Dilemmas of philosophical training:
Between analytical and continental

Dilemmi della formazione filosofica:
Tra analitici e continentali

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ABSTRACT
These reflections have a theoretical character and deal with the question of the formation of the new levels of researchers in the field of philosophy in particular, but given its transdisciplinary dimension, the question extends to the training of humanists.

The aim is to show how the debate within the academic philosophy between Analysts and Continents has led the former to choose a specialized scientific-type training approach and the latter, instead, to favour the approaches of the human sciences. Two perspectives that have created two currents of training, the confrontation of which, often close, has made the international comparison fruitful, influencing the destinies and academic careers of the new researchers.

The approach is qualitative and the epistemological background that frames the problems is hermeneutical.

KEYWORDS
Philosophy, Epistemology, Education, University, Scientific Debate.

Filosofia, Epistemologia, Formazione, Università, Dibattito Scientifico.
1. **Methodology**

It is appropriate to specify, from the first lines of this reflection, that we will speak of philosophy from the point of view of the epistemology of education, which is our field of investigation and university teaching. We witnessed the academic “battles” with passionate interest, certain that, whatever the outcome, the battlefield was, first, an excellent field for comparison, analysis and proposal. We spent over a year exploring the games in this gym, we read documents, texts, research reports and conference proceedings and we talked about it for a long time both with colleagues and with students.

To begin, we are left involved by a “pasolinian” suggestion, mindful of the unfinished “little treatise” where the writer imagines he could play a formative role in adolescence for the fifteen-year-old Grenadillo, an “ideal” pupil, Neapolitan and bourgeois by birth (Pasolini, 1976). In our case I have to introduce some changes to the narrative plot: I could call Antonello, by assonance, the young man, also bourgeois but from Emilia, the son of friends and future student of the Ferrara University, who turns to us to make us a participant, after finishing high school, the intention to study philosophy and acquire not only some information on the university path, but also some suggestions and, above all, the presentation of our point of view.

We can only accept the task, otherwise we will betray our vocation, but immediately introducing a visual angle that connects us to Pasolini’s personality: heresy, a booming prophetic in these words that do not seem half an century old now: “The bottom of my teaching will consist in convincing you not to fear the sacredness and feelings, which consumerist secularism has deprived men of, transforming them into ugly and stupid fetish-worshiping automatons” (Ibid., p. 22). We believe that today more than ever, in the digitally dominated world, it is appropriate to embark on a path of liberation from the myth of “saving” innovation, advocated by unscrupulous globalizers: on this path critical capacity is indispensable, for this reason it is worth studying philosophy and to do it, as for any other serious study, you need a strong motivation. Which means, specifically philosophical, not to be afraid even of any solitary battles, as Socrates teaches, nor of possible accusations of anachronism or conservatism, when they are fought with the spirit of those who love human beings “in flesh and blood” (ibid., p. 28).

At this point the young Antonello, believes he feels motivated and through the enthusiasm, which should always accompany philosophers with their sense of wonder towards the world, feels ready to choose. But before saying goodbye, he asks us, with the same curious gaze of childhood when he believed that adults had an answer for everything, to explain to him what distance or, perhaps, the contrast between analytical and continental is. And, after a pause for reflection, he adds: “but isn’t it strange that the continents have chosen for them this qualifying term, of little philosophical value?” We agree, but add that to attempt a correct answer on the subject I will have to deepen my knowledge, while one thing I am sure: the analytics have chosen both their own denomination and the other, to indicate the belonging to continental Europe of those who they moved in areas of study deemed obsolete, while they belonged geographically to England and the United States and, culturally, to a world more open to novelties. It is strange

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1 To be attributed: Prof.ssa Anita Gramigna: Methodology; Introduction: “heretical” suggestions; The “Vexata quaestio”. Dott. Giorgio Poletti *Is philosophy a “scientific” science?*; Conclusion: beyond specialization.
that, especially in the initial phase, the most significant thinkers belonged precisely to the old continent, just think of Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap. Beyond this curiosity which, however, does not fail to highlight how the labels are lacking in coherence and efficacy, we ask ourselves the problem of an adequate starting point to introduce the aspiring philosopher to the problem, and we find it in “Che cos’è la Metafisica?” (Was ist Metaphysik? - trad. it. 1953), the prolusion of Heidegger, held on 24 July 1929 in Freiburg.

