

Elections for Peace

*An Analysis of Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center's Election
Mediation in the 1990 Nicaraguan and 2006 Palestinian
Elections*

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Chapter 1: Introduction

An individual is not swept along a tide of inevitability but can influence even the greatest human events. [...]

Even without government power – and often in opposition to it – individuals can enhance human rights and wage peace, actively and effectively.

- Jimmy Carter¹

1.1 Small Actors, Big Possibilities?

Former US President, James Earl (Jimmy) Carter, Jr., has made it his goal to fight for peace and human rights at a global scale. Carter's quest for peace focuses on the role individuals and organizations can play in international affairs, and through the activities of the Carter Center, established in 1982 by the former president, Carter hopes to realize his mission. It is the purpose of this thesis to examine Carter and his Center's work for democracy and peace, and especially their election mediation as a strategy for peace. The importance of individual involvement can be verified if Carter and his Center are successful in their strategy, making peace-building a private as well as a governmental enterprise.

Violent conflicts within and between states are never easy to solve. Different settings demand different solutions, and despite continuous efforts, some conflicts seem impossible to mediate. States, international organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and private individuals are all important actors in conflict resolution, and the number of participants in peace work seems only to be growing. Despite this attention to the settling of disputes, wars and violent conflicts dominate international relations, making the challenge of how to assure peace, and whether democracy can be the solution, a million dollar question. This interest in settling of conflicts is also a personal one, where the role of smaller actors and NGOs are of particular interest. Thus, a preliminary hypothesis for this thesis is that NGOs can contribute to peace.

¹ Jimmy Carter, *The Nobel Peace Prize Lecture*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 14.

One NGO involved in democracy work as a way of building peace is the Carter Center. The Center, located in Atlanta, was created as a place to resolve conflicts, and “would stand on the humanitarian principle that everyone on earth should be able to live in peace.”² Today, the organization consists of about 150 persons and with Jimmy Carter at its front, the Center works to wage peace, fight diseases, and build hope around the world. The thesis focuses on Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center’s involvement in conflicts through what they label Peace Programs, and especially on conflict resolution and peace-building by election mediation, thereby concentrating on the international aspect of their work. Whether Jimmy Carter and Carter Center are the same, or if there are differences between the organization and the man, is worthy of a book on its own. This thesis, however, writes from the position that the two equal each other and that Carter’s values and ideals are transmitted through the Center.

The organization’s work for democracy and peace adds to a wide concept of human rights, linking Carter’s post-presidency to his years in office. As president between 1977 and 1981, Carter wanted human rights to be the center of US foreign policy and as ex-president he set out to continue this emphasis on human rights, making the historian Douglas Brinkley argue that Carter is continuing his unfinished presidency.³

According to the former president, democratic elections are one of the best ways to resolve disputes,⁴ thus making election mediation a strategy for peace. The former president’s idea of democratization is to let “the local people [...] decide on their own procedures and techniques and then to honor the results of free elections [.]”⁵ thereby advocating democratization which respects local conditions and wishes. This approach is characterized by supporting national and regional initiatives, with external actors assisting such progress. A forced democracy, on the other hand, can be described as imposing a set of beliefs without regard to local conditions. Carter and his Center oppose the latter one, and base their election mediation on national and regional initiatives for democracy. Carter and his Center undertake long term commitments in connection with elections when invited, and use their expertise, experience, and influence to assist in making elections take place.⁶ Involving only when requested means that Carter and his Center receive a mandate from local authorities to

² Douglas Brinkley, *The Unfinished Presidency: Jimmy Carter’s Journey to the Nobel Peace Prize*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 91.

³ Brinkley, 76, 91, and 211.

⁴ Jimmy Carter, “Letter to Magnus Evensen,” (October 3, 2006.) (Referred to as *Carter (2006A)* hereafter.)

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ The Carter Center, “Promoting Democracy, Election Monitoring - Carter Center Democracy Program,” URL: [<http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/index.html>] [Entered October 16th, 2006.]

observe elections, something which provides access to all aspects of an election. Democratization as a way of building peace is a strategy which uses a correlation between a form of government and peaceful conduct as an ideological base. This assertion has been questioned by different scholars, something the thesis addresses later. Election mediation as a strategy for peace hence builds on this belief, and makes the theory of a democratic peace important to the Center's work. Thereby, the preliminary question behind this thesis is: how does the Carter Center attempt to wage peace through democratic election mediation?

1.2 The Democratic Peace Theory

The basic premise of the democratic peace theory is that democracies do not fight each other.⁷ The theory, which originated with the Philosopher Immanuel Kant in the 18th century, sets up the premise that pairs, or dyads, of democracies have peaceful relations, hence creating a pattern of dyadic peace. Two societies with democratic values and democratic political institutions are not likely to fight each other due to inherent values and structural (institutional) constraints in the two democracies. As a democratic form of government is combined with economic and international organizational interdependence, a democracy launching war on another democracy is less likely than other pairs of states fighting each other.⁸ The theory has gotten renewed interest the last decades, and among its recent advocates are Professor of International Relations and Political Science, Bruce Russett, Professor of International Studies, John Oneal, and Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute of Oslo, Nils Petter Gleditsch. These academics, and others, are central in this thesis' presentation of the theory, which is discussed in depth in chapter two.

The focus of this thesis is on the Carter Center's election mediation as contributing to peace, thereby linking the democratic peace theory to the organization's work. If the Center is successful in its election mediation, it is convinced that it can contribute to conflict resolution and peace. According to Russett and Oneal, a country which becomes democratic is in general less inclined towards violent conflicts internally as well as externally due to respect for human rights and international law.⁹ A democratic election would in this connection be one starting point for internal and dyadic peace, and thereby a way to resolve conflicts through peaceful

⁷ Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Democracy and Peace," in *Journal of Peace Research*, 29.4 (November 1992), 370. URL: [<http://www.jstor.org/search/>] [Entered January 18th, 2007.]

⁸ Bruce Russett and John Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations*, (New York: W. W Norton & Company, 2001), 48-49, 53, and 65.

⁹ *Ibid*, 78-79.

means. For the work of the Carter Center, this means that a successful election can help resolve domestic and external conflicts, an aspect this thesis sets out to examine critically.

1.3 Hypothesis and Questions

Whether democratic elections can contribute to peace is central to the success of the Carter Center's involvements, and as elections do not take place solely on the basis of the involvement of one external actor, the preliminary question behind this thesis needs to be narrowed to the conditions under which the Carter Center attempts to mediate democratic elections as a strategy for peace. Based on this concentration, this thesis' hypothesis is:

The Carter Center can contribute to democracy and peace through its election mediation.

While the main questions the thesis aims at discussing become:

Did Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center meet their own objectives through election mediation, and was their approach a successful strategy for peace?

What are possibilities and limitations of Carter and the Center's involvements, and how did certain conditions influence their work?

1.4 Approach

Two examples of the Carter Center's election mediation are used in order to test this thesis' hypothesis, and to answer its main questions. This approach is used in order to examine possibilities and restraints of the Center's involvements, and to determine under what circumstances the Center is likely to succeed in its elections mediation.

The third chapter of the thesis concerns the first test case, the Center's election mediation in Nicaragua in 1990. These elections have been characterized as a success by Professor in Political Science, James Larry Taulbee, and Professor of History and Political Science, Marion Creekmore Jr.¹⁰ Hence, the test case of Nicaragua is used as an example of the possibilities of the Center's activities. The case also has connections with Jimmy Carter's

¹⁰ James Larry Taulbee and Marion V. Creekmore Jr., "NGO Mediation: The Carter Center," in *International Peacekeeping*, 10.1 (2003), 156. URL: [http://serials.abc-clio.com/active/start?_appname=serials] [Entered February 22nd, 2006.]

presidential career, and events which took place in Nicaragua during Carter's presidency are thereby of importance to the role Carter played in the 1990 elections.

The second test case, presented in chapter four, focuses on the 2006 election in Palestine. The election has not made the situation better for the Palestinians internally or externally, and one can thus ask whether the election was a failure. Due to the apparently negative results, this test case represents limitations of the Center's ability to contribute to democracy and conflict resolution, and thus functions as moderation to the positive example of the first test case. The election in Palestine is, like the ones in Nicaragua, connected with Carter's presidency, adding to the sense of Carter continuing efforts he began as president.

1.5 Conditions

An unlimited amount of conditions may influence the work of Carter and his Center. This thesis only focuses on some of these in order to answer the thesis' hypothesis, to compare possibilities and restraints of the Center's work, and to limit the scope of the thesis. Here, four conditions are examined: a) international organizations' cooperation with the Carter Center, b) Jimmy Carter's political background and reputation as influencing the work of the Center, c) regional initiatives for democracy and peace as influencing the role of Carter and his Atlanta based organization, and d) US foreign policy towards the conflict in question.

The involvement of international organizations as the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organization of American States can offer assistance, attention and guarantee fairness in elections. The work the Carter Center is often dependent on these organizations, and through cooperation they form strengthened election observations.

As noted, Jimmy Carter's reputation is connected with the two test cases. The relationship Carter developed with Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua and the passion for peace in the Holy Land Carter showed through the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, influence the work of the Carter Center. Thereby, Carter's presidency, personal relationships, and reputation are assets which the Center can use in its election mediation. This factor may also limit the work of Carter and the Center if his political background causes negative reactions and a less favorable reputation. Thereby, Carter's character as a former president is a condition worth examining.

Regional initiatives for democracy and peace make up important foundations for the work of the Carter Center. In the case of Nicaragua, the Center's work was made possible by

preceding regional initiatives for democracy, something which contributed to the organization's success. In the period before the Palestinian election, regional peace proposals had failed, and Jimmy Carter and his Center could not rely on regionally established democratization. Hence, the condition of regional initiatives for democracy and peace is examined as an aspect which can explain possibilities and limitations of the Center's work.

American foreign policy has shifted according to succeeding presidents after Carter, and their attitudes and policies towards the test cases have implications for the involvement of other actors in peace building. The role the US can play as the world's only superpower, the pressure it can add, and the resources it can employ, make crucial contributions to a possible solution of a crisis. Still, the role of the US can also work against resolutions; expanding the role other actors can play in peace building. The Center's election mediation is in this thesis viewed in light of US foreign policy toward Nicaragua during the George Herbert Walker Bush administration and the present George W. Bush administration's policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The purpose of including these four conditions is to give the work of the Center different perspectives, and add to a sense of a complex situation in which different actors and interests involve in peace making. Possibilities and limitations of Carter and the Carter Center's work in this myriad of actors are hence discussed through out the thesis.

1.6 Material

The sources for this thesis draw on both primary and secondary material. Works by Jimmy Carter give interesting insights as well as valuable information about how Carter views his presidential activities and his post-presidential career. They also spell out a strong sense of morality, something which is central to the work of the Carter Center. Field - and election reports by the Carter Center are good first hand sources about how the Center works and how it views the results of its activities, and are thereby crucial in describing how the Center attempts to wage peace. The Center's election reports from the two test cases are in this connection of great value for the thesis.

Correspondence with Jimmy Carter forms another primary source for this thesis. Though this contact is of limited scope, it does answer questions in connection with the thesis directly, and is thus of great interest. Replies to questions by e-mails from Jay Kingham

fellow in International Regulatory affairs at the Heritage Foundation, Brett D. Schaefer, are also included as primary material for the thesis.

One interview has been conducted in connection with this thesis. Professor of Political Science, James Larry Taulbee at Emory University, was interviewed in connection with a research trip to the US and Atlanta in the summer of 2006. One interview with a former director at the Carter Center was found in the Jimmy Carter Library in Atlanta, and together, the two interviews make up the oral documentation for the thesis. Some other documents from this presidential library, together with several newspaper articles, are also included as primary sources.

Secondary bibliographic sources about Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center give additional information about their work, as well as a perspective of people not directly connected to the Center. Bibliographies and academic journals form a background to the work of the Carter Center in the two areas. Academic works concerning the role of Carter and the Carter Center in the two cases are used in order to balance the view presented in the Center's own reports. Works concerning the history of Nicaragua and Palestine, as well as bibliographic sources concerning democratization in these two cases, are also used as to get a perception of the two test cases' history and development.

1.7 Structure of Thesis

The thesis is divided into four chapters in addition to the introduction. The main question and the hypothesis are sought answered and discussed throughout the different chapters. The second chapter introduces the work of Jimmy Carter and his Center, and focuses on the theoretical foundations for their work. Definitions of central concepts are presented, together with the work, underlying ideology, and morality of Carter and the Center. Theories of international relations are included to place the work of the Center in a theoretical framework, and to give different perspectives on the work of the Center.

Chapter three and four concern the two test cases and describe the work of the Center in light of the four described conditions. Chapter three aims at discussing whether the Center reached its set goals in Nicaragua and how four conditions can explain the organization's success. The thesis' fourth chapter is devoted to the test case of the 2006 election in Palestine and discusses if the Center's involvement failed to meet its objectives, and if so, how the four

conditions affected this. Whether Carter and the Center's approach was a successful strategy for peace is important in both test cases.

The concluding chapter aims at bringing together the findings from the previous chapters and compare and contrast the test cases. Possibilities and limitations of Carter and the Center's work are thus discussed in light of four conditions. If the Center can play a role in conflict resolution and peace building is also central to the final chapter. Before discussing negative and positive examples of election mediation, the next chapter focuses on foundations for Carter and the Center's work.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Foundations

2.0 Introduction

Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center's election mediation is based on a hands on approach where practical aspects dominate. Still, their work builds on theoretical foundations, something this chapter centers on. The premise that democracy ends conflicts and builds peace is central to the Center's approach to conflict resolution, linking the organization's work on the ground with theories of international relations. This chapter focuses on defining the mission of Carter and the Carter Center before theories behind their work are presented. The concept of realism, idealism and the democratic peace theory, are included as to put the Center's work in a theoretical framework.

2.1 The Mission of the Carter Center

In order to examine the work of Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center, the mission behind their work should be defined. The following discusses how Carter and the Center's view on peace, democracy, and human rights is connected with Carter's personal beliefs, and how the former president and his organization's practical approach to election mediation can be seen in terms of theories of international relations.

As the Carter Center is defined as an NGO in this thesis, the term deserves an explanation. NGOs have, according to Professor of Political Science, Chadwick F. Alger, been fighting for human rights and humanitarian principles for many centuries, and include organizations as Amnesty International, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, and Medicines sans Frontiers to mention a few.¹¹ The number and range of NGOs have grown extensively the last couple of decades, and NGOs can be labeled differently according to their activities or a scholar's perceptions. This is exemplified by the Professors in Political Science, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, who, instead of the term NGO, use 'transnational networks':

By importing the network concept from sociology and applying it transnationally, we bridge the increasingly artificial divide between international and national realms... The networks we

¹¹ Chadwick F. Alger, "Expanding Involvement of NGOs in Emerging Global governance," in *Subcontracting Peace: The Challenges of NGO Peacebuilding*, ed. Oliver P. Richmond and Henry F. Carey, (Hampshire, Eng.: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 3.

describe in this book participate in domestic and international politics simultaneously, drawing on a variety of resources, as if they were a part of an international society.¹²

This thesis uses term NGO, but in the meaning of Keck and Sikkink, defining NGOs as non-state transnational actors in the international society. This definition can be used to describe the work of the Carter Center as a human rights NGO working for peace in the widest sense domestically and internationally, although this thesis focuses on the international part of the Center's work.

Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center include democracy and human rights in their definition of peace. In 2002, Jimmy Carter was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for "his decades of untiring effort to find peaceful solutions to international conflicts, to advance democracy and human rights, and to promote economic and social development."¹³ Furthermore, the Nobel Committee emphasized Carter's involvement in elections and conflict resolution as "international co-operation based on international law, respect for human rights and economic development."¹⁴ The Peace Prize thus denoted how the work of Carter and the Center to wage peace goes beyond the mere absence of conflict. Under what the Center label as their Peace Programs, it includes, among other aspects, conflict resolution, democracy programs, and human rights initiatives,¹⁵ thus showing a similar conception of peace work as the Nobel Peace Prize Committee. As the focus of this chapter is on election mediation as conflict resolution and peace work, the concept of democracy is an important aspect to examine.

Carter defines democracy as a form of government in which representatives are elected through fair elections by a majority of the people, two or more parties compete for power, leaders are responsible and equitable to the people, and in which civil liberties and human rights are protected. The elections must include local citizens as poll watchers, possibilities for candidates to qualify for the election, correct and available lists of candidates, free voting arrangements, accurate counting of the ballots, and must take place under peaceful conditions, to mention some requirements made by Carter.¹⁶ Carter's definition has commonalities with a definition offered by Professor of International Relations and Political Science, Bruce Russett, and Professor of International Studies, John Oneal, who see the

¹² Alger, 4.

¹³ Carter (2002), x.

¹⁴ Ibid, xi.

¹⁵ The Carter Center, URL: [<http://www.cartercenter.org/peaceprograms/peacepgm.htm>] [Entered June 6th, 2006.]

¹⁶ Jimmy Carter, *Talking Peace: A Vision for the Next Generation*, (New York: Dutton Children's Books, 1995), 129-130. (Referred to as *Carter (1995B)* hereafter.)

protection and promotion of civil liberties and human rights as making up an important foundation of values in democracies.¹⁷ Carter sees democracy as a basis for human rights,¹⁸ and the two concepts are therefore intertwined in Carter and the Center's work. Carter's view on democracy can be seen as a humanistic approach to the form of governance, where aspects of human rights are present.

Carter has a broad definition of human rights, and in his Nobel Peace Prize Lecture he included "not only the right to live in peace, but also [...] adequate health care, shelter, food, and [...] economic opportunity"¹⁹ in this concept. As Carter and the Center work to protect and promote human rights around the world, they can be said to favor a universal approach to human rights. Thereby, Carter and his Center can be said to follow the ideas behind the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948, which was written as a "common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations."²⁰ There are those who oppose the declaration as universal and claim that some rights are culturally determined and therefore that different rights apply in different settings.²¹ Both Carter and the former United Nation's (UN) Secretary General, Koffi Annan, seem to oppose this relativism, Carter through his definition of human rights as applying to every human being and by the Center's human rights work around the world, and Annan by his statement that "it was never the people who complained of the universality of human rights, nor did the people consider human rights as a western imposition. It was often their leaders who did so."²² As the UN also sees fair elections as a part of the promotion of human rights,²³ both the Center and the UN share a common view of election work as a part of human rights and peace work.

Carter's definition of human rights includes aspects of religion, as he sees human beings as having a religious mandate to alleviate the plight of those in need, and that God's kingdom will mean an end to economic and political injustice. Taking care of the environment and following the teachings of the Prince of Peace,²⁴ are also aspects which add up to a concept of human rights that is related to the teachings of the Bible.

¹⁷ Russett and Oneal, 44.

¹⁸ Carter (1995B), 104.

¹⁹ Carter (2002), xii.

²⁰ The United Nations, "The Universal Declaration of Human rights," URL: [<http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>] [Entered May 31st, 2006.]

²¹ Karen Mingst, *Essentials of International Relations. 2nd Edition*, (New York: W. W. Norton Company, 2003), 267.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid, 269.

²⁴ Jimmy Carter, *Our Endangered Value: America's Moral Crisis*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc. 2005): 178, 177, and 146.

Another aspect which overlaps with Carter's view on human rights, and with his religious beliefs, is his morality. Carter holds that everyone should be treated with respect, that terrorists should be treated according to international law, and that the rich should reach out to the poor,²⁵ in short that everyone has the right to certain standards of living. Carter's humanism is thus based in the Christian tradition of doing onto others what you would have them do onto you.

Carter's morality can be seen as having much in common with the Humanity Formula of Kant's Categorical Imperative, which read that we are not to treat others as mere means to our own ends,²⁶ meaning that all human beings should be treated with dignity. One consequence of treating others with respect is that it becomes hard to dehumanize fellow human beings. Carter warns against reducing the value of one's opponent, and is outraged by the ill treatment of prisoners denied rights stated in the Geneva Convention.²⁷ If people view others as their equal, it can be argued that degrading or killing them will be increasingly difficult. The dehumanization of one's enemy is common in warfare, and can make the act of killing seem more justifiable. When dehumanization becomes difficult, and when moral principles of human dignity are followed, degrading treatment and war can be seen as a more remote possibility, meaning that the morality of Carter and Kant can promote peaceful conduct. This aspect of morality expands on Carter's broader view on democratic and human rights, values that are tried realized in practice through the Center's work.

Carter's methodology is based on a hands-on-approach, something Carter also practiced as president. As private citizen and leader of the Carter Center, the ex-president wants results, and prefers to take up problems directly with heads of states. Carter also travels to conflict areas in order to understand them better, and to have more information to build proposed solutions on. This active role means that Carter often negotiates with top leaders, while experts from the Center train local citizens as to provide knowledge and authority in solving their own matters.²⁸ Carter's activist approach has, according to Douglas Brinkley, resulted in the release of 50,000 prisoners of conscience,²⁹ showing the effectiveness of Carter's involvement and his personal conviction to protect human rights. This exemplifies a special feature of the Carter Center which few other organizations have, a former American

²⁵ Carter (2005), 126-130 and 180.

