, India and Russia offered a draft resolution charging that the bombings violated several articles of the UN Charter.¹⁰⁷³ Criticism of the NATO campaign within India was widespread and characterized NATO largely as a US tool to dominate the world.¹⁰⁷⁴ This shows that, particularly in the context of India's alignment with the G77 and the group's opposition to interference that violates sovereignty, India has historically been opposed to India's NATO-led interventions.

Still, as India's policy is becoming more assertive, we can best describe its strategy towards NATO as alignment. Despite the historical opposition to outside interventions, India's values and interests are strongly aligned with those of NATO. India and NATO collaborate in Afghanistan, the most important mission in NATO's history, so we can describe India's policy towards NATO as alignment.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Bhadrakumar, M. K. (2009). India holds key in NATO's world view, *Asia Times*, October 6, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IJ06Df03.html (accessed September 7, 2009)

¹⁰⁷¹ Daalder, Ivo (2006). NATO: For Global Security, Expand the Alliance, *International Herald Tribune*, October 26, 2006.

¹⁰⁷² Huria, Sonali (2009). India and the 'Global NATO': Expectations and Reservations. *Military-Articles*, #2790, 26 January 2009, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/military/india-and-the-global-nato-expectations-and-reservations-2790.html>; (accessed July 10th 2010)

¹⁰⁷³ Wedgewood, Ruth (1999). NATO's campaign in Yugoslavia. *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 93, No. 4 (Oct., 1999), pp. 828-834

¹⁰⁷⁴ Nanjundan, S. (1999). World Order Designed by US. India's Options. *Economic and Political Weekly*. Vol. 34, No.21, (May 22-28, 1999), pp.1248-1249

2.3. Evaluation and Interpretation

Section 2.1. and 2.2. have given a brief overview over Brazil’s and India’s strategy towards the Western World Order. The table below summarizes the findings.

Institution (Principles, Rules and Norms, Decision-making procedures)	Brazil	India
<p>UN Security Council: <u>Principles:</u> Maintaining peace and security</p> <p><u>Rules and norms:</u> Majority-based decision-making, binding enforceable resolutions</p> <p><u>Decision-making procedures:</u> Exclusive membership, five permanent veto-holding members</p>	<p><u>Revisionist integration</u> Fundamental agreement with principles, rules and norms. Seeks to amend decision-making procedures through expansion of permanent membership</p>	<p><u>Revisionist integration</u> Fundamental agreement with principles, rules and norms. Seeks to amend decision-making procedures through expansion of permanent membership</p>
<p>UN General Assembly:</p> <p><u>Principles:</u> Promote peace, economic development and global progress, provide international platform for all national actors</p> <p><u>Rules and norms:</u> Equal membership</p> <p><u>Decision-making procedures:</u> Majority-based decision-making, binding enforceable resolutions</p>	<p><u>System-strengthening integration</u> Agrees with and fully supports principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures. Leadership in G77, Observer Status in Non-Aligned Movement</p>	<p><u>System-strengthening integration</u> Agrees with and fully supports principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures. Leadership in G77, Leader and Co-founder of Non-Aligned Movement</p>
<p>UN Peacekeeping:</p> <p><u>Principles:</u> Keep or enforce peace agreements, protect persecuted groups, maintain political stability</p> <p><u>Rules and norms:</u> Voluntary troop contributions and military leadership of missions</p> <p><u>Decision-making procedures:</u> Missions need to be supported by UNSC</p>	<p><u>System-strengthening integration</u> Agrees with and fully supports principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures. Significant troop contributions and leadership of MINUSTAH since 2004</p>	<p><u>System-strengthening integration</u> Agrees with and fully supports principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures. Historically one of the principal troop contributors</p>
<p>World Trade Organization:</p> <p><u>Principles:</u> Reduce trade barriers, promote free trade, enhance welfare</p> <p><u>Rules and norms:</u> Dispute settlements, multilateral trade</p>	<p><u>System-strengthening behavior</u> Agrees with principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures.</p>	<p><u>System-strengthening behavior</u> Agrees with principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. Frequent user of dispute</p>

<p>negotiations, summits <u>Decision-making procedures:</u> One vote per country, necessity to obtain consensus to achieve new trade deal</p>	<p>Frequent user of dispute mechanism and leader of G20 development countries during Doha Round</p>	<p>mechanism and leader of G20 development countries during Doha Round</p>
<p>Non-Proliferation Treaty: <u>Principles:</u> Nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, promotion of peaceful use of nuclear energy for civilian purposes <u>Rules and norms:</u> Two-tiered system, all states that went nuclear before January 1967 are NWS, all other NNWS, non-nuclear powers need to open nuclear facilities for IAEA inspectors <u>Decision-making procedures:</u> Negotiations about additional inspection regimes, five-yearly meeting to discuss progress on disarmament and non-proliferation</p>	<p><u>Systemic confrontation</u> Agrees with overarching principle of NPT Agreed to rules and norms but vague disagreement with ‘nuclear apartheid’. (“signing the NPT was a mistake”), violates fundamental norm of IAEA inspectors Not cooperative with regard to additional inspection regimes to strengthen non-proliferation regime</p>	<p><u>Passive confrontation</u> (amounts to systemic confrontation due to NPT’s structure) Agrees with overarching principle of NPT Has refused to sign NPT as non-nuclear power, tested nuclear weapons in 1974 and 1998. Objects to two-tiered ‘nuclear apartheid’ and does not open all nuclear facilities to IAEA inspectors Part of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), has traditionally acted responsibly with its own nuclear material.</p>
<p>IMF/ World Bank: <u>Principles:</u> Strengthen global financial stability <u>Rules and norms:</u> Lending upon conditionalities, intervention in recipient countries <u>Decision-making procedures:</u> Quotas and voting shares, developed countries overrepresented</p>	<p><u>Revisionist integration</u> Agrees with overall principle, supports ‘spirit’ of organization, gives great importance to ‘lender status’ Agrees with most rules and norms, although some reservations about the type of intervention and conditionalities Disagrees with decision-making procedures, seeks change of quota and voting structures, more weight for developing countries</p>	<p><u>Revisionist integration</u> Agrees with overall principle, supports ‘spirit’ of organization, gives great importance to ‘lender status’ Agrees with most rules and norms, although some reservations about the type of intervention and conditionalities Disagrees with decision-making procedures, seeks change of quota and voting structures, more weight for developing countries</p>
<p>G8 / G20:</p>	<p><u>Revisionist integration</u></p>	<p><u>Revisionist integration</u></p>

<p><u>Principles:</u> Address global challenges in informal meeting without procedural constraints</p> <p><u>Rules and norms:</u> Summit-based communication, exclusive invitation-based participation</p> <p><u>Decision-making procedures:</u> Exclusive creation of joint statement</p>	<p>Agrees with principles and seeks participation</p> <p>Agrees with rules and norms of informal, summit-based communication</p> <p>Disagrees with extreme exclusivity, seeks replacement of G8 by G20, which better reflects developing countries</p> <p>At G20, seeks presence of G24 representative</p>	<p>Agrees with principles and seeks participation</p> <p>Agrees with rules and norms of informal, summit-based communication</p> <p>Disagrees with extreme exclusivity, seeks replacement of G8 by G20, which better reflects developing countries</p> <p>At G20, seeks presence of G24 representative</p>
<p>Regional organizations</p>	<p><u>Alignment</u> Strong supporter of Inter American Development Bank and Mercosur, which are both organized around democratic, fair and open principles</p>	<p><u>Alignment</u> Strong supporter of Asian Development Bank, which is organized around democratic, fair and open principles</p>
<p>NATO</p>	<p><u>Alignment</u> Member of Rio Treaty, which is based on similar principal as NATO</p> <p>Criticized NATO campaign in Yugoslavia but agrees with ISAF mission in Afghanistan</p>	<p><u>Alignment</u> Criticized NATO campaign in Yugoslavia but agrees with ISAF mission in Afghanistan</p> <p>Key donor for Afghan reconstruction due to strategic importance of Central Asia</p> <p>Fully aligned with NATO on issues of terrorism</p>

This shows that both Brazil’s and India’s behavior can be described as overwhelmingly integrative, considering that all strategies except systemic confrontation are, in fact, integrative strategies. This analysis in section 2.1. shows that Brazil’s behavior towards the Western World Order is a mix of system-strengthening integration, revisionist integration, issue-based confrontation, alignment and systemic confrontation. Brazil’s behavior is therefore overwhelmingly integrative. Except for the NPT, Brazil does not engage in any instant in systemic or passive confrontation (which, given Brazil’s size, would amount to systemic confrontation). The results obtained in section 2.2. are slightly different. India’s strategy is a mix of all categories ranging from system-strengthening behavior to passive confrontation. While India’s overall strategy can be characterized as overwhelmingly

integrative, there are instances of confrontation, most prominently regarding the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

What do these results tell us? The results obtained in both section 2.1. and 2.2. therefore prove the hypothesis developed that rising fringe nations will join the Western World Order, creating not a ‘Post-Western World’, but a ‘Greater West’. Brazil and India engage in what Celso Lafer, Brazil’s former Foreign Minister, calls “moderated constructiveness”, characterized by the systemic use of both diplomacy and international law.¹⁰⁷⁵ The case of the NPT, however, requires further analysis.

The hypothesis about the attractiveness and durability of the international institutions that make up the Western World Order is therefore largely proven, but it becomes obvious that the hypothesis does not hold in some instances. Under what circumstances does a democratic nation such as India decide to confront the system? We need to develop additional hypotheses that explain when fringe nations engage in systemic confrontation. We will then seek to prove this second set of hypotheses in Part 3, which will analyze three specific cases in detail.

The first hypothesis is that fringe nations confront a particular institution systemically if they face an acute security threat that can only be addressed employing systemic confrontation. In this case, nations may still approve of Ikenberry’s claim about the openness and fairness of the Western World Order. The security they face, however, supplants the Western World Order’s benefits given the security restraints. This hypothesis has a certain appeal to realists, who argue that institutions are mere strategic alliances which are discarded once they no longer serve a particular short-term interest. As soon as a member country believes that its security is at stake if it is part of a specific institution, it will retreat or oppose the institution.¹⁰⁷⁶

In accordance with this hypothesis, Rahul Sagar argues that

...India will, if by default, pursue prosperity and peace, a strategy that promises to transform it into a great commercial power. Such a development would have positive implications for India and the international system. It would satisfy India’s desire for recognition and create new constituencies for peace and stability in Asia and beyond, founded on the prospect of mutually beneficial trade and investment. However, if this quest is thwarted by external threats it is likely that a contrary dynamic will be set in motion, as calls to enhance India’s military power grow louder—and are heeded more closely.¹⁰⁷⁷

The second hypothesis, involving constructivist approaches, is that nations engage in systemic confrontation if the principals and the ‘spirit’ of the institutions run counter to Ikenberry’s description of international institutions (just, democratic, open), if the institution

¹⁰⁷⁵ Lafer, Celso (2000). Brasil: dilemas e desafios da política externa. *Estudos Avançados* 14, no. 38 (2000): 260-267

¹⁰⁷⁶ Mearsheimer, John J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No.3, (Winter 1994, 1995), pp.5-49

¹⁰⁷⁷ Sagar, Rahul (2009). State of mind: What kind of power will India be? *International Affairs* 85: 4 (2009) 801–816

offers no ‘intra-institutional mobility’, and if states perceive the institution in question as highly unjust and impossible to fix.

This hypothesis is not directly tied to the questions of costs vs. benefits, nor is it about the discussion of relative gains vs. absolute gains between realists and liberals. Rather, it is a question of how fringe countries perceive the spirit of the institutions. During the interviews for this study, all Indian diplomats have consistently characterized the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as “unjust”. If fringe countries perceive the institution to be unjust and void of social mobility, Ikenberry’s claim about institution’s attractiveness (due to openness and fairness) is no longer valid for potential entrants. Their most likely strategy is therefore no longer unconditional integration. Ruzicka and Wheeler voice a similar argument when they argue that “the lack of trust could potentially be overcome in a trust-building process, [but] no amount of trust-building could address the conviction that the bargain incorporated in [a] treaty threatens the state’s security and is inherently unjust and discriminatory.”¹⁰⁷⁸

The more unjust fringe nations consider an institution, and the smaller the probability to solve this issue, the less likely they are to integrate. If they consider the system to be somewhat unjust but worth preserving, they will engage in revisionist integration or alignment. This is arguably the case with the UN Security Council, the G8 and Bretton Woods. If fringe countries consider the system to be unjust and impossible to fix, they will engage in systemic integration. There is some evidence that fringe countries’ strategy towards international relations is correlated to their view on how just that particular international regime is.

In the same vein, Henry Kissinger argues that any system produces winners and losers, and that losers will seek to confront the system if they believe the gap between them and the winners becomes too great.¹⁰⁷⁹ He adds that leading actors have to assure that all participants feel they are on the winning side in order to maintain stability.

We will seek to prove or disprove the hypothesis in Part 3, particularly in Case Study 3, which deals with the UN Security Council.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Ruzicka, Jan, Nicholas J. Wheeler (2010). The puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. *International Affairs* 86: 1 (2010) 69–85

¹⁰⁷⁹ Kissinger, Henry (2008). America will be less powerful, but still the essential nation in creating a new world order. *The Economist*, Nov 19, 2008

3. *Case studies*

CRITERIA FOR THE CASE SELECTION

First, and most importantly, the following three case studies seek to prove or disprove our research hypothesis that liberal theory can adequately explain Brazil's and India's behavior towards the Western World Order. They should also clarify our additional set of hypotheses developed at the end of Part 2 to explain why, in some instances, liberal theory fails to explain their behavior. Most importantly, we have argued that countries may choose to confront the Western World Order if doing so helps them reduce an acute security threat. The second hypothesis is that rising fringe nations will confront regimes that they consider to be unjust.

Secondly, the three case studies that were chosen are of particular interest due to their strategic significance. The United Nations Security Council, the Bretton Woods institutions and the Non-Proliferation Treaty cover an important part of the Western World Order and range across different issue-areas. The Security Council is considered to be the most powerful part of the UN, as it deals with security issues and has enforcement capability. It is true that the Council was largely paralyzed and unable to function properly during the Cold War. Yet contrary to what its critics claim, the UN Security Council's performance has improved with each passing decade.¹⁰⁸⁰ The IMF and the World Bank are the most important aspect of global financial governance, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is crucial because nuclear weapons are the gravest threat to global peace. While it is difficult to predict how international institutions will evolve, we can expect the three institutions covered in Part 3 to play a major role in international politics in the coming years.

The lack of strategic significance is the main reason why alternative institutions such as the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) or the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have not been selected for the case studies. While likely to be of great importance in the future, the institutions are too recent, so their analysis is unlikely to provide meaningful conclusions. This is particularly true for the UNFCCC. However, there is a lack of institutional maturity, as too many countries still doubt whether the United Nations is the best institution to deal with climate change.¹⁰⁸¹ As a consequence, we can argue that the UNFCCC is not yet part of the established institutions that make up the Western World Order.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Luck, Edward C. (2006) *UN Security Council. Practice and Promise*. New York: Routledge, 2006

¹⁰⁸¹ The so-called "non-UNFCCC tracks" are still much discussed.

3.1. Case study I: Brazil, India and the UN Security Council

HISTORIC BACKGROUND: THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

As arguably the most important international institution of all, the UN Security Council (hereafter UNSC) remains the symbol of global governance and the only judge of what amounts to a threat to international peace.¹⁰⁸² Despite its importance, remarkably little has been written about the Council, as Edward Luck points out.¹⁰⁸³

The Security Council is built on the experiences of the League of Nations. In order to strengthen the new institution's ability, the Council's creators made three fundamental changes. First, they gave the organ enforcement capabilities. Second, they discarded the unanimity rule, which was seen as one of the major reasons for the League's failure¹⁰⁸⁴, and gave veto power to a small number of powerful states.¹⁰⁸⁵ Its enforcement authority is unique in the history of international institutions.¹⁰⁸⁶ To compensate the smaller nations, the UN General Assembly (hereafter UNGA) was given the right to discuss security matters under article 10 and give recommendations to the UNSC. The voting procedures in the UNSC were agreed upon during the Yalta Conference by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill in February 1945, and adopted in June of the same year at the UN conference in San Francisco.¹⁰⁸⁷

The Security Council held its first session in 1946 in London. Since then, the Council has existed in continuous session in New York City. The Council consists of 15 members (5 veto-wielding permanent members (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States, called the 'P 5'¹⁰⁸⁸) and 10 elected non-permanent members with two-year terms. In order to respond quickly to crisis situations, representatives of the countries occupying the Council must always be present. Few rules have changed since the Council's inception in 1945. Articles 23 and 27 of the UN Charter were amended in 1965, increasing the Council's membership from eleven to fifteen, increasing the necessary votes for the adoption of resolutions from seven to nine.¹⁰⁸⁹

The Cold War largely immobilized the UNSC¹⁰⁹⁰, but even after a brief moment of hope at the end of the Cold War, criticism persisted.¹⁰⁹¹ In 1990, the UNSC authorized the use of force

¹⁰⁸² Luck, Edward C. (2006). *UN Security Council. Practice and Promise*. New York: Routledge, 2006. See also: Kirgis Jr., Frederic L. *The Security Council's First Fifty Years*. *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), pp. 506-539

¹⁰⁸³ Luck, Edward C. (2006). *UN Security Council. Practice and Promise*. New York: Routledge, 2006

¹⁰⁸⁴ Kirgis, Jr., Frederic L. (1995). *The Security Council's First Fifty Years*. *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), pp. 506-539

¹⁰⁸⁵ Bourantonis, Dimitris (2006). *History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform*, 2006. (Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics)

¹⁰⁸⁶ Luck, Edward C. (2006). *UN Security Council. Practice and Promise*. New York: Routledge, 2006

¹⁰⁸⁷ Blum, Yehuda Z. (2005). *Proposals for UN Security Council Reform*. *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol.99, No. 3, Jul. 2005, p.632-649

¹⁰⁸⁸ Weiss, Thomas G. *The Illusion of UNSC reform*. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 147-166, Autumn 2003

¹⁰⁸⁹ Kirgis Jr., Frederic L. *The Security Council's First Fifty Years*. *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), pp. 506-539

¹⁰⁹⁰ Luck, Edward C. (2006). *UN Security Council. Practice and Promise*. New York: Routledge, 2006

¹⁰⁹¹ Kirgis Jr., Frederic L. (1995). *The Security Council's First Fifty Years*. *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), pp. 506-539. See also: Cooper, Andrew F. and John

for the second time in history, and a large coalition force under US leadership defeated Iraq.¹⁰⁹² In 1992, John Major captured the spirit of the time when he argued that at last the UNSC was fulfilling the role envisioned by the UN's founders in 1945.¹⁰⁹³ Since then, however, the Council proved to be a largely ineffective instrument in the context of collective security, failing to take action in the face of horrific human suffering in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, and making serious mistakes with regard to the Somalia mission, which ended in 1995.¹⁰⁹⁴ "The veto", John English and Andrew Cooper argued in 2009, "plays havoc with the United Nations."¹⁰⁹⁵ "The Security Council failed", John Glennon announced in a similar vein in 2003, after US President Bush had decided to invade Iraq. He predicted that the UNSC would go the same way the League of Nations did sixty-five years before.¹⁰⁹⁶ One of the major criticisms voiced is the lack of representativeness.¹⁰⁹⁷ A New York Times editorial from 2004 reflected a common opinion when it argued that "the Security Council [']s membership.... reflects the power relations of 1945, not 2004."¹⁰⁹⁸ Reform efforts largely focused on the following categories: the size of an enlarged Security Council, the categories of membership, the question of regional representation, the question of the veto, the working methods of the Security Council and the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly.¹⁰⁹⁹

Yet the UNSC proved resilient, adapting to some changing realities.¹¹⁰⁰ In 1965, over initial Soviet opposition due to continued Taiwanese occupation of the permanent seat, the Security Council underwent reform and increased the number of members from eleven to fifteen.¹¹⁰¹ Now, nine instead of seven votes were needed to pass a resolution.¹¹⁰² This was largely done to reflect the new realities after the wave of decolonization in the 1960s which

English (2005). Introduction: Reforming the international system from the top- a Leaders' 20 Summit. In: English, John, Ramesh Thakur, Andrew F. Cooper (eds.) Reforming from the top: A Leaders' 20 Summit. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005

¹⁰⁹² Russett, Bruce and Sutterlin, James S. (1991). The U.N. in a New World Order. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Spring, 1991), pp. 69-83

¹⁰⁹³ Weiss, Thomas G. (2005). Overcoming the Security Council Reform Impasse. *The Implausible versus the Plausible*. Dialogue on Globalization Paper, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, No. 14, January 2005

¹⁰⁹⁴ Melvern, Linda (2001). The Security Council: Behind the Scenes. *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 77, No. 1 (Jan., 2001), pp. 101-111

¹⁰⁹⁵ Cooper, Andrew F. and John English (2005). Introduction: Reforming the international system from the top- a Leaders' 20 Summit. In: English, John, Ramesh Thakur, Andrew F. Cooper (eds.) Reforming from the top: A Leaders' 20 Summit. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005

¹⁰⁹⁶ Glennon, Michael J. (2003). Why the Security Council Failed. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2003), pp. 16-35

¹⁰⁹⁷ Mônica Herz. *Brasil e a Reforma da ONU* (1999). *Lua Nova Revista de Cultura e Política*, 1999

