

Chapter 3

Kazakh Migrants and Soviet-Chinese Relations during the 1940s: A Background of Xinjiang Refugees to the Middle East

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Abstract

This chapter discusses the influence of the Soviet Union on Kazakh emigration from the Xinjiang province of China during the 1940s–1950s, with a focus on those who immigrated to Turkey. The research presented here, based on archival research that centers the narratives of those in the Kazakh diaspora, considers the impact of the relationship between Ospan Batur, a renown Kazakh chieftain, and the Soviets, demonstrating the impact of Ospan-Soviet relations on driving Kazakh emigration from Xinjiang. In addition, this chapter examines Kazakh migrant networks and their self-identification as Kazakhs, Turks, Muslims, and Chinese. This chapter contributes to existing understandings of Kazakh migration during the mid-20th century by establishing the regional and international conditions driving Kazakh emigration during this time.

1. Introduction

Turkey currently has several populations of Turkic migrants from Xinjiang, a northwest province in China, with such migrants primarily of Uyghur and Kazakh decent. Chapters 2 of this volume details the current state and activities of Uyghur migrants in Turkey. Building on such research, this chapter pays particular attention to the historical background of Kazakh emigration from Xinjiang, providing a historiographical survey of the factors that drove and shaped their migration during the 1940s and 1950s. These decades were characterized by a period of upheaval in Xin-



jiang, with the emergence of the “second” Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR) in the province bringing a degree of instability and foreign involvement to the region.

The considerable degree of multi-state involvement in the region – by the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Outer Mongolia, and China – suggests that any analysis of Kazakh migration during this period must consider the foreign policies of and relationships between actors both inside and outside of Xinjiang. Exploring the ever-evolving relationships between external actors and Kazakh migrants in Xinjiang also allows the changing political positions of Kazakh migrants much clearer.

This chapter focuses on the migration of Kazakh nomads, in part, because their nomadic lifestyle enabled cross-border migration of great distances. As this study is highly connected with modern Kazakhstan, the analysis presented here excludes the migration of other groups from consideration, such as the Uyghurs. This chapter considers the international context driving the migration of Kazakhs from the Altay region, in the north of Xinjiang, to Turkey. The research presented here focuses significantly on Ospan Islamūli (Osman Batur), a famous leader of the Altay Kazakhs who was executed by China’s People’s Liberation Army. As there is already significant research on his military activities,¹ this chapter makes clear the international context in which his activities took place, considering the impact of Soviet and the Republic of China’s governmental policies on Kazakh migration. This chapter argues that the Ospan-led Kazakh revolt against the Xinjiang local government in 1944–45 eventually prompted a second wave Kazakh emigration from Xinjiang that began in the early 1950s.²

Existing research on Kazakh migration during the mid-20th century is lacking, in part, because of a large gap between Chinese and Russian accounts on the issue, divergent perspectives rooted in a narrow approach to archival analysis. This gap suggests the need for further integrative research on Kazakh migration during this period. To fill this gap in the literature, this study pays particular attention to viewpoints from the Kazakh diaspora, such as those found in the works of such

¹ For example, Linda Benson, “Osman Batur: The Kazak’s Golden Legend,” in *The Kazaks of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority*, eds. L. Benson and I. Svanberg (Uppsala: Uppsala University), 141–87. Details will be shown later.

² This group includes the Kazakhs led by Qūsayīn (Hüseyin) Taiji, who began to move earlier in 1930s. Also see Chapter 1. Roughly saying, the first migratory group includes those who began to migrate in the 1930s through Qinghai and Tibet into Kashmir in 1941, and they finally left for Turkey in 1953, while the second group fled into Kashmir in 1951, and moved to Turkey in 1952.

scholars like G. Mendikulova and N. Ablazhei.³ The narratives of Kazakh migrants are worth analyzing because they touch on Kazakh migration to places outside of the Middle East, such as migration to the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). Above all, H. Altay and H. Gayretullah are the most famous figures who published their memoirs.⁴

After reviewing the perspectives found in existing archival research on the history of Kazakh migration, this chapter examines 1) the development of Kazakh troops as an initiative military power; 2) the Kazakhs' relations with various authorities including the Eastern Turkestan Republic, the Soviet Union, and the Guomindang Government of China (GMD) led by the Nationalist Party; and 3) the reason why Kazakhs emigrated from Xinjiang to places outside of Central Asia such as Taiwan, India, and Turkey.

2. Existing Archival Research on Kazakh Migration

Earlier archival studies on Kazakh migration have been conducted from the perspectives of the Republic of China (ROC) and Xinjiang provincial governments. Such research includes the work of L. Benson and D. Wang, both of whom relied on Chinese archival sources in their analyses.⁵ The latest study by J. Jacobs similarly relies on Chinese archival material.⁶ Other research from the Chinese perspective in-

³ G.M. Mendikulova, *Istoricheskie sud'by kazakhskoi diaspori: Proiskhozhdenie i razvitie* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1997); N.N. Ablazhei, *Kazakhskii migratsionnyi maiatnik "Kazakhstan-Sin'tszian": emigratsiia, repatriatsiia, integratsiia* (Novosibirsk: Izd-vo SO RAN, 2015), 16–17. For a different discourse, we can refer to the following: Xinjiang hasake zu qianxi shi bianxuezu ed. *Xinjiang hasake zu qianxi shi* (Urumqi: Xinjiang daxue chubanshe, 1993).

