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**DONOR SUPPORT, ELECTORAL DYNAMICS AND DEMOCRATISATION IN
SOUTH AFRICA: THE CASE OF THE BUFFALO CITY METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY, EASTERN CAPE**

By

HENRY KOFI BOSOMPEM (201516572)

**A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Sociology, University of Fort
Hare, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Sociology**

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SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR F H NEKHWEVHA

DECLARATION

I, Henry Kofi Bosompem, solemnly declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own original work and has not been submitted in its entirety or in part to any other university for a degree. The use of both published and unpublished work from other sources has been duly acknowledged in the text and in the list of references.

Signed:

Date

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Mr Francis Bernard Kwadjo Bosompem and Madam Theresah Akosuah Darkoh for all their sacrifices towards my upbringing and education. Secondly, I dedicate it to the memory of Lawyer Kofi Bosompem and Mr Philip Amoah-Gamiah, all of blessed memory, for their great interest in my early education. Lastly, I dedicate it to my children: Francis, David, Derrick, Victoria, Aretha and to my lovely wife, Mrs Deborah Owusu Bosompem, for all their prayers, support and understanding.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is on Donor Support, Electoral Dynamics and Democratisation in South Africa with particular focus on the Buffalo City Municipality of the Eastern Cape. The main aim of the thesis is to investigate and highlight the global outlook of donor support perspectives and conditionalities and to examine the basic tenets of democratisation and link them to the interplay of the electoral dynamics that influence grassroots political participation. Furthermore, the study attempts to ascertain the involvement and perceptions of local communities with regard to the role of donor support in democratic governance, development and electoral dynamics. In this era and dispensation of democracy, the fledging democratic institutions require substantial donor support to perform their constitutional mandatory obligations. Most of this support had traditionally come from government. Given the weight and pressure on the government budget, the widening unemployment and inequality in South African communities, there is the need to solicit assistance from development partners for electoral administration and development. The current study, therefore, investigated community voters, political parties and the Elected or Nominated Councillors' perceptions of donor support and democratisation. This thesis further investigated the roles and functions of the Donor Agency, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality (BCMM) in donor support, electoral administration and democratisation. The study utilized a mixed method approach where 384 structured questionnaires were administered and 52 in-depth interviews conducted with the respondents. The study made use of a systematic empirical inquiry and literature review to understand its subject matter. It did not only scrutinise data previously collected by other researchers but also utilised information from other sources such as tabloid surveys, brochures, bulletins and the internet. Thus, this strategy is ideal for the present study which seeks to capture the views, experiences and feelings and understanding of party officials. This study utilized the Development aid theory, political party and democratisation theories, Gouldner's theory of Moral Norm of Reciprocity and Social Support in combination with Larzasfeld's Voters' behaviour theory and the social justice and equity perspective as elements of the theoretical framework. The purpose of achieving electoral confidence among the citizens is to demonstrate the value of electoral dynamics and perspectives of democratization that forms an expressed

indicator of the relationship between politics and development. The electoral dynamics that shape political institutions, governance and its discourses in any democratic enterprise include: party affiliation, party and donor support mobilisation, voting patterns, government and the state agency's performance. In addition, it includes economic policies towards poverty alleviation, service delivery, ethnic politics and all the state democratization policies which are pursued to bring greater relief to its citizens. Correspondingly, it is geared towards creating a balanced relationship on the donor-recipient equation and to ensure socio-economic well-being to the citizens guided by reciprocity, good governance, transparency, accountability and social justice. The emerging findings indicate that most political parties and elected councillors in the municipality receive donor support beside the traditional sources that we know such as membership dues, party subscriptions, levies, state sponsorship, fundraising for special projects and sale of souvenirs. Some of the sources were from international community and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The study found that donors require huge returns on their support and investments. The IEC and BCMM were largely funded by Treasury for their projects and programmes. However, the BCMM also gets substantial support from sister-city relations with other municipalities abroad. Some community voters hold the view that political party funding opens the doors for the hijacking of democracy. Others hold the opinion that dishonest donors corrupt weak governments, undiscerning officials and immoral leaders. Nevertheless, some political party officials felt that donors were not all that evil. They hold the view that genuine donors help to build the capacity of officials and strengthen party structures, thereby deepening democratic ethics and culture. They were of the view that good donors promote transparency, accountability and good governance to strengthen the pillars and the threshold of democracy and the democratisation processes in emerging states in sub-Saharan Africa.

On the basis of these findings, the core argument of this study is that donor support induces democratisation which mainly benefit donor communities and municipal elites at the expense of local communities. Nevertheless, the perception that development projects funded by donor agencies are meant for donor poverty alleviation, despite the absence of visible effects of trickle down, account for community members' participation in the electoral system.

ACRONYMS

AIC:	African Independent Party
ANC:	African National Congress
APRM:	African Peer Review Mechanism
BCMM:	Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality
BIS:	Bhisho
CCD:	Corporate Community Development
CIDA:	Canadian International Development Agency
COPE:	Congress of the People
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfers
DA:	Democratic Alliance
DAC:	Development Assistance Committee
DANIDA:	Danish International Development Agency
DIDP	Department of International Development Policy
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECSEC:	Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Centre
EFF:	Economic Freedom Fighters
EL:	East London
ENP:	Effective Number Parties
EMB	Electoral Management Bodies
EU:	European Union
FEC:	Federal Election Commission
GTZ:	German Organisation for Technical Cooperation

HR:	Human Resource
IBRD:	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICLD:	International Centre for Local Development
ICT:	Information Communication and Technology
IDA:	International Development Association
IDASA:	Institute for Democracy in South Africa
IEC:	Independent Electoral Commission
IFC:	International Finance Corporation
IFP:	Inkatha Freedom Party
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
KWT:	King William's Town
KZNCSOC:	KwaZulu Natal Civil Society Coalition
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MCPP	Managed Co-Lending Portfolio Programme
MDA:	Mdantsane
MDB:	Municipal Demarcation Board
MEO:	Municipal Electoral Officer
MIC:	Municipal International Cooperation
MIGA:	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MOU:	Memorandum of understanding
MSP:	Municipal Service Providers
NEPAD:	New Partnership for African Development
NGO:	Non-Government Organisation

NPM:	New Public Management
OCB:	Organisational Citizenship Behaviour
ODA:	Overseas Development Assistance
ODI:	Overseas Development Institute
OECD:	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAC:	Pan African Congress
PAC:	Political Action Committees
PGA	Parliamentarians/Peoples for Global Action
PRS:	Poverty Reduction Strategy
SA	South Africa
SIDA:	Swedish International Development Agency
SMP:	Single Member Plurality
UAC:	United African Congress
UDM:	United Democratic Party
UK:	United Kingdom
UN:	United Nations
UCT	Unconditional Cash Transfers
UNDP:	United Nations Development Planning
UNGC:	United Nations Global Compact.
USA:	United States of America
VSO:	Voting Station Operation
WB:	World Bank
ZWL:	Zwelitsha

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CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter 1 covers the introduction and background to the study. The main argument of the thesis is that donor support induces democratisation. The study also argued that the higher the benefits citizens derive from municipal projects, the higher their commitment and patriotism. However, citizens' vote in the electoral system depends on their political affiliation. The study is also of the view that donor support targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens will be highly patronised and accepted by them. The chapter sets the background details for the thesis by discussing the research problem and the objectives to be accomplished by the study. It discusses the significance of the study, outlines the research questions and/or hypotheses and summarizes the research methodology.

Chapter 2 of the study dealt with the review of relevant literature which outlined the global outlook of donor support perspectives. It established the current trends and prospects of donor funding and examined the discourses that impact municipal or local level development programmes. It further discussed the basic tenets of democratisation and focussed on the major issues that surround democratic principles and practices pertaining to local and municipal levels elections. It established the case for why the concept has gained tremendous force in sub-Saharan African politics. It connected the evolving democratisation policies of donors to the electoral dynamics peculiar to the Buffalo City municipality of the Eastern Cape Province of the Republic of South Africa. The chapter succinctly illustrated donor support and democratization as is envisaged in the Buffalo City municipality. It weighs the arguments on the extent to which donor support induces democratisation and justifies the theoretical linkages that connect the debates on democratisation and electoral dynamics and locates the discussions by identifying and examining appropriate literature that informs the study. It presents a debate on international and local research perspectives on donor support and democratisation.

Chapter 3 covered the theoretical framework of donor support and democratization. It used a triangulated (mixed) versions of development aid theory, Gouldner's theory of Moral Norm of Reciprocity and Social Support and the social justice and equity model. In addition, the thesis used the voters' behaviour theory, the democratisation theory and the political party theory. The theories complement and augment each

other. In combination, those theories are an aid in highlighting the main issues under consideration. For instance, the idea that the donor-recipient equation is unequal and heavily tilted towards donors against recipients which create an unfair and unbalanced relationship.

Chapter 4 dealt with the research methods of the study. The chapter discussed the research design, the sampling procedure and the design of the research instrument, methods of data collection and analysis and the limitations of the study. The chapter illustrated the procedures and the specific methodologies that the researcher utilized to elicit data for the study whose aim is to investigate and establish to what extent donor support influences the electoral processes in the Buffalo City Municipality and the electoral dynamic factors which connect this agenda with governance and democratization. The chapter provides a justification on the choice of the method of investigation utilized in the study and also presented the biographical information of respondents in a table that captured the biographical details. Lastly, it also indicated how data was obtained and analysed to bring a clear understanding of the matter under study.

Chapter 5 dealt with the presentation and analysis of data. The chapter reported the data that was collected and showed how the analysis was done and how the interpretations were drawn from the analysis in the context of literature and empirical results. The central focus of this chapter was to organise empirical evidence to answer all the research questions raised on the role of donor agency's support services in electoral administration in the municipality. It further presented an analysis of the research findings on political parties' perceptions. In addition, it organized the empirical evidence to answer the research questions on Elected or Nominated Councillors' perceptions on donor funding and democratisation in the municipality. The findings indicated that donor agencies support municipal elections (cf. fig. 5.2). The funding they provide covers capacity building, logistics for campaigns and the training of electoral officers and party officials (cf. table 5.1). The findings also showed that political parties and politicians agree that donor support was important, necessary and facilitates their activities and programs (cf. table 5.7; 5.8; fig.5.6). In fact, elected or nominated councillors deemed donor support necessary for democratization (fig. 5.11). The findings further indicated that donor support provided party agents with grocery, communication equipment like phones

and other souvenirs and consultancy services. The development aid theory, together with the norm of reciprocity, political party theory, democratisation theory, social justice and equity theories were applied in this chapter to support the findings. This was done by locating and incorporating the theories in the analysis through theoretical literature with other relevant empirical studies and the interviews conducted.

Chapter 6 analyzed the empirical evidence obtained from assessing the roles and functions of the donor agencies, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality (BCMM) on donor funding, electoral administration and democratization in the municipality. The main findings of the study are that donor agencies provide support geared towards assisting the IEC and BCMM with financial and logistical support. The study also found that a major part of the funds was utilised for capacity building, sponsorship of electoral campaigns, and provision of logistics, training of party agents, equipping training centres, providing stationery and documentation and embarking on voter education. The findings were aligned and embedded in the theories utilised which included the theories of development aid, democratisation and the ethics of reciprocity.

Chapter 7 analyzed the data obtained in this study on the perceptions of community voters in the municipality on donor support and democratization. The research findings showed that the donor support is targeted at electoral empowerment for development. In essence, it is to improve human development and empower citizens. The study also found that, donor conditionalities were meant for the protection of investment of donors. In addition, it was to provide them with an opportunity to invest in their organisations. Furthermore, the findings in the chapter indicated that donor support leads to effective electoral administration and democratization (cf. Fig.6.5, tables.7.1, 7.9, 7.11, 7.12,). In fact, voters' reasons for voting indicated that respondents vote based on municipality's performance on service delivery, the benefits they derived from municipal projects and patriotism. They also vote to help their party win (cf. table 7.1). The findings of this chapter aligned and resonated with the political party theory, voters' behaviour theory, democratization, reciprocity and the social justice and equity theories.

Chapter 8 gives the conclusion of the study. It recaps and restates the main thesis of the study that even though donor support induces democratization, it is lopsided towards the supply side of the donor equation. This depicts donor agencies and the local government (municipality) as deliberately creating an unbalanced interface in their relationship with the communities they serve. As a result, the benefits that motivate community participation in elections are seldom evenly distributed. Besides, the benefits shrink on their way to communities where they are most desired. In some cases, the support fails to arrive at the targeted community. In spite of these, the donor agencies still create the impression that they are working in the interest and wellbeing of the communities and therefore deserves their votes in an election. The thesis utilized the development aid theory together with the norm of reciprocity and social justice and equity theories. The chapter concluded with some recommendations and suggestions, such as, donors devising news ways of dealing directly with communities in need of support through their community elders and councillors. In addition, there is the need to provide support for political parties to construct structural ability to support them organize funds to improve internal transparency and accountable systems. Again, the study suggested that the IEC should run electronic voting alongside the paper ballot in all elections. Furthermore, the study recommended that the municipality should be empowered and granted autonomy to solicit for its own donor support for development purposes.

CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

The central issue this study addressed is that donor support influences and facilitates the electoral processes of the Buffalo City Municipality. To reiterate, the main position adopted in this study is that donor support induces neo-liberal democratisation. However, the impression created that donor support benefits the electorates in the community is primarily directed at hoodwinking citizens into participating in the electoral system by voting during the elections. In a nutshell, the diffusion of the benefits does not really get to the community members in poverty alleviation programmes as envisaged. This chapter is the general chapter which not only engage in preliminary theoretical debates but also succinctly outline the research strategy adopted for the study.

This study is on Donor Support, Electoral Dynamics and Democratisation with particular focus on the Buffalo City Municipality of the Eastern Cape Province, Republic of South Africa. The main aim of the study is to explore and highlight the global outlook of donor support perspectives and its conditionality, and to examine the basic tenets of democratisation and link them to the interplay of the electoral dynamics that influence grassroots political participation and the community's involvement and perceptions of local democratic governance and development.

For the purpose of this study, donor assistance, donor funding, donor grant, donor aid and donor support shall be used interchangeably and variously to mean the same phenomena. Donor support is the giving of assistance, transferring or contribution of materials, properties, money and logistics, etc., as a subsidy to a cause or a fund (Amundsen, 2007; Barkan, 1993; Carothers, 2005; Brautigam, 2010; Kurokawa et al, 2008 and Santiso et al., 2006). The direction of this support is three fold: from the worldwide community to the state, from the state to the local constituency and from NGOs and corporate organisations to the local constituency (Meryers et al., 2007 and Amundsen, 2007).

The global trends, patterns and flow of aid is based on bilateral or multilateral arrangements constituted as Inter-governmental Organisations(IGOs) agreements,

international non-governmental organisation (INGOs) agreements, Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) agreements and multinational corporations(MNCs) assistance (Meyers et al., 2007; Khan, 2005 and Dollar, 2001). Donor support groups are categorized into 1) the Political or Diplomatic donors 2) Humanitarian donors 3) and Economic donors (Meyers et al., 2007). The sending country or organisation weighs the needs and the options available to the receiving country before the assistance is given. In most cases this is done to entice nations to democratise their institutions (Amundsen, 2007 and Carothers, 2007).

The case of donor assistance has in recent years been tied to the political fortunes of most African governments and developing nations to democratise. Democratisation is a practice where a country embraces a democratic rule and chooses its leaders through 1) fair and competitive elections, 2) ensure basic civil liberties, and 3) respect the rule of law. In addition, democratisation is a transition from dictatorial regime to a more democratic political regime. It is a procedure which ensures a more open, more inclusive, more sharing and less controlling society. Democracy is a structure of administration which represents a variety of institutions and instruments, the ultimate political power is based on the will of the people (Rummel, 1996; Haerper, 2009; Matlosa, 2005; Karl, 1990; Hudson et al., 2007; Lindberg, 2006; Vandewalle, 2002; Carothers, 2007; Meyers et al., 2007; Hauss, 2003 and Ghali, 1996).

Aid democratization thrives on conditions which initiate a series of processes for the recipient country to follow. These prescriptions include structural adjustment, trade liberalization, public sector reforms and accountability (Bader, 2005; Santiso et al., 2005; Carothers, 2007; Haerper, 2009; Khan, 2005; Lindberg et al., 2006; Amundsen, 2007 and Steytler et al., 1994). Further conditions are transparency and good governance, decentralization, free press, freedom of association and multiparty democracy (Carothers, 2007; Amundsen, 2007 and Barkan, 1993). In addition, there must be periodic free and fair elections through healthy competition and a violent free environment. The elections must be observed by the international organisations such as the African Union (AU) and other sub state organisations like the Southern African Development Corporation (SADC) and the Coalition of Domestic Elections Observers (Carothers, 2007; Amundsen, 2007; Barkan, 1993; Steytler et al., 1994; Huntington, 1991; Kwatamba, 2010 and Lama-Rewal, 2009).

From this broad outlook, this current study shall focus on decentralisation, good governance, free and fair elections and public participation in result making processes at the municipal council level (Cambell, 2003:49-50; De Visser, 2014; Gray et al., 2010; Armstrong, 2008; Eberlie, 2003; Gardiner et al., 2001; Newman et al., 2005; Steytler et al.,1994).This is because the decision taken at the local community stage unswervingly impacts people ensuing in more conviction, confidence and responsiveness. In essence, this makes elections at the local level crucial for electorates to measure the extent to which government agencies convince them about the effectiveness of their performance in a bid to secure their votes in relations to their socio-economic well-being (Crewe, 1994; Muthien, 1999 and Dieter Opp, 2008).

In many parts of the world, local community's development has assumed greater importance in the discourse of human development in recent years than ever imagined. This is largely because the well-being of the people in a community is the utmost responsibility of the state (Chavis et al., 1990; Larson et al., 2002; Mazer, 1997; Newman et al., 2005; Hudson, 2007; De Visser, 2005 and Newman, 2005). The welfare of the people in essence has a direct reflection on the performance of the government in power even as the gap concerning the opulent and deprived is ever broadening (Dollar, 2002).

The 1996 constitution of the Republic of South Africa, chapter 13, Article 214, clause (2) (d), states that there is the necessity to guarantee that the provinces and municipalities are capable to deliver basic amenities and do the purposes allocated to them. Similarly, the local government Act of 1997(Act 52 of 1997) stipulates in chapter 7, clauses 151-164, that 'it will shape and reinforce the capabilities and accountabilities of provinces and municipalities through sustained practical support through the recognised systems and capability building programmes focussing on serious areas such as the Integrated Development Planning (IDP), the Local Economic Development (LED), Financial Management, Service Delivery, Public Participation, assessing the influence of Government programmes in the municipality, coordinating and supporting policy development and implementation, supporting and monitoring delivery services'. Many studies indicate that the Eastern Cape is the poorest province and that the poverty gap is ever widening. There are communities in the Eastern Cape that are grappling with basic necessities of life

ranging from socio-economic issues such as; health education, water and sanitation, housing, transport and infrastructure (Statistics SA, 2011; UNDP/Africa Agenda 21, 2011; SA Year Book, 2013/2014; Ozler, 2007; Aliber, 2003; Woolard, 2002 and Armstrong et al., 2008).

In a quality of life survey in 2011, the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality recorded appalling and unsatisfactory results which indicated an absence or unavailability of a functional basic service delivery system. For instance, the survey showed that most communities were disadvantaged and lacked opportunity to basic necessities such as water, electricity, sewerage and sanitation, solid waste services and toilets, road infrastructure, schools, hospitals, food, access to markets, employment, transportation, trade and finances which were cardinal in the measurement of government performance (Mansuri et al, 2013; Sen, 2008; Stewart, 2010; Melo et al, 2004). The deprivation of communities of basic necessities of life is a clear evidence that support the argument of this study that the unmet needs across different aspects of socio-economic life of the people, as a result of trickle down effects of donor support, is often over looked by donor managers, who use elections as a smokescreen to solicit communities participation in governance (Meller, 2007; Noble et al, 2010; Boraine et al, 2006; Turok et al, 2014; Nel et al., 2003; Knugell et al, 2010 and Rauch, 2002).

The outcome of the above survey confirms the hypothesis that the higher the benefits derived from municipal projects, the higher citizens' commitment and patriotism. According to Letawana (2017), municipalities should create opportunity for real power sharing between municipalities and local communities for community members to completely take part in the development processes. He further stated that local communities should fully participate in development projects through "a participatory governance". In the same way, Moraes et al (2017:25) said the task of municipalities is to, among other things, to "educate and involve citizens on development projects, solicit citizens' contribution to development of the municipality through shared, collaborative municipal management with an emphasis on the educational dimension of all local actions". In addition, Lemos et al (2017) stated that municipalities would serve local communities well if they generate and diffuse judiciously benefits accruing from development assistance (Reid et al, 2016; Bene et al, 2016; Page et al, 2015; Clemens et al, 2016 & Quinones et al, 2014).

The major difficulties with African governments are poor growth performance and balance of payment problems (Kilby, 2005). Given the statistics on unemployment, youth unemployment, education and the dependency ratio, there is a clear indication that a radical and urgent action is needed to ameliorate the dire socio-economic conditions prevalent in the municipality. The way forward is to build and nurture democratic institutions, organise and develop a democratic culture where the needs of the marginalised and underprivileged are considered and tackled consciously. Donor support and intervention become inevitable because of the overstretched government budget and financial constraints (Easterly, 2000; Carothers, 2007; Amundsen, 2007; Graham, 2004). The thrust of this study is to, among other things, find out if there is a link between donor support and the electoral fortunes of political parties and the ordinary citizens that reside in the municipality, which according to De Visser (2014) is the epicentre of development. The study also established whether electoral dynamics such as party affiliation, party support, voting patterns, government and state agencies performance, economic policy towards poverty alleviation, service delivery, state democratization and electoral administration are affected by donor support.

The Buffalo City Municipality is a Metropolitan municipality located on the coast of the Eastern Cape province of South Africa. It comprises the towns of East London, Bhisho, King William's Town, Mdantsane and Zwelitsha. There are several other larger and smaller towns scattered around these big towns. The municipality has a mixed racial make-up of Blacks, Coloured, Indians/Asians and Whites. The languages spoken include inter alia Xhosa, English and Afrikaans. The municipal council comprises one hundred members chosen by mixed member proportional representation. Fifty councillors are elected by first-past-post voting in fifty wards, while the remaining fifty are selected from party lists so that the total number of party representatives is proportional to the number of votes received in the elections (Gabara, 2010).

1.2. Core Argument of the Study

The core argument of this study is that donor support induce democratization. Democratization is viewed in neo-liberal lenses which postulate free market

economy and observation of fiscal discipline by development partners. This version of democratization requires user fee payment for all social services such as education, health services, water supply, energy usages, road and transport tariffs and other such utilities. In addition, democratization enforces economic restructuring or structural adjustment programmes along the following lines: free market economy, devaluation of currency, privatization and deregulation, reduction of state subsidies, organisational restructuring, decentralisation and privatisation which is basically, profit-oriented and focusses on how to establish structures to maximise profit for their businesses and their home economy. It also ensures a global economic policy and neo-liberal market reforms - which comes with decentralisation of public institutions, privatisation of the economy, downsizing bureaucracy, increasing taxation, freezing public sector employment and recruitment, stagnating promotions, pursuing extreme computerisation or automation of the work environment and embarking on massive retrenchments of perceived redundant workers and also enforces trade liberalisation. It is important to note that these policies are mainly pursued through state institutions from the national level to the local level. At the local level, the agenda is mainly supervised by local authorities and municipal administrators. While democratization along neo-liberal lines occurs; however, because it trickles down, it does not always happen, the municipal elite and the donors benefit more from the relations rather than the citizenship. Nevertheless, the perception created by the donor agencies and municipal elites is that poverty alleviation projects benefits community members, which is the reason citizens participate in the electoral system (Bogatchev, 2016; Anelopoulou, 2016; Kleinig, 2017; Balibrea, 2017; Adely, 2017; Ravazzi et al, 2014; Sanina, 2017).

The argument further emphasized that donor support induces democratization but it is lopsided towards the supply side of the donor equation. For instance, donor agencies and the local government (municipality) deliberately create an unbalanced relationship between them and the demand side of the equation involving the citizens - community members and civil society on the basis of donor conditionalities which erode the benefits of equity, equality and social justice in the electoral and democratization processes of the municipality.

The thesis hinged on four-fold perspectives. These perspectives establish the most central fiduciary relationship in the society is distinctly that which occurs amongst the

community (the people), the state, its agencies and administrators; the donor agencies and their partners; political parties and their elected or nominated representatives and all their networks. The thesis derived from the hypothesis of the study and directly linked to the major theories of the study which are development aid theory, the norm and ethics of reciprocity, social justice and equity theories together with democratization theory (cf.table:7.5,7.9,7.10,7.11,7.12). The four-fold arguments advanced by this thesis are that: donor support induce democratization just as it has reflected in the findings of this study (cf.Tables: 5.4,5.5,5.11,5.12,5.17,6.3,6.16,6.18,7.6,Fig.7.4), that there is a important connection between citizens' welfares from municipal projects and their commitment and patriotism; that citizens vote depends on their political affiliation (cf. Fig. 7.5,7.6,Section 5.2.4 ; table 7.10) and finally, donor support targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens will be highly patronized and accepted by them (cf..tables 5.2,5.8,6.14,6.15,7.1,7.9,7.11,7.12, Fig.6.5). (Blais et al, 2016; Hart, 2017; Hobolt et al, 2016).

The major theories utilized were the development aid theory, voters' behaviour theory, democratization, reciprocity and social justice and equity theories. The thesis postulates that even though it has sufficiently been established in this study that donor support induces democratization, it is not enough in itself but should adequately lead to capacity building of voters and citizens at the local and municipality level to enable them benefit fully from the fruits of democracy. In order to foster full participation of citizens in the processes of democratization, it further contends that there should be a balance in terms of development at the municipal level so that citizens' effort at voting in municipal elections should be reciprocated in service delivery in terms of the provision of adequate social amenities such as decent food supply, provision of quality clean rural water, provision of decent, affordable housing, access to quality, accessible and affordable medical and health care system particularly in rural deprived areas of the municipality (Rodgers et al, 2016; Gerber et al, 2016; Reedy et al, 2016).

On the basis of the ethics of reciprocity, which states the golden rule, that one need do unto others as one would be treated themselves, the principle is that mutual recognition and respect of rights warrants that one's own rights will be secured.

The activities of donor agencies in the promotion of democratic culture through transparency, the tenets of accountability, good governance, and electoral justice are in vogue in recent donor politics in sub-Saharan Africa (Crane et al, 2017; Laider, 2017; Hyden 2017). Donors have expressed concern about the association between the value of governance and their economic development purposes. State institutions, agents, officials and political parties are dynamic actors in securing representative and accountable systems of governance. These donor limitations have been acknowledged and donors are starting to address them (Brown et al, 2014; Yanguas et al, 2015; Asongu, 2014).

Although traditional forms of donor support focused mainly on technical assistance, there is an increasing recognition that altering the value of governance means engaging at a deeper, more political level. Rather than simply attempting to outline the organisation of institutions, donors are instead pursuing to shape the performance of different political players (Abdulai et al, 2015; Findley et al, 2017). Ensuring that political institutions have appropriate influences and funds is only one half of the balance, the other half is in certifying those tools are used. This presents problems for donors. Constructing active bodies and political parties means making governments more answerable which, in turn, means a redeployment of political authority. There is an understandable circumspection about meddling in the domestic politics of sovereign nations (Kwon et al, 2004; Shah et al, 2015; De Graaf et al, 2015).

It has been established from time immemorial, according to Pithouse (2009), that history is burdened with the misery instigated by strict individuals and governments that were chosen to authority. For this purpose, the single valuable degree of the accountability of any political project to democracy is to see how it response to tasks to its own people, position and ideas (Pithouse, 2009). This is very important because in many poor and pro-poor programmes in many societies, oppositional politics is not allowed at all and communities are run as vote banks (Norris, 2017; Hsu et al, 2016; Dinnon et al, 2017). The essence of aid conditionality at the local and municipal level should be to entrench and consolidate democracy not to protect the interest and investment of donors and municipal agencies and state officials (Robinson, 2016; Lahiri, 2016; Scholl, 2016). The circumstances should create enabling opportunities and environments for the weak, the poor and the socially

disadvantaged. The doctrine of social justice and equity theories are pursued in the interest of fairness, equity and equality for citizens living on the brinks of excruciating poverty, unemployment and inequality.

In effect, the tenets of democratisation illustrate the point that all hurdles that limit the benefits of democratisation be eliminated in order that the factors of democratisation-economic development, entrenched civil liberties, opportunities for self-actualisation active civil society, buoyant culture as the ideal result of democratisation is to make certain that the people have the right to vote and have a freedom of expression in their political system through the ballot.

1.3. Preliminary Literature Review

There have been several discussions and discourses relating to the impact and activities of donor assistance to needy societies. Researchers have expressed their varied opinions depending on their theoretical leanings. Brautigam and Knack (2004) hold the view that support is associated with decrease in institutional quality. Djankov et al. (2008) think that aid has little effect on democratization. On the other hand, Goldsmith (2001), Dunning (2004) and Alsop et al. (2006) have found that aid is associated with higher levels of democracy. Furthermore, Meryers et al. (2007), Khan (2005) and Moyo (2009) are of the view that donor support neither induces effective administration nor fosters freedom. However, Carothers (2007), Haerpfer (2009), Amundsen (2007), Wright (2009) and Kilby (2009) acknowledge that aid conditionality initiates a series of processes for the recipient country to follow. As a matter of fact, not much research has considered the effects of the conditionality on the socio-economic well-being of the community members in the municipality. This study sought to fill that gap. Bader (2005), Santiso et al. (2005) and Lull (1995) argue that, institutions of states must work efficiently in the interest for which they were established. In their view, donor agencies will place conditionality on their aid in order to ensure accountability. This unfairness in the conditionality is what Austin (1977), Berscheid (1978), Leventhal (1976) and Rawl (1971) think will create disaffection and make people unpatriotic. Eberlei (2007) holds the view that it is important to involve all stakeholders in poverty reduction activities. Gould (2005:55) asserts in the same vein that the donor community uses the name of the state to regulate citizens and markets, as well as by “creating shifts in the political culture of

governing”. However, Kilby (2009), Blauberger (2010) and Brautigam (2010) argue that the traditional aid conditionality has been criticised as unproductive in part because of aid agencies.

Moyo (2009), drawing from the social justice and the equity perspectives, agrees with this view when she suggested that aid is dead and Africa must change its international policy on trade by looking elsewhere, even to China. Literature is replete with imbalances and unfairness in the distribution of wealth, poverty alleviation programmes and other social interventions. There has been extensive research into donor assistance for needy communities and also on elections in Third World countries. Most of these are well documented and have been cited. However, there remains a relatively unexplored area which few scholars have concentrated on at a particular point in time. By failing to consider the focus of this current study, they are missing much that is relevant to the body of knowledge on the connection between donor support and electoral dynamics at the municipal or local levels which, according to De Visser (2005), Newman et al. (2005), Gardiner et al. (2001) and Alsop et al. (2006), is the epicentre of development.

1.4. The Research Problem Statement

A significant number of studies have been done on donor support (Kurokawa et al., 2008; Santiso, 2006; Brautigam, 2010; Power, 2008; Collier et al.1999; Djankov et al., 2008; Moyo, 2009; Easterly, 2000; Burnside et al.1997). Scholars have ceaselessly debated on the role of multilateral agencies and international organisations in supporting countries with weak economies. However, there are few studies which have investigated the global outlook of donor support as an inducing agent of democratisation at the municipal and local constituency politics (Goldsmith, 2001; Dunning, 2004; De Visser, 2014). The challenge of this study was to develop a coherent rational policy that would guide donor support systems at the municipal level. As per the 1996 constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Chapter 13, Article 214, clause (2) (d) and the local government Act of 1997(Act 52 of 1997), the municipal and local councils are mandated to embark on development programmes that advance the well-being of the poor, and to establish mechanisms that addresses the problems of poverty and enrich local level decision making through decentralisation and electoral participation (Statistics SA, 2011; UNDP/Africa

Agenda 21, 2011 and SA year book 2013/14). The evidence shown in a quality of life survey in the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality indicates that there is a very high dependency ratio of 47.9%, the unemployment rate of 35.1%, the youth joblessness rate of 45.1% and a growth rate of 0.69% (Meller, 2007; Noble et al, 2010; Boraine et al, 2006; SA year Book, 2013/2014; SA Local Government Handbook, 2013; Municipal Structures Act and Systems Act 2000-2002; Turok et al, 2014; Nel et al; 2003; Knugell et al, 2010; Rauch, 2002).

There is a substantial argument about the factors which touch or eventually limit democratisation. Imperceptible and existing inquiry thus lead many to accept as true that economic development either surges the chances for a change to democracy or supports newly established democracies integrate. In a representative democracy as it relates to South Africa and in the Buffalo City municipality in particular, elections are not only competitive, but are also costly and expensive. Most political parties and members of parliament and councillors solicit huge sums of monies for their campaigns and advertisements in order to reach the electorate with their messages. The source of funds for political campaigns has often been a contestable issue as it is believed that it leads to corruption. The context and focus of the debate is that such raised funds could lead to corruption of state and party officials that could result in looting and misappropriation of funds. It has also been debated that donor funding does not lead to democratisation but rather stifles state resources, particularly at the municipal level. Contradictory points are often problematized as trials to the efficiency of support for democracy promotion. However, logical research about their emergence and effects is still missing. This study, therefore, addresses this research gap and sought to ascertain the perceptions of community voters, political parties and elected or nominated councillors on donor support and democratisation in the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality. It further investigated the roles and functions of donor agencies, the IEC and the BCMM in donor support, electoral administration and democratisation in the municipality. This study also established the extent to which these factors have enlarged or diminished the freedom and well-being of the marginalised and the poor. There is, therefore, the need for empirical investigations on public perceptions and attitudes into donor support and democratization in the municipality. Based on the research problem, the following section states the research aim, research questions and objectives of the study.

1.5. Research Aim

The aim of the study was to investigate and to establish to what degree donor support influences the electoral processes in the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality (BCMM) and the electoral dynamic factors which connect this agenda with governance and democratization.

1.5.1. General Research Objectives

The research objectives of this study are two-fold. These include the general objectives and the specific objective which were as follows:

- 1) To assess the role of donor agencies and their conditionalities in promoting democratisation and enhance the administration of elections and development in the municipality.
- 2) To investigate the functions of political parties and their perceptions of donor support and democratisation and to ascertain their contributions to local level elections in the municipality.
- 3) To evaluate the role and functions of elected councilors and their perceptions of donor support and democratisation and how their activities deepen and facilitate democratic development.
- 4) To establish the roles and functions of the IEC in electoral administration and how donor support facilitate electoral administration in the municipality.
- 5) To ascertain the role and functions of the BCM municipality in donor assisted programmes and how it assist in electoral administration for development.
- 6) To investigate community voters perceptions of donor support and democratisation for development in the municipality.

1.5.2. Specific Objectives

- 1) To find out the extent to which donor agencies support the administration of elections in the municipality.
- 2) To examine political party perception of donor assistance and democratisation in the municipality.

- 3) To evaluate the perceptions of elected and nominated municipal council members on donor support and democratisation in the municipality.
- 4) To establish how donor support enhances the role of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in the administration of municipal elections.
- 5) To find out about the roles and functions of the BCM municipality in donor assisted programmes in the administration of elections and development
- 6) To find out about Community voters' perceptions of donor support and democratization in the municipality.

1.6. The Research Questions

- 1) To what extent do donor agencies support the administration of elections in the municipality?
- 2) What are the political parties' perception of donor assistance and democratisation in the municipality?
- 3) What are the perceptions of elected and nominated municipal council members on donor support and democratisation?
- 4) How does donor support enhance the role of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in the administration of municipal elections?
- 5) What are the roles and functions of the BCM municipality in donor assisted programmes in the administration of elections and development?
- 6) What are the community voters' perceptions of donor support and democratisation in the municipality?

1.7. Hypothesis

- 1) H₀ = Donor support does not significantly induces democratization
H₁ = Donor support significantly induce democratization.
- 2) H₀ = there is no significant relationship between citizens' higher benefits from municipal projects and their level of commitments and patriotism.

H1 = there is a significant relationship between citizens' higher benefits from municipal projects and their level of commitments and patriotism.

3) H0 = Citizens' vote does not have significant dependability on party affiliation

H1 = Citizens' vote have significant dependability on party affiliation.

4) H0 = there is no significant relationship between donor support targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens' and their patriotism and acceptability.

H1 = there is a significant relationship between donor support targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens' and their patriotism and acceptability.

1.8. Theoretical/Conceptual Framework

This thesis utilized the development aid theory (Kuhn, 1988; Woolcock, 1998), the political party theory (Ley, 1959; Dror, 2012; Olson, 2015; Negretto, 2006; Roberts, 2003; Hyden et al, 2004), the democratisation theory (Elsensadt, 2002; Lewis, 1997; 2006; Allison (1994), Gouldner's theory of Moral Norm of Reciprocity and Social Support in combination with Larzasfeld's Voters' behaviour theory and the social justice and equity perspective as elements of the theoretical framework. The former is directed at addressing the market related issues such fair exchange and reciprocity while the latter theory is directed at fleshing out matters regarding social justice and equity in relations between donors, local governments and the local communities.

The moral norm of reciprocity hinges on the anticipation that individuals will return favourably to each other through their actions and interactions by repaying assistances for benefits and replying with triviality or resentment to harm. Gouldner (1960) made a analytical variance between mutuality as a form of social exchange and reciprocity as a general moral belief. The moral norm of reciprocity forms a dynamic "causal force" in social life. To a large extent, it defines the limits of relationships and interactions that exist among individuals, groups, organizations, institutions and societies (Uehera, 1995; Bruce, 1987; Saleebey, 2006).

Reciprocity attempts to suggest that people will react or be attracted to the motivations that benefit them and will avoid stimuli that pressure them. By extension

and in line with donor support and democratization, there is clear evidence of reciprocal relationships which are established. The lines of reciprocity which are constructed between donors and their beneficiaries are not really of mutuality, but the underlying agenda is to maximize profit through aid marketization (Koch, 2011).

In the moral norm of reciprocity, Gouldner suggested that people's actions and interactions are consciously guided by not only the benefits they obtain presently but also the history of similar associations built on past encounters which shape the outcome of future relationships. The reflection on the donor conditionality with regard to the support given to the municipality will solicit responses emanating from the benefits derived as well as the historical relationships built over time. Ascertaining the impact and effects of the donor support on the municipality and the municipality's response in relation to elections and development can be made easier through the use of insights from the theory of reciprocity. According to Gouldner, if the relationship is positive, it will produce loyalty, approval, affection and commitment but if the history of the relationship is negative, it will produce disaffection, anger, disloyalty and rejection.

The theory of reciprocity does not sufficiently capture the needs of those who by their natural economic orientation can take active part in the norm of reciprocity. As a result, this framework is triangulated strategically with the theory of social Justice and equity. The social justice and equity framework helps to design strategies and approaches in order to increase diversity, create awareness and help us to work towards greater equity and social justice in the community through advocacy, vigilance, corporate and collective responsibility. The social justice theory develops social policies for tackling inequalities, it assesses barriers and access to resources, examines the occurrence and prevalence of poverty and privileges, assesses differential power and prestige, deals with equitable resources allocation, individual rights and the collective good and their implication for the attributes of fairness and issues of oppression and the eradication of poverty (Rawls, 1971; Weiner, 1992; Ostrom, 2009; Austin, 1977; Leventhal, 1976; Hartfield, 1978; Charmaz, 2011; Larson et al., 2002; Locke, 1965).

The social justice and equity theory is crucial for analyzing and gauging the extent to which the available donor support allocated for development and elections is utilized

in the greater interest of the residents and the communities in the municipality. This ultimately ensures timeous measurement of the policy effects of the conditionality on the socio-economic security of the people and the residents of the municipality.

As already indicated above, ample lessons of communal sustenance have fused the ideas of reciprocity and exchange, the validity of which holds potential consequences for the dynamics of social interactions with donors, politicians, administrators, academicians, voters and the general public on matters that border on transactions and policies. Owing to the fact that some of these social interactions could emanate into vertical relationships, there was, therefore, a need to bring into the equation the theory of social justice and equity in order to introduce the element of horizontal relations into the analysis of donor support and democratization in the Buffalo City Municipality. As it is explained already, the study adopted the theoretical triangulation in order to be able to tackle the analyses of the study from different angles. For instance, as indicated in the specific objectives, the study focuses on the roles of donor agencies in electoral administration, political parties' and elected councilors perceptions of donor support and democratisation. In addition, the study evaluates the roles and functions of IEC and BCMM in electoral administration. Finally, it investigated community voters' perceptions of donor support and democratisation in the municipality. The ultimate purpose of a triangulation is to propose a policy framework that attempt to achieve a deliberate balanced reciprocal orientative agenda (DEBROAG) that empowers the local communities to hold donor administrators, politicians and municipal elites accountable through their voting power. The framework reinenforces the point that good governance is an idea that power evolves from the people and should be exercised in a way that benefits the citizens of the state and promotes development in the local communities.

1.9. Research Methods

The section on research methods covered the research method(s) adopted for the study, the research instruments used, the sampling techniques adopted, and data collection and analyses approaches utilized for the study.

1.9.1. The mixed methods approach adopted

The mixed methods approach, also referred to as triangulation, was adopted for this study whose aim is to investigate and to establish to what extent donor support influences the electoral processes in the Buffalo City Municipality in addition to finding out about the electoral dynamic factors which connect this agenda with governance and democratization. To carry out the study, there were many research methods which could be employed as its methodology. Many related studies on donor support have utilized various methodological alignments ranging from cross sectional analysis based on secondary literature review, in-depth interviews and surveys. In the literature, there were several studies carried out utilizing interviews (Egbenya, 2010; Yankson, 2008; Coppedge, 2012; Bless et al., 2006; Nind, 2004; Fowler, 2006; Luff et al., 2015; Fischer, 1993; Bossuyt et al., 2000; Bratton, 2010; Cabrel, 2011; Cook and Sverrisson, 2001; Crook, 2003; Jutting et al., 2004; Steiner, 2007; Von Braun et al., 2002; Velded, 2003) and survey questionnaires (Appiah, 2005; Andrianto, 2006; Nel et al, 2003 and Castillejo, 2009).

As can be seen from the illustrations above, abundant studies in this area have used secondary appraisals that were not fastened on dependable and experiential evidence. Hence, the choice of this current study to use a mixed methods research strategy in order to find out about the relationship between donor support and democratization in the Buffalo City municipality of the Eastern Cape Province of the Republic of South Africa.

The study made use of both qualitative and quantitative research designs in order to gain a comprehensive and a holistic understanding of the phenomenon at hand. The qualitative design was used to confirm and compliment the findings of the quantitative research strategy (Cresswell, 2003).

The rationale for using a methodical triangulation in this study has to do with affording the researcher the opportunity to find aspects of the phenomenon under study, more precisely by tackling it from different vantage points using different methods and techniques such as interviews, survey questionnaires and researchers.

In adopting this mixed method approach, the researcher took cognizance of the complexity of the research design and the fact that it takes time to plan and implement this type of research with a clear understanding of the possible

discrepancies that may arise at the interpretative stage of the findings (Creswell, 2003).

1.9.2. Research instrument

Based on the research methods, the research instruments used for the study was survey questionnaire, in-depth interview guide and document. The structured Likert-scale survey questionnaire consisted of mostly open and closed-ended questions. The respondents rated some statements on a scale ranging from 1 strongly agree, 2 agree, 3 don't know, 4 disagree, and 5 strongly disagree in addition to a multiple choice questions with alternatives. The questionnaire was pre-tested at some selected points at the research area to ascertain its validity and credibility before administering it. In addition, the pre-testing enhanced the process of adaptability and the development of the research instrument (Oppenheim, 1992; Struwing et al, 2007). For purposes of making the in-depth interview instrument user-friendly, an interview guide was designed for use in all interviews.

1.9.3. Sampling and sampling procedure

The study utilized probability and non-probability sampling methods. The exact sampling techniques that were used included; random, cluster and purposive sampling to enhance representation, replication and generalization.

The sampling procedure followed were:

- A simple random sampling;
- Cluster sampling; and
- A purposive sampling.

Sampling is a process of selecting a subset from a population (Bailey, 2001). Sampling is important because it lowers cost, gives a greater accuracy of results, ensures greater speed of data collection and makes possible accurate representation of population (Bailey, 2001). The total sample size was calculated using the Raosoft sample size calculator online at www.raosoft.com/sample_size.htm. The estimated population for the Buffalo City Municipality in the 2011 census was 755,200. Therefore, from the Raosoft sample calculator, given a

standard error of 5% and a confidence level of 95% and a 50% response distribution, this gives an estimated sample population of 384. A cluster sampling technique was used to select respondents. The municipality was put into five clusters or zones made of town and the local councils TLC's. The towns were East London and its surrounding villages, Bhisho and its surrounding villages, King William's Town and its surrounding villages, Mdantsane and its surrounding villages and Zwelitsha and its surrounding villages. For each of these towns 20% (n- 76.8) respondents were selected to represent a cluster (384/5). While ensuring that each cluster was represented in the resultant sample, cognisance was made that each of them was included in terms of the proportion it contributes to the total population as a stratum. After a proportion of the sample was allocated to each cluster-cum-stratum, this was subjected to random sampling within each cluster/stratum. An adult of twenty-two years and above who participated in the recent past elections was selected for the study based on their willingness and informed consent. This was to ensure that participants have fair knowledge of the decisions that goes into voting and the elections procedures. For identification of respondents for in-depth interviews, purposive sampling was used to select at least 5 interviewees each from donor agencies, political parties, elected/nominated councillors, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality (BCMM) officers and administrators from the five (5) clusters. Similarly, 5 interviewees were selected from the clusters for community voters.

1.9.4. Data Collection

Data collection for this study was through the use of a Likert-scale survey questionnaire and an in-depth interview. To reiterate, the survey questionnaire consisted of open-ended and closed-ended questions. In this regard, the respondents rated some statements on a scale ranging from 1 strongly agree, 2 agree, 3 don't know, 4 disagree, 5 strongly disagree in addition to multiple choice questions with alternatives. For the administration of the in-depth interview, an interview guide was compiled with question pointers for use for all interviewees. Data collection started in October 2015 with collection on community voters. The rest of the data on donor agencies, political parties, elected councillors, IEC, and BCMM started from June 2016 to July 2017. The data collection was constrained by

stringent gatekeeping with a lot of bureaucratic and administrative restraints (Burchadt et al., 2008; Bailey, 1994:187, 2001:123).

1.9.5. Data Analysis

Driven by the insights of the theoretical framework derived from the development aid theory, the political party theory, Goulder's norm of reciprocity theory and the Social Justice and equity model, themes were abstracted from both in-depth interviews and the completed questionnaire for analysis. The research questions and/or the research objectives of this study already provided indicators of those themes which were validated from the collected data through some form of content analysis. For statistical analysis, SPSS version 22 was used. Data was computed using Microsoft excel software and subsequently analysed through the use of SPSS. Frequency tables and bar charts were used as descriptive analysis techniques. The study adopted inferential statistics and utilised bivariate correlation, chi square in crosstabs and ANOVA as basic tools to find simple correlations and differences in means.

1.10. The main delineations and limitations of the study

This study focused on investigating and highlighting the global outlook of donor support perspectives and its conditionality and to examine the basic tenets of democratisation and link them to the interplay of the electoral dynamics that influence grassroots political participation and the community's involvement and perceptions of local democratic governance and development. The study was limited to the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality and did not cover the province as a whole.

1.10.1. Significance of the Study

Donor support, democratization and electoral issues shall continue to engage the conscience of society. The findings of this research shall be significant in discourses and shall make significant contributions to the body of knowledge as far as donor assistance and electoral issues continue to bother society;

1.10.2. Ethical considerations

In every professional and academic enterprise, it is important that the researcher exhibit a behaviour that is acceptable in generating quality data from respondents. This clearly makes ethical guidelines a standard which a researcher uses to evaluate his or her conduct (Fouka & Mantzorou, 2011). As a result, the researcher conducted himself honestly in order not to infringe on the ethical rights human participant, since this could lead to moral dilemmas such as issues of trust, harm, deception and consent. This researcher was guided by the requirements of the ethics that must be observed and as outlined by Hennink, Hutter and Bailey (2011).

The ethical issues this study considered for the research were that no unethical means were used to solicit information. The researcher sought the consent from community and opinion leaders before entering into research sites and guaranteed respondents confidentiality and anonymity. No respondent's name was solicited on the questionnaire. The study complied with the research ethics of privacy, consent and confidentiality. The researcher ensured that no harm happens to any respondent before, during and after the research and emphasized that the research was only for academic purposes and guaranteed freedom of withdrawal at any stage of the research. The researcher obtained the relevant ethical clearance certificate from the University of Fort Hare. All the ethical guidelines outlined by the Research Ethics committee were followed strictly.

1.10.3. Intellectual Property Considerations

The content of the completed thesis shall remain the sole property of the author, the University of Fort Hare and the cherished sponsors of the project.

1.10.4 Access to site

The process of gaining access is a very important activity which has been argued to involve "continuous negotiations, bargaining, establishing trustful relationships with the gate keepers and those being studied (Hornby-Smith, 1998: 17). It is for this reason that access to the study site was thoroughly negotiated through all the levels of bureaucracy of the institutions (Appendix A), the IEC, Political parties, BCMM, Donor agencies, elected/nominated councillors and the community members. A clearance letter was obtained from the National Electoral Officer of the IEC and the City Manager of the BCMM. A written permission letter outlining the study purpose

and an introductory letter from the supervisor were forwarded to all the officers and institutions involved.

1.10.5 Informed consent

The researcher obtained informed consent through the permission and consent letters that were forwarded to the various offices and institutions that were contacted to participate in the study. The principal officers secured the consent and involvement of the participating officers on the research site and were informed about the on-going study. The respondents were notified of all aspects of the research such as the brief description of the purpose and the day the questionnaire would be issued. The respondents were informed that their participation was voluntary and the information obtained or gathered from them would be a matter of concern between only the researcher and the supervisor (Hennink et al., 2011).

Again, the interview respondents were informed in advance about the use of a voice recorder during the interviews. They were clearly impressed upon that they had every right to allow or disallow its usage at any point of the interview. There was no circumstance where direct or indirect coercion was applied in this study to exploit any respondent. Respondents' participation was absolutely voluntary and consent was obtained from proper channels (Hennink et al., 2011).

1.10.6 Anonymity and confidentiality

The principles of anonymity and confidentiality are very crucial in any research of this magnitude. Confidentiality includes the ability to keep the identity of respondents without disclosing their comments, names and their whereabouts. This is so that they are not easily recognised. It is for these reasons that respondents were urged not to write their names, age etc on the questionnaires. This was to ensure that their strict privacy and anonymity were covered such that the research does not pose any threat or risk to any respondent. There were some respondents who requested that they want to be interviewed in the night at an exclusive location, and the research team complied accordingly. Those who requested anonymity because the information was deemed to be classified were accordingly granted their wishes. All of

this was done to reinforce confidence and minimise distraction and risk (Fouka et al., 2011).

1.10.7 Reflexivity

Reflexivity is a process and a condition that involves thoughtfulness, conscious, self-awareness, self-evaluation and self-reflection on the researcher's part to make explicit his or her potential influence on the research process. Reflexivity is often utilized in the qualitative aspects of research which requires the researcher to reflect on his own subjectivity on how social background, assumptions, positioning and behaviour impact on the research process. This comes as a caution to the researcher not to involve himself or herself in the research process based on his or her belief and values in order not to influence the findings in any direction. As a result, the researcher put all preconceived ideas aside and constantly took notice of his actions and roles and reflected on them throughout the entire research process, including data collection, analysis and presentations (Fouka et al., 2011). Figure 4.13 below shows respondents' demographic information.

1.11. Conclusion

This chapter outlined and set the focus of the thesis by capturing the general introduction, preliminary literature, research problem and the aim of the study. It stated the research questions, the objectives and hypothesis. It further laid the foundation for the theoretical/conceptual framework, explains the methodology used which include the research instrument design, sampling and sampling procedures, data collection and data analysis strategy. This chapter also stated the significance of the study, streamlined the ethical issues surrounding the study with intellectual property considerations and then encapsulated it with the structure of the thesis.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW- GLOBAL OUTLOOK OF DONOR PERSPECTIVES

2.1. Introduction

This chapter outlines the global outlook of donor support perspectives. It establishes the current trends and prospects of donor funding. It further examines the discourses that impact municipal or local level electoral and development programmes by analysing the actions of the municipal elites against the outcomes of their decisions that affect the disadvantaged residents who vote in the elections in the municipality. Good governance and social protection programs have the ability to create a noteworthy input to the lessening of poverty and susceptibility among citizens who have been deprived of equity and fairness in the distribution of donor assistance in their communities through democratization. The chapter further discusses the basic tenets of democratisation and focuses on the major issues that surround democratic principles and practices pertaining to local and municipal level elections. It established the case for why the concept has gained tremendous force in sub-Saharan African politics.

The chapter connects the evolving democratisation policies of donors to the electoral dynamics peculiar to the Buffalo City municipality of the Eastern Cape Province of the Republic of South Africa. The chapter succinctly illustrates donor support and democratization as envisaged in the Buffalo City Municipality. Theoretical and empirical issues derived from this chapter played a major role in the abstracting of the thesis of the study which is that donor support induces neo-liberal democratisation with the impression created that the poor are the main beneficiaries of this relationships. This is done to camouflage the compulsion of the local communities to participate in the electoral system. On the contrary, it is the donor communities and the municipal elites who benefit from this arrangement. Below, the researcher outlines issues around the development politics and the donor assistance debate before discussing other aspects of the chapter.

2.2. Development Politics and the donor assistance debate

Development assistance and its donations to some nations' role in the world have been restarted by a structure of changes in the local and global settings (Brown et al, 2014; Yanguas et al, 2015; Asongu, 2014; Bader et al, 2014; Jamel, 2015; Findley et al, 2017; Abdulai et al, 2016; Bodenstei et al, 2015). Universally, the dawn of a novel class of donor countries or "aid providers" (including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Korea), the financial crunch of 2007–08 and continuing economic disorder have stunned the basics of North–South interactions (Brown et al, 2014). Among other things, Brown et al (2014) stated that the shifting global circumstances have thrown into problem the donor–recipient procedure and subtleties that have characteristically mounted research on development assistance.

Against this changing context, Western aid donors, arranged by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have embarked on important determinations to reorder the international aid structure with worldwide ingenuities such as the Monterrey Agreement, the Millennium Development Goals, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Sustainable Development Goals. Whether or not these efforts are regarded as fruitful, these tendencies lingered to reverberate in the Canadian setting. The Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA's) subsidy and programme relationships with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector started to adjust in 2008–09 to develop more diligently allied with trade and investment objectives. This is demonstrated in the co-funding of projects with Canadian mining firms and the collation of middle-income countries in the Americas at the cost of poorer African ones with less auspicious profitable prospects (Brown et al, 2014).

Donor nations' reasons and lack of a clear idea for Canadian aid weakened the clearness of purpose in the approach and application of projects, and confuse suitable standards to determine success (Brown et al, 2014). Brown et al (2014) also disputed the essence of the Official Development Assistance Accountability Act of 2008, the tenacity of which is "to ensure that all Canadian official development assistance abroad is provided with a central emphasis on poverty reduction". There have been several discussions, arguments, discussions and discourses relating to the impact and activities of donor assistance to needy societies. Researchers have

articulated their varied opinions depending on their theoretical leanings. Some critics, most prominently Klein (2015, 2014, 2007), are of the view that the World Bank Group's loans and assistance have biased requirements tied to them that mirror their benefits, financial power and political tenets (notably the Washington Consensus) of the Bank and, by extension, the countries that are most significant inside it. Among other claims, Klein (2014) says the Group's truthfulness was dented "when it forced school fees on students in Ghana in exchange for a loan; when it demanded that Tanzania privatise its water system; when it made telecom privatisation a condition of aid for Hurricane Mitch; when it demanded labour 'flexibility' in Sri Lanka in the aftermath of the Asian tsunami; and when it pushed for eliminating food subsidies in post-invasion Iraq"

Brautigam and Knack (2004:255) hold the view that aid is linked with decrease in institutional quality. Djankov et al. (2008:169) think that aid has little effect on democratization. On the other hand, Goldsmith (2001), Dunning (2004) and Alsop et al. (2006) have found that aid is connected with higher levels of democracy. Furthermore, Meryers et al. (2007), Khan (2005) and Moyo (2009) are of the view that donor support neither induces effective administration nor fosters freedom. However, Carothers (2007), Haerper (2009), Amundsen (2007), Wright (2009) and Kilby (2009) acknowledge that aid conditionality initiates a series of processes for the recipient country to follow. The researchers did not consider the effects of the conditionality on the socio-economic well-being of citizens at the local level.

This study sought to fill that gap. Bader (2005), Santiso et al. (2005) and Lull (1995) argued that, institutions of states must work efficiently in the interest for which they were established. In their view, donor agencies will place conditionality on their aid in order to ensure accountability. This unfairness in the conditionality is what Austin (1977), Berscheid (1978), Leventhal (1976) and Rawl (1971) think will create disaffection and make people unpatriotic. Eberlei (2007) holds the view that it is important to involve all stakeholders in poverty reduction activities. Gould (2005:55) asserts in the same vein that the donor community uses the name of the state to regulate citizens and markets, as well as by "creating shifts in the political culture of governing". However, Kilby (2009), Blauberger (2010) and Brautigam (2010) argue that the traditional aid conditionality has been criticised as unproductive, in part, because of aid agencies. Moyo (2009), drawing from the social justice and the equity

perspectives, agrees with this view when she suggested that aid is dead and Africa must change its international policy on trade by looking elsewhere, even to China. Literature is replete with imbalances and unfairness in the distribution of wealth, poverty alleviation programmes and other social interventions. There has been extensive research into donor assistance for needy communities and on elections in Third World countries. Most of these are well documented and have been cited. However, there remains a relatively unexplored area which few scholars have concentrated on at a specific point in time. By failing to consider the focus of this current study, they are missing much that is relevant to the body of knowledge on the connection between donor support and electoral dynamics at the municipal or local levels which, according to De Visser (2005), Newman et al. (2005), Gardiner et al. (2001) and Alsop et al. (2006), is the epicentre of development. The next sub-section deals with the role and influence of the IMF.

2.3. International Monetary Funds (IMF)

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) acknowledged in 1996 that "promoting good governance in all its aspects, including by ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption, as essential elements of a framework within which economies can prosper" (IMF, 2005:1). The IMF is of the view that "exploitation within economies is caused by the unproductive governance of the economy, either too much directives or too little guidelines" (IMF, 2005:1). To obtain loans from the IMF, countries must essentially have certain good control policies, as determined by the IMF, in place (Geeraert et al, 2014; Kwon et al, 2014; Kyriacou et al, 2015; Shah et al, 2015; Bauhr et al, 2014; Munglu-Pippidi, 2015; De Graaf et al, 2015; Hopper et al, 2017). The sub-section below discusses the role of the UN in good governance and donor assistance programmes.

2.4. United Nations (UN)

According to Sethi et al (2014), the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) was designed in 2000 to impact UN prestige and encourage organisations to hold 10 principles integrating values of environmental sustainability, protection of human privileges, fair behaviour of workers, and removal of enticement and corruption. Biermann et al (2014) agree with the opinion stated that the UN's agenda of good governance captures values such as improved participation, transparency,

accountability, and public right to information. It also helps to fight dishonesty and safeguard both basic human rights and the rule of law. Such standards are often associated with Western liberal democratic political institutions, but are now increasingly pursued within prevailing national institutions in various political situations (Overseas Development Institute 2013). The United Nations is playing an important role in good governance. According to former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, "Good governance is guaranteeing reverence for human rights and the rule of law; consolidating democracy; promoting transparency and capacity in public administration" (Annan, 2002:135). To administer this, the UN adhere to the characteristics of: Accountability, Transparency, Responsiveness, Equitability and Inclusiveness. By means of these methods, the UN focuses on consolidating decolonization, localization and, human rights around the world (Thakur, 2016; Kuruvilla et al, 2016; Patrick, 2014; Larmour, 2017; Schaeffer et al, 2017; Kwon et al, 2018; Munglu-Pippidi, 2015; Schroeder, 2018). The next sub-section tackles the role of the World Bank in donor support perspectives.

2.5. World Bank

The World Bank is more focussed on the enhancement of financial and community resource control. In 1992, it highlighted three structures of humanity that they felt interrupt the nature of a country's governance: 1. type of political administration; 2. process by which authority is applied in the administration of the economic and social resources, with a view to development; and 3. Ability of governments to frame strategies and have them effectively executed.

According to Yong Kim (2017:1), the responsibilities of the World Bank is to support developing countries take on poverty and boost their chances of development stretch to nearly \$59 billion in loans, grants, equity funds and securities in the financial year 2017. The World bank, in authenticating its pledges from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)—which delivers expansion information to countries, coupled with financing and risk controlling products showed its finance responsibilities amounted to some \$ 22.6 billion to sub-Saharan African countries in the 2017 fiscal year (Yong Kim, 2017). This exposed the Bank's cautious consideration to certifying continued robust investment capability shares and careful

financial supervision into the future while reacting to customer countries' most persistent growth tasks (Yong Kim, 2017).

According to Yong Kim (2017:1), “with ambitions of the poor on the increase, and overlapping disasters such as forced displacement, famine, and climate change, adding urgency to our mission, our staff worked to provide clear growths in financing from IDA, IFC, and MIGA” (Yong Kim, 2017:1). Yong Kim (2017) continued that, “while we have had to vigorously manage IBRD lending, the Board and management are deliberating on approaches to ensure satisfactory capacity across the World Bank Group to best support countries achieve their improvement goals”. As always, “we are dedicated to working with our member countries and other associates to crowd in private investment and maximize resources for the poor” (Yong Kim, 2017:1). The responsibilities from the International Development Association (IDA), which offers zero or low-interest loans and grants to the world's 77 poorest countries, hit \$19.5 billion in the 2017 fiscal year.

The World Bank, according to Yong Kim (2017) “the IDA's increased commitments reveal strong request for financing, as well as IDA's determinations to better leverage resources and expand financing options for borrowing countries”. The Bank’s report of Yong Kim (2017:1) reflects “a very high demand for IDA financing from clients, which completely show its obligation to the three-year resource cover of IDA 2017”. It noted that “these determinations include an additional \$ 3.9 billion apportioned for non-concessional lending to finance transformational projects in qualified IDA countries”. The report indicated that an augmented funding has also permitted IDA to react rapidly to global dilemmas, including a special provision to Jordan and Lebanon to respond to the refugee crisis and subsidy from IDA's Disaster Response Window to provide immediate relief and reinforce flexibility in countries plagued by starvation.

The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the major universal development institution, according to Yong Kim (2017), concentrated solely on the private sector, leveraged its capital proficiency, and impact to generate markets and prospects wherever they were desirable most. The primary and unaudited data showed that the International Finance Corporation (IFC's) long-term investments totalled nearly \$

18.7 billion, including funds organised from other financiers. The bank said in the 2017 fiscal year, “IFC made nearly \$ 11.9 billion in long-term investments from its own account and organised about \$ 6.8 billion from other financiers”. These often-complex investments supported 342 long-term finance schemes in emerging nations everywhere in the world, it stated. Yong Kim (2017) and Morretti et al (2015) reported that the IFC continued its tactical focus on the poorest countries and regions, adding that it delivered more than \$4.6 billion in long-term funding to quicken growth in IDA countries, including funds mobilized from other investors. These states accounted for nearly 25 per cent of IFC's total reserves. Investments in commerce in delicate and conflict-affected areas totalled \$858 million, including funds harnessed from other stakeholders. It said this was in line with the Bank Group's larger policy to channel resources to hard-hit countries.

As the Bank Group continued to look for new ways to upgrade its infrastructure investment “the IFC introduced the Managed Co-Lending Portfolio Programme (MCLPP) Infrastructure, a pioneering enterprise to mobilize up to \$5 billion from insurance companies and other institutional investors for investment in infrastructure projects in emerging markets” (Yong Kim, 2017; Eichenauer et al, 2016). It said the determination builds on the success of IFC's \$ 3 billion accomplished Co-Lending Group Programme, a loan-syndications resourcefulness that allowed third-party investors to partake inactively in IFC's senior loan portfolio. It said the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the political risk insurance and credit augmentation arm of the World Bank Group, issued a record \$4.8 billion in securities in fiscal year 2017 in backing of 33 projects, helping draw in \$15.9 billion in overseas private capital to developing countries (Beegle et al, 2016; Saers, 2015; Alkire et al, 2017; Brenneman, 2014). The sub-section below illustrates the World Bank's all-inclusive governance pointers and international humanitarian funding.

3.14.4 Worldwide Governance Indicators

The International Governance Indicators is a program financed by the World Bank to measure the quality of governance of over two hundred nations (Merry et al, 2015; Rose-Ackerman et al, 2016; Rotbery, 2014; Kwon et al, 2014; Kelly et al, 2015). It uses six dimensions of governance for their measurements.

These dimensions of governance include: voice and answerability, political stability and lack of violence, government efficiency, governing quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. They have been reviewing countries since 1996.

3.14.5 International humanitarian funding

Good governance as a model is tough to attain in completeness, nevertheless it is something development enthusiasts consider providing to foundations. Most important donors and international financial institutions, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank, are establishing their aid and loans on the situation that the receiver undertake improvements ensuring good governance. This is mostly due to the close connection amongst poor governance and corruption.

In the particular case of developing countries, the brunt of bad governance is felt mostly at the local level where donor elites and municipal managers connive to perpetrate corruption and pretend to be working in the interest of the poor and disadvantaged in society (Gould, 2005; Godamunne, 2015; Pandeya et al, 2016; Sorensen et al, 2016; Freyburg, 2015; Fung, 2015; Bryson et al, 2014 and Keohane, 2015). The section below deals with the effective democratic governance.

2.6. Effective Democratic Governance

In view of the fact that ideas such as civil society, devolution, diplomatic conflict management and accountability are often used when describing the notion of good governance, the definition of good governance endorses many philosophies that closely bring into line with effective democratic governance. Not unexpectedly, emphasising on good governance can occasionally be associated with endorsing democratic government. However, a 2011 literature appraisal analysing the connection between democracy and development by Alina Rocha Menocal of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) stresses the inconclusiveness of indication on this association. A good example of this close rapport, for some actors, between western democratic governance and the perception of good governance is the following statement made by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Nigeria on August 12, 2009, by reiterating Obama speech that, “what Africa needs is not more

strong men, it needs more strong democratic institutions that will stand the test of time. Without good governance, no amount of oil or no amount of aid, no amount of effort can guarantee Nigeria's success. But with good governance, nothing can stop Nigeria. It's the same message that I have carried in all of my meetings, including my meeting this afternoon with your president. The United States supports the seven-point agenda for reform that was outlined by President Yar'Adua. We believe that delivering on roads and on electricity and on education and all the other points of that agenda will demonstrate the kind of concrete progress that the people of Nigeria are waiting for". (Godamunne, 2015; Pandeya et al, 2016 and Sorensen et al, 2016). The following sub-sections focuses on the African perspective of good governance, elections and democratisation.

2.7. African perspectives on good governance, elections and democratisation

The African intellectual community and scholars have engaged in charting the path for good governance and to deepen the processes of elections and democratisation in the context of municipal and local governance and participatory democracy on the continent.

There have been debates, argument and discourses on how to engage African nations and their leaders on how to build and sustain the gains made in the processes of democratisation and the roles assigned in promoting and achieving good governance. There was available opportunity to engage and debate on governance issues which requires African governments to decentralise, to be people centred in order to promote society participation in good governance programmes. It is for these reasons that the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was established which recommended that governments needs to allocate sufficient time for the review of electoral processes in order to establish a common research methodology and to process submissions for the country self-assessment report (NEPAD, 2009: Ottosen, 2010 and Kuwali, 2011).

The New Partnership for African's Development (NEPAD) recognised democracy and good governance as settings for supportable development and made requirements for setting up the APRM (Nigeria, 2001). How have Africans tried to shape democracy and good governance in Africa? Peace, security, democracy,

good governance and human rights are seen as conditions necessary for sustainable development (Ottosen, 2010).

APRM, introduced in 2002, established in 2003 as a mechanism to monitor and measure adherence to the rule of law in Africa. Kuwali (2011) states that the African Institution gives rise to both hope and doubt. He said Africa needs to demonstrate to the world that Africa works through best practices. This illustrates the fact that Africa is able to reach and set good governance standards, which promotes participatory democracy. Turiansky (2014) describes good governance as a tool that consists of a combination of internal and external criteria which identifies governance deficiencies and shortcomings. Grutzd and Petlane (2011) define governance to include institutions of representation, accountable government, including consistent organisation of free and fair elections- which is the major acceptable way for making sure of widespread participation in the constitution of the government and the observing of its performance as well as the practices that are intended to ensure the continuous accountability of officials to the public.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (UNECA/OECD) (2009:186) stated that past AU summits have taken resolutions aimed at endorsing democracy and good political development on the continent NEPAD- Declaration on democracy and political governance – depends on documents that outlines the democracy and political governance themes. As reflected further in the objectives of NEPAD- UNECA/OECD (2009) the themes, the NEPAD declarations has values which are the rule of law, equal opportunity of all citizens before the law, individual and shared freedoms, right to participate by means of free, credible and democratic political processes and devotion to separation of powers. The UNECA/OECD (2009) reports provide the protection of the independence of the judiciary and in 2002, the statement on the values governing democratic elections in Africa was approved.

The reports state that the African charter on democracy, elections and governance (2007) was adopted as a guide and point of reference for sustained and an on-going political reforms on the continent. NEPAD constitute a development framework of the African Union that seeks to find African solutions to African's problems and to redefine its relationship with development donors. Good Governance is an idea that

power should evolve from the people and should be exercised in a way that benefits the citizens of the state and promotes development (UNECA/OECD, 2009)

According to Hope (2005:24), “The overarching objectives in the thematic area of democracy and political government include, among others; a) Greater political participation, b) Pluralism, c) Transparency, d) Accountability, e) Freedom for people to participate and entrench democratic governance processes”. Hope (2005:25) clarifies the involvement and partaking of civil society as well as the protection of human rights are very crucial requirements. These initiatives continue to serve as the basis for participation of communities and organs of civil society in the planning and implementation of government programmes” (Hope, 2005:24; Petlane and Grutzd 2011:19; NEPAD-UNECA/OECD, 2009:202).

According to Petlane and Grutzd (2011:19), democratic governance may be defined as a system of structures, processes and their relationships which are employed by a group of people to guide, stimulate and regulate the collective activities of individuals. Petlane and Grutzd (2011) argue that they include behaviour and interactions in a participatory manner in order to attain growth and development to the benefit of all stakeholders. They hold the view that the guiding principles for the practice of democratic governance include: a) The equality of all people, b) Equitable representation, c) Transparency, d) Accountability.

According to the Department for International development policy (DIDP) paper (2005), autocratic and unaccountable regimes, corruption, wasted public money, weak legislation and weak enforcement of regulations have contributed to a downward situation leading to violence in fragile developing states on the continent. As a result, good governance has become both an objective and a condition for trade and aid policies. The Department for International Development argued that for some institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, good governance is about the fiscal performance such as levels of grant spending and debt (DFID, 2005). DFID (2005) promotes a broader understanding that incorporates a focus on poverty reduction, the respect for human rights and basic financial management.

Mansour-Kadar (2012) reminded us of the African charter on democracy, elections and governance which was adapted in 2007 and enforced in February, 2012. He noted that the APRM instrument basically targets unconstitutional changes of

regimes given the record vulnerability to coups d'états in Africa. Mansour-Kadar (2012) further observed that, it is an ambitious legal instrument with strong commitments to good governance in its political, social, economic and cultural dimensions. He continued that, the charter refers to total rejection of unconstitutional changes of government and sets the floor for the African union peace and Security Council to impose sanctions.

According to Mansour-Kadar (2012), beyond elections, the quest for democracy and good governance in Africa offer snags on structural problems which include: a) State fragility, b) Institutional weakness, c) Ethnic discrimination, d) Crime networks, e) Corruption. Mansour-Kadar (2012) is of the opinion that democracy requires much more than free elections, which includes solving problems that need concerted action. Implicitly, peace and security are essential requirements for sustainable democracy and good governance. According Fischer and Rittberger (2008:171), Chapter 2 Article 4 of the ECOWAS treaty, underlines the principle of maintaining regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness and the consolidation of a democratic system”

This is the only way to move the African continent from crisis to renewal (Hope, 2005:289). Mgijima (2009) holds the view that, transparency and accountability are the basis for good democratic governance. According to him, this is the proven way of a constitutionally guaranteed access to information that enables citizens to monitor and hold government accountable. Other important institutions include a vigilant media, a vibrant civil society. Liberals argue that the universal condition of world politics is globalisation. Mgijima (2009:31) argues that “states are and always have been rooted in a domestic and transnational society which generates reasons for economic, social and cultural interface across borders”. Frederickson and Smith (2003:88) maintain that “governance refers to lateral and inter-institutional relationships in administration in the context of the waning of sovereignty, the lessening importance of jurisdictional borders and a general institutional fragmentation”. Rhodes (1997:15) clarifies that governance “means that there is no one centre but multiple centres, there is no one sovereign authority because networks have considerable autonomy”. Below are some reflections on good governance, democratisation and electoral confidence.

Good governance is argued to be the most important in local governments (Gaeraert et al, 2014; Kwon et al, 2014; Kyriacou et al, 2015; Shah et al, 2015; Bauhr et al, 2014; Munglu-Pippidi, 2015; De Graaf et al, 2015; Hopper et al, 2017; Noman, 2014). It attempts to inspire more interactions between government and, empowered citizens, area councils and community councils. Good governance with local government commitments to escalate public engagement with more members of the community in order to get the best choices that work for the general public. The next sub-sections discuss the essence and nature of democratisation and electoral confidence.

3.16.4 The essence and nature of democratisation

Globally, the essence of multi-party democracy requires countries to adopt a democratic system and to choose its leaders through 1) fair and competitive elections, 2) ensure basic civil liberties, and 3) respect the rule of law. In addition, democratisation is a transition from despotic rule to a more democratic political system. It is a development which leads to a more open, more hands-on and less dictatorial society. Democracy is a structure of government which exemplifies a diversity of institutions and mechanisms, the model of political power grounded on the will of the people (Rummel, 1996; Haerpfer, 2009; Matlosa, 2005; Karl, 1990; Hudson et al., 2007; Lindberg, 2006; Vandewalle, 2002; Carothers, 2007; Meyers et al., 2007; Hauss, 2003; Ghali, 1996).

Aid democratization thrives on conditions which initiate a series of processes for the recipient country to follow. These prescriptions include structural adjustment, trade liberalization, public sector reforms and accountability (Bader, 2005; Santiso et al., 2005; Carothers, 2007; Haerpfer, 2009; Khan, 2005; Lindberg et al., 2006; Amundsen, 2007; Steytler et al., 1994). Further conditions are transparency and good governance, decentralization, free press, freedom of association and multiparty democracy (Carothers, 2007; Amundsen, 2007; Barkan, 1993). In addition, there must be periodic free and fair elections through healthy competition and a violent free environment. The elections must be observed by the international organisations

such as the African Union (AU) and other sub regional groups like the Southern African Development Corporation (SADC) and the Coalition of Domestic Elections Observers (Carothers, 2007; Amundsen, 2007; Barkan, 1993; Steytler et al., 1994; Huntington, 1991; Kwatamba, 2010; Lama-Rewal, 2009).

3.16.5 Electoral confidence

The purpose for achieving electoral confidence among the citizens is to demonstrate the significance of electoral dynamics and the perspectives of democratization that form an expressed indicator of the relationship between politics and development. The electoral dynamics that shape political institutions and governance in any democratic enterprise and experience include party affiliation, party support, voting patterns, government and state agencies performance, economic policies towards poverty alleviation, service delivery, ethnic politics and the state democratisation programmes (Shugart et al, 1992; Tavits, 2005; Bickers et al, 1996; Miller, 1977; Aldrich, 1983; Wong et al, 2002; Mainwaring, 1997; Michell, 2001; Carey et al, 1998; Przeworski, 2000; Posner, 2005; Chhibber et al, 1998; Dror, 2012; LeDuc et al, 1996; Olson, 2015; Negretto, 2006; Roberts, 2003; Hyden et al, 2004; Von Beyeme, 2000). The following sections below discuss donor support, electoral dynamics and the process of democratisation.

2.8. Donor Support

For the purpose of this study, donor assistance, donor funding, donor grant, donor aid and donor support shall be used interchangeably and variously to mean the same phenomena. Donor support is the giving of assistance, transferring or contribution of materials, properties, money and logistics, etc., as a subsidy to a cause or a fund (Amundsen, 2007; Barkan, 1993; Carothers, 2005; Brautigam, 2010; Kurokawa et al, 2008; Santiso et al., 2006). The direction of this support is three fold: from the international community to the state, from the state to the local constituency and from NGOs and corporate organisations to the local constituency (Meryers et al., 2007; Amundsen, 2007).

The global trends, patterns and flow of aid is based on bilateral or multilateral arrangements constituted as Inter-governmental Organisation agreements (IGOs),

international non-governmental organisation agreements (INGOs), Non-governmental organisation agreements (NGOs) and multinational corporations assistance (MNCs) (Meyers et al., 2007; Khan, 2005; Dollar, 2001). Donor support groups are categorized into 1) the Political or Diplomatic donors 2) Humanitarian donors 3) and Economic donors (Meyers et al., 2007). The sending country or organisation weighs the needs and the options available to the receiving country before the assistance is given. In most cases this is done to entice nations to democratise their institutions (Amundsen, 2007; Carothers, 2007).