2. Introduction: “heretical” suggestions

The prolusion of Heidegger, which represents the origin of a rift, aimed at marking the philosophical history of the twentieth century for most of the century. The German philosopher here poses the difference between “metaphysical asking” and “scientific asking”; while in the first the subject who poses the question is part of it, in the second it is separate, so much so that the object of the research is decisive. For this reason, science remains extraneous to the Nothing which, instead, accompanies the existential story of the subject in the condition of anguish.

The young Carnap, a few months earlier had followed the debate held in Davos with the participation of Heidegger and Cassirer, and, however fascinated by the former, he devoted himself to a study to demonstrate the logical limits of metaphysical language, if not even its emptiness of meaning. In it operates a “deception”, to a theoretical gaze, which is not easy to grasp (Carnap trad. It., 1969). Acceptable in his saying, perhaps, on the level of feelings as a poem, or other artistic form but not on that of the philosophical investigation; moreover, for the logic scholar the most coherent example of such writing would be found in Thus spoke Zarathustra of Nietzsche. There is no doubt that, as Friedman has argued (trad. It., 2004), the Carnap-Heidegger contrast focuses on logic but, perhaps, more on its centrality than on its nature and, in fact, for us philosophy is not reducible to logic alone, although this represents a fundamental part of it. In Carnap there is a need for the logical foundation of a scientific philosophy that has as its model the language of physics, the only one capable of lending itself to intersubjectivity; but would we then still be faced with a philosophy? This is a question my pupil should ask himself, in the wake of the aforementioned Fridman who identifies the “crossroads” in these terms: on the one hand the methodological effort to remain within the boundaries, which can become universal, of logic, on the other the renunciation of universal validity but with a free research space, more sensitive to the changing needs of human beings.

2.1 The “Vexata quaestio”

If, from the 1930s to the end of the century, the two currents appeared antithetical and irreconcilable (D’Agostini, 1997), the reasons for the breakdown were also translated into strong-coloured considerations and, in the highest sense of the term, not very philosophical: the language of the continents, for example, was considered not only poetic but also obscure and their partisan and hyperbolic reasoning (Searle, 1977); while analytical philosophy was interpreted as a mechanical, merely technical, reproducible way of proceeding automatically (Adorno, 2004). The question, in our rhetorical and ideological opinion, on what is true philosophy, could only reopen the never resolved debate between scientific knowl-
edge and humanistic knowledge, unsolvable to the extent that the idea that philosophy passes through one and the other. But also, the question considered more concrete, we ask heretically in the Leninian form, what to do? in philosophy, it seems questionable in the answers. We do not feel up to, for reasons of personal dignity, to propose to our pupil the double image that is the most popular: on the one hand, the rigorous analytical, academic and scientific philosophy, little inclined to contacts with social life; on the other, continental philosophy, critical of science, sensitive to political and social problems and attentive to mass-media references. It does not take long for a young person to choose the second perspective, unless he was already born with the double-breasted jacket of academic belonging, which would make him immune to the deadly boredom of certain investigations, which split the hair in four, to use a metaphor known in the environment.

More interesting than the “inquisition tribunal” instituted by Carnap, to remove the knowledge claims of metaphysics as a foundation, it seems to us Wittgenstein’s reflection witnessed by Waismann (1975, p. 55). The Austrian scholar deeply understands the Heideggerian terms of being and anguish, is aware of the rebellious will to lash out against the “limit of language”, which derives from that amazement, or wonder, towards the existing that represents the original impulse of the philosophical adventure. Although there are no ways out, these tensions deserve respect, despite the awareness that the way to solve problems passes through the logical rules of language. This can be not only understandable, but training for our budding philosopher, who will learn to feel the charm of life in its many nuances and the need to investigate them with order and precision to make sense of the experience. It would not be of secondary importance that Antonello came to grasp the basic motivations of Carnap’s criticism of Heidegger, which does not end, historically, on the different levels of philosophical belonging: there is a clear ideological distance towards the philosopher organic representative of Nazism in the turn a few years, by those who advocated the cause of a philosophy lined up alongside science in the name of both social and cultural progress (Friedman, cit., p. 33). And this does not take away, on a level of speculative correctness that has nothing to do with political condemnation, that Heidegger in the reply to Carnap’s criticism posed a question of extreme interest, arguing that thought is not reducible to a measuring intellect of quantity and is tested in the exercise of a truth that goes beyond objectivity.