²⁶ Robert Johnson, "The Humanity Formula," in "Kant's Moral Philosophy," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2004 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL: [<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/kant-moral/>] [Published Feb 23rd, 2004] [Modified Feb 26th, 2004] [Entered May 31st, 2006.]

²⁷ Carter (2005), 126-130.

²⁸ Brinkley, 217, 212 and, 231; and Carter (2005), 181.

²⁹ Brinkley, 212.

President who can gain access to both world leaders and the media to a greater extent than most NGOs.

The Carter Center's election mediation is one special methodology which shows how Carter and the Center's ideas concerning human rights and democracy are transformed into practice. The Carter Center has observed about 60 elections in over 25 countries, but their election work goes beyond observing. The Professors Taulbee and Creekmore Jr., label NGO election mediation as "a special kind of conflict resolution,"³⁰ thus adding aspects of peaceful resolution of conflicts into the Center's election work. The Carter Center's work to promote and secure human rights thus adds up to a form of election mediation which combines observing with active promotion of democratic ideals.

The Carter Center is involved in a country before, during and after elections take place. Prior to elections, the Center is active in helping national leaders define the rules for the elections and also in making sure the leaders abide the results.³¹ This can be defined as a method of conflict resolution, as Jimmy Carter and his Center can contribute to a peaceful transition between opposing parties. One example of this is the 1990 presidential election in Nicaragua, where Jimmy Carter, the Carter Center, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN mediated a successful democratic transition when the Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega voluntarily left office as president after losing the democratic election to the opposition's candidate, Violetta Barrios de Chamorro.³² This example shows how Carter and the Center's method include cooperation with international organizations in order to achieve results.

The Carter Center's election mediation relies on cooperation with national authorities. The Center is only involved when it is invited by the electoral authorities and is welcomed by the major parties contending for power in the election.³³ Being requested to participate gives the Center legitimacy and assures them access to observe the entire electoral process, and also makes the Center's involvement different from democratization by force. A forced democracy could be seen as an oxymoron, democracy should be a will of the people, and not something imposed on the people. An imposed democracy by military means would be at risk with

³⁰ Taulbee and Creekmore, 158.

³¹ The Carter Center, URL: [<http://www.cartercenter.org/peaceprograms/program10.htm>] [Entered May 25th, 2006.]

³² Brinkley, 300; and John Whiteclay Chambers, II, "Jimmy Carter's Public Policy Ex-Presidency", in *Political Science Quarterly*, 113.3 (autumn, 1998), 413. URL: [<http://www.jstor.org/search/>] [Entered January 18th, 2006]; and Taulbee and Creekmore, 159-162.

³³ The Carter Center, URL: [<http://www.cartercenter.org/peaceprograms/program10.htm>] [Entered May 25th, 2006.]

international law, and would undermine democratic principles and rights, causing a forced democracy to be in conflict with the values it tries to achieve.

In the phase before elections, the Carter Center monitors voter registration and voter education as well as estimating the fairness of the election campaign.³⁴ During the election, the Center's observers are stationed around the country at different voting places to determine the accuracy of the election process. The observers monitor the counting and casting of the ballots and talk with polling site officials and voters to note any complaints. This work can give voters a sense of confidence in the elections, and thereby make the voters trust the elections.³⁵ The legitimacy the Center can offer is tied to the fact that international involvement offers international pressure through media reports and the negative consequences a bad election can bring if the observers criticize the election. International pressure and sanctions may be invoked against a nation perceived to underscore democracy, and as such may make national leaders inclined to promote a fair election. Due to the fact that the Center observers get access to world leaders and top governmental officials, they can use their position to promote democracy and come with direct criticism to national leaders. Jimmy Carter is and has been personally involved in many elections, as in the Nicaraguan elections and the elections in the Palestinian territories, adding pressure to leaders and giving media attention to his Center's activities.

After elections, the Center observes the counting of the votes and the delivery of the ballot boxes, before the whole team meets to issue a collective statement on the fairness of the election. "Qualified high-level observers can serve as mediators to facilitate the peaceful transfer of power"³⁶ when necessary, thus making the Center involved to see the actual transfer of power taking place and expanding mediation efforts to other people than Carter himself. The Center also commits to long term involvements, operations in which their presence is continued after the inauguration of a new president or legislative assembly in order to assist in securing confidence in the new democratic institutions. The Center involves to strengthen democratic institutions, something which adds up to the total of what the Center believes a democracy should be: a society with strong democratic institutions, a living civil society and where civil liberties and human rights are protected.

³⁴ The Carter Center, URL: [<http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/nondatabase/wagingpeaceelections.htm>] [Entered April 25th, 2006.]

³⁵ Ibid; and Taulbee and Creekmore, 158.

³⁶ The Carter Center, URL: [<http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/nondatabase/wagingpeaceelections.htm>] [Entered April 25th, 2006.]

The Carter Center is one of several organizations which have signed the *Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation*. This document specifies how organizations should involve in election observation, and one criterion mandates the organizations to cooperate with each other in conducting international election observations, in order to maximize the contribution of their efforts.³⁷ The Carter Center's work can here be said to be included as a part of an international cooperation effort, showing how international organizations not only cooperate, but also that they are dependent on each other for successful involvements.

Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center's mission can be labeled a quest for the realization of a wide concept of peace and human rights inspired by Christianity, sought achieved through a method of election mediation based on a humanistic approach to democracy. The Center's international focus on human rights, and their reasoning for their work, can be explained and criticized by different theoretical approaches, something the next section addresses.

2.2 Theories of International Relations

There are different approaches to how the international community works and how it should work. Three theories are presented in this chapter, where the main distinction is between realism on the one side and liberalism and idealism on the other. There are several directions within each of these theories, and this chapter focuses on broader lines of theories of international relations.

2.2.1 Realism and Liberalism

Advocates of the theory of realism view the international system as anarchic, meaning that there is no authoritative hierarchy, leading states to trust themselves for survival. Realists view international affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states,³⁸ and present the theory as an "antidote to the naïve belief that international institutions and law alone can preserve peace,"³⁹ a misconception many realists believe paves the way to war. Realists also

³⁷ The Carter Center, *Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers*, (New York: United Nations, 2005). URL: [www.cartercenter.org/documents/2231.pdf] [Entered May 23rd, 2006.]

³⁸ Mingst, 67; and Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," in *Foreign Policy*, 145 (2004), 55

³⁹ Snyder, 55.

view military might as central to a state's survival, and that a state which grows more powerful than the opponent will use this power to expand its sphere of influence. Instead of basing a nation's policy in international cooperation through international institutions, realists hold that stability is to be secured through a balance of power and that "policy must be based on positions of real strength, not on empty bravado or hopeful illusions about a world without conflict."⁴⁰ Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center's work for peace focuses on international cooperation and on the possibility of a world without conflict. As their work also centers on the work of non-state actors, they contradict central aspects of realism.

An opposing tradition to realism is liberalism, which holds that realism has a stunned vision that cannot account for the progress in relations between states [and that there is a] slow but inexorable journey away from the anarchical world the realists envision, as trade and finance forge ties between nations, and democratic norms spread.⁴¹

Because elected leaders are accountable to the people, who bear the burdens of war, liberals expect that democracies will not fight each other, and will regard each other's regimes as legitimate and non-threatening (adding up to what has been labeled the democratic peace theory). The rule of law and transparency of the democratic process will, according to liberals, make it easier to sustain international cooperation, especially when cooperation is based in multilateral institutions.⁴² Liberalists can thus be seen as more positive towards both human nature and international cooperation, and view peaceful relations between states as a real possibility, not as a naïve idea. This tradition has commonalities with Carter and the Carter Center's fight for human rights and their view of the importance of international cooperation. Thereby, liberalism provides theoretical foundations for the work for Carter and his Center.

2.2.2 Idealism

A third theory of international relations is idealism, and can be seen to have common features with liberalism while opposing realism. According to idealists "foreign policy is and should be guided by ethical and legal standards,"⁴³ something which can be seen to oppose realism's focus on national interests as the basis for a nation's foreign policy. Such an emphasis on ethics can be found in the statements of former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, exemplified by his belief that "there is a universal interest standing above all particular or national

⁴⁰ Snyder, 56; and Mingst, 71.

⁴¹ Mingst, 71.

⁴² Ibid, 56.

⁴³ Ibid, 59.

interests. The interest is identical with that of humanity, with the basic rights of man.”⁴⁴ Wilson also called for a new definition of nationality and of sovereignty, “a definition conditioned by universal standards of morality.”⁴⁵ Here, Wilson can be seen as putting the interests of individuals above the interests of states, something which is opposite of what the realist and Professor of Political Science, Kenneth Waltz, would favor. Waltz’ conservative state centered realism is criticized by Professor of Political Science, Jürg Martin Gabriel, for not protecting the rights of individuals: “Given the permanent international security problem Waltz cannot possibly emphasize the virtues of an open world society, human rights and democracy. The rights of nations are more important than the rights of individuals.”⁴⁶ Hence, the state centered realism of Waltz differs most distinctly from the idealism exemplified by Wilson. As Jimmy Carter views human rights as universal and due to the fact that he and his Center work to secure the rights of humanity across the globe, both the Center and Carter have a focus on the rights of the individual which differs from the realist focus on the interests of states.

Another difference between idealism and realism is their perception of the importance of the state. Realism focuses on national interests as being the center of state action, and according to former Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger “a wise realist policymaker would not be moved by sentiment alone or personal welfare, but by the calculation of the national interest.”⁴⁷ To Carter and other idealists, national policy should be made out of moral principles. He actually refused to take a stand between the two traditions of idealism and realism as president, saying that “the demonstration of American idealism was a practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs, and moral principles were the best foundation for the exertion of American power and influence.”⁴⁸ The statement still shows how Carter believes foreign policy should be based on ethics, placing him in an opposite tradition of realism. Carter’s administration also emphasized the importance of championing human rights, and his post-presidency has focused solely on the promotion of these rights and resolving conflicts through international cooperation, thus making Jimmy Carter an advocate of idealism.

⁴⁴ Jürg Martin Gabriel, *Worldviews and Theories of International Relations*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 78-79.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 79.

⁴⁶ Gabriel, 86.

⁴⁷ Mingst, 268.

⁴⁸ Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 1995), 147. (Referred to as *Carter (1995A)* hereafter.)

Realism sees the state as the main actor in international affairs, while idealism includes transnational networks and NGOs among these actors.⁴⁹ According to Gabriel, the state centered realism of Waltz

pays little attention to sub-national actors, to individuals, to private organizations, and to multinational corporations. He concedes that their dealings are of increasing importance in modern world but in his judgment they do not matter in determining the issues of war and peace.⁵⁰

In Gabriel's reading of Waltz, "national interests are in the foreground, sub-national interests in the background."⁵¹ Hence, the realism presented by Waltz is little compatible with NGO peace building as these organizations are seen as irrelevant by realists. Advocates of idealism would, according to Professor of International Relations, Jack Snyder, see transnational activist networks as having the possibility to create change through pressuring governments by uncovering and publicizing violations of norms.⁵² Here, the work of the Carter Center to alleviate all unnecessary suffering and to promote human rights fits into the latter tradition. In addition, Carter and the Center fit into a liberal tradition due to their focus on the spread of democracy as a way of creating favorable conditions for human rights and for peace.

The fact that Carter has stated that he could have bigger impact with the formation of a center based on human rights work than if he had been re-elected as president,⁵³ can be seen as a verification of Carter's beliefs in civic international involvement. Instead of focusing on the role of states, and the power he could have had as leader of the world's only superpower, Carter has taken a step in the opposite direction of state centered realism, and embraced idealism's focus on the importance and potential of non-state actors. Carter's idealism still contains elements of realism as much of Carter's force is connected to his presidency. His former career has given him power affiliated with that of a state, and Carter's work during his post-presidency makes use of the prestige, experience, contacts, and attention only a presidency can give. Thus, some of the powers realism focuses on contributes to the work of Carter and his Center, making parts of their underlying ideology dependent on contradicting theoretical foundations.

Just as Carter emphasizes the importance of values, so does another direction within idealism. This new brand of idealism is labeled constructivism, and expands on the

⁴⁹ Snyder, 59.

⁵⁰ Gabriel, 86-87.

⁵¹ Ibid, 87.

⁵² Snyder, 53-62.

⁵³ Brinkley, 91.

importance of ethics by claiming that “social reality is created through debate about values,”⁵⁴ and that individuals and groups can be powerful if they can persuade others to adopt their ideas. Constructivists study the role of trans-national activist networks in promoting change, where the uncovering of human rights violations is one important aspect of activism. Values and intellectuals are seen as having the potential of transforming society, and the notion of national interest is taken to be absurd,⁵⁵ thus creating a dichotomy between realism and constructivism. The Carter Center’s work to protect and promote human rights can here be seen to fit into the constructivist tradition of promoting values as basis for social transformation. Constructivists, as liberals and idealists, favor international accepted rules for international relations, but the theories can be seen to differ on the importance of dialogue for creating such rules. Constructivists would champion a cross-cultural dialogue to reach an agreement, while idealists are criticized for having the answer before-hand, thus making a discussion about the rules unnecessary.⁵⁶ Whether the Carter Center can be accused of imposing a fixed view of the world through their involvements is addressed later in the chapter.

Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center’s work is in the following labeled as idealism due to their focus on ethics, but still include the mentioned aspects of liberalism and constructivism. One of the most important aspects of liberalism that is included concerns how the Center’s work can be compared to the democratic peace theory.

2.2.3 The Democratic Peace

The democratic peace theory can be traced back to the writings of the philosopher Immanuel Kant in the 18th century. According to the professors Russett and Oneal’s reading of the philosopher, Kant maintained that “international peace could be established on a foundation of three elements: republican constitutions, “cosmopolitan” law embodied in free trade and economic interdependence, and international law and organizations.”⁵⁷ This idea has gained much attention the last decades, thus creating a link between the works of Kant and the present time. The already mentioned professors follow Kant in their statement that pairs of democracies rarely fight each other,⁵⁸ and are followed by Professor Gleditsch, who claims

⁵⁴ Snyder, 60.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 60-61.

⁵⁶ Snyder, 61.

⁵⁷ Russett and Oneal, 271.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 43 and 53-65.

“that wars [...] are non-existent (or very rare) among democracies.”⁵⁹ Professor Emeritus of Political Science, R. J. Rummel, continues this focus as he writes that the solution to wars, civil violence, genocide and mass murder is “to foster democratic freedom and to democratize coercive power and force [and that] democracies do not fight among themselves.”⁶⁰ Russett and Oneal base their assumption of the democratic peace theory on the Kantian triangle. This concept borrows the ideas previously mentioned by Kant about how democracy, economic interdependence and international organizations and international cooperation reduce the chance of conflict, and how this triangle thus can lead to (a democratic) peace.

The first leg of the triangle is democracy, and two important aspects of why democracy leads to peace, lies in the democratic institutions and norms democracy is said to produce. Immanuel Kant believed that

if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared, [...] nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war.⁶¹

Here, Kant can be said to argue that as long as the people are the ones with the final vote, a decision to go to war would be unlikely. Thus, the institutions of democracy, where people are given a say in political decisions, can be said to form a hinder to the declaration of war. In addition, it can be argued that as long as a democracy means that the elected leaders are responsible and accountable to the people, the leaders would face the possibility of not being re-elected if they went against popular demand and declared war. It would then be in the self interest of the leaders to follow the citizens’ demands not to declare war, where democracy hence would make war less likely. According to Russett and Oneal, democratic leader must pay a high price for fighting wars, thus reducing the likelihood of armed disputes in a democracy.⁶²

According to Taulbee, most people involved in the Carter Center’s work are more concerned with getting results than with theory, including Carter himself.⁶³ This lack of attention to theory does not, however, rule out the fact that their work is based on theoretical foundations. When the Carter Center claims it is waging peace through democratic

⁵⁹ Gleditsch, 370.

⁶⁰ Rudolph J. Rummel, “Chapter 1. Summary and Conclusions,” in *Power Kills*, 2-3. URL: [<http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/PK.CHAP1.HTM>] [Entered May 25th, 2006.]

⁶¹ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795)*, 4. URL: [<http://www.geocities.com/dspichtinger/otexts/perppeace.htm>] [Entered April 25th, 2006.]

⁶² Russett and Oneal, 54.

⁶³ James Larry Taulbee, “Personal Interview,” (Decatur, June 20th, 2006).

elections,⁶⁴ it is using the same logic as the democratic peace theory. If we take the democratic peace theory to be correct, then an NGO as the Carter Center can be seen to contribute to peace by promoting democracy. If the Center can contribute to democracy, this work could then also lead to a more peaceful society. Jimmy Carter's broad based concept of democracy as including human rights and a strong sense of morality would in the Center's work be tried transmitted to other societies, thus making Carter's values tried realized around the world. The concept of morality can be seen as a part of the democratic peace theory, as morality can be a check on degrading and violent behavior – something exemplified in both Kant's categorical imperative and in Carter's emphasis of treating other's with respect. If Carter's and Kant's concepts were followed and protected in a new democracy, then that nation would have to avoid degrading behavior internally as well as externally, posing moral limits on state and individual conduct which would lead to peaceful relations.

The second leg of the Kantian triangle concerns economic interdependence. Democracy and capitalism seems to go hand in hand, and according to Russett and Oneal, extensive trade develops between democracies due to their form of government.⁶⁵ It can be argued that as two nations are mutually dependent on each others economies; war between them would damage both economically, thus creating financial incentives to maintain peaceful relations. Bilateral trade and open markets will, according to the mentioned professors, reduce the likelihood of conflict as

[c]ountries that are interdependent bilaterally or economically open to the global economy, whether democratic or not, have an important basis for pacific relations and conflict resolution. Still, [...] those that are democratic, interdependent, and economically open [...] are most likely to be at peace.⁶⁶

Here it can be argued that it is not only the form of government which adds to the aspect of peaceful conduct, but that democracy, economic interdependence and international cooperation together will create peaceful relations. China and the US are one example of how a democracy and a non-democracy can cooperate and have peaceful relations despite not having the same form of government. The financial aspect leads to peaceful conduct, but that alone is, as the Kantian triangle shows, not enough to assure peace. If China was to become democratic, the possibility of peaceful relations between the nation and the US would be even greater, according to the Kantian triangle.

⁶⁴ The Carter Center, URL: [<http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/nondatabase/wagingpeaceelections.htm>]
[Entered April 25th, 2006.]

⁶⁵ Russett and Oneal, 125.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 155.

Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center see economic growth as a key to a stable and democratic society. If the Center can contribute to democracy, and the theory of democracies trading more with each other holds true, then the democratization efforts by the Center can assist the nations in which it involves in trading more with other democracies – hence creating economic interdependence and promoting peaceful relations between the trading partners. Economic isolation of a nation may hamper development, and reduce the likelihood of peaceful relations, hence showing the importance of financial aspects.

The last leg of the triangle concerns international cooperation and law, something Kant meant would be most effective among democracies, and would facilitate peaceful relations as well as a collective security for the participating democracies.⁶⁷ The sense of commonality with other people that emerge due to interaction across boundaries adds to the aspect of peace. Through international cooperation people can learn to understand each other's situations, something which can make people see commonalities and find mutual respect, in addition to making dehumanization of others difficult. The United Nations declaration of Human Rights can be seen as a result of international cooperation, thus denoting how cross-cultural values can be reached through international organizations and cooperation.

Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center favor international cooperation and Carter has said that the “international community – usually the UN- negotiated global standards to reach the generally accepted goals of society [of] [...] peace, freedom, human rights, environmental quality, the alleviation of suffering and the rule of law”⁶⁸ Here, the values of the international community coincides with the values of Carter and the Center, who also emphasize the importance of mutual respect. The Center has cooperated with international organizations in its work to promote democracy and human rights, and participated with, amongst others, the Organization of American States (OAS) in the election mediation in Nicaragua in 1990, and with the European Union and the UN to monitor the 2006 Palestinian election.⁶⁹ This can hence be seen as examples of how the Center favors international cooperation and that the Center and its founder see it as an international responsibility to help countries on the path to democracy and peace.

Through the Center's election mediation, the emerging democracies in which the Center involves are tied to the international community, something which may make these

⁶⁷ Ibid, 158.

⁶⁸ Carter (2002), 15-16.

⁶⁹ The Carter Center, URL:

[<http://www.cartercenter.org/activities/showdoc.asp?countryID=52&submenu=activities>] [Entered April 21st, 2006]; and The Carter Center, URL: [<http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2123.pdf>] [Entered April 21st, 2006.]

countries co-operate with international organizations in the future. International cooperation through international organizations like the UN would also mean that the state in question would accept international rules and international law. This is clearly a goal of Jimmy Carter and the Center as they seek to strengthen human rights and international standards set by the UN. Carter believes that the UN is the best venue for the maintenance of peace and that its decisions should be implemented, as in the Palestinian territories where Carter and the Center work for the UN resolutions to be effectuated. If the work of the Center can contribute to increased international cooperation, it can also spread values of democracy and peace.

Democracy, by its recognition of individual liberty and responsibility, encourages entrepreneurship and the expansion of commerce across national boundaries, according to Russett and Oneal. This economic activity makes nations interdependent, and creates a need for institutions to regulate and facilitate trade, which again leads to international law and institutions being created in response. Democracy, economic interdependence and international cooperation and law thus make up a whole that leads to peace.⁷⁰ These three aspects can be used to see how the Center's work fit into the democratic peace theory, where democratic values are of special importance.