¹⁰⁹⁸ New York Times Correspondent (2004). A U.N. for the 21st Century. *New York Times Editorial*. December 7, 2004; <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/07/opinion/07tue1.html> (accessed November 1, 2009)

¹⁰⁹⁹ von Freiesleben, Jonas (2008). Reform of the UN Security Council. Paper, Center for UN Reform, 11 November 2008

¹¹⁰⁰ Luck, Edward C. (2006). *UN Security Council. Practice and Promise*. New York: Routledge, 2006

¹¹⁰¹ Weiss, Thomas G. (2005). Overcoming the Security Council Reform Impasse. *The Implausible versus the Plausible*. Dialogue on Globalization Paper, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, No. 14, January 2005

¹¹⁰² Blum, Yehuda Z. (2005). Proposals for UN Security Council Reform. *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol.99, No. 3, Jul. 2005, p.632-649

had caused the number of UN members to increase from 51 to 114.¹¹⁰³ In 1971, mainland China was handed the seat until then occupied by the government in Taipeh. In 1991, Russia was allowed to hold on to the seat until then assigned to the Soviet Union.¹¹⁰⁴ Despite frequent criticism, there has been no military conflict between members of the UNSC since its inception. Jochen Prantl argues that the Security Council is largely functional, and that conclusions of failure premature.¹¹⁰⁵

In other instances, the UNSC has been slow to change.¹¹⁰⁶ Some years after the expansion in 1965, reform pressure resumed due to the growing number of underrepresented African countries. Efforts for reform reached another high when Razali Ismael, a Malaysian diplomat, submitted to the working group a carefully crafted reform proposal in 1997. Yet too few members were willing to openly support the plan to create the necessary political momentum, and the plan was not put to the vote in the General Assembly.¹¹⁰⁷

In 2002, Kofi Annan made the rare move for a Secretary General to get personally involved in the reform efforts, pursuing the “most ambitious overhaul of the United Nations since its inception”.¹¹⁰⁸ The pressure to reform had been particularly high since the 1990s, which can paradoxically be explained by the relative successes of the Council after the end of the Cold War- as seen by the example of the liberation of Kuwait¹¹⁰⁹ He presented the report produced by the high-level commission he had appointed to make proposals about how to deal with “threats, challenges and change” confronting the United Nations. While the panel specifically warned about solely focusing on the recommendations on how to reform the UNSC, just this happened.¹¹¹⁰ The report proposed two reform options both of which recommended an expansion from fifteen to twenty-four members. One proposal includes Brazil and India as permanent members, the other one offers a rotation principle which would give the two countries semi-permanent status.¹¹¹¹

As a response to Annan’s efforts, reform efforts came relatively close to success in 2005, when the General Assembly could not agree on a reform proposal by the G4.¹¹¹² This specific proposal would have included Germany, Brazil, Japan, India and two African countries as permanent members without veto power. Too many key decision makers,

¹¹⁰³ Weiss, Thomas G. The Illusion of UNSC reform. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 147-166, Autumn 2003. See also: Bourantonis, Dimitris (2006). *History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform*, 2006. (Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics)

¹¹⁰⁴ Kirgis, Jr., Frederic L. (1995). The Security Council's First Fifty Years. *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), pp. 506-539

¹¹⁰⁵ Prantl, Jochen (2005). Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council. *International Organization*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Summer, 2005), pp. 559-592

¹¹⁰⁶ United Nations (2005). Report on the Secretary General High-Level’s Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2005. <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf> See also: Weiss, Thomas G. The Illusion of UNSC reform. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 147-166, Autumn 2003

¹¹⁰⁷ Luck, Edward C. (2006). *UN Security Council. Practice and Promise*. New York: Routledge, 2006

¹¹⁰⁸ Stephen John Stedman. UN Transformation in an era of soft balancing. *International Affairs* 83: 5 (2007) 933–944

¹¹⁰⁹ Weiss, Thomas G. The Illusion of UNSC reform. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 147-166, Autumn 2003

¹¹¹⁰ Blum, Yehuda Z. (2005). Proposals for UN Security Council Reform. *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol.99, No. 3, Jul. 2005, p.632-649

¹¹¹¹ United Nations (2005). Report on the Secretary General High-Level’s Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2005. <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf> (accessed Dec 17, 2008)

¹¹¹² Stedman, Stephen John (2007). UN Transformation in an era of soft balancing. *International Affairs* 83: 5 (2007) 933–944

however, opposed at least one of the G4 members. Particularly the United States only viewed Japan's bid favorably.¹¹¹³ In addition, 43 African countries, submitted their own proposal which included veto power for two African nations, because non-permanent members without a veto have significantly less power than veto-wielding members.¹¹¹⁴ None of the plans received enough endorsement to be put to the vote in the General Assembly. Other, less realistic reform proposals are to give the International Court of Justice (ICJ) the power to “judicially review” decisions by the UNSC to hold it more accountable.¹¹¹⁵

After the failure in 2005, other proposals surge occasionally, but there is overall fatigue with regard to reform. In 2006, the ‘Small 5’ (‘S-5’) launched a more modest reform proposal that merely included procedural reforms but no expansion, and Panama later launched a “transitional proposal” which foresaw five-year terms for non-permanent members with the possibility of becoming permanent members without veto power after four reelections.¹¹¹⁶ Yet, despite numerous efforts within the General Assembly's Working Group on the subject (established in 1993), successful reform seems unlikely at this point.¹¹¹⁷

¹¹¹³ The American Journal of International Law (2005). U.S. Views on UN Reform, Security Council Expansion. *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 99, No. 4 (Oct., 2005), pp. 906-908
Published by: American Society of International Law

¹¹¹⁴ O'Neill, Barry (1996). Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Jun., 1996), pp. 219-237

¹¹¹⁵ Alvarez, Jose E. (1996). Judging the Security Council. *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 90, No. 1 (Jan., 1996), pp. 1-39

¹¹¹⁶ The proposal is available at <http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/246#footnote1> (accessed January 6, 2011)

¹¹¹⁷ Weiss, Thomas G. (2005). Overcoming the Security Council Reform Impasse. *The Implausible versus the Plausible. Dialogue on Globalization Paper*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, No. 14, January 2005. See also: von Freiesleben, Jonas (2008). *Reform of the UN Security Council. Paper*, Center for UN Reform, 11 November 2008

3.1.1. *Brazil and the UN Security Council*

Brazil considers the UN as the most legitimate international institution, and the UN Security Council as the only organ with a legitimate enforcement capacity. This became obvious in 2002 and 2003, when both President Cardoso (1995-2002) and President Lula (2003-2010) argued that war against Iraq would only be justifiable if authorized by the UN Security Council.¹¹¹⁸

Brazil attempted, with the support of the United States, to be included as a permanent member of the UNSC at its inception, but its efforts were thwarted by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union during the Yalta Conference.¹¹¹⁹ As a consolation prize, Brazil was elected as a non-permanent member during the first selection process. In addition, Brazil was granted the right to speak first at General Assembly meetings. Since then, Brazil has been a non-permanent member nine times, currently serving for the tenth time.¹¹²⁰ Yehuda Blum argues that Brazil has become a de facto “semi-permanent” member of the UNSC.¹¹²¹

A permanent seat on the UN Security Council has been, at varying degrees of intensity, the objective of Brazil’s foreign policy over the past decades.¹¹²² There are two types of reform Brazil has sought in the past. First, and most importantly, it has argued for membership expansion. Secondly, it has at times lobbied for an alteration of the P5’s veto rights. Using Krasner’s definition¹¹²³ of an international institution, we can therefore see that Brazil has always fundamentally agreed with the UNSC’s principles and norms, yet sought to modify some of its rules and decision-making procedures. President Itamar Franco (1992-1995) articulated this goal more clearly than his predecessors. President Cardoso (1995-2002) mentioned it more often still, but continued to show restraint out of respect for Brazil’s faltering neighbor, Argentina.¹¹²⁴ In addition, Cardoso argued that UNSC reform was unlikely, and that Brazil should focus on G8 reform instead.¹¹²⁵ President Lula (2003-2010) was more vocal still and made a permanent seat for the UN Security Council a key goal of Brazil’s foreign policy strategy.¹¹²⁶

¹¹¹⁸ Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2010). *Brazilian Foreign Policy In Changing Times: The Quest For Autonomy From Sarney To Lula*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010

¹¹¹⁹ Blum, Yehuda Z. (2005). *Proposals for UN Security Council Reform*. *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol.99, No. 3, Jul. 2005, p.632-649

¹¹²⁰ Countries cannot be immediately re-elected. Blum, Yehuda Z. (2005). *Proposals for UN Security Council Reform*. *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol.99, No. 3, Jul. 2005, p.632-649

¹¹²¹ Blum, Yehuda Z. (2005). *Proposals for UN Security Council Reform*. *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol.99, No. 3, Jul. 2005, p.632-649

¹¹²² Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2007). *Lula’s Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification*. *Third World Quarterly*, 28:7, 1309 – 1326, 2007

¹¹²³ Krasner, Steven D. (1985). *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985

¹¹²⁴ Herz, Mônica (1999). *Brasil e a Reforma da ONU*, *Lua Nova – Revista de Cultura e Política*, no. 46. 1999. See also: Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). *Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process*, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

¹¹²⁵ Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (2006). *A Arte da Política. A História que Vivi*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2006

¹¹²⁶ When Lula became President in 2003, he maintained this foreign policy objective. While President Cardoso sought closer ties to the United States and Europe, Lula hoped to achieve UNSC reform and

Since its earliest efforts to join the Council, Brazil has argued along similar lines, stressing that its inclusion would increase the Council's legitimacy. As President Lula argued in 2008 in the UN General Assembly, "today's structure has been frozen for six decades and does not relate to the challenges of today's world. Its distorted form of representation stands between us and the multilateral world to which we aspire."¹¹²⁷

But not all agree with this rationale. Critics argue that an expanded UNSC could very well paralyze the process.¹¹²⁸ Using the same rationale, the G7 long resisted reform to maintain effectiveness. Finally, there is a more fundamental argument against the value of inclusiveness in the context of the UNSC. No matter how much the UNSC will expand, it will never be as representative as the UN General Assembly, which represents all countries. While the UN's creators attempted to make the UNSC as inclusive as possible, it was specifically not supposed to be inclusive, but functional. The UN General Assembly, on the other hand, satisfied the need for inclusiveness. In this context, it seems questionable whether increasing the inclusiveness to some degree is a worthwhile exercise if it implies a strong reduction of effectiveness. Finally, the argument that Brazil can represent Latin America in the world's most important international institution is strongly contested outside of Brazil. In fact, Argentina, Mexico and Colombia all joined coalitions (first the "Coffee Club"¹¹²⁹, then "Uniting for Consensus" after 2005) created to frustrate Brazil's attempts to gain entry as a permanent member.¹¹³⁰ In a survey in 2005, all Latin American countries except Honduras and Venezuela said they opposed Brazil's permanent membership.¹¹³¹ These smaller countries agree in principal that the 'global South' needs better representation, but there is no consensus about which country should be in the Council permanently. Finally, Weiss points out that the key problem of the Council is not a lack of legitimacy (quite to the contrary, he says), but its strong dependence on US military power to enforce its decisions.¹¹³²

In addition, permanent membership is crucial to defend Brazil's ever more global interests. As Weiss points out, states use whatever institution is available to serve their

entry by aligning with and gaining support from other emerging powers and African countries (Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2007). *Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification*. *Third World Quarterly*, 28:7, 1309 – 1326, 2007).

¹¹²⁷ da Silva, Luiz Inácio (2008). Statement by H. E. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, at the General Debate of the 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 23 September 2008; <http://www.un.int/brazil/speech/008d-CS-agnu-Open%20debate%20230908.html> (accessed June 7, 2010)

¹¹²⁸ Weiss, Thomas G. *The Illusion of UNSC reform*. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 147-166, Autumn 2003. See also: Thomas G. Weiss. *Overcoming the Security Council Reform Impasse. The Implausible versus the Plausible*. *Dialogue on Globalization Paper*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, No. 14, January 2005

¹¹²⁹ The group had been sarcastically christened "Coffee Club" due to the Italian representative Fulci's leadership. In: Gupta, Kulwant Rai. *Reform of the United Nations*. New Delhi : Atlantic Publishers, 2006

¹¹³⁰ Luck, Edward C. (2006). *UN Security Council. Practice and Promise*. New York: Routledge, 2006

¹¹³¹ Weiss, Thomas G. *The Illusion of UNSC reform*. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 147-166, Autumn 2003. See also: Thomas G. Weiss. (2005). *Overcoming the Security Council Reform Impasse. The Implausible versus the Plausible*. *Dialogue on Globalization Paper*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, No. 14, January 2005

¹¹³² Weiss, Thomas G. *The Illusion of UNSC reform*. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 147-166, Autumn 2003

national interests.¹¹³³ Lacking significant military power, Brazil is forced to find other ways in order to make its mark. Multilateralism has been identified as the best tool to do so early on.¹¹³⁴ Assessing Brazil's strategy with regard to UNSC has been widely popular among Brazilian scholars, while few have analyzed reform proposals of the UN's other entities,¹¹³⁵ and at times it seemed as though this particular topic eclipsed all other matters related to Brazil and the United Nations.¹¹³⁶ While some conservative voices have denounced the quest for UNSC as an "unnecessary adventure", there is now a solid consensus that Brazil deserves a permanent seat.¹¹³⁷ For Brazil, a reformed Security Council reflects on the legitimacy and thus on the effectiveness of the entire UN organization, and no UN reform is thus complete without a reform of the UN Security Council.¹¹³⁸

Specifically, Brazil seeks to expand the Council with several permanent and non-permanent members. The G4's proposal envisions six new permanent seats (two for Africa, two for Asia (India and Japan), one for Latin America (Brazil) and the Caribbean and one for Western Europe and Others (German); and four new non-permanent members (one from Africa, one from Asia, one from Eastern Europe, and one from Latin America and the Caribbean).¹¹³⁹ Since expansion and its own inclusion is the fundamental objective, Brazil does not favor rotation of a new permanent seat to be filled by a country from the Latin American and Caribbean region.¹¹⁴⁰

While Brazil would certainly prefer to enter the Council as a permanent member with veto power, pragmatic considerations have led the Brazilian government to seek inclusion without veto power.¹¹⁴¹ This is widely believed to increase the chances for reform. Stressing the need to avoid conditions that led to the downfall of the League of Nations, the P-5 insisted on having individual veto rights over UN Charter amendments.¹¹⁴²

¹¹³³ Weiss, Thomas G. The Illusion of UNSC reform. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 147-166, Autumn 2003

¹¹³⁴ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

¹¹³⁵ See, for example: Avelar, R. O (2010). Brasil no contexto das reformas das Nações Unidas, FHDSS-UNESP- Franca, <http://www.franca.unesp.br/revistari/Renata%20Avelar%5B1%5D.pdf>, (accessed May 16, 2010)

¹¹³⁶ Lacerda, A. (2009). Lula espera reforma do Conselho de Segurança em 2009, Estado de São Paulo, October 15, 2009; <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/nacional,lula-espera-reforma-do-conselho-de-seguranca-em-2009,451128,0.htm> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

¹¹³⁷ Saraiva, J.F. (2010). Interacional: O Brasil e a reforma da ONU, Teoria e Debate n° 62 - abril/maio de 2005, Fundação Perseu Abramo; <http://www.fpabramo.org.br/conteudo/internacional-o-brasil-e-reforma-da-onu>, accessed May 23, 2010

¹¹³⁸ See G4 (2007). The United States' decision to invade Iraq without a UN Security Council resolution caused some to call the quest for Security Council reform irrelevant, as it would not be able to constrain US power (Weiss, Thomas G. The Illusion of UNSC reform. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 147-166, Autumn 2003), yet, for Lula, the Iraq War only strengthened his argument for reformed and more legitimate UN Security Council.

¹¹³⁹ Reform the UN (2008). Task Force Suggests "Timeline" Solution for Security Council Reform, States Remain Divided; <http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php/eupdate/4290>

¹¹⁴⁰ von Freiesleben, Jonas (2008). Reform of the UN Security Council. Paper, Center for UN Reform, 11 November 2008

¹¹⁴¹ United Nations (2010). Brazil's stance on UN Reform ; <http://www.un.int/brazil/brasil/brazil-scnu-reform.htm> (accessed September 15, 2010)

¹¹⁴² Weiss, Thomas G. The Illusion of UNSC reform. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 147-166, Autumn 2003

In 2004, Brazil joined the G4 in an attempt to realize UN Security Council Reform and to obtain a permanent seat.¹¹⁴³ The G4 largely formed to use the “window of opportunity” that Kofi Annan’s push for an intensive UN soul searching and reform project had opened.¹¹⁴⁴ In 2005, the UN Assembly discussed a reform proposal which included the addition of the G4 and two African nations, as permanent non-veto wielding members.¹¹⁴⁵ The proposal failed to be submitted to a vote in the General Assembly, largely because African countries were unable to agree who would occupy the two permanent seats.¹¹⁴⁶ In addition, several countries such as Italy, Argentina, Pakistan and Mexico opposed the inclusion of the G4, which led Brazilian policy makers to doubt whether an alliance with India would be the most prominent strategy.¹¹⁴⁷ However, even if the Assembly had agreed to the proposal, the United States would have most likely vetoed it.¹¹⁴⁸ While the G4 has, for now, ceased to exist as a vehicle for achieving Security Council Reform, Brazil continues to press for expansion and a permanent seat.

More recent reform proposals do not look promising, but the “Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council” (more simply known as the Working Group), set up by the General Assembly in 1993, continues to gather and discuss possibilities. Brazil still pushes for UNSC expansion. The Brazilian government has continuously rejected any more modest proposals that divert attention from UNSC expansion.¹¹⁴⁹

How has the objective of UN Security Council Reform influenced President Lula’s foreign policy since 2003? Brazil’s strategy towards UNSC reform has been a complex mix of multilateral engagement (positioning itself as a ‘responsible stakeholder’), global outreach (diversifying its strategic partnerships), assuming regional leadership, and becoming the leader of the South (by strengthening South-South partnerships and distancing itself from the developed world to some degree. While obtaining a seat on the UNSC may have been the greatest foreign policy goal of the Lula administration, these strategies certainly constitute policy goals in themselves as well. During interviews for this study, most diplomats named 1. A seat on the UNSC, 2. A global trade deal and 3. South American unity under Brazilian leadership as the Lula administration’s three main foreign policy deals.¹¹⁵⁰

¹¹⁴³ Weiss, Thomas G. (2005). Overcoming the Security Council Reform Impasse. The Implausible versus the Plausible. Dialogue on Globalization Paper, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, No. 14, January 2005

¹¹⁴⁴ Nass, Matthias (2004). Wir wollen da rein! DIE ZEIT 16.09.2004 Nr.39
[<http://www.zeit.de/2004/39/UN-Sicherheitsrat>

¹¹⁴⁵ Die Zeit Correspondent (2005). Endspurt fuer den Sitz im Sicherheitsrat, Die Zeit.
<http://www.zeit.de/2005/28/sicherheitsratvoraus>

¹¹⁴⁶ Okouma, G.O. (2007). UN Security Council Reform: A Transitional Approach, UN Chronicle Online Edition, 2007;
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2007/webArticles/120307_security_council_reform.html (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

¹¹⁴⁷ Gallas, Daniel (2006). Aliança com a Índia prejudica Brasil na ONU, dizem analistas. BBC Brasil, September 13, 2006

¹¹⁴⁸ Die Zeit Correspondent (2005). Kein Sitz fuer Deutschland. Die Zeit.
http://www.zeit.de/2005/28/usa_sicherheitsrat (accessed May 14, 2010)

¹¹⁴⁹ von Freiesleben, Jonas (2008). Reform of the UN Security Council. Paper, Center for UN Reform, 11 November 2008

¹¹⁵⁰ Interview, Brazilian Diplomat, Itamaraty, Brasilia, July 23, 2010.

Since 2003, Brazil's commitment to multilateral institutions has continued to be one of its principal policy paradigms.¹¹⁵¹ For example, Brazil has successfully led the UN mission in Haiti. Secondly, one of President Lula's major foreign policy innovations after President Cardoso (1995-2002) was to diversify Brazil's strategic partnerships. One of the major tools to do so was through trade. This goal was largely achieved, as trade and other ties in Africa and Asia have indeed been strengthened. Brazil's engagement in the Middle East and strengthening ties with Russia symbolize this move. In addition, Brazil has attempted to turn into a "Leader of the South" by drastically increasing aid flows to poorer countries.¹¹⁵² Thirdly, it has been one of the major goals of the Brazilian government since 2003 to assume regional leadership and help the process of regional integration. Results of this third strategy, however, have been poor. Progress with regard to Mercosur has largely stalled, and UNASUL, a recently created body, is unlikely to strengthen integration.

This analysis has shown that Brazil's behavior towards the UN Security Council is a classic example of revisionist integration. This becomes clear when we apply Krasner's definition¹¹⁵³ of an institution to the UNSC and assess Brazil's stance. Brazil fully agrees with the UN Security Council's principles (its 'spirit') and the fundamental norms and rules that undergird this particular institution. Quite to the contrary, by seeking to join it, it implicitly strengthens the importance of the Council. Yet, Brazil does seek to change the decision-making procedures by changing the membership rules. As the UN Security Council is an exclusive institution with restricted access, any member's wish to join it constitutes revisionist integration.¹¹⁵⁴ While Brazil seeks changes, it is far from pursuing systemic confrontation as some governments who have called for the abolition of the UN Security Council.