It is no coincidence that Rotry, who had moved away from analytical positions, believed in 1991 that Heidegger and Wittgenstein should be compared, without prejudice, as protagonists of the linguistic turn of the twentieth century. The idea of an open dialogue was undoubtedly significant, but perhaps still premature. It was necessary to go first, if not for a recovery of metaphysics which has also taken place, for a new attention to ontology dictated by concrete needs, connected to developments in information technology and the web-economy. It is within these current disciplinary borders that the need for research and methodologies for the practicability of a science of being in its peculiar existence was felt (Ferraris, 2003). Our young “thinker”, like all the boys of his age, is fascinated and intrigued by this intertwining of philosophical investigation and current knowledge; for him it is the encounter with an unexpected event that could open up new, unexpected perspectives. In my role as a “wise” guide, I emphasize that we must proceed calmly, exercise the patience of reflection and waiting as good philosophers. I point out to him that logical empiricism was marked by the optimism of reason, reduced to scientific reason capable of dealing with “real” problems in all areas:

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from politics to morals, to social life. This security will not increase the prestige of scientific philosophy, on the contrary it will produce some defections with respect to the certainties of the argument. Putnam with the use of a realism with a human face, for example, will question the claim to analyze the natural reality itself, as if the observer had no subjective weight in describing (trad. it. 1995, p. 138), while Rotry (1982, p. 220) will consume the highest of betrayals not only by affirming that it is legitimate to abandon the claims of a scientific philosophy, but by attributing to philosophy, without adjectives, in full the right to consider itself a humanistic discipline, with one own writing style. The turning point in the last twenty years of the last century seems to focus, at the level of internal malaise, on a scientism that, in turning increasingly on the technological side, has lost any real interest in major social issues, which are not unrelated to the other. Impetuous development of information technology and the network, with consequences that are not yet precisely focused. To buffer the gaps, if we can say so, meta-ethical analysis was put in place, but the methodological excess led to a meticulous description of the use of language without the courage of a proposal on that provocative what to do? that we have already introduced.

The young aspiring philosopher looks at us perplexed, perhaps he is a little disappointed and was expecting a more linear journey, for this reason I think it appropriate to quote him a phrase by Macintyre that may be oriented towards analytical philosophy: “What philosophy gains in clarity and rigor, he loses it in providing substantial answers to the great philosophical questions” (trad. it. 1991, p. 169). What does Antonello want to do? The methodological rigor of the investigation of language is fundamental for him or, perhaps, he feels more inclined to investigate general issues, with all the risks of falling into journalism in a way rather than doing philosophy. Of course, it can be compelling to wonder about the conditions of meaning of terms that have a philosophical history: how to be, knowledge or induction, and, in this way, what problems are faced and solved? But perhaps it would be appropriate to say: are there real-world problems that philosophy can solve independently of science? Logically, many analytical philosophers would say no or, better, would prefer to say that philosophy should leave aside the most significant philosophical problems to devote itself to linguistic analysis.

Left to itself - this Antonello must know - philosophy has only “opinions”, it is an area in which we work on doubt: this is the difference compared to science that puts an end to the dilemmas with cognitive resolution (Russell, 1986, p. 243).

