

Artículo de investigación

Sanctions on Russia: effectiveness and impacts on the national security of Russia

Санкции против России: эффективность и влияние на национальную безопасность России

Sanciones a Rusia: efectividad e impactos en la seguridad nacional de Rusia

Recibido: 20 de julio del 2019

Aceptado: 27 de agosto del 2019

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The current stage of development of the entire world community, including Russia, is associated with such a thing as “sanction wars”. As an example, one can recall the introduction of US sanctions against China, Iran, Venezuela, and other countries, European sanctions, as well as various countersanctions of countries subjected to sanction pressure.

As part of this paper, the sanctions imposed against Russia in connection with the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 and countersanctions imposed by Russia are considered. The purpose of this study is to identify the impact of sanctions and countersanctions on the national security of Russia. In this regard, the following tasks were set: to identify the list of sanctions of Western countries imposed against Russia and their impact on the national security of Russia, to identify the list of countersanctions of Russia against Western countries and their impact on the national security of Russia, to identify further actions of Russia to ensure the national security of Russia under the conditions of sanction pressure.

The study is based on the dialectical, historical and systematic approach, analysis, synthesis and comparison, induction and deduction. The study analyzed Russian and international literature on

Анотація

современный этап развития всего мирового сообщества, в том числе России, связан с таким явлением как «санкционные войны», в качестве примера можно вспомнить введение санкции США против Китая, Ирана, Венесуэлы и других стран, европейские санкции, а также различные контрсанкции стран, подвергшихся санкционному давлению.

В рамках данной статьи рассмотрены санкции, введенные против России в связи с украинским кризисом в 2014 году, и контрсанкции введенные Россией. Целью данного исследования является определение влияния санкций и контрсанкций на национальную безопасность России. В этой связи были поставлены следующие задачи: определить перечень санкции западных стран, введенных против России, и их влияние на национальную безопасность России, определить перечень контрсанкций России против западных стран и их влияние на национальную безопасность России, определить дальнейшее действия России по обеспечению национальной безопасности России в условиях санкционного давления.

Исследование основано на диалектическом, историческом и системном подходе, анализе,

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the topic of sanctions and their impact on national security.

Based on the results of the study, the directions of economic development based on the promotion of import substitution, innovation and public-private partnerships with the aim of ensuring the national security of Russia under the conditions of sanction pressure have been proposed. The findings of the study may be of interest to the academic community, studying the impact of sanctions on the national security of the country. The experience of Russia may be of interest to countries subjected to sanction pressure from the United States and its allies.

Keywords: Sanctions, embargo, national security, import substitution, innovation, public-private partnership.

синтезе и сравнении, индукции и дедукции. В исследовании проанализирована российская и международная литература на тему санкций и их влияния на национальную безопасность. По итогам исследования предложены направления экономического развития, основанные на стимулировании импортозамещения, инноваций и государственно-частного партнерства с целью обеспечения национальной безопасности России в условиях санкционного давления. Выводы, полученные в ходе исследования, могут быть интересны научному сообществу, изучающие влияние санкций на национальную безопасность страны, опыт России может быть интересен странам, подвергшимся санкционному давлению США и их союзников.

Ключевые слова: санкции, эмбарго, национальная безопасность, импортозамещение, инновации, государственно-частное партнерство.

Resumen

La etapa actual de desarrollo de toda la comunidad mundial, incluida Rusia, está asociada con cosas como "guerras de sanciones", por ejemplo, podemos recordar la introducción de sanciones de Estados Unidos contra China, Irán, Venezuela y otros países, sanciones europeas, así como varios países. sometido a presión de sanción.

Como parte de este artículo, se consideran las sanciones impuestas contra Rusia en relación con la crisis ucraniana en 2014 y las sanciones contrarias impuestas por Rusia. El propósito de este estudio es determinar el impacto de las sanciones y contra-sanciones en la seguridad nacional de Rusia. En este sentido, se establecieron las siguientes tareas: determinar la lista de sanciones de los países occidentales impuestas contra Rusia, y su impacto en la seguridad nacional de Rusia, determinar la lista de contra-sanciones de Rusia contra los países occidentales y su impacto en la seguridad nacional de Rusia, para determinar acciones adicionales de Rusia para garantizar la seguridad nacional de Rusia bajo condiciones de presión de sanción.

