

IDS

EVIDENCE REPORT

No 150

Reducing Hunger and Undernutrition

The Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI 2014)

Measuring the Political Commitment to Reduce Hunger and
Undernutrition in Developing Countries

Dolf J.H. te Lintelo and Rajith W.D. Lakshman

September 2015

The IDS programme on Strengthening Evidence-based Policy works across seven key themes. Each theme works with partner institutions to co-construct policy-relevant knowledge and engage in policy-influencing processes. This material has been developed under the Reducing Hunger and Undernutrition theme.

The material has been funded by UK aid from the UK Government, however the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK Government's official policies.

AG Level 2 Output ID: 30



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First published by the Institute of Development Studies in September 2015
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Acknowledgements

This report has been produced thanks to funding by Irish Aid from the Government of Ireland and by UK Aid from the UK Government. The views expressed in the report are the authors'; they do not necessarily reflect funders' policies.

The DFID-funded IDS programme on Strengthening Evidence-based Policy works across seven key themes. Each theme works with partner institutions to co-construct policy-relevant knowledge and engage in policy-influencing processes. This material has been developed under the Reducing Hunger and Undernutrition theme.

The authors would like to warmly thank Nicholas Nisbett for insightful and constructive feedback reviewing this report, and Maria Fe Celi Reyna and Woody Wong Espejo for providing competent research assistance at various stages of the project.

Abbreviations

| | |
|-------|---|
| DHS | Demographic and Health Survey |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| GHI | Global Hunger Index |
| HANCI | Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index |
| HRCI | Hunger Reduction Commitment Index |
| ICMBS | International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |
| IFPRI | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| MICS | Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey |
| NCI | Nutrition Commitment Index |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| RTF | right to food |
| SBM | Swachh Bharat Mission |
| SUN | Scaling Up Nutrition |
| WFS | World Food Summit |
| WHA | World Health Assembly |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

Executive summary

What is the HANCI?

This report presents the Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI) 2014. It seeks to:

1. Rank governments on their political commitment to tackling hunger and undernutrition;
2. Measure what governments achieve and where they fail in addressing hunger and undernutrition – providing greater transparency and public accountability;
3. Praise governments where due, and highlight areas for improvement;
4. Support civil society to reinforce and stimulate additional commitment towards accelerating the reduction of hunger and undernutrition;
5. Assess whether improving commitment levels leads to a reduction in hunger and undernutrition.

The report builds on the HANCI 2012 and the HANCI 2013 (launched in 2014) by incorporating new data collated for the period January to December 2014.

Why measure political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition?

Despite progress, globally, levels of hunger and undernutrition remain unacceptably high.

Hunger and undernutrition remain persistent global development challenges. A total of 795 million people in 2014–16, or around one in nine people in the world, are estimated to be suffering from chronic hunger, regularly not getting enough food to conduct an active life (FAO, IFAD and WFP 2015). Undernutrition contributed to 45 per cent or 3.1 million deaths of children under five in 2011 (Black *et al.* 2013) and it has far reaching, largely irreversible effects on the surviving children (Haddad 2013). Despite this bleak picture, some progress is being made. The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 1c target of halving the chronically undernourished's share of the world's population by the end of 2015 has been almost met (FAO *et al.* 2015). And many countries are making good progress in improving nutrition outcomes. Yet the world at large is not on course to achieve World Health Assembly (WHA) undernutrition targets (IFPRI 2014). Globally, scant progress has been made in decreasing rates for anaemia, low birth weight, wasting in children under age five, and overweight in children under age five. Progress in increasing exclusive breastfeeding rates has been inadequate also. More progress has been made in reducing stunting rates in children under five (IFPRI 2014).

Measuring commitment enables evidence-based policy advocacy to generate high levels of political commitment required to fight against hunger and malnutrition

There are many reasons for insufficient progress in reducing hunger and undernutrition. One of these is a 'lack of political will' or political prioritisation (FAO, WFP and IFAD 2012: 22; Smith and Haddad 2015). Political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition would be shown by purposeful and decisive public action, through public policies and programmes, public spending and legislation that is designed to tackle these twin problems, drawing on newly gained wealth. By measuring such efforts, and by working closely with in-country

partners in selected high-burden countries, HANCI supports civil society groups to achieve greater accountability on hunger and undernutrition.

The research methodology

The HANCI compares **45 developing countries** for their performance on **22 indicators of political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition**. It looks at three areas of government action: legal frameworks; policies and programmes; and public expenditures. The HANCI draws on secondary data (owned by governments) and situates levels of political commitment within specific country contexts, such as their levels of wealth and economic growth, government effectiveness and, not least, their hunger and undernutrition statuses. By separately analysing nutrition commitment and hunger reduction commitment HANCI identifies how governments prioritise action on hunger and/or undernutrition.

Key findings for the HANCI 2014

HANCI 2014 has a new leader: Peru. Peru shows the highest level of political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition as compared to 44 other high-burden countries. **Peru overtakes Guatemala** – the number one ranked country in HANCI 2013 and in HANCI 2012. Malawi is ranked number three.

Guinea-Bissau, Sudan and Angola are at the bottom of the rankings.

Peru secures the number one position on the HANCI by unseating Guatemala, which was number one in 2012 and 2013. Peru's achievement owes much to its consistent improvement in relative performance on the Nutrition Commitment Index (NCI) sub-index.

Competition for HANCI's top spot is very tight. In HANCI 2012 Guatemala's scores were substantially higher than those of the other top five countries. This gap declined in HANCI 2013 and Peru has now overtaken Guatemala. As the top three ranked countries are separated by one Borda point from each other, the race for the top spot is as tight as possible.

Top-ranked countries in HANCI continue to strengthen much needed efforts to address hunger and nutrition. This is very good news. While, theoretically, countries could have maintained top rankings without making further efforts to address hunger and nutrition, this is not the case.

Worryingly, countries that were at the bottom of the HANCI 2013 ranking continue to languish at the bottom in 2014, despite modest progress on selected indicators; **for example, Guinea-Bissau, Sudan and Angola.**

South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon show the biggest upward leaps in HANCI rankings, Tanzania the sharpest drop.

Sustaining and accelerating India's growing political commitment will be key to tackling disproportionate numbers of undernourished children.

Political commitment is faltering in Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation and biggest economy.

Some low-ranked countries demonstrate a clear improvement in commitment (relative to others). In addition to South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon, DR Congo, Mali, Kenya and Philippines moved up five or more HANCI ranks in 2014. In all of these cases, this is underpinned by absolute improvements on at least five indicators.

Understanding political commitment in context

The HANCI is calculated using political commitment indicators only. Yet commitment must be understood within context, taking account of variables such as hunger and undernutrition, wealth and governance effectiveness. This process of ‘decoupling and recoupling’ commitment levels from outcomes and context variables enhances HANCI’s diagnostic relevance for policymakers and civil society. As in HANCI 2012 and HANCI 2013 this entailed organising countries into four groupings expressing commitment levels (high; moderate; low; very low) relative to the other countries in the rankings. The HANCI 2014 highlights:

- Significantly, within areas of high and growing hunger and undernutrition prevalence, some countries are clearly showing much greater political commitment to addressing these problems than others. In sub-Saharan Africa for instance, some of the smaller economic powers such as Madagascar and Malawi continue leading the charge against hunger and undernutrition. In South Asia, Nepal continues to lead and India is making good progress catching up. Pakistan, however, is receding in HANCI ranks.¹ The three Latin American countries in the HANCI are all in the top five.
- Worryingly, many countries where more than 40 per cent of children under five years of age are severely or moderately stunted show low to very low levels of political commitment, for instance, Cambodia, Pakistan and Nigeria.
- Countries showing relatively high commitment are found in diverse wealth groups. Malawi, Madagascar and Nepal all show that low mean wealth is not necessarily an impediment for taking highly committed action on hunger and undernutrition.
- Yet countries in the highest wealth group (>US\$3,500 per year per capita) are more likely to undertake committed action than those who are less well off. Encouragingly, greater commitment is now being recorded among some middle-income countries that were lagging, such as India. New survey data are also closing an important evidence gap to suggest that stunting rates have fallen fast over the last decade (Ministry of Women and Child Development, India, and UNICEF India, 2014; as cited in von Grebmer *et al.* 2014). Yet due to sheer population size India continues to be the country with the highest number of stunted children in the world.
- However, important exceptions occur. Despite sound economic growth, some (newly qualified) lower middle-income countries such as Nigeria, Pakistan and Zambia are showing weaker performance on commitment indicators in HANCI 2014 than in HANCI 2013.
- The relative commitment to hunger reduction does not predict the relative commitment to nutrition. For instance, the Gambia ranks 36th on the Hunger Reduction Commitment Index (HRCI) and 1st on NCI and China shows a reverse picture, ranking 2nd on HRCI and 41st on NCI.

¹ The May 2015 announcement of a new National Vision for Coordinated Priority Actions to Address Challenges of Reproductive, Maternal, Newborn, Child Health and Nutrition has not been incorporated in the analysis in this report.

1 Introduction

Hunger and undernutrition remain persistent global development challenges. A total of 795 million people in 2014–16, or around one in nine people in the world, were estimated to be suffering from chronic hunger, regularly not getting enough food to conduct an active life (FAO *et al.* 2015). The region with the largest number of undernourished children (276 million) is South Asia (FAO 2015). Despite this bleak picture, some progress has been made. In relation to hunger for example, the MDG 1c target of halving the chronically undernourished's share of the world's population by the end of 2015 as compared to 1990 has been almost met, even though the more stringent 1996 World Food Summit (WFS) target of halving the absolute number of undernourished people is not achievable (FAO *et al.* 2015). So far 72 out of 129 monitored developing countries have already achieved the MDG target on hunger and 29 of these have done even better by achieving the WFS target (FAO *et al.* 2015). Critics, however, point out that this progress is chiefly the result of revisions in the FAO methodology for measuring hunger in 2012, and that current estimates seriously underestimate the number of hungry people (Pogge 2013).

Undernutrition contributed to 45 per cent or 3.1 million deaths of children under five in 2011 (Black *et al.* 2013) and it has far reaching, largely irreversible effects on the surviving children (Haddad 2013). Globally, scant progress is made in decreasing rates for anaemia, low birth weight, wasting in children under age five, and overweight in children under age five. Progress in increasing exclusive breastfeeding rates has been inadequate also. More progress has been made in reducing stunting rates in children under five, yet, many countries continue to report high or very high child stunting prevalence rates, of 30 per cent or more. In India, for example, preliminary data suggest that stunting rates have declined from 47.9 per cent to 38.8 per cent in less than a decade (IFPRI 2014). Similarly, under-five stunting rates in Tanzania have declined from 42 per cent in 2010 to 34.7 per cent in 2014 (United Republic of Tanzania 2014). While many countries are making good progress in improving nutrition outcomes, the world at large is not on course to achieve World Health Assembly (WHA) undernutrition targets (IFPRI 2014).

There are many reasons² for insufficient progress in reducing hunger and undernutrition. One of these is a 'lack of political will' or political prioritisation (FAO *et al.* 2012: 22). Political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition would be shown by purposeful and decisive public action, through legislation, public policies and programmes and public spending that are designed to tackle these twin problems.