2.2.4 Critique of the Democratic Peace Theory

There is a claim opposing the democratic peace theory which says that emerging and weak democracies are no more peaceful than other forms of political systems. Here, Russett and Oneal claim that it is regime instability that produces violent conflicts, and that democratization generally reduces the risk of war.⁷¹ One way of avoiding regime instability can be said to be involvement aimed at securing new democratic institutions, something the Carter Center does through its post-election work. By committing to long term involvements the Center aims at strengthening people's confidence in the democratic institutions and the institutions themselves. This has been done through various programs during the Center's history, including programs to promote human rights, to build a civil society, to refine the democratic election process and to address economic and development issues.⁷² Hence, the Center can be said to work to avoid regime instability, thereby working to reduce the risk of violent conflict.

⁷⁰ Russett and Oneal, 157.

⁷¹ Ibid, 51-52.

⁷² The Carter Center, URL: [<http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/nondatabase/wagingpeaceelections.html>] [Entered April 25th, 2006.]

Through the Center's election mediation, emerging democracies are tried assisted on the path to national self-determination and international recognition. The formation of a nation-state will often involve forcing minorities to be a part of a bigger formation, creating issues concerning suppression of minorities. Here, international cooperation, and the Center's election mediation, can be seen to be part of a solution. If the international community, represented by the UN, is to recognize a new nation, the nation will also have to sign UN declarations of human rights, thus posing formal and legal protection of minorities through acceptance of international standards. Democracy and human rights are tried realized through the Carter Center's election mediation, and as such the Center seeks to secure and promote the same values as the UN.

2.3 Conclusion

Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center focus on results more than what theory lies behind their activities. One of their tactics is to use election mediation as a strategy for peace, an approach which has human rights and a humanistic view of democracy as ideological foundations. Theories of international relations can explain the reasoning for the Center's goal-oriented work. Carter and his Center position themselves in a tradition of idealism, although Carter carries with him elements often associated with the power of states and thus the theory of realism. Carter's background as president of the US is thereby of crucial importance for the ability of Carter and the Center to realize their set goals.

The next chapters of the thesis discuss what Carter and the Center set out to accomplish through two specific involvements. Whether or not they reached their set goals is examined in light of a limited number of conditions as to debate possibilities and limitations of their work. Hence, the two test cases of the 1990 elections in Nicaragua and the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections aim at debating under what circumstances Carter and the Carter Center can contribute to democracy and peace through a method of election mediation.

Chapter 3: A More Democratic Nicaragua

3.0 Introduction

In 1990, Nicaragua made a leap towards democracy after the country's first national elections for president, legislative, municipal, and autonomous regional councils, in which all political parties participated and accepted the outcome.⁷³ As the elections also ended the Contra War, Nicaragua's democratization assured peace. This chapter discusses how Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center were dependent on factors beyond their control in their election mediation, and especially how four conditions were influential to their success. These factors concern how international organizations contributed in assuring the peaceful outcome, how Carter's reputation assisted him in establishing personal contacts he could influence, how Central American initiatives for democracy were crucial in bringing the election about, and finally how US foreign policy influenced the process. Before discussing these conditions, the chapter examines whether Carter and the Center reached the goals of their involvement.

3.1 Context

American interference, violent conflicts, and political ideology characterized the 1990 Nicaraguan elections. The US has been directly involved in Latin American affairs since the early 1800s, and had close contacts with its allies in the Nicaraguan Somoza dictatorship during the Cold War. This contact meant that the US held its hand over the one-family rule, something which changed during Carter's period in office. As the Somoza dynasty fell after the Sandinista revolution in 1979, the autocracy was replaced by a Sandinista lead socialistic government. This development was seen as a threat to US interests during Ronald Reagan's presidency, leading the 40th President of the US to give economic and military support to the formation of a contra revolutionary guard. This group, which operated from the neighboring country of Honduras, consisted of former National Guardsmen from the Somoza dictatorship, and went under the name of the Contras. Their contra revolutionary activities became known for brutal violations of human rights, and initiated a Nicaraguan civil war, also labeled the Contra War, which cost tens of thousands of casualties between 1981 and 1990. In addition to

⁷³ The Carter Center, *Observing Nicaragua's Elections, 1989-1990*, (May 1990), 10 and 25. URL: [\[http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1153.pdf#search=%22oas%20nicaraguan%20election%201990%22\]](http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1153.pdf#search=%22oas%20nicaraguan%20election%201990%22) [Entered September 26th, 2006.] (Referred to as *The Carter Center (1990)* hereafter.)

the military sanctions, an American economic embargo hurt the Sandinista government as well as the Nicaraguan population. The Sandinista government made moves towards democratization and held elections for the first time in 1984. As these elections were boycotted by the major opposition parties, the elections did not provide openly contested elections, and proved futile in reducing American hostility. In search of recognition and peace, the Sandinistas gave into internal and regional pressure and agreed to hold elections in 1990. Due to the fact that the Sandinistas and the united opposition, the UNO, as well as all the smaller political parties, agreed to participate and accept the outcome, development towards a more democratic Nicaragua was possible, something which also could reduce US aggression.⁷⁴

3.2 The Goals of the Observation Mission

Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center's involvement thus took place in an emerging democracy. Carter wanted personally to play a part in the democratization of Nicaragua, a process he meant would end the violence. To make sure of this, Carter wanted to build on his relationship with Ortega, and gain access to all aspects of the elections. Carter and the Center's election mediation focused on influencing the elections in a positive way by observing and conducting an impartial verdict. Further, Carter and the Center wanted to assure free and fair elections in which they would mediate any problems that might arise.⁷⁵ Hence, Carter and his Center's wanted their mediation to be a strategy for peace, and it is to the goals of mediation and contributing to peace that their efforts are judged in the following.

3.3 Waging Peace through Election Mediation

Jimmy Carter's personal involvement in the Nicaraguan elections assisted in strengthening local initiatives for democracy and peace. Furthermore, he pressured for the release of political prisoners, an aspect which contributed to widened political liberties. Carter's commitment also included cooperation with other organizations to assure the best possible coverage of the elections, as well as adding to pressure on the Sandinistas and the opposition to abide rules of democratic elections. Finally, he personally influenced the events of the election due to his personal contacts, reputation, and mediation. The next section describes

⁷⁴ William I. Robinson, *A Faustian Bargain: U.S. Intervention in the Nicaraguan Elections and American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 8; William H. Blanchard, *Neocolonialism American Style, 1960 – 2000*, (West Port: Greenwood Press, 1996), 51-55, and 57-70; and Carter (1995B), 135.

⁷⁵ Brinkley, 296-298.

how Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center attempted to wage peace through election mediation in Nicaragua, in cooperation with international observers, before, during and after the elections.

3.3.1 Assuring Foundations for Elections

Jimmy Carter's involvement in the Nicaraguan elections was based on regional foundations for democracy. Carter's work prior to the elections thus focused on meeting important persons behind the Central American democratization effort, as well as continuing the regional initiatives for political liberalization in Nicaragua. Carter and the Carter Center's operations in Nicaragua began with a visit to Central America in 1986, where Carter was joined by, amongst others, former National Security Advisor for Latin America and Carter Center Fellow, Robert A. Pastor. Starting in Costa Rica, Carter met with President Oscar Arias Sanchez who gave an update on how he and the Contadora Group (Columbia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) had been working to find a diplomatic solution to the struggle between the Sandinistas and the Contras. The Contadora Group was also joined by the Lima Group (Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay) in an effort to mediate civil conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Arias and President Vinicio Lorenzo of Guatemala had built on the work of the two groups and "decided to put the peace initiative in a Central American framework, calling for democratization and internal reconciliation throughout the region."⁷⁶ Both Carter and Arias agreed that the democratization and peace effort in Nicaragua was not exported from the US, but a desire of Nicaraguan the people. The two statesmen also agreed that the will of the people needed conditions in which to take root, foundations the regional initiatives could provide. Carter's idea was to build on this preceding work, and carve out a mediating role for himself.⁷⁷ Carter's focus on democracy as being a wish of the Nicaraguans, and on the regional initiatives for peace, showed the Center's activities as building on local and regional democratization.

During the 1986 journey, Carter pressured for human rights and the release of political prisoners, something which contributed in pushing Nicaragua towards a more democratic society. Carter had received reports from Amnesty International about the imprisonment of Deputy Secretary General of the trade union Nicaraguan Workers' Central (CNT), José Altamirano Rojas, along with a journalist, Luis Mora Sánchez, and made a plea for their

⁷⁶ Brinkley, 200.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

release. After first denying the existence of the prison in which they were held, Nicaraguan officials changed their policy and released the two prisoners.⁷⁸ This release showed the force of Carter's mission, and exemplified how a focus on human rights can cause change in the policies of otherwise oppressive regimes. It should be noted that Ortega at this time needed a better relationship with the US and wanted an end to the Contra activity and the American economic embargo. To be recognized by the US would in this connection mean a great deal for Ortega, and one way of achieving this was by creating an image of a more democratic society. Jimmy Carter was, in this perspective, just the man to help mend a dark picture of an oppressive regime. Carter's potential approval of the government and an election would in this connection be a step towards full recognition by the US administration. Carter's approval would modify negative statements from the US about the upcoming elections, and reduce hostility by granting legitimacy to a democratically elected Nicaraguan government. Hence, the release of political prisoners mattered little for the Sandinistas apart from being viewed in a better light.

On the other hand, the release of this kind of detainees can also be seen as the Sandinista government lowering its guard, thereby creating more space for the opposition. It would in this perspective also verify the claim that the regime violated human rights, thus reducing the government's popularity. If these two prisoners were imprisoned for their political beliefs, then how many others like them were in other prisons? Because the Sandinistas in fact released over a thousand political prisoners before the elections, much due to regional pressure, the release of these two political prisoners can be seen as the start of the end of a regime that clung to power by means of suppression. And though the Sandinistas may have gained some good will for this policy change, it may also have made the electorate more aware of the regime's oppression of dissent, and thus reduced the Sandinistas' popularity. Carter's pressure for the release of the first two prisoners hence contributed to reduce the allure the Sandinista revolution had for the population and also widened political liberties.

Carter's view that democracy cannot be forced onto a nation also means that he and the Center only involve when invited. Such an invitation came in 1989 when President Ortega, the Supreme Electoral Council and the united opposition - the National Opposition Union (UNO), lead by Violeta Chamorro - invited Jimmy Carter as Chair of the Council of

⁷⁸ Brinkley, 201; and The Organizations of American States, *Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States, "Nicaragua,"* URL: [<http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/85.86eng/chap.4b.htm>] [Entered September 26th, 2006.]

Freely Elected Heads of Government to observe the upcoming elections. The invitation from all the three parties meant that the involvement of the observers would have access to all parts of the elections as well as leverage to influence the parties who invited them.

The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government was established by twelve former prime ministers and presidents in 1986 after a Consultation at the Carter Center on “Reinforcing Democracy in the Americas.” The group wanted to strengthen democratization efforts in the Americas, and chose Carter as the Chair, George Price, former Prime Minister of Belize, as Vice President, and Director of the Carter Center’s Latin American Program, Robert Pastor (who founded the Council) as Executive Secretary. To become member one had to have been President or Prime Minister and be recommended by the Executive Committee. The Council’s main focus was election monitoring as a means of promoting democracy,⁷⁹ and the Nicaraguan elections would prove to be a valuable and successful experience for the Council. As the Council was founded by Robert Pastor, and located at the Center, the Council is often seen as a part of the Center’s functions, leading the historian Douglas Brinkley to label it “the *Carter Center’s* Council of Freely elected Heads of government [my emphasis].”⁸⁰ The Council’s mission to Nicaragua included several of the Carter Center’s staff, among others Robert Pastor, Dr. Jennifer McCoy of Georgia State University and the Latin American Program at the Carter Center, and associate director of the Center’s Latin America Program, Jennie Lincoln. Thus, the work of the Carter Center was fused with the work of the Council, and the involvement in Nicaragua is therefore seen as a Carter Center mission headed by the Center’s founder.

The work of Carter and his Center goes beyond mere observation of an election, and includes cooperation with other organizations and actors to assure the validity and fairness of the whole process. During the Council’s first pre-election visit to Nicaragua, Carter met with the Organization of American States (OAS) Secretary General, Joao Baena Soares, and later with the United Nations (UN) Special representative, Elliot Richardson in Washington D.C., in order to coordinate the work of the three parties. In addition to the UN and the OAS, several other NGOs were invited to observe the Nicaraguan elections, and in total more than three thousand observers were present on election day, representing the world community in

⁷⁹ Brinkley, 229; and The Carter Center (1990), p.6-7 and 40.

⁸⁰ Brinkley, 298 and The Carter Center, *Assessment Mission to Haiti*, (January 1995), 1. URL: [<http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/642.pdf>] [Entered September 27th, 2006.]

an unprecedented number.⁸¹ This presence helped cover almost all aspects of the elections and assured voters of closely monitored and valid elections.

In order to monitor the whole election process, the Council set up a permanent office in Managua, directed by Dr. Jennifer McCoy, which added to the presence and dedication of the Council's work. The Council based its work around the electoral processes of the registration drive, the political campaign, and later around the voting, counting, and transition of power. The registration drive was conducted through cooperation between the three observer delegations and Nicaraguan officials, and the observers, the opposition, and the Nicaraguan Supreme Electoral Council all agreed that the registration had been a success with 89 percent of the voting age public registering (1.75 million people).⁸² The presence of international observers assured voters that fraud would be detected and deterred. As the Sandinistas needed approved elections, in order to obtain peace, and economic - and political gains, elections discredited by the observers would be of no use. Moreover, the Sandinistas believed they would win, and needed the elections to be recognized by the international community. This, in addition to the invitation form all the parties, gave the observers power to check any faults prior, during, and after the elections, thereby assuring the voters of well conducted elections. According to Carter, this gave the observers leverage,⁸³ something they used to pressure for political liberalization and fair elections. This point is further verified by Taulbee and Creekmore Jr. who stated that Carter was able to use this leverage due to the impartial character of the Carter Center.⁸⁴ Being invited, trusted and needed, the Atlanta based NGO and its leader thus had influence in the 1990 elections. In addition, the Center's involvement was conducted in cooperation with the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, a council in which most members had a Latin American background. This again gave the election mission to Nicaragua a regional foundation, making it easier for the electorate to trust the integrity of the Carter Center delegation.

Jimmy Carter is a trade mark of the Carter Center, and in the Nicaraguan elections his personal mission assisted in organizing well conducted political rallies and in pressing for the acceptance of the results as well as national reconciliation. This aspect of Carter's work was initiated during the period just before the political campaign started. Incidents of violence had

⁸¹ Brinkley, 296 and 302; and The United Nations, "UN Chronicle: Central America Peace Process Progress," (June 1990.) URL: [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1309/is_n2_v27/ai_9157705/print] [Entered September 25th, 2006.]; and Robinson, 103.

⁸² Brinkley, 299; and The Carter Center (1990), 14.

⁸³ Helen Dewar and Don Podesta, "U.S. Observer Team Disbands Before Nicaraguan Elections," *The Washington Post*, (February 8th, 1990: A1.) URL: [<http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/search.html>] [Entered January 26th, 2007.]

⁸⁴ Taulbee and Creekmore, 167.

taken place at several of the UNO's rallies, ending in the death of one person on December 10th, 1989. This incident threatened the whole election, and to assure that the process was kept on track, Jimmy Carter assisted in drafting an agreement in which the parties agreed to how demonstrations would be scheduled at different places and times to avoid clashes between opposing demonstrators. In addition, guidelines for how the police should approach the crowd were outlined, and the presence of international election observers at rallies was guaranteed. The draft further included a statement that all parties in the election should announce their acceptance of the upcoming elections and strive for national reconciliation.⁸⁵ Carter's involvement was here an example of election mediation, a method characterized by Carter's dedication to help parties agree, and is a special feature of the Center's activities.

The involvement of Carter and the Center is not always appreciated, and in the case of Nicaragua, the Center's work was criticized by some. According to Lee Hockstader of the *Washington Post*, Oscar Arias criticized the elections due to the Sandinistas' control over the army, the government and the media, making the political campaign unfairly favoring the sitting regime. Sill, Arias felt that Nicaragua was on the right track, stating that "in Europe they're shooting dictators. [...] Here we're trying to replace them through elections."⁸⁶ Arias also criticized the work of the Carter Center due to the observers' alleged attempt to prevent Costa Ricans from interviewing with Nicaraguans, adding that the observers acted in a patronizing manner towards the Costa Ricans. To Carter, such a critique came as a surprise, and he simply rejected the claims made by the Costa Rican President.⁸⁷

The issue of media time was partly solved by allotting free coverage to all candidates, though the Sandinistas' control and advantage persisted until Election Day.⁸⁸ Carter managed to pressure Ortega to state publicly that "intimidation of opposition members would not be tolerated,"⁸⁹ thus showing his commitment to open, free and fair elections. The pressure Carter managed to exercise due to his relationship with Ortega can hence be said to have pushed the Nicaraguan elections in a democratic direction. Without external observers, the Sandinistas would have used their advantages over the opposition to a wider extent. The presence of international observers thus lessened the Sandinistas' ability to exploit their advantage.

⁸⁵ Brinkley, 302; and Carter (1995B), 136; and The Carter Center (1990), 16.

⁸⁶ Lee Hockstader, "Oscar Arias' Legacy: Negotiation," *The Washington Post*, (February 9th, 1990: A20.) URL: [<http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/search.html>] [Entered January 26th, 2007.]

⁸⁷ Brinkley, 302.

⁸⁸ Ibid: 301; and The Carter Center (1990), 18.

⁸⁹ The Carter Center (1990), 18.

Though Carter did not agree with Arias' critique of the observers, Arias' comments put Carter and the Center in a negative light. Outside observers who act in a condescending manner will only distance themselves from the voters and hence undermine the trust they are there to assure. Arias' critique of the conditions for free elections was tried solved by Carter, and due to the fact that Arias and Carter have continued their cooperation (as in Nicaragua's 2001 elections),⁹⁰ the irregularities by the observers may have been isolated incidents which did not ruin the observation mission or the cooperation between Carter and Arias.

The release of political prisoners was continued prior to the elections, proving that the release regional actors and Carter had pressured for was the start of the end of the Sandinistas' oppressive rule. This development was confirmed during the final pre-election observer trip, not attended by Carter, but by the Prime Minister of Belize, George Price, and the former President of Costa Rica, Rodrigo Carazo, together with US Senators. The delegation witnessed the release of 1,190 political prisoners as well as progress in the opposition's access to the media and an enlargement of registration sites,⁹¹ thus adding to the sense that the Sandinistas were trying to create conditions for successful democratic elections and that the government was trying to clean up its tarnished human rights record. The fact that the Council delegations to Nicaragua included politicians from all parts of the Americas added to the sense of a joint effort in seeing Nicaragua's road to democratization fulfilled. Here, the involvement of NGOs, international organizations and private persons showed a positive effect in adding pressure and verification to the election process. The work of Carter and his Center pressured for political liberation, a work which was dependent on regional foundations and backing by other organizations and prominent people.

3.3.2 Election Day

On Election Day, February 25th, 1990, the UN, the OAS and the Carter Center delegation agreed that conditions existed for free and fair elections, and as many as 80 per cent of the registered voters turned up to vote for President and Vice-President, representatives to the National Assembly, members of Municipal Councils, and members of Regional Autonomous Councils. The Center observers divided its 34 member delegation into 14 teams which covered all the electoral regions, an observation activity which was coordinated with the OAS and the UN to ensure the best possible coverage of international observers at the polling sites.

⁹⁰ The Carter Center, "Statement by Former US President Jimmy Carter," (November 3rd, 2001,) URL: [<http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/290.pdf>] [Entered January 18th, 2007.]

⁹¹ The Carter Center (1990), 19.

A technical problem arose during the elections when it was discovered that the ink the voters dipped their fingers in, to assure that no one voted more than once, could be washed off. In order to keep the democratic progress going, Carter met with the political leaders and the Electoral Council, with the agreement that the problem was not of significance (all parties thought they would win), and that the elections should proceed as normal.⁹² Carter's direct involvement in this example showed his influence as a trusted third party, and thereby some of the possibilities of the Center's work.

Jimmy Carter's personal mediation became decisive when Ortega was reluctant to face the results of the elections. Carter and Robert Pastor had both witnessed the voting and the counting processes, and as the early election results came in, they visited the UN delegation in Managua. Here, the projections showed a UNO lead (56 per cent to the UNO and 46 per cent to the Sandinistas), a trend that continued as the votes continued to come in. Realizing the significance of the results, Carter called for a meeting with Ortega, and after a while Ortega invited Carter, Richardson, Soares and Pastor, amongst others, to a meeting at the Sandinistas' headquarters. Ortega accepted a UNO lead but refused to give up, clinging on to his position and power. Explaining the reality of the situation, how he had felt when he lost the 1980 election, and saying that "loosing an election is not the end of the world"⁹³, Carter convinced Ortega to lead a peaceful transition of power.⁹⁴ Ortega reluctantly accepted the loss, and before the delegation left, Ortega asked if the observers would remain in Nicaragua as guarantors of the transition of power.⁹⁵ The relationship between Ortega and Carter, which had its roots in Carter's presidency, thus became important for one former president to convince another to accept the results. Later, Carter also stated that "Ortega's confidence in me was obviously a beneficial factor in his final decision to accept defeat gracefully."⁹⁶ Carter's relationship with Ortega, and Ortega's confidence in Carter, can here be said to have reduced possible tensions between the government and the opposition. Secretary of State, James Baker, seemed to agree with this, saying that "[i]t was good that Carter was there to help convince Ortega to do the right thing."⁹⁷ Thereby, Carter had an influential role to play in the elections, a fact testified to by Bush H. W. Bush's national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, who said that "Carter didn't just observe the elections, he ran it."⁹⁸

⁹² Carter (1995B), 137.