El estudio se basa en un enfoque dialéctico, histórico y sistemático, análisis, síntesis y comparación, inducción y deducción. El estudio analizó la literatura rusa e internacional sobre el tema de las sanciones y su impacto en la seguridad nacional. Sobre la base de los resultados del estudio, se proponen las direcciones del desarrollo económico basadas en la promoción de la sustitución de importaciones, la innovación y las asociaciones público-privadas con el objetivo de garantizar la seguridad nacional de Rusia en condiciones de presión de sanción. Los hallazgos del estudio pueden ser de interés para la comunidad científica, al estudiar el impacto de las sanciones en la seguridad nacional del país, la experiencia de Rusia puede ser de interés para los países sujetos a la presión de las sanciones de los Estados Unidos y sus aliados.

Palabras clave: Sanciones, embargo, seguridad nacional, sustitución de importaciones, innovación, asociación público-privada.

Introduction

The dynamics of modern international relations makes one look differently at the processes of modernization and globalization, which are a

means of introducing universal standards of economic, political and social relations between different countries. That is why the interpretation

of globalization as a process of spreading universal world values is being transformed into a process that provokes the expansion of the environment of risks and threats to national security from the local to the global level. It is obvious that the situation that has developed on the international scene as a result of the application of economic sanctions against the Russian Federation by the countries of the European Union and the USA is the reason for the growing interest in ensuring the country's national security.

The modern era is characterized by new priorities and challenges, as well as new approaches to solving the problems facing Russia and other countries. The relevance and need for the transition of the domestic economy to the post-industrial stage of development are considered the most important problem that has been discussed by economists, political scientists, and government officials in recent decades (Medvedev, 2015). The events that took place in 2014, which were characterized by the military conflict in Ukraine, a worsening situation in the energy market, as well as the imposition of various sanctions against Russian enterprises, show that Russia's transition to a new technological structure based on innovative economic development, and to a new model of economic development should be a priority for ensuring the national security of Russia.

However, in the academic literature, there are various, often diametrically opposing points of view regarding the causes of the current crisis state in the Russian economy. So, according to (Akindinova, Kuzminov and Yasin, 2016), the future model of Russia's economic development (in the context of falling energy prices and, consequently, the absence of a constant influx of oil and gas rents) should focus on the option of gradual development based on the advantages of a market economy and competition, that is, implying the absence of radical changes. At the same time, the point of view is more and more frequent that without a radical restructuring of the economic strategy, Russia will be able to survive, but it risks staying long outside the world community (Stepanov, 2014), because its position in the system of the international division of labor as a "supplier of raw materials, its dependence on prices for them, submission to tight control of global multinationals, signs of degradation of the country's scientific, technical and socio-economic development" (Gurieva and Baburina, 2012) is a serious threat to national security.

Thus, the Russian economy is undergoing profound transformations. In the coming years, Russia will have to radically modernize the economic system to meet the changes and challenges in the global social and economic order (Medvedev, 2016).

No less debatable is the set of problems associated with assessing the impact of economic sanctions on the Russian economy and retaliatory measures (countersanctions) on the US and European economies. In their most general form, sanctions are primarily aimed at changing the behavior of an object (as an instrument of coercion), limiting its behavior (deterrent effect), or transmitting a message to an object (signal effect). Theoretically, sanctions were seen as an alternative to military force, material gain and diplomacy in a situation where "inaction" is not an option. As (Veebel and Markus, 2016) note, sanctions are "less glamorous than diplomacy, and less drastic than war".

(Afesorgbor, 2019) draws attention to the importance of studying the period preceding the imposition of sanctions, the impact of the threat of sanctions on exporters and importers: the longer this period, the lower the effectiveness of sanctions *ceteris paribus*.

