Nothing and nobody exists in this world whose very being does nor presuppose a spectator. In other words, nothing that is, insofar as it appears, exists in the singular; everything that is is meant to be perceived by somebody. Not Man but men inhabit this planet. Plurality is the law of the earth…The worldliness of living things means that there is no subject that is not also an object and appears as such to somebody else, who guarantees its "objective" reality (Arendt, 1978: 19).

The opposite of necessity is not contingency or accident but freedom (Arendt, 1978: 60).

Thinking, willing and judging are the three basic mental facilities: they cannot be derived from each other and though they have certain common characteristics they cannot be reduced to a common denominator (Arendt, 1978: 69).

Mental activities, driven to language as the only medium for their manifestation, each draw their metaphors from a different bodily sense, and their plausibility depends upon an innate affinity between certain mental and certain sensory data. Thus, from the outset in formal philosophy, thinking has been thought of in terms of seeing (Arendt, 1978: 110).

Arendt's 'spectators exist only in the plural' is really a way of saying that judging is a form of public happiness (Young-Bruehl, 2006: 179).

It has been thirty years since the posthumous publication of Hannah Arendt's *The Life of the Mind* (1978). Max Deutscher's *Judgment After Arendt* (2007) is the first full length study of this important Arendtian text on thinking, willing and judging, as well as a philosophical encounter with thinking, willing and judging. Arendt's unexpected death meant that the third part of *The Life of the Mind*, judgment, was never completed. Deutscher develops the theme of judgment to demonstrate the ways in which Arendt significantly contributes to contemporary philosophy by engaging with literature, history, myth and idiom. In his introduction, Deutscher acknowledges that like Simone de Beauvoir, Arendt disclaims the position of 'philosopher' (she would always say she was a political theorist), "only so as to be free to develop the kind of philosophy that she needed" (p. ix). The Roundtable does a number of things. Firstly, it overviews key aspects of Arendt's *The Life of the Mind*. Secondly, it engages with Deutscher's *Judgment After Arendt* in terms of Arendt developing a

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1 This paper is a working draft and provides a very preliminary overview of aspects Arendt's *The Life of the Mind* (1978) and Deutscher's *Judgment After Arendt* (2007). The paper will be reworked to take into consideration comments by referees and participants in the Roundtable at the conference.
phenomenologically influenced new genre of philosophy, referred to as a post-metaphysics that is historically informed (2007: p.x). Finally, it examines the implications of both works for what they tell us about the relationship between the disciplines of political theory and philosophy and the contribution political theory makes to philosophical thinking more generally.

Specifically, this paper is interested in the fact that Arendt adamantly rejected the view that she was a philosopher. This factual reality continues to be underplayed in contemporary conversations. It is not just about the insights Arendt has for the discipline of philosophy and the development of a philosophical post-metaphysics but also about how a philosopher (Max Deutscher) reads a political theorist examining the political elements of the faculties of the mind, thinking, willing and judging. Arendt provides a political theory reading of philosophy, by a political theorist with an excellent knowledge of philosophy, phenomenology, existentialism and political theory. Arendt is able to engage in an examination of mental faculties and show the political dimensions of judging even though it is a faculty of the mind. Another important aspect of a political theory contribution to philosophical writing is whether Arendt has two theories of judgment or one? What are the implications for political theory? Is this an extension of the first phase, is it about developing ways to extend political theory. Are there different implications for this if we consider the difference between withdrawal and invisibility? What about Arendt's notion of the trans-political? Finally, her political reading of judgment as about particulars (examples, exemplary validity) that cannot be captured by a universal, the different types of reflective and deductive meaning and what that means for revisions of understandings of universalism and particularities for philosophy and political theory more generally.