⁹³ Brinkley, 306.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ The Carter Center (1990), 24-25; and Brinkley, 307.

⁹⁶ Carter (2006A.)

⁹⁷ Brinkley, 307.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 309.

When Ortega addressed the nation and accepted the defeat, the opposition could celebrate a 14 per cent victory over the Sandinistas and congratulations from President Bush who declared that there was no longer any reason for continued military activity by the Contras, and who recognized the important work of Carter and the Council, the OAS and the UN. The Center delegation continued the praise of the elections and stated that the elections had been well managed and that the results reflected the will of the people.⁹⁹

3.3.3 Assuring the Results

Carter continued mediating also after the elections as to assure that the results were fulfilled. The day following the opposition's victory, Carter met with the leader of the appointed Transition Team, Antonio Lacayo, a member of the UNO and Minister of Defense, Humberto Ortega, to discuss the transition of power. These talks lead to others, and a meeting was set up with Humberto Ortega, Antonio Lacayo and Jimmy Carter at the Carter Center's office in Managua. During this latter meeting, both parties agreed, among other things, to the demobilization of the Contras, a ceasefire announced by President Ortega, and a complete transfer of power on April 25th, 1990.¹⁰⁰ Carter's personal involvement to see democracy fulfilled meant here that the parties were brought together by a non-partisan actor in order to reach mutual agreement, a method which had positive results in this example and thus showed some of the possibilities of the Center's work.

On April 25th, 1990, Violeta de Chamorro assumed the position as President of Nicaragua, thus ending the transition period and realizing the vote of the people. Humberto Ortega continued as head of the army, though it was depoliticized, causing criticism of Chamorro. Apart from this critique, power was transferred peacefully from former president Ortega to Chamorro, making the election historic: "For the first time in the history of the world, a revolutionary government that had come into power as a result of a 20-year armed struggle voluntarily gave up the reins of power to its adversary."¹⁰¹

3.3.4 Meeting Goals?

As the Contra War ended due to well conducted democratic elections, steps towards democracy in Nicaragua assured peace. Carter's personal engagement had pushed for widened political liberties and a peaceful transfer of power, thus showing possibilities of his

⁹⁹ The Carter Center (1990), 25 and 9.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 31.

¹⁰¹ Ibid 34.

involvement. The presence of the Carter Center delegation helped to assure voters of trustworthy elections, and the organization's election mediation as a strategy for peace succeeded. Thereby, Carter and the Center's mission to observe the 1990 Nicaraguan elections reached their set goals. The next four sections discuss how four conditions contributed to this positive result.

3.4 Conditions that can explain the Delegation's Success

The work of Carter and the Carter Center's Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government depended on factors beyond their control in order to succeed in their strategy of election mediation. The next sections describe and discuss how four these conditions influenced their work and accomplishment. The purpose of including such factors is to be able to determine in what situations Carter and the Carter Center can make a difference and what foundations they are dependent on. This chapter focuses on four conditions, starting with how the UN and the OAS contributed in bringing peace to Nicaragua. The second condition concerns Jimmy Carter's presidency and how it contributed to his later work through a favorable reputation and a good relationship with Ortega. The third factor discusses how regional initiatives were vital for the Center's work to be realized, while the last examines how US foreign policy influenced the elections.

3.4.1 The Role of the OAS and the UN

The United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS) contributed decisively to the elections in Nicaragua and the demobilization of the Contras. These two organizations helped secure the validity of the elections and ended the American sponsored guerrilla activity.

The UN, the OAS and the Carter Center's Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government met prior to the elections, during the Council's first pre-election visit to Nicaragua, to coordinate the missions of the three parties. Jimmy Carter, the OAS Secretary General, Joao Baena Soares, and UN Special representative, Elliot Richardson would hence cooperate to make the most of their activities and avoid overlapping each other's work. The UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) got an expanded mandate from the Security Council, and the UN Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua

(ONUEN) had been invited, together with the OAS, prior to the invitation of the Council.¹⁰² Thus, the work of Carter and his Center took place in a joint effort to help establish democracy in Nicaragua and end the war.

During election day the coordination of monitoring efforts meant that the different organizations managed to cover all the regions and most of the polling sites. While the Council and its delegates monitored voting at 205 sites, the OAS covered 3,064 and the UN 2,155 sites.¹⁰³ The coordination meant that most sites were observed during Election Day, a feature which can be seen as important in ensuring the voters safe, trustworthy and correct elections that would mean a great leap forwards in terms of democratization.

At the close of the polls, the OAS, the UN and the Council teams witnessed the counting of the ballots at the polling sites where they were present. The OAS and the UN did quick counts of the votes, which the UNO and the Nicaraguan governmental officials also did. Thus, the OAS and the UN could help verify the projections of the results the Nicaraguan officials presented. The quick counts of the OAS and the UN were later confirmed by the Electoral Council, thus showing a high degree of accuracy.¹⁰⁴ Again, the two organizations helped verify the results, assuring the Nicaraguan people of correctly conducted elections. The presence of Soares and Richardson in the meeting with Ortega when the results were clear, can, in addition to Carter's relationship with Ortega, have contributed in pressuring the Nicaraguan President in accepting the results. As such the two organizations helped see the results of the elections realized, and thus aided the Carter Center towards their common goals.

The ONUCA got mandate to demobilize the Contras and monitor the separation of forces after Security Council resolution 654 (1990), which followed the US State department agreement to the demobilization of the Contras following the UNO victory, and Carter and Pastor's briefing of Secretary of State James Baker III (and others) on the Nicaraguan progress. The ONUCA successfully demobilized 19,614 armed and unarmed members of the Nicaraguan Resistance (or the Contras) in Nicaragua and 2,759 in Honduras, collecting 15,144 small arms in addition to more heavy weapons as grenade launchers and mines. The process of national reconciliation was thus monitored by the UN until the ONUCA mandate was terminated in January 1992.¹⁰⁵ The successful international involvement of the OAS and

¹⁰² Brinkley, 296 and 302; and The United Nations, "UN Chronicle: Central America Peace Process Progress," (June 1990), URL: [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1309/is_n2_v27/ai_9157705/print] [Entered September 25th, 2006.]; and Robinson, 103.

¹⁰³ Carter (1995B), 136-137; and The Carter Center (1990), 20 and Appendix 22.

¹⁰⁴ The Carter Center (1990), 23-24.

¹⁰⁵ The United Nations, "Central America – ONUCA. Background," URL: [<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucabackgr.html>] [Entered September 25th, 2006.]

the UN contributed most distinctly to the successful elections through their monitoring efforts, verifying of results and the actual demobilization of the Contras. Peace was thereby assured through the work of international organizations, among other factors. The demobilization can also be seen as correcting what was ruled as illegal American interference in Nicaragua. The Center's goal of contributing to peace through election mediation was thus dependent on the international organizations for its success.

3.4.2 The Reputation of a Former President

Jimmy Carter's reputation in Nicaragua, and in the region, helped him get an invitation to monitor the elections in 1990, and contributed to his ability to pressure for political liberalization and influence Ortega to abide the rules of democratic elections. This reputation had its origins in Carter's presidency and the policy of non-intervention in Nicaragua.

Carter entered the White House during a turbulent period of Nicaraguan history. He wanted to put human rights at the center of American foreign policy, an ideology which was put to the test with the Sandinista revolution. The dilemma Carter had to face in the late 1970s was a choice between supporting an ally in the fight against Communism, the Somoza regime, and supporting the likely alternative, the Sandinistas, which had ties to Cuba. Carter was reluctant to back the leftist opposition, the Sandinistas, but he did cut off funding and called for the end of the Somoza regime after an American journalist was killed by Somoza's National Guard. The developments of the Sandinista revolution happened without Carter's acceptance, but as he refused to use military power to keep the American ally in power, he became the first American President to refrain from intervening to keep American influence in Nicaragua.¹⁰⁶ This may have made Carter indirectly respected by many Nicaraguans, a factor which contributed to invitation and access in the later elections.

The Sandinistas did not initially trust Carter, but the Sandinista President, Daniel Ortega, and Carter developed a good relationship based on mutual respect, making Ortega claim the era of American intervention was over.¹⁰⁷ Carter and Ortega's relationship, aided by Carter's formal recognition of the Sandinista government and a peaceful relationship, would later prove valuable for Carter's mediation work. A socialist or communist takeover in

¹⁰⁶ Blanchard, 65-68, and 68-70; and "Memorandum for The President From Zbigniew Brzezinski: PRC on Nicaragua," (January 30th, 1979,) *Jimmy Carter Library*. Donated Historical Material. Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection. Subject File. Box 25. File: [Meetings – PRC 89: 1/26/79]; and "Memorandum for Secretary of State: Secretary of Defense, Administration, Aid, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director, Central Intelligence Agency: U.S. Policy on Nicaragua (S)," (February 1st, 1979,) *Jimmy Carter Library*. Donated Historical Material, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection. Subject File. Box 25. File: [Meetings – PRC 89: 1/26/79].

¹⁰⁷ Blanchard, 72.

America's backyard during the Cold War was not well received by Republicans or conservatives in the US. To Carter, the development was not preferable, and his administration had supported more democratic and moderate forces in Nicaragua as well as Somoza, but as the situation developed, Carter chose to place limits on American intervention and focused on a new approach based on recognition and dialogue - inviting Ortega to the White House in 1979.¹⁰⁸ The aid to Nicaragua was, however, stopped at the end of Carter's presidency after the Sandinistas supported a Salvadoran Guerrilla offensive in January 1981. Though the Sandinistas proved to support revolutionaries in other Latin American countries, Carter did not make use of military sanctions against Nicaragua, something the president who followed Carter would.¹⁰⁹ Carter's hesitance to accept the radical new government was combined with a reluctance to use military force in keeping the old ally of the Somozas in power, and was hence a new approach to political events in Nicaragua. Carter's dialogue based approach to the new government meant that he was the first American president to accept developments which went against the US administration's wishes, something which may have given him a support among Nicaraguans. Commenting on Carter's good reputation in Central America, Douglas Brinkley described Carter as "perhaps the most respected U.S. citizen in the hemisphere. His anti-interventionalist foreign policy pronouncements carried a weight not granted to statements of Richard Nixon or Gerald Ford."¹¹⁰ Continuing the praise for Carter, Art Harris of the *Washington Post* stated that "when Carter speaks, Latin America listens."¹¹¹ For the Nicaraguan elections in 1990, Carter reputation meant that people would trust him and that Ortega would listen to him, giving Carter influence in the elections. Without Carter's reputation and relationship with Ortega, it is not certain that an invitation would have been made to the Carter Center, and as such, Carter and the Center's work is dependent on its leader's former career.

An additional aspect which gave Carter a favorable reputation during his presidency was the Panama Canal Treaties. Through Carter's efforts in 1978, the Panama Canal was gradually transferred from American to Panamanian control. The canal had been important to US interests as it assured passage between the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean, and as it had been vital for the Allies during the two World Wars. The US had constructed the canal in

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 71; and Brinkley, 199.

¹⁰⁹ Robert A. Pastor, "Old Habits, New Opportunities in Nicaragua," in William I. Robinson, *A Faustian Bargain: U.S. Intervention in the Nicaraguan Elections and American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 179-180.

¹¹⁰ Brinkley, 206.

¹¹¹ Art Harris, "Citizen Carter," *The Washington Post*, (Feb. 22, 1990: B1.) URL: [<http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/search.html>] [Entered January 26th, 2007.]

1903, and after agreement with Panama's government, the US was granted power over the Canal Zone and reserved the right to protect it with military means if necessary. Carter mediated the return of the Canal and the Canal Zone to Panama, with the US and Panama running the canal in cooperation. The US was granted the right to protect the Canal until the year 2000, with the possibility to come back and protect it if necessary after that period. The Canal was, according to the Treaties, to continue to be neutral and give equal treatment to ships of all nations. Should the situation arise, US warships would be guaranteed speedy passage. Carter felt that the issue of the Canal had led to anti-Americanism in Latin America, and that by handing over control, the US would restore its image. As Carter used the signing of the Treaties to negotiate with regional leaders about reducing the blood shed between the Somoza regime and the opposition in Nicaragua, the Treaties also became a way of gaining influence in the region. In 1989, Carter denounced Panama's elections, which he and the Center had observed, as a fraud, affirming Carter's dedication to democracy in the region and his moral stance.¹¹² According to Harris, Carter had a highly respectable position among Latin Americans. This reputation grew as the Panamanian President Manuel Noriega was injured when Carter, "the gringo who won hearts and minds south of the border when he repatriated the Panama Canal, declared that election [Panama's election of 1989] a fraud [...]"¹¹³ Hence, Carter could use his reputation and position when involving in the 1990 elections.

3.4.3 Regional Involvement

Regional initiatives for a more democratic Central America began in the early 1980s. For Nicaragua, this process would pressure Ortega and the Sandinistas to political liberalization and to hold open and fair elections prior to the set election date, as well as contribute to a regime change. Hence, regional initiatives were foundations which Carter and the Carter Center's delegation built on in their election mediation.

At the same time as President Ronald Reagan focused on the Contra War, the Contadora Group worked out a plan to reduce foreign involvement in Central America and to strengthen democracy in the region. The Contadora Group (consisting of the foreign ministers of Columbia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) started out as a negotiating forum in 1983 and worked, among other things, for negotiations between the US and Nicaragua. Although the group's efforts failed, it laid the foundations for the Arias Plan which took center stage by

¹¹² Carter (1995A), 157-188, and Carter (1995B), 133.

¹¹³ Harris.

1986. This plan was initiated by the Costa Rican President, Oscar Arias, and was first seen as a Costa Rican - US endeavor to pressure the Sandinistas to negotiate with the Contras and hold new elections. Revised in 1987, the second Arias Plan (also known as the Esquipulas II Accord) focused on internal Nicaraguan democratization and no longer on the previous requirements of the Sandinistas negotiating with the Contras and holding new elections. Although the plan was heavily criticized by the Reagan administration, the accords persevered and were the foundation for a peace treaty between the presidents of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. This new Arias Plan called for cease fires, national reconciliation, dialogue between governments and opposition groups, the lifting of restrictions on civil and political liberties, the release of political prisoners, and an end to the support for insurgent groups in neighboring nations. These requirements of democratization and peace replaced the former demands of new elections, and as such recognized the Nicaraguan government (while prohibiting the government from supporting the guerrilla movement in El Salvador.)¹¹⁴ As the plan also called for negotiations between governments and opposition groups, the Sandinistas and the Contras were encouraged to establish a dialogue. This approach was, however, not realized, but seen as part of a whole, the Arias Plan pressured for democratization from a regional platform and on local initiatives. Such an approach would later be the foundation for the Carter's work in 1990.

The Sandinistas made a concession concerning elections after the signing of the Tesoro Beach Accord early in 1989. In this agreement, signed by Ortega and four other Central American presidents, the Sandinistas moved the upcoming elections from November to January of 1990, and promised they would be open and fair in return for the other presidents' call for the demobilization of the Contras.¹¹⁵ As a continuation of these accords, the Tela Summit, which took place in August 1989, called together the Presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. At this meeting, the Sandinistas restated their commitment to hold new elections while the participating presidents called for the demobilization of the Contras by December 5th, 1989. President George Herbert Walker Bush agreed with the statements from the summit, apart from demobilizing the Contras. The Bush administration was reluctant to reduce the presence of the guerilla group, and can thus be seen to have favored military threats over democratization based on regional initiatives,

¹¹⁴ Kenneth Roberts, "Bullying and Bargaining: The United States, Nicaragua, and Conflict Resolution in Central America," in *International Security*, 15.2 (autumn 1990), 82-83 and 87-88. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/search/> [Entered January 21st, 2007.]

¹¹⁵ William M. Leogrande, "From Reagan to Bush: The Transition in US Policy towards Central America," in *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 22. 3 (October 1990), 599. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/search/> [Entered January 18th, 2007.]

something the chapter discusses later. After the Tela Summit, the Contra War heated up and the scheduled demobilization was not even started by the set date. Ortega reacted to the increased Contra activity by ending the Nicaraguan one-sided ceasefire with the Contras, which had been in effect since March 1988.¹¹⁶ The Nicaraguan elections took thus place in the context of a continued Contra War, which influenced the results of the elections.

The Nicaraguan elections happened during a period of regional initiatives for democratization which had pushed for cease fires, elections and expansion of liberties, while the US funded an illegal Contra War. The Nicaraguan elections were thus partly established by regional actors. The work of Carter and the Center was hence dependent on this kind of aid as the Nicaraguan elections would not have happened without the regional work for democracy and peace. The role of Carter and the Center in the elections was thereby to strengthen the already initiated process of democratization and to use their influence and experience to pressure for free and fair elections. The release of political prisoners, for example, was a regional demand which Carter could build on. The regional activity was hence a necessary condition for the Center's work, a condition which in many ways stood in sharp contrast to Presidents Reagan and Bush's military approach. Although Bush continued his predecessor's focus on military strength and intimidation, Bush also chose a more moderate course which opened up for alternative paths to regime change.

3.4.4 The Presidency of George Herbert Walker Bush

During the presidency of George H. W. Bush (1989-1993), a new phase of the cold war was initiated where the hostility of the Reagan era was replaced by the promotion of democracy.¹¹⁷ Bush's approach to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua was a more moderate policy than Reagan's focus on military intervention as a vehicle of regime change. Bush's approval of the Nicaraguan elections was characterized by unifying the opposition, trying to manipulate the political process and attempts of forcing a dichotomy of war and peace on to the electorate. These three factors made up a tactic which put strategic interests over democratic development, and through attempts of manipulation, Bush chose a policy of forced democratization. The role of Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center, as well as the role of regional and international actors, was to strengthen the regional work for democracy and to disarm Bush's attempts at manipulation.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, 601-602.

¹¹⁷ Robinson, 8.

As the regional initiative had been successful in pressuring for democratization and advancing the upcoming elections, the Bush administration chose to help unify the opposition, the UNO, through advice, campaign material and economic contributions. This first part of Bush's tactic did not mean direct financial aid from the US government, but rather by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). This organization channeled \$ 11.6 million to the opposition for voter registration activities, poll watching and party building and education, thus making the opposition well organized and financed with indirect links between the US government and the UNO.¹¹⁸ Despite the fact that the NED describes itself as "a private, non-profit organization created in 1983 to strengthen democratic institutions around the world through non-governmental efforts",¹¹⁹ the organization can be seen as a tool for the Bush administration. According to Research Associate for the Latin America Data Base at the University of New Mexico, William I. Robinson, the NED has become a specialized branch of the US government, being funded by the US Congress and as US embassies coordinate missions for the organization.¹²⁰ Robinson's claim in the case of Nicaragua was that the organization performed its democracy work on behalf of US interests. By channeling money, though not directly to the UNO but to the opposition's political work in general, the NED created a strong opposition with close ties to the US, hence aiding American foreign policy interests. Bush's approval of the Nicaraguan elections was as such characterized by establishing a US friendly opposition, by agreeing with the proposed democratization efforts, but also by opposing demobilization of the Contras. As the administration further did not believe that the opposition would win,¹²¹ its approval of regional initiatives went only as far as containment of what they believed to be a continued Sandinista government.

Bush hoped to reduce the power and attraction of the Sandinistas, and if the Sandinistas won the election, the opposition would be a part of Bush's idea of at least containing the Sandinista revolution to Nicaragua.¹²² A strong Nicaraguan opposition would be able to work against the Sandinistas, limit its powers in the national assembly and be a voice of critique domestically and abroad. Internal opposition would thus be effective, as it would give Nicaraguans a political alternative and reduce the allure of the Sandinista revolution in neighboring countries. And if the opposition won, the US would be rid of its old

¹¹⁸ Leogrande, 604-605.

¹¹⁹ National Endowment for Democracy, "About us," URL: [<http://www.ned.org/about/about.html>] [Entered December 6th, 2006.]

¹²⁰ Robinson, 17.

¹²¹ Brinkley, 304.

¹²² Leogrande, 599.

rival. Hence, the US support of the elections became a strategic support of what the Bush administration hoped would remove Ortega in the long run.

The claim that Bush's contribution to the Nicaraguan elections was not democratically motivated can be opposed by the argument that support for the opposition was vital in establishing an alternative to the sitting government. A strong opposition was important in creating contested and open elections. As the opposition in Nicaragua pressured for political liberalization and challenged the oppressive sides of the Sandinista government, the UNO, as the biggest and leading oppositional party, played a decisive role in making Nicaragua more democratic. US support for the opposition was in this light support for a more democratic Nicaragua. On the other hand, the Bush administration's backing of the opposition may also have lessened its support among voter groups as ties to the US, and thus the Contras, were possible. Hence, US support for the UNO may also have weakened the opposition, making Bush' pronounced democratic ambitions second to the strategic goal of ousting the Sandinistas.