The HANCI's objective is to develop a credible measure of the commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition to help focus support and pressure for change, because the measurement of hunger and nutrition outcomes alone is not a sufficiently strong accountability mechanism. The theory of change behind the HANCI aims is that: (a) by credibly measuring commitment it will strengthen our ability to hold governments to account for their efforts in reducing undernutrition and hunger; (b) if civil society is better able to hold governments to account, it can apply pressure and ensure that hunger and undernutrition are put high on development agendas; (c) governments can hold themselves to account in their efforts to keep hunger and

² The Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition (cited in FAO *et al.* 2012) identifies the following causes of hunger and malnutrition: 'lack of good governance to ensure transparency, accountability and rule of law, which underpin access to food and higher living standards; lack of high-level political commitment and prioritization of the fight against hunger and malnutrition, including failure to fully implement past pledges and commitments and lack of accountability; lack of coherence in policymaking within countries, but also globally and regionally; lack of prioritisation of policies, plans, programmes and funding to tackle hunger, malnutrition and food insecurity, focusing in particular on the most vulnerable and food insecure populations; war, conflict, lack of security, political instability and weak institutions; and weak international governance of food security and nutrition'.

undernutrition high on the agenda: the index can help them to track and prioritise their efforts because the index is constructed on the basis of performance in different areas (legal, policy and spending); and (d) commitment can be linked to outcomes, to allow all to assess the ‘value added’ of different commitments and effort.

The HANCI is unique in two respects. First, its methodological insistence on decoupling the measurement of political commitment from outcomes (levels of hunger and undernutrition) distinguishes it from other food security metrics and scorecards, such as the Global Hunger Index (von Grebmer *et al.* 2013), the Global Food Security Index (EIU 2013), SUN (Scaling Up Nutrition) country analyses (SUN 2013) and the World Health Organization’s Global Landscape Analyses (WHO 2015b). Second, the HANCI presents composite as well as separate analyses of the political commitment to hunger reduction (using ten distinct indicators) and undernutrition reduction (12 indicators).

This report builds on findings from the previous two issues of the Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index (te Lintelo, Haddad, Lakshman and Gatellier 2013; 2014). It draws on the latest available secondary data to provide an update of the ranking of the extent of government commitment to reducing hunger and undernutrition in 45 high-burden developing countries. The HANCI 2014 continues to employ 22 commitment indicators.³

Table 1.1 provides an overview of key features of HANCI 2012, HANCI 2013 and HANCI 2014.

Table 1.1 Overview of HANCI for developing countries 2012, 2013 and 2014

| Features | HANCI 2012 | HANCI 2013 | HANCI 2014 |
|---------------------------|--|------------|------------|
| Focus | Hunger commitment + Nutrition commitment | | |
| Themes | Legal frameworks Policies and programmes Public expenditures | | |
| Countries | 45 | | |
| Indicators | 22 | | |
| Aggregation of indicators | Normalised values, at theme level | | |
| Ranking scheme | Borda | | |

The remainder of the report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 recaps basic aspects of the HANCI methodology. Chapter 3 presents the HANCI country rankings, based on secondary data analysis. It is followed by a brief set of conclusions in Chapter 4.

³ Like HANCI 2013 it merges two indicators (existence of a nutrition policy/strategy/plan with the existence of time-bound nutrition targets) into one composite indicator, for analytical reasons.

2 Methodology

The HANCI is calculated using political commitment indicators, whose operationalisation references key dimensions of food availability, access, stability and utilisation, and actively seeks to address food, care-related and other non-food aspects of nutrition.

This chapter provides a quick summary overview of the methodology. Full details of conceptualisation, justifications for indicator and country selection, methodological choices regarding normalisation, weighting and ranking of the index (based on secondary data), and the methodology underpinning the primary research with experts and communities are all set out in te Lintelo *et al.* (2013).

2.1 Secondary data on political commitment

The HANCI 2014 reports on the same 45 countries as HANCI 2012 and HANCI 2013 (Table 2.1) and once more sets out how commitment levels relate to critical context variables such as hunger and undernutrition levels, wealth and governance effectiveness.

The HANCI 2014 employs the same indicators as in HANCI 2012 and HANCI 2013 (Table 2.2). The categorisation and interpretation of all indicators remain the same.

The search for new data on commitment indicators was done from January to the end of December 2014. The HANCI spreadsheet presented on www.hancindex.org provides all key data sources. However, we have not been able to provide updated data for all HANCI indicators.

As Table 2.3 shows, these HANCI indicators span multiple sectors and dimensions of food and nutrition security.⁴

It should be noted that HANCI indicators share a common limitation: they weakly express the *quality* of government efforts. Arguably, real commitment should be reflected in thorough implementation of policies and laws, and in spending that reflects value for money. Typically, such data do not exist to allow comparisons between countries. This is a problem across this whole class of commitment and governance indicators. At best, secondary data such as provided by the World Governance Indicators tell us something about the general quality of public administration in a country; accordingly, in Chapter 3 we show how countries' commitment compares to governance effectiveness.

The HANCI 2014 retains the key design principles of HANCI 2012 and HANCI 2013. It applies a subjective, theory-driven weighting scheme that allocates equal weights to:

1. Each of the two sub-indices, such that the hunger reduction commitment and nutrition commitment sub-indices each contribute 50 per cent to overall HANCI scores.
2. Each of the three policy, legal and expenditure themes (within the sub-indices and consequently in the overall HANCI). Figure 2.1 shows the allocation of indicators across these themes in the HANCI 2014.

⁴ Several indicators are not shown in the table because they are cross-cutting ('national nutrition policy or strategy with numeric time-bound nutrition targets'; 'nutrition in national development policies/strategies'; 'multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder coordination mechanism'; and 'regular national nutrition survey').

Table 2.1 HANCI 2014 countries, in alphabetical order

| | | | | |
|--------------|---------------|------------|-------------|--------------|
| Afghanistan | China | Indonesia | Myanmar | Sierra Leone |
| Angola | Congo, DR | Kenya | Nepal | South Africa |
| Bangladesh | Côte d'Ivoire | Lesotho | Niger | Sudan |
| Benin | Ethiopia | Liberia | Nigeria | Tanzania |
| Brazil | Gambia | Madagascar | Pakistan | Togo |
| Burkina Faso | Ghana | Malawi | Peru | Uganda |
| Burundi | Guatemala | Mali | Philippines | Vietnam |
| Cambodia | Guinea-Bissau | Mauritania | Rwanda | Yemen |
| Cameroon | India | Mozambique | Senegal | Zambia |

Table 2.2 HANCI indicators by theme and by type of intervention

| | Legal frameworks | Policies and programmes | Public expenditures |
|------------------------|--|---|-------------------------------------|
| Direct interventions | ICMBS in domestic law* Constitutional right to food‡ | Vitamin A coverage* Complementary feeding* | Nutrition budget* |
| Indirect interventions | Women's access to agricultural land‡ | Access to improved drinking water* Access to sanitation* Skilled birth attendance* | Public expenditures on agriculture† |
| Enabling environment | Constitutional right to social security‡ Women's economic rights‡ | Civil registration of live births‡ Status of safety nets ‡ Security of access to land† Access to agricultural extension services† Nutrition in national development policies/strategies* National nutrition plan or strategy* Multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder coordination mechanism* Time-bound nutrition targets* National nutrition survey‡ | Public expenditures on health† |

Notes: ICMBS, International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes.

*Nutrition indicators, †Hunger reduction indicators, ‡Hunger and nutrition indicators.


Table 2.3 Political commitment indicators by sector and dimension of food and nutrition security

| | Food and agriculture | Women's empowerment | Social protection | Health and nutrition environment |
|--|---|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| Availability of food and key nutrients | Public expenditures on agriculture† | Women's access to agricultural land‡ | | Nutrition budget* |
| Access to food and key nutrients | Security of access to land† Access to agricultural extension services† | Women's economic rights‡ | Constitutional right to social security‡ Constitutional right to food‡ Status of safety nets‡ | Civil registration of live births‡ Vitamin A coverage* Complementary feeding* Skilled birth attendance* |
| Utilisation of food and key nutrients | | | | Public expenditures on health† Access to water* Access to sanitation* ICMBS in domestic law* |

Notes: *Nutrition indicators, †Hunger reduction indicators, ‡Hunger and nutrition indicators.

We assume full substitutability of sub-indices and themes. Given that the HANCI uses uneven numbers of indicators for its themes, and for its two sub-indices, any weighting scheme applied at sub-index and thematic level implicitly affects the weightings attributed to the individual indicators. While we suggest a trade-off between legal frameworks, policies and programmes and public expenditures, we cannot reasonably uphold this position at the indicator level. The unequal weighting of indicators means that, for instance, within the Nutrition Commitment Index putting the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS) into law or having a nutrition budget are weighted nine times more than coverage of access to sanitation; clearly this is contestable. Nevertheless, we decided to privilege comprehensiveness over equality of weighting for indicators. That is, we do not want equal indicator weighting to drive down the number of indicators to the lowest common denominator because we want to capture the multi-dimensional nature of political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition.

Figure 2.1 The structure of the HANCI 2014 for developing countries



3 HANCI findings

The sensitivity analysis carried out in previous rounds of HANCI was repeated to show the robustness of the HANCI 2014 index. That is, rankings would not significantly alter had we decided to employ alternative design and methodological choices (see te Lintelo *et al.* 2013). As the HANCI employs a theory-driven approach to building the index, this section explores whether the index hangs together empirically, by ascertaining its internal reliability.

3.1 Internal reliability

HANCI can be considered reliable if it ranks two countries with the same level of political commitment on par with each other. In statistical terms, reliability is a measure of whether individual indicators in the HANCI produce results that are consistent with the overall HANCI.

Arguably, the most commonly used measure of internal reliability is Cronbach's alpha or the standardised version thereof. Table 3.1 tabulates standard and modified Cronbach's alphas based on the heterogeneous correlation matrix for the HANCI and its sub-indices (HRCI and NCI). The modified version is more accurate as it uses appropriate correlation types for all indicators based on their data types (see te Lintelo *et al.* 2013 for more details).

Table 3.1 Cronbach's alphas for HRCI, NCI and HANCI

| | Number of countries | Indicators | Cronbach's α | Modified Cronbach's α |
|--------------|---------------------|------------|---------------------|------------------------------|
| HANCI | 45 | 21 | 0.6457 | 0.7329 |
| HRCI | 45 | 10 | 0.5694 | 0.7254 |
| NCI | 45 | 11 | 0.5289 | 0.6438 |

The first observation to make from Table 3.1 is that the alphas for HANCI are higher than for either of its sub-indices, confirming that hunger reduction commitment and nutrition commitment are distinct (albeit related) entities.

Researchers commonly use 0.7 as a rule of thumb cut-off value when using Cronbach's alpha to determine the internal reliability within a set of indicators. Table 3.1 shows that HANCI's α value satisfies this rule even though, as te Lintelo *et al.* (2013) point out, the rule is only a guide and should not be applied rigidly. Accordingly, we conclude that HANCI works empirically, to affirm our theory-driven choice of hunger reduction commitment and nutrition commitment sub-indices.