The case of donor assistance has in recent years been tied to the political fortunes of most African governments and developing nations to democratise. Democratisation is a process where a country adopts a democratic regime and chooses its leaders through 1) fair and competitive elections, 2) ensure basic civil liberties, and 3) respect the rule of law. In addition, democratisation is a transition from dictatorial regime to a more democratic political regime. It is a practice which leads to a more open, more participatory and less authoritarian society. Democracy is a structure of government which exemplifies a diversity of institutions and mechanisms, the model of political power based on the will of the society (Rummel, 1996; Haerpfer, 2009; Matlosa, 2005; Karl, 1990; Hudson et al., 2007; Lindberg, 2006; Vandewalle, 2002; Carothers, 2007; Meyers et al., 2007; Hauss, 2003 and Ghali, 1996).

According to Bader (2005) democratization thrives on conditions which initiate series of processes for the recipient country to follow. These prescriptions include structural adjustment, trade liberalization, public sector reforms and accountability (Santiso et al., 2005; Carothers, 2007; Haerpfer, 2009; Khan, 2005; Lindberg et al., 2006; Amundsen, 2007 and Steytler et al., 1994). Scholars of democratisation have further listed other conditions such as: transparency and good governance, decentralization, free press, freedom of association and multiparty democracy (Carothers, 2007; Amundsen, 2007; Barkan, 1993). In addition, some other scholars have outlined periodic free and fair elections through healthy competition and a violent free environment. They hold the view that elections must be observed by the international organisations such as the African Union (AU) and other sub-regional groups like the Southern African Development Corporation (SADC) and the Coalition of Domestic Elections Observers (Carothers, 2007; Amundsen, 2007; Barkan, 1993; Steytler et al., 1994; Huntington, 1991; Kwatemala, 2010; Lama-Rewal, 2009).

3.17.4 Electoral dynamics

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3.17.5 The process of democratization

The process of democratisation in Africa entails the expansion of access and opportunity of citizens of a nation to participate fully in the political, social and economic development that the country offers its people. According to Anyang Nyango, (1992:97), the focus of democratisation is based on a twin objective Anyan of promoting individual liberties and social justice (Rummel, 1996; Haerpfer, 2009; Matlosa, 2005; Karl, 1990; Hudson et al., 2007; Lindberg, 2006; Vandewalle, 2002; Carothers, 2007; Meyers et al., 2007; Hauss, 2003; Ghali, 1996).

Anyang Nyong (1992) articulates that individual liberties and social justice provides valuable insights into the debates unfolding on democratisation in Africa. He indicates that the significance of the debate centers on the reconciliation of political rights with social justice rights which remains a fundamental problem confronting Africam communities at the local level (Carothers, 2007; Amundsen, 2007; Barkan, 1993; Steytler et al., 1994; Huntington, 1991; Kwatamba, 2010 and Lama-Rewal, 2009). The sub-sections below deals with discussions on foreign aid controversies and development, donor support policies and academics' views on development, Econometric studies on donor support, Fragile and inconclusive results on official donor assistance, Bitter policy controversy and intellectual heckling on donor efficiency intermediate positions and Persuasive 'aid narratives'.

2.9. Foreign aid controversies and development

Foreign assistance is a relatively new inkling in economics. The classics – Smith, Ricardo, and Stuart Mill, for example – didn't address the issue in a somewhat substantial way. If anything, traditional economists supposed that the colonies would catch up – and even surpass – the home country quite fast. In Chapter VII of *The Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith (1963:1) offers a detailed argument on the “causes of the prosperity of the new colonies.”

The first lawful proclamation dealing specifically with authorised support was approved by Parliament in the UK in 1929. In 1940 and 1945, new laws dealing with aid to the colonies were voted for in the UK. These Acts enlarged the volume of resources available, and made pledges for longer periods of time – for up to ten years in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945. More outstandingly, the Act of 1945 stipulated that aid plans had to be prepared “in consultation with representatives of the local population.”

In the US, the first law dealing with foreign support came quite late, with the application of the Marshall Plan in 1948. In his maiden speech on 20 January 1949 – the so-called ‘Four Point Speech’ – President Harry Truman put forward, for the first time, the idea that assistance to poor countries was a vital element of US foreign policy. He said that one of the objectives of his government would be to nurture “growth of underdeveloped areas.”

In spite of Truman's keen allocution, aid obligations to poor countries were considered provisional. In 1953, when the legislative body prolonged the Mutual Security Act, it clearly specified that economic aid to US partners would end in two years; military help was to come to a halt in three years.

In the early 1960s – and principally as a consequence of the intensification of the Cold War – the US reviewed its stance concerning bilateral support, and, cooperatively with other advanced countries, created the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at the newly formed Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The main objective of the DAC was – and remains to be – to direct assistance to the poorest countries. One trusts that official support is

unsuccessful, and has abused poor countries throughout the years. This view on official aid as fashioning reliance, fostering corruption, and encouraging currency overvaluation has been expressed by Easterly (2014) and Moyo (2010). It also thwarts countries from taking benefits of the opportunities provided by the global economy. Another camp trusts that assistance levels have been too little, and that large escalations would help reduce poverty. This camp, however, believes “we need a rethinking on the way in which aid is provided” (Sachs 2009; Stiglitz 2002). In particular, specific interventions, such as anti-malaria programmes, should be highlighted. The third camp is less vocal, and includes authors such as Collier (2007), who has emphasised the role of a number of ‘traps’ in extending impoverishment, and Banerjee et al (2011) who argued that the use of ‘randomised control trials’ may help invent effective and specific aid programmes in the battle against poverty and underdevelopment.

3.18.4 Donor Support policies and academics’ views on development

Academic investigation has facilitated and portrayed the effects of international and domestic support policies on developing and communities of least developed countries. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, aid agencies’ work was affected by “the Harrod–Domar growth model” and by Arthur Lewis’ “unlimited supplies of labour model”. As a result, most agencies funded very large capital-intensive projects, and made away with policies, projects, and programmes related to labour, human capital, and productivity.

This transformed in the late 1960s and 1970s with the rise of “Solow’s neoclassical model of growth”, and the development of the ‘basic needs’ style to welfare economics. Aid rules altered focus, and a higher fraction of funds were devoted to social programmes (health and education), programmes intended at directly reducing poverty, and programmes that supported skills and human capital.

Further changes in aid policy came with research that related “openness and exports” expansion to productivity growth”. The work of Krueger and Bhagwati (cf. Cooper, 2014) was particularly important. During the 1980s and 1990s, global assistance became increasingly conditioned on the recipient countries slackening

their economies through the purging of quantitative import limitations and the dropping of import tariffs.

The development of the “dependent economy” macroeconomic model, with tradable and non-tradable goods, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, aided place importance on the vital role of the real exchange rate in the resource distribution practice. Works by Mundell (1981) and Dornbusch (cf. Kim, 2015) and others pointed out that actual exchange rate overvaluation was costly and at the core of overwhelming currency crises. These works, in combination with research embarked on by Bates and Berg (1981), among others, influenced aid agencies’ views regarding currencies, incentives, exports, and agriculture. The very poor performance of the agricultural sector between 1965 and 1985 in most regions – and in particular in Africa – also affected thinking in the aid agencies, and contributed to a new view that underscored “getting prices right”.

In the 1990s, two research lines influenced assistance programme, namely:

- Work on motivation compatibility and tactical conduct influenced support officials in donor countries to become supplier, and to integrate recipient governments in the plan and administration of support programmes.

This slant established the name of ‘programme ownership’, and has been at the core of enhanced dealings between donors and poor nations in the last two decades.

- New study on funds flexibility and the international spread of crises, occasioned in a more nuanced and practical view concerning the expenditure of capital controls.

Many agencies – including the IMF and the World Bank – reinforced a limited use of capital controls (especially controls on capital inflows) and so-called macro-prudential regulations, as a way of avoiding undermining forces and currency crises.

3.18.5 Econometric studies on donor support

Academic and aid-community economists have used a set of econometric approaches to investigate whether aid is effective in the sense of producing greater development and better economic outcomes.

Some of these programmes have tried to tackle problems of inverse connectedness, and have used a chain of mechanisms – some more conclusive than others – in an effort to deal with the fact that slower growth (in very poor countries) may attract additional aid.

Some enquiry concentrated on whether aid only works under certain conditions, or whether a trifling degree of institutional improvement is required for international assistance to bear fruit (Burnside et al, 2000, 2004). Several of these studies have a well thought-out nonlinear functional forms, and have examined if there are significant interactions between aid and other variables, such as the amount of literacy, the level of dishonesty, the level of macro-economic stability, institutional strong point, the value of general economic policies, and natural features.

In all-purpose, most studies have depended on cross-country or panel data, and have tried to distinguish between short- and long-term influences. A number of writers have used ‘Dutch disease’-related models to scrutinise the degree to which enlarged support results in currency overvaluation, poor trade accomplishment, and crunches – (cf. Rajan et al, 2011).

3.18.6 Fragile and inconclusive results on official donor assistance

Generally, the consequences of the debates of the results on official assistance have been delicate and inconclusive. After evaluating 97 studies, Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008, 2009) established that, in the best of cases, it was probable to say that there was a small optimism, and yet statistically insignificant, association between official aid and growth. This conclusion was also reached by Rajan et al (2008) in an enquiry that modified likely endogeneity problems, and that measured a complete number of covariates. In particular, according to this study there was no clear relation running from more support to faster growth; this is precise even in countries with healthier programme environment and stronger institutions (Rajan et al, 2008; Quibria, 2014).

Bourguignon et al (2007:316) have argued that one ought not to be astonished by the indecisiveness of studies that bank on cumulative statistics. According to them, aid affects economic performance, openly and ultimately, through a multiplicity of networks. Considering all aid as same – independently of whether it is disaster assistance, programme aid, or project-based aid – is disingenuous. In their opinion, it is essential to break open the ‘black box’ of international aid, and analyse the causality chain that goes, in complex and non-obvious ways, from aid to legislators, to policies, and to country outcomes. This type of scrutiny would discover a number of precise ways in which international assistance could impact economic performance. In particular, according to Bourguignon et al (2007) it is important that studies that attempt to define the effect of aid on growth deliberate matters linked to technical assistance, conditionality, level of understanding of the economy in question, and the government’s ability to implement specific programmes.

3.18.7 Bitter policy controversy and intellectual heckling on donor efficiency

In spite of its contributions and passion which academics provides towards the debates surrounding policy controversies and donor efficiency, the academic argument diminishes in comparison with fresh policy disputes on the subject. The level of hostility in this absolute conflict of ideas is illustrated by the following quote from an article by Sachs (2009):

“Moyo's views [are] cruel and mistaken... Moyo and Easterly are trying to pull up the ladder for those still left behind.” Easterly’s response, also from 2009, was equally strong... Sachs (2009) the world's leading supporter and fund-raiser for the aid establishment... Sachs suffers from [an]... acute shortage of truthiness...”

The Easterly–Sachs argument has created public responsiveness because it has been embedded in rather simple terms. These are simple descriptions based on ethnographic arguments that reverberate with large sections of the general public. But behind the diverse positions there are a lot of academic investigations – most of them based on advanced econometric techniques – that have tried to decide the extent to which foreign aid is effective. The problem, as noted, is that much of this

body of practical work has resulted in delicate and inconclusive evidence (Bourguignon et al, 2007).

3.18.8 Intermediate positions

For a growing number of economists, the subject of aid efficiency is neither black nor white. Indeed, a number of writers have taken in-between positions. For example, in a powerful book that deals with the predicament of the poorest of the poor, Collier (2009) has argued that both critics and loyal supporters of official aid have greatly embellished their assertions and biased the empirical and historical records.

Collier's reading of the evidence is that over the last 30 years official assistance has assisted in accelerating gross domestic product (GDP) growth among the poorest nations in the world – most of them in Africa – by approximately 1% per year. This is a non-trivial figure, especially when one considers that during this period the poorest countries have had an aggregate rate of per capita growth of zero. That is, in the absence of official assistance, the billion people that live in these nations – the so-called 'bottom billion' – would have seen their incomes decline year after year.

Banerjee et al (2011:40) argued that there is need for a "radical rethinking of the way to fight poverty." In their view, "the acrimonious debate between the Easterly and Sachs factions has missed the boat". Banerjee et al (2011:40) joined a growing group of scholars in arguing that "this debate cannot be solved in the abstract, by using aggregate data and cross-country regressions". The evidence, in their view, is quite simple – "some projects financed by official aid work and are effective in reducing poverty and moving the domestic populations towards self-sufficiency and prosperity, while other projects (and programmes) fail miserably. The question is not how aggregate aid programmes have fared in the past, but how to evaluate whether specific programmes are effective".

3.18.9 Persuasive 'aid narratives'

In the narratives of Edwards (2014), he discussed the effectiveness-of-aid literature from a historical viewpoint, and contends that international assistance affects recipient economies in enormously multifaceted ways and through multiple and changing channels. Moreover, this is a two-way connection – aid agencies impact

policies, and the truth in the recipient country affects the actions of support agencies. This relationship is so intricate and time-dependent that it is not open to being captured by cross-country or panel regressions; in fact, even classy stipulations with several breakpoints and nonlinearities are improbable to clarify the internal workings of the aid–performance connection.

Bourguignon et al (2007:316) have pointed out that “there is a need to go beyond econometrics, and to break open the ‘black box’ of development aid”. He would go even further, and argued that “we need to realise that there is a multiplicity of black boxes. Or, to put it differently, that the black box is highly elastic and keeps changing through time. Breaking these boxes open and understanding why aid works some times and not others, and why some projects are successful while others are disasters, requires analysing in great detail specific country episodes. If we want to truly understand the convoluted ways in which official aid affects different economic outcomes, we need to plunge into archives, analyse data in detail, carefully look for counterfactuals, understand the temperament of the major players, and take into account historical circumstances”. This is a “difficult subject that requires detective-like work”. The analysis in this section does not pretend to be complete and is not an attempt to deal with every aspect of aid-related arguments.

It is interesting to note the complexities of international assistance which may lead to the consultation of some of the very thorough examinations on the issue, including two comprehensive articles by Radelet (2005, 2006) and Quibria (2014), and the widespread literature mentioned therein. In many ways this enquiry is extraordinarily modern. Smith (1950:1) argues that the main reason why the English colonies of North America had done significantly better than the Spanish dominions of South America was that “the political institutions of the English colonies have been more favourable to the improvement and cultivation of this land than those of the Spanish colonies.” Smith (1950:1) goes on to list a number of policies implemented by the British – including tax, inheritance, and trade policies – that, in his view, explain the economic success in what was to become the US; in parallel, he discusses how poor policies enacted by the Dutch and the Spanish – and to a lesser extent by the French – stifled growth and progress in their dominions. It was evidently clear in documents and literature that, “there was not even a mild suggestion that the home

nation should provide systematic financial assistance to its colonies (Radelet, 2005, 2006 and Quibria, 2014).

The Colonial Development Act created the Colonial Development Fund with resources of one million pounds sterling per year. Although this Act intended to improve the social conditions in the colonies – especially in the rural sector – its main objective was to promote British exports at a time when the overvaluation of the pound had greatly reduced British competitiveness. Until the passing of this law the colonies were supposed to be, largely, self-financing, and any assistance was confined to emergencies. The Marshall Plan, which was announced by US Secretary of State George C. Marshall in a speech at Harvard University on 5 June 1947, played an important role in defining US policy towards foreign aid. He then added that “more than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery... For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people.” In 1946, France created its first aid agency (FIDES), which in 1963 was replaced by the Ministry of Cooperation. The Nordic countries fashioned their own aid agencies in 1962. The following subsections below discuss local government provisions and the role of elected councillors, municipal service provision, critical views on donor support, donor agency’s provision of support for elections, donor agency support for elections in the municipality, donor funding for elections, donor conditionality attached to donor support, attached donor conditionality and democratization, focus of aid conditionality is to ensure democratisation, donor conditionality’s effects on voters, and the effects of donor conditionality on democratization.

2.10. Local government provisions and the role of Elected Councillors

In this era and dispensation of democracy, municipal council representatives from political organisations play a crucial role in the process of democratisation. Councillors facilitate the possibility of local government administration, they link the local council with the local municipality through a cooperative procedure of appointment to diminish unemployment, inequality and poverty. In the Buffalo City municipality, councillors were elected representative of the general public and are authorised as chosen representative to make decisions on behalf of their communities. This is based on the principles of representative democracy which

identify the need for people to have a voice in their government by assigning that voice to a designated person chosen through voting processes.

As elected representatives, councillors need to carry out their duties in a transparent and accountable manner (Fenwick et al., 2006; Chandler, 2001; Lowndes, 2006; Osborne, 2007; Michels et al., 2010; Cherry et al., 2000; Besley, 1997; Manor, 1995; Alexander, 2010). Councillors serve as architects of community/constituent input, the public partake in local governance and democracy through their representation. Councillors function as communication link between the council and the community, they serve as members on committees, and they endorse key decisions of the council. In addition, councillors work with local community to find supportable ways to meet their social, economic and their material needs and to improve their quality of lives. Councillors are expected to maximise social development and economic growth by creating an integrated living environment which involves paying attention to all the different needs that a community must meet in order to sustain itself. In this regard, councillors play an awfully vital role in promoting democracy, empowering and redistributing the benefits of development to all members of the communities. The constitution of the Republic of South Africa, chapter 7, articles 152-153 stated clearly the objects of local government and its duties in relations to basic service delivery in the municipalities.

Buffalo City is a metropolitan municipality located on the east coast of Eastern Cape Province, South Africa. It includes the towns of East London, Bhishe and King William's Town, as well as the large townships of Mdantsane and Zwelitsha.

The municipality was established as a local municipality in 2000 after South Africa's restructuring of municipal areas, and is named after the Buffalo River, at whose mouth lies the only river port in South Africa. On 18 May 2011, it was disconnected from the Amathole District Municipality and transformed into a metropolitan municipality. The area has a well-developed manufacturing base, with the automobile industry playing a foremost role. Daimler AG, through its exclusively owned subsidiary Mercedes-Benz South Africa (MBSA), has a large assembly plant located next to the port of East London, which produces a variety of vehicles for export. The climate is mild, with year-round sunshine and the average rainfall is 850mm (33.5 inches).

The population of 755,200 (2011) is largely Black (85.2%), with White (8.4%) and Coloured (5.7%) minorities. There is also a small Indian community (0.6%). There are several other larger and smaller towns scattered around these cities. The municipality has a mixed racial make-up of blacks, Afrikaans, Coloured, Indians/Asians and Whites. The languages spoken include *inter alia* Xhosa, English and Afrikaans. The municipal council comprises of one hundred members chosen by mixed member proportional representation. Fifty Councillors are selected by first-past-post voting in fifty wards, while the remaining fifty are chosen from party lists so that the total number of party legislatures is proportional to the number of ballots received in the elections (Gabara, 2010)

3.19.4 Municipal Service provision

Local government (municipality) is the domain of government closest to the people, they are chosen by citizens to represent them and are accountable to guarantee that services are delivered to the community (Jorgensen et al, 2016; De Kadt et al, 2015; Ajam, 2014; Brettenny et al, 2016; do Vale et al, 2017; De Kadt, 2017; Burger et al, 2014; Mershon, 2015; Rodina et al, 2016). One way in which municipalities can do this is to deliver the service themselves through the use of their own resources - finance, equipment and employees. A municipality may also subcontract the provision of a service. In other words, it may choose to hire someone else to deliver the service but it remains the duty of the municipality to choose the service provider and to make sure that they deliver the service appropriately.

Many municipalities, however, are incapable of delivering services to residents. This might be because of lack of funds or lack of capacity to provide a good service at an affordable price. Such municipalities should find other ways to ensure that the services are improved and reach the people most in need of them. Some options that they could consider are capacity-building and corporatisation. At the point where the municipality faces financial challenges, donor support comes in handy as the only way of bail out and available option to augment the municipality's source of funds (Jorgensen et al, 2016; De Kadt et al, 2015; Ajam, 2014; Brettenny et al, 2016; do Vale et al, 2017).

3.19.5 Critical views on donor support

According to Dreher et al (2016), the Chinese support improves local development outcomes, as measured by per-capita night-time light emissions at the first and second subnational administrative level in Africa. Their investigation showed that China's foreign aid is prone to capture by political leaders of aid receiving countries. They found out that when leaders hold power, their birth regions receive substantially more funding from China than other subnational regions. They established that, African leaders direct more Chinese aid to areas populated by individuals who share their ethnicity. They, therefore, conclude that China's foreign assistance program has both distributional and developmental consequences for Africa. In contrast, Venner (2016:1) observed that donor assisted programmes and agencies can be irrational. She said "the development is a bit chaos" as far as she is concerned. She doesn't think "they operate in a very rational manner". She claims they have good intentions, but the way they work—"I'm still getting to grips with it". Venner (2016:1) criticised the performance of major donor actors at the municipality that, what should have been a united effort to improve lives of the people "was mired in bureaucracy and riven in conflict between organisations and individuals who work there". According to Fuhr (1994), the circumstances surrounding public institutional reforms in Ecuador which were set in motion through, on the one hand, a link established by external contributors between the financing of infrastructure projects at the local level, and institutional reforms on the other (Romeo, 2003; Heewig et al, 2017; Chawla, 2016; Roberts et al, 2016; Rosendo et al, 2016; Platz, 2016; Wowerijn et al, 2017). Credit was only provided to municipalities on the understanding that attempts were made by them to improve their capacity to provide urban services. This approach has enjoyed considerable success to date they noted (Norris, 2017; Fiedler, 2016; Goetz et al, 2016; Annen, 2017; Macdonald, 2016; Ascher, 2016; Bush, 2016; Bardall, 2017; Hasselskog et al, 2017; Awortwi, 2017; Swedlund, 2017; Crane et al, 2017; Buckley et al, 2017; Moguees et al, 2016; Havel, 2016; Mbachu, 2016; Gaynor, 2016; Nickson et al, 2016; Arnon, 2017).

3.19.6 Donor Agency's provision of support for elections

Donor agencies provide enormous support for municipal elections. The support these agencies provide are varied and diverse. Most of the support were geared towards assisting the IEC, BCMM, political parties, elected or nominated councillors who contest for local and municipal elections with financial assistance and logistical

support. According to Bratton et al (2001) and Mattes (1995), popular provision for democracy in Africa as in other Third Wave regions provide less gratification with the performance of elected governments. The fact that Africans support democracy while being dissatisfied with its accomplishments suggests a measure of inherent support that surpasses instrumental considerations. In the opinion of Collier et al (2012), Southall (2002) and Geisler (1979), democratization has introduced elections into settings that often do not have restrictions upon the behaviour of candidates, resulting in the advent of voter intimidation, vote-buying, and ballot fraud. In addition, they hold the view that, a stronger incumbent facing local opposition will prefer to use corruption or ballot fraud. In spite of all these difficulties, the role of donor agencies cannot be underestimated in municipal elections.

3.19.7 Donor agency support for elections in the municipality

The knowledge of democracy has become so thoroughly known with elections that we are in danger of overlooking that the modern account of representative elections is a tale of authoritarian manipulations as much as it is a narrative of democratic achievements (Schedler (2002). Historically, according to Scedler (2002) elections have been a tool of authoritarian control as well as a means of democratic governance. Since the early days of the “third wave” of global democratization, it has been clear that changes from dictatorial rule can lead anywhere. Over the past quarter-century, many have led to the setting up of some form of democracy. This democracy, according to Nye (1967, 2014), has been a terrain that bred corruption through most of donor activities. Nye (1967:417, 2014:427), holds the view that “political corruption and nepotism rot good intentions and retard progressive policies”.

In contrast, Corstange (2017) is of the opinion that parties use clienteles’ in competitive and uncompetitive electoral environments. He argues that “parties enjoy wide discretion to target clientelistic payoffs to inexpensive voters in their strongholds, but that head-to-head competition compels them to bid for more expensive voters”. Wiezien (2017:711) says that “elections are not simply games of musical chairs, but that the cost of ruling has effect on electoral support”. According to him, “Policy is not the only thing that matters, and other factors, in particular the

economy, are more powerful. From the point of view of electoral accountability, however, the results do provide good news, as they indicate that substantive representation is important to voters”.

3.19.8 Donor funding for elections

According to Lippel et al (2016), funding for elections is used to develop and strengthen the skills, instincts, abilities, processes and resources of the IEC, the BCMM, the political parties and the elected councillors. Similarly, donors raise funds to assist in campaigns, provide logistics, training centers, offices and documentation support centers, voter education, job training, learning centers and consultancy services (Olowu et al, 2016; Fukuyama, 2017; Birch et al, 2017; Goodhand et al, 2016; White et al, 2016; Hamalai et al, 2015). The essence, according to Geerring et al (2016) of electoral support, to a large extent, “was to ensure electoral development, to ensure free and fair elections, democracy improves human development by showing that some aspects of democracy – but not others – affect human development”. Geerring et al (2016) argue that the “electoral” aspect of democracy improves human development while aspects related to citizen empowerment do not (or scarcely so). According to Fried et al (2017), politicians often struggle to claim credit for programmatic policies and therefore use personalized benefits to win elections. Non-programmatic strategies that target individual voters provide a greater electoral return, even if the technocratic provision of public goods would better serve citizens’ needs. Dominioni (2016) argues that electoral fraud and electoral malpractices relate to the domain of electoral affairs, which is one of the core elements of a regime with representative institutions. According to Dominioni (2016), the last decades at the international level have produced many documents, charters and organisations that contributed to craft the standards of electoral integrity. These sentiments were also shared by Miura et al (2016); Aldrich et al (2017); Bellucci et al (2017); Diaz Caveros, (2016) and Maskin, (2017).

3.19.9 Donor conditionality attached to donor support

The end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the Soviet Union has invigorated democratisation in most parts of Africa (Muriuki, 2000; Thompson, 1992; Dzungwa,

2004; Mulonya, 2010; Mundau, 2013; Baylles, 1995; Brown, 2001; Grosh, 1996 and Rossler, 2005). At the same time, Western donors' approaches towards recipients of foreign aid have changed. This has caused a new practice, which attempts to force Third World states to move toward liberal democracy by conditioning lending on the holding of multi-party elections. In Africa this has resulted to the holding of multi-party elections. Muriuki (2000) examined donor conditionality and democratisation in Kenya by examining the results of 1992 and 1997 multi-party elections.

Kenya attained independence from the British and ushered in a multi-party democracy in 1963. Since then, the country has undergone a full circle of political development, starting with a multi-party democracy at independence, through a one party dictatorship between 1982 and 1992 and back to a multi-party democracy in 1993. The need to “satisfy foreign donors forced the leadership to amend Section 2(A) of Kenya’s constitution that had legalised single-party rule in 1982 thus allowing plural politics” (Muriuki, 2000). Thompson (1992) tries to appraise the role of the World Bank in Sub-Saharan Africa's development. She argues that the World Bank has treaded beyond the boundaries of a typical borrowing institution by linking its assistance to political reorganisation. The study argues that in this capacity the Bank has contributed to the halting of democratization process currently underway in Africa. The economic effects of the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programmes have been less successful (Van,2016; Jakupe et al, 2016; Collier et al, 2016; Cassomon et al, 2017; Dijk, 2017; Adam et al, 2016; Koch et al, 2017; Skladany, 2017; Jakupec, 2018 and Paraji, 2017). In the 1990s, the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) started to focus on the promotion of human rights. During this time, political conditionality made its first major appearance. Political conditionality “entails the linking of perceived benefits to another state to the fulfilment of conditions relating to the protection of human rights and the advancement of democratic principles” (Potyrala et al, 2015:136) Although aid conditionality had already been used by some Bretton Woods institutions, this conditionality was primarily concentrated on economic-stabilization. In the 1990s, aid conditionality was no longer limited to economic purposes but spread to political liberalisation, good governance, and human rights. These assertions reflect the reciprocal relations that exist in the norm of reciprocity where donors have their expectations in what they can get back on their investments.

3.19.10 Attached donor conditionality and democratization

According to Baylies (2007), the use of aid to inflict political conditions on recipient countries, to further democratic and government reforms or to penalise non-compliance with earlier demands, is a comparatively new feature of the international assistance system. She assesses the proliferating donor and academic literature emerging on the subject. The core argument of democracy and governance policies are discussions about transformation of the state, its relationship to economic development and the declining extent to which deliberations of sovereignty limit donor involvements. Baylies (2007) Swedlund (2007) and Woll (2008) observed that political conditionality may assist the development of democratic movements in Africa, there is an insincerity in that structural adjustment risks discouraging the state reforms seen to be vital to them while, similarly, democratisation may contest the procedures of economic restructuring being executed.

3.19.11 Focus of aid conditionality is to ensure democratization

Citizens in donor countries have a strong preference for conditioning foreign aid on good governance (Swedlund, 2017; Jorg et al, 2012; Fisher, 2013; Raimund, 2014; Woll, 2008; Baylies, 2007). Over 90% of respondents in the 2011 Eurobarometer, which sampled more than 25,000 individuals from 27 countries, expressed that foreign aid should be conditioned on democracy, human rights and governance. Swedlund (2017), Nikolas (2010), Borchgrevink (2011) Haymen (2011) and Tjonneland (2008) asserted that the focus of donor assistance be conditioned on deepening democracy, ensuring accountability and safeguarding donor's investment and profits.

This is consistent with the observations of Layton et al (2015), who emphasized that social assistance shapes election results across Latin America. Layton et al (2015) further noted that case studies in numerous countries have found electoral effects, yet it remains uncertain whether and how effects differ cross-nationally, and whether electoral effects are due to mobilization or persuasion.

3.19.12 Effects of Donor conditionality on democratization

Platz (2016: 4/5) pointed out that Competitive national elections can play a significant role in the consolidation process of developing and established

democracies alike. Nevertheless, according to him “if not handled adequately, they have the potential to bring long-existing, existential conflict lines to the surface”. This electoral conflict, becoming manifest in election violence, has the potential to shy people off from voting and negatively affect their attitude towards elections and democracy in general. Platz (2016) examined the ways in which violent electoral conflict affected political participation and the personal attitudes towards democracy of ordinary Kenyan citizens. Kenya has experienced violent electoral conflict repeatedly since the re-introduction of competitive elections in 1992 and became one of its prime examples due to the devastating 2008 post-election clashes. Similarly, Muriuki (2000) examined donor conditionalities and democratisation in Kenya by examining the results of 1992 and 1997 multi-party elections. According to Muriuki (2000), the end of the Cold War and the downfall of the Soviet Union has motivated democratisation in most parts of Africa.

At the same time, Western donors' attitudes towards beneficiaries of foreign assistance have changed. This has occasioned in a new practice, which tries to force Third World states to move toward liberal democracy by conditioning loaning on the holding of multi-party elections. In Africa, this has resulted to the holding of multi-party elections. Dzungwa (2004), opined that given the capacity and resource constraints within municipalities in third world countries, which necessitate that it collaborates closely with other stakeholders, particularly donors, in seeking to augment its resource base and capacity, the lack of capacity is further complicated by the various pieces of legislation, which have a serious bearing on how municipalities have to work - irrespective of their capacity and resources limitations. The effects of donor conditionality was discussed extensively by respondents. The sub-section below discusses political party affiliation.

3.19.13 Political party affiliation

In their study to explore the relationship between political party affiliation and Latino identity, drawing on the 2002 National Survey of Latinos, it was revealed that Latinos are considerably more likely to identify themselves as Republicans as opposed to Democrats based on their self-identification along ethnic lines, their adherence to Latino family ideals and values, and their general trust of politicians and perceptions of politicians' interest in Latinos (Dutwin et al, 2005; Carpinella et al, 2013; Czech et

al, 2001; Gerber et al, 2010). According to the work of Czech et al (2001), Basedau et al (2011), Young (2012), Manning (2005) and Awortwi (2017), there is a connection between “political party affiliation to species preservation practices and perspectives. In a nationwide public belief survey, they discovered that Democrats rate species protection more highly than do Republicans, and that Democrats are also more strongly sensitive to the Endangered Species Act. Republicans put higher importance on assets rights than do Democrats, but members of both parties value “economic growth as highly as wildlife conservation”.

2.11. Conclusions

This chapter has demonstrated through the discussions from the relevant literature the debates surrounding donor support efficiency and efficacy in inducing democratisation. The arguments weighed the cases of donor support for elections and development for emerging democracies as it pertains in the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality. In fledgling democracies, as is the case of South Africa, donor funding for elections are often sourced from foreign assistance as well as from local corporate establishments. International donors, corporate organisations, individuals and particularly the government, through the treasury, which provide financing to political parties, the IEC and the BCMM as a way to encourage democracy and good governance.

The chapter sufficiently established the importance of donor support for elections, democratisation and for development. Ted the point that, support can be virtuously financial or otherwise. Additionally, the chapter stressed that, support could be used for capacity development purposes such as supporting parties’ development, compiling and publishing their manifestos, their constitutions and enhancing their campaigning skills. Developing connection between ideologically connected parties is another common attribute of international and local support for a party. Occasionally this can be perceived as directly supporting the political aims of a political party. The issue of good governance was forcefully articulated by leaders in the Sub-Saharan Africa through the APRM and NEPAD programmes. To this end, it was envisaged that matters that border on social justice, equity and fairness in the distribution of development programmes to alleviate poverty, unemployment and inequality were deliberately considered by donors, development partners and

especially governments and its agencies in the municipality. Unfortunately, as has already been indicated elsewhere in this study, it is the donor communities and the local elite who benefit more from this neo-liberal democratisation as privatisation, de-regulation and de-valuation of currency affects the poor excessively. The inference drawn from the donor-recipient relations as it occurs in the municipality is that of unequal and exploitative one. During elections, community members are enticed to vote as though they are partners in development but they are only sacrificed on the altar of unfulfilled campaign promises as donor assistance designated for their welfare never reach their destinations as a result of the activities of donor managers in the municipalities.

The next chapter discussed the theoretical framework and linkages that connect donor support perspectives to the processes of democratisation.

CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL/CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Introduction

There were a lot of available theories that would have been suitable for utilisation in this study. The theories such as Social Contract, Human Rights, Relative Deprivation and Rational Choice were among those suitable to have been considered for this study. However, in terms of relevance, appropriateness and sufficiency, the study opted to adopt the Development aid theory, which was used to tackle issues around donor support and development. It also utilised the Moral norm and Ethics of Reciprocity, voters' behaviour theory, the political party theory, Democratisation and the Social Justice and Equity theories. Most of these theories were used in complementary capacity to augment and strengthen the major theories used such as the development aid theory, the moral norm and ethics of reciprocity, democratisation and social justice and equity theories.

The overall evidence of the donor-recipient relationship is skewed in favour of the donor through the municipality to the disadvantage of the recipient and local beneficiaries of the donor support through the establishment of conditionalities that disconnect and distort the interactive balance of engagement that produces and leads to unfairness, inequity, inequality and injustice in the democratization processes in the municipality. The performance of the metropolis in terms of service delivery and engagement with the local communities raise questions of unbalanced and disjointed relationship of mistrust laced with allegations of corruption that undermines the essence of donor funding of projects to promote and enhance good governance, transparency, accountability and democratization. These constitute the basis of investigation for this current study.

This thesis utilized democratisation theories, Gouldner's theory of Moral Norm of Reciprocity and Social Support in combination with Larzasfeld's Voters' behaviour theory and the social justice and equity perspective as elements of the theoretical framework (Ley, 1959; Dror, 2012; Olson, 2015; Negretto, 2006; Roberts, 2003 and Hyden et al, 2004). These theories were used in combination with the political party theory (Elsenstadt, 2002; Lewis 1997, 2006 and Allison, 1994). In addition, Ley's

(1959) political party model was used to tackle the questions on political parties' perceptions of donor support and democratisation, the community voter's and elected or nominated councillors perceptions of donor support and democratisation. Gouldner's theory of Moral Norm of Reciprocity and Social Support (Gouldner, 1960; Uehara, 1995; Masumi et al., 2008; Goldsmith, 2004; Konovsky et al., 1994; Green et al., 2009) was used to complement Larzasfeld's et al (1944, 1954, and 1955) voters' behaviour theory in an interface with the social justice and equity perspective as elements of the theoretical framework. The former is directed at addressing the market related issues such fair exchange and reciprocity while the latter theory is directed at fleshing out matters regarding social justice and equity in relations between donors, local governments and the local communities.

3.2. Development Aid Theory

Development aid or support (also known as development assistance or technical assistance) is economic assistance given by governments and other agencies to support the economic, environmental, social, and political advancement of developing nations (Kuhn et al, 1988; Woolcock,1998). It is differentiated from humanitarian aid by concentrating on reducing poverty in the long term, rather than a short term reaction. This is used to express the idea that a corporation should occur among donor and recipient, rather than the traditional condition in which the connection was controlled by the affluence and specialised knowledge of one side. Most development assistance comes from the Western industrialised countries but some poorer countries also contribute aid. The essence of development aid changed and re-shaped the role of government in the advancement of welfare which slowly directed to a more practical strategy of economic and developmental assistance towards poor countries and deprived and disadvantage areas (Scott, 1995; Hofstede, 1993; Dweck, 2000; De Haas, 2010; Wills, 2011; Crain, 2015)

3.3. The Moral Norm and Ethics of Reciprocity Theory

The moral norm of reciprocity was used to address the research objectives and research questions on the perceptions of community voters, donor agency's role and the functions of municipal councils programs on poverty alleviation, good health and well-being of residents, the fight against hunger, excellent education, clean water

and sanitation, decent work and economic growth, employment opportunities, reduced inequality and sustainable communities projects to inspire hope for the future. These are matters for which people engage in voting in an election. Thus, as they vote, they expect the municipal council, government, donors and all those engaged in development to reciprocate their action.

The Moral norm of reciprocity hinges on “the expectation that people will respond favourably to each other through their actions and interactions by returning benefits for benefits and responding with indifference or hostility to harm” (Uehera, 1995; Masumi et al., 2008:). Gouldner (1960: 161) made a diagnostic difference between “reciprocity as a pattern of social exchange and reciprocity as a general moral belief”. The moral norm of reciprocity forms a dynamic “causal force” in social life. To a large extent, it defines the limits of relationships and interactions that exist among individuals, groups, organizations, institutions and societies (Uehera, 1995; Bruce, 1987; Saleebey, 2006).

Reciprocity attempts to suggest that people will react or be attracted to the motivations that benefit them and will avoid impetuses that burden them. By extension and in line with donor support and democratization, there is clear evidence of reciprocal relationships which are established. The lines of reciprocity which are constructed between donors and their beneficiaries are not really one of mutuality but the underlying agenda is to maximize profit through aid marketization (Koch, 2011). In the Moral Norm of reciprocity, Gouldner suggested that people’s actions and interactions are consciously guided by not only the benefits they obtain presently but also the history of similar associations built on past encounters which shapes the outcome of future relationships. The reflection on the donor conditionality with regard to the support given to the municipality solicited responses emanating from the benefits derived as well as the historical relationships built over time.

Ascertaining the impact and effects of the donor support on the municipality and the municipality’s response in relation to elections and development, can be made easier through the use of insights from the theory of reciprocity. According to Gouldner, if the relationship is positive, it will produce loyalty, approval, affection and commitment but if the history of the relationship is negative, it will produce disaffection, anger, disloyalty and rejection.

3.4. The social justice and equity theories

The concept of justice is explained to mean equity and equality in all human endeavour, and the thesis is advanced that “equity” is only one of the many values which may underlie a given system of justice. Some other values include; fairness, access and opportunity and a sense of self-worth and dignity. Other values of social justice are; openness, civil liberties, political rights and removal of all limitations and barriers that demean human dignity (Deutsch, 1975). The explanations about the conditions which determine which values will be employed as the basis of distributive justice in a group are proposed, with discussion centered about the values of “equity,” “equality,” and “need” and the conditions which lead a group to emphasize one rather than another value (Brown, 2004).

The theory of Reciprocity does not sufficiently capture the needs of those who by their natural economic orientation can take active part in the norm of reciprocity. As a result, this framework is triangulated strategically with the theory of Social Justice and Equity. The social justice and equity framework helps to design strategies and approaches in order to increase diversity, create awareness and help us to work towards greater equity and social justice in the community through advocacy, vigilance, corporate and collective responsibility. The social justice theory develops social policies for tackling inequalities, it assesses barriers and access to resources, examines the occurrence and prevalence of poverty and privileges, assesses differential power and prestige, deals with equitable resources allocation, individual rights and the collective good and their implication for the attributes of fairness and issues of oppression and the eradication of poverty (Rawls, 1971; Weiner, 1992; Ostrom, 2009; Austin, 1977; Leventhal, 1976; Hartfield, 1978; Charmaz, 2011; Larson et al., 2002; Locke, 1965).

The social justice and equity theory is crucial for analyzing and gauging the extent to which the available donor support allocated for development and elections is utilized in the greater interest of the residents and the communities in the municipality. This ultimately ensures the timeous measurement of the policy effects of the conditionality on the socio-economic well-being of the communities and the residents of the municipality.

As already indicated above, ample studies of social support have incorporated the concepts of reciprocity and exchange, the validity of which holds possible consequences for the dynamics of social interactions with donors, politicians, administrators, academicians, voters and the general public on matters that border on transactions and policies. Owing to the fact that some of these social interactions could emanate into vertical relationships, there was therefore a need to bring into the equation the theory of social justice and equity in order to introduce the element of horizontal relations into the analysis of donor support and democratization in the Buffalo City Municipality.

Ley (1959:51) asserts that in this era and dispensation of democracy, political parties as political organisations play a crucial role in the course of democratisation. Broadly speaking, parties facilitate the possibility of parliamentary government, they formulate and influence public policies, educate public opinions, provide political stability and help recruit leaders. They articulate their policies, programmes and activities through their manifestoes in order to persuade the electorates to patronise their campaign messages to solicit their votes. In order to perform this role effectively, political parties require huge financial support.

3.5. Political party theory

The doctrine that “party systems are exclusively or largely determined by electoral systems seems now to be as widely rejected as it was once widely accepted; yet few primers banish its central postulates wholly from their pages” (Ley, 1959:127). This view is widely embraced amongst scholars of political party theory (Dror, 2012; Olson, 2015; Negretto, 2006; Roberts, 2003; Hyden et al, 2004). From this prevalent fence-sitting, according to Ley (1959:127), “we can draw on important methodological moral, and from the elements of their particular doctrine, we can construct a revised theory which, though modest in scope, is tenable, and which it may be possible to extend”.

Ley (1959:127) emphasize that the doctrine, was derived from Maurice Duverger’s work on “The influence of Electoral System on Political Life” which he agrees, as the most recent systematic exposition in democratic theory. He explains the doctrine at its simplest form to mean that, the simple-majority single-ballot system of balloting, in

single member constituencies “favours” two party systems, while proportional systems of representation favours “multipartism”.

This assertion affirms the practice that pertains to the Buffalo City municipality. The “municipal council consists of one hundred members elected by mixed member proportional representation. Fifty councillors are elected by first-past-post voting in fifty wards, while the remaining fifty are chosen from party lists so that the total number of party representatives is proportional to the number of votes received in the elections” (Gabara, 2010).

Ley (1959:127) noted that of all the hypothesis that have been advanced, the approaches are “most nearly perhaps correct to a true sociological law”. He observed a complete “correlation between the simple-majority single-ballot system and the two-party system”. Therefore, he stated that “dualist countries use the simple-majority vote and simple majority vote countries are dualist even though exceptions are rare but can generally be explained as a result of some special conditions”. He further stated that “voters would vote in an election after getting signals that depend on the theoretical model which is developed for predicting the relative effectiveness of different electoral system for reducing government corruption”. He stated, “We consider voting games in which voting parties with known corruption levels and known positions on a major policy question compete for legislative seats. We find that approval voting and proportional representation are fully effective, in the sense that all equilibria exclude corrupt parties from legislative seats. Plurality voting is partly effective, in the sense that there always exist some equilibria that exclude corrupt parties. Borda voting is ineffective because for some political situations, no equilibria can guarantee the exclusion of corrupt parties” (Ley, 1959:127).

3.6. Voting behaviour theory

Voting behaviour is a form of political behaviour (Goldman, 1966:374). Understanding voters' behaviour can clarify how and why choices were prepared either by public decision-makers, which has been a vital concern for political experts, or by the electorate (Goldman, 1966). This view was shared by other contemporary voting behaviourist theorists (Larzasfeld et al, 1944, 1954, 1955; Biswal et al, 2010; Braha et al, 2017; Andreadis et al, 2000; Kyogoku et al, 1960;

Winkielman et al, 2007; Marcus et al, 2000; Healy et al, 2010). To interpret “voting behaviour both political science and psychology proficiency were necessary; therefore, the field of political psychology emerged. Political psychology researchers study ways in which affective influence may help voters make more informed voting choices, with some suggesting that affect may explain how the electorate makes informed political choices in spite of low overall levels of political attentiveness and sophistication” (Goldman, 1966:374).

To make extrapolations and “predictions about behaviour concerning a voting decision, certain factors such as gender, race, culture or religion must be considered. Moreover, key public influences include the role of emotions, political socialization, tolerance of diversity of political views and the media. The effect of these influences on voting behaviour is best understood through theories on the formation of attitudes, beliefs, schema, knowledge structures and the practice of information processing” (Diener, 2000:34). For example, studies from diverse nations show that people are generally better-off in distinctive cultures where they have privileges such as the right to vote. Additionally, social impact and peer effects, as coining from family and friends, also play an important part in polls and voting behaviour. An important question in this background is how to unravel the social infection by peers from external influences. The “degree to which voting decision is affected by internal processes and external influences alters the quality of making truly democratic decisions” (Diener, 2000:34).

3.6.1. Voting behaviour types

The prevailing literature does not afford a clear cataloguing of voting behaviour types. However, research following the Cypriot referendum of 2004, “identified four distinct voting behaviours depending on the election type” (Andreadis et al, 2006:1). Citizens use different “decision criteria” if they are called to exercise their right to vote in i) presidential, ii) legislative, iii) local elections or in a iv) referendum (Andreadis et al, 2006:1). In national elections, “it is usually the norm that people vote based on their political beliefs. Local and regional elections differ, as people tend to elect those who seem more capable to contribute to their area” (Andreadis et al, 2006:1). A referendum follows another rationality as people are specifically asked to vote for or against an undoubtedly defined policy (Biswal et al, 2010; Braha et al,

2017; Andreadis et al, 2000; Winkielman et al, 2007; Marcus et al, 2000; Healy et al, 2010).

Interestingly, an older study in post-war Japan recognised that city residents were more likely to be sympathetic to socialist parties, whereas rural citizens were favourable of conservative parties. Notwithstanding the political inclination, this is a thought-provoking differentiation that can be ascribed to sentimental effect. The next sub-section discusses affective influence (Kyogoku et al, 1960:167).

3.6.2. Affective influence

A growing literature on the significance of affect in politics discovers that affective states play a part in public voting behaviour that can be both favourable and biasing (Winkielman et al, 2007). Affect here denotes the involvement of sentiment or feeling, which is often defined in contrast to reasoning (Biswal et al, 2010; Braha et al, 2017; Andreadis et al, 2000; Kyogoku et al, 1960; Winkielman et al, 2007; Marcus et al, 2000; Healy et al, 2010). This work basically follows from results in psychology regarding the ways in which affective conditions are tangled in human decision and management (Biswal et al, 2010; Braha et al, 2017; Andreadis et al, 2000; Kyogoku et al, 1960; Winkielman et al, 2007; Marcus et al, 2000; Healy et al, 2010). Investigation in political scholarship has traditionally ignored non-rational reflections in its theories of mass political behaviour, but the combination of social sensibility has become increasingly common. In discovering the benefits of affect on voting, scholars have argued that affective states such as apprehension and passion inspire the appraisal of new political information and thus benefit political behaviour by leading to more well-thought-out choices. Others, however, have revealed ways in which affect such as emotion and mood can expressively bias the voting choices of the electorate. For example, evidence has shown “that a variety of events that are irrelevant to the evaluation of candidates but can stir emotions, such as the outcome of football matches and weather, can significantly affect voting decisions” (Healy et al, 2010:1).

Several variables have been suggested that may moderate the connection between emotion and voting. Researchers have shown that “one such variable may be political sophistication, with higher sophistication voters more likely to experience emotions in response to political stimuli and thus more prone to emotional biases in

voting choice” (Miller, 2011:575). Emotional concentration has also been shown to moderate the relationship between affect and voting, with one study finding a doubling of estimated effect for higher-intensity affective shocks. The sentimental “influence is linked to the mechanisms which controls the influence on voting mechanisms of affective influence on voting” (Healy et al, 2010:1).

The distinguishing effect of several exact feelings have been deliberated on voting behaviour: Braha et al (2017:1) investigated the relationship between the emotional states of gratitude and indebtedness in two studies. Although many have suggested that these affects are fundamentally comparable. They submit that they are distinct emotional states. Following this attribution, there flows a proposal that with increasing expectations of return communicated with a gift by a benefactor, indebtedness should increase but gratitude should decrease (Braha et al, 2017:1). This view was also supported by scholars of affective influence on voting behaviour (Heider, 1958; Biswal et al, 2010;; Andreadis et al, 2000; Kyogoku et al, 1960; Winkielman et al, 2007; Marcus et al, 2000; Healy et al, 2010). The results of two vignette studies reinforced this proposition, and patterns of thought/action inclinations showed these states to be distinct (Watkins et al, 2006). In addition, Braha et al (2017) found that with increasing expectations communicated by a benefactor, beneficiaries reported that they would be less likely to help the benefactor in the future. Taken together, they argued that the debt of gratitude is internally generated, and is not analogous to an economic form of indebtedness” (Watkins et al, 2006:217)

The mechanism of affective influence consisted of elements such as surprise, anger, anxiety, fear and pride which are all discussed below.

3.6.2.1. Surprise

The discourse of surprise on recent development suggests that “the emotion of surprise may magnify the effect of emotions on voting research” (Healy et al, 2010:1). In weighing the consequence of home-team sports wins on voting, Healy et al, (2010) showed that surprising triumphs delivered close to twice the benefit to the incumbent party compared to victories overall.

3.6.2.2. Anger

The Affective theory would envisage that anger escalates the usage of widespread knowledge and reliance upon stereotypes and other heuristics (Parker et al, 2010:548). An experiment on students at the University of Massachusetts Amherst showed that “people who had been primed with an anger condition relied less upon issue-concordance when choosing between candidates than those who had been primed with fear” (Parker et al, 2010:548). In an isolated laboratory study, subjects well-informed with the anger emotion were considerably less likely to pursue evidence about a candidate and spent less time reviewing a candidate's policy positions on the web” (Valentino et al, 2008:247).

3.6.2.3. Anxiety

The Affective intelligence theory “identifies anxiety as an emotion that increases political attentiveness while decreasing reliance on party identification when deciding between candidates, thus improving decision-making capabilities” (Ladd et al, 2011:347). Voters who “report anxiety regarding an election are more likely to vote for candidates whose policies they prefer, and party members who report feeling anxious regarding a candidate are twice as likely to defect and vote for the opposition candidate. Others have denied that anxiety's indirect influence on voting behaviour has been proven to the exclusion of alternative explanations, such as the possibility that less preferred candidates produce feelings of anxiety, as opposed to the reverse” (Ladd et al, 2011:347).

3.6.2.4. Fear

According to Tiedens et al (2001:973), studies in psychology have “shown that people suffering fear rely on more thorough processing when making choices”. One study found that “subjects primed with fear spent more time seeking information on the web before a hypothetical voting exercise than those primed with anger” (Parker et al, 2010:548).

3.6.2.5. Pride

Results from the American National Elections Survey found that “pride, along with hope and fear, explained a significant amount of the variance in peoples' 2008 voting choices” (Fin et al, 2010:262). The “size of the effect of expressions of pride on voting for the Republican Party was roughly one third of the size of the effect of party identification, typically the strongest predictor” (Finn et al, 2010:262). Appeals to

pride “were also found to be effective in motivating voter turnout among high-propensity voters, though the effect was not as strong as appeals to shame” (Panagopoulos, 2010:369). Voting behaviour theory is a form of political behaviour that help explain how and why electorates make voting decisions and choices. It explains affect influence and mechanisms and types (Marcus et al, 2000; Healy et al, 2010). The next sub-section discusses the effects of voting on emotions.

3.7. Effects of voting on emotion

According to Waismel-Manor et al (2011:789), the act of voting “can produce emotional responses that may bias the choices voters make and potentially affect subsequent emotional states”.

A recent study on voters in Israel found that voters' cortisol levels, the so-called "stress hormone," “were significantly higher immediately before entering a polling place than personal baseline levels measured on a similar, non-election day this may be significant for voting choices since cortisol is known to affect memory consolidation, memory retrieval, and reward- and risk-seeking behaviour” (Putman et al, 2010:257). Acute stress “may disrupt decision making and affect cognition” (Porcelli et al, 2009:278).

Additionally, research done on voters in Ann Arbor and Durham after the US 2008 elections “showed partial evidence that voting for the losing candidate may lead to increased cortisol levels relative to levels among voters who chose the winning candidate” (Stanton et al, 2010:768). The sub-section below discusses political campaigns with regard to the role of political parties in a democracy.

3.8. Political campaigns

The use of passionate requests in political operations to escalate backing for a candidate or decrease support for a contestant is a extensively accepted practice and a common part of any campaign plan (Bader, 2005, 2006; Kern, 1989; Witte et al, 2000; Westen, 2008; Kaid et al, 1991; Ridout et al, 2011, Lau et al, 2007; Weber, 2013; Jerit, 2004). Campaigns often seek to inspire constructive feelings such as interest and confidence about their contender among party centres to advance turnout and political involvement while seeking to raise fear and anxiety about the challenger. Enthusiasm have a tendency to reinforce preferences, whereas fear and

anxiety tend to interrupt behavioural patterns and lead individuals to look for new sources of information (Gerodimos et al, 2015; Maor et al, 2015; Miller, 2017; Samuel-Azran et al, 2015; Scammell, 2016; Himelboim et al, 2016; Bonikowski et al, 2015 and Casero- Ripolles et al, 2016). The following sub-section explains political surveys and their influence on voting behaviour.

3.9. Political surveys

Investigative findings show that “it is possible to influence a persons' attitudes toward a political candidate using carefully crafted survey questions, which in turn may impact his or her voting behaviour” (Brader, 2006: 2). A laboratory study in the UK focussed on participants' attitude towards former Prime Minister Tony Blair for the duration of the 2001 pre-election period through a phone survey. After assessing respondents' interest in politics, the survey requested the partakers to state either i) two positive characteristics of the Prime Minister, ii) five positive characteristics of the Prime Minister, iii) two negative characteristics of the Prime Minister, or iv) five negative characteristics of the Prime Minister. Participants were then probed to indicate their attitude toward Blair on a scale from 1 to 7 where higher values mirrored higher favourability (Haddock, 2002).

Recording five positive or negative features for the Prime Minister was puzzling, especially for those with little or no concern in political affairs. The ones inquired to list five positive characteristics were informed negatively towards the politicians because it was too tough to name five good traits. On the contrary, following the same reason, those who were to list five negatives came to admire the politician better than before. This conclusion was publicised in the final survey stage when participants assessed their outlook toward the Prime Minister (Holsti, 1999; Van Ripper et al, 1965; Feaver et al, 2001; Haddock, 2002; Biondo et al, 2017; Guo, 2015; Andreenkova, 2007; Sciarini et al, 2016; Almond et al, 2015; Wantchekon, 2017; Kiss, 2012; Blouin, 2014; Penny, 2001). The sub-section below takes a look at military voting behaviour.

3.10. Military Voting Behaviour

Recent study into whether service personnel vote or behave electorally than the general populace has defied some long-held conservative knowledge. The partisan behaviour of officers has been widely studied around the globe (Holsti, 1999; Van

Riper et al, 1965; Feaver et al, 2001; Inbody, 2008). In the United States, mostly since the close of the Vietnam War, officers are strongly traditional in nature and incline to identify with the Republican Party in the United States.

Recruited personnel political behaviour has only been considered more recently with regard to their balloting past (Dempsey, 2010; Inbody, 2008, 2009 and 2016). Conscripted personnel, often believed to perform and cast their ballot as officers, but they do not. They more nearly symbolise the overall populace. In general, the usual demographic forecasters of voting and other political behaviour apply to military personnel (Dempsey, 2010; Inbody, 2008, 2009 and 2016). The sub-section below discusses the loss aversion theory in relation to voters' behaviour.

3.11. Loss aversion

The loss aversion theory by Tversky et al (1981) is frequently connected with voting behaviour as people are more probable to utilise their ballot to escape the consequence of a hostile policy rather than supporting a favourable policy. From an emotional perspective, value references are crucial to govern individual inclinations. In a definitive statement, Gouldner (1960) made an imperative diagnostic difference between reciprocity as a design of social give-and-take and reciprocity as a general moral belief. Gouldner argued that the moral norm of reciprocity institutes a vital 'causal force' in social life. The reciprocity norm states that the Ego should not end up gaining at the expense of Alter's helpful acts towards him or her. In distinction to equity theory, which proposes that people will respond equally negatively to under and over benefiting, the reciprocity norm suggests that people will, above all, try to evade over benefiting from their openly supportive connections. While numerous lessons of social support have merged the ideas of reciprocity and exchange, practically none has analysed the far-sightedness of Gouldner's distinction nor its prospective outcomes for the dynamics of social support. This thesis explores the evidence for Gouldner's claims from studies on support and reciprocity. Evidence is established signifying that people feel satisfied to return assistances they obtain from others, give the impression to be more sensitively and emotionally opposed to over benefiting than under benefiting from social support interactions, and be likely to avoid placing themselves in the position of 'over benefit'.

Different explanations for evading of over benefiting are measured, and consequences for the study of social support are discovered. This forms of connections is played out in the relationship built between donors, government agency or administrators and the local community residents who are often called out to vote in an election. Evidently, they vote based on the benefits they derived from donor activities, especially the extent to which they benefit from municipal projects that affect their well-being and livelihood on daily basis.

The norm of reciprocity requires that we reimburse in kind what another has done for us. The norm of reciprocity is an extensively acknowledged social rule that necessitates us to return favours to those who do something nice for us (Tversky et al, 1981). In an experiment by Tversky et al (1981) to test the hypothesis that the responsibility to return favours reduces as the amount of time between the initial favour and the opportunity to respond grows. The outcome of the enquiry indicated that the norm of reciprocity does not direct an open-ended responsibility to return a favour. Rather, the social rule requires only that we return acts of kindness within a reasonable period of time. Tversky et al (1981) examined the association between the expressive states of gratitude and indebtedness in two studies. Although many have suggested that these affects are basically alike, they reported that there are different emotional states. Following Heider (1958) and Tversky et al's (1981:453) proposal that with growing opportunities of return communicated with a gift by a benefactor, indebtedness should increase but gratitude should decrease. The results of two essay readings supported this premise, and designs of thought/deed propensities presented these states to be distinct. In addition, Tversky et al (1981) found that with increasing expectations communicated by a benefactor, recipients stated that they would be less likely to help the supporter in the future. Taken together, "they argued that the debt of gratitude is internally generated, and is not similar to an economic form of appreciation".

This research explores Tversky's et al's (1981:453) reciprocity within the exchange relationship between donors, government and its agencies, political parties and community voters and citizens using the psychological contract framework. Specifically, it examined the bi-directionality of the norm of reciprocity. It was conjectured that there will be a positive association between perceived employer obligations, fulfilment of obligations, and employee duties and accomplishment. In

addition, it was postulated that employee achievement of obligations will be positively associated with perceived employer duties.

Using a longitudinal survey of 1400 public sector employees and 84 managers, “our findings suggest that there is broad agreement between the two parties regarding the norm of reciprocity that governs the relationship” (Coyle-Shapiro et al, 2002:1; Stritch, 2017). “We found that perceived employer obligations at “: time 1” is positively associated with employees’ fulfilment of obligations at time 2 and perceived employer fulfilment of obligations at “time 1” is positively related to employee obligations and fulfilment of obligations at (“time 2”) “ (Coyle-Shapiro et al, 2002). Furthermore, “we found that employee fulfilment of obligations at “time 1” is positively associated with perceived employer obligations at “time 2”. Overall, these findings provide initial empirical support for the norm of reciprocity in exchange relationships from both the perspective of employees as well as managers, as employer representatives (Coyle-Shapiro et al, 2002).

Isen (1984:534) and Berkowitz (1987) noted that there is a solid relation between positive moods and positive thinking. Isen (1984:534) proposed that “the well-established relation between positive moods and increased helping or compliance is attributable to the facilitating effects of positive thinking”. In the current study, “the effect of interest—a type of positive thinking—on compliance was examined. Due to the strong link between positive moods and positive thinking, it was expected that inducing interest would increase compliance” (Isen, 1984). Isen (1984:534) conducted a study among college scholars where students sitting alone in a university library were approached and asked to complete an interesting task, an unexciting task, or were asked to do an initial task. All students were then asked to answer questions from a sociology survey.

Students in the interesting task condition were eager to respond to more queries than students in the other two conditions, in which compliance rates were equal. A second experiment was conducted to determine whether the task used in Experiment 1 increased compliance because it increased interest or because it induced guilt or lowered self-esteem (the task was a perceptual trick that most students got wrong even though it appeared very easy). Results disclosed that “the interesting task created not only more interest, but also more guilt than the

uninteresting task. Both interest and guilt contributed independently to compliance. Together, the two experiments showed that interest, like positive affect, can increase compliance” (Isen, 1984; Berkowitz, 1987).

McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons and Larson (2001:249) postulated that “gratitude prompts individuals to behave prosocial”. However, research supporting “the prosocial effect of gratitude” has relied on “scenario and self-report methodology” (McCullough et al, 2001:249). To address limitations of preceding research, “this experiment utilised a laboratory induction of gratitude, a method that is potentially more covert than scenarios and that elicits actual grateful emotion” (McCullough et al, 2001:249). Prosocial responses to gratitude—operationalised as the delivery of resources to another—were combined with a self-report measure of appreciation to test the prosocial effect of gratitude. To scrutinise positive mood as an alternative clarification, “this experiment compared responses of individuals receiving a favour to responses of individuals receiving a positive outcome by chance. A total of 40 participants were randomly assigned to either a Favour or Chance condition. Participants receiving a favour helped more and reported more gratitude compared to participants in the Chance condition” (McCullough et al, 2001).

There has been an investigation into the relationship between the emotional states of gratitude and indebtedness in two studies. Although many have suggested that these effects are essentially equivalent, it was submitted that there are distinct emotional states. Following Heider (1958), it was proposed that “with increasing expectations of return communication with a gift by a benefactor, indebtedness should increase but gratitude should decrease” (McCullough et al, 2001:249). The results of two vignette studies supported this hypothesis, and patterns of thought/action tendencies showed these states to be distinct. In addition, it was found that “with increasing expectations communicated by a benefactor, beneficiaries reported that they would be less likely to help the benefactor in the future. Taken together, it was argued that the debt of gratitude is internally generated, and is not analogous to an economic form of indebtedness” (McCullough et al, 2001).

Americans and Hindu Indians assessed conjectural circumstances in which assisting was made in reply to previous reciprocity, in response to a financial payment, or

spontaneously. Reciprocity considerations “increase the number of Indians viewing helping in moral terms but had no effect on moral judgment among Americans” (McCullough et al, 2001). Americans judged that “helping is less endogenously motivated when undertaken in response to the norm of reciprocity than when spontaneous, whereas Indians viewed helping as equally endogenously motivated in those two cases” (McCullough et al, 2001). Results imply that “interpersonal reciprocity is invested with a deontological moral status rather than viewed in purely utilitarian terms in cultures emphasizing interdependent, as contrasted with independent, views of the self: The findings also suggest that less of a dichotomy is drawn between communal and exchange relationships and between endogenous motivation and normative conformity in the former type of culture” (McCullough et al, 2001:249).

Reciprocity is a fundamental aspect of social life, and a phenomenon studied from a wide variety of philosophical, theological, and social scientific perspectives. In a study carried out by Tepper et al (2004:455), they used social exchange theory to investigate why employees help other employees (Tepper et al, 2004:455). They hypothesized based on the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), that a significant cause of an employee's helping behaviour is how much organizational citizenship behaviour (OCB) the employee has received from co-workers” (Tepper et al, 2004:455). To offer a sign of the discriminant validity of OCB received as an antecedent of helping behaviour, “we also assess its effects on another form of extra-role behaviour, voice, as well as in-role performance. We found, in a sample of 157 employee-supervisor dyads, that OCB received was related to helping behaviour after controlling for several antecedents of helping behaviour identified in past research, and was less related to voice and in-role behaviour, as hypothesized. Implications for theory and practice are presented” (Tepper et al, 2004:455).

Elster (1989b), contrasts two different and often divergent social science traditions. One was raised by Adam Smith and is carried onward today by neoclassical economists and rational-choice thinkers in political science. It observes humans as “economic men,” that is, as driven by selfish material trepidations. The other tradition has its pedigree in the work of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim, which make available the basis for much present-day sociology and has advocates among

political researchers, particularly, political culture philosophers such as Eckstein (1988). It considers humans as social beings, having duty-based and other responsibilities to their companions. "Sociological man's" activity is thus inhibited by shared social (cultural) norms. Elster is skeptical that these cultural norms commonly appreciate individual self-interest as this is unstated in the rational-choice practice. Indeed, in another place he differentiates "economic man" rationality and "non-rational" cultural norms even more abruptly than he did in this (Elster 1989b). Overall, Elster holds the view that, for the most part, cultural norms neither arise from rationality, as neoclassical economists know it, nor do they serve it.

The norm of reciprocity is the anticipation that people will respond favourably to each other by repaying benefits for benefits, and reacting with either in consequence or aggression to injury. The social norm of reciprocity often takes changed forms in different areas of social life, or in different societies. All of them, however, are dissimilar from connected ideas such as gratitude, the Golden Rule, or mutual goodwill.

An underlying norm of reciprocity is, by itself, a influential apparatus for inspiring, generating, satisfying, and regulating the accommodating behaviour necessary for self-sustaining social organizations, as well as for governing the harm done by the unprincipled. This is justly demonstrated in the debates in tit-for-tat and reciprocity (social psychology). The power and ubiquity of the norm of reciprocity can be used against the gullible, however, and is the foundation for the accomplishment of many cruel confidence games. Minor, usually less nasty examples are methods used in advertising and other publicity whereby a small gift of some kind is tendered with the anticipation of creating a craving on the part of the recipient to reciprocate in some way, for example by purchasing a product, making a donation, or becoming more receptive to a line of argument. These minor examples include gifts of stickers and pens distributed by charities and flowers handed out by members of the Hare Krishna group (Elster 1989b).

A positive norm of reciprocity is "the embedded obligations created by exchanges of benefits or favours among individuals. The recipient feels indebted to the favour or benefit giver until he/she repays" (Chen, 2009:24). The constructive reciprocity norm is a common social expectancy where a person who helps another person can anticipate positive response whether it's in the form of a gift, a compliment, a loan, a

job reference, etc. In social psychology, positive reciprocity refers to responding to a positive action with another positive action (rewarding kind actions). This norm is so powerful; it allows the initial giver to ask for something in return for what was given rather than having to wait for a voluntary reciprocal act. In some cases, a person does not have to request for the other person to return a goodwill because it's already inferred. Reciprocity also works at the level of liking; we like people who help us and dislike those who ask for help but never return it. Disapproval is often enough to make people conform to norm of reciprocity.

"A negative norm of reciprocity represents the means by which individuals act against unfavourable treatments, and functions to keep balance in social systems" (Chen, 2009:24). In contrast to the positive reciprocity norm, the negative reciprocity norm give emphasis to the return of hostile action as a suitable response to a misdeed. The principle of this norm functions as a great restraint for vicious or symbolic abuse in society. Hurting others calls irritation and retaliation; therefore, people getting undesirable action are likely to get revenge in an angry manner. Studies have shown, that persons with a tendency towards fury might more strongly validate the negative reciprocity norm as a rationalisation for carrying out their hostility by punishing the instigator of mistreatment (Eisenberger, Lynch, Aselage and Rohdiek, 2004). Carlsmith, Darley and Robinson (2002) found that most college students consider that criminal sentence should be determined by the gravity of the crime rather than by punishment's effectiveness in preventing similar crimes.

There are also contrasting ideas when it comes to the distinction of negative and positive norms of reciprocity. "In contrast to a positive norm of reciprocity, Gouldner (1960) also suggested a negative norm of reciprocity or sentiments of retaliation where the emphasis is placed not on the return of benefits but on the return of injuries" (Chen, 2009:24). Therefore, there is a slight grey line between what could be considered a positive norm and a negative norm. However, both of these reciprocity norms are mechanisms adapted by humans in order to ep a balance among mankind. "Accordingly, both positive and negative norms or reciprocity serve as starting mechanisms as well as stabilizing functions in that they help initiate and maintain equitable interpersonal exchanges in human evolution" (Chen, 2009:24).

Private reciprocity, also known as internal reciprocity, stresses repaying favours because of individual principles and an inherent duty. Failing to repay kind favours

brings feelings of guilt. Public reciprocity, also known as social reciprocity, highlights acts of reciprocity and kindness that are publicly recognised, where the receiver identifies who the provider is, with no confidentiality. There is less of a personal reward, as the individual now is rewarded for following the social norm.

Whatley et al (1999) found that people who obtain a favour will often return the favour, as opposed to people who are not given a favour and have the chance to give a favour. They also found that people will give more favours, like a higher donation, if it is a public condition. All these forms of reciprocity can be demonstrated in the interactions that exist between donors, the government, the local authority and the inhabitants of the communities in the municipality as far as voting and elections are concerned. The following sub-section discusses the voter in an election and the theory of democratisation.

3.12. The voter in an election and the theory of Democratisation

The theory of democratisation is used to tackle the research question on all the institutions which work in the interest of democracy such as the IEC, the BCMM, the political parties, and the donor agency on their practices that promote democratisation at the local government level.

According to Carothers (2007), Rummel (1996), Hudson et al (2007) and Ghali (1996) democratization explains the processes that when a country or an organization follows will cumulate into a full democracy practice, as in a move from a controlling political system to one that leads to a more open, more participatory and less controlling society. The result may be amalgamated (as it was for example in the United Kingdom) or democratization may face repeated setbacks (as it has faced for example in Argentina). Different forms of democratization are often used to explain other political occurrences, such as whether a country goes to a battle or whether its economy grows. Democratization itself is influenced by various factors, including economic development, history, and civil society. The ultimate result from democratization is to guarantee that the people have the right to vote and have a voice in their political system. It also hinges on consensus and orientation in the sense that, the government should be based on resolving the struggle and hostilities between its citizens. Participation is key in democratization. The government should permit the participation of its citizens in various serious and productive state affairs.

The advancement of rule of law is very important in democratization. In this, the government and its workforces should be under the law and all decisions should follow the common law of the state. This theory was used to measure government's effectiveness and efficiency in handling the goals or problems of citizens accountably, transparently, responsively, equitably and inclusively.

A higher GDP/capita, according to Elsenstadt (2002; 2003) associates with democracy and some claim the affluent democracies have on no occasion been perceived to tumble into dictatorship. The rise of Hitler and of the Nazis in Weimar Germany can be understood as a clear counter-example, but although in early 1930s Germany was already an advanced economy, by that time, the country was also surviving in a state of economic crunch nearly since the World War I (in the 1910s), a crisis which was ultimately depreciated by the effects of the Great Depression. There is also the overall thinking that democracy was very irregular before the industrial revolution. Realistic enquiry thus leads many to believe that economic growth either escalates chances for a change to democracy (modernization theory), or helps newly established democracies consolidate. One study found that economic development stimulates democratization but only in the medium run (10–20 years). This is because progress may establish the mandatory leader but make it tougher for him to handover the state to a son or trustworthy aide when he depart. However, the deliberation about whether democracy is a result of prosperity, a cause of it, or both processes are unrelated and is far from conclusion. Another study advocates that economic growth hinges on the political stability of a country to support democracy.

Acemoglu et al (2000) argued that the connection between social equality and democratic transition is complex: People have less incentive to rebel in a classless society (for example, Singapore), so the possibility of democratization is lower. In a highly unequal society (for example, South Africa under Apartheid), the relocation of wealth and power in a democracy would be so detrimental to the privileged that these would do everything to prevent democratization. Democratization, according to Lewis (1997), is more possible to arise somewhere in the middle, in the countries, whose elites offer concessions because (1) they consider the risk of a revolt credible and (2) the cost of the concessions is not too high. This expectancy is in line with the

pragmatic research showing that democracy is more stable in democratic societies (Acemoglu et al, 2000)

It is claimed, according to Allison (1994), by some that certain cultures are basically more conducive to democratic principles than others. This opinion is likely to be ethnocentric. Naturally, it is Western values which are named as "best suited" to democracy, with other cultures depicted as holding values which make democracy difficult or unwelcomed. This argument is sometimes used by undemocratic governments to validate their disappointment to implement democratic reforms. Today, however, there are many non-Western democracies. Examples include: India, Japan, Indonesia, Namibia, Botswana, Taiwan, and South Korea. Research finds that Western-educated leaders meaningfully and functionally advance a country's democratization prospects (Gibson, 1998; Gift et al, 2015; Katz, 2013; Kola et al, 2017 and Omtola, 2014). The theoretical triangulation as utilised in this work is essential in a scholarly pursuit where a phenomena of donor support, electoral dynamics and democratisation in South Africa is tackled from different angles and perspectives (Jick, 1979). The triangulation of the discourse becomes relevant as it anchors the scientific knowledge and debates around theories that enables the researcher sufficiently navigates a difficult learning curve in the analyses of an empirical data. The theoretical triangulation assisted in a scientific knowledge generation where confounding themes elicited a multiple application of theories. This strategy though can generate tension and a cluster of ideas if not handled well. However, they become complementary when handled with skill. The objective in view is to ensure that theory, research and practice were intertwined and woven craftily (Duffy, 1987; Begley, 1996; Hussein, 2015; Smith, 1981, Kushner et al, 2003; Halcomb et al, 2005).

The sub-section below reflects the conclusions to this chapter.

3.13. Conclusion

This chapter explores the theoretical framework which utilizes Woolcock's (1998), development aid theory to assess the role of donors, Gouldner's (1960) Moral norm of reciprocity and social support to tackle and analyse the "give and take" relationship that seemingly exist between and amongst donors, government or the

municipal council and the community. It vividly illustrates the fact that community members will reciprocate on the benefits they derive from government and donor projects in the BCM municipality which have artificially been created to entice them to participate in elections as a result of the trickle down effects of donor support which does not benefit them because of limited supply orchestrated by municipal elite. Ley's (1959) political party theory, Lazarsfeld's voter behaviour theory and the democratisation theories were used to answer the questions on the role and functions of the IEC, the BCMM as institutions established to nurture and to promote democracy and to explain the support services rendered by donor agencies. The social justice and equity theories were used as a balancing factor to give a voice to a majority of community voters and local citizens who are disadvantaged and alienated from local active politics but are called upon every election period to vote, indicating that they exist only as "vote bank". The next chapter deals with the research methodology used in the study.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1. Introduction

This chapter deals with the research methods of the study. The chapter discusses the research design, the sampling procedure, the design of the research instrument and methods of data collection and analysis. Based on the research questions, the aim and objectives of the study, this chapter discusses the research methodology and approach that this study utilized. It involves the discussion which covers the positivistic paradigm, the interpretative paradigm and the mixed method research based on the research questions. This is followed by the research design section which looks at the correlational analysis, sampling and sample size justification. The next sub-section covers the methods of collecting data. It addresses questionnaires, interviews, document analysis and triangulation and elaborates on the quantitative data analysis and assumptions, qualitative data and assumptions, analysis of data from documents and fusion of data from instruments. It also discusses the research quality in terms of concepts such as trustworthiness, validity, reliability, dependability and the ethical considerations which guided the study. In addition, it provides a brief profile of biographical and demographic information of respondents.

The thrust of this chapter, to reiterate, is to outline the research strategy and method that were used within the research study. It provides a detailed debate of the following issues: research design, data collection methods, sampling techniques and data analysis methods as well as reporting procedures. The preceding chapter provided the theoretical framework of the study by arguing for an extensive adaptability of the Development aid theory, Political party and voter's behaviour theory encompassing Gouldner's Moral norm of Reciprocity and insights from the social justice and equity theories to guide the study and define the analysis. As a result, the theoretical framework gives direction and a focus for the adaptation of a mixed method approach as a relevant and valid method for dealing with the study from varied points utilising different strategies as indicated above. Using a methodical triangulation in this study has afforded the researcher the opportunity to find aspects of the phenomenon under study more precisely by tackling it from

different vantage points using different methods and techniques such as interviews, survey questionnaires and researchers

4.2. Research paradigm

The choice of “paradigm” for a study is critical since it is central to the research strategy which guides the researcher into how the research questions are formulated and used. It streamlines what data collection methods to use as well as providing the framework for interpretations (Terre Blanche, Durrheim, & Painter, 2009). Thus, the paradigm impacts and guides the researcher’s total decision making in the study. There are many definitions that capture the crux of a paradigm for this study. Among them is the definition by Cohen, Manion, and Morrison (2007). According to them, paradigms or “world views” are a set of beliefs, assumptions about how something works and a framework for how things are observed, interpreted and learned.