The second part of Bush's tactic, which draws into question Bush's democratic ambitions, was the administration's attempt to manipulate the political process prior to the 1990 elections. According to journalists John M. Goshko and Al Kamen of the *Washington Post*, the US overstated election offences made by the Sandinistas. This political intrusion was exemplified by spokeswoman of the State Department, Margaret Tutwiler, who doubted whether the elections would be free and fair due to the Sandinistas' intimidation, harassment and violence. The Organization of American States opposed this statement and meant the State Department had exaggerated the case, while Robert Pastor described the US as a partisan actor. Both UN and OAS representatives further claimed that the US administration was involved in political manipulation of public opinion in Nicaragua,¹²³ thus emphasizing how the Bush administration favored one actor over genuine democratic elections. Bush's tactic of discrediting the elections would enable a continued Contra activity as an elected Sandinista government would be accused of fraud and thus not be recognized. By choosing such a tactic, Bush damaged his own idea of promoting democracy and reviled that strategic interests were superior to democratic ideals.

The third part of Bush tactic for regime change was the administration's focus on the military threat of the Contras as to portray the elections as a choice between war and peace.

¹²³ John M. Goshko and Al Kamen, "U.S. Accused of Overstating Managua Election Offences," *The Washington Post*, (Jan. 25, 1990: A29.) URL: [<http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/search.html>] [Entered January 26th, 2007.]

According to Robinson, the choice the electorate got from the US was a continued Sandinista government, which would prolong the war, or peace through a UNO victory.¹²⁴ Bush's interest in keeping the Contras as a threat to the Nicaraguan electorate was challenged by the US Congress. As Secretary of State James Baker and the U.S. Congress completed the Bipartisan Accord, strong support for the Central American peace plan was declared and further military aid to the Contras was denied, although humanitarian aid for the group was allowed until the elections.¹²⁵ Hence, the US Congress limited the military ability of the guerilla group. For Bush, this restricted the use of the Contras to some degree, but continued their existence and threat in the upcoming elections.

The claim that the electorate voted solely on the basis of the Contra threat, in other words on Bush's dichotomy of war and peace, neglects other factors in the elections. Many Nicaraguans were not satisfied with the Sandinistas who were seen as out of touch with the people and the elections proved rather to be a referendum on ten years of Sandinista rule.¹²⁶ As the people saw the opposition as having a greater prospect of changing Nicaragua for the better, the electorate voted for both better governance and peace. In addition, the FSLN only lost by 14 percent, showing that many Nicaraguans voted for the sitting government despite the US sponsored military threat. The presence of Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center, as well as regional and international observers, further weakened Bush's dichotomy by granting legitimacy to the elections. An election judged fair by the observers would weaken Bush's argument of election fraud, thereby complicating justifications for continued Contra activity. As Congress already had limited the funding of the Contras, the observers' verification of the results would give Congress further reason to reduce or possibly end the Contra War regardless of the results of the elections. Thus, the presence of Carter and his Center, and the legitimacy they could provide, contributed to fair elections where voters were encouraged to vote freely and not due to American pressure.

A problem with the argument that Carter disarmed Bush's rhetoric by verifying the correctness of the elections is that Carter favored keeping the Contras in uniform. According to Harris, Carter felt that the guerilla group could work as quiet leverage on the Sandinistas, without its military activity, thereby reducing the Contra threat to just their existence.¹²⁷ As such, Carter followed Bush's rhetoric that the Contras would be a check against the Sandinistas. Carter differed most distinctly, however, from Bush as Carter meant that the

¹²⁴ Robinson, 148 and 150.

¹²⁵ The Carter Center (1990), 11-12.

¹²⁶ The Carter Center (1990), 9 and 130.

¹²⁷ Harris.

UNO had contributed to a rise in the popularity of the Sandinistas as the leaders of the UNO had done little to distance themselves from the Contras. Due to the fact that Carter feared the Sandinistas would bend the law and even break it to secure a victory,¹²⁸ the disarmed Contras may have been motivated by the want of keeping the Sandinistas from election fraud. Carter's wish for a demilitarized Contra group further distanced him from Bush dichotomy of war and peace as Carter wanted the military activity to end before the elections. Conclusively, Carter only agreed with Bush in the presence of the Contras. As they differed on the questions of military activity, democratic conditions, and available choices to the voters, Carter's role in the elections was to limit the influence of Bush's manipulation by verifying the correctness of all parts of the elections.

Describing the Nicaraguan elections as an American interference, as Robinson largely does, would undermine the national, regional, and international initiatives for democracy. The US, through their aid to the Contras and the opposition, did influence the results of the elections, but did not decide the outcome. The regional initiatives contributed to the elections through various agreements and plans. Oscar Arias' work for democracy and peace in Central America (for which he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987¹²⁹) was in this connection of crucial importance. His focus on internal development based on civil liberties made democratization in Central America and Nicaragua a project based on regional democratization. In all, the regional pressure for democracy can be seen in sharp contrast to the American approach of military coercion to change the Nicaraguan society. The strategic interest Bush had in the elections, which would reduce the power or oust a long time US rival, surpassed his democratic ideals. Though the elections did produce the results the US wanted, the elections would not have been possible without the regional initiatives. Thus, the regional work for democracy between 1983 and 1990 initiated the Nicaraguan elections while the Bush administration did their best to influence them. For Carter and the Carter Center this meant that the elections was there due to regional activity, but also that an external actor pressured hard for one of the parties in the elections. Hence, Carter and the Center's role, in coordination with other organizations, became to continue the positive aspects of the regional initiatives and to guarantee that the elections would halt American hostility regardless of the results of the elections.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ The Nobel Foundation, "The Nobel Peace Prize 1987," URL: [\[http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1987/press.html\]](http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1987/press.html) [Entered December 7th, 2006.]

3.5 The Influence of the Four Conditions

The role of the UN and the OAS exemplified how international organizations, in addition to many other NGOs, gave attention, verification and pressure to the Nicaraguan elections. The two organizations also participated in assuring correct and well monitored elections, in cooperation with Carter and his Center. The UN's role in demobilizing the Contras marked the end of the elections and contributed hence most concretely in ending the civil war. For Carter and the Carter Center the cooperation with the UN and the OAS meant a wide coverage of monitoring as well as added international pressure and attention.

Jimmy Carter's presidential period contributes to the work he and his Center are doing around the world. This feature had implications for their election mediation in Nicaragua when Carter's reputation gave him and his Center invitation, influence and access. In addition to their pressure for political liberation, and guarantee of fair elections, Carter also used his relationship with Ortega to pressure for a peaceful transition of power.

Regional initiatives laid the foundations for democracy and peace, and were as such important for the 1990 Nicaraguan elections to take place. This regional involvement created foundations for peace through democracy, something Carter wanted to build on. This aspect of regional democracy was challenged by US supported military interference, but succeeded in securing democracy despite the US funded Contra War. The Bush administration's policy towards the Nicaraguan elections was more a support for an alternative to the Sandinista government than for a democratic Nicaragua. Bush's plan was to threaten the electorate to vote for the opposition. This policy did influence the elections to some degree, but with the presence of the international observers, the prospect of a continued Contra War after a legitimized and verified election looked bleak. Through media access and popular support, Carter, the Center and the international organizations could give media and popular pressure for the respect of any new government based on the results of open and fair elections. The legislative branch of the US government might also share such an opinion, in addition to already having limited US support for the Contras. For Bush, it would have become difficult to continue the war, making elections as path to peace regardless of the results. This aspect may have convinced the Nicaraguan people to vote freely without being forced to choose between life and death. Hence, Bush's policy towards Nicaragua was only of many factors which mattered to the voters. In this perspective, the role of Carter and the Center contributed in opposing the undemocratic tendencies of American interference and contributed thus to fair elections.

In total, the work of Jimmy Carter and the Center's Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government was a successful strategy for peace that built on Carter's presidency and on regional initiatives. The possibilities of Carter and the Center's work were in many respects dependent on other organizations, with the drive of Carter as a crucial factor in contributing to widen political liberties and verifying elections which in some aspects defied US demands. The role of the US was in this respect less than that of Carter, the Center's Council, regional initiatives and international organizations combined. For NGO work in general this shows a capacity to make a difference, but only if it happens in unison. The work of an NGO as the Carter Center, in concert with other organizations and being influenced by certain condition, has the power to contribute to peace through its elections mediation, hence strengthening this thesis' hypothesis. Whether this positive example of NGO involvement can apply in a different test case and a different setting is, however, still to be discussed.

Chapter 4: Prospects for a Palestinian Democracy

4.0 Introduction

Violence has characterized the relationship between Israel and its Arab neighbors for many decades. At the heart of the ongoing conflict are the issues of Israel's occupation of Palestine and the prospect of an independent Palestinian state. It is in this conflict that Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center have involved themselves in election mediation as a strategy for establishing a Palestinian state at peace with its neighbors. In 2006, Carter headed a joint Carter Center and National Democratic Institute for Foreign Affairs (NDI) delegation to observe the Palestinian Legislative Council elections. This chapter focuses on this specific election, and although the conflict in question has roots in historical events dating back centuries, present or very recent events are emphasized. The chapter discusses what Carter and the delegation he led aimed to accomplish through their election mediation and what conditions that can explain the results of the engagement. The first three sections describe and discuss the nature of their observation mission, while the fourth discusses how their work was affected by other contributing observation organizations, Carter's reputation, regional initiatives, and US foreign policy. The underlying question is what limitations there are in regard to the ability of Carter and his Center to influence developments of democracy and peace.

4.1 The Geopolitical and Historical Context

The territory of Palestine is made up of the West Bank and Gaza, often referred to as the Palestinian Areas, bordered by the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, divided by the state of Israel in between these areas, and fragmented by the Israeli settlements within them. The West Bank and Gaza were occupied by Israel during the Six Day War of 1967. Israel evacuated the Gaza strip for settlements and military occupation in 2005, a unilateral withdrawal that did not improve the desperate economic and social conditions there. Gaza is still surrounded by a separation barrier monitored by Israeli checkpoints and one single opening which leads into Egypt. Poverty is at a 70 per cent level and according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, as well as former UN Aid Chief, Jan Egeland,

malnutrition continues to threaten both the West Bank and Gaza.¹³⁰ The West Bank is broken up by Israeli settlements and connection roads, in addition to a separation wall that is being constructed around the entire West Bank. Settlements have spread all over the West Bank and include what the Israeli settlers believe to be parts of the historical land of Israel. Shifting Israeli governments have continued to endorse expanding settlement policies, and by 1998 the number of Israeli settlers in the occupied territories had reached 350,000, of which 164,000 lived on the West Bank. By 2006, 268,000 settlers resided on the West Bank,¹³¹ showing an increase in the colonization of Palestinian land.

In addition to Israeli occupation and settlements, the situation for the Palestinian population is marked by poverty, with a high percentage of the Palestinian population living in refugee camps in neighboring countries and on the Gaza strip. The refugee problem has its origins in the violent conflicts of the region. Following the formation of the Israeli state in 1948, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Iraq invaded the new nation, resulting in the first Arab-Israeli war. The outcome was that Palestine became divided between Israel, Egypt (occupying the Gaza strip) and Transjordan (retaining control over the old city of Jerusalem and the West Bank). Israel's victory enlarged its territory, while 700,000 of the Arab population became refugees. A mass exodus of Palestinian Arabs followed, something the Israeli army intensified by a systematic expulsion of Palestinian Arabs living inside Israel's recently altered borders. This policy caused even greater flight, and by 1950, 960,000 Palestinians had become refugees. Following Israel's pre-emptive attack on Egypt and Arab forces in 1967, resulting in the Six Day War, Israel occupied the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the Sinai desert, and the Golan Heights. These seizures caused more refugees, and an occupation of Palestinian land that continues today. After the war of 1967, 1.3 million Palestinian refugees lived in temporary refugee camps primarily in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and on the Gaza strip. Israel absorbed the vacant Palestinian land for itself, making repatriation impossible. By 2005, the UN had registered 4.3 million Palestinian refugees,¹³²

¹³⁰ BBC News, "Donors Pledge Palestinians \$500m," (September 1st, 2006,) URL: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5304546.stm] [Entered March 20th, 2007.]; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Food Insecurity and Malnutrition on the Rise in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," (April 15th, 2002,) URL: [<http://www.fao.org/english/newsroom/news/2002/3780-en.html>] [Entered March 20th, 2007]; and Jimmy Carter, *Palestine Peace not Apartheid*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 176. (Referred to as *Carter (2006B)* hereafter.)

¹³¹ William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East: Third Edition*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), 363-366 and 511; and Shahar Ilan, "Interior Ministry: West Bank Settler Population Grew by 6% in 2006," *Haaretz*, (January 11th, 2007,) URL: [<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/811480.html>] [Entered April 21st, 2007.]

¹³² Cleveland, 268-270, 345, 356-358; and UNRWA, "Who is a Palestinian Refugee," URL: [<http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/whois.html>] [Entered March 4th, 2007.]

many of them living in desperate conditions. The issue of the refugees has great importance for the possible solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and remains unsettled to this date.

Several peace initiatives have taken place in the Middle East, though only one has proved to be lasting. Following the Camp David Accords of 1978, Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty that is still in effect. Peace between Israel and the Palestinians has, however, not been accomplished, despite several accords. In 1991, the Madrid Conference brought together Israel and a delegation of Palestinians under US and Russian initiative. The Conference did not produce any major results apart from contact between the parties and a partial freeze in Israeli settlements, but it did provide groundwork for the Oslo Peace Process. This peace initiative was started by Israeli and PLO officials who met in secret with Norway as intermediary. The negotiations were successful, and a historic agreement was reached in 1993. A five year plan was agreed upon, outlining stages that would lead to peace and a two state solution with Palestinian autonomy. The agreement also set up a Palestinian Authority, and stated PLO's recognition of Israel. This caused protests from, among others, the Islamic Palestinian organization of Hamas, which vowed to oppose the agreement and launched suicide bombings against Israel. The Oslo accords postponed several important issues, including the settlements, the refugee problem, and the issue of a Palestinian capitol in East Jerusalem, but were a step towards peaceful coexistence.¹³³

The Oslo Accords ended the violent uprising labeled the first Palestinian Intifada, which had begun in 1987, but as the plan failed, violence reemerged. Following the Israeli conservative party leader Ariel Sharon's visit to the Islamic and Jewish sacred site of the Temple Mount in 2000, another violent Palestinian uprising – labeled the second Palestinian Intifada - arose, resulting in a harsh Israeli response. The spiral of violence continued and by the summer of 2003, 2,400 Palestinians and 780 Israelis had lost their lives in suicide bombings and military interventions.¹³⁴ As no peace talks had been initiated by the Israeli Prime Minister Sharon or the US President, George Walker Bush, a group of Palestinians and Israelis decided to establish dialogue and met in Geneva, where Jimmy Carter was invited to negotiate. The Geneva Initiative proposed solutions to Israel's security problem, the issue of borders, Palestinian political prisoners, the refuge problem, and to the question of control over East Jerusalem. The initiative included, amongst others, Palestinian and Israeli politicians, retired Israeli generals and former intelligence officers, as well as academics from both sides as participants. The initiative received support in the Israeli and Palestinian populations, and

¹³³ Cleveland, 500-507.

¹³⁴ Ibid, 473 and 507-516.

international leaders stated their approval. President Bush, on the other hand, remained quiet, while Sharon condemned the plan. Hence, the plan did not bring about any lasting solution, although Israel's evacuation of its settlements on the Gaza strip in 2004 can be seen as a result of the initiative.¹³⁵

In 2003, the EU, Russia, the UN, and the US (adding up to what has been labeled the Quartet) issued the Road Map for Peace, a plan which set forth a time line of three phases which would lead to a final agreement and the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict. A two-state solution was proposed, but the plan was never followed through, much due to Palestinian terrorist attacks and Israeli military interventions.¹³⁶

The peace plans from the 1990s to the present have stressed the issue of a two-state solution with an autonomous Palestinian Authority. The failed peace agreements have as such been parts of the foundation for elections in Palestine, something which began after the Oslo Accords. Since 1996, Palestinians have voted in presidential elections, municipal elections, and in legislative council elections, and preceding agreements have functioned as a basis for these to take place. The 2006 election was carried through in a situation marked by occupation, violence, desperate living conditions, and failed peace initiatives. The election happened ten years after the first legislative council elections and presented opposition to the one party dominance in Palestinian politics.

4.1.1 The Two Major Parties

The participation of Hamas introduced a new challenge to the ruling party, Fatah, and to the democratic conditions of the 2006 election. Hamas is, according to Director of Terrorism Studies at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Matthew Levitt, an Islamist organization established in 1987 with the goal of eliminating Israel and has always operated through three core activities. One is the organization's social welfare work, which gives the organization support in large segments of the society. The second is its political activity which positions the group as a rival to the PLO and the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA). The third is the organization's involvement in guerilla and terrorist attacks aimed at Israel and its civilians. Hamas' goal is to counter what they see as a secularization and westernization of the Arab society, a trend symbolized by Fatah's political involvement. These three activities

¹³⁵ Carter (2006B), 163-168.

¹³⁶ US Department of State, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," (April 3rd, 2003,) URL: [<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm>] [Entered April 4th, 2007.]

happen simultaneously, and there is no division between Hamas' political and military wings. The opposition to the secular forces in the Palestinian society is aided by the low standard of living and the economic and social hardship the PA has not managed to correct. In addition, accusations of corruption have damaged Fatah's standing in the Palestinian society. Islamist opposition to the secular PA is funded by several individuals and nations in the Middle East, Iran being the foremost of the contributing nations. The organization's decision making body had its head quarters in Syria's capitol of Damascus, thereby strengthening the influence of some neighboring nations. The involvement of Iran is meant to empower Hamas at the cost of the PA, comprising an undeclared and hidden approach which is meant to weaken the self-rule government and to pose Hamas as an alternative to the PA. This is, according to Levitt, verified by a PA intelligence report which stated that "the Hamas movement has begun to constitute a real threat to the PA's political vision, its interests, presence, and influence."¹³⁷ Levitt further describes how the organization sees its participation in politics as undermining the secular authorities, furthering the violent Islamic agenda and participating in parliamentary elections so as to destroy the Oslo accords. The group's participation has not moderated its military agenda, and has thus been met with skepticism from Fatah and the international community.¹³⁸

Fatah, or the Movement for the Liberation of Palestine, was, according to Levitt, established in the 1950's by Palestinian university graduates working in Kuwait. After the 1967 War, the organization revolted against the leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (an Arab League initiated umbrella organization of different Palestinian resistant groups) and assumed total control over the PLO through reorganizing it as a centralized democracy with Yasser Arafat as its leader. Fatah and the PLO endorsed armed struggle as a way to obtain an independent Palestinian state and did not recognize Israel until 1988. The PLO organized a cabinet which again selected the central committee, the government, which supervised the parliament, the Palestine National Council. The PLO also organized a foreign ministry which would represent Palestine abroad, an army – the Palestine Liberation Army, a social service, and its own Red Crescent society. The PLO thus created a pre-state structure which fortified the one party domination. Fatah's focus on restoring a national identity and the PLO's nationalization of the welfare activities gave the organizations widespread support, and a popularity they lost after the 1990s peace talks with Israel. Fatah and the PLO endorsed

¹³⁷ Matthew Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 117.

¹³⁸ Ibid, 1, 5, 8-9, 15, 116-117 and 240; and The BBC, "US 'Ready' for non-Hamas Contacts," (March 8th, 2007,) URL: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6463925.stm] [Entered April 23rd, 2007.]

armed struggle as a way to obtain an independent Palestinian state and did not recognize Israel until 1988. PLO and Fatah were fused together from 1969, and in the 1996 election for legislative council, Fatah won the important seats, and continued the uniformity of Palestinian politics.¹³⁹ Arafat won the 1996 Presidential election, and after his death in 2004, another party member, Mahmoud Abbas, became the second Palestinian President in 2005. The 2006 election was thus the first time that the hegemony of Fatah was challenged by a viable opposition, and would prove to alter the distribution of power in Palestinian politics.

4.2 The Goals of the Center's Involvement

The 2006 election had the prospects of strengthening democracy in Palestine, and it was in this context that Jimmy Carter headed the Carter Center and NDI election observation. The Center delegation's goal was to "express the international community's interest in and support for Palestinian efforts to develop a democratic process, and to provide impartial and accurate report on the conduct of the election."¹⁴⁰ In addition, the observers from the two organizations saw the election as an important step on the road to democratization, and after the voting they declared that it was "up to the leaders and representatives to construct genuinely democratic institutions and processes that will bring the peace and prosperity the Palestinian people deserve, within a free and independent state." Thus, the goal for the delegation was to foster an election which would lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state living in peace both internally and externally. A critical element in this composite of factors to keep in mind is that Carter's quest for peace in the holy land is much influenced by his personal faith. A part of Carter's work in the region was as such characterized by his want to personally contribute to democracy and peace, making Carter's want for a role as peacemaker a goal of the Center's election mediation. The following discusses whether the delegation was able to attain these goals.

