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Heterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation when humans play a Prisoner’s Dilemma

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It is not fully understood yet why we cooperate with strangers on a daily basis. In an increasingly global world, where interaction networks and relationships between individuals are becoming more complex, different hypotheses have been put forward to explain the foundations of human cooperation on a large scale and to account for the true motivations that are behind this phenomenon. In this context, population structure has been suggested to foster cooperation in social dilemmas, but theoretical studies of this mechanism have yielded contradictory results so far, and the issue lacks a proper experimental test in large enough systems. We have performed the largest experiments to date with humans playing a spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma on a lattice and on a scale-free network (1229 subjects). We observed that the level of cooperation reached in both networks is the same, comparable to that of smaller networks or unstructured populations. We have also found that subjects respond to the cooperation they observe in a reciprocal manner, being more likely to cooperate if in the previous round many of their neighbors and themselves did so. This implies that humans do not consider neighbors’ payoffs when making their decisions in this dilemma, but only their actions. Our results, that are in agreement with recent theoretical predictions based on this behavioral rule, suggest that population structure has little relevance as a cooperation-promoter or inhibitor among humans.

Human Cooperation | Structured Populations | Scale-Free Networks | Evolutionary Game Dynamics

The strong cooperative attitude of humans defies the paradigm of *homo economicus* and poses an evolutionary conundrum [1, 2]. This is so because many of our interactions can be framed as Prisoner’s Dilemmas [3–5] or Public Goods Games [6], famous for bringing about a “tragedy of the commons” [7]. Several mechanisms have been suggested as putative explanations of cooperative behavior [8], among which the existence of an underlying network of contacts constraining who one can interact with has received very much attention. This mechanism was first proposed by Nowak and May [9], whose simulations on a square lattice with agents that imitate the behavior of their neighbor with the highest payoff showed high levels of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The ensuing two decades have witnessed a wealth of theoretical studies that have concluded that this so-called “network reciprocity” [8] is indeed possible under a variety of circumstances, but in many other contexts networks do not promote –or even inhibit– cooperation [10, 11]. The effect of regular and homogeneous networks on cooperation is very sensitive to the details of the model (e.g., dynamics, clustering), while theoretical results and simulations indicate that heterogeneous networks should be particularly efficient in fostering cooperation in social dilemmas [11–13]. A natural way to shed some light on these partially contradictory results would be to test experimentally the predictions of the different models. Such tests are currently lacking [14], as the few available experimental works only deal—with some exception [15]— with

very small networks [16–18]. Interestingly, the only theoretical result [19] that takes into account the behavioral information extracted from experiments predicts that neither homogeneous nor heterogeneous networks would influence the cooperative behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, i.e., the observed cooperation level should be the same as if every player interacted with every other one.

Here, we close the cycle by testing the above theoretical predictions [19] and contributing to the current debate on the existence and effects of network reciprocity by performing experiments on large samples of structured populations of individuals who interact through a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. Specifically, we have designed a setup in which 1229 human subjects were placed either in a square lattice or in a scale-free network, and for more than 50 rounds they played a 2×2 multiplayer PD game with each of their k neighbors, taking only one action, either to cooperate (C) or to defect (D)—the action being the same against all opponents. The experiment was simultaneously carried out on two different virtual networks: a 25×25 regular lattice with $k = 4$ and periodic boundary conditions (625 subjects), and a heterogeneous network with a fat-tailed degree distribution (604 subjects, the number of neighbors varied between $k = 2$ and $k = 16$). Figure 1 depicts a snapshot of a visual representation of the experiment as well as of the two networks; more details on the experimental setup, as well as a full movie summarizing the actions of the subjects during the experiment, can be found in the Supplementary Information (SI). Subjects played a repeated (weak) Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) with all their neighbors for an initially undetermined number of rounds. Payoffs of the PD were set to be 7 ECUs for mutual cooperation, 10 ECUs for a defector facing a cooperator, and 0 ECUs for any player facing a defector (weak PD [9]). We note that this choice of payoffs is as in Grujić et al.’s experiment on a smaller regular lattice [15] (see Figure 1) and such that cooperation should reach a high level according to the available simulations [9, 11–13]. The size of each network was large enough so that clusters of cooperators could form (the underlying mechanism by which cooperators may thrive [20, 21]).