After analyzing, (Dong and Li, 2017) showed that everyone suffers from the sanctions imposed on Russia and its retaliatory measures: Russia, the EU countries, the United States, but to varying degrees, with the most significant damage to Russia. From an economic point of view, the optimal choice for the US and the EU is, in the author's opinion, the rejection of sanctions against Russia.

Assessing Russia's damage from sanctions and retaliatory measures, IMF experts believe that sanctions led to a reduction in economic growth by 1-1.5%, while cumulative losses from them can reach 9% of the Russian economy (Gordienko, 2019). This forecast is understandable, because only 60 areas of production (more than 248 products and product groups, software and technologies) are classified as critically dependent on imports in Russia. The total domestic market in these areas is almost 2% of Russia's GDP (Vartanova and Osadchaya, 2018). The share of imports in the machine tool industry exceeds 90%, in the electronic industry, as well as in pharmaceuticals and the medical industry – about 80%, in heavy engineering – almost 80%, etc. (Goncharova, 2015). The most serious consequences, according to forecasts, may be the ban on the export of high technology

to Russia, as well as a lack of access of Russian banks to cheap Western loans.

According to (Gurvich and Prilepskiy, 2016), the imposed sanctions against the Russian Federation hit many oil, gas, and defense enterprises, as well as banks such as Gazprom, Almaz-Antey, Sberbank, VTB and many others. At the same time, the authors note that sanctions indirectly affected enterprises working with these banks, especially foreign ones. The total economic damage from the imposition of sanctions by researchers was estimated at USD 160-170 billion, and the reduction of foreign assets – more than 3.3 times.

However, the effectiveness of sanctions cannot be unambiguously assessed only relying on forecast data that, by definition, are probabilistic. According to (Portansky, 2014), Russia in its history has repeatedly experienced the influence of Western sanctions: the “sanitary cordon” around Soviet Russia in 1920-1930, the restrictive list of COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) on the supply of “strategic” goods and technologies to the countries of the “Eastern bloc” in the post-war period, the American ban on the sale of grain of the USSR in 1980, etc. Sanctions were repeatedly introduced against other countries, including Cuba, Libya, Iraq, Iran, but their effectiveness did not exceed, on average, 35%. At the same time, during the period of sanctions, opportunities for strengthening national security open up, for example, China, which, under the influence of US sanctions, “managed to develop its own policy that ensured tremendous growth of the national economy ... became an active participant in the global market... while maintaining national specificity and sovereignty” (Baburina, 2015). A similar task now faces Russia – to create its own model of economic development with the aim of creating a state that is strong economically and independent.

In the framework of this paper, of course, it is impossible to cover all aspects of such a model. It is advisable to dwell on some aspects of development under the conditions of sanctions: the transition to an innovative path of development and the development of public-private partnerships (PPPs).

In the academic literature today there is no unequivocal opinion either on the issue of the impact of economic sanctions and retaliatory measures on national security, or on the issue of assessing damage to the Russian economy (both current and long-term, from their application), or

regarding the contours of the future model of the Russian economy.

Moreover, it is completely obvious that the current stage of development is a chance to narrow the gap in the levels of economic and social development of Russia and developed countries, and to create an economically and politically independent power.

To achieve these goals, a comprehensive approach is needed, a radical change in the state’s economic policy, stimulation of innovation and public-private partnerships.

The impact of economic sanctions on national security in terms of the transition to an innovative trajectory and the development of public-private partnerships is ambiguous.

The current situation determines the need to improve state support for innovation in the Russian Federation in order to maintain and strengthen national security, as well as make adjustments to the state policy of stimulating PPP.

However, first of all, it is necessary to form a clear idea of the model of the economy, which must necessarily replace the raw stock model. It is within the framework of this new model that one should consider the directions of stimulating innovation and public-private partnerships.