3. Is philosophy a “scientific” science?

The question is not insignificant, we asked it to reason about the formation of Antonello, who says that in the pre-Socratic Greek culture there was no clear distinction, just think of the pre-Socratics. In fact it is starting from the modern science of the seventeenth century that things change, and when we reach the threshold of the twentieth century the power of science, not only on the cultural level but also for the economic effects of research, is such as to be able to reach the conclusion that the philosophy is useful only if it puts itself at its service. In the last thirty years, according to analytics, it has been concluded that it is better to promote a scientific philosophy, because the times require it, especially with the effects of the globalized world. Our young interlocutor opens his arms in a gesture that seems to suggest the need for an acknowledgment of the facts which seems to me not very philosophical.
Antonello did not study Leibniz in high school and it is not strange, given that the high school teacher can only make choices in the boundless sea of philosophy. But I consider it important to make a reference to the German philosopher and mathematician for the effects that his studies have had up to now. The brilliant idea was to make a connection between Aristotelian and Stoic logic, on the one hand, and mathematical calculation on the other. In this way the calculation no longer concerns only numeric entities but also the symbols traceable in logical propositions and recurring terms, both in Aristotle and in Stoicism. Hence, the aspiration to a universal language, of which traces could be found in Renaissance culture, such as to orient the dialogue between different forms of thought. In a famous letter to Tshirnhaus of 1678, the scholar expressed his conviction to derive a tool to resolve controversies, freeing thought from more or less deceptive rhetoric and relying on the calculation and comparison on elements controllable by both contenders (Bochenski, 1972, vol. II, p. 357). It is the idea of operating through symbols the common thread that brings together the general calculation on symbols with the universal language. He was made aware of the danger of losing relations with the real world within the calculus-symbolic dimension; but Leibniz replied by observing: “We must not be afraid that the contemplation of characters will take us away from things; on the contrary, it will guide us to the very core of them” (1992, vol. II, p. 444).

The question is not insignificant, we asked it to reason about the formation of Antonello, who says that in the pre-Socratic Greek culture there was no clear distinction, just think of the pre-Socratics. In fact it is starting from the modern science of the seventeenth century that things change, and when we reach the threshold of the twentieth century the power of science, not only on the cultural level but also for the economic effects of research, is such as to be able to reach the conclusion that the philosophy is useful only if it puts itself at its service. In the last thirty years, according to analytics, it has been concluded that it is better to promote a scientific philosophy, because the times require it, especially with the effects of the globalized world. Our young interlocutor opens his arms in a gesture that seems to suggest the need for an acknowledgment of the facts which seems to me not very philosophical.
The analytical philosophy in a first phase, for example, underwent the influence of behaviorism, arriving with Gilbert Ryle’s theory to a “scientific” study of behavior, intended as a mechanism of responses to environmental stimuli. It is a disturbing scientific model for me and it is not enough for someone to point out that it is dated, so much so that for about half a century, analyst philosophers have been confronting Chomsky’s “mentalist” positions. Of course, with respect to the Pavlovian model of stimulus-response, the perspective of “linguistic creativity” has made its way, important because it suggests the human capacity to formulate an infinite number of sentences starting from a finite number of terms. Continuing along this path and considering the parallel developments in cybernetics and computer science, we have come to question physicalist reductionism, that is, the reduction of mental states to mere brain states. The birth of Cognitive Sciences (we use the plural as we believe that there is not one) has favoured Putnam’s functionalist hypothesis (trad. It. 1987), but also Fodor’s (trad. It. 1990), which it can be translated into a known computer-based parallel: the brain is to the mind as hardware is to software. My student finds the development of these problems interesting, as well as the interdisciplinary intertwining increasingly evident. I agree with him but, at the same time, I point out to him that the autonomy of philosophical thought is at risk and he will realize it as soon as I enter a thorny topic for me: the naturalization of epistemology.

During the 1980s, Quine (trad. It. 1986) above all supported this perspective, because of the criticism of the “foundational” theory of knowledge. Since there cannot be “foundational” or “raw” knowledge of philosophical origin, it is better to leave epistemology in the hands of science itself, also because the model of science is always that of the natural sciences. Once the philosophy of one’s critical autonomy has been deprived, the game is done, everything is “naturalizable”, from ethics to semantics, just as in the past for psychology, mathematics or logic. I do not see any advantages for knowledge in this, nor that openness to the plurality of approaches that characterized, instead, the culture of complexity. Moreover, we point out to Antonello, how much more the analytical philosophy has taken hold worldwide has no longer had inhibitory brakes, and in the magazines that accompany its diffusion also an uncommon propaganda skill emerges: the slogan clarity and precision acts as background to the primacy of argumentation, while the list of fields where his authority dominates goes from linguistics, and logic, to go into ethics and ontology, up to neurosciences and cognitive sciences. We ask ourselves: is there anything left to research for other methodological approaches and other theoretical approaches? Scholars such as Bateson, Bachelard, Maturana and Varela, Capra, Prigogine, Morin come to mind, who seem to me to lack scientific dignity even if they travel different paths.