3.2 Interpreting HANCI rankings

Before setting out the HANCI rankings, readers should be aware of the following features of the index:

- The HANCI aggregates relative (not absolute) political commitment levels. HANCI indicators are measured on ordinal, categorical and cardinal scales, and the index is therefore not able to meaningfully calculate absolute commitment levels aggregated across indicators.
- Instead, the HANCI employs the Borda scoring technique to calculate scores for the HRCI and NCI sub-indices and for the three themes that compose these (policies and programmes, spending and legal frameworks). Borda scoring respects the diversity of measurement scales and thus allows the valid calculation of aggregate scores across indicators. Resultant Borda scores are translated in rankings.

- It is important to remember that the Borda scores do not represent absolute commitment levels; they represent relative political commitment levels. For this reason also, the HANCI does not identify absolute benchmarks of commitment to be achieved.
- The HANCI compares countries' performance relative to one another. Consequently, a ranking emerges regardless of the (weak or strong) performance of countries.
- Countries that show relatively high commitment levels in the HANCI do not necessarily perform strongly on all of the composite indicators. High rankings should not be a reason to sit back and relax: often, substantial scope remains to enhance performance on selected indicators.
- Absolute commitment levels can be ascertained for all individual indicators (not aggregations) by referring to the raw data (prior to normalisation) shown in the spreadsheet in Annex A.
- Countries may improve their absolute performance on indicators, say between HANCI 2013 and HANCI 2014, yet fail to improve their rankings, when other countries' performance improvements are at least just as fast. To prevent demotivation, we suggest that wherever absolute performance on indicators improves, this should be the benchmark (not country rankings).
- Finally, commitment rankings should not be confused with hunger and nutrition outcomes.

3.3 Key findings for the HANCI 2014

HANCI 2014 has a new leader: Peru. Peru shows the highest level of political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition as compared to 44 other high-burden countries. **Peru overtakes Guatemala** – the number one ranked country in HANCI 2013 as well as HANCI 2012. Malawi is ranked number three (Table 3.2).

Guinea-Bissau, Sudan and Angola are at the bottom of the rankings.

Table 3.3 shows countries' performance in HANCI 2013 and 2014. The change in rankings give a quick impression of how well a country has done relative to others, and the Borda scores provide a relative measure of the size of their temporal differences in performance.⁵ Note that a country's performance on the HANCI over time is affected by its own as well as the other countries' baseline 2013 and 2014 performance on each indicator. To assess what efforts a particular country has made, we guide readers towards absolute scores on individual commitment indicators, see www.hancindex.org/explore-the-data. This report will highlight for selected countries commitment indicators on which absolute scores improved or deteriorated between the 2013 and 2014 issues of the HANCI.

Peru secures the number one position on the HANCI by unseating Guatemala, which topped the index in 2012 and 2013. Peru's achievement owes much to its consistent improvement in relative performance on the NCI sub-index, which ranked Peru 11th in 2012, 5th in 2013 and 1st in 2014. Compared to 2013, Peru has improved on four nutrition-related indicators in 2014: a (marginally) higher percentage of the population is estimated to have access to safe drinking water and sanitation, more births are attended by skilled health professionals and the country has adopted time-bound nutrition targets in policy.

⁵ Because a country's rankings depend not just on its own score (Borda points) but also on those of other countries, some apparent anomalies occur. For instance, we find countries that are improving in terms of Borda points but are getting lower rankings and vice versa.

Table 3.2 HRCI, NCI and HANCI scores and rankings, 2014

| | HRCI Score | NCI Score | HANCI Score | HRCI Ranks | NCI Ranks | HANCI Ranks |
|---------------|------------|-----------|-------------|------------|-----------|-------------|
| Peru | 104 | 123 | 227 | 6 | 2 | 1 |
| Guatemala | 114 | 112 | 226 | 1 | 7 | 2 |
| Malawi | 110 | 115 | 225 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Madagascar | 111 | 101 | 212 | 3 | 16 | 4 |
| Brazil | 96 | 115 | 211 | 9 | 4 | 5 |
| Philippines | 94 | 115 | 209 | 10 | 4 | 6 |
| Burkina Faso | 102 | 105 | 207 | 8 | 13 | 7 |
| Nepal | 83 | 122 | 205 | 15 | 3 | 8 |
| South Africa | 93 | 102 | 195 | 11 | 15 | 9 |
| Indonesia | 79 | 109 | 188 | 17 | 10 | 10 |
| Rwanda | 107 | 81 | 188 | 5 | 28 | 10 |
| Senegal | 75 | 111 | 186 | 20 | 8 | 12 |
| Vietnam | 92 | 94 | 186 | 12 | 20 | 12 |
| Bangladesh | 75 | 110 | 185 | 20 | 9 | 14 |
| Gambia | 53 | 132 | 185 | 36 | 1 | 14 |
| Mali | 73 | 108 | 181 | 23 | 11 | 16 |
| Ghana | 79 | 100 | 179 | 17 | 17 | 17 |
| India | 103 | 76 | 179 | 7 | 30 | 17 |
| Tanzania | 64 | 108 | 172 | 30 | 11 | 19 |
| Kenya | 75 | 96 | 171 | 20 | 19 | 20 |
| Benin | 76 | 94 | 170 | 19 | 20 | 21 |
| Uganda | 65 | 100 | 165 | 29 | 17 | 22 |
| Niger | 70 | 91 | 161 | 24 | 22 | 23 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 52 | 105 | 157 | 37 | 13 | 24 |
| Ethiopia | 89 | 68 | 157 | 14 | 31 | 24 |
| Sierra Leone | 68 | 83 | 151 | 26 | 25 | 26 |
| China | 112 | 38 | 150 | 2 | 41 | 27 |
| Mozambique | 56 | 87 | 143 | 33 | 23 | 28 |
| Cameroon | 61 | 79 | 140 | 32 | 29 | 29 |
| Pakistan | 55 | 83 | 138 | 34 | 25 | 30 |
| Zambia | 51 | 87 | 138 | 38 | 23 | 30 |
| Cambodia | 67 | 66 | 133 | 27 | 32 | 32 |
| Liberia | 91 | 40 | 131 | 13 | 40 | 33 |
| Congo, DR | 67 | 57 | 124 | 27 | 35 | 34 |
| Togo | 80 | 35 | 115 | 16 | 42 | 35 |
| Mauritania | 54 | 55 | 109 | 35 | 36 | 36 |
| Burundi | 62 | 43 | 105 | 31 | 39 | 37 |
| Afghanistan | 18 | 82 | 100 | 45 | 27 | 38 |
| Lesotho | 69 | 29 | 98 | 25 | 44 | 39 |
| Nigeria | 35 | 58 | 93 | 42 | 34 | 40 |
| Myanmar | 36 | 52 | 88 | 41 | 37 | 41 |
| Yemen | 23 | 64 | 87 | 43 | 33 | 42 |
| Angola | 49 | 24 | 73 | 39 | 45 | 43 |
| Sudan | 39 | 33 | 72 | 40 | 43 | 44 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 19 | 47 | 66 | 44 | 38 | 45 |

Table 3.3 Temporal changes in relative scores and ranks, and absolute scores for indicators, by country, 2013–2014

| | Change in Borda score (2014–2013) | | | Change in ranks (2013–2014) | | | Indicators with no change in score | Indicators with absolute score declines (1) | Indicators with absolute score increases (2) | (2)–(1) |
|---------------|-----------------------------------|------|-----|-----------------------------|------|-----|------------------------------------|---|--|---------|
| | HANCI | HRCI | NCI | HANCI | HRCI | NCI | | | | |
| Afghanistan | -4 | 4 | -8 | 1 | 0 | -7 | 15 | 1 | 6 | 5 |
| Angola | -20 | -5 | -15 | -1 | -4 | -3 | 14 | 5 | 3 | -2 |
| Bangladesh | 8 | 10 | -2 | 2 | 7 | -1 | 14 | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| Benin | 8 | 14 | -6 | 0 | 10 | -6 | 15 | 2 | 5 | 3 |
| Brazil | 0 | -5 | 5 | -1 | -2 | 5 | 14 | 3 | 5 | 2 |
| Burkina Faso | 13 | 3 | 10 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 16 | 2 | 4 | 2 |
| Burundi | -24 | 3 | -27 | -5 | 1 | -8 | 12 | 6 | 4 | -2 |
| Cambodia | -22 | -4 | -18 | -6 | -2 | -8 | 15 | 3 | 4 | 1 |
| Cameroon | 32 | 26 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 14 | 3 | 5 | 2 |
| China | -13 | 6 | -19 | -7 | 0 | -4 | 15 | 2 | 5 | 3 |
| Congo, DR | 30 | 15 | 15 | 7 | 10 | 6 | 13 | 0 | 9 | 9 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 34 | 11 | 23 | 9 | 3 | 12 | 13 | 3 | 6 | 3 |
| Ethiopia | -4 | 1 | -5 | -2 | 0 | -2 | 14 | 3 | 5 | 2 |
| Gambia | -10 | -8 | -2 | -6 | -5 | 0 | 14 | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| Ghana | -14 | -13 | -1 | -7 | -5 | -4 | 16 | 2 | 4 | 2 |
| Guatemala | -1 | 6 | -7 | -1 | 0 | -4 | 15 | 1 | 6 | 5 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 14 | 3 | 5 | 2 |
| India | 10 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 3 | -2 | 12 | 3 | 7 | 4 |
| Indonesia | -2 | 3 | -5 | 2 | 5 | -3 | 12 | 2 | 8 | 6 |
| Kenya | 23 | 3 | 20 | 7 | 3 | 7 | 13 | 4 | 5 | 1 |
| Lesotho | -15 | -18 | 3 | -4 | -9 | 0 | 13 | 3 | 6 | 3 |
| Liberia | -3 | 8 | -11 | -2 | 5 | -2 | 12 | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| Madagascar | 3 | 5 | -2 | 1 | -1 | -5 | 13 | 3 | 6 | 3 |
| Malawi | 11 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 16 | 4 | 2 | -2 |
| Mali | 24 | -17 | 41 | 8 | -10 | 22 | 12 | 2 | 8 | 6 |
| Mauritania | -1 | -8 | 7 | 1 | -6 | 3 | 12 | 7 | 3 | -4 |
| Mozambique | -13 | -2 | -11 | -3 | 1 | -8 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 0 |
| Myanmar | 3 | 9 | -6 | 2 | 2 | -1 | 13 | 3 | 6 | 3 |
| Nepal | 3 | 4 | -1 | -2 | 4 | -1 | 15 | 1 | 6 | 5 |
| Niger | 1 | -2 | 3 | 0 | -1 | -1 | 14 | 5 | 3 | -2 |
| Nigeria | -27 | -16 | -11 | -6 | -3 | -2 | 12 | 7 | 3 | -4 |
| Pakistan | -9 | 3 | -12 | -2 | 3 | -8 | 15 | 3 | 4 | 1 |
| Peru | 6 | -2 | 8 | 1 | -4 | 3 | 14 | 2 | 6 | 4 |
| Philippines | 18 | 6 | 12 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 12 | 4 | 6 | 2 |
| Rwanda | -2 | 2 | -4 | 2 | 1 | -5 | 14 | 3 | 5 | 2 |
| Senegal | 2 | -18 | 20 | 2 | -9 | 11 | 10 | 6 | 6 | 0 |
| Sierra Leone | 5 | 9 | -4 | 3 | 6 | -3 | 14 | 2 | 6 | 4 |
| South Africa | 25 | -13 | 38 | 9 | -9 | 20 | 14 | 3 | 5 | 2 |
| Sudan | -7 | -15 | 8 | 0 | -5 | 2 | 14 | 1 | 7 | 6 |
| Tanzania | -24 | -14 | -10 | -12 | -10 | -7 | 14 | 5 | 3 | -2 |
| Togo | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 14 | 3 | 5 | 2 |
| Uganda | -8 | -2 | -6 | -5 | -3 | -7 | 14 | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| Vietnam | 4 | 8 | -4 | 3 | 5 | -5 | 17 | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| Yemen | -8 | -7 | -1 | -2 | -1 | 1 | 15 | 2 | 5 | 3 |
| Zambia | -1 | -13 | 12 | 0 | -10 | 4 | 14 | 4 | 4 | 0 |

Note: Green (or light grey if reading in black and white) highlight significant improvement of more than or equal to 15 Borda points or more than or equal to five HANCI, HRCI or NCI ranks. Significant declines are highlighted in red (or dark grey if reading in black and white).