Research objective and methodology

The purpose of this study is to identify the impact of sanctions and countersanctions on the national security of Russia. In this regard, the following tasks were set: to identify the list of sanctions of Western countries imposed against Russia and their impact on the national security of Russia, to identify the list of Russian countersanctions against Western countries and their impact on the national security of Russia, to identify further actions of Russia to ensure national security under the conditions of sanction pressure.

The study is based on the dialectical, historical and systematic approach, analysis, synthesis and comparison, induction and deduction. The study analyzed Russian and international literature on the topic of sanctions and their impact on national security.

The study used data from The Global Innovation Index 2018, The Global Competitiveness Report 2018, the National Report on Innovations in Russia 2016, reports of the National Association

of Innovations and Development of Information Technologies, the Federal State Statistics Service of Russia.

Results

Sanctions applied to Russia are classified as blocking and sectoral. Under blocking sanctions, the assets of individuals and companies in both the USA and the EU are frozen, and entry into the territory of these countries is also prohibited. Sectoral sanctions apply to specific individuals operating in certain sectors of the economy, as well as to companies owned or controlled by such individuals.

In the defense sector, persons and companies that have fallen under US sanctions have been banned from importing and exporting weapons and related dual-use products, goods, and services. The energy sector has banned the export to Russia of goods, services, and technologies related to exploration and production of oil on the Arctic shelf, deep-sea production, and shale projects. For those included in the EU sanctions lists, a licensing procedure has been introduced for transactions with Russia in relation to goods and technologies that are designed for oil and mineral extraction.

By mid-March 2018, 422 legal entities were under US sanctions from among the key sectors of the Russian economy; the number of individuals exceeded 400. As of today, this list has been supplemented by 38 more Russian representatives. A significant problem from the application of sanctions was the decline in the investment activity of large-scale Russian companies such as Gazprom, Lukoil, Novatek and Rosneft [Political Internet Portal "Current Time", 2019]. In this connection, the state budget expenditures increased in order to support these companies; pension accumulations of citizens and the National Welfare Fund became the compensating financial sources. In view of the circumstances, it is understood that the US and the EU will not stop the spread of anti-Russian sanctions and will expand the list of their allies. Using sanctions as a signal for the international community can be seen as an instrument of "communication war" (Veebel and Markus, 2016).

In addition, the regime of existing sanctions against the Russian Federation is constantly being tightened, namely, the maximum term of permitted debt obligations has been reduced. The new deadlines were 14 days for banks under sanctions (previously 30 days) and 60 days for

energy companies (previously 60 days). The restrictions on Russian oil projects in deep-sea, offshore Arctic and shale deposits were also tightened, setting a maximum threshold for Russian organizations to participate at 33% in projects where the American side is allowed to sell equipment and technologies (Political Internet Portal "Current Time", 2019).

As noted above, Russia responded with a list of retaliatory sanctions and embargoes on imports of most agricultural products, the country of origin of which either decided to impose economic sanctions on Russian legal entities and (or) individuals, or joined their imposition (Castagneto -Gissey and Nivorozhkin, 2016). Political issues began to dominate economic interests (Mau, 2017). The analysis shows that sanctioned opposition between the US, EU, and Russia definitely harms all participants, but benefits countries not involved in this process (Dong and Li, 2017).

In modern conditions, it is especially important to consider the impact of sanctions on national security in terms of the development of Russian innovative potential. Today, according to researchers, the share of Russia in the global innovation system is less than 1%, which is explained by the fact that Russia "dropped out" of the world technological race in the 1980s-1990s (Lebedeva, 2017).

According to the rating of the World Economic Forum, the Russian Federation has indicators of innovative development much lower than the average world level and ranks as follows (in 2018): the level of innovative potential of the country – 36th; the infrastructure support – 51st; the business activity of enterprises – 51st place (The Global Competitiveness Report, 2018).

In addition, Russia, unfortunately, is far behind developed countries in terms of funding research and development (R&D), and the share of research costs in Russian GDP remains low. In the period from 2008 to 2011, there was an increase in R&D expenditures in Russia, but from 2012 to 2017, this indicator decreases annually (Indicators of Innovation in the Russian Federation, 2019).

