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The Politics of Reproductive Labour in Globalization

The aim of this paper is to describe the main changes globalization and the engendering of work and migration have produced in the politics of reproductive labour, and to address several important questions they raise from a political and ethical point of view. I intend to argue here that it is the privatization of care and the exploitation of reproductive labour, not its remuneration, that constitutes a problem today. From the perspective of both local and global justice, the privatization of care poses a threat, due the consequences it entails in terms of different purchasing power not only between rich and poor countries, but even within rich countries themselves, between higher and lower classes. Moreover, from a gender perspective, the commodification of reproductive labour today assumes forms that are functional to the reinforcement of patriarchal power structures and create an apparent conflict of interest between women, along lines of class, colour and race. At the same time, the new division of reproductive labour threatens to undermine everything that has been achieved since the 1970s, in terms of gender parity, equal division of care labour between men and women and the politics of reconciliation between labour and caring.

Before entering the heart of the subject, I would like to offer a more precise definition of “reproductive labour”. When we speak of “reproductive” or “care labour” we refer to the diverse and complex totality of activities pertaining to the production of men themselves, the species, the workforce and, last but non least, to the satisfaction of our affective needs and the training of our moral sentiments. Cindi Katz describes reproductive social labour as “the fleshy, messy, and indeterminate stuff of every day life”. Reproductive labour has to do with flesh and bodies, with giving birth to children and taking care of them, with caring for the frail, the elderly and the sick, with people’s needs for tenderness and love. These activities range from biological reproduction to the support of fundamental processes of socialization. Traditionally, they have been carried out within the home, by women, for free or with poor compensation. Such work is seldom rendered visible or recognized as “real work”, despite its vital contribution to the functioning of the economic system, in producing and maintaining the workforce. The conceptualization of care labour as a


woman’s natural duty and as a private/family matter has served to deny the fact that care affords crucial support to the economic system and society in general, banishing care from the political and economic system, leaving it to women and families to bear the cost of these activities.

The primary transformation of reproductive labour pertains to its extensive commodification: care labour is now an increasingly scarce commodity, in great demand in rich countries. It is a commodity that circulates in an enormous, legal and illegal, market, ranging from more traditional sectors, such as prostitution, domestic labour and qualified nursing assistance, to the adoption market, mail order brides, and surrogate motherhood. There are several reasons for the care resource shortage in rich countries: ageing population, falling fertility rates, the desire of women to enter the labour market, the low level of public social services guaranteed by the welfare state in most countries, the transformation of the family, with its nuclearization and the resulting weakening of social bonds.

By failing to implement policies based on family and work reconciliation, and to recognize the right to give and receive care, rich nations are squandering the social capital of their care resources. Instead, they are draining poor countries of their reproductive labour, closing an eye to illegal immigration or creating special visas for domestic workers, caregivers and nurses. In this way, rich countries can make use of a labour force whose disciplining and training as disposable workers is sustained by poor countries. According to Arlie Hochschild we are witnessing a new form of imperialism: “emotional imperialism”. Once rich countries drained precious raw materials from poor countries; today they are mining a new kind of “gold”: care resources. If it is imperialism however, it is imperialism without empire, governing in new ways. There is no big, invasive colonial structure behind the new system of exploitation; only what appear to be individual choices, often supported by families, and taken under economic pressure. There is no metropolitan centre, but the demand emanating from receiving countries cannot fail to influence the survival strategies chosen by sending countries. These are countries struggling to offer a way out of unemployment and economic crisis and, most of all, to find the foreign currency they need to cope with their foreign debts.

The commodification of care labour now has a global dimension: reproductive activities are increasingly delegated to third world women - a trend that shows, as Saskia Sassen has

demonstrated in many of her works, how globalization is not at all gender neutral. Post-fordist restructuring of production, and the structural adjustment plans imposed on many developing countries by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have effectively feminized the labour force in the most unsafe, least remunerated and more flexible jobs, reshaping the labour market according to gender, race and ethnic hierarchies.

In some cases, the redistribution of care labour or the “new international division of reproductive labour” on a global scale assumes the form of veritable outsourcing. Think of surrogate mothers provided by infertility clinics in India, South Africa or Ukraine, whose labour has been termed “sexualized care work” — a phenomenon I would like to compare to the total negation of women’s reproductive rights in the maquiladoras and other businesses in South America and other parts of the world, in order to emphasize the paradoxicality of the contemporary global scene. In both cases women’s bodies are manipulated and subjugated to deny or enhance their reproductive power.

