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GORGIAS: AN EDITION OF THE EXTANT TEXTS AND FRAGMENTS WITH COMMENTARY AND INTRODUCTION

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CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a commentary on G.'s extant works and fragments which consists in three main parts: an Introduction, the Greek text, and notes on the text and fragments. a) The Introduction offers an account of G.'s life which is based on the information provided by ancient authors, a discussion of the stylistic features of his prose – along with a presentation of the criticism of his style by ancient authorities – and an analysis of the recurring argumentative schemata that underlie G.'s extant work. b) The Greek text, as it stands, embodies the readings that I adopt. c) The commentary on the extant texts and fragments is normally preceded by short Introductions, which are pertinent to the main problems of interpretation posed by the individual texts. The notes themselves normally include: i) a presentation of the textual problems and the possible solutions which have been proposed by previous scholars, together with the arguments that support the readings adopted in the text, ii) explanation of the text and its stylistic characteristics, iii) discussion of the individual arguments, and their role in the reasoning as a whole, and iv) where appropriate an analysis of the philosophical issues raised by the texts themselves.

PREFACE

This is the first commentary on Gorgias' work in English, and the first detailed one in any language; more importantly perhaps this thesis deals independently with an author who is most frequently referred to in footnotes. I think that I am justified in believing that this neglect does not accurately represent the gravity of G.'s work, and the scholarly work that has been done in the last few years makes me feel less lonely.

The emphasis in this thesis is mainly placed on the interpretation of G.'s *own* preserved speeches, and this explains the order in which I have presented the texts. It was for this reason also that I did not see fit to comment on the text of Sextus' summary of G.'s work *On not Being*; yet, it would have been impossible to avoid textual notes on the *De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia*, because the readings one adopts there affect one's own interpretation. Writing a commentary requires a certain economy of expression; several points could have been discussed in more detail, but my aim has been to present the whole of G.'s work. It was also for the sake of economy that I did not include the Testimonia (section A in Diels-Kranz);[1] it was upon those, however, that I based my Introduction. In complying with the instructions, the Bibliography includes only the titles of books and articles that I refer to in my thesis, and consequently I only reluctantly dropped works that contributed decisively to my understanding of G.

Commenting on G. is not the same as commenting on a single work of an individual orator which purports to be cohesive in itself; like the Sophists' intellectual activity in general, G.'s individual works touch on a great range of themes. Numerous scholars make G.'s works appear coherent by systematising the available material and thus detecting in them theories or doctrines that recur in various forms. I frequently challenge this view, mainly on the basis of

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[1] The numbering of the Testimonia in my text follows Buchheim's edition.

evidence provided by the texts themselves. I hope that my difficulty in detecting theories in G.'s work will not be construed as a difficulty in appreciating his pioneering contribution to the development of rhetoric and the examination of *logos*, the two fields in which his influence was particularly felt.

cases they offered alternative interpretations which now seem to me more plausible than the ones that I had originally put forward.

My deepest gratitude I owe to my supervisor, Professor MacDowell. Without his support this thesis would have been a 'not-being'. I may be the least appropriate person to praise his erudition and his expertise in the fields of Greek oratory, comedy, and Athenian law. However, I feel confident in saying that his scholarly excellence is in harmony with a deeply διδασκαλική nature.

ABBREVIATIONS

Ancient authors

Aiskh. = Aiskhylos
Aiskhin. = Aiskhines
And.   = Andokides
Arist. = Aristotle
Ar.   = Aristophanes
Dem.   = Demosthenes
Eur.   = Euripides
Hdt.   = Herodotos
Hom.   = Homer
Is.   = Isaios
Isok . = Isokrates
Lys.   = Lysias
Pl.   = Plato
Plout. = Ploutarkhos
Soph.   = Sophokles
Theophr. = Theophrastos
Thuc.   = Thucydides
Xen.   = Xenophon

Frequently abbreviated words and titles

DK   = H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th edn., rev. and ed. W. Kranz, vols. 1-3, Berlin, 1951-2.

fr.   = G.'s Texts and Fragments (section B in DK)

G.   = Gorgias

Hel. = G.'s *Encomium of Helen*

Loeb = Loeb Classical Library

LSJ = *A Greek- English Lexicon*, H. G. Liddell-R. Scott, 9th ed. Rev. H. S. Jones, R. McKenzie, Oxford, 1940.

MXG = [Aristotle] *De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia.*

O N B = G.'s *On not Being* (as represented either in the *MXG* or in Sextus)

Pal. = G.'s *The Defence of Palamedes*

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Test. = Testimonia (section A in DK; in the present thesis I employ Buchheim's edition)

Abbreviations of the titles of periodicals in the Bibliography are normally as per *L' Année Philologique*.

INTRODUCTION

I. Gorgias' Life

G. was the son of Charmantides of whom nothing is known; his brother was the physician Herodikos.[1] G.'s sister was married to Deicrates, and she gave birth to a certain Hippokrates, whose son Eumolpos dedicated a statue of G. at Olympia.[2] Ploutarkhos (fr.8a) says that when G. delivered his Olympic Oration, a certain Melanthios complained that G. advised the Greeks to unite, when he was himself unable to secure unity in his own house, because he had fallen in love with his female servant and this caused the jealousy of his wife; but Isokrates belies this information (Test.18), and there is every reason to believe *him*, not the anecdotal testimony given by Ploutarkhos. G.'s life lasted for more than 105 years, and thus he had a personal experience of the fascinating events that took place during the fifth, and the beginning of the fourth centuries: though at a very young age, it is possible that he had firsthand knowledge of events that took place during the Persian wars, and he was an old

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[1] For Herodikos see Pl. *Grg.* 448b (=Test.2a); at 456bff. Plato puts in G.'s mouth a comparison of rhetoric with medicine, which shows that the former is by all means superior to the latter and to any other existing art (τέχνη). G. there says that the physician, if he is to be compared with a rhetor, "would be left at the post" (as Dodds translates οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἰατρόν, p.211), which is certainly a reductive colloquialism. But there is no way of confirming that the historical G. considered the 'art' of his brother inferior to his own one, although we may speculate that this was so. Yet, it is certainly possible that Plato exploits and gives a new meaning to the comparison of rhetoric with medicine which was probably inaugurated by G. himself (see *Hel.* 14). From Aristotle (*Rhet.*1400b19) we learn that Herodikos attempted a word-play with the names of Thrasymakhos and Polos. We should also say that Herodikos, G.'s brother, should be distinguished (see Olympiodoros on 448b) from Ἡρόδικος ὁ Σηλυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον Μεγαρεύς (Pl. *Prot.*316e1), of whom we learn from Suida s. v.Ἱπποκρατης that he was, along with G., a teacher of Hippokrates.

[2] We possess this information thanks to the fact that the base of the statue with the inscription (Test.8) was discovered in 1876, by German archaeologists very close to the temple of Zeus at Olympia, and it dates from the first half of the fourth century.

man at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War; he contributed to and witnessed the evolution of Greek science; he was still active in his eighties[1] when Sokrates (399) defended himself, and he was in his early sixties when Plato, the person who later wrote a dialogue under his name, was born; if we accept Athenaios' otherwise anecdotal testimony (see *Deipn.* xi 505d-e=Test.15a) he also read it and refuted its accuracy, as far as his own theses were concerned. In the field in which his influence was particularly felt, he had plenty of time to identify the features of his own prose in the works of Antiphon, Andokides, Isokrates, and to read some of the narratives of Lysias, for which the latter was so much admired by critics in antiquity.

Although there is no reason to doubt that G.'s life spanned more than a century,[2] the exact dates of his birth and his death cannot be specified with any certainty. The main information is given by pseudo-Ploutarkhos (Test.6) who says that G. was older than Antiphon, who was born around 480; Porphyrios now places G.'s *acme* in the 80th Olympiad, that is in the years 460-457, and according to Pausanias (Test.7) he was invited to Pherai by its tyrant, Iason, which provides us with a terminus post quem, as Iason became tyrant in 380. On the basis of this information, in combination with the fact that most of the sources give him 107-109 years of life one should consider the years around 485 as a possible date for his birth and 378 or later for his death. But these

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[1] See Pl. *Ap.*19e (=Test.8a).

[2] The most reliable sources do not specify the exact number of years; these sources are Isokrates *Antid.*155 (πλεῖστον χρόνον βιοὺς) and Plato (*Phdr.*261b) who compares G. with Nestor, the proverbially old wise man of the *Iliad*. The scholiast writes: ἀπεικάζει δὲ τὸν Γοργίαν τῷ Νέστορι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ αἰδήμων καὶ πολυετὴς ἐγένετο. Other sources include: Suidas s.v. Γοργίας (=Test. 2), Apollodoros (=Test.10), and Olympiodoros (Test.10) 109; Philostratos (=Test.1), Pliny (=Test.13), Loucianos (Test.13), and Censorinus (TEst.13) 108; Cicero (=Test.12) 107; Pausanias (=Test.7) 105. Athenaios (Test.11) 80 is certainly wrong; as Skouteropoulos suggests (p.155), by π̇ Apoll. probably refers to the years that G. was professionally active; Diels suggests ρι΄ .

conclusions are merely based on the available sources; although there is no serious reason to object to the placing of G.'s birth in the years before the birth of Antiphon, common experience shows that it is hardly possible for a person who is 107 years of age to travel from wherever he was situated in the Greek world to Pherai, in order to exhibit or teach his art.[1] At this age – normally much earlier – human ambition expires.

Nothing is known about G.'s life before his arrival in Athens in 427; some sources make him a pupil of Empedokles,[2] but this information should preferably be considered with caution, because as a leading scholar in the field of the history of ancient philosophy has recently claimed, "retrospecively, such lines of succession were also constructed for the Preplatonic period, and these successions of Preplatonics were in various ways linked with the later philosophical schools".[3] Apart from specific affinities of G.'s works with Empedokles' life (mainly his reputation as a *magos*; notice that Diogenes (Test.3), says that he found in Satyros the information that G. witnessed Empedokles' practice of magic) and premises (for instance the theory of ἀπορροαί; see also notes on *Hel.* 4), it was also Aristotle's otherwise opaque statement that Empedokles was the one who inaugurated rhetoric that probably served as the ground for the invention of a smooth and (even geographically)[4] 'reasonable' succession.[5]

The first (and probably the only) important incident that we know with some certainty is that G. arrived in Athens in 427, as the

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[1] To this commonsensical observation, we may add Kerferd's remark (1981, p.44) that "the inference [sc. that 380 is a terminus post quem] is quite unjustified since the story merely relates a comparison between G.'s brand of rhetoric with that of his pupil Polykrates".

[2] See mainly Diog. Laert. 3.58,9 (=Test.3); see also frs. Test.3, 10, 14.

[3] Mansfeld (1999), p.32.

[4] Dodds (1959), p.7, contends that "late writers make him a 'pupil' of Empedocles...perhaps merely because they were both Sicilians".

[5] For G. and Empedokles see Buchheim 1985, 417-29.

leader of an embassy whose task was to seek Athenian assistance on behalf of the city of Leontini against the threat of Syracuse. This information is safe, because it is provided by Plato (*Hip.Maj.*282b; it is surprising that Diels did not include this passage in his edition), and there are at least two more authors to reiterate it (see Test.4); but the chronology of the embassy we owe to Thucydides (3.86.2), who does not mention G.'s name. Yet, that this was G.'s first visit to Athens, as most of the scholars suggest,[1] is in itself doubtful. None of the above mentioned sources says that it was, and it is equally feasible to speculate that it *was not*: in 427, G. was already 60 years old, and it is possible that there may have been more opportunities for him to visit Athens before this date.

The duration of his stay there is unknown, and we know nothing of any subsequent visits to it, but according to Plato (*Hip.Ma.*282b4=Test.4), G. taught in Athens for money. Like most of the sophists[2] he moved from the one city to the other teaching people for fees. We are told that he was treated with animosity by the citizens of Argos and that a penalty was imposed on those who attended his teaching (Test.22a); he spent some time in Thessaly at the court of Aleuadae (as Plato and Isokrates confirm; see Test.18, 19); he travelled to Elis, where he delivered his encomiastic speech for the city; we also know (see fr.5) that he taught Proxenos of Boiotia, and it has been inferred that G. went to Boiotia as well;[3]

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[1] Untersteiner (1954, p.93) writes "he then traveled from city to city"; but probably this is what he did before his arrival in Athens; similarly, Dodds, in discussing the dramatic date of *Grg.* is certain that 427 "is Gorgias' first (and only attested) visit to Athens" (1959, p.17). But that it is the 'only attested' one does not mean that this was the only one as well.

[2] In Pl. *Ap.*19e Sokrates mentions G., Prodikos, and Hippias; in Pl. *Prot.* 316c6 we learn that Protagoras did the same thing (earlier in this dialogue we are told that Protagoras was accompanied by some of his pupils 315b).

[3] See Untersteiner (1954), p.98 n.21.

and he also appeared before the audiences gathered in Delphi and Olympia.[1]

Several prominent figures are mentioned by ancient authors as being G.'s students, but their common practice of creating successions and contextualising individual intellectuals is once more discernible. This is obvious in Suidas (s.v. Γοργίας=Test.2) where Alkidamas is presented as the leader who succeeded G. in his school (σχολήν), although we know that no such school was established by G. Others, like Agathon, were simply imitators of G.'s style, and in the absence of any further positive indications it would be wrong to assume that they were his students in the sense that they systematically attended his lectures.

A number of G.'s pupils are mentioned by several authors; Menon of Thessalia and his friend Aristippos (Pl.Men.70a-b=Test.19). Plato also presents Polus, one of the interlocutors in his dialogue Gorgias, as one of G.'s pupils. Isokrates, the rhetor who established a school in Athens, is also listed by some authorities among G.'s pupils; but as this is information given by authors of late antiquity, mostly Roman times, we should not be too ready to accept it.[2] A certain Philippos appears in all the instances where

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[1] Blass (1887), p.25 suggested that he returned to Leontini in 424, due to the political situation there; but no source confirms such an hypothesis. That he went back to Athens "at the time of his *Funeral Oration*" as Untersteiner claims (1954, p.94) is speculation which in its turn is based on the speculative view that this speech was composed in 421. The *Epitaphios* is void of references to particular historical events, and there is no good reason to suppose that G. needed to be in Athens at the time of its composition.

[2] All the sources are cited by Too 1995, p.235, who devotes an Appendix of her book to this subject; she rightly casts doubt on the sources making Isokrates a pupil of G. Her argumentation is twofold: a) she refutes the reliability of later biographers and writers, and b) she claims that all the direct references to G. are pejorative, and that in the cases where G.'s name *is not* mentioned we should not associate Isokrates with him. More particularly, she maintains that in *Antidosis* 155f. (=Test.18) "Isokrates implicitly underscores a contrast with his predecessor" (p.238); but in this context Isokrates uses G.'s case as an example, in order to show that the Sophists did not make a fortune out of their profession, and

Aristophanes refers to G., and it has been suggested that he probably was one of his students (Test.5a).[1] Eumolpos, the grandson of his sister might also be included, if the phrase παιδείας καὶ φιλίας ἕνεκα in the inscription on the base of the statue that he dedicated in Olympia means: 'because of the education (that he [sc.Eumolpos] has received). A certain Proxenos of Boiotia is also presented by his friend Xenophon in the *Anabasis* (Test.5) as a pupil of G.[2]

Pausanias (Test.7) saw at Delphi a golden statue of G. which he dedicated himself, whereas Cicero (Test.7) claims that the golden statue was dedicated by the Greeks in order to honour him. Athenaios (Test.15a) embellishes this dedication by saying that when G. came back to Athens, Plato welcomed him with these words: 'the elegant and golden G. has arrived'! Pliny, in referring to the same incident, gives a date which is conspicuously wrong: he writes '*LXX circiter olympiade*' (Test.7), which means that the dedication took place between 500 and 497. Diels[3] has maintained that Pliny misread φ' in his Greek source, and took it to be an o', from which it should be deduced that G. dedicated the statue in 420-417. This is a reasonable but not conclusive explanation. More can perhaps be said about G.'s statue in Olympia; this statue was dedicated by Eumolpos, the grandson of G.'s sister, and it dates from the first half of the fourth century.[4] It should be taken for

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Skouteropoulos (1991) is probably right in saying that "στὸ ἀπόσπασμα διαφαίνεται... ἕνα θερμὸ συναίσθημα γι' αὐτόν" (p.161). She also doubts that when Isokrates says that "his work serves to correct the attempts of an unnamed author who composed a defence of Helen while intending to write an encomium of her" (p.138); Too has not probably read carefully enough G.'s *Hel.* to see its intertextual affinities with Isokrates' own *Helen*.

[1] See Dunbar 1995, note on 1700-1.

[2] For more names see Untersteiner (1954), p.94 with notes.

[3] 1876, p.50.

[4] This can be inferred from the letters on the inscription; it is reasonable to assume that the statue was dedicated some time after G.'s death (which probably occurred some time after 380; I deduce that simply on the basis of his long life, not on the information concerning Iason), and if this is true the statue was dedicated there

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granted that this statue is later than the one in Delphi (see Test. 8), because the inscription clearly refers to the latter. It seems that the dedication of a golden statue had caused negative comments, because Eumolpos thought it wise to mention that by the dedication he did not mean to show off wealth, but to pay tribute to G.[1]

A good deal of the sources provide us mostly with anecdotal material about G. Ailianos (Test.9) tells us that he, and Hippias, used to wear purple clothes, "as though to emphasise their continuation of the functions of poets in earlier days";[2] if this information is true, it may also be an indication of the emphasis that G. placed on the external appearance and the ritualistic gestures that perhaps accompanied his displays.[3]

Athenaios (Test.11) says that when G. was asked how he achieved such a long life, he responded that he never did something for his own pleasure, although he says that Demetrios records a

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either at the end of the first or at the beginning of the second quarter of the fourth century.

[1] Both dedications have ingeniously been discussed by Morgan (1994, p.375-386), in relation to Plato's *Phaidros* 235d6-236b4, where Phaidros promises Sokrates that he will dedicate a golden statue of him, if the latter will manage to deliver a speech on the subject of love which will be better than Lysias' one. Morgan believes, and convincingly shows, that the reference is to the statues of G., and that it serves as "an implicit critique of Gorgias' dedicatory practice" which "is not merely a passing blow at the sophist, but is integrated with the major themes of the dialogue: the quality of the virtuous life, the practice of writing, and the kind of immortality that one should aim for" (p.386).

[2] Kerferd (1981), p.29.

[3] It is well known that in his *Clouds* Aristophanes caricatures the Sophists for being particularly poor; they have an empty stomach, they walk barefoot, they have to go through numerous hardships etc. In three cases they are presented as securing their clothing by smuggling people's clothes (179, 497, 859). It is evident that Aristophanes does not have fifth-century Sophists in mind; notice that Plato (*Hipp.mi.* 368bff.) depicts Hippias – who is mentioned by Ailianos – skilful enough to make his own rings, sandals, clothes and belts of the 'Persian' type, which are πολυτελῶν (they cost a fortune). Dover, in his edition of the play, p.xxxix-xl suggests that Aristophanes attributes asceticism to the Sophists probably by generalizing a typical characteristic of the Pythagoreans.

different answer: 'I did nothing for someone else', which may probably be related to the fact that G. was a bachelor;[1] a very similar answer is provided by Stobaios (fr.11). Cicero (Test.12) gives a different version: G. was asked why he wanted to be alive for so many years; his answer was, that he did not have any complaints against being elderly. When death was about to come he said to someone who came to see him: 'Sleep is now about to hand me to his brother [namely Death]'.[2]

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[1] Buchheim (1989), p.203 adopts a different view, but the dictum is so enigmatic that nothing can be said with certainty.

[2] Cp.Test.15.

II. GORGIAS' STYLE

i. *Stylistic features*

a) *epanalepsis*

1. <u>repetition of units of utterance</u>

No other known prose author makes such a great use of repetition as G.[1] The effect of this device becomes even more spectacular by virtue of the fact that the elements repeated are placed very close to each other. Sometimes no other units intervene between two similar words, and frequently there are just one or two.[2]

epanalepsis in G. either coexists with other stylistic devices, or else it results directly from them. As will be shown later, repetition and balanced *antithesis* are interrelated, but an equally important device that produces repetition is the *polyptoton*. Some examples include: *Hel.* 4 ἑνὶ δὲ σώματι πολλὰ σώματα συνήγαγεν ἀνδρῶν, *Hel.* 18 πολλὰ δὲ πολλοῖς πολλῶν, *Pal.* 8 ἐμοί τε παρ' ἐκείνου ἐκείνῳ τε παρ' ἐμοῦ (notice the chiasm as well). Other less complicated *epanalepses*, very common in *Pal.*, involve *anadiplosis*, as in 36 εὐεργέτην τῆς Ἑλλάδος, Ἕλληνες Ἕλληνα or Ἕλληνας Ἑλλήνων in 37. The *schema etymologicum* also makes its presence, as in *Pal.* 13, τοὺς μεγίστους κινδύνους κινδυνεύειν. To these features one should add the climax attempted in *Pal.* 23: περὶ δὲ τῶν γενομένων οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥᾴδιον, οὐδὲ μόνον ῥᾴδιον, ἀλλά....

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[1] See Dover (1997), p. 136ff.

[2] Dover (1997), p.136-7 evinces statistically that G. "must have sought close recurrence deliberately" (see Table 7.2), but he also claims that "whatever praise or blame is deserved for the 'invention' of close recurrence should be attached not to him but to moralizing aphorisms", such as the passage from Hesiod's *Works and Days* (352-5) that he cites.

Anthypophora and questions are sometimes followed by recurrences; so in *Pal.* 7, the hero asks τίνι τίς ὤν...πότερα μόνος μόνῳ; Anthypophora (a string of questions answered by the speaker) plays an important role in the section of *Pal.* where G. seeks to show that the act of treason was impossible; so in 9, P. says that one may allege that he made a pledge with Priam by means of money, and he poses the question: πότερον οὖν ὀλίγοις; He immediately retorts, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀντὶ μεγάλων ὑπουργημάτων ὀλίγα χρήματα λαμβάνειν. He then refutes the possibility that he got a large amount of money by asking how was it possible to transfer the money, and he goes on: τίς οὖν ἦν ἡ κομιδή; πῶς δ᾽ ἂν <ἦ εἷς> ἐκόμισεν ἦ πολλοί; πολλῶν γὰρ κομιζόντων πολλοὶ ἂν ἦσαν μάρτυρες τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς, ἑνὸς δὲ κομίζοντος οὐκ ἂν πολύ τι τὸ φερόμενον ἦν. As this example shows it is practically impossible to track down a passage where stylistic devices will not include *antithesis*.

