

---

# OUTLINES - CRITICAL PRACTICE STUDIES

---

• Vol. 21, No. 1 • 2020 • (19-33) •  
[www.outlines.dk](http://www.outlines.dk)

---

## Ruqaiya Hasan, in memoriam: A manual and a manifesto

**David Kellogg**

Teachers College, Sangmyung University  
Seoul, South Korea

### Abstract

*This paper has two goals, distinct but linked. The first goal, as the title suggests, is to remember the work of the late thinker, writer, and linguist Ruqaiya Hasan (1931-2015) in just the way she herself would have had it remembered: in the form of a short, practical manual of her method of linguistic analysis. This is based on the work of her teacher Basil Bernstein and her co-thinker and companion, M.A.K. Halliday. The second goal is to link this manual and this analysis to a kind of manifesto of her ideal of human progress. This progress is always revolutionary, i.e. crisis-ridden and critical, and it takes place on three timescales: the long-term sociological, the mid-term child-developmental, and the short-term textual. The link between the two goals of this paper is a defense of Hasan's legacy against criticisms that her work is essentialist, elitist and easily weaponized and turned against the daughters and sons of working people. Hasan's work may be ignored; but, without first disabling its comprehension, it cannot be so compromised.*

In a 2007 paper, Ruqaiya Hasan recalled a British Marxist remarking, sometime in the early forties, that the key problem of capitalist education lies in creating a system that will somehow enable the operation of a Bren light machine gun but disable the comprehension of the *Communist Manifesto*. As a sociolinguist, she thought of problems in three overlapping timescales—the sociogenetic (the cultural-historical timescale spanning millennia, centuries and decades), the ontogenetic (the child-developmental timescale spanning decades, years and months), and the 'logogenetic' (the timescale of making meaning in an oral or written text over years, months, and even classroom moments). On the sociogenetic timescale, the problem was one of forming a whole class capable of producing surplus value and reproducing cannon fodder but incapable of the awareness of being made to do so. On the ontogenetic timescale, the problem was one of training individual children to be capable soldiers without educating any working-class intellectuals. On the logogenetic timescale, the problem was one of forging a register of language that cements technical skills as habits but consistently stops these habits short of developing into

---

critical, intelligent free will. Like the timescales themselves, these three problems overlap to such a degree that they are best thought of as three viewpoints on a single continuous problem. “Our hope,” Hasan commented drily (2007, p. 247), “has to be that the capitalist world never succeeds in solving this problem”.

But the first part of the problem had already been solved. The Bren light machine gun had been used by soldiers of working class origin to crush the Malaysian and Indonesian Communist Parties, and to support brutal British and Australian interventions to crush revolutions in Korea and Vietnam. One text that probably enabled the operation of the Bren was the War Office’s pamphlet and wall poster *The Bren Light Machine Gun: Description, Use and Mechanism*; we propose a modest but nevertheless systematic analysis of this work which purports to explain how it did so. One text that did not, and that inspired the uprisings in Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and Vietnam instead, was the first English translation of the *Communist Manifesto*, whose opening lines are also analyzed below.

The *Communist Manifesto* concludes with a rather long section by Marx and Engels in which they criticize, one by one, contemporary adversaries, whether progressive or reactionary. This section historically played a key role in defining what the Manifesto means to us today, and it is referred to in the very first, better known, part of the Manifesto (see sentence 4 in Table 1 below). But, perhaps as a direct result of the efficacy of the criticism, this is one part no one actually reads or understands today. Just as the opening of the Manifesto helps to create the register of language and the genre of text by which we are enabled to read it, the conclusion creates conditions which have largely disabled its comprehension and today enables us to ignore it. As we shall see, the work of Ruqaiya Hasan has also had some adversaries, and these must and will be addressed in the last part of this paper. But since this tribute to Ruqaiya Hasan is meant exemplify and explicate her own method, we will try to end, as she would have done, on a more positive note and consider two equally legitimate purposes for linguistic analysis—one oriented to singular artefacts and the other towards typical specimens, one for the visionary Manifesto and the other for the humdrum Manual.

## Manual and manifesto

Figure 1 below shows the texts as they might appear at a glance, to the eye unaided by analysis: on the left, well-illustrated sandwiches of capitalized nouns and lower case verbs; on the right, a block of text that begins with only one capitalized word and sentences that begin with only one capitalized letter. Table 1 below it shows the eleven major orthographic sentences (grammatical clause-complexes) which make up the Manual on the left with the first eleven orthographic sentences of the Manifesto on the right.

Figure 1. Pictures and text from the Manual and the Manifesto.