Regarding surrogacy, India, is perhaps the most striking case. India legalized surrogacy in 2002, and within a short time, this reproductive technology became a very profitable global business. Infertile couples, singles or gay couples from rich countries, anxious to have a baby at any cost, pay young women, aged 18 to 45, recruited by the more then 100 infertility clinics and hospitals active in the market not only in big cities, such as Delhi, Calcutta and Mumbai, but also in smaller towns such as Bhopal, Indore and Ahmadabad. In India, a surrogate mother costs around $10,000 - far less than the $50,000-80,000 required in the United States; medical personnel are generally well-qualified and highly-trained, and risks of legal action are low, due to the preference for separation between the gestational and genetic mother. There is no official data on the number of children delivered by Indian surrogate mothers, but some estimate the scope of this business at around 445 million dollars per year. India’s booming rent-a-womb industry can be taken as a mark of the tendency to reproduce a well-known local phenomenon on a global scale: the relegating of work considered “hard”, because it is “harsh, unpleasant, cruel, difficult to endure” and because it “carries negative goods in its train: poverty, insecurity, ill health, physical danger, dishonour and degradation”, to “guest workers” or “internal aliens”. Among the many complex issues posed by surrogacy, one cannot ignore, on the one hand, the health risks for the woman,
risks associated not only with pregnancy itself but also with the medical treatment necessary to prepare the gestational mother’s body for artificial childbearing and, on the other hand, the psychological and social effects this experience can have on a woman selling her body - something that, in a traditional culture, comes dangerously close to the image of a “whore”14.

In the new global division of reproductive labour, the active role or at least the complicity of the state in exporting and selling care resources is crucial. Struck by the effects of economic globalization, debt and widespread unemployment, many countries today see this particular labour market as a last resort. Countries such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Indonesia and especially the Philippines, have invested in their image as exporting countries of skilled human resources, domestics workers, caregivers and nurses15. At the same time, these states have also worked to maintain, to the greatest extent possible, strong and permanent transnational relationships with their emigrant labour forces, thereby ensuring a regular flow of remittances from abroad. What emerges from this picture is not the weakness of the state in a globalized world, but its ability to reinvent itself and its functions of governance16. Countries negatively affected by globalization make transnationalism part of their nation-building - one of the means at their disposal to contend with their vulnerability in the face of global reorganization and restructuration processes17. Thanks to the large-scale manufacturing of human resources “built” for export, states are sometimes authors or partners in the creation of survival circuits transcending national borders and often operating in an illegal market, in a shadow economy18. In the context of this third-world survival strategy, women have become a precious commodity for myriad legal and illegal employment agencies operating in the sending countries and elsewhere, due to the ease in finding placement for them within the expanding care market. The strong ties that bind these women to their families serve the sending state as a guarantee of the constancy of their remittances. Frequently, governments finance training programmes that teach these women not only how to use electrical appliances, but also how to relate to their employers. They teach them not only to be polite, but to be submissive and humble and almost invisible, in order to avoid falling victim to sexual abuse. The national mission of the migrant worker and the significance of the remittances for the economy of the sending country have engendered truly nationalistic rhetoric in some countries. While waiting at the airport lounge for the plane that will take them to their respective destinations, Sri Lankan domestic workers can listen to a song that encourages them to migrate and return home with treasure for everyone, and promises that the state will not abandon them, but will continue to protect and support them during their time abroad19 - a promise that is often utterly and

18 Cf. S. Sassen, Women’s Burden, cit.
shamefully broken. Studies on the conditions of migrant domestic workers from Sri Lanka in Lebanon\textsuperscript{20} - to name but one example, multiplied many times over for other sending and receiving countries – describe a situation of continuous violations of human rights, discrimination and exploitation of the female workforce. Sending countries generally have little ability or desire to address such cases, despite numerous warning signs (such as the high suicide rate among migrant Sri Lankan domestic workers in Lebanon\textsuperscript{21}).

In light of all this, the choice of migration - which may be dictated by the desire to escape poverty and unhappiness at home - rarely represent a real opportunity for emancipation for these women. Indeed, the value of women's work and the kind of activities open to them continue to be linked to a patriarchal imaginary that is still very strong in the culture of sending countries, despite the fact that women today are frequently the sole breadwinners in their families. Employment agencies and bureaus of foreign employment that have been established by some sending countries seek to promote their workers on the foreign market by stressing qualities such as docility, passivity and trustworthiness, presenting them as traditional women committed to family values, who work hard and don’t ask too many questions. Reading the sociological and anthropological studies conducted in recent years in various parts of the world, it striking how little the present female migration has changed gender relationships in sending countries\textsuperscript{22}. The absence of the main female figure in the family seldom leads to a shift in gender role. If a woman migrates, she will often do so, and can be pressed to do so by her family, with a care objective in mind (to give her children a better life and education), which now includes her new role of main breadwinner. Before leaving, she will entrust her children to other women - her mother, sister, an older daughter, or female domestic workers, creating the so called “global care chain”\textsuperscript{23}. The male, weakened in his role as main breadwinner and often in his decisional power within the family, rarely redefines himself in terms of responsibility for the care of his children, so that even when this does occur, traditional gender divisions of labour remain unchanged.