The tenets of a paradigm include shaping of a researcher’s insight of the world, identification of one’s roles in the research processes, determination of the course of the study and the showing other differences in the perspectives (Creswell, 2007; Terre Blanche et al, 2009). The three kinds of research paradigms are: positivism, interpretivism and mixed method research, have been identified as alternative claim positions (Creswell, 2003). The contestation between positivism and interpretivism had all been well documented, especially the issues around objective and subjective dimensions. As observed by Cohen et al, (2007) and Creswell (2003), and in relation to this study based on the research questions and hypothesis formulated, (cf. Chapter 1 sections 1.6 and 1.7), the mixed method research (MMR) which combines both positivistic and interpretivism/constructivism approaches was employed as a broad framework of understanding the social reality of donor support, electoral dynamics and democratisation. It mainly focussed on the perceptions of community voters, political parties, municipal administrators, the elected and nominated ward councillors and the overall roles of the IEC and donor agencies in enhancing and consolidating the democratic processes in the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality. In this regard, the sub-section below discusses the details of the three paradigms.

The study utilized a mixed method approach in order to get a full understanding of how people viewed the attitude of bureaucrats in the distribution and the administration of development projects in the municipality to promote social justice

and equity for the majority of the residents in the rural areas and how their affiliation to political parties fosters grassroots political participation that enriches the process of democratisation that enhances the virtues of healthy democratic development.

The history of the Republic of South Africa as an emerging state from the doldrums of excruciating apartheid system and colonialism is gradually building the pillars and the structures for a take-off to bouncing and flourishing political democratic future. In charting this course for a monumental political future, the Republic of South Africa requires enormous assistance, logistics and goodwill from the league of all democratic countries around the globe. The same is required from development partners to help in strengthening the fragile and infant democracy.

What is of particular interest to this study is how to gauge the role(s) of donors in supporting the electoral processes from the local government or the municipal elections to the national and presidential elections. It is also to solicit and establish the extent to which democratisation has enlarged or diminished the freedom and well-being of the marginalised and the poor. The expectation of municipal administration is to enhance and deliver efficient service delivery particularly in rural communities. The present economic truths, the effects of globalisation, the potential for technological improvement and the public's plea for better services have led to incessant protests in various municipalities. These upheavals are in spite of the fact that government is vigorously pursuing the provisions of the constitution in Chapter 7, Article 152 which states in sections (b, c, d) that; it will guarantee the delivery of amenities to communities in a sustainable manner; it will promote social and economic development and will promote safe and healthy environment. There is therefore the need for empirical investigations of public perceptions and attitudes into donor support and democratization in the municipality. Against this background, this study sought to:

- 1) Find out about the kinds of donor support available to the municipality in relations to development and elections;
- 2) ascertain the conditionality attached to the support given to the municipality for development and elections;
- 3) Establish the ways in which the municipality responds to the conditionality attached to donor support for development and elections and

4) Evaluate the impact and effects of donor conditionality on the well-being of citizens in the municipality.

This section of the study clarifies and validates the research methods, sampling procedures and research instruments chosen. In order to certify the rationality and generalizability of the results, the basis for the choice of research design is herein discussed. The adopted methods are anticipated to meet the aims of the study. This chapter discusses, to reiterate, the research methods employed in this study. The chapter used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods for the purpose of finding out the extent to which donor support influences the electoral processes in the Buffalo City Municipality and the electoral dynamic factors which connect this agenda with governance and democratization.

This study made use of both qualitative and quantitative research designs since they allow for a comprehensive and holistic understanding of donor support, electoral dynamics and democratization in South Africa. Data collection began in October 2015 with collection on community voters. The rest of the data on donor agencies, political parties, elected councillors, IEC, and BCMM started from June 2016 to July 2017. The data collection was constrained by stringent gatekeeping with a lot of bureaucratic and administrative restraints. The current study sought a methodological approach that includes multiple ways of knowing. It utilized a mixed method approach with the resolve of picking up the finest of both qualitative and quantitative methodology (Cresswell, 2003). These are two competing and opposing perspectives in the process of understanding social phenomenon.

On the one hand, there is the philosophical paradigm of positivism (which exclusively relies on quantitative methods) and on the other is constructivism (which relies on qualitative research strategies). The adoption of a mixed-methods approach was directed at a holistic collection of information about the real experience of people's perception of donor support, electoral dynamics and democratization. This chapter also offers a brief summary of the rational foundations of a mixed-method enquiry and sketches the usefulness of and reasons for choosing this method over other methodologies. In addition, the methodology helped the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of the electoral dynamics that pertains to the municipality and democratization. The chapter also highlights the rationality and consistency of using

a critical realist approach. The methods of data collection that were utilized in this study are in-depth interviews, a survey questionnaire and documentary analysis.

4.3. Linking theory and methodology

Critical realism was strategically utilized to understand donor support, electoral dynamics and democratization in South Africa: The Case of the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality. The research project took into account the domain of the donor support, electoral dynamics and the democratization processes which include issues like transparency, electoral accountability, free and fair elections and fair competition. This can be linked to the tenets of voter behaviour and the norm of reciprocity theories and to possibly assess the threshold of democratization that emerges from the active roles played by the donors on one side and the municipal administrators and the bureaucrats, who on the side of government, determine the flow and the direction of support given to the electoral areas and the communities at large. Furthermore, the research design took into account what influence donor conditionality has on democratization. In this regard, the voters' behavior theory, the moral norm of reciprocity, social justice and equity theories were used as a framework.. In order to measure the extent to which donor support in the municipality is utilized for development and for electoral outcomes, a mixed methods approach was adopted. This assisted a lot in an endeavor to understand the role of the municipality, political parties, ward councillors, the IEC, donor agencies in enhancing the process of democratization.

The community voters themselves through interviews developed their analytical insights of what constitutes donor support and how this induce democratization. Community members became the centre of their own assessment of development in the process of providing insights about their own experiences and the factors that they consider to influence their pattern and direction of voting in any electoral exercise. In this sense, this study made use of interviews which enabled this researcher to get a clear perspective on the voters' understanding of electoral democratization and donor support for state institutions and development programs that affect them directly and indirectly. Utilizing interviews in this study was part of an attempt to freely allow community voters the platform to communicate from their own frame of reference.

Furthermore, utilizing interviews gave the community voters a voice to articulate their views on current political issues that affect their well-being. In this way, they felt included and empowered as respondents to point out factors that were not initially included in the survey questionnaire. The open ended questions gave room for the respondents to give their in-depth views about the governance system, their position as recipients or partners of development, the effectiveness or otherwise of the municipal administration in terms of funded projects and their constituted mindset of voting and all the decisions that goes into voting for a particular candidate or party.

4.4. Critical Realism

In the work of Bless and Higson-Smith (1995), research design is a process involving planning the scientific work one is to involve in from the start to the end. The research project acts as a plan which anchors the collection of data and the analysis of the obtained information through scientific measures. Afterwards, the research design links the information gathered with the initial research questions and conclusions drawn from the study (Yin, 2003). It creates the unit of analysis, the sampling processes, the variables on which evidence is to be attained, data collection, and the analysis of data (Denzin & Lincoln, 2006).

McEvoy and Richards (2006:69) mentioned that human perceptions are shaped by theoretical resources and investigative interests where researchers get empirical feedback from those aspects of humanity that are accessible (Sayer, 2004). There are three different ontological modes of reality which include:

- 1) The empirical which can be experienced directly and indirectly;
- 2) The actual aspects of reality that can occur but which are not experienced;
and
- 3) The real structures which can generate phenomena (Bhaskar, 1978; Delome, 1999)

Critical realism classifies two major problems from positivistic or quantitative methodologies. Positivistic methodologies fail to consider the extent to which observations are influenced by prior theories. In this case, prior theories which inform the utilization of observations and interviews are derived from the hypothesis that the higher the community derive benefits from municipal projects, the higher they patronize electoral issues. The researcher used interviews to probe more on this

hypothesis and to gain a deeper understanding of donor support and democratization at the municipal level.

Secondly, critical realism deals with issues of the social systems in isolation without considering the external influences which are in play (McEvoy and Richards, 2006). Critical realists advocate for causal mechanisms which have a potential impact on phenomena. Utilizing critical realism, observations and lived experiences are translated for the purpose of postulating the underlying structures and phenomena (Minger, 2003). The underlying social structure, values and belief systems have impact on the live experiences of residents of the communities in the municipality.

The value system, beliefs, aspirations and experiences of the citizens are encapsulated, captured and expressed in the Republic of South African constitution 1996, chapter 13, Article 214, clause (2) (d), states that there is the need to ensure that the provinces and municipalities are able to provide basic services and perform the functions allocated to them. Similarly, the local government Act of 1997(Act 52 of 1997) stipulates in chapter 7, clauses 151-164, that “it will shape and reinforce the capabilities and accountabilities of provinces and municipalities through continued hands-on support through the established systems and capability building programmes focussing on critical areas such as the Integrated Development Planning (IDP), the Local Economic Development (LED), Financial Management, Service Delivery, Public Participation, assessing the influence of Government programmes in the municipality, Coordinating and Supporting policy development and implementation, supporting and monitoring delivery services”.

Many studies indicate that the Eastern Cape is the poorest province and that the poverty gap is ever widening. There are communities in the Eastern Cape that are grappling with basic necessities of life ranging from socio-economic issues such as; health education, water and sanitation, housing, transportation and general infrastructure (Statistics SA, 2011; UNDP/Africa Agenda 21, 2011; SA Year Book, 2013/2014; Ozler, 2007; Aliber, 2003; Woolard, 2002; Armstrong et al., 2008). In order to facilitate local government participation of communities in a democracy, municipal council representatives from political organisations are elected to play a crucial role in the process of democratisation. Councillors facilitate the possibility of local government administration, they connect the local council with the local

community through a collaborative process of engagement to reduce unemployment, inequality and poverty. They help formulate and influence public policies, educate public opinions, provide political stability and help strengthen the link between government and communities. They articulate their policies, programmes and activities through their manifestoes in order to persuade the electorates to patronise their campaign messages to solicit their votes. It is for these reasons that the study's hypotheses were directed at teasing out the role of donors in inducing democratization. It also established the effects of municipal projects on citizens and residents in the municipality. Again, it assesses the relationship between voters and their political affiliation and checked whether the benefits citizens derive from municipal projects justify their commitment and patriotism and the call for their participation in elections.

The following section will further elaborate and justify methodological triangulation as framed within the tenets of critical realism as a philosophical framework.

4.5. Qualitative and Quantitative Research Designs

Several research paradigms have been discussed in the following sub-sections.

4.5.1. Interpretative Paradigm

Unlike positivistic paradigm (cf, section 4.5.2) which argues that social observation should be treated as entities in the same way as physical scientist treat physical phenomenon. Interpretive is one paradigm which acknowledges human characteristics in so much that it studies the individuals' different behaviours, opinions and attitudes (Cohen et al., 2007). Therefore, it hinges around 'meaningfulness' of an individual's perspective which is considered as much more valuable. This so because individualistic perspective cannot be ruled out in a social context and therefore has been argued to be responsible for shaping and affecting one's reality and further influencing the answers that a person gives to a research question (Ary et al., 2014; Cohen et al., 2007).

The interpretative school of thought proposes that there are other ways of knowing about the world other than by straight observation and that the physical world can be studied differently in isolation (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Cohen et al., 2007). This

means that knowing is about an individual's interpretation and understanding of their environment since deeper meaning, implications and understanding can be revealed by the respondents themselves as the data. Hence in this study, community voters, elected or nominated party candidates, municipal and IEC administrators, political party officials and donor agencies were considered as individual humans in the community situated within the municipality whose ways and views of dealing with electoral matters reflect how they deal with donor support, electoral dynamics and democratisation from different perspectives. In support of this framework, the interpretivist paradigm enabled the researcher to solicit responses for the purpose of clarification on the positivistic results as depicted by the research questions 1, 2,3,4,5, and 6 concerning measures, confounding variables, support for electoral ramifications in theoretical and practical perspectives.

However, the challenges of interpretive are evidenced. It has been a concern in terms of the subjective meanings which are often brought about during interpretations (Ary et al., 2014). Thus, how community voters, elected or nominated party candidates, municipal and IEC administrators, political party officials and donor agencies in their individual situation in the municipality apprehend and make sense of their social events related to measures display and practices employed in reciprocal discourse can be influenced by the researcher due to the premise that both researcher as a knower (source of reality) and known (research findings) cannot be separated. It is on this basis that the researcher with reference to the emerged research questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 integrated both positivistic and interpretive paradigms. Because looking into the positives and also the limiting aspects of each of the two paradigm-positivism and interpretivism aforementioned (cf. section 4.5), it can be said that while positivist focuses on correlation and association of variables and verify hypotheses without subjectivity, it is at the same time useful to use the interpretative technique to gather broader information which readily measures variables that cannot be explored in the phenomenon. Hence, the next sub-section discusses the mixed methods research which incorporates the two paradigms.

The qualitative approach is used to get a complete picture on the role of donors in inducing democratization. Creswell (2003) describes qualitative study as a multi-method focus, involving a true-to-life method in its subject matter. This means that

“qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. The researcher gets multiple meanings and interpretations rather than one imposed dominant interpretation” (Mouton & Marais, 1990:175). The qualitative research design allows the investigator to achieve a wider understanding of the roles the community, the municipality and donors play in promoting democratization in the country and their constituencies. Qualitative research “seeks to understand a social phenomenon within its cultural, social and situational context without imposing pre-existing expectations upon the settings. Qualitative research rests upon the assumption that one can obtain extensive in-depth data from ordinary conversations with people” (Gubrium & Sankar, 1994:7).

Qualitative research design is “based on inductive reasoning. Once the data has been generated, relationships and patterns are revealed through the close analysis of the data. The data is analyzed and interpreted by means of inductive abstraction and generalization” (De Vos, 1998:336). The research is intended at prompting the participants’ understanding of their world through in-depth examination of meanings, experiences and perceptions. The researcher elicited data through excerpts drawn from interview transcripts reflecting the participants’ explorations of their experiences in their own spoken words. Qualitative research design yields graphic data in the participants own written or spoken words. It thus involves ascertaining the participant’s beliefs, values, attitudes and intellectual processes, which trigger the phenomenon (Creswell, 1994). The researcher needed to investigate deep into the perception, emotions and experiences of the participants in order to gain an understanding of how they describe how donors and the municipality inhibits or promotes participation in governance and democratization.

4.5.2. Positivistic Paradigm

Positivism adopts an objective world; hence it often examines facts considered in terms of specified correlations and associations among variables (Ary, Jacobs, Sorensen & Walker, 2014). This means that it is through the interrelatedness of identified variables in a study that a positivist establishes the truth. As positivism is concerned with uncovering of truths and facts. It is asserted that the best way of generating knowledge as a means of understanding phenomena is through scientific

methods such as observation, experimentation or survey methods (Ary et al, 2014; Cohen et al, 2007). Through these means, information or knowledge about donor support and democratization is believed to be gathered based on experience of senses and that electoral dynamics attributes are only meaningful if they are observable and verifiable.

Meanwhile, due to the embedded scientific method in positivism, how truths and facts are discovered is based on eminent logic and governed by laws since science is believed to “provide us with the clearest possible ideal of knowledge” (Cohen et al., 2007: 9). In Cohen et al’s (2007) assertion: a) social reality is explored logically through senses application, and b) If information can be found or discovered in a setting then that information is governed by or regulated by laws. Therefore, donor support and electoral dynamics influence democracy and all the processes of democratisation.

In the light of this paradigm, especially its usage of scientific method as a knowledge generation, means have to be employed within the frameworks of principles and assumptions of science. To this regard, amongst the four assumptions of positivism, three aspects- determinism, empiricism and generality – stand out and make it more relevant to the study (Cohen et al, 2007). Determinism comprises the circumstances which lead to the democratisation in the Buffalo City municipality as it is shaped and influenced by the activities of donors during elections and what electoral dynamic factors that emerged as outcomes in the democratisation process.

In this study, the researcher followed the assumption of empiricism. It catered for the identification and assembling of evidences which are empirically verified to be in support of the theories at hand (Cohen et al., 2007). This includes assembling of empirical evidences on political party finance, voters behaviour, the municipal administration of elections in conjunction with the roles of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), donor activities in support of elections and how and what ways all of these affect the decisions of the community voters in the municipality. In the third assumption of generality, it is simply the process of applying and linking the observation of a particular phenomenon to the rest the world’s phenomena (Cohen et al., 2017). Thus, findings can be linked to other similar situations in which democratisation can be connected to local governance structure and development.

Drawing from the three assumptions (determinism, empiricism and generality) of positivism identified by Cohen et al. (2007) and linking them to the current study. It is from this perspective that the researcher drew on the positivist rigour of the scientific method and adhered to all the canons in carrying out one of the research instruments (Questionnaires) to seek responses on the six specific research questions used in the study.

Whilst a positivistic paradigm contends that a researcher is separate from the respondents who are subject to observation (among other advantages), criticism of positivism has not been unknown. For instance, positivism has been blamed on the premise that it fails to consider the subjective states of individuals in a particular setting (Lieber, 2007). As such, human behaviours are regarded as passive which can be controlled and determined by the external environment (Cohen et al., 2007). Due to this controlled aspect or conditions of this paradigm, its findings tend to be generalised as 'one truth' which has been argued by another school of thought that it clearly ignores the behaviouristic aspect of the respondents (Lieber, 2009). In addition, as pointed out by Denzin and Lincoln (2008), it strips contexts from meaning in a phenomenon in its process of developing quantified measures. This implies that the meanings assigned to a phenomenon are focussed on objective reality which is independent of the respondents. Hence in this current study, the effects of these challenges of positivistic paradigm were minimised by incorporating the interpretative paradigm as discussed below.

The study was aimed at investigating and to establish to what extent donor support influences the electoral processes in the Buffalo City Municipality and the electoral dynamic factors which connect this agenda with governance and democratization. The logical position of the positivists is derived from the view that all theoretical terms can be reduced to observable phenomena. The realist ontology under the positivist paradigm makes certain that the physical and social world exist independently through causal relationships and universal laws (Miller, 1998).

The quantitative research design employs a deductive approach and the researcher examines variables and the relationships among and between them (Sousa, 2007:503). Positivism has been largely rejected for isolating human judgement because of the value free enquiry and the quest for objectivity. In this sense, utilizing

only quantitative research deters the researcher from understanding the orientation and values of political parties, the traditional norms of voters and their party affiliation status and dynamics. Furthermore quantitative research designs use rigorous methods to generate and refine knowledge utilizing deductive reasoning and the findings of the study are generalizable when there is a complete separation between the investigator and the subject. This can be achieved through scientific methods which insist on procedural objectivity (Kerlinger, 1979: 264). Quantitative research designs are quantified and data is expressed in numerical data and statistical tests (Struwing, 2004:41). It is centered on the control of variables, randomization and generalizability from the sample. The findings from this type of research design are generalized from the study sample to the larger target population.

Commeyras and Chilisa (2001) question the positivistic research paradigm as it adopts a technocratic approach which legitimizes the ideology of dominant groups (Neuman, 1997:45). However, indigenizing quantitative research methodologies might require the researcher to include open ended questions so that the unheard voting public can reflect on their values, beliefs, practices, perceptions, attitudes, experiences and affiliations to the work of their municipal administrators in embarking on development projects in the utilization of donor funds in aiding and promoting democratization, social justice and equity.

4.5.3. METHODOLOGICAL TRIANGULATION

Considering the complexity of the study as revealed by the research questions and hypothesis (cf. section 1.5; 1.7) and the strength and weaknesses of the various paradigms (cf. section 4.5) when a single paradigm is used, the researcher opted for mixed methods research (MMR) as the most suitable to map out the complex territory of the study. Due to the MMR usage in the study, it is important to differentiate between the terms 'methodology' and 'methods'. The former deals with the theoretical assumptions and principles underpinning the research approach, and guides the framing of the research questions as well as methods to be used (Creswell, 2013; Cohen et al, 2000) The latter serves as the practical techniques used to collect and analyse data (Creswell, 2007; Cohen et al, 2000). Hence, methodology helps to employ useful and appropriate techniques and procedures in order to attain a solution to the research questions, while methods are techniques to

carry out the research in smooth way to find proper results for the study. The MMR involvement with quantitative and qualitative can be used to describe both methods and methodologies used in this research study.

The importance of MMR usage have been echoed by many methodologists not as application for the sake of mere method mixing (Flick, 2002; Lieber, 2009). For instance, Creswell (2007) mentioned that it facilitates a holistic view and also strengthens the internal validity and reliability of the design and findings. In support, Flick (2002) and Lieber (2009) assert that MMR usage offers two important benefits: (a) it offers broader focus and gathers more information in various ways, and (b) it enables the study to acquire quantifiable and self-reported responses. In the same vein, Fidel (2008: 2) reported that MMR application “allow researchers to address issues more widely and more completely than one method could, which in turn amplifies the richness and complexity of research findings”. This does not mean that each paradigm has no substantial value to be used alone, but rather since none of these paradigms are exempt from limitations towards these research objectives, this study advocates the adoption of mixed-methods as a holistic means to reinforce reliability on analysing the nature of knowledge and how it relates to notions in connection with truth, belief and reliability of the findings.

For these purposes, the study employed MMR to enhance the processes of making predictions, seeking deeper understanding and deconstruction of the effects of donor support on voters’ perceptions of municipal and IEC administration of elections and the outcomes of all these on the electoral dynamics that shapes political parties, community voters, ward councillors and the entire citizens’ engagement in the overall development discourse in the municipality. Thus, whilst quantitatively quantifiable data and reliable data that is usually generalizable to some larger population was obtained regarding research questions, the qualitative approach provided an understanding of the perspective of the specific respondents through immersion in their own communities, organisations, situations and the outcome of the democratisation processes vis-à-vis local participation, governance and development in the municipality towards the research questions (Ary et al, 2014; Bergman, 2008).

Grounded on Chein and Mugnier’s (2009) position on the nature of knowledge, the researcher focused on analysing the nature of information and how it relates to

notions in connection with truth, belief and rationalisation. The data considered as knowledge generated through quantitative and qualitative approaches on donor support in municipal elections and were analysed and perfectly linked together as a notion to enhance understanding. Hay (2008) believes that balance establishment between belief, truth and justification in these categories aid to realise the purpose of the study. This is so because in a positivist aspect, the researcher was indeed objective and controlled his bias and therefore acted as a detached observer who made references to clear rules that were unmodified by the setting. One of the advantages through the quantitative aspect, as argued by many researchers, has been the identification of trends and patterns in relations to this research purposes (van Rensburg, 2001; Yin, 2003 and Chein; Mugnier, 2009). Moreover, in an interpretative strand, the researcher is an emphatic observer as well as meaning since the basis of data was produced in linguistic and cognitive skills of the researcher to enable deeper understanding of trends and patterns (Terre Blanche et al, 2009).

Yet, as much as MMR has a number of positives, limitations are not far-fetched. Some of these concerns are that MMR is labour intensive and time consuming in relation to planning, negotiation and establishing common agreement on whether findings fit together or not (Terre Blanche et al, 2009). Furthermore, the question of how far a researcher analyses, interprets and write up in mutually illuminating manner remains unresolved (Hay, 2008). To this regard, Bergman (2008) advises that in order for quantitative and qualitative components to be in mutual illumination, the MMR researcher needs to reconcile these two sets of standards (quantitative and qualitative) appropriately by assessing the credibility of results and interpretations. This advice was followed strictly by the researcher and as such the limitations of the paradigms were turned into opportunities. Table 4.1 highlights the MMR incorporation of both the positivistic and interpretative paradigms.

There have been a significant number of studies on methodological triangulation (Bryman, 1988; Brewer and Hunter, 1989; Green et al, 1989; Cresswell, 2006; Teddie, 2003; Onwuegbuzie and Johnson, 2004; Yin, 2006). The use of methodological triangulation has gained ground in literature. A mixed method approach was used to unravel the interface between donor support, electoral dynamics and democratization in the municipality in this dispensation of building and

developing very strong democratic culture and values. Creswell (2009) mentions that triangulation focuses on the integration of qualitative and quantitative methods. Similarly, Tashakkori and Teddie (2003a, 2003b) defined a mixed method approach as a design which makes use of multiple methods (qualitative and quantitative methods). Vanketesh et al. (2012) notes that methodological triangulation uses quantitative and qualitative research methods concurrently or sequentially. In this study, findings from quantitative study informed the qualitative approach in an endeavor to get an in-depth understanding of the donor influence on democratization.

Creswell and Clark (2007) suggested four types of mixed methods design which are:

- I. Triangulation (merging qualitative and quantitative data);
- II. Embedded (using either qualitative or quantitative data to assist in elaborating a phenomenon);
- III. Explanatory (using either quantitative or qualitative data to explain the other design); and
- IV. Exploratory (quantitative data to test and explain a relationship in qualitative data).

Despite the different types of research designs, a major characteristic of methodological triangulation is whether it is concurrent or sequential in terms of data collection, analysis and presentation. The use of mixed methods developed real experience of how community members and research participants interpret the tenets of donor support, electoral dynamics and democratization in South Africa from their own perceived perspectives.

4.5.4. Justification for the Choice of Methodological Triangulation for the Study

With new and complex understanding of social phenomenon, single methodologies do not sufficiently explain social phenomenon (Vankatesh, 2012: 4). This calls for triangulation of methods to provide subsequent contributions to research. Methodological triangulation was uniquely utilized to understand the effects of the intersection of donor support, electoral dynamics and democratization at the municipal level of the Buffalo City Metropolis. The research design took into account the domain of the thesis which hinges on the availability of donor support in the

municipality, how this affects the electoral dynamics in the electoral areas, the influence of these on democratization at the grassroots and the localities and how all of these can be connected and strung to induce development in the municipality particularly at the constituency and the rural areas. A mixed method approach has more advantages than one single method because of its ability to address confirmatory and exploratory research questions (Teddie & Tashakkori 2003 and 2009).

As previously mentioned, qualitative methods have been used to gain a deeper understanding of the social phenomenon while quantitative methods were used for the electoral dynamics and democratization in South Africa and the conditionality and its repercussions for development, the study used survey questionnaires to test the main research questions and the sub-hypothesis through deductive reasoning. One of the many sub-hypothesis explored was “Municipal projects that benefits residents and citizens are always patronized by them” Although participants mentioned the lived experiences and realities associated with donor support, the results of the study indicated that the majority of residents do not think they are receiving a fair share of support from municipal projects. The result therefore confirmed the assertion that municipal projects targeted at poverty alleviation are patronized by residents and citizens. In this regard, the qualitative knowledge revealed the reasons for the unpatriotic attitude of residents of the municipality.

Teddie and Tashakkori (2003, 2009) indicate that triangulation provides stronger inferences and rich insights from qualitative and quantitative designs owing to the covering of the weaknesses of one methodology by the strength of the other (Greene & Caracelli, 1997). In a nutshell, the use of a quantitative design helped reveal aspects that ascertain the extent to which democratization is linked to governance and development at the municipal level. On the other hand, qualitative designs unveil deep insights on donor support and democratization utilized for good governance and development and the conditionality associated with it. This section provides further justifications for utilizing methodological triangulation in this study which include compensation, corroboration, completeness and complementary.

The mixed methods approach makes possible the compensation for weaknesses of one method using the other which has merits and competence in that aspect of the

study (Denis & Garfield, 2003). Triangulation aims at validating qualitative results by quantitative results by quantitative research findings and vice versa. Methodological triangulation for confirmatory purposes helps to overcome weakness of one research design or method and is applied to confirm the results of one method by the other (Yeasmin & Rahman, 2012: 157). In this study, the triangulation of methods assisted in covering sampling bias. Community voters were purposively selected for in-depth interviews in order to obtain data on the realities, experiences and perceptions of activities of donors on democratization and governance at the municipal and local levels.

The distinction of how positivistic and interpretative approaches influenced the MMR usage in the study is outlined below.

Table 7.1: The three approaches procedures (Creswell, 2003: 17)

Item	Qualitative	Quantitative	Mixed Methods
Methods	Emerging	Predetermined	Both emerging/predetermined
Questions	Open-ended	Closed-ended	Both emerging/predetermined
Data	Interview/document	Performance/Census	Multiple forms
Analysis	Text/Image	Statistical	Text and Statistical

Table 4.1 distinguishes the three research approaches in terms of methods, forms of questions and data analysis strategies. It shows that MMR incorporates and borrows from the positivistic and interpretative paradigms and therefore uses one's advantages to cover up for the other's disadvantages. The next section deals with the research questions, theories and paradigm relationships employed in the study.

4.5.5. Interrelationships between research questions, theory and paradigms.

It is well acknowledged that a research study requires a rationale or base on which the study is conducted (Cohen et al, 2007). Therefore, in order to clearly see the variables emerged from the study and to provide general framework for data analysis to achieve the purpose of the current study, it is imperative the research questions and hypotheses be linked and explained based on the theories and paradigms.

Table 4.2 summarises, as part of the broad strategies to understand and address the research questions, the theoretical frameworks and the paradigms linkages.

Table 7.2: Summary of structure, research questions, theory and paradigm

RQ (Research Question)	Component	Theory	Paradigm
RQ 1	Donor Agency's perceptions	Political party, Reciprocity, Social justice & equity	Positivistic/Interpretive
RQ 2	Political party's perceptions	Democratisation, social justice	Positivism/ Interpretive
RQ 3	Elected/Nominated Councillors perceptions	Democratisation, social justice	Positivism/ Interpretive
RQ 4	Role & functions of IEC	Democratisation, social justice Reciprocity	Positivism/ Interpretive
RQ 5	Role & functions of BCM	Voters behaviour ,social justice	Positivism/ Interpretive
RQ 6	Community members perceptions of donor support and democratisation	Political party, Reciprocity Pol. Party, Voters behaviour	Positivism/ Interpretive
Hypotheses	Measures the goodness of fit of the variables.	Reciprocity, Social justice	

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data on the summary of structure, research questions, theory and paradigm.

It is noted that research question 1 corresponds with the theory of political parties, the norm of reciprocity, social justice, equity and voters' behaviour theories (cf. section 3.3.). Therefore, it was a good idea to adopt positivistic and interpretive paradigms (cf. Table.4.5) to seek more responses on application of measures and seek further explanation of their perceptions of donor support and democratisation in relation to voters' behaviour and the norm of reciprocity and social justice.

The Positivistic and interpretive approach associated with the questionnaire and interview enabled hypotheses testing. Hypothesis is defined as a reasonable guess which serves to guide the researcher to find solution towards the research problems (Cohen et al, 2000). In this study, four hypotheses emerged, thus, 1, 2, 3, 4. The hypotheses testing was one of the researcher's aims to relate the causal relationships of variables using quantitative data and the theory of political parties, the voters behaviour theory, the norm of reciprocity, social justice and equity theories to explain the relationships in donor support, electoral dynamics and democratisation in the BCM municipality.

Therefore, it can be linked that if positive attitudes exist, then the measures will positively influence the objectives that donor support influence local governance participation and development.

The next section deals with the research design necessary to address the research questions.

4.6. Research design

Having clarified the two-phase MMR approach undertaken in the study, the researcher adopted correlational research design described by Cohen et al (2007) as essential in dealing with many variables that emerged from the research questions and hypotheses (cf. section 4.5.5, Table 4.2). The sub-section below shows correlational research and analysis.

4.7. Correlational research and analysis

This sought to establish a relation, association or correlation between two or more variables that do not readily lend to experimental manipulation (Cohen et al, 2007). Thus, relation between the donor support as independent variable and the electoral dynamics and democratisation as dependent variables were described and predicted, whereas the relationship between the variables was further specified with regard to an increase or decrease in a certain number of units in the one variable (Gast & Ledforrd, 2014). As argued by some schools of thought the use of various variables (especially in this study) was due to the fact that human behaviour, whether at the individual or social level, is characterised as complex (Cohen et al., 2007). Therefore, to better understand the complexity underlying human behaviour such as voters in the context of electoral dynamics in democratisation, it is required of the researcher to tease out the relationship between community voters and the factors that influence their voting pattern, the IEC and how they enhance the process of democratisation, the relationship between the municipality and the communities in terms of how they promote or induce community participation in local governance and development. This brings out the factors that have a bearing of some sort on the behaviour so that representation in numerical and interpretive was revealed.

The importance of correlational research design to this study on one hand was that it permitted the use of a wide range of variables and their interrelationships and on the other hand, much information was collected from many respondents at one time

(Coolican, 2014). In this study, due to the nature of variables as revealed by the research questions and many respondent, multiple correlation measure technique was utilised to predict one variable from a linear weighted combination of more independent variables (Coolican, 2014). The multiple correlation was related not only to the correlation of independent variables with the dependent variables of research questions, but also the interconnections that exist between the dependent variables and the independent variables in the hypothesis.

Correlational research investigates the possibility of relationships and therefore describes the degree to which two or more quantitative variables are related based on a coefficient value. Therefore, to this current study, two main characteristics or purposes were outstanding: 1) it helped to explain the behaviour of voters, in the relationship that exist between donor activities, electoral dynamics, local government and the development of the communities. 2) It predicted likely outcomes (Cohen et al., 2007). Additionally, in explanatory studies, the researcher investigated a number of variables believed to relate to a more complex variable, whilst prediction studies predicted a score on one variable when a score on the other variable was known (Cohen et al., 2007).

Meanwhile, the two purposes of correlational research were performed in this study to identify variance relationships and predictions. While there are many ways of establishing relationship and predictions between variables, in this study (1) correlation tables were used to predict scores to find a correlation between the variables (identified in research question; (cf. tables 7.6; 7.9; 7.10; 7.11; 7.12). (2) Partial correlation was done by controlling the clusters with regard to electoral dynamics and democratisation in part of research question 1. (3) A simple prediction equation was used to make further predictions with regards to close similarities between the results of the categories. (4) Regressions technique was used on more complex correlations to enable the researcher to determine a correlation between the total items of measures and confounding variable items, and the best combination of two or more predictor variables such as items of practical and theoretical ramification and support system items.

4.8. Sampling of clusters and population

The study was conducted in the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality which was grouped into five (5) clusters. The clusters are: A) East London cluster, (B) Mdantsane cluster, (C) Zwelitsha cluster, (D) Bhisho cluster and (E) King William's Town cluster. Each cluster is made up of a major city with surrounding towns and villages (Mntengwana, 2018; Bond, 2002; Beinart et al, 1987, 2018; Raymond et al, 2013; Binns et al, 2018; Pierce, 2016; Mark et al, 2014; Nel, 1999, Bwalya et al, 2016; Butter et al, 2015; Vaaltein et al, 2017; Mayundle, 2010; Mallory, 2015). The sample sizes of the clusters are discussed below.

4.8.1. Cluster selection and description

The BCM municipality was grouped into five (5) clusters and the major cities were purposefully selected. They were selected because they all had a mixture of urban and rural community settlements.

4.8.2. Nature and Scope of Cluster A

East London is a city on the southeast coast of South Africa in the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality of the Eastern Cape Province. The city situated on the Indian Ocean coast, mainly sandwiched between the Buffalo River and the Nahoon River, and hosts the country's only river port. East London today has a population of over 267,000 with over 755,000 in the metropolitan area (Mntengwana, 2018; Bond, 2002; Beinart et al, 1987, 2018; Raymond et al, 2013; Binns et al, 2018; Pierce, 2016; Mark et al, 2014; Nel, 1999, Bwalya et al, 2016; Butter et al, 2015; Vaaltein et al, 2017; Mayundle, 2010; Mallory, 2015).

4.8.3. Nature and Scope of Cluster B

King William's Town is a town in the Eastern Cape province of South Africa beside the banks of the Buffalo River. The town is about 30 minutes' highway drive of the Indian Ocean port of East London. The town is part of the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality in the Eastern Cape. King, as the town is in the vicinity called, stands 389 m above the sea at the foot of the Amatola Mountains and in the centre of a densely populated agricultural district. King William's Town is the second most populous city in the Buffalo City Municipality, with a population near 100,000 inhabitants. The town has one of the ancient post offices in the country established

by missionaries led by Brownlee (Mntengwana, 2018; Bond, 2002; Beinart et al, 1987, 2018; Raymond et al, 2013; Binns et al, 2018; Pierce, 2016; Mark et al, 2014; Nel, 1999, Bwalya et al, 2016; Butter et al, 2015; Vaaltein et al, 2017; Mayundle, 2010; Mallory, 2015).

4.8.4. Nature and Scope of Cluster C

Mdantsane is a South African urban settlement located 15km away from East London and 37 km away from King William's Town in the Eastern Cape province. The name Mdantsane was a derivative from a stream that ran from the Nahoon River down to the Buffalo River. Some hold the view that the stream was named Dontsane. Soon after the stream was named, a "white farm" which was at the entrance of Mdantsane [now known as Zone 1] was also named after the stream Dontsane or Umdanzani. The township is part of the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality in the Eastern Cape. (Mntengwana, 2018; Bond, 2002; Beinart et al, 1987, 2018; Raymond et al, 2013; Binns et al, 2018; Pierce, 2016; Mark et al, 2014; Nel, 1999, Bwalya et al, 2016; Butter et al, 2015; Vaaltein et al, 2017; Mayundle, 2010; Mallory, 2015).

4.8.5. Nature and Scope of Cluster D

Zwelitsha is a settlement in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. It forms part of the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality. Zwelitsha was created in 1947 as Pathway Township to King William's Town to offer workforces for the Good Hope Textile Factory of the Da Gama Group, South Africa. As a mark of the liberal United Party government, it had "middle class" posturing in terms of neat schools, clinics, shopping centers, dairy, in-house plumbing, bathrooms and toilets. With the entrenchment of apartheid by the early 1960s Zones 6-10 were added to the original Zones 1 to 5. From 1972 to 1981, it functioned as the temporary capital of the "Bantustan of Ciskei", until the capital could be moved to Alice, and then to Bhisho.

Moreover, in 1972, it became the rebellious center of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) with the Mapetla Mohapi and Mongezi Sefika wa Nkomo starting a workstudy/political circle in Zone 10 area to launch later in January 1973, the Black People's Convention (BPC), King William's Town, Branch with Zwelitsha as the Headquarters. BCM activists and leaders, including Steve Biko, Harry Ranwedzi

Nengekhulu, and Welile Nhlapho paid visit in the early days that including the launching of the National Youth Organization (NAYO), a Black Consciousness youth wing at nearby Mount Coke Hotel (Mntengwana, 2018; Bond, 2002; Beinart et al, 1987, 2018; Raymond et al, 2013; Binns et al, 2018; Pierce, 2016; Mark et al, 2014; Nel, 1999, Bwalya et al, 2016; Butter et al, 2015; Vaaltein et al, 2017; Mayundle, 2010; Mallory, 2015).

4.8.6. Nature and Scope of Cluster E

Bisho (formerly Bhisho) is the capital of the Eastern Cape Province in South Africa. The Office of the Premier, Provincial Government and many other administrative departments are headquartered in the town. The town situated 3 kilometres away from King Williams Town and 70 kilometres away from East London is part of the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality of the Eastern Cape (Mntengwana, 2018; Bond, 2002; Beinart et al, 1987, 2018; Raymond et al, 2013; Binns et al, 2018; Pierce, 2016; Mark et al, 2014; Nel, 1999, Bwalya et al, 2016; Butter et al, 2015; Vaaltein et al, 2017; Mayundle, 2010; Mallory, 2015).

4.8.7. Sample size and selection

The determination of sample size was in three folds as a result of mixed method approach (cf. section 4.5.) Tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicate the population and sample sizes for the quantitative and qualitative approach respectfully.

4.8.8. Sampling size and justification in quantitative part of the study

In the quantitative approach, the sample size was determined based on an adapted Cohen et al.'s (2007) simplified Table 4.3 as indicated below, considering the number of variables in section (cf.1.6.2). This was an imperative exercise because in a research study, the researcher has to determine that enough data is obtained. Therefore, the number of community voters, donor agency officials, party officials, municipal administrators, elected or nominated councillors and IEC officials constituting the population to be selected to ensure proper representation of the population for enough data was essential. For instance, it has been argued that too large sample sizes may waste time, resources and money, whilst too small sample may lead to incorrect results (Terre Blanche et al., 2008 and Cohen et al., 2007). There are, however, other techniques of calculating sample sizes, such as the

raosoft.sample.onlinecalculator.com. The table below illustrates the sample size, the confidence levels and sampling errors for all categories used in the study.

Table 7.3: Sample size, confidence levels and sampling errors for all categories.

Category	Total number of Questionnaires Administered	Cluster A EL	Cluster B KWT	Cluster C MDA	Cluster D ZWL	Cluster E BHISHO
COMM VOTERS	208	42	42	41	41	42
IEC	35	7	7	7	7	7
BCMM	35	7	7	7	7	7
POLITICAL PARTY	35	7	7	7	7	7
ELECTED/NOMINATED COUNCILORS	36	8	7	7	7	7
DONOR AGENCY	35	7	7	7	7	7
TOTAL	384					

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data on Sample size, confidence levels and sampling errors for all categories

4.8.9. Sample size and justification in the qualitative part of the study

On the basis of the section (cf. 4.5) which dealt with mixed methods, in the qualitative approach, at least five (5) respondents were selected conveniently from each cluster and for every category to accommodate cross-section of the socio-economic backgrounds in all the clusters in the municipality. In each of these clusters, five respondents were purposively selected from each category to participate in the interviews in each category, for instance in the BCM municipality, the speaker, directors, managers were purposively selected based on their knowledge, willingness and availability. In the political party's category, the party chairman, treasurer and any other frontline officers were purposively selected and interviewed.

For elected or nominated councillors, the first five elected councillors represented in the municipal assembly were purposively selected and interviewed. For the IEC, the frontline staff were purposively selected and interviewed based on their availability, knowledge and willingness. Donor agency such as the municipal treasurer in Bisho was selected and interviewed, the chairman of the municipal Taxi association, which provide support to the municipality and the IEC was interviewed, the chairperson of the hotel association was identified and interviewed on the ways they provide support for parties and the electoral commission in their electoral duties. The community voters were randomly selected from the 5 clusters. In all twenty voters were selected. For every cluster, four community members were selected from four wards in the cluster based on their political affiliation and lineage. The table below indicates the qualitative sample size used in the study.

Table 7.4: Sample Size, Qualitative

Category	No. of respondents interviewed	CLUSTER A EL	CLUSTER B KWT	CLUSTER C MDA	CLUSTER D ZWL	CLUSTER E BHISHO
Community Voters	20	4	4	4	4	4
IEC	6	2	1	1	1	1
BCMM	6	1	2	1	1	1
POL. PARTY	5	1	1	1	1	1
ELECTED/ NOMINATED COUNCILLORS	9	2	2	2	1	2
DONOR AGENCY	5	1	1	1	1	1
TOTAL	52	11	10	10	9	11

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data on Sample size, qualitatively.

The table shows in each cluster and for each category, the number of respondents purposively selected to take part in the interviews. The respondents were selected in the various categories to represent the entire municipality.

4.9. Methods of data collection

In this study, three instruments: structured questionnaires, face-to-face semi-structured interview schedule and documents evaluation checklist were critically formulated through many drafts to check their sequence and relevance to the research questions and hypothesis. Cohen et al (2000) identified many other research instrument techniques such as accounts, observations, test and role playing which are available. Although these techniques have their advantages and their applicability, they were not suitable for the current study. For instance, the “account” technique with its historical stories may be limited in verification. In observation, although some of its naturalistic characteristics were utilized in the interview, it was considered as “not too a morally neutral enterprise” (Cohen et al., 2000:316). Furthermore, as the aim of this study was to investigate and to establish to what extent donor support influences the electoral processes in the Buffalo City Municipality and the electoral dynamic factors which connect this agenda with governance and democratization, neither testing nor role playing was sufficient to address these key issues.

As can be seen already, even within the questionnaires and interviews schedules designed and employed by the researcher, there are wide ranges of other types in existence. For instance, in questionnaires, there are semi-structured as well as unstructured questionnaires and in interviews, there are informal conversational interviews, focus interviews etc (Cohen et al., 2000; Terre Blanche et al., 2006). In a nutshell, a good instrumentation design comes with numerous scrutiny and checks. The essence was to arrive at instruments which were valid and precise to evaluate the research data. Therefore, the processes of the design and administration of the three instruments for the study are summarised as follows:

4.9.1. Questionnaires

This questionnaire is one of the instrument used for data collection in this study. The advantages of questionnaire to this study are numerous as attested by several methodologists such as Goodwill (2008), Cohen et al., (2000) and Terre Blanche et al., (2006). For instance, in the quantitative phase, the use of questionnaires enabled the researcher to cover a large number of respondents in a more dependable and greater honesty due to anonymity. Again, as one of the aim of questionnaires was to

get quantifiable and comparable data from all the categories and the clusters, massive data were generated on a whole range of items related to the objectives and aim of the study.

Additionally, in terms of analysis, questionnaires were easy to analyse in a manner that reduced bias as the researcher's own opinions could not influence the respondents due to non-verbal or visual clues from the respondents (Cohen et al., 2007; Terre Blanche et al., 2006). This proved useful as the responses assigned to the questions were captured as they appeared. Moreover, the limitation of low percentage of returns of a questionnaire was avoided in the study. There were six categories of questionnaires designed for this study that covered the research questions and objectives of the study. In each of these categories, the research questions were structured into five sections (Section A to E. Section A obtained basic demographics which include gender of respondents, age, educational background, district and province born, employment status, income and marital status etc. The main parts of the questionnaire contained five sections (Section B to E) that comprised a 5-point Likert scale items (strongly Agreed, Agreed, don't know, disagreed and strongly disagree). Each section consisted of items to address each of the six research questions.

4.9.2. Questionnaire distributions and challenges

In the municipal council, three officers were assigned to assist the research team contact designated officers for questionnaire administration. All the officers assigned were unavailable except one. This officer arranged contacts with municipal administrators and councillors for the research team. For several months, she was unable to, with the excuse that, all the councillors were unavailable and the administrators were all busy. The officer who was a member of the municipal knowledge committee, took several of the questionnaires but never returned them with the excuse that the respondents never returned them. For a period of over six months, from October 2016 to March, 2017, the team had not secured a single interview or questionnaire administered. In fact, the research team were yelled at with screams, "get out and don't come here again. We don't receive any donor support. You can't investigate us".

The research team then secured the council's news bulletin that had the addresses and the contact numbers of all the councillors and their wards and all the frontline administrative officers of the municipality. The research team called the councillors by phone and arranged meetings with them at their convenience in order to solicit interviews with them. In most of these encounters, it was at exclusive locations and at night where they would not be seen. Questionnaires were distributed at the municipal IEC offices, political party offices and donor agencies in all the clusters and respondents were interviewed. Data collection started in October 2015 with collection on community voters. The rest of the data on donor agencies, political parties, elected councillors, IEC, and BCM started from June 2016 to July 2017. The data collection was constrained by stringent gatekeeping with a lot of bureaucratic and administrative restraints.

4.9.3. Semi-structured interview

Semi-structured interviews were conducted to seek more in-depth explanations with regards to the research questions. This was to validate and follow up on the rationale and responses given on certain questionnaire items in relation to the research objectives (Cohen et al, 2006; Longhurst, 2003; Whiting, 2013; Rabionet, 2011; Schmidt, 2004; Harrell et al, 2009; Dearnley, 2013; Hove et al, 2005). The researcher had composed different but similar interview schedule with varying question pointers under which the researcher probed with follow-up questions. During the interviews, respondents were free to respond to all of the questions. However, the depth of explanation for some questions differed from respondent to respondent. Whilst some gave detailed explanations that answered some of the questions that were yet to be asked, other respondents needed the researcher to probe further before certain answers were given. In most cases, probe questions were not pre-planned, but were as a result of the explanations given by the respondents at a certain point in the interview process (Van Teijlingen, 2014; Drever, 1995; Mcintosh et al, 2015; Majtahed et al, 2014; Kallio et al, 2016; Brinkmann, 2014; Matthew et al, 2014; Ashton, 2014; Bryman, 2017). The sub-section below discusses the document analysis.

4.9.4. Document analysis

Documents such as schedule of municipal budget statement, schedule of borrowings, operating expenditure report, capital expenditure report, BCMDA monthly expenditure report, City managers report, Corporate services report BCMM ward update, BCMM Service Delivery Legacy 2011-2016 back to basics, BCMM Monthly, BCMM Metro Voice, which is a bi-monthly publication, The SABI magazine, The water wheel magazine, and The African energy journal were willingly obtained from the municipality to corroborate the evidence that emerged from both questionnaire and interview responses. The other sources for document analysis were obtained from the Economic development and Agencies report, executive support services report, Finance SD BIP report, Health, public safety and emergency services report, Human settlement report, infrastructure services report, municipal services report, spatial planning and development report and performance report to council. All these reports are available at BCMM homepage at: www.buffalocitymetro.gov.za. This was done not only to ensure many diverse sources of data for triangulation purposes, but shed more light on research questions. As argued by some authors, documents in a quantitative study are sources of information where statistics can be drawn from them. In a qualitative study, explanations through analysing the data they contain are obtained (Hennink et al., 2011; La Tran et al, 2017; Schroll et al, 2016; Owen, 2014; Parker et al, 2015; Ligostera et al, 2017; Stage et al, 2015; Goodwin, 2008). Thus in this study, unsolicited documents were analysed, where information they contained was used to support responses made from the other instruments. The sub-section below discusses the triangulation of method, sources and theory.

4.10. Data analysis

Data analysis is any approach, qualitative or quantitative, that reduces the complexity of the information obtained from the respondents and comes to an interpretation of what is real and what is not real (Hennink et al., 2011). Thus, the researcher thinks about the central role of the research questions and begins to summarise, reduce, create themes and compute variables in line with the electoral dynamics, measures, supports and confounding factors associated with democratisation processes which lead to interpretation of data and drawing of conclusions.

By using the MMR, the data analysis took two stages: the quantitative stage and the qualitative stage. For the former stage, data arising from the questionnaires were analysed using the statistical approach (Statistical package for Social Sciences (SPSS) for correlational purposes and hence the Chi Square test procedure was employed. In a later stage, data from the interviews were thematised based on the emerged themes. At the end of the two stages, data was merged by comparing the result of the quantitative and qualitative datasets through a discussion, whilst the document analysis data was used to support the analysis. The summary of how data was analysed is given in the next section which included: quantitative data analysis, qualitative data analysis, data capturing and immersion, inducing themes and coding, categorisation and interpretation, assumptions of the qualitative data analysis: ontological assumptions, epistemological assumptions, axiological assumptions, methodological assumptions, the need for the assumptions, analysis of data from documents and synthesis of instruments for analysis.

4.10.1. Quantitative data analysis

This section discusses how the quantitative aspects of the data in this study were analysed. Initially, data screening was employed before the questionnaire data was analysed. That is, the data was captured/entered based on the numerical codes assigned in the questionnaire. The capturing process enabled the researcher to be intimate with the questionnaire data and also identified any missing data. Screening and cleaning of data were done for accuracy. Through this process, data was systematically monitored, and errors were checked and corrected using case summaries. The sub-section below discusses the qualitative data analysis.

4.10.2. Qualitative data analysis

The qualitative data was construed to give significance to the findings since interpretation involves reliable understanding, clarifications and conceptual frameworks on the orderly observation of the phenomenon in context of the study (Creswell, 2007). In this study, data from interviews was familiarised, induced into themes, coded, elaborated, interpreted and checked based on Creswell (2007) and Terre Blanche et al.'s (2006:322) procedures. The section below illustrates how data was captured and immersed.

4.10.3. Data capturing and immersion

The data that emerged from the interviews were all captured on a voice recorder since none of the respondents objected to its usage. In Creswell's (2007) view, both listening to the recorded conversation and reading transcripts are of definite value since nuances of feelings, pauses and even tones of voice can be used as evidence. Transcription of raw data was done by listening repeatedly to the interview conversations. Hennink et al (2011) believe that since transcription involves making of a written record from an interview for data analysis purpose, words, phrases and expressions of both the researcher and interviewees are captured to reflect and emphasise on emotions related to the issues discussed. Although it was time-consuming, accuracy and completeness of each transcript was checked repeatedly to eliminate errors, omissions or inaccuracies. The transcripts were further read on many occasions, taking in every detail, where researcher devised and made notes to know the data well for theme generation. The section below shows how themes were induced and coded.

4.10.4. Inducing theme and coding

As it is well known, there are no hard-and-fast rules with regard to what sort of themes are best, themes in this study were induced from the data at hand in relation to the questionnaire analysis themes (Terre Blanche et al, 2007). Thus, responses with similar points from different interviews which ideally came naturally from the data with bearing to the questionnaire items in the research questions were used. The theme developing activities started with coding. As thematising involves organising data responses into themes based on common attention paid to by respondents, coding entails marking different sections of the data relevant to the themes (Terre Blanche et al., 2007). The data was broken down into analytically relevant ways and names were assigned to them. The themes were revised and restructured for easier interpretation and evaluation by highlighting themes with various colours for better understanding and defining relationships with each other. The clustering of the different codes helped to eliminate irrelevant data and aided the researcher to be able to answer the research questions (Cohen et al., 2007). The section below discusses categorisation and interpretation.

4.10.5. Categorisation and interpretation

Thematised and coded data, according to Hennink et al (2011) must be further studied carefully. Thus, the colour coding was elaborated on and further explored in a small drastic way in order to be able to render a good account of what was going on in the data. Thorough analysis was made, reflected on, and data restructured several times to examine the relationship with the questionnaire items before a written account as interpretation was made. The next section discusses the assumptions in the qualitative aspect of the study.

4.10.5.1. Assumptions of the qualitative data analysis

Creswell (2012) identified four assumptions of qualitative research which include: ontological, epistemological, axiological and methodological. It is essential that a qualitative researcher not only considers these philosophical assumptions but also understand and applies them in order to achieve results. A brief discussion of these assumptions follows:

4.10.5.2. Ontological assumptions

This assumption expresses the nature of reality as explained by Creswell (2012). It involves the nature of certainty and all its features. Thus, a qualitative researcher needs to embrace the idea of multiple realities and therefore report on these multiple realities. It extends that the researcher ought to explore multiple forms of proof from different individual's perspectives and knowledge. Hence, in this study, the views of community voters, political party officials, elected or nominated councillors, donor agency officials, municipal administrators and IEC officials in the five clusters were solicited regarding donor support, electoral dynamics and democratisation and in relation to the research questions.

4.10.5.3. Epistemological assumption

This assumption looks into how the researchers know what they know from the study (Creswell, 2012). It implies that the researcher ought to get close to the respondents being studied in order to get quality data. As a result, the researcher endeavoured to become part of the respondents' situations by understanding their views on democratisation processes as pertains to the BCMM.

4.10.5.4. Axiological assumption

This includes the role of value in the research (Creswell, 2012). This assumption was followed as the researcher made his values and norms clear and known to the respondents and reported on how biases and subjectivity were managed on ethical consideration. Hence data generated from research questions were reported from the respondent's point of view.

4.10.5.5. Methodological assumption

With this assumption, the methods used in the process of the research comes to play. A qualitative researcher needs to adopt inductive, emerging methods shaped by experience in collecting and analysing the data (Creswell, 2012). This depends on many factors as some respondents may be more intimate and speak about their realities than just filling a pre-determined questions alone. As a result, interviews, transcriptions and analysis were carefully handled in this study to reflect the true account of the respondents to support the questionnaire accounts on research questions.

4.10.5.6. The need for assumptions

The philosophical assumptions underlying each inquiry (quantitative and qualitative) cannot be ignored since their understanding aided the researcher to make significant impact about the reality of a particular world (Hathaway, 1995). Looking at the usage of qualitative and quantitative analysis and their assumptions, Hathaway (1995) advocates that using both modes of inquiry, both ways of knowing, and both kinds of knowledge based on the study's aim helps the researcher to; (a) to use the findings generated from one approach to reinforce or contrast the other, and (b) to advance understanding of a specific phenomenon. However, it was warned that without proper handling and adhering to the assumptions of inquiries, the applicability of their importance becomes questionable (Ibid, 1995). This is necessary as some research questions are more amenable to being investigated by one approach, using both enhances the researcher's ability to understand "the trends" and therefore comes up with better conclusions (Hathaway, 1995: 21). The section below discusses document analysis.

4.10.5.7. Analysis of data from documents

The data from the documentary analysis was recorded on the document analysis tool. Firstly, the municipal administrators, IEC officials, donors and party officials' portfolios were ascertained to find the themes related to the research questions as indicated on the instrument-rubric and checklist. The planning of document analysis took the form of scrutinising newsletters, official correspondence, budgetary transactions and deliberations and relate them to the objectives and research questions to make sense of measures as well as practices, both theoretically and practically. These insights obtained from the documents were analysed in relation to the questionnaire and interview responses. Thus, themes were connected to the themes that had already been identified from the questionnaire and also from the interview questions.

4.10.5.8. Synthesis of instruments for analysis

The analysis of both quantitative and qualitative methods was done to afford an overall representation of the answers according to the research questions and hypothesis. Hence, questionnaires, interviews and document analysis data relevant to the research objectives were analysed and conclusions regarding donor activities, electoral dynamics and democratisation were drawn.

Table 7.5: Summary of structure, research questions, instrument and analysis

RQ	COMPONENT	INSTRUMENT	METHOD OF ANALYSIS
RQ1	Role of BCM in electoral adm	Questionnaires/interviews/documents	Correlation/Chi square/qualitative
RQ2	Role of IEC in electoral adm.	Questionnaires/Interviews/Doc	Correlation/Chi square/qualitative
RQ3	Community voters perceptions	Questionnaires/interviews/Doc	Correlation/Ci square/qualitative
RQ4	Donor Agency's perceptions	Questionnaires/interviews/Doc	Correlation/Chi square/qualitative
RQ5	Political party's perceptions	Questionnaires/interviews/Doc	Correlation/Chi square/qualitative
RQ6	Elected/Nominated Councillors perc	Questionnaires/interviews/Doc.	Correlation/Chi square/qualitative
HYPOTHESES	Measures the effects donor	questionnaires/interviews	Correlation/qualitative

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and the summary of structure, research questions, instrument and analysis.

This table indicates that whilst questionnaire usage covered all the research questions, interviews and document analysis were also used to contrast and compare the responses. Hence in the overall analysis, statistical techniques were used while qualitative means were used to support or interrogate the former. The next section below discusses the research quality in quantitative and qualitative strategies of the study.

4.11. Respondents' Demographic Information

The table below outlines the demographic information of the respondents

Table 7.6: Respondents' Demographic Details

		Donor Agencies	Political Parties	Elected/ Nominated Councillors	IEC	BCMM	Community Voters
Demographics		%	%	%	%	%	%
Gender	Male	38.24	48.57	58.33	36.11	63	51.7
	Female	61.76	51.43	41.67	63.89	37	48.3
Age	31-40	35.29	31.43	27.8	36.11	17.14	27.7
	41-50	32.35	25.71	38.9	30.56	71.4	19.14
	51 and above	14.7	2.86	16.7	8.34	5.72	4.78
Level of Education	Matric	14.7	11.43	19.44	75.00	85.17	
	Tertiary	85.29	80.00	69.44	19.44	8.57	
Ethnicity	Xhosa	64.71	92	69.44	97.67	74	
	Zulu	8.82	2.86	2.78	5.56	2	
	White	5.88	11.43	8.33	2.77		
	Coloured	17.65	17.14	13.89		8	
	Indian	2.94				3	
Marital Status	Married	67.65	51.4	63.89	50.0		27.2
	Single	26.47	40.00	27.78	47.2		67.46
	Widowed	2.94	2.9	5.56			2.37
	Divorced	2.94	5.7	2.78	2.8		2.8
Employment Status	Employed	94.12	77.1		86.11		33.65
	Pensioners	2.94	5.7		11.11		1.9
	No formal employment	2.94	8.6		2.78		45.19
Income	> R6000	41.2	37.1	41.67	25.0	25.75	12.00
	R5001-R6000	17.6	37.1	22.22	13.9	31.4	2.9
	R4000-R5000	17.6	11.4	19.44	33.3	40.0	8.6
	R3000-R4000	14.6		8.33	8.3	2.9	7.2
	R2000-R3000	5.9	2.9	2.78	5.6		12.9
	R1000 and less	2.9	3	5.56	2.8		33.0
Place of	District	70.59	20.00	69	63.9		65.07

birth	Different District but same province	11.75	5.7	19.44	22.2		22.01
	Different Province	17.65	2.86	11.11	5.6		11.95

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and Respondents' demographic details.

The above table encapsulates the biographical details for all respondents for all the thematic categories in the study. The table captured respondents demographics such as; gender, age, level of education, ethnicity, marital status, employment status, income and place of birth.

4.12 Conclusion

This chapter presented the philosophical basis of the study. It focused the discussions on research paradigms- positivistic, interpretative and mixed method research. It covered the research design and showed that correlational research was appropriate and useful. The sample size and selections both quantitatively and qualitatively were addressed. The data collection methods were outlined, which included discussions on the questionnaires, interviews and document analysis were employed. The data analysis covered how quantitative, qualitative and documents data were analysed and their assumptions followed, whilst research quality and the ethical considerations employed were outlined. The next chapters report on the findings of the study.

CHAPTER FIVE: DONOR AGENCIES' AND DONOR RECIPIENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF DONOR SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT AND ELECTORAL PURPOSES

5.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the discussion of findings on donor agencies and donor recipients' perceptions of donor support for development and electoral purposes. The chapter is arranged as follows: it evaluates the role and functions of donor agencies and their perceptions of donor support and democratisation in conjunction with the recipients of donor assistance, such as political parties and elected councillors to ascertain their perceptions on donor funding, electoral dynamics and democratisation in the municipality. There is a manifest fundamental relationship that exist between electoral and democracy sponsors and the institutions that promotes, strengthens and sustains the core tenets of democracy itself.

Sponsoring domestic efforts at organising elections has become a well-developed area that requires tremendous assistance. This has engaged the conscience of serious organisations committed to ensure that elections at every level becomes successfully free and fair and that promotes the well-being of the ordinary citizens. Helping countries hold local and municipal elections has become a well-developed domain for assistance for untainted electoral management by political parties and elected or nominated councillors, by virtue of their roles and functions, require huge financial and logistical support in order to fully participate and contest in an election. This, therefore, establishes a reciprocal relationship between donors and recipients of support in an election.

Unfortunately, the assistance given and received does not sink down to the local constituencies where the supposed poverty and development projects were targeted. Instead, it becomes a political ploy to involve voters participate in elections while their greatest needs and welfare such as education, health, energy, food supply, roads and transport infrastructure are relegated to the background. The chapter begins with the core arguments of the chapter, followed by the survey aspects under consideration. The sections conclude with a summary of the analysis and discussion of the presented results.

5.2. Core Argument of the Chapter

The core argument of this chapter is that donor agencies, political parties and the elected councillors are often disengaged from voters and are subjugated by privileged leaders with few motivations or competences to increase the representation of the voters. Political parties play important role in essential moments of a state's growth either detrimentally (organizing and instigating violence) or constructively (by leading discussion in a ruptured society). Projects of democracy financiers aimed at democratic development will be more successful if they engage both the opposition parties and civil society. Unjustified class relations between voters, donors and municipal officers that create a gap and a rift in relationship does not augur well for the development of the municipality and neither does it uplift the tenets of democratization because it enlarges the benefits of the donors and the municipal elites and diminishes the benefits of citizens. This is due to the fact that the supposed donor interventions do not diffuse completely to the citizens at the communities.

The rationale for democratization and devolution has continuously been good governance through improving local democracy, encouraging transparency, culpability, reliability and fair representation in the administration of public affairs. Good governance can, therefore, be strengthened when patrons can reach a practically clear common dream which directs their activities for shared benefits. The findings of the study confirmed the hypothesis of the study (cf. tables 7.5; 7.9; 7.10; 7.11; 7.12) which also aligns with the theoretical and the conceptual framework. The findings indicated that donor agencies support municipal elections (cf. fig. 5.2).

The funding covers capacity building, logistics for campaigns, training electoral officers, party officials (cf. table 5.1). In addition, the findings showed that political parties and politicians agree that donor support was important, necessary and facilitate their activities, programs and ensures their survival (cf. table 5.7; 5.8; fig.5.6). The findings also confirmed that elected or nominated councillors deemed donor support necessary for democratization (fig. 5.11). It further showed the sources of funding for campaigns (cf. table 5.15). The elected councillors concurred that donor support induces good governance through conditionality (cf. 5.16). The essence of development aid extended to recipients is in support of alleviating

poverty, enhance social, economic and political development (Kuhn et al, 1988; Woolcock, 1998). It espouses and thrives on the idea of partnership, with the sense of promoting welfare of people and society. In support of the above, democratization ensures that persons have the privilege to vote and to have a say in their political system. It also hinges on consensus building and grassroots participation of its citizens (Esenstadt, 2002, 2003; Allison, 1994). The notion of political party theory by Ley (1959), Dror (2012) and Olson (2015) aligns with the proportional representation system which favours “multipartyism” as it relates to what pertains to the Buffalo City Municipality as opposed to the single – majority single-ballot system of balloting in single member communities which favours two party state. This chapter also uses the social justice and equity theories to create the awareness of domination, inequality and injustice that emanates from unequal relationship between donors, officials and citizens in the municipality (Charmaz, 2011; Larson et al, 2012). Reciprocity was utilized to address the balanced and the mutual relationship that should exist and be reciprocated by the mutual satisfaction of the donor-recipient equation (Gouldner’s, 1960; Uehera, 1995; Masumi et al, 2008). The sub-section below discusses the donor agencies’ view on donor support.

5.3. Donor Agencies’ views on support.

In the context of this study, the sources of donor support are three-fold: it considers donation from international sources and bilateral agreements. Examples are world bank/IMF assistance and sister-city collaborations. The second source is regional and sub-regional inter-governmental and Non-governmental agreements eg SADC protocols. The third channel is the domestic or local donor support received from donor agencies. Donor agency refers to all sponsors that provide support in cash and in kind to political parties and candidates who contested for municipal council seats. It must be noted that the support provided at this level included assistance in campaign souvenirs, logistics, groceries, accommodation, transportation, communication equipment and gadgets, advertising accessories etc. In the special case of BCMM, the donor agencies that support and sponsor candidates and political parties include; business owners, Advertising houses, Hotel owners and caterers, corporate printing houses and publishers, co-operative transport operators and taxi associations, powerful telecommunication operators, the municipal treasury and rich individuals in the municipality.

The figure below illustrates the distribution of respondents' views on donor support.




Figure 8.1: Distribution of respondents' views on donor support:

Source: Computer printout of a Graph derived from the data and findings of this study.

The majority of surveyed respondents agreed that their organization gave out donor support for development. 64.7% agreed while 29.41% strongly agreed giving donor support. However, 5.88% strongly disagreed to giving out donor support. The cumulative total of respondents in agreement was 94.22%. The above findings indicate that the contributions of donor organizations to the development of in the municipality is enormous. As can be seen, 64.7% of respondents agreed that donor support was important and relevant for development. The results in figure 5.1 shows the importance of support for political parties and candidates in an election and development. The importance of donor support brings the development aid theory into focus. The development support theory advances its relevance as lack of finance and diminishing sponsorship account for poor governance among the most important causes of state failure and underdevelopment (Ciborra et al, 2010) Hence innovations and reforms in the governmental and bureaucratic apparatus are an important prerequisite for development. Development support policy initiatives have

gained international and domestic validity by the donor community as a catalyst for such reforms

The conditions adjoining municipal institutional reorganisations in Ecuador which were set in motion through, on the one hand, a connection instituted by external donors between the funding of substructure tasks at the local level, and institutional reforms on the other (Fuhr, 1994; Romeo, 2003; Heewig et al 2017; Chawla, 2016; Roberts et al, 2016; Rosendo et al, 2016; Platz, 2016; Wowerijn et al 2017). Credit was only delivered to municipalities on the consideration that efforts were made by them to advance their ability to offer urban facilities. This approach has attained considerable success to date, they noted (Norris, 2017; Fiedler, 2016; Goetz et al, 2016; Annen, 2017; Macdonald, 2016; Ascher, 2016; Bush, 2016; Bardall, 2017; Hasselskog et al, 2017; Awortwi, 2017; Swedlund, 2017; Crane et al, 2017; Buckley et al, 2017; Mogues et al, 2016; Havel, 2016; Mbachu, 2016; Gaynor, 2016; Nickson et al, 2016; Arnon, 2017). The section below describes donor agency's provision of support for elections.

5.4. Donor Agency's provision of support for elections

Donor agencies provide enormous support for municipal elections. The support these agencies provide is varied and diverse. Most of the support was geared towards assisting the IEC, BCM, Political parties, elected or nominated councillors who contest for local and municipal elections with financial assistance and logistical support. According to Bratton et al (2001) and Mattes (1995), widespread support for democracy in Africa as in other Third Wave regions offer less contentment with the output of elected governments. The fact that Africans backing democracy while being dissatisfied with its accomplishments suggests a degree of deep-down support that surpasses instrumental considerations. In spite of all these difficulties, the role of donor agencies cannot be underestimated in municipal elections. This is particularly supported by the essence of development aid extended to recipients in support of alleviating poverty, enhance social, economic and political development (Kuhn et al, 1988; Woolcock, 1998). The following are some of the excerpts from respondents about the use of donor support funding during elections:

“... By providing accommodation to municipal assessors and evaluators. Sometimes they use our hotels for workshops and

summits. Electoral trainings are held here. We provide accommodation and meals for people trained to be electoral officers” (Interviewee 1, Agency officer, King William’s Town, June 2017).

and

“...We fund political parties when contesting for presidential elections...The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, only addresses the funding of political parties on national and provincial level. Section 236 of the Constitution deals with the funding of political parties” (Interviewee 2, Agency officer, East London, June 2017).

The above responses from two donor agency respondents during the discussions confirms the notion that donor agencies provide support for elections in the municipality. For instance interviewee 1, acknowledge that their agency provide accommodation for municipal assessors and evaluators when they are on assignment, workshop or summit.

In corroborating the above views, Posner et al (2002), Johnson et al (1966), Cheeseman et al (2001) and Mattes et al (1979) stated that the results of economic situations on support for an incumbent administration in a new African democracy is misleading and irregular. They noted that to the degree that voters answer to deteriorating economic conditions, they do so through departure from the voting procedure rather than by support for the opposition. They suggested that African electorates are at least humbly reactive to economic tendencies but that noneconomic impetuses still dominate in any given election.

The notion of democracy has become so thoroughly acknowledged with polls that we are in danger of overlooking that the contemporary account of illustrative elections is a story of strict operations as much as it is a story of democratic achievements (Schedler, 2002). Historically, as noted by Scedler (2002), elections have been an instrument of tyrannical control as well as a means of democratic governance. Since the early days of the “third wave” of world-wide democratization, it has been strong that changes from authoritarian rule can lead anywhere. Over the past quarter-century, many have headed to the creation of some practice of democracy. This democracy, according to Nye (1967, 2014), has been a ground that bred corruption through most of donor activities.

In contrast, Corstange (2017) is of the opinion that parties use clienteles' in competitive and uncompetitive electoral environments. He contends that parties enjoy a wide choice to target clientelistic kickbacks to cheap voters in their strongholds, but that head-to-head race coerces them to bid for more affluent voters. Wiezien (2017) says that elections are not just games of musical chairs, but that the cost of governing has effect on electoral support. According to him, a course of action is not the only thing that matters, and other factors, in particular, the economy, are more influential. From the point of view of electoral responsibility, however, the outcomes do make available good news, as they show that functional representation is important to voters. Figure 5.2 below shows donor agency's support for elections in the municipality.




Figure 8.2: Donor agency support for elections in the municipality

Source: Computer printout of a graph derived from the data and findings of this study

The majority of the respondents, a cumulative total of 97.16%, agreed that they offered donor support for elections. However, 2.94% disagreed that their organizations offered donor support for elections. Elections are activities that engage political parties and other important organizations in terms of program, bills, transport and infrastructure and so on. In every election cycle, donors spend a lot of funds on the media market on sponsorship of a particular candidate or organization. According to Lindberg (2010), donor funding concern on democratization may add to the duplication of neo-patrimonialism, rather than to neutralise it. He observed that the election operation of parliamentarians in terms of their total expenditure, sources of finance, and their tradition in the framework of the consolidation of liberal democracy is deeply rooted in their relationship with donors and sponsors. Lindberg (2010) noted that parliamentarians are involved in patron-client dealings to reproduce their political power. Furthermore, Lindberg (2010:121) noted that “prevalence of patronage politics has increased throughout the period of democratic rule”. This persistent pattern of patronage politics “threatens the very heart of democratic consolidation”. Vertical culpability and validity is endangered by other treaties of loyalty, expectations of corruption, and tendencies to “delegative” mandates. Below are extracts from participants about donor support for elections:

“...In the context of South Africa, all the major parties that are represented in the national and provincial legislatures i.e. the African National Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance (DA), Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and the Congress of the People (COPE), among others would be entitled to funding from public funds. But there are other smaller parties sponsored by residents and ratepayers associations which are represented in local government only and, therefore, do not qualify for public funding in terms of section 236 of the Constitution” (interviewee 2, Agency officer, Bhisho, June 2017)

and

“...Donor support is not targeted at development improvement we offer our building and services to secure investments” (interviewee 3, Agency officer, East London, June 2017)

and.

“...Differ from one political party to another... the funds can be utilised for logistics, campaigns or even administrative purposes” (Interviewee 5, Agency officer, King William’s Town, June 2017)

The above respondents indicated their views on the various ways they support municipal elections in order to boost development. From the findings, most funders and agencies engage in the provision of transport, accommodation, provision of logistics, assisting in training and printing of T-shirts for parties. Others provide funds for campaigns and for administrative purposes. Below are items on what donor funding covers in the municipality.

Table 8.1: Items donor funding for elections covers in the municipality

Donor funding covers Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Donor funding covers	Campaigns	27	19.0%	79.4%
	Logistics	28	19.7%	82.4%
	Capacity Building	22	15.5%	64.7%
	Training.Electoral Officers	14	9.9%	41.2%
	Support.Political Parties	19	13.4%	55.9%
	Voter Education	31	21.8%	91.2%
	Others	1	0.7%	2.9%
Total		142	100.0%	417.6%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The majority of the donor funding (21.8%) was used for voter education; 19.7% was directed towards logistics; 19.0% went towards campaigns; 15.5% was used for capacity building; 13.4% was used for supporting political parties; 9.9% was utilized for training officers while 0.7% was used for other amenities. As indicated above, the findings of this study shows that, the bulk of electoral funders utilize their funds to cover capacity building, that is to say, according to Lippel et al (2016) develop and reinforce the skills, instincts, abilities, processes and resources of the IEC, the BCM, the political parties and the elected councillors . Similarly, donors raise funds to assist in campaigns, provide logistics, training centers, offices and documentation support centers. (Collier et al, 2015) voter education, job training, learning centers and consultancy services. (Olowu et al 2019; Fukuyama, 2017; Birch et al 2017; Goodhand et al, 2016; White et al 2016; Hamalai et al 2015).

5.4 Donor support is targeted at electoral improvement for development

Fig. 5.3 below demonstrates that donor support is targeted at electoral improvement for development at the municipality. Most donors indicated that their support was geared toward improving the electoral fortunes of the municipality. Figure 5.3 below shows electoral improvement by donor support.




Figure 8.3: Electoral improvement by donor support

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The majority of the respondents, cumulative total of 88.24% agreed that the offered donor support is targeted at electoral improvement. A cumulative total of 11.76% however, disagreed that their organizations offered donor support for elections. The essence of voting support to a large extent, were to safeguard electoral development, to ensure unrestricted and reasonable elections, democracy advances human growth by displaying that some aspects of democracy – but not others – affect human development (Geerring et al, 2016). Geerring et al (2016:1) argued that the “electoral” aspect of democracy advances “human development” while parts connected to “citizen empowerment” do not (or scarcely so).

According to Fried et al (2017:1), politicians “often struggle to claim recognition for programmatic policies and therefore use modified assistances to win elections”. Non-programmatic policies that target individual voters provide a greater electoral return,

even if the technocratic provision of public goods would better serve citizens' needs. Dominioni (2016) argues that electoral fraud and electoral malpractices relate to the realm of electoral affairs, which is one of the core elements of a government with representative institutions. According to Dominioni (2016), the last decades at the international level saw many documents, charters and organisations being contributed to craft the standards of electoral integrity. These feelings were also shared by Miura et al (2016), Aldrich et al (2017), Bellucci et al (2017), Diaz Caveros (2016) and Maskin (2017). In support of the above, democratization ensures that persons have the privilege to vote and to have a say in their political system. It also hinges on consensus-building and grassroots participation of its citizens (Esenstadt, 2002, 2003; Allison, 1994). One of the respondents said the following about donor support targeted at electoral improvement:

"...the donor support is targeted at electoral improvement for development through educational programmes" (Interviewee 5, Agency officer, Zwelitsha, May 2017).

The responses from the above interviewees illustrate the perceptions donors hold about the influence of support on electoral improvement. In various ways, they indicated that they provide support by making their taxis available for campaigns. In this case, it does mean the local taxis association are donors in the purest sense of the word. They are recognised as providing essential service and support to parties and their candidates. Some have shown that they support the parties to enhance electoral improvement through educational programmes that they run. The table below indicated the targeted electoral improvement by donor sponsorship.

Table 8.2: Donor support and targeted improvements

The donor support and targeted improvement was to solicit response from the municipal treasury which provide finance and support to deserving parties. But their ultimate functions does not only end with elections but also targeted improvement of projects and service delivery such as those below.