¹³⁹ Ilan Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 192-193 and 256-257, and Cleveland, 358-360.

¹⁴⁰ The National Democratic Institute for Foreign Affairs and The Carter Center, "Elections can be an Important Step on the Road to Greater Democracy, Say NDI and Carter Center Observers," (January 26th, 2006,) URL: [http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/1977_wbg_press_012606.pdf] [Entered February 3rd, 2007.]

4.3 The Election: What did the Observers do?

Jimmy Carter and his Center have monitored the elections in Palestine since 1996. The election in 2006 continued their work for democracy and peace in Palestine, and their attempt to advocate elections as a path to peace. Their work in 2006 evolved, as all their election missions have, around the periods prior, during and after the election.

4.3.1 Prior to Election Day

Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center were invited to observe the 2006 election by the Palestinian Central Election Commission, a request which was issued to a joint Carter Center and NDI delegation. The NDI is a nonprofit organization devoted to “strengthen and expand democracy worldwide [,]”¹⁴¹ which includes election monitoring as part of their strategy. The delegation to the 2006 Palestinian election was headed by Jimmy Carter together with former Prime Minister of Sweden, Carl Bildt, and included other delegates such as former Albanian President, Rexhep Meidani, and former Spanish Foreign Minister, Ana Palacio.¹⁴² Being invited by national authorities might give legitimacy to the observers, but whether this enabled the observers to influence the election is uncertain.

Because neither Carter himself nor the report made by the Carter Center and NDI, mention invitations from Fatah or Hamas, such requests were probably not issued. Carter and his Center’s ability to influence the two major parties in the 2006 election was thus reduced. Though none of the parties protested against Carter’s involvement, an invitation to Carter and the Carter Center from all of the parties would likely have resulted in closer contact and thus greater influence for the observers. In this light, the absence of invitations from the major parties might have limited the possibility of Carter in influencing the parties and the results of the election. As Fatah used to have control over most political institutions in Palestine, the party may have had control over the Central Election Commission, and thus invited Carter and the delegation from a party platform. On the other hand, the Commission is meant to be independent and not in favor of one political party, hence reducing the influence of Fatah. Thereby, only central authorities invited Carter, and no political party. Carter’s leverage was also affected by the US administration, which demanded that none of the observers spoke with any of the Hamas candidates. Without meeting the candidates or party leaders, Carter

¹⁴¹ The National Democratic Institute, *Final Report on the Palestinian Legislative Council Elections*, (January 25, 2006), iv. [http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/2068_ps_elect_012506.pdf] [Entered February 3rd, 2007.] (Referred to as *NDI (2006)* hereafter.)

¹⁴² Ibid, 1, 5 and 8.

and his Center's ability to influence or discuss with Hamas was limited, something the chapter discusses later.

Due to Carter's political career and involvement in the search for democracy and peace in the Middle East, he could gain access to a large network of influential persons and leaders in Israel and Palestine. In 2006, Carter met with important people in order to discuss aspects of the election and to gain influence. Carter first met with the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, an old acquaintance of Carter, and spent time discussing with him the prospects for resuming peace talks with the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Little came from the meeting, apart from Carter's encouragement to establish such a dialogue. Carter also met with the Palestinian President, who expressed his frustration over the absence of peace talks and the worsening economic and social conditions in the Palestinian Areas. Carter's meetings with both sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict showed his belief in dialogue and the fruitlessness of isolating one of the parties. This was again exemplified by Carter's meeting with a public relations spokesperson for Hamas. As Carter could not meet the candidates of Hamas, at least he could meet someone with connections to the party, thus emphasizing his commitment to speak with all the parties involved.¹⁴³ The fact that Carter did not meet with Hamas candidates did, however, mean that he would have small chances of influencing them prior to the election, thus resulting in reduced leverage over one of the parties involved.

Continuing the dialogue based approach, Carter met with Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni, Shimon Perez (incumbent Vice Prime Minister of Israel), Quartet Special Envoy James Wolfensohn, candidates of Fatah and independent parties, Yossi Beilin (who had been important for the work of the Geneva initiative), as well as representatives for the major international observer groups.¹⁴⁴ Meeting all these persons showed how Carter had access to a wide range of influential persons in top governmental positions, making Carter's personal diplomacy a special feature of the Carter Center. No direct results came of the meetings, and Carter did not influence the election in any particular way prior to the casting of the ballots.

An important aspect which could have contributed to widened political liberties in Palestine was the release of political prisoners. Prior to the election in 2005, about 1000 Palestinian political prisoners were released from Israeli imprisonment as a sign of goodwill towards the upcoming election of Abbas.¹⁴⁵ The period before the 2006 election saw no similar

¹⁴³ Carter (2006B), 180-181.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, 180.

¹⁴⁵ Aaron D. Pina, "CRS Report for Congress: Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas: Overview of the Internal and External Challenges," (March 9th, 2006,) URL: [<http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RS22047.pdf>] [Entered April 21st, 2007.]

development, and according to the US department of state, citing the Mandela Institute, 10,633 Palestinians were held as political prisoners by Israel at the end of 2006, including four ministers and 32 Legislative Council members from Hamas. The Palestinian Authority held 263 prisoners due to collaborating with Israel, someone Israel labeled as political prisoners,¹⁴⁶ thereby adding to limited political liberties in Palestine. Carter did not broker any agreements about the release of these detainees; something which highlights that Carter could not influence Israeli policy towards Palestine or Palestinian policies concerning their political prisoners. This stood in sharp contrast with the accomplishment seen in the previous chapter concerning the 1990 elections in Nicaragua, a difference the thesis addresses in the concluding chapter.

4.3.2 Election Day

During the election day, the observer delegation split up to cover as many election sites as possible, and coordinated their activities with other international observer delegations. Carter visited more than two dozen sites in East Jerusalem, Hebron, Ramallah and Jericho, and in total the international observers provided a wide coverage of election sites. This presence might have worked as a physical check against possible irregularities. Any negative aspects would be disclosed by the observers, and could cause international attention, as well as protests to the authorities. The observers might also denounce the whole election if problems were substantial. Thereby, the observers could deter attempts of election fraud and assure the voters of well managed election procedures.

A serious problem in the 2006 election was the restrictions placed on voting in East Jerusalem. Voting here had been a problem previously, and in the 2005 Presidential election, Carter had personally interfered to better the arrangements for the voters. During this preceding election, Israeli officials had operated with voter's lists that were completely different from the people who came to vote at the polling sites, turning most people away despite the fact that they were registered in Jerusalem. When Carter threatened to hold an international press conference about the problem, the Israeli prime minister's office agreed to allow all voters registered in Jerusalem to vote at any polling site, and that international

¹⁴⁶ US Department of State, "Israel and the Occupied Territories, (March 6th, 2007,) URL: [<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78854.htm#ot>] [Entered April 4th, 2007.]

observers, not any Palestinians, should monitor this process.¹⁴⁷ Carter's involvement in this issue hence bettered the conditions for voting, but in 2006 the problem continued.

In 2006, 120,000 eligible Palestinian voters lived in Jerusalem, 9 percent of the total electorate, but only 6,300 (a slight improvement from the previous election) of these were allowed to vote by the Israeli authorities. An agreement had been made between the Palestinians and the Israelis concerning the voting procedures in East Jerusalem only eleven days prior to the election, making preparations and voter education difficult. Numbered tickets were issued to East Jerusalemites who planned to vote in the city, while those without these tickets were not allowed cast their ballots. As this arrangement happened close to the election, many people did not know about the requirements or where to obtain the necessary tickets. Those who did vote, at selected post offices, were not granted secret voting as they had to cast their ballots in front of postal workers. In addition, many Palestinians did not vote owing to a fear of losing health insurance and retirement benefits which the Israeli state provides for East Jerusalemites. Here, the presence of international observers was not enough to assure the voters of a free and fair election, and despite Carter's reputation for standing up against unfair election procedures, he could not help mend this negative aspect. This example thus showed limitations to the work of Carter and his Center. Voter turnout was lower in East Jerusalem than in the West Bank and Gaza, and though improvements were made in 2006, voting arrangements were characterized as inadequate by the observers. Still, the irregularities were not enough to damage the whole election which complied with international standards.¹⁴⁸

4.3.3 The Results of the Election

The results of the election surprised the observers, the international community and the political parties themselves. Hamas won a clear majority of the parliamentary seats, (76 of 132 members) resulting in Fatah's resignation. Carter stayed after the election in order to discuss the results with the different parties, and visited Abbas in Ramallah. The Palestinian President expressed his satisfaction with the fair and free election, said he would remain in his position, but also commented that he would not cooperate with Hamas. Carter urged him to

¹⁴⁷ Carter (2006B), 171-172.

¹⁴⁸ NDI (2006), 2 and 14-16.

reconsider, but could not persuade him.¹⁴⁹ Carter's access in this example did not give him influence over the actors, showing limitations to Carter and the Center's work.

At the Carter Center's offices in Ramallah, set up prior to the election in order to make a correct judgment about the whole process, Carter was informed that the Israeli government would not allow Hamas candidates to move from Gaza to the West Bank, thus preventing the elected candidates from realizing the results of the election and form a government. Carter called the Israeli Prime Minister's office and got this policy confirmed. Carter then informed the US Counsel General who again promised to inform the ambassador, the State Department and the White House.¹⁵⁰ Carter's attempt to resolve this issue was unsuccessful, showing Carter's inability to positively affect the results of the election. In fact following an attack by Palestinian gunmen on an Israeli military outpost, in which an Israeli soldier was abducted, over twenty Hamas members of cabinet and parliament were arrested, in addition to Israeli army attacks on Gaza.¹⁵¹ The situation after the election thus worsened, and the election did not seem to bring peace.

Carter's commitment to speak with all the parties involved had not included candidates from Hamas, due to restrictions put on the Center's work by the sitting US President. After the election, Carter no longer felt obliged to refrain from meeting Hamas, and at the Carter Center's office, Carter met with Hamas member Dr. Mahmoud Ramahi. Ramahi who would later become the legislature's secretary and was one of the Hamas members Israeli authorities arrested.¹⁵² Carter and the Ramahi discussed the prospects of a continued cease fire and the possibility of a Palestinian coalition government, and though the contact itself was significant, no results came from the meeting. The fact that Carter met with a Hamas candidate, probably against the US administration's wishes, meant that he followed through his commitment to speak with all of the parties involved. Carter's inability to push Hamas in a direction of fulfilling the international community's demands of renouncing violence, recognizing Israel and fulfilling previous agreements, may be explained by many factors. One might have been the lack of personal relationships with Hamas leaders, and the absence of a direct invitation from Hamas to Carter. Had they invited him, Carter may have had a greater leverage in persuading them to make concessions. Carter's lack of influence is further addressed later in the chapter.

¹⁴⁹ Jimmy Carter, "Palestinian Elections: Trip Report by Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter," (January 30th, 2006,) URL: [<http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc2287.html>] [Entered February 24th, 2007.]

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Greg Myre and Ian Fisher, "Israel Arrest Hamas Politicians," *International Herald Tribune*, (June 29th, 2006,) URL: [<http://www.ihf.com/articles/2006/06/29/news/mideast.php>] [Entered March 19th, 2007.]

¹⁵² Carter (2006B), 184-185.

The results of the Palestinian election were met with severe criticism by most of the international community. As Fatah refused to cooperate with Hamas, the new government consisted of only Hamas members, with Dr. Ismail Haniyeh as Prime Minister. Israel, the Quartet and the Western hemisphere¹⁵³ isolated the new government, leading to an economic boycott which resulted in worsening living conditions for the Palestinians. The debt of the self-rule authorities grew, and according to the *Associated Press*, Israel withheld tax transfers to the Palestinian Authority to the amount of \$50 million a month while the international community retained hundred of millions of dollars in aid, severely damaging the newly elected government's ability to pay salaries and provide public services.¹⁵⁴ According to a World Bank monitoring note on the fiscal crisis, the Palestinian economy saw a 61 percent drop in gross revenues compared to the same period the previous year, emphasizing the extent of the crisis.¹⁵⁵ In addition to the state of the economy, armed conflict worsened the situation. After the mentioned kidnapping of an Israeli soldier by Palestinian gunmen, Israel attacked Gaza and arrested many Hamas members. After Hezbollah members based in Lebanon attacked Israeli vehicles in Israel in support of the Palestinians, Prime Minister Olmert declared war on Lebanon, bombing Beirut and Southern Lebanon. The conflict was resolved after UN resolution 1701 - with Hezbollah undefeated and with renewed support in the area. Hence the conflict in Palestine spread as a regional conflict, and the situation in the Palestinian Areas deteriorated.

To make matters even worse, tension between Fatah and Hamas rose in May of 2006. According to the BBC, a power struggle between Hamas and the Fatah dominated police force developed as Hamas deployed its own security forces.¹⁵⁶ The struggle became violent, and by March 2007, 130 people had been killed in the fractional fighting. In order to end this conflict, Fatah and Hamas met in Saudi Arabia where they in March of 2007 reached an agreement to form a coalition government which would end the armed dispute. The agreement also included statements to respect and follow previous agreements, moving Hamas in a direction of complying with international critique and pressure. Hence, following a regional initiative, the situation was resolved, a feature the chapter addresses later.

¹⁵³ 'Western' is in this thesis understood as North American and European.

¹⁵⁴ The Associated Press, "Palestinian Economy Shrinks 21 Per Cent in Fourth Quarter of 2006," (February 22nd, 2007,) URL: [<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/830389.html>] [Entered March 20th, 2007.]

¹⁵⁵ The World Bank, "Coping with Crisis: Palestinian Authority Institutional Performance," (November 2006,) URL:

[<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/PAInstitutionalPerformanceNov.7.06.pdf>] [Entered March 20th, 2007.]

¹⁵⁶ The BBC, "Gunmen Kill Hamas Member in Gaza," (May 24th, 2006,) URL:

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5011422.stm] [Entered March 20th, 2007.]

Commenting on the situation from the sideline, Jimmy Carter stated that the reaction from the US and Israel to punish the entire Palestinian people was a “counterproductive tragedy.”¹⁵⁷ Carter maintained that the new Hamas government should meet international demands, including recognizing Israel’s right to live in peace, but that aid to the Palestinians should not be cut off, rather funneled through a third party like the UN.¹⁵⁸

4.3.4 Meeting Goals?

The Carter Center and NDI observation of the 2006 Palestinian election did meet its goal of conducting an impartial verdict. The election itself was according to Carter one of the best the Carter Center had monitored in terms of expressing the will of the people, despite the problems in East Jerusalem.¹⁵⁹ The presence of observers guaranteed that fraud and irregularities would be discovered and as such their presence functioned as deterrence against attempts of election manipulation. However, the observers only partly contributed to a safe election as many Palestinians in East Jerusalem did not vote due to fear of reprisals. Apart from the well managed election, the delegation did not meet its goal of contributing to build a Palestinian state living in internal and external peace, or Carter’s goal to personally play a part in bringing democracy and peace to the Middle East. Thereby, the Center’s election mediation as an approach to peace only partly succeeded. The following discusses four factors which can help explain why Carter and the delegation did not meet all of its goals and as such highlights limitations to the work of Carter and the Carter Center.

4.4 Four Conditions that Influenced the Center’s Work

Explaining why Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center did not meet their own goal of contributing to peace in the 2006 Palestinian election may be based on examining numerous causal factors. The following focuses on four conditions that can explain why. The first concerns other organizations involved, and is included as to discuss how the Carter Center relies on cooperation for its election mediation. The second focuses on Carter’s political and post-presidential career. As Carter’s background is essential to the Carter Center’s work, his

¹⁵⁷ Carter (2006A).

¹⁵⁸ Carter (2006B), 216; and CCN, “Jimmy Carter: Give Hamas a Chance,” (February 1st, 2006,) URL: [<http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/02/01/carter.hamas/>] [Entered February 26th, 2007.]

¹⁵⁹ Jimmy Carter, “Punishing the Innocent is a Crime,” *International Herald Tribune*, (May 7th, 2006,) URL: [http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2006/05/07/opinion/edcarter.php] [Entered March 16th, 2007.]

work and statements as president and ex-president regarding the Middle East is presented. The purpose of this condition is to discuss what leverage and personal contacts Carter had to build on in 2006. Thirdly, regional initiatives for peace are included to explain the circumstances for the 2006 election. Lastly, US policy towards the area of interest under George W. Bush is presented as this policy can affect the results of Carter and the Center's election mediation as well as the results of the election itself.

4.4.1 Other Organizations Involved

Several organizations observed the election in 2006. The UN, the Canadian Observation Mission (COM) and the EU Election Observation Mission (EOM), were all represented and cooperated with the delegation from the Carter Center and NDI. The EOM and the COM assessed the election in a similar manner as the delegation Carter headed, and concluded that the election was free and fair. The EOM shared the Carter Center and NDI's critique of the irregularities of the election, especially the voting procedures in East Jerusalem. The delegations also noted problems concerning intimidation of the CEC, media time allotted to the different candidates, campaigning close to and during election, and the issue of promoting women's participation. Despite these shortcomings, the general judgment of the election was favorable. During election day, 198 international observers from the EU delegation covered 32 per cent of the election sites in fourteen of the sixteen election districts, while 55 observers from the Canadian delegation covered 200 sites.¹⁶⁰ The presence of a large body of international observers assured a wide coverage of a large number of sites. Thus, their presence guaranteed that errors and fraud would be detected and deterred, giving voters confidence in the election. This is an idea also presented by Taulbee and Creekmore Jr. who claim that the attendance of international and prestigious observers can induce parties and authorities to abide the rules, and thereby give voters confidence in the electoral process.¹⁶¹ For the work of Carter and the Center, the presence of international observers strengthens their work for correct electoral procedures, making election observation a joint effort.

¹⁶⁰ European Union Election Observation Mission, *West Bank and Gaza Strip: Palestinian Legislative Council Elections*, (2006), 1, 4, 28, and 39-45. URL: [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/westbank/legislative/final_statement_0106.pdf] [Entered February 21st, 2007]; The Canadian International Development Agency, "Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions – Palestinian Legislative Council Elections 2006," (January 26th, 2006,) URL: [<http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/EMA-218122158-PRU>] [Updated February 2nd, 2007] [Entered April 18th, 2007]; and NDI (2006), 18-21.

¹⁶¹ Taulbee and Creekmore, 158.

The fact that many voters in East Jerusalem did not vote due to fear of reprisals from the Israeli authorities contradicts the observers' role as making voters trust the election. Thus, the undemocratic character of the voting in East Jerusalem showed limitations to the role of the observers. A factor which can explain this is the observer teams' lack of regional foundation. As the described international observer teams represented Western dominated organizations, they lacked local connections which could have made the observer teams more trusted. There is a danger that the observers might be seen as imposing a Western system without regard to local condition, and thus intimidate voters. Taking into account Western colonization of and interference in the Middle East, some Palestinians may be skeptical towards Western observers. And as Hamas works to reduce what they see as westernization of the Middle East, Western organizations are not unconditionally welcomed. Further, there is a special relationship between the West and Israel which can lead to skepticism towards all western organizations among Palestinians. However, the Carter Center and NDI delegation included members from all over the world, including resident Palestinians, and may as such have given the international observers a local belonging. Still, the majority of the observers were from Europe, the US, and Canada, contributing to their Western character and reduced reassuring presence.

4.4.2 The Reputation of a Former President

Events during Jimmy Carter's period in office provided foundations and contacts for him to build on in his search for peace between Israel and Palestine during his post-presidency. A development in his own beliefs and statements after he left office aided Carter in this work, and provided a better reputation among Palestinians than his presidency did.

One of the major achievements of Carter's presidency was the Camp David Accords which lead to a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. After thirteen days of negotiations in September of 1978, Carter had managed to get the former rivals Menachem Begin, Israeli Prime Minister, and Anwar el-Sadat, President of Egypt, to accept a framework for peace which also included foundations for further negotiations concerning Palestine. The Palestinians were to gain autonomy through the parties' dedication to UN resolutions 242 and 338, and would be granted autonomy after electing a self-rule government which again would result in Israeli withdrawal. The modalities of establishing the self-rule government were to be discussed between Egypt, Israel and Jordan, with delegations from the West Bank and Gaza being included with the Egyptian and Jordanian representatives. Police and security

arrangements were also to be agreed upon by the mentioned nations, while the final status of the West Bank and Gaza was to be resolved between Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the elected representatives of the Palestinians within three years after the election.¹⁶² The mentioned UN resolution 242 stated that Israel should withdraw from the occupied territories, recognized Israel's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, and affirmed the necessity of a just solution to the refugee problem. Resolution 338 called for a cease fire which ended the 1973 war, the implementation of resolution 242 and decided that negotiations about a just and durable peace in the Middle East should take place with the cease fire. In total, the Camp David Accords thus proposed a solution to both the conflict between Israel and Egypt and the issue of Palestine. In this light, the Camp David accords may have contributed to Carter's reputation of supporting the Palestinians in their fight for independence, which again can be argued to have given him a favorable standing in the Middle East.