It is worth noting that in the ranking of the Global Innovation Index for 2018, which is calculated on the basis of the achieved results in the field of innovation and available resources for innovation, Russia ranked only 46th, which indicates a low innovative potential of the country. The leaders of this rating are

Switzerland and the Netherlands (The Global Innovation Index, 2018).

The current economic and political situation in Russia, in particular, the imposition of sanctions and counter-sanctions, has a twofold effect on the innovative sphere of Russia.

On the one hand, there is a stimulating effect of sanctions. According to the National Association of Innovation and Information Technology Development (NAITD, 2015), in 2014 in Russia there was a significant increase in the innovation activity of domestic enterprises: the general index of innovation activity grew by 18%, the number of new startups grew by 15% due to 2.8 thousand new projects. Moreover, a significant part of them, namely 68%, is devoted to the real sector of the economy. In industries where there was a particular dependence on Western technology, significant growth was also noted: by 18% in biotechnology, by 17% in microelectronics, and by 14% in pharmaceuticals. In the field of creating robotics and unmanned aerial vehicles, an increase of 21% was also noted.

On the other hand, NAITD data indicate that as a result of the imposition of sanctions for the first half of 2015, the innovation industry in Russia lost about USD 50 million in investments. Also, a 30% reduction in the financing of innovation from the state budget was noted. It can be stated that there is a decrease in the share of innovative services and goods in the total volume of products shipped from 8.9% to 8.2%. The proportion of organizations implementing technological innovations has decreased. So, if in 2012 this indicator was at the level of 9.1%, then in 2016 it amounted to 8.9% (NAITD, 2015).

The Gaidar Forum "Russia and the World: A Look at the Future" was held in 2016, and the "National Report on Innovations in Russia in 2016" [National Report on Innovations in Russia, 2016] was presented at this forum. This report cited disappointing figures: in the total output of innovative products, the share was 8.0% and has not increased over the past 3 years, while in the leading countries, this indicator is almost 15%. The slowdown may be partially due to cyclical factors, that is, low investment activity, which is reflected in the excess of savings over investments, which is typical for most developed countries. This period of declining investment is apparently associated with a high level of uncertainty, which is natural during the modernization of technology and the expected structural reforms.

The report also noted that there is low competitiveness of Russian innovations – in the total world export of high-tech goods, Russia's share does not exceed 0.4%. These values are extremely low, even despite the fact that this indicator shows positive dynamics – in 2010, the share of Russia was 0.21%. In general, it can be noted that the Russian economy and its innovative component continue to "struggle" with inefficiencies in the allocation of production factors, ruble devaluation, tightening monetary policy, capital flight, reduced investment and increased risk perception (Tuzova and Qayum, 2016).

The sanctions had a mixed effect on the public-private partnership (PPP) system in Russia. In general, in modern conditions, as (Aleinikov, 2011) rightly remarks, the state needs highly developed, civilized, socially responsible entrepreneurship, strategically focused on the long-term interests of society, while entrepreneurial structures "... have reached the limit of efficiency within the framework of a resource-based export-oriented model and need in the institutional transformation of relations with the state upon entering new, high-tech and science-intensive markets, in reducing administrative barriers and investment risks".

In the context of the sanctions policy of Western countries, many foreign companies were forced to leave the Russian market, because they were facing problems in those countries where their head offices were located in the form of closure, payment of huge fines and other sanctions. Studying the impact of sanctions on the economic development of the country, the author opines that one of the important ways to improve the socio-economic situation in the country can be to expand the system of partnerships between the state and business – that is, the system of public-private partnership. In addition, this mechanism is one of the most important for the growth and competitiveness of the regions.

It should be noted that the policy of foreign companies under the conditions of sanctions is more pragmatic than the statements of officials. Often there are contradictions between the sanctions imposed by foreign states and the domestic legislation of the Russian Federation, in particular, affecting PPP projects with foreign enterprises. So, some foreign sanctions prohibit any economic activity in the Republic of Crimea. At the same time, the Russian legislation prohibits any discrimination of a client. For example, on the basis of Article 846 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, a bank is

obligated to conclude a bank account agreement with a client who has the opportunity to offer to open an account with the bank allocated for opening such accounts that fully complies with the requirements established by law and banking rules. Unilateral refusal of the bank to provide services is prohibited.

