Realism as Social Criticism: The Thinking Partnership of Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau

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Abstract     The contextualisation of Hans Morgenthau’s thought has been significantly advanced in recent years. Uncovering the intellectual relationships Morgenthau had with Max Weber, Friedrich Nietzsche, members of the Frankfurt School, or even Carl Schmitt has not only revealed the development of political discourses in the Weimar Republic, but it has helped to rectify interpretational shortcomings of realism and encouraged scholarship to apply realist principles to twenty-first century world politics. Despite this comprehensive contextualisation, the “thinking partnership” between Morgenthau and Hannah Arendt has attracted so far only rhapsodic elaborations. This neglect is surprising because, at a time when the financial crisis in Western democracies is gradually turning into a crisis of democracy itself, a close reading of them offers a kind of social criticism whose implications are worthy of consideration.

Keywords     Classical realism, Hannah Arendt, Hans Morgenthau, oikos, polis
Introduction

Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau shared the fate of many émigré scholars. Both were educated in Continental European humani- ties, but the rising wave of anti-Semitism denied them the possibility to pursue academic careers in Germany. Both were forced to emigrate to the USA and it is there where they became ‘thinking partners’ (Young-Bruehl, 1982, p. xv).

In International Relations (IR), this thinking partnership yet awaits an in-depth discussion. Following Patricia Owens (2005a, p. 30), one reason might be that Arendt herself is neglected in IR. As Arendt does not generally have a place in the IR-canon, elaborations of Morgenthau’s intellectual relationships have focused on more firmly established scholars in the discipline, like Carl Schmitt and Max Weber (cf. Williams, 2005; Scheuerman, 2009). Furthermore, Morgenthau’s name is connected to realism. This connection has equally hindered explorations of their partnership because, as Ian Hall (2011, p. 47) notes, Arendt is commonly not related with realism. However, there are contributions which acknowledge similarities. Christoph Rohde (2004, p. 98) mentions that Morgenthau is intellectually indebted to Arendt, creating a first incentive to further elaborate the similarities in their thought. Equally, Owens (2009) encourages investigating their relationship. She remarks that both were concerned about depolitisation in modern democracies and shared a similar understanding of the political. So far, Douglas Klusmeyer (2005) has brought forward the most elaborate analysis of this thinking partnership. He reasoned that, despite their common life trajectories, both differed in that the Shoah became only constitutive of Arendt’s political thought. In a further article Klusmeyer (2009, p. 342; more nuanced: 2011) argues that this difference had great bearing and was responsible for the pair’s diverging understandings of the political.

This paper dissents Klusmeyer’s assessment. Rather, Richard Ned Lebow’s (2003, p. 292, also: Hayden, 2009, p. 19 and Scheuerman, 2011, p. 115) suggestion is taken up as it is
argued that their thoughts are characterised by fundamental similarities. Both followed an ethics that encourages reconsidering the human condition of politics. Despite the fact that the Shoah had different influences on them, they still were, what Arendt (1978, pp. 65-6) called, ‘conscious pariahs’ because their intellectual development was informed by the worldview of Weimar’s Jewish middle-class. This common ground of the ‘Judeo-Christian tradition … [and] Greek and German philosophy’ (Morgenthau Papers, Container 33) fostered similarities. An elaboration of their partnership is not only interesting in terms of IR’s sociology of knowledge, but their thought also has implications for contemporary IR-theory. Arendt and Morgenthau were concerned about depoliticising tendencies in modern democracies. For both, economy (oikos) and politics (polis) were constitutive societal spheres. However, the political broke down in modern democracies because economics underwent transformations which reduced humans’ ability to cooperate and hindered the development of a public sphere (Arendt, n.d.). Both scholars argued that ideologies constrain free and reflective thinking and that the development of consumer societies does not only heighten the inability of people to act, but the possibility of action is gradually vanishing altogether. To confront these developments, they aimed to re-establish the political sphere.

The following discussion reflects this shared criticism. Economy and politics are spheres that condition sociation. For Arendt and Morgenthau, their existence was not naturally given, but they considered them cultural spheres in the sense that they are constantly recreated through human efforts. This societal division is reflected in the conceptual framework of this paper, as the Aristotelian concepts of oikos and polis are used to which both referred.