¹¹⁵¹ Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

¹¹⁵² de Souza, A. (2009). *A Agenda Internacional do Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro: Relativa, 2009

¹¹⁵³ Krasner, Stephen (1985). *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985

¹¹⁵⁴ Bourantonis, Dimitris (2006). *History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform*, 2006. (Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics)

3.1.2. *India and the UN Security Council*

India was an avid supporter of the United Nations, and the UNSC, since the body's inception. India, which had been a member of the League of Nations¹¹⁵⁵, actively campaigned for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council during the San Francisco Conference in 1945, but ultimately failed, like Brazil, partly because it was not an independent country yet.¹¹⁵⁶ This can mostly be explained by India's leaders' refusal to suspend its independence struggle, which caused Roosevelt to stop pressuring Great Britain to grant independence, driving a wedge between the US and India during the War.¹¹⁵⁷ It then changed its approach and lobbied towards making population a crucial indicator for the selection of the non-permanent members to assure its frequent presence on the Council.¹¹⁵⁸ It has been on the Council as a non-permanent member six times¹¹⁵⁹, making it one of the most frequent non-permanent members. As Blum points out, India has obtained "quasi semi-permanent" status, although it has not been able to participate in the Council as often as Brazil due to its regional rivalry with Pakistan.¹¹⁶⁰ In 2010, after Kazakhstan decided to give up a campaign it had been waging for years to obtain the Asian seat in the UNSC, India will once more occupy the non-permanent seat starting in January 2011.¹¹⁶¹

India has regularly pushed for UNSC Reform, and it remains one of the principal foreign policy objectives.¹¹⁶² In 1979, a series of NAM countries, including India, submitted a draft resolution to the General Assembly proposing an increase of the non-permanent members from 10 to 14. They argued that UN membership had increased since 1963, from 136 to 152, and that the last 1965's benefits had already been nullified.¹¹⁶³ The 1990s saw India strengthen its campaign for reform and a permanent seat on the UNSC.¹¹⁶⁴ Finally, in 2005, India was once more, as part of the 'G4', one of the driving forces behind a reform effort which almost led to a second fundamental reform.

India's major argument is that its inclusion would increase the UNSC's legitimacy by making it more representative of UN membership.¹¹⁶⁵ In 2004, for example, India argued that it deserved the seat because it was the world's second largest country in terms of population,

¹¹⁵⁵ Gupta, Kulwant Rai (2006). *Unlike Great Britain's other colonies, India had been given permission to join the League of Nations*. In: *Reform of the United Nations*. New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 2006.

¹¹⁵⁶ Blum, Yehuda Z. (2005). *Proposals for UN Security Council Reform*. *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol.99, No. 3, Jul. 2005, p.632-649

¹¹⁵⁷ See also: Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

¹¹⁵⁸ Gupta, Kulwant Rai (2005). *Reform of the United Nations*. New Delhi : Atlantic Publishers, 2006

¹¹⁵⁹ Blum, Yehuda Z. (2005). *Proposals for UN Security Council Reform*. *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol.99, No. 3, Jul. 2005, p.632-649

¹¹⁶⁰ Blum, Yehuda Z. (2005). *Proposals for UN Security Council Reform*. *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol.99, No. 3, Jul. 2005, p.632-649

¹¹⁶¹ Nayar K.P. (2010). *UN Security Council seat within reach*. *The Telegraph*, Calcutta. February 21, 2010; http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100221/jsp/frontpage/story_12132738.jsp (accessed February 25, 2010)

¹¹⁶² Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

¹¹⁶³ Gupta, Kulwant Rai (2006). *Reform of the United Nations*. New Delhi : Atlantic Publishers, 2006

¹¹⁶⁴ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

¹¹⁶⁵ Gupta, Kulwant Rai (2006). *Reform of the United Nations*. New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 2006

with a large economy and the third largest contributor of troops to UN peace-keeping missions.¹¹⁶⁶ In addition, it has always been India's proclaimed goal to increase the representation of the 'global South' and limit the influence of the established powers. The government argues that an "adequate presence" of developing countries is needed in the Security Council. Nations of the world must feel that their stakes in global peace and prosperity are factored into the UN's decision making. Any expansion of the permanent members' category must be based on agreed criteria, rather than be a pre-determined selection. There must be an inclusive approach based on transparent consultations. India supports expansion of both the permanent and non-permanent members' category. The latter is the only avenue for the vast majority of Member States to serve on the Security Council. Reform and expansion must be an integral part of a common package."¹¹⁶⁷ With regard to these principled motivations, India's rhetoric has been and remains remarkably similar to that of Brazil, another G77 member.

But permanent membership would also help India defend its ever more global interests. According to Kulwant Rai Gupta, there is a sense in India that regarding security matters, the role of the UNSC is increasing while that of the UN General Assembly is diminishing. Development issues are more and more handled by the IMF and the World Bank, while the UN turns into an institution dealing mostly with security issues. This interpretation is thus yet another reason why India should seek to gain admission as a permanent member to an ever more important organ.¹¹⁶⁸ Finally, India is said to eye a permanent seat to assure that the United Nations does not get involved in the conflict in Kashmir, which would, Indians fear, lead to a partition or independence of Kashmir.¹¹⁶⁹

Specifically, India seeks to expand the UNSC by four permanent and six non-permanent members. The G4's proposal envisions the six new permanent seats to be occupied by two African nations, two for Asia (India and Japan), one for Latin America (Brazil) and the Caribbean and one for Western Europe and others (Germany); and four new non-permanent members (one from Africa, one from Asia, one from Eastern Europe, and one from Latin America and the Caribbean).¹¹⁷⁰

While a majority of states within the General Assembly want to abolish or curtail the right of the veto¹¹⁷¹, India is more pragmatic and seeks no veto rights for new permanent members. It thus proves much more realistic, given the fact that the current permanent members with veto power are unlikely to grant it to any newcomers.¹¹⁷²

¹¹⁶⁶ von Freiesleben, Jonas (2008). Reform of the UN Security Council. Paper, Center for UN Reform, 11 November 2008

¹¹⁶⁷ United Nations (2010). India and UN Reform.

http://www.un.int/india/india_and_the_un_unreform.html (accessed September 10, 2010)

¹¹⁶⁸ Gupta, Kulwant Rai (2006). Reform of the United Nations. New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 2006

¹¹⁶⁹ Cohen, Stephen P. (2000). India. Rising. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer, 2000), pp. 32-53

¹¹⁷⁰ Reform the UN Project, Institute for Global Policy (2010). Task Force Suggests "Timeline" Solution for Security Council Reform, States Remain Divided;

<http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php/eupdate/4290> (accessed June 1, 2010)

¹¹⁷¹ Weiss, Thomas G. (2006). Overcoming the Security Council Reform Impasse. *The Implausible versus the Plausible*. Dialogue on Globalization Paper, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, No. 14, January 2005

¹¹⁷² Weiss, Thomas G. (2006). Overcoming the Security Council Reform Impasse. *The Implausible versus the Plausible*. Dialogue on Globalization Paper, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, No. 14, January 2005

Similar to Brazil, UN Security Council Reform has been one of India's key objectives over the past decade, influencing its policies to some degree. Given its prominence, UN Security Council Reform has traditionally been regarded as a crucial part of any wider UN reform by the Indian government.¹¹⁷³ Several of India's strategies can be better understood in the context of the UN Security Council.

India's UNSC reform strategy has two main components: Garnering support in the UN General Assembly and reducing resistance in the UN Security Council. Through India's continued leadership in the G77, India hopes to assure widespread support in the UN General Assembly. India's strong stance on defending sovereignty and criticizing "the responsibility to protect" can be understood in this context. At the same time, India's recent rapprochement with China, its historic deal with the United States, and its continued historic friendship with Russia are all meant to assure that none of the permanent members would block India's entry.

India's decision to openly vie for a seat as part of the 'G4' was the most recent attempt, which garnered considerable support but failed to materialize due to African disunity. Specifically, the G4's proposal envisions six new permanent seats (two for Africa, two for Asia, one for Latin America and the Caribbean and one for Western Europe and Others); and four new non-permanent members (one from Africa, one from Asia, one from Eastern Europe, and one from Latin America and the Caribbean).¹¹⁷⁴ Even South Africa supported the proposal.¹¹⁷⁵

Since the G4's failure in 2005, India has continued to focus on UNSC expansion. When the so-called "Small 5" or "S5", a group made up of Switzerland, Singapore, Jordan, Costa Rica and Liechtenstein, submitted a proposal that sought not to expand the UNSC but change its procedures to some degree, India rejected it as it would shift focus away from expansion.¹¹⁷⁶ India has, together with Brazil and South Africa, created an IBSA faction within the Working Group set up by the General Assembly (called "Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council"), but its impact has not been substantial.¹¹⁷⁷

India seeks to alter some of the UNSC's rules and decision-making procedures, but adheres to its principles, ultimately strengthening the UNSC. Its strategy is therefore not merely "revisionist", as is often claimed¹¹⁷⁸, but it constitutes revisionist integration. The fact

¹¹⁷³ Kennedy, Paul and Bruce Russett (1995). *Reforming the United Nations*. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 5, September/ October 1995

¹¹⁷⁴ Reform the UN Project, Institute for Global Policy (2010). Task Force Suggests "Timeline" Solution for Security Council Reform, States Remain Divided; <http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php/eupdate/4290> (accessed June 1, 2010)

¹¹⁷⁵ The Hindu Correspondent (2004). South Africa to support India, Brazil for Security Council seat. *The Hindu*, March 6, 2004; <http://www.hinduonnet.com/2004/03/06/stories/2004030603541200.htm> (July 14, 2009)

¹¹⁷⁶ von Freiesleben, Jonas (2008). Reform of the UN Security Council. Paper, Center for UN Reform, 11 November 2008

¹¹⁷⁷ von Freiesleben, Jonas (2008). Reform of the UN Security Council. Paper, Center for UN Reform, 11 November 2008

¹¹⁷⁸ See, for example: "Our size, our potential strength, our traditions and heritage do not allow us to become a client state." Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall (1999, eds.) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

that India is one of the few member states that has been elected six times to the body underlines the importance of the entity for the Indian government.¹¹⁷⁹ The Indian government bemoans that governance structures, particularly in the UNSC, had not been able to keep up with contemporary realities. Indian politicians believe that India should have been granted a permanent seat on the UNSC in 1945.¹¹⁸⁰ After failing to obtain a seat in 2005, when India was part of the G-4 (together with Germany, Japan and Brazil), the Indian government is determined to continuously push for expanding the Council, even though short-term success is unlikely. China is seen as a crucial gate keeper in India's attempt to advance in the UN Security Council, and this—together with an appreciation of China's growing economic importance—is one of the reasons that India aims to improve relations with China, despite an ongoing border dispute in Arunchal Pradesh. In the future, India is more likely to team up with Brazil in its attempt to obtain a seat, as Germany and Japan weaken India's claim that developing countries need to be better represented.

¹¹⁷⁹ Nafey, Abdul (2008). India and the G8: Reaching out or out of reach? In: Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008

¹¹⁸⁰ Sud, H. (2007). Commentary: India and the UN Security Council, UPI Asia, 11.9.2007; http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2007/09/11/commentary_india_and_the_un_security_council/1443/ (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

3.2. Case study II: Brazil, India and Bretton Woods

3.2.1. The Bretton Woods institutions

The IMF and the World Bank, jointly often referred to as the “Bretton Woods institutions” named after the town of their founding conference, were created in 1945 in order to help poorer countries stabilize financially and avoid debt crises and to facilitate development through the implementation of economic reform. Having started out with only 44 members, this number quadrupled in the process of decolonization. Today, all UN members except Cuba, North Korea and a series of city states are members of the IMF. As of 2010, Hungary (\$11.6 billion), Romania (\$12.5 billion) and Ukraine (\$16.4 billion) were the largest borrowers from the fund.

3.2.1. Brazil and Bretton Woods

Brazil’s economic growth story is not yet as impressive as that of its fellow emerging powers, China and India¹¹⁸¹, but President Lula has tried to make up for it by being the most vocal player of the group, tirelessly pressing for more weight for emerging countries in both the IMF and the World Bank since he took office in 2003.

President Lula identified the financial crisis as a unique chance to make a compelling case for the democratization of global governance, pointing out that the established powers could no longer fix the world on their own.¹¹⁸² Eager to stress that the crisis originated in the developed world, Lula repeatedly claimed that emerging powers’ participation was necessary to build a more robust system. Brazil, as he often and proudly pointed out, had been “the last country to enter the crisis and the first to leave it.”¹¹⁸³ While this claim was false - the Brazilian economy was in recession for a short period of time, yet India and China did not enter recession at all¹¹⁸⁴ - his point was clear. Lula sees Brazil on the way to “decoupling” from the rich world, and hopes that this will soon allow Brazil to no longer depend on consumption in Europe and the United States. As Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, one of Brazil’s leading diplomats, has noted, Brazil is aiming to create a multipolar world system with a Brazil-led South America as one of the poles.¹¹⁸⁵

¹¹⁸¹ de Sousa S.L.J. (2008). Brasil como nuevo actor del desarrollo internacional, la cooperación Sur-Sur y la iniciativa IBSA, Comentário, FRIDA, July 2008

¹¹⁸² da Silva, Luiz Inácio (2009). Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 23.9.2009; http://www.un.org/ga/64/generaldebate/pdf/BR_en.pdf (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹¹⁸³ da Silva, Luiz Inácio (2009). Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 23.9.2009; http://www.un.org/ga/64/generaldebate/pdf/BR_en.pdf (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹¹⁸⁴ International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2010): IMF Data Mapper; <http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php>, (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹¹⁸⁵ Guimarães, Samuel Pinheiro (2006). Desafios brasileiros na era dos gigantes. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2006. And Brazil’s president likes to recount with gusto the day he said no to the International Monetary Fund. “I called [Rodrigo] de Rato, [managing director] at the IMF and told him I didn’t want his money. He was really upset,” Lula laughs. “Rato said: ‘But lending to Brazil is really important to me.’” (Barber, L., Wheatley, J. (2009). The Real Reward, Financial Times,

What lies behind the bold rhetoric? Lula's occasional outburst against "Western-dominated" international institutions and evil "blond and blue-eyed bankers" must be seen in the domestic context.¹¹⁸⁶ This confrontational rhetoric is a concession for the left-leaning factions of Lula's government who feel betrayed by Lula's conservative economic policy at home. In addition, Brazil's international actions often do not match Lula's verbosity.

Brazil, above all, seeks to increase its visibility and influence. Brazil's goal to strengthen its voice in the international institutions can be seen as a consequence of that strategy. It also shows Brazil's willingness to engage in and strengthen existing multilateral development regimes, although most of Brazil's aid expenditures are still disbursed bilaterally. This is mostly because Brazilian aid is given for economic and political reasons, and the political and economic impact of bilateral aid (international political gain and economic gain for Brazilian economic interests) is considered larger and more direct than multilateral aid.

Judging from the statements made during the G20-summit in Pittsburgh in late September and the Annual IMF and World Bank Meeting in Istanbul early October 2009, Brazil's and the other emerging powers' arguments about reform are unlikely to go unheard.¹¹⁸⁷ While the changes will not take effect before 2011, developing countries' voting share in both institutions is set to increase, promising Brazil's more active engagement in both the IMF and the World Bank.

3.2.1.1. BRAZIL AND THE IMF

This section will give a brief overview of Brazil's stance towards the IMF. This concerns Brazil's views on the distribution of power and the way the fund operates.

Today's International Monetary Fund is very different from the organization its founders envisioned in 1944. It was conceived as an institution to monitor exchange rates and provide currency to support states through balance-of-payments difficulties.¹¹⁸⁸ Yet, as Barnett and Finnemore point out, the IMF's failure to help states adequately paradoxically justified its expansion, culminating in sweeping structural interventions. Through technical advice and conditionalities tied to loans, the IMF has become deeply involved in members' domestic affairs in a way specifically rejected by its founders.¹¹⁸⁹

In late 2007, prior to the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, analysts across the world openly asked whether the IMF was a superfluous organization.¹¹⁹⁰ In a world where IMF lending seemed to be largely unnecessary due to large amounts of private

November 8, 2009; <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a1ed46c2-cc8d-11de-8e30-00144feabdc0.html> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

¹¹⁸⁶ Nossa, L. (2009). Lula diz que crise é causada por 'gente branca de olhos azuis', Estado de São Paulo, March 26, 2009, <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/economia,crise-foi-causada-por-gente-branca-e-de-olhos-azuis-diz-lula,345255,0.htm> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

¹¹⁸⁷ Dervis, K. (2009). The G-20, the "Istanbul Decisions" and the Way Forward; Brookings, 2009. http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1008_g20_istanbul_dervis.aspx (accessed May 15, 2010)

¹¹⁸⁸ Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004

¹¹⁸⁹ Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004

¹¹⁹⁰ Economist correspondent (2009). Back from the dead, The Economist, September 17, 2009

capital, ever fewer governments paid attention to its advice.¹¹⁹¹ Another problem was that the IMF's reputation remained tarnished from botched attempts to stabilize several developing countries, such as Argentina, Zambia and Pakistan¹¹⁹², and the IMF was criticized for “overdoing it” by imposing too many major structural and institutional reforms.¹¹⁹³ Still today, the IMF's image in Argentina is tainted, and populist politicians across Latin America (including Brazil) frequently speak out against it to shore up support, as many citizens associate the IMF's involvement with the financial collapse in 2001.¹¹⁹⁴ As an official at Brazil's Finance Ministry pointed out, there still is a stigma attached to IMF loans¹¹⁹⁵- and, as a consequence, to the institution itself. In this regard, Brazil has been very much aligned with the rest of the region.¹¹⁹⁶

The crisis has brought radical change. Under the leadership of Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the IMF came “back from the dead”, having increased lending considerably, and planning to increase the fund's size even more, to around 2 trillion dollars, to become a credible lender of last resort.¹¹⁹⁷

Understanding how the Brazilian government thinks of the IMF helps us put Brazil's behavior into context. President Lula's Workers Party (PT) has traditionally seen the IMF as a tool used by “Western imperialists” to control developing countries. This opinion is not restricted to the left-leaning parties, and a negative view of the IMF has been historically endemic among Brazil's political elites.¹¹⁹⁸ Lula has strong negative memories of Brazil's experience as an IMF lender, calling it “traumatic to see, for almost two decades, IMF bureaucrats telling us what we should do”¹¹⁹⁹ This fuelled fear in a country that is historically concerned about attacks on its sovereignty - be it in the form of internationalizing the Amazon forest, or in the form of strings attached to IMF loans.¹²⁰⁰

The old rhetoric remains, at least among PT politicians, but today, Brazil regards the IMF as an important and necessary tool to stabilize the world economy. This acknowledgement can best be explained by Brazil's strong insertion in the world economy, and a resulting interest in global financial stability. As recently as March 1999, Michael Reid, wrote that

¹¹⁹¹ Ambrose, S. (2010). IMF Confidence Crisis, Foreign Policy in Focus, Institute of Policy Studies, April 12, 2007; http://www.fpif.org/articles/imf_confidence_crisis (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹¹⁹² Khan, S.R. (2002). IMF Conditions Stunt Growth, Economic and Political Weekly, Volume 37, November 29, 2002

¹¹⁹³ Feldstein, M. (1998). Refocusing the IMF, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, pp. 20-33, March/April 1998

¹¹⁹⁴ Llana, Sara Miller and Matthew Clark (2007). Latin America's answer to the World Bank and IMF. Christian Science Monitor, July 12, 2007

¹¹⁹⁵ Interview, Brazilian Finance Ministry, March 26, 2010. See also Zaidi, S. A. (1999). IMF Package: Nothing to celebrate, Economic and Political Weekly, Volume 34, Number 8 February 20, 1999

¹¹⁹⁶ Brazil's changed relationship to the IMF is certainly not representative of the region. In Argentina, the IMF continues to be fiercely criticized, despite an emerging global consensus that a credible lender of last resort is necessary.