Arendt's *The Life of the Mind* (1978)

In the opening paragraph of *The Life of the Mind*, Arendt says that in approaching the topic of thinking she felt disturbed for she had "neither claim nor ambition to be a "philosopher", or be numbered amongst what Kant, not without irony, called 'professional thinkers'" (1978: 3). Arendt's interest in mental activities came from two different origins. The first was the infamous Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, where Arendt spoke of "the banality of evil". "Behind that phrase, I held no thesis or doctrine, although I was dimly aware of the fact that it went counter to our tradition of thought - literary, theological, or philosophic - about the phenomenon of evil" (1978: 3). What struck Arendt was not Eichmann's stupidity but his thoughtlessness. "Cliches, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized codes of expression and conduct have the socially recognized function of protecting us from reality, that is, against the claim on our thinking attention that all events and facts make by virtue of their existence" (1978: 4). Arendt questioned whether evil doing, both the sins of omission and commission, arise from no motive whatsoever without specific interest or volition. She asks, "Might the problem of good and evil, our faculty for telling right from wrong, be connected with our faculty of thought?" (1978: 5). Arendt wondered

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2 Biskowski (1993) cites an interview with Hans Jonas with Arendt whilst she was preparing the Gifford lectures (the foundation of The Life of the Mind). Apparently Arendt said,"I have done my bit in politics, no more than that; from now on, and for what is left, I will deal with trans-political things" (1993: 871). This trans-political understanding of the political demonstrates the way in which political theory significantly contributes to contemporary philosophical discussion.
whether thinking was an activity that could prevent men from evil doing or even condition them against evil. "The very word "conscience," at any rate, points in this direction insofar as it means "to know with and by myself," a kind of knowledge that is actualized in every thinking process" (1978: 5).

The second was moral questions arising out of factual experience that was counter to much of what ethics had to say about the problem of evil and also much of what philosophy had to say about the question What is thinking? - "were apt to renew in me certain doubts that had been plaguing me ever since I had finished a study of what my publisher wisely called "The Human Condition," but which I had intended more modestly as an inquiry into "The Vita Activa." I had been concerned with the problem of Action, the oldest concern of political theory, and what had always troubled me about it was that the very term I adopted for my reflections on the matter, namely, *vita activa*, was coined by men who were devoted to the contemplative way of life and looked upon all kinds of being alive from that perspective" (1978: 6). She explains that what interested her in the Vita Activa was the difference from the complete quietness of the Vita Contemplativa and the way the stillness made the differences in the Vita Activa disappear (1978: 7). She became aware that the matter could be looked upon differently and indicated her doubts in the final sentence of The Human Condition "never is a man more active than when he does nothing, never is he less alone than when he is by himself." On the assumption that Cato is right, Arendt asks, "What are we 'doing' when we do nothing but think? Where are we when we, normally surrounded by our fellow-men, are together with no one but ourselves" (1978: 8). Arendt notes that at first glance these questions seem to belong to philosophy and metaphysics, two disciplines that have declared themselves to have come to an end.

Arendt considers the possible advantages "of our situation" in terms of the demise of philosophy and metaphysics. She suggests that it allows us to look at the past with new eyes and suggests that the situation would be even more advantageous "had it not been accompanied by the disrepute into which everything that is not visible, tangible, palpable has fallen, so that we are in danger of losing the past itself together with our traditions" (1978:12). Philosophy and metaphysics deal with matters outside sense perception that transcends common sense reasoning, which arises from sense perception and can be validated empirically. As Arendt suggests, from Parmenides til philosophy's end, all thinkers have advocated that in order for man to deal with these matters, he needs to detach his mind from his senses and detach them both from the world and from sensations aroused by sense-objects. The philosopher withdraws from the world of appearances and moves in the world of the few. Arendt claims that the second advantage of the present situation is that the distinction between professional thinkers and the many has lost its credibility. "If as I suggested before, the ability to tell right from wrong should turn out to have anything to do with the ability to think, then we must be able to "demand" its exercise from every sane person, now matter how erudite or ignorant, intelligent or stupid, he may happen to be" (1978:13). She distinguishes stupidity from absence of thought and claims Kant's distinction between reason and intellect as "crucial for our enterprise" (1978: 13).