In recent years, Peru has enjoyed rapid economic growth, which has enhanced the nutrition status in Peru (Humphries *et al.* 2014). Yet, it has done so unequally across population, income and ethnic groups. For instance, while stunting rates among the middle-income group improved substantially, this was not the case amongst the poorest and second poorest quintiles (Bredenkamp, Buisman and Van de Poel 2014: Figure 5). Specific endeavours may hence be required to equitably⁶ enhance hunger and nutrition outcomes.

Competition for HANCI's top spot is very tight. In the HANCI 2012 Guatemala's scores were substantially higher than those of the other top five countries. This gap declined in HANCI 2013 and Peru has now overtaken Guatemala. As the top three ranked countries are separated by one Borda point from each other, the race for the top spot is as tight as possible.

Top-ranked countries in HANCI continue to strengthen much needed efforts to address hunger and nutrition. This is very good news. While theoretically, countries could have maintained top rankings without making further efforts to address hunger and nutrition, this is not the case.

Among the top five countries, three reported net improvements on HRCI indicators: Peru (2–1=1), Guatemala (3–0=3), and Madagascar (2–1=1). In these countries, the number of HRCI indicators on which absolute improvements were reported exceeds the number on which declines were reported. So for instance, in case of hunger reduction efforts, public spending on health in Peru increased from 15 per cent in 2013 to 18 per cent in 2014 and access to agriculture extension services improved.⁷

The performance of top runners on nutrition commitment indicators is also encouraging. Looking across all 12 NCI indicators, Peru saw a net improvement on one indicator (2 improved - 1 worsened indicator). Guatemala (2–1=1), Madagascar (4–1=3) and Brazil (3–1=2) all recorded net improvements within the sub-index. Among top five HANCI countries only Malawi declined on more NCI indicators than it improved on.

Worryingly, countries that were at the bottom of the HANCI 2013 ranking continue to languish at the bottom in 2014; for example, Guinea-Bissau, Sudan and Angola.

Guinea-Bissau made some progress on four indicators including on multi-stakeholder coordination and on the constitutional right to food, but these gains were not enough to counter weakening performance on vitamin A coverage and security of access to land. Sudan improved on seven indicators, but just two of them substantially – access to skilled birth attendance increased to 74.3 per cent from 55.9 per cent in 2013 and more ICMBBS clauses have been enshrined in domestic law, while it saw a rapid reduction in public spending on agriculture. In Angola, positive change on some indicators albeit from a low threshold may generate some positive outcomes domestically. However the pace of change is too slow to allow the country to catch up with commitment levels demonstrated by other high-burden countries. As a consequence, *these countries are increasingly getting left behind.*

South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon show the biggest upward leaps in HANCI rankings, Tanzania the sharpest drop.

⁶ HANCI is currently not able to assess the equity of nutrition interventions.

⁷ Only on one HRCI indicator, civil registration of live births, declined during the period and this decline was by a very small margin. Peru's dropping four places from 2nd in 2013 to 6th in 2014 on the HRCI sub-index is hence largely the result of other countries performing better on the sub-index, not because Peru's performance on indicators declined.

Table 3.3 also highlights that over the 2013–14 period South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon made the biggest leaps forward in relative commitment (9 HANCI ranks), while Tanzania showed the biggest drop (12 HANCI ranks).

South Africa's nutrition commitment rankings rose sharply (19 NCI ranks) because South Africa introduced time-bound nutrition targets, strengthened the ICMBS in domestic law, and marginally enhanced access to safe drinking water and sanitation. However, the country also reduced public spending on agriculture, and civil registration coverage weakened; as a consequence the country slipped ten ranks on the Hunger Reduction Commitment sub-index. Cameroon's climbing in HANCI rankings was driven by investments in public spending on agriculture and in women's improved access to agricultural land. Since HANCI 2013, Côte d'Ivoire, has enshrined ICMBS in local laws, put in place time-bound nutrition targets, and has increased spending on health.

Tanzania dropped 12 ranks in HANCI, from 7th to 19th in 2014. These findings may appear counterintuitive given recent reports on the stunting reduction rates (United Republic of Tanzania 2015), possibly driven by increased investment in nutrition (Haddad 2015). Annual government budgets for nutrition have increased from US\$12.5m in 2010/11 to US\$21.3m in 2012/13 (United Republic of Tanzania 2014: 19). However, it should be noted that more than three-quarters (77.7 per cent) of these budgets are provided by donors and that the growth in donor spending exceeds growth in government spending on nutrition (United Republic of Tanzania 2014: 19). While HANCI is unable to include an indicator on government nutrition spending, we find that public spending on health (which includes nutrition) in Tanzania had declined from 11.1 per cent in HANCI 2013 to 10.3 per cent in 2014. Moreover, public spending on agriculture has declined from 7.7 per cent in 2009 to 3.7 per cent of government spending in 2013 (www.resakss.org/map). Performance on three other indicators has also weakened: access to agriculture extension services; coverage of vitamin A supplementation; and access to clean drinking water. These factors explain Tanzania's slipping down the HANCI rankings.

Sustaining and accelerating India's growing political commitment will be key to tackling disproportionate numbers of undernourished children.

India continues to climb HANCI ranks. It was ranked 25th in HANCI 2012, 19th in HANCI 2013 and 17th in this year's edition. Over the last year it has strengthened public spending on health; secure access to land;⁸ civil registration coverage and access to sanitation. While India produces enough food to meet the average calorie requirements of its population (FAO 2015), access to food, including to the food assistance programmes, is unevenly distributed across states – as are wider health and nutrition outcomes (Dreze and Sen 2013). Despite strong economic growth, India continues to be the country with the highest number of stunted children in the world. New survey data, which are also closing an important evidence gap, however, show that stunting rates have fallen over the last decade (Ministry of Women and Child Development, India and UNICEF India, 2014, as cited in von Grebmer *et al.* 2014). India elected a new government in 2014 and so it will be important to see how these gains can be locked in – sustaining and accelerating political commitment will be an important factor in further driving down undernutrition and hunger in India. India's national sanitation programme, the Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM), has a bold vision of an open-defecation-free rural India by 2019 (Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation, GoI 2015). The success of this mission will be critical as there is strong evidence that undernutrition in India is related, in part, to poor sanitation and widespread open defecation (Chambers and Von Medeazza 2013), with 53 per cent of India's population defecating in the open (Government of India 2012, as cited in Chambers and Von Medeazza 2013). But spending on health remains low

⁸ Government of India health spending somewhat recovered after a severe cut in the previous year but not to previous spending levels. Also note that the current debate about the Land Bill is not reflected in the data used calculating the secure tenure indicator.

and is fragile to cuts – it will be useful to return to the Indian example in future HANCI rankings.

Political commitment is faltering in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous nation and biggest economy.

Despite having achieved the MDG 1c target of halving the proportion of hungry people by 2015 (FAO *et al.* 2015), HANCI analysis shows that Nigeria’s political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition is faltering. Nigeria has dramatically dropped in the global rankings, and is now situated among the bottom ten HANCI countries. Although the country is facing a Boko Haram insurgency in the north-east, it continues to benefit from rapid economic growth. Over the last decade annual growth rates amounted to 6.8 per cent. However, while the country’s economy is slowly diversifying (IMF 2015), it remains strongly dependent on the oil sector (Playfoot, Andrews and Augustus 2015). Often viewed as ‘resource cursed’, Nigeria has struggled to achieve the economic and social progress these abundant natural resources might afford. We find that Nigeria has consistently lowered its public spending on agriculture since 2008 (www.resakss.org/map). In 2013, the most recent year for which data is available, it spent only 2 per cent of its budget on agriculture, which is far below its Maputo pledge of 10 per cent. Moreover, Nigeria has also been cutting public spending on health as a percentage of total budget since 2007 (WHO 2015a) and vitamin A coverage rates for children have declined. On the other hand, Nigeria has promoted private investment and industrialisation in agricultural and food systems through an Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA) (Robinson and Humphrey 2014). While these reforms may be positively affecting food security (FAO *et al.* 2015), they run the risk of neglecting nutrition, which in the case of Nigeria is the priority area (Robinson and Humphrey 2014). Despite the serious challenges ahead, 2015’s first peaceful democratic transition of power in post-independence Nigeria has generated a sense of optimism, and the new president, Mr Buhari, has promised to address Nigeria’s development challenges. The change in leadership hence offers an opportunity to strengthen Nigeria’s political commitment to hunger and nutrition.

Some low-ranked countries demonstrate a clear improvement of commitment (relative to others).

In contrast to Nigeria, and in addition to South Africa, Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon, DR Congo, Mali and Kenya all moved up five or more HANCI ranks in 2014. In all of these cases, this is underpinned by absolute improvements on at least five indicators, and in the case of DR Congo even nine indicators (even though actual improvements are marginal on some indicators, e.g. water and sanitation coverage). Mali put nutrition budgets and time-bound nutrition targets in place and as a result the country records the highest improvement (22 positions) in NCI ranks. Kenya has done well by strengthening five indicators including access to agriculture extension services, time-bound nutrition targets and fully enshrining ICMBIS in domestic laws.