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
\$Improvements_Targets ^a	Education	30	19.4%	93.8%
	Water Supply	17	11.0%	53.1%
	Electricity Supply	23	14.8%	71.9%
	Health	24	15.5%	75.0%

	Sanitation	16	10.3%	50.0%
	Housing	20	12.9%	62.5%
	Roads/Transport	25	16.1%	78.1%
Total		155	100.0%	484.4%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The findings on donor support and targeted improvements showed diverse outcome in several areas which include education, water supply, electricity and energy, health, housing and transport. The majority of the improvements (19.4%) were focused on education; 16.1% was focused on roads and transport development; 15.5% was focused on health; 14.8% was focused on electricity supply; 12.9% was focused on housing; 11.0% was focused on water supply while 10.35 was focused on sanitation. The findings above show that the targeted donor improvement illustrate education as its greatest need. According to De Visser (2014), the municipality is the epicenter of development. This view is in line with the promotion of social justice and equity in order to intensify fairness in the distribution of development to serve the interest of the poor and the marginalized.

The improvement in municipality education services, water supply system, energy supply, health, sanitation, housing roads and transportation constitute the electoral dynamic factors that ensures the participation of ordinary citizens. There is a connection between treasury sponsorship of parties, donor support, campaign and votes. Voters may not necessarily know donors, but parties and candidates get sponsorship from donors. Some of the respondents gave the following answers during the discussions on donor support and targeted improvement:

“...It differs from one political party to another... the funds can be utilised for logistics, campaigns or even administrative purposes. The donor support is given to enhance multi-party democracy, national legislation provide for the funding of political parties participating in national and provincial legislatures on an equitable and proportional basis” (Interviewee 5, Agency officer, , Mdantsane, May 2017).

and

“...Electoral trainings are held here. Accommodation and meals for people trained to be electoral officers. Donor support is not targeted at development improvement we offer our building and services to

secure investments” (Interviewee 1, Agency officer, East London, May 2017)

and

“...We assist them by providing bursaries to the youth they work with and sometimes skills training” (Interviewee 3, Agency officer, Bhisho, May 2017).

According to the respondents and the illustration on Table (5.2), the municipal donor support is targeted at improving education, health, sanitation, water supply, housing, roads and transport. According to Crewe (1994), Mithien (1999) and Dieter Opp (2008), these are the electoral factors that measures the socio-economic well-being of citizens and residents of the municipality. According to Clive et al (2016) and Harutyunyan (2016), in Sub-Saharan Africa, Mozambique remains one of the deprived countries in the region receiving large volumes of Development Assistance (DA) from the international donor community yet the majority of its population still continue to suffer from poverty. The same could be said of other municipalities in South Africa. In the words of Acheampong (2016), there is the need to recognise variety of important community actors in the health sector at Ashaiman (a suburb of Accra, Ghana) and to find out what each can do to bring about improvement in sanitation in their homes before they can dispose of refuse. The improvement cuts across all sides of society. In the words of Msengana-Ndlela (2006), the revenue improvement programme should be seen within the framework of the five-year strategic plan.

Twelve municipalities across nine provinces in South Africa have been selected to develop a model for improved revenue generation in municipalities. She pointed to the need to bridge the social distance between clienteles and municipalities, paying particular attention to issues that have annoyed the public and worn the confidence in the municipality. This meant improving functioning and organisational systems, ensuring improved coordination of departments and improving the financial and economic capability of municipalities. Manomano et al (2017) contended that though the worldwide confirmation of human self-worth remains a resolve whose massive scopes would be remarkably formidable for all but the truly far-sighted, reimagining appropriate and current emancipatory philosophy has the prospective to contribute towards improving the situations and statuses that threaten and

incapacitate human self-esteem. It is principally notable that emerging nations, and their rural areas, in particular, continue to be plagued by an absence of access to basic needs such as adequate access to basic education, social development and housing. The table below shows the donor conditionality attached to donor support.

Table 8.3: Donor conditionality attached to donor support

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
Disagree	1	2.9	2.9	8.8
Don't Know	3	8.8	8.8	17.6
Agree	20	58.8	58.8	76.5
Strongly Agree	8	23.5	23.5	100.0
Total	34	100.0	100.0	

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The majority of the respondents, cumulative total of 82.3% agreed that donors placed conditionality on their support. A cumulative total of 11.7% however, disagreed that there were no conditionality attached to donor support. The result from table 5.3 reveal an overwhelming response from participants that donors place conditionality on their support. This is consistent with the development aid theory that their support was targeted at good governance, transparency and electoral reforms and multipartyism. According to Muriuki (2000), Thompson (1992), Dzengwa (2004), Mulonya (2010) and Mundau (2013), the termination of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union has heartened democratisation in most parts of Africa. At the same time, Western donors' approaches towards beneficiaries of foreign aid have changed. This has occasioned in a new exercise, which forces Third World states to move toward liberal democracy by conditioning lending on the holding of multi-party elections.

Donor conditionality, according to the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) started to emphasize on the elevation of human rights. During this time, political conditionality made its first major appearance. Political conditionality “entails the linking of perceived benefits to another state to the fulfilment of conditions relating to the protection of human rights and the advancement of democratic principles”. Although support conditionality had

previously been used by some Bretton Woods institutions, this conditionality was mostly fixated on economic-stabilization. In the 1990s, aid conditionality was no longer limited to economic determinations but spread to political liberalization, good governance and human rights. These assertions reflect the reciprocal relations that exist in the norm of reciprocity where donors have their expectations in what they can get back for their investments (Van,2016; Jakupe et al, 2016; Collier et al, 2016; Cassomon et al, 2017; Dijk, 2017; Adam et al, 2016; Koch et al, 2017; Skladany, 2017; Jakupiec, 2018; Paraji, 2017). Below is an excerpt of an interview from one of the respondents on donor funding as some form of investment:

“...Politicians are corrupt that we need to acknowledge... the donor funding conditionality would also differ as these donor funding are regarded as investments. They may be investments for business or loyalty investments” (Interviewee 4, Agency officer, Zwelitsha, May 2017)

The above response from the participant showed that most of the donors to political parties are mainly interested in the returns on their investments. The returns, as can be seen, are based on the principles of reciprocity. In this sense, the tenets of social justice and equity has been relegated to the background. Clearly, the donors are focused on profits and what will come to them as benefits to themselves alone and not on the interest of the greater majority of citizens in the municipality. Donors benefit from their sponsorship packages through patronage and clientelism. Their gestures unwittingly solicit patronage of their products and their services. Table 5.4 shows what attached conditionalities are likely to induce.

Table 8.4: Attached conditionalities and what they are likely to induce

	Responses		Percent of Cases	
	N	Percent		
\$donor_conditionality_induce				
s ^a	Tax Exemptions	14	12.1%	45.2%
	Free trade	20	17.2%	64.5%
	Electoral Reforms	24	20.7%	77.4%
	Democratism	23	19.8%	74.2%
	Trade Liberalisation	10	8.6%	32.3%
	Platform.Politics	12	10.3%	38.7%
	GrassRoots	13	11.2%	41.9%

Total	116	100.0%	374.2%
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a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The table above summarizes the findings on the perceived effects of donor support. It was found that 20.0% of the respondents suggested that donor support induced electoral reforms; 19.8% suggested that it induced democratization; 17.2% suggested that it induced free trade; 12.15 suggested that it induced tax exemptions. 11.2% of the respondents suggested that donor support induced grass root development; while 10.3% suggested that it induced platforms for political interaction; with 8.6% of the respondents suggesting that donor funding induced trade liberalization. As indicated in the above table 5.4, 20.7% of respondents stated that the conditionality is likely to result in electoral reforms which promotes good governance and fair representation.. Again, 19.8% noted that it is likely lead to democratisation which is clearly the ambition of most development aid givers. According to Baylies (2007), the use of aid to impose political conditions on recipient countries, to further democratic and government reforms or to punish non-compliance with earlier demands, is a relatively new feature of the international aid regime. She evaluates the proliferating donor and academic literature emerging on the subject.

At the heart of discussion of democracy/ governance policies are debates about transformation of the state, its relationship to economic development and the decreasing extent to which considerations of sovereignty limit donor interventions. Baylies (2007), Swedlund (2007) and Woll (2008) observed that political conditionality may assist the development of democratic movements in Africa, “there is an irony in that structural adjustment risks undermining the state reforms seen to be essential to them while, equally, democratisation may challenge the processes of economic restructuring being imposed”. During the discussions on the functions of donor support, some respondents had this to say:

“...It induces democratisation because we invest with the aim of benefiting at a long run” (Interviewee 3, Agency officer, Bhisho, May 2017)

and

“.. Yes, donor support does a lot not only for elections but also for the well-being of the citizens in the municipality. Most of the support we give are channeled into development projects which benefits the poor and the disadvantaged in our society. The reality is that, in whatever way you look at it, we need donor support, we need development partners and that is why we support in our own little way we can. In this sense, yes, I agree, donor support induce democratization” (Interviewee 2, Agency officer, Mdantsane, May 2017).

The excerpts of interviewees above clearly captures the sentiments of the majority of the respondents concerning the likely effects of aid conditionality. For instance, Agency officer 3 stated that “they invest with aim of benefitting at the long run”.

Gibson et al (2015) corroborated the above sentiments by arguing that after the Cold War, “Donors increased their use of technical assistance in aid packages, improving their monitoring capacity and thus reducing autocrats’ ability to use aid for patronage”. To remain in power, “autocrats responded by conceding political rights to their opponents—from legalizing opposition parties to staging elections”. They tested their theory with panel data for all sub-Saharan African countries. They noted that while other factors played pivotal roles in Africa’s political liberalization, they found that technical assistance helps to “explain the timing and extent of Africa’s democratization” (Del Biondo et al, 2014; Hackenesch, 2015; O’Shea, 2016; Molenaers et al, 2015; Babayan et al, 2017; Roessler, 2005; Henderson, 2003; Rahman, 2006; Savin et al, 2011; Grosh et al, 1996; Ethier, 2003; Schmitter, 1999; Diamond, 1995; Faust et al, 2012; Edwards et al, 1996).

In the analysis, the findings confirmed the hypothesis on donor support importance and democratisation as was used in a regression analysis which also confirmed the stated hypothesis indicating that when donor support importance was regressed on the importance of donor funding for democratisation, it explained 29.1% in democratisation variability which is caused by donor support on the residents with significant relationship which indicate a high degree of correlation between donor support and democratisation. (cf.table7.5).

According to Anderson et al (2016), as democracy develops in poor countries around the world, “wealthier countries have sought to enhance social development and democratisation through donor assistance”. According to them, some donors have begun to consider donations to local communities and to local government. They hold the view that “if local government is democratic, it may well deliver assistance more immediately than does national government”. They further stated that, “donors have had a powerful effect on improving people’s lives and on advancing democratisation”. Again, they stated that as the democratic quality of the national government has declined, aid has continued to advance democratisation by providing mayors and community leaders with a resource base independent of national government.

Similarly, Fiedler (2016) noted that donor support can achieve peace and democratisation if donors jointly pursue political agenda that connect to local community needs and to home-grown processes (Mercer, 2007; Fowler, 1993; Hauser,1999; Fowler, 1991; Savun et al, 2011; Edwards et at,1996; Belloni, 2008; Stewart, 1997; Ott et al, 2000; Brown, 2001; Brett, 2017; Fuchs et al, 2015; Macdonald, 2016; Bermeo, 2016; Van de Walle, 2016; Delcour et al, 2015; Noutcheva, 2016). The table 5.5 below shows the focus of aid conditionalities and what it is supposed to ensure.

Table 8.5: Focus of aid conditionalities and the items it is to ensure

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
\$Aid_conditionalty_focus ^a	Accountability	23	19.8%	69.7%
	Judicious	22	19.0%	66.7%
	Investments	9	7.8%	27.3%
	Safeguard profits	6	5.2%	18.2%
	Reforms	6	5.2%	18.2%
	Good governance & Democratisation	25	21.6%	75.8%
	Deepen democracy	25	21.6%	75.8%
	Total	116	100.0%	351.5%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

This section found that 21.6% of the respondents perceived that the focus of the aid was to ensure good governance and democratization; another 21.6% perceived that it was to deepen democracy. 19.8% of the respondents perceived that it was geared towards accountability; while 19.0% perceived that it was for judicious purposes. 7.8% perceived that it was for investments while 5.2% suggested that it was for reforms and safeguarding profits separately. The results as indicated from the table above shows the importance of the focus of aid conditionality in inducing good governance and democratisation. It could be seen clearly from the results the 21.6% of respondents stated that the expectation of donors was to achieve democratisation and good governance as the ideal result from democratisation is to ensure that the people have the right to vote and have a voice in their political system. The results also confirms that accountability, constituting 19.8% and judicious use of donation (19.0%) are focus of aid givers. According to Swedlund (2017), Jorg et al (2012), Fisher (2013), Raimund (2014), Woll (2008) and Baylies (2007), citizens in donor countries have a strong preference for conditioning foreign aid on good governance.

Over 90% of respondents in the 2011 Eurobarometer, which sampled more than 25,000 individuals from 27 countries, expressed that foreign aid should be conditioned on democracy, human rights and governance. The findings of this study agree with Swedlund (2017), Nikolas (2010), Borchgrevink, (2011), Haymen, (2011) and Tjonneland's (2008) assertion that the focus of donor assistance be conditioned on deepening democracy, thus ensuring accountability and safeguarding donor's investment and profits. This position was reinforced by some respondents during the discussions on aid conditionality as follows:

"...The aim is to have a large chunk of investment when ANC wins the elections through which we can only benefit if the organisation we supported wins" (Interviewee 5, Agency officer, King William's Town, May 2017).

and

"...We scratch your back, you scratch ours, meaning we help the party when preparing for elections if the party wins the party will invest in us" (Interviewee 2, Agency officer, East London May 2017).

The above responses from the participants is a reflection on the theory of reciprocity where according to Gouldner (1956), benefits are exchanged for benefits, good for good and evil for evil.




Figure 8.4: Donor conditionality has effects on voters

Source: Computer printout of a graph derived from the data and findings of this study

The findings on the effects of donor conditionality show that 64.17% of the respondents agreed that donor support has effects on voters in South Africa; 20.59% strongly agreed. 11.76% were in disagreement while 2.94% strongly disagreed. From the above findings, it shows that support has effects on voters. Figure 5.4 above shows respondents view on donor conditionality on voter. Majority of respondents 64.17% agree that donor conditionality has effect on voters. This is because voters perceive that a creation of political space and a transition to a democratic regime has been advanced for them (Gift, 2015). This results reflect the assertion of voters' behaviour theory that the effect of influences on voting behaviour is best understood through theories on the formation of attitudes, beliefs, schema, knowledge structures and the practice of information processing (Braha et al, 2017 and Diener, 2000).

The above results is consistent with the observations of Layton et al (2015), who asserted that social assistance shapes election results across Latin America. Layton et al (2015) further noted that case studies in numerous countries have established electoral effects, yet it remains uncertain whether and how effects vary cross-nationally, and whether electoral effects are due to mobilization or persuasion. Table 5.6 below shows the likely effects of donor conditionality on voters.

Table 8.6: Likely effects of Donor conditionality on voters

	Responses		Percent of Cases	
	N	Percent		
\$Donor_Conditionality_effects ^a	Disrupt elections	17	16.0%	50.0%
	Lower Voter	23	21.7%	67.6%
	Delay.Voting	1	0.9%	2.9%
	Delay.Announcing	4	3.8%	11.8%
	Poor logistics	28	26.4%	82.4%
	Poor Equipment	19	17.9%	55.9%
	Untrained Officers	14	13.2%	41.2%
Total	106	100.0%	311.8%	

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The majority of the respondents 26.4% cited that donor support conditionality would cause voters to be affected by poor logistics; 21.75 suggested that there would low voter turnout; 17.9% suggested that there would be poor equipment; 16.0% suggested donor conditionality can be disruptive to the elections; 13.25 suggested that it would result in untrained officers being used; 3.9 % suggested delays in announcements while 0.9% suggested that there would be delays in voting. The above table 5.6 provide stunning results on the effects of voters on donor conditionality. The results revealed that 26.4% of respondents felt conditionality would produce poor logistics which would affect voters. 17.9% of respondents recorded that conditionality can result in poor equipment. This is true in situations where poor equipment are secured for elections as a result of lack of finance or diminished donor support. The voters' behaviour theory predicts the behavior of voters in an election. For instance, 16.0% responded that conditionality can lead to election

disruption. This appears to be typical of most countries where disagreements emerged as a result of activities of election sponsors. In corroborating the above, Platz (2016) pointed out that Competitive national elections are able to perform a substantial role in the consolidation process of developing and established democracies alike. Nevertheless, if not handled adequately, they have the potential to bring long-existing, existential conflict lines to the surface. This electoral conflict, becoming manifest in election violence, has the potential to shy people off from voting and negatively affect their attitude towards elections and democracy in general. Platz (2016) examined the ways in which violent electoral conflict affected the political participation and the personal attitudes towards democracy of ordinary Kenyan citizens. Kenya has experienced violent electoral conflict repeatedly since the re-introduction of competitive elections in 1992 and became one of its prime examples due to the devastating 2008 post-election clashes. Similarly, Muriuki (2000) examined donor conditionality and democratisation in Kenya by examining the results of 1992 and 1997 multi-party elections. According to Muriuki (2000), the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union has encouraged democratisation in most parts of Africa.

At the same time, Western donors' approaches concerning recipients of foreign assistance have changed. This has resulted in a new practice, which attempts to force Third World states to move toward liberal democracy by conditioning lending on the holding of multi-party elections. To a large extent, this may be true as development aid theories propose that it enlarges civil liberties, transparency and broader political pluralism and participation. The effects of donor conditionality were discussed extensively by respondents. Below are the views of some of the participants with regard to donor conditionalities:

“...The mandate of Parliament is based on the provisions of chapter 4 of the Constitution, which establishes Parliament and sets out the functions it performs. Parliament is elected to represent all South African citizens, to ensure government by the people under the Constitution, and to represent the provinces in the national sphere of government. It does this by electing the president, providing a national forum for the public consideration of issues, passing legislation, and scrutinising and overseeing executive action” (interviewee 2, Agency officer, Bhishe, May 2017).

and

“...Yes, unfavourable conditionality will impact negatively on the poor and the disadvantaged in the municipality. Conditionality on elections can affect turnout and even logistics. It may even restrain the performance of elected politician since this conditionality will be hanging on their necks as an albatross” (Interviewee 5, Agency officer, King William’s Town, May 2017)

Based on the findings and the above responses from interviewees, it is evident that donor conditionality is likely to result in lower voter turnout, the voting process can be affected by poor logistics and poor equipment. It further indicated by suggesting that donor conditionality can be disruptive to the elections; 13.2% suggested that it would result in untrained officers being used; 3.9 % suggested it could result in delays in announcements of results while 0.9% suggested that there would be delays in voting. The section below discusses the political party perceptions of donor funding and democratisation in the municipality.

5.5. Political Parties’ perceptions of donor funding and democratisation in the municipality

Through the procedures and techniques under the methodology, data was collected and processed. This section presents the data obtained in the study on the perceptions of political parties on donor funding and democratisation in the administration of municipal elections. The section analysed the findings through the combination of empirical studies and relevant theoretical framework of Democratisation (Elsentadt, 2002, 2003; Acemoglu et al, 2000; Allison, 1994; Gift et al, 2015), the political party theory (Ley, 1959; Dror, 2012; Olson, 2015; Hyden et al, 2004) and the voter’s behaviour theory (Larzasfeld et al, 1944, 1954, 1955; Biswal et al, 2010; Braha et al, 2017).

In addition, the theory moral norm of reciprocity (Uehara, 1995; Masumi et al, 2008; Gouldner, 1960) and the social justice and equity theories (Rawl, 1971; Weiner, 1992; Ostrom, 2009; Charmaz, 2011; Larson et al, 2002) have also been utilized. This section discussed the activities of political parties in relation to their history in South African politics, their work and functions in democratisation and how they

influence and contribute to democratic politics in South Africa. In particular, it will engage in the debate of political party finance and donor support dynamics as it pertains to the Buffalo City municipality in the Eastern Cape.

A political party is an coalition of like-minded people who put effort together to triumph in elections and control of the government. Political parties strive alongside one another for political power and for the capability to put their philosophies and strategies into practice (Bawn, 2012; Aldrich, 2011; Leys, 1969; Strom, 1990; Montero, 2003; Bawn et al, 2012; Cohen, 2009). Political parties execute an important assignment in government. They bring people together to achieve control of the government, develop policies positive to their interests or the groups that support them, and organise and influence voters to elect their candidates to office.

Members of the same political party share a common goal, aims and objectives. Different political parties contest with each other with the view to influence the public policies and opinion with their philosophies, ideals, and objectives (Masket, 2009; Karol, 2009; Bawn et al, 2006; Koger et al, 2009; Hernson, 2009; Koger et al, 2010; Noel, 2014; Laymen et al, 2010; Aldrich, 2011; Skinner et al, 2012; Grossman et al, 2009; Heaney et al, 2012; Feinstein et al, 2008; Cohen et al, 2008; Boatright, 2013; Dominguez, 2011; Aldrich et al, 2010; Hernson,2010; Debie, 2012; Prickett, 2016; Novak, 2015).

The section below deliberates on donor support and democratisation.

5.5.1. Donor support and Democratization

Democratisation is a creation of political space and a transition to a democratic regime (Gift, 2015). It involves a political change moving in a democratic direction (Feng, 1997). The outcome of democratisation is the consolidation of civil liberties and democratic rights for citizens to participate in the political deliberations of the nation and to ensure the economic and social well-being of the citizens of a country. Democratisation is influenced by factors such as economic development, history and civil society. The ideal result from democratisation is to ensure that the people have the right to vote and have a voice in their political system (Przworski et al, 2000; Rice et al, 2002; Treisman, 2015; Traversa, 2014; Clark et al, 2013; Acemoglu et al, 2006).

According to Lynch et al (2011), over two decades have elapsed since the 'third wave' of democratization started to move across sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s. The introduction offers a comprehensive assessment of the (lack of) advancement made in democratization processes in Africa from 1990 to 2010. It climaxes seven parts of growth and limitations, namely: increasingly illegitimate, but ongoing military intervention; regular elections and occasional handovers of power, but realities of democratic rollback and hybrid regimes; democratic institutionalization, but ongoing high-level and extensive corruption; the institutionalization of political parties, but prevalent ethnic voting and the rise of an exclusionary (and often violent) politics of belonging; increasingly thick civil societies, but local truths of vulgarity, violence and insecurity; new political freedoms and economic growth, but extensive political controls and uneven development; and the donor community's assorted obligation to, and at times awkward impact on, democracy promotion. "We conclude that steps forward remain greater than reversals and that typically, though not universally, sub-Saharan African countries are more democratic today than in the late 1980s" (Lynch et al, 2011). Simultaneously, Lynch et al (2011) called for more expressive progressions of democratization that aim not only at obtaining civil and political privileges, but also socio-economic rights and the physical security of African citizens. The following respondents articulated their impressions on donor support and democratisation during the discussions as follows:

"...What do we get from elections? We just waste our time. It is just a wasteful exercise since it does not necessarily translate into enduring benefits for the present nor for the future" (Interviewee1, Political party Member, Mdantsane, April 2016).

"...It is just a few elite in society who are enjoying at our expense" "Look, we have suffered a lot. We continue to battle with life every day. We have children to take of, our youth are unemployed when they leave school. The system is frustrating. All of these are a creation of the capitalist bourgeois you call donors. They are all looting criminals who connive and hijack our freedom and wellbeing" (Interviewee 2, Political party Member, East London, April 2016)

In supporting the above respondents, Ihonvbere (2007) observed that, Africa, like most regions of the world, has not been avoided by the present upsurge of political changes from various types of dictatorships to more open political systems. Workers, students, women, religious leaders, rural and urban associations, and even sectors of the military have become fed up with subjugation, corruption, economic malpractice, and the choking of civil society. In response, they have agitated for political liberalization, and a return to democratic politics and governance. The subsection below discusses donor support and elections

5.5.2. Donor support and elections

The results that was gathered from respondents from political party members has shown respondents' reaction to donor support and elections and democratisation. During the discussions, political party members 1 and 2 from Mdantsane and East London respectively registered their displeasure for elections. Political party member 1 saw elections as a waste of time and a wasteful exercise when he said, *"What do we get from elections? We just waste our time. It is just a wasteful exercise since it does not necessarily translate into enduring benefits for the present nor for the future"* The above response expresses a voice of desperation and frustration on the part of a party member. According to the political party theory, the effects of voting on emotions can produce emotional responses that may bias the choice voters and party members make and potentially affect subsequent emotional states.

According to Simpson et al (2017), cash transfers, both conditional and unconditional, have become progressively popular in incipient economies, but comparatively little study scrutinises the types of countries most likely to embrace this form of social assistance. Simpson et al (2017) stated that, programme funders have offered enhanced clarification of cash transfer adoption in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from 1990 to 2011. The outcomes indicate that conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are accepted in poor African countries with financial support from the World Bank, while unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) are adopted across an array of countries with the support of various donors. He concludes that his work shows quantitatively that donor support may be more significant than some domestic

factors, such as bureaucratic capacity, for understanding CCT implementation in SSA (Simpson, 2017; Bhishop et al, 2016; Kerr, 2017; Posner et al, 2002; Southall, 2005; Langan 2016; Crespin, 2006; Gramby-Sobukwe, 2005).

Linking the findings to the basis of donor support for elections, participants were divided in their views. Some indicated that donor support is necessary to run the country and to facilitate developmental projects (Amundsen, 2007; Barkan, 1993; Carothers, 2005; Brautigam, 2010; Kurokawa et al, 2008; Santiso et al., 2006). However, their fear was that it could lead to corruption, vote buying and vote switching. These opinions were corroborated by research participants during the interviews as follows:

“...There is a participation crisis in our democracies. Fewer people are turning out for elections and many hate politicians or believe they are all the same. In between elections, there are not many opportunities for ordinary people to influence the issues that affect them. Democracy has been diluted” (Interviewee 3, Political party official, East London, July 2016)

“...All of them are the same. They are in this game for themselves. I mean the politicians and their development partners and cohorts” (interviewee 2, Political party member, Bhisho, May 2016)

It can be seen from the above discussion that, respondents express despondency, anger and anxiety. According to the affective intelligence theory, anger escalates the usage of widespread knowledge and reliance upon stereotypes and other heuristics (Parker et al, 2010). Lard et al (2011:347) noted that anger and anxiety are emotions that increase political alertiveness while decreasing reliance on party identification when deciding between candidates. This affects decision-making capabilities.

In agreement with the above respondents, Awortwi (2017) noted that the commitment of government is based on a social contract that the state has with its citizens, not on any specific written policy or legislation. Awortwi (2017) observed that in Uganda, Kenya and Nigeria, the presence or absence of policy or legislative documents makes no difference to the nature of state support for cash transfer. It is the historical pattern of patronage policies and donor solidarity that influences

programmes. The perceptions among recipients of cash transfers is that they are at the mercy of the politician for handouts. Awortwi (2017) and Simpson (2017) further pointed out that in Africa, the democratic policies are often associated with the expression of social protection programme. Awortwi (2017) said based on the country studies, promises to expand the reporting and funds of current cash transfer were supported during elections. His view was that donors have played important roles in pushing home notions about cash transfers and electoral policies which has played key roles where development of programmes has occurred (Awortwi, 2017; Adam, 2008; Kuenzi et al, 2017; Kangwa, 2016; Cesarino, 2016; Adejumobi, 2000; Bleck-Jamie et al, 2012; Mozaffer, 2002). Below are interview extracts from some of the respondents during the interviews about donor support and elections:

“...Yes, our party do receive donor support. They come in the form of vehicles which we use for our campaigns, we also use part to maintain our office staffs in the provinces, districts, towns and cities” (Interviewee 4, Political party member, King William’s Town, June 2016)

“...The party raises its funds from membership dues, fundraising activities, special levies, sale of party souvenirs and paraphernalia, donations, public goodwill and support from donors” (Interviewee 1, political party official, East London, July 2016).

The above views illustrate that political parties in the municipality receive and attach great importance to the donor support they receive for electoral purposes. According to Fisher (2013), Smidt (2016), Simpson (2017), Ogundime (1997), Darnolf (2011), Msila et al, (2017), Maphunye (2017), Abbink (2017), Southall (2009), Galvin et al (2010), Brown (2010) and Matlosa et al (2013), following the downfall of the Soviet Union and the end of a bipolar world, Africa's Western donors quickly gathered around a conceptually direct agenda in their approach to election assistance on the continent's 'political conditionality'. This democracy-promotion strategy involved supporting through aid cuts and other instruments, the pull to pieces of 'one party' autocracies throughout aid-dependent Africa and seeing them substituted by Western-style 'multi-party' systems. Though donor divisions and foreign policy requirements rapidly saw this often challenging project undercut, an international

focus on promoting democracy in Africa through pressuring recalcitrant 'presidents for life' to sanction and institutionalize 'multi-partyism' remained a central preoccupation for the donor community throughout the 1990s. In their study to search the relationship between political party affiliation and Latino distinctiveness, drawing on the 2002 National Survey of Latinos, Dutwin et al (2005), Carpinella et al (2013), Czech et al (2001) and Gerber et al (2010) found that Latinos were considerably more likely to identify themselves as Republicans as opposed to Democrats based on their self-identification along ethnic lines. Their devotion to Latino family ideals and values, and their general trust of politicians and perceptions of politicians' interest in Latinos.

According to Basedau et al (2011), ethnicity matters, but that its effect is largely rather weak and fluctuates with regard to party systems and individual parties. 'Ethnic parties' in the strict sense are practically lacking. In particular, the voters' location seems more important than ethnic connection. Other elements such as regional ties, exclusive policies, cross-cutting cleavages, and cogent inclinations merit more consideration in the future study of voting behaviour in Africa. Young (2012) hold the view that in Africa political parties hardly differ from each other in their policy packages. Young (2012) explained the decisions to stay with or defect from political parties made by Members of Parliament in Malawi – a sub-Saharan African country that clearly lacks a salient ideological cleavage. He exhibited that re-election prospects and joining the government significantly determine patterns of party swapping.

Young (2012) found various evidence that ethno-regional relations account for allegiance, and no evidence that governing party politicians leave their parties to avoid culpability for pitiable government performance. Manning (2005) pointed out that even though political parties help outline central democratic processes and institutions, parties and party systems have received moderately little attention on democratization in Africa. Manning (2005) argues that party systems in most African countries are constructed on quite a different basis from the one that undergirds both advanced industrial democracies and the theories about party systems produced by their practices. This assertion supports the notion of the political party theory by Ley (1959), Dror (2012) and Olson (2015) which aligns with the proportional representation system which favours "multipartyism" as it relates to what pertains to

the Buffalo City Municipality as opposed to the single – majority single-ballot system of balloting in single member communities which favours two party state. The table below shows donor support importance for organising elections. Table 5.7 below indicates the responses on donor support importance for organizing elections.

Table 9.1: Donor support importance for organizing elections

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree	11	31.4	31.4	31.4
Strongly Agree	24	68.6	68.6	100.0
Total	35	100.0	100.0	

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

When questioned on the importance of donor support for organizing elections, 68.6% of the respondents strongly agreed while 31.4% agreed. This made a cumulative 100.0% in agreement to donor support for organizing elections. As can be seen from the results above, 68.6% of respondents strongly agreed that donor support was important for elections. While 31.4% agreed that support was necessary for elections. Grauvogel (2016) assessed the Cheeseman notion of how he contended with some of the most vital questions confronting Africa and democracy today, as well as whether international players should make the effort and encourage democracy in a foreign country, how to plan political systems that cope with ethnic diversity, and why democratic governments often make bad policy decisions. Grauvogel (2016) contended that the colonial period, with the introduction of multi-party elections and ending in 2013 with the failure of democracy in Mali and South Sudan, defines the increase of dictatorial states in the 1970s; the attempts of trade unions and some religious groups to check the misuse of power in the 1980s; the amazing reappearance of multiparty politics in the 1990s; and finally, the catastrophic propensity for elections to aggravate dishonesty and violence have become matters that bother the conscience of democratic scholars, practitioners and society. Kuenzi et al (2017) examined the causes of electoral unpredictability in 35

African countries from 1972 to 2010. Their findings indicated that electoral instability is lower when foreign assistance is high, while structural adjustment programs are related with increased unpredictability. The findings contributed to the research on the political economy of aid, demonstrating the effect of these economic practices on election results. The following is an interview excerpt illustrating a typical response on the issue about the political economy of aid:

“... Yes, I believe, because donor support is very important, remember in South Africa, we still have a backlog of resources particularly as black parties we don't have much money for example to campaigning to advertise, as a political party we don't have money to advertise. For instance if you gonna say to advertise in the SABC, you must pay many millions of rand, and we don't have that. Donors are often important because they are bringing about relief in terms of financing. So I strongly believe that donors are important to a greater extent” (Interviewee 4, Political party official, Zwelitsha, May 2017).

Interviewee 4, party officer from Zwelisha concurred that, he believes donor support is very important. He noted that some young parties lack resources for party activity like advertising. So donors bring relief to them.

In support of the above opinions expressed by the respondents, Svasand (2011) Welzel et al (2008) and Grauvogel (2016) thought that Malawi continues to be deeply hooked on the international community for financial sustenance, including the financing of elections, which restricts the potentials for Malawi's elected officials to follow policy priorities which may be contrasting by donor countries and international finance institutions. Below is a respondent's view in support of the idea of donor funding importance in organising elections:

“... Well, in South Africa people are mainly supported by the IEC through the national elections Acts and no funding has always proven to be sufficient especially during elections times. So in order for the parties to be fully visible and to be able to get to all places to try and campaign. It is important to have trained party agents, to have trained campaign people who are into door-to-door and other campaign strategies then parties acquire donor funding. So donor funding helps party's to be able to reach

out to voters, to be able to interact with diverse voters and be able to send their message and their electoral manifestos to voters. So that is how donor funding is very useful. Then it also means, if you look at how the Act, how IEC funds political party, it funds them on this basis of eeh, in proportion to their electoral results. That is if you get 60% in the election, say is for ANC, you will get 60% of the funding. Now, that means, the smaller parties and the new parties will likely get very little funding outside of funding or donor funding. Now if their intention is to have a multi-party democracy, to have many parties operating, then the IEC alone will profit sufficiently for that so donor funding becomes important to the party. It expands the political space and the participation of the smaller and the new parties. It also helps the bigger parties where the IEC funding proofs insufficient” (Interviewee 4, Political party member, Mdantsane, May 2017)

The above accounts suggested that donor support for organizing elections is not important but also crucial to facilitate smooth running of political parties. This is attested to by the findings that showed political parties’ agreement to the importance of donor support. However, respondents also indicated the effective supportive role played by IEC through the provisions of the national elections Act.

The table below indicates that donor support facilitates the operations of political parties.

Table 9.2: Donor support facilitates the operations of the party

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree	17	48.6	48.6	48.6
Strongly Agree	18	51.4	51.4	100.0
Total	35	100.0	100.0	

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The findings on donor support in facilitating party operations, indicated that 51.4% of the respondents strongly agreed while 48.6% agreed; this brought a cumulative total of 100.0% who were in support with the notion of donor support in the facilitation of party operations. From the findings of this study, it is clear that donor support facilitates the operations of political parties in the municipality. According to Routledge et al (2016), there is an endless problem of obtaining finance to provide key resources. For instance, Routledge et al (2016) intimated that the PGA Asia conference in Dhaka was hindered by almost two years due to the difficulties related with fund-raising and was further caught up by the late obtainability of some of those funds. The ANC is a party-movement that draws on its liberation credentials yet is conflicted by a multitude of weaknesses, factions and internal succession battles.

Booyesen (2011) builds her analysis around the ANC's four faces of political power – organisation, people, political parties and elections, and policy and government – and explores how, since 1994, it has acted to continuously regenerate its power. Scoones et al (2016) have asked if a new model for development assistance is evolving, and argues that they must move past the basic descriptions of either “South–South” relationship or “neo-imperial” expansion of “rising powers” to look at the active and disputed politics of engagement, as new forms of investment and technology enter African situations. Historical practices in Brazil and China, as well as local political and economic arguments, affect how interventions are outlined, and by whom, and so impact on tools chosen, investments funded, and who gets educated. There are both political and economic drivers at the core of these choices, but these are not uniform or uncontested, either in Brazil and China or in Africa. The findings were explicitly supported by excerpts of interviews from respondents with a typical example as follows:

“... For example, as I have said, previously that we were struggling, in our organisation Donor support help our organisation. As I said earlier on, remember in politics the name of a party is a brand so it needs to be marketed and it needs a lot of capital. So we have managed to pass that stage of marketing our political party because the donors came in and they brought about relief to us” (Interviewee 3, Political party official King William’s Town, May 2017).

The above views were supported by Robinson (2016) who holds the view that strengthening civil society and political parties through the delivery of financial resources and technical assistance is observed by aid donors as an operative means of cultivating political pluralism and consolidating delicate democracies in developing countries. Starting from the proposition that donors lack a well-defined idea of civil society which covers its conflictual nature, Robinson (2016) considers a variety of possible problems that aid donors might encounter in relation to the practice of democratic consolidation when supporting civil society organizations. He contends that since donors are not well-prepared to handle these types of interventions, they need to avoid discouraging the independence and legality of recipient organizations. Robinson (2016) stated that their absorptive ability is restricted and only certain types of organization are able to contribute meritoriously to democracy promotion, and little is known about their impact. The objective of consolidating civil society may be creditable, but since it is a hard and possibly dangerous area for external intervention, donors should advance carefully and with meek prospects about what might be attained.

Robinson (2016) thinks that consolidation of civil society and political parties constitutes an increasingly important component in the collection of constructive support actions accepted by aid donors as part of the good government program. Although donors have long reinforced community associations, often through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the volume of aid allotted for this purpose has normally been small and it has been negligible to the main aid policy agenda. Robinson (2016) explored the justification behind this change in importance, emphasising the interaction of domestic and international factors. He then measured the range of significances ascribed to the concept in academic discussion and the role of civil society in the process of democratic consolidation.

The nature of the association between civil society and the state in Africa provides a basis for evaluating the role of foreign assistance and its possible influence on the internal dynamics of civic associations and their capacity to contribute to political diversity and democratic consolidation. The conclusion considers the benefits and limitations of this type of support in firming up civil society and the types of interventions and funding mechanisms that hold most potential in this respect (Routledge et al, 2016; Booyesen, 2017; Kingma, 2016; Scoones et al, 2016;

Robinson, 2016; Gu et al, 2016; Du Tott, 2017; Slater et al, 2016; Skaines, 2016). This was corroborated by a respondent as follows:

“... Well, in an election campaign, we have quite a lot of things to do. Unlike ordinary work where we operate in, during election campaigns, you need to train your volunteers, you must go door-to-door, you must train your party agents who must man the voting stations, you must be able to have, to distribute and communicate your message through all channels, through all media platforms which all cost money. So donor funding helps us in all those different areas as a party that we are able to have a properly run and peaceful election campaign” (Interviewee 2, Political party official, Mdantsane, May 2017).

Party official 2, stated that during election campaigns, there is the need to train volunteers and agents who will man the polling stations for the party and they need to be paid for their services. They need airtime in order to communicate and stay in touch. That is why support is important.

According to Sokomani (2010), Kumar (2007) Sarakinsky (2007) and Osei (2013), in an atmosphere where party financing, private funding in particular, is usually a laissez faire business, as in most Southern African countries, there is the actual vulnerability that interest groups and wealthy individuals will accept influence in political parties and in so doing wear away public assurance in the political system. Since they are neither exposed to public scrutiny nor subject to any law-making limitations, huge private donations can and often do come with strings attached. This absence of transparency and openness, as well as mechanisms to prevent it, provides sufficient ground for influence peddling, where those who pay the piper call the tune. Left unrestrained, this party funding situation will continue to be a serious indictment of the region's democratisation projects, crippling democracy and inhibiting economic development. The table below shows whether the parties receives donor support.

Table 9.3: Party receives donor support

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent

Valid Agree	12	34.3	34.3	34.3
Strongly Agree	23	65.7	65.7	100.0
Total	35	100.0	100.0	

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The majority of the respondents (65.7%) were in strong agreement with the fact that the party receives donor support; while 34.3% agreed to be aware that the party receives donor support. There was an overwhelming agreement on the issue of parties receiving support. 65.7% strongly agreed that parties receive support while 34.3% agreed to the question. The issue of party's financial support has been a hotly debated issue. Some critics have called on parties for full disclosure of their source of support, how much they receive, who are their funders and to openly publish their audited accounts. The findings of this study confirm that political parties in the municipality receive support especially financial support. However, Sarakinsky (2007) contended that legal action announced by the Institute for Democracy in Southern Africa against all political parties for the revelation of contributions started a debate over party-funding monitoring systems. The case for revelation and regulation highlighted the underlying connection between secret funding and corruption as well as the weakening of democratic practice. An empirical valuation of these claims shows that secrecy has not brought about these anticipated effects and that official institutions have been active in divulging and taking legal action against political and other forms of corruption. Moreover, proof is offered showing that the disclosure of donors' identities will prejudice smaller, opposition parties to the disadvantage of South Africa's multi-party democratic system. A suitable regulatory system for the country must develop from a purposeful process, rather than a legal decision, if it is to be effective. In addition, the regulations must balance transparency against the interests of smaller parties through innovative and country-specific monitoring mechanisms (Sarakinsky, 2007; Kumar, 2007; Osei, 2013; Sokomani, 2010). The excerpt below is a typical response of views of the interviewees about party donor support:

“... Yes I am aware because my party is a party that promotes transparency and openness. If there is donors, in fact, we our leadership what they usually do is to publicly announce those who donated to our organisation. We are a party that do everything in public. We don't do anything under the carpet. So I am aware” (Interviewee 5, Political party official, East London, May 2017).

The discussions on whether political parties receive donor support was openly articulated. Parties accepted the fact that they receive donor support. The above party officer conceded that his party practices transparency and openness, therefore they declare publicly the sources of their donations.

According to Kumar (2007) and Osei (2013), the global public has been providing support to political parties as part of its determinations to encourage multi-party democracy in developing and transition societies. Its support programmes are planned to help political parties advance their administrative abilities, promote internal democracy, recruit women and minorities, and effectively participate in legislative processes (Kumar, 2007; Osei, 2013). The programmes also support legal and regulatory reforms for active working of parties. Kumar (2007) examined the nature and form of political party assistance given by the international community. He also advances a number of questions and matters about party assistance programmes. They found out that, “there is a lack of local ownership of assistance programmes; the possible undesirable impacts of financial and commodity assistance; limited technical skill of donor and transitional organizations; limited time horizon of assistance projects; partisanship nature of assistance; balancing political party and civil society assistance; and finally the relevance of the assistance models” (Kumar, 2007; Osei, 2013). The table below indicates donor support utilization frequencies. Table 5.10 shows donor support utilization frequencies.

Table 9.4: Donor Support utilization Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Donor support utilization	Campaigns	34	22.2%	100.0%

	Logistics	25	16.3%	73.5%
	Training party agents	21	13.7%	61.8%
	Evacuating voters to voting centers	12	7.8%	35.3%
	party planning	21	13.7%	61.8%
	Voter Edu	29	19.0%	85.3%
	Stipend PO	11	7.2%	32.4%
Total		153	100.0%	450.0%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The majority of the donor funds, 22.2%, was utilized for campaigns; 19.0% was utilized for voter education; 16.35 was used for logistics; 13.7% was used for party planning; while another 13.7% was used for training party agents; 7.8% was used for evacuating voters to voting stations while 7.2% was utilized as stipend for party officers. The utilization of donor support is a very crucial matter in politics. This is the point where party corruption is widespread. Table 5.10 reveals that most parties 22.2% utilize their support on campaigns. The findings of the study shows that political parties in the municipality utilize their donor funds for campaigns, voter education, logistics acquisition, training of part agents and paying stipend for party officers. According to Weissenbach (2010), the contribution and the role of the Stiftungen in party support lines in the several phases of the democratization process is immense and massive. Weissenbach (2010) unambiguously traces the ambitions of the “German Stiftungen”, and explores the extent to which their party assistance activities take account of the various platforms of the democratic evolution process and of the level of party institutionalization. Weissenbach (2010) stated that the study advances a ‘phase model of party assistance’ in the changeover process and scrutinizes the party assistance activities in two illustrative cases – the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung (FES) in Kenya and in South Africa – in seven

dimensions of “party institutionalization: level of organization internal party democracy, political programme, autonomy, roots in society, coherence, and, regional and international integration”.

To expand the effectiveness of political parties as well as their proficiency to support the democratic consolidation of transformation states and young democracies, numerous Western institutions and organizations are working in the field of party support and party assistance (Weissenbach, 2010; Burnell et al, 2010; Baker, 2010; Rakner et al, 2010; Lynch et al, 2011; Taylor, 2016; Paret, 2016) According to Taylor (2016) parties in new democracies often avoid programmatic policy proposals in support of appealing to voters’ ethnic distinctiveness, dispensing non-programmatic benefits, or emphasizing the personalities of their candidates. However, this is not comprehensively the case. Taylor (2016) examined current campaign approaches in two blossoming democracies in Africa: Ghana and Kenya.

Taylor (2016) suggested that programmatic campaigning is much more common than is assumed, but that parties have different inclinations for how much programmatic content they include in their campaigns. Taylor (2016) argues that differences in campaign tactics are primarily due to differences in the structure of ethnic support for contending parties. Parties that attract a majority of their support from a single large ethnic group are more likely to develop campaign strategies based on programmatic, policy-based appeals in the form of definite schemes for national public goods than are parties with a more diverse ethnic base of supporters. Taylor (2016) further argued that these requests serve as a pre-election commitment to defuse uncertainties among the electorate of domination by the large ethnic core of the party. These findings were supported by some respondents who said:

“... Like I said, it is for programs of the organisation varying from all sorts of things. It is for the development of manifesto. Like I said before, it is for the organisation of workshops, political education programs. I am coming from program for example, which is the planning for the ANC working government that will lead to the Eastern Cape Province address. So we generate some of the funds to assist with this” (interviewee 3, Political party officer, Mdantsane, March 2017)

“... Mainly for us, the areas that we use donor support for will be on training both for our election volunteers and party agents, on securing campaign materials, that is your posters, flyers, media access and all of that. We also use that fund for our election monitoring in all our operational centres that is the centres that are set up during elections to monitor voter activities. So those are the main areas that we use donor funding for” (Interviewee 4, Political party officer, Bhisho, March 2017)

As observed above, the evidence supports the findings that donor support is utilized for political party campaigns, voter education, training of political agents and appointees, logistics acquisition and stipend for officials. The figure below shows that it is difficult to organise a party without donor support.




Figure 9.1: It is difficult to organize a party without donor support

Source: Computer printout of a graph derived from the data and findings of this study

When questioned on the difficulty in organizing a party without donor support, the majority of the respondents 71.43 strongly agreed; 17.14% agreed; 5.71% disagreed; 2.86% strongly disagreed while another 2.86% were not sure. The results from figure 5.5 indicate that 71.43% of respondents strongly agreed that it was difficult to organize party without donor support. This brings the financing of political

parties into sharp focus. According to Osei (2013), political parties are commonly thought of as representatives of democracy that achieve a range of purposes, such as policy design, interest accumulation and articulation, social integration, and elite recruitment. However, given the weakness of many African parties, are they able to contribute positively to democracy?

Osei (2013) sought to answer this question by using Ghana – one of Africa's most popular democracies – as a case study and found that parties in Ghana are practically resilient and do indeed organise large numbers of voters and finance. Osei (2013) stated that they even portray a degree of philosophical competition and have successfully adapted their tactics to the local situation. On the other hand, they expose serious weaknesses in the field of social integration and interest representation. Against that background, Osei (2013) argued that even in procedurally well-functioning democracies like Ghana, political parties can be tools of elite competition that contribute to the exclusion of the poor from decision-making.

Rakner et al (2010) observed that Democracy assistance programmes have slowly involved support for political parties in addition to backing for civil society, parliaments and the electoral process. In investigating the impact of donors, for instance the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), on the electoral processes in Malawi and Zambia, Rakner et al (2010:4) found out that its monies were spent to support parties in three ways: “strengthening inter-party dialogue, strengthening party organizations, and improving party-civil society linkages”. The following are interview excerpts which illustrated the different responses from some participants about the difficulty of organising party activities without donor support:

“... We get funding from the IEC depending on the representation that you have. But the truth is that, that sort of funding is very little compared to the task and the enormous political activities that we are engaged in. So the smaller parties will have to be innovative in sourcing for their own funding to augment with what they receive. As a result, we can't do without donor support, both external and domestic” (Interviewee 5, Political party official, Zwelitsha, May 2017).

“... Without donor support, it is quite difficult. The only revenue we have is subscriptions from membership and for political party organisation, it is a bit difficult for them to run the organisation on subscriptions alone unlike trade unions. The subscriptions for membership per year is R 20 and you see, you can't run the organisation on subscriptions alone. You will need support from donors otherwise it is going to be extremely difficult. Trade unions receive subscriptions every month unlike political parties” (Interviewee 2, Political party official, King William's Town, May 2017)

In concurring with the views of the above respondents, Lemanski (2017:15) articulated that “participatory governance has become a mainstream feature of city management, endorsed by governments and aid agencies as a platform for state-civil society engagement”. Despite this popularity, “criticisms are rife, focusing on agency problems of implementation alongside fundamental concerns related to structural power asymmetries”. Lemanski (2017:15) intimated that “the absence from these debates is the active role played by the urban spatial and temporal structural context in shaping citizenship experiences of participatory processes”. Lemanski (2017:15) noted “a geopolitical space that hosts a wide socio-economic range of citizens that demonstrates how active support systems create and perpetuate inequalities that are institutionalised through processes of participatory governance”.

According to Norris et al (2016) the indicators of the Publicly Funded Research Institute (PFRI) that they observed were the different policies that states can and do implement to regulate political finance. Concretely, Norris et al (2016) pointed out that, these indicators are based on the following measures: disclosure requirements, contribution limits, spending limits and public finance. Figure 5.6 below indicates that parties generate substantial resources from donor sources.




Figure 9.2: Party generates substantial resources from donor sources

Source: Computer printout of a graph derived from the data and findings of this study.

The findings from the figure above indicate that most of the respondents 54.29% strongly agreed that the party generates sufficient resources; 37.41% agreed while 8.57% of the respondents were not sure. The findings on whether parties generate substantial resources from donors was strongly agreed to by respondents. Supporting the above Arthur (2016), Cruz et al (2015), Kuzio (2014), Bowler et al (2006) and Mietz (2008) stated that the period from 1992 saw Ghana under burden from both internal and external sources, to embark on the change to democratic rule. Notwithstanding the developments, an issue that has the potential to test Ghana's liberal democratic credentials has hinged on the process of political party financing. Arthur (2016) analysed how the current political party financing system in Ghana is destructively impacting on electoral competition and the country's democratic process. Arthur (2016) showed that, given that it is political resources that energise party enthusiasm and keenness, a level playing field in terms of public financing of political parties can help in electoral competition and the promotion of the democratic process in Ghana. However, Arthur (2016) stated the importance of transparency and accountability, as well as a legal framework that monitors, condemns, sanctions

and punishes abuse in the use of public funds, would be critical if success is to be achieved.

Gherghina et al (2012), Stotzer (2012), Svasand (2014), Wilk-Heeg (2011) and Bertoa et al (2017) illustrated how the rising intricacy of regulations concerning party funding in post-communist Romania is paralleled by practices engaged by political parties in their effort to achieve enlarged access to state resources. Gherghina et al (2012: 510) indicated that “political parties succeeded in misusing the weaknesses of the increasingly multifaceted legislative framework”. They noted that “parties use the existing defects in the legislation on party funding to indirectly get and abuse state resources for their (electoral) purposes, an enriched law tackling those shortcomings was passed, but political parties were able to find other flaws and use them to gain financial benefits”.

A similar view was shared by Johnston et al (1996:12) who noted that “funding of political parties is a matter of substantial contemporary apprehension in the UK”. Even though “utmost consideration has been paid to the situation regarding national parties, the new funding regime introduced in 2001 also relates to constituency parties, and some concerns have been raised regarding the limits on spending here and spending there”. Using data released by the Electoral Commission on all donations above a definite minimum to constituency parties, Johnston et al (1996:12) looked at the pattern of assistances over the period 2001–05. They analysed the effect of spending on the 2005 constituency promotions, showing that “for the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats considerable assistances enhanced their vote-winning performances in seats where their candidates were competitors whereas for Labour significant contributions helped its performance in borderline seats that it was protecting”. This sentiment was shared by other scholars on electoral fortunes and party financing (Van Biezen, 2004; Stonecash et al, 1996; Kolodny et al, 2003 and Sarangi, 2016). The table below shows the connection between donor funding and democratisation.

Table 9.5: Donor funding and democratization

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Disagree	1	2.9	2.9	2.9

Don't Know	2	5.7	5.7	8.6
Agree	8	22.9	22.9	31.4
Strongly Agree	24	68.6	68.6	100.0
Total	35	100.0	100.0	

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The majority of the respondents, 68.6% strongly agreed that donor support has an effect on democratization; 22.9% agreed; 5.7% were not sure while 2.9% were in disagreement. The above table explicitly shows the relationship between donor funding and democratization as perceived by respondents. The findings of this study was supported by Edgell et al (2017) who made the point that uninterrupted multiparty elections in sub-Saharan Africa are connected to incremental democratization. The work of Edgell et al (2017) moved the discussions forward by posing a complete global set of assessments on the democratizing effect of elections.

Edgell et al (2017) sought to create the scope conditions of the argument geographically, temporally, and substantively. Although they found a relationship between reaffirmed multiparty elections and developments in the liberal-democratic workings of electoral managements internationally since 1900, the relationship according to Edgell et al (2017) is only significant in the period since the beginning of the “third wave” of democracy. Experiences with recurrent multiparty elections have practical importance for democratization in sub-Saharan Africa, the post-communist region, Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia. For the Middle East and North Africa, “the association is feeblor and less vigorous”. Edgell et al (2017) suggested that frequent arrangements of multiparty elections are associated with enhancements to liberal and purposeful components of democracy more so than unrestricted components (Findley et al, 2017; Fiedler, 2016 and Schultz, 2016). Below are excerpts of interviews from some respondents on donor funding and democratisation:

“... Yes, to a certain extent I believe they are also pushing the agenda of democratisation, transparency and competitiveness in our democracy but

you find those hiccoughs here and there but all – in – all, I believe they are pushing the agenda of transparency and democratisation” (Interviewee 2, Political party official, King William’s Town, May 2017)

and

“... Donor support has a positive impact on democratisation” (Interviewee 4, Political party member, Zwelitsha, May 2017).

In concurring with the arguments, Birchler et al (2016) argued that repressive rules allocate incomes from overseas support with the purpose of steadying their rule rather than serving economic and social development. According to them, donors often condition foreign assistance on reforms in recipient state. Birchler et al (2016:427) maintained that “those circumstances for reform emphasize on participative processes and government responsibility which they thought absolutely affect democratization”. They evaluated their assertion based on types of World Bank and IMF lending programme for a panel of 100 low- and middle- income countries over the years 1980-2011.

Birchler et al (2016) indicated that their results suggested that aid positively affects democratization when it hardens domestic culpability mechanisms and thereby reduces its fungibility for recipients. According to Birchler et al (2016), Clemens et al (2016) and Kim et al (2016) the World Bank and IMF’s poverty reduction strategy programmes provide a notable case of aid effects on democratisation. This supports the democratization theory for accountability. The figure below depicts donor conditionality for accountability.




Figure 9.3: Conditionality for accountabilities

Source: Computer printout of a graph derived from the data and findings of this study.

A cumulative 94.29% agreed that donors placed conditionality for accountability; 54.29% strongly agreed; 40.0% agreed; 2.86% were not sure while another 2.86% strongly disagreed. In support of the findings of this study, Robinson (2007) examined the role of economic factors, the democratization effects of the changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and the domestic political circumstances of individual countries. Robinson (2007:7) indicated that growing attention is also being given to the assistances of political conditionality. Robinson (2007) said whereby the requirements of development assistance are made conditional on political and administrative changes to the democratization processes in the recipient countries, the expectation of the aid donors is that “democracy will bring with it better prospects of sustained economic growth by increasing regime accountability and liberalizing the policy making environment”. These contributions, according to Robinson (2007), consider the significance of political conditionality as a factor influencing recent processes of liberalization and democratization in sub-Saharan Africa. Burnell (2007) pointed out some aspects of the aid donors’ existing

concern in political conditionality as examined in the light of perspectives from the aid receiving world. The likelihoods of executing policies for good government effectively through the attachment of political conditions to aid will be served by: clarity of aims and objectives on the part of the donors; transparency of purpose and consistency in application; a strategic grasp of the political complexities of each aid receiving country, in order that the application of conditionality does not weaken the networks of good government and arm its opponents (Burnell, 2007).

Ideally, Burnell (2007:410) stated that “the *modus operandi* of political conditionality should exhibit the very same characteristics that are held to provide the reasons for attaching the conditions, such as transparency and greater openness, accountability and the rule of law”. “... In practice, this ideal may be unattainable, especially with regard to reconciling the moral of political accountability in the aid-receiving countries with the realities of power and influence in international relations”. These interview excerpts below by some respondents corroborate the findings of the study on conditionalities for accountability:

“... To a certain extent because, remember, donors they have their agenda they want to achieve so if they give you one million, obviously they want you to do them a favour, so I believe some others are not honest, some others have an agenda they want to push so that is the situation. Fortunately we can avoid that. There are good people, there are bad people. There are good and honest donors. We should be a moral organization” (Interviewee 5, Political party official, Bhishe, May 2017)

“... Donors place conditionality on their support to increase the ability to account for how the money was used and what effects it had” (Interviewee 2, Political party official, King William’s Town May 2017)

The above responses indicate that, participants felt donors place conditionalities on their donations to increase the ability of organisation to account for how the money was used. The above accounts suggest that donors place conditionality on their support not only to promote the factors of democracy such as accountability, transparency, electoral fairness and good governance but also to safeguard their profits and investments. (Viterna et al, 2008; Kaballo, 1995; Teele, 2014; Ogundimu, 1997; Alexander, 2008; Armstrong, 2004; Miller, 2009; Kalandadze et al, 2009;

Arshad, 2017; Hill, 2010; Ayers, 2009; Mercer, 2002). The table below shows that donors insist on conditionality to promote democratisation.

Table 9.6: Donors insist on conditionality to promote democratisation

	Responses		Percent of Cases
	N	Percent	
\$Donor_insists ^a E Transp	29	20.0%	82.9%
E Plurality	20	13.8%	57.1%
Decentralization	22	15.2%	62.9%
Good Governance & Democratisation	28	21.4%	80.0%
Healthy_electoral_competition	14	9.7%	40.0%
Free&Fair Representation	31	19.3%	88.6%
Other	1	0.7%	2.9%
Total	145	100.0%	414.3%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The majority of the respondents 21.4% cited that donor conditionality were for good governance and democratisation. 20.0% cited that the conditionality were for electoral transparency; 19.3% cited that conditionality supported free and fair representation of the party; 15.2% cited decentralization while 9.7% cited a healthy electoral process, the remaining 0.7% cited alternative demands placed by these conditionality. The findings of this study show that electoral transparency, good governance free and fair representation were the factors that promote donor conditionality.

According to Baylies (2007), the use of support to impose political conditions on receiver countries, to further democratic and government changes or to penalise non-submission with earlier demands, is a relatively new feature of the international aid regime. Baylies (2007) appraised the growing donor and academic works

evolving on the subject. At the heart of discussion of democracy governance policies are arguments about change of the state, its link to economic development and the decreasing extent to which considerations of authority limit donor involvements. Baylies (2007) and Rowbottom (2016) argued that, while political conditionality may assist the development of democratic movements in Africa, there is an insincerity in that structural adjustment risks undermining the state reforms seen to be essential to them while, equally, democratisation may defy the processes of economic restructuring being imposed.

The majority of the respondents (71.43%) strongly agreed to political parties misappropriating donor funds. 17.41% were in agreement with the misappropriation of funds; while 5.71% were not sure, another 5.71% disagreed with the fact that political parties misappropriated funds. Figure 5.8 below confirms that political parties misappropriate donor funds.




Figure 9.4: Political Parties misappropriation of donor funds

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study.

From the figure above, 71.43% of the respondents strongly agreed that political parties misappropriate donor funds; 17.14% agreed that funds were misappropriated. On the other hand, 5.71% of respondents disagreed to misappropriation and 5.71% declared that they don't know. According to Coetzee (2017), the idea and concept of governance is becoming gradually important in order to bring about affluence, proper living conditions and development. The doctrines and values connecting to good governance are a prerequisite for direction and steadiness in a country. Good governance practices are also universally supported by institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It is vital for developing countries to understand and take note of good governance practices. There is burden on African states to institute good governance practices.

Coetzee (2017) noted further that to establish good governance practices in Africa, there must be governance practices which include openness, honesty and integrity; but these practices are not always maintained in some African states. Africa countries have made good headway in implementing governance principles but unfortunately, examples of corruption and unethical behaviour and poor policy implementation problems as well as poor partnerships are common.

In adding their voices to the embezzlement of party and public funds Agbor (2017), Pruce et al (2017), Philips (2017), De Vires (2017), Rodan (2016) and Crutz et al (2017) observed that the fight against the embezzlement of public funds committed by individuals, especially public servants, for private gain, enjoys different degrees of commitment by different countries. The enactment of laws and establishment of institutional mechanisms towards this end are partly a consideration of the achievement of such a mission and can also be the extent by which such a commitment can be gauged.

Rated as one of the most corrupt countries in Africa by Transparency International (TI), the global anti-corruption watchdog, the Republic of Cameroon recently passed a law that fashioned a Special Criminal Court. This comes as one of the most toughest and significant legislative developments in the fight against the misuse of public funds. Warf (2017) stated that corruption is a rooted part of African political culture. He further stated that corruption is a highly observable aspect of African politics, with a number of high-profile scandals standing out. Kofele-Kale

(2006:187) summarizes the dismal state of African corruption succinctly as follows:

“...Corruption is a punishable offense under the laws of nearly every African state, and it is expressly prohibited in several of their constitutions and in various regional and pan-African anti-corruption instruments. In fact, Africa’s leadership is so concerned about the problem of corruption that hardly a day goes by without some government entity criticizing corruption and its cancerous effects on African society. Yet, for all the bombast about eradicating corruption, Africa has made little progress on this front”.

According to Bailey (2017), the Muldergate scandal that occurred in South Africa exposed the widespread corruption, bribery, extortion, self-enrichment, and misappropriation of donor funds. This has battered the virtuous image that the National Party sought to portray. The funds were misappropriated in numerous ways, usually through Swiss bank accounts. In similar studies, there have been findings that attested to the widespread occurrence of the phenomena (Koelble, 2017; Issacharoff, 2016; Cheeseman, 2017; Pruce et al, 2017; Baily, 2017, Eke et al, 2016; Ajibolade et al, Frahm, 2017; Sauer et al, 2017; Philips, 2017; Lindberg, 2010; Zoube, 2007; Little, 2007; Chandler, 2010; Faust et al, 2012; Lynch et al, 2011; Kim, 2007). Table 5.13 below shows the effects of donor conditionality on voters.

Table 9.7: The effects of donor conditionality on voters

	Responses		Percent of Cases
	N	Percent	
Conditionality on voters: Disrupt elections	14	13.2%	41.2%
Lower voter turnout	23	21.7%	67.6%
Delay Voting	8	7.5%	23.5%
Delay Results	9	8.5%	26.5%
Poor Logistics	23	21.7%	67.6%
Poor Equipment	16	15.1%	47.1%
Untrained electoral officers	11	10.4%	32.4%
Others	2	1.9%	5.9%

Total	106	100.0%	311.8%
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a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this stud

The findings on the effects of conditionality on voters showed that the majority of the respondents 21.7% cited that it led to poor logistics; while another 21.7% said it resulted in lower voter turnout. 15.1% said it resulted in poor equipment; 13.2% of instances said it resulted in disrupted elections; 10.4% of the times stated it resulted in untrained electoral officers; while 8.5% of the times said it resulted in delayed results while 7.5% of the times said there was delayed voting; and lastly 1.9% of the cases were cited as being other effects. The findings indicates that, the effect conditionality will have on voters is it will result in low voter out, poor logistics, poor equipment and disruption of elections. The findings were supported by Jan's (2016) work which stated that since the 1980s, the major part of development support has been strewn with some kind of conditions. Donors oblige aid-receiving states to abide by some conditions or to impose certain reforms in order to receive development aid.

According to Stokke (1995: 1), donors "often provide financial aid dependent on the aid-receiving state's performance on certain indicators; for example, ensuring respect for human rights, implementing elements of the good governance agenda or ensuring market liberalization". Giving assistance dependent on certain conditions is a widespread practice as reflected in behaviour of donor governments, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs). "Different kinds of conditionality create specific sets of conditions and establish diverse interactions between donor and receiving government. One type of conditionality is of particular interest to political science: political conditionality. Political conditionality entails the delivery of financial assistance to developing countries reliant on certain conditions about the political characteristics of the aid-receiving country" (Stokke, 1995: 1).

The goal of political conditionality is to promote democracy, human rights and accountability in the aid-receiving countries" (Stokke, 1995: 1). By requiring the aid-receiving government to comply with certain conditions, donors can ensure that the

given aid will be effective, as it allows them to influence the aid-receiving government and its policies (Riddell, 2007). This observation is supported by other donor conditionality scholars and organisations (Stokke, 1995:12; Transparency International, 2012, 2016). When aid receiving states “fail to respect the conditions, donors can decide to partially or completely suspend and even withhold development aid. This allows donors to spur development in the aid-receiving state according to the donor’s outlook on development” (Stokke, 1995:12). These were concurred to by some respondents during the interviews as follows:

“... The donor conditionality will have qualitative effects on voters or residents in the municipality if implemented as per the donor and recipient agreement and commitment” (Interviewee 1, Political party official, East London, May 2017).

“... That is very difficult. It becomes difficult from how I look at it, because our understanding of conditionality will be based on accountability for the funds received. Secondly, whether those funds are used in line with the objectives of the donor organisation. So it will be difficult to respond to say, what effects will those have on voters unless I can speculate or say hypothetically when the conditionality are the objectives of the donor agency actually interfere with the democratic wishes of voters then you might have some problems there but I think it is very difficult to respond to that from a position of a political party rather than a voter. I think a voter will be more placed to answer this. We need to get that sense of whether these, in a negative way or in what other funding ways that these conditions directly affect the voter outside of the fact that they are mostly intended for political parties or receiving organisations” (Interviewee 3, Political party official, King William’s Town, May 2017).

The contributions of the above respondents to the discussions raised interesting responses. The participants made the point that conditionality will have effects on voters if implemented as per the donor-recipient agreement.

According to Norris et al (2017), in development, transparency and accountability are claimed by anti-corruption advocacy agencies to help plug the leaky pipes of bribery and inefficiency, channel public spending more efficiently and produce better services. In the field of electoral governance, Norris et al (2017) stated that openness about rates and procedures outcomes, and decisions making processes used by electoral authorities is thought to build public trust, improve policy making and facilitate accountability. In contrast, in the words of the open society institute

(OSI): “silence and secrecy are two of the most powerful tools that governments can employ to mute critics and cloak their actions from public scrutiny”. Proponents claim that open governance sparks innovation, drive efficiency gains and fuel economic development. (Open Society Foundation, 2016; Norris et al, 2017).The sub-section below takes a look at the norm of reciprocity and social justice.

5.5.3. Reciprocity and social justice

The concept of justice is explained to mean equity and equality in all human endeavour, and the thesis is advanced that “equity” is only one of the many values which may underlie a given system of justice. Some other values include; fairness, access and opportunity and a sense of self-worth and dignity. Other values of social justice are; openness, civil liberties, political rights and removal of all limitations and barriers that demean human dignity (Deutsch, 1975). The explanations about the conditions which determine which values will be employed as the basis of distributive justice in a group are proposed, with discussion centered about the values of “equity,” “equality,” and “need” and the conditions which lead a group to emphasize one rather than another value (Brown, 2004).

In corroborating with the norm of reciprocity Gouldner (1960), Uehera (1995), Masumi et al (2008), Goldsmith (2004), Konovsky et al (1994) and Green et al (2009) and the social justice and equity theorists Rawls (1971), Weiner (1992), Ostrom (2009), Austin (1977), Leventhal (1976), Hartfield (1978), Charmaz (2011), Larson et al (2002) and Locke (1965) stated that political party members have observed and are of the opinion that the greatest impediment to democracy, electoral funding, development and peace were corrupt and bad governance. The following were sentiments expressed by some respondents during the discussion:

“...It really varies from region to region, but if I had to be honest, it is bad governance, a government that does not care about its own people. That can sometimes take the form of aggression abroad, but it can also simply lead to increased unhappiness at home, which feeds anger, which gets easily fed by nationalist or religious rhetoric and then causes conflict” (Interviewee 5, Political party member, Bhisho, May 2016)

“...What role do issues such as hunger, disease, lack of clean water, and lack of education play in our communities today”? “When people feel that their needs are not being met, when they lack hope and opportunity, they will respond. This response may not end up serving their own interests, but they will act” (Interviewee 2, Political party Member, East London, April 2016)

The responses from the above participants indicate that the issues of service delivery, community development, care of the government to respond to their needs are paramount to them. Their indignation stems from bad governance, bad attitude and irresponsible leadership.

The following sub-section discusses the voting behaviour and political participation of voters.

5.5.4. Voting behaviour and political participation of voters

Democracy represent popular social environments in which people interact by exchanging resources such as information, ideas, and advice about their common interests. Existing research bring into focus an explication of why people help others in elections and how such voluntary behaviors drive subsequent attitudes, for example, commitment and behavioral intentions that justifies political participation of voters.

Voters in an election most often participated in polls for various reasons based on ideology, economics and ethnicity. The contract is normally extended to almost all citizens aged 18 or over. The levels of turnout measure electoral political participation. Low turnout brings into question the government's legitimacy and strength of its mandate. It is worth considering differential turnout - how turnout varies geographically and according to factors such as age and social class. Types of election also affect turnout (Baker, 2016; Wiggly-Wiggle, 2011; Georg-Genyi, 2015; Asnal et al, 2013; Encyclopedia.com, 2008; Worley, 2013; Gutierrez et al, 2014). Two participants expressed the following views during the discussions about voting behaviour:

“...Our voting behaviour emanates from our political and cultural history. You see, our history emerged and was orchestrated from these antagonistic and diabolical apartheid and colonial systems. In fact, it was a framework of

wickedness that denied us of our rights to vote and to elect our representatives. We were treated with no respect, no identity with intimidation to put fear in us. But our leaders fought until they won and today democracy is entrenched. I will forever vote ANC, Amandla” (Interviewee 5, Political party member, Mdantsane, April 2016)

“...It is the desire and ambition of government to reciprocate the confidence of the electorate for exercising their franchise by voting for the party. The government is determined to promote social justice and equity by bridging the gap between the rich and the poor, ensuring equality and eliminate discrimination”. This our party has set for itself to achieve and we will fulfil it” (Interviewee 3, Political party member, Zwelitsha, May 2016).

The respondents remembered the social contract the government has with the people who elected. They are confident that they will deliver on their mandate.

The sub-section below discusses elected or nominated councillors’ perceptions on donor support, electoral dynamics and democratisation in the municipality.

5.6. Elected and nominated councillors’ perceptions on donor support, electoral dynamics and democratization in the municipality

This section presents the data obtained in this study on the perceptions of elected and nominated councillors in the municipality. Based on the research aim, objectives and the research questions of the study, this section analyzed the empirical evidence obtained from assessing the perceptions of elected and nominated councillors on donor funding and democratization in the BCM. This section engaged in the debate of councillor’s finance and donor support dynamics as it pertains to the Buffalo City municipality. In this era and dispensation of democracy, municipal council representatives from political organisations play a crucial role in the process of democratisation. Councillors facilitate the possibility of local government administration and connect the local council with the local community through a collaborative process of engagement to reduce unemployment, inequality and poverty. In the Buffalo City Metropolitan municipality, councillors were elected representative of the people and are mandated as elected representative to make

judgements on behalf of their constituencies. This is grounded on the values of representative democracy which identify the need for people to have a voice in their government by assigning their voice to a designated person selected through voting processes. As chosen representatives, councillors need to carry out their responsibilities in a transparent and accountable manner. Councillors serve as facilitators of community/constituent input, the public participate in local governance and democracy through their representation (Fenwick et al., 2006; Chandler, 2001; Lowndes, 2006; Osborne, 2007; Michels et al., 2010; Cherry et al., 2000; Besley, 1997; Manor, 1995; Alexander, 2010). Councillors serve as communication connection between the council and the community, they serve as members on committees and ratify key decisions of the council. In addition, councillors work with local community to find reasonable ways to meet their social, economic and their material needs and to advance their quality of lives.

Councillors are expected to maximise social development and economic growth by creating integrated living environment which includes paying attention to all the diverse needs that a community must meet in order to sustain itself. In this regard, councillors play an extremely important role in upholding democracy, empowering and redistributing the benefits of development to all members of the communities. This, therefore, forms the basis for an enquiry into the perceptions of donor support and democratisation of elected or nominated councillors in the BCM municipality. The sub-section below ascertains the number of time councillors have been elected to serve on the council. The table below shows the number of times councillors have been elected to serve on the council.

Table 9.8: Number of times elected

Times Elected		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	4 years	25	69.4	69.4	69.4
	8 years	11	30.6	30.6	100.0
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The majority of the respondents (69.4%) of the respondents have been nominated for four years while 30.6% of the respondents were nominated for eight years. The majority of elected councillors as shown in the results are newly elected which indicate that it will take a lot of resources to train these officers on council procedures and how to effectively represent their constituencies. The following are interview excerpts from some respondents about times elected:

“...This was first experience I was never nominated before” (interviewee 2, Councillor, King William’s Town, March 2017).

“... I was nominated for the first time” (interviewee 3, Councillor, Zwelitsha, March 2017)

As illustrated by the above respondents, it is clear that term change in political career can help reduce corruption since most of them are new councillors (Scott, 1969; Bunce et al.2010; Persson et al. 2013; Myerson, 1993; Feree, 2010; Mattes, 2012; Raga et al., 2005). In relation to the fairness of the electoral process, the following were evidenced. Table 5.15 below indicates the fairness of the nomination processes in the municipality.

Table 9.9: The nomination process fairness

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
Strongly Disagree	2	5.6	5.6	11.1
Disagree	4	16.67	16.67	22.2
Don’t Know	1	2.8	2.8	25.0
Agree	10	27.8	27.8	52.8
Strongly Agree	17	47.2	47.2	100.0
Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The nomination process fairness is subjective. 47.22% of the respondents strongly agreed that the nomination process is fair; 27.78% of the respondents agreed that nomination was fair; 16.67% of the respondents disagreed that nomination was fair;

5.56% strongly disagreed while 2.78% were not decisive. These indicated, according to Crook et al (1998) the levels of satisfaction with elected councillors. It shows the fairness of councillors' elections (those who received electoral mandates). The fairness in elections has been disputed as a result of the elite capture of local power structure which often has been facilitated by the desire of ruling elite to create and sustain power basis in the municipality (Williams, 2004; Crook, 2003; Blais et al., 2002; Oelofse et al., 2005; Mattes et al., 2010; Pottie, 2010; Mattes et al., 2010; Nijzink, 2010; Davis, 2010; Bosman et al., 2011; Sandbrook, 1996; Modomo, 2000; Buthelezi et al., 2004; Gouws, 2004). Supporting the above statements, the following were interview excerpts from some respondents on the fairness of the nomination process:

"... It was not a smooth ride we had challenges as the outgoing councillor wanted to serve for the second term too so it was not easy but the experience humbled me. I was a ward committee then later elected by the organisation to be a PR then vote of confidence was passed" (interviewee 3, Councillor, Mdantsane April 2017).

"... It wasn't easy but I pulled through the only thing that's left is for me to deliver what I have promised the people. After being nominated to contest I became the face of the party that when the campaigning stage began. I then recruited people who will support me on local electoral debates which in turn became my party agents" (interviewee 6, Councillor, King William's Town, April 2017).

There has been a lot of political rancour, disputes and contestations leading to break-aways by aggrieved candidates over nominations processes among political parties' members. From the contributions of the above participants, you can see clearly the contradictions in their nomination processes. Councillor 6 from King William's Town said he did not have it easy since there were a lot of opposition to his nomination but he pulled through. On the other hand, councillor 3 from Mdantsane had a smooth ride.

The above comments were supported by Engst et al (2017) who noted that non-majoritarian institutions are mushrooming around the globe. Elected officials delegate more and more power to non-elected actors to make public policy thereby transforming the democratic system of governance. Regulatory bodies staffed with

specialists, central banks or highest courts are prime examples of such institutions. Due to their role in the chain of delegation within the public policy-making process, non-majoritarian institutions act as agents for elected officials in their role as principals. This development obviously undermines the traditional understanding of democratic accountability and, thus, has implications for how legitimate the public perceives such system of governance including the relevant political actors. Given that elected officials, as principals, are also themselves agents of the public, Engst et al (2017) argue that the selection process to staff non-majoritarian institutions becomes an important but yet not well understood mechanism to legitimize the policy-making process. We assume that if elected officials consistently select candidates to staff institutions that the public does not prefer, decisions of such institutions are less likely to be seen as legitimate". Manion (2014) made the point that Chinese voters can use their voting influence to select "good types," with personal qualities that indicate they will unfailingly represent local interests. Some of the interviewees mentioned the following with regard to elections during the interview session:

"... People did not trust me as I was a member of Cope before. I joined EFF and I was the only one with experience in politics so I was elected to represent the party" (interviewee 9, Councillor, King William's Town, April 2017)

and

"... It was a challenge especially when I had to contest against the political party I am passionate about and love dearly. Someone from my community nominated me and submitted my name at IEC offices and petitions were signed of people who were in favour of the nomination signed and the rest was history. I paid for all expense that lead to the elections" (interviewee 4, Councillor, Zwelitsha, March 2017).