There are some cases where the elements repeated are not very close to each other, as in *Pal.* 11 (πράττειν) and 16, with the dazzling recurrence of τιμή and its products, but they are admittedly very few. Parallelism, a very important feature in G.'s prose unavoidably results in repetitions as well. So, in *Hel.* 11 we find: ἡ δὲ δόξα σφαλερὰ καὶ ἀβέβαιος οὖσα σφαλεραῖς καὶ ἀβεβαίοις ἐπιτυχίαις περιβάλλει τοὺς αὐτῇ χρωμένους .

Pleonasm, redundant repetition, stresses important points, as the one made in *Pal.* 29 concerning his previous life: ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος ἀναμάρτητος ὁ παροιχόμενος βίος ἐστί μοι, καθαρὸς πάσης αἰτίας or in *Hel.* where G. becomes very analytical about the laws as they are dictated by nature: πέφυκε γὰρ οὐ τὸ κρεῖσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἥσσονος...καὶ τὸ μὲν κρεῖσσον ἡγεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἧσσον ἕπεσθαι (6).

We may now discuss some of the repetitions that G. seems to be fond of. He shows a preference for παντ- derivatives, and this may belong to the style of the prose composed by the Sophists, because Plato pokes fun at it in his *Menexenos* (247e). So in *Pal.* 12 we find a striking *polyptoton* with πάντες, after a lower-scale repetition of

ἅπας (notice that the next paragraph starts with one more πάντ-); later, in 19, we read πάντες πάντα πράττουσι (the *parechesis* of /p/ in παντ- repetition is very common), and πᾶσι περὶ παντός ἐστι. In 24 we find κοινὸν ἅπασι περὶ πάντων. Apart from that, there is a specific kind of repetition which G. uses when he wants to produce strong correspondences. So, when in *Hel.* G. claims that Paris deserves an eye-for-an-eye and a tooth-for-a-tooth punishment, he writes: ἄξιος οὖν ὁ μὲν ἐπιχειρήσας βάρβαρος βάρβαρον ἐπιχείρημα καὶ λόγῳ καὶ νόμῳ καὶ ἔργῳ λόγῳ μὲν αἰτίας, νόμῳ δὲ ἀτιμίας, ἔργῳ δὲ ζημίας τυχεῖν (8). A similar example, accentuated with a question, can be tracked down in *Pal.*22: φράσον τούτοις <τὸν τρόπον>, τὸν τόπον, τὸν χρόνον, πότε, ποῦ, πῶς εἶδες;. Finally, one should mention the passage from active to passive voice (ὁ μὲν οὖν πείσας ὡς ἀναγκάσας ἀδικεῖ, ἡ δὲ πεισθεῖσα ὡς ἀναγκασθεῖσα μάτην ἀκούει κακῶς 12, or ἐταράχθη καὶ ἐτάραξε τὴν ψυχὴν *Hel.* 16).

To these types of repetition we should add the recurrences of elements (mainly in *Hel.*) which are significantly distanced from each other, or even repeated in different texts. In *Hel.* 6, G. gives the four possible reasons that made the heroine travel to Troy. The same words – along with the statement of the author's reassurance that he has completed the task that he had programmatically stated in the prologue – are used in the epilogue of this text in the reverse order. Another interesting example is the repetition of the derivatives of πόριμος in *Pal.*, which is undoubtedly intended to bring out the situation Palamedes is in (e.g. διδασκάλων ἐπικινδυνοτέρων ἢ πορμωτέρων τυχεῖν 4), as opposed to his proverbially resourceful personality (see 30 τίς γὰρ ἂν ἐποίησε τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον πόριμον ἐξ ἀπόρου...). Some expressions can also be found in both *Hel.* and *Pal.* The λαβοῦσα καὶ οὐ λαθοῦσα in *Hel.* 4, becomes ἔλαβον, ἔλαθον λαβών (*Pal.*11). Similarly, the description of the function of φάρμακα as lethal substances in *Hel.* 14 (καὶ τὰ μὲν

νόσου τὰ δὲ βίου παύει), is altered in *Pal.* to define death and a bad reputation (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ βίου τέλος, ἡ δὲ τῷ βίῳ νόσος)

2. *epanalepsis* in sound

It is natural that the repetitions of words or phrases produce similarities in sound. But G. does not confine himself to that, as his preserved texts are marked by a manifestly deliberate recurrence of similar sounds. Traditionally, such devices as *homoeoteleuton* and *paronomasia* are not analysed under the heading of *epanalepsis*. However, it is primarily through repetition of phonemes that these devices are achieved, and this is why I discuss them in connection with *epanalepsis*.

Critics imputed to G. redundant sound play; independently of how annoying or gracious the frequency of sound-plays may be, we should bear in mind that form is not simply the robe of content. Similarity in sound is in most of the cases inextricably interwoven with meaning; for example, when G. says ἴση γὰρ ἁμαρτία καὶ ἀμαθία μέμφεσθαί τε τὰ ἐπαινετὰ καὶ ἐπαινεῖν τὰ μωμητά, he clearly intends to stress the opposition between ἐπαινετά and μωμητά. In other words, the similarity in sound serves to transfer the meaning of the one element to the meaning of the other, in a way which resembles very much the 'metaphor' of meaning attempted in rhyming poetry. The devices I shall discuss are the following: (i) *isocolon*, (ii) *homoeoteleuton*,[1] (iii) *parison*, (iv) *paronomasia*, and (v) *parechesis*.[2]

All the first three devices are very frequently combined; so in the *Epitaphios* we read Διὸς μὲν ἀγάλματα, ἑαυτῶν δὲ ἀναθήματα. Several striking combinations of them in *Hel.* are also

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[1] Sometimes G. transposes the similarity of sound from the end to the beginning of sentences (see Smith 1921, p.351, and Dover 1997, p.152); the technical term for this device is *homoikatarkton*.

[2] For reasons of a more economical presentation of examples under the heading *parechesis* I include invariably alliteration and assonance.

worth noticing. In 2 we read μέμφεσθαί τε τὰ ἐπαινετὰ καὶ ἐπαινεῖν τὰ μωμητά, and later εἰ δὲ βίᾳ ἡρπάσθη καὶ ἀνόμως ἐβιάσθη καὶ ἀδίκως ὑβρίσθη. A perfectly balanced construction ending with *homoeoteleuton*[1] is the one closing the examination of the first cause in *Hel.*: εἰ οὖν τῇ Τύχῃ καὶ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναθετέον, ἢ τὴν Ἑλένην τῆς δυσκλείας ἀπολυτέον. *Pal.* offers several examples as well; P. expresses the cornerstones of his argumentation as follows: οὔτε γὰρ βουληθεὶς ἐδυνάμην οὔτε δυνάμενος ἐβουλήθην ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν τοιούτοις (5). *Epitaphios* is no less marked by such constructions, as θεράποντες μὲν τῶν ἀδίκως δυστυχούντων, κολασταὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδίκως εὐτυχούντων.

Homoeoenarcton, epanalepsis of initial syllables, is again a field in which G. is at home. Some examples: ἁμαρτία καὶ ἀμαθία, ὁμόφωνος καὶ ὁμόψυχος, φιλονίκου φιλοτιμίας, ἀπολογήσασθαι...ἀπολύσασθαι, (*Hel.* 1, 2, 4, 8); βίος δὲ οὐ βιωτὸς (which is also an oxymoron), ἀνάξιος ἀνάξια, ἴσως ἴσον, ἀδικῶ...ἀδικηθῆναι, ἄθεον, ἄδικον, ἄνομον, ἄξιον ἀξιῶσαι (*Pal.*21, 22, 23. 33, 36, 37). In *Epitaphios* we find τὸ δέον ἐν τῷ δέοντι, ὑβρισταὶ εἰς τοὺς ὑβριστάς..., ἐρώτων...ἔριδος.

Paronomasia is the word-play which involves sound assimilation between signifiers that are semantically related to each other in various ways. In *Pal.* for example G. plays with the antonyms κράτιστος and κάκιστος twice: in 2 (ὥσπερ δι᾽ ἐκεῖνα κράτιστος ἂν ἦν ἀνήρ, οὕτω διὰ ταῦτα κάκιστος ἂν εἴη) and in 14 (ἀντὶ τοῦ κρατίστου τὸ κάκιστον). Another word-play G. seems to enjoy is the one with συν-compound verbs denoting knowledge, which are combined with similar compound verbs used of existence. In *Pal.* 11, we find τῶν συνόντων, σύνειμι, ξύνοιδε and later in 15 σύνεστε γάρ μοι, διὸ σύνιστε ταῦτα. But playing with words denoting knowledge does not stop here. In 22, P. will contend that 'if you know (εἰδώς), you do know (οἶσθα) because you saw (ἰδών),

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[1] Dover's (1997), p.153 comparison of the frequency of *homoeoteleuton* in G. with other authors proves that "again, G. leads the field".

or because...'. The unreliability of δόξα is later expressed as follows: δόξῃ πιστεύσας ἀπιστοτάτῳ πράγματι (24)[1]. To these examples we may add the ironical use of καινός in (26), used of λόγος, probably alluding to κενός, that is 'empty', 'meaningless' (although these words were not homophones, as they are in modern Greek).

We may now pass to *parechesis*. G.'s play with sounds within phrases or sentences is extremely complicated, undoubtedly the fruit of meticulous composition. Apart from the repetition of a single consonant known as alliteration (see *Hel.* 4 πλείστας...ἀνδρῶν, with the insisting /s/), he very regularly pursues assonance, that is the repetition of combinations of vowels with consonants, arranged in various manners (i.e. in some cases we find the same consonant followed or preceded by the same consonant, in some others it is the vowel that remains the same etc.). In *Hel.* 3 we read περὶ ἧς ὅδε ὁ λόγος, οὐκ ἄδηλον, οὐδὲ ὀλίγοις. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς μητρὸς μὲν Λήδας, with the combinations *de – dêl – ude – dêl – lêd*. In *Pal.* we find ἔλαβον, ἔλαθον λαβών with *elab – elath – lab* (11) and παραδώσουσιν, μισθὸν τῆς προδοσίας ἀντιδιδόντες (21); a reversal of the order of the phonemes is traced in ἀποβαλόντα...ἀναλάβοι τις (21). Other examples from *Hel.* would include προμηθία / προθυμία 6 and σμικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ 8. Lastly, a remarkable sentence full of assonance, is the one closing the *Epitaphios*.

b. *Symmetry*

1. *antithesis*

Probably no other author in antiquity used symmetrical *antithesis* as much as G. did;[2] it has been remarked that in some cases G.

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[1] For more examples, see Schiappa 1999, p.90-1.

[2] Dover's calculations (1997), p.151 reassure me in making this point (see his Table 7.4). As he says "Gorgias' use of symmetry is prodigious".

conjoins antithetical words or notions even in places where they are useless (e.g. ἐκεῖνος μὲν διδούς, ἐγὼ δὲ λαμβάνων *Pal.* 9). This may well be true but the frequency of contrasted items in his prose is not simply the product of his general tendency for polished symmetry. Closer reading of the techniques of reasoning employed by him clearly shows that G. bases a good deal of his argumentation on polarities. One cannot be far from truth if one concludes that the distinctly antithetical form of his prose coincides with rhetorical tactics that rely on antinomical syllogisms.

The most recurrent type of argument from antinomy is the one in which G. proposes two possible options which contradict each other, in which case he does very little to vary his diction. In *Hel.* 6 he repeats the antithetical pair κρεῖσσον / ἦσσον three times, he then picks up κρεῖσσον once more in comparing the gods to men; another example is found in *Pal.2*: πότερά με χρὴ δικαίως ἀποθανεῖν ἢ μετ᾽ ὀνειδῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῆς αἰσχίστης αἰτίας βιαίως ἀποθανεῖν 18 (an instance where he varies his wording is *Pal.*18 where he uses βλάπτειν and κακῶς ἐποίουν; but the second alternative comes a few lines later in the paragraph), so as the one member of the antithesis to counterbalance the other both in form and content (μέμφεσθαί τε...μωμητά 1; in *Pal.*, οὔτε γὰρ βουληθείς...ἐβουλήθην 5, ἀλλὰ χρήματα μὲν...κτᾶσθαι 15). The symmetrical construction of the antitheses is even more emphasised by the coexistence of other stylistic devices, such as the *paromoiosis* (ἡγεῖσθαι / ἄγεσθαι, θεοῦ γὰρ προθυμίαν...ἀνθρωπίνῃ προμηθίᾳ *Hel.* 6, and ἐπαγωγοί / ἀπαγωγοί 10), complicated chiasms (τὸν τότε...ἀρχὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος *Hel.* 5), questions and hypophora (see *Pal.* 9, 10,), *isocolon, parison* and *homoeoteleuton* (e.g. ταῦτα γὰρ προνοήσασι μὲν δυνατά, μετανοήσασι δὲ ἀνίατα *Pal.*34) and sound-plays which to a certain degree are unavoidable due to the abundance of repetitions of the same words.

There are very few paragraphs in G.'s texts in which antithesis is absent. With great care he opposes words to words, phrases to

phrases, clauses to clauses. Some examples: in *Hel.* ψευδομένους...τἀληθὲς 2, θεοῦ...θνητοῦ 3, ἀλκῆς ἰδίας εὐεξίαν...ἐπικτήτου δύναμιν 4, ὁ μὲν ἁρπάσας...ἐδυστήχησεν (with the stressed antithesis between passive and active voice; cp. πείσας - ἀναγκάσας / πεισθεῖσα - ἀναγκασθεῖσα 12), and ὁ μὲν ἔδρασε δεινά, ἡ δὲ ἔπαθε 7, δυνάστης μέγας...σμικροτάτῳ σώματι 8, τέχνῃ γραφείς, οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ λεχθείς 13, λυπεῖν / ποθεῖν 18. In *Pal.*ἦ σαφῶς ἐπιστάμενος...ἢ δοξάζων 3, οὔτε γὰρ βουληθεὶς ἐδυνάμην...ἐβουλήθην 5, Ἕλλην βαρβάρῳ 7, πείσας ἢ βιασάμενος (although for G. persuasion *is* violence) 14, εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰμι σοφός...εἰμι 26, οὔθ' ὑπὸ...ἄρχουσιν 32. It would be useless to bring in examples from the *Epitaphios*, because almost every single line of this text includes an antithesis.

It would be more interesting, however, to cite some recurrent antitheses. G. opposes one to many three times (*Hel.* 4, 13; *Pal.*9), and the word βάρβαρος to Ἕλλην twice in *Pal.* (7 and 14): in both cases the two words are juxtaposed. ἐπιστήμη and εἰδώς are opposed to δόξα in *Pal.* 3, 22, 24. It is also remarkable how G. plays with the pronouns to distinguish the situation Palamedes is in from that of the prosecutor (ἐγὼ / ὑμεῖς, σέ γε...ἐμέ).

The most frequent conjunction in his antitheses is the μέν...δέ, but ἤ has a significant presence as well. A notable example of the μέν...δέ conjunction is in *Hel.* 3: μητρὸς μὲν Λήδας, πατρὸς δὲ τοῦ μὲν γενομένου θεοῦ, τοῦ δὲ λεγομένου θνητοῦ, ὧν ὁ μὲν διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἔδοξεν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ φάναι ἠλέγχθη. For ἤ in antithetical constructions one may compare *Pal.*18: ἀλλὰ δὴ φίλους ὠφελεῖν ἢ πολεμίους βλάπτειν. It should be pointed out that ἤ appears more frequently in *Pal.*, where disjunctive questions play a prevalent role in the reasoning.

2. symmetry in construction

Much attention has been paid to the absence of variation in the diction and to the symmetry in sound; yet, an equally important feature of G.'s prose is the symmetry in the construction of his sentences. Words or phrases are very commonly arranged so as to match other units of utterance with the same syntactical function, and in this way there is a remarkable parallelism in the surface structure of his sentences. As in most cases, symmetry in construction coexists with acoustic similarities.

This phenomenon is so frequent that only some examples can be presented here; for a better depiction of the phenomenon I intend to reproduce longer units of utterance, such as the first paragraph of *Hel.*, *Pal.*30 (πόριμον ἐξ ἀπόρου...διατριβήν) and *Epitaphios* (μαρτύρια δὲ...πίστει) (Key: A= article N=noun or pronoun, P-participle, n= nominative, g=genitive etc; p=particle, p*=the same particle as the previous one, Adj.= Adjective, Adv.=Adverb, c= conjunction, c* as p*, Pr=preposition, V=verb, Inf=infinitive, Part.=participle; when a participle functions as an Adjective I write Adj.)

Helen 1: Nn Nd p Nn Nd p Nn Nd p* Nn Nd p* Nn Nd p* Nn

An p* Adjn. Ng Nn

Na p c Na c* Na c* Na c* Na c* Na

V

Aa p Adja. Ng Nd Inf Ad p Adjd Na Inf.

Adjn p Nn c Nn

Inf c Aa Adja c Inf Aa Adja

Palamedes 30:   Adja Pr Adjg

c

Adja Pr* Adjg

Na c Adja Part. Adja Pr. Na

Na c* Adja Na Ag Ng

Na c* Ng Na

Na c Na Ng Adja Na

Na c Ng Na

Na c* Adja c Adja Na

Na c Ng Adja Na

Epitaphios: Nn p Ng v Ag Ng

Ng p Nn Ng p Nn

c Na

c Adjg Ng

c Adjg Ng

c Adjg Ng

c Adjg Ng

Adjn Pr Aa Na Ad Nd

Adjn p Pr Aa Na Ad Nd

Adjn p* Pr Aa Na Ad Nd

Adjn p* Pr Aa Na Ad Nd

c) *asyndeton*

There is a remarkable disparity in the distribution of *asyndeton* between *Hel.* and *Pal.*; in the former, *asyndeton* is rare, whereas in the latter one it is more regular. In *Hel.* there is just one example which is worth mentioning, located in the last paragraph: ἀφεῖλον τῷ λόγῳ δύσκλειαν γυναικός, ἐνέμεινα τῷ νόμῳ...[1]

In *Pal.* there are numerous *asyndeta* with nouns, adjectives and participles as in 3 πατρίδα, τοκέας..., 13 προγόνων ἀρεταί, χρημάτων πλῆθος (notice the sequence: nN, nN, N, Nn, Nn, where n=noun gen. and N=noun nom.), Ἕλλην βαρβάρους, εἷς ὢν πολλούς 14, δουλείαν ἀντὶ βασιλείας, ἀντὶ τοῦ κρατίστου τὸ κάκιστον 14, the remarkable τῷ νόμῳ, τῇ δίκῃ...in 17, ἐμαυτὸν, τοκέας...19, παραμελήσαντα...ἐστερημένον...διάγοντα...ἀπορρίψαντα 20, πεποιηκότι...παραδεδωκότι 21, the symmetrical <τὸν τρόπον>, τὸν

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[1] Schiappa (1999, p.89 n.5) observes that "the use of asyndeton at or near the end of a speech can be found also in Isaeus (6.62, 9.37), Aiskhines (1.196, 2.182), and Demosthenes (8.76, 21.226)".

τόπον...πῶς εἶδες 22, ἀδυνάτοις, αἰσχροῖς... 25, ἄθεον, ἄδικον... 36. There are fewer *asyndeta* with verbs as in the climax συνήλθομεν...ἔκρυψα 11, and in the intense challenging at 22 ἐλθέτω, φανήτω, μαρτυρησάτω..., which is the second strong *asyndeton* in the same paragraph.

In *Epitaphios* the *asyndeton* is employed in the accumulation of the virtues of the dead and by employing it G. encourages a faster reading of the text, which suggests that the dead did not lack any possible praiseworthy virtue and that these virtues are in fact so many that it is tiring even to enumerate them. This is further stressed by the fact that the phrasing immediately preceding the asyndeton is marked by the abundance of particles: καὶ λέγειν καὶ σιγᾶν καὶ ποιεῖν...καὶ...γνώμην <καὶ ῥώμην>, τὴν μὲν...τὴν δ'...μὲν...δὲ...αὐθάδεις πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, εὐόργητοι πρὸς τὸ πρέπον, τῷ φρονίμῳ...ὑβρισταὶ εἰς τοὺς ὑβριστάς...δεινοὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς.

d) *hyperbaton*

There is no significant difference in the frequency of *hyperbaton* in *Hel.* and *Pal.* Apart from the separation of the article from a noun, an adjective or a participle, which are common *hyperbata* in Greek language (at any rate 'correct' word order exists only in the teaching of Greek composition), it is worth our attention that G. often uses *hyperbata* in order to bring together two similar or antinomical elements. So, in τὸν χρόνον δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸν τότε νῦν ὑπερβάς (*Hel.* 5; is it a coincidence that ὑπερβάς appears here?) the *hyperbaton* has as a result the emphasis on the antithesis between 'time past' and 'time present' and a chiasm as well (see also ἀποκτεῖναι γάρ με...ῥαδίως, where βουλόμενοι and δυνήσεσθε 2; the words expressing the cornerstones of his argumentation in this text are brought together. ὡς ἀνάξιος ἀνάξια 22, ὅταν ἄνδρες ἄνδρα...34, τοὺς δὲ πρώτους τῶν πρώτων Ἕλληνας Ἑλλήνων 37). An excellent *hyperbaton* – to the extent that it can also be adduced as an

argument against those who impute to G. that he sacrifices the content for the sake of the form – is found in *Hel.* 15 οὐ χαλεπῶς διαφεύξεται τὴν τῆς λεγομένης γεγονέναι ἁμαρτίας αἰτίαν. With this wording G. can be assured that no one takes the charges against Helen seriously. What I read as an *hyperbaton* (see note *ad loc.*) can be found in the last line of the preserved passage from *Epitaphios*, because I believe that the best possible reading of the text emerges if we take ὁ πόθος to govern οὐ ζώντων. The fact that G.'s other *hyperbata* are not as long as this one should not prevent us from reading this sentence in the way I do for two reasons: first, because in *Hel.* 16 the verb is distanced from ὅταν that introduces the clause, secondly because G.'s period normally consists in smaller clauses and phrases, and thirdly because conclusions based on statistics are not always safe: if a stylistic device appears once, it is 100% this device.

e) *hiatus*

There is a great discrepancy in the distribution of hiatus between *Hel.* and *Pal.*; according to my calculation there are 94(+3)[1] in *Hel.*, 56 (+3) in *Pal.* and 19 (+1) in *Epitaphios.*[2] This discrepancy, along with other stylistic features, has been used by Schmidt as an argument[3] for the later dating of *Pal.* I believe though that such an argument is too shaky, and I would prefer to see in this discrepancy a depiction of the different character of these two speeches. It is possible that, as he intended his *Pal.* to be a speech for oral presentation before an imaginary courtroom, G. took care to compose a smoother speech. It is for the same reason that there is a

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[1] I exclude from my calculation *Hel.* 12, because the text is too corrupt; (+3) means that there are three hiatuses in places where the text is not well preserved.