**Oikos: The Inability to Act**

*Labour and Work*
We have to consider first the *oikos* because, for Arendt and Morgenthau, it was in this private realm in which people received the competence to then act in the public realm. Modernity’s scientific and technological advancements changed people’s lives dramatically, and both scholars did not disavow their benefits. New means of communication and transportation were welcomed by Morgenthau (1973, pp. 51-3) because it enabled people to engage with their coevals even over long distances. He hoped that this would lead to a more sustainable peace because people were given the possibility to overcome spatio-temporal distances. However, both scholars shared the concern that modernity would not be able to fulfil all expectations. In fact, Morgenthau (1972, p. 2) argued that ‘science … elates man with the promise to transform *homo faber*, the maker of tools, into *homo deus*, the maker of worlds, [but] it also depresses him.’ Attempting to create life-worlds through social planning would lead to a scenario in which human creativeness would have no room. Alfons Söllner (1996, p. 241) is, therefore, right to argue that Arendt’s thought (and Morgenthau’s) is characterised by a history of decline. To demonstrate this decline, both scholars referred to two ideal types: *homo faber* and *animal laborans*. *Homo faber* is the ideal typification of work, while *animal laborans* stands for labour. Both thinkers feared that modernity, in which *homo faber* aspired to become *homo deus*, would reduce the former to *animal laborans*.

*Homo faber* experiences him-/herself as an autonomous subject through his/her work. Creating objects enables *homo faber* to master physical and artificial tools. The choice of tools, the object’s purpose, and even the decision to create an object are all within *homo faber*’s liberty. In addition, the creation itself happens without outside interference (Arendt, 1958, pp. 143-4). However, working in solitude does not mean that *homo faber* is disconnected to the world (Arendt, 1953, pp. 303-6). Rather, *homo faber* enters a discussion with his/her coevals through the produced objects. These objects are reified manifestations of their creators’ subjectivity which can be cognitively experienced by others. *Homo faber*,
therefore, has an interest to produce high-quality objects, not only because this publicly
demonstrates his/her mastery, but because the objects’ durability will leave traces beyond
his/her death (Arendt, 1958, pp. 118-9). This aspect leads Patrick Hayden (2009, p. 94) to
conclude that this ‘fabrication of tangible “worldliness” … guarantee[s] the permanence and
stability without which the human world would not be possible.’ Morgenthau even argued
that death itself can be an experience in which humans gain awareness of their own self. By
committing “suicide with a good conscience”, people have the ability to master their
biological death by choosing its place, time, and tenor (Morgenthau, 1930b).

Modernity, however, reduces work to labour. Mass production constrains people into
industrial processes over whose purpose they do not have control. Regulatory frameworks
were created that deny people the autonomy which they require to become aware of their
subjectivity. Life as animal laborans is not characterised by an aspiration for mastery, but is
reduced to mere self-preservation through the acquisition of financial means in order to be
able purchase commodities to sustain one’s life (Arendt, 1958, p. 90). This concern is
likewise to be found in Morgenthau. He argued that modernity perpetuates mediocrity
because humans are not encouraged to make use of all their abilities. Rather, a mediocre
effort is sufficient to fulfil one’s task within the production process and any further effort
would make no difference. Therefore, the world of animal laborans ‘compels its members to
live below their capabilities rather than exhausting them. It misdirects their energies and
wastes the best of their talents’ (Morgenthau, 1960b, p. 79).

Unlike homo faber, animal laborans does not have the capacity to contribute to the
creation of life-worlds; instead he/she is characterised by ‘worldlessness’ (Arendt, 1958, p.
115). As Cara O’Connor (2013, pp. 110-1) states, being reduced to physicalness, out of a
concern for self-preservation, does not allow animal laborans to experience subjectivity. This
prevents people from engaging in the public sphere because only homo faber has the capacity
to get into contact with his/her coevals through the use and display of objects. *Animal laborans*, by contrast, is absorbed by a cycle of subsistence which denies the possibility of continuity. In this cycle, people cannot give meaning to their life by mastering their life-worlds which makes death ‘the ultimate shock to human experience’ (Morgenthau, 1976, p. 5). Karl-Heinz Breier (2011, p. 35) corroborates this account in saying that even by giving birth to a new generation, *animal laborans* does not contribute to the creation of life-worlds. This could only happen if his/her thought and/or action would be of relevance for posterity. *Animal laborans*, however, can only pass on physicalness.