The interviewee 9 and 4 recounted their experiences with regard to the events leading to their elections. Both councillors conceded that they went through challenges. For instance councillor 9 observed that he was not trusted since he crossed-carpetted from COPE to EFF. Councilor 4 narrated how he had to contest against the party he loved dearly. These experiences reveals the politics that surround local level elections with regard to candidate selection and nomination processes.

Pruysers et al (2016) examined how political parties pick their candidates in Canada's decentralized multilevel setting. They scrutinised the selection practices of the principal federal parties, concentrating on the formal and informal rules relating to the appropriateness and organisation of voters and candidates, the spreading of power within the party, and representational results. Pruyers et al (2016) highlighted how Canadian parties have approached the trade-off between competing democratic standards as each party attempts to find a subtle balance between grassroots authority and central party involvement. Pruyers et al (2016) suggested that while centralization may undermine membership participation, grassroots sovereignty, and responsiveness, central party involvement may also enhance the democratic values of fairness, representation, and in some instances even participation (Wilking et al, 2017; Medvic, 2017; Yoon et al, 2017; Westlake, 2016; Colombo, 2016). The figure below shows donor support necessity for elections in the municipality.




Figure 9.5: Donor support necessity for elections

Source: Computer printout of a graph derived from the data and findings of this study

From the figure 5.9 above, the majority of the respondents 61.11% strongly agreed that donor support is necessary for elections; 30.56% of the respondents agreed that donor support is necessary; 5.56% disagreed that donor support is necessary while 2.78% strongly disagreed. As indicated in the responses above, donor support is very critical and crucial for the successful implementation of political campaigns and elections. Kumar (2005) stated that the assistance programme is intended to assist political parties advance their organizational capacities, promote internal democracy, recruit women and minorities and effectively participate in legislative practices (Lyon, 2004; Ott et al., 2000; Braa et al., 2004; Heeks, 2001, 2002; Van Der Spuy, 2000; Laakso, 2002; Barkan, 1997; Othaway et al., 1999; Dietrich et al., 2014; Erdman, 2010; Gershman, 2007; Green et al., 2006; Cornell, 2013; Caorothers, 2007; Scott, 2007; Elthier, 2010; Grim et al., 2012; Scott et al., 2007 and Van Cranenburgh, 2002). These were corroborated by respondents during the interview when they were asked about donor support necessity and its impacts. Some respondents answered as follows about the importance of donor funding for elections:

“... I received support financially from businessman and from different communities where I campaigned. I received all forms of support. It's vital not only for administration purposes but also for logistics” (interviewee 6, Councillor, King William's Town, April 2017).

“... I received support financially from businessmen and stakeholders and moral support from my family and friends not forgetting the people who had faith in me and supported me. It is very essential because they support campaigns” (interviewee 5, Councillor, Zwelitsha, March 2017).

The responses from the above participants abundantly articulates the importance of support for political participation. Councilor 6 boldly declared that he received huge support from business owners for her campaign. Councilor 5 also recounted same. Their comments reinforces the importance of donor support.

Kujaja (2017) supported the above sentiments in his work where he analysed polarization in the United States by examining the influence of primary elections, donors, and a lack of competitive congressional districts have on the ideological positioning and electoral success of candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives. Kujaja (2017) found evidence that the influence of co-partisans and donors in primary elections, and the proliferation of safe congressional districts affect polarization in the United States by affecting the ideological position and electoral success of congressional candidates. Table 5.16 indicate the source of funding for campaigns frequencies.

Table 9.10: Source of funding for campaigns Frequencies

	Responses		Percent of Cases	
	N	Percent		
Source_of_funding_for_campaigns ^a	Fund Raising	26	14.3%	72.2%
	Membership Contributions	26	14.3%	72.2%
	Party Subscriptions	30	16.5%	83.3%
	Special levies	20	11.0%	55.6%
	Sale of Souvenirs	17	9.3%	47.2%
	Public goodwill	21	11.5%	58.3%
	State sponsorship	22	12.1%	61.1%
	Special Projects	20	11.0%	55.6%
	Total	182	100.0%	505.6%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The table above shows that 14.3% of the funds comes from Fund raising activities, another 14.3% comes from membership contributions, 16.5% comes from party subscriptions, 11.0% comes from Special levies, 9.3% comes from Sale of Souvenirs, 11.5% comes from members' goodwill, 12.1% comes from State sponsorship, while Special projects contribute 11.0%. The revelations in this study presents an insightful truth about source of funds for elections for councillors in the Buffalo City municipality. As can be seen from the results, huge source of support, 16.5% comes from party subscriptions. Another important source are from fund raising, 14.3% and membership dues 14.3%. Interestingly, other important sources of funds came from state sponship, 12.1%, public goodwill 11.5%, and special levies accounting for 11.0% and souvenirs, 9.3%. These revelations are very insightful. Lindberg (2003) expressed his impressions about source of funds for elections as "our time to chop" and that elections feed on neo-patrimonialism rather than counteracting it. Most political corruptions are not attributed to dubious contract deals but also to fundraising as a source of garnishing support for elections (Seekings, 1990, 2000; Adam et al., 1998; Nattrass 2001; Bratton, 1998 and Lindberg, 2003). Most respondents indicated the sources of the funds for their municipal campaign and elections activities as is seen above. These are excerpts from some of the interviewees on source of funds for campaigns:

".... Money is important, you see, you have to pay party agents, pay people that will lead your party, when your vote are containing party agents people record people coming and out" (Interviewee 2, Councillor, Zwelitsha, April 2017)

"..... Contribution from party members and money collected from membership cards to mention a few" (interviewee 4, Councillor, Bhisho, April 2017).

The assertions of the above interviewees buttresses the relevance and importance of finance in elections. Both councillors agreed that money is relevant in campaigns since you need to feed and pay your party agents. Councilor 4 stated the source of funds comes from membership contributions.

In contributing to the issues, Alfa et al (2016:65) in their study with the goal of determining the influence of money on the quality of democracy and democratic consolidation in Nigeria, they recognised that the use of money by politicians to influence the outcome of elections through vote buying among other abuses in the country is firstly “a consequence of the prevailing poverty and the expectation of the electorate for the aspiring politicians to distribute money”. This development “bring about the lack of trustworthiness of election results and in Nigeria's democracy” .Alfa et al (2016:65). It is suggested that funding the electoral process must be changed to make access and participation possible for a broader gamut of society. Pienaar (2016) argues that transparency is the essential element of comprehensive anti-corruption regulation. Pienaar's (2016) work was based largely on selected key findings of the Money, Politics and Transparency Project research survey coordinated jointly by Global Integrity, the Sunlight Foundation and the Electoral Integrity Project during 2014.

According to Heewig (2016:181), notwithstanding the reputation of individual contributors to financing federal candidates, “past work has largely ignored this crucial financial constituency in support of enquiry on corporate and trade political action committees” (PACs). By contrast, Heewig (2016:181) offered the first analysis of collective contributions from the population of individual contributors to House candidates. Using an original big dataset built from over fifteen million Federal Election Commission (FEC) disclosure records, Heewig (2016:181) “recognised individual contributions (rather than contributions) and drew the discrepancy in their tactics across types of House candidates”. Heewig (2016) distinguished between “regular donors, who were considered to have more contact with members of Congress, versus irregular donors in these elections”. Heewig (2016) found evidence that “the character of aggregate donations from repeat donors is more access-oriented even while controlling for other prominent candidate characteristics”. Funds from “infrequent donors, in contrast, appear more ideologically motivated”. By also examining the percentage of funds that House candidates receive from repeat donors, Heewig (2016) showed that “the fundraising coalitions of candidates may reproduce reliance on more access-oriented, repeat donors despite the influx of dollars from infrequent donors”. Heewig (2016) suggested that his findings provide a convincing case for “re-evaluating the variety of

roles individual contributors play in the campaign finance system, and for systematically analysing disparity in contributor strategies” (Heewig, 2016).

The responses from most of the participants shows that they all receive one form of donor support or another. The prevalent source of funding, according the findings of this study came from party subscriptions, fund raising, membership dues, special levies and public goodwill. It was also made abundantly clear that, some respondents did receive sponsorship from business and corporate bodies, NGOs and from international investors (Taylor, 2017; Owusu, 2017; Albright, 2016; Ruuge, 2016; Keefer et al, 2017; Norris et al, 2016; Nwangwu et al, 2016 and Sakyi et al, 2016). The table below solicited respondents’ views on donor conditionality on elections.

Table 9.11: Donor conditionality on elections

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Donor conditionalities	Electoral transparency	24	19.5%	70.6%
	Electoral Plurality	7	5.7%	20.6%
	Decentralization	21	17.1%	61.8%
	Good Governance & Democratisation	26	21.1%	76.5%
	Healthy Electoral Competition	20	16.3%	58.8%
	Free & Fair Elections	25	20.3%	73.5%
	Total	123	100.0%	361.8%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The table above shows respondents views on donor conditionality on elections. Most of the respondents 21.1% cited good governance and democratization; 20.3% suggested free and fair elections; 19.5% cited electoral transparency; 17.1% suggested donor conditionality were geared towards decentralization; 16.3% suggested a healthy electoral competition; while 5.7% suggested electoral plurality. The findings on donor conditionality points to good governance, democratization and electoral transparency as the most important condition that donors consider.

Easterly (2013) condemns aid agencies for maintaining the “technocratic illusion” that expertise will solve the problems of developing world. In his view, the advice of technocrats has helped to dominate people rather than to free them from poverty. In addition to these, some authors have attributed leadership, ownership, effectiveness and efficiency as other considerations by donors (Koeberie et al, 2005; Collins, 2009; Dreher, 2009; Action Aid, 2004; Eurodad, 2007; Easterly, 2013; Nadeem 2016; Dorman, 2017; Freytag et al 2017; Nuscheler et al, 2017; Robinson, 2016; Fukuyama, 2017; Ascher, 2016; Mawere et al, 2016; Findley et al, 2017; Dickerson, 2016; Cooper et al, 2016; Banik et al, 2016; Teichmann, 2016; Bergamaschi et al, 2017). In contribution to the discussions, the following were interview excerpts which illustrated the different views some respondents held about donor conditionalities:

“...The conditions are there but I have little knowledge on how they work. I have noticed when I was with the ANC that sometimes the money that is allocated for service delivery is used to donate to some of these donor funding companies” (interviewee 9, Councillor, Mdantsane, May 2017)

“... There is no one who funds anything without expectations. So whatever funds you make in whatever project you make, there are expectations from whatever political party in return but advertising, acknowledgement and it can be expectations in government, for example, for various reasons but take note, there will be conditionality to the source of funding” (Interviewee 1, Councillor, East London, May 2017).

The observations made by the above participants is both insightful and instructive. The councillors agreed that it is justified for funders to attach conditionality to their funds. According to councillor 1, there is no one who funds anything or free. There are expectations for their funds. Councilor 9 from Mdantsane admitted that there are conditionality but he has very little knowledge about how it works.

The table below presents an assessment of municipal performance. This table also indicates the municipal performance assessment on employment, health, housing, water supply, food, etc.

Table 9.12: Municipal performance assessment

	Responses		Percent of Cases
	N	Percent	

Municipality_performance ^a	Employment	5	13.5%	33.3%
	Youth Employment	4	10.8%	26.7%
	Health	1	2.7%	6.7%
	Education	1	2.7%	6.7%
	Water	1	2.7%	6.7%
	Food	2	5.4%	13.3%
	Housing	1	2.7%	6.7%
	Security	1	2.7%	6.7%
	Electric	1	2.7%	6.7%
	Corruption	7	18.9%	46.7%
	Poverty	4	10.8%	26.7%
	Indebted	2	5.4%	13.3%
	Sanitation Refuse	2	5.4%	13.3%
	Transport	5	13.5%	33.3%
Total		37	100.0%	246.7%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

When entreated to rate the performance of the municipality and its activities, most of the respondents submitted that the municipality was involved in corrupt activities, with 18.9% of the respondents highlighting the presence of corruption. 13.5% commended the municipality for transport provision and employment creation separately. 10.8% cited the presence of youth employment. On the contrary, another 10.8% suggested the presence of poverty. 5.4% of the respondents suggested that the municipality was performing well in sanitation and refuse collection; another 5.4% cited performance in food provision while another separate 5.4% cited that the municipality had a sense of indebtedness. The remaining performance ratings were distributed as follows: 2.7% for electricity supply; 2.7% for security; 2.7% for housing; 2.7% for water provision; 2.7% for education and another 2.7% for health. The results on the performance of municipality by councilors is very instructive. From the results, it reveals that majority of the councilors indicated that corruption (18.9%) is a major problem in the municipality. The table also recorded that employment and transportation, constituting 13.5% respectively were lacking in the municipality.

10.8% was assigned to poverty levels in the municipality which does not paint a good picture of the livelihood ratings.

Valeta et al. (2008) held the view that the local government sphere play a significant role in the provision of public goods and services to the communities. Nel et al (2005) supported this view but indicated that political pressure, projects and staff shortages are the key reasons why impact on municipal projects are poorly assessed. The following are interview extracts from some respondents on municipality's performance:

"...The outgoing councillors did a great job but had short falls in the term of creating jobs. I was elected by the party I serve and represent my community and then public vote on my effects at the moment I am busy with projects I won't say much about. I take everyone's complaints in criantonton (criteria whatever) seriously you know that we have power of efforts they also have power to put me down" (interviewee 7, Councillor, Zwelitsha, April 2017).

"...He (the former councillor) has failed to create jobs and we are currently facing water shortage he has failed to provide alternative ways of providing people with water" (Interviewee 2, Councillor, Bhisho, April 2017).

The above comments are the contributions of two councillors when the questions were put to them. It could be deduced from the comments that the councillors were newly elected and so they blamed the out-gone councillors for poor work done on service delivery.

Eliuz et al (2016) surveyed the predictors of actual performance measurement in the context of Turkish municipalities. They examined the background and policy factors which have influenced the effective use of performance measurement systems in Turkish municipalities. Eliuz et al (2016) assumed in the study that outside support and organizational support for the use of performance measurement, and technical capacity for the performance measurement were connected with superiority of performance measures and efficacy of performance measurement systems in general. According to Eliuz et al (2016), the outcomes of the study sustained the propositions of the study regarding the relationships among organisational support, technical capacity, quality of performance measures, and effectiveness of

performance measurement. Although the consequences established that external support has an indirect effect on effectiveness of performance measurement through technical capacity and quality of performance measures, the hypothesis regarding the direct effect of it on effectiveness of performance measurement was not supported. Below are some responses from some councillors on the performance of councillors during the interviews:

“...The previous councillor failed on providing on job opportunity we have high criminal rate in buffalo city metro municipality we have a problem with water supply our previous councillor was corrupt. I will provide projects that will open job opportunities and will be driven by Bantu Pele principle. I am evaluating projects that are registered we assist in their fails and mistakes we establish project that will empower women with skills. Transparency is my first weapon I will report every detail” (Interviewee 3, Councillor, King William’s Town, April 2017)

“...All she is doing is buying fancy cars and living in fancy flats. She has ignored crucial matters affecting the survival and livelihood of the residents. There are serious issues with provision of water for the people, there are housing problems, poverty issues, employment matters, food security issues and many other pressing issues”. (Interviewee 4, Councillor, East London, April 2017)

The above responses reflect the different sentiments that councillors hold about the performance of the municipality as far as housing, job creation, education and so on were concerned. The comments above showed that, councillors 3 and 4 blamed the previous councillors for poor work done on job creation, housing etc. Councillor 4 for instance, accuses the past councillor buying luxury cars and ignored crucial matters of service delivery to the people. According to Moyo (2017:295) the central essentials of service delivery, inter alia, are “accountability, participation, rule of law and transparency”. In accountability, decision-makers in the ranks of governance should be accountable to the common people. The rule of law requires to be fair and neutrally enforced with respect to human rights irrespective of creed, colour, race or religion. In transparency, there is need to participate in a free flow of information. Every participant should access important information, understand it, monitor it and choose what to do with it. The preceding clarifications were envisioned to offer a broad-based consensus building process of understanding which is the aim of the

study. The task of governance should seek to promote, support and sustain human development thus eliminating forms of exclusion (UNDP Human Development Report, 1996). Advocates of human capital management agreed “that the interaction between employee capacitation and organisational success cannot be underestimated” (Meyer, 2007:54). Knowledge of what one is mandated to do is “considered as a currency for success” (Wessels, 2014:32). It is further assumed that “the quality performance of staff is determinant of the success, advancement and sustainability of any organisation” (Wessels, 2014:32). Qwabe and Pillay (2009:67) also concurred that “a culture of skills acquisition in any organisation improves the level of service delivery”. The sub-section below captures the conclusions of this chapter.

5.7. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has highlighted donor agencies’ and donor recipients’ perceptions of donor support and democratisation in the municipality. It outlined the roles and functions of donor agencies, political parties and elected or nominated councillors in relation to democratisation. Substantively, the chapter covered donor agencies’ support for elections, their views on donor support, items donor funding covers, donor conditionality and the effects of attached conditionality on voters. It further presented findings on donor support and democratisation, donor support and elections, importance of donor support to political parties and donor support utilisation. The chapter closes on the fairness of nominating processes for electing councillors, the necessity of donor support for elections, source of funding for councillors’ campaign, the conditionality attached to support and an assessment of the municipality’s performance in terms of service delivery.

The route to donor support effectiveness and efficiency in the local community is to distance/divorce itself from political meddling. A donor-induced de-politicization offers an avenue to successful development implementation in recipient constituencies (Norris, 2017; Fiedler, 2016; Goetz et al, 2016; Bardall, 2017). Nevertheless, in the case of the BCM municipality, avenues for the trickling-down effect of funding for poverty alleviation projects is minimal; therefore, it does not justify or compensate for the call on citizens to participate in elections regularly.

The usage of donor support to levy political conditions on local recipients to further democratic and government improvements or to punish non-compliance with earlier demands is, relatively, a newness in the aid administration that has the potential to promote good governance, transparency, integrity, accountability and representation but are unlikely to serve the interest of people of the local constituency on the basis of fairness, equity and social justice (Mundau, 2013; Mulonya, 2010; Dzungwa, 2004; Collier et al, 2016; Koch et al, 2017; Thompson, 1992). While variances in the democratic system play their part in defining the number of parties and their influence once in power (proportional, first past the post), the funding and skill available to parties also plays a significant role not only in their survival, but their ability to link to a broad base of support in the community (Muriuki, 2000; Nikolas, 2010; Hayman, 2011; Borcharevink, 2011; Faust et al, 2012; Platz, 2016).

The perceptions of political party officials and members are varied and diverse on the issue of donor funding. The findings of the study indicate that political parties obtain their major funding from rich individuals, special contributions and donations rather than membership dues. Some rich individuals fund more than one political party. Furthermore, funding from foreigners especially foreign businesses is common within political parties (Weizel et al, 2008; Svasand, 2011; Sarakinsky, 2007; Osei, 2013). The study conclusions are that support from state funding is stronger among the elite political class and party executives than ordinary party members.

Institutional weakness emerged as one of the severest challenge to political parties in mobilising financial resources for their activities (Sakyi et al, 2015; Osei, 2013; Cruz et al, 2015; Arthur, 2016). This institutional weakness manifests in the lack of transparency and accountability frameworks and weak internal organisational mechanisms required to mobilise funds from ordinary members (Sakyi et al, 2015). Political parties must embark on healthy political campaigns that will ensure votes for them in the community. Political parties must engage citizens on the daily basis and not just during electoral seasons. Citizens perceive them as taking them for granted until the next elections surfaces. They need to interact and socialise with their members and then acquaint themselves with needs of the constituencies and design practical ways of solving or helping them to solve their socio-economic issues such as: health, educational, nutritional and environmental needs. Donors must observe

and uphold clear and sound ethical considerations in offering assistance to parties without corrupting weak and dishonest government officials and leaders. The perceptions of elected or nominated councillors are varied and diverse on the issue of donor funding and democratisation in the Buffalo City municipality. The findings of the study indicate that elected councillors obtain their major funding from rich individuals, special contributions and donations rather than membership dues. The findings indicate that 25 respondents constituting 69.8% are serving for the first time as councillors who are newly elected for the next four years. 11 (30.6%) of respondents are serving their second term of eight years as councillors.

On the basis of the fairness of the nomination process that elected them, 17(47.22%) strongly agree that the process was very fair, 10(27.78%) agreed that the process was fair. These broadly support the tenets of social justice and equity (Rawl, 1971; Weiner, 1992; Ostrom, 2009; Charmaz, 2011; Larson et al, 2002). However, 2(5.6%) strongly disagreed that the processes were fair, 5.56% disagreed while 2.75% were not decisive

Donor support necessity was tested to find out councillors' views on the importance of donor funding for electoral processes and democratisation. The findings of this study revealed that 61.11% of respondents strongly agreed that donor support was important for democratisation. In addition, 30.56% of the councillors agreed that donor support was necessary for elections whilst 5.56% of the interviewees disagreed on the necessity of donors, with 2.78% strongly contesting the relevance of donor support (Vitorna et al, 2008; Kaballo, 1995; Teele, 2014; Miller, 2009; Alexander, 2008; Ogundimu, 1997)

This study also reveals the sources of funds for councillors' campaigns and party activities. It has emerged that a major source of funding for councillors include; fund raising, party membership contributions, party subscriptions, state sponsorship, special levies, special projects and public goodwill (Cruz et al, 2015; Kuzio, 2014; Bowler et al, 2006; Stotzer, 2012).

The results on donor conditionality on funds raised by councillors indicate that 21.1% of respondents acknowledge that donor conditionality promotes good governance, 19.5% believe that it increases electoral transparency, 20.3% think that it promotes free and fair elections, 17.1% agree that donor conditionality induces

democratisation while 16.3% hold the view that it brings about a healthy electoral competition (Dijk, 2017; Adam et al, 2016; Jakupe et al, 2016; Collier et al, 2016).

Furthermore, on the assessment of municipal performance on service delivery, most of the respondents suggested that the municipality was involved in corrupt activities, with 18.9% of the respondents highlighting the presence of corruption. Additionally, 13.5% commended the municipality for transport provision and employment creation separately. Moreover, 10.8% cited youth employment as a major problem in the municipality. On the contrary, 10.8% suggested the presence of poverty whilst 5.4% suggested that the municipality was performing well in sanitation and refuse collection; another 5.4% cited performance in food provision while another separate 5.4% cited that the municipality had a sense of indebtedness. The remaining performance ratings were distributed as follows: 2.7% for electricity supply; 2.7% for security; 2.7% for housing; 2.7% for water provision; 2.7% for education and another 2.7% for health (Jorgensen et al, 2016; De Kadt et al, 2015; Ajam, 2014; Burger et al, 2014).

The chapter has argued that donor agencies, political parties and elected councillors are institutions and organisations that are established to cultivate and nurture the tenets of democracy and to deepen the culture of accountable governance. These public institutions are critical in ensuring that the citizens take active part in the politics of development in the municipality. The expression of the peoples' vote in an election is the peoples' voice of reason, shared authority, rationality and conscience. It is their expression to promote the cause of social justice and equity in the development agenda of good governance and democracy. However, the active engagement of donor agencies and donor recipients have not impacted on the local communities and voters. This is because the benefits of the trickling effects of development does not reflect in the livelihood of local community members. As a result, the growing inequality and continued poverty curtail their freedom and justice and do not justify a call for their participation in elections.

The next chapter discusses and analyses the roles and functions of the IEC and the BCM in donor assisted projects and electoral administration in the municipality.

CHAPTER SIX: THE ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF IEC AND BCM IN DONOR ASSISTED PROJECTS AND ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE MUNICIPALITY

6.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the analysis of data presented on the role and functions of the IEC and the BCM in donor-assisted projects and municipal electoral administration and the perceptions of these institutions in an interface with donor support, electoral dynamics and democratisation in the municipality. This first section presents the data obtained in the study on the role and functions of the IEC in the administration of municipal elections. This is followed by the analysis of the data collected on the BCM on its role and functions about donor projects and electoral administration in the municipality. The analysis of findings based on the role of IEC utilised empirical and theoretical studies from development aid theory, reciprocity, democratisation and social justice and equity theories. As a state agency, the IEC is required by law to work in the interest of the people of South Africa to promote social justice, equality, reduce poverty and to enhance electoral development and to conduct elections which are free and fair.

The perceptions of the IEC and BCM on donor support and democratisation serve to ascertain the reciprocal relations the IEC and the BCM have with donors, including government, stakeholders in an election and the local community where they operate. The study argues that donor support, to a large extent, induces neo-liberal democratisation. Which is to say, it ensures and enables *inter alia* the free market economy, the deregulation of public institutions and the devaluation of currency. However, the citizens in local communities have been mostly impoverished as a result of their inability to access fully the benefits that were supposed to have been administered to them by sub-state institutions and donor managers. This chapter, therefore, assesses the extent to which the IEC has helped the local community to develop in the course of undertaking and discharging their constitutionally mandated roles and functions.

6.2. Core Arguments of the Chapter

This chapter has argued that donor support is necessary for democratisation. The introduction of political conditionalities has fostered establishment of electoral institutions resulting in donor recipient institutions, organisations and countries to conduct and undergo regular and frequent elections which ensures transparency, accountable regimes and good governance practices at all levels of public and private institutions and spheres culminating into enhancing the socio-economic well-being of citizens. However, the conditionality creates imbalances in the corporate relationship in the donor-recipient scale which must be addressed by levelling the platform of reciprocity, social justice and equity through democratisation. It has been firmly established in previous chapters that donor support induces neo-liberal democratisation, but in fact, the benefits do not descend well enough to the local constituencies where citizens are always called upon to vote in an election, but the benefits rather accrue to the benefits of the donors and the elites in the municipality.

The findings of this chapter indicate (cf. table 6.3) that donor conditionality promotes good governance, transparency, free and fair representation. Fig. 6.5 shows that the IEC cannot operate without donor support. Fig. 6.7 confirmed that donor support induced voter choice direction, reduces voter patriotism, that citizen's vote for regime consolidation and that the support induces low voter turnout. The findings further show that (cf. table 6.15) donor support priorities for the municipality were on energy needs, agriculture, housing, roads/transportation development, followed by employment needs and health provisions. Table 6.18 confirms the findings that donor support induces democratisation through good governance, transparency and decentralisation. On the basis of the hypothesis of the study on donor support and poverty alleviation (cf. table: 7.6, 7.9, 7.10, 7.11, 7.12), it adduces, supports and confirms the findings (Fig. 6.8; Table 6.16) that donor support reduces poverty. The donor poverty reduction strategy in the municipality includes: academic skills training, vocational skills training, agriculture mechanisation and agro-processing, animal husbandry and youth sports development. In support of these findings was the utilisation of development aid theory, reciprocity, democratisation and the social justice theories. The findings aligned with the development aid theory in the sense that development aid expresses the idea of a partnership with the sense of promoting the welfare of people in society while supporting political development

(Kuhn et al., 1988; Woolcock, 1998). Democratisation, on the other hand, ensures that people have the right to vote and have a voice in the political system which is well represented (Acemoglu, 2000; Allison, 1994; Elsenstadt, 2002, 2003). However, by reciprocity Gouldner (1960), Uehera (1995) and Masumi et al (2008) reiterated that people are expected to respond favourably to each other through their actions and interactions. From the survey data, people expected that the IEC interaction and involvement hinge on the IEC to conduct the election, (see figure 6.1) for the responses distributions. The next sub-section shows in Figure 6.3 the IEC's responsibility in conducting municipal elections

6.3. IEC responsibility in conducting municipal elections

Figure 6.1 below presents responses of IEC officials on their responsibility in conducting municipal elections.




Figure 10.1: IEC responsibility in conducting municipal elections

Source: Computer printout of a graph derived from the data and findings of this study

The majority of the respondents were in agreement with the involvement of the IEC in running municipal elections. A cumulative total of 91.67% agreed that the IEC was responsible for conducting municipal elections while 8.33% of the respondents were

in disagreement. It is significant that a cumulative of 91.67% strongly agreed that the IEC is the official authoritative institution that organizes municipal elections. In the work of Fedderke et al (2017), they acknowledged in their study that they merged two distinct datasets: Census Data on the demographics of the population, and Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) data on voting behaviour at ward level 7. Only the most recent South African 2011 census was used, given the close temporal closeness to the election date.

Fedderke et al (2017) stated that the national statistics agency of South Africa (Stats SA) and the Municipal Demarcation Board (MDB) provided the data. Voting data from the 2009 National Election was used, obtained from the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Since national elections have a better turnout than municipal and local elections, this data is better suited to combine with Census data. Moreover, in national elections, every ballot has the same political parties registered on it, which provides constancy across voting districts (in the municipal elections, party selection varies between regions and wards). The following were some interview excerpts which capture the sentiments of respondents on the IEC's responsibility of conducting municipal elections:

"...Ok, we always had free and fair elections in South Africa In local government, provincial and the National elections in SA is always free and fair. There are challenges, but challenges are managed here and there. We take our challenges from previous elections and take it off to another. We deal with those challenges for the national elections, and we deal with those of the local elections. When we are through with those challenges to make sure they are free and fair, then we just move on" (Interviewee 2, IEC official, East London, April 2017).

"...As you have indicated, we have managed national, provincial and local level elections. Our elections have been very successful. I take you through the account of our first elections immediately after 1994. When South Africa was declared a democratic state so every election milestone we been learning throughout especially in the areas of logistics and as well in the areas of, at a later stage, improving our electoral systems. So that is my view" (Interviewee 5, IEC official, Bhisho, April 2017).

The responsibility of the IEC to conduct municipal elections was collaborated by the above IEC officials during the interview discussions. They both stressed the point that they oversee and manage national, provincial and local level elections in South Africa.

In corroborating with the preceding interviewees, Karlsson et al (2017) and De Visser et al (2016) pointed out that the electoral system for local government combines ward elections with proportional representation. It is controlled in at least four different laws: the Electoral Act 73 of 1998, the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act 27 of 2000 and the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. According to De Visser et al (2016), more guidelines can be found in various regulations under these Acts. This results in an advanced but complex electoral system, which, according to De Visser et al (2016) outlined the key structures of the system in a accessible manner. The objective is to help anyone who participates in the election such as voting officials, government officials, councillors, candidates, political parties and members of civil society or assists in the electoral process (De Visser et al, 2016). The handbook also reports the rules for filling vacancies in between elections. While the manual is complete, it does not address every aspect of the electoral system or every plausible analysis of the electoral laws (De Visser et al, 2016). They stated that further details could be found in the various acts and regulations or obtained from the Independent Electoral Commission. The following respondent supported this view during the discussions as follows:

“...The IEC is mandated by the constitution to manage all elections at the provincial and local elections, and that is the core business of the IEC, and that is what the IEC has been doing over the years. Moreover, you have seen growth regarding political parties and party elections. Though of the whole period the IEC has gained good reputation and has been acknowledged worldwide as an independent commission that manages elections freely and fairly in SA on the continent and the globe as well. It is well recognised as an institution that manages elections in a free and fair manner as the constitution required 50 over the past 20 years, we have managed quite some elections; provincial and local government election, including by-elections, we also extend to secondary schools and university SRC elections for tertiary institutions” (Interviewee 3, IEC official, King Williams Town, April 2017).

The above responses were made by IEC official during the interview. He explained that the South African constitution mandates the IEC to manage all elections and that is their core business.

Table 6.1 below indicates donor funding for IEC for electoral purposes.

Table 10.1: Donor funding for IEC for election purposes

IEC receives donor support

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
Strongly Disagree	8	22.2	22.2	27.8
Disagree	2	5.6	5.6	33.3
Agree	7	19.4	19.4	52.8
Strongly Agree	17	47.2	47.2	100.0
Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

Most of the respondents 47.2% strongly agreed that the IEC receive donor support, 19.4% of the recipients agreed; this resulted into a cumulative total of 66.6% of the respondents agreeing to the fact that the IEC receives donor support. Also, 8(22.2 %) strongly disagreed that the IEC receives donor support. Again, 2(5.6 %) disagreed that the IEC receives donor support. Table 6.1 indicate that a cumulative of 66.6% acknowledge that the IEC receives donor support to conduct elections. At the same time, 22.2% strongly disagreed. Calland et al (2016) offered a discursive assessment of the contribution of the Chapter Nine institutions to South Africa's governance and constitutional democracy, noting essential strengths and weaknesses. Calland et al (2016) contributed to filling a somewhat surprising gap in the academic literature on democratic institutions and, in particular, the Chapter Nine bodies. It was acknowledged by Calland et al (2016) that at the outset of the dominant party debate early in the democratic era 'in the absence of [electoral] alternation, these institutions would have a heavy load to bear in checking the abuse of public power by the ANC' (Southall 1994: 654, cited in Choudry 2009: 17; Butler, 2017; Hyde, 2017). The following is an interview excerpt of a respondent who believes that only the National Treasury is funding the elections:

“...No, not my understanding. The only organisation that I believe is funding us or providing assistance for elections is the National Treasury. No one else. No other organisation or external organisation. It is only national treasury who is assisting regarding finance” (Interviewee 3, IEC official, Zwelitsha, April 2017).

The above IEC official held the view that the only organisation that funds the IEC for electoral purposes is the national treasury.

Mershon (2017) asked how local political elites in new democracies might meet the necessities of the people they rule. Mershon (2017) stated that this question is particularly crucial in sub-Saharan Africa. The 1990s witnessed the introduction of democratic regimes across Africa, the region with the highest rates of infant and under-five mortality in the world (WHO 2016a; 2016b). In many African democracies, including post-apartheid South Africa, sub-national governments shoulder a range of responsibilities devolved by the national government and thus are in charge of delivering such services as water, sanitation, and healthcare (Banerjee and Morella 2011; Riedl and Dickovick, 2014). However, Mershon (2017) mentioned two prominent arguments focused on the electoral arena. In the first, local variation in party system competitiveness should determine disparity in the strength of the largest party's motivations to provide citizens with public goods. In the second, local variation in popular participation should account for variation in the incentives to elected incumbents to supply public goods. In contributing to the discussions on donor funding for IEC for election purposes, the following respondent answered as follows:

“... Yes, we use schools, we use municipal halls, we use churches, we use traditional, councils halls in the rural areas, we use crèches, we use in some instances we use tents, we put up tents in vacant areas and some instances we use the properties of private persons when that is the only property available to use as voting station. Well, um, I cannot remember all the countries in 1994, but I remember the UN was involved we have, I will not do justice but, the AU and these are countries and institutions that also sent observers to come and observe the elections as observers. So we would have the United Kingdom (UK) we would have countries from Europe were involved, countries from many European countries, and also you find that many African countries were observers but not necessarily donors regarding donations, but they send observers to come and observe the elections. Yes” (Interviewee 3, IEC official, Bhisho, April 2017).

In response to the question whether the IEC receives donor support, the above official listed important assistance the IEC receives from community organisations who offer their halls for use during elections. He further indicated that the IEC has received elections observers and advisors around the globe.

The statistics on donor funding for the IEC indicated that 47.2% of the respondents agreed the IEC receives donor funding for electoral purposes. The table below assesses the organisations that fund the IEC.

Table 10.2: Organisations funding electoral activities in the municipality

	Responses		Percent of Cases
	N	Percent	
Organisations Funding			
World Bank	6	14.3%	19.4%
IMF	2	4.8%	6.5%
UN	3	7.1%	9.7%
UNDP	1	2.4%	3.2%
JICA	1	2.4%	3.2%
GOVERNMENT	29	69.0%	93.5%
Total	42	100.0%	135.5%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The respondents cited the following as the organisations funding municipal elections. Most of the funding comes from the government 69.0%; 14.3% comes from the World Bank; 7.1% comes from the UN; 4.8% comes IMF; while 2.4% comes from the UNDP and JICA separately. The results from table 6.2 shows that the government of South Africa, constituting 69.0%, provide all the funding for municipal elections. The table also revealed that the world bank, representing 14.3%, also contributes assistance. This revelation contradicts the view held by interviewee 3 that it was only the national treasury that funds elections. Additionally, the table reveals that the IMF (4.8%), the UN (7.1%), the UNDP and JICA (2.4%) respectively, all contribute to municipal elections. Akintola et al (2016) stated that Community Based Organisation (CBOs) described undergoing a clear reduction in funding received from both international and local donors as a consequence of the global financial crisis. Akintola et al (2016) said they experienced problems in obtaining new funding. Furthermore, Akintola et al (2016) reiterated that organisations addressed the funding difficulties by directing organisational reform and applying strict measures that led to the cutback of staff, reduction in benefits and motivations for staff and volunteers, reduction in the number of communities served and regulating of services provided to these communities. Akintola et al (2016) indicated in their findings showed that the global financial crisis has comprehensive

repercussions for health, social and developmental services delivery and devastating effects on the economy of marginalised communities.

Runge (2016) evaluated how over the past decades, China has changed into a major world power and progressed from being a secluded nation to one incorporated into the international community. Runge (2016) discussed how Chinese presence, showcases power and meddling which have advanced and how this has impacted the international community with an attention on the African continent, as Ethiopia and Zambia represented on an in-depth cases (Koch et al., 2016; Hicks et al., 2016; Lemanski, 2017; Phama et al., 2016; Clark et al., 2016; Norris et al., 2017 and Fernandez et al., 2016). In support of this, data in Figure 6.2 substantiated the importance of budgetary support from the government. The figure below indicates that substantial support comes from the government of South Africa.




Figure 10.2: Substantial support comes from government

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

From the surveyed respondents a cumulative of 77.78% of the respondents agreed that the IEC receives support from the government budget; while 22.22% of the respondents were in disagreement. Evidently, the findings of the study on substantial support from the government is supported by the work of Van de Waldt (2016) who stated that budget approach and procedures in African nations are contexts delicate. Each country is shaped and moulded by its history, political and government system, culture, demographics, geographical truths and current events and trends. According to Van de Waldt (2016), these realities can be analysed from various vantage points which include resource allocation and distribution in any country which ultimately boils down to its broader dominant governance philosophy and ideology.

South Africa, according to Van de Waldt (2016) has a highly sophisticated financial sector. South Africa complies with international accepted comparative measures of budget transparency and budget criteria developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and International Organization of Supreme Audit Institution (INTOSAI). Regarding the statutory framework, the principle of political oversight is embedded in the South African constitution (Van de Waldt, 2016). This is because, section 1 of the constitution requires a system of democratic governance to guarantee accountability, responsiveness and openness. Furthermore, Section 41 calls for all spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere to offer the practical, transparent, accountable and coherent government. The constitution, Van de Waldt (2016) stated, also provided legislation such as the public finance management Act 1 of 1999, the Municipal finance management Act 56 of 2003 and the Public Audit 25 of 2004 further provide for monitoring and political oversight over the expenditure of government institutions.

The National Treasury prescribes to the budget reporting framework. Phama et al (2016) and Calland et al (2016) pointed out that the Independent Electoral Commission is a chapter 9 institution under section 190 of the constitution and so it is affected by the provisions of the Act. Phama et al (2016) noted that the IEC is established to strengthen and support democracy. Phama et al.. (2016) stressed that the IEC is independent and subject only to the constitution of South Africa. The following respondents corroborated this view as follows:

“...The fund allocated to us, what I know as a chapter nine institutions, we get funding from national treasury like any other institution, so out of the budget we get from the national treasury we allocate our projects and elections happens to be one of our projects” (Interviewee 2, IEC official, Zwelitsha, April 2017).

“..Well, the commission receives a budget from parliament. Remember that the commission is responsible to parliament it reports to parliament, so during the budget allocation that is done by the minister of finance to parliament the commission also gets its share of the budget from the budget allocation which is done in parliament. That is what we get from the parliament or from government” (Interviewee 4, IEC official, Bhisho, April 2017).

From the above narrative, it is evident that the IEC is financed by National Treasury as it is guaranteed in the electoral Acts 190 and by the provisions of the South African constitution as a Chapter 9 institution (Calland et al., 2016; Van de Walddt, 2016; Besharati et al., 2016; Desai, 2017; Pearson et al., 2016; Koelble, 2017; Koch et al., 2016; Butler, 2017). The next sub-section shows that the IEC receives funding for logistics and for organising elections.

6.4. The IEC receives funding for logistics and for organising election

In an effort to enhance the work of the IEC to function effectively and efficiently, Maphephe et al (2016) pointed to the critical role played by Internet-based technologies (IBTs) and Information Communication Technology (ICT) as logistics used by the Electoral Commission (IEC) of South Africa in order to secure transparent and fair elections and also to assess and supplement the performance of the Commission from 2014 to 2016. Maphephe et al (2016) concluded that these new equipment have been useful, but there were still a few areas where the current system can be improved to deliver transparent, free and fair elections.

Maphephe et al (2016) noted that the use of IBTs and ICT in our modern era could help improve the quality of electoral democracy by reducing the disagreements and clashes ensuing from elections. Maphephe et al (2016) stressed that many other African countries could also learn from IEC in South Africa on the use of ICT to promote democracy on the continent. According to Besharati et al (2016), the rise of

the South and the role of “emerging powers” in global development has influenced much of the political and economic discourse of the past decade. Besharat et al (2016) insisted that the power of this emerging states be articulated in the assistances that they make to the electoral processes in the south which include: printing of ballot, training of personnel, providing technical assistance and logistical support.

In their contributions to the discourse, interviewees 3, 5 and 6 said the following during the interview:

“...What rather seem similar to me is like what sometimes happens that is normally used at the voting stations like we use our schools, our community halls so if a particular voting stand is in need, that municipality might request funding from the local government to fix such things as windows, toilets for those, water, if there are challenges with the roads, the municipality will communicate with the department of roads and public works for them to fix those. These are some of the funding we get” (Interviewee 3, IEC official, Mdantsane, April 2017).

“...You know, local government elections are some of the things municipalities do, we are not like the national and provincial elections. So we are always in close contact with the municipalities. For instance, we have someone who is taken to be the Municipal Electoral Officer (MEO), It is mostly the municipal manager, a high ranking officer within the municipality, will become the face of the municipality within our office and that helps us a lot in terms some of the infrastructural challenges we have in terms of adding of roads, in terms of clearing of tent sites, in terms of cutting grasses at tent site, in terms of provision of water, things like lights. So they really help us a lot because they are municipal officials, so they are able to see to that. What is required in preparation for the elections is actually what takes” (Interviewee 5, IEC official, East London, April 2017).

“...I rather know of this that as a commission we do get our funding from the national treasury. Like any chapter nine institution In terms there are, there is also, the commission does not receive funding in terms of the provinces, there is a budget from the province and is allocated to the municipality, parties, but that is only administered by the local government and those local officers and does not come to the commission” (Interviewee 6, IEC official, King William’s Town, April 2017).

The above interviewees provided an illumination into how the IEC acquires funds for logistics in an election. All of them agreed that, as a commission, IEC operate from a budget and it is accountable to the parliament.

Byrd (2016) argued for unassertive prospects and longer time horizons, concentrating less on each individual election and more on developing active political institutions (including not least strong political parties), evading international interventions that unintentionally worsen results or produce difficulties for the future, and not combining elections with other major ‘turning points’ such as removal of foreign troops or harsh decreases in support and international political support. Canaan (2016) introduces policy directive outlines and vital deliberations about the design of the National Electoral Authority organogram- the new electoral management body- NEA- stated in the 2014 Egyptian constitution. Canaan (2016) stated that the suggested structure is based on a range of the most widely used electoral administration options and a comparative study of three different countries. Canaan (2016) recalled relevant principles of international electoral principles, policies and practices (Nhlapo et al., 2017; Ittmann et al., 2017; Panda et al., 2016; Mbete, 2016; Smith, 2016). Figure 6.3 below presented a survey data on NGOs support for the IEC.




Figure 10.3: NGOs and individuals support the IEC

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

A cumulative 77.78% of the respondents agreed that NGOs support the IEC, while a total of 19.44% of the respondents were in disagreement. In addition, 2.78% of the respondents were not sure whether the IEC was receiving support from NGOs. The findings on NGOs support to the IEC towards elections is vividly articulated in the work of Hsu et al (2016) who scrutinized the overseas behaviour of Chinese non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in two African nations, Ethiopia and Malawi, with different political administration type. Hsu et al (2016) noted that regardless of regime type, Chinese NGOs have yet to make a substantial impact on either nation.

Hsu et al (2016) argued that notwithstanding the power of the Chinese state and the high levels of international development assistance given, domestic politics and regulatory frameworks in host nation still matter a great deal. In their observation, Hsu et al (2016) suggested that Chinese ideal of international development will continue to be one in which provisional one-off projects are favoured, and insofar as social organisations will play a part, they will be in the domain of government-organisation NGOs rather than ordinary NGOs. Fisher (2016) said that the expansion of civil society since the “global associational revolution” has coincided

with an increase in the number of countries called “democracy”. However, the events reinforce the strength and visibility of NGOs at the national level that focuses on democracy because NGOs were working on everything from elections to public debates, from human rights to prison reform (Fisher, 2016). Furthermore, Fisher (2016) stated that promoting a democratic culture is not just about positive attitude and sound principles, it breaks down negative attitudes and behaviour such as corruption. Whatever else is done to promote democracy such as corruption, sustainability depends on tracking corruption and its ties to dictatorship and patronage. The following excerpts from the interview presents a respondents’ view:

“... Yes, from private organisations. We do not hire vehicles for all the offices but some of the offices which don’t have enough vehicles. There are some people who say there are no cars to assist primarily from the rural areas. I stand to be corrected but from the rural areas. In the urban areas, you find that everywhere there is a car, but in the rural areas, you find that sometimes, there are no cars available, but you have to assist maybe where we can. We do have. However, as I am saying we have a pool of vehicles for other offices, not all the offices, they do not have a pool of vehicles. So not every office that has a pool of vehicles. We do conduct training for political parties because they should know what is going on at the polling station. They must not come to the voting station and expect to tell us what to do. They must be trained first before they go to the voting station so that they know what is going on. They are trained on our electoral practices” (Interviewee 3, IEC official, Zwelitsha, April 2017).

The above accounts by interviewee 3, confirmed that NGOs and individuals support the work of IEC to deepen the process of democratisation. The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), according to Fisher (2016) is the largest and most powerful South African democratisation NGO. As with other issues related to democracy, IDASA has played a dominant role in efforts to combat corruption (Fisher, 2016). He stated that IDASA does its work through its research, publications and advocacy on corruption as well as through its dominant but supportive role with other NGOs. (Norris, 2017; Darnolf et al, 2016; Anderson et al., 2017; Dinnen et al.,

2017; VonDoepp et al., 2016; Smidt, 2016). The next sub-section indicates the IEC's programme or projects in an election.

6.5. Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) Programmes or Projects in an Election

The Constitution of South Africa established the IEC. The Electoral Commission (IEC) of South Africa is a self-governing body that manages elections of legislative bodies and institutions through the contribution of citizens, political parties and civil society (Deegan, 2014; Butler, 2017; Doorenspleet et al., 2014; Darnolf et al., 2016; Cameron, 2014; The Constitution, Electoral Commission Act 190). Part of the responsibilities of the IEC are as follows: to manage elections of national, provincial and municipal legislative bodies; ensure that those elections are free and fair; declare the results of those elections and assemble and maintain a national common voters' roll.

The Commission's duties, according to Deegan (2014), Butler (2017), Doorenspleet et al (2014), Darnolf et al (2016), Cameron (2014), The Constitution and the Electoral Commission Act (190) were to ensure that any election is free and fair; promote conditions favourable to free and fair elections; compile and maintain a national common voters' roll; compile and maintain a record of parties; create and sustain liaison and cooperation with parties; undertake and promote enquiry into electoral matters; develop and promote the development of electoral proficiency and technology in all spheres of government; continuously review electoral laws and proposed electoral laws, and make recommendations; promote voter education; declare the results of elections for national, provincial and municipal legislative bodies within seven days; and appoint appropriate public administrations in any sphere of government to conduct elections when necessary. The following were interview excerpts which illustrated the views of a respondent:

".... In preparation for elections, we do have voter's education, for voter education, we usually do it from the level of going to high schools, to teach learners about democracy, we teach learners about voting. We go as much as high learning to register pupils; we register learners, we even go, sometimes we go from door-to-door to do targeted registration. We also do community voter education. That where the municipality assists us. They sometimes give us the slots when may be they are going to have a function; they will give slots. It is only the municipality, and we do not attend any political activity. If it is the municipality, if it is schools, if it is any

of them but for the political activities, we do not attend. That is what we do under registration” (Interviewee 5, IEC official, Bhisho, April 2017).

The interviewee above gives a vivid narrative of IEC’s preparation towards elections. She enumerates the procedures the organisation follows such as voter education, registration, compilation of party list and so on.

The above accounts suggested that the work of the IEC centres on elections only. However, in the words of O’Donnell (2001:9), the IEC’s work in elections can be seen as one of the steps in the process of democratisation. As O’Donnell (2001:9) puts it, “fair elections are crucial. This is not because such elections will necessarily lead to wonderful outcomes. It is because elections mark a departure from authoritarian rule”. O’Donnell (2001:9) stated further that “elections are a necessary but not probably sufficient condition for democracy”. According to O’Donnell (2001:9), “democracy is not only about organising elections; a wide range of different ingredients is needed to develop democracy, increase its quality and avoid the breakdown of new or young democracies: a political culture that is open and tolerant of dissent, active and informed citizens, functional and accountable state institutions, a vibrant civil society including diverse media and a range of political parties and political systems”. O’Donnell (2001:9) indicated that “while initially elections were considered key indicators of successful transitions to democracy, they are increasingly seen as just one of several essential elements of democracy, and these elements include political parties and political system as well”.

In their work, Jablonski et al (2016) assessed whether foreign aid impedes or catalysed democratisation in Africa in the 1990s. Jablonski et al (2016) argued that after the cold war, donors enlarged their use of technical assistance in support packages, improving their monitoring capacity and thus reducing tyrants’ ability to use aid for patronage. Jablonski et al (2016) found technical assistance helps to explain the timing and extent of Africa’s democratisation. The explanation of respondents 2 and 5 shows their opinion on the issue:

“... Yes, the commission must comply with the public finance management Act and the commission must work with the national treasury and to ensure that we comply with the public finance

management Act and any other legislation and directive from the national treasury and the commission also as public institution is audited by the auditor general which again audits with compliance with the PFA and all legislation that applies to the budget and how funds are used (Interviewee 5, IEC official, East London, April 2017).

“... To a certain extent because remember, donors they have their agenda they want to achieve so if they give you one million. Apparently, they want you to do them a favour, so I believe some others are not honest, some others have an agenda they want to push so that is the situation. Fortunately, we can avoid that. There are good people; there are bad people. There are good and honest donors. We should be a worthy organisation” (Interviewee 2, IEC official, East London, April 2017)

Two participants gave their answers on what they thought was the terms and conditions for all the financial assistance extended to IEC in the performance of its programmes and projects towards elections. For IEC interviewee 5, stated that the IEC was guided by the financial management act and oversight control from treasury.

Molenaers et al (2015) stated that apart from the traditional questions of use and efficiency, there is also a need to excavate deeper into the undercurrents surrounding political conditionality, particularly the negotiating practices and results along the support chain from domestic donor politics, donor coordination fora, policy discourse spaces to the political economy of recipient institutional reform and donor-coping strategies - because they influence the system, use, follow-up, purpose, and effectiveness of political conditionality (Abdulai et al., 2015; Robinson, 2016; Lahiri, 2016; Scholl, 2016; Resnick et al., 2013; Grosh, 1996; Peiffer, 2012). The table below displays donor conditionality promotes good governance and democratisation.

Table 10.3: Donor conditionalities promotes good governance and democratisation

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
\$Donor Conditionality Insist	Electoral transparency	28	20.0%	93.3%
	Electoral plurality	23	16.4%	76.7%
	Decentralization	10	7.1%	33.3%
	Good governance & Democratisation	28	20.0%	93.3%
	Healthy Electoral Campaign	23	16.4%	76.7%
	Free and Fair Representation	27	19.3%	90.0%

Others	1	0.7%	3.3%
Total	140	100.0%	466.7%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The findings on donor conditionalities observed by the respondents were distributed as follows: 20% of the conditionalities promotes good governance and democratisation; while another 20% was on electoral transparency; 19.3% was towards free and fair elections, 16.4% was focused on healthy electoral campaigns, another 16.4% was focused on electoral plurality while 7.1% was on decentralization. Moreover, 0.7% of the respondents specified other focus areas. The findings indicated that respondents thought that donor conditionalities promotes more electoral transparency, good governance and democratization, and free and fair representation. Plateau et al (2015) argued that the current criticism levelled against the current pattern of aid allocation is the co-existence of “aid darling” and “aid orphans” among recipient countries. Plateau et al (2015) claimed that this subsists despite the coming to the fore of a new approach to development cooperation that emphasised policy dialogue, country ownership and the need to get rid of conditionalities and reform overhead or high transactional cost. The following were interview excerpts from two respondents:

“... You know I will not say because, at the local level, we are given money where they see maybe there is a need but if we request for money from the provincial office, they will see, they will allocate it. In those budget, they may say that those, there is no need for it now. However, the budget constraints, I am not aware of it” (Interviewee 2, IEC official, East London, April 2017).

“... Yes, that does happen. Most recently, you know, remember that chapter 9 institutions are independent institution so there are also other institutions like the Human Rights which is also funded by treasury. So we are not the only institution that is an independent institution that is funded by treasury, so there are budgetary constraints. You find that sometimes when we are conducting the projects, we run short in terms of budget but there are budgetary constraints. Sometimes we struggle with the budget. It does happen. I think it is the physical outlook of the country, just that that is the problem” (Interviewee 4, IEC official, Zwelitsha, April 2017).

The interviewees above expressed their views about conditional limits that guide their operations and financial management. For instance, the IEC official 4 admitted

that there are budgetary constraints that the IEC try to grapple with. However, officer 2 was straight forward. He stated that if there were constraints in the budget, at the local level, they always receive budgetary allocations.

In their work on donor support utilisation, Johnston et al (2014) stated that in campaigning for leadership to the Eastleigh by-election, it was evidenced that the Liberal Democrats “bombarded” the electorates with half a million pieces of literature. According to Johnston et al (2014), the Liberal Democrats were not only able to flood the Eastleigh constituency with party activists and supporters, but they were able to raise a substantial sum of money with which they paid for its leaflets, posters and other costs for the intensive short campaign. Figure 6.4 below displays findings on IEC finds it difficult to operate without donor support.




Figure 10.4: IEC will find it difficult to operate without donor support

Source: Computer printout of a graph derived from the data and findings of this study

From the figure above, a cumulative total of 75.00% of the respondents agreed that it would be difficult to operate the IEC without the government and donor support. 25.00% of the respondents disagreed. The findings on the IEC finding it difficult to operate without donor support showed the importance attached to the support it receives. The figure 6.4 showed a cumulative of 75.00% of the respondent agreeing that The IEC will find it difficult to operate without donor support. It must be noted 25.00% of respondents cumulatively disagreed. In the study of Wessel (2012) whose

work addressed the financial cost implications sustained during elections, with a particular emphasis on South Africa. Wessel (2012) study was conducted by way of comparing South Africa to India, Australia, Israel and Mexico.

According to Wessel (2012), democracy entails more than merely conducting periodic elections that are free and fair, but it cannot be less.

To a large extent, Wessel (2012) observed that free and fair elections are indicative of the governing authority's commitment to democracy. Wessel (2012) held the view that commitment has financial implications. He said a country such as South Africa with a range of other pressing socio-economic issues, the cost factor about the voting process is of vital importance. The South African electoral practice, according to Wessel (2012) in comparison to other developing countries was at the time very costly undertaking at a conservative average cost of more than US\$ 13.00 per vote. Wessel (2012) further pointed out that the tardiness on the part of South Africa government in appointing the Electoral Commission to conduct the 1999 elections and the consequent skirmishes regarding the budgetary allocations to the Electoral Commission (IEC) combined with poor electoral planning, resulted in the IEC having to resort to costly technology in order to ensure that a free and fair election would be conducted on the date set by the president. The following were interview excerpts which represented the different views from respondents:

"... You work with what you have, even with the constraints, you work with what you have. If you have to buy this ballot boxes with this amount of money, you have to because you do not have a choice, that is the money that you are given. No one else is supposed to provide from other organisation except the national treasury" (Interviewee 2, IEC official, King Williams Town, April 2017).

and

"... Money from government are public funds, you cannot misuse them. Remember, there is a budget for travelling for us. If you take it to the local context, there is budget for everything which is allocated by the national office. So for instance every month, there is budget for travelling to conduct IEC business, there is budget for stationery, of course you know we have to account for the way we use the budget and for all expenditure, we have to account. Even if you look at the supply chain again, there we have to follow the processes as they are in terms of treasury regulations so those are the

conditionality attached” (Interviewee 2, IEC official, King Williams Town, April 2017).

The respondents above noted that money from government are public funds which cannot be misused. The IEC official 2 stated there are processes that guide the terms of treasury regulations. The respondents believed that they work within budget constraints.

Tumba (2016) investigated the perceptions of elections stakeholders about the management of the 2011 electoral processes in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Tumba (2016) stated that the involvement of civil society organisations, electoral experts, and academia, including party agents, as domestic observers and stakeholders in Congolese electoral processes, is crucial as they help electoral and participatory democracy to take root in the DRC. During the interview, participants 4 and 1 responded as follows:

“... What rather seem similar to me is like flag that is usually used at the voting station our schools, our community halls so if a particular voting stand is in need, that municipality might request funding from the local government to fix such things as windows, toilets for those, if there are challenges with the roads, the municipality will communicate with the department of roads and public works for them to fix those. These are some of the funding we get” (Interviewee 4, IEC official, King Williams Town, April 2017).

and

“... The fund allocated to us, what I know as a chapter nine institutions, we get funding from national treasury like any other institution, so out of the budget we get from the national treasury we allocate our projects and elections happens to be one of our projects” (Interviewee 1, IEC official, East London, April 2017).

The respondents above observed that the IEC mainly operate a budget as any other chapter nine institution who are funded by national treasury. They said the IEC gets allocation for it projects and elections. The IEC official 4 indicated that the IEC gets assistance from community leaders, other departments and institutions.

The findings on IEC, finding it difficult to operate without donor support was corroborated by the above respondents. The outcome showed a majority of 75% cumulative agreed to the issue of donor funding importance to IEC operations. The table below finds out respondents’ knowledge of donor conditionality on donor support.

Table 10.4: Donor conditionality on donor support

Conditionality on donor support				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
Strongly Disagree	6	16.7	16.7	19.4
Disagree	2	5.6	5.6	25.0
Don't Know	5	13.9	13.9	38.9
Agree	8	22.2	22.2	61.1
Strongly Agree	14	38.9	38.9	100.0
Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The findings on all the interviewed respondents indicated that 60% agreed that the donors placed conditionality on their support; of the 60%, 38.9% strongly agreed while 22.2% were in agreement. To add, 22.3% of the respondents were in disagreement with the fact that donors placed conditionality on their support; 13.9% of the respondents were not aware of any conditionality being placed by the donors on their support. According to Fisher (2015), political conditionality has long engrossed on the question of instrumental efficacy – whether political conditionality encourages policy reform in developing states.

Fisher (2015) stated that the proof from the UK however proposes that this emphasis is inappropriate and that donor officials increasingly use PC for 'expressive' reasons – to signal their reputed commitment to providing 'value for money' in a stimulating international economic climate. Robinson (2016) observed that there is an increasing attention being put on the pressure exerted by foreign aid donors through political conditionality whereby the delivery of development assistance is made a condition on political, administrative reforms and its influence to the democratisation process in recipient countries. The expectation of the aid donors is that democracy will bring with it better prospects of sustained economic growth by increasing regime accountability and liberalising the policy-making environment. Robinson (2016) described political conditionality as linking of support to administrative and political reform in recipient countries, in pursuit of good governance (Gibson et al., 2015; Abdulai et al., 2015; Del Biondo, 2015; Molenaers et al., 2015; Brown, 2014; Mckie,

2017; Cheru, 2016; De Felice, 2015). Table 6.5 shows donor support conditionality to the IEC.

Table 10.5: Donor support conditionality to the IEC

\$donors support ties to IEC Frequencies				
		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Donor support on IEC	Follow election schedule	27	37.5%	90.0%
	adhere to strict regulations	7	9.7%	23.3%
	regularise appointment of officers	1	1.4%	3.3%
	adhere to regulations on special votes	8	11.1%	26.7%
	allow officers to alter boundaries	3	4.2%	10.0%
	provide assistance to voters	25	34.7%	83.3%
	OTHER	1	1.4%	3.3%
Total		72	100.0%	240.0%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The respondents cited that donor support introduced some ties to the IEC. Thus, 37.5% of the ties were towards sticking to a strict electoral schedule; 34.7% for providing voter assistance; 11.1% towards adhering to special vote's regulations; 9.7% towards following regulations; 4.2% for officers to have the flexibility to alter boundaries; and 1.4% to regularise the appointment of officers. The IEC is a chapter 9 institution; therefore, it is funded by the national treasury to run elections. The table 6.5 depicts that 37.5% of the donor conditionality was to enable the IEC follow the election schedule. The table also showed that 34.7% was to provide assistance to voters. Gibson et al (2015), Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and Westebbe (1994) argued for the prevalence of domestic forces, such as an economic crisis or political dissent. Others noted the speedy disappointment of despotism at the end of the Cold War and recommended that global factors cultivated the changes (Huntington, 1993). Some studies suggested that foreign assistance may have contributed to democratisation (Gibbon, Ofstad, & Bangura, 1992; Nelson, 1990; Resnick & van de Walle, 2013). After the downfall of the Soviet Union, donors paid increasing attention

to political reorganisations and started ascribing conditions to their assistance. Some narratives suggested that elections were in part a response to these pressures. However, others contended that foreign aid has, instead, had the effect of establishing tyrants in power by increasing the resources available for patronage (Bates, 1994; Brautigam, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson et al., 2001; Morrison, 2009; Rodrik, 1996).

Gibson et al (2015) argued that foreign support does both: in earlier periods, aid increased resources available for patronage. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, donors paid attention to government spending and exploitation, making it harder for governments to use foreign aid for patronage systems. Enhanced monitoring radically reduced the resources a political leader could engage to remain in power. Gibson et al (2015) argue that such a reduction in resources, and with few alternatives to maintain patronage networks, Africa's incumbents during this period were forced to concede political rights to their opponents". To test whether higher levels of observing contributed to political liberalisation, they detached technical assistance from other forms of aid. Apart from a few studies such as Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, & Seligson (2007), Resnick and van de Walle (2013) and Scott et al (2011) which indicated that much of the literature exploring aid's effects on democracy does not disaggregate foreign assistance into its various types, Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008), Dunning (2004), Goldsmith (2001), Knack (2004) and Wright (2009) hold the view that aid has a higher influence on democratisation. Nevertheless, Gibson et al (2015) argued that technical assistance is connected with a higher degree of donor oversight than other aid modalities, and should have the marginal effect of lessening fungible resources and promoting liberalisation. In contrast, other types of aid should have little effect on liberalisation. Gibson et al (2015) found vibrant proof that supports their claims that when technical assistance such as a share of GDP increases, the probability of political liberalisation also increases and fewer resources are available for patronage. Gibson et al (2015) saw no such effect for other forms of aid; in fact, they saw an increase in patronage spending under some conditions. One respondent gave an account of funds allocated to the IEC for elections as follows:

“...Money from the government are public funds; you cannot misuse them. Remember, there is a budget for travelling for us. If you take it to the local context, there is a budget for everything which is allocated by the national office. So, for instance, every month, there is a budget for travelling to conduct IEC business, there is a budget for stationery, of course, you know we have to account for the way we use the budget and for all expenditure, we have to account. Even if you look at the supply chain again, there we have to follow the processes as they are regarding treasury regulations, so those are the conditionality attached” (Interviewee 3, IEC official, King William’s Town, April 2017).

The above respondent, IEC official 3 stated that The IEC has to account for how their budgets are utilised and for all expenditures, they have to account according to treasury regulations.

Table 6.6 below presents donor conditionality effects on voters.

Table 10.6: Effects of donor conditionality on voters

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
donor conditionalities on voters	voter apathy	6	7.6%	21.4%
	electoral boycotts	5	6.3%	17.9%
	voter fatigue	2	2.5%	7.1%
	voting regime consolidation	15	19.0%	53.6%
	low voter turn out	10	12.7%	35.7%
	lack of voter patriotism	17	21.5%	60.7%
	electoral disputes	5	6.3%	17.9%
	long queues at voting stations	1	1.3%	3.6%
	inducing voter choice direction	17	21.5%	60.7%
	Other	1	1.3%	3.6%
Total		79	100.0%	282.1%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The findings on the effects of conditionality on voters showed over 21.5% of the respondents mentioned that donor conditionality results in voters changing their chosen direction. Another 21.5% suggested that voter patriotism will be altered;

19.0% suggested that there would be a consolidation of the voting regime; 12.7% cited that there would be a low voter turnout; 6.3 % suggested that there would be voter apathy, while 6.3% suggested that there would be electoral disputes. Additionally, 2.5% suggested voter fatigue; 1.5% cited that there would be long queues at voting stations. The findings of the study on the effects of conditionality on voters could result in changing voter choice direction, altering of voter patriotism, lower voter turnout and engendering electoral disputes. According to Plata (2016), competitive national elections can play a significant role in the consolidation process of developing and established democracies alike. Nevertheless, if not handled adequately, they have the potential to bring long-existing, existential conflict lines to the surface. Below is an extract from an interviewee:

“... Yea. I think so, you see when people are not satisfied, and people will be so vocal about us. SA is a growing democracy. People can critique whatever you do. In that corner, somebody will say something else. However, you take those people in one, and you explain the processes. The problem is awareness as far as I understand. How people are at the processes that happen at any elections. Then the IEC provide their things out of the outreach program, the voter education program. Then people are aware now of what is going on in that corner. However, so far, I can tell you that, I even had processes that had an impact on us. One of the impacts of the election is the party and intraparty conflicts. All the parties, they have got their intraparty conflicts. So its impacts on us because the voters now start to say, we are not going to vote now because of this. However, we say no, no IEC does not involve itself in it. Political organisations are handling these matters. They will sort out these things. Like they will say, we do not want this candidate, we want that candidate, which is not our role. You cannot say you do not want to vote because you want a candidate. You can go and vote for another candidate” (Interviewee 3, IEC official, Zwelitsha, Apri 2017).

The IEC official 3 thoroughly discussed the issues on the effects of conditionality on voters. He admits that the IEC have been wrongly linked to party and intraparty conflicts over candidates. He said people become very vocal when they are not satisfied. He said solution is in creating awareness.

Asunka et al (2017) reported on the effects of local election observers on electoral fraud and violence. The study showed that observers reduced deceit and violence at the polling stations which they observed. Asunka et al (2017) argued that local

electoral race shape party activists' response to observers. As expected, in single-party dominant areas, parties used their local political networks to move fraud to polling stations without an election observer. In contrast, party campaigners relocated violence to stations without observers in competitive areas – a reaction that needs less local organisational capacity. This highlights how local party organisation and electoral incentives can shape the manipulative electoral approaches engaged by parties in democratic elections. (Asunka et al., 2017; Hyde, 2017; Berinsky et al., 2016). The following is an interview excerpt from a respondent:

“... From where I am sitting, every election has got its challenges as I have mentioned before but what is important is to resolve those challenges so that you do not go to the next elections with same challenges. You learn from the previous elections, and you go to new elections with an open mind. Hence we are preparing for the next elections, so we go to the elections for 2019 with an open mind, don't think about what happened as long as you resolve those problems, those challenges, and then you go straight with a positive mind” (Interviewee # 3, IEC official, East London, April 2017).

The IEC respondent above stated that every election has its own challenges. So they try to resolve the challenges as they come. He indicated their preparedness for the 2019 elections. He said they will confront emerging issues with open mind.

Kramon (2016) observed that vote buying is effective where machine holds receivers of donations answerable for their successive political behaviour. He noted that vote buying is typical in many situations where political party machines are not present, or where parties apply little work in inspecting voters. Kramon (2016) addressed this secret by arguing that politicians often issue electoral handouts to carry information to voters. This vote buying delivers information concerning the future provision of resources to the poor. Kramon (2016) noted that voter's information about a candidate's vote buying leads to substantial increases in electoral support, an effect driven by prospects about the provision of clienteles' benefits beyond the electoral period. According to Kramon (2016), the results showed that the circulation of material benefits could be electorally effective for influential reasons, thereby explain how vote buying can be effective in the absence of machine politics (Guardado et al., 2017; De Kadt et al., 2017; Obradovich et al., 2016; Cancela et al, 2016).

The next sub-section illustrates and analyses the roles and functions of the BCMM in donor-assisted projects for development and electoral administration.

6.6. The role and functions of BCMM in donor-assisted projects for development and electoral administration

This section of the study analyses the data collected and presented on the role and functions of the BCMM in donor-assisted projects in the municipality and the perceptions of officials of the municipality on donor support, electoral dynamics and democratisation as it pertains to the municipality. It is also ascertained how it utilises donor funds and resources in the interest of the public good of the citizens. South Africa faces a significant task in making certain that municipalities offer ideal and professional services to citizens of different cultures. The ongoing difficulties citizens face, therefore, guarantee that all municipalities develop the essential capacity to transform those resources into instruments with which to confront problems of poverty and underdevelopment. The constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Chapter 7, articles 152-153 stated the objects of local government and its duties in relations to essential service delivery in the municipalities.

The study is thus premised on the fact that no political democracy can endure and flourish if the mass of its people remained in poverty, and in a state of inequality and unemployment without real prospects for a better life. South African municipalities could do well in rendering effective public services if problems of poor public participation, corruption, service delivery hindering systemic factors, a burdensome legislative environment, political infighting, impoverished intergovernmental fiscal regime and the low capacity of municipalities were sufficiently addressed. The interventions must make a positive impact on the way the municipality meet such challenges as public participation, programme management as well as creating conditions for sustainable service delivery and economic development. The monitoring of service delivery needs thorough effective governance and service administration is crucial. This section utilised the development aid, reciprocity, democratisation as well as the social justice and equity theories for the analysis. The table below illustrates the municipal donor support assistance.

Table 10.7: Municipal donor support assistance

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
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Valid	Don't Know	3	8.6	8.6	8.6
	Agree	18	51.4	51.4	60.0
	Strongly Agree	14	40.0	40.0	100.0
	Total	35	100.0	100.0	

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

According to the table above, the majority of the respondents confirmed the fact that the municipality receives donor support assistance. Only a small percentage (8.6%) attested to not knowing that the municipality was receiving donor support assistance. According to Platz (2016), in light of growing urbanisation and an ambitious new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, subnational entities (cities, towns, provinces) in developing countries needed to find ways to unlock private funds to finance large-scale capital investments. In a regime where most developing economies and governments are embarking on austerity measures, there is prudent need to utilize donor support assistance in the greater interest of the majority of the citizens to ensure equality, eradicate poverty and fix the employment, sanitation, water, food, housing, energy, education, health and security problems (French, 2016; Manuel et al., 2016; Chawla et 2016; Waverijn et al., 2017; Ahmed et al., 2016; White,2016; Leitch,2016; Venner, 2016; Shkaruba et al., 2017; Clive et al.,2016; Cook et al.,2017; Heerwig et al, 2017). These findings were concurred by the following respondent as follows:

“.. We do have donor support, yes. There are different types of donor funding. I cannot give you the exact one that you want; our finance directorate can give you the specific funding. There are different types of donor funding. Some agreements come from the governments; there are some of the agreements that the city has got with other cities. So some of them come from those other cities” (Interviewee 2, BCMM official, East London, May 2017).

The BCMM official 2 confirmed that the BCMM receives donor funding. He indicated that the city was engaged in different types of donor funding.

The table 6.8 below indicates the source of donor support for development.

Table 10.8: The source of donor support for development

Donor support source for development Frequencies			
	Responses		Percent of Cases
	N	Percent	
Donor support source for development	World Bank	30	52.6%
	UNDP	25	43.9%
	DANIDA	1	1.8%
	CIDA	1	1.8%
Total		57	100.0%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The table above shows that the majority of the respondents acknowledge that a major source of donor support (52.6%) originates from the World Bank. The UNDP contributes 43.9% while DANIDA and CIDA contribute 1.8% apiece. Development support provided by donor countries outside the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is often observed as an alternative of last resort for developing countries funding poverty reduction programs (Downs & Kurlantzick, 2006). Furthermore, non-DAC donor contribution in international development actions has been regarded as the

crucial duty to attaining sustainable indebtedness levels and dependable growth policies (Dahle Huse & Muyakwa, 2008). This group of “new” donors includes important contributors such as China, apparently the second largest donor in Africa in the 2000–10 period, and Saudi Arabia, reported to be the largest donor worldwide regarding aid effort in the 1970–95 period (Neumayer et al., 2003).

The potential threat rests on the argument that the operations of new donors are frequently not synchronised with those of DAC donors. For example, recipient countries unwilling to follow the requirements of the DAC might find in the new donors a source of otherwise impossible finance. The DAC could conceivably deactivate the antagonistic effects of additional incoming resources from new donors by calling for reform in their beneficiary countries. These future reforms could be promoted through conditions attached to loans delivered through organisations in which DAC donors are influential, namely the Bretton Woods Institutions (Bresslein et al, 2013; Dreher et al, 2007). For example, credit conditions might set specific economic targets if development aid from new donors is causing debt overhang in a borrowing country. (Hernandez, 2017; Akintola et al., 2016; Greenhill et al.,2016; Strange et al.,2017; Muchapondwa et al., 2016; Visser et al., 2016; Koch et al., 2016; Bräutigam, 2009). The table below shows donor support awareness for the municipality.

Table 10.9: Donor support awareness for the municipalities

Awareness of municipal support from NGO					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Disagree	1	2.9	2.9	2.9
	Don't Know	3	8.6	8.6	11.4
	Agree	16	45.7	45.7	57.1
	Strongly Agree	15	42.9	42.9	100.0
	Total	35	100.0	100.0	

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The supported municipalities exhibit an extent of responsiveness to the fact that the municipality obtains donor support from NGOs for development. Most of the respondents (88%) agree that the municipality was a recipient of NGO donor support

for development purposes. However, a small population of the respondents, 2.9% was not in agreement with the fact that municipalities receive donor support for developmental purposes. The above results were supported by McEwan et al (2017) who explained the role of the private sector in international development which is growing, reinforced by new and progressing official programme, funding, partnerships and explanations.

This outcome approves the place of the private sector in “community growth” in the global south. It positioned corporate community Development (CCD) conceptually in long-standing debates within critical development lessons to consider the different roles that corporations are playing and how they are reacting to the tasks and inconsistencies involved inside “community development”. Drawing on field-based research across three different settings and sectors for CCD in Fiji, Papua New Guinea and South Africa, the findings suggested that carefulness is required in supposing that corporations can succeed where government, Non-governmental organisation (NGOs) and international development organisations have so often met with intricate challenges and obstinate difficulties. The observation was supported in the works of Rosendo et al. (2017), Baudoin et al. (2017), Cook et al. (2017) and Engelbrecht et al. (2016). An interviewee corroborated this view during the discussions as follows:

“... Some agreements come from the governments; there are some of the agreements that the city has got with other cities. So some of them come from those other cities” (Interviewee 6, BCMM official, Mdantsane, May 2017).

The above BCMM official response confirmed that some donor funding agreements come from government while others comes from sister-city agreements.

The results of the study as indicated above shows that the municipality enjoys support from NGOs for development. The next sub-section assesses the municipal Council’s relations with the IEC.

6.7. Municipal Council's Relations with IEC on Elections

The Constitution of South Africa has empowered the municipalities by the provisions of chapter 7, Articles 152-153 to ensure the development of the local constituencies. According to De Visser (2005), the local strategy was annually to be revised and checked by a system of performance management, also enacted in the Municipal Systems Act. Importantly “there is an intergovernmental aspect to the IDP in that it should be the central point for national and provincial planning. In other words, the IDP should be the process through which municipalities become the epicentre of developmental activities of national, provincial and other actors” (De Visser, 2005). This assertion was concurred by the following respondent as follows:

“... The municipality assists in providing general services to the elections, while the IEC conducts the elections. The role we play is to provide services if they need water, we provide water etc. The essential services that the IEC will require the municipality to help. That is the only role the municipality plays. The IEC coordinates elections. I think that is the only democracy people know, and that is the only democracy people are used to, and that is the only democracy known across the world. Some are not coming up something new, no one has seen yet. The democracy people know is through the election, there is no other way. That is the type of democracy known across the world, unless someone comes up with something new” (Interviewee 4, Municipal officer, East London, May 2017).

The above municipal officer 4 explained the relationship between the municipal council and the IEC on elections. He conceded that the council provide general and essential services in an elections while the IEC co-ordinates the elections.

According to Bel et al (2015), “Inter-municipal partnership is an important public service delivery improvement, whose drivers move beyond simple concerns with resources and cost-effective efficiency, to policy issues related to the governance structure and spatial milieu”. Bel et al (2015) found strong evidence that “fiscal constraints, spatial, and organisational factors are significant drivers of municipal cooperation”. Table 6.10 shows countries with sister-city relations with the BCM municipality.