Table 1: The first eleven sentences of the *Bren Light Machine Gun Manual* (fine print omitted) and of the *Communist Manifesto*

Manual	Manifesto
1. THE GUN IS GAS OPERATED	1. A SPECTRE haunts Europe – the spectre of communism.
2. IT IS AIR COOLED	2. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to lay this spectre: pope and tsar, Metternich and Guizot, French radicals and German police.
3. IT IS FED BY A MAGAZINE holding 30 Rounds	3. Where is the opposition party that has not been stigmatised as communist by those who wield power?
4. LOADING is a SIMPLE OPERATION	4. Where is the opposition party which has not hurled back the scandalous charge of communism in the teeth of its adversaries, whether progressive or reactionary?
5. THE GUN is shoulder controlled and normally fired from the BIPOD	5. Two things may be deduced from this fact:
6. IT IS EASY TO STRIP	5.1 Communism is already acknowledged by all European powers to be itself a power.
7. It is practically immune from STOP-PAGES provided the firer attends to the points in 'PREPARE FOR ACTION' which are—  EXAMINE Foresight, GAS REGULATOR, Bipod, Barrel Nut Catch, and Backsight.  TEST mechanism to ensure free working.	

<p>EXAMINE EACH MAGAZINE to see that the top cartridge is correctly positioned.</p> <p>IMPORTANT—Ensure that cartridges are not rim behind rim.</p> <p>8. THERE IS ONLY ONE ‘IMMEDIATE ACTION’.</p> <p>(If the gun fails to fire or stops firing—</p> <p>PULL BACK COCKING HANDLE</p> <p>MAGAZINE OFF</p> <p>PRESS TRIGGER</p> <p>MAGAZINE ON*</p> <p>COCK GUN, AIM AND FIRE</p> <p>*The magazine which has been removed is examined to see if empty; if not, that the top rounds are correctly positioned.</p> <p>If the rounds in the magazine are correct and it is reasonably full, the same magazine will be used.</p> <p>If, after applying I.A., the gun fires one or two rounds and stops again---</p> <p>Pull back cocking handle and remove magazine, press trigger, cock gun, disconnect the barrel, and adjust the gas regulator to the next largest hole—replace the barrel—place magazine on, aim and fire.</p> <p>9. It is capable of firing ‘BURSTS’ or ‘SINGLE ROUNDS’ by moving the change lever to ‘A’ or ‘R’</p> <p>10. THE MECHANISM IS SIMPLE</p> <p>11. ELEVATION is obtained by turning the RANGE DRUM</p>	<p>5.2 It is time for the communists to make open proclamation of their outlook, their aims, their trends; and to confront the old wives’ tale of a communist spectre with a Manifesto of their own party.</p> <p>6. To this end, communists of various nationalities have foregathered in London and have drafted the following Manifesto, which will be published in English, French, German, Italian, Flemish and Danish.</p> <p>7. The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.</p> <p>8. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.</p> <p>9. In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank.</p> <p>10. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations.</p> <p>11. The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.</p>
--	--

Hasan approached textual comparisons like this systematically—that is, systemically and functionally, using the system of the Marxist linguist Michael Halliday. Halliday requires a text analysis he calls ‘trinocular’; that is, from ‘below’ (that is, from spellings to wordings to meanings), from ‘above’ (that is, from meanings to wordings to spellings), and finally from ‘round about’ (that is, from ‘ideational’ wording to ‘interpersonal’ wording to ‘textual’ wording).

Table 2 shows us the picture from below—the graphology, the punctuation, and the sheer quantity of spaces between words, clauses, and sentences. We can see a number of visual effects in addition to the “sandwiches” of capitalized nominalizations and lower-case verbal groups noted for ‘4’ and ‘5’ (see also ‘11’) of the Manual. In ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘6’, and ‘10’ we see all caps, while ‘7’ and ‘8’ seem to SHOUT the action verbs. No such effects are to be found in the Manifesto. As Table 2 shows, the Manual text has more clauses, but the Manifesto has over three times as many commas, nearly twice as many prepositions, and about 60% more words per clause. As a result, there are on average some three more lexemes per clause in the Manifesto. But since the clauses are twice as long, the overall lexical density of the Manifesto is slightly less. A long clause like “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” will contain far more closed class words like articles and prepositions, while a short clause like ‘PRESS TRIGGER’ can consist of only open class words like verbs and nouns, ensuring that the lexical density is higher. The Manual is about seven and half percent verbs in the simple present tense, but the Manifesto is not even two and half percent. All this does suggest the greater lexicogrammatical complexity, and greater semantic density, of the latter.