For Arendt, Kant's distinguishing of the two faculties of reason and intellect coincides with two other mental faculties, thinking and knowing and two different concerns, meaning and cognition. Arendt claims that "in a nutshell: *The need of reason is not*
inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest for meaning. And truth and meaning are not the same. (Arendt, 1978: 15). For Arendt, the basic metaphysical fallacy is to interpret meaning on models of truth, which is a refusal to think through Kant's distinction "between the 'urgent need' to think and the 'desire to know', and is by no means due only to the weight of tradition" (1978: 15). Whilst Kant's insights brought light to German philosophy and inspired German idealism. The speculative thought that arose created a new philosophy that considered its subject matter to be "actual knowledge of what truly is...pursuing the Cartesian ideal of certainty as though Kant had never existed, they believed in all earnest that the results of their speculations possessed the same kind of validity as the results of cognitive processes" (1978:16).

The Life of the Mind is about the inability or refusal to think and the capacity of doing evil. "Thoughtlessness, it follows, is the absence of internal dialogue" (Young-Bruehl, 1982a: 279). Arendt examines the tradition in terms of how it understands evil and is critical of the almost unanimous view that evil is a mere privation or exception from the norm. "The most conspicuous and most dangerous fallacy in the proposition, as old as Plato, "nobody does evil voluntarily," is the implied conclusion, "Everybody wants to do good." The sad truth of the matter is that most evil is done by people who never made up their mind to be either bad or good" (2003:180). At the end of "Thinking and Moral Considerations" Arendt mentions that it took language a long time to distinguish between 'consciousness' and 'conscience' (2003: 186). She claims that thinking in its noncognitive and nonspecialised forms is a natural need of human life and that it is not something that only the few can do, but on the contrary, is an 'ever-present faculty in everybody" (2003: 187). This also applies to the inability to think which is not as simple as images of mindless masses but the ever present possibility for everybody. Arendt emphasises the importance of the intercourse with oneself discovered by Socrates. Arendt is concerned with evil which she distinguishes from wickedness, "the nonwicked everybody who has no special motives and for this reason is capable of infinite evil" (2003: 188).

In moments of human crisis, "thinking ceases to be a marginal affair in political matters" (2003: 188). When everybody is caught up unthinkingly in what everyone else does and believes, "those who think are drawn out of hiding because their refusal to join is conspicuous and thereby becomes a kind of action" (my emphasis) (2003: 188). What Arendt refers to as the 'purging element in thinking' brings into light the shortcomings of unexamined opinions, values, theories, doctrines and convictions, and this has political implications. This destruction liberates the faculty of judgment which Arendt refers to as "the most political of man's mental abilities" (2003: 188). The faculty of judging particulars without subsuming them under a general rule can be taught and learned until they become habits, that can in turn be replaced by other habits and rules (2003: 189). Arendt distinguishes between the faculty of thinking and the faculty of judgment, the latter being concerned with particulars, with sense perceptions and the ability to say, 'this is wrong' and this is beautiful' and the former, concerned with invisibles and representations of things that are absent from the senses. Arendt's understanding of the importance of thinking is summed up in these words from the final paragraph of the essay:

If thinking, the two-in-one of the soundless dialogue, actualizes the difference within our identity as given in consciousness and thereby results in conscience as its by-product, then judging, the by-product of the liberating effect of thinking, makes it
manifest in the world of appearances, where I am never alone and always much too busy to be able to think. The manifestation of the wind of thought is no knowledge: it is the ability to tell right from wrong, beautiful from ugly. And this indeed may prevent catastrophes, at least for myself, in the rare moments when the chips are down (2003: 189).