[2] One should note that *Pal.* is a considerably longer text than *Hel.*, and this points even more to G.'s carelessness to avoid hiatus in the latter. No conclusions can be drawn from the *Epitaphios*, because in all likelihood it is fragmentarily preserved.

[3] Schmidt (1940 vol. iii), p.71. For a summary of views see Orsini 1956, 82-83, 87 n.1, and my discussion of the relation between the *Troades* and G.'s *Hel.* below.

significant decrease in 'poetic' diction and an increase in more dramatic expression (questions, apostrophes to the litigant and the judges etc.) in this text.

f) *Transition*

Every reader of G.'s works will *prima facie* discern that the author takes pains to signpost his passing from the one section of his speeches to the other.[1] This process, evident in both *Hel.* and *Pal.*, attests the didactic nature of his prose, as it makes possible the memorisation of how a speech should be structured. Instead of learning general rules about the structure of a speech, G.'s students were provided with ready-made expressions of general applicability. As may be expected this applicability is more overt in *Pal.* than in *Hel.*, because of the markedly forensic character of the former. It is to this text that we will turn our attention.

(1)'Η μὲν κατηγορία καὶ ἡ ἀπολογία καὶ ἡ κρίσις οὐ περὶ θανάτου γίγνεται.

(4) περὶ τούτων λέγων δὲ πόθεν ἄρξωμαι

(5) διὰ δισσῶν ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω τρόπων· οὔτε γὰρ βουληθεὶς...

(6) ἐπὶ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον εἶμι πρῶτον...

(12) πάντως ἄρα καὶ πάντῃ πάντα πράττειν ἀδύνατον ἦν μοι.

(13) σκέψασθαι κοινῇ καὶ τόδε.

(21) ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτ' ἂν <ἐδυνάμην βουλόμενος οὔτ' ἂν δυνάμενος> ἐβουλόμην...διὰ τῶν προειρημένων δέδεικται.

(22) βούλομαι δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν κατήγορον διαλεχθῆναι.

(27) πρὸς μὲν οὖν σὲ ταῦτα (of general applicability as a transition is the whole of 27)

(28) πρὸς δ' ὑμᾶς ὦ ἄνδρες κριταὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ...

(32) ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐκ ἐμὸν ἐμαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν· ὁ δὲ παρὼν καιρὸς ἠνάγκασε, καὶ ταῦτα κατηγορούμενον, πάντως ἀπολογήσασθαι.

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[1] See MacDowell (1982), pp.18-19, who rightly observes that this feature did not originate with G., as "Herodotos too sometimes announces what he is going to say, and later points out that he has said it".

(33) λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ ὑμῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐστί μοι λόγος, ὃν εἰπὼν παύσομαι τῆς ἀπολογίας.

(37) εἴρηται τὰ παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ καὶ παύομαι...ἔχει λόγον.

g) *Diction*

1. Dialect

G. writes in Attic dialect, and his texts are among the oldest extant examples of Attic prose.[1] Before his time, prose was written in Ionic dialect, and Herodotos and the medical texts are the main exponents of this prose. The reason why G. chose Attic for his teaching of rhetoric and for the exhibition of his potential in public speaking is eloquently explained by Dover: "[Athens] was the powerhouse of oratory, the meeting place of philosophers, and that is why Zeno (from Elea) and G. (an Ionic-speaker from Sicily) wrote in Attic"[2]. Apart from this obvious reason, G., as a vagabond professional teacher of rhetoric must have had every reason to express himself in the predominant dialect of the day, and this was undoubtedly the Attic dialect.

But if the choice of Attic dialect by G. is relatively simple to explain, the concomitant problems arising from this choice are

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[1] We have no knowledge about Attic prose before G. (see Blass, 1887, p.55). Finley (1939) has given strong arguments that favour the view that the style of the speakers in Thucydides is the one that they used, and that he remained independent of G.'s influence. In any case, almost nothing has survived from their speeches, for the practice of publishing speeches originates with Antiphon. Gagarin (1997, p.9) claims that Antiphon's *Tetralogies* are "perhaps the earliest works of Attic prose", but I am very reluctant to accept this both because we do not possess the whole of G.'s works and most importantly because the extant ones do not include any internal evidence (the case of Aiskhylos' *Suppliants* should make scholars more cautious, when they draw conclusions about dates on the basis of stylistic analysis). The information that he came to Athens in 427 does not necessarily mean that nothing was written by him in Attic dialect before this date (according to Gagarin 1997, p.4, Antiphon wrote his first speech around 430), because if it is true that he amazed the assembly, we may infer that he was at least fluent enough to make himself understood.

[2] Dover (1997), p.85.

rather intriguing. We may, however, start from a less complicated point. It is well known that G. came from Sicily, a place where people did not speak the language spoken and written in Athens. Was it then possible for him to produce such a polished prose? The answer to this question is clearly yes. One should not confuse a literary dialect with a local one; the Doric of Pindar is not the Doric spoken in Sparta or elsewhere.[1]

We may now pass to the most puzzling problem concerning G.'s decision to use the Attic dialect. We have already mentioned that the language of prose before our Sophist's time was the Ionic dialect, and that the earliest datable speech composed in Attic prose is placed around 430. However, there is little doubt that some Attic prose was in use as well; people always wrote letters, and the administration of the city included the issuing of decrees and laws. But before the emergence of early rhetoric, the only literary genre composed in the dialect which later became the language of science, history, philosophy, and oratory was tragedy.[2] And it is perhaps to this incomparably appealing literary genre that one should primarily turn, if one wishes to locate the linguistic paradigm of G..

From a morphologic point of view, G. employs, as most of his contemporaries do (mainly Antiphon and Thucydides) Ionic types, such as -σσ- (*Hel.*: κρεῖσσον, ἧσσον 4, 19, δισσαί 10; *Pal.*: δισσῶν 2, 5, 19, πεσσούς 30, τασσόμενον 32, *Epitaphios* δισσά), but like other current authors he is not consistent (*Pal.*: πράττειν 6, 11, 13, πράττων 19, κρείττονας 12). He uses θάρσος (*Hel.* 14; ρσ is the norm in tragedy) and πυρσούς (*Pal.* 30), σμικροτάτῳ (*Hel.* 8, probably to intensify the parechesis of /s/), τειχέων (instead of τειχῶν, *Pal.* 12), and he has ξύνοιδε instead of σύνοιδε in *Pal.* 11 (so common in Thucydides), but he totally avoids ἐσ- instead of εἰσ-. It is not safe

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[1] See Dover (1997), pp.83-4.

[2] Comedy as well; but the language of this *genre* is frequently colloquial and it may have been of little use as a paradigm.

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to say that all the above mentioned words are Ionic forms,[1] because as inscriptions show Attic dialect at the time of G. indifferently includes both -σσ- and -ττ-. Furthermore, it is hardly possible to attribute the preference to -σσ- or - ρσ- to echoes from poetry;[2] G. taught rhetoric in more places than Athens, and probably he had good reason to avoid forms that would mark his texts with the local Attic idiom.[3]

2. Poetic diction

The choice of words by G. contributes significantly to the overall result of his poetic style; but it should be made clear that the investigation of poetic words in G. differs significantly from that in other prose authors, because there is nothing to be compared to the systematic embedding of poetical techniques attempted in his prose. Where in other authors poetic vocabulary or other distinguishable deviations from the linguistic norm can be isolated, in G. elements from poetry haunt the entirety of his preserved texts. In other words, 'poetic language' as such ought to be taken to mean something different from poetic style, for the former is only one among other elements that contribute to the formation of the latter.

Such words as μῶμος (in *Helen* 1 we find μῶμον ἐπιθεῖναι, where later orators would have probably written ἐπιτιμᾶν), ἀλκήν, ἀπέπλησε, δισσός[4] (for which see my discussion on the dialect), προβλήματα, τοκεύς, ἔγκτησις, κακότης, χειμαζόμενοι, λιταί in *Hel.* and *Pal.*, or εὐόργητος and ἐνόπλιος in *Epitaphios* – to mention some examples – are not very frequent in prose. But it is with great

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[1] Schiappa (1999, p.102 n.17) too hastily concludes that "his Attic was not 'pure'"; but is there such a thing as 'pure' Attic?

[2] Sometimes the presence of the one rather than the other alternative may be due to sound-plays; this is confirmed by the use of πράσσοντος (instead of πράττοντος) in *Pal.* 27. However, this explanation should be restricted only in cases where the context clearly shows that the writer attempts *parechesis*.

[3] See Dover (1997), p.83.

[4] See Diels 1884, p.367 n.2.

reluctance that we quote these words, because defining an isolated word as poetic is in itself problematic. Poetic words become poetic in virtue of the context they are in or as a result of their combination with other words. Things become even worse if we consider that our knowledge of the language used by speakers that preceded G. does not amount to much. Aristotle, for instance, implies that, in general, early prose writers adopted a poetic style, because of its acceptability,[1] and brings in G.'s name as an example. If the norm was a style similar to that of G., then what is poetic for us (or for ancient critics) was not poetic at all to the ear of his audience.[2]

3. compound words

G. was fond of compound words and Aristotle gives us two examples (see fr.15): πτωχομουσοκόλακας, ἐπιορκήσαντας καὶ κατευορκήσαντας; no such long compound word can be traced in the preserved texts, but numerous less ostentatious examples would confirm Aristotle. In *Hel.* we find ὁμόφωνος καὶ ὁμόψυχος 2, φιλονίκου-φιλοτιμία 4, περίφοβος, πολύδακρυς, φιλοπενθής 9, παροιχομένων 11, ἐξεγοήτευσαν 14; in *Pal.* compound words are

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[1] Schiappa maintains that, "Aristotle repeatedly calls Gorgias' prose excessively poetic". But I cannot find anything disparaging in the passages he refers to. Especially in *Rhet.*1404a 24-27, G.'s style is used as an example, as Aristotle takes care to make a clear distinction between what happened when G. composed his prose, and the present situation (καὶ νῦν). In addition, the τοιούτους suggests the imitators of G.'s style, rather than the creators of it themselves (see Buchheim (1989), p.206 and Skouteropoulos (1991), p.175)

[2] Perikles' *Epitaphios* in Thucydides does not differ very much in style from a piece of G.'s prose, and if Finley (1939) is correct in maintaining that the historian remained uninfluenced by the manners of G.'s prose, the suggestion that G.'s prose was not construed as poetic is strengthened (see also MacDowell (1982), p.17 and Gagarin (1997), p.25).

considerably fewer, and in any case they do not seem to be favoured at the expense of simple words.[1]

It comes as no surprise that compound words provide G. with the opportunity to embellish his speeches with more sound-plays. For one can regularly find in his texts a juxtaposition of two compound words with either the first or the second element changed. In *Hel.* one can trace the following instances: ὁμόφωνος καὶ ὁμόψυχος 2, ὑπ' ἔρωτός τε φιλονίκου φιλοτιμίας τε ἀνικήτου (notice that G. avoids the τε..καὶ conjunction to bring the φιλο- words together); in *Pal.* ὁ δὲ παραδώσων τίς...ἐγὼ δὲ ποίᾳ δυνάμει παραλήψομαι 14, παρέξομαι τὸν παροιχόμενον βίον 15, σύνεστε γάρ μοι, διὸ σύνιστε ταῦτα 15. In *Epitaphios*, admittedly not marked by compound words, we find ἐμφύτου Ἄρεος...ἐνοπλίου ἔριδος, ἀποθανόντων ὁ πόθος οὐ συναπέθανεν.

It is also interesting to mention some cases where G. uses the above-mentioned technique to express or emphasise antithesis. So in *Hel.* 8 one finds καὶ λύπην ἀφελεῖν καὶ χαρὰν ἐνεργάσασθαι, in 10 ἐπαγωγοὶ ἡδονῆς, ἀπαγωγοὶ λύπης 10; in *Pal.* 34 προνοήσασι μὲν δυνατά, μετανοήσασι δὲ ἀνίατα.

ii. *The critics of Gorgias' prose*

a) Aristophanes, Plato and Xenophon

Unfortunately, all the critics who have something to say about G.'s prose belong to later generations, and their criticisms are mostly short comments made *en passant*, either in comparing the author they discuss with G. or using him as an example of a certain stylistic feature. It is also more than clear that a significant portion of these

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[1] This probably reflects the different purpose of G.'s two preserved speeches; *Pal.*, as a *paradeigma* of forensic argument, tends to be closer to what would be expected to be herd in a real courtroom (see also below my discussion of hiatus).

criticisms are not independent assessments put forward by individual authors: Aristotle's influence is overt.[1]

The earliest author who has some words to say about G. is Aristophanes; in both cases G.'s name appears along with that of Philippos, presumably one of his students. In his *Birds* (1694ff.= Test.5a) he calls orators ἐγγλωττογάστορες, that is people making their living from what they produce with their tongue (a metonymy for language), and in the *Wasps* (420=Test.5a) we are told that the judges destroyed G.'s pupil Philippos. Yet, there is a passage in the *Frogs* where it is possible that Aristophanes caricatures a feature of G.'s style that we have already discussed, that is the formulas of transition. In 907-908, Euripides says: καὶ μὴν ἐμαυτὸν μέν γε, τὴν ποίησιν οἷός εἰμι, / ἐν τοῖσιν ὑστάτοις φράσω· τοῦτον δὲ πρῶτ᾽ ἐλέγξω.... It is perhaps safe to assume that it is G. that Aristophanes parodies here, and that the practice of explaining how one will proceed to structure one's speech must have been recognised as typically Gorgian. For it cannot be a coincidence that Agathon's speech in Plato's *Symposium*, deliberately designed to resemble G.'s style (see below), starts with these words: ἐγὼ δὲ βούλομαι πρῶτον μὲν εἰπεῖν ὡς χρή με εἰπεῖν, ἔπειτα εἰπεῖν. And it is certainly no coincidence at all that we later find sentences like those in 196d (περὶ μὲν οὖν...εἴρηται. περὶ δὲ...λείπεται...πειρατέον μὴ ἐλλείπειν; for a pedestrian mimesis see Isokrates 10.8 τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου ποιήσομαι τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ γένους αὐτῆς).

We then have to move to Plato and Xenophon, who once more have not much to tell us about G.'s style. We have already pointed out that Agathon's speech should be construed as a parody of G.'s style. This at least seems to be Plato's explicit intention, voiced by Sokrates when Agathon completes his speech (καὶ γάρ με Γοργίου

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[1] Aristotle's views on Sophistic rhetoric are distorted even by modern scholars; Gagarin (1994) has shown that Kennedy (a foremost authority on ancient oratory), by quoting Aristotle in a fragmentary manner, reaches the conclusion that the Sophists relied solely upon probabilities (εἰκότα), and he thus makes the student of Plato agree with his master's thesis, as it is expressed in *Phaidros* 267a.

ὁ λόγος ἀναμίμνησκεν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἐπεπόνθη...198c). Another characteristic noted by Plato (*Gorg.* 449b9ff. and *Phdr.* 267a-b) is that G. (like Protagoras, see *Protag.* 334e, 335b) was able to make a speech as long or as short as he wanted to. Dodds says that "Plato's language seems to imply that the συντομία of Protagoras and G. was simply a laconic style, 'putting a thing in the fewest possible words'".[1] Apart from these sporadic remarks, and some more parodying of G.'s style in the *Apology* and the *Menexenos*, Plato has nothing more specific to say. At any rate, Plato was not primarily concerned about *how* G. or other orators spoke, but about the fact that rhetoric departed from truth. When he *is* interested in making points about the style of orators he uses his excellent rhetorical talent to mimic and thus parody them,[2] by using their own tools.

Xenophon does not have much to say; he simply puts in the mouth of one of the interlocutors in his *Symposium* a phrase (μικραῖς κύλιξι μικρὰ ἐπιψεκάζωσι 2,26), which is Γοργιείοισι ῥήμασι expressed; this, we may infer, is probably because of the compound verb ἐπιψεκάζωσι and the repetition of μικρ-. The only value of this short reference is probably that G.'s diction had become a synonym of ' grandiloquent speaking'.

b) Aristotle
The first author who has more specific points to make is Aristotle, who is anyway the first to attempt a systematic approach to rhetoric; yet, as it is well known, Aristotle is not interested in individual orators, and for this reason we should bear in mind that most of the times G.'s writings are used by Aristotle as examples. We have already said that it is in his *Rhetoric* that he contends that G.'s style is poetic (1404a24-27; see the discussion of poetic diction and n.20).

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[1] Dodds (1959), p.195; in the same place in *Phaidros* Plato also says that through the power of speech, G. along with Teisias, managed to make unimportant things seem important, and also old issues seem new.

[2] See North 1991, pp. 201-219.

He elsewhere quotes G. to show how τὸ ψυχρόν results from compound words and metaphors (*Rhet.* 1405b 38, 1418a34-6; see notes on fr.15, 16), and that G. did not have any difficulty in developing epideictic speeches, as he included a good deal of material which was not directly related to them (see fr.17). He also says (*Rhet.* 1415b32-1416a3=fr.10) that the beginning of his praise of the citizens of Elis is too abrupt, but again, this should not be taken as a hostile comment, because the quotation from the beginning of this speech (it is thanks to Aristotle that we possess the three first words of it) is used to show that τὰ δὲ τοῦ δημηγορικοῦ...φύσει δὲ ἥκιστα ἔχει [sc. προοίμια]. However, none of these quotations comes from a preserved speech, and it is thus impossible to know in what context they were actually placed by G. But even the examples Aristotle cites do not always find their stylistic parallels in the preserved texts. There is not an equally clumsy metaphor, such as the one of fr.16, or such a dull word, as πτωχομουσοκόλακας (fr.15).

c) Cicero

Cicero pays much attention to the symmetrical construction of G.'s sentences; in the *Orator* 38 (*ut crebro conferantur pugnantia comparenturque contraria*) he remarks that some people maintain that symmetrical antithesis, along with *parison* and *homoeoteleuton* were firstly used by Thrasymakhos and G. He later rightly suggests that balanced clauses prompt rhythm (167), but he seems inconsistent, for at 175 he attributes the invention of symmetry solely to G.[1] Although he does not name G., it is clear that Cicero in *Orator* 84 has him in mind when he maintains that the author of 'plain' style will avoid similar endings, symmetry etc.

We may now pass to the more general points that Cicero makes about G.'s style; in *Orator* 39, he refers to Plato's *Phaidros* 266e, where the word λογοδαιδάλους is used to stigmatise G.,

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[1] See also Diodoros XII 53,2 (=Test.4).

Thrasymakhos and Theodoros. His exact words, by which he finishes his list of λογοδαίδαλοι runs as follows: *Theodorum inde Byzantium multosque alios quos* λογοδαιδάλους *appellat in Phaedro Socrates.* But if we turn to *Phaidros* 266e4 we find out that Plato refers to τόν γε βέλτιστον λογοδαίδαλον Βυζάντιον ἄνδρα, and he has not yet mentioned G.. It seems thus that Cicero generalises, so as to prepare the transition to a comparison of these rhetoricians with the *mirabiles* Herodotos and Thucydides. These orators, one of whom is G. himself, *satis arguta multa sed ut modo primumque nascentia minuta et versiculorum similia qaedam nimiumque depicta* ('they show many clever phrases but these are like a new and immature product, choppy, resembling verselets, and sometimes over-ornamented', Loeb translation). But not many critics, modern or ancient, would agree that Thucydides primarily, and Herodotos probably, *longissime tamen ipsi a talibus deliciis vel potius ineptiis afuerunt.* In 175-6, Cicero talks solely about G. and he there provides us with a piece of information which we cannot confirm: he says that G. overuses metaphor and embroideries that make the speech more joyful (this is what *festivitatibus* must mean), as he himself [sc. G.] calls them (*et his festivitatibus − sic enim ipse censet − insolentius abutitur*). Unfortunately, Cicero − if what he says is accurate − tantalises us here, as he does not give the Greek word for *festivitatibus*. We may speculate, and only speculate, that what he attributes to G. is perhaps associated with pleasure (τέρψις), which, according to our Sophist, has a pivotal role in persuasion (see *Hel.* 5, 13).

d) Poetic style and Gorgias as the εὑρετής of stylistic of devices

Most of the critics of later antiquity who refer to G.'s style seem to focus their attention on the poetical features and the use of stylistic devices in his prose. As we have already seen, numerous critics have been particularly ready to adopt Aristotle's view that

G.'s prose is poetic. Yet, it is perhaps more interesting that each one of them gives different reasons to explain why this is so.

Philostratos (who came to Rome when Septimus Severus was emperor), has more to say in the *Βίοι Σοφιστῶν*, at the beginning of which emphasis is given to the Sophists, and particularly to G. (see Test. 1); he first compares him to Aiskhylos, because each of them contributed significantly to his own individual art. After this general point, Philostratos passes to more specific details; he says that G. was the first to introduce unexpected expression (*παραδοξολογίας*), grandiloquence for important issues, *ἀποστάσεις* and *προσβολάς*, that is abrupt pauses and passing to different subjects, and finally he comes to poetic words, which aim at ornamentation and grandeur. Among these attributes, only a few can be confirmed by the extant texts. No one would doubt that G.'s style is pompous and abrupt (ancient critics would call it 'austere'), but *ἀποστάσεις* and *προσβολαί* are certainly not the most typical features of his style. His explanation of the function of poetic names does not present any originality to be discussed (he merely says that they function as embroideries and they add to the seriousness of the speech). Finally, *Epistle* 73, probably by the same Philostratos, addressed to Julia Domna, does not add much (see Test.35). Philostratos there reiterates that G. employed *ἀποστάσεις* and *προσβολάς*, which abound in Epic poetry.