¹¹⁹⁷ Economist Correspondent (2009). Back from the dead, The Economist, September 17, 2009

¹¹⁹⁸ In 1986, for example, Brazil's President Sarney laid out his strategic plan and described under how much pressure he was due to the IMF'. (Sarney, José. Brazil: A President's Story. Vol. 65, No. 1, Foreign Affairs, 1986)

¹¹⁹⁹ Junior, C. (2009). Lula diz que FMI não deve mais ditar regras a países devedores, Folha de São Paulo, April 15, 2009; <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u550953.shtml> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

¹²⁰⁰ Busch, Alexander (2009). Wirtschaftsmacht Brasilien, München: Hanser Verlag, 2009

[Brazil's] currency has lost about 35% against the dollar, and nobody knows yet whether that is the end of the slide. A recession that was already under way has deepened, and inflation is rising once again. Although the government has reached a new agreement with the IMF, it faces a battle to regain the confidence of the financial markets. Fears that private companies, or even the government, might default on debts have receded but not disappeared.¹²⁰¹

After the turn of the century, Brazil obtained a credit line of over 30 billion dollars, the biggest in IMF history¹²⁰², to avoid a looming default on its debt.¹²⁰³ Furthermore, its very interest in IMF reform and more voting shares is a strong signal that Brazil acknowledges the IMF's relevance as a credible lender of last resort in the future.¹²⁰⁴ Considering Krasner's definition of international institutions (principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures), it becomes obvious that Brazil agrees with the IMF's fundamental principles. Brazil's policy is thus by no means aligned with that of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, who aims to replace the fund with a home-grown model, the Bank of the South.¹²⁰⁵

In Istanbul, during the yearly IMF gathering in October 2009, Brazil's finance minister Guido Mantega announced that Brazil would spend \$10 billion dollars (€6.8 billion) to buy International Monetary Fund bonds to boost the fund's resources. Ahead of the meeting in Istanbul, Mantega underlined the importance of this decision for Brazil, noting it was a "historic moment for us. It is the first time in history that Brazil is lending resources to the IMF and therefore to the international community", stressing that Brazil's contribution "is an expression of Brazil's willingness to play a greater role in the fund and support the institution and its objectives."¹²⁰⁶ Brazil's commitment is likely to alter the way the world perceives Brazil, and the way Brazil perceives itself. For example, it may accelerate the reduction of aid given by rich countries to Brazil, as they will increasingly regard Brazil as a "donor country". In Germany, for example, some policy makers have questioned the need to provide development aid to emerging powers such as Brazil, India and China.¹²⁰⁷

¹²⁰¹ Reid, Michael (1999). The devaluing of a Presidency. *The Economist*. March 25, 1999

¹²⁰² Hakim, Peter (2004). The reluctant partner. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 1, January/February 2004

¹²⁰³ Brazil repaid 15.57 billion dollars in December 2005 to settle its debt two years ahead of schedule

¹²⁰⁴ During the IMF meeting in Istanbul in early October, the Group of 24, which includes Brazil, said that the IMF should assume a stronger role and make more use of the SDRs (Special Drawing Rights). (Wall Street Journal Correspondent (2009). G-24: Supports Greater Role For IMF And Its SDRs. *Wall Street Journal*, October 3, 2009)

¹²⁰⁵ The Bank of the South (Banco del Sur in Spanish) is a monetary fund and lending organization first proposed by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, which aims to focus on poverty reduction. Lula has frequently supported the idea of the Bank of the South, which is ideologically opposed to the Bretton Woods institutions, yet this support is likely to remain rhetorical, and Lula does not consider the Bank of the South to be of major strategic importance similar to the IMF.

¹²⁰⁶ Rodriguez, A. (2009). Brazil joins emerging-nation boost to IMF funds, *Agence France Presse*, October 5, 2009; <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hQ8r19HEHMHVd2zurIgbCuZhvqQ> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

¹²⁰⁷ For example, Wolff, P. (2009). Traditionelle Entwicklungshilfe ist nicht mehr zeitgemäß, *Die Zeit*, <http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2010-05/entwicklungshilfe-modern> (accessed May 15, 2009), *Handelsblatt Correspondent* (2009). Fricke: Keine Entwicklungshilfe für China, <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/fricke-keine-entwicklungshilfe-fuer-china;2119466> (accessed May 15, 2010)

At the same time, the Brazilian government claims it is determined to alter the way the fund operates in the future (Krasner's decision-making procedures), and it has tied its promise to become a lender to the rapid implementation of reform. Brazil demands change in two areas. First, Brazil believes it is necessary to enhance emerging powers' weight in the decision making process, and to reduce richer countries' influence. Brazil consequently presses for a change of the IMF quotas.¹²⁰⁸ Quotas determine voting shares in the fund, and the contributions countries make to it. Brazil wants power to be taken away from European countries, increasing emerging powers' weight.¹²⁰⁹ The fact that Belgium has more votes than Brazil¹²¹⁰ is an oft-cited fact in the Brazilian media that symbolizes Brazil's discontent with the current *modus operandi*. In Istanbul, developed nations proposed to increase developing countries' voting share in the IMF by 5%, which would bring the developing countries' total share to 48%.¹²¹¹ It is unclear at this point whether this increase will be sufficient for Brazil and the other developing nations. It would mean an increase of Brazil's share from 1.38% to 1.72%. The United States' share would decrease from 16.77% to 16.73%, yet the US' ability to block proposals would be maintained. Prior to the meeting, the G24, which includes emerging and developing countries from Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia, called for a commitment to shift 7 percent of quota shares from rich to developing countries, which would give them an equal say with the industrialized world.¹²¹²

During the G20 summit in South Korea in October 2010, IMF head Dominique Strauss-Kahn announced that European countries would give up two of their eight seats to

¹²⁰⁸ In his speech, Mantega stressed that the next quota review should at least double the overall size of quotas. Quotas, not borrowing arrangements, should be the main source of funding for the IMF. Mantega, Guido (2009). Statement of Mr. Guido Mantega, Finance Minister of Brazil. International and Financial Committee, Istanbul, October 4, 2009

<http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/releases/2009/outubro/Guido-Mantega-Statement-IMFC-04-10.pdf> (accessed December 24, 2009)

¹²⁰⁹ Quota subscriptions generate most of the IMF's financial resources. Each member country of the IMF is assigned a quota, based broadly on its relative size in the world economy. A member's quota determines its maximum financial commitment to the IMF and its voting power, and has a bearing on its access to IMF financing. The IMF's Board of Governors conducts general quota reviews at regular intervals (usually every five years). Any changes in quotas must be approved by an 85 percent majority. There are two main issues addressed in a general quota review: the size of an overall increase and the distribution of the increase among the members. First, a general quota review allows the IMF to assess the adequacy of quotas both in terms of members' balance of payments financing needs and in terms of its own ability to help meet those needs. Second, a general review allows for increases in members' quotas to reflect changes in their relative positions in the world economy. The Thirteenth General Review was concluded on January 28, 2008 with no proposal by the Board of Governors to increase quotas. (www.imf.org) See also: Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). *Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004

¹²¹⁰ Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). *Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004

¹²¹¹ Cermak, C. (2009). "G-innovations": Major powers jockey for influence, *Earth Times*, October 4, 2009; <http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/288641,g-innovations-major-powers-jockey-for-influence--feature.html> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

¹²¹² The Executive Board (the Board) is responsible for conducting the day-to-day business of the IMF. It is composed of 24 Directors, who are appointed or elected by member countries or by groups of countries, and the Managing Director, who serves as its Chairman. The United States, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom appoint their directors, the other directors are elected and usually represent several countries, such as Adarsh Kishore from India, who represents Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and India. (www.imf.org)

better reflect the newfound power of emerging powers. These measures are likely to be ratified by the IMF by late 2011.¹²¹³

In addition, the Brazilian government aims to reduce the percentage of votes needed to ratify the IMF's most important decisions. Currently, 85% are needed. The goal is to break the United States' ability to veto any crucial vote with its 17% share. Breaking the US veto power would be an additional step to reduce the established powers' grip on the fund.¹²¹⁴

In this context, Brazil largely agrees with the IMF-appointment committee headed by South Africa's then Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel, who reported to the fund on March 24th, 2009 on how to enhance the Fund's capacity.¹²¹⁵ The Brazilian government has also repeatedly criticized the unwritten rule that a European and an American head the IMF and the World Bank, respectively. When rumors emerged in July 2009 that the Obama administration had informally asked President Lula to head the World Bank, Brazil's leader stated that he would be honored to take on the post. He is since said to have changed his mind, hoping to succeed Ban Ki-moon as United Nations Secretary General. No matter what Lula's personal ambitions are, Brazil will continue to press for a selection process that chooses the IMF leadership irrespective of nationality.

The second area where Brazil sees the need for reform is the lending procedure. Brazil believes in a more "recipient-friendly" lending process, envisioning a less intrusive process with fewer "strings attached", i.e., fewer policy conditionalities.¹²¹⁶ However, the Brazilian government has been rather vague about how exactly things should be changed.¹²¹⁷ In this regard, Brazil remains a developing country in spirit, even though it has pledged to give the fund 10 billion dollars, thus becoming - for the first time in history - a lender to the IMF. Commenting on Brazil's new role in the IMF, President Lula stressed that "as we turned from debtors into international creditors... we decided to contribute resources for the IMF to loan money to poor countries, free of unacceptable conditionalities imposed in the past."¹²¹⁸ Such demands are not new. In fact, the IMF has already modified the way it imposes conditions on its borrowers. In the 1990s, the fund was known to micromanage economic policy in debtor countries and to impose reform in areas that were not directly related to economic growth. In 2002, under Horst Köhler's leadership, new guidelines were published to operate in a less invasive manner. While loans will always have to be attached to conditions, the involvement of Brazil and other emerging markets may further dilute conditionalities, in

¹²¹³ Song Jung-a (2010). G20 agrees historic reform of IMF, *Financial Times*, October 23, 2010

¹²¹⁴ Aside from a country's votes, the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) are important because they represent a potential claim on other countries' freely usable currency reserves, for which they can be exchanged. Alternatively, countries with robust finances can buy SDRs from countries which are in need of hard currency. If the IMF issues new SDRs, it increases countries' foreign reserves without needing to be lent. (www.imf.org)

¹²¹⁵ Manuel, Trevor (2009). Cover letter to Mr. Dominique Strauss-Kahn. 24.3.2009; www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2009/govref/032409n.pdf (accessed July 19 2010)

¹²¹⁶ Rowlands, Dane (2008). *Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: A Synthesis Report*, Partnership and Business Development Division, IDRC, January 2008

¹²¹⁷ It must be noted here that there have been no specific proposals put forward by the Brazilian government in this regard. Evidence for this policy position is based on two conversations with Brazilian diplomats and on declarations by politicians.

¹²¹⁸ da Silva, Luiz Inácio (2009). Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 23.9.2009; http://www.un.org/ga/64/generaldebate/pdf/BR_en.pdf (accessed July 19, 2010)

the hope of making them more effective. Brazil called the FCL (Flexible Credit Line), a tool recently created by the IMF with few strings attached, a “breakthrough”.¹²¹⁹

Brazil’s motivations to increase developing countries’ weight in the IMF and insistence on reducing the amount of conditionalities attached to IMF loans are based on power politics, its own experience as an IMF recipient, and the genuine belief that emerging countries can help the Fund increase its legitimacy. Despite continuing former President Cardoso’s conservative economic policies, the Lula administration has introduced a leftist ideology in its foreign policy outlook. In order to gain more leeway with regard to (conservative) internal policies, Lula has made significant concessions in the area of foreign policy, allowing left-leaning perspectives to dominate Itamaraty, the foreign ministry.

While rhetoric is usually more radical than actual policy, the result has been a marked shift. Under Cardoso, Brazil’s major allies were, aside from Argentina, the United States and the European Union. While Lula never openly broke with the richer countries, his government has changed focus and sought to align with other developing countries. The objective to increase Brazil’s weight on the international stage remained unchanged, but the strategy employed to achieve this goal changed radically. Rather than seeking rapprochement to the United States and Europe, Lula attempted to maximize benefits by positioning Brazil as the “leader of the South”¹²²⁰, aligning with other developing countries. Lula’s travels have been indicative of this shift of focus. Lula has travelled to Africa and Asia more frequently than any other President in history.

This change towards the left has been criticized by foreign policy advisors of the Cardoso administration and by Mr. Cardoso himself. Their major criticism is that Lula’s foreign policy, which resulted in the establishment of the “South-South diplomacy”, is based on a somewhat ideologized and antiquated dichotomy of “first world vs. third world”, or “us vs. them”. Several analysts¹²²¹ have therefore described Lula’s foreign policy outlook as “third worldish”, showing that while the Workers’ Party modernized its views in several areas such as economic management, its foreign policy outlook remains that of the 1960s and 70s, when the term “third world” was still in use. Lula’s opponents, furthermore, ascribe his apparent foreign policy successes as a result not of his strategy, but of Brazil’s economic growth, the result of Cardoso’s clever policies in the 1990s.¹²²²

Brazilian policy makers are right to believe that the IMF can be strengthened and made more effective if developing countries were to participate more in decision making. This position is tied to a general interest in the democratization of global governance and the

¹²¹⁹ Mantega, Guido (2009). Statement, International and Financial Committee, Istanbul, October 4, 2009; <http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/releases/2009/outubro/Guido-Mantega-Statement-IMFC-04-10.pdf> (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹²²⁰ Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2010). *Brazil’s Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, Lanham (MD): Lexington Books

¹²²¹ Hurrell, Andrew and Narlikar, Amrita (2006). *A New Politics of Confrontation? Brazil and India in Multilateral Trade Negotiations*. *Global Society*, Volume 20 (4), 2006, pp. 415-433

¹²²² The opposition is certainly right to point out that the economic rationale for Lula’s alignment with the South is questionable, as economic relations with developing countries are, with the exception of China, still far below those with the United States and Europe. Lula’s “South-South diplomacy” explains why Brazil not only fought for its own better representation, but also that of other developing nations. But from a realist perspective, aligning with other emerging countries such as India increases Brazil’s clout during negotiations.

belief that a more balanced global leadership is more successful at tackling the world's most pressing issues.¹²²³ Brazil has long argued that developing countries' contributions, such as from Brazil, Russia, India and China, will boost the fund's legitimacy and its ability to convince countries in trouble to adopt its recommendations.¹²²⁴ Brazil has been pushing for reform for several years.¹²²⁵ In 2006, the Medium Term Strategy was passed, which includes changes in IMF governance to enhance the role of developing countries in the institution's decision-making process - yet Brazil did not receive a higher share of votes. While Brazil feels well protected from financial disaster at this moment, its recent memory of the rescue by the IMF certainly added to the conviction that a strong lender of last resort can provide a useful safety net in rough times. As the Brazilian economy is more and more open and intertwined with the global economy, and as more Brazilian multinationals venture out into the world, Brazil has an increasingly strong interest in global financial stability, something the IMF contributes to.¹²²⁶

In conclusion, the Brazilian government strongly believes in the future of the IMF, and in its ability to help prevent further financial crises. The Brazilian government's strategy is a clear case of revisionist integration as it accepts the IMF's principles, but seeks to change its rules and decision-making procedures. The Brazilian government wants the IMF to become a credible lender of last resort, a role the IMF had temporarily lost prior to the economic crisis in 2008. The IMF emerged from the meetings in Istanbul with a promised increase of its capital, also thanks to developing countries such as Brazil. At the same time, the Brazilian government is committed to increasing its own role and that of other developing countries in the IMF decision making process. European countries are likely to be most affected by Brazil's growing role in these institutions. Proposals by Brazil carry with them a loss of power for European nations because changing voting rights is, by definition, a zero-sum game. If the Brazilian economy continues to grow, so will Brazil's demands for more weight in the IMF.

Brazil also claims it wants the IMF to operate less invasively. Rather than insisting on fundamental changes in economic and institutional structures, Brazil envisions credits to be more flexible, with fewer conditions attached. One possibility is to tie loans to macroeconomic goals only, and leave it to the recipient to design the necessary changes. Brazil's proposition remains vague, however, and it is unclear whether Brazil will bring forward any specific proposals. In this context, when analyzing Brazil's reform proposals, one must carefully assess how much Brazil is really interested in actual change in procedure, and in how far Brazil pushes for reform in order to make a broader argument about an unjust distribution of power in today's international institutions.¹²²⁷ While Brazil may be genuinely

¹²²³ During the meeting in Istanbul, Finance Minister Mantega stressed that the fund was "ill-prepared to face the challenges of the current economic crisis." (Mantega 2009)

¹²²⁴ Mantega, Guido (2009). Statement, International and Financial Committee, Istanbul, October 4, 2009; <http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/releases/2009/outubro/Guido-Mantega-Statement-IMFC-04-10.pdf> (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹²²⁵ Overseas Development Institute (ODI), (2007): Closing the deal: IMF Reform in 2007, Briefing Paper, <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/388.pdf> (accessed May 15, 2010)

¹²²⁶ Busch, Alexander (2009). *Wirtschaftsmacht Brasilien*. München: Hanser Verlag, 2009

¹²²⁷ Spektor, Matias (2010). How to read Brazil's Stance on Iran?, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 2010 http://www.cfr.org/publication/21576/how_to_read_brazils_stance_on_iran.html (accessed May 15, 2010)

interested in improving the IMF's work, Brazil has identified the IMF as a medium of power and influence, and its principal goal is therefore better representation.

2.3.1.2. BRAZIL AND THE WORLD BANK

As this section will show, there are similarities between Brazil's strategy towards the IMF and the World Bank- Brazil seeks changes in both the internal distribution of power in the organization and the way the World Bank operates. The International Monetary Fund has received widespread attention over the past year due to its role as a financial fire fighter in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The World Bank finances more tangible projects which are usually less politicized.¹²²⁸

Brazil and the World Bank have a long history of collaboration until this day. The World Bank started to finance public sector projects in Brazil in the late 1940s, soon after the institution's creation. In the 1970s, the Bank turned into one of the largest funding sources of social projects in Brazil.¹²²⁹ The Bank continues to play an important role in Brazil today. For example, the Bank will help Brazil accelerate \$11.1 billion in mostly infrastructure investments needed to host the Olympic Games (World Bank 2009). In addition, the World Bank will lend the state of Rio de Janeiro \$212 million to help the state government purchase 30 trains for its rail network, and \$480 million to improve public administration of the health and education systems.¹²³⁰

Similar to its sister organization, the IMF, the World Bank has been slow to adapt to changing global economic realities by changing its decision-making structures. It remains dominated by rich and established countries.¹²³¹ The United States is the Bank's principal paymaster, and there is an unwritten rule that the White House can appoint the World Bank's President. Critics claim Europe is overrepresented: Eight to nine members of the 24-member executive board are Europeans. 60% of the executive directors are from the world's industrialized countries, and the US government, with close to 20% of the vote, can veto important decisions, which require an 85% majority. The 46 Sub-Saharan African members together control only 8% of the board's total voting power, with two seats.

In yet another parallel to the IMF, where South Africa's former Finance Minister Trevor Manuel headed an independent commission to propose reforms, World Bank President Robert Zoellick appointed a high-level commission to improve the Bank's performance. The commission was headed by Mexico's former President Zedillo, and it included, among others, Brazil's former Central Bank Chief Armínio Fraga, one of Brazil's most influential economists.¹²³² Similar to the Manuel Report, the Zedillo Commission called for sweeping changes to reflect the world's new economic order. Presenting the proposal to

¹²²⁸ Both in Brazil and in the world.

¹²²⁹ Fonseca, M. (1998) O Banco Mundial como referência para a justiça social no terceiro mundo: evidências do caso brasileiro, *Revista da Faculdade de Educação*, Rev. Fac. Educ. vol.24 n.1 São Paulo Jan./Jun. 1998

¹²³⁰ Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Brief, 2009; <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/0,,contentMDK:20340156~menuPK:258561~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258554,00.html> (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹²³¹ Einhorn, J. (2006). *Reforming the World Bank*. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No.1, January/ February 2006

¹²³² Busch, Alexander (2009). *Wirtschaftsmacht Brasilien*. München: Hanser Verlag, 2009

Zoellick, Zedillo said that the decision-making process was too exclusive, and that European countries' influence in the executive board needed to be reduced- to four or five seats. The report also recommends replacing the Executive Board with a "World Bank Board", whose members should hold ministerial or vice-ministerial rank.¹²³³ The report further suggests lowering the majority needed on major decisions to end America's ability to veto decisions. Finally, it argues that the selection process for the World Bank's leadership position should not be based on nationality, but on merit.¹²³⁴ While there has been no explicit endorsement of the entire report, Brazil's rhetoric indicates that the Brazilian government's position on World Bank reform is largely in line with that of the Zedillo Report, supporting all the items listed in the Zedillo Report.¹²³⁵

During the recent G20 Summit in Pittsburgh, heads of governments agreed to shift voting power within the World Bank, increasing developing countries' weight by 3%. The Brazilian government does not regard this as sufficient, but rather as a first step towards a long term reform process. Prior to the summit, Brazil had asked for a bigger increase.¹²³⁶

While Lula frequently berates the World Bank¹²³⁷, he also seeks to strengthen it. This strategy points to a struggle within the ruling Workers' Party (PT), which the pragmatists are winning. The party's base adheres to traditional leftist views and often strongly disagrees with Lula's conservative economic policies, yet Lula is pragmatist enough to understand that Brazil is better served by continuing former Presidents Cardoso's economic policies. Several analysts argue that Lula attempts to compensate and satisfy his left-leaning party members by using a foreign policy rhetoric reminiscent of the "good old days" when the PT was still genuinely fighting for socialism similar to that in Cuba.¹²³⁸ President Lula frequently uses harsh rhetoric against the World Bank, sometimes calling it an "evil western institution". For example, in a typical speech in early 2009, Lula criticized the World Bank for the way it was handling the crisis: "It seems like those institutions, which knew everything when we had a crisis, don't know anything when the crisis is happening there (in the rich world). Or, at least it is not permitted to give their advice; with the arrogance they do it here."¹²³⁹ Yet, in such

¹²³³ Zedillo, E. (2009). *Repowering the World Bank for the 21st Century*. Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2009

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/WBGovernanceCOMMISSIONREPORT.pdf> (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹²³⁴ Linn, J. (2009). *World Bank Reform: Proposals for the next G20-summit*, Brookings, 2009 http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0225_world_bank_linn/0225_world_bank_linn.ashx (accessed May 15, 2010)

¹²³⁵ Several Brazilian diplomats have confirmed this assumption during interviews for this paper. (Phone interviews, July 1, July 1,4 2010, and Interviews, May 22, 2010, Brazilian Foreign Ministry)

¹²³⁶ Mantega, Guido (2009). Statement, International and Financial Committee, Istanbul, October 4, 2009; <http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/releases/2009/outubro/Guido-Mantega-Statement-IMFC-04-10.pdf> (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹²³⁷ Criticism of the World Bank is by no means limited to Brazil and India. Many prominent former World Bank employees, such as Martin Wolf, William Easterly, and Joseph Stiglitz have turned against the Bank after leaving it. (Wolf, Martin (2004). *Why globalization works*. New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 2004); Easterly, William (2007). *The White Man's Burden*. New York: Penguin Book, 2007; Stiglitz, M. (1998). *Globalization and its Discontents*, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1998

¹²³⁸ Interview with Rogério Schmitt, Political Analyst, Center for Public Leadership, São Paulo, November 11, 2009

¹²³⁹ Aquino, Y. (2009). *Lula critica FMI e Bird por não interferirem em países desenvolvidos durante crise*, Agência Brasil, January 12, 2009; http://www.sintectrj.org.br/carrega_PDF//janeiro2009.pdf (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

cases, he is pandering to leftist or anti-Western factions in his government and the population. In reality, Brazil pursued conservative economic policies (de Onis 2008), and its interest in the World Bank's reform process underlines its belief in the usefulness and future of the organization to maintain financial stability, help transition countries join the international economy, and fight poverty. The US and European governments are therefore right not to take Lula's at times anti-Western comments too seriously, as they are clearly directed towards certain domestic groups.