The final chapter of Young-Bruehl's *Why Arendt Matters* examines Arendt's least read book (published after her death) *The Life of the Mind*, which is described as "a very political work of philosophy" (p.161). In this book, Arendt investigates the entire legacy of Western philosophy in terms of how we think, will and judge and finds it wanting. Arendt sought to engage with a few exemplary philosophers (Kant, Jaspers) who she believed faced reality in order to reconsider the relationship between the disciplines of politics and philosophy. Of course, the reader must imagine what Arendt might have said about judging, a mental ability she believed more than any other, is exercised in relationships with others, seeing things from their point of view (p.165). "One might say in other terms that judgement, more than any other mental abilities, fits us for the condition of human plurality and is rooted in it (as action is "ontologically rooted" in natality)" (p.166). A key insight that Young-Bruehl acknowledges is that judgment relates the particular and the general, *reflectively* where particular types of judgments have something in common, and *deductively* which begins with the general and moves to the particular. This highlights the importance of aesthetic judging which operates reflectively and not deductively, beginning when a particular phenomenon occurs. For Young Bruehl, the key question that guides a revisitation of the notes and lectures is: "What do people who are able to judge reflectively, to be judging spectators, contribute to the political domain" (p.176). Indeed, the very constitution of the public realm is by critics and spectators, not by actors and makers.

Reading *The Life of the Mind* in conjunction with "Thinking and Moral Considerations," written while Arendt worked on the former, provides interesting insights into the way concepts outside the political can provide insights into the political. Arendt says in the essay that few philosophers have ever explained why they think or what thinking is. "In this difficulty, unwilling to trust our own experiences because of the obvious danger of arbitrariness, I propose to look for a model, for an example that, unlike the "professional thinkers" could be representative for our "everybody," (2003: 168).

**Deutscher's *Judgment After Arendt* (2007)**

In *Judgment After Arendt*, Deutscher claims that Arendt develops a phenomenologically influenced new genre of philosophy - a post-metaphysics that is historically informed. The book is written as a direct response to Arendt's *The Life of the Mind*. In the opening paragraph of the introduction Deutscher remarks that whilst Arendt disavowed the title of philosopher, she nevertheless did this so she could "develop the kind of philosophy that she needed" (2007: ix). He recalls that Arendt's interest in thinking was sparked by the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem where she observed Eichmann's 'thoughtlessness' as opposed to his stupidity. For Deutscher, Arendt does philosophy so that she can displace metaphysical theories of mind and is critical of dualistic "two worlds" theories of the mind. Arendt writes philosophy
without wanting to create a new metaphysics by drawing upon the resources of metaphor.

Arendt examines the illusions of dualism and argues that there are not two worlds because metaphor provides a bridge between them. "The two-world theory, as I have said, is a metaphysical delusion although by no means an arbitrary or accidental one;...Language, by lending itself to metaphorical usage, enables us to think, that is, to have traffic with non-sensory matters, because it permits a carrying-over, *metapherein*, of our sense experiences. There are not two worlds because metaphor unites them" (Arendt, 1978: 110). As Deutscher makes clear, Arendt contends that a dualism of thought and behaviour can be understood as a *metaphor* that emanates from the experience of withdrawing from the world to think, resolve one's will and consider judgment. The point is that metaphor presents the facts of one category of discourse to another (2007: xi). Arendt is clear that language is the only medium where the invisible can become manifest in a world of appearances and says it's not as adequate for this task as our senses for coping with the perceptible world "and that the metaphor in its own way can cure the defect. The cure has its dangers and is never wholly adequate either. The danger lies in the overwhelming evidence the metaphor provides by appealing to the unquestioned evidence of sense experience (1978: 112).