A number of critics have derogatory points to make about the use of stylistic devices in G.; the great critic of the Attic orators, Dionysios of Halicarnassos, frequently mentions G. as a representative of the pompous and grandiose style adopted by early rhetoricians. Syrianus records Dionysios' suggestion (Test.29) that G., unlike Lysias, adopted the poetical style (*ἑρμηνείαν*) in prose, because he thought that orators should differentiate their speech from that of the average citizen. But if one considers the fact that Lysias wrote forensic speeches for a great range of people, whereas G. composed model-speeches which did not have to be in

correspondence with the personality of any historical person, one understands that Dionysios' explanation is not satisfactory. In other places Dionysios becomes more hostile; in *Isaios* 19.2 (=Test.32), he contends that G. was less competent in his use of poetical style and grandiloquence than Isokrates, because he lacked the self-constraint that this style requires, and he also characterises G.'s expression as 'childish' (παιδαριώδη).

In addition, it would be interesting to observe that in *Lys*.3 Dionysios quotes a phrase that Sokrates (Pl. *Phdr*.238d) utters to warn Phaidros that the rest of his speech about love will be expressed οὐ πόρρω διθυράμβων τινῶν; with this quotation, Dionysios becomes more specific: G.'s style is not only poetic, but it also adheres to a *genre* whose style is manifestly high-flown. Some features of this bombastic style are brought out in Aristophanes' *Birds* 1372-1409: it was characterised by a fondness for rare, compound words which have a significant presence in G.'s work (cp. Aristotle's criticisms of G.'s style above).

Dionysios, like many ancient critics, readily names such stylistic devices as *parisosis, antithesis, paronomasia* etc as Γοργίεια ('Gorgian'), a blanket-term which is meant to cover the combined use of these stylistic features; it was the excessive accumulation of these devices in his prose that made G. appear as their εὑρετής (cp. for instance Dionysios *Dem*.25.23).

Hermogenes, an author of the imperial era, claims that rhetors like G. were driven away (ἐκτραχηλίζουσι) by the tragedians, and by poets like Pindar, who elaborate a τραγικόν style (meaning here a pompous, majestic style, fr.5a). That he refers to G. is confirmed by the fact that he cites as an example of ψυχρόν style the phrase ἐμψύχους τάφους, γῦπας from the *Epitaphios*. His language is particularly vitriolic, for he describes 'sophists' as ὑποξύλοις, meaning 'faked', and he goes on to say that it is they whom we should truly call ἐμψύχους γῦπας. Hermogenes also comments on the disproportion of what G. and his students Meno and Polus say

with the way they say it (Test.29). He stigmatises their use of grandiloquent style for unimportant, common ideas, which is especially apparent when they employ devices, and all or some of the things that are embroidered, exaggerated, and finally pompous. There is little doubt that Hermogenes is one among the most hostile critics of G.

Diodoros of Sicily is the author who informs us that that G. arrived in Athens in 427. He attributes to him the invention of rhetoric devices, and he claims that G. amazed the Athenians, who were anyway taken in by nice words. He then specifies the stylistic devices that G. was the first to use: *antithesis, parisa, homoeoteleuton*; this information is, of course, inaccurate because we know that these features had a long history before 427, since they were developed by the Presocratics and the poets. It is perhaps more interesting to observe that Diodoros explains the plausibility of these devices on the basis of the difference in individual taste when G. used them from the taste of his contemporaries.

Athanasios Alexandrinos, in his Prolegomena on Hermogenes' Περὶ Στάσεων (see fr.5a) refers to Thrasymakhos' and G.'s students, who used *parison* without any restraint, but he also says that G. himself was unwise in employing it (κουφότατος), and he then ridicules him for using the well-known metaphor of γῦπας as 'living tombs'. It is the same metaphor that irritated the author of Περὶ Ὕψους as well. Yet, no matter how silly this metaphor may have appeared to critics, it proved to be an influential one (see comments on *Epitaphios*).

Another important critic of antiquity is Demetrios (the date of his work is unknown to us); the points he makes about G. concern primarily the period of his prose. Demetrios (I.12) calls G.'s, like Isokrates' and Alkidamas' ἑρμηνεία (his word for 'style') κατεστραμμένη, with tightly connected shorter periods, to which he opposes ἑρμηνεία διῃρημένη (that is periods loosely connected to each other). He later contends (I.15) that a good speech should be a

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mixture of both these two styles, because if it consists merely in dense periods, 'the audience cannot keep their heads on their shoulders, as if they are drunk, and they suffer from headaches (ναυτιῶσι) because of the oddity of what they hear, and they sometimes shout the end of a period because they know it in advance'. The last disclaimer must primarily concern symmetrical constructions, because, as we have already mentioned, G. does very little in them to vary his diction. There is one more word that Demetrios has to say about G., and this is that his (along with Isokrates') symmetrical κῶλα expressing antithesis contribute to 'highness of expression' (μεγαληγορία).

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version of the myth followed by G.,[1] Palamedes was falsely accused by Odysseus that he betrayed Greece to the Trojans. In order to support this accusation, he forged a letter ostensibly sent by Priam to Palamedes and placed it in the tents of the latter along with a quantity of gold. When Odysseus 'found' the gold and the letter, he accused Palamedes of treason, and after a trial heard by the Greek leaders the wise hero was condemned to death. G. divides his defence into two major parts: a) if I had wanted to betray the Greeks to the barbarians I would not have been able to do so (6-12), and b) if I had been able to do it I would not have wanted to do it (13-21).[2] The development of the argumentation in both parts makes abundant use of probabilities: in the first part, Palamedes proves that all the necessary stages for the preparation of the betrayal (communication with Priam, a pledge, the transfer of money etc.) were all impossible. His argumentation proceeds by conceding each step: in order to betray Greece I had to do A which was impossible; but even if A had been possible B would have been necessary; but B was impossible; even if B had been possible, and so on.[3] This first part is, basically, a presentation of probabilities which are proved to be invalid, due to practical reasons. In the second part, probabilities are employed in relation to motives. It is an exhaustive examination of possible reasons for which one might have been tempted to commit the crime of treason (money, power, helping friends etc.); each one of these motives is dealt with separately and much of the persuasiveness lies both in the conformity of the hero with generally accepted moral standards and in the detailed discussion of practically every possible motive.

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[1] For the myth of Palamedes see Introduction.

[2] Note that when probability arguments are employed, hypothetical clauses are very likely to appear; an εἰκός must have as its starting point a hypothesis, which is either confirmed or rejected; in *Pal.*, the two hypotheses are rejected, whereas in *Hel.* the validity of the four hypothetical reasons for which Helen deserted her home is confirmed (see also Anastassiou 1982, p.244).

[3] See below, 'the Russian doll' argumentation.

The *Encomium of Helen* is not marked by the use of
probabilities; the mythological version adopted here is the Homeric
one, according to which Helen *did* travel to Troy with Paris (cp. 5
ἔπραξεν ἃ ἔπραξεν); what is questioned in this speech is the
responsibility of Helen.[1] The invention of the reasons which made it
possible for Helen to travel to Troy is the only trace of probabilities
in this speech (cp. 6 τὰς αἰτίας, δι' ἃς εἰκὸς ἦν γενέσθαι τὸν τῆς
Ἑλένης εἰς τὴν Τροίαν στόλον). These reasons are the following: a)
the wish of the gods, b) natural violence, c) speech-persuasion, and
d) love. Each reason is dealt with separately (as are the motives in
Pal.),[2] and they are not mutually exclusive. At any rate, Helen is
innocent; but her innocence, in this case, does not mean that she did
not desert her husband, or that she did not travel to Troy with
another man: it means lack of personal responsibility.

The absence of probability-arguments in *Hel.*, and the ample use
of them in *Pal.* is a first indication that G. did not actually prefer
probabilities to truth, and that the use of this type of argumentation
is not a matter of choice, but a matter of necessity.[3] In the case of

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[1] Cole 1991, p.76 claims that *Hel.* "is an illustration of what later rhetoricians (for
example, Quint. 7.41) would call the *status qualitativus*", whereas "*Palamedes'*
defense…provides a model for the *status coniecturalis* – the type of argument
concerned with determining what actually occurred (cf. Cicero, *De inv.* 1.8.10)".
Gagarin 1997, p.122 saw both in G.'s *Hel.* and *Pal.* and in Antiphon's *Tetralogies*
"a foreshadowing of *stasis*-theory in Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1.13.9-10, 1373b38-74a17),
who distinguishes cases where the facts are in dispute from those where the facts
are admitted but the defendant denies there is a crime". At any rate, G. is aware of
the fact that the two cases differ to this respect, and this awareness is depicted in
both texts: *Hel.* ἐγὼ δὲ βούλομαι…ἀμαθίας 2, προθήσομαι τὰς αἰτίας, δι' ἃς εἰκὸς
ἦν γενέσθαι τὸν τῆς Ἑλένης εἰς Τροίαν στόλον 5, and *Pal.* οὐδὲ οἶδ' ὅπως ἂν
εἰδείη τις ὃν τὸ μὴ γενόμενον 5.

[2] See below, 'apagogic' argumentation.

[3] Gagarin 1994, p.54 rightly observes that Helen's "case seems well suited for
giving probability a higher value than truth, since many different versions of
Helen's actions existed…in which she did not go to Troy", and concludes "G. has
no reason to resort to probability arguments, since the basic facts are known and
accepted", though it is not certain if Euripides' *Helen* (included by Gagarin in

Pal., G. undertakes the defence of a man accused falsely. At the very beginning of the speech (4), he has Palamedes claim that he is in a situation of ἀπορία (although he is πόριμος *par excellence* 25, and indeed the hero who made human life πόριμον ἐξ ἀπόρου 30) due to ἔκπληξις created by groundless accusation. The only thing Palamedes can do is trust 'truth' (ἀλήθεια), and 'compulsion' (ἀνάγκη), which (or who) are dangerous rather than resourceful teachers (διδασκάλων ἐπικινδυνοτέρων ἢ πορίμωτέρων). Why is truth a dangerous teacher? Because in his case, the truth is that he has not committed the crime which he is accused of − a disclaimer which admittedly is not of much convincing value − especially in the absence of witnesses. G. certainly knows that judges are not persuaded by mere statements of innocence, which entails that an approximation of truth through arguments should be employed instead. This is exactly what probabilities serve for. In the case of *Hel.*, the defence does not refute the facts; G., neglecting the moral of Stesichoros' suffering, seems confident enough to adopt the Homeric version of the myth: Helen *did* go to Troy. By doing so, he does not need probabilities. What is at stake in *Hel.* is the removal of her infamy on the grounds of reasonable excuses; the notorious trouble-maker has been the victim of uncontrolled powers.

It seems thus that probabilities appear when facts are disputed and that they are more of a necessity than mere choice; but even in the discussion of factual reality, G. does not always prefer probabilities. He must have realised that other means of persuasion are sometimes equally effective and convenient. In *Hel.* 13, he claims that a speech written with skill (τέχνη) persuades an audience without necessarily telling the truth. The form of a speech is there considered as a determinant factor of persuasiveness; if the admirers of truth may now feel ready to argue that this is a further proof of

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these versions) existed before G.'s *Hel.* The dates of both *Pal.* and *Hel.* are uncertain; for some conjectures see Orsini 1956, p.82-88 with summary, and Introduction.

the (conscious) sacrifice of real facts for the sake of persuasion, there is the counter-argument that in cases like the one of Palamedes, the truth is that he *is* an innocent person, who has the serious task of defending his own honour and life. Who, in other words, would today accuse an advocate defending a victim of conspiracy on the grounds of his / her eloquence, especially in a case where the evidence is lacking?

Another vehicle of persuasion is, of course, direct evidence given by witnesses. In *Pal.* 22, the defendant holds that an accusation is stronger when it is accompanied by witnesses (πιστότερον γὰρ οὕτως τὸ κατηγόρημα μαρτυρηθέν).[1] In the following paragraph (23) the hero addresses Odysseus with the following words:

ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οὐκ ἦν οἷόν <τε> μόνον μάρτυρας ἀλλὰ καὶ ψευδομάρτυρας εὑρεῖν, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐδέτερον εὑρεῖν τούτων δυνατόν.

The point is that Palamedes, being innocent, could not find any witnesses of a crime which has never been committed; but Odysseus, on the contrary, was able to present both witnesses – in case Palamedes *has committed* the crime – and falsewitnesses[2] – as, of course, *he has not committed* the crime. The reference to witnesses, that is to say people with personal knowledge, shows that G. was aware of and able to use means which normally furnish direct evidence. This point becomes more interesting, when G.

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[1] The false accusation of Odysseus is implied in *Pal.* 7, where the defendant, for the argument's sake, concedes the possibility of communication with Priam, which entails that an interpreter should have been used. If this had occurred, the latter would have been a witness of the transaction. The failure of the opponent to provide witnesses or to accept evidence by means of βάσανος (cp. *Pal.* 11) is a *topos*; see Antiphon 1.6.13, 23 and 29-30. Most recently Plant 1999, p.66-67, 71.

[2] For ψευδομαρτυρία see for example Antiphon 2.4.7, Andokides 1.7, Lysias 19. 4.

attempts to transform Odysseus from an accuser into a witness or even an accomplice (22):

εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰδώς, οἶσθα ἰδὼν ἢ μετέχων ἢ τοῦ <μετέχοντος> πυθόμενος. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἰδών, φράσον τούτοις <τὸν τρόπον>, τὸν τόπον, τὸν χρόνον, πότε, ποῦ, πῶς εἶδες· εἰ δὲ μετέχων, ἔνοχος εἰς ταῖς αὐταῖς αἰτίαις...

To sum up, although probabilities are an important vehicle of argumentation, G. does not value them ahead of truth; εἰκότα are necessary in cases where real facts are disputed and where evidence is lacking.[1] Pleasure invoked in the audience by a skilled speech is also regarded by G. as a factor which plays an important role in its persuasiveness, so that a good rhetor should take this parameter into account. Lastly, it is clear that direct evidence presented by witnesses is known to G., and, what is more, he seems to be aware of the function of this type of evidence, so that he can argue by using it.

b) Argument from antinomy

This pattern of argumentation (Aristotle describes it as τόπος ἐκ των ἐναντίων) is founded on the location of antinomic or contradictory properties attributed to one and the same entity.[2] It occurs both in *On not Being* (*ONB*), where it is used for the refutation of philosophical arguments and in *Pal.*, where it is integrated in the characterisation of the opponent.

In *ONB* G. puts forward three major theses: a) nothing is, b) if it is it is unknowable, and c) if it is and it is knowable it cannot be communicated to others. A problem which has tantalised scholars is what exactly this 'it' refers to. Some scholars have said that it is the phenomenal world in general and some others that it is the

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[1] Cp. Arist. *Rhet.* 1376a17ff.: πιστώματα δὲ περὶ μαρτυριῶν μάρτυρας μὲν μὴ ἔχοντι. ὅτι ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων δεῖ κρίνειν...καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπατῆσαι τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἀργυρίῳ, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἁλίσκεται τὰ εἰκότα ψευδομαρτυριῶν.

[2] See Lloyd 1971, p.121 and Mansfeld 1990, p. 99-102

fundamental entities of the philosophers, abstract notions expressed by the term ὄντα.

In the second part supporting the first major thesis (namely, 'nothing is'), G., as the Anonymous author of *De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia* (*MXG*) informs us, collected contradictory properties (τἀναντία 979a15) attributed by philosophers to ὄντα; these contradictory properties, according to Anonymous, were discussed by G. after the 'original proof' (μετὰ τὴν ἴδιον αὐτοῦ ἀπόδειξιν 979a24), in which he sought to show that 'it is not either for being or for not-being'. In the version given by the author of *MXG* these properties are discussed in 979b20-980a9, were we learn that 'if anything is' (εἰ δὲ ἔστιν), it must be either generated or ungenerated, one or many, in motion or at rest.[1] Each member of these pairs is proved impossible (with syllogisms which partly derive from axioms of the philosophers themselves), and from that it is inferred that 'being is not'.

In *Pal.* 25-26, the hero addresses the litigant; it is interesting that he does not attack Odysseus on the grounds of personal characterisation (27, although numerous adjectives may have been used against Odysseus).[2] The characterisation of the adversary is

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[1] The list of properties attributed to ὄντα by philosophers is fuller in *MXG*979b20-980a9, for Sextus does not include the pair in motion / at rest. This pair is absent in the 'doxographical' summary in *MXG*979a14-18, but it is traced in Xen.*Mem.*1.1.14. (Mansfeld 1990, 246-247 investigates the historiography of philosophy as a Sophistic activity and he shows how later doxographical accounts depend on it. G.'s *ONB* does not merely intend to record earlier ideas out of historical interest, but it clearly seeks to refute them on the basis of 'logical' antinomies.

[2] Cole 1991, p.73 classifies the lack of *ēthos* as one among other characteristics of late fifth-century rhetoric: "the absence of any attempt to give *ēthos* to what is said by making it suggest the character of the person or class of person who is saying it...points to the demands of the practice and demonstration text" (p.79). There is no doubt, I think, that G.'s *Hel.* and *Pal.* are intended for practical didactic purposes, and a need for general applicability is also discernible; but this is rather different from saying that *ēthos* is totally absent. In his self-

built on two separate arguments: in the first one Palamedes explains that Odysseus rests his accusation upon belief (δόξα), which is defined as an ἀπιστότατον πρᾶγμα; serious accusations, we are told, should be based on firm knowledge.[1] The second part of the

characterisation, Palamedes lists his inventions, which are presented as a great benefaction to the Greeks and humanity in general (30). These are very unique virtues peculiar to this specific hero, and it is impossible to think of any of G.'s students who might have been in a position to claim that he was the inventor of letters. It is now true, that much of the self-characterisation of Palamedes makes use of standard moral values (29-32): he has never been accused of anything before (29; notice that λοιδορία, an inaccurate accusation, οὐκ ἔχουσαν ἔλεγχον, is imputed to the opponent); he does not cause pain to the elderly, he helps the young, he does not envy prosperous people, he sympathizes with those who suffer...(32): in short, Palamedes is in absolute conformity with moral standards and G. is thus teaching prospective rhetoricians how to use the stock of conventional morality. This does not, I am inclined to believe, imply the absence of *êthos*; it implies a twofold function of the self-characterisation: a) to present an impeccable Palamedes for the purposes of *The Defence of Palamedes*, that is a Palamedes whose profile does not deviate from the mythical account, and b) to offer a paradigm of general applicability. If my reading is correct, then Cole's suggestion seems to be an unjustified generalisation (I acknowledge, of course, that Cole examines a greater range of texts; my point is simply that G. is not among those who neglect *êthos*).

[1] G.'s texts have regularly been interpreted under the light of a distinction between 'knowledge' and 'belief'; the most eloquent representative of this line of inquiry has been Kerferd 1981, pp.81-82, who claims that "it is possible to discern a common conceptual model...on the one hand is the real world, labelled truth or that which is true. The cognition of this real world is knowledge. But the commonest cognitive state is opinion, not knowledge, and logos...operates upon opinion". Long 1982, p.240, has rightly explained that "this is an unjustified systematisation of Gorgias' principal preserved writings" (see also Schiappa 1999, pp.125-126). The artificiality of this distinction cannot be shown here; it will suffice to say that it appears only in *Pal.* 3 and 24, in a context which does not allow for generalisations. *Hel.* 11 has also been taken to depict the prevalence of knowledge, but knowledge is not mentioned there at all. It is simply said that 'belief' (δόξα) is slippery (see MacDowell 1982, note *ad loc.*). I consider that this systematisation is partly the concomitant of considering *ONB* as a treatise in which G.'s own theoretical credo is embedded and explicitly put forward. However, this text is (and probably was intended to be) open to different readings;

apostrophe to the opponent makes use of an argument from antinomy; what is at issue here is the unreliability of a litigant who in referring to a person, attributes to this very person contradictory properties.

In this context, Palamedes refers to the speech of accusation in which Odysseus had allegedly claimed that the defendant is both wise and mad: wise in respect to his resourcefulness, mad in respect to the fact that he betrayed the Greeks (25):

κατηγορήσας δέ μου διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων λόγων δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα, σοφίαν καὶ μανίαν, ὥσπερ οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔχειν. ὅπου μὲν γάρ με φῇς εἶναι τεχνήεντά τε καὶ δεινὸν καὶ πόριμον, σοφίαν μου κατηγορεῖς, ὅπου δὲ λέγεις ὡς προὐδίδουν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, μανίαν...

What we have here is a game of chess played by a single player: G., in defending Palamedes, has the privilege of answering accusations made by himself, while it should be noticed that these accusations could reasonably have been put forward by one who might have wished to capitalise on the overwhelming potential of this hero; if Palamedes is so resourceful, then he has probably used his resourcefulness for malicious purposes. The argument from antinomy, though more simple here than in *ONB*, is obvious; the 'two totally contradictory properties' (δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα) ostensibly ascribed to Palamedes by Odysseus make the latter's accusation contradictory itself, from which it is logically inferred

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far from putting forward new theories, it questions the validity of established ones. If the message of *ONB* is that philosophical systems claiming absolute approaches to truth are refutable, as I think it is, then it may turn out to be the worst source of information for G.'s own premises, if they existed at all. In my view, *ONB* should be read as a criticism on the *process* of philosophical reasoning, as a scrutiny of philosophical discourse. The fragility of philosophical reasoning recurs in *Hel.* 13 as well.

that his accusation is unreliable (πῶς χρὴ ἀνδρὶ τοιούτῳ πιστεύειν, ὅστις τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον λέγων πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ ἐναντιώτατα λέγει; note the αὐτὸς / ἐναντιώτατα antithesis). The defendant concludes that Odysseus is a liar (δι' ἀμφότερα ἂν εἴης ψευδής 26), by using the same argument. He asks him if he deems wise men as φρόνιμοι or ἀνόητοι; if wise men are ἀνόητοι, Odysseus' claim is a flagrantly untrue novelty. If they are φρόνιμοι they do not prefer sufferings to goods they already possess.[1] The conclusion is: εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰμι σοφός, οὐχ ἥμαρτον· εἰ δ' ἥμαρτον, οὐ σοφός εἰμι; in either case Odysseus' accusations are proved to be false, the opponent is a liar.