There are several problems, however, with the idea that Carter had a good reputation in the Middle East and among Palestinians. In an interview with the *New York Post* on May 1st, 1978, Carter stated that he did not believe Israel would completely withdraw from the occupied territories and that he had never favored an independent Palestinian state.¹⁶³ As a result, Carter's later work for peace in Palestine may hence have been met with skepticism in some quarters. The Camp David Accords were also met with contempt by most Arab states, which broke all contact with Egypt (until the mid 1980's) for concluding a separate peace agreement with Israel. The hatred towards the Egyptian President Sadat accumulated in his assassination by Islamic extremists, partly due to his signing of the Accords and the following peace treaty.¹⁶⁴ For Carter's reputation in the Middle East, his statements in 1978 and the general negative reactions to the Accords may thus have reduced Carter's ability to influence future events and personal contacts.

According to former National Security Council member and member of the US delegation at Camp David, William B. Quandt, a major error of the Camp David Accords was that they did not stop Israeli settlements.¹⁶⁵ Additional critique of the Accords is offered by Advisor to the Kuwait delegation to the UN, Fayez A. Sayegh, who points out the errors of

¹⁶² Carter (2006B), 221-230.

¹⁶³ Jimmy Carter, "Opposition to a Palestinian State," in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 7.4 (Summer 1978), 168-169. URL: [<http://www.jstor.org/search/>] [Entered March 21st, 2007.]

¹⁶⁴ William B. Quandt, "Camp David and Peace Making in the Middle East," in *Political Science Quarterly*, 101.3 (1986), 357-358. URL: [<http://www.jstor.org/view/00323195/di980412/98p0224m/>] [Entered March 21st, 2007.]

¹⁶⁵ William B. Quandt, "Seminar on US Middle East Policy at the Peace Research Institute of Oslo and the University of Oslo," (March 6th and 7th, 2006.)

not including the Palestinians at Camp David, of not including the issue of who should have control over Jerusalem, for dealing with the refugee problem imprecisely, for only paying lip service to UN resolutions, and for denying the Palestinians a national identity.¹⁶⁶ The negative reactions and the shortcomings of the agreement, emphasizes how the Camp David Accords gave Carter a mixed reputation at best, hence reducing his leverage in negotiating and pressing for solutions in the 2006 election.

Carter's ability to influence Hamas may have been affected by events at the end of his presidency. On November 4th, 1979, the American embassy in Tehran was overrun by Iranian militants, taking 65 Americans hostage. Being supported by the new Iranian revolutionary and religious government, lead by Ayatollah Khomeini, 52 of the hostages were held for 444 days, causing what has been labeled the Iranian Hostage Crisis. Carter ordered a military rescue operation which failed, and chose not to pursue a continued military approach to the conflict. Until the last minutes of his presidency, Carter negotiated for the release of the Americans, who were finally set free on January the 20th, 1980; just minutes after Carter had resigned as President.¹⁶⁷ The crisis damaged Carter's chances for a second term in office, as well as his relationship with Iranian leaders. As Iran's religious and political leaders still use an anti-American rhetoric, and as the nation supports Hamas, Carter's image among some Iranians may be similar to his image among Hamas members. If so, the Iranian hostage crisis can have complicated Carter ability to use his reputation or friendship to put pressure on Hamas leaders and candidates, resulting Carter's reduced influence.

Today, it would seem that Carter has deviated from his former position of not wanting an independent Palestinian state, as he wrote in *Palestine Peace not Apartheid* in 2006, that "Israel must accept a Palestinian state in the small remaining portion of territorial homeland allotted to the Palestinians by the UN [...]"¹⁶⁸ According to Douglas Brinkley, Palestine became a preoccupation for the former president as soon as he left office. Carter made a trip to the Middle East in 1983 which established contacts and a favorable reputation among PLO members, who stated that Carter understood their plight. And though Carter did not have direct contact with Arafat at this time, he did establish a back channel through which the two communicated by messengers. Carter's involvement gave him adherents among Palestinians, according to Brinkley, and provided foundations for the Center's later election mediation. In

¹⁶⁶ Fayeze A. Sayegh, "The Camp David Agreement and the Palestinian Problem," in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 8.2 (Winter 1979), 33, 39-40. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/view/0377919x/di009591/00p01145/0> [Entered March 20th, 2007.]

¹⁶⁷ Carter (1995A), 5-16 and 466.

¹⁶⁸ Carter (2006B), 18.

1996, the Carter Center, in cooperation with NDI, was invited by Arafat to observe Palestine's first democratic election, an invitation which came due to Carter's relationship with Arafat. Carter wanted to aid in the creation of a Palestinian state separate from Israel, and wanted as such a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Arafat won the Presidential election, which could not have happened without Carter's help, according to the Palestinian President. Carter's reputation among Palestinians can thus be said to have risen since he left office, although his relationship with Arafat and participation in the election caused criticism among some Israelis.¹⁶⁹ Carter's involvement in Palestinian elections since the 1990s, his close relationship with former President Arafat, and Carter's endorsement of a two state solution,¹⁷⁰ shows a change from previous statements and his current commitment to realizing an independent Palestinian state.

Carter's approval of the election of Arafat can be criticized for condoning the undemocratic one party system with the Fatah leader at the top. Carter's support also gave him opponents in Israel, reducing Carter's ability to influence irregularities Israel was responsible for in the 2006 election. Though Carter still had contact with people top governmental positions in Israel, his support of Arafat may have given him a reputation which reduced his ability to affect the 2006 election in a positive way. As such, Carter's personal contacts made possible and limited the work of the Carter Center.

Carter's actions during his post-presidency have contributed to a better image, and his latest book, *Palestine Peace not Apartheid*, can be argued to have given him a more favorable reputation among Palestinians, though it likely worsened his reputation among some Israelis. Lena Khalaf Tuffaha wrote in the *Palestine Chronicle* that Carter had challenged Americans to view the Israeli-Palestinian conflict differently through his book, while the Palestinian-American, Sherri Muzher wrote in the *Jordan Times* that Carter's apartheid analogy was correct, comparing Carter's use of the term with South African Bishop, Desmond Tutu's and former South African President, Nelson Mandela's comparisons of the histories of Palestinians and South Africans. Head of the American Jewish Committee, David Harris, on the other hand, wrote in the *Jerusalem Post* that Carter was one-sided and that he did not understand the history of the conflict. In the US, some pro-Israeli voices, like Marty Peretz, have labeled Carter a Jew hater, while others have stated that the apartheid analogy is

¹⁶⁹ Brinkley, 102, 121-123, 464-465, and 468.

¹⁷⁰ Brinkley, 464-468; and Jimmy Carter, "Op-Ed: Middle East Accords offers 'Best' Chance for Peace," (November 3rd, 2003,) URL: [<http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc1525.html>] [Entered February 24th, 2007.]

outrageous.¹⁷¹ In all, Carter's dedication for the cause of the Palestinians does seem to have risen since 1978, aiding his image and reputation among Palestinians. As Carter's book was released after the election of 2006, the publication did not boost Carter's reputation prior or during the election. The book did, however, emphasize Carter's dedication for peace and the development in his beliefs since the late 1970s.

Carter's Christianity may have hampered his ability to influence the Palestinian election. Carter's reasoning for his work has its foundations in his personal faith, something which may add to a sense of Carter imposing Western religion and traditions through his work. Such a missionary spirit would in this sense clash with Hamas's fight against what the organization views as westernization of the Arab world. Carter's relationship with Arafat can also have reduced Carter's standing among Hamas members. Carter's ability to gain influence over Hamas members may thus have been lessened due to religiousness and his contacts.

There are of course many reasons for Carter inability to gain influence, his reputation being just one. Still, it can be argued that Carter's reputation is crucial for his and the Center's ability to influence elections. This factor was partly present in 2006, but did not give Carter or the Center influence in the election. Thereby, their ability to meet their own goals was reduced. The next two sections examine how two other conditions, regional initiatives and American foreign policy, may have affected the work of the Carter Center.

4.4.3 Regional Initiatives

Of all the nations in the Middle East, only Israel can be labeled a democracy. There are democratic movements within different nations (as in Iran), but there is no general trend towards democratization in the nations surrounding Israel and Palestine. The moves towards a democratic Palestine thus took place without a regional pressure for such political liberalization. For the work of the Carter and the Carter Center, the absence of regional foundations for democracy and peace complicates their ability to make positive impacts on elections. According to Jimmy Carter, the regional peace initiatives in the Middle East are of little relevance at the present:

Except for Egypt's contacts with the Palestinians, the Arab nations surrounding Israel do not now play a constructive role in any potential peace process, but their cumulative influence will

¹⁷¹ Jefferson Morley, "World Opinion Roundup: Jimmy Carter, Palestinian Sympathizer," *Washington Post*, (December 6th, 2006,) URL: [http://blog.washingtonpost.com/worldopinionroundup/2006/12/jimmy_carter_palestinian_sympa.html] [Entered February 24th, 2007.]

be vital in helping to consummate an acceptable agreement and in assuring doubtful Israelis that such a peace can be dependable and permanent.¹⁷²

Carter's statement may, on the other hand, not be completely true. There have been regional initiatives for peace, which indirectly have pushed for democratic elections. The Saudi Peace plan of 2002 is one such example, and was adopted at the Arab summit in Beirut that year. This peace plan, also known as the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, called for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict following the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied since the 1967 war, a just settlement of the refugee problem, an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and the implementation of UN resolutions 242 and 338.¹⁷³ The regional pressure for an independent Palestinian state was reaffirmed through the Saudi Arabian peace initiative, and as the Palestinian election in 2006 can be seen as a step towards independence, the regional agreement was part of its foundation.

Another regional initiative which did bring peace, was the pressure added especially by Saudi Arabia in getting Hamas and Fatah to negotiate and agree to form a unified government. This initiative brought an end to the fractional violence, and thus contributed distinctly to democracy and peace. The regional initiative was in this example vital for reconciliation, and showed the importance of regional actors. For the future work of Carter and his Center, regional foundations for democracy and peace will be important for their ability to play a part through their election missions.

4.4.4 The Presidency of George Walker Bush

US foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict under George Walker Bush is a hollow policy not followed through by political action. In 2002, the Bush administration issued the National Security Strategy (NSS) which set out to make the world a better place through political and economic freedoms, goals which should be accomplished by expanding the number of open societies with democratic infrastructures. Concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, the document stated the administration's commitment to a democratic and independent Palestine living side by side with Israel in peace.¹⁷⁴ In a speech held in June 2002, Bush restated his vision of an independent and democratic Palestine, something which

¹⁷² Carter (2006B), 71.

¹⁷³ The Arab Peace Initiative, 2002, URL: [<http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm>] [Entered March 21st, 2007.]

¹⁷⁴ The National Security Council, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Chapter I and IV. URL: [<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss1.html>] [Entered March 21st, 2007.]

would require constitutional reform and a new Palestinian leadership denouncing terrorism.¹⁷⁵ The call for a new leadership was met by the election of a new Palestinian President in 2005 and by the election of a new Palestinian legislative council (with new powers over the executive,) thus fulfilling some of the US demands. The policy of democratization in the Middle East was further followed up by a joint initiative by the Quartet. In April 2003, the Quartet presented the Road Map for Peace, a plan which set forth timetables for progress towards a “final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”¹⁷⁶ Free elections were one part of the Road Map’s goals, and though the plan failed, elections did take place. As such, US demands to elect a new Palestinian leadership and to hold free elections were met by the Palestinians. Bush’s commitment to an independent Palestinian state was as such good on paper, making him the first sitting American President to declare support for a sovereign Palestinian state. Bush’s actions, however, have failed to follow up his words. According to Jimmy Carter, the “United States is squandering international prestige and goodwill and intensifying global anti-American terrorism by unofficially condoning or abetting the Israeli confiscation and colonization of Palestinian territories.”¹⁷⁷ In addition, there had been no real peace talks since Bush took office, resulting in a weak US policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.¹⁷⁸ The absence of US pressure for dialogue thus results in a “paper” policy that is not backed up by appropriate action.

Bush’s response to the results of the 2006 Palestinian election was first that the challenge to the regime in power was a good thing, but that the US would not have any contact with the Hamas government unless it renounced terrorism, recognized Israel and accepted previous peace agreements, something Carter agreed with.¹⁷⁹ Still, Carter maintained that peace talks should be held between the Israelis and the Palestinian President and criticized Bush for not believing that peace could be obtained during his presidency, and for not fulfilling his statements about a peace process. According to Carter, direct engagement with Abbas and government leaders in Damascus was needed if negotiated agreements were to be realized.¹⁸⁰ Further, the former President did not agree with Bush in cutting off aid to the

¹⁷⁵ George W. Bush, “President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership,” (June 24th, 2002,) URL: [\[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html\]](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html) [Entered March 23rd, 2007.]

¹⁷⁶ US Department of State, “Roadmap for Peace in the Middle East: Israeli/Palestinian Reciprocal Action, Quartet Support,” (July 16th, 2003,) URL: [\[http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/22520.htm\]](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/22520.htm) [Entered March 21st, 2007.]

¹⁷⁷ Carter (2006B), 216.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, 157, 163.

¹⁷⁹ John Vause, Guy Raz and Ben Wedeman, “Hamas’ Past Cast Shadow over Peace Plans,” (January 26th, 2006,) *CNN*, URL: [\[http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/01/26/palestinian.election/\]](http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/01/26/palestinian.election/) [Entered March 26th, 2007.]

¹⁸⁰ Carter (2006B), 160, 203.

Palestinians, funding Carter meant should be funneled through the UN or similar parties. Carter thus wanted the US and the international community to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people and resort to diplomacy, claiming that “the attempt to coerce Hamas leaders by starving the Palestinian people has failed.”¹⁸¹ Carter disagreed with Bush in not recognizing the new Palestinian administration, something he felt the US should do as it had sponsored the election. Carter’s optimism of Hamas developing into a nonviolent organization was not met by the Bush administration, and the isolation of the new government was upheld.¹⁸²

The special relationship between the US and Israel is something Carter describes as damaging to the political debate concerning Israel and Palestine. According to Carter, the US is condoning illegal Israeli actions, such as the continued colonization of Palestinian land, without debate: “because of powerful political, economic, and religious forces in the United States, Israeli government decisions are rarely questioned or condemned [.]”¹⁸³ The power of the pro-Israeli lobby, the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), is a part of this relationship, and an element which has no countervailing voices, according to Carter. Carter sees a fusion between Christian fundamentalists and fundamentalist politics that influences the US’ present policy towards the Middle East. The political fundamentalism is defined, by the former President, as a simplification of complex situations where there is no room for dissent, something which has been mixed with a religious conservative outlook, thus closing the gap between religion and politics. US acceptance of Israeli settlements is one example of this fundamentalism, Carter says, something which complicates a peace agreement acceptable to all the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹⁸⁴ US policy towards the Middle East is thus influenced by pro-Israeli voices as who Carter describes as fundamentalists (Carter’s definition of neoconservatives) have gained power in the Bush administration.¹⁸⁵

An aspect which hindered Carter in his involvement in the Palestinian election was the Bush administration’s limitations on who Carter could meet in order to obtain approval for his journeys. In 2005 Carter did not get permission from the White House to visit Syria’s

¹⁸¹ Jimmy Carter, “Statement by Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter in the Israel/Palestinian Conflict,” (October 6th, 2006,) URL: [http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/releases/statement_100606.html] [Entered February 23rd, 2007.]

¹⁸² CNN, “Jimmy Carter: Give Hamas a Chance.” URL: [<http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/02/01/carter.hamas/>] [Entered February 26th, 2007.]

¹⁸³ Carter (2006B), 209.

¹⁸⁴ Carter (2006B), 208-209; Jimmy Carter, “Jimmy Carter Issues Letter to Jewish Community on Palestine Peace not Apartheid,” (December 15th, 2006,) URL:

[http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/carter_letter_121506.html] [Entered February 23rd, 2007]; and Carter (2005), 13, 100-101, and 113-114.

¹⁸⁵ Carter (2005), 99-101, and 114.

President in Damascus. Carter reluctantly complied, though stressing how counterproductive it was to refrain from meeting parties with whom one disagreed. Prior to the 2006 election, Carter had promised the US administration not to meet any of the Hamas candidates or its leaders as to obtain approval for his involvement.¹⁸⁶ These restrictions put limitations on Carter's work, and may have obstructed Carter's ability to establish contacts he could influence.

The fact that Carter has publicly disagreed with the US administration has been met with criticism. Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs at the Heritage Foundation, Brett D. Schaefer, has, for example, stated that it is a destructive trend that harms long term US interests and undermines the authority of the sitting President.¹⁸⁷ Carter, on the other hand, stresses that he and his Center always seek approval for their involvements, but that they "reserve the right to express our frank assessment of those situations."¹⁸⁸ Despite his honest assessment of US foreign policy, Carter did not influence or alter US foreign policy.

4.5 The Influence of the Conditions

Jimmy Carter's ability to affect events of elections is dependent on several factors. One of these is the combined work of the Carter Center and international organizations. In this test case, international observers strengthened the Center's work for a well managed election, but the observer teams only partly assured voters of a free and fair election. Another factor is Carter's ability to influence parties and developments due to his character and reputation. Despite a network composing of persons in top governmental positions, Carter did not broker any agreements that could have bettered the situation prior, during or after the election. For Carter and the Center to be successful in influencing elections, democratic foundations must exist, something regional initiatives for democracy can provide. Such foundations were not present in Palestine, making this condition limiting Carter and the Center's ability to influence the process and results of the election. A last condition concerned US restrictions on who Carter could meet, a factor which limited Carter's role in the election. Thus, the four conditions had limiting implications for the work of Carter and the Center. Election mediation was not a successful strategy for peace in this test case, hence limiting the validity of the

¹⁸⁶ Carter (2006B), 81, 184.

¹⁸⁷ Brett D. Schaefer, [Brett.Schaefer@heritage.org] "Re: Questions in Connection with Master Thesis," (July 7th, 2006.)

¹⁸⁸ Carter (2006A).

thesis' hypothesis. Carter and the Center can thus contribute to democracy and peace only when their work is aided by other factors.

Elections alone do not bring democracy or peace, and as seen in the situation after the election in Palestine, economy plays an important part in developing a viable and peaceful democracy. Carter's idea that one of the best ways to resolve disputes is through democratic elections where the results are honored¹⁸⁹, might as such not always be the case. Still, it can be argued that the result of the election of 2006 was not respected; in fact, the new government was isolated and punished due to a history of violence and a religious extremist program. Most of all, the shortage of money made governing an impossible task, and fueled the violent conflicts within the Palestinian society and regionally.

The involvement of the EU, the US and the Carter Center can be criticized for granting legitimacy to Hamas. The EU as a part in election observation is complicated by the policy of the EU after the election. Despite the organization's own positive assessment of the election, it agreed with the rest of the Quartet to impose sanctions on the elected Hamas government, hence creating a contradicting stance. First the EU approved of the election and thus the parties which participated. When one of the parties then, surprisingly, won, it withdrew its support and claimed democratic measures were needed before it would offer its support. Had the EU's position on Hamas been consistent, the organization should have refused to approve the election before Hamas had taken the necessary steps and possibly divided its military and political wing. This point can also be seen to be valid for the position of the US as it pushed for the very election which produced Hamas' victory. Thirdly, the involvement of Carter and the Carter Center did also bring recognition to Hamas by verifying the election. As Hamas' program calls for the destruction of Israel and contains religious fundamentalism, its participation in 2006 reduced the democratic character of the process. Thereby, Carter's acceptance of Hamas' participation and its victory contributed in approving the undemocratic character of the election. Carter's approach may have been motivated by an idea that when absorbed in a democracy, the undemocratic aspects of Hamas would be modified. This can as such be a proposed solution to the democratic problem of how best to meet challenges of undemocratic forces. The acceptance of Hamas as a participant did grant it legitimacy by all the mentioned parties, and though bringing the organization into democratic governance may moderate its fundamentalist stance, there is a risk by approving such an organization's entry in elections.

¹⁸⁹ Carter (2006A).

The Carter Center's focus on elections as being a path towards peace was undermined by Hamas's want for the elimination of Israel. In addition, Carter's choice of involving despite the US demand of not meeting Hamas prior to the election reduced Carter and the Carter Center's ability to influence actors and events. Had the Carter Center withdrawn its support prior to the election due to the restrictions posed by the US government, the Center would have shed light on the fruitlessness of isolating one part.

Had Carter's organization refused to give legitimacy to the election until Hamas had either divided its military and political wing or dropped their goal of eliminating Israel, Carter and the Center could have put pressure on both the conditions for political participation and Hamas. As Hamas wanted to participate in 2006, instead of boycotting as in 1996 and 2005,¹⁹⁰ the organization could have been susceptible to outside demands. As such, denial to accept the organization participation before they had modified their stance on the use of violence could have had a better effect than letting them run for office and then demanding political revisionism.

On the other hand, if Carter and the Center had withdrawn their support, they might not have been able to contribute in the building of democratic Palestinian political institutions, a project they had been involved in since the early 1990s. Still, the ability of Carter and the Center to influence the election was weakened by not speaking with all the parties, something which would have been more likely if Carter had adopted a different approach prior to the election.

¹⁹⁰ Aljazeera, "Hamas to Boycott Palestinian Presidential Elections," (December 1st, 2004,) URL: http://www.aljazeera.com/me.asp?service_ID=5900 [Entered April 29th, 2007.]