Deutscher understands Arendt's work on the life of the mind as 'ec-centric' and he doesn't mean this as an insult. He notes the currently fashionable tendency to de-centre the subject, the author etc and says it takes a different type of approach to provide a way for recentricity. "That requires taking another centre, offset from the established point and then (if you have the drive, knowledge and genius) subtending traditional discourse from this shifted point. The newly demarcated field, with its offset boundaries, then registers as eccentric" (2007: xi). Deutscher suggests that in learning to read Arendt as a philosopher and a social and political thinker and critic, her work must be placed with her contemporaries, particularly Sartre and Heidegger. The new phenomenological tradition that emerges in German philosophy with the work of Husserl in the nineteenth century provided Arendt with new ways of considering philosophical writing. Deutscher suggests there "is more than an echo of this concern" in Arendt's approach to thinking and the mind.

Deutscher is interested in the way Arendt revives Plato's understanding of thinking as a conversation with oneself with an emphasis on the 'invisible' and 'inaudible' aspects of thinking. The privacy of thought being enacted presents implications for dualist understandings of the two worlds of mind and matter. Thinking is autonomous and provides the basis for judgment, although Arendt is mindful of the way privacy of thinking is invisible and inaudible in the public realm, thinking requires plurality within the self, and for Arendt, this is different to our identity. Even in solitude this plurality of the self means we can converse with ourselves and enjoy our own company. Loneliness and solitude differ as the former means there is no plurality of the self. Arendt is aware that thought requires solitude to gain strength and this prepares us for public encounters. We need others to think things through and the need for a public life is what leads into willing and judging. Thinking is a kind of action by inaction that for Arendt helps explain why dualism imagines the mind and body as separate. Deutscher is interested in the ways Arendt elaborates the fallacy of dualism with her keen insights into thinking, willing and judging understood as withdrawing from perception and action in the world (2007: xiii).
In chapter six 'Absence,' in the opening section on 'Spectators and participants,' Deutscher claims that before The Life of the Mind, Arendt had located judgment in political and social life (citing her papers collected in the section on Judgment in Responsibility and Judgment, Arendt: 2003). He notes that some commentators have understood the shift to judgment requiring a withdrawal from life to the role of the spectator as problematic. "what she says at this stage, however, is an elaboration of her earlier attention to judgment; the latter emphasis on the need for a 'withdrawal' to the position of spectator is offered as an additional thought rather than as the correction of a previous error" (Deutscher, 2003: 69). Deutscher does not include Between Past and Present in the principal relevant works of Hannah Arendt he has cited for his study on judgment (2007:162).

The importance of Deutscher's Judgment After Arendt (2007) becomes more strident if contemporary philosophy has moved beyond the dualism of mind and body and "our challenge is to reconsider the concepts and phenomena of the thinking, willing and judging body" (2007: xvii). Deutscher is aware that a focus upon thinking, willing and judging as autonomous, while framed socially and physically, might appear to "readmit the old 'ghost' in the machine" and suggests that working with Arendt and others with their attention to our allegories of passing time when we engage in thinking, willing and judging may provide a different path. Overall, Deutscher argues that we are immobilised by the opposing images of dualism and reductive materialism, and that there is a tendency to remain "willing victims" to the illusion that judging takes place from nowhere and no-when. Instead, he suggests embracing the materiality of mind "even if we vindicate the power of thought to disturb each solution it constructs" (2007: xvii).

**Post-Metaphysics, Political Phenomenology & Political Theory**

For d' Enterves, "Together with the theory of action, her unfinished theory of judgment represents her central legacy to twentieth-century political thought" (2000: 245). Arendt's writings on judgment were not developed into a theory of judgment as such. However, her writings on judgment are located in the first two volumes of The Life of the Mind on Thinking and Willing, an essay she wrote whilst working on the two earlier volumes titled "Thinking and Moral Considerations," her Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy given in 1970 in New York at the New School for Social Research, and in two of her exercises in political thought appearing in Between Past and Future. The first is "The Crisis in Culture" which examines judgment and opinion in relation to culture and taste, and the second "Truth and Politics" on the question of truth.