Logical argumentation is thus in G.'s hands a means of bringing out the *éthos* of the opponent; instead of a personal attack, we are provided with an analysis of the logical contradictions resulting from the opponent's charges. Two points should be made: a) the clarity with which this pattern of argumentation is presented serves as an example of G.'s teaching practices and the need for general applicability; having this example in mind, students of rhetoric can easily argue from antinomy. b) the *éthos* of the opponent (not that of the defendant) is not presented on the basis of personal attack; if one is reluctantly tempted to indulge in a discussion of the morality of Gorgian rhetoric by comparing the method of attack employed by G. with that used by fourth-century orators (say by Aiskhines in *Against Timarkhos*), where even false evidence is used against the personalities of the opponents[2], then we may conclude that G. was almost naïve.

c) <u>Theorisation and examples</u>
This pattern is related to reasoning involving speculation, which is not directly relevant to the theses defended. Criticism has focused

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[1] In the theory of rhetoric this type of argument is called *dillema*.

[2] On inaccurate personal attack, see Halliwell 1991, pp.292-294, Harding 1994, pp.196-221.

mainly on the discussion of λόγος by G. in *Hel.* 8-14; this part of the speech includes one of the earlier approaches to the function of speech and persuasion (πειθώ), especially in connection to its impact on the human soul: poetry, incantations, the perception of speech by audiences, persuasive speech are all employed to exemplify the omnipotence of λόγος. However, it is critical to bear in mind that G. does not support his argumentation by the means of theoretical discourse *solely* in this part of *Hel.* The final reason, namely love, is from the very beginning of its analysis linked to ὄψις ('vision'), and what follows is a theoretical evaluation of the function of this sense in relation with the emotional world.

The impact of λόγος upon the the emotional world of men has been admirably examined by Segal;[1] what I intend to do is to show a) the ways in which the combination of theoretical generalisation with the use of examples contributes to the argumentation in *Hel.* and b) that the separate arguments included in the discussion of λόγος and love are underlined by a common pattern of analysis.

In 8, λόγος is defined as a great ruler with extreme powers (λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν); the realm of His activity is chiefly the emotional world of men. In order to demonstrate the impact of λόγος upon our emotions G. brings in two examples corresponding to two different kinds of λόγοι: poetry, defined as λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον (9), and incantations, ἔνθεοι διὰ λόγων ἐπῳδαί (10). Poetry awakens within the souls of audiences emotions for the sufferings of others (that is, with the 'suspension of disbelief' audiences partake in the reality of the literary event), and incantations – by means of magical charming (γοητείας καὶ μαγείας) – make the soul act independently

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[1] Segal 1962, p.99-155; according to this scholar *Hel.* appeals more to the emotional aspect of persuasion, whereas *Pal.* makes use of logical reasoning. This distinction is somewhat elusive, because the *rationalistic approach* to λόγος is one thing, and the impact of λόγος upon the emotional world *itself* quite another (see Anastassiou 1982, pp.246-247).

of its own will. In both examples, speech enters the soul physically, and the schema applied is common in both cases:

poetry → soul → emotions

incantations → soul → enchantment

Both poetical and verbal incantations (διὰ λόγων) enter the soul (εἰσῆλθε, συγγιγνομένη) and they affect it.[1]

The same pattern recurs in the analysis of love (15-19); the logical discussion of a notoriously irrational emotion[2] is foreshadowed from the very beginning: G. links ἔρως to ὄψις and he remarks that 'the objects of our sight do not have the nature that we want them to have, but the one they happen to have' (15). The problem, now, seems to be that 'soul is moulded by vision' (διὰ δὲ τῆς ὄψεως ἡ ψυχὴ κἀν τοῖς τρόποις τυποῦται). An example which supports this thesis is brought in:[3] when soldiers face the weapon of the enemies, their soul is in panic, so that they fly without considering the detrimental consequences of their action (16). The function of ὄψις is based on the same pattern of analysis already employed in the context of λόγος-arguments:

vision → soul → flight (πολέμια σώματα...→ ἐτάραξε τὴν ψυχήν → φεύγουσιν ἐκπλαγέντες).

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[1] Mourelatos 1982, pp.229-230 rightly maintains that the discussion of *logos* in *Hel.* is basically behavioural, but he fails to observe that the same holds for the discussion of vision as well.

[2] This is explicitly acknowledged by G. (εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπινον νόσημα καὶ ψυχῆς ἀγνόημα, οὐχ ὡς ἁμάρτημα μεμπτέον ἀλλ' ὡς ἀτύχημα νομιστέον 19); the superiority of love because of its divine nature (ὃς εἰ μὲν θεός θεῶν θείαν δύναμιν <ἔχων>19) is not the cornerstone of G.'s reasoning (it is mentioned in passing), and it is worth noticing that it is rationalised in the way that divine powers are rationalized in 6.

[3] The examples adduced in 15-19 correspond to a distinction between negative (16, 17, mainly fear) and positive (18, mainly pleasure invoked by painting and sculpture) emotions.

Vision is again presented as coming physically (ἐλθοῦσα 16) into the soul, which is 'moulded' (τυποῦται 15; notice also that the images of vision seen in the past are 'engraved', ἐνέγραψεν 17).

The generalisation about the function of vision is completed with a reference to emotions aroused by fine arts (19). It is assumed that the function of painting and sculpture is to provide vision with pleasant images, and, what is more, from the products of art πόθος and ἔρως can be generated. If one can possibly fall in love with a statue (the example of Pygmalion is telling), then Helen's falling in love with statuesque Paris is perfectly comprehensible.

It has been made clear, I hope, that the reasoning in the discussion of both λόγος and love develops with a good deal of theorisation, which in some respects follows a common pattern of analysis concerning the relation of the stimuli to the emotions that they invoke in the soul. But what is the value of this pattern in association with the development of the reasoning for the case of Helen?

The answer is partly given by the text itself: at 12, Helen[1] is called a victim of persuasion, and at 19 we are told that we should not consider Helen's falling in love with Paris as a strange thing, simply because her eye (*sic*) happened to see his body. G. then uses theorisation because he relies on *analogies*: if λόγος is omnipotent, as it is shown that it is, in what manner could Helen escape his power? If objects of vision contaminate our souls, as it is shown that they do, how then could Helen's soul avoid contamination by the statuesque body of Paris? In the theoretical pattern of reasoning, the person defended is just another example that confirms the theory. In addition, theorisation has the virtue of explaining, giving logical

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[1] In spite of the textual problems the meaning is clear; G. is clearly trying to present Helen as a victim of persuasion. That he intends us to construe Helen as another example confirming the view that persuasion is as effective as violence and necessity is brought out by the wording itself (καὶ τὴν Ἑλένην).

meaning to things otherwise self-evident. Everyone has perhaps fallen in love; G. is there to show (in his own way) *why* and *how* this occurs. From an excuse love is elevated to a very important reason.

In conclusion, the discussion of λόγος in *Hel.* 8-14, however interesting implications for the history of criticism in antiquity it may have, is intended as a separate argument of *equal* significance; theorisation is used *both* in the examination of logos and in that of love-vision, where examples play an important role. The value of this pattern lies in that, by generalising, it is analogously applicable to individual cases (in this case, Helen). We also have to assume, that much of the persuasiveness of theorisation through examples may have been the product of ἔκπληξις experienced by audiences (or readers) resulting from the impressive ability of the rhetor to apply elaborate 'knowledge' to demanding intellectual issues. There is one more question: if λόγος is able to deceive, why should *we* become the victims of the person who has just shown that λόγος deceives? This is a matter of a second-order reading of *Hel.*, and should be left open.[1] Personal answers are, of course, always available.

d) Apagogic and the 'Russian doll' argumentation

I include these two types in my classification reluctantly, for they concern formal schemata of reasoning. However, I hope that the investigation of their role in G.'s reasoning will be compensating.

Apagogic reasoning is employed both in *Hel.* and in the discussion of motives in *Pal.*; in the former, each reason is dealt with separately, and none of them results from or presupposes the preceding one.[2] This is brought out from the text itself, because the

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[1] For the role of ἀπάτη in G., see Verdenius 1981, pp.116-128; although Verdenius' study is learned and still up-to-date, in my view the phrase 'doctrine of deception' clearly overstates our evidence.

[2] However, Porter 1993, p.275, is certainly right in holding the view that "if G. is trying to keep his *aitiai* apart, he is trying no less hard to make that task next to impossible".

transition from each reason to the following one is clearly marked (ἢ
γάρ...6 εἰ δὲ βίᾳ...7, εἰ δὲ λόγος ὁ πείσας...8 καὶ ὅτι μὲν, εἰ
λόγῳ...15, τὴν δὲ τετάρτην αἰτίαν τῷ τετάρτῳ λόγῳ διέξειμι 15).
G. invents four reasons, each one of which is intended to show the
same thing: Helen is not responsible. The same process is traced in
Pal. 13-21. G. distinguishes between two types of motives (19):
people commit crimes either in pursuit of a gain *or* in avoidance of a
loss (ἢ κέρδος τι μετιόντες ἢ ζημίαν φεύγοντες) *et tertium non
datur.* All the motives presented fall within those two categories; the
arguments put forward show that if the defendant had committed the
crime of treason, he would have had the opposite results. The
apagogic reduction both in *Hel.* and in *Pal.* is used because each
independent argument is meant to be perceived as being as strong as
the rest of them. In other words, G. is not compelled to present each
step in any particular order, because in these cases his material does
not impose upon him such a process.

On the contrary, the first major division of *Pal.* (6-12) proceeds
with the 'Russian doll' schema, which I take it to be an indication of
G.'s awareness that motives and actions corroborate the
argumentation in a different manner. As each new smaller doll is
brought out from a 'Russian doll', in the same manner each stage in
the discussion of the actions preparing an alleged betrayal is
presented as logically following the preceding one[1]. The more the
arguments represent a logical string of acts, the more the
argumentation is benefited; this is why the first argument deals with
what should have normally been the starting point of a betrayal (6):

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[1] In Long's words (1982), p.235 "the sequence of claims is assumed to be
exhaustive, leaving the opponent no perch for any reply", and further (237) he
points out that the elimination of the defendant's opportunities "amount to...a
reconstruction of the alleged treachery from its beginning to its end".

ἔδει γάρ τινα πρῶτον ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι τῆς προδοσίας, ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ λόγος ἂν εἴη· πρὸ γὰρ τῶν μελλόντων ἔργων ἀνάγκη λόγους γίγνεσθαι πρότερον...

That each argument concedes the preceding one is indicated by the introductory phrase of each new argument: ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο τῷ λόγῳ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι...7, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο γενέσθω, καίπερ οὐ γενόμενον...8, φήσει τις...9, καὶ δὴ τοίνυν γενέσθω καὶ τὰ μὴ γενόμενα...11 etc. It is also worth our attention that the second major division is actually introduced by conceding the first one: 'if it were by all means possible (εἰ μάλιστα πάντων ἐδυνάμην), for what reason would I have wished to do these things?' (6). The value of this type of argumentation lies in the fact that it presents a cohesive string of arguments, based on logical assumptions. It can be conceived as a representation of the crime, in which the defendant is able to show that what is presented by the accuser as a fact is nothing but assumption.

The same pattern is followed in the philosophically oriented *On not Being*; each one of the three major theses concedes the previous one: nothing is (A), *if it is*, it is not possible to have knowledge of it (B), *if it is and it is possible to have knowledge of it*, it is impossible to communicate it to others (C). Although the schema is the same, it is not used to the same extent in the individual arguments of this texts, as it happens in *Pal.* 6-12.

In short, G. seems to arrange his arguments in accordance with the nature of the case he defends; actions, normally developing in a linear, consecutive order, suggest a similarly linear and exhaustive representation, which demands some logical participation of the audience. In the case of self-contained arguments on the other hand the argumentation is *apagogic*; different theses are supported by independent arguments: in *Hel.* each reason is argued separately, so that the refutation of her infamy is based on four equally strong reasons; analogously, in *Pal.* 13-22 each motive is dealt with

separately as well, and it is shown that none of them could have led the hero to perform the act that he is accused of.

G.'s argumentative process does not merely consist in probabilities; Plato in his *Phaidros* (267a) simply singles out the type of argument which makes G. susceptible to criticism, in view of the fact that probabilities do not reproduce factual reality. A sober assessment of the argumentation used by this Sophist, which is based on a close reading of *his own* preserved texts, shows that various argumentative patterns are employed by G. and that he is wise enough not to ignore factual reality. G.'s reasoning is not as simple as it is usually taken to be.

TEXTS AND FRAGMENTS

11

Γοργίου

Ἑλένης Ἐγκώμιον

(1) Κόσμος πόλει μὲν εὐανδρία, σώματι δὲ κάλλος, ψυχῇ δὲ σοφία, πράγματι δὲ ἀρετή, λόγῳ δὲ ἀλήθεια· τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων ἀκοσμία. ἄνδρα δὲ καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ λόγον καὶ ἔργον καὶ πόλιν καὶ πρᾶγμα χρὴ τὸ μὲν ἄξιον ἐπαίνου ἐπαίνῳ τιμᾶν, τῷ δὲ ἀναξίῳ μῶμον ἐπιτιθέναι· ἴση γὰρ ἁμαρτία καὶ ἀμαθία μέμφεσθαί τε τὰ ἐπαινετὰ καὶ ἐπαινεῖν τὰ μωμητά. (2) τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς λέξαι τε τὸ δέον ὀρθῶς καὶ ἐλέγξαι τοὺς μεμφομένους Ἑλένην, γυναῖκα περὶ ἧς ὁμόφωνος καὶ ὁμόψυχος γέγονεν ἥ τε τῶν ποιητῶν ἀκουσάντων πίστις ἥ τε τοῦ ὀνόματος φήμη, ὃ τῶν συμφορῶν μνήμη γέγονεν. ἐγὼ δὲ βούλομαι λογισμόν τινα τῷ λόγῳ δοὺς τὴν μὲν κακῶς ἀκούουσαν παῦσαι τῆς αἰτίας, τοὺς δὲ μεμφομένους ψευδομένους ἐπιδεῖξαι καὶ δεῖξαι τἀληθὲς <καὶ> παῦσαι τῆς ἀμαθίας.

(3) ὅτι μὲν οὖν φύσει καὶ γένει τὰ πρῶτα τῶν πρώτων ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ἡ γυνὴ περὶ ἧς ὅδε ὁ λόγος, οὐκ ἄδηλον οὐδὲ ὀλίγοις. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς μητρὸς μὲν Λήδας, πατρὸς δὲ τοῦ μὲν γενομένου θεοῦ, τοῦ δὲ λεγομένου θνητοῦ, Τυνδάρεω καὶ Διός, ὧν ὁ μὲν διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἔδοξεν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ φάναι ἠλέγχθη. καὶ ἦν ὁ μὲν ἀνδρῶν κράτιστος ὁ δὲ πάντων τύραννος. (4) ἐκ τοιούτων δὲ γενομένη ἔσχε τὸ ἰσόθεον κάλλος, ὃ λαβοῦσα καὶ οὐ λαθοῦσα ἔσχε· πλείστας δὲ πλείστοις ἐπιθυμίας ἔρωτος ἐνειργάσατο, ἑνὶ δὲ σώματι πολλὰ σώματα συνήγαγεν ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ μεγάλοις μέγα φρονούντων, ὧν οἱ μὲν πλούτου μεγέθη, οἱ δὲ εὐγενείας παλαιᾶς εὐδοξίαν, οἱ δὲ

ἀλκῆς ἰδίας εὐεξίαν, οἱ δὲ σοφίας ἐπικτήτου δύναμιν ἔσχον· καὶ ἧκον ἅπαντες ὑπ' ἔρωτός τε φιλονίκου φιλοτιμίας τε ἀνικήτου. (5) ὅστις μὲν οὖν καὶ δι' ὅτι καὶ ὅπως ἀπέπλησε τὸν ἔρωτα τὴν Ἑλένην λαβών, οὐ λέξω· τὸ γὰρ τοῖς εἰδόσιν ἃ ἴσασι λέγειν πίστιν μὲν ἔχει, τέρψιν δὲ οὐ φέρει. τὸν χρόνον δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸν τότε νῦν ὑπερβὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος λόγου προβήσομαι, καὶ προθήσομαι τὰς αἰτίας, δι' ἃς εἰκὸς ἦν γενέσθαι τὸν τῆς Ἑλένης εἰς τὴν Τροίαν στόλον.

(6) ἢ γὰρ Τύχης βουλήμασι καὶ θεῶν βουλεύμασι καὶ Ἀνάγκης ψηφίσμασιν ἔπραξεν ἃ ἔπραξεν, ἢ βίᾳ ἁρπασθεῖσα, ἢ λόγοις πεισθεῖσα, <ἢ ἔρωτι ἁλοῦσα>. εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ πρῶτον, ἄξιος αἰτιᾶσθαι ὁ αἰτιώμενος· θεοῦ γὰρ προθυμίαν ἀνθρωπίνῃ προμηθίᾳ ἀδύνατον κωλύειν. πέφυκε γὰρ οὐ τὸ κρεῖσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἥσσονος κωλύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἧσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄγεσθαι, καὶ τὸ μὲν κρεῖσσον ἡγεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἧσσον ἕπεσθαι. θεὸς δ' ἀνθρώπου κρεῖσσον καὶ βίᾳ καὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. εἰ οὖν τῇ Τύχῃ καὶ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναθετέον, ἢ τὴν Ἑλένην τῆς δυσκλείας ἀπολυτέον.

(7) εἰ δὲ βίᾳ ἡρπάσθη καὶ ἀνόμως ἐβιάσθη καὶ ἀδίκως ὑβρίσθη, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ <μὲν> ἁρπάσας ὡς ὑβρίσας ἠδίκησεν, ἡ δὲ ἁρπασθεῖσα ὡς ὑβρισθεῖσα ἐδυστύχησεν. ἄξιος οὖν ὁ μὲν ἐπιχειρήσας βάρβαρος βάρβαρον ἐπιχείρημα καὶ λόγῳ καὶ νόμῳ καὶ ἔργῳ λόγῳ μὲν αἰτίας, νόμῳ δὲ ἀτιμίας, ἔργῳ δὲ ζημίας τυχεῖν· ἡ δὲ βιασθεῖσα καὶ τῆς πατρίδος στερηθεῖσα καὶ τῶν φίλων ὀρφανισθεῖσα πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως ἐλεηθείη μᾶλλον ἢ κακολογηθείη; ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔδρασε δεινά, ἡ δὲ ἔπαθε· δίκαιον οὖν τὴν μὲν οἰκτίρειν, τὸν δὲ μισῆσαι.

(8) εἰ δὲ λόγος ὁ πείσας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπατήσας, οὐδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο χαλεπὸν ἀπολογήσασθαι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπολύσασθαι ὧδε. λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν, ὃς σμικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ· δύναται γὰρ καὶ φόβον παῦσαι καὶ λύπην ἀφελεῖν καὶ χαρὰν ἐνεργάσασθαι καὶ ἔλεον ἐπαυξῆσαι. ταῦτα δὲ ὡς οὕτως ἔχει δείξω· (9) δεῖ δὲ καὶ δόξῃ δεῖξαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι· τὴν ποίησιν ἅπασαν καὶ νομίζω καὶ ὀνομάζω λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον· ἧς τοὺς ἀκούοντας εἰσῆλθε καὶ φρίκη περίφοβος καὶ ἔλεος πολύδακρυς

καὶ πόθος φιλοπενθής, ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίων τε πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων
εὐτυχίαις καὶ δυστυχίαις ἴδιόν τι πάθημα διὰ τῶν λόγων ἔπαθεν ἡ
ψυχή. φέρε δὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ἀπ' ἄλλου μεταστῶ λόγον. (10) αἱ γὰρ
ἔνθεοι διὰ λόγων ἐπῳδαὶ ἐπαγωγοὶ ἡδονῆς, ἀπαγωγοὶ λύπης
γίνονται· συγγιγνομένη γὰρ τῇ δόξῃ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δύναμις τῆς
ἐπῳδῆς ἔθελξε καὶ ἔπεισε καὶ μετέστησεν αὐτὴν γοητείᾳ. γοητείας
δὲ καὶ μαγείας δισσαὶ τέχναι εὕρηνται, αἵ εἰσι ψυχῆς ἁμαρτήματα
καὶ δόξης ἀπατήματα. (11) ὅσοι δὲ ὅσους περὶ ὅσων καὶ ἔπεισαν
καὶ πείθουσι δὲ ψευδῆ λόγον πλάσαντες. εἰ μὲν γὰρ πάντες περὶ
πάντων εἶχον τῶν <τε> παροιχομένων μνήμην τῶν τε παρόντων
<ἔννοιαν> τῶν τε μελλόντων πρόνοιαν, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως ὁ λόγος ἦν.
ἀλλὰ νῦν γε οὔτε μνησθῆναι τὸ παροιχόμενον οὔτε σκέψασθαι τὸ
παρὸν οὔτε μαντεύσασθαι τὸ μέλλον εὐπόρως ἔχει· ὥστε περὶ τῶν
πλείστων οἱ πλεῖστοι τὴν δόξαν σύμβουλον τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχονται. ἡ
δὲ δόξα σφαλερὰ καὶ ἀβέβαιος οὖσα σφαλεραῖς καὶ ἀβεβαίοις
εὐτυχίαις περιβάλλει τοὺς αὐτῇ χρωμένους. (12) τίς οὖν αἰτία
κωλύει καὶ τὴν Ἑλένην νομίσαι ὑπὸ λόγων ἐλθεῖν ὁμοίως οὐχ
ἑκοῦσαν ὥσπερ εἰ βίᾳ ἡρπάσθη; ὑπὸ γὰρ τῆς πειθοῦς ἐξηλάθη τὸ
νόημα. καίτοι πειθὼ ἀνάγκης εἶδος ἔχει μὲν οὔ, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν
τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει. λόγος γὰρ ψυχὴν ὁ πείσας, ἣν ἔπεισεν, ἠνάγκασε
καὶ πιθέσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ συναινέσαι τοῖς ποιουμένοις. ὁ
μὲν οὖν πείσας ὡς ἀναγκάσας ἀδικεῖ, ἡ δὲ πεισθεῖσα ὡς
ἀναγκασθεῖσα τῷ λόγῳ μάτην ἀκούει κακῶς. (13) ὅτι δ' ἡ πειθὼ
προσιοῦσα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐτυπώσατο ὅπως ἐβούλετο, χρὴ
μαθεῖν πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς τῶν μετεωρολόγων λόγους, οἵτινες δόξαν
ἀντὶ δόξης τὴν μὲν ἀφελόμενοι τὴν δ' ἐνεργασάμενοι τὰ ἄπιστα
καὶ ἄδηλα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς τῆς δόξης ὄμμασιν ἐποίησαν· δεύτερον δὲ
τοὺς ἀναγκαίους διὰ λόγων ἀγῶνας, ἐν οἷς εἷς λόγος πολὺν ὄχλον
ἔτερψε καὶ ἔπεισε τέχνῃ γραφείς, οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ λεχθείς· τρίτον
<δὲ> φιλοσόφων λόγων ἁμίλλας, ἐν αἷς δείκνυται καὶ γνώμης
τάχος ὡς εὐμετάβολον ποιοῦν τὴν τῆς δόξης πίστιν. (14) τὸν αὐτὸν
δὲ λόγον ἔχει ἥ τε τοῦ λόγου δύναμις πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς τάξιν ἥ
τε τῶν φαρμάκων τάξις πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν. ὥσπερ γὰρ
τῶν φαρμάκων ἄλλους ἄλλα χυμοὺς ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἐξάγει, καὶ τὰ

μὲν νόσου τὰ δὲ βίου παύει, οὕτω καὶ τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν ἐλύπησαν, οἱ δὲ ἔτερψαν, οἱ δὲ ἐφόβησαν, οἱ δὲ εἰς θάρσος κατέστησαν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, οἱ δὲ πειθοῖ τινι κακῇ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφαρμάκευσαν καὶ ἐξεγοήτευσαν.