**Table 2. Quantitative comparison of the Manual and the Manifesto**

Text	Manual	Manifesto
Clauses (total)	40	26
Words per clause (mean)	8.47	15.27
Commas (total)	8	29
Prepositions (total)	12	23
Lexemes per clause (mean)	4.97	8.04
Lexical density in text (percentage of lexemes in total text)	58.70%	52.64%
Simple present tenses (percentage of simple present verbs)	8.75%	2.30%

Now consider the picture from above—from context to text, and, within text, from meanings to wordings. For Hasan, a text realizes a ‘contextual configuration’. This is not the *material* situational setting of a text (i.e. it’s not the bricks-and-mortar of the room in which the text was written or that in which it is read); it’s an *ideal*, abstraction of context, and consequently a constellation visible to both writers and their readers. This constellation can be thought of as bearings taken on three different axes, ‘field’, ‘tenor’, and ‘mode’.

‘Field’ is the ideal, abstract representations realizable by the language system, from proximal ‘here and now’ doings and happenings to ones that are ‘there and then’ and distal. The field for the Manual lies on proximal end by virtue of the copious drawings that immediately accompany the text; the field for the Manifesto lies on the distal end by virtue of the far-flung historical, linguistic and geographical references: Pope and Tsar, Flemish and Danish languages, the patricians and plebeians of ancient Rome and medieval times.

‘Tenor’ is the ideal, abstract relationship between speaker and hearer. This is not simply a redundant, more interpersonal, social, or cultural take on the field and it is never reducible to the pole that extends from ‘up close and personal’ to purely formal and distant. Tenor also involves the nature of the commodity being exchanged (e.g. whether it is tangible goods-and-services or intangible information) and how symmetrical that exchange is (e.g. whether the speaker or hearer is just giving/getting or both giving and getting). We can see that the goals of the authors of the Manual lie with the former choices: they are interested in getting the reader to perform services, and they slip clumsily and ungrammatically in places from describing the weapon as an object (e.g. sentences 1-6) to issuing commands for its operation (sentences 7-8). The authors of the Manifesto, in contrast, tend towards the latter choices: they are interested in sharing intangible information, and move briskly but thoughtfully from description (1-2) to rhetorical questions which are to be jointly entertained (3-4).

‘Mode’ is the ideal, abstract role to be played by language itself. This isn’t just how the speaker gets and holds the floor (which would make it redundant with tenor); it includes, as we’ll see below, how the speaker orders points of departure and arrival and how information that is given and information is new are marked for the hearer. It also includes whether the part played by language in an event constitutes the whole of the event or merely plays an auxiliary role. For example, the Manual is designed to supplement actions which do not themselves consist of language. Hasan, Cloran, Williams, and Lukin (2007, pp. 723-724) describe a mode continuum in the semantics, ranging from action through commentary, reporting, predicting, conjecturing and generalizing. Neither text is pure, but if we analyze them message by message, we will find that on the average our Manual text lies near the action end of the continuum (‘COCK GUN, AIM, AND FIRE’) while the Manifesto tends to conjectures (‘Two things result from this fact’) and generalizations (‘...we find almost everywhere...’).

These three axes of the contextual configuration suggest important semantic differences that favor comprehension of the Manual text, and it is semantic variation like this, according to Hasan, which makes it possible to reconcile the apparently contradictory goals of a capitalist education. But because the messages lie in the semantics, because they are differences in meanings, we cannot access them immediately; we can only analyze them through differences in the lexicogrammar.

This brings us to the view from around and about, the view from the lexicogrammar. Hasan says that the three axes of the contextual configuration will consistently (though not invariably) take three different grammatical realizations; she gives this the now rather unfortunate name of the ‘metafunctional hookup hypothesis’. Field typically hooks up with transitivity/ergativity (e.g. material, mental, and relational processes, canonically realized as acting, thinking/feeling, and being verbs); tenor with mood (i.e. questions, statements, and commands, typically realized as indicative-interrogative, indicative-declarative, and imperative, as well as through the system of prosodic intonation), and mode with a grammatical system called theme. In some languages (e.g. Korean), the ‘Theme’ (topical, interpersonal, or textual) of a clause is marked with a particle that distinguishes it from the verb’s subject. In English we do not mark the intensionality of a clause in this way: instead, Themes such as ‘the gun’ (topical), ‘Important’ (interpersonal), or ‘If the rounds in the

magazine are correct and it is reasonably full' (textual) are simply placed at the outset of the clause where they form the point of departure and the orientation.