⁴ Halife Altay, *Anayurttan Anadolu'ya* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1981); Hızırбек Gayretullah, *Altaylarda Kanlı Günler* (İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1977). Matsubara well used the former, conducting the interviews with other migrants, see Masatake Matsubara, *Kazafu yūbokumin no idō: arutai sanmyaku kara toruko e 1934–1953* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2011). The work of Zhanaltay (Canaltay) can be included here, Dälekhan Zhanaltay, *Qili zaman – Qiin künder* (Almaty: Düniezhüzi Qazaqtarining qauımdastighi, 2000). For the overview of Kazakh migration, see Äbdüuaqap Qara, *Qazaqtardıng Türkiyagha köshı* (Almaty: Orkhon, 2016) and his Chapter 1 of this volume. Also see the Svanberg's discussion on the adaptation of Kazakhs in Turkey, Ingvar Svanberg, *Kazak Refugees in Turkey: A Study of Cultural Persistence and Social Change* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1989).

⁵ Linda Benson, *The Ili Rebellion: the Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944–1949* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990); David Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow: The Yining Incident Ethnic Conflicts and International Rivalry in Xinjiang 1944–1949* (Hong Kong: the Chinese University Press, 1999).

⁶ Justin Jacobs, *Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016). Also see his Chapter 5 of this volume.

cludes the study “A History of Migration of Xinjiang Kazakh People” published within China.⁷ Interestingly, in such studies, the Eastern Turkestan Republic during 1940s was less evaluated. Importantly, the archival documents kept in the Academia Historica of Taiwan (*Guoshiguan*) still offer possibilities for further research.⁸ The research presented in this chapter uses parts of political and administrative documents housed in this archive, including the writings of Kazakhs themselves regarding their migration. It is necessary to note, however, that such archival documents lack the correspondences of local Muslim populations.

In contrast, research from the Soviet perspective offers a viewpoint of the Soviet policy. Examples of such studies include those by Russian researcher A. Barmin and the recent scholarship of Azerbaijani scholar Dzh. Gasanli. Both scholars based their investigations on Soviet archival documents. Japanese scholar K. Terayama has also analyzed Soviet-Xinjiang relations in detail, utilizing Soviet archives, particularly those related to Stalin. He has also closely focused on the economic ties between USSR and Xinjiang.⁹ Recent studies clearly indicate that Stalin had great interest in Xinjiang and that he changed USSR policies to withdraw government support to the Eastern Turkestan government and other Muslim polities. Research based on Mongolian archives, such as that of S. Rakhmetūli similarly reflects the Soviet perspective.¹⁰

Finally, Japanese scholars demonstrate several interesting tendencies in their research on Kazakh migration that are worth noting. Although the number of studies is sparse, their scholarly contributions are significant. For instance, A. Matsunaga’s earliest survey on the Kazakhs in Istanbul.¹¹ K. Higa’s interview with an Ospan Batur’s colleague explores the life history of the famous Kazakh leader. H. Abe’s fieldwork research offers another point of view on the eastward migration of Kazakhs from Xinjiang into the Qinghai province.¹² The important and comprehensive work by M. Matsubara follows the migratory route from Altay to Turkey beginning in 1934, featuring interviews from migrants themselves, including that of Kulanbay

⁷ Xinjiang hasake zu qianxi shi bianxuezu ed. *Xinjiang hasake zu qianxi shi*.

⁸ It contains a lot of documents related with the policies of the Republicans of ROC.

⁹ Dzhamil’ Gasanly, *Sin’ tshian v orbite sovetsoi politiki: Stalin i musul’ manskoe dvizhenie v Vostochnom Turkestane 1931–1949* (Moscow: FLINTA, 2015); Kyōsuke Terayama, *Sutārin to Shinkyō: 1931–1949-nen* (Tokyo: Shakai hyōronsha, 2015).

¹⁰ Sūraghan Rakhmetūli, *XX ghasir. Ospan – Choybalsan: 1912–1949 zhzh.* (Astana: REGIS-ST poligraf, 2017).

¹¹ He conducted the interviews with the famous Kazakh migrant, Khalifa Altay and others, see Akira Matsunaga, “Isutanbulu no kazafu jin,” *Isuramu sekai* 46 (1996), 17–33.

¹² Kiyota Higa, “Intabyū Osupan isuramu shōshi: bukadatta kazafujin eno intabyū,” *Chūgoku kenkyū geppō* 56, no. 9 (2002), 34–45; Haruhira Abe, “Rurō kazafu kaimetsu no kiroku,” *Chūgoku kenkyū geppō* 56, no. 1 (2002), 21–36.

Nazır (Qūlanbay Nāzır). His monograph contains ethnographic descriptions and stories about Kazakh migration toward Turkey, drawing on information from British and Turkish archives as well.¹³ Lastly, R. Ono, part of a younger generation of scholars, supplements existing Japanese research with an analysis of this issue from the viewpoint of the American diplomacy (see his Chapter 4).