(15) καὶ ὅτι μέν, εἰ λόγῳ ἐπείσθη, οὐκ ἠδίκησεν ἀλλ' ἠτύχησεν, εἴρηται· τὴν δὲ τετάρτην αἰτίαν τῷ τετάρτῳ λόγῳ διέξειμι. εἰ γὰρ ἔρως ἦν ὁ ταῦτα πάντα πράξας, οὐ χαλεπῶς διαφεύξεται τὴν τῆς λεγομένης γεγονέναι ἁμαρτίας αἰτίαν. ἃ γὰρ ὁρῶμεν, ἔχει φύσιν οὐχ ἣν ἡμεῖς θέλομεν, ἀλλ' ἣν ἕκαστον ἔτυχε· διὰ δὲ τῆς ὄψεως ἡ ψυχὴ κἀν τοῖς τρόποις τυποῦται. (16) αὐτίκα γὰρ ὅταν πολέμια σώματα καὶ πολέμιον ἐπὶ πολεμίᾳ ὁπλίσει κόσμον χαλκοῦ καὶ σιδήρου, τοῦ μὲν ἀλεξητήριον τοῦ δὲ προβλήματα, [εἰ] θεάσηται ἡ ὄψις, ἐταράχθη καὶ ἐτάραξε τὴν ψυχήν, ὥστε πολλάκις κινδύνου τοῦ μέλλοντος <ὡς> ὄντος φεύγουσιν ἐκπλαγέντες. ἰσχυρὰ μὲν ἡ ἀμέλεια τοῦ νόμου διὰ τὸν φόβον εἰσῳκίσθη τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως, ἥτις ἐλθοῦσα ἐποίησεν ἀμελῆσαι καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ διὰ τὸν νόμον κρινομένου καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ διὰ τὴν νίκην γινομένου. (17) ἤδη δέ τινες ἰδόντες φοβερὰ καὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἐν τῷ παρόντι χρόνῳ φρονήματος ἐξέστησαν· οὕτως ἀπέσβεσε καὶ ἐξήλασεν ὁ φόβος τὸ νόημα. πολλοὶ δὲ ματαίοις πόνοις καὶ δειναῖς νόσοις καὶ δυσιάτοις μανίαις περιέπεσον· οὕτως εἰκόνας τῶν ὁρωμένων πραγμάτων ἡ ὄψις ἐνέγραψεν ἐν τῷ φρονήματι. καὶ τὰ μὲν δειματοῦντα πολλὰ μὲν παραλείπεται, ὅμοια δ' ἐστὶ τὰ παραλειπόμενα οἷάπερ <τὰ> λεγόμενα. (18) ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ γραφεῖς ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν χρωμάτων καὶ σωμάτων ἓν σῶμα καὶ σχῆμα τελείως ἀπεργάσωνται, τέρπουσι τὴν ὄψιν· ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀνδριάντων ποίησις καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀγαλμάτων ἐργασία θέαν ἡδεῖαν παρέσχετο τοῖς ὄμμασιν. οὕτω τὰ μὲν λυπεῖν τὰ δὲ ποθεῖν πέφυκε τὴν ὄψιν. πολλὰ δὲ πολλοῖς πολλῶν ἔρωτα καὶ πόθον ἐνεργάζεται πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων. (19) εἰ οὖν τῷ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου σώματι τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης ὄμμα ἡσθὲν προθυμίαν καὶ ἅμιλλαν ἔρωτος τῇ ψυχῇ παρέδωκε τί θαυμαστόν; ὃς εἰ μὲν θεὸς θεῶν θείαν δύναμιν <ἔχων>, πῶς ἂν ὁ ἥσσων εἴη τοῦτον ἀπώσασθαι καὶ ἀμύνασθαι δυνατός; εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπινον νόσημα καὶ ψυχῆς ἀγνόημα, οὐχ ὡς ἁμάρτημα μεμπτέον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀτύχημα νομιστέον·

ἦλθε γάρ, ὡς ἦλθε, ψυχῆς ἀγρεύμασιν, οὐ γνώμης βουλεύμασιν, καὶ ἔρωτος ἀνάγκαις, οὐ τέχνης παρασκευαῖς.

(20) πῶς οὖν χρὴ δίκαιον ἡγήσασθαι τὸν τῆς Ἑλένης μῶμον, ἥτις εἴτ' ἐρασθεῖσα εἴτε λόγῳ πεισθεῖσα εἴτε βίᾳ ἁρπασθεῖσα εἴτε ὑπὸ θείας ἀνάγκης ἀναγκασθεῖσα ἔπραξεν ἃ ἔπραξε, πάντως διαφεύγει τὴν αἰτίαν;

(21) ἀφεῖλον τῷ λόγῳ δύσκλειαν γυναικός, ἐνέμεινα τῷ νόμῳ ὃν ἐθέμην ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου· ἐπειράθην καταλῦσαι μώμου ἀδικίαν καὶ δόξης ἀμαθίαν· ἐβουλήθην γράψαι τὸν λόγον Ἑλένης μὲν ἐγκώμιον, ἐμὸν δὲ παίγνιον.

τοῦ αὐτοῦ

Ὑπὲρ Παλαμήδους Ἀπολογία

(1) ἡ μὲν κατηγορία καὶ ἡ ἀπολογία <καὶ ἡ> κρίσις οὐ περὶ θανάτου γίγνεται· θάνατον μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις φανερᾷ τῇ ψήφῳ πάντων κατεψηφίσατο τῶν θνητῶν, ᾗπερ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο· περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀτιμίας καὶ τῆς τιμῆς ὁ κίνδυνός ἐστι, πότερά με χρὴ δικαίως ἀποθανεῖν ἢ μετ' ὀνειδῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῆς αἰσχίστης αἰτίας βιαίως ἀποθανεῖν. (2) δισσῶν δὲ τούτων ὄντων τοῦ μὲν ὅλου ὑμεῖς κρατεῖτε, τοῦ δ' ἐγώ, τῆς μὲν δίκης ἐγώ, τῆς δὲ βίας ὑμεῖς. ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν γάρ με δυνήσεσθε βουλόμενοι ῥᾳδίως· κρατεῖτε γὰρ καὶ τούτων, ὧν οὐδὲν ἐγὼ τυγχάνω κρατῶν. (3) εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁ κατήγορος Ὀδυσσεὺς ἢ σαφῶς ἐπιστάμενος προδιδόντα με τὴν Ἑλλάδα τοῖς βαρβάροις ἢ δοξάζων γ' ἀμῇ οὕτω ταῦτα ἔχειν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν κατηγορίαν δι' εὔνοιαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἄριστος ἂν ἦν ὁ ἀνήρ· πῶς γὰρ <οὐχ>, ὅς γε σῴζει πατρίδα, τοκέας, τὴν πᾶσαν Ἑλλάδα, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τιμωρούμενος; εἰ δὲ φθόνῳ ἢ κακοτεχνίᾳ ἢ πανουργίᾳ συνέθηκε ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, ὥσπερ δι' ἐκεῖνα κράτιστος ἂν ἦν ἀνήρ, οὕτω διὰ ταῦτα κάκιστος ἂν εἴη.

(4) περὶ τούτων λέγων δὲ πόθεν ἄρξωμαι; τί δὲ πρῶτον εἴπω; ποῖ δὲ τῆς ἀπολογίας τράπωμαι; αἰτία γὰρ ἀνεπίδεικτος ἔκπληξιν ἐμφανῆ ἐμποιεῖ, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἔκπληξιν ἀπορεῖν ἀνάγκη τῷ λόγῳ, ἂν μή τι παρ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς παρούσης ἀνάγκης μάθω, διδασκάλων ἐπικινδυνοτέρων ἢ πορυμωτέρων τυχών. (5) ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ σαφῶς <εἰδὼς> ὁ κατήγορος κατηγορεῖ μου, σαφῶς οἶδα· σύνοιδα γὰρ ἐμαυτῷ σαφῶς οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον πεποιηκώς, οὐδ' ἔοιχ' ὅπως ἂν εἰδείη τις ὂν τὸ μὴ γενόμενον. εἰ δὲ οἰόμενος οὕτω ταῦτα ἔχειν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν κατηγορίαν, οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν διὰ δισσῶν ὑμῖν

ἐπιδείξω τρόπων· οὔτε γὰρ βουληθεὶς ἐδυνάμην ἂν οὔτε δυνάμενος ἐβουλήθην ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν τοιούτοις.

(6) ἐπὶ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον εἶμι πρῶτον, ὡς ἀδύνατός εἰμι τοῦτο πράττειν. ἔδει γάρ τινα πρῶτον ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι τῆς προδοσίας, ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ λόγος ἂν εἴη· πρὸ γὰρ τῶν μελλόντων ἔργων ἀνάγκη λόγους γίνεσθαι πρότερον. λόγοι δὲ πῶς ἂν γένοιντο μὴ συνουσίας τινὸς γενομένης; συνουσία δὲ τίνα τρόπον γένοιτ' ἂν μήτ' ἐκείνου πρὸς ἐμὲ πέμψαντος μήτ' ἐμοῦ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἐλθόντος; οὐδὲ παραγγελία διὰ γραμμάτων ἀφῖκται ἄνευ τοῦ φέροντος. (7) ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο τῷ λόγῳ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι. καὶ δὴ τοίνυν σύνειμι καὶ σύνεστι κἀκεῖνος ἐμοὶ κἀκείνῳ ἐγώ - τίνα τρόπον; τίνι τίς ὤν; Ἕλλην βαρβάρῳ. πῶς ἀκούων καὶ λέγων; πότερα μόνος μόνῳ; ἀλλ' ἀγνοήσομεν τοὺς ἀλλήλων λόγους. ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἑρμηνέως; τρίτος ἄρα μάρτυς γίνεται τῶν κρύπτεσθαι δεομένων. (8) ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο γενέσθω, καίπερ οὐ γενόμενον. ἔδει δὲ μετὰ τούτους πίστιν δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι. τίς οὖν ἦν ἡ πίστις; πότερον ὅρκος; τίς οὖν ἐμοὶ τῷ προδότῃ πιστεύειν ἔμελλεν; ἀλλ' ὅμηροι; τίνες; οἷον ἐγὼ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἔδωκ' ἂν (οὐ γὰρ εἶχον ἄλλον), ὁ δὲ βάρβαρος τῶν υἱέων τινά· πιστότατα γὰρ ἂν ἦν οὕτως ἐμοί τε παρ' ἐκείνου ἐκείνῳ τε παρ' ἐμοῦ. ταῦτα δὲ γιγνόμενα πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἂν ἦν φανερά. (9) φήσει τις ὡς χρήμασι τὴν πίστιν ἐποιούμεθα, ἐκεῖνος μὲν διδούς, ἐγὼ δὲ λαμβάνων. πότερον οὖν ὀλίγοις; ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀντὶ μεγάλων ὑπουργημάτων ὀλίγα χρήματα λαμβάνειν. ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς; τίς οὖν ἦν ἡ κομιδή; πῶς δ' ἂν <ἢ εἷς> ἐκόμισεν ἢ πολλοί; πολλῶν γὰρ κομιζόντων πολλοὶ ἂν ἦσαν μάρτυρες τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς, ἑνὸς δὲ κομίζοντος οὐκ ἂν πολύ τι τὸ φερόμενον ἦν. (10) πότερα δ' ἐκόμισαν ἡμέρας ἢ νυκτός; ἀλλὰ <νυκτός;> πολλαὶ καὶ πυκναὶ φυλακαί, δι' ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λαθεῖν. ἀλλ' ἡμέρας; ἀλλά γε τὸ φῶς πολεμεῖ τοῖς τοιούτοις. εἶεν. ἐγὼ δ' ἐξελθὼν ἐδεξάμην, ἢ ἐκεῖνος ὁ φέρων εἰσῆλθεν; ἀμφότερα γὰρ ἄπορα. λαβὼν δὲ δὴ πῶς ἂν ἔκρυψα καὶ τοὺς ἔνδον καὶ τοὺς ἔξω; ποῦ δ' ἂν ἔθηκα; πῶς δ' ἂν ἐφύλαξα; χρώμενος δ' ἂν φανερὸς ἐγενόμην, μὴ χρώμενος δὲ τί ἂν ὠφελούμην ἀπ' αὐτῶν;

(11) καὶ δὴ τοίνυν γενέσθω καὶ τὰ μὴ γενόμενα, συνήλθομεν, εἴπομεν, ἠκούσαμεν, χρήματα παρ' αὐτῶν ἔλαβον, ἔλαθον λαβών, ἔκρυψα. ἔδει δήπου πράττειν ὧν ἔνεκα ταῦτα ἐγένετο. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔτι τῶν εἰρημένων ἀπορώτερον. πράττων μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔπραττον ἢ μεθ' ἑτέρων; ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑνὸς ἡ πρᾶξις. ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἑτέρων; τίνων; δηλονότι τῶν συνόντων. πότερον ἐλευθέρων ἢ δούλων; ἐλευθέροις μὲν γὰρ ὑμῖν σύνειμι. τίς οὖν ὑμῶν ξύνοιδε; λεγέτω. δούλοις δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἄπιστον; ἑκόντες γὰρ ἐπ' ἐλευθερίᾳ χειμαζόμενοί τε δι' ἀνάγκην κατηγοροῦσιν. (12) ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις πῶς ἐγένετο; δηλονότι τοὺς πολεμίους εἰσαγαγεῖν ἔδει κρείττονας ὑμῶν· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. πῶς ἂν οὖν εἰσήγαγον; πότερα διὰ πυλῶν; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐμὸν ταύτας οὔτε κλῄειν οὔτε ἀνοίγειν, ἀλλ' ἡγεμόνες κύριοι τούτων. ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τειχέων <διὰ> κλίμακος; οὔκουν <ἐφωράθην ἄν;> ἅπαντα γὰρ πλήρη φυλάκων. ἀλλὰ διελὼν τοῦ τείχους; ἅπασιν ἄρα φανερὰ γένοιτο ἄν. ὑπαίθριος γὰρ ὁ βίος (στρατόπεδον γὰρ) ἔστ' ἐν ὅπλοις, ἐν οἷς <πάντες> πάντα ὁρῶσι καὶ πάντες ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρῶνται. πάντως ἄρα καὶ πάντῃ πάντα πράττειν ἀδύνατον ἦν μοι.

(13) σκέψασθε κοινῇ καὶ τόδε. τίνος ἔνεκα προσῆκε βουληθῆναι ταῦτα πράττειν, εἰ μάλιστα πάντων ἐδυνάμην; οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται προῖκα τοὺς μεγίστους κινδύνους κινδυνεύειν οὐδὲ τὴν μεγίστην κακότητα εἶναι κάκιστος. ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τούτων; (καὶ αὖθις πρὸς τόδ' ἐπάνειμι.) πότερον <τοῦ> τυραννεῖν; ὑμῶν ἢ τῶν βαρβάρων; ἀλλ' ὑμῶν; ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον τοσούτων καὶ τοιούτων, οἷς ὑπάρχει ἅπαντα μέγιστα, προγόνων ἀρεταί, χρημάτων πλῆθος, ἀριστεῖαι, ἀλκὴ φρονημάτων, βασιλεία πόλεων. (14) ἀλλὰ τῶν <βαρβάρων>; ὁ δὲ παραδώσων τίς; ἐγὼ δὲ ποίᾳ δυνάμει παραλήψομαι Ἕλλην βαρβάρους, εἷς ὢν πολλούς; πείσας ἢ βιασάμενος; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι πεισθῆναι βούλοιντ' ἄν, οὔτ' ἐγὼ βιάσασθαι δυναίμην. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἑκόντες ἑκόντι παραδώσουσιν, μισθὸν τῆς προδοσίας ἀντιδιδόντες; ἀλλά γε ταῦτα πολλῆς μωρίας καὶ πιστεῦσαι καὶ δέξασθαι· τίς γὰρ ἂν ἕλοιτο δουλείαν ἀντὶ βασιλείας, ἀντὶ τοῦ κρατίστου τὸ κάκιστον; (15) εἴποι τις ἂν ὅτι πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων ἐρασθεὶς

ἐπεχείρησα τούτοις. ἀλλὰ χρήματα μὲν μέτρια κέκτημαι, πολλῶν δὲ
οὐθὲν δέομαι· πολλῶν γὰρ δέονται χρημάτων οἱ πολλὰ δαπανῶντες,
ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ κρείττονες τῶν τῆς φύσεως ἡδονῶν, ἀλλ' οἱ
δουλεύοντες ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ ζητοῦντες ἀπὸ πλούτου καὶ
μεγαλοπρεπείας τὰς τιμὰς κτᾶσθαι. τούτων δὲ ἐμοὶ πρόσεστιν
οὐθέν. ὡς δ' ἀληθῆ λέγω, μάρτυρα πιστὸν παρέξομαι τὸν
παροιχόμενον βίον· τῷ δὲ μάρτυρι μάρτυρες ὑμεῖς <ἐστέ>· σύνεστε
γάρ μοι, διὸ σύνιστε ταῦτα. (16) καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἂν τιμῆς ἕνεκα
τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἀνὴρ ἐπιχειρήσειε καὶ μέσως φρόνιμος. ἀπ' ἀρετῆς
γὰρ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ κακότητος αἱ τιμαί· προδότῃ δὲ τῆς Ἑλλάδος
ἀνδρὶ πῶς ἂν γένοιτο τιμή; πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἐτύγχανον
ἐνδεὴς ὤν· ἐτιμώμην γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐντιμοτάτοις ὑπὸ τῶν
ἐντιμοτάτων, ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ. (17) καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἀσφαλείας
[ὧν] οὕνεκά τις ἂν ταῦτα πράξαι. πᾶσι γὰρ ὅ γε προδότης
πολέμιος, τῷ νόμῳ, τῇ δίκῃ, τοῖς θεοῖς, τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἀνθρώπων·
τὸν μέν γε νόμον παραβαίνει, τὴν δὲ δίκην καταλύει, τὸ δὲ θεῖον
ἀτιμάζει, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος διαφθείρει. τῷ δὲ τοιούτῳ <ὁ> βίος περὶ
κινδύνων τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ ἔχει ἀσφάλειαν. (18) ἀλλὰ δὴ φίλους
ὠφελεῖν βουλόμενος ἢ πολεμίους βλάπτειν; καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕνεκά
τις ἂν ἀδικήσειεν. ἐμοὶ δὲ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐγίνετο· τοὺς μὲν
φίλους κακῶς ἐποίουν, τοὺς δὲ ἐχθροὺς ὠφέλουν. ἀγαθῶν μὲν οὖν
ἔγκτησιν οὐδεμίαν εἶχεν ἡ πρᾶξις· κακῶς δὲ παθεῖν οὐδὲ εἷς
ἐπιθυμῶν πανουργεῖ. (19) τὸ δὲ λοιπόν ἐστιν, εἴ τινα φόβον ἢ
πόνον ἢ κίνδυνον φεύγων ἔπραξα. ταῦτα δ' οὐθεὶς ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχοι
τί μοι προσήκειν. δισσῶν γὰρ τούτων ἕνεκα πάντες πάντα
πράττουσιν, ἢ κέρδος τι μετιόντες ἢ ζημίαν φεύγοντες· ὅσα δὲ
τούτων ἔξω πανουργεῖται, <ὅτι> κακῶς ἐμαυτὸν ἐποίουν ταῦτα
[γὰρ] πράττων, οὐκ ἄδηλον· προδιδοὺς γὰρ τὴν Ἑλλάδα προὐδίδουν
ἐμαυτόν, τοκέας, φίλους, ἀξίωμα προγόνων, ἱερὰ πατρῷα, τάφους,
πατρίδα τὴν μεγίστην τῆς Ἑλλάδος. ἃ δὲ πᾶσι περὶ παντός ἐστι,
ταῦτα ἂν τοῖς ἀδικήσασιν ἐνεχείρισα. (20) σκέψασθε δὲ καὶ τόδε.
πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἀβίωτος ἦν ὁ βίος μοι πράξαντι ταῦτα; ποῖ γὰρ
τραπέσθαι με χρῆν; πότερον εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα; δίκην δώσοντα τοῖς
ἠδικημένοις; τίς δ' ἂν ἀπείχετό μου τῶν κακῶς πεπονθότων; ἀλλὰ

μένειν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις; παραμελήσαντα πάντων τῶν μεγίστων,
ἐστερημένον τῆς καλλίστης τιμῆς, ἐν αἰσχίστῃ δυσκλείᾳ διάγοντα,
τοὺς ἐν τῷ παροιχομένῳ βίῳ πόνους ἐπ᾽ ἀρετῇ πεπονημένους
ἀπορρίψαντα; καὶ ταῦτα δι᾽ ἐμαυτόν, ὅπερ αἴσχιστον ἀνδρί,
δυστυχεῖν δι᾽ αὐτόν. (21) οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ παρὰ τοῖς βαρβάροις πιστῶς
ἂν διεκείμην· πῶς γάρ, οἵτινες ἀπιστότατον ἔργον συνηπίσταντό
μοι πεποιηκότι, τοὺς φίλους τοῖς ἐχθροῖς παραδεδωκότι; βίος δὲ οὐ
βιωτὸς πίστεως ἐστερημένῳ. χρήματα μὲν γὰρ ἀποβαλόντα <ἢ >
τυραννίδος ἐκπεσόντα ἢ τὴν πατρίδα φυγόντα ἀναλάβοι τις ἄν· ὁ
δὲ πίστιν ἀποβαλὼν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι κτήσαιτο. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτ᾽ ἂν
<ἐδυνάμην βουλόμενος οὔτ᾽ ἂν δυνάμενος> ἐβουλόμην προδοῦναι
τὴν Ἑλλάδα, διὰ τῶν προειρημένων δέδεικται.