Table 3 shows the major metafunctional differences between the lexicogrammars of our two texts. Even with this small sample, three are statistically significant at the  $p < .05$  level or better (using a t-test on occurrences per thousand words). In transitivity, the Manual has significantly more 'to be' and 'to have' processes per thousand words. In mood, the Manual has significantly more indicative-declaratives and significantly more imperatives. And in theme, the Manual has a preference for unmarked topical clauses, of which 11 are 'it', and three more are 'the gun', while the Manifesto uses significantly more Adjunct Themes, especially 'where?', which is used as often as the topical 'it'.

**Table 3. Some major metafunctional differences between the two texts**

Metafunction	Grammar	Manual		Manifesto		t-statistic	Confidence
		N	Per 1000	N	Per 1000		
Field—ideational	'To be/to have'	14	74.07	6	15.31	2.57	98%
Tenor—interpersonal	Declarative	22	74.07	12	30.61	2.74	98%
Mode—textual	Adjunct theme	2	6.73	4	10.20	1.69	90%

There are, after all, only eleven sentences, and some of the differences are not statistically striking (there are only two Adjunct Themes in the Manual, both 'if' clauses). So perhaps this is much ado about nothing?

## Dialect and register

Perhaps not. In the first place, the results themselves are hardly trivial: we have confirmed, through the analysis of these singular texts, that one is oriented towards supplementation with pictures, relying on typical, unmarked forms, simple 'to be' structures, declaratives and imperatives, and subject themes. The other is poorer in pictures, using far fewer 'picturable' words, more rhetorical questions and more circumstantial Themes. It is not hard to see now why one of these might depend more on imagery; it is easier to see why the other relies more heavily on verbal thinking.

But in the second place, our intention was always to exemplify and illustrate Hasan's method, not to exhaust and illuminate the actual texts. As Gramsci puts it:

In the sciences in general, method is the most important thing; moreover in certain sciences that must necessarily be based on a limited, nonhomogeneous supply of positive data, questions of method are even more important, if they are not actually everything. (Gramsci, 1975, p. 85)

That method, as we have seen, requires us to consider that languages are adaptive to communicative tasks—and that some communicative tasks, particularly in the realm of education, may be far more conducive to human progress than others.

Gramsci was, of course, a linguist as well as a Marxist and an educator. But before he was any of these, he was a native speaker of Sard, the ancient language of Sardinia. Sard is today recognized as an independent Romance language with many pre-Romance linguistic roots, but in Gramsci's day was considered a debased dialect of Italian. That was, certainly, how Gramsci himself regarded his mother tongue:

If it is true that any language contains the elements of a conception of the world and of a culture, it will also be true that the greater or lesser complexity of a person's (60) conception of the world can be judged from his language. A person who only speaks a dialect or who understands the national language in varying degrees necessarily enjoys a more or less restricted and provincial, fossilized and anachronistic perception of the world in comparison with the great currents of thought which dominate world history. His interests will be restricted, more or less corporative and economic, and not universal. If it is not always possible to learn foreign languages so as to put oneself in touch with different cultures, one must at least learn the national tongue. One great culture can be translated into the language of another great culture that is, one great national language which is historically rich and complex can translate any other great culture, i.e. can be a world expression. But a dialect cannot do the same thing. (Gramsci, 1957, pp. 59-60)

It would take a brave—no, a foolhardy—linguist to defend these words today. Still, this is Gramsci: let us try to imagine a world in which what he says has more than a kernel of truth to it. It turns out to bear more than a passing resemblance to Gramsci's own world. A user of Sardinian living in Turin continues to speak Sardinian when, for example, he meets some soldiers from his homeland who have been sent to break a strike in the leather factory there (Gramsci, 1957, p. 35); it was the different uses of language at the University of Turin where Gramsci studied that necessitated his mastery of the Tuscan dialect he calls the “national language”, and it was these which enabled his own “world expression”.

Today Gramsci's notion of ‘national language’ seems pitifully provincial: perhaps it reflects rather too well the language ideology of a country which, divided by the papal states, had sought national unity in language and nowhere else for many centuries. Any national or even official language, from a linguistic point of view, is simply the dialect of its ruling class; modern ‘national languages’ are usually based on whatever *parvenu* dialect happens to be spoken by wealthy, educated people in or around the capital. For yet another, precisely because modern cultures are, despite their pretensions, almost always multi-lingual, it should not surprise us that a single culture can be realized as, or expressed in, more than one language, and that this multi-lingualism crosses borders at least as easily as goods and services do. But the notion that culture can be ‘translated’ into language at all is not theoretically or even lexicogrammatically coherent: one cannot translate something that is not already language.