According to d' Enterves, "these writings do not present a unified theory of judgment but, rather, two distinct models, one based upon the standpoint of the actor, the other from the standpoint of the spectator, which are somewhat at odds with each other" (2000: 246). Arendt's work on the theme of judgment is understood to be in two phases. The early phase is where judgment is the faculty of political actors in the public realm and a later phase where judgment is about non-participating spectators who gain meaning from the past to understand the present. D’ Entreves argues that the later formulation indicates a shift from judging being about political actors in a public realm to judgment as an autonomous faculty of the life of the mind, "the faculty
through which privileged spectators can recover meaning from the past and thereby reconcile themselves to time and, retrospectively, to tragedy" (2000:246).

Moreover, as well as these two theories of judgment that exist in a contradictory tension, he claims that Arendt does not clarify the status of judgment in terms of two of its philosophical sources, Aristotle and Kant. According to d' Entrevès, the two philosophical sources go in opposite directions as the Aristotelian version is concerned with the particular and the Kantian version is concerned with universality and impartiality. The conclusion is that Arendt's theory of judgment has two models, "the actors - judging in order to act - and the spectator's - judging in order to cull meaning from the past - but that the philosophical sources it draws upon are somewhat at odds with each other" (2000:246).

Deutscher is concerned with developing the theme of judgment to show the ways that Arendt significantly contributes to contemporary philosophy and d' Entrevès is concerned with the shift between two modes of judgment he identifies with the vita contemplativa and the vita activa. Deutscher depicts the theory of judgment as a continuation on an earlier theme and d' Entrevès depicts it as a shift between phases. My own view of this is closer to Deutscher but for different reasons. I see the development of the theory of judgment as extending understandings of the political and political theory, by invoking the importance of conscience and spelling out the importance of thinking, willing and especially judging to phenomenological understandings of the political, by highlighting this conversation we have with ourselves when we are not in the company of others as opposed to withdrawing from them permanently.

"Thinking, willing and judging, guide Arendt toward some reflections that appear philosophical but that in fact dismantle philosophy as well as politics itself, reflections that lay out a new, and specifically Arendtian, approach to freedom (Kristeva, 2001: 172). I agree with Kristeva in considering the importance of Arendt's specifically political contribution to highlighting the difference between the two disciplines. Arendt's "life of the mind" carried out her own "dismantling of metaphysics, but she also transmitted it into the "new world" - the political world, the technological world, and the English world" (Kristeva, 2001: 186-87). Deutscher says Arendt develops a post-metaphysics that is historically informed. Whilst this is so, it is more than this, it is also politically informed in ways not significantly drawn out in Deutscher's reading.

**Between Political Theory and Post-Metaphysics**

A central concern to Arendt was the relationship between thought and action and politics and philosophy. "Only by way of political theory did she eventually find her way back to philosophy proper" (Canovan, 1992: 253). In the final paragraph of Young-Bruehl's 'Reflections on Hannah Arendt's The Life of the Mind', Young-Bruehl reminds us that Arendt strongly maintained that philosophers who abstained from politics or thought philosophy should rule politics with standards and truths, could never provide important political understanding. "When she turned at the end of her life to philosophy, to what she called remembering her university studies with Heidegger, Husserl and Jaspers, "my first amour," she did not abandon her criticism. What she did, in The Life of the Mind, was to show how a philosophical investigation
of the Mind can offer political theory a portrait of the thinking, willing and judging faculties in their freedom" (1982a: 303).

A key aspect of Deutscher's reading of Arendt and of Arendt's reception more generally is the way in which Arendt's political theory is appropriated as philosophy and as a way of extending philosophy, bringing new insights into post-metaphysical philosophy that deny the political insights from the discipline of political theory into the discipline of philosophy. It is a historical fact that phenomenology and existentialism are both outsiders to metaphysics and philosophy. It is also a fact that Arendt is considered outside the established received understandings of what constitutes legitimate contemporary political theory.