(22) βούλομαι δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν κατήγορον διαλεχθῆναι. τίνι
ποτὲ πιστεύσας τοιοῦτος ὢν τοιούτου κατηγορεῖς; ἄξιον γὰρ
καταμαθεῖν, οἷος ὢν οἷα λέγεις ὡς ἀνάξιος ἀνάξια. πότερα γάρ μου
κατηγορεῖς εἰδὼς ἀκριβῶς ἢ δοξάζων; εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰδώς, οἶσθα ἰδὼν
ἢ μετέχων ἢ τοῦ <μετέχοντος> πυθόμενος. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἰδών, φράσον
τούτοις <τὸν τρόπον>, τὸν τόπον, τὸν χρόνον, πότε, ποῦ, πῶς
εἶδες· εἰ δὲ μετέχων, ἔνοχος εἶς ταῖς αὐταῖς αἰτίαις· εἰ δὲ τοῦ
μετέχοντος ἀκούσας, ὅστις ἐστίν, αὐτὸς ἐλθέτω, φανήτω,
μαρτυρησάτω. πιστότερον γὰρ οὕτως ἔσται τὸ κατηγόρημα
μαρτυρηθέν. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε οὐδέτερος ἡμῶν παρέχεται μάρτυρα. (23)
φήσεις ἴσως ἴσον εἶναι τὸ σέ γε τῶν γενομένων, ὡς σὺ φής, μὴ
παρέχεσθαι μάρτυρας, τῶν δὲ μὴ γενομένων ἐμέ. τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἴσον
ἐστί· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀγένητά πως ἀδύνατα μαρτυρηθῆναι, περὶ δὲ τῶν
γενομένων οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥᾴδιον, οὐδὲ μόνον
ῥᾴδιον, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οὐκ ἦν οἷόν <τε> μόνον μάρτυρας ἀλλὰ καὶ
ψευδομάρτυρας εὑρεῖν, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐδέτερον εὑρεῖν τούτων δυνατόν.
(24) ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ οἶσθα ἃ κατηγορεῖς, φανερόν· τὸ δὴ λοιπὸν
<οὐκ> εἰδότα σε δοξάζειν. εἶτα, ὦ πάντων ἀνθρώπων τολμηρότατε,
δόξῃ πιστεύσας, ἀπιστοτάτῳ πράγματι, τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὐκ εἰδώς,
τολμᾷς ἄνδρα περὶ θανάτου διώκειν; ᾧ τί τοιοῦτον ἔργον
εἰργασμένῳ σύνοισθα; ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε δοξάσαι κοινὸν ἅπασι περὶ
πάντων, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐν τούτῳ σὺ τῶν ἄλλων σοφώτερος. ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε

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τοῖς δοξάζουσι δεῖ πιστεύειν ἀλλὰ τοῖς εἰδόσιν, οὔτε τὴν δόξαν τῆς ἀληθείας πιστοτέραν νομίζειν, ἀλλὰ τἀναντία τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς δόξης.

(25) κατηγορήσας δέ μου διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων λόγων δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα, σοφίαν καὶ μανίαν, ὥσπερ οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔχειν. ὅπου μὲν γάρ με φῇς εἶναι τεχνήεντά τε καὶ δεινὸν καὶ πόριμον, σοφίαν μου κατηγορεῖς, ὅπου δὲ λέγεις ὡς προὐδίδουν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, μανίαν· μανία γάρ ἐστιν ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀδυνάτοις, ἀσυμφόροις, αἰσχροῖς, ἀφ' ὧν τοὺς μὲν φίλους βλάψει, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς ὠφελήσει, τὸν δὲ αὑτοῦ βίον ἐπονείδιστον καὶ σφαλερὸν καταστήσει. καίτοι πῶς χρὴ ἀνδρὶ τοιούτῳ πιστεύειν, ὅστις τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον λέγων πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ ἐναντιώτατα λέγει; (26) βουλοίμην δ' ἂν παρὰ σοῦ πυθέσθαι, πότερον τοὺς σοφοὺς ἄνδρας νομίζεις ἀνοήτους ἢ φρονίμους. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀνοήτους, καινὸς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀληθής· εἰ δὲ φρονίμους, οὐ δήπου προσήκει τούς γε φρονοῦντας ἐξαμαρτάνειν τὰς μεγίστας ἁμαρτίας καὶ μᾶλλον αἱρεῖσθαι κακὰ παρόντων ἀγαθῶν. εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰμι σοφός, οὐχ ἥμαρτον· εἰ δ' ἥμαρτον, οὐ σοφός εἰμι. οὐκοῦν δι' ἀμφότερα ἂν εἴης ψευδής.

(27) ἀντικατηγορῆσαι δέ σου πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παλαιὰ καὶ νέα πράσσοντος δυνάμενος οὐ βούλομαι· <βούλομαι> γὰρ οὐ τοῖς σοῖς κακοῖς ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀποφεύγειν τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην. πρὸς μὲν οὖν σὲ ταῦτα.

(28) πρὸς δ' ὑμᾶς ὦ ἄνδρες κριταὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ βούλομαι εἰπεῖν ἐπίφθονον μὲν ἀληθὲς δέ, <μὴ> κατηγορημένῳ μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτά, κατηγορουμένῳ δὲ προσήκοντα. νῦν γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν εὐθύνας καὶ λόγον ὑπέχω τοῦ παροιχομένου βίου. δέομαι οὖν ὑμῶν, ἂν ὑμᾶς ὑπομνήσω τῶν τι ἐμοὶ πεπραγμένων καλῶν, μηδένα φθονῆσαι τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ἡγήσασθαι κατηγορημένον δεινὰ καὶ ψευδῆ καί τι τῶν ἀληθῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰπεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν ὑμῖν· ὅπερ ἥδιστόν μοι. (29) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν καὶ δεύτερον καὶ μέγιστον, διὰ παντὸς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος ἀναμάρτητος ὁ παροιχόμενος βίος ἐστί μοι, καθαρὸς πάσης αἰτίας· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν οὐδεμίαν αἰτίαν κακότητος ἀληθῆ πρὸς ὑμᾶς περὶ ἐμοῦ εἰπεῖν ἔχοι. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' αὐτὸς ὁ κατήγορος

οὐδεμίαν ἀπόδειξιν εἴρηκεν ὧν εἴρηκεν· οὕτως λοιδορίαν οὐκ
ἔχουσαν ἔλεγχον ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ δύναται. (30) φήσαιμι δ' ἄν, καὶ
φήσας οὐκ ἂν ψευσαίμην οὐδ' ἂν ἐλεγχθείην, οὐ μόνον ἀναμάρτητος
ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγας εὐεργέτης ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῶν ἁπάντων
ἀνθρώπων, οὐ μόνον τῶν νῦν ὄντων ἀλλὰ <καὶ> τῶν μελλόντων,
εἶναι. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἐποίησε τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον πόριμον ἐξ ἀπόρου
καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἐξ ἀκόσμου, τάξεις τε πολεμικὰς εὑρὼν,
μέγιστον εἰς πλεονεκτήματα, νόμους τε γραπτοὺς φύλακας [τε] τοῦ
δικαίου, γράμματά τε μνήμης ὄργανον, μέτρα τε καὶ σταθμὰ,
συναλλαγῶν εὐπόρους διαλλαγάς, ἀριθμόν τε χρημάτων φύλακα,
πυρσούς τε κρατίστους καὶ ταχίστους ἀγγέλους, πεσσούς τε σχολῆς
ἄλυπον διατριβήν· τίνος οὖν ἕνεκα ταῦθ' ὑμᾶς ὑπέμνησα; (31)
δηλῶν <μὲν> ὅτι τοῖς τοιούτοις τὸν νοῦν προσέχω, σημεῖον δὲ
ποιούμενος ὅτι τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν ἔργων ἀπέχομαι· τὸν
γὰρ ἐκείνοις τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα τοῖς τοιούτοις προσέχειν
ἀδύνατον. ἀξιῶ δέ, εἰ μηδὲν αὐτὸς ὑμᾶς ἀδικῶ, μηδὲ αὐτὸς ὑφ'
ὑμῶν ἀδικηθῆναι. (32) καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων
οὕνεκα ἄξιός εἰμι κακῶς πάσχειν, οὔθ' ὑπὸ νεωτέρων οὔθ' ὑπὸ
πρεσβυτέρων. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πρεσβυτέροις ἄλυπός εἰμι, τοῖς δὲ
νεωτέροις οὐκ ἀνωφελής, τοῖς εὐτυχοῦσιν οὐ φθονερός, τῶν
δυστυχούντων οἰκτίρμων· οὔτε πενίας ὑπερορῶν, οὐδὲ πλοῦτον
ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἀρετὴν πλούτου προτιμῶν· οὔτε ἐν βουλαῖς ἄχρηστος
οὔτε ἐν μάχαις ἀργός, ποιῶν τὸ τασσόμενον, πειθόμενος τοῖς
ἄρχουσιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐκ ἐμὸν ἐμαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν· ὁ δὲ παρὼν καιρὸς
ἠνάγκασε, καὶ ταῦτα κατηγορούμενον, πάντως ἀπολογήσασθαι.
(33) λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ ὑμῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐστί μοι λόγος, ὃν εἰπὼν
παύσομαι τῆς ἀπολογίας. οἶκτος μὲν οὖν καὶ λιταὶ καὶ φίλων
παραίτησις ἐν ὄχλῳ μὲν οὔσης τῆς κρίσεως χρήσιμα· παρὰ δ' ὑμῖν
τοῖς πρώτοις οὖσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ δοκοῦσιν, οὐ φίλων βοηθείαις
οὐδὲ λιταῖς οὐδὲ οἴκτοις δεῖ πείθειν ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τῷ σαφεστάτῳ
δικαίῳ, διδάξαντα τἀληθές, οὐκ ἀπατήσαντά με δεῖ διαφυγεῖν τὴν
αἰτίαν ταύτην. (34) ὑμᾶς δὲ χρὴ μὴ τοῖς λόγοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς
ἔργοις προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, μηδὲ τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ἐλέγχων
προκρίνειν, μηδὲ τὸν ὀλίγον χρόνον τοῦ πολλοῦ σοφώτερον ἡγεῖσθε

κριτήν, μηδὲ τὴν διαβολὴν τῆς πείρας πιστοτέραν νομίζειν. ἅπαντα γὰρ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι μεγάλης εὐλαβείας ἁμαρτάνειν, τὰ δὲ ἀνήκεστα τῶν ἀκεστῶν ἔτι μᾶλλον· ταῦτα γὰρ προνοήσασι μὲν δυνατά, μετανοήσασι δὲ ἀνίατα. τῶν δὲ τοιούτων ἐστίν, ὅταν ἄνδρες ἄνδρα περὶ θανάτου κρίνωσιν· ὅπερ ἐστὶ νῦν παρ᾽ ὑμῖν.

(35) εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦν διὰ τῶν λόγων τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν ἔργων καθαράν τε γενέσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι <καὶ> φανεράν, εὔπορος ἂν εἴη ἡ κρίσις ἤδη ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, τὸ μὲν σῶμα τοὐμὸν φυλάξατε, τὸν δὲ πλείω χρόνον ἐπιμείνατε, μετὰ δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν κρίσιν ποιήσατε. ὑμῖν μὲν γὰρ μέγας ὁ κίνδυνος, ἀδίκοις φανεῖσι δόξαν τὴν μὲν καταβαλεῖν, τὴν δὲ κτήσασθαι. τοῖς δὲ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν αἱρετώτερος θάνατος δόξης αἰσχρᾶς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ βίου τέλος, ἡ δὲ τῷ βίῳ νόσος. (36) ἐὰν δὲ ἀδίκως ἀποκτείνητέ με, πολλοῖς γενήσεται φανερόν· ἐγώ τε γὰρ <οὐκ> ἀγνώς, ὑμῶν τε πᾶσιν Ἕλλησι γνώριμος ἡ κακότης καὶ φανερά. καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν φανερὰν ἅπασαν ὑμεῖς ἕξετε τῆς ἀδικίας, οὐχ ὁ κατήγορος· ἐν ὑμῖν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς δίκης. ἁμαρτία δ᾽ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο μείζων ταύτης. οὐ γὰρ μόνον εἰς ἐμὲ καὶ τοκέας τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἁμαρτήσεσθε δικάσαντες ἀδίκως, ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς δεινὸν ἄθεον ἄδικον ἄνομον ἔργον συνεπιστήσεσθε πεποιηκότες, ἀπεκτονότες ἄνδρα σύμμαχον, χρήσιμον ὑμῖν, εὐεργέτην τῆς Ἑλλάδος, Ἕλληνες Ἕλληνα, φανερὰν οὐδεμίαν ἀδικίαν οὐδὲ πιστὴν αἰτίαν ἀποδείξαντες.

(37) εἴρηται τὰ παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ, καὶ παύομαι. τὸ γὰρ ὑπομνῆσαι τὰ διὰ μακρῶν εἰρημένα συντόμως πρὸς μὲν φαύλους δικαστὰς ἔχει λόγον· τοὺς δὲ πρώτους τῶν πρώτων Ἕλληνας Ἑλλήνων οὐκ ἄξιον οὐδ᾽ ἀξιῶσαι μήτε προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν μήτε μεμνῆσθαι τὰ λεχθέντα.

6

τοῦ αὐτοῦ

'Επιτάφιος

Maximus Planudes, Commentary on Hermogenes' *Id.* (vol.v, pp.548,8-551,1, ed. Waltz)

Διονύσιος ὁ πρεσβύτερος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ χαρακτήρων περὶ Γοργίου λέγων τάδε φησίν· «δικανικοῖς μὲν οὖν οὐ περιέτυχον αὐτοῦ λόγοις, δημηγορικοῖς δὲ ὀλίγοις καί τισι καὶ τέχναις, τοῖς δὲ πλείοσιν ἐπιδεικτικοῖς. τῆς δὲ ἰδέας αὐτοῦ τῶν λόγων τοιοῦτος ὁ χαρακτήρ (ἐγκωμιάζει δὲ τοὺς ἐν πολέμοις ἀριστεύσαντας 'Αθηναίων)·

"τί γὰρ ἀπῆν τοῖς ἀνδράσι τούτοις ὧν δεῖ ἀνδράσι προσεῖναι; τί δὲ καὶ προσῆν ὧν οὐ δεῖ προσεῖναι; εἰπεῖν δυναίμην ἃ βούλομαι, βουλοίμην δ' ἃ δεῖ, λαθὼν μὲν τὴν θείαν νέμεσιν, φυγὼν δὲ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον φθόνον. οὗτοι γὰρ ἐκέκτηντο ἔνθεον μὲν τὴν ἀρετήν, ἀνθρώπινον δὲ τὸ θνητόν, πολλὰ μὲν δὴ τὸ παρὸν ἐπιεικὲς τοῦ αὐθάδους δικαίου προκρίνοντες, πολλὰ δὲ νόμου ἀκριβείας λόγων ὀρθότητα, τοῦτον νομίζοντες θειότατον καὶ κοινότατον νόμον, τὸ δέον ἐν τῷ δέοντι καὶ λέγειν καὶ σιγᾶν καὶ ποιεῖν, καὶ δισσὰ ἀσκήσαντες μάλιστα ὧν δεῖ, γνώμην <καὶ ῥώμην>, τὴν μὲν βουλεύοντες τὴν δ' ἀποτελοῦντες, θεράποντες μὲν τῶν ἀδίκως δυστυχούντων, κολασταὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδίκως εὐτυχούντων, αὐθάδεις πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, εὐόργητοι πρὸς τὸ πρέπον, τῷ φρονίμῳ τῆς γνώμης παύοντες τὸ ἄφρον <τῆς τόλμης>, ὑβρισταὶ εἰς τοὺς ὑβριστάς, κόσμιοι εἰς τοὺς κοσμίους, ἄφοβοι εἰς τοὺς ἀφόβους, δεινοὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς. μαρτύρια δὲ τούτων τρόπαια ἐστήσαντο τῶν πολεμίων, Διὸς μὲν ἀγάλματα, ἑαυτῶν δὲ ἀναθήματα, οὐκ ἄπειροι οὔτε ἐμφύτου "Αρεος οὔτε νομίμων ἐρώτων οὔτε ἐνοπλίου ἔριδος οὔτε φιλοκάλου εἰρήνης, σεμνοὶ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τῷ δικαίῳ, ὅσιοι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς τοκέας τῇ θεραπείᾳ, δίκαιοι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀστοὺς τῷ ἴσῳ, εὐσεβεῖς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους τῇ πίστει. τοιγαροῦν

αὐτῶν ἀποθανόντων ὁ πόθος οὐ συναπέθανεν ἀλλ᾽ ἀθάνατος οὐκ ἐν
ἀθανάτοις σώμασι ζῇ οὐ ζώντων ."

1

Isokrates, 10.3 (ed. Mathieu-Brémond)

πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις ὑπερβάλοιτο Γοργίαν τὸν τολμήσαντα λέγειν, ὡς
οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἔστιν, ἢ Ζήνωνα τὸν ταὐτὰ δυνατὰ καὶ πάλιν
ἀδύνατα πειρώμενον ἀποφαίνειν;

Isokrates, 15. 268 (ed. Mathieu-Brémond)

διατρῖψαι μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς παιδείας ταύτας χρόνον τινὰ
συμβουλεύσαιμ᾽ ἂν τοῖς νεωτέροις, μὴ μέντοι περιιδεῖν τὴν φύσιν
τὴν αὐτῶν...ἐξοκείλασαν εἰς τοὺς λόγους τοὺς τῶν παλαιῶν
σοφιστῶν, ὧν ὁ μὲν ἄπειρον τὸ πλῆθος ἔφησεν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων,
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τέτταρα καὶ νεῖκος καὶ φιλίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς, Ἴων δ᾽ οὐ
πλείω τριῶν, Ἀλκμέων δὲ δύο μόνα, Παρμενίδης δὲ καὶ Μέλισσος
ἕν, Γοργίας δὲ παντελῶς οὐδέν.

2

Olympiodoros, *in Grg.* Proem.9

ἀμέλει καὶ γράφει ὁ Γοργίας Περὶ Φύσεως σύγγραμμα οὐκ
ἄκομψον τῇ πδ΄ ὀλυμπιάδι.

3

Γοργίου

Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος

[Aristotle], *De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia* 979a12-980b21.

979a12 οὐκ εἶναί φησιν οὐδέν· εἰ δ᾽ ἔστιν, ἄγνωστον εἶναι· 12

εἰ / δὲ καὶ ἔστι καὶ γνωστόν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δηλωτὸν ἄλλοις.

καὶ ὅτι / μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, συνθεὶς τὰ ἑτέροις εἰρημένα,

ὅσοι περὶ τῶν / ὄντων λέγοντες τἀναντία, ὡς δοκοῦσιν, 15

ἀποφαίνονται αὐτοῖς, / οἱ μὲν ὅτι ἕν καὶ οὐ πολλά, οἱ δὲ

αὖ ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ οὐχ / ἕν, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὅτι ἀγένητα, οἱ δ᾽ ὡς

γενόμενα ἐπιδεικνύν / τες, ταῦτα συλλογίζεται κατ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων.

ἀνάγκη γάρ, / φησίν, εἴ τι ἔστι, μήτε ἕν μήτε πολλὰ

εἶναι, μήτε ἀγέ / νητα μήτε γενόμενα· οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη· εἰ 20

γὰρ εἴη τι, τού / των ἂν θάτερα εἴη. ὅτι <δ᾽> οὐκ ἔστιν

οὔτε ἕν, οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε / ἀγένητα οὔτε γενόμενα, τὰ μὲν

ὡς Μέλισσος τὰ δὲ ὡς / Ζήνων ἐπιχειρεῖ δεικνύειν μετὰ

τὴν πρώτην ἴδιον αὐτοῦ / ἀπόδειξιν, ἐν ᾗ λέγει, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν

οὔτε εἶναι, οὔτε μὴ εἶναι.

εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἂν 25

ἧττον / τὸ μὴ ὂν τοῦ ὄντος εἴη. τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὂν ἔστι μὴ

ὄν, καὶ / τὸ ὂν ὄν, [ὥστε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ οὐκ

εἶναι τὰ πράγ / ματα].

εἰ δ᾽ ὅμως τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔστι, τὸ εἶναι, φησί, οὐκ / ἔστι, 30

τὸ ἀντικείμενον. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔστι τὸ εἶναι μὴ / εἶναι προσήκει.