Therefore, any organization engaged in foreign economic activity in Russia within the framework of public-private partnership projects is obliged to take into account the provisions of the Russian law in its activities, which prohibits any discrimination against customers, but on the other hand, such an organization is in connection with the real sanctions regime of the country where its parent company is located. This example demonstrates the main dilemma that most foreign companies, especially credit ones, deal with. The data suggest that most of the counterparties of foreign companies located in the territory of Crimea use the addresses of the Krasnodar Territory or Rostov Region to prevent the account being blocked.

Sanctions had an extremely negative impact on many projects involving foreign companies. For example, British Petroleum and Shell completely suspended their activities in the framework of the construction of the Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 gas pipelines, because otherwise they would be threatened with termination of business not only in Russia but also in many other countries of the world.

The head of practice on the formation of infrastructure projects and public-private partnership projects of Herbert Smith Freehills Olga Revizina noted that today projects of this format that have already been conceived have significant difficulties in implementation. The expert noted that foreign enterprises that want to cooperate with Russia should now look through the sanctions lists in advance and choose for themselves those companies with which there is no prohibition on joint activities. Therefore, the first thing that now foreign companies wishing to work with a particular company in Russia do is finding out from independent legal consultants whether their potential partner is subject to sanctions. It is possible that those companies being already ready to enter the Russian market could face restrictions on creating joint ventures and abandon this idea (Mereminskaya, 2017).

However, not all projects in the field of public-private partnerships are completely prohibited. For example, only financial restrictions are possible. For example, the French construction

company Vinci and Sberbank have already decided to hold a joint event, but one of the largest Russian banks got into the sanctions list. In general, according to analysts, there are no insurmountable barriers to the development of a public-private partnership system based on the influence of sanctions. To a greater extent, the problem is not sanctions. The general expediency of using these projects in Russia is gradually falling, since many financial organizations of an international level, for example, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, have left Russia, and accordingly, there is no way to obtain additional financing. In addition, investors leave the Russian market because they do not see interesting projects.

Conclusions

Most state strategies for the development of sectors of the Russian economy until 2020 and until 2023 provide for measures to develop import substitution (preferences for enterprises engaged in modernization, budget investments in infrastructure development, tax preferences, formulation and implementation of federal targeted programs for the development of these sectors).

It is necessary to consolidate these measures into a single document covering the entire Russian economy as a whole and to develop a comprehensive program for import substitution and simultaneous solving of the problems of faster production development based on innovative technologies and ensuring national security. It is important that this program contributes to the creation of new cooperative ties, primarily within the framework of the EAEU and BRICS, which, ultimately, should give an additional impetus to the development of the real sector of the Russian economy, reduce the severity of the problem of attracting investments, ensure the participation of foreign companies in large infrastructure and transport projects.

It is equally important to study the experience of countries that have successfully implemented a course towards the development of the economy, in particular, China. Today, after many years, China is seen as a new economic leader, having created its own distinctive and quite effective model of economic development. It should be based on the fact that the period that Russia is going through is a time of opportunities, including opportunities to solve the problems of overcoming the lag behind developed countries in the innovation sphere, as well as the

development of public-private partnerships. Moreover, these problems, which are currently aggravated by the action of economic sanctions, will be solved in a rather short time, because in the next 10 to 15 years, developed countries will begin the transition to the sixth technological order, which will open up new opportunities for Russia. They should not be missed, since Russia in the 1990s was not able to take advantage of the transition to the fifth technological mode, as a result of which its gap in development level with Western countries increased to 35 years. In this context, sanctions can and should become an incentive for the country to move onto the rails of sovereign socio-economic development, to create an economically and politically independent Russia, to ensure Russia's national security.

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