Table 10.10: Countries with sister city relationships with the BCM municipality

Sister city countries Frequencies				
		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Sister city countries	USA	3	3.2%	9.1%
	ISRAEL	24	25.5%	72.7%
	CHINA	4	4.3%	12.1%
	SWEDEN	30	31.9%	90.9%
	UK	1	1.1%	3.0%
	NETHERLANDS	32	34.0%	97.0%
Total		94	100.0%	284.8%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

According to the table above, most of the sister donor support (34%) is from the Netherlands, followed by Sweden with 31.9%; Israel offers 25.5% support. To add, 4.3% sister support comes from China; 3.2% comes from the USA while 1.1% comes from the UK. As democracy develops in developing countries around the world, more prosperous countries have pursued programmes to enhance social development and democratisation through foreign aid (Anderson et al., 2016). Although the national state has historically been the recipient of aid, some donors have begun to consider assistance to local governments. It has been recognised that donors have had a powerful effect on improving people’s lives and on advancing democratisation. As the democratic quality of the national government has declined, foreign aid has continued to advance democratisation by providing mayors with a resource base independent of national government (Akurugoda, 2018; Glaser et al., 2016; Thomas et al., 2017; Shinn, 2016; Barluzzi et al., 2016; Myers, 2017; Drolet, 2016; Anderson, 2016). These are interview excerpts from some respondents on countries with a sister city relationship with the municipality:

“...Yes, we have got historical ones also like Sweden, Germany, and China. However, it is based on best practices mostly. We are looking at best practices of introducing new approaches to service delivery like the one on housing I was talking about that one that has been piloted, but it includes desertification

which is a new thing. Most of them, they are on that basis as well, all on best practices, learning to do government work, so they assist us on that, no longer on capital projects, it is all on intellectual schedule, yea. The international development partners come on their terms through conditionality” (Interviewee 3, Municipal officer, East London, May 2017).

“... Yes, they are from the International funding partnerships. For instance, Sweden they are partners, I mentioned Germany as well, there is funding that comes as part of that, so there is that also from China, sometimes the support is not financial, but it is in kind where there is exchange of expertise, where they will bring people” (Interviewee 2, Municipal officer, East London, May 2017).

Interviewees 3 and 2 above have explained the sister-city partnership that the BCMM had with other cities such as Sweden, Germany and China. They indicated that the partnership was not only financially based but also based on exchange of ideas on best practices and exchange of expertise.

Table 6.11 below shows that the municipality receives support from sister-city relations

Table 10.11: Municipality receives support from sister city relations

Municipality Receives Support from Sister-city					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Disagree	1	2.9	2.9	2.9
	Agree	15	42.9	42.9	45.7
	Strongly Agree	19	54.3	54.3	100.0
Total		35	100.0	100.0	

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The table above indicates that 19(54.3%) of respondents strongly agreed that the municipality receives support from sister city relations. It further shows that 15(42.9%) of respondents agree that the municipality receives donor support.

However, 1(2.9%) of respondents disagreed that the municipality receives donor support. Donor support to municipalities has become the new fashionable way of transferring assistance to development partners at the municipal levels even though that has not been the traditional ways of engaging municipalities. According to Drolet (2016), sister city or twinned or networked cities, which includes the role of NGOs has become the normative and innovative ways to meet long-term transformative goals; urban policy and management contexts; city-to-city co-operation and other partnerships; internationalism and global interchange (Drolet, 2016). Table 6.12 below confirms the sister-city support utilisation.

Table 10.12: Sister-city support utilization

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Sister city support is utilization	Agriculture	27	16.1%	87.1%
	Education	23	13.7%	74.2%
	Health	27	16.1%	87.1%
	Housing	28	16.7%	90.3%
	Road Infrastructure	27	16.1%	87.1%
	Water Supplies	6	3.6%	19.4%
	Electricity/Energy	30	17.9%	96.8%

Total	168	100.0%	541.9%
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a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The majority of the support from sister cities relationship is utilised for energy; with 17.9% being used for electricity. 16.7% is used for housing; 16.1% is used for road infrastructure; another 16.1% is used for health while another 16.1% is used for agriculture. 13.7% goes towards education, and 3.6% is used for water supplies. The municipality is burdened with numerous developmental challenges. It tries to solicit funding from various sources, including sister city relations, to meet some of these development pressures. Moya (2016), Tarigan et al (2017), Siakwa et al (2016), Spronk (2016), El Ebrashi et al (2017) and Kim et al. (2017) hold the view that rural councils ensure that sound environmental practices were observed by all persons within the village, town or community and had several other areas of responsibility. They indicated that the municipality or town councils' duties included: maintaining streets, drains and waste disposals, water and sanitation management, maintaining parks, markets and cemeteries, they provide social housing, schools, health services, they engage in socio-economic transformation and implement policies to curb unemployment and promote technical co-operation. Their assertions were concurred by one of the following respondents as follows:

"... Yes, we have got historical ones also like Sweden, Germany, and China. However, it is based on best practices mostly. We are looking at best practices of introducing new approaches to service delivery like the one on housing I was talking about that one that has been piloted, but it includes desertification which is a new thing. Most of them, they are on that basis as well, all on best practices, learning to do government work, so they assist us on that, no longer on capital projects, it is all on intellectual schedule, yea. The international development partners come on their terms through conditionality" (Interviewee 2, Municipal officer, East London, May 2017).

The municipal officer, interviewee 2 articulated his views on sister-city utilization. According to him, there are historical relations between BCMM and Sweden,

Germany and China, but those were based on best practices on new approaches to service delivery and best practices on doing government work.

Table 6.13 below illustrates the municipality’s income generating projects.

Table 10.13: Municipality’s income generating projects

Income generation Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
\$Income_generation ^a	Revenue Taxes	31	29.5%	88.6%
	Property Taxes	34	32.4%	97.1%
	Government Subversions/Budget	31	29.5%	88.6%
	Fines	3	2.9%	8.6%
	Investments	2	1.9%	5.7%
	Donations	4	3.8%	11.4%
	Total	105	100.0%	300.0%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The respondents highlighted that the municipality had some income generating projects. Most of the auxiliary income 32.4% comes from property taxes; 29.5% comes from revenue taxes while another 29.5% comes from government subventions and budgets; 3.8% comes from donations; 2.9% comes from fines while 1.9% comes from investments. These sources of income generation shows that the municipality has multiple channels to enhance its income generation capacity. It is possible that the municipality can wean itself off government budget if it takes property 32.4% and revenue 29.5% taxes seriously and embark on aggressive investment drive. Monkam (2014) assessed the technical competence of 231 local municipalities in South Africa for 2007 and examined the possible factors of efficiency gaps. Monkam (2014) found out that on average, B1 and B3 municipalities

could have cautiously achieved the same level of basic services with about 16% and 80% fewer resources respectively.

Furthermore, financial independence and the number and expertise levels of the top management of a municipality's administration were found to impact the industrious efficiency of municipalities in South Africa. Monkam (2014) showed a miserable picture of the democratic behaviour at the local level in South Africa. He stated that higher income and highly educated households do not feel the motivation to be active participants in public decision-making processes. He raised concerns over the future of local municipalities in the country, especially about their ability to competently deliver expected outcomes on a supportable basis (Gutura et al., 2017; Shava et al., 2017; Spocter, 2016). The majority of respondents indicated that the municipality generates most of its income from taxes, rates, fines. Table 6.14 below shows donor support priorities for development.

Table 10.14: Donor support priorities for development projects

Donor_support_priorities_for_development_projects Frequencies

	Responses		Percent of Cases
	N	Percent	
Donor support priorities for Education development projects	8	4.5%	25.8%
Health	19	10.6%	61.3%
Agriculture	28	15.6%	90.3%
Employment/Jobs	20	11.2%	64.5%
Roads	25	14.0%	80.6%
Water/Sanitation	17	9.5%	54.8%
Housing	27	15.1%	87.1%
Toilets	6	3.4%	19.4%

	Energy/Electricity	29	16.2%	93.5%
Total		179	100.0%	577.4%

Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The majority of donor support priorities 16.2% were shifted towards energy provision in the form of electricity; 15.6% was focused on agriculture; 15.1% was focused on housing. 14.0% was shifted towards roads; 11.2% goes towards employment (jobs); health makes up 10.6%; education makes 4.5% while toilets take up 3.4%. The majority of respondents held the view that energy supply in the form of electricity is their priority. This was followed by agriculture, housing, roads, jobs, education and energy. Supporting this view Nene (2016), do Vale et al. (2017), Oberhauser (2015) Hay (2017), James et al (2017), Azimoh et al (2016), Sidloyi et al (2016), Godfrey et al (2017), Kombe et al. (2016), Van Ewijk et al (2015), Jones et al (2014) and Regmi et al. (2016) stated that South Africa, as with most African countries, is facing the truth about insufficient economic growth, high levels of scarcity and increasing unemployment. Therefore, there are needed ways to deliver significant opportunities for improving the livelihoods, generating jobs and developing enterprises through agriculture, recycling of waste and greening the environment. The above findings on donor support priorities for development projects was corroborated by one of the participants as follows:

“.... Any donor if you work with donors, any donor will indicate the kind of project that they will support. Donors do not support every project they will indicate that as ICLD we support this and that and that. So when we submit a business plan to a donor and it is approved obviously with us remain comes conditions and conditions vary because donor varies” (interviewee 3, Municipal officer, East London, May 2017).

During the discussions on donor support priorities for development projects, the municipal officer 3 shared his views that donors have their project priorities and interest. He said donor preference differ and varies.

Figure 6.5 below depicts donor support and the municipal poverty reduction strategy.




Figure 10.5: Donor support and Municipal poverty reduction strategy

Source: Computer printout of a graph derived from the data and findings of this study.

The majority of the respondents 62.66% strongly agreed that donor support reduces poverty; 22.86% of the respondents agreed that donor support reduces poverty; 5.71% of the respondents were not aware of donor support induced development; another 5.71% disagreed while 2.86% strongly disagreed. A cumulative 85.72% affirmed that donor support assisted in alleviating poverty. In contrast with the above findings, Abdulai et al (2015) stated that through an investigation of Ghana's Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Fund which was proven as part of the poverty reduction strategy programme (PRSP) process, the study showed how aid-finance efforts to reduce regional inequality in Ghana has failed. According to Abdulai et al (2015), the main political elites agreed to policies reducing regional inequality to have access to aid funding but once approved; these funds were distributed on entirely different conditions in ways that sideline the poorest.

However, according to Hickey (2008), the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) experiment, along with other innovations encouraged by the international financial institutions over the past decade, has promised to protect pro-poor forms of accountability in relation to development policy-making (Chawla, 2016; Eyben, 2004; Resnick, 2014; Devas, 2014; Satterthwaite, 2001; Fox, 2014; Dijkstra, 2011; Bebbington, 2005; Jutting, 2004; Dongier et al., 2003; Barrientos et al., 2009). It can be noticed that such provisions and development is an affront to and aberration to the essence of democratisation and fairness, equity and equality which are the elements social justice. Table 6.15 below illustrates poverty alleviation strategies the municipality embarks on.

Table 10.15: Poverty alleviation strategies the municipality embarks on

Poverty alleviation strategies Frequencies

Poverty alleviation strategies	Responses		Percent of Cases
	N	Percent	
Vocational Skills development	22	19.3%	64.7%
Academic training/skills	32	28.1%	94.1%
Agriculture mechanization	18	15.8%	52.9%
Agro processing skills	16	14.0%	47.1%
Animal husbandry training/skills	4	3.5%	11.8%
Textile manufacturing	2	1.8%	5.9%
Auto Mechanics/Construction	3	2.6%	8.8%
Youth sports Development	14	12.3%	41.2%
Trading/Marketing skills	3	2.6%	8.8%
Total	114	100.0%	335.3%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The municipality also engages in poverty alleviation initiatives. The poverty alleviation initiatives were distributed as follows; 28.1% was invested towards academic training; 19.3% was set towards vocational skills training; 15.8% was set towards agriculture mechanization; 14.0% is set towards agro-processing skills; 12.3% was set towards youth sports development; 3.5% was set towards animal husbandry; 2.6% was focused on trading and marketing skills while 2.6% was set

towards auto mechanics. The findings of this study indicated that academic training and skills was one of the strategies for poverty alleviation.

However, Kwon et al (2014) observed that good governance eases paucity only in middle-income countries, not in the least developed ones. Ellis et al (2006) outlined how low family incomes in rural areas of all countries are linked with low land and livestock holdings, high reliance on food crop agriculture, and low monetisation of the rural economy. These opposing factors are, in some examples, made more problematic by land sub-division at inheritance, declining civil security in rural areas, deteriorating access to proper agronomic advice and inputs, and destructive taxation by decentralised district councils. This confirms the hypothesis on donor support targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens. The hypothesis showed a moderate positive correlation between the study variable. The hypothesis indicated a statistically significant correlation between donor support conditionalities for accountability and donor funding facilitating democratisation. The correlation of the hypothesis concludes that donor support targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens will be highly patronised and accepted by them (cf. tables 7.11, 7.12).

In concurring with this hypothesis, Abdulai et al (2018) were of the opinion that local communities patronise projects sponsored by donor managers to reduce poverty and to enable the poorest in society gain greater relief. They intimated that in most cases, the donor initiatives fail because political elites divert the approved resources, thereby reducing the capacity of local communities to contribute to reducing regional and community inequality. In the same manner, Banks et al (2015) observed that donor agencies' ability to meet long-term transformative goals in their work for development and social justice has been scrutinised for their frail roots in civil society in the face of rapid technology. As a result, agencies remain poorly placed to stimulate the real drivers of social change. It is their view that agencies can strengthen their threshold by building bridges between grassroot organisations, local and national-level structures and processes by applying local context knowledge to reinforce their parts for empowerment and social transformation. According to Islam (2016), poverty alleviation programmes generate a lot of interest among donors, governments and development practitioners. Local communities are attracted to development projects that benefit them particularly due to the great competition for

scarce donor funds for development (Bogatchev, 2016; Anelopoulou, 2016; Kleinig, 2017; Balibrea, 2017; Adely, 2017; Ravazzi et al, 2014; Sanina, 2017). Table 6.16 below shows that donor support induces democratisation and development.

Table 10.16: Donor support induce democratisation and development

Donor Support Induce Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Donor Support Induce	Transparency	31	23.5%	91.2%
	Patriotism	2	1.5%	5.9%
	Decentralization	30	22.7%	88.2%
	Good Governance & democratisation	33	25.0%	97.1%
	Healthy and effective service delivery through democratisation.	34	25.8%	100.0%
	Rapid development of the municipality	2	1.5%	5.9%
Total		132	100.0%	388.2%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study.

Donor support for development induces some responses from the municipality. From the responses, 25.8% of the responses cited that donor support induces healthy and effective service delivery; 25.0% cited the induction of good governance and democratisation; 23.5% of the respondents cited that donor support induces transparency; 22.7% of the responses cited decentralization as an effect of donor support conditionality; 1.5% cited rapid development of the municipality while another 1.5% cited patriotism. The responses indicated that donor conditionality induces positive effects on the residents. The findings on donor support inducing democratisation and development indicated that the respondents agreed that donor support induces democratisation, effective service delivery, transparency, good governance and decentralisation. This is corroborated by Delcour et al (2015) who examined Russia's reaction to political changes in Georgia and Ukraine in light of the

exchange between the democracy-promotion policies accomplished by the EU and US and domestic patterns of democratisation.

Delcour et al (2015) argued that notwithstanding the relatively feeble effect of EU and US policies concerning domestic structures, Russia has retorted severely to (what it perceives as) a Western expansionist agenda in chase of confirming its hegemonic position in the post-Soviet space. They argued that the gravity has made Georgia and Ukraine more strongminded to pursue their pro-Western orientation and has produced democratization, thereby supporting the objectives of the Western democracy promoters. This was succinctly captured by Edgell et al (2017:1) as follows:

“...Successful multiparty elections in sub-Saharan Africa are associated with incremental democratisation .Experiences with reported multiparty elections have substantive importance for democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa, the post-communist region, Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia. The reiterated arrangements of multiparty elections are associated with enhancements to liberal and deliberative components of democracy more so than egalitarian components”.

According to Szent-Ivanyi et al (2015), Grosh (1996), Roessler (2005), Baylies (1995) Savun et al (2011) and Acharya (2003), the flow of foreign assistance have responded to events of democratisation in developing countries. Using a panel dataset of 136 aid-receiving countries between 1980 and 2009, aid allocation regressions showed that Western donors, in general, have a tendency to act in answer to observable, major democratic changes by increasing aid to the partner country, but no significant increases can be identified in the case of countries introducing smaller democratic reforms. The increases in aid flow according to Szent-Ivanyi et al (2015) are not sustained over time, suggesting that donors do not provide long-term support to emerging democracies. This was corroborated by Kuenzi et al (2017) who conducted a research in 35 African countries from 1972-2014. They found out that electoral instability is lower when foreign aid is high. The hypothesis on donor support importance and democratisation used in a regression analysis confirmed the stated hypothesis which showed that when donor support importance was regressed on the importance of donor funding for democratisation, it

explained 29.1% in democratisation variability which is caused by donor support on the residents with significant relationship which indicate a high degree of correlation between donor support and democratisation. (cf.table7.5).

According to Anderson et al (2016: 276), as democracy develops in poor countries around the world, “wealthier countries have sought to enhance social development and democratisation through donor assistance”. According to them, some donors have begun to consider donations to local communities and to local government. They hold the view that “if local government is democratic, it may well deliver assistance more immediately than does national government”. They further stated that, “donors have had a powerful effect on improving people’s lives and on advancing democratisation” (Anderson et al, 2016:276). Again they stated that as the democratic quality of the national government has declined, aid has continued to advance democratisation by providing mayors and community leaders with a resource base independent of national government. Similarly, Fiedler (2016) noted that donor support can achieve peace and democratisation if donors jointly pursue political agenda that connect to local community needs and to home-grown processes (Mercer, 2007;Fowler, 1993; Hauser,1999; Fowler, 1991; Savun et al, 2011; Edwards et at,1996; Belloni, 2008; Stewart, 1997; Ott et al, 2000; Brown, 2001; Brett, 2017; Fuchs et al, 2015; Macdonald, 2016; Bermeo, 2016; Van de Walle, 2016; Delcour et al, 2015; Noutcheva, 2016).The Table 6.17 below indicates the necessity to attached conditionality to donor support.

Table 10.17: The necessity to attached conditionalities to donor support

Conditionalities donor-supported development projects in Municipality

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Don't Know	1	2.9	2.9	2.9
	Agree	21	60.0	60.0	62.9
	Strongly Agree	13	37.1	37.1	100.0
	Total	35	100.0	100.0	

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

A cumulative 97.1% of the respondents agreed that it was necessary to attach conditionality on donor support. However, 2.9% of the respondents were in disagreement with donor conditionality on donor support. The majority of respondents agreed that it was necessary for donors to attach conditionality to their funds. In support of this findings, Baylies (2007), Plateau et al (2015), Del Biondo (2015), Robinson (2016), Mclean et al (2014) and Koch et al (2017) noted that the use of support to enforce political conditions on recipient countries, to further democratic and government reforms or to punish non-amenability with earlier demands, is a fairly new feature of the international aid administration.

Baylies (2007) assessed the flourishing donor and concrete works developing on the subject. At the heart of the argument of democracy/ governance policies are deliberations about the change of the state, its relationship to economic development and the decreasing extent to which considerations of sovereignty limit donor interventions. Baylies (2007) argues that political conditionality help the development of democratic movements in Africa. Below are typical examples of extracts from interviews on the necessity to attach conditionalities to donor support:

“...It is obvious, every agreement you sign has got conditions” (Interviewee 2, Municipal officer, East London, May 2017).

and

“... Yes I am aware of the terms and usually there are discussions that proceed the funding so there will be for instance mutually agreed upon projects by both parties that is BCM and its International partners and key will agree that there is this project that is of mutual interest that we want to pursue and they will put the conditions attached to the projects, you know, so I am aware that there are conditions, terms and conditions. However, they are according to the discussions or engagements of such discussions” (Interviewee 4, Municipal officer, East London, May 2017).

The discussions on the necessity to attach conditionality on support solicited the views of the above respondents. According to interviewee 4, he was aware that there

are terms and conditions in all agreements. What was important to him was the mutual agreement that serve the best interest of all parties.

The table below is on donor support and democratization.

Table 10.18: Donor support ensures good governance and democratization

Donor support for good governance and democratization Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Donor support	Prudent utilization	34	21.9%	100.0%
	Excessive taxation	1	0.6%	2.9%
	Decentralization	30	19.4%	88.2%
	Good governance & democratization	33	21.3%	97.1%
	Healthy citizen's participation in development	28	18.1%	82.4%
	Effective service delivery	29	18.7%	85.3%
Total		155	100.0%	455.9%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The findings on donor support for the municipality mostly ensures prudent utilisation of funds as cited by 21.9% of the respondents. 21.3% cited that it ensured good governance and democratization; 19.4% cited that it ensured decentralisation while 18.7% cited that it ensured effective service delivery. To add, 18.1% of the respondents cited that donor support conditionality ensured healthy citizen participation while 0.6% cited that it ensured excessive taxation. According to development aid theory, poor governance is among the most important causes of state failure and underdevelopment Woll (2008) stated that multi-donor budget support mechanisms are presently the major instrument in progressive collaboration. Woll (2008) argues that a multi-donor budget support mechanism was established in Ghana in 2003. To guarantee proper management of the public financial plan,

donors pressure for inclusion of a list of reform rudiments that the government had to implement to receive the full funding. According to Rahaman (2012), International donors to Bangladesh have stressed governance reform since the 1990s, on the basis that bad governance was draining off both domestic and foreign aid resources.

While donor support towards good governance is encouraging, such support should be arbitrated in the light of actual contributions to the promotion of good governance (Abubakari et al., 2016; Bal-Gunduz et al., 2014; Greenberg et al., 2016; Wiggill, 2014; Gampfer et al., 2014; Fayaz et al., 2017; Hurt et al., 2015; Gunduz et al., 2014). The findings above showed that donor support ensures prudent utilisation of funds, good governance and democratisation. The table below illustrates the response of the municipality to the donor conditionality.

Table 10.19: The response of the municipality to the donor conditionalities

Response to Donor Support Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
\$responsetoDonnorSupport ^a	Tax exemptions	6	6.1%	18.2%
	Free market access	26	26.5%	78.8%
	Freedom to repatriate profits	1	1.0%	3.0%
	Investment opportunities	32	32.7%	97.0%
	Technical support for projects	32	32.7%	97.0%
	Others	1	1.0%	3.0%
Total		98	100.0%	297.0%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The findings on the response of the municipality on donor conditionality showed that about 32.7% of the respondents cited that the municipality responded to donor conditionality by creating investment opportunities; another 32.7% cited that the municipality offered technical support to projects as a response; 26.5% of the respondents cited that the municipality offered free market access while 6.1% cited

that the municipality introduced tax exemptions as a response to donor conditionality; 1.0% cited freedom to repatriate profits while another 1.0% had other citations. The findings of the study show that technical assistance and investments opportunities were the response of the municipality to donor conditionality. Gibson et al (2015), Brinkerhoff et al (2015) corroborated the findings and argued that after the Cold War, donors enlarged their use of technical assistance in aid packages, improving their monitoring capacity and thus dipping totalitarians' aptitude to use aid for patronage.

To remain in power, dictators responded by surrendering political rights to their opponents—from legalising opposition parties to staging elections. Brinkerhoff et al (2015) stated that the standard responses to public sector management shortfalls in developing countries have focused mainly on a mixture of technical efficiency-enhancing improvements based on neoliberal market models and New Public Management (NPM) principles and tools (Domam, 2017; Crivelli et al., 2017; Foli et al., 2014; Ascher et al., 2016; Venner, 2016; Schmit et al., 2015; Dickerson, 2016; Stubbs et al., 2017; Plateau et al., 2015; Fukuda et al., 2016; Del Blondo, 2015; Prizzon, 2016). Table 6.20 gives an output of the effects of donor conditionality on residents.

Table 10.20: Effects of donor conditionality on residents

Effects_on_donor_conditionality_on_residents Frequencies				
		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Effects_on_donor_conditionality_on_residents ^a	Unemployment	14	8.0%	42.4%
	Poverty	15	8.5%	45.5%
	Unfair trade terms	26	14.8%	78.8%
	Administrative Corruption	28	15.9%	84.8%
	Insufficient funds for Development	31	17.6%	93.9%
	Uncompleted municipal projects	1	0.6%	3.0%

Undue pressure on projects	3	1.7%	9.1%
Distorted municipal planning	3	1.7%	9.1%
Corruption	10	5.7%	30.3%
Lack of patriotism	1	0.6%	3.0%
Lead to service delivery disputes	26	14.8%	78.8%
Abandoning of projects	5	2.8%	15.2%
Obstruct poverty alleviation programs	13	7.4%	39.4%
Total	176	100.0%	533.3%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The findings on the effects of donor conditionality was cited to have several adverse effects on the residents. Most respondents 17.6% cited insufficiency of development funds as the major effect. Other major effects included: 15.9% administrative corruption; 14.8% service delivery disputes; 14.8% unfair trade terms; 8.5% poverty; 8.0% unemployment; 7.4% obstruction to poverty alleviation; 2.8% abandoning of projects and 0.6% lack in patriotism. The findings of the effects of donor conditionality on residents indicated that it will result in lack of funds for development, service delivery disputes and extreme administrative corruption. The findings were concurred by Aladwani (2016), Zhu et al (2015,2017), Valle-Cruz et al (2015) and Stiglitz et al (2015) who argued that the frequency of corruption in developing economies could limit moral and governance competences of administrative systems managing e-Governments in a way that could lead to the failure of these entities to produce ingenuities that meet stakeholders' anticipations. The following is an interview excerpt of the effects of donor conditionalites on residents from a respondent:

"...Look, some of the conditions are just the reporting conditions on what you need to spend. It is not conditioned that will add anything. It is just this is the money, you are allowed to spend it on this item, those are some of the conditions, and then you report to us quarterly or yearly. Those are not strict conditions but for reporting purposes" (Interviewee 3, Municipal officer East London, May 2017).

The municipal officer, interviewee 3 from East London indicated that most of the requirement in terms and conditions are merely formalities. He said the conditions were for reporting purposes only.

Table 6.21 shows the extent to which the municipality suffers public protestation over service delivery.

Table 10.21: The extent to which municipality suffers public protestation over service delivery

Municipality suffering from service delivery				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
Don't Know	3	6.8	6.8	6.8
Agree	13	37.1	37.1	42.9
Strongly Agree	20	57.1	57.1	100.0
Total	35	100.0	100.0	

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The majority of the respondents 57.1% strongly agreed that the municipality had suffered public protestation over service delivery. 37.15% agreed also bringing a cumulative total of 94.2%; the remaining 6.8% were not sure. The findings showed that majority of respondents' agreed in their views on incessant service delivery protests in the municipality. The findings were supported by Botes (2016), Zuem (2014) and De Kadt et al (2017) who stated that local communities protest against government's inability to provide adequate services including water, electricity, housing, roads and sanitation is worrying. Botes et al (2016) observed that protests take place not only because of the perceived slow pace of service delivery but often due to the poor quality of services and the practices of patronage and inclusion associated with their delivery. Botes et al. (2016) said community demonstrations should be taken to reflect a genuine rebellion by South African poor. The following are excerpts of interviews from respondents on the extent to which the municipality suffers public protestations over service delivery:

“... Yes. Remember it comes with different issues. Sometimes it is the issue of priority. They fail to prioritize what is going to be done first. Then you have a community that wants priority number five to being converted to priority number one in terms of what was discussed is not priority no. 1. That is what is causing a lot of protests. Some issues connected to politics within the area. They are not mostly related to service delivery” (Interviewee 1, Municipal officer, King William’s Town, May 2017).

“... it has suffered a lot of voter protest, where people, the demands of the people is if you don’t give us this, we will not vote. Yeah, no, that has been the trend really but social protest before elections becomes a big driver yeah and then it does a bit but no it has been a but again it was seasonal. You see now after the elections, they keep quite. We have a situation where very few, I say when you look at the newspaper, we have had very few protest now after the elections but before then everybody put pressure, demands, we want service delivery now, don’t tell me we are still planning you know or you don’t have money or there is still budget constraints or things will be followed you know, it can’t be, unfortunately there is shortage of funding” (Interviewee 2, Municipal officer, East London, May 2017).

The above municipal officers 1 and 2 contributed to the discussions on the incessant service delivery protest in the municipality. According to them, the protest had focused on different issues. Some of the issues bother on politics, others on service delivery. But according to them, it all boils down to lack of funding.

Table 6.22 indicates the most challenging areas of municipality’s development.

Table 10.22: Most challenging areas of municipality’s development

Most_challenging_areas_for_municipality Frequencies				
	Responses		Percent of Cases	
	N	Percent		
Most_challenging_areas_for_municipality ^a	Water shortages	2	1.4%	5.9%
	Sanitation	10	7.2%	29.4%
	Energy/Electricity	32	23.2%	94.1%

Housing	33	23.9%	97.1%
Corruption	29	21.0%	85.3%
Toilets	1	0.7%	2.9%
Crime and Security	30	21.7%	88.2%
Food Supplies	1	0.7%	2.9%
Total	138	100.0%	405.9%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The findings showed that energy and housing were cited as being the most challenging areas for the municipality with each scoring 23.2% and 23.9% respectively. Corruption and crime and security each scored 21.0% and 21.7% respectively. Sanitation was scored at 7.2% while water shortages and food were the minority with 1.4% and 0.7% respectively. The challenges facing the municipality as can be seen from the table are numerous. The results show that energy and housing were the most challenging development issues in the municipality. Other concerns in the municipality were on corruption, crime and security issues. Pereira et al. (2016), Nanni et al. (2016) and Azimoh et al. (2015) have concurred that energy and housing were challenges facing the municipalities. The following are interview excerpts from respondents on the most challenging areas of the municipality's development:

"...there have been a lot of challenges facing the municipality. There are housing problems for the poor and the homeless, the crime rate here is very high and food supply is also a problem" (Interviewee 2, Municipal officer, East London, May 2017).

"... Well, you know, with the Eastern Cape and BCM in particular, the potential for agricultural development is huge because land is not necessarily a problem eemm and we have the talents, we have a lot of unemployed young people but what is lacking is the capital to make use or fully exploit that land because the world has now shifted". (Interviewee 5, Municipal officer, East London, May 2017).

The development challenges facing the municipality were articulated by the above respondents. The officers mentioned the challenge of housing, crime, poverty and shortage and high cost of food supply. They also mentioned the potential of agricultural development in the municipality.

The sub-section below shows the municipality's response to accusations of mismanagement, corruption and misappropriation of funds.

6.8. Municipality accused of mismanagement, corruption and misappropriation of funds

There have been rampant reports of corruption, misappropriation and mismanagement of public funds at the municipality. Public sector corruption is a canker that has plagued our society. According to Gottschalk et al (2017), public corruption poses a fundamental threat to our national security and our way of life. According to Rispel et al (2015) corruption is a problem in South Africa's healthcare sector. Rispel et al (2015) noted that corruption is influenced by adversative agent selection, lack of mechanisms to identify corruption and a failure to punish those entangled in corrupt activities. This was corroborated by the following respondents as follows:

"... Yes, I agree, yes it is true it happens, it happens. Hey look, in my view they become institutions of government that are largely are at the receiving end of what I call "private accumulation" which is rampant in even in South Africa. What do I mean by that? I mean a situation where politicians are not vigilant in ensuring that public spending is done prudently, effectively and efficiently but allow loopholes to exist for them as politicians" (interviewee 5, Municipal officer, Bhisho, May 2017).

"...That was in bad taste. And there is a politician, a regional secretary who was embroiled in that scandal, who facilitated that transaction to occur. So those are the loopholes that are created in the system, and politicians are just taking advantage of that in moving forward. Why is corruption something that is prevalent in all the three spheres of government? It has become rampant at this particular level. This is because, all the other three spheres of government want to take advantage of what happens. Yeah, it is true. It is happening including in our own municipality. We are not spared. We are in the news now, today

for instance, in terms of unauthorized expenditure, more than a billion rand, which is a loophole created by not being vigilant enough to close them. So that money is spent. So we are in it also” (interviewee 2, Municipal officer, East London, May 2017).

The municipal officers, interviewees 2 and 5 in their contributions to the discussion on municipal corruption, mismanagement and misappropriation of funds admitted that it is very true. They said it is public institutions that largely guilty of corruption. They claim municipal officers are at the end of receiving end of what they call “private accumulation” which they claim is rampant in South Africa.

The sub-section below provides the conclusion(s) to the chapter.

6.9. Conclusions

This chapter analyzed the roles and functions of the IEC and the BCM in donor assisted projects and the electoral administration in the municipality. It captured the IEC as responsible for conducting elections and that the IEC receives donor support for electoral purposes. It also established that the government of South Africa provides substantial support for elections and outlined organizations and NGOs supporting the IEC. The chapter looked at donor conditionality and its effects on residents and voters in the municipality. The chapter also assessed the functions of the BCM with regard to elections and poverty alleviation strategies in the municipality and the effects of donor conditionalities on citizens.

It finally looked at how the municipality has handled accusations of corruption, misappropriation of funds and mismanagement. Good governance has helped reshaped the structure of political institutions as a result of aid conditionalities that solicited reforms for regular free and fair elections, transparency, consolidation of civil liberties, ensuring peoples’ right to vote, the right to contests for public office, the right to acquire properties and the freedom to self-actualisation. The most effective projects and programs in the municipality are those that give local cohorts real ownership over the development process. This study has shown that donor support induces neo-liberal democratization such as the privatisation of the economy, deregulation and economic restructuring towards free market economy etc.

The impression was created that these activities are pursued in the best interest of the marginalised and the poor in society for them to feel that the agenda is working in their interest and welfare; however, the agenda is to serve the whims and caprices of donor elite. The findings on this chapter on the role and functions of the IEC and Buffalo City municipality on the development and the electoral administration revealed numerous problems and challenges that confront the municipality. Findings also showed that the municipal council plays an important and active role in the electoral administration of the municipality. The municipal city manager indeed becomes the face of the elections. In all elections, he becomes the municipal electoral officer (MEO) who together with the IEC administer the elections. It emerged that funding for elections in the municipality emanates not only from the government through the national treasury but also from the donor community. The municipal council assists in providing infrastructure and services to deprived and rural areas. The municipality attracted some donor support for development mostly based on sister-city relations. The support was specific for some targeted projects such as energy, sanitation, environment, industry, technology and technical cooperation and transfers, for capacity building and boardwalk. There are past projects with certain countries like China, Sweden, and the Netherlands are utilised for educational exchanges, boardwalks and capacity building. The municipality is heavily challenged with youth unemployment, agriculture, energy, housing, corruption and crime and security. The next chapter looks at community voters' perceptions of donor support and democratization.

CHAPTER SEVEN: COMMUNITY VOTERS' PERCEPTIONS OF DONOR SUPPORT, ELECTORAL DYNAMICS AND DEMOCRATISATION

7.1. Introduction

This chapter presents findings on the perception of community voters on donor support and democratisation. This is due to the fact that the decision made at the community level directly influences people resulting in more trust, confidence and openness. In essence, this makes elections at the local level crucial for electorates as a barometer for the effectiveness of government performance in relations to citizens' socio-economic well-being (Crewe, 1994; Muthien, 1999; Opp, 2008).

In many parts of the world, the local community's development has assumed greater importance in the discourse of human development in recent years than ever imagined. This is mainly because the well-being of the people in a community is the utmost responsibility of the state (Chavis et al., 1990; Larson et al, 2002; Mazer, 1997; Newman et al, 2005; Hudson, 2007; De Visser, 2005 and Newman, 2005). The welfare of the people, in essence, has a direct reflection on the performance of the government in power even as the gap between the rich and poor is ever widening (Dollar, 2002).

The section further discussed the findings based on existing literature and other empirical findings. The chapter includes a test of significance of difference statistical table; response frequencies for different survey aspects; results of chi-square goodness of fit and some cross-tabulations. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings. For instance, one major finding of this chapter, and by extension of this study, is that donor support was important for municipal elections and that donor support induces democratisation.

7.2. Core Argument of the Chapter

The chapter argues that donor support, as democracy assistance to municipality, will be most useful when aimed at projects supported by residents of the local communities. The radical political changes towards poverty alleviation must come

with peace, justice and development. Community poverty reduction strategies require improved municipal governance and the active participation of the poor. The chapter further argues that every electoral participation of citizens is a political decision which the voter exercises as a right through conscious affiliation. However, voters are done a great injustice if all they get was to be called upon each election year to vote because they constitute a vote bank to politicians. The perceptions created by politicians portray a picture that poverty alleviation programs as the ultimate intervention that liberate community members from the shackles of poverty and underdevelopment and for which they urge them to participate in elections. As has been adduced in previous chapters, donor support induced neo-liberal democratisation but the benefits of donor interventions hardly trickle down and saturate the lower echelons of the local constituencies mainly due to the operations of donor governors who syphon and arrogate to themselves the benefits of democratisation.

The findings in the chapter indicate that donor support leads to efficient electoral administration and democratisation (cf. Fig.7.4). In ascertaining voters' reasons for voting, respondents indicated they vote based on the municipality's performance in service delivery, benefits they derive from municipal development projects, patriotism and to help their party win (cf. table 7.1). The chapter also shows voters' response to the effects of dwindling donor support in the municipality. The responses (cf. 7.1.3) ranges from violence, electoral boycott, voting for change, incessant demonstrations, lawsuits and agitations. In support of the findings, the democratisation theory, according to Eisenstadt (1999, 2003), indicate that there are significant factors that affect or ultimately limit democratisation.

Factors such as economic development, history, active civil society and a vibrant culture are the ideal results of democratisation that guarantee that citizens have the freedom to vote and have a voice in their political arrangement. Furthermore, the norm of reciprocity and social justice enable voters to judge the extent of benefits they derived from municipal projects for them to make a fair assessment of the direction of their vote (cf. table7.1.1; table 7.2). The theories utilised in this chapter speak to the findings of this study well enough. For instance, the voters' behaviour theory postulates helps to explain how electorates make informed political and voting choices despite the levels of political attentiveness or sophistication. According to

Lazarsfeld et al (1944), Biswal et al (2010), Braha et al (2017); Healy et al (2010) voting behaviour is affected by race, gender, culture, religion, emotions, socialisation, level of tolerance to opposing political views and the media. This is also valid whether the elections are national, local or municipal.

7.3. Importance of municipal elections

Local government is the level of government that deals directly with the local community needs of the people. Local government affects every aspects of daily life of community members. It is at this level that decision is taken on voters' needs and priorities. Municipal elections therefore constitute a chance for citizens to vote for how the municipality should be run, by whom and hold officers accountable over their service delivery interest such as: education, housing, water, food supply, energy, roads, transportation, crime and safety issues (Wyatt, 2017; Dassonneville et al, 2016; Fiva et al, 2018; Moore et al, 2017; Marien et al, 2015).

The figure below depicts the importance of municipal elections.




Figure 11.1: Importance of municipal elections

Source: Computer printout of a graph derived from the data and findings of this study.

The majority of the respondents emphasized the importance of municipal elections in fostering development. A cumulative total of 81.81% agreed that municipal elections were necessary. Moreover, 4.78% of the respondents were indecisive while a cumulative total of 13.40% of the respondents were in disagreement with the statement that municipal elections were necessary. The findings show that respondents agreed that municipal elections are important. Cheibub et al (2012), Doorenspleet et al. (2014) and Vam Ham (2015) expressed the opinion that multiparty elections in changing dictatorial administrations ought to be held sooner rather than later because they have more and more been under attack.

Opponents argue that, under situations of low institutional development, multiparty elections may lead to violence and civil war, rather than to the peaceful distribution of power that everyone wishes. Starting from the basis that elections are purposefully timed and endogenous in transitioning dictatorial governments, that is, more likely to be held when violence is impending, “we show that for Africa, the continent with the lowest levels of political institutionalisation, elections do not increase the probability of civil war initiation” (Doorenspleet et al, 2014; Wehman, 2017; Cheibub et al, 2017; Vamttam, 2015; Gibson et al, 2015; Dreher et al, 2014; Fjeld et al, 2016). The following is an extracts of an interview with one of the respondents on the issue:

“... I think they are of very high importance because people of that particular municipal area are given the platform to choose who they think is best for serving them and for the development of that area. It is also fair because it gives a chance to those who oppose the national ruling party, so at least maybe the party of their choice may win the municipal elections. For example, the ANC is very corrupt, so if a different organisation wins municipal elections, then corruption may be minimal in that region (Interviewee19, Community member, Mdantsane, April 2016).

The above response was from community member, interviewee 19 who concurred the importance of municipal level elections because it a platform given the citizens to choose the leaders they think can serve their best interest in their communities.

Gibson et al (2015), Fjeld et al (2016), Wahman (2017); Jensen et al (2014) concurred with the above respondent that recent years had elevated hopes for enhanced political changes and steadiness across the African continent where

unrestricted and transparent political elections constitute an important and indispensable step towards successful leadership and democracy. They stressed the importance of elections and criticised the current international emphasis of regime consolidation and term extension. Their analysis provided indication that elections, in fact, have a causal impact on improving the quality of democracy in Africa. The course of holding an uninterrupted series of de jure participatory and competitive elections were crucial for transformation and good governance for emerging democracies.

Charbonneau et al (2015) hold the view that government interventions can arrange for various yardsticks when broadcasting their performance to citizens, but not much is known about how citizens understand and respond to benchmarking information. Hence, the aim of this study was to test what performance targets appear most outstanding and convincing to citizens. Charbonneau et al (2015) said the consequence is that citizens find broad, comparative benchmarks to be the most convincing and view spontaneous benchmarks as less impressive. In their work to find the performance rating in the Philippines, Capuno et al (2015) stated that to advance local service delivery under devolution performance assessments were often introduced.

In their study, performance ratings and other correlates of the citizens' valuation of the sensitivity of their local governments were examined with a regression analysis of survey data collected during the pilot test of a performance rating scheme in 12 Philippine cities and municipalities in 2001–2003. The local governments in the eight sites where the ratings were announced were appraised as less accessible by their residents than those in the four control areas they had oversight. Perhaps, the citizens exposed to the ratings expected better performances from their officials. The sub-section below discusses the satisfactory rating of the municipality.

7.4. Municipal Performance satisfaction rating

Citizens' rating of municipal performance is an activity that paints a picture that reflects the expectation of community members on issues that are dearest to them with regard to service delivery and government performance. In a recent South African Customer satisfaction Index (SAcsi) for municipalities, the BCMM consistently registered lowest score with 47.2 in 2017, which is a slight decline from

47.6 in 2016 and marginally higher than its 2015 score of 47.1 (Statsa, 2017; Bohler et al, 2016; Azimoh et al, 2015; Moller et al, 2015).

The data in figure 7.2 below presents the municipality performance rating in the BCMM.




Figure 11.2: Municipality performance satisfaction rating

Source: Computer printout of a graph derived from the data and findings of this study.

There were mixed feelings from the respondents which impacted their views and rating of municipality performance. As can be seen, the majority of the respondents agreed that the municipality performs satisfactorily with 65.11% of the respondents agreeing that the municipality performance was satisfactory, while 16.74% were in disagreement. However, 19.14% of the respondents were indecisive. The findings of this study on municipal performance satisfactory ratings show that a majority of respondents agree that the municipality performs satisfactorily. In response to the interview questions, some of the interviewees have these to say:

“... Eeh! To be honest, I would not applaud our municipality because it has been serving us the same things for the past years, we cannot point to

something and say this is what is different in the past three years' service and today's'. Some things need to be dealt with, development, unemployment, education. I think the main issue that is a barrier is either a small budget by the government or corruption in the municipality” (Interviewee 4, Community member, Zwelitsha, April 2016).

and

“... Very poor. On a scale of 1-10, I give them 0.5. There is a growing trend of municipalities misappropriating funds. It has become so routine that it is even suspicious when you find a municipality that delivers” (Interviewee17, Community member, Bhisho, April 2016).

From the above responses, it can be verified from the community members 17 and 4 that they are not happy with the municipality's satisfaction performance rating. They lamented bitterly that the municipality has done poorly. They claim the municipality has served them the same things over the years. No change.

Ammons (2014), Pawi et al (2014), Bajpai et al (2016), Thaba et al (2014), Denters et al (2016), Adams et al (2016) and Marais et al (2015) stated that city governments used performance yardsticks if they are serious about the efficient delivery of quality services. Ammons et al (2014) thought that citizens need municipal benchmarks if they (municipal) do not need them. Mayors, council members, general citizens and municipal administrators want to know how to evaluate service delivery performance of their local government. The sub-section below discusses donor funding importance for municipal elections.

7.5. Donor funding for municipal elections

Election finance is widely known to be centrally important from the point of view of corruption and anti-corruption policies. It is appreciated worldwide that vibrant and genuinely competitive democratic politics is not possible without well-functioning financial resource. It is for these reasons why donor funding becomes relevant for municipal elections (Gierzynski, 2018; Bush, 2015; Masket et al, 2015).

Figure 7.3 presents the importance of donor funding for the elections in the municipality and development in BCMM.




Figure 11.3: Importance of donor funding for development and municipal elections
 Source: Computer printout of a graph derived from the data and findings of this study

The majority of the respondents observed agreed with the importance of donor support for development. A cumulative total of 84.11% agreed that donor support is vital in municipal development while 11.48% of the respondents were indecisive; 4.25% of the respondents were in disagreement. The findings confirmed the hypothesis of the study that donor support induces democratization and development. In the works of Miller (2017), Taylor et al (2014), Reddy et al (2015) and Anderson et al (2016) on protecting the capability of the small donor in modern election. Miller (2017) stated that in 2010, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case between Citizens United versus FEC. In its decision, the Court found limitations on corporate spending to be an unconstitutional restriction on the First Amendment's free speech protections. Following Citizens United, campaign finance reform efforts have found themselves in a precarious position.

Miller (2017) said although such efforts have been utilised with varying success since the 1700s, Citizens United appeared to roll back progress made on campaign finance reform over the last century. Miller (2017) observed that within the past five

years; however, new legislation has been proposed and implemented that attempts to reform the electoral process through alternative financing schemes designed to survive judicial review after Citizens United, including small-donor matching programs. Miller (2017) noted that some local jurisdictions have already begun using small-donor matching programs that aimed to remove the influence of big money donors while amplifying the political voice of the average donor. Miller (2017) examined the emergence of small-donor matching programs and argued that although they faced some implementation hurdles, these programs are one of the few viable solutions for meaningful reform in the post-citizens era (Cook et al., 2017; Resnick, 2014; Lambright, 2014). The following interview excerpts illustrates the view of those respondents who agree that donor support is good for democratization and development:

“...They are important, and I think they play a vital role in that the areas where the government lacks putting money into, the donated funds can go to those areas because the government funds are sometimes insufficient. The support contribute to the sustainability of democratization in that through them there will be fair elections with proper administration by individuals who have been trained and security can be provided to ensure legitimate results come out. The training of staff is very important, for the appropriate process of elections without any barriers: to ensure a smooth process, the obtainment of the appropriate venue and security and obviously a sufficient number of administrators who will have to be incentivised. The government would have to be brought in, to make sure that elections go well/ according to how they are supposed to go”
(Interviewee 4, Community member, Zwelitsha, April 2016).

From the above excerpts from community member, interviewee 4, donor funding for elections is very important. He holds the view that donor funding play a vital role in areas where government lacks putting money or the funds are insufficient.

The above response supported the work of Anderson et al (2016) who stated that as democracy develops in developing countries around the world, wealthier countries have sought to enhance social development and democratisation through financial aid. Anderson et al (2016) noted that although the nation-state has historically been

the recipient of aid, some donors have begun to consider donations to local governments. For them “if local government is democratic, it may deliver aid more immediately than does the national government”. Anderson et al (2016) said about Nicaragua that, it has had a powerful effect on improving people’s lives and on advancing democratisation. As the democratic quality of the national government has declined, foreign aid has continued to advance democratisation by providing mayors with a resource base independent of national government. The sub-section below discusses donor support, democratisation and effective electoral administration.

7.6. Donor support leads to democratisation and electoral administration

Donor support for democratisation is crucial to support inclusive citizen participation in legitimate, transparent and accountable political processes. For effective electoral administration, it is necessary to empower individuals and institutions to consolidate democratic norms and channel citizens’ desires into effective representation and resilient governance (Nackerdien, 2016; Norris, 2017; Bush, 2015; Carothers, 2015).

The survey data in Figure 7.4 below presents analysis on the effectiveness of the donor support for the electoral administration.




Figure 11.4: Donor support leads to democratisation and effective electoral administration.

Source: Computer printout of a graph derived from the data and findings of this study.

When questioned on the effects of donor support on democratization, a cumulative 77.51% of the respondents agreed that donor support funding was crucial for electoral administration and democratization, while 11.94% of the respondents were in disagreement. In addition, 10.53% of the respondents were indecisive. The findings on donor funding for municipal elections and development importance indicated that respondents agreed that donor support induces democratization. Donor support may in some cases help improve the quality of an election and thereby deepen democratisation in various parts of the world where democracy has not yet been consolidated and entrenched in their body politics (Norris, 2017; Hankla et al., 2016; Orji, 2017; Carothers, 2015; Gaynor, 2014; Bus, 2015; Bowler et al., 2016; Dietrich, 2016; Hajat et al., 2014; Molenaers et al., 2015; Von Borzyskowski, 2016).

Donor support has consequences for the maintainable provision of free, fair and credible elections as is the case of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kenya and

Nigeria. While donor support may include financial supports and technical assistance, including advanced technologies, some donors avoid supporting Electoral Municipal Boards (EMBs') recurrent budgets — that is, core personnel costs and hiring of buildings and furniture, as well as other non-technical items, such as motor vehicles and fuel. Donor assistance is sometimes accompanied by a tied aid concept in which the recipient EMB is required to purchase goods and services from nationals of the donor concerned. The costs of buying from external vendors is often considerably higher than purchasing from suppliers in-country, which bloats total electoral costs.

Brinkerhoff et al (2016) stated that engaging citizens in holding public officials and service providers accountable, signified weakness, figuring prominently in many international donor-funded projects leads to extensive duplication. However, the incidental factors that impact the successful transfer of social accountability are debated. Demand-side factors (civil society and citizens) are emphasised in much of other studies. Nevertheless, supply-side factors (state structures and processes) and the nature of state-society relations are also important. Brinkerhoff et al (2016) examined four projects in developing countries to discover how these background factors impact social accountability intentions and results. The salience of supply factors in supporting social accountability for service delivery and government performance stood out, particularly the degree of decentralisation and the availability of space for citizens' engagement. The aptitude and inspiration of citizens to occupy the available space combined and voice their anxieties and participate with state actors in evaluating service delivery performance and problems are plain. Below is a discussion on community members' reasons for voting.

7.7. Community members' reasons for voting

There are several reasons that account for the reasons why citizens vote in an election. The reasons vary from person to person due to their orientation, religion, race philosophy among others. It could be ascertained from some scholars that reasons for voting include but not exclusive to: a privilege, a responsibility, for fair representation and opportunity to fill a "power vacuum" (McFadyen, 2017; Fahmy, 2017; Tucak et al, 2015; Sierra, 2018; Caramani et al, 2018).

Table 7.1 below shows the outcome of their responses on why citizens' vote in an election.

Table 11.1: Reasons for voting

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Reasons for voting	Patriotism	51	13.1%	24.8%
	Benefits	54	13.9%	26.2%
	registration	41	10.5%	19.9%
	vote for record	14	3.6%	6.8%
	campaign messages	36	9.3%	17.5%
	expectations	47	12.1%	22.8%
	Performance of municipality on service delivery	95	24.4%	46.1%
	help party	51	13.1%	24.8%
Total		389	100.0%	188.8%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The findings from table 7.1 show that 24.4% of the respondents cited that they vote based on the performance municipality from tableon service delivery, 13.9% vote for the benefits; 13.1% vote due to their patriotism and another 13.1% vote to help the party win. To add, 12.1% of the respondents vote based on the campaign expectations; 10.5% vote because they are registered voters; 9.3% of the respondents vote due to the influence of campaign messages while 3.6% of the respondents vote for the record. Based on these findings it can be concluded that most of the voters vote due to the performance of the municipality on service delivery and their patriotism. Below are excerpts of interviews from some of the respondents on the reasons for voting:

“...First it’s a right I have as a citizen in my democratic government but most importantly by voting I’m voicing out my opinion as to whom I would like to

lead, and I think it's something that we citizens need to practice, it is an opportunity" (Interviewee 1, Community member, East London, April 2016).

"...I am exercising my right to freedom of it speech; it is saying something but in action and with the purpose of helping my leadership of preference get the opportunity to serve people" (Interviewee 18, Community member, King William's Town, April 2016).

The above responses were contributions from community members during the discussions. The participants enumerated their reasons for voting in an election. Interviewee 18 believed that voting is an expression of their freedom of speech. Interviewee 1 articulated that it is her right to vote as a citizen in a democratic country.

The above opinions were concurred to by Tideman (2017) who sees voting as a collective decision that has the potential for public choice. Gerber et al (2014) measured the social rewards and sanctions connected with voting. They showed that information about whether a person votes directly marks how positively that person is viewed. They also showed that survey measures of social norms about voting are correlated with country-level turnout (Harrop et al, 1987; Achen et al, 2017; Healy et al, 2014; Jacobsen et al, 20015; Kendall et al, 2015; Gerber et al, 2016; Wattenberg, 2015; Hosch-Dayican et al, 2016; Tideman, 2017). The sub-section below discusses donor support focus in the municipality.

7.8. Donor support focus in the municipality

The section below discusses the donor assistance focus in the municipality on civic education needs, campaigns, technical support, and voter education and so on. The results were duly debated and recorded. The table below indicates the donor support focus in the municipality.

Table 11.2: Donor support focus in the municipality

Donor support focus Frequencies		
Responses		Percent of Cases
N	Percent	

Donor Assistance should focus on	campaigns	66	11.0%	31.9%
	personnel training	74	12.3%	35.7%
	civic edu.	71	11.8%	34.3%
	tech support	55	9.2%	26.6%
	voter edu	82	13.7%	39.6%
	logistics	64	10.7%	30.9%
	political party spon.	43	7.2%	20.8%
	publicity	68	11.3%	32.9%
	electoral mat	75	12.5%	36.2%
	other	2	0.3%	1.0%
Total		600	100.0%	289.9%

Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The majority of the respondents 13.7% showed that donor support for elections is supposed to be utilized for voter education. As indicated above, 12.3% of the respondents suggested that donor support must be channelled towards personnel training. In addition, 11.8% suggested that donor support must be focused on civic education while 11.3% said that donor support was to be used for publicity; 11.0% indicated that donor support is utilised for electoral campaigns. Findings also show that 10.7% suggested that donor support is used for electoral logistics with 9.2% highlighting that donor support should be used for technical support. Moreover, 7.2% suggested that support should be used for sponsoring the political parties while 0.3% of the respondents were indecisive. The interviews below illustrate some of the respondents' views:

"... The training of staff is very important, for the appropriate process of elections without any barriers: to ensure a smooth process, the obtainment of the appropriate venue and security and obviously a sufficient number of administrators who will have to be incentivised" (Interviewee 10, Community member, Mdantsane, April 2016).

"... Well, hmmm, maybe on the training of elections commissioners and assistants, through that the appropriate election process will be guaranteed" (Interviewee 20, Community member, Zwelitsha, April, 2016).

The above are interview responses from two community members on donor support focus in the municipality. Their responses indicate their preference for donor support focus in the municipality. They both admit that training of staff and election commissioners as important focus for election administration.

The above views were corroborated by Amundsen (2007) who noted that donor focus in an election covers party registration administration, the construction of polling materials, regulations covering campaigning and the use of symbols, the placement and management of polling stations, training of elections officials is an area of increasing donor focus and support. According to O'Neil (2006) whose study measured the association between perceptions of public relationships and donor support, strong public relations are not connected to the amount donated but are associated with years of support, happiness to carry on donating and happiness to commend others to donate.

Bunce et al (2006) were of the opinion that the success of revolutions reflect favourable political and social conditions as well as building common structures and policies of regimes created good conditions for diffusion of the electoral benefits. Structural conditions lead international donors to concentrate democracy assistance and efforts to support electoral revolutions in countries with less support. Kelly's (2009) study focused on electoral norms. She noted that the norms do not only focus on electoral quality, but the assessment reflect interest of donor as well as other tangential organisational norms. These also reflect the development aid theories assertions on the focus of donor support. Below is a discussion on the effects of dwindling support on the municipality.

7.9. Effects of dwindling support on the municipality

There is abundant literature on massive demonstration and protestations on South African municipalities' inability to meet service delivery needs of community members. The effects of dwindling support in the BCMM was ascertained and findings debated and recorded accordingly as shown in the table below.

The table below shows the effects of dwindling donor support on the municipality

Table 11.3: Effects of dwindling donor support on the municipality

Donor_support_dwindling_results Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Donor support dwindling _results	demonstrations	45	13.4%	22.6%
	boycotts	83	24.7%	41.7%
	violence	100	29.8%	50.3%
	agitations	27	8.0%	13.6%
	lawsuits	27	8.0%	13.6%
	vote change	54	16.1%	27.1%
Total		336	100.0%	168.8%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study.

The table above shows that the withdrawal of donor support has a lot of adverse effects which may result in violent and disruptive responses from the electorates. Over twenty-nine percent 29.8% of the respondents highlighted that the withdrawal of donor support may result in violence; 24.7% suggested that it may results in electoral boycotts; 16.1% suggested that it will results in vote change;13.4% of the respondents suggested that withdrawal of donor support may result in demonstrations while 8.0% suggested that it may lead to lawsuits and agitations. The findings on dwindling support on the municipality shows a reflection on cases of violence across Africa and other places where electoral violence erupts.. The following are excerpts of interviews from some of the respondents with regard to the dwindling effects of donor support:

“...Yes, we do partner mostly with overseas municipalities but overtime things have changed from receiving huge grants. The grants have dwindled from huge grants and its small for capacity building and you know of course, that planning and training is the type of arrangement now” (Interviewee 12, Community member, King William’s Tow, April 2016)

“.... This is a very difficult one. I suppose in this country of ours the only way to force development is to go through the judiciary. Getting court

orders. However, if donor support is delayed, a way is to ask for alternative measures. If donor support is suspended, what would be done to remedy the situation? What temporary measures will be put in place?” (Interviewee 18, Community member, East London, April 2016)

“... I would find out the reasons behind the delay or suspension and try to fix the problem, and if it is impossible to fix, then I would embark on a mission to look for new donors who are willing to assist” (Interviewee 4, Community member, Bhisho, April 2016).

In their contribution to the discussions, community members 4, 18 and 12 stated that it is important to find out the reasons for the delay or suspension of the donor funding in order to fix it. Otherwise, they would look for new donors who are willing to assist.

The sentiments expressed were concurred by Alexander (2010) who stated that South Africa “has experienced a movement of local protests amounting to a rebellion of the poor. This has been widespread and intense, reaching insurrectional proportions in some cases”. Ebrahim (2005) noted that allocation of housing “has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process”. Similarly, Booysen (2007) observed that in 2006, “local government elections assumed the character of de facto referendum in service delivery”. He noted that “leading to the elections were grass-roots protests about the quality of service delivery and the representation of needs”.

Furthermore, Atkinson (2007) and Jain (2010) stated in their observations that, “people have taken to the streets to protest over failure of development local government. The agitation were orchestrated by houses promises that were never delivered. Peoples’ protestation in the municipality were for lack of progress with housing and services”. According them, “residents blocked roads for several hours because of their dissatisfaction with municipal service delivery”. The sub-section below discusses the municipal rating on service provision.

7.10. Municipal performance rating on service provision

The cardinal task of municipalities is to be on target on service delivery and satisfy the needs of community members especially the poor and the disadvantaged in society on the provision of services. Politicians and municipal administrators often fail in this responsibility. The BCMM was tested in this, and findings are discussed below.

Table 7.4 below shows municipal performance ratings on service provision.

Table 11.4: Municipal performance ratings on service provision.

Municipal_Performance Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Municipal Performance	employment	4	6.8%	11.1%
	health	2	3.4%	5.6%
	education	3	5.1%	8.3%
	water	1	1.7%	2.8%
	food	1	1.7%	2.8%
	housing	1	1.7%	2.8%
	electricity	9	15.3%	25.0%
	corruption	15	25.4%	41.7%
	poverty	12	20.3%	33.3%
	indebtedness	3	5.1%	8.3%
	sanitation	5	8.5%	13.9%
	transportation	3	5.1%	8.3%
	Total	59	100.0%	163.9%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

When requested to rate the performance of the municipality, most of the respondents suggested that the municipality was involved in corrupt activities, with 25% and 20.3% of the respondents highlighting the presence of corruption and poverty respectively. However, 15.3% of the respondents commended the municipality on electricity supply; 8.55 on sanitation; 6.8% on employment; 5.1% on transportation, education and indebtedness; 1.7% on water, food and housing provision. The

findings on municipal satisfactory rating reveals deep seated problems in municipality with regard to corruption, crime and poverty issues. The escalation of protestations and demonstrations against council official on corruption charges may be justified by this findings. The following are interview excerpts from some respondents during the interview:

“..Eerh... to be honest, I personally wouldn't applaud our municipality because it's been serving us the same for the past years, we can't really point to something and say this is what is different in the past 3 years' service and today's. There are a number of things that need to be dealt with, development, unemployment, education. I think the main issue that is a barrier is either a small budget by the government or corruption in the municipality” (Interviewee 17, Community member, East London, April 2016).

“...The municipality's performance looks fine when it comes to service delivery although somewhere somehow it lacks. Like there are some rural areas that don't receive service delivery of which that is so unfair because people from these rural areas are really in need of taps, electricity, and roads. Municipality has to improve its way of doing things just to save many lives because people are suffering a lot around the region ” (Interviewee 9, Community member, King William's Town, April 2016)

“...I really think they vary according to how big they are because metros have a lot to do than other municipalities. There is a lot of fraud, money laundering, corruption, etc., lately and the worst part about service delivery is that government does not do follow ups on activities/tenders done. Therefore, we find a lot of poor service delivery because of the lack of proper management strategies” (Interviewee 11, Community member, Bhisho, April 2016).

The above are excerpts from participants during the interviews. The respondents affirmed that most municipalities were embroiled in corruption, fraud and money laundry. However, interviewee 9 praised the municipality on service delivery eventhough some rural areas lack service delivery.

Based on the opinions expressed above, De Kadt et al (2017) acknowledged that various theories of democratic governance posit that “citizens should vote for incumbent policies when they provide good services and vote for the opposition

when service delivery is poor”. Brettenny et al (2016:11) noted that South Africa “has faced many protests with regard to service delivery and particularly the provision of basic services such as water, sanitation, health, energy, housing and unemployment”. In the same vein, Hanyane et al (2015:241) observed that “public service delivery protests in post-apartheid South Africa has come to characterize community life at the local sphere of government with negative consequences of corruption, maladministration, mismanagement of public resources and poor service delivery”. Again, Cameron (2014) examined how decentralization policies and inter-party policymaking have affected urban service delivery responsibility and resources. He concludes that “it all negatively impact good governance in South Africa’s young democracy”. Below is a discussion on the voting patterns across political parties.

7.11. Voting patterns across political parties

Voting is an important activity that enables citizens to express their choice of whom to vote for and what party to belong to. According to McFadyen (2017) voting is a right, a responsibility, a call to participation and an activity that fills a “power vacuum”.

Figure 7.5 below presents the voting patterns of the respondents on the basis of political parties.




Figure 11.5: Voting patterns across political party

Source: Computer printout of a graph derived from the data and findings of this study

The findings showed that the majority of the respondents prefer voting for ANC 53.11%, followed by 17.70% for DA, followed by 12.92% for those who would vote for EFF, 4.78% for COPE, 5.26% for PAC, 3.83% for UDM, 1.91% for FP while 0.48% would prefer voting for the PAM political party. The findings on voting pattern across political parties presents an interesting picture of electoral results in the municipality. The ANC has often dominated in all elections in this municipality. The finding is a true reflection of voting pattern in the municipality. Based on similar findings, Diamond (2015) declared that the motivations for democratic and accountable government run deep throughout the Middle East, and for years to come, the region will be an active and challenged ground of possibilities for regime progression. According to Everatt (2016), electoral research in post-apartheid South Africa was primarily subjugated by those supporting a variously racial-cum-ethnic census approach, later confronted by analysts who contended for less race-reductionist models of understanding voting behaviour. The core of the 'racial census' approach was to question the possibility of democracy finding genuine procurement where victory for the party of liberation was assured because black

majoritarianism was blind to corruption, incompetence or worse, open only to race. The distinctive distrust of the South African democracy, which this perspective introduced, has deepened, notably after the recall of President Mbeki and the subsequent installation of President Zuma.

After 20 years of democracy, many commentators have written off the ruling African National Congress (ANC) as corrupt, inept, authoritarian and set on a path of decline that will drag South Africa inescapably towards becoming 'the next Zimbabwe'. In the same way, Chipkin (2016) indicated that the ANC votes in Kwazulu-Natal in the 2009 elections dropped bringing its national vote down. He suggested that ethnic drift in ANC's support base was caused from an exit of voters (Harding, 2015; Stonecash, 2018; Deegan, 2014; Sklar, 2015; Almond et al, 2015; Caramani, 2017; Sisk, 2017). The above findings confirmed the hypothesis on citizens' vote depending on party affiliation showed that there was a strong positive correlation between political party choice, citizens' vote and the political party that citizens' subscribe to. (cf. 7.10).

Green et al (2015) hold the view that political campaigns are strategies adopted by parties geared towards identifying with potential voters, in order to whip up voters' enthusiasm to register so as to motivate them to vote. The motivation is assigned for them to receive fair treatment from voters and often turn to broad-gauge the explanations for why so few people vote in an election. According to Almond et al (2015), party affiliation provide us with norms and attitudes as well as inspiration for ordinary citizens, their relation to government and their fellow citizens. This forms the basis for citizens' engagement and promotes civic culture and political attitude in a democracy. In the same vein, Hoffmann-Martinot (2018:195) thought that citizens' vote depends on party affiliation but "parties' limit citizens input by imposing their candidates upon voters and suppress names in order to give their votes to another". However, according to him, "parties are open to all citizens who declare their partisan affiliation which they do not have to prove" (Stadelmann et al, 2015; Casas et al, 2017; Grober et al, 2017; Stadelmann et al, 2016; Ansolabehere et al, 2016; Klasnja et al, 2016).

The sub-section below discusses donor support and elections.

7.12. Electoral funding and sponsorship

Based on donor support for elections, participants were divided in their views. Some indicated that donor support is necessary to run the country and to facilitate developmental projects (Amundsen, 2007; Barkan, 1993; Carothers, 2005; Brautigam, 2010; Kurokawa et al., 2008; Santiso et al., 2006). However, they feared that it could lead to corruption, vote buying and vote switching. Some of the research participants during the interviews corroborated these opinions as follows:

“...There is a participation crisis in our democracies. Fewer people are turning out for elections, and many hate politicians or believe they are all the same. In between elections, there are not many opportunities for ordinary people to influence the issues that affect them. Democracy has been diluted”. (Interviewee 10, Community Member, East London, July, 2016)

‘.... Donors help many countries in diverse ways. However, corrupt donors can easily corrupt weak leaders” (interviewee 7, community member, King William’s Town, April, 2016)

“ All of them are the same. They are in this game for themselves” I mean the politicians and their development partners and cohorts” (Interviewee 6, community member, Bhisho, May, 2016).

The above respondents expressed their views on electoral funding and sponsorship. They jointly made the claim that there is participation crises in democracy because people hate corrupt politicians who embezzle electoral funds. For instance interviewee 7 believes that corrupt donors corrupt weak leaders.

Based on the findings above on donor support and elections where respondents expressed their fears of vote-buying and breeding of corruption, others still thought that donor support was needed to run the country and to facilitate development projects (Amundsen, 2007; Barkan, 1993; Carothers, 2005). The sub-section below discusses political parties and party affiliations.

7.13. Political parties and party affiliations

Political parties are important institutions in a democracy. Parties articulate the sentiments, views, aspirations and vision of the people in their manifestoes in order

to win political power. They attract membership through campaigns, socialisation and appeals or advertisements. Figure 7.6 below illustrates respondents' political party and party affiliation.




Figure 11.6: Political party and party affiliation

Source: Computer printout of a graph derived from the data and findings of this study

The majority of the respondents 54.29% were affiliated with the ANC. Followed by 25.71% who were affiliated to EFF; 11.43% were affiliated to DA while only 8.57% were affiliated with COPE. Political party affiliation is an important feature in politics. It is through the political affiliations that a party will be able to embark on membership drive to increase their support. Gerber et al (2010) found that partisanship is powerfully correlated with attitudes and behaviour, but it is uncertain from this outline whether partisan identity has a causal effect on political behaviour and attitudes. Gerber et al (2010), Manning (2005) and Czech et al (2001) reported the outcomes of a field experiment that investigated the causal effect of party identification and established that the finding is consistent with the claim that

partisanship is an active force of changing how citizens behave in and perceive the political world.

Similarly, political parties and their campaign messages are some of the driving forces or electoral dynamics in an election (Shugart et al, 1992; Tavits, 2005; Bickers et al, 1996; Miller, 1977; Aldrich, 1983; Wong et al, 2002; Mainwaring, 1997; Michell, 2001; Carey et al, 1998; Przeworski, 2000; Posner, 2005; Chhibber et al, 1998; Dror, 2012; LeDuc et al, 1996; Olson, 2015; Negretto, 2006; Roberts, 2003; Hyden et al, 2004; Von Beyeme, 2000). Voters are attracted by political campaign messages, their affiliations to political parties and their ethnicity. These qualities are shaped by theoretical underpinnings of history, voters' behaviour, reciprocity and social justice. On the basis of party affiliation, some political party members shared these sentiments:

"... Recently, I contested as a ward councillor representing Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). I am also the chairperson of the branch ward 20. Yes, we have been involved in this for long" (interviewee 9, Community member, King William's Town, June 2016).

... I belong to the ANC as a 'cpmal xhosi'. "Oh yes, I belong to a political party. This year I decided that I shall not vote, but for the sake of patriotism and love of nation, I shall vote but not for my party" (interviewee 9, Community member, King William's Town, June 2016).

The above are responses articulated by participants. These respondents were bold to declare their party affiliation and their intentions during elections

The sub-section below discussed the norm and ethics of reciprocity and Social Justice.

7.14. Reciprocity and social justice

The concept of justice is explained to mean equity and equality in all human endeavour, and the thesis is advanced that "equity" is only one of the many values which may underlie a given system of justice. Some other values include; fairness, access and opportunity and a sense of self-worth and dignity. Other values of social justice are; openness, civil liberties, political rights and removal of all limitations and barriers that demean human dignity (Deutsch, 1975). The explanations about the

conditions which determine which values will be employed as the basis of distributive justice in a group are proposed, with discussion centered about the values of “equity,” “equality,” and “need” and the conditions which lead a group to emphasize one rather than another value (Brown, 2004).

On the basis of reciprocity and social justice, community voters have observed and are of the opinion that the greatest impediment to democracy, electoral funding, development and peace were corrupt and bad governance (Gouldner, 1960; Uehera, 1995; Masumi et al., 2008; Goldsmith, 2004; Konovsky et al., 1994 and Green et al., 2009; Rawls, 1971; Weiner, 1992; Ostrom, 2009; Austin, 1977; Leventhal, 1976; Hartfield, 1978; Charmaz, 2011; Larson et al., 2002; Locke, 1965). The following were sentiments expressed by some of the respondents during the discussions:

“...It varies from region to region, but if I had to be honest, it is bad governance, a government that does not care about its people. That can sometimes take the form of aggression abroad, but it can also simply lead to increased unhappiness at home, which feeds anger, which gets easily fed by nationalist or religious rhetoric and then causes conflict” (Interviewee 6, Community member, Bhisho, May 2016).

“...What role do issues such as hunger, disease, lack of clean water, and lack of education play in our communities today”? “When people feel that their needs are not being met, when they lack hope and opportunity, they will respond. This response may not end up serving their interests, but they will act” (Interviewee 2, Community Member, East London, April 2016).

The above community members have indicated their resentment to uncaring nature of public officials and some leaders. According to them, the art of government should be a kind of give-and-take or a reciprocal relationship. Their impression is that peoples needs are not met by politicians.

The sub-section below discusses voting behaviour and political participation.

7.15. Voting behaviour and political participation

Voters in an election, most often participated in polls for various reasons such as ideology, economics and ethnicity. The franchise is usually extended to almost all citizens aged 18 years or over. Baker (2016), Wiggly-Wiggle (2011), Georg-Genyi (2015), Asnal et al (2013), Worley (2013) and Gutierrez et al (2014) suggested that political participation drives and influence voting behaviour. Voting behaviour is a form of electoral behaviour. Understanding voters' behaviour can explain how and why decisions were made either by public decision-makers, which has been a central concern for political scientists (Goldman, 1996) or by the electorate. To interpret voting behaviour both political science and psychology expertise were necessary and therefore the field of political psychology emerged. Political psychology researchers study ways in which affective influence may help voters make more informed voting choices, with some proposing that affect may explain how the electorate makes informed political choices in spite of low overall levels of political attentiveness and sophistication.

According to Goldman (1996) to make inferences and predictions about behaviour concerning a voting decision, certain factors such as gender, race, culture or religion must be considered. Moreover, key public influences include the role of emotions, political socialization, tolerance of diversity of political views and the media. The effect of these influences on voting behaviour is best understood through theories on the formation of attitudes, beliefs, schema, knowledge structures and the practice of information processing (Braha et al, 2017 and Diener, 2000).

Types of an election also affect turnout (Baker, 2016; Wiggly-Wiggle, 2011; Georg-Genyi, 2015; Asnal et al., 2013; Worley, 2013; Gutierrez et al., 2014). Two participants expressed the following views on voting behaviour during the discussions:

“...Our voting behaviour emanates from our political and cultural history. You see, our history emerged and was orchestrated by this antagonistic and diabolical apartheid and colonial systems. In fact, it was a framework of wickedness that denied us of our rights to vote and to elect our representatives. We were treated with no respect, no identity with intimidation to put fear in us. However, our leaders fought until they won and today

democracy is entrenched; I will forever vote ANC, Amandla! (Interviewee 5, Community member, Mdantsane, April 2016).

“...It is the desire and ambition of government to reciprocate the confidence of the electorate for exercising their franchise by voting for the party. The government is determined to promote social justice and equity by bridging the gap between the rich and the poor, ensuring equality and eliminate discrimination, and this is what our party has set for itself to achieve, and we will fulfil it” (Interviewee 7, Community member, Zwelitsha, May 2016).

The responses of the above interviewees show their sentiments and the events that have shaped their political behaviour by history.

The above expressed opinions and findings are corroborated by Faucher (2014:1) who stated that “in the past 30 years, party membership has dropped significantly across Europe, whereas other forms of political participation have developed”. She showed how political parties “have sought to be more attractive by lowering the cost of membership and creating new selective incentives (such as the right to vote in internal ballots), leading to a convergence of party rules across European parties”. Similarly, Kumlin et al (2014) stated that in democracies, “citizens’ attitude and behaviour influence future public policies”. On the contrary, she continued, “attitudes and behaviour can be the result of past policies”. McNair (2017) observed that in political organisations, “there are political actors who are individuals who aspire through organisational and institutional means to influence the decision-making process”. According to him, “political actors can seek to do this by attaining institutional political power in government or constituent assemblies, through which preferred policies can be implemented. This categories of political actors include most obviously, the established political parties’ aggregates of more or less like-minded individuals, who come together within agreed organisational and ideological structure to pursue common goals”. Furthermore, Emmenegger et al (2015:189) noted that political behaviour “shapes political orientation, redistribution preferences and insider-outsider politics”. They are of the view that “labour market disadvantages influence voting behaviour by increasing support for redistribution, reduce internal political efficacy or lower external political efficacy”. This view was supported by

other scholars of voting behaviour and political participation (Bartle et al, 2014; Landau et al, 2014; Dunleavy, 2014 and Lafleur et al, 2015).

The sub-section below discusses donor support inducing democratization as the hypothesis of the study. The section included donor support influence on governance and democratization, the political party representation and donor support necessity, Citizens' benefits from municipal performance promote commitment and patriotism, study variables correlations and hypothesis, evaluation on citizens' vote and party affiliation, donor support targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being induces patriotism and acceptance from citizens and the chi square test of goodness of fit report.

7.16. Donor support as inducing variable of democratisation

This section deals with donor support as variable that induces democratization as a hypothesis of this study.

The study's hypotheses were directed at teasing out the role of donors in inducing democratisation. It also established the effects of municipal projects on citizens and residents in the municipality. In addition, it assessed the relationship between voters and their political affiliation and checked whether the benefits citizens derived from municipal projects justify their commitment and patriotism. The section below restates and discusses the hypothesis of the study in the light of the empirical evidence gathered.

In analysing the hypothesis on donor support importance and democratisation, this study found that the regression analysis confirmed the stated hypothesis which showed that when donor support importance was regressed on the importance of donor funding for democratisation. It explained the 29.1% in democratisation variability which is caused by donor support on the residents with significant relationship which indicate a high degree of correlation between donor support and democratisation (cf.table7.5). According to Anderson et al (2016:276), as democracy develops in poor countries around the world, "wealthier countries have sought to enhance social development and democratisation through donor assistance". According to them, some donors have begun to consider donations to local communities and to local government. They hold the view that "if local government is democratic, it may well deliver assistance more immediately than does national

government” (Anderson et al 2016:276). They further stated that, “donors have had a powerful effect on improving people’s lives and on advancing democratisation”. Again they stated that as the democratic quality of the national government has declined, aid has continued to advance democratisation by providing mayors and community leaders with a resource base independent of national government. Similarly, Fiedler (2016) noted that donor support can achieve peace and democratisation if donors jointly pursue political agenda that connect to local community needs and to home-grown processes (Mercer, 2007; Fowler, 1993; Hauser,1999; Fowler, 1991; Savun et al, 2011; Edwards et at,1996; Belloni, 2008; Stewart, 1997; Ott et al, 2000; Brown, 2001; Brett, 2017; Fuchs et al, 2015; Macdonald, 2016; Bermeo, 2016; Van de Walle, 2016; Delcour et al, 2015; Noutcheva, 2016).