3.4 Understanding political commitment in context

The HANCI is calculated using political commitment indicators only. Yet commitment must be understood within context, taking account of variables such as hunger and undernutrition, wealth and governance effectiveness. This process of ‘decoupling and recoupling’ commitment levels from outcomes and context variables enhances HANCI’s diagnostic relevance for policymakers and civil society. As in HANCI 2012 and in HANCI 2013 this entailed organising countries into four groupings expressing commitment levels (high; moderate; low; very low) relative to the other countries in the rankings. This section only presents a brief narrative of findings. The keen reader is referred to Annex C for detailed graphs and tables. Here we summarise a few highlights:

- Significantly, within areas of high and growing hunger and undernutrition prevalence, some countries are clearly showing much greater political commitment to addressing these problems than others. In sub-Saharan Africa for instance, some of the smaller economic powers such as Madagascar and Malawi continue to lead the charge against hunger and undernutrition. In South Asia, Nepal continues to lead and India is making good progress catching up. Pakistan however is receding in HANCI ranks.⁹ The three Latin American countries in the HANCI are all in the top five.
- Worryingly, many countries where more than 40 per cent of children under five years of age are severely or moderately stunted show low to very low levels of political commitment, for instance, Cambodia, Pakistan and Nigeria.
- Countries showing relatively high commitment are found in diverse wealth groups. Malawi, Madagascar and Nepal all show that low mean wealth is not necessarily an impediment for taking highly committed action on hunger and undernutrition.
- Yet, countries in the highest wealth group (>US\$3,500 per year per capita) are more likely to undertake committed action than those who are less well off. Encouragingly, greater commitment is now being recorded among some middle-income countries that were lagging, such as India. New survey data are also closing an important evidence gap to suggest that stunting rates have fallen fast over the last decade (Ministry of Women and Child Development, India, and UNICEF India 2014, as cited in von Grebmer *et al.* 2014). Yet due to sheer population size India continues to be the country with the highest number of stunted children in the world.
- However, important exceptions occur. Despite sound economic growth, some (newly qualified) lower-middle-income countries such as Nigeria, Pakistan and Zambia are showing weaker performance on commitment indicators in HANCI 2014 than in HANCI 2013.
- The relative commitment to hunger reduction does not predict the relative commitment to nutrition. For instance, the Gambia ranks 36th on HRCI and 1st on NCI 1st and China shows a reverse picture, ranking 2nd on HRCI and 41st on NCI (Figure 3.1).
- When countries are grouped by commitment levels and cross-tabulated against critical context variables such as hunger (Global Hunger Index scores) and undernutrition (stunting rates) levels and trends (changes in decadal stunting rates), wealth (GNI per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted current international \$) and governance effectiveness (World Bank Group 2014), findings for the HANCI 2014 were overall strikingly similar to those for the HANCI 2012 and HANCI 2013.

⁹ The May 2015 announcement of a new National Vision for Coordinated Priority Actions to Address Challenges of Reproductive, Maternal, Newborn, Child Health and Nutrition has not been incorporated in the analysis in this report.

Figure 3.1 Country performance: hunger commitment vs nutrition commitment



The linear trend line has a slope of 0.4041 ($p = 0.005$) with an R^2 value of 0.1665.

4 Conclusions

The HANCI 2014 is the third issue of the Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index for developing countries. It measures government commitment to reducing hunger and improving nutrition because this is something governments can be held accountable for by civil society actors.

The HANCI 2014 compares 45 countries' performance over 22 indicators on public spending, policies and programmes and legal frameworks; instruments that governments can employ to enhance access, availability and utilisation of food and nutrition. The HANCI is a measure of relative political commitment. Though it cannot measure absolute levels of commitment, changes in actual performance on each of the 22 indicators enable assessments of country commitment over time.

Main findings for the HANCI 2014 include:

- Peru, followed by Guatemala, and Malawi, tops the list of 45 countries in terms of relative political commitment to addressing hunger and undernutrition.
- Guinea-Bissau, Sudan and Angola languish at the bottom of the rankings.
- Competition for the HANCI's top spot is very tight and top-ranked countries in HANCI continue to strengthen much needed efforts to address hunger and nutrition. This is very good news. While, theoretically, countries could have maintained top rankings without making further efforts to address hunger and nutrition, this is not the case.
- Several countries that are already at the bottom of the HANCI ranking, including Guinea-Bissau, Sudan and Angola, are increasingly left behind. While in some cases they do improve their performance on commitment indicators, the pace of change is too low, and other low-ranked countries are improving faster.
- South Africa, Cote d'Ivoire and Cameroon show the biggest upward leaps in HANCI rankings, Tanzania the sharpest drop in 2014.
- The top performers in relative commitment to hunger reduction in 2014 are: Guatemala, China and Madagascar; and the top performers in relative nutrition commitment are Gambia, Peru and Nepal.
- India climbs in the HANCI rankings but still has a long way to go. It will be important to see if India can lock in sustained and accelerated political commitment, to further drive down undernutrition and hunger.
- Significantly, within areas of high and growing hunger and undernutrition prevalence (as measured by Global Hunger Index scores and stunting rates), some countries are clearly showing much greater political commitment to addressing these problems than others. Among those countries with high stunting levels and with 'serious' or 'alarming' status on the Global Hunger Index, there is high variation in relative commitment levels.
- The countries showing relatively highest commitment are found in diverse wealth groups. Low wealth is not necessarily an impediment for taking committed action on hunger and undernutrition.
- Countries in the highest wealth group (>US\$3,500 per year per capita) are more likely to undertake committed action than those that are less well off, however there are some important exceptions to this trend, notably Malawi, Burkina Faso and Madagascar. Economic growth has not necessarily led to a commitment from governments to tackle hunger and undernutrition. More so, despite sound economic growth, some lower-middle-income countries such as Nigeria, Pakistan and Zambia are showing weaker performance on commitment indicators in HANCI 2014 than in 2013.
- The relative commitment to hunger reduction does not predict the relative commitment to nutrition.

Annex A HANCI raw data (22 indicators, 45 countries)

| | Government spending on agriculture | Government spending on health | Nutrition budget | Security of access to land | Access to agriculture extension services | Civil registration of live births | Status of safety nets | Vitamin A coverage |
|---------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------|----------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Afghanistan | 4.3 | 7.1 | 0.0* | 3.0 | 3.4 | 37.4 | 1.0 | 97.0 |
| Angola | 3.5 | 5.6 | 0.0* | 2.8 | 3.3 | 35.6 | 2.0 | 48.0 |
| Bangladesh | 8.9* | 7.7 | 1.0 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 30.5 | 4.0 | 97.0 |
| Benin | 6.1 | 10.3 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 4.5 | 80.2 | 4.0 | 99.0 |
| Brazil | 2.0* | 7.6 | 1.0* | 4.4 | 4.6 | 92.8 | 7.0 | 13.8 |
| Burkina Faso | 9.0 | 11.9 | 0.5 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 76.9 | 3.0 | 99.0 |
| Burundi | 4.8 | 13.7 | 0.0 | 3.8 | 3.3 | 75.2 | 3.0 | 75.0 |
| Cambodia | 4.8* | 6.7 | 0.0* | 3.6 | 3.0 | 62.1 | 3.0 | 90.0 |
| Cameroon | 6.8 | 8.5 | 0.5 | 3.5 | 4.1 | 61.4 | 4.0 | 99.0 |
| China | 8.8 | 12.5 | 0.0* | 4.2 | 4.1 | 92.8 | 5.0 | 29.0* |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 4.6 | 8.0 | 1.0 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 65.0 | 2.0 | 99.0 |
| DR Congo | 2.7 | 12.8 | 0.0 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 27.8 | 1.0 | 98.0 |
| Ethiopia | 7.8 | 11.1 | 1.0* | 4.5 | 4.0 | 6.6 | 5.0 | 79.0 |
| Gambia | 3.5 | 11.2 | 1.0 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 52.5 | 2.0* | 46.0 |
| Ghana | 3.4 | 9.7 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 62.5 | 5.0 | 96.0 |
| Guatemala | 2.3 | 19.5 | 1.0 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 96.7 | 4.0 | 13.0 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 0.8 | 7.8 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 24.1 | 1.0* | 97.0 |
| India | 6.3 | 9.4 | 0.5* | 3.8 | 4.0 | 83.6 | 5.0 | 53.0 |
| Indonesia | 0.7 | 6.9 | 1.0 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 66.6 | 6.0 | 82.0 |
| Kenya | 3.1 | 5.9 | 1.0 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 60.0 | 3.0 | 19.0 |
| Lesotho | 1.7 | 14.5 | 0.0* | 3.8 | 3.7 | 45.1 | 3.0 | 66.0 |
| Liberia | 9.1 | 19.2 | 0.0 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 24.6 | 3.0 | 88.0 |
| Madagascar | 11.9 | 12.8 | 1.0 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 83.0 | 3.0 | 94.0 |
| Malawi | 12.0 | 17.8 | 1.0 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 63.9 | 3.0 | 90.0 |
| Mali | 5.7 | 12.5 | 1.0 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 80.8 | 3.0 | 98.0 |
| Mauritania | 4.2 | 9.9 | 0.5 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 58.8 | 4.0 | 99.0 |
| Mozambique | 2.6 | 8.8 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 47.9 | 3.0 | 99.0 |
| Myanmar | 8.0* | 1.5 | 0.0 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 72.4 | 1.0 | 86.0 |
| Nepal | 6.9 | 10.4 | 1.0 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 42.3 | 2.0 | 99.0 |
| Niger | 9.7 | 10.3 | 1.0 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 63.9 | 3.0 | 96.0 |
| Nigeria | 2.0 | 6.7 | 0.0* | 3.5 | 3.3 | 29.8 | 4.0 | 70.0 |
| Pakistan | 0.6 | 4.7 | 0.0 | 3.4 | 4.1 | 33.6 | 3.0 | 99.0 |
| Peru | 1.2* | 18.3 | 1.0 | 4.4 | 3.8 | 95.6 | 5.0 | 3.1 |
| Philippines | 5.5 | 10.3 | 0.5 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 90.2 | 5.0 | 89.0 |
| Rwanda | 8.0 | 22.1 | 1.0 | 4.5 | 4.3 | 63.2 | 6.0 | 3.0 |
| Senegal | 9.2 | 9.6 | 1.0 | 3.6 | 4.2 | 73.0 | 4.0 | 99.0 |
| Sierra Leone | 6.2 | 12.3 | 1.0 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 78.0 | 3.0 | 99.0 |
| South Africa | 1.6 | 12.9 | 1.0 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 85.0 | 6.0 | 42.0 |
| Sudan | 2.6 | 10.7 | 0.0* | 3.6 | 3.7 | 59.3 | 1.0 | 83.0 |
| Tanzania | 3.7 | 10.3 | 1.0 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 16.3 | 4.0 | 92.0 |
| Togo | 7.8 | 15.4 | 0.0* | 2.5 | 3.0 | 77.9 | 3.0 | 61.0 |
| Uganda | 3.2 | 10.2 | 0.5 | 4.8 | 4.0 | 29.9 | 4.0 | 65.0 |
| Vietnam | 3.9* | 9.5 | 0.5 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 95.0 | 6.0 | 98.0 |
| Yemen | 1.1* | 4.0 | 0.0 | 4.5 | 4.0 | 17.1 | 2.0 | 87.0 |
| Zambia | 5.0 | 16.4 | 0.5 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 11.3 | 4.0 | 93.0 |

Note: * employed previous HANCI data where no updated data was available.
(Cont'd)