A review of existing literature on Kazakh migration suggests that previous research has paid less attention to the fact that many states were involved in shaping Kazakh migration. Therefore, it is necessary to put historical discussions of this migration within the context of international relations and diplomacy taking place at the time. As this chapter shows, international pressure from outside entities was significantly responsible for the second wave of Kazakhs emigration during the 1940s and 1950s.

3. Kazakh Society in Xinjiang Prior to Mid-20th century Migration

In 19th century Xinjiang, each Kazakh tribe was led by members of the Kazakh Chinggisid nobility,¹⁴ hereditary aristocrats who held the title of *Taiji* (Kaz: täyzhǐ) under the Qing rule. Despite the leadership of the Taiji nobility, each tribal division was administered by a Chief of thousand (*qianhu zhang*). While such social structure was mandatorily altered within the Russian territory, Kazakhs situated within the Qing Empire kept this social structure¹⁵ even after the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 and the subsequent fall of the Qing empire. Several scholars argue that these chiefs gradually replaced the hereditary *Taiji*,¹⁶ pointing to, for example, chiefs such as Eliskhan, the Chief of Thousand who led later an emigrating group of Kazakhs out of Barköl. Nevertheless, even Chiang Kai-shek's government regarded the structure of Kazakh social groups as led by Taiji aristocrats.¹⁷

As Table 1 indicates, by 1945, there were approximately 438,575 Kazakh people living in the Xinjiang province. Part of this population had kinship ties not only

¹³ Matsubara, *Kazafu yūbokumin no idō*.

¹⁴ Jin Noda, *The Kazakh Khanates between the Russian and Qing Empires: Central Eurasian International Relations during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Leiden: Brill, 2016).

¹⁵ Jin Noda, "Crossing the Border, Transformation of Belonging, and "International" Conflict Resolution between the Russian and Qing Empires," in T. Onuma; D. Brophy; Y. Shinmen eds., *Xinjiang in the Context of Central Eurasian Transformations* (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 2018), 59–77.

¹⁶ Svanberg indicated the example of Kazakhs in the Northern Xinjiang, see Ingvar Svanberg, "The Nomadism of Orta žüz Kazaks in Xinjiang 1911–1949," in *The Kazaks of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority*, eds. L. Benson and I. Svanberg (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1988), 120.

¹⁷ Ma Lingyun reported that the several groups of Kazakhs were headed by *Taijis* (September, 1948), AH, 002-080200-00333-092.

within Xinjiang, but also with those living on the Soviet side of the region. Importantly, the Xinjiang border was never completely sealed, with gaps in the border allowing many Kazakh migrants to easily move beyond the Chinese border.

Nationality	Population
Uyghurs	2,988,528
Taranchi	79,296
Kazakhs	438,575
Hui	99,607
Kirghiz	69,923
Total	3,675,929

Table 1: Population of Muslim Minority Groups in Xinjiang in 1945¹⁸

After the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 and the overthrow of the Qing empire in 1912, the Xinjiang province became a semi-independent territory under Republic of China (ROC) rule. While under ROC administration, Xinjiang experienced two national movements. The creation of the first Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR) (1933–1934) represented an initial attempt to secure independence for those of Turkic descent. While this movement did not have serious effects on Kazakhs living in Xinjiang, the oppressive provincial government lead by Sheng Shicai subsequently established policies that were highly anti-Kazakh in nature.¹⁹ As a result, a portion of the nomadic Kazakh population were forced to move out of the province during the 1930s.²⁰

This cohort of Kazakh emigrants is referred to here as the “first migratory group.” This first group of migrants began emigrating from Barköl, undertaking a series of treks around the Gansu and Qinghai provinces that ultimately led them on a perilous journey from Tibet to India. In contrast, the second Kazakh migratory group began of its journey out of Qinghai at the end of 1950. It is this group that is of chief concern for this study. The following sections attempt to illuminate the international and local factors that prompted the emergence of the second migratory group and shaped the nature of the migration that occurred.

¹⁸ Benson, *The Ili Rebellion*, 30.

¹⁹ Ō Ka [Wang Ke], *Higashitorukisutan kyōwakoku kenkyū: Chūgoku no isuramu to minzoku mondai* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1999), 179.

²⁰ For instance, the criticism to Sheng Shicai, governor of the Province, by Dälekhan Haji (Zhanīmkanūli) on June 1, 1948 (from Social Ministry to Ministry of Foreign Affairs), AH: 020-012600-0018, 154.

4. The Soviet Factor

Soviet Influence on Kazakh Migration

In addition to pressure to emigrate from Republic of China authorities, the Soviet Union also influenced Kazakh migration significantly, an influence made clear from a review of archival documents. Since access to Soviet political archives are frequently limited, and documents issued by Stalin are kept under careful control, examining Soviet diplomatic relations with China during the 1940s and 1950s must be approached in an eclectic manner. While research by Azerbaijani scholar Gasanly has established the validity of previously opened Soviet archival material, this study addresses any deficiencies in Soviet archival documents through the study of Chinese documents that consider Soviet policies from additional viewpoints.