Brazilian policy makers believe that the developing countries' lack of participation in the decision-making process reduces the World Bank's legitimacy. However, that does not mean that Brazil is on a confrontational course against the World Bank - quite the opposite. Rather than avoiding contact with the Bank, Brazil is keen to assume more responsibility. Brazil's position thus strongly differs from that of Venezuela and Ecuador, which have attempted to take concerted action against the World Bank. In April 2007, Ecuador's President Rafael Correa expelled the World Bank representative from the country. In the same month, Venezuela's President Chavez announced his country's withdrawal from both the IMF and the World Bank.¹²⁴⁰ Venezuela was later forced to reverse its decision to prevent default clauses in the country's sovereign bonds.

Brazil's proposals of how to reform the World Bank have been largely focused on issues related to the organization's decision making procedure. Its strategy therefore constitutes revisionist integration. Yet, judging from the comments made by Brazilian policymakers about pushing for IMF loans with fewer strings attached, it is likely that this policy also affects Brazil's views on how the World Bank should operate: less invasive and "less arrogant"¹²⁴¹ although it is somewhat unclear what exactly that means, and there have been no specific World Bank proposals put forward by the Brazilian government in this regard. There is thus some gap between Brazil's rhetoric and its actual behavior with regard to World Bank Reform. Brazilian officials, however, have pointed out that they prefer to exert pressure together with other countries, rather than assume responsibility and stick out as the leader, to not undermine the overall effort to improve developing countries' weight. Brazil's view on the World Bank is therefore aligned with that of the IMF. It regard the World Bank as a crucial institution with an important role in the context of facing global development challenges. Yet, in order for the Bank to assume that role, Brazil thinks it should give developing nations a greater say. Brazil's behavior towards the Bank is thus a classic example of revisionist integration.

¹²⁴⁰ Buncombe, A. (2009). Chavez pulls out of IMF and World Bank, *The Independent*, May 2, 2007; <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/chavez-pulls-out-of-imf-and-world-bank-447087.html> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

¹²⁴¹ For example, see Folha de São Paulo Correspondent (2009). Lula pede reforma internacional em discurso à ONU. *Folha de São Paulo*, October 23, 2009. Contrary to recipients of private creditors, those who make use of World Bank loans must usually be careful not to destroy the environment, or uproot indigenous peoples unfairly.

3.2.2. *India and Bretton Woods*

3.2.2.1. INDIA AND THE IMF

India's noteworthy transition from IMF recipient to IMF lender has important implications for India's international role, which will be studied in this section.

Similar to Brazil, India has been quite outspoken about its desire to reform the Bretton Woods Institutions. During the annual IMF and World Bank meeting in Istanbul in early October 2009, the Indian press cheered on as Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee made his case for “far-reaching changes” in the governance structure of financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, to “reflect the changing dynamics of the world economy.”¹²⁴² India has called for the quota shares of developing countries to be raised since 2003. To strengthen its claim, India wrote off Rs1 billion (\$24 million) owed to it by seven Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Guyana, Nicaragua, Ghana and Uganda).¹²⁴³

According to the World Bank, even before the crisis, nearly three-fifths of the growth in global GDP was created in India and China alone. In 2009, most of the global growth has occurred in emerging economies.¹²⁴⁴ While the case for reform seemed evident to Indian policy makers all along, they have identified the crisis as an opportunity to strengthen their argument. The statements made by several officials from developed countries, such as US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, about the need for reform have been interpreted in India as a sign that change is underway. With 1.89% of total voting rights at the IMF, India feels its newly found economic strength is not adequately reflected. As in Brazil, the fact that small countries such as the Netherlands or Belgium have more votes than India is an often used argument to symbolize the inequality and of the Bretton Woods institutions.¹²⁴⁵ Indian newspapers often write that “the rich countries” or simply “the West” are not ready to accept the fact that they are losing power.¹²⁴⁶

The Indian government has proposed a quota shift of 7% towards the developing countries during the recent IMF meeting in Istanbul motivated by national interest and a genuine belief that greater legitimacy and credibility will increase the IMF's effectiveness.¹²⁴⁷

¹²⁴² For example, see: The Hindu Correspondent (2009). India pitches for governance reforms in IMF, World Bank. The Hindu, October 7, 2009

¹²⁴³ Price, G. (2005). Diversity in donorship: the changing landscape of official humanitarian aid, Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI, September 2005

¹²⁴⁴ International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2010): IMF Data Mapper; <http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php>, (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹²⁴⁵ Gurumurthi, S. (2006): IMF quota formula needs reality check, The Hindu, September 23, 2006; <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2006/09/23/stories/2006092300821000.htm> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

¹²⁴⁶ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

¹²⁴⁷ Mukherjee, P. (2009). Statement by the Governor of the Bank and the Fund for India, at the Joint Annual Discussion, Board of Governors, 2009 Annual Meetings, Istanbul; <http://www.imf.org/external/am/2009/speeches/pr25e.pdf> (accessed July 19, 2010)

Yet, it has also conceded that this goal could be achieved over several years, which indicates that India will be content with the promised 5% increase for now.¹²⁴⁸

Over the past decades, the IMF has played an important and often controversial role in Indian politics. The IMF loan agreement and the World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) signed in December 1991 had severe social consequences. It forced India to cut social programs (including food subsidies) and scrap infrastructure projects.¹²⁴⁹ Its economic impact was contentious, especially for the poor, as food prices temporarily spiked, and wages decreased. The IMF's influence in the early nineties was so palpable that one economist claimed that "while the rajputs and princely states had a fair degree of autonomy in relation to the British colonial government (...), under IMF-Worldbank tutelage, the union minister of finance reports directly to 1818 H Street NW, Washington, D.C., bypassing the parliament and the democratic process".¹²⁵⁰ In a similar fashion, Joseph Stiglitz compared India's agreement to the IMF with the "surrender of Mahrajadas to the British".¹²⁵¹ The IMF's intervention created political tension, as several ministers of the Congress party spoke out against the IMF's austerity measures, which eroded their political support among the rural poor.

Despite these at times traumatic experiences, Manmohan Singh has achieved the improbable in more than a decade - first as Finance Minister and then as Prime Minister- and stabilized the economy and convinced the political establishment and the voters that the IMF is a functional organization, and that India can use the IMF as a vehicle to increase its power in the international arena. Rather than marking a stark turnaround, India's engagement with the IMF as a lender marks the culmination of Manmohan Singh's long and arduous travails, which includes offering painful truths and questioning long-held convictions. Admitting that both the socialist-leaning Nehruvian economic model and Gandhi's belief that small-unit rural production were the key to development have ultimately failed has been difficult in a country where the two are revered father figures.¹²⁵² Today the Indian government now strongly believes in the future of the IMF and wants to be a credible lender of last resort. The Singh government supports the recommendation brought forth by the commission headed by Trevor Manuel in March 2009. The commission, which included the Indian intellectual Amartya Sen, among other things recommended an adjustment of the fund's power structures to today's economic realities and the end of the United States' ability to veto important decisions.¹²⁵³ The commission recommended a reform of voice and vote share: The five biggest financial contributors should no longer have the right to appoint a Director to the

¹²⁴⁸ Similar to Brazil, India is willing to increase its financial contributions, but it insists that these increases must be reflected in voting power. But China, Brazil and India have said any increase in their contributions must be tied to changes in voting power. (Reuters Correspondent (2009). IMF members make little headway on power shift. Reuters, October 4, 2009)

¹²⁴⁹ Chossudovsky, M. (1993). India under IMF Rule, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 22 Issue 6, March 6, 1993

¹²⁵⁰ Chossudovsky, M. (1993). India under IMF Rule, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 22 Issue 6, March 6, 1993

¹²⁵¹ Stiglitz, M. (1998). *Globalization and its Discontents*, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1998

¹²⁵² Swaminathan, S. (2010). The Nehruvian paradigm - A sham homage, *The Hindu*; <http://www.hinduonnet.com/2000/12/06/stories/0606000c.htm>, accessed May 16, 2010 (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹²⁵³ Manuel, Trevor. (2009). Cover letter to Mr. Dominique Strauss-Kahn. 24.3.2009; www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2009/govref/032409n.pdf (accessed July 19 2010)

Executive Board (Voice reform), and the Directors representing the developing nations should have more weight (Vote reform).

As India's Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee laid out during the IMF meeting in Istanbul, India wants to ratify the April 2008 package of quota reforms early, calling it an "urgent requirement", and stating that the next quota review should be completed no later than January 2011.¹²⁵⁴ Finally, India is intent on preserving the Fund as a quota-based institution, pushing for a doubling of quotas. This position very much reflects the Indian government's conviction that it will grow significantly in the future, and that it believes in the possibility to assume an every greater role in the IMF.¹²⁵⁵

One of India's principal goals was already achieved during the G20 meeting in November 2008. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had repeatedly called for a more inclusive Financial Stability Forum (FSF), which until recently consisted of the finance ministers and central bankers of the rich world. The FSF has since been replaced by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which includes members from all the G20 members.

Yet, India's push for reform, which constitutes revisionist integration is set to continue. India's view on how to reform the IMF is, overall, good news for the fund. Rather than calling for other institutions to regulate the world economy, Indian policy makers do not tire to point out the importance of the IMF as a credible last lender. Manmohan Singh's recent experience as Finance Minister under IMF tutelage can only be helpful for an institution that seeks to reproduce India's economic success - which includes the move of millions from the lower to the middle classes - story all over the world.

3.2.2.2. INDIA AND THE WORLD BANK

When, in October 2009, India's External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna invited Chinese Foreign Minister Yan Jiechi and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Bangalore to speak about the future of the international architecture, the joint communiqué issued after the meeting emphasized that future global economic governance should ensure the "voice and representation of emerging market and developing countries".¹²⁵⁶ Among reforms of the IMF voting structure and question of who may host G20 summits, the ministers called for a 3% voting share increase for developing nations in the World Bank. This would elevate the developing nations share to 47%.¹²⁵⁷ "The ultimate goal" of governance structure reform of international institutions, including the World Bank, is the equitable distribution of voting power between developed countries and developing ones. This could only be achieved by

¹²⁵⁴ Mukherjee, P. (2009). Statement by the Governor of the Bank and the Fund for India, at the Joint Annual Discussion, Board of Governors, 2009 Annual Meetings, Istanbul; <http://www.imf.org/external/am/2009/speeches/pr25e.pdf> (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹²⁵⁵ Mukherjee, P. (2009). Statement by the Governor of the Bank and the Fund for India, at the Joint Annual Discussion, Board of Governors, 2009 Annual Meetings, Istanbul; <http://www.imf.org/external/am/2009/speeches/pr25e.pdf> (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹²⁵⁶ The Hindu Correspondent (2009). India, China, Russia seek equitable voting powers in IMF, WB, The Hindu, October 27, 2009; <http://beta.thehindu.com/business/Economy/article39463.ece> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

¹²⁵⁷ Zoellick, Robert (2009). Annual Meetings Opening Press Conference, October 2, 2009; <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,print:Y~isCURL:Y~contentMDK:22336798~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html> (accessed January 7, 2010)

increasing the developing nations' share by 6%, but even India's Finance Minister Mukherjee acknowledges that while this move would be transformational, it could take place in stages. Yet, patience can be expected to be limited because emerging countries are expected to grow faster than rich countries for the years to come, and small steps are unlikely to halt India's drive for significant reform. In 2008, the World Bank agreed to give sub-Saharan countries a greater share. Mr. Mukherjee says he was dismayed to see the shift to be of only 1.4 percent, too small to have an impact.¹²⁵⁸ Indian officials keep pointing out that they regard a country's GDP (using purchasing power parity) as a "main" reference point. In this dimension, India is already the fourth largest nation.¹²⁵⁹

Interestingly, this puts India in a difficult position, as it puts the country slightly at odds with the G77, a group of developing countries that requests a more fundamental change instead of seeing India become part of the powerful. While India has repeatedly assured that it will defend developing countries' views, it cannot hide the fact that it now requests the same privileges other rich countries such as the United States have secured for itself. India's developmentalist rhetoric is thus possibly aimed to appease other developing countries.

India's position reflects some discontent with the World Bank's governance structure, but it also makes clear that India sees the World Bank as a key institution to confront today's global development challenges. It is a classic case of revisionist integration. According to India's Finance Minister Mukherjee, the goal to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) suffered a setback during the financial crisis, and the demand for help from the World Bank was set to increase. A well-capitalized Bank is therefore necessary.¹²⁶⁰ India's view on how to reform the World Bank was strengthened by the Zedillo Commission, which presented its findings to World Bank President Zoellick in October 2009. The Commission, which included Montek Singh Ahluwalia, deputy chairman of India's planning commission, criticized the rich countries' grip on the organization's governance structure and recommended more power for the world's developing nations such as India. Among other issues, the final report called for the abolition of the United States' veto power and the American right to appoint the World Bank President.

Yet, India's claim to better representation is contrasted by its reluctance to use multilateral channels as a donor more fully. Most Indian assistance is bilateral, and while India prefers to receive aid to multilateral institutions, as a donor it prefers bilateral aid to increase political impact.¹²⁶¹ This represents an unresolved dilemma.

¹²⁵⁸ The Hindu Correspondent (2009). India pitches for governance reforms in IMF, World Bank, October 7, 2009; <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2009/10/07/stories/2009100751611500.htm> (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹²⁵⁹ International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2010): IMF Data Mapper; <http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php>, (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹²⁶⁰ Mukherjee, P. (2009). Statement by the Governor of the Bank and the Fund for India, at the Joint Annual Discussion, Board of Governors, 2009 Annual Meetings, Istanbul; <http://www.imf.org/external/am/2009/speeches/pr25e.pdf> (accessed July 19, 2010)

¹²⁶¹ In the case of Afghanistan, for example, India argues that bilateral aid is cheaper (avoiding administrative cost) and faster. India only uses bilateral aid channels if it has no knowledge of the environment in the recipient country- a rare event, given that India mostly channels its aid to neighbors in the region. (Price, G. (2005): Diversity in donorship: the changing landscape of official humanitarian aid, Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI, September 2005)

Despite its economic growth, India still takes loans from the World Bank, and it is expected to do so over the next decades. The World Bank strategy envisages total proposed lending to India of \$14 billion for 2009 - 2012. Due to the financial crisis, the Bank has agreed to provide an additional \$3 billion as part of the total financing envelope of \$14 billion to India.¹²⁶² In late September 2009, the World Bank signed a \$4.3 billion loan for the capitalization of public sector banks in India, the India Infrastructure Company Ltd and debt support for the Power Grid Corporation of India.¹²⁶³ India remains one of the principal recipients of World Bank loans.¹²⁶⁴

World Bank involvement in India is controversial and hotly debated in the Indian media. After the announcement of the new loans in September, several op-eds in leading newspapers denounced the World Bank loan as unnecessary.¹²⁶⁵ As *The Hindu* argued, the new World Bank loans were too expensive, they did not meet genuine requirements, and its conditionalities were unacceptable.¹²⁶⁶ This criticism is different from the latent howling of anti-capitalists such as Arundhati Roy, who accuses the World Bank of infiltrating into the Indian government, and of killing the poor through neo-imperialist policies.¹²⁶⁷

Rather, it may reflect a clash between two identities - that of a developing nation and that of a great power.¹²⁶⁸ Massive World Bank loans and the intervention that comes with it may be a normal phenomenon for a developing nation. India undoubtedly possesses the characteristics of a developing nation, such as extreme poverty, a high percentage of the population in rural areas, and low literacy rates. At the same time, it possesses several characteristics of a great power. India is a recognized nuclear power, it is one of the fastest growing markets in the world, and India's voice is increasingly recognized in international institutions. For a great power, meddling in internal matters by the World Bank seems wholly inadequate. This reflects India's engagement with the donor community in general - India regards intrusive development aid tied to conditions as humiliating. As a consequence, its bilateral aid programs tend to be based on more balanced donor-recipient relationships-although it must be noted that a higher percentage of Indian bilateral aid is tied to projects than aid from established donors. Rowland argues that "the poorer the donor, the less

¹²⁶² World Bank (2010). Country Lending Summaries, India. World Bank, 2010. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,countrycode:IN~cntry:82602~menuPK:64819306~pagePK:64392398~piPK:64392037~theSitePK:40941,00.html> (June 10, 2010)

¹²⁶³ Payls, P. (2009). World Bank Chief warns of funding constraints, Seattle Times, October 2, 2009; http://seattletimes.nwsourc.com/html/business/technology/2009986007_apworldconomyworldbank.html (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

¹²⁶⁴ World Bank (2010). Country Lending Summaries, India. World Bank, 2010. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,countrycode:IN~cntry:82602~menuPK:64819306~pagePK:64392398~piPK:64392037~theSitePK:40941,00.html> (June 10, 2010)

¹²⁶⁵ Kumar, S. (2009). Why India does not need the World Bank loan, October 7, 2009; <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2009/10/07/stories/2009100750350800.htm> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

¹²⁶⁶ Kumar, S. (2009). Why India does not need the World Bank loan, October 7, 2009; <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2009/10/07/stories/2009100750350800.htm> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

¹²⁶⁷ Roy, A. (2007). Speech in New Delhi, 2007; <http://www.worldbanktribunal.org/arundhati-findings.html> (accessed September 30, 2009)

¹²⁶⁸ Hurrell, Andrew (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global power: What space for would-be great powers?, *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1. January 24, 2006

intrusive its assistance programs.”¹²⁶⁹ This may explain India’s call for the World Bank to act less invasively.

The clash of identities points to a more fundamental struggle between the “two Indias” that have different interests. Within India, there are interest coalitions that are concerned primarily with addressing economic problems (e.g. low caste parties representing the poorest) and interest coalitions that support the promotion of India as a great power. One of the major issues here is the presence of an extremely large group of poor peasant farmers (approx. 300 million), who have limited empathy with promoting India as a big power given their still appalling economic circumstances. Poor Indians are still likely to vote on local issues, and often feel regional caste-based parties best represent their interests. These regional parties distinguish themselves by having no foreign policy position at all¹²⁷⁰, and they reflect the fact that poor Indians have different priorities than the country’s educated elites. While the elites would very much like to present themselves as a powerful country that needs no World Bank loans, ending the Bank’s involvement in India would not be politically feasible due to the interests of the poor and their political representatives. The Indian government is thus forced to attempt to position itself as a key player in the World Bank while still being one of the Bank’s principal clients for years to come. Yet, India’s two sides may be complementary to some degree as they strengthen India’s argument that developing countries need a better representation in the Bank’s decision-making bodies. India’s claim that it can offer a different perspective on the issue of poverty is real, and India has a point that the World Bank is likely to gain from a greater Indian representation. Out of necessity, this constellation has shaped India’s policy approach towards the World Bank. In the next years, the Indian government under Manmohan Singh is likely to attempt to balance these two sets of interests by showing how India’s greater insertion and international engagement helps even the poorest. The key takeaway is that India regards a reformed World Bank as a crucial institution to deal with today’s global development challenges.

This analysis shows that, similar to Brazil, India’s strategy towards the Bretton Woods organizations can be best described as revisionist integration. Despite the reforms India calls for, its behavior clearly strengthens both the World Bank and the IMF. There is thus fundamental agreement with principles and norms, but a desire to change some specific rules and decision-making procedures still exists, especially regarding quota shares and the distribution of votes between developed and developing countries.

¹²⁶⁹ Rowlands, Dane (2008). *Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: A Synthesis Report*, Partnership and Business Development Division, IDRC, January 2008

¹²⁷⁰ Luce, Edward (2007). *In spite of the Gods: The Rise of Modern India*, London: Brown Book Group, 2007

3.3. Case study III: Brazil, India and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

INTRODUCTION: THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (hereafter NPT), which came into force in 1970, seeks to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promote disarmament, and enhance the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Currently there are 189 states that have signed the treaty. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council are recognized Nuclear Weapon States (hereafter NWS), the other 184 states are Non-Nuclear Weapon States (hereafter NNWS).¹²⁷¹ To put the principle of non-proliferation into practice, the Treaty consists of three pillars (non-proliferation, disarmament, and right to peaceful use). All three pillars of the NPT are fraught with problems, and the treaty is facing growing pressures that may be eroding what used to be an effective barrier to nuclear arms proliferation.¹²⁷²

The first is non-proliferation, which bars NWS from transferring nuclear weapons or material to NNWS, and NNWS from receiving it, is becoming ever harder to implement in a world where several nuclear powers – India, Pakistan, Israel and soon North Korea – have not signed the treaty. The ease with which A.Q. Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist, was able to operate his illicit global nuclear market-place further points to the dangerously porous NPT.