Mothers try to compensate for the sense of loss within their families, by means of remittances,

\textsuperscript{20} Cf. R. Jureidini e N. Moukarbel, Female Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Lebanon: a Case of 'Contract Slavery', «Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies», 30, 4 (2004), pp. 581-607 and M. Smith, "Model employee": Sri Lankan Dominestics in Lebanon, “Middle East Report online”, 238 (Spring 2006): http://www.merip.org/mer/mer238/smith.html. Monica Smith writes: “Responsibility for the maltreatment and lack of protection for domestic migrant workers does not lie solely with prejudice and poor law enforcement in receiving countries. The countries that send workers abroad are deeply complicit as well. Labor-exporting states intervene only meekly on their citizens’ behalf when specific abuses are reported, and have done little to ameliorate the systemic problems. [...] The reason is clear: for labor-exporting countries, migrant workers are a growing source of badly needed hard currency. [...] According to P. G. Jayasinge, director of planning, research and development at the Labor Secretariat of Sri Lanka, abuse of domestics is never mentioned directly in meetings or written correspondence with counterparts in labor-importing countries. «If we demand better working conditions and greater salaries,” he explains, “the receiving countries, like Lebanon, will look to other sending countries for their labor».”


gifts, photos, letters and frequent long distance communication, made possible by low international telephone rates or the internet. These communication technologies shrink time and space, enabling a feeling of closeness over long distances. In this way, women continue to fulfil their maternal roles from afar, striving to maintain the affective bond essential to their children’s emotional stability and growth\textsuperscript{24}, in the context of a “transnational family”. The children however, will often resent their mothers’ decision to migrate and stay away for long periods, even as long as 10-15 years. The material wellbeing guaranteed by remittances do not always have the desired effect: mothers’ migration can leave behind a sense of loss and emptiness in their children; and a culture of dependency can ensue from the arrival of wealth, without any real awareness on the part of the recipients, of the suffering and hard work endured by the migrant to obtain it.

If we shift our attention from sending to receiving countries, we cannot say that the effects produced by migrant care workers on culture and the popular imaginary are more positive in terms of gender parity. In rich countries, women now appear to enter the labour market thanks to the possibility of delegating their traditional domestic roles to migrant women from the world’s poorest countries. Gender injustice and inequality are thus never challenged on the structural level: men and the state continue to be exonerated from any responsibility for reproductive labour; care labour continues to be ignored in economic calculations and planning, and is still considered degrading labour, to be left to the most disadvantaged members of society.

Receiving states have no interest in guaranteeing migrant workers stable social integration, or affording them the concrete possibility of family reunion, even in liberal states such as Italy, where family reunion immigration programmes exist. The uncertainty of their legal status is, for immigration countries, a powerful instrument by which to maintain a low-paid workforce and women migrant workers in a subordinate state.

In countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia, foreign domestic workers with a two-year employment contract can request an extension for a further two years, but cannot change jobs, nor can they aspire to permanent residency or citizenship. Alone in a new country, confined to the household, invisible to the rest of society and subject to the near absolute power of their employers (in the virtual absence of rules governing this labour market), these women migrant workers are viewed as a danger to the integrity of society. For the duration of their contracts, they must refrain from sexual relations with the local male population, and must submit to periodic medical examinations for HIV infection and pregnancy. If they are found to be pregnant, they are immediately sent back to their country of origin\textsuperscript{25}.