On this general setup, we carried out two treatments, which we will refer to as experiment and control. In the experiment, subjects remained at the same positions in the network with the same neighbors throughout all the rounds played. In the control treatment we removed the effect of the network by shuffling the neighbors of each subject in every round. Therefore, in this phase, the players were always connected to the same number of neighbors, but these neighbors changed from round to round. On the screen, subjects saw the actions and normalized payoffs of their neighbors from the previous round, who in the control treatment were different from their current neighbors with high probability (see SI). All treatments of the experiment were carried out in sequence with the same subjects. Players were also fully informed of the different setups they were going to run through. The number of rounds in each treatment was randomly chosen between 50 and 70 in order to avoid subjects knowing in advance when it was going to finish, resulting in 51 and 59 rounds for the experimental and control treatments, respectively. Full details are provided in the SI.

Results and Discussions.

Figures 2A and 2B show the fraction of cooperative actions, c , in each round for the two networks and for both treatments. The first feature worth noticing in this figure is that, in the experiment phase, the level of cooperation in either network quickly drops from initial values around 60% to values around 40% and finally settles at a slower pace around 30%, much lower than theoretical models predict [9–11]. This is especially remarkable for the heterogeneous network, on which no previous results are available, and is in stark contrast with the predictions that this kind of networks should be particularly efficient in promoting cooperation [11–13]. In the control, the initial level of cooperation is already at these low values. This behavior is consistent with previous findings in experiments with smaller lattices [15, 18] as well as with unstructured populations [22, 23]. Regarding the slow decay undergone by these curves after the first quick drop in the level of cooperation, we believe that this is associated to a process of learning (see below). However, the most remarkable result that this figure provides is that, quite unexpectedly, the network does not have any influence in the evolution of the level of cooperation. In fact, both curves are nearly identical—the slightly lower values obtained for the lattice are likely to arise from the small difference in the initial level of cooperation—despite the very different nature of the networks of contacts between the players.

The experimental result we have just reported is in very good agreement with the theoretical prediction in [19]. This prompts us to investigate in detail what is the players’ behavior, as the reason why this prediction was different from earlier ones is the use of the update rule observed in [15]. The distributions of subjects by their individual cooperation levels (averaged over the whole experiment) depicted in Figures 2C and 2D show quite some heterogeneity of behavior: a few subjects have a high level of cooperation (above 70%), a sizable fraction cooperated less than 20% of the rounds, whereas the bulk of subjects have intermediate levels of cooperation. Importantly, the comparison of these distributions of actions, which turn out to be statistically indistinguishable (see Kolmogorov-Smirnov test data on Table S1 of the SI section), provides additional evidence that the behavior observed in the two networks is the same. This finding, along with the identical behavior of the cooperation level, suggests that subjects use the same strategies in the lattice and in the

heterogeneous network, regardless of the fact that in the latter the number of neighbors of each individual is heterogeneously distributed.

After considering the aggregate distribution of actions, let us now look for deeper insights on the individual behaviors. As in previous experiments on smaller lattices [15, 18] or unstructured populations [22, 23], our results are compatible with a coexistence of at least three basic strategies: cooperators (players who cooperate with a high probability regardless of the context), defectors (players who defect with a high probability regardless of the context) and “moody” conditional cooperators [15] (players whose action depends on their previous action as well as the level of cooperation in their neighborhood). A search for moody conditional cooperation shows the results depicted in Figure 3. Panels A and B show the fraction of cooperative actions occurred after a cooperation/defection, as a function of the level of cooperation in the neighborhood. The plots are the fingerprint of moody conditional cooperation: players are more prone to cooperate the more their neighbors cooperate if they cooperated than if they defected. Furthermore, Figure 3 also supports the striking finding that the strategic behavior of subjects is remarkably similar whether they are playing on the lattice (Figure 3A) or on the heterogeneous network (Figure 3B). On the other hand, panels C and D show that the next action of a subject cannot be predicted knowing the largest payoff difference he/she sees in the neighborhood, thus confirming that subjects did not use payoff differences as a guidance to update their actions.

Figure 4 provides further evidence of the significance of the moody conditional cooperation by means of a nonparametric bootstrap check. The series of actions taken by every individual are randomly reassigned to other positions in the lattice or the network and the probability of cooperation is recomputed. This is done 10^6 times and the results show that the two probabilities become independent of the context. Of course, such a reshuffling will not change the dependence on the player’s own previous action, as the order of the actions is not altered, and consequently there are still two distinct lines corresponding to the probability of cooperation following cooperation or defection, but the dependence on the number of cooperators in the previous round is fully removed.

The existence of (almost pure) cooperators and defectors aside from moody conditional cooperators can be further supported through a comparison with the same histograms but for the control condition (see Figure S4 of the SI section), since for the latter a larger number of subjects are in the region that would correspond to defectors. This can be interpreted as an indication that a fraction of—probably—moody conditional cooperators changed to a defective strategy, given that retaliation is ineffective in the control condition. Furthermore, performing running averages of the levels of cooperation during the experiment condition (see Figures S5 and S6 of the SI section) shows that the number of subjects whose level of cooperation is below a given threshold increases with time—irrespective of the precise value of the threshold. Not only this gives support to the existence of this kind of players, but it is consistent with a continuous (albeit small) flow of players who change from moody conditional cooperation to defection—a behavior that could be understood as a generalized form of a grim strategy. Notice that this flow can account for the slow decay observed all along the run of the experiment and control observed in Figures 2A and 2B.