The second pillar, disarmament, is an equally important bone of contention. It asks NWS to negotiate in good faith and move towards disarmament. Its ambiguous wording, however, has given NWS enough wriggle room to disarm very slowly, much to the criticism of the NNWS. From the very start, critics called the NPT unjust as it created two classes of states, the ‘haves’ and the have nots’.¹²⁷³ Jaswant Singh, former Minister for External Affairs of India, famously called the system established by the NPT “nuclear apartheid.”¹²⁷⁴ This has reduced the NWS’ legitimacy to assume leadership in matters of non-proliferation.¹²⁷⁵ The problem of disarmament is arguably most prominent in relation to the question that has divided the signatories from the outset: whether the NPT’s ultimate goal is nuclear disarmament, or whether NWS merely seek to reduce their stockpiles without ever engaging in the difficult process of absolute disarmament.¹²⁷⁶ There is thus a fundamental uncertainty with regard to one of principles of the treaty.

¹²⁷¹ The “cut-off date” was January 1967. The five permanent members of the UNSC had acquired nuclear weapons before the date and thus qualified as nuclear weapon states.

¹²⁷² Ruzicka, Jan, Nicholas J. Wheeler (2010). The puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. *International Affairs* 86: 1 (2010) 69–85

¹²⁷³ Vital, David (1968). Double-talk or double-think? A comment on the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty. *International Affairs* 44: 3, July 1968, pp. 419–33

¹²⁷⁴ Singh, Jaswant (1998). Against Nuclear Apartheid, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol, 77, No. 5, September/October 1998

¹²⁷⁵ Ruzicka, Jan, Nicholas J. Wheeler (2010). The puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. *International Affairs* 86: 1 (2010) 69–85

¹²⁷⁶ Ruzicka, Jan, Nicholas J. Wheeler (2010). The puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. *International Affairs* 86: 1 (2010) 69–85

The third pillar, peaceful use, is the most contentious. Peaceful use allows and regulates the transfer of nuclear technology to NNWS to develop strictly civilian nuclear energy programs. As the commercially popular light water reactor nuclear power station uses enriched uranium fuel, states must be able to either enrich uranium themselves or purchase it on the international market. This makes it relatively easy to build a nuclear bomb. As the global thirst for energy explodes, and environmental concerns about fossil fuels increase, the number of states to establish their own fuel cycle is set to increase, making nuclear material essentially available to everyone. The International Atomic Energy Agency (hereafter IAEA) has the leading role in the verification process and thus a crucial executive branch of the NPT.¹²⁷⁷ Established in 1957 as an independent organization, the IAEA reports back to the United Nations and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The IAEA engages in many activities such as cooperation on nuclear safety mechanism, but its most visible function is that of assessing whether member states properly comply with the rules stipulated by the NPT.

Despite its flaws, the treaty has had a very good record of attracting states over the past forty years, as attested by the low number of non-signatories today.¹²⁷⁸ Aside from the five nuclear weapon states when the Treaty was signed in 1970, Israel, India and Pakistan developed nuclear weapons. In the late 1970s, South Africa developed nuclear bombs but discarded them in the 1990s. The most recent nuclear power is North Korea, which developed nuclear arms after it left the NPT in 2002. Yet, as Charles Ferguson argues, the situation could have been much worse.¹²⁷⁹ In 1963 President Kennedy envisaged a world in the 1970s with 15 to 25 nuclear weapon states.¹²⁸⁰ In 1976, US President Ford's report to Congress estimated that by 1985 40 countries would have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons.¹²⁸¹ Dozens of countries, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, South Korea, and Switzerland, have explored nuclear weapons programs, but ultimately decided not to pursue such aims. Thanks to the non-proliferation regime most countries that have the technical ability to build nuclear arsenals have renounced nuclear weapons. And, most importantly, for more than 60 years, no nuclear weapons have been used in an attack.¹²⁸²

Still, the future of the NPT is uncertain. Experts frequently question whether the NPT is still relevant, predict that it will collapse, or wonder if it is “worth saving.”¹²⁸³

¹²⁷⁷ Pilat, Joseph F. (2007). The end of the NPT regime? *International Affairs* 83: 3 (2007) 469–482

¹²⁷⁸ Ruzicka, Jan, Nicholas J. Wheeler. The puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. *International Affairs* 86: 1 (2010) 69–85

¹²⁷⁹ Ferguson, Charles D. (2010). The Long Road To Zero. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 1, pp. 88-94, January February 2010

¹²⁸⁰ Nye, Jr., Joseph S. (1985). NPT: The Logic of Inequality. *Foreign Policy*, No. 59 (Summer, 1985), pp. 123-131.

¹²⁸¹ Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (1976). 24th Report: Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament, 1976. In: Falk, Richard (1977). *Nuclear Weapons Proliferation as a World Order Problem*. *International Security*. Vol 1, No. 3 (Winter, 1977)

¹²⁸² Allison, Graham (2010). Nuclear Disorder. Surveying Atomic Threats. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, No.1, pp. 74-85. January February 2010

¹²⁸³ Pilat, Joseph F. (2007). The end of the NPT regime? *International Affairs* 83: 3 (2007) 469–482

3.3.1. *Brazil and the NPT*

3.3.1.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: BRAZIL AND NUCLEAR ENERGY

Brazil has a long-standing interest in nuclear energy. “It was inevitable that Brazil would turn to nuclear power”, William Lowrance wrote in a commentary in 1975, after Brazil had signed the largest nuclear deal in history with West Germany¹²⁸⁴, which provided Brazil with an autonomous nuclear industry, justified by a strongly growing population and too little energy sources to sustain them.¹²⁸⁵

Prior to the historic deal, however, Brazil had historically played a leading role in nuclear disarmament. This was particularly the case in the early 1960s, when Brazil became a member of the UN Disarmament Committee.¹²⁸⁶ During the Goulart Presidency from 1961 to 1964, Brazil promoted the idea that rich countries should use the money not spent on arms to help developing countries fight poverty. The “3 Ds” (disarmament, development, decolonization) represented the cornerstones of Brazilian foreign policy.¹²⁸⁷ It signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, commonly referred to as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in 1967.¹²⁸⁸ This had significance because the NPT was still in the making, and the Tlatelolco Treaty obliged Brazil, as Redick points out, to adhere to non-proliferation.¹²⁸⁹ The Treaty largely came into being for two reasons: The tenacity of Mexico’s Under-Secretary García Robles, and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 had alarmed heads of state sufficiently to convince them to ban nuclear weapons.¹²⁹⁰

Brazil was an early skeptic of the NPT. In the UN debate about the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, Brazil refused to sign the NPT, characterizing it as an attempt to “freeze” the international power structure to contain emergent powers such as Brazil.¹²⁹¹ Brazil’s refusal to sign the NPT had mostly psychological reasons; emotional nationalists pointed out that signing the treaty posed a ‘colonialist threat’.¹²⁹² More moderate voices argued that Brazil should retain the ability to use nuclear energy for the purpose of economic development.

¹²⁸⁴ It was also the first time that a country sold the entire fuel cycle capacity, which was the major point of international contention. In: Lowrance, William W. *Nuclear Futures for Sale: To Brazil from West Germany*. *International Security*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Autumn, 1976), pp. 147-166, 1975

¹²⁸⁵ Lowrance, William W. (1975). *Nuclear Futures for Sale: To Brazil from West Germany*. *International Security*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Autumn, 1976), pp. 147-166, 1975

¹²⁸⁶ Rosenbaum, H. Jon and Glenn M. Cooper (1970). *Brazil and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1970

¹²⁸⁷ Rosenbaum, H. Jon and Glenn M. Cooper (1970). *Brazil and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1970

¹²⁸⁸ Redick, John R. (1981). *The Tlatelolco Regime and Non-proliferation in Latin America*. *International Organization*, Vol. 35, No. 1, *Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain* (Winter, 1981), pp. 103-134

¹²⁸⁹ Redick, John R. (1981). *The Tlatelolco Regime and Non-proliferation in Latin America*. *International Organization*, Vol. 35, No. 1, *Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain* (Winter, 1981), pp. 103-134

¹²⁹⁰ Redick, John R. (1981). *The Tlatelolco Regime and Non-proliferation in Latin America*. *International Organization*, Vol. 35, No. 1, *Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain* (Winter, 1981), pp. 103-134

¹²⁹¹ Rosenbaum, H. Jon and Glenn M. Cooper (1970). *Brazil and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1970

¹²⁹² Rosenbaum, H. Jon and Glenn M. Cooper (1970). *Brazil and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1970

Furthermore, it was often argued that Brazil should be able to have its own nuclear deterrent, or at least be able to develop one, rather than depending on the established nuclear powers.

A consequence of this conviction was the nuclear agreement between Brazil and Germany in 1975, in which Germany would sell nuclear technology to Brazil.¹²⁹³ It was triggered after India exploded nuclear bombs in 1974, an event that had a palpable impact on developing countries across the world. An additional reason was the high oil price, which had quadrupled in 1973-74, making nuclear energy more attractive.¹²⁹⁴ India and Brazil had been observing each other with suspicion prior to 1974, and India's nuclear tests seemed to strengthen Brazil's determination to obtain nuclear arms as well. As Norman Gall pointed out in 1976, several developing countries were attempting to acquire nuclear technology, but Brazil and India were the most serious ones. They were also the only ones carrying out space programs with their own launching facilities.¹²⁹⁵

In the 1980s, Brazil tried to develop nuclear bombs and hid its efforts from the IAEA.¹²⁹⁶ During that time, Brazilian policy makers frequently argued that the NPT does not provide a balance between duties and obligations. It lacked, according to diplomats, the spirit of reciprocity that characterizes most institutions. During the time, Brazil insisted on the dubious distinction between 'peaceful nuclear explosives' and nuclear bombs.¹²⁹⁷

During the time between 1975 and 1990, each branch of Brazil's armed forces pursued its own route towards nuclear weapons status. The navy was most successful, and it managed to operate small reactors for submarines. Under President João Figueiredo (1979-1985), the government was preparing to conduct a "peaceful nuclear explosion," based on the Indian example. The 300-meter shaft for the test had already been drilled.¹²⁹⁸

In 1990, the nuclear program was officially repudiated by President Fernando Collor, Brazil joined the NPT and international inspection became the norm. This helped reintegrate Brazil into the international community, after it had been somewhat ostracized under the military dictatorship, which had ended in 1985. The international press famously depicted the President who took a shovel and began to close the nuclear shaft built by the military regimes for nuclear weapons testing.

Brazil turned into a responsible actor. Five years later, in 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely, at US President Clinton's behest. This was part of an agreement that extracted other commitments from the five official nuclear powers at that conference and the next one in 2000. To this day, virtually none of these agreements, like faster disarmament, have been met. As a consequence of a proliferation regime that seemed ever more stable, the Brazilian government signed the NPT in 1998 under President Cardoso. In 1996, he had signed the

¹²⁹³ Hirst, Mônica (2005). *The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet Expectations*. New York: Routledge, 2005.

¹²⁹⁴ Gall, Norman (1976). *Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All*. *Foreign Policy*, No. 23 (Summer, 1976), pp. 155-201

¹²⁹⁵ Gall, Norman. (1976). *Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All*. *Foreign Policy*, No. 23 (Summer, 1976), pp. 155-201

¹²⁹⁶ Palmer, Liz and Gary Milhollin (2004). *Brazil's Nuclear Puzzle*. *Science, New Series*, Vol. 306, No. 5696, Gene Expression: Genes in Action (Oct. 22, 2004), p. 617

¹²⁹⁷ Rosenbaum, H. Jon and Glenn M. Cooper (1970). *Brazil and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1970

¹²⁹⁸ Ruehle, Hans (2010). *Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America: Is Brazil developing the bomb?* *Der Spiegel*, May 7, 2010

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which Brazil's Congress ratified in 1998. These moves were interpreted as Brazil's growing commitment to the regime.¹²⁹⁹

3.3.1.2. BRAZIL'S POLICY SINCE 2003

Under Lula da Silva, however, Brazil seems to have become less hesitant about toying with the nuclear option. Only a few months after Lula's inauguration in 2003, the country officially resumed the development of a nuclear-powered submarine, for which it is, under the NPT, allowed to enrich uranium.¹³⁰⁰

Even during his election campaign, Lula criticized the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), calling it unfair and obsolete, arguing that it failed to grant Brazil the status he felt it deserved.

In 2004, Brazil took the unusual step of barring its nuclear plant's doors to IAEA's inspectors, violating its obligations under the NPT. As Palmer and Milhollin point out, at its announced capacity, Brazil could, in theory, produce five to six implosion-type war heads. While Roberto Abdenur, then Brazil's ambassador to the United States,¹³⁰¹ vigorously denied that Brazil was violating the NPT, the consequences were felt around the globe. Brazil's behavior allowed Iran, another NPT signatory, to ask for similar treatment.¹³⁰² In 2008, Brazil unveiled its new National Defense Strategy, which, in addition to the mastery of the complete nuclear fuel cycle - since been achieved - called for the building of more nuclear-powered submarines.¹³⁰³ The rhetoric has taken a sharp turn, and Brazilian politicians now frequently lambast the non-proliferation regime. Similar to India's stance, Brazil's Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry pointed out that the "established nuclear powers sought to fortify their oligopoly of power," and that signing the NPT "had been a mistake."¹³⁰⁴

There is now widespread apprehension about Brazil's intentions, and several experts such as Sam Nunn and Graham Allison predict that Brazil will obtain nuclear bombs.¹³⁰⁵ In addition, several high-ranking members of Brazil's government frequently insinuate that Brazil should develop nuclear weapons. In 2009, during a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a group of nuclear supplier countries that works toward non-proliferation by controlling exports of nuclear materials, the Brazilian representative did his utmost to fight

¹²⁹⁹ da Cruz, José A. (2005). Review: Brazil's International Relations at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century. *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Spring, 2005), pp. 115-122

¹³⁰⁰ Ruehle, Hans (2010). Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America: Is Brazil developing the bomb? *Der Spiegel*, May 7, 2010

¹³⁰¹ Abdenur, Roberto (2005). Brazil's Nuclear Activities. *The Policy Forum* "Brazil's Nuclear Puzzle", February 11, 2005

¹³⁰² Palmer, Liz and Gary Milhollin (2004). Brazil's Nuclear Puzzle. *Science*, New Series, Vol. 306, No. 5696, Gene Expression: Genes in Action (Oct. 22, 2004), p. 617

¹³⁰³ Ruehle, Hans (2010). Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America: Is Brazil developing the bomb? *Der Spiegel*, May 7, 2010

¹³⁰⁴ Glüsing, Jens (2010). *Der Spiegel*. Baut Brasilien eine Atombombe, Herr Minister? May 10, 2010

¹³⁰⁵ Nunn, Sam (2006). The Race between Cooperation and Catastrophe: Reducing the Global Nuclear Threat *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 607, Confronting the Specter of Nuclear Terrorism (Sep., 2006), pp. 43-50. See also: Allison, Graham (2010). Nuclear Disorder. *Surveying Atomic Threats. Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 1, January February 2010, and Ruehle, Hans (2010). Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America: Is Brazil developing the bomb? *Der Spiegel*, May 7, 2010

requirements that would have made the nuclear submarine program transparent.¹³⁰⁶ During the 2010 NPT Conference, Brazil was one of the least constructive members when discussing issues such as improving monitoring by IAEA's inspectors. It continues to refuse to let IAEA inspectors take a full look at its uranium-enrichment machines at Resende, and will not sign the additional protocol that would oblige it to do so.¹³⁰⁷

The Brazilian government, however, denies such claims and argues that it has no intention to develop nuclear weapons. It points out that Brazil merely enriches uranium to 3,5%, and “occasionally to 19%”¹³⁰⁸, while 90% is necessary to build bombs.¹³⁰⁹ At the same time, Brazil would break three treaties if it decided to build nuclear bombs: The Tlatelolco Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and its own Constitution, adopted in 1988.¹³¹⁰ Yet, Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, in charge of foreign policy strategy, also denies that Brazil sought nuclear weapons in the 1970s and 1980s, a highly dubious claim given the copious historical evidence.¹³¹¹

In a highly controversial move, the Brazilian government has also sought to strengthen ties with Iran, attempted to act as a mediator between Iran and the established powers, and opposed sanctions against Iran in the UNSC in June 2010. The controversy ensued because Iran had continued to defy the IAEA's inspectors, blocking entrance to several nuclear facilities and raising doubts about Iran's intentions. After a tentative agreement in the fall of 2009 between Iran and the ‘G6’ (consisting of the US, Russia, Great Britain, France and Germany), which included a fuel swap to prevent Iran from enriching uranium fuel domestically, Iran had reneged, fuelling suspicions that Iran was seeking to develop nuclear weapons.

This behavior, combined with the numerous missed opportunities to come to an agreement, caused the United States to call for a new round of sanctions in the UNSC, an effort that received widespread international support. In May 2010, Turkey's Prime Minister Erdogan and Brazil's President Lula traveled to Iran and signed an agreement with Iran's Ahmadinejad which included enriching uranium in Turkey and shipping it back to Iran.¹³¹² This agreement failed to convince the established powers, who suspected another Iranian ploy, and the United States presented a sanction package only days later.¹³¹³ Although Brazil has been a member of the UNSC for almost twenty years in total (on ten separate occasions since 1946), it was the first time it voted against a majority-backed resolution. Only Turkey joined it in its opposition, while Lebanon abstained, and all permanent members backed the

¹³⁰⁶ Ruehle, Hans (2010). Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America: Is Brazil developing the bomb? *Der Spiegel*, May 7, 2010

¹³⁰⁷ Ruehle, Hans (2010). Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America: Is Brazil developing the bomb? *Der Spiegel*, May 7, 2010

¹³⁰⁸ Glüsing, Jens (2010). *Der Spiegel*. Baut Brasilien eine Atombombe, Herr Minister? May 10, 2010

¹³⁰⁹ Palmer, Liz and Gary Milhollin (2004). Brazil's Nuclear Puzzle. *Science*, New Series, Vol. 306, No. 5696, Gene Expression: Genes in Action (Oct. 22, 2004), p. 617

¹³¹⁰ Redick, John R. (1981). The Tlatelolco Regime and Non-proliferation in Latin America. *International Organization*, Vol. 35, No. 1, Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain (Winter, 1981), pp. 103-134

¹³¹¹ Glüsing, Jens (2010). *Der Spiegel*. Baut Brasilien eine Atombombe, Herr Minister? May 10, 2010

¹³¹² Lesser, Ian O. (2010). Turkey, Brazil and Iran: A Glimpse into the Future. *Today's Zaman*, May 23, 2010

¹³¹³ Stephens, Philip (2010). Rising Powers do not want to play by the west's rules. *Financial Times*, May 20, 2010

resolution. According to Matias Spektor, Brazil's behavior cannot be explained by a specific interest in Iran or nuclear weapons, but by Brazil's discontent with the lack of justice, fairness and openness in the structure of the NPT.¹³¹⁴

In conclusion, we can argue that Brazil's behavior constitutes systemic confrontation. There may be agreement with the spirit and the principles of the NPT (a world free of nuclear weapons and with nuclear energy for peaceful purposes for all), but disagreement about the two-tiered structure of nuclear and non-nuclear states and inspections (norms and rules). Brazil violates the NPT as it does not allow IAEA's inspectors to view its centrifuges. The argument that Brazil seeks to protect commercial secrets is spurious as inspectors have an excellent record of keeping such secrets. There is therefore considerable reason to believe that Brazil seeks either to build nuclear weapons, or it seeks to develop the ability to do so.

¹³¹⁴ Spektor, Matias (2010). Why Brazil is a broker with Iran, Council of Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/22139/why_brazil_is_a_broker_with_iran.html (accessed October 15, 2010)

3.3.2. *India and the NPT*

3.3.2.1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: INDIA AND NUCLEAR ENERGY

India has been skeptical of the NPT since the treaty's inception, and it has always refused to consider signing it. India has continuously argued that the NPT was unjust and cemented 'nuclear colonialism.'¹³¹⁵ India tested a nuclear device in 1974, which it described as a "peaceful nuclear explosive." India conducted further nuclear tests in 1998, which raised widespread international condemnation. India's role in the context of nuclear proliferation is therefore complex. Supporters of the NPT, most prominently the United States, called India one of the most recalcitrant countries that contribute to the destruction of the global non-proliferation regime.¹³¹⁶ Indians disagree, call the regime flawed, and point to India's continuous leadership in calling for bans on nuclear testing, for the establishment for a non-discriminatory treaty on non-proliferation, and complete elimination in 1988.¹³¹⁷

How did such confrontational behavior emerge? India was arguably the country most affected by the NPT because it was the only large country that had no nuclear power-ally to provide it with a nuclear security umbrella. Indians were, Nayar and Paul write, "simply left to fend for themselves."¹³¹⁸ First opinion polls after the creation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) conducted in 1972 showed that the majority of India's elites was against the development of the bomb. The pro-bomb faction was small, but their support for the bomb was stronger than the skeptic's rejection. While rightist parties were more in favor of the bomb, socialists, communists and the Congress Party were split on the issue. However, 82% of respondents of the study opposed the NPT, as it would severely limit India's options to develop a bomb if the necessity arose, an important topic after the war against China in 1962 and against Pakistan in 1965.¹³¹⁹ In addition, rejecting the treaty would allow Indians to keep foreign inspectors out of its nuclear sites, important for a country that despises foreign meddling after centuries of foreign occupation. Thirdly, the rejection can be explained by the "discriminatory conditions favoring the nuclear powers", which have failed to honor their promise and disarm.¹³²⁰

These fundamental arguments - the security problem of not possessing nuclear weapons, the rejection of foreign inspections, and the inherent injustice of the NPT as it

¹³¹⁵ Vanaik, Achin (1988). Why NPT Is Unacceptable. *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 23, No. 36 (Sep. 3, 1988), pp. 1825-1826

¹³¹⁶ Carter, Ashton B. (2006). America's New Strategic Partner? *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006), pp. 33-44. See also: Ollapally, Deepa and Raja Ramanna. *US-India Tension: Misperceptions on Nuclear Proliferation*. *Foreign Affairs*, January February 1995.