Annex A (cont'd)

| | Governments promote complementary feeding | Access to drinking water | Access to sanitation | Skilled birth attendance | Extent of nutrition features in national development policies/strategies | National nutrition policy, plan or strategy | Multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder coordinator mechanism |
|---------------|---|--------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|--|---|--|
| Afghanistan | 1.0* | 64.2 | 29.0 | 47.9* | 0.19* | 1.0* | 1.0* |
| Angola | 1.0* | 54.3 | 60.1 | 79.8* | 0.00* | 1.0 | 1.0* |
| Bangladesh | 1.0* | 84.8 | 57.0 | 52.5 | 0.55 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Benin | 1.0* | 76.1 | 14.3 | 83.5 | 0.23* | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Brazil | 1.0* | 97.5 | 81.3 | 98.2* | 0.24* | 1.0 | 1.0* |
| Burkina Faso | 1.0* | 81.7 | 18.6 | 94.3* | 0.10* | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Burundi | 1.0 | 75.3 | 47.5 | 98.9* | 0.04 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Cambodia | 1.0* | 71.3 | 36.8 | 89.1* | 0.46 | 1.0 | 1.0* |
| Cameroon | 1.0* | 74.1 | 45.2 | 84.7* | 0.06* | 1.0 | 0.0 |
| China | 1.0* | 91.9 | 65.3 | 95.0 | 0.00* | 1.0 | 0.0* |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 1.0* | 80.2 | 21.9 | 90.6* | 0.14 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| DR Congo | 1.0 | 46.5 | 31.4 | 88.8* | 0.28 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Ethiopia | 1.0* | 51.5 | 23.6 | 42.5* | 0.02* | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Gambia | 1.0* | 90.1 | 60.2 | 98.1* | 0.41 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Ghana | 1.0 | 87.2 | 14.4 | 96.4* | 0.14* | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Guatemala | 1.0* | 93.8 | 80.3 | 93.2* | 0.23 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 1.0* | 73.6 | 19.7 | 92.6* | 0.12* | 1.0* | 1.0 |
| India | 1.0 | 92.6 | 36.0 | 74.2* | 0.08 | 1.0 | 0.0* |
| Indonesia | 1.0 | 84.9 | 58.8 | 95.7 | 0.09* | 1.0 | 1.0* |
| Kenya | 1.0 | 61.7 | 29.6 | 91.5* | 0.08 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Lesotho | 1.0* | 81.3 | 29.6 | 91.8* | 0.20 | 1.0 | 0.0 |
| Liberia | 0.0* | 74.6 | 16.8 | 79.3* | 0.09 | 1.0* | 1.0 |
| Madagascar | 1.0* | 49.6 | 13.9 | 82.1 | 0.27* | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Malawi | 1.0* | 85.0 | 52.9* | 94.7* | 0.71 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Mali | 1.0 | 67.2 | 21.9 | 74.6 | 0.71 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Mauritania | 1.0 | 49.6 | 26.7 | 84.2 | 0.32* | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Mozambique | 1.0 | 49.2 | 21.0 | 90.6 | 0.25 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Myanmar | 1.0 | 85.7 | 77.4 | 83.1* | 0.11* | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Nepal | 1.0 | 88.1 | 36.7 | 58.3* | 0.22 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Niger | 1.0* | 52.3 | 9.0 | 82.8 | 0.31 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Nigeria | 1.0* | 64.0 | 27.8 | 60.6 | 0.03 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Pakistan | 1.0* | 91.4 | 47.6 | 73.1* | 0.09* | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Peru | 1.0* | 86.8 | 73.1 | 96.0 | 0.17* | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Philippines | 1.0* | 91.8 | 74.3 | 94.5 | 0.18* | 1.0 | 1.0* |
| Rwanda | 1.0* | 70.7 | 63.8 | 98.0* | 0.27 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Senegal | 1.0 | 74.1 | 51.9 | 94.5 | 0.32 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Sierra Leone | 1.0 | 60.1 | 13.0 | 97.1 | 0.28 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| South Africa | 1.0* | 95.1 | 74.4 | 97.1* | 0.00* | 1.0 | 0.0 |
| Sudan | 1.0* | 55.5 | 23.6 | 74.3 | 0.00* | 1.0 | 0.0* |
| Tanzania | 1.0* | 53.2 | 12.2 | 87.8* | 0.03 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Togo | 1.0 | 60.0 | 11.3 | 71.6* | 0.36* | 1.0 | 0.0 |
| Uganda | 1.0* | 74.8 | 33.9 | 93.3 | 0.16* | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Vietnam | 1.0* | 95.0 | 75.0 | 93.7 | 0.05* | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Yemen | 0.0* | 54.9 | 53.3 | 64.8* | 0.09* | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Zambia | 1.0 | 63.3 | 42.8 | 93.7* | 0.24* | 1.0 | 1.0 |

Note: *employed previous HANCI data where no updated data was available.
(Cont'd.)

Annex A (cont'd)

| Indicator | National nutrition survey | Constitutional right to food | Women's access to agricultural land | Women's economic rights | Constitutional right to social security | Enshrine ICMBBS in domestic law |
|---------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| Afghanistan | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 0.0* | 0.0* | 9.0 |
| Angola | 0.0 | 2.0 | 0.5 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 3.0 |
| Bangladesh | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 8.0 |
| Benin | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 0.0* | 9.0 |
| Brazil | 0.0* | 3.0 | 1.0 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 9.0 |
| Burkina Faso | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 9.0 |
| Burundi | 0.0 | 2.0* | 0.5 | 0.0* | 0.0* | 4.0 |
| Cambodia | 0.0 | 2.0* | 1.0 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 8.0 |
| Cameroon | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 0.0* | 0.0* | 9.0 |
| China | 0.0* | 1.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 7.0 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 8.0 |
| DR Congo | 1.0 | 3.0* | 0.5 | 0.0* | 1.0* | 8.0 |
| Ethiopia | 1.0 | 2.0* | 0.5 | 0.0* | 1.0* | 7.0 |
| Gambia | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.0 | 1.0* | 0.0* | 9.0 |
| Ghana | 1.0 | 2.0* | 0.0 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 9.0 |
| Guatemala | 0.0 | 3.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 9.0 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 1.0 | 2.0 | 0.5 | 0.0* | 0.0* | 7.0 |
| India | 1.0 | 2.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 9.0 |
| Indonesia | 1.0 | 1.0* | 1.0 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 8.0 |
| Kenya | 0.0 | 3.0* | 0.5 | 0.0* | 1.0* | 9.0 |
| Lesotho | 0.0 | 2.0* | 0.5 | 2.0* | 0.0* | 4.0 |
| Liberia | 1.0 | 2.0* | 0.5 | 2.0* | 1.0* | 5.0 |
| Madagascar | 0.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 2.0* | 1.0* | 9.0 |
| Malawi | 1.0 | 3.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 8.0 |
| Mali | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 0.0* | 1.0* | 8.0 |
| Mauritania | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 0.0* | 3.0 |
| Mozambique | 1.0 | 2.0 | 0.5 | 1.0* | 0.0* | 9.0 |
| Myanmar | 0.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 0.0* | 4.0 |
| Nepal | 1.0 | 3.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 9.0 |
| Niger | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 0.0* | 8.0 |
| Nigeria | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 0.0* | 1.0* | 8.0 |
| Pakistan | 1.0 | 2.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 9.0 |
| Peru | 1.0 | 2.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 9.0 |
| Philippines | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 9.0 |
| Rwanda | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 2.0* | 0.0* | 4.0 |
| Senegal | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 0.0* | 0.0* | 8.0 |
| Sierra Leone | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.0 | 0.0* | 1.0* | 4.0 |
| South Africa | 0.0 | 3.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 9.0 |
| Sudan | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.0 | 0.0* | 1.0* | 7.0 |
| Tanzania | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 0.0* | 1.0* | 9.0 |
| Togo | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 4.0 |
| Uganda | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 0.0* | 1.0* | 9.0 |
| Vietnam | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.5 | 1.0* | 1.0* | 8.0 |
| Yemen | 0.0* | 1.0* | 0.5 | 0.0* | 0.0* | 9.0 |
| Zambia | 1.0 | 1.0* | 0.0 | 0.0* | 0.0* | 8.0 |

Note: *employed previous HANCI data where no updated data was available.

Annex B Political commitment within context

Two principles are applied to demarcate four country groupings. First, each of the four groups contains the nearest approximation of a quarter of all Borda points that were distributed in the scoring process. As such, groups with the relatively higher commitment levels (based on aggregate Borda scores across themes and HRCI and NCI sub-indices) contain fewer countries. Second, countries with the same number of Borda points must be located in the same group. Table B.1 sets out resultant groupings.

Table B.1 Relative political commitment groupings HANCI 2014

| High commitment | HANCI Borda score | Moderate commitment | HANCI Borda score | Low commitment | HANCI Borda score | Very low commitment | HANCI Borda score |
|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| Peru | 227 | South Africa | 195 | Tanzania | 172 | Pakistan | 138 |
| Guatemala | 226 | Indonesia | 188 | Kenya | 171 | Zambia | 138 |
| Malawi | 225 | Rwanda | 188 | Benin | 170 | Cambodia | 133 |
| Madagascar | 212 | Senegal | 186 | Uganda | 165 | Liberia | 131 |
| Brazil | 211 | Vietnam | 186 | Niger | 161 | Congo, DR | 124 |
| Philippines | 209 | Bangladesh | 185 | Côte d'Ivoire | 157 | Togo | 115 |
| Burkina Faso | 207 | Gambia | 185 | Ethiopia | 157 | Mauritania | 109 |
| Nepal | 205 | Mali | 181 | Sierra Leone | 151 | Burundi | 105 |
| | | Ghana | 179 | China | 150 | Afghanistan | 100 |
| | | India | 179 | Mozambique | 143 | Lesotho | 98 |
| | | | | Cameroon | 140 | Nigeria | 93 |
| | | | | | | Myanmar | 88 |
| | | | | | | Yemen | 87 |
| | | | | | | Angola | 73 |
| | | | | | | Sudan | 72 |
| | | | | | | Guinea-Bissau | 66 |

Worryingly, many countries where more than 40 per cent of under-five children are severely or moderately stunted, show low to very low levels of political commitment (Table B.2). Some of these countries now have less commitment than in 2013. For example, Cambodia and Pakistan, which were low commitment countries in 2013, are now among very low commitment countries (cf. te Lintelo *et al.* 2014: Table C.3). Another example is Tanzania, which dropped from being a high commitment country in 2013 to a low commitment one in HANCI 2014 and has at the same time reduced stunting severity from 'very high' to 'high'. It could be that Tanzania's stunting reduction is achieved on the strength of its earlier commitment levels and as a consequence of growing donor funding for nutrition programmes (United Republic of Tanzania 2014).

Within countries that have seen stunting levels increase over the last two decades, current levels of political commitment are low to very low.

Many countries in this position are currently or have recently been afflicted by conflict (Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Afghanistan).

Figure B.1 also shows that several countries buck the trend. Mauritania and Angola are among the countries showing the highest past decadal stunting reduction rates, yet they record low levels of current political commitment. In Angola, substantial non-agricultural


economic growth (oil based) has lifted average incomes to among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa.