Finally, another important point that our experiment allows to address to some extent is the dependence of the actions on the connectivity of the participants for the heterogeneous network. The results are displayed in Figure 5, where we represent the average cooperation level c as a function of

the connectivity of the players, k , for both treatments: experiment and control. As can be seen from the plots, there might be some trend towards lower levels of cooperation with increasing degree for small connectivities, particularly in the control (the levels for the first three values of the degree in the experiment are not statistically different). However, looking at the figure as a whole it becomes clear that there does not seem to be any statistically significant trend. It has to be borne in mind that in this type of networks the number of hubs or large-degree nodes is intrinsically small, and therefore the statistics for them is not very accurate (notice the size of the error bars). Going beyond this results would require much larger networks (which would still have the same problem for their higher degree nodes). Additionally, the bottom panels of Figure 5 show the frequency of cooperative actions of nodes with degree k after playing as C or D with respect to the fraction of their neighbors that cooperated in the previous round. The results are a clear evidence that moody conditional cooperation is indeed the general behavior even if one disaggregates the data in terms of their degree. As we have already stated above for the total level of cooperation, for higher degrees the statistics is poorer and the analysis does not lead to such clear-cut results.

Conclusions

To sum up, we have performed a large-scale experimental test of the hypothesis of network reciprocity, i.e., that the existence of a structure in the population may affect cooperation in social dilemmas. Our experiment shows that, when it comes to human behavior, the existence of an underlying network of contacts does not seem to have any influence in the global outcome. We want to stress that this conclusion applies only to human cooperation, and network reciprocity may still be relevant in other contexts, e.g., in microbiology [25]. Players seem to act by responding to the level of cooperation in their neighborhood, and this renders the network irrelevant. In addition, players behave in a ‘moody’ manner, being significantly less likely to cooperate following a defection of their own. The levels of cooperation attained in a regular lattice and in a highly heterogeneous network (hitherto thought to be a cooperation enhancer) are indistinguishable, and the responsive behavior of subjects appears to be independent of the number of neighbors they have or on the payoff differences they observe. The results are in full agreement with the theoretical prediction in [19]; the fact that the key hypothesis in that model is that people behave in the way we have just described, provides further support to our finding of moody conditional cooperation in networked Prisoner’s Dilemmas.

Our results have implications for policy making when cooperation is a desired behavior. Although further experiments with other social dilemmas still need to assess the range of applicability of our conclusions, the present study suggests that imposing a network structure might be a sterile effort. It should be noted, however, that this caveat does not im-

ply that networking is useless to achieve cooperation—results would probably be very different if the network is allowed to be formed by the subjects as part of the game. Recent experiments on groups of up to 20 people [26, 27] strongly suggest this, but to the best of our knowledge no large-scale experiments have been carried out to test this issue. On the other hand, the theoretical work in [19] does not predict the slow decay of the cooperation level observed in the experiments, which we have conjectured that arises from moody conditional cooperators becoming defectors in a generalized grim behavior. Such a change in the percentage of players using different strategies is not included in the theoretical model, and therefore a next step would require to account for such changes and, if possible, to justify them within an evolutionary framework. Finally, given that in our setup players have to play the same action with all their neighbors, it is clear that our results should be related to those of public goods experiments. In fact, conditional cooperation was first observed in that context [24]. Our findings suggest that the “moody” version we have found can also arise in public goods games. If that is the case, it is likely that network reciprocity does not apply to public goods games on networks. Hopefully our experiment will encourage further research in all these directions.

Materials and Methods

Experimental setup. The experiment was carried out with 1229 volunteers chosen among last year high-school students (17-18 years old) of 42 different High Schools located throughout the geography of the Autonomous Region of Aragón, Spain. All the students played via a web interface specifically created for the experiment (see SI) that was accessible through the computers available in the computer rooms of their respective schools. At least one teacher supervised the experiment in each computer room (which at most had a maximum capacity of 20 students), preventing any interaction among the students. To further guarantee that potential interactions among students seating next to each other in the class do not influence the results of the experiment, the assignment of players to the different topologies was completely random. The colors used to code the two available actions of the game were also selected randomly, further decreasing the likelihood that neighboring participants could influence each other. All participants went through a tutorial (included in the SI) on the screen, including questions to check their understanding of the game. When everybody had gone through the tutorial, the experiment began, lasting for approximately an hour. The experiment assumed synchronous play, thus we had to make sure that every round ended in a certain amount of time. This playing time was set to 20 seconds. At the end of the experiments volunteers were presented a small questionnaire to fill in. Immediately after, all participants received their earnings and their show-up fee. Total earnings in the experiment ranged from 2.49 to 40.48 euros.