In western democracies migrant domestic workers are better off than in Asia and the Arab World. Nevertheless, even in the West, transnational domestic workers challenge membership definitions and admission criteria. The difficulties in legally entering the labour markets of receiving countries – the Italian case is sadly emblematic in this sense - do not discourage migration, but favour phenomena such as trafficking and smuggling\(^{26}\) and the ongoing presence of illegal aliens, constituting a more vulnerable and exploitable workforce. Receiving states seem to do very little to keep this situation in check, because a cheap illegal-migrant workforce, easily eliminated by sending workers back to their native countries, can be extremely useful in certain economic conditions\(^{27}\). Even when granted regular residence permits for work, women migrants live as permanent guest workers - often without access to fundamental civil and political rights, despite their contribution to the economy of the receiving country - for whom the prospective of ever obtaining the right to full citizenship, if they so desire, appears faraway and uncertain\(^{28}\). Even in the best of circumstances, as in Canada, admission criteria for foreign care workers are grounded in unfair assumptions. Canada has a special recruitment programme for foreign domestic workers, whereby 15,000-20,000 entrance permits are allocated every year, to migrants willing to work for two years as live-in care-givers. These domestic workers, mostly women coming from the Philippines, are required to live in their employer’s home. They may change employers during the two years of the contract, but may not change the type of employment or apply for family reunion\(^{29}\). Just criteria for membership is a fundamental issue today, if democracies wish to be consistent with their formal declarations of respect for human rights\(^{30}\). Equal, certain and fair conditions for access to citizenship must become an integral part of a theory of local and global justice shared, at the every least, by the world’s democracies. The condition of permanent alienage, to which many migrants are relegated today, allows the creation of a sort of “reserve army” of people recruited by means of permits or visas for limited types of jobs.

We often hear people saying that, in rich countries, few citizens are still willing to do the so called “dirty, dangerous, demeaning, and demanding” jobs. More precisely, few citizens are inclined to do such jobs without decent pay and suitable working conditions. Many more would be prepared to work hard, providing day-long assistance to the elderly or the disabled, were conditions and pay commensurate with the varied and often emotionally-demanding tasks entailed by this kind of care work\(^{31}\). We agree with those who point out that there are really no cases in which it is


\(^{27}\) Cf. E. Santoro, *La regolamentazione dell'immigrazione come questione sociale*, in Id. (a c. di), *Il diritto come questione sociale*, Giappichelli, Torino 2010.


impossible to find someone prepared to do a given job, with the right compensation, in terms of free time, pay or social recognition. The input of migrant temporary workers in the labour market is thus simply a way of keeping the costs of certain services low and thereby affordable to the majority of citizens. In this way, the market is made to provide private solutions to problems that would otherwise demand significant public attention. This is undoubtedly the case in Italy, where numerous studies have characterized the legal and illegal market of foreign female domestic workers as a form of “grey welfare”. Without the “badanti” (female care workers) the structural deficiencies of our welfare state system, in terms of assistance to frail elderly people, the disabled and the chronically ill, would be revealed within days, sending the entire country into a state of crisis.

The picture presented by the rich countries seems to reflect a conflict between women of the first and third world: women citizens in the West acquire full citizenship at the expense of poor migrant women, denied even basic human rights, such as the right to take care of their own children. This picture is incomplete however. Even in the West, women able to resort to migrant care-givers constitute only a small part of the population. For many women, care responsibility for children, the sick or the elderly are still a cause of exclusion from public life and often a risk factor for poverty. Unequal access to care resources thus exacerbates not only the divide between rich and poor countries, but even the divide between classes and families within democracies, creating increasingly unequal societies, where only the few can truly benefit from qualified assistance and care. From this point of view, the commodification of care indeed represents a negative phenomenon, but not necessarily as a result of its monetization. There are those who view monetization in itself as a form of degradation of the purity of care, for fear that money will contaminate the true source of care, that is love, affection and solidarity. Yet, many professions – teaching or nursing, for example – entail “care” and have always been paid. Money does not, and is not meant to pay for the strong relational and emotional aspect of many professions. The real problem with the commodification of reproductive labour pertains on the one hand, to the increasing inequality of opportunity it creates between families, along lines of class, gender, ethnicity, nationality and level of education, and on the other hand, to the fact that it merely postpones the adoption of serious public policies with regard to care -- entailing recognition of care as a fundamental resource and ability in the life of every individual in all societies.

Therefore, the interests of women in the first and third worlds - apparently at odds with one another at present - cannot but converge in the end. It is no coincidence that women’s attitudes toward the welfare state have always been much more positive than those of men: a majority of men prefer lower taxes to the improvement of public services, whereas women tend to express a clear preference for welfare services.34 The reason for this simple: women feel the effects of cuts or

32 Cf. J. Carens, Live-in domestics, seasonal workers, and others hard to locate on the map of democracy, cit.
the lack of public services in a far more direct and immediate way than men. If reproductive labour policies are to break away from local and global patriarchy, they will have to consider “care” and “social reproductive labour” a central value in every society. To this end, it would suffice to design a welfare model in keeping with the experiences of women\textsuperscript{35}.

\textsuperscript{35} Cf. ibidem.