The discomfort we feel is the same as when, years ago, we encountered the certainties of positivism and, with different shades, of logical empiricism: the uniqueness of the scientific method according to the model of the natural sciences, the substantial indisputability of one, and only one form of knowledge. To want to make the low controversy it would be enough to remember the examination to which Mulligan’s continental philosophy was subjected (1992, pp. 183-190), who finds it not only “dark”, but “obscurantist”, unable to know what she is looking, as uncertain and lost in her “aesthetic issues”. As a counterweight, Berlin (trad. It. 2002), who left analytical philosophy to devote himself to the history of ideas, uses the fruitful metaphor of the “two original baskets” of philosophy: the empirical and the formal. But there is a third, which collects all the questions that have no place in the other two. They are questions of different nature, inherent words,
symbols, methods not only scientific, but also used in the daily arts and crafts. Then there are questions about the relationships between different forms of knowledge, the ends of different actions, from moral to social or political. An authentic philosophy cannot attempt at all costs to bring them into the two, so to speak, “canonical” baskets. I point out to my interlocutor, particularly attentive, that this is one of the inevitable lessons in philosophical training, because philosophy cannot betray or abandon any of the questions that come from the world.

What if we turn the question around? If we wanted to pass on the idea that science is a philosophy? My young friend laughs, says that the sophists come to mind with their puns; instead, the Platonic Socrates with his “science of good”, a science that is not contemplated in the register of analytical philosophers and, nevertheless, on which it is appropriate to reflect: “possession of the other sciences if you do not he also possesses the science of the good, risks being rarely useful, in fact most of the time it is a real damage “(2000, 144d). Certainly it is not a current vision of science, but there is a clear clarification, indeed a warning, on the human end that every science should maintain as a presupposition of its own research; while one has the impression of being in front of a philosophy that denies the humanistic value, which has been the basis for centuries, to become a scientific instrument. Moreover,Franca D’Agostini observes, by now “knowledge in general” is destined to “scientificise” and philosophy must adapt to these needs of globalization (2014, p.80). There is nothing to discuss, no critical spirit to exercise, you just need to know English to know how the world is going. Naturally Antonello, from a good family, knows English from an early age and does not find it strange, indeed he seems productive, the use of a common language that facilitates planetary communication. Let’s move the question to another plane: language is not just a technical fact, behind it there is a way of thinking, a strategy that tends to remove value from other ways of thinking, and other cultural traditions, to achieve the dream of uniformed, conformist, acquiescent citizenship. If this were not so, the analytics would not have conquered the world philosophical scene with a non-philosophy. An example of the standard procedure that celebrates the “becoming science” of philosophy is found in this deduction. “It was ultimately Aristotle’s program, which reorganized and arranged the philosophical intuitions of Socrates and Plato” (Ivi, p. 83). An ante litteram scientist, Aristotle would have decided to “scientific” two thinkers who had had some good intuition but needed to be framed in the perspective of study 2500 years later, to dispose of the harmful patina of “continentiality”.

Sadness leaves room for a little irony. At this point we ask ourselves if it is worthwhile to continue the attempts to outline the presuppositions of a philosophical formation for our “budding philosopher”. Because, if he intended to follow the guidelines of the analytics, I would find myself in serious difficulty, for example in the face of a further affirmation relating, in this case, to Hegel “who redefined the science system, taking care to place philosophical science in it” (ibid). I did not know that Hegel was so inclined to the “concern” of having to adapt to future analytical philosophy, coming to transform his philosophical system into a scientific system, where philosophy could find its small, but dignified, space. My belief at this point is that rampant scientism is functional to a dominant culture in the western world, which is not offering anything particularly positive to the humanity of our time. Humanistic sensitivity is lacking, without which every human project is reduced to calculation, to counting mere quantities which, if they are not oriented towards a qualitative order, are only market objects. I have endeavoured to find a convincing point of reference, in relation to science, to
leave to Antonello, for a space for personal reflection, which can later become an
element of dialogue between us. Rita Levi Montalcini wrote: “Science is not an
absolute to which everything must be subordinated, possibly sacrificed, including
human dignity. Today anyone who cares about the fate of humanity – believers
and non-believers – is concerned about this reduction and subordination of
human values to scientific logic” (2005, p. 195).