In 1945, soon after the establishment of the second Eastern Turkestan Republic (1944–1946), the Guomindang Government of China (GMD) tried to conciliate the Soviet authority for the stability in Xinjiang.²¹ The Soviets declared that they did not have any interests in Xinjiang, a declaration that may have been related to the pro-Western sentiments of the GMD. Despite Soviet government suspicions of the pro-American and pro-British attitude of the GMD,²² the Chinese government was rather optimistic about Soviet interest in Xinjiang.²³

Despite the Soviet's professed lack of interest in the province,²⁴ recent historical scholarship has revealed that the second Eastern Turkestan Republic was under the full control of the Soviets, control driven partly by the Soviet's economic interests in Xinjiang.²⁵ A review of archival material suggests that the emergence of a second migratory group of Kazakhs was caused by the collapse of the second ETR, with their migration indirectly caused by the Soviet Union's influence in the province. That is, it generated anti-Soviet group of Kazakhs. This indirect impact can be seen through an analysis of the role of Ospan Batur in Xinjiang during the 1940s.²⁶

²¹ Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow*, 225.

²² Xue Xiantian, *Zhongsu guanxi shi: 1945–1949* (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2003), 272.

²³ Suspicion and optimistic comment shown by a US diplomat Harry Hopkins, June 13, 1945, AH, 002-020300-00048-025.

²⁴ Ō, *Higashitorukisutan kyōwakoku kenkyū*, 206.

²⁵ Terayama, *Sutārin to Shinkyō*, 561. While the official Soviet-Xinjiang trade was suspended, the border trade in Northern Xinjiang still continued. It is also inevitable to consider the Soviet interest in Xinjiang's natural resource.

²⁶ For his activity in this time, see Benson, "Osman Batur"; Ömer Kul, *Osman İslamoğlu'ndan Osman Batur Han'a 1941–1951: On Yıla Siğan Efsanevi Ömür* (İstanbul: Doğu Türkistan Göçmenler Derneği, 2011).

Soviet Influence on the Leadership of Ospan Batur

Ospan was from the Altay region and, importantly, was of non-Chinggisid origin. Despite his lack of noble status, he led a group of Kazakhs in Altay to rebel against the Sheng Shicai-led government of Xinjiang. By 1948, an estimated 3,700 Kazakh households were under Ospan's authority.²⁷ In August, 1945, he joined the second ETR, a movement that was part of the first phase of the Three Districts Revolution (*Sanqu geming*). During negotiations between the ETR and GMD, Ospan defected from the ETR side and began fighting against the Communist Party of China (CPC) led by Mao Zedong, a party that would go on to establish the People's Republic of China (PRC). Towards the end of his life, Ospan was caught by the CPC's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and executed on April 29, 1951.

Ospan's influence is important to consider when examining Kazakh migration to the Middle East, as it was his fight against the PLA that led directly to the mass emigration of Kazakhs from places in northern Xinjiang such as Barköl, the Altay region, and elsewhere. Many Kazakh migrants ended up in Indian territory (i.e. Kashmir), while Ospan himself was not authorized to leave the region.

Previous research, especially research from the Soviet perspective, has emphasized the negative influence of Ospan for the ETR and his refusal to support the Communist position. In contrast, this study demonstrates how Soviet policy greatly influenced the activity of Ospan and, by extension, Kazakh migration.²⁸

It is important to recognize that the Soviets initially supported Ospan's anti-GMD actions.²⁹ After Sheng Shicai's government shifted toward anti-Soviet policies

²⁷ Ma Lingyun's report mentions the 3,700 tents under Ospan, AH, 002-080200-00333-092. The figure of the other source is 1,200 tents in 1947, Benson, *The Ili Rebellion*, 135.

²⁸ Personal sides of Ospan were already examined by following works, Benson, "Osman Batur"; Justin Jacobs, "The Many Deaths of a Kazak Unaligned: Osman Batur, Chinese Decolonization, and the Nationalization of a Nomad," *American Historical Review* 115, no. 5 (2010): 1291–1314; Rakhmetüli, *XX ghasir. Ospan – Choybalsan*. Contrastively, this paper will try to locate the activity of Ospan in the contemporary international relations.

²⁹ The report by Sheng Shicai in 1950 mentioned the support from the Soviet side in 1943, see Waijiaobu ed., *Waijiaobu dang'an conshu-jiewu lei: Xinjiang juan* (Taipei: Waijiaobu, 2001), 1: 46. Also see Sergey Radchenko, "Choibalsan's Great Mongolia Dream," *Inner Asia* 11, no. 2 (2009): 252–53. There were frequent meetings between Choibalsan and Ospan, which meant the seduction from the Soviets via Mongolia, see Kh. Bat-Ochiryn Bold and Kh. Bat-Ochiryn Tuiaa, *Ospan khén baiv: Mongol barimt yuu ögüülév* (UlaanBaatar: Nikel' Dekel' KhKhK, 2011). For relations between Ospan and Choibalsan in 1945, see V.A. Barmín, *Sin'tszian v sovetsko-kitaiskikh otnosheniakh 1941–1949 gg.* (Barnaul: Barnaul'skii gosudarstvennyi pedagogicheskii universitet, 1999), 106. In addition, the GMD and the Soviets simultaneously tried to induce Ospan to their own side in 1945, Jacobs, *Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State*, 160. Ospan regarded himself as a khan and behaved as if independent (in around 1945), Terayama, *Sutārin to Shinkyō*, 555.