This worldlessness leads to loneliness. Being constrained into industrial processes ingrains replaceability to *animal laborans*, as it does not allow self-fulfilment or awareness of one’s subjectivity (Arendt, 1953, p. 323). *Animal laborans*’s loneliness is a sign of his/her inability to engage with other people (Young-Bruehl, 2006, p. 85). Lacking subjectivity in the sense of being aware of individual abilities and interests, hinders him/her from establishing intersubjectivity by engaging with others in the political sphere. For both, the reduction of work to labour in the age of modernity was, therefore, endangering the political.

**Ideologisation**

Loneliness was for both thinkers one reason for the rise of ideologies and totalitarianism in the twentieth century. Both were deeply concerned about the apoliticism that was abetted by ideologies. Following Klusmeyer (2009), it was particularly the Shoah-experience that informed Arendt’s thought. Due to the devastation of this experience, she dedicated her scholarship to the elaboration and support of liberty. Morgenthau’s thought, too, cannot be understood without considering this experience and the advancing ideologisation of the Weimar Republic. Throughout his life, Morgenthau returned to questions of ideologies and
depolitisisation. In *Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt identified three elements that characterise ideologies:

First, ideologies do not aim to understand spatio-temporal contingent events, but they purport to be able to explain the entire course of history by providing ‘world explanations’ (Arendt, 1962, p. 469). She (1962, p. 470) noted that ‘[t]he claim to total explanation promises to explain all historical happenings, the total explanation of the past, the total knowledge of the present, and the reliable prediction of the future.’ Ideologies turn history into world history, and they are not restricted to the past in their temporal scope. Rather, ideologies also provide policy procedures for future actions. Arendt argued that this teleological processuality of a coherent historical fiction deprives people of their ability to act because they are reduced to mere executors of the ideology.

Ideologies also instil hubris in people. Vibeke Schou Tjalve (2008) and William Scheuerman (2009) note that hubris looms large in Morgenthau’s ethics. With the rise of nationalism in the last century, Morgenthau was exposed to the consequences of hubris in world politics. As he argued in *La Réalité des Normes* (1934), there are moral, societal, and legal restrictions which hinder the outbreak of violence. However, morality is the only restraint on the international scene, and there, seemingly, it had vanished. Based as they were upon assumptions of divine rights and/or natural law, nationalistic ideologies encouraged their followers to pursue their power ambitions on the international level. For success was embraced within the coherent historical fiction of the ideology. Furthermore, as ideologies know no spatial restrictions, nation-states pursue universalistic ambitions in their attempt for ideological fulfilment. The resulting nationalistic universalism ‘tries to impose a new order upon a fragmented and anarchical political world, and it does so by using its own national order as a universal model’ (Morgenthau, 1966, p. 8). This turned nation-states into ‘blind
and potent monster[s]’ (Morgenthau, 1962a, p. 61) which threaten to descend the world into
chaos in the pursuit of their various ideological ambitions.

Second, Arendt (1962, pp. 470-1) criticised ideologies for emancipating from
experience because ideologies accept human experiences only to a limited extent. In order not
to jeopardise their spatio-temporal processuality, only those experiences which are
ideologically consistent are accepted as real. To guarantee that as many experiences as
possible are in line with ideological world explanations, ideologies attempt to reify life-
worlds to match thought-constructs consistent with the tangible reality. For Arendt and
Morgenthau (1977, p. 127), this reification of reality happened through the advance of
bureaucratisation, as it is used as a means of violence to support authority. This happens
through the creation of norms and rules, which define social life-worlds, and administration
apparatuses which ensure that they are enforced. In addition, dichotomies of good and bad
and right and wrong are used to define normality. This dictates life-trajectories, as humans
can only develop in clearly defined channels. Deviations from the norm are punished with
social ostracism, financial coercion, or even physical persecution (Morgenthau, 1959, p. 5;
1974, p. 15; Arendt, 1970, pp. 6-13). People accept reifications of their life-worlds because,
to borrow György Lukács’s (1963, p. 41) phrasing, ideologies promise to free from
‘transcendental homelessness’. They fill the metaphysical void that modernity had left people
in by promising to re-enchant their worlds: allocating them a place among the masses for the
attainment of the ideology’s goal.