Hasan would add that Gramsci is confusing the concept of ‘dialect’, which is a form of language defined in relation to its user, with “register”, which is a form of language defined in relation to specific uses. Hasan says (2011b, p. 38) that the fact that dialects are defined by user explains why a Glaswegian in London still sounds Scottish and not English and




thus why there is no particular region associated with US white English—or black. *Pace* Gramsci, subaltern dialects can and do express or realize all the currents of their cultures and the elite cultures to which they are politically, economically, and socially subordinated; this is why there are indeed many poets and singers of dialect. The capability and even necessity of a subaltern dialect to translate any and all meanings available in the “national language” dialect explains why it is more often the ruling stratum of a speech community which is monodialectal while subaltern classes tend to bidialectism, and there is no reason in principle why this bidialectism and even bilingualism should remain within national boundaries.

The *Communist Manifesto* is written in a register that is easily recognizable today in retrospect, but it is a register which the Manifesto and its widespread translation helped bring into being. Translatability into different dialects and different languages is inscribed in the text itself: since working people have no fatherland, it must follow that they are not restricted to any fatherland dialect or even mother tongue. In contrast, the restriction of the Manual to a very narrow range of meanings is apparent from the very fact that it is hard to interpret without the pictures. Although the restrictedness of the ‘international’ English of science and business, air traffic control or modern art criticism is less apparent, these too are highly specialized and restricted. Their uses are functionally limited—we do not use artspeak for landing jetliners—and so with Hasan’s concept of register what Gramsci says can be placed on much firmer ground.

Unlike a dialect, the grammatical range of a register like business English or diplomacy is tightly restricted by its function, and it’s for this reason that dialects, but not registers, are phonologically marked, while registers, but not dialects, are lexicogrammatically marked. This lexicogrammatical marking is what we observed in our comparison between the Manual and the Manifesto above. This marking represents adaptation: a register represents an adaptation to one set of situation types rather than another. These situation types include situations that can have a direct and long-lasting effect the quality, longevity, and potential of human life. This necessarily suggests that some registers of that language are more equal—that is, more equal to the tasks of improving the quality, longevity, and potential of human lives—than others. Shweder & Bourne (1984, p. 159) once argued that there are three possible models of anthropological interpretation: the universalist model which holds that all cultures are basically the same and hence equal; the relativist one which holds that all cultures are fundamentally different and hence incommensurable, and the evolutionist one which holds that all cultures are different. Hasan’s view is not simply an evolutionary one—it is revolutionary, in (at least) three senses.

First of all, her view is revolutionary in the old-fashioned sociogenetic sense: Hasan recognizes the potential of meaning potential itself to transform society. This follows from Hasan’s understanding of a context: it is not a ‘material situational setting’ but rather that material situational setting represented as meaning potential—as potential text. Figure 2 shows how this relationship appears to Hasan.

Figure 2. Two clines of instantiation (Hasan, 2009, p. 451).



The dotted lines indicate the clines of instantiation (a situation being an instance of culture, and a text being an instance of language). The blue arrows indicate realization (materialization from context to text) and red arrows indicate activation (putting particular meanings at risk rather than others).

When we read the figure horizontally, from left to right or from right to left, the relationship is one of instantiation or exemplification: a situation is an instance of a situation type, and a situation type is an example of a culture type, which is a specimen of culture. Here the relationship is something like the relationship between weather and climate. When we read the figure vertically, from top to bottom or vice-versa, there is a rather different relationship: the movement from potential to actual meaning making which Halliday calls ‘realization’ and Hasan divides into ‘realization’ from context to text and ‘activation’ from text to context. Because every instance of meaning alters, even if only very slightly, the probabilities of the register and indeed the probabilities of the language system as whole, it is entirely possible for changes in text to amount to changes in context as well; this is in fact what happens when highly valued texts like the Manifesto alter public discourse and through it to act on the material situational settings of a culture as well.

Second, Hasan’s view is revolutionary in the ontogenetic sense: it recognizes that child language development is not the incremental acquisition of words and grammar rules, but rather the seizure and mastery of registers; in other words, the process of child development involves movement along the cline of instantiation in Figure 2, from the situation to the culture, and from the text to the language system. Halliday (2004, p. 349) finds that this movement, in the process of learning language, learning through language, and learning about language, experiences three important semantic ‘breakthroughs’ separated by three to five year gaps. Generalization—that is, the recognition that wordings can therefore name whole classes of objects rather than singularities—is the way that the child breaks from proto-language into language proper at the age of two or three. This is where we find words like ‘gun’, ‘handle’, and ‘trigger’. Abstractness—that is, the thinking process that produces imaginary entities like ‘spectre’ and ‘communism’, as well as the ability to abstract away numbers from numbers of objects—is the way the child breaks from everyday language into the disciplinary languages of elementary school at around age six or seven. Finally, metaphor—that is, the recognition that we can take a concrete process like ‘revolve’ and create an imaginary entity called ‘revolution’ which can be classified and defined and even changed again into a quality, ‘revolutionary’—is the way the child breaks into specialized technical discourses, around age thirteen. These grammatical metaphors often end in ‘~tion’, and it is here we find much of the language of the Manifesto: ‘opposition’, ‘reconstitution’, ‘gradation’, and ‘oppression’ in addition to ‘arrangement’. On the face of it, it would seem that the solution to that key problem of capitalist education with which we began is not so difficult, indeed, natural: teaching the language of Manual without teaching