in 1942, the Soviets attempted to seek the support of Kazakhs, by way of Mongolia, for anti-GMD government action. After the second ETR government was created in 1944, the Xinjiang provincial coalition government was born in 1946. At that time, Ospan took part in the newly established coalition government as a minister without a portfolio.³⁰ Ospan then aligned with Dälel Khan Sügürbaev, another Kazakh leader who was pro-Communist and based in Outer Mongolia. The Soviets reformulated their foreign policy, shifting their support from Ospan to Sügürbaev. As a result, Ospan developed a hostile attitude towards the Soviets. According to Soviet archives housed at the Wilson Center, the shift in Soviet policy away from Ospan was the result of a decision made within the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.³¹

The Impact of Soviet-Chinese Relations

Soviet relations with Xinjiang during this period were challenged by what became known as the Beitashan Incident of June 1947, a border conflict in the northern part of Xinjiang between the Outer Mongolian government and the GMD.³² Frequently referenced in historical writings, this incident was viewed as a border invasion initiated by Outer Mongolia and supported by Soviet authorities,³³ although both sides claimed the incident was based on the opponent's initiative. While the Soviet government officially denied its involvement in the incident almost immediately,³⁴ documentation from the Soviet Consulate in Nanjing also suggests that the Soviets believed that Ospan and his troops had crossed over the border from Xinjiang side.³⁵ Thus, the incident occurred on the delicate balance among the GMD government, pro-ETR groups, the Soviet Union, and the Kazakhs led by Ospan.³⁶

The GMD embraced the interpretation of the Beitashan Incident as a Soviet-

³⁰ Benson, "Osman Batur," 175.

³¹ The decision of the Politburo, TsK KPSS in 24th Feb. 1947 (originally in RGASPI: f. 17, op. 162, d. 38, ll. 154–55, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121809>, accessed February 1, 2019). Also see Gasanly, *Sin'tszian v orbite sovetskoi politiki*, 273 and 297.

³² The earliest detailed research was conducted by Forbes, see Andrew D.W. Forbes, *Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 214. The Soviet historiography much insisted on the US and GMD's initiative, Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow*, 277.

³³ For example, Rakhmetüli, *XX ghasir. Ospan – Choybalsan*, 254–55.

³⁴ For example, FRUS, 571.

³⁵ June 12, AH, 002-080200-00317-035. Also see Gasanly, *Sin'tszian v orbite sovetskoi politiki*, 277.

³⁶ The confidential telegram of Song Xilian, the Xinjiang Garrison Commander, explained Ospan's relations with other powers, mentioning Kazakhs' anti-communism attitude on June 9, 1947, see Waijiaobu, *Waijiaobu dang'an conshu*, 2: 318.

supported border invasion by Outer Mongolia, and thus took a firm stance in subsequent diplomatic negotiations with the Soviets and Mongolia.³⁷ Chiang Kai-shek went as far as to recommend that the GMD should assist the Kazakh army led by Ospan through weapons procurement and other assistance. The ex-Chairman of the Government of Xinjiang Province, Zhang Zhizhong, reported from Urumqi (*Dihua*) that GMD troops in Beitashan were sent specifically to aid Ospan's army. He highly suspected that the Soviets drove the Mongol army to invade Chinese territory.³⁸ As T. Yoshida explains, the GMD intended to internationalize the incident, forcing the United States to understand it was a violation by the Soviet Union of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.³⁹ While further consideration of the complex background of the Beitashan Incident is beyond the scope of this chapter, the incident demonstrates the interest of the Xinjiang provincial government at the time in using Ospan and his military power against the USSR, creating an obstacle for Soviet involvement in the Altay region and thus prompting a shift in relations between Choibalsan, the Prime Minister of the Mongol People's Republic, and Ospan.⁴⁰

It is clear that the GMD intended to offer assistance to Ospan, despite lacking an official coalition with him.⁴¹ According to S. Rakhmetūli, a Kazakh scholar from Mongolia, analysis of Mongolian archival material indicates that the GMD, led by Zhang Zhizhong, was significantly concerned about the power and initiative of Ospan's army, which might pose a threat to the GMD.⁴² Nevertheless, the GMD,

³⁷ The policy of Chiang Kai-shek, June 13, 1947, AH, 002-080200-00317-019. Besides, Chiang required the avoidance of the head-on clash. Shortly before the incident, Chiang indicated his will to support Ospan, May 3, 1947, AH, 002-080200-00316-040.

³⁸ June 12, AH, 002-090400-00009-417. The GMD side always tried to collect the information on the reaction of the Soviet side, see Waijiaobu, *Waijiaobu dang'an*, 2: 260.