Logical-deductive reasoning was for Arendt the final element that characterised
ideologies. From an assumed premise, ideologies would deduce their entire thought-construct
with absolute congruity. This allows them to become a substitute for reality because they
offer their followers a life free of antagonisms. Having been deprived of the ability to think
and reflect freely and critically, people are willing to ‘be commanded into a fool’s paradise or
fool’s hell in which everything is known, explained, and characterised by a priori definitions based on supernatural laws’ (Arendt, 1974, p. 159).

Both scholars criticised social sciences for providing the grounds for ideologies to establish such a substitute for reality, rather than critically reflecting on it. Morgenthau (1944, p. 174) saw this evidenced in its efforts to contribute to social planning by arguing for a ‘method of the single cause’. With this method, they aim to mimic natural sciences by developing approaches based on logical-deductive reasoning which imply that, in the social world, the development of one particular effect could be explained by one particular cause. However, both scholars argued that the tangible facts of reality have no meaning in themselves because they can acquire different empirical meanings depending on the space and time in which they are considered. Epistemologically, social sciences require hermeneutic and context-sensitive methods, although there are ‘perennial problems’ that affect their study throughout time and space (Morgenthau, 1962b, p. 110; 1971, p. 77; Arendt, 1970, p. 7).

Worldlessness and Worldconsumption

Their final objection to modernity was the rising consumerism it conditions. Embedded into labour processes which reduce people to mere physicalness, people neither achieve nor do they aspire to mastery. They are not able to experience themselves as subjects, which is why, in their worldlessness, they consume rather than create life-worlds. For Arendt (2005, p. 198), a dilemma had caused this state of affairs. She admitted that the rapid increase of productivity was only possible because animal laborans, whose sole task left is the sustainment of self and family, had seized the public sphere. This increase in productivity even freed people from subsistence concerns because, at least in the Western World, provisions became available abundantly. However, this development also led to the downfall of the public sphere and,
indeed, ever-increasing ideologisation further brings forth depoliticised societies in which there exists only publicly displayed privateness.

To face this worldlessness and to give meaning to their lives, people began to follow the ‘assumption of classical political economy that the ultimate goal of the vita activa is growing wealth, abundance, and the “happiness of the greatest number”’ (Arendt, 1958, p. 133). For Arendt, like Morgenthau, this was evidenced in the replacement of commodities by the consumption of goods. People consume material objects to display their wealth and how far they have advanced in the labour process. In such societies, the quality of the objects that homo faber creates are inappropriate because people are not supposed to master their life-worlds, and their lifespan hinders people in their constant reassurance of their position in life. Rather, the ‘shop-window quality of things’ (Simmel, 1997, p. 257) is sought after because with each purchase people assure themselves and others of their position. For Morgenthau, one reason for this consumerism was to be found in human nature. Being labourers, self-assertion cannot be directed in mastering a trait or accomplishing a task, but it also cannot be suppressed (Morgenthau, 1930a, p. 70). Consumerism is, therefore, a way for humans to satisfy their self-assertion because, in making purchases, they manifest their abilities within the channels left by their reduced animal laborans condition. This ‘element of prestige’ (Morgenthau, 1960b, p. 69) has resulted in ‘meaningless growth’ (Morgenthau, 1972, p. 23). Consumerism, however, was criticised by Arendt and Morgenthau for an implication that is even more far-reaching than the reification of the assumption of growth. It is not only a channel to exhaust self-assertion, but it is a threat to human existence itself.

Both scholars were concerned that unrestricted consumerism would lead to a ruthless enforcement of the human drive for self-assertion which would, in turn, enter into conflict with the drive for self-preservation. In a ‘society of waste’ (Morgenthau, 1960a, p. 215) goods are produced and consumed for no other purpose than producing and consuming ever
greater quantities, thereby squandering limited natural resources. The worldlessness of the *animal laborans*, therefore, may turn into world consumption because *animal laborans* threatens to destroy the natural environment upon which social life-worlds are constructed.

**Polis: The Ability to Act**

*The Political*

Arendt and Morgenthau were concerned about societal developments in which the *oikos* gradually replaced the *polis* as the central means of sociation (Owens, 2009, p. 107). Their critique was not only restricted to the socio-economic effects of modern jobholder societies (Arendt, 1958, p. 46), but they also developed a political ethics of responsibility by reconsidering the political. Particularly three elements characterise the political for Arendt and Morgenthau.