the language of the Manifesto involves little more than arresting semantic development at around age thirteen.

Finally, Hasan's vision is a revolutionary one in the pedagogical, or 'logogenetic' sense. In a 1996 paper on 'Literacy, everyday talk and society', Hasan argued that extant approaches to literacy in school can be placed into three categories: a 'recognition' literacy which focuses on mastery of the system of expression (e.g. learning the alphabet), an 'action' literacy which includes issues of content (e.g. learning various genres of writing), and finally—as yet largely unexplored—a reflection literacy which can concentrate on the production of new knowledge through dissociation and re-synthesis of the old. These categories of literacy are historically related, in so far as each—including the first—must replace what preceded it, and thus each must both oppose and include its precedent. Recognition literacy replaces illiteracy to the extent that it provides the learner the signs with which to encode sounds, but it includes illiteracy by omitting content. Action literacy (e.g. the "genre pedagogy" now widely used in Australia) replaces recognition literacy to the extent that it extends literacy to include meaning-making and overcomes the fragmentation introduced by teaching the system of expression, but it includes the system of conformity and unquestioning obedience to the genre, and it is this which must be replaced by critical reflection if the learner is to be able to create new knowledge (2011a, pp. 178-199). Curiously, this is the part of Hasan's work that has attracted the most obloquy. This is particularly curious when we consider the nature of the complaint: a reflection literacy is based on 'deficit' linguistics—that is, an analysis which ignores the social and even linguistic roots of differences that make a difference in teaching-and-learning and instead tries to locate these 'deficits' in the learner alone. The last part of this paper is devoted to trying to make sense of this objection and answer it. The first part of this task—making sense of the objection—will not be easy.

## Differences that make a difference

Making sense of the objection is largely a matter of deciding whether it is based on witless misunderstanding or willful misrepresentation. In 2013, *Language and Education* devoted an entire special issue to what it called 'deficit linguistics'. It is always remarkable—though not always in a good way—when a special issue presents papers from only one side of a question, as Karen Grainger and Peter Jones announced they would (Grainger & Jones, 2013, p. 96). Grainger and Jones justified this remarkable practice by referring to "a resurgence of the socially intolerant 'deficit' approach" that had to be exposed and criticized (p. 95). Curiously, with the sole exception of Ruqaiya Hasan's work, the only twenty-first century research that they could expose was work supporting their own position. From this it appeared that the 'deficit linguistics' requiring this unique urgent and unified counterattack was not actually any single target. It was an amalgam: alongside contemporaneous policy statements by think tanks and NGOs, many of which were affiliated with the Liberal/Conservative coalition then in power (see Grainger, 2013), there was the much earlier theory of education and language developed by Basil Bernstein (1973; 1996/2000) and Ruqaiya Hasan (2005, 2011a, 2011b, 2016). Peter Jones wrote the concluding article, in which Hasan's theory was singled out as the chief contemporary apology for 'divisive' practices in education.

‘Political correctness’ has long since lost whatever ironic reference it may have had; it has long since become little more than a naked justification of brutality and bigotry. Still, it is hard to miss a tiresome demagogic shrillness here, and this in turn makes it a little hard to overlook the irony of a British white male academic imputing prejudicial and racist views to the practice of education in general and to a Pakistani female educator in particular. Let us try, nevertheless, to limit ourselves to passing apophasis and instead take the ‘deficit vs. difference’ argument seriously. Let us assume that by ‘deficit,’ a term that is explicitly eschewed by both Bernstein and Hasan, Jones has in mind some difference which not only disempowers the child but places the child beyond the reach of learning and development.