³⁹ Toyoko Yoshida, "Tenkanki kokuminseifu no taiso seisaku to amerika: 1947nen nakaba," in *Chūgoku shakai shugi bunka no kenkyū*, ed. by Y. Ishikawa (Kyoto: Kyoto Univ. Institute for Research in Humanities, 2010), 481. In this regard, D. Wang previously regarded, "The Beitashan Incident provided the GMD government a basis for an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaign," Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow*, 275.

⁴⁰ Meeting of Choibalsan and Molotov was held on September 30, 1947 to discuss even the murder of Ospan, see Radchenko, "Choibalsan's Great Mongolia Dream," 253; Gasanly, *Sin'tszian v orbite sovetskoi politiki*, 297.

⁴¹ The involvement of the GMD is still under discussion, see V.A. Barmin, "Sobytiia Mongolo-Kitaiskogo vooruzhionnogo konflikta 2–8 iunia 1947 goda v zapadnoi istoriografii i istochnikakh tsentral'nykh arkhivov Rossiiskoi Federatsii," *Vestnik Altaiskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta* 18 (2014): 19–24; Gasanly, *Sin'tszian v orbite sovetskoi politiki*, 295. See also FRUS, 573.

⁴² Rakhmetūli, *XX ghasir. Ospan – Choybalsan*, 246. Here, Dälelkhan Sügırbaev highly warned to Zhang Zhizhong the menace of Ospan. Zhang Zhizhong's pro-Soviet attitude should be considered as well, A.M. Ledovskii et al. eds., *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia*, Vol. 5 book 1 (1946–fevral' 1950) (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 2000), 336.

from Zhang Zhizhong's perspective, expected the military abilities of Ospan's troops to present a formidable obstacle to the ETR and USSR.⁴³ An anonymous report on the situation in Xinjiang suggests that not only did the GMD authority recognize the significance of the Ospan's military force, but the American consul at Urumqi, John Hall Paxton,⁴⁴ did as well.⁴⁵ The former-ETR side, especially Sügürbaev, also expected to use Ospan's force.⁴⁶

As relations worsened between Ospan and the Soviets, Ospan became politically independent from any established authority involved in the region.⁴⁷ Consequently, he could accept various groups including Dälelkhan, Sültanshärp, Nurghozhay, Yolbars Khan from Uyghurs.⁴⁸ Those who joined his army as well as those following his leadership began emigrating out of Xinjiang.

In summation, the Soviet Union exercised both positive and negative effects for Kazakh migrants. On the one hand, the Soviet authority through the ETR indirectly pushed the Kazakhs from northern Xinjiang, which the case of Ospan well reflected. On the other hand, a portion of the Kazakh migrants after the establishment

⁴³ Telegram from Zhang to Chiang Kai-shek, October 30, 1948, AH, 002-080-101-00054-011, 7. Zhang mentioned the usage of the army of Ospan to confront with the ETR group.

⁴⁴ For his later activity, see Chapter 4 by Ono. Ospan's anti-communist stance motivated American diplomats to stay in contact with Ospan, and these diplomats tried to support Kazakh groups to fight against the ETR authorities. U.S. diplomat D. Mackiernan played a significant role in structuralizing relations with Ospan, see A.K. Kamalov, "Amerikanskaia diplomatiia v Sin'tsziane: Zakrytie konsul'stva i sud'ba poslednikh predstavitelei SShA v Urumchi Dzh. Pakstona i D. Makirnana," *Izvestiia Natsional'noi Akademii nauk Respubliki Kazakhstan*, no. 1 (2012): 61–69; Gayretullah, *Altaylarda Kanlı Günler*, 96. As a well-known fact, on June 19, 1947, Paxton dispatched Mackiernan to Ospan, FRUS, 567. Later in 1948, Mackiernan again met with Ospan and Zhanimkhan (Canımhan), Higa, "Intabyū Osupan isuramu shōshi," 42.

⁴⁵ In 1947, AH, 002-080101-00054-010.

⁴⁶ His letter to Ospan, August 20, 1949, Xinjiang hasake zu qianxi shi bianxuezu, *Xinjiang hasake zu qianxi shiqianxi shi*, 267.

⁴⁷ Barmin, "Sobytiia Mongolo-Kitaiskogo vooruzhyonnogo konflikta," 10. According to Barmin, General Song Xilian mentioned that the troops of Ospan were not under the full-control of the GMD. In other words, Ospan and his army were in a distance from the GMD, while previous researchers considered that Ospan was fully in the pro-GMD side by the Beitashan incident.

⁴⁸ Gasanly, *Sin'tszian v orbite sovetskoi politiki*, 329. Since October, 1949, people from various standpoints like Sültanshärp (Sultan Şerif), Nurghozhay, Yolbars, Russian White Armies, and some Dungan groups, gathered to Barköl where Ospan and Zhanimkhan stationed, see G.M. Mendikulova, *Istoricheskoe i sovremennoe razvitie kazakhskoi diaspori i irredenty* (Almaty: Qazaq universiteti, 2016), 162–63. A part of them, on May 17, 1950, left for the lake Gasköl (Today's *Gasikule*), located at the west of Qinghai bordering the Xinjiang province. Among them were Dälelkhan Zhanaltay and Qalibek, who finally joined Qūsayin Täyzhi there. See Mendikulova, *Istoricheskie sud'by kazakhskoi diaspori*, 150. Also see Chapter 1.

of the second ETR fled into the United Soviet Socialist Republic with the approval of the Soviet government.⁴⁹ Thus, the Soviet Union both caused the second wave of Kazakh emigration as well as sought to assist Kazakh refugees.