First, as *homo faber* introduces one’s objects into the public realm, they are made tangible for others and in this experience, intersubjectivity is constituted (Heuer, 2006, p. 9). In Arendt’s (1958, p. 7) words, ‘[a]ction … corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world … this plurality is specifically the condition … of all political life.’ Hence, the political is a sphere of diverse people who cooperate through speech and action by bringing in their subjectivity in a mutually reflective process. This happens through an exchange of interests, which Morgenthau (2012, p. 126) termed ‘discussion’. These discussions constitute political meaning. Morgenthau’s terminology (“colouring”) indicates that meaning is not given or inherent to the objects in question, but it is created through human interaction; meaning is characterised by specific historical contingency and provisionality. For both, social reality is, therefore, only accessible in the political realm as it is there where people ‘form a world between them’ (Arendt, 1973, p. 175).
Second, Morgenthau (2012, pp. 123-6) argued that the political has to be made up of ‘spheres of elasticity’. It has to be a flexible realm in which not only divergent interests have to be accommodated, but also the expanding knowledge base. For, although politics is an endeavour to settle “perennial problems”, the knowledge that is created while finding solutions to these problems and the political orders that are established in the course of their settlement are conditioned by space and time. Morgenthau (1962a, p. 110) referred to Karl Mannheim’s *Standortgebundenheit* according to which each generation and each society will have to find new answers to these problems. Arendt (1958, p. 199) also argued in this vein. For her, the political was a ‘space of appearances’. The socio-political reality people experience as tangible is not given or based upon absolute facts; Arendt argued instead that this reality is created through the intangibility of the in-betweens of a specific context. The meaning people attach to objects or events in this context has meaning only then and there (Owens, 2005b, pp. 51-2). Therefore, the political has to be flexible in which discussions about meaning-allocation can evolve without restraints.

Third, this process cannot evolve without conflicts and may even cause violence because of the ‘plurality of opinions’ (Vollrath, 1995, p. 56). What supports this assumption, in Bonnie Honig’s (1993, p. 93) words, is that this is ‘a radically contingent public realm where anything might happen, where the consequences of actions are boundless, unpredictable, unintended, and often unknown to the actors themselves.’ To avoid the looming danger of violence, Arendt and Morgenthau endorsed the evolution antagonisms of interests in order to counter depolitisation in modern democracies. Only then would it be possible to allocate political meaning and contribute to the creation of social life-worlds. The political, therefore, stands in contrast to ideologisation. In ideologised societies, conflicts have to be suppressed because they would undermine the claim of world explanation unless these conflicts happen to support the ideology.
Although Arendt and Morgenthau agreed that antagonisms have to evolve freely, they took different stances on its requirements. Arendt argued that through their evolution political liberty is established in the sense that the involved people will realise that only in this process of mutual suasion are all their interests considered. This is why she gave glowing accounts of American town hall meetings. These meetings epitomised for Arendt (2005, pp. 243-5) an ideal-typical political process because people managed to find viable solutions by themselves through expressing and listening to diverse interests. This belief in the self-preservation of the political process substantiated her affection for Morgenthau because she considered him a ‘man of praxis, of action’ (Young-Bruehl, 2006, p. 34). Particularly Morgenthau’s involvement in teach-ins during the Vietnam War endorsed her perception (Arendt and McCarthy, 1995, p. 217). Morgenthau, by contrast, was less optimistic about the self-preservation of the political, which is why he repeatedly discussed the concept of wise statesmanship. For Morgenthau, it is the statesman’s task to establish fora in which antagonisms can evolve. In addition, statesmen are supposed to help in aligning the diverse interests and ensuring that all of them are considered in the process of formulating a common good according to public support.

Power

The elaboration of the political has demonstrated that Arendt’s and Morgenthau’s concept of power diverges from its common understanding. Usually, power is thought of along the lines of Weber’s well-known definition as the ability to impose one’s interest on others through physical or mental force. With such an understanding of power, however, the political could not evolve. Intersubjectivity could not be established because enforcing one’s interest does not allow free and open-minded exchanges of interests. In addition, the political could not be formed because a sphere of elasticity as imposing one’s interest discourages flexibility in
thought and action. In the case of Arendt, her opposition to Weber’s concept is well documented (Habermas, 1977, pp. 3-4; Owens, 2009, p. 110). In the case of Morgenthau, this is different. The scope of his concept of power is still contested in academic debates. It is for this reason that this paper first turns to Morgenthau.