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


Fig. 1. Players in the experiment were sitting in different physical locations, but played in two virtual networks. Panel A is a snapshot at round 10 of a graphic animation illustrating the activity during the experiment (the full animation movie is provided as SI section). On a map of Aragón the image displays small buildings representing the schools. Arrows (green for cooperate and red for defect) represent actual actions taken by players. They travel towards the school where their randomly assigned neighbors were sitting. Buildings are colored green and red, proportional to the respective number of cooperative and defective actions taken by the subjects in that school. The height of the yellow column on top of each building is proportional to the school's accumulated payoffs. Panels B and C show snapshots of the two networks at that same round, along with their degree distributions (in the case of the heterogeneous network, both the theoretical distribution and the actual realization corresponding to the network of the experiment are represented). Colors indicate the corresponding player's action (green for cooperate, red for defect). The size of a node is proportional to its degree.




Fig. 2. The level of cooperation declines and is independent of the network of contacts. Fraction of cooperative actions (level of cooperation) per round during the experiment (panel A) and the control (panel B) for both networks, and histograms of cooperative actions in the lattice (panel C) and in the heterogeneous network (panel D). The histograms (panels C and D) show the number of subjects ranked according to the fraction of cooperative actions they perform along the experiment in the two networks. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that the distributions are statistically indistinguishable (see SI section). They illustrate the high heterogeneity in subjects' behavior, their levels of cooperation ranging from nearly zero to almost one in a practically continuous distribution. The corresponding histograms for the control (Figure S4 of the SI section) show that a sizable group of subjects lowered their levels of cooperation hence becoming mostly defectors. Actually, the decline in the level of cooperation observed in the experiment (panels A and B) can be explained as a constant flow of subjects to more defective strategies (for evidence supporting this hypothesis see Figures S5 and S6 of the SI section).




Fig. 3. Players' behaviour depends both on the level of cooperation in the neighborhood and on their previous action. Frequency of cooperative actions after a cooperative/defective action, conditioned to the context (fraction of cooperative actions in the neighborhood in the previous round) observed in the lattice (A) and in the heterogeneous network (B). Details of the linear fits and comparison with randomizations to prove statistical significance can be found in the SI section. The plots demonstrate that there is a relevant dependence on the context for subjects that cooperated in the previous round (i.e., were in a “cooperative mood”), the cooperation probability increasing with the fraction of cooperative neighbors much as for the conditional cooperators found by Fischbacher *et al.* [24]. However, after having defected, this dependence is less clear, and if anything, it suggests an exploiting behavior—subjects who defected are less prone to cooperate the more cooperation they find around. Panels C and D show how subjects who cooperated or defected are distributed according to the largest payoff-per-link difference in their neighborhoods between the two actions. These plots reveal that a player's decision to cooperate or defect was independent on the payoffs-per-link they observed (an information that was explicitly provided during the experiment).




Fig. 4. Null hypothesis statistical significance test. Probability of cooperating after playing C or D, conditioned to the context (fraction of cooperative actions in the neighborhood in the previous round), averaged over 10^6 random shuffling of players. Panel A) corresponds to the experimental treatment in the lattice, panel B) to the same treatment but for the heterogeneous network, panel C) to the control phase in the lattice and panel D) to the same control treatment for the heterogeneous network. The results show that there is no dependence on the context and hence that the results of panels A and B of Figure 3 are statistically relevant. The anomalous variance (or even absence of data) observed at a fraction of C's in the neighborhood close to 0.9 is not a relevant feature of the experimental results but a consequence of the very low probability of having events contributing to that bin of the histogram in the heterogeneous network. This anomaly can also be noticed in Figure 3.




Fig. 5. Dependence of the strategies on the connectivity. The upper panels show the cooperation level c as a function of the connectivity k_i in the heterogeneous network, averaged over all rounds of the experiment (upper left panel) and the control (upper right) of the experiment. In the lower panels, we plot the frequency of cooperative actions of players with degree as indicated, after they have cooperated or defected, as a function of the fraction of cooperative actions in their neighborhood during the previous round, along the experiment treatment in the heterogeneous network. Statistics is restricted to nodes of connectivity $k = 2$ (lower left panel), $k = 3$ (lower center) and $k = 4$ (lower right).