5. Chinese Influence on Kazakh Migration

Other factors than Soviet Union influence shaped the second wave of Kazakh migration as well. The Republic of China also played a role in shaping Kazakh migration, particularly through the activity of the Chinese Muslim Association, which was under GMD authority.⁵⁰ The Nationalist Party took responsibility and care for Kazakh refugees in Pakistan, as their homeland had to be China. Even after the ROC was expelled from the Chinese mainland and fled to Taiwan after Mao Zedong established the People's Republic of China, the GMD tried to maintain relations with Kazakh migrants in Pakistan and Turkey through the China Mainland Relief Organization.⁵¹ The GMD was concerned with the first migrant group too with payment to India for Kazakh migrant debt which occurred during their stay in India, expressing such concerns through the Overseas Community Affairs Council based in Taiwan. Here, it is important to note that the GMD authority in Taiwan aimed to recover its lost power at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party.⁵² As a result, the GMD government in Taiwan continuously kept contact with the Kazakh migrants out of Xinjiang and tried to position them on the pro-GMD side.

6. Ethno-nationalist Networks and Kazakh Migration

In addition to Soviet and Chinese influence on Kazakh migration, migrant networks also played a role in shaping the history of Kazakh migration. After 1949, as Kazakh migrants gradually migrated out of Xinjiang, these migrants engaged significantly with the cultural networks of the region. These networks had various dimensions, including an ethno-nationalist one.

During the Sheng Shicai era, particularly during the 1940s, Kazakhs struggled for cultural autonomy. In 1934, the Kazakh-Kyrgyz Association for the promotion of

⁴⁹ Ablazhei, *Kazakhskii migratsionnyi maiatnik*, 63–69. Also see Ledovskii, *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia*, 359. For the 1,400 Kazakhs who moved into the Soviet territory through Tarbaghatay in 1945, see AH, 020-021904-0001.

⁵⁰ The president of the Association visited Peshawar to the Xinjiang refugees in 1943, AH, 020-011908-0037, 077. The name of All-Turkestan Muslim Union was also found in a document (May, 1951), AH, 020-011908-0040.

⁵¹ Request and aid regarding Kalibek and others in 1952, AH, 020-069911-0008. For the invitation from Taiwan, see Chapter 5.

⁵² In 1946–47, AH, 020-012600-0017, 99 and 103. Request for aid by the first migrant group of Kazakhs at Bhopal, AH, 020-012600-0018.

the culture was established under the instruction of Burhan Shahidi (*Bao'erhan*).⁵³ Importantly, the Association did not always consider the needs of all Kazakhs living in Xinjiang. For example, when discussing the rights of Kazakhs, the discourse of Aqit Ülemjī was often restricted to the rights of Kazakhs within the Altay region.⁵⁴ Nonetheless, on February 25, 1947, under the rule of the coalition government, Kazakh, Hui Muslims, and Han Chinese associations demonstrated in Urumqi for their rights.⁵⁵

Such demonstrations increased incrementally. According to a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, a conference of the Kazakh Association promoting the advancement of Kazakh rights was held at Urumqi in October 1947, led by Kazakh politician Salishi (Salis Ermekūli).⁵⁶ During this time, according to Zhang Zhizhong, conflict between Kazakhs and Uyghurs escalated.⁵⁷ There existed a clear ethnic distinction between Kazakhs and Uyghurs and the ethno-nationalist movements during this time period solidified Kazakhs ethnic identity more firmly than ever. One researcher even stated the Uyghur chauvinism during the second ETR.⁵⁸ Such a situation might be one of the reasons of corruption within the ETR regime and the subsequent fall of the coalition government.

In the context of such movements for cultural autonomy, Kazakh ethno-nationalism served as a contributing factor of Kazakh migration. Emigration from

⁵³ Asaiyin Jiakesileke, "Wo suo zhidao de yili ha, ke wenhua zujinhui," *Yili wenshi ziliao* (Yining: Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Yili hasake zizhizhou weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, 2009) 6–10: 344–7. Practically, it was established in 1935 Sep. The Association had its divisions in the various areas of Xinjiang, playing the role to develop the education for Kazakhs.

⁵⁴ Jin Noda, "The Scope of the Kazakh Intellectuals in Xinjiang: A Case of Aqit Ulemjiuli," paper presented in the Workshop "Mobility of Central Asian Intellectuals: Scholarly and Religious Networks between Xinjiang and Middle East" (July 21, 2018, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies).