According to Benhabib (2000), Arendt uses two methodologies for treating tradition and the past: the phenomenological method from Heidegger and Husserl and a fragmentary methodology from Walter Benjamin where the past is understood in terms of collecting or pearl diving. Benhabib argues that we need to follow the latter method for Arendt's political theory but I don't agree. The phenomenological aspects of Arendt's examination of the faculties of the life of the mind gives us a way of rethinking philosophy as a discipline via insights from political theory (2000: 172-173). For Benhabib, Arendt's reflections on judgment facilitate between judgment understood as a moral faculty that guides action to a retrospective judgment guiding the spectator or storyteller. Moreover, she argues that "there is an even deeper philosophical perplexity about judgment in her work" (2000: 175) concerning her bringing together of Aristotle's understanding of judgment as an aspect of phronesis with the Kantian understanding of judgment as a faculty of enlarged mentality (2000: 175). In Lectures on Kant, Second Session, Arendt notes that Kant's Critique of Judgment deals with particulars of which Kant identifies two types. The particular, whether a fact of nature or historical event. The faculty of judgment is the faculty of man's mind that deals with them and the insight that sociability is the condition for this faculty to function, "That is, the insight that men are dependent on their fellow men not only because of their having a body and physical needs but precisely for their mental faculties - these topics, all of them of eminent political significance, that is - important for the political" (Arendt, 1982: 14).

McGowan argues that The Life of the Mind represents for Arendt a turn from political philosophy to philosophy proper, as the question What is thinking? is proper to this discipline (1998: 98). This rather misses Arendt's point that thinking is not the activity of the few as oppose to the many, and that the containment of thinking to 'professional thinkers' is not enough to avert us from the thoughtlessness of evil, which may be perpetuated regardless of how 'stupid' or 'intelligent' a person is. Finally, he suggests that the status of The Life of the Mind is unclear in terms of its relationship to the rest of Arendt's political thought. McGowan wonders whether this work should be considered as the philosophical underpinnings of her political works, suggesting Arendt seemed to indicate this although it is hard to know considering her untimely death before developing her ideas fully. Alternatively, the view that this work signals a retreat to philosophy in an attempt to locate surety in thought even though there has been an adamant defence of the contingencies of action? "I am somewhat sympathetic to the view that the last, philosophical works blunt that strong Arendtian insistence on what is at stake in and what can be accomplished only through politics by suggesting that similar results can be achieved through thinking, which is not fully
intersubjective and public the way Arendtian politics is (1998:99), although his own view takes a different turn. Because the tradition views evil radically different to Arendt, McGowan sees the continuity "between Arendt's political theory (which, in my view, is developed as an envisioned alternative to the evils of totalitarianism) and her philosophical mediation (which might be seen as exploring how the philosophical tradition must be revised to take adequate account of the fact of evil" (1998: 99).

Conclusion

This paper seeks to commemorate thirty years of the publication of Hannah Arendt's *The Life of the Mind* (1978) by examining key aspects of Deutscher's *Judgment After Arendt* (2007), the first full length study of Arendt's important text. Deutscher has sought to demonstrate the ways that Arendt's *The Life of the Mind* makes significant contributions to the contemporary discipline of philosophy beyond calls that philosophy has come to an end. He describes Arendt's *The Life of the Mind* as a post-metaphysical engagement that revitalises philosophy by challenging key aspects of dualism and reductive materialism. The paper suggests that, in fact, Arendt was a political theorist who engaged with the discipline of philosophy to highlight its continuing shortcomings in understanding the political relevance of political theory to the discipline of philosophy. Unlike many positions in philosophy that understand the business of thinking, willing and judging as the right of the few, Arendt makes the political claim that these important mental facilities are important for everybody to exercise. Thoughtlessness, rather than stupidity or wickedness, is a political and philosophical issue of major significance, particularly when articulated behind the backdrop of the Eichmann trail and the events of World War II. Overall, Arendt's *The Life of the Mind* (1978) contributes important insights to both the disciplines of philosophy and political theory, and is a crucial contribution to understanding the importance of political insights for the discipline of philosophy.
References