Morgenthau, like Arendt (1973, p. 181), distinguished between two concepts of power (Rösch, forthcoming; also: Solomon, 2012). In its empirical form, he described power as coercion and, normatively, he argued for power as collective action. The former is well researched, for we know that in developing his empirical concept Morgenthau considered Freud and Weber. Robert Schuett (2010) concludes that, despite Morgenthau’s (1984, pp. 13-14) later attempts to renounce Freud’s influence, he relied on his sexual instinct in formulating his notion of self-assertion which formed the essence of Morgenthau’s concept of power. For his elaboration of its consequences, Morgenthau relied on Weber. In *Politics as a Vocation*, Weber (2004, p. 33) noted that ‘[w]hen we say that a question is “political” ... we always mean the same thing. This is that the interests involved in the distribution or preservation of power, or a shift in power, play a decisive role in resolving that question.’ Christoph Frei (2001, p. 130) ascertained that he already referred to these strategies in his doctoral thesis, but he elaborated them only later. In *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau (1948, p. 52) noted that ‘[a]ll politics ... reveals three basic patterns ... either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power.’ *Politics Among Nations* demonstrates that Morgenthau considered power so-defined to be evidenced in the time of nation-states in which he lived because ideologies encouraged its use. Its popularity, and the widespread assumption that with this book Morgenthau would have brought forward his international relations theory, encouraged scholars to criticise Morgenthau for supporting ruthless power politics and nationalistic worldviews.
However, although Morgenthau analytically dealt with power as coercion, he normatively argued for the invigoration of power as a collective affair. Indeed, it is this understanding of power that demonstrates most his thinking partnership with Arendt. In *Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt (1962, p. 474) referred to Edmund Burke’s “acting as concert” to formulate her concept of power. Later, she further remarked that ‘[p]ower corresponds to the human ability not just to act but act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together’ (Arendt, 1970, p. 44). Power signifies the consent of people to temporarily come together in collective speech and action in order to create institutions and norms (Arendt, 1970, p. 41; also: Owens, 2005b, p. 53). For Arendt (1970, p. 51), like Morgenthau (1929, p. 51), power was not a means, but was an end in itself, which explains why both distinguished between power and violence. This distinction is epitomised in Morgenthau’s stance towards the 1960s student protests. He argued that violent outbreaks were a consequence of their disempowerment. In other words, they protested against their inability to contribute to the creation of their life-worlds; an inability caused by ideological affirmations of the *status quo* (Morgenthau, 1968, p. 9). Correspondingly, as Rohde (2004, p. 98) and Owens (2009, p. 110) argue, violence is a potential consequence when normative power is absent and it is a characteristic of empirical power. Power is only legitimised through collective action as Arendt and Morgenthau distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate power.

*Bürgerwissenschaft*

Central to Arendt’s and Morgenthau’s thought was the accentuation of the human condition of politics, as Arendt (1965, p. 1-2) argued for politics to be a scholarship of worldly concern. In a letter to Paul Nitze from 12 February, 1955 (Morgenthau Papers, Container 44), we find
similar remarks from Morgenthau. He even affirmed that not only the world is the object of academic concern, but also that the scholar him-/herself is part of that world.

Their common intellectual background in Continental European humanities and their experiences of ideological atrocities were the foundation for framing political science, in Breier’s (2011, p. 7) words, as a Bürgerwissenschaft. Arendt and Morgenthau did not create knowledge with the claim to provide absolute answers to political questions: they did not support academic attempts to socially plan the world, and they were critical of the personal proximity that particularly IR held with public policy makers. Rather, they intended to support people in being able to live freely in the sense of being able to critically reflect on the current political status quo and have the opportunity to create their life-worlds (Smith, 2010, pp. 109-12). In other words, Arendt and Morgenthau aimed to support a condign human life.

Morgenthau, particularly, became engaged in the public sphere (Cozette, 2008; Tjalve, 2008). He argued that scholarship has to be a corrective of the political status quo by discerning people’s political interests through discussions and by establishing fora in which the political could re-evolve. For Morgenthau, scholars, therefore, had to act as facilitators of the political through which people could transcend various constraints in modern societies in order to free them in their thought and action and to help them creating their life-worlds.