Table B.2 HANCI commitment levels and stunting levels for children under 5 years of age

| | % of under 5 stunting (severe and moderate) | | | |
|---------------------|---|--|---|---|
| | Low (<20) | Medium (20–29) | High (30–39) | Very high (≥40) |
| High commitment | Brazil Peru | | Burkina Faso Philippines | Guatemala Madagascar Malawi Nepal |
| Moderate commitment | Senegal | Gambia Ghana South Africa Vietnam | Indonesia Mali | Bangladesh India Rwanda |
| Low commitment | China | Côte d'Ivoire | Cameroon Kenya Tanzania Uganda | Benin Ethiopia Mozambique Niger Sierra Leone |
| Very low commitment | | Angola Mauritania Togo | Guinea-Bissau Lesotho Myanmar Nigeria Sudan | Afghanistan Burundi Cambodia Congo, DR Liberia Pakistan Yemen Zambia |

Note: Stunting data is sourced from UNICEF in 2014. Reference years range from 2004 to 2013.

Figure B.1 Decadal stunting trends by country



Note: Stunting trend is calculated as the difference between the average of 1994–2003 and the average of 2004–13. Sudan has no stunting data for 1990s and is therefore not included. The remaining countries are ordered according to their HANCI 2014 rank.

Table B.3 HANCI political commitment and hunger and undernutrition status as per GHI

| | Low (≤ 4.9) | Moderate (5.0–9.9) | Serious (10.0–19.9) | Alarming (20.0–29.9) | Extremely alarming (≥ 30.0) |
|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--|---|------------------------------------|
| High commitment | Brazil | Peru | Burkina Faso Guatemala Malawi Nepal Philippines | Madagascar | |
| Moderate commitment | South Africa | Ghana Vietnam | Bangladesh Gambia India Indonesia Mali Rwanda Senegal | | |
| Low commitment | | China | Benin Cameroon Côte d'Ivoire Kenya Tanzania Uganda | Ethiopia Mozambique Niger Sierra Leone | |
| Very low commitment | | | Angola Cambodia Guinea-Bissau Lesotho Liberia Mauritania Nigeria Pakistan Togo | Sudan Yemen Zambia | Burundi |

Alternatively, political commitment levels can be compared to countries' hunger and undernutrition statuses as defined by the Global Hunger Index (Table B.3). The GHI is a composite index, calculated by combining hunger prevalence, child mortality and stunting prevalence data (von Grebmer *et al.* 2014).

With regard to global hunger reduction, perhaps the single most important message in Table B.3 is how India has progressed. Comparing the table against the corresponding table in te Lintelo *et al.* (2013: Table 3.5) it is clear that India's improving commitment (low to moderate) is pleasantly but not surprisingly associated with improving GHI scores (from alarming to serious). After decades of strong economic growth, India is belatedly moving towards greater action on nutrition.

Nepal and Cambodia were ranked the same in HANCI 2012 but have taken divergent paths since. With its rapid ascent from low commitment country in 2012 to a high commitment country in 2014 now Nepal seems to have a better chance of further reducing hunger. With rapidly declining commitment Cambodia may find the fight against hunger more difficult.

Countries with high commitment are more likely to be from the highest wealth group (\geq US\$3,500 per capita) in Table B.4 than from a poorer group. Comparing Table B.4 against the corresponding data in (te Lintelo *et al.* 2014: 115) it is clear that the highest wealth group now has several new members: Nigeria, Pakistan, Yemen, Zambia and Ghana. None of these newcomers have concurrently improved their political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition. All but one remained in the same commitment category while their wealth

category improved. The exception, Pakistan, dropped from low to very low commitment status when moving into the highest wealth group.

Table B.4 HANCI political commitment groupings versus Gross National Income

| | GNI per capita 2013, PPP (current international \$) | | | | |
|---------------------|---|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|--|
| | <1000 | 1000–1499 | 1500–1999 | 2000–3499 | ≥3500 |
| High commitment | Malawi | Burkina Faso Madagascar | | Nepal | Brazil Guatemala Peru Philippines |
| Moderate commitment | | Rwanda | Gambia Mali | Bangladesh Senegal | Ghana India Indonesia South Africa Vietnam |
| Low commitment | Niger | Ethiopia Mozambique Uganda | Benin Sierra Leone Tanzania | Cameroon Côte d’Ivoire Kenya | China |
| Very low commitment | Burundi Congo, DR Liberia | Guinea-Bissau Togo | Afghanistan | Cambodia Lesotho Mauritania Sudan | Angola Nigeria Pakistan Yemen Zambia |

PPP: purchasing power parity.

Zambia, where wealth increase has been more pronounced than in Nigeria, had also experienced rapid unabated increases in inequality during the last decade. The Gini coefficient for Zambia was 42 in 2003, 50 in 2004, 54 in 2006 and 57 in 2010 (World Bank data where 0 represents perfect equality and 100 implies perfect inequality). This possible wealth-inequality-commitment nexus is worth looking further into in future.

Figure B.2 compares change in average annual GNI growth rates between the periods of 1994–2003 and 2004–13. The average growth rate for the two periods was calculated using purchasing power parity adjusted GNI per capita (measured in constant 2011 prices). The overall fitted linear trend is weakly negative and statistically insignificant. This suggests that countries that reported increasing growth between the two decades were not able to achieve statistically significant reductions in stunting rates, affirming similar findings by Headey (2011).

Figure B.2 sets out on the X-axis the difference in mean economic growth rates in the 2000s compared to the 1990s. Countries on the right-hand side of the Y-axis (in quadrants Q2 and Q3) experienced an acceleration of growth rates during the 2000s. Peru, Guatemala and Madagascar, Malawi and Brazil, our top five countries, are in this group. Countries above the X-axis (Q1 and Q2) show worsening stunting rates during this period. In quadrant 2, therefore, we see countries that experience an acceleration of economic growth as well as stagnating or worsening stunting rates. For instance in case of Mozambique, a 4 per cent GNI growth rate per annum is accompanied by worsening stunting rates. Nevertheless, for the majority of countries (Q3) positive economic growth trends go together with reducing rates of stunting.

Finally, Figure B.3 presents the same data as Figure B.2 with a twist: it adds a coding scheme of symbols that demonstrates which countries have relatively high, moderate, low or very low political commitment (HANCI 2014 data). The diagram shows clearly that countries

above the X-axis (those with increasing stunting rates) do not include countries with high current political commitment. It also, somewhat puzzlingly, shows that three countries with the fastest stunting declines over the past two decades, Mauritania, Angola and Cambodia, currently have low levels of commitment. This report has not further investigated these outliers, and this is something that may require further attention in future.

Figure B.2 Change in mean annual GNI growth vs mean annual change in stunting rates for 1990s vs 2000s





Figure B.3 HANCI political commitment levels, change in mean annual GNI growth vs mean annual change in stunting rates for 1990s vs 2000s (by level of political commitment)



Political commitment ● High ● Moderate ● Low ○ Very low

Only very weak government effectiveness seems to bar the development of political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition.

Governments in our sample demonstrate that high levels of commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition occur at all but the weakest levels of government effectiveness. Our data (Table B.5) suggest that low levels of political commitment may be partially caused by very low levels of government effectiveness. Governments of countries such as Afghanistan, DR Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Myanmar, Sudan, and Togo may feel stifled undertaking initiatives towards hunger and undernutrition reduction because of legitimate concerns regarding their capacity to deliver policies and programmes, put legal frameworks into practice and effectively use government spending.

Nevertheless, once a relatively low threshold of government effectiveness is passed (>10), governments seem able to be moderately to highly committed (e.g. Madagascar, Nepal, Bangladesh, Mali).


Table B.5 further demonstrates that high HANCI rankings overall coincide with higher levels of high government effectiveness. The regression coefficient of -0.7893 is fairly strong.

Table B.5 HANCI political commitment and government effectiveness (World Governance Indicators 2013)

| | Government effectiveness (2013) ^a | | | | |
|---------------------|--|---|---|---------------------------------|--------|
| | 0–10 | 10–25 | 25–50 | 50–75 | 75–100 |
| High commitment | | Madagascar Nepal | Burkina Faso Guatemala Malawi Peru | Brazil Philippines | |
| Moderate commitment | | Bangladesh Mali | Gambia India Indonesia Senegal Vietnam | Ghana Rwanda South Africa | |
| Low commitment | | Cameroon Côte d'Ivoire Sierra Leone | Benin Ethiopia Kenya Mozambique Niger Tanzania Uganda | China | |
| Very low commitment | Afghanistan Congo, DR Guinea-Bissau Liberia Myanmar Sudan Togo | Angola Burundi Cambodia Mauritania Nigeria Pakistan Yemen | Lesotho Zambia | | |

Source: ^a World Bank Group (2014), Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).

Figure B.4 A linear regression of HANCI rankings and government effectiveness levels



Source: World Bank Group (2014), Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).

Annex C Operationalisation of indicators

| Indicator | Main source ^a | URL ^b | Operationalisation | Year |
|------------------------------------|---|--|--|-----------|
| Government spending on agriculture | IFPRI (SPEED database), ReSAKSS calculations using IMF Government Statistics, FAO experimental series | www.resakss.org/map/ www.ifpri.org/book-39/ourwork/programs/priorities-public-investment/speed-database www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-economic/expenditure/en/ | Government expenditure on agriculture as share of total government expenditure (percentage) | 2013 |
| Government spending on health | WHO Global Health Observatory Data Repository | http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.1900ALL | Government expenditure on health as a share of total government expenditure (percentage) | 2012 |
| Nutrition budget | SUN country summary reports (not in public domain); SUN Compendium of fiches; IDS Nutrition Governance; Save the Children Nutrition Barometer; WHO Landscape Analysis; Global Nutrition Report (N4G tracking tables). | http://globalnutritionreport.org/the-report/nutrition-for-growth-tracking-tables/ http://scalingupnutrition.org/resources-archive/country-resources/progress-in-the-sun-movement www.ids.ac.uk/nutritiongovernance | 0 = No budgets or where no confirming information could be found; 0.5 = Sectoral budgets for nutrition; 1 = Separate budget line for nutrition | 2012–2014 |
| Security of access to land | The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) | http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/IFD.xlsx | Assesses the existence of an institutional, legal and market framework for secure land tenure and the procedure for land acquisition and accessibility to all. The Ratings Scale goes from 6 (high) through 1 (low), as follows: 6 - Good for three years 5 - Good 4 - Moderately Satisfactory 3 - Moderately Unsatisfactory 2 - Unsatisfactory 1 - Unsatisfactory for three years | 2013 |

Notes: ^aIn addition to these main sources for some countries we sourced the data from specific country sources. These sources are highlighted in the online data base. ^bThe URLs were last confirmed live on 4 April 2015 even though the data were extracted in 2014.
(Cont'd.)