4. Conclusion: beyond specialization

Antonello has reflected and tells us that he was struck by two terms used by the
scientist: reduction and subordination. The boy has qualities, and, for this reason,
we inform him that in the title of the book from which the quote is taken, we speak
of the courage to know, this is precisely the foundation of philosophical training.
The analyticity are keen to underline on every occasion their professionalism
based on specialists; I advise my potential philosopher, on the other hand, if he
will have the solid motivation, to become a professional who does not disdain to
consider himself an amateur, in the full sense of trying “pleasure” in his work. We
submit to him the need to always keep an open mind to understand the point of
view of others, and the reasons behind it, especially when we are in total disagree-
ment. Once the belief, for example, that current science tends to subordinate
every value to itself and simplify every aspect of complexity for measuring needs,
does not imply denying its relevance in our lives, nor its merits. At the same time,
it is a good rule, precisely in philosophy, to recognize the qualities of those
thinkers who are far from our study models.

Despite this spirit of acceptance of the difference, we must nevertheless note
that the analytics do not seem to have overcome the phase of tensions as they
tend to say; for example, the belief of an ongoing “underestimation of science” in
Italy dependent on the “cultural domination of humanities” is reiterated (D’Agos-
tini, 2014, cit., p. 79). Moreover, the belief remains that only analytical philosophers
are “typically” professional while others, even because of a “certain stylistic free-
dom”, are at risk of non-philosophy. The point of view is always judgmental: it is
they, the analytics, who decide what is good philosophy, or what is true science.
And, based on this judgment from above, a real dividing line is drawn between
the Anglo-Saxon model, and then the American one, and the other world, where
philosophy is lost in exercises of public communication, which between origin
from role of the enlightenment philosophes, in their desire to play a role of public
intellectuals. That this trend has continued to me seems good and not a waste of
time. Antonello himself is convinced that this must be a task that philosophy must
protect with prestige and, even, he first mentions the role of interest played by
Habermas in these years.

So why do analytics find much to say about a philosophy oriented towards
public issues? Because, for them, philosophy is something for specialists, disclo-
sure tends to make it banal, to “mass-medialize”.

In the end they experience the frustration of being the most qualified and the
least recognized: almost anonymous specialists, unknown outside the circle of
insiders. The others, on the other hand, enjoy an undeserved publicity by doing
– perhaps I am forcing the terms – philosophy-junk. The young pupil smiles slyly,
all in all he would not mind this simplified road to fame. I, somewhat annoyed,
submit to him a certain fact: the European philosophers of the younger genera-
tions, in general, are trained with an attention paid to both philosophical traditions
and, according to Dummett, they place themselves in the perspective of a philos-
ophy such as “serious” undertaking aimed at solving large-scale problems: “Philosophy seeks to explore the structure of human thought, and it does so by clarifying our ways of conceiving reality. Those who have a scientist mentality disdain the philosophical reflections thus conceived; they prefer to use scientific concepts, as if truth were at home only in conceptual systems conceived for specialized theoretical purposes” (2001, pp. 38-39).

We too are convinced of the need for a philosophy as a serious enterprise, for this reason we remain perplexed in the face of the improvement of a method of “experimental philosophy” with psychological support, described in these terms, as regards a research on utilitarianism: we choose a sample of subjects to which to submit indicative questions: “for example they ask whether or not you prefer a solution to a problem that is beneficial for themselves and harmful to others, and reflecting on the statistical results that follow” (D’Agostini, 2014, cit., note 14). We do not understand what the starting hypothesis of the investigation is, nor the possible application of the result, but we ask, in any case, to our “almost” philosopher if he would like to act concretely as a philosophical experimentalist. He answers frankly no, in case he would like to interview people in a dialogical form on utilitarianism, above all to understand if they have a differentiated or opposite notion of individual good compared to that of collective good.