However, as Morgenthau (1955, pp. 446-7) was well aware of, convincing others of their capacities by challenging vested interests, causes discomfort among people because their habitual ways of thinking are questioned. During the height of the Cold War, critical thinking was not well-received because questioning the foundations of common beliefs was considered a societal threat. Numerous records exist documenting the negative personal consequences Morgenthau suffered as a result of his work. He even claimed that the FBI and the White House pursued an “Operation Morgenthau” (Morgenthau Papers, Container 27) to collect imputations against him (Cox, 2007, p. 184; Cozette, 2008, p. 17).
Despite their criticism, Arendt and Morgenthau were ardent supporters of American civic culture (Owens, 2005a, p. 35; Schulz, 2006, p. 144). Even at times, when the ideological penetration of socio-political life seemed irrevocable, they were surprised about its assimilative capacity (Vollrath, 1995, pp. 53-4). The shared criticism of Arendt and Morgenthau was, therefore, not a criticism of substance, but a criticism voiced in fear that the USA would lose its culture; a loss that both experienced in the downfall of the Weimar Republic. Dolf Sternberger’s (1976, p. 941) claim that Arendt turned into ‘a convinced “political” American, a citizen by heart’ is a legitimate description of both Arendt and Morgenthau.

Conclusion

This paper has contributed to the elaboration of Arendt’s and Morgenthau’s thinking partnership. It was demonstrated that, due to their common concern about the effects of modernity on political sociation in democracies, their partnership deserves to be the topic of further academic discourses. Their assessment of depolitisation shows strong similarities because of their common socialisation in Continental European humanities and Shoah-experiences. Particularly Morgenthau profitied from this partnership because Arendt pushed his criticism beyond a mere description of the socio-political status quo. Both thinkers pursued a normative world postulate.

This world postulate was the establishment of a world community. Both scholars reflected in their works on the increasing ideologisation of life-worlds brought about by the dominance of the nation-state on the international level. They left no doubt that they considered nationalism and bureaucratisation as the biggest threats for people to live in peace and liberty. Hence, neither Arendt nor Morgenthau were apologists of the nation-state. However, repudiating nation-states did not make realists ingenuously pursue the promotion of
a world-state, as Scheuerman contends. Rather, realism encourages critically attending these efforts. Scheuerman (2011, p. 150) argues that realists help ‘defenders of the global state to stay sober’. Because realism stresses the potential of war, a world state would not end the depolitisation of modernity, and one could not develop political identities in a world state. In addition, its establishment would equally block people from making full use of their capabilities, for a world state would also encourage homogenisation and despotism (Scheuerman, 2011, pp. 154-68).

Contrastingly, Arendt’s and Morgenthau’s thought allows for considerations about the establishment of a world community. This makes their agenda an important contribution to IR in which peace and conflict studies and concepts like global governance are heatedly discussed more than ever. Such a global community could be established through political spheres that transcend natural and national borders. By enabling people to get together on various different levels and settings, these spheres would allow for the creation of intersubjectivity which would, in turn, help to reassure them of their worldly orientation and find suitable compromises which are considerate of all. Compromises can be found because the flexibility of political spheres allows them to accommodate numerous and diverse human interests. The resulting self-reflexivity and open-mindedness helps to accept different life-trajectories which are influenced by historical, cultural, socio-political, or religious factors. This acknowledgment of the spatio-temporal conditionality of knowledge is, finally, a means to hinder turning discussions into dialogues. The purpose of dialogues is to establish a consensus within a national context. However, despite good intentions, institutionalised dialogues fail to establish consensus because they are not conceived as an open process with equal rights for all. Rather, they are set up with the intention to affirm the status quo in which a minority has to adopt the regulations of a majority. What is more, these dialogues reduce people to ethnic-religious otherness and create an irrevocable we-they-dichotomy that had not
existed before. In political spheres, however, people are acknowledged for their differences and, through discussions, a common ground is established that suits everybody. Conceiving a world community through re-establishing political spheres cannot be implemented through attempts of social planning by national administrations or on a collective level through (inter-)national foreign policy making. It is, instead, a long-term process in which well-educated citizens emerge as willing and able to engage in discussions and do not shy away from the conflicts involved.

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