One way in which a difference might be transformed into a permanent deficit is logogenetic and situated immediately in the classroom; it is the failure, by the teacher, by the educational authorities, and even by university professors, to recognize data and admit empirical evidence that there is any significant difference in semantic code here to worry about. One of Hasan’s most important contributions to the work of her mentor Bernstein was to provide precisely that data and that empirical evidence. Bernstein had based his codes on the distinction that Durkheim, Toennies, and Weber all used, between forms of social organization that involved similar social being (‘mechanical solidarity’ or ‘community’) and forms of social organization that involved difference and interdependence (‘organic solidarity’ or ‘society’). Hasan operationalized this long-standing and widely accepted distinction from sociology in a Marxist way, as ‘Higher Autonomy Professions (HAP)’ where the breadwinner exercises a good deal of personal agency in relation to the means of production (e.g. a bank manager or doctor) and ‘Low Autonomy Profession (LAP)’ where the worker had very little (e.g. a council truck driver or a contract brick-layer). She then found statistically robust differences in the language of the home (Hasan, 2009, p. 91). HAP mothers, for example, were more likely to ask yes/no questions and introduce questions with a named point of view (e.g., “I think that might be enough for two sandwiches there, mightn’t it?”) but less likely to ask why/how questions and to rely on unspoken assumptions (“You’re not gonna kiss me? Why?”). HAP mothers were also more likely to relate messages, making one question dependent upon another (p. 113), in the manner we see in the Manifesto but not in the Manual. Children, in turn, were more likely to give answers to questions deemed adequate, and to elaborate answers beyond the bare minimum (p. 114). Jones simply denies that this logogenetic evidence exists (Jones, 2013, p. 165).

Another way in which differences might actually be transformed into deficits is more ontogenetic in its argument: it is to recognize that such differences exist but to deny that they are what Gregory Bateson calls ‘differences that make a difference’ (1972, p. 149), differences that have any important consequences for the well-being, longevity, and developmental outcome for the child. So Jones claims that Bernstein and Hasan claim that the differences in semantic code that they uncovered had ‘cognitive consequences’—in other words, according to Jones (2013, p. 164), Bernstein and Hasan were arguing that working class kids were linguistically, and therefore cognitively, deficient. Here we are at some disadvantage, because the model of thinking and speech that Hasan, Halliday, and the present author defend does not consider either thinking or speech as examples of cognitive processing: neither is a spiritual analogue to biological processes, nor is either the work of some kind of digital computer constructed of nervous tissue. One of the great advantages of considering linguistic and even psychological processes as essentially social and interpersonal in nature, inextricably intertwined and interwoven in culture, is that they can

be objectively observed in social interactions and explained and even altered as activities of a consciousness given to humans phylogenetically by evolution but then developed sociogenetically by human history. To reject the possibility that these processes involve semantic variations of the sort that Hasan document would require us to freeze both evolution and history in time; to deny that these semantic variations have important consequences for child development, to ignore kind of variation studied by Hasan and also examined in the first part of this article, is simply to ignore the child's development altogether—that is, to ignore the second, ontogenetic, sense in which Hasan's vision was revolutionary.

So one more way that a difference could be transformed into a deficit would be simply to acknowledge that such differences exist and may even be educationally significant, but then to assert that making them an object of scientific study would be a fatal distraction from their causes in the social situation of development. Sure enough, in his conclusion to the *Language and Education* special issue, Jones blames Hasan for shifting the critical attention of the academic community away from the educational system and onto the child's own thinking and speech (Jones, 2013, p. 176). Perhaps the academic community might be enjoined to hold both a cause and a consequence in its field of attention at the same time. The academic community, in any case, should not assume that the environment is forever the cause and the child is the eternal consequence: this is a rejection of the very first, sociogenetic, sense in which Hasan's vision was revolutionary. A child, or at least a child in which we have enabled not only generic texts like the Manual but also singular texts like the Manifesto, does not always grow up to be like her or his parents; children not only realize their own meaning potentials but bequeath to their own children all the unrealized potential which that meaning has unchained.

## Conclusion

The difference between the two texts is a difference which has the potential to make a difference, but it has that potential precisely because it rests on a fundamentally similar base, namely the system of meaning potential as a whole. At the very outset of their magisterial *Introduction to Functional Grammar*, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014, p. 3) distinguish between looking at a text as an artefact and studying it as a specimen. With the former, we are reading as a literary critic and trying to find out what makes it valued the way it is; with the latter, we are reading it as a child does and trying to use it to make sense of language system as a whole—or at least we are trying to learn enough about it to make some appropriate reply. But the literary critic and the child are simply taking two different perspectives of one and the same phenomenon: the former is looking at the text against a background of all the other options the language system offered which were not taken, and the latter is scanning the language system for options that may be taken against the background of the instance of text.