⁵⁵ Bao'erhan, *Xinjiang wushi nian: Bao'erhan huiyi lu*, (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1994), 308. Zhanaltay, paying attention to the Feb. 25 incident, mentioned that his father Zhanimkhan was confronting with the ETR members and Burhan, see Zhanaltay, *Qili Zaman*, 61. According to the telegram from the Counterintelligence Bureau under the Ministry of National Defense to Chiang Kai-shek, Akhmetzhan and other ETR members wanted to dismiss Zhanimkhan claiming his support for Ospan, January 26, 1947, AH, 002-080200-00313-051. The other telegram from the Counterintelligence Bureau revealed that Zhanimkhan played a role on the election of Masud Sabri as a next governor of the province, April 28, 1947, AH, 002-080200-00316-029.

⁵⁶ AH, 002-080200-00322-015. In it, for example, Kazakhs requested the more frequent usage of the language in the administrative documentation.

⁵⁷ Zhang's opinion of March, 1947, AH, 001-059300-0007, 117. For the increase of the confrontation of the second half of 1946, see Waijiaobu, *Waijiaobu dang'an conshu*, 2: 296.

⁵⁸ Ō, *Higashitorukisutan kyōwakoku kenkyū*, 264.

Xinjiang thus provided Kazakhs an alternative way to achieve cultural autonomy, with a number of Kazakh migrants choosing to flee to the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic where they had kinship ties.

Considering the role of Kazakh ethnic identity on Kazakh migration also requires attention to the existence of countrymen in the Gansu-Qinghai regions who were forced to migrate from Xinjiang in the 1930s.⁵⁹ After the retirement of Sheng Shicai, a few groups of Kazakh migrants returned to Xinjiang.⁶⁰ Thereafter, some groups of Kazakhs still moved to and from between Xinjiang and Gansu-Qinghai regions.

Kazakh migration was also influenced by Turkic ethno-nationalist networks. The existence of the Eastern Turkestan Association⁶¹ and the Kashmir Association for Those Who Are from Xinjiang clearly shows that these groups shared an identity of Xinjiang origin.⁶² The first migratory group of Kazakhs living in Pakistan had their own association, the Eastern Turkestan Kazakh Refugees Association.⁶³

In addition, according to Matsubara, Turkish documents described the Kazakh refugees in Pakistan as “Turks.” Here, pan-Turkism from the viewpoint of Turkey has to be considered.⁶⁴ According to the reports of İsa Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra who, in 1951, were in Kashmir traveling alongside the Kazakh second wave of migrants, Yolbars Khan, the later governor of Xinjiang based in Taiwan, and Ospan aimed to meet in Kashmir.⁶⁵ In the end, Yolbars moved to Taipei and witnessed Ospan’s arrest by PRC troops in February 1951.⁶⁶

⁵⁹ Abe, “Rurō kazafu kaimetsu no kiroku.”

⁶⁰ A report on Kazakhs who returned to Xinjiang from Gansu (1949), AH, 020-021905-0002. Also see the above mentioned Ma’s report, AH, 002-080200-00333-092.

⁶¹ It worked in 1940s in Kashmir, AH, 020-012600-0019, 71–72.

⁶² In Chinese, “Xinji tongxianghui,” AH, 020-069911-0008.

⁶³ It was created on October 17, 1951, see Altay, *Anayurttan Anadolu’ya*, 375; Mendikulova, *Istoricheskie sud’by kazakhskoi diaspori*, 157; Matsubara, *Kazafu yūbokumin no idō*, 325.

⁶⁴ Matsubara, *Kazafu yūbokumin no idō*, 348.

⁶⁵ For the involvement by Alptekin, see AH, 020-069911-0008. Matsubara pays attention to their role in the relations with the Turkish government, Matsubara, *Kazafu yūbokumin no idō*, 348. For instance, Polat Qadiri’s work mentioned “Turk,” including Kazakhs, Ondřej Klimeš, *Struggle by the Pen: The Uyghur Discourse of Nation and National Interest, c. 1900–1949*. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015), 216. In spite of the famous claim by Alptekin to unify all of the Turkic populations in Xinjiang, it is suspicious that the Kazakhs had the sympathy with the Pan-Turkism thought.

⁶⁶ Alptekin’s report on the arrival of Hüseyin Teyji (200 people at Ladakh) in 1951, AH, 020-011908-0040.

7. Conclusion

This chapter examined the historical context of the second migratory movement of Kazakhs, focusing the period of the second half of 1940s, from the end of World War II to the consolidation of power by the Communist Party of China in 1949. It is clear that the Soviet's exerted significant influence on the history of Xinjiang, and Kazakh migration in particular, during this time.

Cultural networks surrounding Kazakh migrants influenced the second wave of Kazakh migration as well. Evidently, such networks were far from the influence of the Soviet Union. Considering the impact of Turkic ethno-nationalist networks enabled an exploration of the issue of Kazakh migration within the broader context of international relations. It is clear that these networks shaped the migrations of Kazakhs from Xinjiang. Despite the fact that Kazakhs in Xinjiang had ethnic ties with those living in the neighboring Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, these ties did not automatically translate into pro-Soviet sentiment. Consequently, Kazakhs aimed to immigrate to places other than the Soviet Union, such as Taiwan, India, and Turkey.

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