Annex C (cont'd.)

| Indicator | Main source ^a | URL ^b | Operationalisation | Year |
|---|---|--|--|-----------|
| Access to agricultural extension services | The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) | www.ifad.org/operations/pbas/docs.htm www.ifad.org/operations/pbas/scores.pdf | This indicator assesses to what extent the agricultural research and extension system is accessible to poor farmers, including women farmers, and is responsive to the needs and priorities of the poor farmers. Coding is done in the same manner as for the 'security of access to land' indicator. For coding details see p.8 of: /www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/80/e/EB-2003-80-R-3.pdf | 2013 |
| Civil registration of live births | UNICEF: DHS/MICS | http://data.unicef.org/ | Percentage of children under five years of age who were registered at the moment of the survey | 2001–2013 |
| Status of safety nets | Transformation Index of the Bertelsmann Stiftung (BTI) | www.bti-project.org/index/ | 10 = Social safety nets are comprehensive 7 = Social safety nets are well developed, but do not cover all risks for all strata of the population 4 = Social safety nets are rudimentary and cover only few risks for a limited number of beneficiaries 1 = Social safety nets do not exist | 2008–2014 |
| Vitamin A coverage | MICS4 Indicators, UNICEF field offices and WHO, Countdown 2015 reports, author calculations based on country DHS data | http://data.unicef.org/ | The percentage of children aged 6–59 months who received 2 high doses of vitamin A supplements within the last year | 2012–2013 |
| Governments promote complementary feeding | Sun Reports/world breast feeding trends initiative | http://worldbreastfeedingconference.org/images/51-country-report.pdf | Whether governments promote complementary feeding practices of children aged 6–9 months and continued breastfeeding of children at ages 12–15 and 20–23 months. 0 = no; 1 = yes | 2010–2014 |
| Access to drinking water | Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) for water supply and Sanitation - WHO/UNICEF | www.wssinfo.org/ | The percentage of population with access to an improved drinking-water source | 2012 |

Notes: ^aIn addition to these main sources for some countries we sourced the data from specific country sources. These sources are highlighted in the online data base. ^bThe URLs were last confirmed live on 4 April 2015 even though the data were extracted in 2014.

(Cont'd.)

Annex C (cont'd.)

| Indicator | Main source ^a | URL ^b | Operationalisation | Year |
|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| Access to improved sanitation | World Bank Database Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) for water supply and Sanitation - WHO/UNICEF | www.wssinfo.org/ | The percentage of population with access to improved sanitation facilities. | 2011–2012 |
| Skilled birth attendance | UNICEF: DHS/MICS | http://data.unicef.org/ | Percentage of women aged 15–49 years attended at least once during pregnancy by skilled health personnel (doctor, nurse or midwife) | 2007–2013 |
| Extent of nutrition features in national development policies/ strategies | Web-based searches | See appendix F for a list of documents consulted for each country. | The total count of key search terms in a selected policy document divided by the number of pages in the document. Search terms: nutritio*. *; undernutrition/under-nutrition; malnutrition/mal-nutrition nutrient; diet*. *; stunt*. *; wasting/wasted; short-for-age; short for age; height-for-age; height for age; weight-for-age; weight for age; weight for height; weight-for-height; underweight; under-weight; low birth weight; thinness; micro-nutrient; micronutrient; 1000 days; one thousand days; breastfeed*. *; behavior change; behaviour change; Iron deficiency anaemi/anemi; zinc; deworm; de-worm; Vitamin A; supplementary feed; complementary feed | 2013–2014 |
| National nutrition policy, plan or strategy | EIU Global Food Security Index; Save the children Nutrition barometer | http://foodsecurityindex.eiu.com/ www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/docs/Data_for_Nutrition_Barometer_0.pdf | Whether a national nutrition policy, plan or strategy exists: 0 = no; 1 = yes | 2012–2014 |
| Multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder coordination mechanism | SUN fiches/Country docs and unpublished SUN country documents | http://scalingupnutrition.org/resources-archive/country-resources/progress-in-the-sun-movement | Whether a multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder coordination mechanism exists: 0 = no; 1 = yes | 2012–2014 |

Notes: ^aIn addition to these main sources for some countries we sourced the data from specific country sources. These sources are highlighted in the online data base. ^bThe URLs were last confirmed live on 4 April 2015 even though the data were extracted in 2014.
(Cont'd.)

Annex C (cont'd.)

| Indicator | Main source ^a | URL ^b | Operationalisation | Year |
|------------------------------|--|--|--|-----------|
| Time-bound nutrition targets | Sun 2.2, 2.3, / Save the children nutrition barometer; Global Nutrition Report | http://globalnutritionreport.org/the-report/nutrition-for-growth-tracking-tables/ http://scalingupnutrition.org/resources-archive/country-resources/progress-in-the-sun-movement www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/docs/Data_for_Nutrition_Barometer_0.pdf | Whether governments identify time bound nutrition targets in public policy documents: 0 = no; 1 = yes | 2012–2014 |
| National nutrition survey | UNICEF and DHS | www.dhsprogram.com/data/available-datasets.cfm http://mics.unicef.org/surveys | Has there been a Demographic and Health Survey/ Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey/comparable national nutrition survey in the past three years? 1: Yes if the survey was dated 2011 or thereafter, or currently underway 0: No new survey undertaken after 2011 | 2014 |
| Constitutional right to food | FAO information paper | www.fao.org/docrep/016/ap554e/ap554e.pdf ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/a0511e/a0511e00.pdf | Strong = 3 Explicit all citizens, specific groups or incorporated under living standards AND/OR Ratified international law (automatically assigned equal status as domestic law) Moderate = 2 Implicit as part of a broader right in constitutional law Weak = 1 Directive Principle OR Likely or confirmed primacy over national legislation (source: constitution or other) | 2006–2013 |

Notes: ^aIn addition to these main sources for some countries we sourced the data from specific country sources. These sources are highlighted in the online data base. ^bThe URLs were last confirmed live on 4 April 2015 even though the data were extracted in 2014.
(Cont'd.)

Annex C (cont'd.)

| Indicator | Main source ^a | URL ^b | Operationalisation | Year |
|---|--|--|---|------|
| Women's access to agricultural land | Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) accessed via OECD's Gender, Institutions and Development Database (GID-DB) | http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=GIDDB2012 http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?datasetcode=GIDDB2014 | Score based on women's legal rights and de facto rights to own and/or access agricultural land. Value based on the following scale: 1: Equal 0.5: Women have equal legal rights but there are discriminatory practices against women's access to and ownership of land in practice. 0: Women have no/few legal rights to access or own land or access is severely restricted by discriminatory practices. (note: in HANCI calculation, this scoring is reversed for consistency) | 2014 |
| Constitutional right to social security | FAO information paper | ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/a0511e/a0511e00.pdf | The Constitution clearly references a right to social security (see Annex II of the source document). 0 = no; 1 = yes | 2011 |
| Women's economic rights | The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project | www.humanrightsdata.com/ | The extent to which women have equal economic rights in law and in practice. 0: There were no economic rights for women in law and systematic discrimination based on sex may have been built into law 1: Women had some economic rights under law, but these rights were not effectively enforced 2: Women had some economic rights under law, and the government effectively enforced these rights in practice while still allowing a low level of discrimination against women in economic matters 3: All or nearly all of women's economic rights were guaranteed by law and the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws in practice. | 2006 |

Notes: ^aIn addition to these main sources for some countries we sourced the data from specific country sources. These sources are highlighted in the online data base. ^bThe URLs were last confirmed live on 4 April 2015 even though the data were extracted in 2014.
(Cont'd.)

Annex C (cont'd.)

| Indicator | Main source ^a | URL ^b | Operationalisation | Year |
|--------------------------------|---|---|---|------|
| Enshrine ICMBS in domestic law | SUN Compendiums and UNICEF (unpublished) data accessed via Global Nutrition Report (2014) | www.unicef.org/nutrition/files/State_of_the_Code_by_Country_April2011.pdf http://globalnutritionreport.org | The extent to which the International Code for Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes is enshrined in law. 9 = ICMBS is fully in law 8 = Many provisions of ICMBS are in law 7 = Few provisions are in law 6 = Voluntary adoption of all, or nearly all provisions of the ICMBS 5 = Some provisions voluntary 4 = Measure drafted awaiting final approval 3 = Being studied 2 = Action to end free breastmilk substitutes 1 = No action | 2014 |

Notes: ^aIn addition to these main sources for some countries we sourced the data from specific country sources. These sources are highlighted in the online data base. ^bThe URLs were last confirmed live on 4 April 2015 even though the data were extracted in 2014.

Annex D Policy documents analysed for nutrition key words

| Country | Searched document | Period |
|---------------|---|---------|
| Afghanistan | Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) | 2008–13 |
| Angola | MPLA Development Program | 2012–17 |
| Bangladesh | Perspective plan of Bangladesh 2010–2021 | 2012–21 |
| Benin | Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) | 2011–15 |
| Brazil | Plano Plurianual (PPA): Plano Mais Brasil | 2012–15 |
| Burkina Faso | Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development | 2011–15 |
| Burundi | Vision Burundi 2025 | 2011–15 |
| Cambodia | National strategic development plan | 2014–18 |
| Cameroon | Growth and Employment Strategy Paper (GESP) | 2010–20 |
| China | 12th Five Year Plan (FYP) | 2011–15 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | Plan national de developpement | 2012–15 |
| DR Congo | Second generation growth and poverty reduction strategy paper | 2011–15 |
| Ethiopia | Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) | 2011–15 |
| Gambia | Program of accelerated growth and employment | 2012–15 |
| Ghana | Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) | 2010–13 |
| Guatemala | Lineamientos generales de politica 2015–2017 | 2015–17 |
| Guinea-Bissau | PRSP II | 2011–15 |
| India | 12th five year plan | 2012–17 |
| Indonesia | National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) | 2010–14 |
| Kenya | Second medium-term plan 2013–2017 | 2013–17 |
| Lesotho | PRSP: National Strategic Development Plan | 2013–17 |
| Liberia | Agenda for transformation: Steps towards Liberia RISING 2030 | 2011–16 |
| Madagascar | Madagascar Action Plan (MAP) | 2007–12 |
| Malawi | Malawi Growth and development strategy II | 2011–16 |
| Mali | PRSP II | 2007–11 |
| Mauritania | PRSP III | 2011–15 |
| Mozambique | Programa Quinquenal do Governo | 2010–14 |
| Myanmar | Framework for Economic and Social Reforms (FESR) | 2012–15 |
| Nepal | Three Year Interim Plan | 2007–10 |
| Niger | PRSP II: Accelerated Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (ADPRS) | 2008–12 |
| Nigeria | PRSP: National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) | 2003-07 |
| Pakistan | Vision 2030 | 2007–30 |
| Peru | Plan Bicentenario: El Perú hacia el 2021 | 2011–21 |
| Philippines | Philippine Development Plan | 2011–16 |
| Rwanda | PRSP | 2008–12 |
| Senegal | PRSP II | 2007–15 |
| Sierra Leone | PRSP II | 2009–12 |
| South Africa | National Development Plan: Vision for 2030 | 2012–30 |
| Sudan | The Five Year Plan | 2007–11 |
| Tanzania | The Tanzania Development Vision 2025 | 2025 |
| Togo | PRSP | 2009–11 |
| Uganda | National Development Plan | 2011–15 |
| Vietnam | Socio-Economic Development Plan | 2006–10 |
| Yemen | Socio-Economic Development Plan for poverty reduction | 2006–10 |
| Zambia | Vision 2030 | 2007–30 |

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Brighton BN1 9RE

T +44 (0)1273 606261

F +44 (0)1273 621202

E ids@ids.ac.uk

www.ids.ac.uk



Irish Aid

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Rialtas na hÉireann