¹³¹⁷ Ollapally, Deepa and Raja Ramanna (1995). *U.S.-India Tensions: Misperceptions on Nuclear Proliferation* *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1995), pp. 13-18. See also: Singh, Jaswant (1998). *Against Nuclear Apartheid*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 5, September/October 1998

¹³¹⁸ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

¹³¹⁹ Nandy, Ashis (1972). The Bomb, the NPT and Indian Elites. *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 7, No. 31/33, Special Number (Aug., 1972)

¹³²⁰ Nandy, Ashis (1972). The Bomb, the NPT and Indian Elites. *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 7, No. 31/33, Special Number (Aug., 1972). See also, Vanaik, Achin. Why NPT Is Unacceptable. *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 23, No. 36 (Sep. 3, 1988), pp. 1825-1826

could not ascribe great power status to India - have remained the same over the past forty decades. The latter problem, the NPT's inequality and injustice, has probably been the most often-used argument by those defending India's position.¹³²¹ In 1998, for example, Jaswant Singh, former Minister of External Affairs, argued that the NPT perpetuated "the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of five countries busily modernizing their nuclear arsenals", and that India would stick to the principle that "the country's national security in a world of nuclear proliferation lies either in global disarmament or in exercise of the principle of equal and legitimate security for all."¹³²² In a similar fashion, Baldev and Paul argue that "the aim of [the NPT] has been to bar new nuclear weapons states (NWS) from emerging in order to preserve indefinitely the powers' position of the existing nuclear powers in the international system."¹³²³

Summarizing the argument, Singh argued that

The first 50 years of Indian independence reveal that the country's moralistic nuclear policy and restraint paid no measurable dividends, except resentment that India was being discriminated against. Disarmament seemed increasingly unrealistic politics. If the permanent five's possession of nuclear weapons increases security, why would India's possession of nuclear weapons be dangerous? If the permanent five continue to employ nuclear weapons as an international currency of force and power, why should India voluntarily devalue its own state power and national security? Why admonish India after the fact for not falling in line behind a new international agenda of discriminatory nonproliferation pursued largely due to the internal agendas or political debates of the nuclear club? If deterrence works in the West as it so obviously appears to, since Western nations insist on continuing to possess nuclear weapons - by what reasoning will it not work in India? Nuclear weapons powers continue to have, but preach to the have-nots to have even less. India counters by suggesting either universal, nondiscriminatory disarmament or equal security for the entire world.¹³²⁴

Joseph Nye disagrees. He admits that the NPT is inherently unequal. But he argues that the strategic characteristics of nuclear weapons are such that equality is difficult to obtain. He points out that equality only existed if every single government had nuclear weapons or if none had them. Since a couple of countries already have them and immediate disarmament is not feasible, the choice lies between universal proliferation to assure equality and a non-proliferation regime, which inevitably creates inequality. The vast majority of nations, Nye points out, is pragmatic and prudent, and prefers inequality over "anarchic equality".¹³²⁵

¹³²¹ Vanaik, Achin (1988). Why NPT Is Unacceptable. *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 23, No. 36 (Sep. 3, 1988), pp. 1825-1826

¹³²² Singh, Jaswant (1998). Against Nuclear Apartheid, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 5, September/October 1998

¹³²³ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

¹³²⁴ Singh, Jaswant (1998). Against Nuclear Apartheid, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 5, September/October 1998

¹³²⁵ Nye, Jr., Joseph S. (1985). NPT: The Logic of Inequality *Foreign Policy*, No. 59 (Summer, 1985), pp. 123-131

Indian scholars retort that the concern for world order and international stability is a weak pretext to deny or deprive rising powers nuclear weapons they consider necessary to turn into major powers.¹³²⁶

India's intransigence is fundamentally tied to the conviction that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is the key to major power status, and that India wants to be a major power. Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul recognize this when they argue that although the "immediate origins" of the decision to test nuclear weapons were security concerns, the "key underlying reason" is, often unstated, India's deep-rooted aspiration to assume the role of a major power.¹³²⁷ These two aspects are, naturally, somewhat connected. Part of what makes a power great is its invulnerability, which is, most argue, enhanced through the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

After having failed to obtain serious disarmament guarantees, India conducted its first nuclear test, Pokhran I, in 1974 under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.¹³²⁸ As Chopra writes, the rationale was no different from other countries who had decided to go nuclear. Russia went nuclear because America did, China went nuclear because Russia did, and India went nuclear because China did - and because it suspected Pakistan was about to go nuclear as well, which would make India the only country "sandwiched" between two nuclear powers.¹³²⁹ Asia thus became, with three nuclear powers with neighboring borders to the other two, the highest concentration of nuclear arms and thus the highest risk of nuclear war. India's test would have probably taken place much earlier had India's chief scientist, Homi Bhabha, not died in 1966, significantly delaying the project.¹³³⁰ The government's insistence that, despite the tests, called "peaceful explosions", India had no intention of producing nuclear arms, caused confusion and uncertainty whether India had joined the nuclear club.¹³³¹ Only when Rajiv Gandhi, initially opposed to nuclear weapons, obtained evidence that Pakistan was acquiring nuclear weapons in 1987, he ordered India's nuclear weapons program to proceed in 1988.

In the 1990s, pressure increased on India to join the NPT. In 1992, the UN Security Council passed a resolution declaring that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was a threat to international peace and security. This resolution, passed in the presence of India's Prime Minister Rao, was directly aimed at India and significantly increased political pressure.¹³³² The 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT legitimized and perpetuated, in India's eyes, an

¹³²⁶ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

¹³²⁷ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

¹³²⁸ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

¹³²⁹ Pran, Chopra (1993). *Towards a Nuclear Free World*. *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 28, No. 16 (Apr. 17, 1993), pp. 759-767

¹³³⁰ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

¹³³¹ Walker, Martin (2006). *India's Path to Greatness*. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 30, No. 3 (Summer, 2006), pp. 22-30, 2006

¹³³² Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

unequal nuclear regime.¹³³³ It constituted a turning point for India as it viewed the extension as a US attempt to foreclose India's rise for good and "defang it in the nuclear arena".¹³³⁴ Later in the same year India came tantalizingly close to testing nuclear weapons openly, but the government pulled back in the last minute due to mounting international pressure.

Despite the pressure, India tested nuclear weapons for a second time (Pokhran II) in 1998, this time "crossing the nuclear Rubicon"¹³³⁵ and fully assuming its nuclear weapons status, causing international condemnation and sanctions.¹³³⁶ Criticism was not only widespread abroad, but also at home, where several commentators argued that India had "lost moral stature and courage."¹³³⁷ This points to an internal struggle between two lines of thought. Indian idealists seek to bring peace to the world and abhor the thought of India developing weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, realists argue that the world is such that without those weapons, great power status cannot be attained. Many prominent Indian analysts, among them Raja Mohan, hailed the deal as a breakthrough and argued that "thanks to the nuclear tests, India's relationship with the United States stood transformed by the turn of the century. Although the United States did impose sanctions, it also began to treat India more seriously than ever before."¹³³⁸ India correctly argued that it had not broken international law (pointing to a clause in the CBTB that allows countries to withdraw in the face of acute security threats). Rather, the Indian government said it was forced to openly turn into a nuclear power since the Sino-Pakistani nuclear weapons collaboration (what India saw as a violation of the treaty) was proof for India that the NPT regime had collapsed in India's neighborhood.¹³³⁹

3.3.2.2. INDIA'S POLICY SINCE 2003

Since the tests in 1998, however, India has acted responsibly, having refrained from testing or deploying nuclear weapons or passing technologies on to other states. As Nayar and Paul point out, the end of India's isolation became evident with the visits from heads of state or

¹³³³ Singh, Jaswant (1998). *Against Nuclear Apartheid*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 5, September/October 1998

¹³³⁴ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul. *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

¹³³⁵ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. See also: Cohen, Stephen P. *India Rising. The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer, 2000), pp. 32-53

¹³³⁶ In the aftermath of the tests, the members of the UNSC, the G8, and the EU condemned India and imposed economic sanctions. Two years later, however, most sanctions had been reversed, and New Delhi stood in strategic dialogue with most major powers. Russia and France maintained strong ties to India and avoided its complete isolation. Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul. *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Raja Mohan points out that barely four months after the nuclear tests, India's Prime Minister Vajpayee declared that India and the United States were 'natural allies'. (Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)

¹³³⁷ Gidwani, Vinay Krishin (1998). *India's Nuclear Tests: Loss of Moral Stature and Courage*. *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 33, No. 22 (May 30 - Jun. 5, 1998), pp. 1312-1315

¹³³⁸ Mohan, C. Raja (2004). *Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

¹³³⁹ Singh, Jaswant (1998). *Against Nuclear Apartheid*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 5, September/October 1998. See also: Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

foreign ministers of all major powers within two years of the tests.¹³⁴⁰ Furthermore, India has not supplied nuclear material to NNWS, as China is thought to have done with Pakistan.¹³⁴¹ While India remained obstinate about the NPT, this responsible behavior certainly helped improve ties between India and the United States.¹³⁴² After the tests, India even considered signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but in the end decided not to when Bill Clinton failed to convince US Congress to ratify the treaty. India had assumed leadership in initiating the negotiations that led to the CTBT, but later refused to sign because the treaty was de-linked from the issue of non-proliferation.¹³⁴³

This caused the Indian government to characterize the treaty as another way the United States sought to implement an unjust system. Most analysts argued that the CTBT had turned into yet another imperialist tool that sought to foreclose India's nuclear option, given that India had not yet tested sufficiently to have a credible deterrent. Against this, several Indian experts called on the Indian government to sign the CTBT, stressing that signing it would have prevented the international isolation that ensued the tests in 1998.¹³⁴⁴ Since the IAEA meeting in 2004, India began to join the United States and Europe in arguing that Iran had violated NPT obligations, helping refer the matter to the UN Security Council.¹³⁴⁵

In a highly controversial move, the United States and India signed a bilateral nuclear agreement in 2005 in which the United States recognized India as a nuclear power. Aiding India's nuclear weapons program violated the NPT, which bans such help to any country not recognized as a nuclear power by the treaty. President George W. Bush's move constituted a break with long-standing U.S. policy as he openly acknowledged India as a legitimate nuclear power.¹³⁴⁶ In a highly asymmetrical deal regarded by many as an attempt by the United States to find an ally both to balance China and to fight (nuclear) terrorism, India emerged with an impressive diplomatic victory as it obtained many concessions and gave away little.¹³⁴⁷ India did not make any commitment to limit the growth of its nuclear arsenal and merely needs to allow inspectors into its civilian nuclear plants (not its military plants). One the other hand, the deal included significant economic cooperation and the United States subsequently pushed the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a group of countries allowed to

¹³⁴⁰ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

¹³⁴¹ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

¹³⁴² Ollapally, Deepa and Raja Ramanna (1995). U.S.-India Tensions: Misperceptions on Nuclear Proliferation. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1995), pp. 13-18

¹³⁴³ Jayaprakash, N. D. (2000). *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 35, No. 7 (Feb. 12-18, 2000), pp. 525-533

¹³⁴⁴ Bidwai, Praful and Achin Vanaik (1998). Why India Should Sign CTBT: Returning to Our Own Agenda. *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 33, No. 38 (Sep. 19-25, 1998), pp. 2469-2479

¹³⁴⁵ Carter, Ashton B. (2006). America's New Strategic Partner? *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006), pp. 33-44

¹³⁴⁶ Carter, Ashton B. (2006). America's New Strategic Partner? *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006), pp. 33-44

¹³⁴⁷ Carter, Ashton B. (2006). America's New Strategic Partner? *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006), pp. 33-44

trade nuclear technologies, to accept India's membership.¹³⁴⁸ Since 2005, four of its 17 nuclear reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards.

This move drew criticism particularly from countries like Brazil that had signed the treaty and refrained from developing nuclear weapons. India, they claimed, had disregarded the rules and was rewarded for it.¹³⁴⁹ Worse, India continued to refuse to sign the NPT (although accepting India to the NPT as an NWS would have been unlikely anyway since this would require approval from all its 189 members). Yet the worst consequence of the treaty was probably of systemic nature. The deal, critics argued, would undermine the rules of non-proliferation and disarmament. Despite being accepted as a nuclear power, India did not agree in any way to reducing its nuclear stockpile. It did not even agree to stop nuclear testing.¹³⁵⁰

Supporters of the deal answered that India's nuclear status was an irreversible fact, that India was a responsible and democratic power, and that the damage to the NPT would be insignificant.¹³⁵¹

The agreement was, if anything, concrete proof that India is considered a future world power. The United States' concessions were not based on current strategic weight, but on the expectation of future power. In 2000 already, future Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice identified India as a 'strategic partner' (and China as a 'strategic competitor')¹³⁵²

After signing the deal, India continued to pursue an independent foreign policy. As Ashton Carter pointed out, there was little evidence that India's overall policies would align with those of the United States. Fresh from signing the deal with America, Singh joined Cuba's Fidel Castro and Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for the Non-Aligned Meeting.¹³⁵³ Americans, furthermore, showed surprise at the "lack of gratitude" shown by Indian policy makers, who rather contended that India had been entitled to nuclear weapon status.

This analysis shows that India's behavior constitutes passive confrontation, which, given the structure of the non-proliferation regime, amounts to systemic confrontation. While India may agree on the principles and the spirit of the NPT in principle (a world free of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy for all), it disagrees once these principles are made more specific and turn into norms and rules (most importantly, the cutoff date of January 1967). It significantly destabilizes the non-proliferation regime. Ashton Carter, former US undersecretary of defense, argued that the US-India nuclear deal would not damage the NPT, pointing out that North Korea and Iran were already breaking the rules, no matter what

¹³⁴⁸ Carter, Ashton B. (2006). How Washington Learned to Stop Worrying and Love India's Bomb. Postscript. January 10, 2007. Foreign Affairs

¹³⁴⁹ Carter, Ashton B. (2006). America's New Strategic Partner? Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006), pp. 33-44 See also: Ruzicka, Jan, Nicholas J. Wheeler. The puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. International Affairs 86: 1 (2010) 69-85

¹³⁵⁰ The Economist Correspondent (2006). From bad to worse. June 20, 2006

¹³⁵¹ Carter, Ashton B. (2006). America's New Strategic Partner? Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006), pp. 33-44

¹³⁵² Rice, Condoleezza (2000). Promoting the National Interest. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, no. 1, Jan.-Feb. 2000

¹³⁵³ Carter, Ashton B. (2007). How Washington Learned to Stop Worrying and Love India's Bomb. Postscript. January 10, 2007. Foreign Affairs

India did.¹³⁵⁴ Yet, Carter overlooks how other emerging democracies such as Brazil and Turkey would interpret the deal. If states remain outside the NPT, the pay-offs from the treaty for the signatories will change and influence their cost-benefit calculations about their participation in it. This is the classic problem of free-riding.¹³⁵⁵ Contrary to what official government sources indicate, there is a vibrant internal discussion inside the Brazilian government about the merits of obtaining nuclear arms.¹³⁵⁶ Due to India's decision to build them, Brazil remains as the only non-nuclear BRIC. The fact that a rising power can "get away" with systemic confrontation and maintain and strengthen crucial partnerships may cause others to behave in a similar way. There is an additional aspect that explains why India's behavior is so serious. The world can only make significant progress towards non-proliferation if all countries join and obey the treaty. A single country is, in theory, enough to undo the benefits. As long as at least one state stays outside the treaty, the trusting relationships that are embodied in the NPT will be diminished and may even be fatally undermined.¹³⁵⁷ While India is not the only country to remain outside of the treaty (Israel, Pakistan, North Korea are the others), its integrative behavior could fundamentally strengthen the non-proliferation regime. During interviews for this study, Indian diplomats have unanimously contested the claim that India's nuclear policy is confrontational. They are right to claim that since they have not signed the NPT, they have not violated it. But the structure of the NPT is so universal that it virtually turned into compulsory jurisdiction in international proliferation law, so India confronts even without having signed the treaty.

India's confrontational strategy is unlikely to change in the short-term. In 2009, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1887 which called on states outside of the NPT to join the treaty. India immediately rejected the resolution, repeated the argument heard so many times that the treaty is discriminatory and strengthened the Indian prime minister's statement earlier that year that there 'is no question of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state'.¹³⁵⁸ But even if India wanted to join the treaty as a nuclear weapons state, it would not be able to do so. In order to add India as a nuclear weapons state, all 189 members would have to agree, something which is virtually impossible at this point. As Wheeler points out, even if all 189 states were to agree, it would fundamentally contradict the normative underpinning and principles of the NPT and the commitment of the NNWS to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.¹³⁵⁹ India is therefore certain to remain outside of the NPT.

India's behavior points to two important issues. First, India's (and Brazil's) critique of the NPT is not only about content, but also about procedure. India repeatedly points out that the NPT is inherently unjust and fails to award India with 'big power status'. Second, India's

¹³⁵⁴ Carter, Ashton B. (2006). *America's New Strategic Partner?* Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006), pp. 33-44

¹³⁵⁵ Ruzicka, Jan, Nicholas J. Wheeler (2010). The puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. *International Affairs* 86: 1 (2010) 69–85

¹³⁵⁶ Interview, Brazilian Diplomat, Itamaraty, Brasilia, July 23, 2010.

¹³⁵⁷ Ruzicka, Jan, Nicholas J. Wheeler (2010). The puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. *International Affairs* 86: 1 (2010) 69–85

¹³⁵⁸ Ruzicka, Jan, Nicholas J. Wheeler (2010). The puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. *International Affairs* 86: 1 (2010) 69–85

¹³⁵⁹ Ruzicka, Jan, Nicholas J. Wheeler (2010). The puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. *International Affairs* 86: 1 (2010) 69–85

behavior reveals the tensions that exist between two fundamentally different organizing principles of the international system: Balance of power and constitutional order. In this context, it seems useful to recall Ikenberry's distinction between three different types of international order. The hegemonic type of order is hierarchical and possesses no restraints on concentrated power. Balance of power, on the other hand, is an anarchic order, made up of counterbalancing coalitions, and its source of stability is the equilibrium of power. Finally, the constitutional order's organizing principle is the rule of law. Its binding institutions pose severe restraints on concentrated power, and it achieves stability by limiting the returns to power.

As pointed out in section 1.2.3., today's international order is of constitutional, rule-based nature. The return to power is therefore limited. Yet the case of India and the NPT clearly show that the rule of law is not always compelling enough. India believes the rules are not entirely just, which reduces the incentives to engage. India has, as Part 2 has shown, decided to engage with and integrate in the vast majority of institutions, strengthening the argument that today's constitutional world order is very attractive and bound to persist even as the distribution of power changes. While the case of the NPT cannot undo this argument, it does show that balance of power remains a reality in our constitutional system, and India is convinced that power still matters.

The tensions between the concept of balance of power and constitutional order are therefore one of the defining characteristics of today's system. Fundamentally, the question is how valid Ikenberry's claim about the reduced importance of power really is, and in how far countries agree with him. It must be pointed out in this context that emerging powers are by no means the only actors to engage in balancing behavior. The United States' decision to sign a nuclear deal with India in 2005 was interpreted, by most analysts, as an attempt to balance China by strengthening a US-ally in China's neighborhood. It thus indirectly accepted Indian claims that balance of power remains, despite the global constitutional system, a relevant paradigm in Asia.

Given the contrary principles that undergird balance of power and constitutionalism, how do the two interact? Today's institutions and rules are complex and of multidimensional nature- they are generally organized according to issue area (such as in the case of the WTO), but at times also according to region (such as in the case of NATO). This leads to a scenario in which the rule of law is the dominant organizing principle, but in which there remain pockets where actors revert to balance of power. Security in South and East Asia is a classic example of how balancing continues to be the norm, defying the global trend towards constitutionalism. India's refusal to integrate into the NPT is thus a consequence of this peculiar regional situation. Yet the Indian government's stance affects not only the region, but weakens the attractiveness and effectiveness of the entire constitutional order. To keep the pockets of balancing behavior from enlarging, the most powerful actor in the Western World Order, the United States, needs to show that the return to its power is limited by the rule of law, and that balancing needs to take place within the institutions, rather than outside of them.

4. Conclusion: Towards the Greater West or a Post-Western World?

What have we learned? This study has sought to show that our traditional paradigms of understanding and interpreting world politics are coming under strain due to fundamental power shifts towards non-established actors. The question of how these rising powers behave towards the West is difficult to answer unless we properly define the West.

As we have shown in Section 1.1., traditional definitions of the West - using history, religion, culture, values, policy, and geography - are insufficient and do not stand up to rigorous analysis.

Section 1.2. argued that rather than defining what the West is, we need to observe its practical consequences. Therefore, the best way to capture the West and understand how nations make use of it is by looking at international institutions. Given the West's fundamental role in their creation, we can call the order they establish the 'Western World Order'. This concept is post-ideological and transcends cultural, civilizational and historic dimensions. But more fundamentally it is the Western procedures - constitutionalism, representation, rules, membership, social mobility, fairness, democracy and economic interdependence - that undergird these institutions.