Chapter 5: Conclusions

It has been the purpose of this thesis to test if Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center succeeded in the goals of their election mediation, and how four specific conditions can affect their work. Thereby, the question of whether election mediation is a successful strategy for peace has been sought answered. In order to discuss this, the two test cases of the Center's involvement in the 1990 Nicaraguan and the 2006 Palestinian election were chosen. As the Center's approach in both cases built on the belief that elections would produce democracy and peace, the involvement in 2006 can be compared to the involvement in 1990. Though comparing two different election observations in two different continents conducted 16 years apart is extremely difficult, positive and negative aspects of their election missions can be compared.

5.1 Possibilities and Limitations

The two test cases showed that Carter and the Center had similar goals for their election mediation. In both cases, Carter wanted to influence events of the elections, and the former president and his Center wanted to use election mediation as a way of establishing democracy and peace. The role of the delegations was to observe all aspects of the two elections and to involve directly, if possible, to correct irregularities. In the case of Nicaragua, Carter did play an influential role, and the Center reached the goals of their mission. In Palestine, the Center only partly obtained its goals, and the two cases thus showed one positive and one negative example of Carter and his Center's election mediation.

In the 1990 Nicaraguan elections, Carter and his Center's involvement was based on strengthening local initiatives for democracy and peace. The delegation Carter led was a joint Carter Center and Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government mission, and included several members from Latin America. Their cooperation with the Organization of American States further strengthened the regional character of the election observers, making their presence a reassuring factor for the voters. The Center cooperated with the National Democratic Institute for the 2006 Palestinian election, and though the delegation included local representatives, the observers had no similar regional foundation as the 1990 delegation.

Carter's reputation and former career gave the Carter Center an invitation to the Nicaraguan elections. This invitation gave them access and a mandate from the national

authorities as well as the two major political parties to become involved. Carter made use of this and played a part in negotiating agreements concerning the conduct of political rallies, technical problems, and transition of power. Further, Carter convinced Ortega to step down after the results were clear, and managed thus to contribute to well managed elections which produced a stronger Nicaraguan democracy and peace. This first test case thus presented some of the possibilities of the Center's work.

In the Palestinian election, Carter's previous involvements and personal contacts contributed to the invitation of the Center. As the invitation to observe the election only came from the Central Elections Commission, and not the political parties, Carter and the Center delegation's ability to influence the actors was reduced. To a degree, they missed the mandate the Center had been given by the major parties in the first test case. Although the delegation was not met with hostility in Palestine, they still lacked leverage over the actors. And though numerous factors can explain the observer's lack of influence, the Center is dependent on this sort of impact in order to reach their set goals of contributing to democracy and peace. The absence of influence thus showed limitations to the work of Carter and his organization.

Another achievement of Carter in Nicaragua was his contribution to the release of political prisoners and hence widened political liberties. Carter's successful pressure for the release of these detainees continued a regional work for political liberties and showed another possibility of the Center's work. This positive result had no equivalent in the case of Palestine. This can, of course be explained in various ways, as for example by the difference in the two situations. Also, the issue of political prisoners in Palestine concerns Israeli as well as Palestinian policy, thus complicating the situation. Thereby, this issue was of a different character than in the case of Nicaragua in 1990, and not something Carter managed to correct in 2006. The two test cases thus showed possibilities and limitations of the work of the former president and his organization.

As the elections in Nicaragua ended the Contra War, the link between democracy and peace was strengthened. Carter and the Center delegation contributed to this process, and as such their approach of election mediation proved a successful strategy for peace. In the case of Palestine, the approach did not bring peace, and as such failed.

5.1.1 A Democratic Peace

The theory of the democratic peace (that pairs of democracies have peaceful relations) was verified by the positive example of the 1990 Nicaraguan elections. Elections, as being part of

the foundation for democracy, can as such ease tensions and can help warring parties reconcile. Democracy can in this sense lead to domestic peace, and as the American funded Contra group put down their arms, dyadic peace was also realized. Further, the economic embargo of Nicaragua was lifted after the elections, thus strengthening the nation's ability to make progress. The cooperation with international organizations meant that Nicaragua would be encouraged to work with regional and international organizations, thus inviting Nicaragua to cooperate internationally. As the elections brought about a more democratic society, commerce and international cooperation, the elections met all three legs of the Kantian triangle, hence strengthening the prospects for lasting peace.

Because the Center's election mediation as a strategy for peace proved to be unsuccessful in the case of Palestine, the link between democracy and peace can be challenged. According to the democratic peace theory, pairs of democratic states do not launch war on another, but this has not been the case between Palestine and Israel since the 2006 election. Is the democratic peace theory then incorrect in its hypothesis? In order for the theory to apply, both parties would have to be independent states and democratic as well, something which was not fully realized in the case of Israel and Palestine. There are degrees of democratization and the extent to which political liberties are protected in a society. As democracy would require good governance and protection of essential freedoms, the holding of elections alone is not sufficient. The Palestinian society has moved in a democratic direction, but does not guarantee political liberties and human rights to a wide extent. The former one party rule of Fatah resulted in no real political competition and also caused corruption. The victory of Hamas challenged the party in power and thereby contributed to political contest. This expansion of democratic procedures was, however, reduced by Hamas' violent and fundamentalist party program. The fractional violence between Fatah and Hamas further weakened the democratic character of the political contest and resulted in a step backwards in terms of democratization.

The 2006 election in Palestine was vital in itself, but whether Palestine can be labeled a democracy, and whether the example contradicts the democratic peace theory, is doubtful. According to Professor Emeritus of Political Science, R. J. Rummel, the election did not challenge the premise that democracies do not fight each other, as the "PA is a nascent democracy and requires time to establish itself."¹⁹¹ Honorary Visiting Research Fellow in

¹⁹¹ Mandy Turner, "Building Democracy in Palestine: Liberal Peace Theory and the Election of Hamas," *Democratization*, 13.5 (December 2006), 751. URL: [<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340601010628>] [Entered April 21st, 2007.]

International Relations at the University of Bradford, Mandy Turner, compared the views of Rummel with Professor of International Relations, Jack Snyder, and his point that emerging democracies and weak political institutions are likely to go to war as handling internal tensions. Turner also stressed how elections can not settle a conflict negotiations have failed to end,¹⁹² and as such highlighted the importance of dialogue between Israel and Palestine. The fact that the international community withheld funds, worsened the situation for Palestinians, and made prospects of a better economy impossible. This isolation also excluded Palestine from international cooperation, making essential foundations for peace absent.

The issue of the economy was just as important for peace as was the election, or as Professor of Political science, Etel Solingen, stated, “[e]conomic liberalization is central to the connection between democratization and peace in the Middle East, as elsewhere.”¹⁹³ Whether a democratic Palestine will end the Arab-Israeli conflict is too early to tell as Palestine lacks important components of a democracy. Thus, the democratic peace theory is not incorrect, as the theory does not apply to other pairs of political systems. For the future, this holds some hope for continued democratization and peace. For Palestine, the election did not assure democracy, but moved it in an important direction. Democracy in Palestine will take time, and should be further encouraged. As Academic Program Officer in Peace and Government Programme of the United Nations University of Tokyo, Albrecht Schnabel, states, “democratization is a journey, a process; it is not a condition.”¹⁹⁴

5.2 The Influence of Four Conditions

The limitations and possibilities of the Center’s work were affected by several factors. Four of these were examined to discuss under what conditions the Center can play a part in peace building.

Other international organizations worked along side the Carter Center in both test cases. In Nicaragua, especially the Organization of American States and the United Nations contributed in observing and realizing the elections. Through the observer teams’ cooperation, voters were assured of correct, safe, and trustworthy elections in which fraud would be

¹⁹² Turner, 751.

¹⁹³ Etel Solingen, “Toward a Democratic Peace in the Middle East,” in ed. Amin Saikal and Albrecht Schnabel, *Democratization in the Middle East: Experiences, Struggles, Challenges*, (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003), 55.

¹⁹⁴ Albrecht Schnabel, “A Rough Journey: Nascent Democratization in the Middle East,” in ed. Amin Saikal and Albrecht Schnabel, *Democratization in the Middle East: Experiences, Struggles, Challenges*, (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003), 2.

detected and deterred. The regional and local character of the OAS gave the observers a position of trust, thus giving the voters confidence in the correctness of the electoral procedures. The presence of international observers also successfully pressured for Ortega's acceptance of the results, and contributed distinctly to the disarmament of the Contras. Through an expanded UN mandate, the UN mission to Nicaragua disarmed the contras, and thus physically limited the possibility of a continued Contra War. Carter and the Carter Center were thereby dependent on this kind of cooperation and international involvement for their approach to be successful in bringing about democracy and peace.

In the second test case, international organizations also cooperated with the Carter Center. A difference was that they only partly assured the voters of a fair and correct election, as several voters in East Jerusalem did not vote due to fear of negative Israeli sanctions towards those who voted. The character of the international observers as representing Western institutions may have added to a lack of trust among East Jerusalemites.

The second condition concerned the reputation Jimmy Carter had in the two situations. Carter's background and character assured the Center invitations and access in the two cases, and contributed thus to the Center's work. A good reputation in the area of involvement would also assure voters of Carter and the Center's impartiality and democratic ambitions. Hence, Carter's presence as a man of principles meant that irregularities would be detected, thereby deterring attempts of fraud and giving voters confidence in the elections. In Nicaragua, it can be argued that Carter enjoyed respect from a large portion of the population due to his non-intervention policies towards the nation during his presidency and due to his negotiations which brought control over the Panama Canal back to Panama. Further, Carter had denounced the 1989 elections in Panama as a fraud, giving Carter a status as a respected man of principles both in Nicaragua and Latin America. For Carter and his Center's election mediation in 1990 this meant that Carter would be listened to, that he enjoyed leverage when negotiating, and that he could assure voters of a correct verdict of the elections.

Carter's reputation in Palestine can be taken to be mixed. His presidency did not give him univocal support, especially due to Arab reactions against the Camp David Accords. The Iranian hostage crisis also influenced Carter later work as the event reduced Carters reputation among Iranian leaders. Due to the fact that Hamas receives funding from Iran, this negative view of Carter may have spilt over on the Palestinian organization, thus reducing Carter's influence over Hamas in the 2006 election. Carter made several statements during his presidency which reduced his standing among Palestinians. After Carter left office, his views concerning Palestine seemed to change, something exemplified by his statements of the need

for a two state solution, his friendship with Arafat, and his latest book. This development in his beliefs may have given him a better reputation amongst Palestinians, providing Carter attention, but only limited influence in the election. Carter's reputation as siding with the Palestinians may have reduced his influence in Israel and thus complicated his ability to successfully pressure for the release of Palestinian political prisoners held by Israel. Carter's Christianity may also have complicated his work in an Islamic setting.

As the Carter Center relies on its leader's influence in order to meet its own goals, the reputation of Carter can work both ways for the Center. In situations where Carter is able to influence decision makers and events, much due to his reputation and personal contacts, the Center can be more successful than in situations where this is missing. In Nicaragua, Carter could use his friendship with Ortega and his reputation to push the elections in a democratic direction, while these factors were not present to the same degree in the case of Palestine. Thereby, Carter's reputation aided the Center in reaching its goals in only the first test case.

Regional initiatives for democracy and peace affect Carter and the Center's ability to meet their own objectives. In the first test case, the Center delegation built their work on preceding regional agreements which had pressured for political liberties and open and fair elections prior to the original set date. The regional pressure for democratization and peace laid the foundations for successful elections of 1990, which led to peace and regime change. The role of Carter and his Center was to build on this regional work, making the success of the Center's activities dependent on preceding regional foundations.

In the second test case, Carter and the delegation he led could not build on a similar regional movement for democracy. There had been regional initiatives for peace which called for an independent Palestinian state, and which thus indirectly made up foundations for elections. As an example of the importance of regional actors, Saudi Arabia brought Fatah and Hamas together in order to end the fighting between the two Palestinian parties after the election. The initiative succeeded, and led to a coalition government, an end to the fractional violence, and assured realization of the election results. The lack of democratic initiatives prior to the election limited Carter and the Center's ability to play a decisive part in the election and meant that they did not reach the goals of their involvement. When building on regional foundations, Carter and his Center are more likely to succeed, making the regional conditions important to their work.

The foreign policy of the US towards a conflict affects the work of Carter and the Center. Carter seeks approval for his involvement from the sitting administrations, and briefs the President or other members of staff, after his journeys. As such, Carter is careful to keep a

good relationship with the sitting President, although he reserves the right to publicly disagree when their opinions differ. In the case of Nicaragua, President George Herbert Walker Bush's policy was characterized by unifying the opposition (UNO), by attempts of manipulating the political process, and by attempts to scare the electorate to vote for the UNO by threatening with a continued Contra War if the electorate did not follow suit. Hence, strategic interests were superior to democratic ambitions, and Carter's role became to disarm Bush's attempts of manipulation by strengthening local and regional initiatives for democracy and peace. Carter helped assure voters of free and open elections by opposing Bush's rhetoric. In order to do so Carter relied on his reputation as a man of principles, standing up for correct elections regardless of the results. A verified election would have made Bush's reasoning for a prolonged use of the Contras difficult, hence reducing Bush's dichotomy of war and peace.

In the second test case, Carter labeled President George Walker Bush's Middle East policy as a counterproductive tragedy, and though Carter tried to reverse the US' isolation of the newly elected Palestinian government, no change came. Bush had called for a new Palestinian leadership in 2002, welcomed an independent Palestinian state, and had taken part in the Quartet's Road Map for Peace. The Plan failed, and was not followed up by Bush, adding to Carter's disapproval of the President in office. The 43rd President welcomed the challenge to the sitting Fatah regime in 2006, but would not have any contact with Hamas until it showed modification, and chose to cut off all funding and aid to Palestine. Bush had restricted Carter from meeting with Hamas candidates, something which limited who Carter might be able to influence in the election. Carter's verification and support for the election did not affect the US response, showing that Carter did not alter US foreign policy. Carter's disagreement with Bush also caused criticism some saw the former president as obstructing US policy. The limitations on who Carter could meet, and the policy of isolation, limited Carter and the Center's ability to obtain the goals of their mission. Carter's inability to influence US policy can put into question whether Carter could have changed US foreign policy if the results of the Nicaraguan elections had been different. Hence, one can ask if Carter only affects elections that correspond with US wishes.

5.3 Concluding Remarks

This thesis has focused on how Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center work for peace through democratic election mediation, and how four specific conditions affect their work. Through

two test cases their election mediation has been tested as a strategy for peace, where four conditions have been seen as influencing their work, for good and bad. The Carter Center is likely to succeed in its election mediation when the Center's work happens in unison with other international organizations, when preceding foundations for democracy are in place, when Jimmy Carter has a reputation and personal contacts to build on, and when US foreign policy can be positively affected by Carter or when it does not interfere with democratic ideals. The thesis' hypothesis is thus modified: Carter and the Carter Center can contribute to peace through election mediation when certain conditions exist.

The two test cases highlighted how elections have the possibility to make a country more democratic and peaceful, while at the same time that one election alone is not sufficient. The failure of Carter and the Carter Center to meet their own goals, as seen in the case of Palestine, should not discourage such involvement. As stated by Taulbee, the Center can try and fail without damaging their prestige or reputation.¹⁹⁵ Carter and the Center should approach future election mediations with the precondition that undemocratic elements should be pressured before elections to adopt a democratic platform.

Jimmy Carter can be the Carter Center's strength as well as its weakness. The attention Carter's person can bring raises questions of how the media can assist a situation. The media can give international attention and as such add pressure to leaders who are criticized by Carter. But the media attention may also mean that Carter and the Center only are invited when national leaders feel their nation is 'presentable', meaning that the Center's ability to warn against possible human rights abuses is limited to an invitation. Leaders of such countries may fear losing face, and as such shun the attention Carter would bring. Still, the legitimacy Carter can provide can also mean that leaders can get recognition for an election or progress made towards a more democratic society. Hence, the attention Jimmy Carter can provide works both ways.

The focus on Carter has caused critique. Former Associate Director at the Carter Center, Dalye Spencer, resigned from that position due to Carter's refusal to share limelight. According to Spencer, Carter was unwilling to let other take responsibility and credit, and the conflict resolution programs relied solely on Carter and his influence. To the former Director, Carter should have trained other world leaders to do the same job he was doing as to create a legacy others could build on. Spencer also criticized Carter's egotism as a desire to prove

¹⁹⁵ Taulbee and Creekmore, 168.

himself worthy of the Nobel Peace Prize, something which became an obstacle for including other prominent persons who could have had greater impact than Carter could in certain situations.¹⁹⁶ The Center's election mediation is one part of the conflict resolution programs, and is thereby hurt by the same critique. The power, experience and influence Carter has are vital aspects for the Center, but also something which can make the Center dependent on the role of one man.

Carter can also bring negative attention to the work of the Center. If the involvement of the Center is perceived as being an imposition of American, Christian or Western values, the Center's mission can be seen as a quest for assimilation of foreign nations into a Western system. This is also a critique which concerns the democratic peace theory, as the idea, of what often is seen as a western tradition of democracy, is tried spread to all corners of the globe. Due to the fact that democracies only have peaceful relations towards other democracies, some people living with other forms of government can see the democratic nations as imposing their will on them in order to assimilate all nations into a Western political system. Many weaker states without a democratic form of government see democracies as profiting from the international system. Powerful democratic nations have often used the international system in ways they see fit, not according to principles of treating others with respect or assisting those in need, and hence used others as mere means to their own ends. Military invasions of countries not living up to democratic standards have also been commonplace for many Western liberal democracies, thus creating animosity towards the West and its political system. One vivid example of this would be the present US lead occupation of Iraq, where the opposition to the US maintain democracy is imposed by military force. The US as a representative of the West is by many groups in the Middle East seen as forcing upon them a fixed set of values, disregarding local traditions and violating democratic values of treating others with respect.

Jimmy Carter opposed the war in Iraq, does not believe in democratization by force, favors international law and champions protection of human rights regardless of political systems, and can thus be said to oppose forced American or Western assimilation. But Carter, as being a former American President who uses a Christian duty as justification for his work, can easily be seen as a representative of negative aspects of the Western world. The Center's work may in this connection be viewed as a North-American assimilation project with Christian rhetoric, a feature which easily can cause opposition.

¹⁹⁶ Dayle Spencer, "Interview with Dayle Spencer by Kay Hamner," (June 25th, 2003,) *Jimmy Carter Library Oral History Collection*, Research Room Copies, File: Dayle Powell Spencer, Box 1 of 1.

Carter and the Center can, often in cooperation with other organizations, give attention to human rights violations, pressure leaders to follow democratic norms, assist prisoners of conscience, and spread ideals of human rights, democracy and peace through its election mediation. These positive aspects of the Center's work are combined with more negative aspects concerning a possible missionary spirit of Carter and the Center. These negative aspects do not, however, rule out the possibilities of the Center's work.

The fact that the character of Carter means much for the Center's work can become a problem when Carter decides to retire. This problem has been addressed by the Center, which in 1997 established an executive directorship based on a division of labor between health, conflict resolution and operations. The Center also works to assemble ambassadors to lead its involvements,¹⁹⁷ and Carter hopes to "inspire others to embrace the theology of the hammer."¹⁹⁸ According to Carter, "the future of The Carter Center is well assured, having close ties with Emory University, a strong endowment, and a reputation for incisive projects and provable results."¹⁹⁹ The question still remains whether the Center can achieve the same results and get the same attention without the former president at its front. Professor Taulbee views the future of the Center as good, but that the high profile election mediation will be hard to continue without the 39th President of the US.²⁰⁰ As Carter's resources and drive are crucial for the Center's successful involvements, he will be difficult to replace.

¹⁹⁷ Brinkley, 476-477.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Carter, (2006A).

²⁰⁰ James Larry Taulbee, "Personal interview," (Decatur, June 20th, 2006.)

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²⁰¹ The title of this edition is somewhat misleading. The year given as publishing date is three years before Jimmy Carter won the Nobel Peace Prize, and unless it was meant to be a prediction of what would happen some years later, the title is probably an addition made by the publisher. The book was first published as [...] *Jimmy Carter's Journey beyond the White House*.

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Appendix A:

Letter from Jimmy Carter to Magnus Evensen, October 3, 2006.



JIMMY CARTER

October 3, 2006

To Magnus Evensen

To answer your questions:

Ortega's confidence in me was obviously a beneficial factor in his final decision to accept defeat gracefully.

Our policy of not interfering in the internal affairs of Latin American countries was correct. After the revolution, my receiving the successful ones was also appropriate.


It was a surprise and great disappointment that Israel, the U.S., and others chose to punish the entire Palestinian population for the result of the election. This is a counterproductive tragedy.

One of the best ways we have found to resolve disputes is through democratic elections. One of the key principles is to permit the local people to decide on their own procedures and techniques and then to honor the results of free elections.

I've always been careful before injecting The Carter Center into sensitive situations to obtain prior approval from the White House or State Department. We reserve the right to express our frank assessment of those situations.

The future of The Carter Center is well assured, having close ties with Emory University, a strong endowment, and a reputation for incisive projects and provable results.

Best wishes,



Appendix B:

Jimmy Carter and Magnus Garder Evensen.

Plains, Georgia, June 2006.