7.16.1. Donor support influence on governance and democratisation

To reiterate this study was conducted to investigate and to establish to what extent donor support influences the electoral processes in the Buffalo City Municipality and the dynamic electoral factors which connect this agenda with governance and democratisation. The formulation of the research hypothesis and objectives was based on development aid theory, the moral norm and ethics of reciprocity, democratisation, social justice and equity theories (Gouldner, 1960; Uehera, 1995; Masumi et al., 2008; Goldsmith, 2004; Konovsky et al., 1994 and Green et al., 2009; Rawls, 1971; Weiner, 1992; Ostrom, 2009; Austin, 1977; Leventhal, 1976; Hartfield, 1978; Charmaz, 2011; Larson et al., 2002; Locke,1965). The section below discusses the political party representation and donor support necessity of the study.

7.16.2. Political Party representation and donor support necessity

This section deals with the inferential statistical part of the research. Table 7.5 shows cross tabulations with regard to political parties presented and donor support necessity.

Table 12.1: Crosstabulation of political party representation and donor support necessity.

Political Party Presented * Donor Support Necessity Cross-tabulation		
	Donor Support Necessity	Total

			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	
Political Party Presented	ANC	Count	1	0	6	7	14
		% within Political Party Presented	7.1%	0.0%	42.9%	50.0%	100.0%
		% within Donor Support Necessity	100.0%	0.0%	54.5%	31.8%	38.9%
	DA	Count	0	0	3	2	5
		% within Political Party Presented	0.0%	0.0%	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
		% within Don Support Necessity	0.0%	0.0%	27.3%	9.1%	13.9%
	EFF	Count	0	2	1	10	13
		% within Political Party Presented	0.0%	15.4%	7.7%	76.9%	100.0%
		% within Don Support Necessity	0.0%	100.0%	9.1%	45.5%	36.1%
	IFP	Count	0	0	0	1	1
		% within Political Party Presented	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% within Don Support Necessity	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.5%	2.8%
	COPE	Count	0	0	1	1	2
		% within Political Party Presented	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
		% within Don Support Necessity	0.0%	0.0%	9.1%	4.5%	5.6%
	UDM	Count	0	0	0	1	1
		% within Political Party Presented	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% within Don Support Necessity	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.5%	2.8%
Total	Count	1	2	11	22	36	
	% within Political Party Presented	2.8%	5.6%	30.6%	61.1%	100.0%	
	% within Don Support Necessity	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The section below discusses the regression analysis on donor support inducing democratisation of the study.

7.16.3. Regression analysis on donor support inducing democratization

In analysing the hypothesis on donor support inducing democratisation, the study found that the regression analysis confirmed the stated hypothesis as can be seen in the table above:

$H_0 = \text{Donor support induces democratisation}$

$H_1 = \text{Donor support does not induce democratisation}$

Table 12.2: Regression Analysis on the relationship between donor support importance and democratization

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.539 ^a	.291	.287	.599	.291	84.759	1	207	.000

a. Predictors: (Constant), Donor support on democratization

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

In this study, the regression analysis was used to confirm the stated hypothesis. Table 7.5 above shows that when donor support importance was regressed on the importance of donor funding for democratization. It explained 29.1% in democratization variability which is caused by donor support on the residents, with significant F-statistics ($F = 84.759$, $r = 0.539$ and $p = 0.000$), which indicates that there is a high degree of correlation. Therefore, H_0 accepted that there is a definite relationship between donor support and democratisation. The table below indicates the ANOVA for the regression equation.

Table 12.3: Analysis of variance table for regression equation (ANOVA)

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	51.994	1	51.994	84.759	.000 ^b
	Residual	126.982	207	.613		
	Total	178.976	208			

a. Dependent Variable: DS. Democratization

b. Predictors: (Constant), DS. Development

The table above shows the ANOVA table which reports how well the regression equation fits the data in predicting the dependent variable – Donor support inducing democratisation. From the table above, the analysis of variance (ANOVA) test shows that $F = 84.759$, $df = 208$ and $p = 0.000$ which less than 0.05. Since $p\text{-value} < 0.05$, we reject H_1 and accept H_0 . We, therefore, conclude that overall, the regression model statistically significantly predicts the outcome variable that it is a good fit for the data.

Table 12.4: Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.072	.308		3.481	.001
	DF. development	.705	.077	.539	9.206	.000

a. Dependent Variable: DF. Democratization

The coefficients table provides us with the necessary information to predict donor funding inducing democratisation and the perceived importance of donor support as well as the variable which determines whether donor support contributes statistically significantly to the model (by looking at the “Sig.” column).The sub-section below

describes the hypothesis on citizens' benefit from municipal performance that promotes commitment and patriotism.

7.16.4. Citizens' benefit from municipal performance promotes commitment and patriotism

The hypothesis confirmed a statistically significant correlation between the study variables and the expected benefits as indicated on the table:

H₀ = the higher the benefits citizens' derived from municipal projects, the higher their commitment and patriotism

H₁ = the lower the benefits citizens' derived from municipal projects, the lower their commitment and patriotism

Table 12.5: Correlation between study variables and performance (Benefits) Expectations

		Donor support for development	donor funding for democratisation
Employment	Pearson Correlation	-.126	-.183
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.069	.008
	N	209	209
youth Employment	Pearson Correlation	-.103	-.206
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.139	.003
	N	209	209
Health	Pearson Correlation	-.111	-.191
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.110	.006
	N	209	209
Education	Pearson Correlation	-.093	-.084
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.180	.225
	N	209	209
Water	Pearson Correlation	-.108	-.229
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.120	.001
	N	209	209
Food	Pearson Correlation	-.162	-.216
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.019	.002
	N	209	209
Housing	Pearson Correlation	-.133	-.081
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.054	.244
	N	209	209
Security & crime	Pearson Correlation	-.140	-.172
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.044	.013
	N	209	209

Electricity	Pearson Correlation	-.215**	-.191**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	.006
	N	209	209
Corruption	Pearson Correlation	-.116	-.147
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.095	.034
	N	209	209
Poverty	Pearson Correlation	-.087	-.140
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.209	.043
	N	209	209
Indebtedness	Pearson Correlation	-.011	-.062
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.872	.374
	N	209	209
Sanitation	Pearson Correlation	.045	.005
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.520	.943
	N	209	209
Transportation	Pearson Correlation	-.111	-.066
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.110	.343
	N	209	209

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The table above shows the correlations between study variable (Donor support for development and donor support in democratisation) and the performance expectations. From the table it can be noted that there are statistically significant correlations between the study variables and the expectations such as transportation and indebtedness. There is a strong relationship between the study variable (donor funding for democratisation) and electricity, food, security, health and youth employment.

Furthermore, there are notable correlations between the study variables and sanitation ($r=0.45$ with donor support for development) and ($r=0.05$ with donor support for democratisation). This could indicate the living conditions among the residents and how the people in this respective municipal locality are self-sufficient. Based on the results shown it can be inferred that residents' commitment and support is tied to the benefits they derived from the municipality. Therefore, H_0 is *accepted*.

$H_0 = \text{the higher the benefits, the higher their commitment and patriotism}$

Is accepted as a valid hypothesis. The hypothesis on the higher the benefits, the higher citizens' commitment and patriotism, as indicated in Table 7.9, shows correlations between the study variable (donor support for development and donor support in democratisation) and the performance expectations of residents in the municipality. The hypothesis confirmed statistically significant correlations between the study variables and the expected benefits such as transportation and indebtedness. The hypothesis established a strong relationship between the study variable (donor funding for democratisation) and energy supply, food, security, health and youth unemployment as expected benefits. Furthermore, there was a notable correlation between the study variables and sanitation with donor support for development and with donor support for democratisation. This indicated the living condition impact and satisfaction among the residents and how the people in the municipal locality experience the effects for self-sufficiency. The hypothesis again indicated that residents' commitment and support is tied to the benefits they derived from the municipality.

According to Letawana (2017), municipalities should create opportunity for real power sharing between municipalities and local communities for community members to completely take part in the development processes. He further stated that local communities should fully participate in development projects through "a participatory governance". In the same way, Moraes et al (2017) said the task of municipalities is to, among other things, "to educate and involve citizens on development projects, solicit citizens' contribution to development of the municipality through shared, collaborative municipal management with an emphasis on the educational dimension of all local actions". In addition, Lemos et al (2017) stated that municipalities would serve local communities well if they generate and diffuse judiciously the benefits accruing from development assistance (Reid et al, 2016; Bene et al, 2016; Page et al, 2015; Clemens et al, 2016; Quinones et al, 2014). The sub-section below discusses the study variables' correlations on citizens 'vote and party affiliation.

7.16.5. Study variables correlations on citizens' vote and party affiliation

The hypothesis on citizens' vote depending on party affiliation showed that there was a strong positive correlation. The table below illustrates the findings:

H_0 = Citizen's vote depends on party affiliation

H_1 = Citizen's vote does not depend on party affiliation

Table 12.6: Citizen Vote and party affiliation

Correlations			Political Party Subscription	Political Party I would vote
Political Subscription	Party	Pearson Correlation	1	.832
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.057
		N	209	209
Political would vote	Party I	Pearson Correlation	.832	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.057	
		N	209	209

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The table above shows that there is a strong positive correlation ($\rho=0.832$; $p=.000$) between political party choice and the political party that one subscribes to. This supports hypothesis one, H_1 which state that ***Citizen's vote depends on party affiliation***. Therefore, H_0 is accepted against H_1 . This means that citizen's voting choice is affected by the party. The hypothesis on citizens' vote depending on party affiliation showed that there was a strong positive correlation between political party choice, citizens' vote and the political party that citizens' subscribe to (cf. 7.10).

Green et al (2015) hold the view that political campaigns are strategies adopted by parties geared towards identifying with potential voters, in order to whip up voters' enthusiasm to register so as to motivate them to vote. The motivation is assigned for them to receive fair treatment from voters and often turn to broad-gauge the explanations for why so few people vote in an election. According to Almond et al (2015), party affiliation provides us with norms and attitudes as well as inspiration for ordinary citizens, their relation to government and their fellow citizens. This forms the basis for citizens' engagement and promotes civic culture and political attitude in a democracy. In the same vein, Hoffmann-Martinot (2018:11) think that citizens' vote depends on party affiliation but "parties' limit citizens input by imposing their

candidates upon voters and suppress names in order to give their votes to another” (Hoffmann-Martinot, 2018:11)

However, according to him, “parties are open to all citizens who declare their partisan affiliation which they do not have to prove” (Stadelmann et al, 2015; Casas et al, 2017; Grober et al, 2017; Stadelmann et al, 2016; Ansolabehere et al, 2016; Klasnja et al, 2016). The sub-section below shows the correlation of donor support targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens.

7.16.6. Correlation of donor support targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens

The hypothesis stating that donor support targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens will be highly patronised and accepted by them showed a moderate positive correlation between the study variable as indicated on the table below:

H₀ = Donor support targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens will be highly patronised and accepted by them.

H₁ = Donor support that burdens the citizens will be resisted and rejected by them. The table below shows donor support conditionalities on accountability.

Table 12.7: Donor support and conditionality on accountability

Correlations		Donor support conditionality for Accountability	Donor funding facilitates democratisation
Donor support conditionality for Accountability	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	1 35	.265 .124 35
Donor funding facilitates democratization	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	.265 .124 35	1 35

Sig at 0.50

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study

The results in the table indicate a moderate positive correlation between the two study variables. The significance is measured at 0.50, thus the results shown in the table above are statistically significant in describing the correlation between donor support conditionality for accountability, and donor funding facilitates democratisation. Based on this correlation it can be concluded that donor support targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens will be highly patronised and accepted by them. Therefore, H_0 is accepted as a valid hypothesis against H_1 , and it can be said that Donor support targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens will be highly patronised and accepted by them. The hypothesis on donor support targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens being highly patronised and accepted by them showed a moderate positive correlation between the study variable. The hypothesis indicated a statistically significant correlation between donor support conditionality for accountability and donor funding facilitating democratisation. The correlation of the hypothesis concludes that donor support targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens will be highly patronised and accepted by them (cf. tables 7.11, 7.12).

In concurring with this hypothesis, Abdulai et al (2018) were of the opinion that local communities patronise projects sponsored by donor managers to reduce poverty and to enable the poorest in society gain greater relief. They intimated that in most cases, donor initiatives fail because political elites divert the approved resources, thereby reducing the capacity of local communities to contribute to reducing regional and community inequality. In the same manner, Banks et al (2015) observed that donor agencies' ability to meet long-term transformative goals in their effort for progress and social justice has been scrutinised for their weak roots in civil society in the face of rapid technology. As a result, agencies' remain poorly placed to influence the real drivers of social change. It is their view that agencies can strengthen their threshold by building bridges between grassroot organisations, local and national-level structures and processes by applying local context knowledge to reinforce their roles for empowerment and social transformation.

According to Islam (2016), poverty alleviation programmes generates a lot of interest among donors, governments and development practitioners. Local communities are attracted to development projects that benefit them particularly due to the great competition for scarce donor funds for development (Bogatchev, 2016; Anelopoulou, 2016; Kleinig, 2017; Balibrea, 2017; Adely, 2017; Ravazzi et al, 2014; Sanina, 2017). The following sub-section describes the chi-square response frequencies of municipal performance.

7.16.7. Chi-Square table on response frequencies with regard to municipal performance

Below is the the respondents' frequencies which were categorised into three sections as follows: satisfied, neutral and not satisfied. Table 7.12 shows response frequencies on municipal service performance.

Table 12.8: Response frequencies on municipal performance

Service	Not satisfied	neutral	satisfied	Mean	Standard deviation	Chi-square	P-value
	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)	M	SD	χ^2	P
Housing	108(21.6)	242(48.4)	150(30)	2.08	0.71	56.37	0.000***
Employment	273(54.6)	194(38.8)	33(6.6)	1.52	0.62	179.52	0.000***
Education	89(17.8)	267(53.4)	144(28.8)	2.11	0.67	99.68	0.000***
Water	73(14.6)	234(46.8)	193(38.6)	2.24	0.69	84.00	0.000***
Electricity	94(18.8)	234(46.8)	172(34.4)	2.16	0.71	59.06	0.000***
Youth. Employment	79(17.8)	267(53.4)	140(28.8)	2.11	0.69	99.68	0.000***
Sanitation	95(19.0)	246(49.2)	159(31.8)	2.13	0.70	68.93	0.000***
Health	73(14.6)	233(46.6)	194(38.8)	2.24	0.69	83.52	0.000***
Food	262(52.4)	182(36.4)	56(11.2)	1.59	0.68	129.42	0.000***
Social security/grants	26(5.2)	135(27.0)	339(67.8)	2.63	0.58	302.93	0.000***

*significant at $p < 0.05$; **significant at $p < 0.005$; ***significant at $p < 0.001$

Source: Computer printout of a table derived from the data and findings of this study. The sub-section below discussed the chi-square test of goodness of fit report. The Chi-Square table above will be discussed under the following topics: chi-square test of goodness of fit report, municipal provision of housing, municipal provision of education, municipal provision of job creation, municipal provision of water services, municipal provision of health, municipal provision of food supply, municipal provision of sanitation facilities, municipal provision of electricity and municipal provision of youth employment. This section below discusses the chi-square goodness of fit report which covered municipal provision on housing, job creation, education, water services, electricity, sanitation facilities, health, food security and youth employment opportunities.

7.16.7.1. Municipal provision of housing

A chi-square test of goodness-of-fit was performed to ascertain whether the three classes of responses were equally preferred. Preference for the three classes (i.e. not satisfied, neutral, and satisfied) was not correspondingly distributed in the population, $X^2(2, N = 256) = 56.37, p < .05$. Section 26 of the Constitution of South Africa provides that “*everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing*“. In this regard the “*State must take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive realization of this right.*” Subsequently, from 1994, the government has taken several steps to address its responsibilities towards housing. These measures include the Housing Act of 1997, which portrays out government’s apparitions and key values underlying the provision of housing; the Local Government Municipal Systems Act of 2000.

This puts in place mechanisms and principles to ensure that the government moves towards social and economic upliftment and ensures access to essential services, including further plans such as the National and Provincial Spatial Development Frameworks and the National Development Plan. According to Shackleton et al (2014) and Zweig (2015), rural-urban migrants bring about low-cost or informal housing or slums in urban areas. It is argued that that local government has a deficit in housing stock and has a lot of people on a long waiting list for state-provided low-

cost housing (Patel, 2016; Ballard et al, 2017). The section below discusses municipal provision of job creation.

7.16.7.2. Municipal provision of job creation

A chi-square test of goodness-of-fit was performed to determine whether the three classes of responses were equally preferred. Preference for the three classes (i.e. not satisfied, neutral, and satisfied) was not equally distributed in the population, $\chi^2(2, N = 256) = 179.52, p < .05$. The unequal distribution of responses on job creation indicated the sentiments people have concerning the situation of job creation. According to Makhubo (2015) and Godfrey et al (2017), the Local Economic Development (LED) and Co-operatives are seen and created as a tools for job creation and poverty alleviation in the municipalities. Unfortunately, rapid population growth has surpassed job creation.

7.16.7.3. Municipal provision of education

A chi-square test of goodness-of-fit was performed to determine whether the three classes of responses were equally preferred. Preference for the three classes (i.e. not satisfied, neutral, and satisfied) was not equally distributed in the population, $\chi^2(2, N = 256) = 99.68, p < .05$. The unequal distribution of responses on education indicated the feelings people carry concerning the situation in the municipality. Educational outcomes show a huge gap in performance rate and educational attainment (Chawla, 2016; Abrahams, 2018; Butler, 2017; Azimoh et al, 2015)

7.16.7.4. Municipal provision of water services

A chi-square test of goodness-of-fit was performed to determine whether the three classes of responses were equally preferred. Preference for the three classes (i.e. not satisfied, neutral, and satisfied) was not equally distributed in the population, $\chi^2(2, N = 256) = 84.00, p < .05$. The unequal distribution of responses on water services indicated the feelings respondents have concerning the situation in the municipality. According to Chawla (2016), Brettenny et al (2016), Rodina et al (2016) and Sutherland et al (2015) observed that the water situation in South Africa is partly caused by poor standards of recording of inputs, the inadequacy of the municipality hydraulic network and the discriminatory service patterns under apartheid laws.

7.16.7.5. Municipal provision of electricity

A chi-square test of goodness-of-fit was performed to determine whether the three classes of responses were equally preferred. Preference for the three classes (i.e. not satisfied, neutral, and satisfied) was not equally distributed in the population, $\chi^2(2, N = 256) = 59.06, p < .05$. The chi-square results on municipal provision of electricity showed unequal distribution of responses on electricity and energy supply that indicated the views respondents have concerning the situation in the municipality. Azimoh et al (2015) are of the opinion that policies aimed at providing access to electricity to all South Africans exist, but there a persistent problem of theft of power and cables.

7.16.7.6. Municipal provision of sanitary facilities

A chi-square test of goodness-of-fit was performed to determine whether the three classes of responses were equally preferred. Preference for the three classes (i.e. not satisfied, neutral, and satisfied) was not equally distributed in the population, $\chi^2(2, N = 256) = 68.93, p < .05$. The unequal distribution of responses on sanitation facilities shows the condition of sanitation in the municipality. The agenda of sanitation, according to Mcfalane et al (2017), is to improve healthcare delivery, eradicate diseases by improving basic household sanitation, remove refuse, eradicate pit latrine and provide potable water for households (Lewis et al, 2014; Redfield et al, 2016; Pan et al, 2015; de Kadt et al, 2015).

7.16.7.7. Municipal provision of health facilities

A chi-square test of goodness-of-fit was performed to determine whether the three classes of responses were equally preferred. Preference for the three classes (i.e. not satisfied, neutral, and satisfied) was not equally distributed in the population, $\chi^2(2, N = 256) = 83.52, p < .05$. The unequal distribution of responses on health facilities registers the divergent views respondents hold concerning health delivery in the municipality. According to Chawla (2016), there is great problem of avoidable diseases which can be alleviated through enhancements in the environment. Research of epidemics of disease, checking of the environment and health promotion can be strategies to improve healthcare in the municipalities (Roberts et al, 2016; Rogerson, 2018; Brettenny et al, 2016).

7.16.7.8. Municipal provision of food security

A chi-square test of goodness-of-fit was performed to determine whether the three classes of responses were equally preferred. Preference for the three classes (i.e. not satisfied, neutral, and satisfied) was not equally distributed in the population: $\chi^2(2, N = 256) = 129.42, p < .05$. The unequal distribution of responses on food security in the municipality is a result of continued poverty manifesting in food insecurity, ill health and arduous work for low returns (Robert et al, 2016; Azimoh et al, 2015; Butler, 2017). According to Rogerson (2018) and Rodina et al (2016), Africans experienced the highest poverty, hunger and unemployment rates shaped by the impact of apartheid through an active disposition of assets such as land and livestock and a lack of access to markets.

7.16.7.9. Municipal provision of youth employment

A chi-square test of goodness-of-fit was performed to determine whether the three classes of responses were equally preferred. Preference for the three classes (i.e. not satisfied, neutral, and satisfied) was not equally distributed in the population, $\chi^2(2, N = 256) = 302.93, p < .05$. The unequal distribution of responses on youth employment is a reflection of the feelings respondents have concerning the situation in the municipality. South Africa has a serious problem of youth unemployment that needs a multi-pronged policy to increase employment and provide inclusion and social consistency.

High youth joblessness means young people are not obtaining the skills or knowledge needed to drive the economy forward. This constrains the country's economic growth and inflicts a larger problem on the state to offer social assistance (Abraham, 2016; Chawla, 2018; Rogerson, 2018; De Kadt. et al, 2015). The subsection below covers the conclusions for this chapter. The conclusion recaps the highlights of community voters' perceptions on donor support, electoral dynamics and democratisation in the municipality.

7.17. Conclusion

The conclusion of this chapter focused on capturing the sentiments of community voters' on donor support and democratisation in relation to good governance and the poverty alleviation programmes pursued in the municipality in an interface with the relevance of municipal elections. The chapter started by establishing the core argument of the chapter. It captured the importance of municipal elections, it

assessed the municipal satisfaction ratings of community members and evaluated the importance of donor funding for development and whether it leads to democratisation. The chapter further solicited citizens' reasons for voting. It also ascertained donor support focus in the municipality and the effects of dwindling donor support. Again, the chapter looked at voting patterns, political participation and elections in terms of reciprocity and social justice. In addition, the chapter evaluated the hypothesis of the study by utilising inferential statistics, which made use of regression analysis, correlational and ANOVA evaluation and also presented a chi-square test of goodness of fit report. It has been amply demonstrated in this chapter that citizens in the municipality are not enthused about how much they get from the municipality in terms of service delivery and poverty alleviation programmes. To bridge the gap and discrepancies in the relationship between donors and citizens, there is the need to establish community common fund to be administered by councillors and community leaders to serve urgent and identified community needs and projects.

Democracy financiers should create community platforms of engagement to ascertain their priorities to connect with them on a frequent and regular basis instead of channelling aid through the municipality. This is because community members have been portrayed as the beneficiaries of poverty alleviation programs in the municipality, but the agenda was to get them to participate in elections as a ploy of democratization which only serves the interest of the donor community.

The perceptions of community voters are varied and diverse. The response of voters on their political affiliation, campaign messages, reasons for voting indicate that electorates have very high expectations of municipal administrators and elected councillors to deliver on their promises and to ensure efficient and effective service delivery in the municipality. Elections are an essential exercise in the life of a nation. It is very important that community voters' should attach great importance to all levels of national elections, be it local government or municipality or parliament and presidential elections. It is essential that elected officers should represent their constituent very diligently. Donor funders and electoral financiers should eschew corrupt practices but should ensure free and fair elections.

Municipal administrators must ensure that funds allocated for elections and development are utilised accordingly to improve the life of constituents. Political parties must embark on healthy political campaigns that will ensure votes for them in the community. Political parties must engage citizens on a daily basis and not just during electoral seasons. Citizens perceive them as taking them for granted until the next elections surfaces. They need to interact and socialise with their members and acquaint themselves with the needs of the constituencies and design practical ways of solving or helping them to solve their social, economic, health, educational, nutritional and environmental needs. The next chapter discusses the summary, recommendations, suggestions and conclusion of the study.

CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a summary of the main ideas and findings, conclusions and recommendations. It started by capturing the core argument of the study. This is followed by a summary of findings, then conclusions. It concludes by making recommendations and suggestions for further and future research on the subject of donor support, electoral dynamics and democratisation in South Africa. Africa's development revival has been stamped by several factors which included its vast and fast growing population, poor infrastructure base, unfavourable world economic order, poor growth from agriculture and industry, corruption, unemployment and too many failed developmental models prescribed by donors. This assertion has been succinctly captured by Edwards (2014b:1) when he said:

"...the effectiveness of official development aid is the subject of heated debate. This column argues that aid affects recipient economies in extremely complex ways and through multiple and changing channels. Moreover, this is a two-way relationship-realities in recipients' countries affect the actions of aid agencies. This relationship is so intricate and time-dependent that it is not amenable to being captured by cross-country or panel regressions. Even sophisticated specifications with multiple breakpoints and nonlinearities are unlikely to explain the inner workings of the aid-performance connections"

The world's economic outlook has drastically affected Africa following the global economic meltdown that sparked off a worldwide recession and economic crises by the close of 2009 (Westeneng et al, 2007; Koch, 2009; Hewison et al, 2013; Abbott et al, 2011; Carothers, 2007). As a result, the continent has pursued vigorous interventions through bilateral and multilateral agreements to build its future by focusing on its development agenda through conscientious and prudent management of its finance and resources. In doing this, African nations have mobilised resources from the international, national and the domestic domains for its development. However, most African nations are plagued with poor growth and balanced of payment problems. There are great efforts by western donors led by the Bretton Woods Institutions-the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other bodies and organisations such as the European Union (EU),

JICA, USAID and CIDA among others, to use assistance to promote democracy in other countries (Westeneng et al, 2007; Koch, 2009; Hewison et al, 2013; Abbott et al, 2011; Carothers, 2007). Following the spread of democratic systems of government and transitions in the 1980s, western donor agencies began to consider how to widen their assistance portfolios to support the trend. The dramatic expansion of democracy, according to Carothers (2007), in the late 1990s, in parts of the world including sub-Saharan Africa, fuelled donor agencies to carry out programmes which they specifically conceived of as pro-democratic. These programmes have been labelled in various ways but the form and functions have remained the same. The development models included: a) Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost Adjustment (PAMSCAD). This was followed by other packages such as; b) The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP); c) the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP); d) Highly Indebted Poor Nations Programme (HIPC); e) Millennium Development Goals prescriptions (MDGs) and now the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The intentions and full import of these programmes, according to Carothers (2007), has the semblance of enhancing democracy through free and fair elections, championing of human rights and civil liberties but underlying this is the economic and the profit motives of the multilateral organisations.

The agenda for achieving the above objectives is shrouded in donor assistance packages which according to Kilby (2009), Gould (2005) and Poku (2004) were carried out through various ways which included: a) aid marketization, b) global economic policy and neo-liberal market reforms and c) trade liberalisation. According to Westeneng et al (2007), aid marketization is a reorganisation process that empowers state enterprises to function as market oriented firms. This is attained through the reduction of state subventions, organisational restructuring, decentralisation and privatisation which is basically, profit oriented and focusses on how to establish structures to maximise profit for their businesses and their home economy. Global economic policy and neo-liberal market reforms come with decentralisation of public institutions, privatisation of the economy, downsizing bureaucracy, increasing taxation, freezing public sector employment and recruitment, stagnating promotions, pursuing extreme computerisation or automation of the work environment and embarking on massive retrenchments of perceived redundant workers. Trade liberalisation is the deletion of or the lessening in the trade

practices that frustrate free flow of goods and services from one nation to another. It comprises disassembling of tariffs (such as duties, surcharges and export subsidies) as well as non-tariffs (such as licensing regulations, quotas and arbitrary standards (Bhagwati, 2011; Love et al, 2009; (Westeneng et al, 2007; Koch, 2009; Hewison et al, 2013; Abbott et al, 2011). International trade has contributed immensely to the development and the well-being of the economics of nations around the globe. It has also enhanced and tackled policies on employment, education, health, infrastructure-housing, roads, and pipe borne water, toilets, markets and food security (Bhagwati, 2011).

The impact of International trade is felt in the cost and availability of practically everything that we consume (Love et al, 2009). International trade has played crucial roles in human history in the field of employment, the environment and the fight against extreme poverty. There is no human history where prosperity has been achieved or sustained without trade. The relevance of trade liberalisation has been over extensively stretched in the literature. Proponents for trade liberalisation such as Bhagwati (2011) have argued that it brings with it great benefits to consumers as prices are low, quality range of goods and services are available, it differentiates risks for companies and channels resources to where profits are highest, it streamlines domestic policies by open markets, facilitates competition, investments and increases productivity.

The arguments against trade liberalisation, according to Bhagwat (2011), were that, it leads to shift in the balance of an economy, it leads to greater exploitation, it damages economies which cannot compete against free trade, and it can cause people to lose their jobs and even lives as cheaper goods flood the market. These observations were corroborated by Hazlitt (1984: 48) and Stiglitz (2003:155), respectively, as follows:

“...the World Bank along with the monetary system it was designed within would promote world inflation and “a world in which international trade is state-dominated” when they were being advocated”

and

“... the so-called free market reform policies that the Bank advocates are often harmful to economic development if implemented badly, too quickly, in the wrong sequence or in weak, uncompetitive economies”

Globalization has made the world become more closely connected. Trade has improved significantly, and the movement of people between countries is greater than ever before. However, billions of people still live in abject poverty, and in many places, the gap between the rich and the poor is ever-widening (Dollar, 2001). As a result, some countries, their institutions and organizations have assumed roles on the international scene to lead and trumpet the economic woes of poor nations in order to prescribe solutions for economic recovery programmes and to canvass for international assistance from the donor community (Meryers et al, 2007; Khan, 2005; Moyo, 2009). Consequently, sovereign states, by some creation, have entered into bilateral and multilateral agreements with other states to create what has become known as: inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), international non-governmental organisations (INGO's), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and multinational corporations (MNCs).

The activities and impact of development assistance to third world countries and its global ramifications on grassroot electoral processes and participatory democracy in the municipal, including local level constituency politics is what this research sought to investigate. Particularly, it evaluated the impact of the conditionality attached to the donor assistance packages and its effects on the poor and ordinary citizens in the municipality. International relations have established patterns of complex interacting forces that continuously shape and influence the socio-economic and cultural powers that exist among sovereign states, governments and organisations (Lull, 1995). The interactions and actions of endowed governments and organisations with other smaller emerging economies are unequal and unbalanced.

Silverstone (1999: 107) observes this as “a product of a changing economic and political order; one in which technical and capital has combined in a new multi-faceted imperialism”. Tomlison (1991:2) described this occurrence as “a western ideology spreading its wings across the globe”. The economic power, according to Tomlison (1991:2), and the affinity to create a dependency relationship is the result of these structures. The countries which are well endowed economically tend to lend or donate a lot of resources to the least developed countries (LDC) largely for their interest in what they can get from such countries. Furthermore, the entire economy of the LDC'S shall depend fully on the economy and the markets of the donor

countries, thereby plunging them heavily into indebtedness and huge interest repayments for their loans. Burnside et al (2000) and Kilby et al (2005) indicated that global economic outlook on third world or underdeveloped countries, to a large extent, is determined by activities of donor agencies and corporations from the western developed countries. Their development agenda is what is pushed down the throat of receiving countries. Donor support from these multilateral organisations set the development agenda of poor nations. As a result, recipient nations are mostly constrained by the tenets and concepts of development orientation which are at variance to the economic, social, political and the electoral needs of developing countries.

There have been several debates in literature as to real motives of donor funding. Among them are: (a) the political or diplomatic reasons: They want to uphold a reliance relationship with the recipient nation in order to impact government and the political direction of the country. (b) The humanitarian purpose: There are some individuals who give charity as a sign of identifying and showing compassion to the poor and needy who may be suffering as a result of famine, drought or an outbreak of diseases or some natural disaster or war. c) Then there are the economic reasons: Some governments may want a country's resource indirectly.

They do these through their corporate bodies and agencies. The donors may want to control the supply of certain commodities such as oil (petroleum), water, food, pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals. In addition, they want to guarantee free markets for their products such as cars, planes, computers, mobile phones and for their own experts to provide technical services at high fees. The effects of these aids or assistance on the recipient countries are very huge. In some cases, the foreign aid project is not suitable for the recipient country. This mostly occurs when the local community is not involved in the planning and the implementation of the projects. Aid is often wasted on condition that the recipient country must use overpriced goods and services from the donor nation. It is also noted that most aids do not go to the poor who need it most. Another action of donor countries is to dwarf the aids amounts given in order to protect their home market access for poorer countries. From the neo-liberal perspectives, there are conditionalities attached to development assistance offered to countries which needs them. Foreign aids or grants attract

different conditionalities. There are different categories of donor support offered to specific countries, depending on their perceived needs. Koch (2009) and Amundsen (2007) observed that donors have their “darlings” and their “donor orphans”. Among the different categories were: the financial donor support, the material or logistical donor support, the military donor support, the technical support, the capacity building support, educational support, agrochemical support, healthcare support, emergency and disaster relief support, the mining and industrial support and environmental and food security support. The demand of the conditionalities ranges from structural adjustment, trade liberalization and public sector reforms. These conditions place demand on governments to cut down on its bureaucratic spending and expenditure. This means it should lay off workers who are deemed to be redundant, freeze employment and put a ban on salary increments (Bader, 2005).

Governments were expected to raise revenue by increasing taxes on all commodities and services and then remove its borders for the free movement of people, goods and services. In other words, poor governments should open up their markets freely to them for dumping of their inferior commodities. Other conditionality are that, nations which need support should ensure accountability in their public sector administration. It has to be accountable to the people and their development partners (Santiso et al, 2005). There is also the condition of transparency. Governments must ensure transparency in all its transactions on behalf of the public. Some donors also place high premiums on free press and freedom of associations, thus people are free to belong to different political parties of their choice and to any group or club (Bader, 2005).

Another major conditionality is the decentralisation policy. There is a huge demand on qualifying countries for donor support to decentralize their institutions. This means that excess political power and authority must be devolved or shared from the central government to the periphery or the local constituencies in order to speed up development. Then also there is the condition of good governance and periodic free and fair elections through healthy competition and violent free environment. The elections must be observed by the international community and international bodies and groups such as the United Nations (UN), The African Union (AU) and other sub regional groups like South African Development Corporation (SADC). The

international community, especially donor agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), The World Bank (WB), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) all prescribe conditionality that are incongruent to the development agenda and aspirations of recipient countries. Easterly (2000) argues that the conditionality of the multilateral agencies are first of all to promote their interest. They give *in lieu* of what they will get, and poor nations pay dearly for it. The arrangement for their deal is to establish a patron-client relation with the recipient nation.

The constraints in the conditionality are passed down from the center (central government) to the peripheral and local authority (municipality). Their implementation of the prescription is religiously supervised by state agencies. The outcome of these types of development agenda is that the aspirations of local authorities and rural dwellers are relegated to the background in disappointment. In Africa, and in other parts of the world which are least developed, foreign aids, grants and donor funding of projects such as water, sanitation, hospitals, schools, food, shelter and other interventions are always welcomed with great fun fair and enthusiasm. The expectation and the hope has often been that, these things will alleviate and reduce the hardship and poverty of the poor and needy in society (Huntington, 1991).

The interventions listed above are not bad in themselves, but when they are linked to the electoral system and the ballot box of a country, they have a tendency to stifle grassroots participatory democracy. Khan (2005), Eberlei (2007) and Meyers et al (2007) believe that aid does not foster freedom. They hold the view that democracy does not reduce poverty and inequality but rather lines up the wallets of the donors with abnormal profits. Meyers et al (2007) think that the administrators, supervisors and the executives who receive the donation on behalf of the people hijack the process so the mass of the people are severely impoverished.

8.2. Core argument of the study

This thesis has argued that donor support induces democratisation. Nevertheless, the agenda of the donor community, even though tagged as alleviating poverty in marginalised and deprived areas, is indeed to draw voters to participate in elections as a cover up for their inability to spread the benefits of donor support to reach the majority of the poor in most deprived communities in the municipality.

The study sought to investigate and establish the extent to which donor support influences the electoral processes in the Buffalo City Municipality and the electoral dynamic factors which connect this agenda with governance and democratization. The first chapter outlined and set the focus of the thesis by capturing the general introduction, preliminary literature, research problem and the aim of the study. It stated the research questions, the objectives and hypothesis. It further laid out the foundation for the theoretical/conceptual framework and explained the methodology used which included the research instrument design, sampling and sampling procedures, data collection and data analysis strategy. Finally, it stated the significance of the study, streamlined the ethical issues surrounding the study.

Chapter two demonstrated through the discussions from the relevant literature the debates surrounding donor support efficiency and efficacy in inducing democratisation in the Buffalo City Municipality. The arguments considered the case of donor support for elections and development for emerging democracies. In fledgling democracies, funding can be provided by foreign aid as well as by local corporate support. International donors, corporate organisations, individuals and particularly the government, through the treasury, provide financing to political parties, the IEC and the BCMM as a means to promote democracy and good governance. Support can be purely financial or otherwise. Frequently, it is provided as capacity development activities which included the development of party manifestos, party constitutions and enhancing campaigning skills. Developing a connection between ideologically linked parties is another common feature of international and local support for a party. Sometimes this can be perceived as directly supporting the political aims of a political party. The issue of good governance was forcefully articulated by leaders in the sub-saharan Africa through the APRM and NEPAD programmes. To this end, it was envisaged that matters that border on social justice, equity and fairness in the distribution of development programmes to alleviate poverty, unemployment and inequality will deliberately be considered by donors, development partners and especially governments and its agencies.

Chapter three explored the theoretical framework which utilized Woolcock's (1998) development aid theory to assess the role of donors, Gouldner's Moral norm of

reciprocity and social support to tackle and analyse the “give and take” relationship that seemingly exist between and amongst donors, government or the municipal council and the community. It vividly points and illustrates the fact that, community members will reciprocate on the benefits they derive from government and donor projects in the BCM municipality. Ley’s (1959) political party theory, Lazarsfeld’s voter behaviour theory and the democratisation theories were used to answer the questions on the role and functions of the IEC, the BCMM as institutions established to nurture and to promote democracy and to explain the support services rendered by donor agencies. The social justice and equity theories were used as a balancing factor to give a voice to a majority of community voters’ and local citizens who are disadvantaged and alienated from local active politics but are called upon every election period to vote existing only as voters’ bank.

Chapter four presented the philosophical bases of the study. It focussed the discussions on research paradigms - positivistic, interpretative and mixed method research. It covered the research design and showed that correlational research was appropriate and useful. The sample size and selections both quantitatively and qualitatively were addressed. The data collection methods were outlined which included discussions on the questionnaires, interviews and document analysis were employed. The data analysis covered how quantitative, qualitative and documents data were analysed and their assumptions followed, whilst research quality and ethical considerations employed were outlined.

Chapter five presented perceptions of political party officials and members are varied and diverse on the issue of donor funding. The findings of the study indicated that political parties obtain their major funding from the government, public goodwill, special contributions and donations rather than membership dues. Some rich individuals fund more than one political party. Correspondingly, funding from foreigners, especially foreign businesses, is common within political parties. The study conclusions are that support for state funding is stronger among the elite political class and party executives than ordinary party members. Institutional weakness emerged as one of the severest challenge to political parties in mobilising financial resources for their activities. This institutional weakness manifests in the

lack of transparency and accountability frameworks and weak internal organisational mechanisms required to mobilise funds from ordinary members.

The perceptions of elected or nominated councillors were varied and diverse on the issue of donor funding and democratisation in the Buffalo City municipality. The findings of the study indicated that elected councillors obtain their major funding from rich individuals, special contributions and donations rather than membership dues.. On the basis of the fairness of the nomination process that elected them, 17 (47.22%) strongly agree that the process was very fair, 10 (27.78%) agreed that the process was fair. However, 2(5.6%) strongly disagreed that the processes were fair, 5.56% disagreed while 2.75% were not decisive donor support necessity was tested to find out councillors' views on the importance of donor funding for electoral processes and democratisation.

The findings of this study revealed that 61.11% of respondents strongly agreed that donor support was important for democratisation. 30.56% of the councillors agreed that donor support was necessary for elections. 5.56% of interviewees disagreed to the necessity of donor with 2.78% strongly contesting the relevance of donor support.

This study also revealed that the sources of funds for councillors' campaigns and party activities emanates from fund raising activities, membership dues and contribution, special levies, state sponsorship and public goodwill.. It also emerged that a major source of funding for councillors include; fund raising, party membership contributions, party subscriptions, state sponsorship, special levies, special projects and public goodwill.

The results on donor conditionality on funds raised by councillors indicated that 21.1% of respondents acknowledge that donor conditionality promotes good governance, 19.5% believe that it increases electoral transparency, 20.3% think that it promotes free and fair elections, 17.1% agree that donor conditionality induces democratisation while 16.3% hold the view that it brings about a healthy electoral competition.

Finally, on the assessment of municipal performance on service delivery, most respondents suggested that the municipality was involved in corrupt activities, with

18.9% of the respondents highlighting the presence of corruption. To add, 13.5% commended the municipality for transport provision and employment creation separately. 10.8% cited the existence of youth unemployment. On the contrary, another 10.8% suggested the presence of poverty. 5.4% of the respondents suggested that the municipality was performing well in sanitation and refuse collection; another 5.4% cited performance in food provision while another separate 5.4% cited that the municipality had a sense of indebtedness. The remaining performance ratings were distributed as follows: 2.7% for electricity supply; 2.7% for security; 2.7% for housing; 2.7% for water provision; 2.7% for education and another 2.7% for health. Chapter six covered the findings on this section on the role and functions of the Independent Electoral Commissioner (IEC) and the Buffalo City Metropolitan municipality on development and electoral administration has revealed numerous problems and challenges that confronts the municipality.

Chapter seven dealt with the perceptions of community voters on donor support and democratisation. The views which were expressed were varied and diverse. The response of voters on their political affiliation and campaign messages gave reasons for voting which indicated that electorates have very high expectations of municipal administrators and elected councillors to deliver on their promises and to ensure efficient and effective service delivery in the municipality. Elections are a very important exercise in the life of a nation. It is very important that community voters should attach great importance to all levels of national elections be it local government or municipality or parliament and presidential elections. It is important that elected officers should represent their constituent very diligently. Donor funders and electoral financiers should eschew corrupt practices but should ensure free and fair elections. Municipal administrators must ensure that funds allocated for elections and development are utilized accordingly to improve the lives of constituents. Political parties must embark on healthy political campaigns that will ensure votes for them in the community. Political parties must engage citizens on the daily basis and not just during electoral seasons. Citizens perceive them as taking them for granted until the next elections surface. They need to interact and socialise with their members and then acquaint themselves with needs of the constituencies and design practical ways of solving or helping them to solve their social, economic, health, educational, nutritional and environmental needs.

Chapter eight presents a summary of main ideas and findings, conclusions and recommendations. It starts by capturing the main ideas of each chapter, followed by a summary of findings, then conclusions. It ends by making recommendations and suggestions for further and future research on the subject of donor support, electoral dynamics and democratisation in South Africa. The next sub-section shows the summary of findings of the study.

8.3. Summary of Main Findings

On the basis of the research questions, objectives of the study, the hypotheses, rigorous methodology guided by the data collection strategy and the aim of the study which is to investigate and to establish to what extent donor support influences the electoral processes in the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality and the electoral dynamic factors which connect this agenda with governance and democratization, the research was executed and accomplished.

The thesis of the study has argued that donor support induce democratisation in the Buffalo City Municipality and that citizens' participation in an election by voting was a rehearsed strategy by sub state institutions and donor lords to cajole electorates, as if they are partners in development, to participate in an election without considering the inadequate provision of electoral dynamic factors such as housing, education, health services, energy supply, employment opportunities, food security, good roads, clean water supply and sanitation which are services rendered by the municipality.

The study arrived at the following findings based on: donor agencies' and donor recipients' perceptions of donor support for development and electoral purposes; the roles and functions of IEC and BCMM in donor assisted projects and electoral administration in the municipality and community voters' perceptions of donor support, electoral dynamics and democratisation. Below are elaborations of these key findings on donor agencies' and donor recipients' perceptions of donor support and democratisation.

The sub-section below focuses on the findings on donor agencies' and donor recipients' perceptions of support and democratisation.

8.3.1. Donor Agencies' and Donor Recipients' perceptions of donor support for development and electoral purposes

The chapter partly evaluated the role and functions of donor agencies and their perceptions of donor support and democratisation in conjunction with the recipients' of donor support, such as political parties and elected councillors to ascertain their perceptions on donor support, electoral dynamics and democratisation in the municipality. The following were the main findings derived.

8.3.1.1. Donor Agency's views on donor support

The findings indicate that the contributions of donor organizations to the development of in the municipality are enormous. As can be seen, a cumulative majority of respondents agreed that donor support was important and relevant for development. According to Dreher et al (2016), the Chinese aid improves local development outcomes, as measured by per-capita night-time light emissions at the first and second subnational administrative level. They, therefore, concluded that China's foreign assistance program has both distributional and developmental consequences for Africa. In contrast, Venner (2016) observed that donor assisted programmes and agencies can be irrational. She said the development is a bit chaos as far as she is concerned. She does not think they operated in a very rational manner. She claims they have good intentions, but the way they work-"I'm still getting to grips with it".

Venner (2016) criticised the performance of major donor actors at the municipality that, what should have been a united effort to improve lives of the people was "mired in bureaucracy and riven in conflict between organisations and individuals who work there". According to Fuhr (1994), Romeo (2003) and Heewig et al (2017), the situations surrounding municipal institutional reforms in Ecuador set in motion on one hand, a link established by external contributors between the financing of infrastructural projects at the local level, and institutional reforms, on the other (Fuhr, 1994; Romeo, 2003; Heewig et al, 2017; Chawla, 2016; Roberts et al, 2016; Rosendo et al, 2016; Platz, 2016; Wowerijn et al, 2017).

Credit was only provided to municipalities on the understanding that efforts were made by them to increase their capability to provide urban services. This approach has enjoyed considerable success to date (Norris, 2017; Fiedler, 2016; Goetz et al, 2016; Annen, 2017; Macdonald, 2016; Ascher, 2016; Bush, 2016; Bardall, 2017; Hasselskog et al, 2017; Awortwi, 2017; Swedlund, 2017; Crane et al, 2017; Buckley

et al, 2017; Mogues et al, 2016; Havel, 2016; Mbachu, 2016; Gaynor, 2016; Nickson et al, 2016; Arnon, 2017).

Below is the sub-section on donor agencies' provision of support for elections.

8.3.1.2. Donor Agency's provision of support for elections

Donor agencies provide enormous support for municipal elections. The support these agencies provide is varied and diverse. In the context of this study, the sources of donor support are three-fold: it considers donation from international sources and bilateral agreements. Examples are world bank/IMF assistance and sister-city collaborations. The second source is regional and sub-regional inter-governmental and Non-governmental agreements eg SADC protocols. The third channel is the domestic or local donor support received from donor agencies. Donor agency refers to all sponsors that provide support in cash and in kind to political parties and candidates who contested for municipal council seats. It must be noted that the support provided at this level included assistance in campaign souvenirs, logistics, groceries, accommodation, transportation, communication equipment and gadgets, advertising accessories etc. In the special case of BCMM, the donor agencies that support and sponsor candidates and political parties include; business owners, Advertising houses, Hotel owners and caterers, corporate printing houses and publishers, co-operative transport operators and taxi associations, powerful telecommunication operators, the municipal treasury and rich individuals in the municipality. Most of the support were geared towards assisting the IEC, BCMM, Political parties, elected or nominated councillors who contest local and municipal elections with financial assistance and logistical support. According to Bratton et al (2001) and Mattes (1995), widespread support for democracy in Africa as in other "Third Wave" regions provides less contentment with the performance of elected governments. The fact that Africans support democracy while being dissatisfied with its achievements suggests a measure of intrinsic support that surpasses instrumental considerations.

In the opinion of Collier et al (2012), Southall (2002) and Geisler (1979), democratization has presented elections into contexts that often lack limitations upon

the behaviour of candidates, thus resulting in the appearance of voter intimidation, vote-buying, and ballot fraud. In addition, they hold the view that, a stronger incumbent facing local competition will prefer to use bribery or ballot fraud. In spite of all these difficulties, the role of donor agencies cannot be underestimated in municipal elections.

The sub-section below discusses donor funding for elections.

8.3.1.3. Items donor funding for elections covers

The findings of this section show that, the majority of electoral funders utilize their funds to cover capacity building, that is to say, according to Lippel et al (2016), developing and strengthening the skills, instincts, abilities, processes and resources of the IEC, the BCM, the political parties and the elected councillors. Similarly, donors raise funds to assist in campaigns, provide logistics, training centres, offices and documentation support centres, voter education, job training, learning centres and consultancy services (Collier et al, 2015; Olowu et al, 2019; Fukuyama, 2017; Birch et al, 2017; Goodhand et al, 2016; White et al, 2016; Hamalai et al, 2015

The sub-section below indicates donor support as targeted at electoral improvement for development.

8.3.1.4. Organizations' funding electoral activities

The majority of respondents cited the following as the organization's funding municipal elections. Most of the funding comes from the government; another source of funding comes from the World Bank, the UN and the IMF. While the rest comes from the UNDP and JICA separately. Besides these organisations, most respondents stated that they receive monetary and logistical support from business owners, rich individuals, advertising companies, cooperatives, transport owners and party members. Akintola et al (2016) stated that community based organisations (CBOs) reported facing a striking reduction in funding received from both international and local donors as a result of the global financial crisis. Akintola et al (2016) said they experienced problems in acquiring new funding. Organizations addressed finance problems by conducting organizational reorganisation and implementing austerity measures that led to the cutback of staff, reduction in benefits and incentives for staff and volunteers, reduction in the number of communities served and rationing of services provided to these communities (Akintola et al, 2016).

8.3.1.5. Donor support as target at electoral improvement for development

The findings on donor support targets for electoral improvement had most respondents focussing on education, water supply and sanitation, energy/electricity supply, health care delivery, housing, roads and transport as their priority as far as electoral improvement for development is concerned. According to Geerring et al (2016), the essence of electoral support, to a large extent, were to ensure electoral development, to ensure free and fair elections, to ensure that democracy progresses human development by displaying that some features of democracy – but not others – affect human growth. Geerring et al (2016) argued that the “electoral” aspect of democracy improves human development while aspects related to citizen empowerment do not (or scarcely so). According to Fried et al (2017), politicians often struggle to claim credit for programmatic policies and therefore use personalized benefits to win elections.

Non-programmatic strategies that target individual voters provide a greater electoral return, even if the technocratic provision of public goods would better serve citizens’ needs. Dominioni (2016) argued that electoral fraud and electoral malpractices related to the domain of electoral affairs, which is one of the core elements of a regime with representative institutions. According to Dominioni (2016), the last decades at the international level have seen many documents, charters and organisations that contributed to craft the standards of electoral integrity. (Aldrich et al, 2017; Bellucci et al, 2017; Diaz Caveros, 2016; Maskin, 2017).

The sub-section below shows donor conditionalities attached to donor support.

8.3.1.6. Donor conditionalities attached to donor support

The majority of the respondents agreed that donors placed conditionality on their support. A cumulative majority stated that donors place conditionality to induce tax exemptions, promote free trade, electoral reforms, democratisation and trade liberalisation. However, few respondents disagreed that there were any conditionalities attached to donor support. According to Muriuki (2000), Thompson (1992), Dzungwa (2004), Mulonya (2010) and Mundau (2013), the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the Soviet Union has inspired democratisation in most parts of Africa. At the same time, Western donors’ approaches towards recipients of foreign aid have altered. This has occasioned in a new practice, which tries to force

Third World states to move toward liberal democracy by conditioning lending on the holding of multi-party elections.

The sub-section below discusses what the attached conditionalities are likely to induce.

8.3.1.7. What the attached conditionalities are likely to ensure

The summary of the findings on the perceived effects of donor support indicate that the respondents suggested that donor support induced electoral reforms. A majority of respondents suggested that donor support induced democratization. A significant percentage also suggested that it induced free trade. Some other respondents suggested that it induced tax exemptions. In addition, respondents indicated that donor support induced grass root development; while few suggested that it induced platforms for political interaction. A small fraction of respondents suggested that donor funding induced trade liberalization. Also, some respondents noted that donor conditionality are likely to affect voters' by resulting in disrupting elections, lowering voter turn out, delaying voting and providing poor logistics for conducting elections. According to Baylies (2007), the use of assistance to enforce political situations on recipient countries, to further democratic and government reforms or to punish non-compliance with earlier demands, is a comparatively new story of the international aid regime. She weighs the proliferating donor and academic literature emerging on the subject.

At the heart of discussion of democracy and governance policies are debates about revolution of the state, its relationship to economic development and the lessening extent to which deliberations of authority limit donor interventions. Baylies (2007), Swedlund (2007) and Woll (2008) observed that political conditionality may help the development of democratic actions in Africa. There is insincerity in that structural adjustment dangers undermining the state modifications seen to be essential to them while, equally, democratisation may challenge the processes of economic restructuring being imposed (Baylies, 2007; Swedlund, 2007; Woll, 2008).

The sub-section below discusses political parties' perceptions of donor funding and democratisation in the municipality.

8.3.2. Political parties' perceptions of donor funding and democratisation in the municipality.

This section discusses the findings on political party affiliation, donor support importance for organising elections, donor support facilitation of party operations, party reception of donor support and difficulty in party organisation without donor support

8.3.2.1. Political Party Affiliation

The findings indicated that the majority of the respondents were affiliated with the ANC. This was followed by respondent who were affiliated to EFF. Some others were affiliated to DA while only a small percentage were affiliated with COPE. Gerber et al (2010) found that partisanship is strongly linked with attitudes and behaviour, but it is unclear from this arrangement whether partisan characteristics has a contributing effect on political behaviour and attitudes. Gerber et al (2010), Manning (2005) and Czech et al (2001) reported that the results of a field experiment that investigated the causal effect of party identification and established that the finding is reliable with the claim that partisanship is an active force changing how citizens behave in and perceive the political world (Gerber et al, 2010). The sub-section below shows donor support importance for organising elections.

8.3.2.2. Donor support importance for organising elections

In answering questions on the importance of donor support for organizing elections, a great number of the respondents strongly agreed that donor support is important for organising elections. It was found that 31.4% of the respondents agreed to the question. This made a cumulative 100.0% in agreement to donor support for organizing elections. Grauvogel (2016) assessed Cheeseman's notion of how he tackles with some of the most important questions facing Africa and democracy today, including whether international actors should try and promote democracy abroad, how to design political systems that manage ethnic mixture, and why democratic governments often make bad policy decisions.

The sub-section below indicates donor support facilitation of the operations of the party.

8.3.2.3. Donor support facilitates the operations of the party

The study found (from the question on donor support in facilitating party operations) that 51.4% of the respondents strongly agreed that donor support facilitates the operations of the party, while 48.6% agreed to the question; this brought a cumulative total of 100.0% who were in support with the notion of donor support in facilitating party operations. From the findings of this study, it was clear that donor support facilitates the operations of political parties in the municipality. According to Routledge et al (2016), there is a constant problem of acquiring funding to provide key funds. For instance, Routledge et al (2016) intimated that the PGA Asia conference in Dhaka was delayed by almost two years due to problems associated with fund-raising and was further hampered by the later availability of some of those funds. The ANC is a party-movement that draws on its liberation credentials yet is conflicted by a multitude of weaknesses, factions and internal succession battles. Booyesen (2011) constructed her analysis around the ANC's four faces of political power – organisation, people, political parties and elections, and policy and government – and discovers how, since 1994, it has acted to continuously renew its power. Scoones et al (2016) have asked if a new paradigm for development cooperation is developing, and argues that there must move beyond the naïve accounts of either “South–South” partnership or “neo-imperial” expansion of “rising powers” to look at the dynamic and contested politics of engagement, as new forms of capital and technology enter African contexts. The next sub-section shows that parties receive donor support.

8.3.2.4. Parties receive donor support

The majority of the respondents 65.7% were in strong agreement with the fact that the party receives donor support; while 34.3% agreed to be aware that the party receives donor support. The findings of this study confirms that political parties in the municipality receives support, especially financial support. However, Sarakinsky (2007) contended that legal action instigated by the Institute for Democracy in Southern Africa against all political parties for the revelation of donations introduced a debate over party-funding supervisory regimes in South Africa.

The case for declaration and regulation stressed the causative connection between secret funding and corruption as well as the weakening of democratic practice. An empirical assessment of these claims shows that secrecy has not brought about

these anticipated effects and that official institutions have been effective in uncovering and indicting political and other forms of corruption. Moreover, evidence is presented showing that the disclosure of donors' identities will prejudice smaller, opposition parties to the detriment of South Africa's multi-party democratic system. An appropriate regulatory regime for the country must emerge from a deliberative process, rather than a judicial decision, if it is to be effective (Sarakinsky, 2007; Kumar, 2007; Osei, 2013; Sokomani, 2010). In addition, the regulations must balance transparency against the interests of smaller parties through innovative and country-specific monitoring mechanisms.

According to Kumar (2007) and Osei (2013), the global public has been assisting political parties as part of its efforts to promote multi-party democracy in developing and transition societies. Its assistance programmes were designed to help political parties improve their organisational capacities, promote internal democracy, recruit women and minorities, and effectively participate in legislative processes. The subsection below shows that it will be difficult to organise a party without donor support.

8.3.2.5. It is difficult to organise a party without donor support

The study found (on the difficulty in organising party without donor support) that, the majority of the respondents 71.43% strongly agreed that it was difficult to organise party without donor support. It also found that 17.14% agreed; 5.71% disagreed; 2.86% strongly disagreed while another 2.86% were not sure. According to Osei, (2013) political parties are commonly thought of as agents of democracy that accomplish a variety of functions, such as policy preparation, interest accumulation and articulation, social incorporation, and elite recruitment. However, given the weakness of many African parties, are they able to contribute positively to democracy? Osei (2013) sought to answer this question by using Ghana – one of Africa's most successful democracies – as a case study.

Osei (2013) found that parties in Ghana were comparatively strong and do indeed marshal large numbers of voters and finance. Osei (2013) stated that they even expose a mark of philosophical rivalry and have successfully modified their policies to the local context. On the other hand, they expose serious flaws in the field of social amalgamation and interest representation. Against that background, Osei (2013) argued that even in procedurally well-functioning democracies like Ghana, political parties can be tools of elite competition that contribute to the

exclusion of the poor from decision-making. Rakner et al (2010) observed that Democracy assistance programmes have gradually included support for political parties in addition to support for civil society, parliaments and the electoral process. The sub-section below indicates the elected councillors' perceptions on donor support and democratisation.

8.3.3. Findings on elected and nominated councillors' perceptions on donor support, Electoral dynamics and democratization in the municipality

The sub-section below indicates donor support necessity.

8.3.3.1. Donor support necessity

The majority of the respondents 61.11% strongly agreed that donor support is necessary; the findings also indicated that 30.56% of the respondents agreed that donor support is necessary; 5.56% disagreed that donor support is necessary while 2.78% strongly disagreed. As indicated in the responses above, donor support is very critical and crucial for the successful implementation of political campaigns and elections. Kumar (2005) stated that the assistance programme is intended to support political parties advance their organizational capacities, promote in-house democracy, recruit women and minorities and effectively participate in legislative processes (Lyon, 2004; Ott et al., 2000; Braa et al., 2004; Heeks, 2001, 2002; Van Der Spuy, 2000; Laakso, 2002; Barkan, 1997; Othaway et al., 1999; Dietrich et al., 2014; Erdman, 2010; Gershman, 2007; Green et al., 2006; Cornell, 2013; Caorothers, 2007; Scott, 2007; Elthier, 2010; Grim et al., 2012; Scott et al., 2007; Van Cranenburgh, 2002).

The next sub-section shows findings on the source of funds for campaigns and elections

8.3.3.2. Source of funds for campaigns and Elections

The findings shows that 14.3% of the funds come from fundraising activities, another 14.3% comes from membership contributions, 16.5% comes from party subscriptions, 11.0% comes from Special levies, 9.3% comes from Sale of Souvenirs, 11.5% comes from members' goodwill, 12.1% comes from State sponsorship, while Special projects contribute 11.0%. The revelations in this study presented some insightful truths about source of funds for elections for councillors in the Buffalo City municipality. Lindberg (2003) expressed his impressions about the

source of funds for elections as “our time to chop” and that elections feed on neo-patrimonialism rather than counteracting it. Most political corruptions were not only attributed to dubious contract deals but also to fundraising as a source of garnishing support for elections (Seekings, 1990, 2000; Adam et al., 1998; Nattrass, 2001; Bratton, 1998; Lindberg, 2003).

The sub-section below shows the roles and functions of the IEC and the BCM in donor assisted projects and electoral administration in the municipality.

8.4. The roles and functions of IEC and BCM in donor assisted projects and electoral administration in the municipality

This section cover the findings on the role and functions of the IEC and the BCM in donor assisted projects for development and electoral administration. The first part tackles the roles and functions of the IEC.

8.4.1. IEC receives funding for logistics and for organising elections with donor support

The findings showed that the majority of respondents constituting 47.2% strongly agreed that the IEC receives donor support. Another 19.4% of the respondents agreed. This resulted in a cumulative total of 66.6% of the respondents agreeing to the fact that the IEC receives donor support. Likewise, 8 (22.2 %) strongly disagreed that the IEC receives donor support. Again, 2 (5.6 %) disagreed that the IEC is in receipt of donor support. According to Calland et al (2016), this offered a discursive assessment of the contribution of the Chapter Nine institutions to South Africa’s governance and constitutional democracy, noting important strengths and weaknesses.

Calland et al (2016) made a contribution to filling a rather surprising gap in the academic literature on democratic institutions and, in particular, the Chapter Nine bodies. It was acknowledged by Calland et al (2016) at the outset of the dominant party debate early in the democratic era that ‘in the absence of [electoral] alternation, these institutions would have a heavy burden to bear in checking the abuse of public power by the ANC (Southall, 1994: 654 as cited in Choudry, 2009: 17; Butler, 2017; Hyde, 2017).

The next sub-section shows the organisation’s funding electoral activities.

8.4.1.1. Organizations' funding electoral activities

The respondents cited the following as the organization's funding municipal elections. Most of the funding comes from the government 69.0%; another 14.3% comes from the World Bank; 7.1% comes from the UN; 4.8% comes IMF; while 2.4% comes from the UNDP and JICA separately. Akintola et al (2016) stated that community based organisations (CBOs) reported facing a striking reduction in funding received from both international and local donors as a result of the global financial crisis. Akintola et al (2016) said they experienced problems in acquiring new funding. Organizations addressed finance problems by conducting organizational reorganisation and implementing austerity measures that led to the cutback of staff, reduction in benefits and incentives for staff and volunteers, reduction in the number of communities served and rationing of services provided to these communities (Akintola et al, 2016).

The sub-section below discusses donor support utilisation in relation to elections in the municipality.

8.4.1.2. Donor support utilization

The findings showed the responses on donor support utilization. Most of the donor support 14.4% goes towards the setting up of voting stations; 13.8% was geared towards election publications; 13.3% goes towards annual reports and voter education separately. 11.35 is used for research and statistics; 10.8% was utilized for electoral reports; 9.7% goes towards electoral forms; 5.1% was used for campaign materials; 2.1% was for event management and strategic planning separately; while 1.5% was for press conferences and preparing councillors list separately, and 1.0% was used for facilitating electoral courts.

The sub-section below covers the findings on the roles and functions of BCMM in donor assisted projects for development and electoral administration.

8.4.2. Roles and functions of BCMM in donor assisted projects for development and electoral administration.

The sub-section below shows the sources of donor support for development.

8.4.2.1. The source of donor support for development.

The findings exhibited that the majority of the respondents acknowledged that a major source of donor support 52.6% originated from the World Bank. The UNDP

contributed 43.9%, while DANIDA and CIDA contributed 1.8% apiece. Development aid provided by donor countries outside the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is often perceived as an alternative of last resort for developing countries financing poverty reduction programs (Downs, 2011; Kurlantzick, 2006). Besides these development partners assistance, the study also found out that the municipality income generation projects and sources include: taxes, market tolls, property rates, court fines, government budgets and subsidies, municipal investments and public donations. The sub-section below indicates donor support awareness.

8.4.2.2. Donor support awareness for the municipalities

The supported municipalities exhibit an extent of awareness of the fact that the municipality receives donor support from NGOs for development. Most of the respondents (88%) agree that the municipality was a recipient of NGO donor support for development purposes. However, a small population of the respondents, 12% was not in agreement with the fact that municipalities receive donor support for developmental purposes. The above result was supported by McEwan et al (2017) who explained the role of the private sector in international development which is growing, supported by new and evolving official programme, financing, partnerships and narratives. This results confirmed the place of the private sector in “community development” in the global south. It places corporate community Development (CCD) practically in long-standing disputes within critical development studies to consider the distinct roles that corporations play and how they respond to the challenges and contradictions entailed within “community development”.

The next sub-section indicates countries with sister-city relationships with the municipality.

8.4.2.3. Countries with sister city relationships with municipality

According to the findings, most of the sister donor support 34% was from Netherlands, followed by Sweden; Israel offered 25.5% support. While 4.3% sister support came from China, 3.2% came from USA while 1.1% came from the UK. This study has established that, the essence of sister-city relationship was to support largely the municipality’s programmes on agriculture, health, education, housing water supply and sanitation, energy and electricity supply and to build and expand road and transport infrastructure. As democracy develops in poor countries around

the world, wealthier countries have sought to enhance social development and democratization through foreign aid. Although the national state has historically been the recipient of aid, some donors have begun to consider donations to local governments (Anderson et al, 2016). It has been established that donors have had a powerful effects on improving people's lives and on advancing democratization. As the democratic quality of the national government has declined, foreign aid has continued to advance democratization by providing mayors with a resource base independent of national government (Akurugoda, 2018; Glaser et al, 2016; Thomas et al, 2017; Shinn,2016; Barluzzi et al, 2016; Myers, 2017; Drolet, 2016; Anderson, 2016).

The sub-section below shows poverty alleviation strategies that the municipality embarks on.

8.4.2.4. Poverty alleviation strategies the municipality embarks on

The findings of this section indicate that academic training and skills is one of policies for poverty relief. It also emerged from the findings that agriculture/agro processing, auto mechanic and construction, textile manufacturing, animal husbandry training, youth sports development and enhancing marketing and trading skills through apprenticeship were topmost on the list of poverty alleviating strategies in the municipality. Kwon et al (2014) thought that good governance alleviates poverty only in middle-income countries, not in least developed ones. Ellis et al (2006) outlined how low domestic incomes in rural areas of all countries are associated with low land and livestock holdings, high reliance on food crop agriculture, and low monetisation of the rural economy. These hostile factors are, in some instances, made more difficult by land sub-division at inheritance, deteriorating civil security in rural areas, worsening access to proper agronomic advice and inputs, and predatory taxation by decentralised district councils. The sub-section below shows that donor support induce democratisation and development.

8.4.2.5. Donor support induce democratization and development

Donor support for development induces some responses from the municipality. Thus, 25.8% of the responses cited that donor support induces healthy and effective service delivery; 25.0% cited the fact that donor support induces of democratisation and good governance; 23.5% of the respondents cited that donor support induces

transparency; 22.7% of the responses cited decentralization as an effect of donor support conditionality; 1.5% cited rapid development of the municipality while another 1.5% citing patriotism. The responses indicated that donor conditionality induces positive effects on the residents.

The findings on donor support inducing democratization and development indicated that the respondents agreed that donor support induces democratization, effective service delivery, transparency, good governance and decentralization. This is corroborated by Delcour et al (2015) who examined Russia's reaction to political changes in Georgia and Ukraine in light of the relationship between the democracy-promotion policies implemented by the EU and US and domestic patterns of democratization. The sub-section below shows the response of the municipality to the conditionality.

8.4.2.6. Response of the municipality to the conditionality

The findings of this section showed that technical assistance and investments opportunities were the response of the municipality to donor conditionality. The responses also indicated that, the municipality will submit to conditionality such as; free market access, tax exemptions, free to repatriate profits in favour for investment opportunities and technical support for projects. The findings was corroborated by Gibson et al (2015) and Brinkerhoff et al (2015) argued that after the Cold War, donors enlarged their use of technical assistance in aid packages, improving their monitoring capacity and thus reducing autocrats' ability to use aid for patronage.

To remain in power, autocrats responded by conceding political rights to their opponents—from legalizing opposition parties to staging elections. Brinkerhoff et al (2015) stated that the standard responses to public sector management deficits in developing countries had focused largely on a combination of technical efficiency-enhancing reforms based on neoliberal market models and New Public Management (NPM) principles and tools (Domam, 2017; Crivelli et al, 2017; Foli et al, 2014; Ascher et al, 2016; Venner, 2016; Schmit et al, 2015; Dickerson, 2016; Stubbs et al, 2017; Plateau et al, 2015; Fukuda et al, 2016; Del Blondo, 2015 ; Prizzon, 2016). The sub-section below indicates the most challenging areas of municipality's development.

8.4.2.7. Most challenging areas of the municipality's development

The finding showed energy and housing were cited as being the most challenging areas for the municipality with each scoring 23.2% and 23.9%, respectively. Corruption and crime and security each scored 21.0% and 21.7%, respectively. Sanitation was scored 7.2% while water shortages and food were the minority with 1.4% and 0.7%, respectively. Beside the energy and housing challenges enumerated above, other pressing challenges included; unemployment, poverty, administrative corruption, unfair trade terms with the municipality economic agenda, insufficient funds for development, uncompleted municipal projects and many service delivery disputes that has plagued the municipality.. Pereira et al (2016), Nanni et al (2016) and Azimoh et al (2015) have concurred that energy and housing were challenges facing municipalities. The sub-section below showed community voters' perceptions of donor support, electoral dynamics and democratisation.

8.5. Community voters' perceptions of donor support, Electoral dynamics and democratisation

This section covers key findings on the community voters' perceptions on donor support, electoral dynamics and democratisation.

8.5.1. The importance of municipal elections

The findings showed that respondents agreed that municipal elections were important. Elections are seen as avenue to hold government accountable. Cheibub et al (2012) Doorespsleet et al (2014) and Vam Ham (2015) expressed the view that multiparty elections in changing authoritarian regimes should be held sooner rather than later has increasingly been under attack. Critics argued that, under conditions of low institutional development, multiparty elections may lead to violence and civil war, rather than to the peaceful allocation of authority that everyone desires. Starting from the premise that elections were strategically timed and endogenous in transitioning authoritarian regimes, that is, more likely to be held when violence is imminent, "we showed that for Africa, the continent with the lowest levels of political institutionalization, elections do not increase the probability of a civil war initiation". The following sub-section shows municipality's performance satisfaction rating.

8.5.1.1. Municipality performance satisfaction rating

The rating of municipality performance was met by mixed feelings from the respondents. The majority of the respondents agreed that the municipality performs satisfactorily. Overall, 65.11% of the respondents agreed that the municipality performance was satisfactory, while 16.74% were in disagreement. 19.14% of the respondents were indecisive. The findings of this study on municipal performance satisfactory ratings showed that a majority of respondents agreed that the municipality performed satisfactorily but nevertheless some residents still register their dissatisfaction on matters bordering employment, health, education, water and sanitation, food supply, housing, poverty, energy, corruption and transportation in the municipality.

The next sub-section indicates that donor support leads to effective electoral administration.

8.5.1.2. Donor support leads to effective electoral administration

The finding on donor funding for municipal elections and development importance indicated that respondents agreed that donor support induce democratization. Donor support may help improve the quality of an election, and in some cases may even be necessary for it to occur. They hold the view that donor support enhance democratisation and ensures effective electoral administration (Norris, 2017; Hankla et al, 2016; Orji, 2017; Carothers, 2015; Gaynor, 2014; Bus, 2015; Bowler et al, 2016; Dietrich, 2016; Hajat et al, 2014; Molenaers et al, 2015; Von Borzyskowski, 2016). Donor support has implications for the sustainable delivery of free, fair and credible elections as is the cases of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kenya and Nigeria. While donor support may include budgetary contributions and technical assistance, including advanced technologies, some donors avoid supporting electoral management bodies (EMBs') recurrent budgets — that is, core personnel costs and rental of buildings and furniture, as well as other non-technical items, such as motor vehicles and fuel. The next sub-section shows the reasons for voting in an election.

8.5.1.3. Reasons for voting in an election

The majority of the respondents 24.4% cited that their vote is based on the municipality's performance on service delivery, 13.9% said their vote is based on the benefits they obtain from municipal administration; 13.1% voted due to their

patriotism and another 13.1% vote to help the party win. 12.1% of the respondents voted based on the campaign expectations; 10.5% voted due to the fact that they are registered voters; 9.3% of the respondents vote due to the influence of campaign messages while 3.6% of the respondents vote for the record. Based on these findings, it can be concluded that most of the voters vote due to the municipality's performance and patriotism. The sub-section below indicated the party they will vote for in an election.

8.5.1.4. Party you will vote for in an election

The majority of the respondents stated that they would vote for ANC, constituting 53.11%; this is followed by 17.70% who would vote for DA; followed by 12.92% who would vote for EFF; 4.78% would vote for COPE; 5.26% would vote for PAC; 3.83% would vote for UDM; 1.91% would vote for IPF while 0.48% would vote for PAM. The sub-section below shows community voters' views on donor conditionalities.

8.5.1.5. Community voters' views on donor conditionalities

Donor conditionalities was cited to have several adverse effects on the residents. Most respondents 17.6% cited insufficiency of development funds as the major effect. Other major effects included the following: 15.9% cited administrative corruption; 14.8% service delivery disputes; 14.8% unfair trade terms; 8.5% poverty; 8.0% unemployment; 7.4% obstruction to poverty alleviation; 2.85 abandoning of projects and 0.6% lack in patriotism. The findings of the effects of donor conditionality on residents indicated that it will result in lack of funds for development, service delivery disputes and extreme administrative corruption. The findings were concurred by Aladwani (2016), Zhu et al (2015,2017), Valle-Cruz et al (2015) and Stiglitz et al (2015) who argued that the prevalence of corruption in developing economies could restrict moral and governance capabilities of administrative systems overseeing e-Governments in a way that could lead to the failure of these entities to produce initiatives that meet stakeholders' expectations.

8.5.1.6. Effects of dwindling donor support on municipality

The findings on the effects of dwindling donor support shows that the withdrawal of donor support has a lot of adverse effects which may result in violent and disruptive responses from the electorates. Over twenty-nine percent (29.8%) of the respondents highlighted that the withdrawal of donor support may result in violence; 24.7% suggested that it may results in electoral boycotts; 16.1% suggested that it

will result in vote change; 13.4% of the respondents suggested that withdrawal of donor support may result in demonstrations while 8.0% suggested that it may lead to lawsuits and agitations. The findings on dwindling support on the municipality shows a reflection on cases of violence across Africa and other places where electoral violence erupts. Majority of respondents indicated that they will resort to violence and disruptive conduct, boycotts, demonstrations because elimination of donor support badly affects service delivery.

8.5.1.7. Electoral funding and sponsorship

Based on donor support for elections, participants were divided in their views. Some indicated that donor support is necessary to run the country and to facilitate developmental projects (Amundsen, 2007; Barkan, 1993; Carothers, 2005; Brautigam, 2010; Kurokawa et al., 2008; Santiso et al., 2006). However, they feared that it could lead to corruption, vote buying and vote switching. The respondents expressed their views on electoral funding and sponsorship. They jointly made the claim that there is participation crises in democracy because people hate corrupt politicians who embezzle electoral funds. For instance, they believe that corrupt donors corrupt weak leaders. Based on the findings on donor support and elections where respondents expressed their fears of vote-buying and breeding of corruption, others still thought that donor support was needed to run the country and to facilitate development projects (Amundsen, 2007; Barkan, 1993; Carothers, 2005).

8.5.1.8. Donor support focus in electoral administration in the municipality

The donor assistance focus in the municipality was on civic education needs, campaigns, technical support, and voter education and so on. The majority of the respondents 13.7% showed that donor support for elections is supposed to be utilized for voter education. As indicated above, 12.3% of the respondents suggested that donor support must be channelled towards personnel training. In addition, 11.8% suggested that donor support must be focused on civic education while 11.3% said that donor support was to be used for publicity; 11.0% indicated that donor support is utilised for electoral campaigns. Findings also show that 10.7% suggested that donor support is used for electoral logistics with 9.2% highlighting that donor support should be used for technical support. Moreover, 7.2% suggested that support should be used for sponsoring the political parties while 0.3% of the respondents were indecisive. . Their responses indicated the preference for donor

support focus in the municipality. Majority of respondents admitted that training of staff and election commissioners as important focus for election administration.

The sub-section below shows the implications of the study for existing theory, policies and practice.

8.6. Implication for Existing Theory, Policies and Practice

This section of the study discusses the implication of the findings of the study for existing theory, policies and its practices for adaptability.