We may say much the same about our comparison of the Manifesto and the Manual: it's not the case that one is an ineffable artefact and the other mere specimen; both are ineffable and yet both are typical in their relationship to the language system. As we saw in Figure 2, much the same thing may be said of the contexts of situation these two texts realize: both

are both inimitable and unrepeatable on the one hand and ongoing and unfinished on the other. We can still analyze and make sense of them, however, if we look at them trinocularly, as Halliday asks—that is, if we examine them simultaneously from the context and semantics above, from the phonology and graphology below, and above all from the lexicogrammar which mediates between them. What Hasan in her work brought to Halliday's analysis was the sociogenetic, the ontogenetic, and the logogenetic dimensions of each text she examined. In each dimension, we find forms of progress that are revolutionary and critical as well as evolutionary and adaptive.

We found that what really set the two texts apart is what Bernstein and Hasan called their different semantic codes: their different orientations to meaning potential. In one case, the meaning potential is ready-made, in the routine, habitual use of weapon of war: in the other, the meaning potential has yet to be realized, in the promulgation of a programme for the construction of a new society. There is no reason to try to locate these differences deep in cognition. They may be found right in the open where they can be studied and acted upon, in the differing uses of language and the differing orientations to meaning—the differing semantic codes—that these different registers entail. Because differences in semantic code are historical rather than natural differences—because they are made through language rather than grown out of cognitive deficits—they can, with teachers' help, be overcome. But in order to do that, we cannot simply ignore them, deny them, or insist that their recognition and solution is some kind of distraction from their causes and consequences. In order to overcome them, we must confront, analyze and understand them. Here Hasan's work is both manual and manifesto.

## References

- Bateson, G. (1972). *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. New York: Balantine.
- Bernstein, B. (1973). *Class, Codes and Control, Volume 1: Theoretical studies towards a sociology of language*. St Albans: Paladin.
- Bernstein, B. (1996/2000). *Pedagogy, Symbolic Control, and Identity: Theory, research, critique*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Grainger, K. (2013). 'The daily grunt': middle-class bias and vested interests in the 'Getting in Early' and 'Why Can't They Read?' reports. *Language and Education*, 27(2), 99-109. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2012.760583>
- Grainger, K., & Jones, P. E. (2013). The 'Language Deficit' argument and beyond. *Language and Education*, 27(2), 95-98. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2012.760582>
- Gramsci, A. (1957). *The Modern Prince and Other Writings*. New York: International Publishers.
- Gramsci, A. (1975). *The Complete Prison Notebooks. Volume 2*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Halliday, M. A. K. (2015). The influence of Marxism. In J. Webster (Ed.), *The Bloomsbury Companion to M.A.K. Halliday* (pp. 94–100). London: Bloomsbury.
- Halliday, M. A. K., & Matthiessen, C. M. I. M. (2014). *Halliday's Introduction to Functional Grammar*. London: Routledge.
- Hasan, R. (1985). *Linguistics, Language and Verbal Art*. Victoria: Deakin University Press.
- Hasan, R. (2005). *Language, Society, and Consciousness*. London: Equinox.
- Hasan, R. (2011a). *Language and Education*. London: Equinox.
- Hasan, R. (2011b). *Selected Works of Applied Linguistics*. Beijing: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press.
- Hasan, R., (2016). *Context in the System and Process of Language*. London: Equinox.
- Hasan, R., Cloran, C., Williams, G., & Lukin, A. (2007). Semantic networks: The description of linguistic meaning in SFL. In R. Hasan, C. M. I. M. Matthiessen & J. Webster (Eds.), *Continuing Discourse on Language, Vol. 2* (pp. 697-737). London: Equinox.
- Jones, P. E. (2013). Bernstein's 'Codes' and the Linguistics of 'Deficit'. *Language and Education*, 27(2), 161–179, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2012.760587>
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1969). *Selected Works. Vol. 1*. Moscow: Progress.
- Shweder, R. A., & Bourne, E. J. (1984). Does the concept of the person vary cross culturally? In R. A. Shweder & R. A. LeVine (Eds.), *Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion* (pp. 158-199). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- War Office (1940). *The Bren Light Machine Gun*. Aldershot: Gale and Polden.

### Acknowledgements

I gratefully acknowledge that comprehension of this article was vastly enabled by Niklas Alexander Chimirri and the anonymous reviewers. I claim exclusive copyright over any remaining incoherence or inaccuracy.

### About the author

**David Kellogg** is currently based at Sangmyung University in Seoul, South Korea. He has helped to translate eleven volumes of Vygotsky's works into Korean. With Nikolai Veresov, he is translator and editor of Vygotsky's pedagogical works (Springer).

*Contact:* David Kellogg, Teachers College of Sangmyung University, Email: [dkellogg60@smu.ac.kr](mailto:dkellogg60@smu.ac.kr)