Since the Western World Order is fundamentally about procedures, a country does not need to 'westernize' culturally in order to become part of the West. Japan is well-integrated into the Western system, while being culturally non-Western. In the same way, countries do not need to democratize to integrate.¹³⁶⁰ The Western World Order can thus even continue its existence under Chinese dominance as long as China chooses to rise within the system.¹³⁶¹ An expansion of the Western World Order thus cannot be confused with neoliberal concepts of democracy and capitalism, such as those presented in Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man*, which is a radical restatement of the liberalization theme.¹³⁶² For example, Indonesia can become a full member of the Western World Order by integrating in its institutions, irrespective of its domestic political system or cultural norms.

By uniquely focusing on the procedures we gain clarity about the concept of the West, but we must acknowledge that there is also a content-related dimension to it, and there is a certain tension between these two dimensions. From the procedural point of view, the West is stable and survives even the rise of China. Yet could there be substantive changes within the established structures?

¹³⁶⁰ In theory, even a non-capitalist country could integrate into the Western World Order, although participation in some institution would be limited, such as the World Trade Organization.

¹³⁶¹ Ikenberry, G. John (2008). The Rise of China and the Future of the West, *Foreign Affairs*; Jan/Feb2008, Vol. 87 Issue 1, pp. 23-37

¹³⁶² This study makes no prediction about whether international institutions cause countries to democratize or change any of their domestic policies. Michael W. Doyle. A Liberal View. In: Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall (1999) *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

The claim that the democratic character of international institutions directly promotes ‘Western values’ such as democracy in autocratic regimes, a notion common among American policy makers¹³⁶³, seems somewhat far-fetched. Throughout the Cold War, the representatives of autocratic regimes have actively participated in democratic institutions such as the UN General Assembly without worrying that this would somehow bring democracy to their countries. In addition, our previous analysis has shown that the concept of ‘Western values’ does not stand up to rigorous analysis.

Still, a rule-based and democratic constitutional global order is likely to indirectly promote rule-based governance on the domestic level. Mandatory norms by institutions such as the NPT force closed regimes to open their doors to foreign inspectors, thereby fostering the application of international standards. The web of treaties and commitments is set to increase, including with regard to pervasive aspects such as climate change. In addition, through global norms, for example regarding human rights, today’s rule-based order affects governments to some degree by establishing the meaning of specific issues, such as genocide, and the adequate way to respond to them.¹³⁶⁴

We can therefore identify some relation between procedure and content, and the spread of the Western World Order may have a domestic impact on countries that integrate into today’s global order. Yet it is important to point out that issues such as human rights and democracy do not belong uniquely to the West. Rather, the Western World Order will put those concepts at an advantage that are deemed the most attractive and modern, irrespective of whether they are ‘Western’ or not. Once emerging powers such as China and India are able to define modernity and articulate the ‘best practice’ in areas such as poverty-reduction or climate change, the rule-based Western World Order will invariably promote their concepts, so today’s order is not a one-way street. Thus, rather than promoting ‘Western values’ (a concept difficult to sustain analytically) as if in a one-way street, the Western World Order helps spread best practices.

The system’s supporters argue that the Western World Order is unique as it is rule-based, open and democratic. Moderate critics mostly agree but point to problems with regard to distribution, and more radical opponents disagree entirely and describe it as hegemonic and exploitative, just like all the other previous global systems. Moderate critics are certainly right to point out that the system has weaknesses. Established powers seek to avoid truly democratic institutions such as UNCTAD and the General Assembly, and take important decisions in less open, more exclusive decision-making bodies such as the World Bank or the G20.

However, the supporters are right. The fact that non-established countries have joined today’s institutions in large numbers, and their ability to rise within and thanks to the Western World Order, proves Ikenberry’s claim that the system is easy to join and hard to overturn. One needs to admit that “not all is well with the institution the world currently

¹³⁶³ Strobe, Talbott (1995). Why Nato should Grow. *The New York Review of Books*, August 10, 1995, pp. 1-2

¹³⁶⁴ Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). *Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004

has,”¹³⁶⁵ and that several institutions that make up the Western World Order are not as open and democratic as Ikenberry claims. Yet, the fundamental argument is not that the institutions themselves have triumphed; rather, it is the institutions’ underlying procedures that have triumphed. Inconsistencies in the Western World Order exist, but they fail to disprove the argument about the gist of today’s institutions.

Today’s order is of a constitutional nature, which means that its organizing principle is the rule of law, its binding institutions are a restraint on power, and the source of stability is the limits on the return to power. The major tensions will arise not between the constitutional nature and hegemonic elements, but between constitutionalism and balance of power behavior. Balancing behavior may occur within the system (“soft balancing”)¹³⁶⁶, seen during trade negotiations, in which case it strengthens the institutions.¹³⁶⁷ Balancing outside of the institutions, however, threatens to weaken the constitutional character of today’s order. Given its attractiveness and the benefits the rule-based system provides to all participants, rising powers will not challenge the system. Rather, they will seek to maintain its rule-based character. Still, even though the returns to power are much lower than in an anarchic system, power still matters, and the tensions between balancing behavior and the rules and procedures that define the constitutional order are bound to define the future of today’s rule-based system.

Using this procedure- and rule-based definition of the West, we can identify a group of ‘fringe’ countries that is either not fully integrated into the institutions, or that seems to confront them frequently. The “fringe” is a problematic term, and it is merely used in this context to describe a group with regard to their relationship with the Western World Order. Other terms such as “second world”, specify a group of countries without characterizing or predicting any specific features. Brazil’s and India’s strategy towards institutions shows that the two countries belong in this “fringe category.”

Liberal theory fundamentally supports the claim that it will be in the interest of non-established democratic members to join the institutions. The creation of international institutions harks back to Kantian ideas formulated in his work *Eternal Peace* about the Pacific Union. Kantian liberal theory supports this claim and says that there is an incentive to collaborate internationally. One of the factors that lend strength to today’s system - compared to institutions before WWII - is that they are virtually all-encompassing, and they enjoy the support of many powerful nations. Liberal theory explains democracies’ strong interest in joining international institutions and predicts that Brazil and India will seek collaboration. Liberal theory would therefore account for India’s and Brazil’s integrative behavior.

It becomes clear that we cannot make progress on either adequately explaining the past or predicting the future with realist or liberal theories until we have a better way of defining the terms for the options rising powers have. Before we turn to the case studies, we need to properly understand the terms such as integration, alignment, and confrontation,

¹³⁶⁵ Hurrell, Andrew (2007). *On Global Order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*. 2007, Oxford: Oxford University Press

¹³⁶⁶ Paul, T.V. (2005). Soft Balancing in the Age of Hegemony. *International Security*, Volume 30, Number 1, Summer 2005, pp. 46-71

¹³⁶⁷ Narlikar, Amrita (2006). *Bargaining for a Rise. Internationale Politik*, 2006

which are not sufficiently defined to describe rising powers' strategy. We can differentiate between seven types of strategies. Unconditional integration, revisionist integration, strengthening integration, alignment, passive confrontation, systemic confrontation and issue-based confrontation. Five of these options strengthen the system, two options (passive confrontation and systemic confrontation) weaken the system. All the other ones strengthen the Western World Order and contribute to the emergence of what we shall call 'The Greater West'. Issue-based confrontation, often wrongly interpreted as systemic confrontation, is probably the most common. It has become the norm and the trademark of the Western World Order - for example, by denying the UN stamp of approval on U.S.-led interventions. Liberal theory would expect fringe nations to strengthen the system and, through their behavior, create a Greater West, and not a 'Post-Western World.'

Part 2 shows that India and Brazil do, in fact, overwhelmingly integrate. While traditional foreign policy analysis deals more with a nation's ties to other governments, this part analyzes Brazil's and India's behavior towards the major international institutions. Applying the categories developed in section 1.5., we can observe that Brazil's behavior is a mix of mostly revisionist integration and issue-based confrontation, but with one case of systemic confrontation. India's strategy consists of a combination of revisionist integration, issue-based confrontation and a prominent case of systemic confrontation. Both countries engage in systemic confrontation regarding the non-proliferation regime.

How can we explain the exceptions? While both Brazil's and India's strategy is overwhelmingly system-strengthening, as predicted by liberal theory, we can hypothesize about why countries confront at times, proving the theory wrong. One hypothesis would be that fringe countries always engage except when they face acute security threats, such as India does with regard to Pakistan, and, as some argue, China. The second hypothesis would be that fringe countries always integrate except when they consider a particular institution, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, extremely unjust and impossible to fix through revisionist integration. This would also explain why Brazil has engaged in confrontational behavior in the absence of a security threat.

Part 3 analyzed three case studies in detail to prove or disprove the hypotheses developed at the end of Part 2. The three issue-areas analyzed - the UN Security Council, Bretton Woods and the Non-Proliferation Treaty - are among the most important regimes of the Western World Order.

The analysis of the UN Security Council shows that both Brazil and India engage in revisionist integration. While Brazil and India frequently criticize the Council and describe it as an instrument established powers use to defend their interests, they fundamentally accept the principles that undergird the institution and believe its problems can, albeit serious, be solved through reform.

The analysis of the World Bank and IMF shows that both Brazil and India engage in revisionist integration. Similar to the UN Security Council, both India and Brazil feel established countries use the IMF and the World Bank to exploit others. But, as they play a more important international role and have to defend their economic interests globally, both Brazil and India have realized that both the IMF and the World Bank are necessary- they agree with the principles that undergird these institutions. Their confrontational behavior is

limited to the institution's decision-making procedures, which shows that they engage in revisionist integration.

The analysis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty shows that Brazil engages in systemic confrontation, India engages in passive confrontation. Both countries have historically had profound reservations about the fundamental principles of the NPT. Brazil and India initially refused to sign the NPT when it was drafted in 1970. Both countries antagonized early on. India conducted nuclear tests in 1974, Brazil secretly tried to develop nuclear weapons in the 1970s and 1980s before officially ending its program in the 1990s. In 1998, India became more confrontational by conducting a second nuclear explosion while Brazil signed the NPT as a non-nuclear power. In 2004, however, Brazil violated the NPT by not allowing IAEA inspectors view its nuclear facilities. India signed a historic nuclear deal with the United States in 2005, which gave it *de facto* recognition, but it continues to refuse IAEA inspectors access to most of its military nuclear facilities. Both countries' behavior undermined the system. Their strategy can therefore be characterized as systemic confrontation.

It must be noted in this context that confrontational behavior with regard to the NPT is highly unusual. There are only six countries in the world that engage in confrontational behavior: Brazil, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea and Iran. Pakistan is often characterized as a failed state¹³⁶⁸, and North Korea is one of the most isolated regimes in the world. Iran remains, despite basic democratic structures, a theocratic dictatorship. Brazil and India therefore are, along with Israel, the only fully democratic countries that decide to engage in confrontational behavior with regard to the NPT.

Confrontational behavior in the context of the non-proliferation regime also has serious consequences for global security. This does not mean that Brazil and India are wrong to engage in this particular strategy. Yet they cannot deny that their behavior significantly reduces the stability of the proliferation regime, which directly increases the risk of proliferation and, indirectly, nuclear terrorism. Iran does not allow IAEA inspectors see its nuclear facilities because it points to Brazil's behavior. Brazil closes the doors of its nuclear facilities and asks why it has to obey rules that India does not need to obey. In addition, Brazil has continuously opposed the adoption of more stringent inspection rules, thus undermining more effective non-proliferation mechanism.

Brazil's and India's confrontational behavior towards the NPT can be explained not by costs that outweigh the benefits, but by Brazil's and India's belief that this particular institution is highly unjust and its problems impossible to fix. The NPT does not provide them with the intra-institutional mobility they require as emerging powers who seek to rise in the system. India's confrontational behavior with regard to the NPT is often justified by the high cost it entails in the context of security concerns, and the few benefits it provides. This may certainly influence India's behavior to some degree, in the same way that security issues partially explain Israel's decision to confront the NPT and develop nuclear weapons. But a careful analysis shows that nuclear weapons have done little to improve India's security. As Stephen Cohen argues, "India's security [after the 1998 test] stands in more - not less - jeopardy", given that India's conventional weapons' superiority over Pakistan is now

¹³⁶⁸ Cohen, Stephen (2004). *The Idea of Pakistan*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004

worthless.¹³⁶⁹ One year after openly assuming nuclear status, the so-called Kargil War broke out between India and Pakistan.¹³⁷⁰ Nuclear weapons are unlikely to ever be used in a conflict, so their practical use is limited. Several diplomats have conceded during interviews that India's and China's nuclear status is unlikely to render a conventional war between the two impossible. In addition, they affirm that India would prefer a world without nuclear weapons, and that it would be no obstacle once all nuclear powers would begin to destroy their stockpiles.¹³⁷¹ India's violation of the NPT can best be explained by India's frustration that the NPT is unjust, undemocratic, and unable to provide India with 'first-class' status it feels it deserves. Precisely this possibility is, even if at times remotely, a key characteristic of all the other institutions of the Western World Order. Even institutions as inflexible as the UN Security Council and the IMF provide emerging powers with some perspective that they may eventually be granted the great power status. The possibility that the NPT will grant this possibility is too small for India to take the chance. The key moment came in 1995, when the Clinton administration succeeded in extending the NPT indefinitely, perpetuating, in India's eyes, an unequal nuclear regime.¹³⁷² As Nayar and Paul point out, it constituted a "turning point" for India as it viewed the extension as a US attempt to foreclose India's rise for good.¹³⁷³

The case is even more pronounced regarding Brazil. The first hypothesis cannot explain Brazil's systemic confrontation, given that it does not face any acute security threat. Quite to the contrary, Brazil's foreign policy strategy can be characterized by the complete lack thereof.¹³⁷⁴ As Matias Spektor points out, Brazil does not engage in systemic confrontation because such behavior would not provide it with any tangible benefits. Rather, Lula seeks to make a broader argument that parts of the international system, such as the NPT, are fundamentally unjust.¹³⁷⁵ He uses the same line of argument to explain Brazil's unprecedented involvement in the dispute between Iran and the developed world.¹³⁷⁶ Brazil believes the NPT is unjust and that the treaty does not grant Brazil the status it requires as an aspiring power. This is a striking finding because it clearly contradicts realists' predictions. Opposing the NPT with its decision to close the doors of its nuclear facilities to the IAEA's inspectors, Brazil gains nothing tangible. But even if Brazil sought to develop nuclear weapons, its strategic gains would be negative: With no security threat in the region and no declared enemy, Brazil has no need for a deterrent. Obtaining nuclear weapons could cause

¹³⁶⁹ Khilnani, Sunil (2000). *Asia's Exceptional Nation*. In: Cohen, Stephen P. *India Rising* (2000). *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer, 2000), pp. 32-53

¹³⁷⁰ Cohen, Stephen (2002). *India. An Emerging Power*. New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2002

¹³⁷¹ Interviews and phone interviews, Indian diplomats, New Delhi, March, April, May, June 2010

¹³⁷² Singh, Jaswant (1998). *Against Nuclear Apartheid*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 5, September/October 1998

¹³⁷³ Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). *India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003

¹³⁷⁴ Fleitas, Diego M. (2007). *Arms Race Vs. Cooperation in Security in South America*, in: *International Security: A European-South American Dialogue*, IV International Security Conference of Forte de Copacabana, Konrad Audenauer Foundation, 2007

¹³⁷⁵ Spektor, Matias (2010). *How to read Brazil's Stance on Iran*, First Take, Council of Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/21576/how_to_read_brazils_stance_on_iran.html (accessed June 2, 2010)

¹³⁷⁶ Spektor, Matias (2010). *Why Brazil is a broker with Iran*, Council of Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/22139/why_brazil_is_a_broker_with_iran.html (accessed October 15, 2010)

Argentina and Venezuela to pursue nuclear weapons and cause a Latin American arms race reminiscent of the 1970s.

Seen from a systemic perspective, India's behavior reveals the tension that exists between a fundamentally constitutionalist international system and pockets where balancing behavior is still the norm. Balancing is not limited to emerging powers, and the United States' decision to elevate India's status to recognized nuclear power has rightly been interpreted as balancing behavior. The institutional cobweb that enmeshes all actors is particularly weak in South and East Asia. There is no "Asian NATO", and the source of stability in the region is not the limits on the return to power, but the equilibrium of power. The consequences extend beyond Asia and affect the entire nuclear proliferation regime, and with it the whole constitutionalist international order. This tension exists because nations such as India are not fully convinced that power no longer matters as much as it used to. Incentives to engage in balancing behavior need to be dealt with in two ways.

First, the 'justice deficit' needs to be reduced and intra-institutional mobility needs to be increased, especially with regard to the non-proliferation regime. The NPT constitutes a fundamental exception to Ikenberry's claim about the Western World Order. As section 3.3. shows, the NPT is not as attractive as all the other institutions analyzed in this study. In the interviews conducted, no diplomat agreed that the NPT was "democratic, open and just." Guimarães, one of the most powerful individuals in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, called President Cardoso's decision to sign the NPT a "mistake".¹³⁷⁷ This is particularly surprising in the Brazilian case, as Brazil signed the NPT in 1998, and the government argues that it does not violate the NPT. This is not merely rhetoric. President Lula is known to disparage many institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and the UN Security Council.¹³⁷⁸ But, differently to the NPT, Brazilian diplomats and policy makers agree that the fundamentals of the WTO, the UNSC and Bretton Woods are sound. The only way to address these problems is for nuclear weapons states to take more visible steps towards disarmament. Only then will powers such as India and Brazil regard the NPT as a genuine element of the constitutional order, and not an attempt to "freeze" current international power structures. Increased intra-institutional mobility will therefore increase an institutions' attractiveness, its membership, and thus, its legitimacy. This may temporarily make negotiations more difficult, just as politics in democratic India is often slower and more cumbersome than in autocratic China, where fewer parties take part in the decision-making process. Long and at times frustrating negotiations, such as those on global trade and those on climate change, are thus unlikely to become less intricate.

Secondly, the most powerful nation in today's constitutional order, the United States, must show that the limits on the return to power apply to all actors, including itself. Emerging powers only resort to balancing behavior if they believe that power, not rules, remains the ultimate arbiter in international politics. The United States must therefore use its position to exercise leadership by adhering to the rules it wants rising actors to respect now, and also once America no longer plays the dominant position it plays today.

¹³⁷⁷ Glüsing, Jens (2010). Der Spiegel. Baut Brasilien eine Atombombe, Herr Minister? May 10, 2010

¹³⁷⁸ See, for example: Nossa, Leonencio (2009). Lula diz que crise é causada por 'gente branca de olhos azuis', Estado de São Paulo, March 26, 2009, <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/economia,crise-foi-causada-por-gente-branca-e-de-olhos-azuis-diz-lula,345255,0.htm> (accessed Dec 30, 2009)

What do the results of this analysis mean for the Western World Order? The analysis shows that in the vast majority of cases, Ikenberry's claim that the system is open, democratic, rule-based and therefore easy to join and hard to overturn is correct. The Western World Order is indeed unique and historically unprecedented, and there is a strong likelihood that the Western World Order will persist - a scenario we have termed the 'Greater West'.¹³⁷⁹

Non-established powers agree with the claim and join today's institutions because they consider them as fundamentally just and mutually beneficial. The argument that countries join the Western World Order out of coercion is unconvincing. For example, neither Brazil nor India were forced to become IMF lenders. Quite to the contrary, their move was highly surprising and historic, given that they had been IMF recipients until very recently. This is good news for the supporters of today's Western World Order. Brazil's and India's engagement will significantly strengthen the existing institutions and increase their legitimacy further. The IMF is a good example for an institution that has successfully turned former recipients into donors. While both still receive loans from the World Bank, they have already begun to assume leadership in this organization, strengthening its legitimacy and effectiveness. The same logic applies to other organizations such as the WTO, which has been fiercely criticized by Brazil and India, but which succeeded in creating a stable framework that helped countries "agree how to disagree" on matters of trade. Furthermore, non-established countries are able to prosper within and thanks to the system. It is particularly this detail that makes the Western World Order stronger than any previous system. It allows new entrants to rise, which in turn increases their interests in engaging more profoundly in the system due to their ever more global interests. There is a "virtuous circle" at work which makes the current order stronger through every new entrant. Few aspects epitomize the strength of the Western World Order better than Brazil's and India's strategy vis-à-vis today's international institutions.

¹³⁷⁹ Robert Gilpin rightly points out that there has been some social mobility in earlier system. During the Pax Britannica, for example, countries other than the hegemon grew, at times faster than the hegemon itself. Gilpin, Robert (1975). *US Power and the Multinational Corporation*. New York: Basic Books, 1975

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“The next morning, as the sun was rising, the animals were still gathered with the heads of state around the negotiation table. (...) Oscar, the elephant, said: If you don’t sign the treaty in two minutes, (...), I will talk to the people who have gathered outside, and you will not govern for much longer. Then, finally, the men pulled their pencils and signed the document. The animals had won!

The treaty the heads of state had signed, said: We, the responsible representatives of all nations on earth, oblige ourselves with our life and our property to implement the following policies: 1. All border posts and border guards will be removed. 2. The army and all fire weapons and bombs will be destroyed. There will be no more wars. 3. The police responsible for maintaining order will be equipped with bows and arrows. It needs to assure that science and technology are used for peaceful purposes (...) 4. The number of offices, public employees and filing cabinets will be reduced to the absolute minimum. Offices are for people, not vice versa. 5. The public employees with the highest salaries will be the teachers. The task to educate the children to become real human beings is the most important and most difficult task. The goal of education shall be that our hearts can no longer be idle!”

- Erich Kaestner, *The Animals’ Conference* (1988)

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