8.6.1. Implication for existing theory

The theoretical framework of this study is derived from a combination of aspects of development aid theories, the norm of reciprocity, the social justice and equity, theories, political party, voters' behaviour and democratisation theories. These theories combined to succinctly address the critical focus of this study. The central issues arising out of the study involved donor support as a poverty alleviating strategy, the effects of donor conditionality, electoral dynamic factors underlying donor-recipient engagements, and the broad outlook of democratisation. A popular notion raised in the theories were the issues of promoting democracy to ensure that people have the greater access to electoral rights, economic rights, escape from poverty and underdevelopment as enshrined in the constitution and as depicted by the overall agenda set by the donor community. The study has exposed, through the social justice and equity theories that unequal relationship has been created between donors and local community members which makes the donors and municipal elites benefits more than the citizens at the communities and that elections are a camouflage to elicit their votes in an election (Charmaz, 2011; Larson et al, 2002). Development aid theory was utilized to ascertain the effects of aid in alleviating poverty and promoting welfare and partnership for the people in the society (Kuhn et al, 1988; Woolcock, 1998). The norm of reciprocity expresses the expectation that people will respond favourably to each other through their actions and interactions by returning benefits for benefits (Gouldner, 1960; Uehara, 1995; Masumi et al, 2008; Bruce, 1987). As is the case of donor-recipient relationship, the study showed it is skewed in the interest of the donor for returns on profit and investment.

The political party theory, according to Ley (1959), Dror (2012) and Oisen (2015) benchmarked, even as it pertains to the Buffalo City Municipality that the single-majority-single-ballot system of voting in single member constituency, favours two party states while proportional system of representation favours “multipartism”. In addition, the voters’ behaviour theory, according to Larzasfeld et al (1944), postulates that affect helps to explain how people make informed political and voting choices in spite of low overall levels of political focus and complexity. Voting behaviour is connected with the democratisation theory which is supposed to ensure that people have the right to vote and have a voice in the political system which builds consensus and ensures the participation of its citizens (Eisenstadt, 2002, 2003; Acemoglu and 2000; Allison, 1944).

The case of the Buffalo City Municipality indicated that the donor support induces neo-liberal democratisation. However, the benefits of donor support only trickles down and it is not diffused to reach all the community members as the benefits are creamed off by municipal elites and officials. On the basis of findings of this current study, the combination of theories utilized and the methodological approach, the study advances a Deliberative, balanced, Reciprocal, Orientation Agenda (DEBROAG) framework. The framework is set to contribute to the new thinking of how to re-shape and restructure the relationship the municipality and local community. It is also to enhance the interactive levels that exist between donor agencies, the sub-state institution (municipality) and the citizens of the local constituencies for mutual benefits of good governance and democracy which must emerge from a deliberative, engaging balanced reciprocal relationship and agenda. This is so, in order to check corruption, uphold shared policy implementation and partnership and enhance ethical behaviour in the administration of donor support at the municipality.

8.6.2. Implication for Existing Policies

The challenge of most African governments and emerging economies has been how to harness resources to satisfy the genuine needs of deprived and underprivileged communities. Historically, urban and rural development agendas have been crafted and presided over by bureaucrats whose entrenched positions has often been orchestrated by development-driven rather than people-driven. In this era of

democracy, the demand of communities on service delivery such as water, electricity, sewerage and sanitation, solid waste services and toilets, road infrastructure, schools, hospitals, food, access to markets, employment, transportation, trade and finances has remained cardinal in the measurement of government performance (Mansuri et al, 2013; Sen, 2008; Stewart, 2010; Melo et al, 2004). It is for these reasons that the constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Chapter 7, articles 152-153 stated clearly the objects of local government and its duties in relations to basic service delivery in the municipalities.

Post-apartheid South Africa faces a major challenge in ensuring that municipalities provide optimal and professional services to citizens of heterogeneous cultures. This is succinctly captured by Mufamadi (2005, p. 1) when he said that “the challenges we face therefore, are ensuring that all municipalities develop the requisite capacity to translate those resources into instruments with which to confront problems of poverty and underdevelopment”. This underscores the importance of service delivery at ministerial level. The monitoring of service delivery needs, through effective governance and service administration, is clearly crucial. This is based on the belief that this is only possible through enhancing leadership in the local government sphere. In post-apartheid South Africa, access to effective public services is no longer seen as an advantage enjoyed by only a privileged few in the community, but as a legitimate right of all residents, particularly those who were previously disadvantaged. This stance emphasizes “service to the people” as parameter for local government transformation.

Thus, one of the greatest significant pointers in measuring the change of indigenous administration is the practises and insights society have of provision of amenities in their day-to-day lives, more precisely whether they see an enhancement in the services provided to them. The importance of this is for local government to translate words into activities, and thus to prioritize and satisfy the needs of the communities they service. Attempting to offer a outline for people-centred public service delivery the South African government introduced Batho Pele (derived from a Sesotho word meaning “putting people first”) in 1997 (<http://www.dpsa.gov.za/batho-pele/index.asp>). This resourcefulness strives towards moving public servants to become service orientated, to pursue excellence in service delivery and to commit themselves to continuously improved service delivery. It also sets values for changing service

delivery with respect to consultation, service standards, access, courtesy, information, openness and transparency, redress and value for money.

These principles are required, since it is argued that a transformed local government needs to be measured against its commitment to continuous service delivery improvement. Evidently, it could be ascertained that citizen engagement has to play a pivotal role in the implementation and the achievements of the municipalities in relations to service delivery in the country. On the basis of the attainment of health, sanitation, education, eradication of poverty, infant mortality and all the efforts made to achieve the millennium targets, it can be squarely posited in Grandvionnet's (2016) framework of socio-political context and the 5 constitutive elements of citizen action, state action, civic mobilization, citizen-state interface and information. In each of the elements under consideration, it clearly sees the interplay of state action and citizen action that create awareness, enabling environment, capacity and commitment for development in attaining sustainable service delivery through citizen engagement.

8.6.3. Implication for Practice

The study establishes that donor support induces democratisation; it found that citizens' vote depended on their party affiliation and that municipal projects targeted at poverty alleviation will be accepted and patronised by them. Nevertheless, citizens at the local community have been side-lined from the benefits emanating from donor support as public officials and donors dissipates the benefits from reaching their targeted recipients in the local communities. As democracy develops in poor countries around the world, wealthier countries and donor agencies should consider enhancing social development and democratisation through assistance. Although the national state has historically been the recipient of aid, it is expedient that donors begin to consider donations to local constituencies through community leaders and their representatives. If local government can democratise, it may deliver aid more immediately than does national government through the municipality. It is prudent to identify innovative ways of enhancing service delivery in rural communities that could provide active and efficient services to the South African public. The current

economic realities, the effects of globalisation, the potential for technological innovation and the public's call for improved services have led to incessant protests in various municipalities. These upheavals are persistent in spite of the fact that government is vigorously pursuing the provisions of the constitution in chapter 7, Article 152 which provides in sections (b, c, d) that; "it will ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; it will promote social and economic development and will promote safe and healthy environment".

8.7. Conclusions

This study argued that donor support induces democratisation which mainly results in benefits to the donor governors and municipal elites. The study has established the fact that donor support is not only essential for running elections and advancing democratic societies, but it has however been used as window-dressing that props up local elites and foreign economic and political agendas. It also found that citizens' vote depended on their party affiliation and that municipal projects targeted at poverty alleviation will be accepted and patronised by community members. Nevertheless, citizens at the local community have been neglected from the benefits emanating from donor support as public officials and donors managers squander and prevent the benefits from reaching their targeted recipients in the local communities in spite of the fact that elections are craftily used to create a euphoria around citizens' engagement and participation. It is for this reasons why majority of respondents indicated that they will resort to violence and disruptive conduct, boycotts, demonstrations because elimination of donor support badly affects service delivery. On the basis of this, the thesis advances the expansion of the role of the poor in the electoral processes through citizens' engagement, political participation through public debates, town hall discussions and voting in an election. In order to attend to more accountable electoral processes based on social justice, it was important to engage the discussion on the concept of justice is explained to mean equity and equality in all human endeavour, and the thesis has advanced that "equity" is only one of the many values which may underlie a given system of justice. Some other values include; fairness, access and opportunity and a sense of self-worth and dignity. Other values of social justice are; openness, civil liberties, political rights and removal of all limitations and barriers that demean human dignity. On the basis of social justice, community voters have observed and are of the opinion that

the greatest impediment to democracy, electoral funding, development and peace were corruption, bad governance and bad leadership.

The findings of the study have confirmed the hypotheses that donor support induces democratisation (cf. table 7.6), and that citizens' vote depends on their political affiliation (cf. table 7.10). As evidenced from the findings, donor support for development induces some responses from the municipality (cf. Tables: 5.4, 5.5, 5.11, 5.12, 5.17, 6.3, 6.16, 6.18, 7.6, Fig.7.4). For instance, 25.8% of the responses cited that donor support induces healthy and effective service delivery; 25.0% cited that it induces democratisation and good governance; 23.5% of the respondents cited that donor support induces transparency; 22.7% of the responses cited decentralization as an effect of donor support conditionality; 1.5% cited rapid development of the municipality while another 1.5% cited patriotism. The responses indicated that donor conditionality induces positive effects on the residents. The findings on donor support inducing democratization and development indicated that the respondents agreed that donor support induce democratization, effective service delivery, transparency, good governance and decentralization. This is corroborated by Delcour et al (2015) who examined Russia's reaction to political modifications in Georgia and Ukraine in light of the connection between the democracy-promotion policies executed by the EU and US and domestic patterns of democratization. The findings showed that political parties and politicians agreed that donor support was important, necessary and facilitate their activities, programs and ensures their survival (cf. section 5.2, 4 table7.10; fig.7.5, 7.6).

The findings also confirmed that elected or nominated councilors deemed donor support is necessary for democratization (fig. 5.11). The findings also confirmed that elected or nominated councilors deemed donor support necessary for democratization (fig. 5.11). It further showed the sources of funding for campaigns (cf. table 5.15).The elected councilors concurred that donor support induce good governance through conditionality (cf. 5.16). The essence of Kuhn et al's (1988) and Woolcock's (1998) argument is that development aid extended to recipients in support of alleviating poverty and enhancing social, economic and political development. This is confirmed by the findings of the study (cf. tables 5.2, 5.8, 6.14, 6.15, 7.5, 7.9, 7.11, 7.12, Fig.6.5).

Donor support and democratisation espouses and thrives on the idea of partnership, with the sense of promoting the welfare of people and society. In support of the above, democratization ensures that people have the right to vote and to have a voice in their political system. It also hinges on consensus building and grassroots participation of its citizens (Esenstadt, 2002, 2003; Allison, 1994). The idea of democracy according to Schedler (2002) has become so closely identified with elections that “we are in danger of forgetting that the modern history of representative elections is a tale of authoritarian manipulations as much as it is a saga of democratic triumphs”. Historically, Scedler (2002) stated that in other words, “elections have been an instrument of authoritarian control as well as a means of democratic governance. Since the early days of the “third wave” of global democratization, it has been clear that transitions from authoritarian rule can lead anywhere. Over the past quarter-century, many have led to the establishment of some form of democracy”. This democracy, according to Nye (1967, 2014), has been a terrain that bred corruption through most of donor activities. Nye (1967, 2014) holds the view that political corruption and nepotism rot good intentions and retard progressive policies. The path to donor support success and proficiency in the local community is to give away itself from political interfering. A donor-induced de-politicization offers an avenue to successful development implementation in recipient constituencies but as is the case of this municipality, avenues for the trickling effect of funding for poverty alleviation projects is minimal therefore it does not reflect and compensate for the call on citizens to participate in an election regularly.

The use of donor support to inflict political conditions on local recipients to further democratic and government reforms or to punish non-compliance with earlier demands, is relatively a novelty in the aid regime that has the potential to promote good governance, transparency, integrity, accountability and representation but are unlikely to serve the interest of people of the local constituency on the basis of fairness, equity and social justice.

To be able to reach this final conclusion, the thesis started off by clearly setting out the research topic and explaining it. In explaining and elaborating on the importance of the topic, it was made clear, in the beginning, that the research focuses and directs its analysis towards donor support, electoral dynamics and democratisation

with specific reliance on Development aid theory, Gouldner's moral norm of reciprocity, political party, democratisation and voters' behaviour theories in combination with social justice and equity theories. This thesis adopted an integrated theoretical framework to provide illumination to the issues the thesis has grappled with. The triangulation has guided and directed the empirical analysis. The triangulation of the discourse became relevant as it anchors the scientific knowledge and debates around theories that enables the researcher sufficiently navigates a difficult learning curve in the analyses of an empirical data. The theoretical triangulation assisted in a scientific knowledge generation where confounding themes elicited a multiple application of theories. This strategy became complementary when handled with skill. The objective in view was to ensure that theory, research and practice were intertwined and woven craftily. I strategically deployed the political party theory, the development aid theory, democratisation and social justice and equity theories to guide and direct the empirical analysis in donor agencies and donor recipients' perceptions of donor support for development and electoral purposes in chapter five. Pg.116, 117, 118, 119

Thus, throughout, the research analysed the perceptions, processes and experiences of BCMM administrators and officials, it ascertained the roles and functions of IEC in the electoral administration, it investigated the perceptions of donor agencies, political parties, elected or nominated councillors and community voters on donor support and democratisation, in the greater attempt to understand the significance of donor support and its implication for the local electoral dynamics and democratisation at the municipal level. The findings indicated that donor agencies support municipal elections (cf. fig. 5.2). The funding they provide covers capacity building, logistics for campaigns and the training of electoral officers and party officials (cf. table 5.1). The findings also showed that political parties and politicians agree that donor support was important, necessary and facilitates their activities and programs (cf. table 5.7; 5.8; fig.5.6). In fact elected or nominated councilors deemed donor support necessary for democratization (fig. 5.11). The finding further indicated that donor support provided party agents with grocery, communication equipment like phones and other souvenirs and consultancy services. The emerging findings indicate that most political parties and elected councillors in the municipality receive donor support beside the traditional sources

that we know such as membership dues, party subscriptions, levies, state sponsorship, fundraising for special projects and sale of souvenirs. Some of the sources were from international communities and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The study found that donors require huge returns on their support and investments.

The IEC and BCMM were largely funded by treasury for their projects and programmes. However, the BCMM also gets substantial support from sister-city relations with other municipalities abroad. Some community voters hold the view that political party funding opens the doors for the hijacking of democracy. Others hold the opinion that dishonest donors corrupt weak governments, undiscerning officials and immoral leaders. Nevertheless, some political party officials felt that donors were not all that evil. They hold the view that genuine donors help to build the capacity of officials and strengthen party structures thereby deepening democratic ethics and culture. They were of the view that good donors promote transparency, accountability and good governance to strengthen the pillars and the threshold of democracy and the democratisation processes in emerging states in sub-Saharan Africa.

In addition, the findings found that donor agencies provide support geared towards assisting the IEC and BCMM with financial and logistical support. The study also found that a major part of the funds was utilised for capacity building, sponsorship of electoral campaigns, and provision of logistics, training of party agents, equipping training centres, providing stationery and documentation and embarking on voter education. The study also found that, donor conditionalities were meant for the protection of investment of donors. In addition, it was to provide them with opportunity to invest in their organisations. Furthermore, the findings in the chapter indicated that donor support leads to effective electoral administration and democratization (cf. Fig.6.5, tables.7.1, 7.9, 7.11, 7.12,). In fact, voters' reasons for voting indicated that respondents vote based on the municipality's performance on service delivery and benefits they derived from municipal projects and patriotism. They also vote to help their party win (cf. table 7.1). The chapter 7 presented findings on the perception of community voters on donor support and democratisation. This is due to the fact that the decision made at the community level directly influences people resulting in more trust, confidence and openness. In essence, this makes

elections at the local level crucial for electorates to measure the extent to which government agencies convince them about the effectiveness of their performance in a bid to secure their votes in relations to their socio-economic well-being (Crewe, 1994; Muthien, 1999; Opp, 2008). The chapter discussed the findings based on existing literature and other empirical findings. The chapter not only used inferential and simple descriptive statistics but also included a regression analysis, test of significance of difference statistical table; response frequencies for different survey aspects; results of chi-square goodness of fit and some ANOVA cross-tabulations.

The methods and theories used in the study provided illumination on the issues the thesis is investigating. It guided and directed the analysis of the empirical data. Even though some of the theories were deficient, they were complemented by other theories. With new and complex understanding of social phenomena, single methodologies do not sufficiently explain social phenomena (Vankatesh, 2012: 4). This calls for triangulation of methods to provide subsequent contributions to research.

In sum, this study has argued that donor support to a greater extent induces democratisation. The policies which consequently emerge from the relationship of the municipality with both the donors and the electorate facilitate the adoption of inter alia the good governance, political participation of public institutions and the transparency and accountability of the donor community and public officials and their institutions. In the process, local communities have been put at a disadvantage as a result of their inability to access the benefits expected to be derived from the relationship with sub-state institutions and donor managers. For instance, they are expected to pay user fees to access for instance quality health care and education which are mostly available in the private sector rather than in the public sector which has been found to be fraught with major inefficiencies.

With the absence of effective service delivery, the study therefore concludes that the municipal electorate is to a larger extent used as voting cattle towards the adoption and implementation of neo-liberal policies and practices. In a nutshell, while negligible trickle down can be acknowledged such as skills training and mentoring in agriculture entrepreneurship and agro-processing, this study is of the view that there

is an unequal and exploitative relationship between municipal and donor elites and voter communities in the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality.

8.8. Recommendations

This section of the study focuses on recommendations for donors, political parties, elected/nominated councillors, the IEC, the BCMM and the community voting public and the scholarly society in general. Besides the recommendations made based on this study, suggestions on other related topics were incorporated. Donor support for electoral practices and development has been found to be essential and necessary for any democratic society. The case as it occurs in the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality is not an exceptional one. In fact, the place of support in politics, development, elections and democracy has forcefully been articulated. As a result, the following recommendations are made: Donor support should not only cover electoral matters such as campaigns, logistics, elections and seek only to protect their investment but should focus on helping politicians develop real political; culture of service to the people. Donors and donor agencies should aspire to improve electoral dynamics by pushing their support into enhancing voter education, assist in community development by supporting education, health water supply, housing for the people and augmenting in areas such as sanitation, energy/power and roads construction to the township. In addition, donors should not only focus their conditionalities on their investment alone, but should aim at ensuring reforms, good governance and deepen democratisation.

The role of political parties in a democracy is unchallengeable. To a large extent, political parties require huge financial and material support for their operations. It is in this vein that donor support becomes handy. It is recommended that political parties become accountable to their members and the state by submitting yearly audited accounts to the state.

Similarly, elected/nominated councillors must represent their constituencies and wards in honesty and in a true call for duty. Councillors must eschew corruption and lead with shining examples to achieve transparency, good governance and electoral integrity.

The role of the IEC in conducting municipal elections is undoubtedly a herculean one which require enormous support. However, the IEC must not lose sight of its core mandate to oversee all elections conducted fairly and without prejudice.

The buffalo city metropolitan municipality as has been indicated in previous chapters plays an exclusive role, not only in elections but also with the overall development of the municipality. The municipality can harness a lot support from sister-city relations to augment its revenue base for development. The municipality also has great potential in agricultural, agro-processing and animal husbandry industry to explore. In its programmes to alleviate poverty, the municipality must embark on and intensify vocational and academic skills training, textile manufacturing skilss, trade and marketing skills and youth in sports development programmes.

The community voters' perception on donor support shows that, the voters felt they were alienated and sidelined. Their involvement and participation in political discourse is paramount. Community voters must be satisfied with employment opportunities and reliable service delivery in order to avoid rampant protestations, agitations and violence as poor infrastructure tend to discourage voter turnout at elections.

Furthermore, the following recommendations have also been proposed to further tackle the funding problem. There is need to provide support for political parties to build organisational capacity to enable them mobilise funds and improve internal transparency and accountable systems. The Electoral Commission would have to be strengthened to enforce the rules governing funding of political party activities. Unwavering support from the political elites is required so as to intensify public discourse on the vexing question of state funding of political parties. Furthermore, a more vibrant civil society to continuously demand accountability and compliance with the laws on party funding is needed. An overwhelming majority of interviewees recommended that political parties themselves would have to start showing impeccable signs of being very transparent and accountable internally to their own membership. Again, every political party that qualifies for state funding must complete and submit an assets declaration and financial report form to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) or the state protector office or its representative before and after every election. In addition, this study suggests that,

the scale of donations to political parties, particularly from foreign circles should be capped. The perceptions of community voters were varied and diverse. The response of voters on their political affiliation, campaign messages and reasons for voting indicated that electorates have very high expectations of municipal administrators and elected councillors to deliver on their promises and to ensure efficient and effective service delivery in the municipality.

Elections are a very important exercise in the life of a nation. It is very important that community voters should attach great importance to all levels of national elections, be it local government or municipality or parliament and presidential elections. Similarly, elections should advance the needs of the local community in the sense that, community voters' should hold elected councillors, party officers and municipal administrators accountable by voting them out for poor performance on service delivery. It is important that elected officers should represent their constituent very diligently. Donor agencies and electoral financiers should eschew corrupt practices but should ensure free and fair elections. Municipal administrators must ensure that funds allocated for elections and development are utilized accordingly to improve the life of its constituents. Political parties must embark on healthy political campaigns that will ensure votes for them in the community and engage citizens on a daily basis and not just during electoral seasons. Citizens perceive them as taking them for granted until the next elections surfaces. They need to interact and socialise with their members and then acquaint themselves with needs of the constituencies and design practical ways of solving or helping them to solve their social, economic, health, educational, nutritional and environmental needs.

The study suggests that the IEC should consider running electronic voting alongside paper ballot in all elections in South Africa. It should also consider realigning all National, Provincial and Municipal elections time table to be run at one and same time to cut electoral cost in the future. There should be similar research on students' perceptions on donor support in student politics in the Universities in South Africa. The IEC should consider reducing its dependence on state funding and on government subventions. The IEC can be granted autonomy to solicit its own funds in the spirit of true independence. This study further proposes research on the Military perceptions on donor support and democratisation. The municipality should be empowered and granted autonomy to solicit for donor support and account for all

funds acquired for development purposes. It is recommended that, the municipality should take pragmatic steps to urgently tackle food security, aggressively provide housing facilities, and consciously find innovative ways of creating jobs for the youth especially in agriculture sector and vocational skills through apprenticeship. Again, the IEC should embark on a rigorous and aggressive media campaign on voter education as a civil education strategy. There must be a National Commission on civic education to educate the electorate and citizens on their civil liberties and responsibilities. There must be a creation of a Communication and Public Awareness Centre for responsive politics in the municipalities. The study should be extended to investigate Trade Unions perceptions on donor support and democratisation a similar research can be done on religious bodies' perceptions on donor support and democratisation. Civil society's perceptions on donor support and democratisation should be conducted to ascertain their views.

Other researchable areas include: mass media perceptions on donor support and democratisation and corporate organisations' perceptions on donor support and democratisation. The municipality should exploit thoroughly all the benefits accruing from sister-city relations besides the selected informal programmes it is currently pursuing. Donor sponsors, democracy financiers and municipal administrators must improve government structures and administration by ensuring greater enforcement of co-owning service delivery problems. State institutions must embark on aggressive monitoring of provinces and municipalities by exercising oversight of donor assisted programmes to create employment, eradicate or reduce poverty and bridge inequality.

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- Hillary Diane Rodham Clinton is an American politician who was the First Lady of the United States from 1993 to 2001, U.S. Senator from New York from 2001 to 2009, 67th United States Secretary of State from 2009 to 2013, and the Democratic Party's nominee for President of the United States in the 2016.
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APPENDICES.

Appendix 1: Questionnaires on Donor Agency's role in donor assisted project and electoral administration in the municipality.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Survey questionnaire on Donor Support, Electoral Dynamics and Democratisation in South Africa.

This questionnaire is designed to obtain information on donor support, democratisation and development support in South Africa. The study is part of the requirement for a Doctor of Social Science degree in Sociology I am pursuing at the University of Fort Hare. I humbly request your participation in completing this questionnaire. All information you provide will be confidential and will be used only for academic purpose. Thank you.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE:

Please Mark with an X where appropriate

1.1 Respondent's gender

Male

Female

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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1.2 How old are you?

20 years and below	<input type="checkbox"/>
21-30 years	<input type="checkbox"/>
31-40 years	<input type="checkbox"/>
41-50 years	<input type="checkbox"/>
51-60 years	<input type="checkbox"/>
60+	<input type="checkbox"/>

1.3 Acquired Level of Education

No formal Education	<input type="checkbox"/>
Primary Education	<input type="checkbox"/>
Secondary Education/Matric	<input type="checkbox"/>
Post Matric-Degree/Diploma	<input type="checkbox"/>
Others(Specify)	<input type="checkbox"/>

1.4 Ethnicity:

Xhosa	<input type="checkbox"/>
Zulu	<input type="checkbox"/>
Twana	<input type="checkbox"/>
Venda	<input type="checkbox"/>
White	<input type="checkbox"/>
Coloured	<input type="checkbox"/>
Indian	<input type="checkbox"/>
Others(Specify)	<input type="checkbox"/>

1.5 What is your Language?

English	
Afrikaans	
Xhosa	
Zulu	
Others(Specify)	

1.6 Marital Status:

Single	
Window	
Divorced	
Widowed	
Others(Specify)	

1.7 Employment:

Employed	
Self-Employed	
Unemployed	
Pensioner	
Others(Specify)	

1.8 Income:

Please mark with an X where appropriate

Below R 1000	
R 1001-2000	
R 2001-3000	
R 3001-4000	
R 4001-5000	
R 5001-6000	
R 6000+	

1.9 Where were you born?

This District	
Different district in the Province	
In another Province	
Outside South Africa	

Donor Agency's role in donor support services and developmental assistance in South Africa:

Please, indicate your response by marking X where appropriate

2.0 This agency provides donor support and developmental assistance to the Republic of South Africa?

Please mark with an X where appropriate

1)Strongly disagree		2)Disagree		3)Don't know		4)Agree		Strongly Agree	
---------------------	--	------------	--	--------------	--	---------	--	----------------	--

2.1 To what extent do you agree that donor assistance is given in support of elections in South Africa?

1)		2)Disagree		3)		4)Agree		5)	
----	--	------------	--	----	--	---------	--	----	--

Strongly disagree				Don't Know				Strongly Agree	
-------------------	--	--	--	------------	--	--	--	----------------	--

2.2 The donor funding for elections covers:
(Please, indicate all possible responses)

1) Campaigns	
2) Logistics	
3) Voter Education	
4) Training of Electoral Officers	
5) Support for political parties	
6) Capacity building	
7) Others(Specify)	

2.3 The donor support is targeted at electoral improvement for development

1) Strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------	--	-------------	--	---------------	--	----------	--	-------------------	--

2.4 The development improvement targets may include;
(Please check all possible responses)

1) Education	
2) Water supply	
3) Electricity supply	
4) Health care	
5) Sanitation	
6) Housing	
7) Roads/Transport	
8) Others (Specify)	

3.0 Donor Conditionalities are attached to the donor support

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------	--	-------------	--	---------------	--	----------	--	-------------------	--

3.1 The attached donor conditionalities are likely to induce
(Please indicate all possible responses)

1) Tax Exemptions	
2) Free trade	
3) Electoral Reforms	
4) Democratisation	
5) Trade Liberalisation	
6) Level Platform for Political Parties	
7) Grassroots political participation	
8) Others (specify)	

3.2 The focus of the Aid conditionality is to ensure
(Please indicate all possible responses)

1) Accountability	
2) Judicious use of resources	
3) Returns on investment	
4) Safeguard profits	
5) Reforms	
6) Aid is used for intended purpose	
7) Deepen democracy	
8) Others (specify)	

3.3 The donor conditionality will have effects on the voters or the people of South Africa.

Please mark with an X where appropriate

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5)Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	---------------------	--

4.0 The likely effects of donor conditionality on voters or residents may include:
(Please, indicate all possible responses)

1) Lack of donor funding may disrupt elections	
2) Lower voter turn outs	
3) Delay in voting	
4) Delay in announcing results	
5) Poor logistics can lead to inferior equipment breakdown	
6) Poor equipment can lead to long queues on voting days which can be a disincentive	
7) Untrained electoral officers can mar elections which could lead to electoral disputes	
8) Others (specify)	

HYPOTHESIS TESTING QUESTIONS

Please use the following codes for your response:

Strongly disagree-1; Disagree-2; Don't know-3; Agree-4; Strongly agree-5

	1	2	3	4	5
The higher the benefits citizens derive from municipal projects, the higher their commitments and patriotism.					
The lower the benefits citizens derive from municipal projects, the lower their commitment and patriotism.					
Donor Conditionality targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens will be highly patronised and accepted by them.					
Donor conditionality that burdens the citizens will be resisted and rejected by them.					
The higher the citizen's level of education, the higher his/her chances of getting employment.					
The lower the citizen's level of education, the lower his/her chances of getting employment					
Donor Support induces democratization through electoral participation					
Donor Support does not induce democratization through electoral participation					

INSTRUMENT 2: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR DONOR AGENCIES.
DONOR SUPPORT, ELECTORAL DYNAMICS AND DEMOCRATISATION: THE
CASE OF THE BUFFALO CITY, METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY, EASTERN
CAPE, SOUTH AFRICA.
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Introduction

1) Purpose of the interview

To investigate and establish to what extent donor support influences the electoral processes in the Buffalo City Municipality and the electoral dynamic factors which connect this agenda with governance and democratisation

2) Guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality

Your response will be strictly confidential and will not be forwarded to any other person(s) except my supervisor.

3) Permission to tape

The interview will be tape recorded if only you agree. This will only allow me to capture all the conversation. The recorded conversation will be deleted or discarded immediately they have been transcribed into text.

4) Any questions?

The following are mostly open-ended questions and should be asked of each person interviewed.

- 1) How does this agency provide donor support to the Municipality?
- 2) In what ways do you channel some of your donor assistance in support of elections in the municipalities?
- 3) What specific projects/programmes does the donor funding for elections in the municipality cover?
- 4) Briefly explain how the donor support is targeted at electoral improvement for development.
- 5) What are some of the municipal development improvement targets that are envisaged?
- 6) What conditionalities are attached to the donor support to the municipalities?
- 7) In what ways are the attached donor conditionalities likely to induce democratisation?
- 8) What is the main focus of the Aid conditionality?
- 9) Do you think the donor conditionality will affect the voters or residents of the municipality?
- 10) What are the likely effects of donor conditionality on voters or residents in the municipality?

Thank You.

Appendix 2: Questionnaire for the Independent Electoral Commission

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Survey questionnaire on Donor Support, Electoral Dynamics and Democratisation:
The case of the Buffalo City, Metropolitan Municipality, Eastern Cape, South Africa.

This questionnaire is designed to obtain information on donor support, Electoral Dynamics and democratisation in the Buffalo City Municipality. The study is part of the requirement for a Doctor of Social Science degree in Sociology I am pursuing at the University of Fort Hare. I humbly request your participation in completing this questionnaire. All information you provide will be confidential and will be used only for academic purpose. Thank you.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE:

Please mark with an X where appropriate

1.10 Respondent's gender

Male

Female

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1.11 How old are you?

20 years and below	
21-30 years	
31-40 years	
41-50 years	
51-60 years	
60+	

1.12 Acquired Level of Education

No formal Education	
Primary Education	
Secondary Education/Matric	
Post Matric-Degree/Diploma	
Others(Specify)	

1.13 Ethnicity:

Xhosa	
Zulu	
Twana	
Venda	
White	
Coloured	
Indian	
Others(Specify)	

1.14 What is your Language?

English	
Afrikaans	
Xhosa	
Zulu	
Others(Specify)	

1.15 Marital Status:

Single	
Married	
Divorced	
Widowed	
Others(Specify)	

1.16 Employment:

Employed	
Self-Employed	
Unemployed	
Pensioner	
Others(Specify)	

1.17 Income:

Please mark x where appropriate

Below R 1000	
R 1001-2000	
R 2001-3000	
R 3001-4000	
R 4001-5000	
R 5001-6000	
R 6000+	

1.18 Where were you born?

This District	
Different district in the Province	
In another province	
Outside South Africa	

The Role of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in the administration of Municipal elections.

Please mark with an X where appropriate

2.0 The IEC is responsible for conducting all elections in the municipality

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

2.1 To what extent do you agree that the IEC receives subsidy/government subvention/funding for the administration of elections in the municipality?

Please mark with an X where appropriate

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3)Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	-----------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

2.2 Which of these organisations is a source of support for electoral activities in the municipality?

(Please indicate all possible responses)

World Bank	
IMF	
UN	
UNDP	
IDA	
CIDA	
JICA	
DANIDA	
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)	
Others (Specify)	

2.3 Substantial support comes from the government budgetary allocation

Please mark with an X where appropriate

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

2.4 There are NGOs, Co-operate bodies, companies and Individuals who support the electoral activities of the IEC

Please mark with an X where appropriate

1) strongly agree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
-------------------------	--	----------------	--	------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

3.0 Donors/Government place conditionalities on their support to the IEC for electoral activities

Please mark with an X where appropriate

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

3.1 Donors/Government insist on conditionality to promote and ensure

(Please indicate all possible responses)

Electoral transparency	
Electoral plurality	
Decentralisation	

Good governance	
Healthy electoral competition	
Free and Fair representation	
Others(specify)	

3.2 Donor/Government electoral Supports are utilized for:
(Please indicate all possible responses)

Campaign materials	
Annual Reports	
Strategic documents	
Elections reports	
Event materials	
Electoral forms	
Press conferences/Media Briefings	
Publications	
Research & statistics	
Voter Education	
Erecting voter stations	
Preparing councillors lists	
Facilitating electoral Courts	
Others (specify)	

3.3 IEC's work will be difficult to operate without Donor/Government support for elections

Please mark with an X where appropriate

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

4.0 There are conditionalities/ rules/terms and conditions attached to the donor/government support to the municipality for elections

Please mark with an X where appropriate

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5)Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	---------------------	--

4.1 The donor/government conditionality/rules/terms attached to the support ties the IEC to

(Please indicate all possible responses)

Strictly follow elections timetable	
To adhere strictly to regulation concerning elections deposits	
Regularise appointments of party agents at voting stations	
To adhere to regulations regarding special votes	
Allow presiding officers to alter boundaries of voting stations	
Provide assistance to voters	

Others (Specify)

4.2 The donor/government conditionalities/terms/rules/prescription regulates (please indicate all possible responses)

Parties contesting elections	
Party lists and deposits	
Ward candidates	
Voting stations officers	
Voting stations agents	
Voting station observers	
Accreditation of observers	

Voter education providers	
Voting and Counting procedures	
Code of conduct for accredited observers	
Code of conduct for voter education providers	

Others (Specify)

4.3 The conditionalities/rules/terms/prescription has impact on voters

Please mark with an X where appropriate

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

4.4 The effects of donor/government conditionality/rules/terms/prescription on voters and voting can lead to (please indicate all possible responses)

Voter apathy	
Electoral boycotts	
Voter fatigue/exhaustion	
Voting for regime consolidation	
Low voter turn out	
Lack of voter patriotism	
Electoral disputes	
Long queues at voting stations	
Inducing voters to vote in a particular direction	
Others (specify)	

HYPOTHESIS TESTING QUESTIONS

Please, use the following codes for your response:

Strongly disagree-1; Disagree-2; Don't know-3; Agree-4; Strongly agree-5

	1	2	3	4	5
The higher the benefits citizens derive from municipal projects, the higher their commitments and patriotism.					
The lower the benefits citizens derive from municipal projects, the lower their commitment and patriotism.					
Donor Conditionality targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens will be highly patronised and accepted by them.					
Donor conditionality that burdens the citizens will be resisted and rejected by them.					
The higher the citizen's level of education, the higher his/her chances of getting employment.					
The lower the citizen's level of education, the lower his/her chances of getting employment					
Donor Support induces democratization through electoral participation					
Donor Support does not induce democratization through electoral participation					

INSTRUMENT 2: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR IEC IN THE BCM MUNICIPALITY

DONOR SUPPORT, ELECTORAL DYNAMICS AND DEMOCRATISATION: THE CASE OF THE BUFFALO CITY, METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY, EASTERN CAPE, SOUTH AFRICA.

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Introduction

1) Purpose of the interview

To investigate and to establish to what extent donor support influences the electoral processes in the buffalo city municipality and the electoral dynamic factors which connect this agenda with governance and democratisation

2) Guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality

Your response will be strictly confidential and will not be forwarded to any other person(s) except my supervisor.

3) .Permission to tape

The interview will be tape recorded if only you agree. This will only allow me to capture all the conversation. The recorded conversation will be deleted or discarded immediately they have been transcribed into text.

4) Any questions?

The following are mostly open ended questions and should be asked of each person interviewed.

- 1) The IEC is responsible for conducting all elections in the municipality
- 2) The IEC receives donor support for the administration of elections in the municipality?
- 3) What is the source of donor support for electoral activities in the municipality?
- 4) Briefly explain whether a substantial support comes from the government budgetary allocation for elections
- 5) In what ways do NGOs, corporate organisations and Individuals assist the IEC in its administration of elections in the municipality?
- 6) Briefly explain how donors place conditionalities on their support to the IEC for electoral activities
- 7) Why do donors insist on aid conditionality?
- 8) What projects/programmes of the IEC is donor support utilized for?
- 9) In what ways will the IEC's work be difficult to operate without donor support for elections?
- 10) What conditionalities are attached to the donor support to the municipality for elections?
- 11) Do the donor conditionalities regulate the IEC'S work in any way?

12) What are the effects or impact of donor conditionality on voters in the municipality?

Thank You.

Appendix 3: Questionnaire for Political Parties

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Survey questionnaire on Donor Support, Electoral Dynamics and Democratisation:
The case of the Buffalo City, Metropolitan Municipality, Eastern Cape, South Africa.

This questionnaire is designed to obtain information on donor support, Electoral Dynamics and democratisation in the Buffalo City Municipality. The study is part of the requirement for a Doctor of Social Science degree in Sociology I am pursuing at the University of Fort Hare. I humbly request your participation in completing this questionnaire. All information you provide will be confidential and will be used only for academic purpose. Thank you.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE:

Please mark with an X where appropriate

1.19 Respondent's gender

Male

Female

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--	--

1.20 How old are you?

20 years and below	
21-30 years	
31-40 years	
41-50 years	
51-60 years	
60+	

1.21 Acquired Level of Education

No formal Education	
Primary Education	
Secondary Education/Matric	
Post Matric-Degree/Diploma	
Others(Specify)	

1.22 Ethnicity:

Xhosa	
Zulu	
Twana	
Venda	
White	
Coloured	
Indian	
Others(Specify)	

1.23 What is your Language?

English	
Afrikaans	
Xhosa	
Zulu	
Others(Specify)	

1.24 Marital Status:

Single	
Married	
Divorced	
Widowed	
Others(Specify)	

1.25 Employment:

Employed	
Self-Employed	
Unemployed	
Pensioner	
Others(Specify)	

1.26 Income:

Please mark with an X where appropriate

Below R 1000	
R 1001-2000	
R 2001-3000	
R 3001-4000	
R 4001-5000	
R 5001-6000	
R 6000+	

1.27 Where were you born?

This District	
Different District in Province	
In another Province	
Outside South Africa	

Political Party's perceptions of donor assistance and Democratization in the municipality

Please indicate your response with an X where appropriate. (Please indicate all possible responses that apply to you)

2.0 Which of the following political parties do you belong to?

African National Congress-ANC	
Democratic Alliance-DA	
Economic Freedom Fighters-EFF	
Inkathata Freedom Party-IFP	
Congress of the People-COPE	
Pan African Congress-PAC	
African Independent Congress-AIC	
African Christian Democratic Party-ACDP	
United Democratic Movement-UDM	
Pan Africanist Movement-PAM	
OTHERS (SPECIFY)	

2.1 To what extent do you agree that donor support is important in organising elections? (Mark with an X where appropriate).

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

2.2 Donor support facilitates the operations of my party (Mark with an X where appropriate).

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

2.3 I am aware that my party receives donor support (Mark with an X where appropriate).

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

2.4 The donor support for my party is utilized for:
(Please indicate all possible responses)

Campaigns	
Logistics	
Training party agents	
Evacuating voters to voting centres	
Party paraphernalia	
Voter education	
Stipend for party officials	
Others (specify)	

2.5 Indicate how difficult it is to organise party without donor support
(Mark X where appropriate).

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

3.0 Our party generates substantial resources from donor sources
(Mark with an X where appropriate).

1) Strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

3.1 To what extent do you agree that donor funding facilitates the processes of democratisation?
(Mark with an X where appropriate).

1) Strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

3.2 Donors place conditionalities on support to ensure accountability
(Mark with an X where appropriate).

1) strongly Agree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
-------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

4.0 Donors insist on conditionality to promote

(Please indicate all possible responses)

Electoral transparency	
Electoral plurality	
Decentralisation	

Good governance	
Healthy electoral competition	
Free and Fair representation	
Others(specify)	

4.1 To what extent do you agree that some political parties misappropriate donor funds for development?

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

4.2 The likely effects of donor conditionality on voters or residents may include:

(Please, *indicate all possible responses*)

1) Lack of donor funding may disrupt elections	
2) Lower voter turn outs	
3) Delay in voting	
4) Delay in announcing results	
5) Poor logistics can lead to inferior equipment breakdown	
6) Poor equipment can lead to long queues on voting days which can be a disincentive	
7) Untrained electoral officers can mar elections which could lead to electoral disputes	
8) Others (specify)	

HYPOTHESIS TESTING QUESTIONS

Please use the following codes for your response

Strongly Disagree-1; Disagree-2; Don't know-3; Agree-4; Strongly Agree-5

	1	2	3	4	5
The higher the benefits citizens derive from municipal projects, the higher their commitments and patriotism.					
The lower the benefits citizens derive from municipal projects, the lower their commitment and patriotism.					
Donor Conditionality targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens will be highly patronised and accepted by them.					
Donor conditionality that burdens the citizens will be resisted and rejected by them.					
The higher the citizen's level of education, the higher his/her chances of getting employment.					
The lower the citizen's level of education, the lower his/her chances of getting employment					
Donor Support induces democratization through electoral participation					
Donor Support does not induce democratization through electoral participation					

INSTRUMENT 2: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE BCM MUNICIPALITY

DONOR SUPPORT, ELECTORAL DYNAMICS AND DEMOCRATISATION: THE CASE OF THE BUFFALO CITY, METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY, EASTERN CAPE, SOUTH AFRICA.

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Introduction

1) Purpose of the interview

To investigate and to establish to what extent donor support influences the electoral processes in the buffalo city municipality and the electoral dynamic factors which connect this agenda with governance and democratisation

2) Guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality

Your response will be strictly confidential and will not be forwarded to any other person(s) except my supervisor.

3) Permission to tape

The interview will be tape recorded if only you agree. This will only allow me to capture all the conversation. The recorded conversation will be deleted or discarded immediately they have been transcribed into text.

4) Any questions?

The following are mostly open-ended questions and should be asked of each person interviewed.

- 1) Which political parties do you belong to?
- 2) In what ways do you think donor support is important in organising elections?
- 3) How aware are you that your party receives donor support?
- 4) Briefly describe how donor support facilitates the operations of your party
- 5) How is the donor support for your party utilized?
- 6) In what ways will you say that it is difficult to organise party without donor support?
- 7) Briefly explain how donor funding facilitates the processes of democratisation
- 8) Why do you think donors place conditionality on their support?
- 9) What are your views on corruption and misappropriation of funds by political parties?

10)What are the likely effects of donor conditionality on voters or residents in the municipality?

Thank You.

Appendix 4: Questionnaire for Elected/Nominated Councillors

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Survey questionnaire on Donor Support, Electoral Dynamics and Democratisation:
The case of the Buffalo City, Metropolitan Municipality, Eastern Cape, South Africa.

This questionnaire is designed to obtain information on donor support, Electoral Dynamics and democratisation in the Buffalo City Municipality. The study is part of the requirement for a Doctor of Social Science degree in Sociology I am pursuing at the University of Fort Hare. I humbly request your participation in completing this questionnaire. All information you provide will be confidential and will be used only for academic purpose. Thank you.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE:

Please Mark x where appropriate

1.28 Respondent's gender

Male

Female

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1.29 How old are you?

20 years and below	
21-30 years	
31-40 years	
41-50 years	
51-60 years	
60+	

1.30 Acquired Level of Education

No formal Education	
Primary Education	
Secondary Education/Matric	
Post Matric-Degree/Diploma	
Others(Specify)	

1.31 Ethnicity:

Xhosa	
Zulu	
Twana	
Venda	
White	
Coloured	

Indian	
Others(Specify)	

1.32 What is your Language?

English	
Afrikaans	
Xhosa	
Zulu	
Others(Specify)	

1.33 Marital Status:

Single	
Married	
Divorced	
Widowed	
Others(Specify)	

1.34 Employment:

Employed	
Self-Employed	
Unemployed	
Pensioner	
Others (Specify)	

1.35 Income:

Please mark with an X where appropriate

Below R 1000	
R 1001-2000	
R 2001-3000	
R 3001-4000	
R 4001-5000	
R 5001-6000	
R 6000+	

1.36 Where were you born?

This District	
Different District in Province	
In another Province	
Outside South Africa	

The perceptions of elected and nominated municipal council members on donor support and democratization

2.0 How many times have you been elected or nominated to serve on the municipal council?

4 years and below	8 years	12 years	16 years	20 years+
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--	--	--	--	--

2.1 The processes leading to my election or nomination was free and fair

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

2.2 I was elected or nominated on the ticket of (please mark with an X where appropriate)

African National Congress-ANC	
Democratic Alliance-DA	
Economic Freedom Fighters-EFF	
Inkhatha Freedom Party-IFP	
Congress of the People-COPE	
Pan African Congress-PAC	
African Independent Congress-AIC	
African Christian Democratic Party-ACDP	
United Democratic Movement-UDM	
Pan Africanist Movement-PAM	
OTHERS (SPECIFY)	

2.3 Donor support is necessary for the administration of elections in the municipality.

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

2.4 The sources of donor support for my party's campaigns are from:
(Please indicate all possible responses)

Fundraising	
Membership contributions	
Party's subscriptions	
Special Levies	
Sale of souvenirs	
Public goodwill/donations	
State sponsorship	
Special projects	
Others(specify)	

3.0 The conditionalities attached to donor support are to ensure:
(Please indicate all possible responses)

Electoral transparency	
Electoral plurality	
Decentralisation	
Good governance	

Healthy electoral competition	
Free & fair representation	
Others (specify)	

4.0 As an elected or nominated member of the municipality, briefly assess the council's performance on the following: *(please mark with an X where appropriate)*.

	Excellent	Very good	Good	Poor	Very poor	Don't know
Employment						
Youth employment						
Health						
Education						
Water						
Food						
Housing						
Security & crime						
Electricity						
Corruption						
Poverty						
Indebtedness						
Sanitation & refuse collection						
Transportation						
Others(specify)						

HYPOTHESIS TESTING QUESTIONS

Please use the following codes for your response

Strongly disagree-1; Disagree-2; Don't know-3; Agree-4; Strongly agree-5

	1	2	3	4	5
The higher the benefits citizens derive from municipal projects, the higher their commitments and patriotism.					
The lower the benefits citizens derive from municipal projects, the lower their commitment and patriotism.					
Donor Conditionality targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens will be highly patronised and accepted by them.					
Donor conditionality that burdens the citizens will be resisted and rejected by them.					
The higher the citizen's level of education, the higher his/her chances of getting employment.					
The lower the citizen's level of education, the lower his/her chances of getting employment					
Donor Support induces democratization through electoral participation					
Donor Support does not induce democratization through electoral participation					

INSTRUMENT 2: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR ELECTED OR NOMINATED MEMBERS TO THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

DONOR SUPPORT, ELECTORAL DYNAMICS AND DEMOCRATISATION: THE CASE OF THE BUFFALO CITY, METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY, EASTERN CAPE, SOUTH AFRICA

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Introduction.

1) Purpose of the interview

To investigate and to establish to what extent donor support influences the electoral processes in the buffalo city municipality and the electoral dynamic factors which connect this agenda with governance and democratisation

2) Guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality

Your response will be strictly confidential and will not be forwarded to any other person(s) except my supervisor.

3) Permission to tape

The interview will be tape recorded if only you agree. This will only allow me to capture all the conversation. The recorded conversation will be deleted or discarded immediately they have been transcribed into text.

4) Any questions?

The following are mostly open ended questions and should be asked of each person interviewed.

- 1) How many years/times have you been elected or nominated to serve on the municipal council?
- 2) On which party's ticket were you elected or nominated?
- 3) Can you share your experiences with municipal elections with me?
- 4) a) Briefly describe the processes leading to your elections or nominations to the municipal council.
b) In what ways did you receive support for your elections or nomination?
- 5) In what ways do you think donor support is necessary for the administration of elections in the municipality?
- 6) What are the sources of donor support for your party's campaigns?
- 7) What conditionalities are attached to these donor support?
- 8) What effects do you think the conditionalities have on the residents of the municipality?
- 9) As an elected or nominated member of the municipality, briefly assess the council's performance on service delivery.

- 10) Describe briefly how well you have served or represented your ward and party in this municipality.
- 11) What are some of the projects you have lobbied for your ward?
- 12) Briefly explain how your work as councillor has enhance or promoted democratisation in your constituency.

Thank You.

Appendix 5: Questionnaires on BCMM Administrators and officers

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Survey questionnaire on Donor Support, Electoral Dynamics and Democratisation in South Africa: The case of the Buffalo City, Metropolitan Municipality, Eastern Cape, South Africa.

This questionnaire is designed to obtain information on donor support and Development in the Buffalo City Municipality. The study is part of the requirement for a Doctor of Social Science degree in Sociology I am pursuing at the University of Fort Hare. I humbly request your participation in completing this questionnaire. All information you provide will be confidential and will be used only for academic purpose. Thank you.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE:

Please Mark x where appropriate

1.35 Respondent's gender

Male

Female

--	--

1.36 How old are you?

20 years and below

21-30 years

31-40 years	
41-50 years	
51-60 years	
60+	

1.37 Acquired Level of Education

No formal Education	
Primary Education	
Secondary Education/Matric	
Post Matric-Degree/Diploma	
Others(Specify)	

1.38 Ethnicity:

Xhosa	
Zulu	
Twana	
Venda	
White	
Coloured	
Indian	
Others (Specify)	

1.39 What is your Language?

English	
Afrikaans	
Xhosa	
Zulu	
Others (Specify)	

1.40 Marital Status:

Single	
Married	
Divorced	
Widowed	
Others (Specify)	

1.41 Employment:

Employed	
Self-Employed	
Unemployed	
Pensioner	
Others (Specify)	

1.42 Income:

Please mark x where appropriate

Below R 1000	
R 1001-2000	
R 2001-3000	
R 3001-4000	
R 4001-5000	
R 5001-6000	
R 6000+	

1.43 Where were you born?

This District	
Different district in the province	
In another province	
Outside South Africa	

The role and functions of the BCMM in donor assisted programmes and development administration in the municipality.

2.0 To what extent do you agree that the municipality receives donor support for the administration of development projects?

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

2.1 The source of donor support for development comes from:
(Please indicate all possible responses)

World Bank	
IMF	
UN	
UNDP	
JICA	
DANIDA	
CIDA	
IDA	
IFC	
Others(specify)	

2.2 I am aware that the municipality receives support from NGOs, Co-operate organisations and individuals in the municipality towards development.

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

2.3 The municipality has established sister-city relations with cities in these countries
Please mark X where appropriate (indicate all possible responses)

USA	
-----	--

ISRAEL	
CHINA	
SWEDEN	
UK	
NETHERLANDS	
Others (specify)	

2.4 The municipality receives support from sister-city relations for development

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

2.5 Municipality sister-city support is utilized for:
(Please indicate all possible responses)

Electoral administration	
Agriculture	
Education	
Health	
Housing	
Road Infrastructure	
Water supplies	
Electricity/Energy	
Others(specify)	

2.6 The municipality receives support from the government of the Republic of South Africa for development administration in the municipality

1) strongly agree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
-------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

2.7 In which of the following ways does the municipality generate income for development?

Revenue Taxes	
Property Rates	
Government Subventions/Budget	
Fines	
Sales Tax	
VAT	
Bonds	
Investments	
Donations	
Others(Specify)	

2.8 Which of the following development projects is/are priority area where donor support is mostly utilized? *(Please indicate all possible responses)*

Education	
Health	
Agriculture	
Employment/Jobs	
Roads	
Water/Sanitation	
Housing	
Toilet/s	
Energy/Electricity	
Others(Others)	

2.9 To what extent do you agree that donor support reduces poverty and induce development?

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) strongly agree	
----------------------	--	-------------	--	---------------	--	----------	--	-------------------	--

2.10 Which of the following poverty alleviation strategies does the municipality embark on to empower the residents? *(Please indicate all possible responses)*

Vocational skills development	
Academic training/skills	
Agriculture mechanisation	
Agro processing skills	
Animal husbandry training/skills	
Textile Manufacturing	
Auto Mechanics/Construction	
Youth sports Development	
Trading/Marketing skills	
Others(Specify)	

2.11 To what extent do you agree that NGOs, corporate organisations and individuals contribute to municipal development administration?

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------	--	-------------	--	---------------	--	----------	--	-------------------	--

3.0 Donor support for development administration induces:
(Please indicate all possible responses)

Transparency	
Patriotism	
Decentralisation	

Good governance	
Healthy and effective service delivery	
Rapid development of the municipality	
Others (specify)	

3.1 It is necessary to attach conditionality to donor supported development projects in the municipality

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

3.2 Donor conditionality ensures:
(Please indicate all possible responses)

prudent utilisation of funds	
Excessive taxation	
Decentralisation	
Good governance	
Healthy citizen's participation in development	
Effective service delivery	
Others (specify)	

3.3 The response of the municipality to the conditionality is:
(Please indicate all possible responses)

Tax exemptions	
Free market access	
Freedom to repatriate profits	
Access to land	
Investment opportunities	
Technical support to projects	
Others(specify)	

4.0 The effects of donor conditionality on residents of the municipality may lead to:
(please indicate all possible responses)

Unemployment	
Poverty	
Heavy Indebtedness	
Unfair trade terms	
Administrative Corruption	
Insufficient funds for development projects	
Impoverishment	
Uncompleted municipal projects	
Undue pressure on projects	

Distorted municipal planning	
Corruption	
Lack of patriotism	
Lead to service delivery disputes	
Abandoning of projects	
Obstruct poverty alleviation programmes	
Others(specify)	

4.1 To what extent do you agree that the municipality has suffered a series of public protestation over service delivery?

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	----------------------	--

4.2 The challenge of the municipality in relation to service delivery is/are mostly over:

Water shortages	
Sanitation	
Energy/Electricity	
Housing	
Corruption	
Toilets	
Taxes	
Crime and Security	
Food Supplies	
Others(specify)	

HYPOTHESIS TESTING QUESTIONS

Please use the following codes for your response

Strongly disagree-1; Disagree-2; Don't know-3; Agree-4; Strongly agree-5	1	2	3	4	5
The higher the benefits citizens derive from municipal projects, the higher their commitments and patriotism.					
The lower the benefits citizens derive from municipal projects, the lower their commitment and patriotism.					
Donor Conditionality targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens will be highly patronised and accepted by them.					
Donor conditionality that burdens the citizens will be resisted and rejected by them.					
The higher the citizen's level of education, the higher his/her chances of getting employment.					
The lower the citizen's level of education, the lower his/her chances of getting					
Donor Support induces democratization through development projects					
Donor Support does not induce democratization through development projects					

INSTRUMENT 2: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR BUFFALO CITY MUNICIPALITY OFFICIALS

DONOR SUPPORT, ELECTORAL DYNAMICS AND DEMOCRATISATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE CASE OF THE BUFFALO CITY, METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY, EASTERN CAPE, SOUTH AFRICA.
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Introduction

1) Purpose of the interview

To investigate and to establish to what extent donor support influences the electoral processes in the buffalo city municipality and the electoral dynamic factors which connect this agenda with governance and democratisation

2) Guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality

Your response will be strictly confidential and will not be forwarded to any other person(s) except my supervisor.

3) Permission to tape

The interview will be tape recorded if only you agree. This will only allow me to capture all the conversation. The recorded conversation will be deleted or discarded immediately they have been transcribed into text.

4) Any questions?

The following are mostly open-ended questions and should be asked of each person interviewed.

- 1) Does this municipality receive donor support for the administration of elections?
- 2) Where do the sources of donor support for elections and development come from?
- 3) Does the municipality receive support from NGOs, Co-operate organisations and individuals in the municipality towards elections?
- 4) Has the municipality established sister-city relations with any city or country?
- 5) Does the municipality receive enormous support from sister-city relations?
- 6) Briefly describe what the municipality sister-city support is utilized for?
- 7) Does the municipality receive support from the government of the Republic of South Africa for electoral administration in the municipality?
- 8) Do you think donor support for electoral administration induce/lead to/help build the structures for democratisation?
- 9) What are your views about the attachment of conditionality to donor support to the municipality?
- 10) Briefly explain how the municipality response to these conditionalities
- 11) What effects do you envisage that donor conditionality can have on voters and residents of the municipality?
- 12) Is there anything you want to add or any questions you want to ask?

Thank You.

Appendix 6: Questionnaires on Donor Agencies

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Survey questionnaire on Donor Support, Electoral Dynamics and Democratisation:
The case of the Buffalo City, Metropolitan Municipality, Eastern Cape, South Africa.

This questionnaire is designed to obtain information on donor support, Electoral Dynamics and democratisation in the Buffalo City Municipality. The study is part of the requirement for a Doctor of Social Science degree in Sociology I am pursuing at the University of Fort Hare. I humbly request your participation in completing this questionnaire. All information you provide will be confidential and will be used only for academic purpose. Thank you.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE:

Please Mark x where appropriate

1.44 Respondent's gender

Male

Female

--	--

1.45 How old are you?

20 years and below	
21-30 years	
31-40 years	
41-50 years	
51-60 years	
60+	

1.46 Acquired Level of Education

No formal Education	
Primary Education	
Secondary Education/Matric	
Post Matric-Degree/Diploma	
Others(Specify)	

1.47 Ethnicity:

Xhosa	
Zulu	
Twana	
Venda	
White	
Coloured	
Indian	
Others(Specify)	

1.48 What is your Language?

English	
Afrikaans	
Xhosa	
Zulu	
Others (Specify)	

1.49 Marital Status:

Single	
Window	
Divorced	
Widowed	
Others (Specify)	

1.50 Employment:

Employed	
Self-Employed	
Unemployed	
Pensioner	
Others (Specify)	

1.51 Income:

Please mark x where appropriate

Below R 1000	
R 1001-2000	
R 2001-3000	
R 3001-4000	
R 4001-5000	
R 5001-6000	
R 6000+	

1.52 Where were you born?

This District	
Different district in the province	
In another province	
Outside South Africa	

Donor Agency's role in donor support services in the municipality:

Please indicate your response by marking x where appropriate

2.0 This agency provides donor support to the Municipality:

Please Mark x where appropriate

1)Strongly disagree		2)Disagree		3)Don't know		4)Agree		Strongly Agree	
---------------------	--	------------	--	--------------	--	---------	--	----------------	--

2.1 To what extent do you agree that donor assistance is given in support of elections in the municipality?

1) Strongly disagree		2)Disagree		3) Don't Know		4)Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	------------	--	---------------------	--	---------	--	-------------------------	--

2.2 The donor funding for elections in the municipality covers:
(Please, indicate all possible responses).

1)Campaigns	
2)Logistics	
3) Voter Education	
4)Training of Electoral Officers	
5) Support for political parties	
6) Capacity building	
7) Others(Specify)	

2.3 The donor support is targeted at electoral improvement for development

1)Strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4)Agree		5)Strongly Agree	
------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	---------	--	---------------------	--

2.4 The municipal development improvement targets may include:
(Please check all possible responses)

1) Education	
2) Water supply	
3) Electricity supply	
4) Health care	
5) Sanitation	
6) Housing	
7) Roads/Infrastructure	
8) Others (Specify)	

3.0 Donor Conditionalities are attached to the donor support

1)strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5)Strongly Agree	
------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	---------------------	--

3.1 The attached donor conditionalities are likely to induce:
(Please indicate all possible responses).

1) Tax Exemptions	
2) Free trade	
3) Electoral Reforms	
4) Democratisation	
5) Trade Liberalisation	
6) Level Platform for Political Parties	
7) Grassroots political participation	
8) Others (specify)	

3.2 The focus of the Aid conditionality is to ensure:
(Please indicate all possible responses)

1) Accountability	
2) Judicious use of resources	
3) returns on investment	
4) safeguard profits	
5) Reforms	

6) Aid is used for intended purpose	
7) deepen democracy	
8) Others (specify)	

3.3 The donor conditionality will have effects on the voters or residents of the municipality

Please mark x where appropriate

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	----------------------	--

4.0 The likely effects of donor conditionality on voters or residents may include:
(Please indicate all possible responses)

1) Lack of donor funding may disrupt elections	
2) Lower voter turn outs	
3) Delay in voting	
4) Delay in announcing results	
5) Poor logistics can lead to inferior equipment breakdown	
6) Poor equipment can lead to long queues on voting days which can be a disincentive	
7) Untrained electoral officers can mar elections which could lead to electoral disputes	
8) Others (specify)	

HYPOTHESIS TESTING QUESTIONS

Please use the following codes for your response:

Strongly disagree-1; Disagree-2; Don't know-3; Agree-4; Strongly agree-5

	1	2	3	4	5
The higher the benefits citizens derive from municipal projects, the higher their commitments and patriotism.					
The lower the benefits citizens derive from municipal projects, the lower their commitment and patriotism.					
Donor Conditionality targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens will be highly patronised and accepted by them.					
Donor conditionality that burdens the citizens will be resisted and rejected by them.					
The higher the citizen's level of education, the higher his/her chances of getting employment.					
The lower the citizen's level of education, the lower his/her chances of getting employment					
Donor Support induces democratization through electoral participation					
Donor Support does not induce democratization through electoral participation					

INSTRUMENT 2: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR DONOR AGENCIES.

DONOR SUPPORT, ELECTORAL DYNAMICS AND DEMOCRATISATION: THE CASE OF THE BUFFALO CITY, METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY, EASTERN CAPE, SOUTH AFRICA

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Introduction

1) Purpose of the interview

To investigate and to establish to what extent donor support influences the electoral processes in the buffalo city municipality and the electoral dynamic factors which connect this agenda with governance and democratisation

2) Guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality

Your response will be strictly confidential and will not be forwarded to any other person(s) except my supervisor.

1) Permission to tape

The interview will be tape recorded if only you agree. This will only allow me to capture all the conversation. The recorded conversation will be deleted or discarded immediately they have been transcribed into text.

2) Any questions?

The following are mostly open ended questions and should be asked of each person interviewed.

- 1) How does this agency provide donor support to the Municipality?
- 2) In what ways do you channel some of your donor assistance in support of elections in the municipalities?
- 3) What specific projects/programmes does the donor funding for elections in the municipality cover?
- 4) Briefly explain how the donor support is targeted at electoral improvement for development
- 5) What are some of the municipal development improvement targets that are envisaged?
- 6) What Conditionalties are attached to the donor support to the municipalities?
- 7) In what ways are the attached donor conditionalities likely to induce democratisation?
- 8) What is the main focus of the Aid conditionality?
- 9) Do you think the donor conditionality will have an effect on the voters or residents of the municipality?
- 10) What are the likely effects of donor conditionality on voters or residents in the municipality?

Thank You.

Appendix 7: Questionnaires on Community voters.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Survey questionnaire on Donor Support, Electoral Dynamics and Democratisation:
The case of the Buffalo City, Metropolitan Municipality, Eastern Cape, South Africa.

This questionnaire is designed to obtain information on donor support, Electoral Dynamics and democratisation in the Buffalo City Municipality. The study is part of the requirement for a Doctor of Social Science degree in Sociology I am pursuing at the University of Fort Hare. I humbly request your participation in completing this questionnaire. All information you provide will be confidential and will be used only for academic purpose. Thank you.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE:

Please Mark x where appropriate

1.53 Respondent's gender

Male

Female

--	--

1.54 How old are you?

20 years and below	
21-30 years	
31-40 years	
41-50 years	
51-60 years	
60+	

1.55 Acquired Level of Education

No formal Education	
Primary Education	
Secondary Education/Matric	
Post Matric-Degree/Diploma	
Others(Specify)	

1.56 Ethnicity:

Xhosa	
Zulu	
Twana	
Venda	
White	
Coloured	
Indian	
Others(Specify)	

1.57 What is your Language?

English	
Afrikaans	
Xhosa	
Zulu	
Others(Specify)	

1.58 Marital Status:

Single	
Married	
Divorced	
Widowed	
Others(Specify)	

1.59 Employment:

Employed	
Self-Employed	
Unemployed	
Pensioner	
Others(Specify)	

1.60 Income:

Please mark x where appropriate

Below R 1000	
R 1001-2000	
R 2001-3000	
R 3001-4000	
R 4001-5000	
R 5001-6000	
R 6000+	

1.61 Where were you born?

This District	
Different District in Province	
In another Province	
Outside South Africa	

Community voters' perceptions of donor support and democratization in the municipality.

2.0 Municipal elections are very important activities in the country
(Mark X where appropriate)

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3)Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	-----------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

2.1 The following explain why I vote in an election
(Please mark X where appropriate. Indicate all possible responses)

I am patriotic	
Because I receive benefits from municipal projects	
I have registered	
I just want to vote for the record	
I vote base on the campaign messages	
I vote base on my expectations	
I vote base on the performance of government	
I vote to help my party/candidate win	

Others(specify)	
-----------------	--

2.2 To what extent do you agree that the municipality has performed satisfactorily?

(Mark X where appropriate)

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3 Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	-----------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

2.3 Donor funding for municipal elections and development is important

(Mark X where appropriate)

1) strongly disagree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
----------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

2.4 Donor support leads to effective electoral administration and democratisation

(Mark X where appropriate)

1) strongly agree		2) Disagree		3) Don't Know		4) Agree		5) Strongly Agree	
-------------------------	--	----------------	--	---------------------	--	-------------	--	-------------------------	--

3.0 The donor assistance for elections should focus on:

(Please indicate all possible responses)

Electoral campaigns	
Personnel training	
Civic education	
Technical support	
Voter education	
Logistics	
Political party sponsorship	
Publicity	
Electoral materials	
Others(specify)	

3.1 The following can result when donor support is dwindled, delayed or suspended:

(Please mark x where applicable. Indicate all possible responses)

Demonstrations	
Boycotts	
Violence	
Agitations	
Lawsuits	
Spontaneous Voting for c	
Others (specify)	

4.0 Briefly assess the municipality on the following priority areas:

	Excellent	Very good	Good	Poor	Very poor	Don't know
Employment						
Youth employment						
Health						
Education						

Water						
Food						
Housing						
Security & crime						
Electricity						
Corruption						
Poverty						
Indebtedness						
Sanitation & refuse collection						
Transportation						
Others(specify)						

4.1 Indicate which party you will vote for if you have the opportunity

African National Congress-ANC	
Democratic Alliance-DA	
Economic Freedom Fighters-EFF	
Inkhatha Freedom Party-IFP	
Congress of the People-COPE	
Pan African Congress-PAC	
African Independent Congress-AIC	
African Christian Democratic Party-ACDP	
United Democratic Movement-UDM	
Pan Africanist Movement-PAM	
OTHERS (SPECIFY)	

HYPOTHESIS TESTING QUESTIONS

Please use the following codes for your response

Strongly disagree-1; Disagree-2; Don't know-3; Agree-4; Strongly agree-5

	1	2	3	4	5
The higher the benefits citizens derive from municipal projects, the higher their commitments and patriotism.					
The lower the benefits citizens derive from municipal projects, the lower their commitment and patriotism.					
Donor Conditionality targeted at poverty alleviation and socio-economic well-being of citizens will be highly patronised and accepted by them.					
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The higher the citizen's level of education, the higher his/her chances of getting employment.					
The lower the citizen's level of education, the lower his/her chances of getting employment					
Donor Support induces democratization through electoral participation					
Donor Support does not induce democratization through electoral participation					

INSTRUMENT 2: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR VOTERS IN THE BCM MUNICIPALITY

DONOR SUPPORT, ELECTORAL DYNAMICS AND DEMOCRATISATION: THE CASE OF THE BUFFALO CITY, METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY, EASTERN CAPE, SOUTH AFRICA.

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Introduction

- 1) Purpose of the interview
- 2) To investigate and to establish to what extent donor support influences the electoral processes in the buffalo city municipality and the electoral dynamic factors which connect this agenda with governance and democratisation
- 3) Guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality

Your response will be strictly confidential and will not be forwarded to any other person(s) except my supervisor.

- 4) Permission to tape

The interview will be tape recorded if only you agree. This will only allow me to capture all the conversation. The recorded conversation will be deleted or discarded immediately they have been transcribed into text.

- 5) Any questions?

The following are mostly open-ended questions and should be asked of each person interviewed.

- 1) In what ways do you think municipal elections are very important activities in the country?
- 2) Briefly explain why you vote in an election
- 3) How would you describe the municipality's performance in relation to service delivery?
- 4) Describe briefly how donor funding for municipal elections and development is important
- 5) In what ways does donor support lead to effective electoral administration and democratisation?
- 6) What projects/programmes do you think donor assistance for elections should focus on?
- 7) What action(s) will you embark on if donor support for development is dwindled, delayed or suspended?
- 8) Briefly describe your views on donor conditionality?
- 9) What are your views on corruption and misappropriation of funds by political parties?
- 10) What are the likely effects of donor conditionality on voters or residents in the municipality?

Thank You

Appendix 8: LETTER TO QUESTIONNAIRE PARTICIPANTS

University of Fort Hare

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AND HUMANITIES
FACULTY OFFICE

Aliso (Main) Campus
Private Bag X7314, No 1 King Williams Town Road, Aliso, 5700, RSA
Tel: +27 (0) 40 602 2233/ 2181/ 2378/ 2242 • Fax: +27 (0) 40 603 2541
Email: mtmqandi@ufh.ac.za / zmqguni@ufh.ac.za



Dear Sir/Madam,

LETTER TO QUESTIONNAIRE PARTICIPANTS-

REQUEST FOR PERMISSION: PARTICIPATION IN A RESEARCH STUDY

I Write to request your permission to participate in my research study. I am Henry Kofi Bosompem, a PhD student at the University of Fort Hare. I am conducting this research as part of requirement for the fulfilment of my degree. The research topic is Donor Support, Electoral dynamics and Democratisation: The Case of the Buffalo City, Metropolitan Municipality, Eastern Cape, South Africa.

The study will require you to fill out a questionnaire to solicit responses on the above-mentioned research topic during the first cluster moderation. Ethical principles and guidelines has been sought and compiled.


Please be assured that under no circumstances will any of your responses be disclosed to any person (s). You are assured of utmost confidentiality and will remain anonymous. It is anticipated that your involvement in this study will enhance our better understanding of Donor Support, Electoral Dynamics and Democratisation in the municipality.

As participation in this is purely voluntary, I will appreciate if you will kindly complete the questionnaire. Your participation is highly appreciated and should require further clarity, do not hesitate to contact my supervisor, Professor F H Nakhwevha on 0027734232610.

Thank you so much

Sincerely,


Henry Kofi Bosompem



Department of Sociology

www.ufh.ac.za

Appendix 9: Approval Letter from IEC



SOUTH AFRICA

Mr H. Bosompem
Department of Sociology
University of Fort Hare
P.O.Box 1314
Alice Campus
Alice
5700

22 July 2016

Dear Mr Bosompem,

Request to Conduct a Research Study in the Electoral Commission


The Electoral Commission of South Africa acknowledges receipt of your request dated 7th March 2016, to conduct your study on electoral processes in the Buffalo City Municipality and apologises for the delay in responding to you.

I wish to advise you that your request has been approved on the understanding that the Ethical Clearance Certificate, ref. number NEK041SBOSO1 and all its contents holds for the Electoral Commission.

Your contact person for the project is Mr Thami Mraji, the Provincial Electoral Officer responsible for the Eastern Cape. You can communicate with him at MrajiT@elections.org.za, or during office hours at 043- 709 4201.

The Commission wishes you success with your studies.

Yours sincerely,



M.S. Moepya, (Mr)
Chief Electoral Officer

Electoral Commission

Ensuring Free and Fair Elections

Commissioners: Mr V.G. Mashinini (Chairperson) • Mr I.T. Tselane (Vice-Chairperson) • Judge G.M. Makhanya • Rev. B.B. Finca • Ms J.Y. Love
National Office: Election House, Riverside Office Park, 1303 Heuwel Avenue, Centurion, 0157 • P/Bag X112, Centurion, 0046
Tel (+27) 12 622 5700 • Fax (+27) 12 622 5784

**BUFFALO CITY METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY**



MEMORANDUM

Date: 05 APRIL 2016

From: **HEAD: INFORMATION
KNOWLEDGE
MANAGEMENT, RESEARCH
AND POLICY** To: **Mr. H.K BOSOMPEM**

Our ref:	Please ask for MS Z.S STOFIE (043) 705 9746	Your ref:
----------	---	-----------

**RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN BCMM:
Mr. HENRY KOFI BOSOMPEM**

It is hereby acknowledged that **Mr. Henry Kofi Bosompem**, a student at **University of Fort Hare** completing a **PhD in Sociology** has met the prerequisites for conducting research at Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality (BCMM) for partial fulfillment of his degree. He has provided us with all the necessary documentation as per the BCMM Policy on External Students conducting research at the institution. With reference to the letter to the Acting City Manager received on 17 March 2016, permission was requested to conduct research at BCMM for his Research Report, entitled "**DONOR SUPPORT, ELECTORAL DYNAMICS AND DEMOCRATISATION; THE CASE OF THE BUFFALO CITY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY, EASTERN CAPE, SOUTH AFRICA.**" This request was acknowledged by the Office of the Acting City Manager, and forwarded to the Information & Knowledge Management, Research & Policy Unit for further assistance. Mr. Bosompem was asked to provide the Unit with the necessary documentation, which she subsequently did.

The relevant Officials to assist in the research were identified and duly informed about the research, and the fact that Mr. Bosompem has met all the prerequisites. Their contact details have also been provided to Mr. Bosompem and he was informed to contact them directly for assistance.

Wishing you good luck in your studies.


DR T. NORUSHE
HEAD: INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, RESEARCH AND POLICY

Appendix 10: APPROVAL FOR A REQUEST TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN BCMM

Zimkhita Stofile <zimkhitas@buffalocity.gov.za>

Thu 4/7/2016 2:50 PM

Drafts

To:

bosompem@gmail.com;

BOSOMPEM, HENRY KOFI;

Cc:

Nokulunga Ndongeni <NokulungaN@buffalocity.gov.za>;

Zukiswa Fatuse <ZukiswaFa@buffalocity.gov.za>;

Malusi Maxegwana <MalusiM@buffalocity.gov.za>;

You forwarded this message on 4/9/2016 8:02 PM.

1 attachment

Good Day Mr Bosompem

Please find attached your approval letter affording you permission to proceed with your research within BCMM. According to your area of interest, you may contact the following relevant officials for assistance and show them this letter when requesting them to partake in your study.

Name	Department	Tel	e-mail
1. Ms Nokulunga Ndongeni	City Hall	043 705 2803	NokulungaN@buffalocity.gov.za
2. Ms Zukiswa Fatuse	Trust Centre	043 705 1901	ZukiswaFa@buffalocity.gov.za
3. Mr Malusi Maxegwana	City Hall	043 705 2849	MalusiM@buffalocity.gov.za

Please note that according to research ethics and code of conduct, participants have the right to refuse to partake in your study.

Trust you will find all this in order.

Appendix 11: Ethical Clearance Certificate



University of Fort Hare
Together in Excellence

ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE REC-270710-028-RA Level 01

Certificate Reference Number: NEK041SBOS01

Project title: **Donor support, electoral dynamics and democratization: The case of the Buffalo City, Metropolitan Municipality, Eastern Cape, South Africa**

Nature of Project: PhD

Principal Researcher: Henry Kofi Bosompem
Sub-Investigator:

Supervisor: Prof F.H Nekhwevha
Co-supervisor:

On behalf of the University of Fort Hare's Research Ethics Committee (UREC) I hereby give ethical approval in respect of the undertakings contained in the above-mentioned project and research instrument(s). Should any other instruments be used, these require separate authorization. The Researcher may therefore commence with the research as from the date of this certificate, using the reference number indicated above.

Please note that the UREC must be informed immediately of

- Any material change in the conditions or undertakings mentioned in the document
- Any material breaches of ethical undertakings or events that impact upon the ethical conduct of the research

The Principal Researcher must report to the UREC in the prescribed format, where applicable, annually, and at the end of the project, in respect of ethical compliance.

Special conditions: Research that includes children as per the official regulations of the act must take the following into account:


Note: The UREC is aware of the provisions of s71 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 and that matters pertaining to obtaining the Minister's consent are under discussion and remain unresolved. Nonetheless, as was decided at a meeting between the National Health Research Ethics Committee and stakeholders on 6 June 2013, university ethics committees may continue to grant ethical clearance for research involving children without the Minister's consent, provided that the prescripts of the previous rules have been met. This certificate is granted in terms of this agreement.

The UREC retains the right to

- Withdraw or amend this Ethical Clearance Certificate if
 - Any unethical principal or practices are revealed or suspected
 - Relevant information has been withheld or misrepresented
 - Regulatory changes of whatsoever nature so require
 - The conditions contained in the Certificate have not been adhered to
- Request access to any information or data at any time during the course or after completion of the project.
- In addition to the need to comply with the highest level of ethical conduct principle investigators must report back annually as an evaluation and monitoring mechanism on the progress being made by the research. Such a report must be sent to the Dean of Research's office

The Ethics Committee wished you well in your research.

Yours sincerely


Professor Gideon de Wet
Dean of Research

01 October 2015