At this point it seems to us indispensable to proceed to the conclusion of our attempt to offer elements for a philosophical formation, entering more specifically into the profession-specialist theme, which finds in Marconi an in-depth and significant treatment starting from the article Consolations for the specialist (2003, pp. 625-631). Already here the meta-philosophical problem of the unbridgeable distance between the specialized, truly professional philosophy and the mass media that is not. If we emphasize the oppositional relationship between professional / non-professional and analytical / media, we can deduce that the break between analytical and continental is not overcome. The question is not exempt from the introduction by the author of a deduction: publicly legitimated philosophy enjoys public funding, which rigorous philosophy will not be able to obtain, but nothing is told about private funding which we believe is not lacking in these areas of study.

There is a fundamental intellectual honesty in the scholar, which is perceived when he recognizes how the growing specialization comes to break the links with common sense, which were previously considered a strength. The problem actually goes further: the research fields are increasingly a meeting place and exclusive debate for experts, or super-experts, hence the doubts expressed for example by Morin (2000) on the applicability of “cognitive democracy” to interior of the current democratic civilization. Manzoni, in more recent times (2014), considered that hyper-specialists puts the tradition of philosophical heritage in difficulty for several reasons: it takes away meaning from the problematic dimension, neglects the philosophy-society and philosophy-wisdom relationships.

His reflection, in my completely personal vision, tends to expire when he deals with the “others” who are, still and always the continents, who would be constantly in the media, recognized by the public so much that they can carry out the philosophy festivals. They end up no longer remaining in the specificity of the profession, becoming commentators and full-time experts.

The risk of making every herb a bundle is evident: I can’t remember seeing philosophers on television so often, except for Cacciari, who for his past is normal to express political opinions. Others write articles in newspapers, even in high circulation, but they are not only the continental ones; still others participate in philosophy festivals. In substance, the reasons for this criticism seem weak to me,
while the media non-participation of the analytics is explained, at least in part, with a certain sense of superiority and detachment from the public sphere. But the most questionable question is undoubtedly that of standards, the real workhorse of analytical philosophy. It defines its standards and then judges, based on them, the philosophical work of others; here then that hermeneutics could also be saved from continental drift, but it is not accurate enough to fall within the standards (ibid., pp. 20-22).

And what if hermeneutics, or other continental philosophical tendencies believed to employ other standards to verify professionalism? This is not contemplated and we have the doubt that this does not happen for seriously philosophical, but ideological, as ideological seems to us the concept of genealogy, which can never be, in an authentic philosophical vision, an instrument to destroy the work of others as it can happen in the scientific field with an experiment, which negates in fact the explanation of a previous theory. In philosophical work a series of steps must be made to reconstruct a context and the procedural sequences that led to building a model of thought.

Perhaps we should resign ourselves to the idea that the charm of philosophy, which affects the public even of the incompetent, consists in the greatness of the questions and in the courage with which answers are attempted. For this reason, we have suggested to Antonello, if he wants to train himself in philosophy, to have courage to probe the doubts we all have, to ask himself about the meaning of life, transcendence, good and justice, and we stop here. The general fields of interest do not produce the absence of professionalism but represent an exercise and a context of comparison for more specific and detailed works. The specialization that is so dear to analytical philosophers is tinged with the colors of a dogmatism of manner, expression of an incurable bourgeois conception of life and culture, which loves the status quo, the continuity of a perpetual capitalism with its science for a few, who likes it the most, for those few, it produces wealth.

With all frankness, although a philosopher for pleasure, I feel continental and I hope that my young friend will know how to choose the way that is most congenial to him, without any debt towards my positions, but respecting the difference and dignity of all positions democratically She expressed. By virtue of this I allow myself one last affectionate suggestion, which finds its fulcrum in distant roots. In the early seventies, when the theoretical clash between the two styles of thought was in full evidence, the first important philosopher of Italian science of Marxist orientation, Ludovico Geymonat, in his monumental philosophical-scientific work, entrusted the chapter to Alberto Meotti Developments of logical empiricism, which in the end states: “Several criticisms can be made to logical empiricism (…): for example its detachment from the problems of man, society and history. However, we must recognize the merit of having emphasized that philosophical problems are clarified and resolved with the use of rigorous language."

This can be considered a valuable indication for the systematic study of precisely those problems that logical empiricism has neglected “(1976, vol. VII, p. 260).

References