ὥστε οὐκ ἂν οὕτως, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη εἰ μὴ /

ταὐτόν ἐστιν εἶναί τι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ταὐτό,

καὶ οὕτως / οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐδέν· τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ὄν,

ἐπείπερ /γε ταὐτὸ τῷ μὴ ὄντι. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ πρῶτος λόγος ἐκείνου. /

Chapter 6

οὐδαμόθεν δὲ συμβαίνει ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν,

μηδὲν εἶναι. / ἃ γὰρ καὶ ἀποδείκνυσιν, οὕτως διαλέγεται·   35

εἰ τὸ μὴ ὂν / ἔστιν, ἢ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν <ἂν> εἴη <ἢ> καὶ ἔστιν

ὅμοιον μὴ ὄν. / τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε φαίνεται οὕτως οὔτε ἀνάγκη.

ἀλλ᾽ ὡσπερεὶ δυοῖν ὄντοιν, τοῦ μὲν / ὄντος,

τοῦ δ᾽ οὐκ ὄντος, τὸ μὲν ἔστι, τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἀληθές, ὅτι ἔστιν /

979b1 τὸ μὲν μὴ ὄν.

διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι; /

τὸ δὲ ἄμφω ἢ τὸ ἕτερον οὐκ ἔστιν; οὐδὲν γὰρ <ἧττον>,

φησίν, εἴη ἂν / τὸ μὴ εἶναι τοῦ εἶναι, εἴπερ εἴη τι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι,

ὅτε οὐδείς / φησιν εἶναι τὸ μὴ εἶναι οὐδαμῶς.

εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὴ / ὂν μὴ ὄν, οὐδ᾽ οὕτως ὁμοίως   5

εἴη ἂν τὸ μὴ ὂν τῷ [μὴ] ὄντι· τὸ / μὲν γάρ ἐστι μὴ ὄν,

τὸ δὲ καὶ ἔστιν ἔτι.

εἰ δὲ καὶ ἁπλῶς / εἰπεῖν ἀληθές (ὡς δὴ θαυμάσιόν

γ᾽ ἂν εἴη "τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔστιν", ἀλλ᾽ / εἰ δὴ οὕτω), πότερον <οὐ>

μᾶλλον ξυμβαίνει ἅπαντα μὴ εἶναι / ἢ εἶναι;

αὐτὸ γὰρ οὕτω γε τοὐναντίον ἔοικεν γίγνεσθαι.

εἰ γὰρ / τό τε μὴ ὂν ὄν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ὂν ὄν ἐστιν,   10

ἅπαντα ἔστι· καὶ γὰρ / τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἔστιν·

οὐκ ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰ τὸ μὴ / ὂν ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ὂν μὴ εἶναι.

εἰ δὴ καὶ οὕτω τις ξυγχωροῖ, / καὶ τὸ μὲν μὴ ὂν εἴη,

τὸ δὲ ὂν μὴ εἴη, ὅμως οὐδὲν ἧττον / εἴη ἂν <τι>·

τὰ γὰρ μὴ ὄντ᾽ ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον.

εἰ / δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστιν τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι,   15

οὐδ᾽ οὕτως / μᾶλλον οὐκ εἴη ἄν τι <ἢ> εἴη. ὡς γὰρ κἀκεῖνος λέγει,

ὅτι εἰ / ταὐτὸν τὸ μὴ ὂν καὶ τὸ ὄν, τό τε ὂν οὐκ ἔστι

καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, / ὥστε οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀντιστρέψαντι ἔστιν

ὁμοίως φάναι ὅτι πάντα / ἔστιν· τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὂν ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὄν,

ὥστε πάντα ἔστιν.

μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον φησίν· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν, ἤτοι   20

ἀγένη / τον ἢ γενόμενον εἶναι. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀγένητον,

ἄπειρον αὐτὸ / τοῖς τοῦ Μελίσσου ἀξιώμασι λαμβάνει·

τὸ δ᾽ ἄπειρον οὐκ / ἂν εἶναί που. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ οὔτ᾽ ἂν

ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι· / δύο γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἢ πλείω εἶναι,

τό τε ἐνὸν καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ. μηδαμοῦ / δὲ ὂν οὐδὲν εἶναι κατὰ τὸν   25

τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγον περὶ τῆς / χώρας.

ἀγένητον μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτ᾽ οὐκ εἶναι, οὐ μὴν

οὐδὲ / γενόμενον. γενέσθαι γοῦν οὐδὲν ἂν οὔτ᾽ ἐξ ὄντος

οὔτ᾽ ἐκ μὴ / ὄντος. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὂν μεταπέσοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτ᾽

εἶναι τὸ ὄν, / ὥσπερ γ᾽ εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν γένοιτο,

οὐκ ἂν ἔτι εἴη μὴ ὄν. /

οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἐκ <μὴ> ὄντος ἂν γενέσθαι·   30

εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἔστι τὸ / μὴ ὄν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκ μηδενὸς ἂν γενέσθαι·

εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι (αὖ) τὸ / μὴ ὄν, δι᾽ ἅπερ οὐδ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος,

διὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἂν οὐδ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ / ὄντος γενέσθαι.

εἰ οὖν ἀνάγκη μέν, εἴπερ ἔστι τι, ἤτοι ἀγέ / νητον

ἢ γενόμενον εἶναι, ταῦτα δὲ <ἀδύντα>, ἀδύνατόν τι καὶ εἶναι. /

ἔτι εἴπερ ἔστι, ἓν ἢ πλείω, φησίν, ἐστίν·   35

εἰ δὲ μήτε ἓν μήτε / πολλά, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη. καὶ ἓν μέν.......

καὶ ὅτι ἀσώματον ἂν εἴη / τὸ.........ἐν κ.....ε ἔχον

μέν γε......τῷ τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγῳ. ἑνὸς δὲ ὄντος / οὐδ᾽

ἂν......εἶναι οὐδὲ μὴ........μήτε πολλά.....εἰ δὲ

μήτε ....μήτε / πολλά ἐστιν, οὐδέν ἐστιν.

980a1 οὐδ᾽ ἂν κινηθῆναί φησιν οὐδέν. εἰ γὰρ κινηθείη, /

[ἢ] οὐκ ἂν ἔτ᾽ εἴη ὡσαύτως ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν <ὂν> οὐκ

ὂν εἴη, / τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ὂν γεγονὸς εἴη.

ἔτι δὲ εἰ κινεῖται καὶ ἓν / <ὂν> μεταφέρεται, οὐ συνεχὲς

ὂν διῄρηται τὸ ὂν οὐδ᾽ ἔστι ταύτῃ. / ὥστ᾽ εἰ   5

πάντῃ κινεῖται, πάντῃ διήρηται.

εἰ δ' οὕτως, πάντῃ οὐκ / ἔστιν. ἐκλιπὲς γὰρ ταύτῃ,

φησίν, ᾗ διήρηται, τοῦ ὄντος, / ἀντὶ τοῦ κενοῦ τὸ διῃρῆσθαι

λέγων, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Λευκίπ / που καλουμένοις λόγοις γέγραπται.

εἶναι οὖν οὐδέν, τὰς / ἀποδείξεις λέγει <ταύτας>...

ἅπαντα δεῖν γὰρ τὰ φρονούμενα εἶναι, / καὶ   10

τὸ μὴ ὄν, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστι, μηδὲ φρονεῖσθαι.

εἰ δ' οὕτως, / οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποι ψεῦδος οὐδείς,

φησίν, οὐδ' εἰ ἐν τῷ πελάγει / φαίη ἁμιλλᾶσθαι ἅρματα.

πάντα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα εἴη.

καὶ / γὰρ τὰ ὁρώμενα καὶ ἀκουόμενα διὰ τοῦτο ἔστιν,

ὅτι φρ / ονεῖται ἕκαστα αὐτῶν· εἰ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο,

ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οὐδὲν / μᾶλλον ἃ ὁρῶμεν ἔστιν, οὕτω <οὐδὲν>   15

μᾶλλον ἅ ὁρῶμεν ἢ <ἅ> διανοούμεθα. /

καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ πολλοὶ ἂν ταὐτὰ ἴδοιεν,

καὶ ἐνταῦθα / πολλοὶ ἂν ταὐτὰ διανοηθεῖεν. † τ<ὰ> οὖν μᾶλλον

<τοιά>δ' ἢ <τ>ὰ τοιάδ' / ἐστί †, ποῖα δὲ τἀληθῆ, ἄδηλον. ὥστε

καὶ εἰ ἔστιν, ἡμῖν γ' ἄγνωστ' ἂν / εἶναι τὰ πράγματα.

εἰ δὲ καὶ γνωστά, πῶς ἄν τις, φησί, δη / λώσειεν   20

ἄλλῳ; ὃ γὰρ εἶδε, πῶς ἄν τις, φησί, τοῦτο εἴποι / λόγῳ; ἢ

πῶς ἂν ἐκεῖνο δῆλον ἀκούσαντι γίγνοιτο, μὴ ἰδόντι; /

980b1 ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἡ ὄψις τοὺς φθόγγους γιγνώσκει, οὕτως,

οὐδὲ / ἡ ἀκοὴ τὰ χρώματα ἀκούει, ἀλλὰ φθόγγους· καὶ

λέγει ὁ / λέγων, ἀλλ' οὐ χρῶμα οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα.

ὃ οὖν τις μὴ ἐννοεῖ / πῶς αὐτὸ παρ' ἄλλου λόγῳ

ἢ σημείῳ τινὶ ἑτέρῳ τοῦ πράγμα / τος ἐννοήσει, ἀλλ'   5

ἢ ἐὰν χρῶμα, ἰδών, ἐὰν δὲ <ψόφον ἀκού>σας; /

ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐ <ψόφον> λέγει <ὁ λέ>γων οὐδὲ χρῶμα,

ἀλλὰ λόγον· ὥστ' / οὐδὲ διανοεῖσθαι χρῶμα ἔστιν,

ἀλλ' ὁρᾶν, οὐδὲ ψόφον, ἀλλ' / ἀκούειν.

εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐνδέχεται γιγνώσκειν τε καὶ ἃ ἂν

γιγνώσκῃ / λέγειν, ἀλλὰ πῶς ὁ ἀκούων τὸ αὐτὸ ἐννοήσει;

οὐ γὰρ οἷόν / τε ταὐτὸ ἅμα ἐν πλείοσι καὶ χωρὶς οὖσιν   10

εἶναι· δύο γὰρ / ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕν.

εἰ δὲ καὶ εἴη, φησίν, ἐν πλείοσι καὶ ταὐτόν, / οὐδὲν
κωλύει μὴ ὅμοιον φαίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς μὴ πάντῃ ὁμοίοις/
ἐκείνοις οὖσι καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, εἷς ἂν
ἀλλ᾽/ οὐ δύο εἶεν.

φαίνεται δὲ οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὅμοια αἰσθανόμε / νος
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερα τῇ ἀκοῇ καὶ τῇ ὄψει/   15
καὶ νῦν τε καὶ πάλαι διαφόρως. ὥστε σχολῇ ἄλλῳ γ᾽ ἂν
ταὐτὸ αἴσθοιτό τις.

οὕτως οὖν εἰ ἔστι τι γνωστὸν οὐδεὶς ἂν / αὐτὸ
ἑτέρῳ δηλώσειεν, διά τε τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα / λόγους,
καὶ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ ταὐτὸν ἐννοεῖ. ἅπασαι/
δὲ αὗται καὶ ἑτέρων ἀρχαιοτέρων εἰσὶν ἀπορίαι, ὥστε   20
ἐν τῇ / περὶ ἐκείνων σκέψει καὶ ταῦτα ἐξεταστέον.

Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 7. 65-87

(65) Γοργίας δὲ ὁ Λεοντῖνος ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν τάγματος ὑπῆρχε τοῖς ἀνῃρηκόσι τὸ κριτήριον, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν δὲ ἐπιβολὴν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Πρωταγόραν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ Περὶ φύσεως τρία κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς κεφάλαια κατασκευάζει, ἓν μὲν καὶ πρῶτον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν, δεύτερον ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἀνθρώπῳ, τρίτον ὅτι εἰ καὶ καταληπτόν, ἀλλὰ τοί γε ἀνέξοιστον καὶ ἀνερμήνευτον τῷ πέλας.

(66) ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἐπιλογίζεται τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· εἰ γὰρ ἔστι <τι>, ἤτοι τὸ ὂν ἔστιν ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἢ καὶ τὸ ὂν ἔστι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ ὂν ἔστιν, ὡς παραστήσει, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς παραμυθήσεται, οὔτε τὸ ὂν καὶ <τὸ > μὴ ὄν, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο διδάξει· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι.

(67) καὶ δὴ τὸ μὲν μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔστιν, ἔσται τε ἅμα καὶ οὐκ ἔσται· ᾗ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὂν νοεῖται, οὐκ ἔσται, ᾗ δὲ ἔστι μὴ ὄν, πάλιν ἔσται. παντελῶς δὲ ἄτοπον τὸ εἶναί τι ἅμα καὶ μὴ εἶναι· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔστι, τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἔσται· ἐναντία γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, καὶ εἰ τῷ μὴ ὄντι συμβέβηκε τὸ εἶναι, τῷ ὄντι συμβήσεται τὸ μὴ εἶναι. οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν· <τοίνυν> οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔσται.

(68) καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἔστιν, ἤτοι ἀίδιόν ἐστιν ἢ γενητὸν ἢ ἀίδιον ἅμα καὶ γενητόν· οὔτε δὲ ἀίδιόν ἐστιν οὔτε γενητὸν οὔτε ἀμφότερα, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ ἀίδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὂν <ἀρκτέον γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν>, οὐκ ἔχει τινὰ ἀρχήν.

(69) τὸ γὰρ γινόμενον πᾶν ἔχει τιν᾽ ἀρχήν, τὸ δὲ ἀίδιον ἀγένητον καθεστὼς οὐκ εἶχεν ἀρχήν. μὴ ἔχον δὲ ἀρχὴν ἄπειρόν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ ἄπειρόν ἐστιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ πού ἐστιν, ἕτερον αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν, καὶ οὕτως οὐκέτ᾽ ἄπειρον ἔσται τὸ ὂν ἐμπεριεχόμενόν τινι· μεῖζον γάρ ἐστι τοῦ ἐμπεριεχομένου τὸ ἐμπεριέχον, τοῦ δὲ ἀπείρου οὐδέν ἐστι μεῖζον, ὥστε οὐκ ἔστι που τὸ ἄπειρον.

(70) καὶ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἐν αὑτῷ περιέχεται. ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἐν αὑτῷ, καὶ δύο γενήσεται τὸ ὄν, τόπος τε καὶ σῶμα (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ᾧ τόπος ἐστίν, τὸ δ᾽ ἐν αὑτῷ σῶμα). τοῦτο δέ γε ἄτοπον. τοίνυν οὐδὲ ἐν αὑτῷ ἐστι τὸ ὄν. ὥστ᾽ εἰ ἀίδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, ἄπειρόν ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ ἄπειρόν ἐστιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ μηδαμοῦ ἐστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν. τοίνυν εἰ ἀίδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὄν ἐστιν.

(71) καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ γενητόν εἶναι δύναται τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ γέγονεν, ἤτοι ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γέγονεν. ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος γέγονεν· εἰ γὰρ ὄν ἐστιν, οὐ γέγονεν ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἤδη· οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὐδὲ γεννῆσαί τι δύναται διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀφείλειν ὑπάρξεως μετέχειν τὸ γεννητικόν τινος. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ γενητόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν.

(72) κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ συναμφότερον, ἀίδιον ἅμα καὶ γενητόν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀναιρετικά ἐστιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἰ ἀίδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, οὐ γέγονεν, καὶ εἰ γέγονεν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀίδιον. τοίνυν εἰ μήτε ἀίδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὂν μήτε γενητὸν μήτε τὸ συναμφότερον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ὄν.

(73) καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ ἔστιν, ἤτοι ἕν ἐστιν ἢ πολλά· οὔτε δὲ ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε πολλά, ὡς παρασταθήσεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ ἕν ἐστιν, ἤτοι ποσόν ἐστιν ἢ συνεχές ἐστιν ἢ μέγεθός ἐστιν ἢ σῶμά ἐστιν. ὅ τι δὲ ἂν ᾖ τούτων, οὐχ ἕν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ ποσὸν μὲν καθεστὼς διαιρεθήσεται, συνεχὲς δὲ ὂν τμηθήσεται. ὁμοίως δὲ μέγεθος νοούμενον οὐκ ἔσται ἀδιαίρετον. σῶμα δὲ τυγχάνον τριπλοῦν ἔσται· καὶ γὰρ μῆκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος ἕξει. ἄτοπον δέ γε τὸ μηδὲν τούτων εἶναι λέγειν τὸ ὄν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἓν τὸ ὄν.

(74) καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ πολλά ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ μή ἐστιν ἕν, οὐδὲ πολλά ἐστιν· σύνθεσις γὰρ τῶν καθ᾽ ἓν ἐστὶ τὰ πολλά, διόπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀναιρουμένου συναναιρεῖται καὶ τὰ πολλά. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅτι μὲν οὔτε τὸ ὂν ἔστιν οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔστιν, ἐκ τούτων συμφανές.

(75) ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀμφότερα ἔστιν, τό τε ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, εὐεπιλόγιστον. εἴπερ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὂν ἔστι, ταὐτὸν ἔσται τῷ ὄντι τὸ μὴ ὂν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ εἶναι· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδέτερον

αὐτῶν ἔστιν. ὅτι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὁμόλογον· δέδεικται δὲ ταὐτὸ τούτῳ καθεστὼς τὸ ὄν· καὶ αὐτὸ τοίνυν οὐκ ἔσται.

(76) οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἴπερ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὄν, οὐ δύναται ἀμφότερα εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ ἀμφότερα, οὐ ταὐτόν, καὶ εἰ ταὐτόν, οὐκ ἀμφότερα. οἷς ἕπεται τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ μήτε τὸ ὂν ἔστι μήτε τὸ μὴ ὂν μήτε ἀμφότερα, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν νοεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔστιν.

(77) ὅτι δὲ κἂν ᾖ τι, τοῦτο ἄγνωστόν τε καὶ ἀνεπινόητόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ, παρακειμένως ὑποδεικτέον. εἰ γὰρ τὰ φρονούμενα, φησὶν ὁ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, τὸ ὂν οὐ φρονεῖται. καὶ κατὰ λόγον· ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς φρονουμένοις συμβέβηκεν εἶναι λευκοῖς, κἂν συμβεβήκει τοῖς λευκοῖς φρονεῖσθαι, οὕτως εἰ τοῖς φρονουμένοις συμβέβηκεν μὴ εἶναι οὖσι, κατ' ἀνάγκην συμβήσεται τοῖς οὖσι μὴ φρονεῖσθαι.

(78) διόπερ ὑγιὲς καὶ σῷζον τὴν ἀκολουθίαν ἐστὶ τὸ "εἰ τὰ φρονούμενα οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, τὸ ὂν οὐ φρονεῖται". τὰ δέ γε φρονούμενα (προληπτέον γάρ) οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὂν φρονεῖται. καὶ <μὴν> ὅτι τὰ φρονούμενα οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, συμφανές.

(79) εἰ γὰρ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα, πάντα τὰ φρονούμενα ἔστιν, καὶ ὅπῃ ἄν τις αὐτὰ φρονήσῃ. ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀπεμφαῖνον· [εἰ δέ ἐστι, φαῦλον.] οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν φρονῇ τις ἄνθρωπον ἱπτάμενον ἢ ἅρματα ἐν πελάγει τρέχοντα, εὐθέως ἄνθρωπος ἵπταται ἢ ἅρματα ἐν πελάγει τρέχει. ὥστε οὐ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα.

(80) πρὸς τούτοις εἰ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα, τὰ μὴ ὄντα οὐ φρονηθήσεται. τοῖς γὰρ ἐναντίοις τὰ ἐναντία συμβέβηκεν, ἐναντίον δέ ἐστι τῷ ὄντι τὸ μὴ ὄν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντως, εἰ τῷ ὄντι συμβέβηκε τὸ φρονεῖσθαι, τῷ μὴ ὄντι συμβήσεται τὸ μὴ φρονεῖσθαι. ἄτοπον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο· καὶ γὰρ Σκύλλα καὶ Χίμαιρα καὶ πολλὰ τῶν μὴ ὄντων φρονεῖται. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὂν φρονεῖται.

(81) ὥσπερ τε τὰ ὁρώμενα διὰ τοῦτο ὁρατὰ λέγεται ὅτι ὁρᾶται, καὶ τὰ ἀκουστὰ διὰ τοῦτο ἀκουστὰ ὅτι ἀκούεται, καὶ οὐ τὰ μὲν ὁρατὰ ἐκβάλλομεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀκούεται, τὰ δὲ ἀκουστὰ παραπέμπομεν ὅτι οὐχ ὁρᾶται (ἕκαστον γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας αἰσθήσεως ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπ'

ἄλλης ὀφείλει κρίνεσθαι), οὕτω καὶ τὰ φρονούμενα καὶ εἰ μὴ
βλέποιτο τῇ ὄψει μηδὲ ἀκούοιτο τῇ ἀκοῇ ἔσται, ὅτι πρὸς τοῦ
οἰκείου λαμβάνεται κριτηρίου.

(82) εἰ οὖν φρονεῖ τις ἐν πελάγει ἄρματα τρέχειν, καὶ εἰ μὴ
βλέπει ταῦτα, ὀφείλει πιστεύειν ὅτι ἄρματα ἔστιν ἐν πελάγει
τρέχοντα. ἄτοπον δὲ τοῦτο· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὂν φρονεῖται καὶ
καταλαμβάνεται.

(83) καὶ εἰ καταλαμβάνοιτο δέ, ἀνέξοιστον ἑτέρῳ. εἰ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα
ὁρατά ἐστι καὶ ἀκουστὰ καὶ κοινῶς αἰσθητά, ἅπερ ἐκτὸς ὑπόκειται,
τούτων τε τὰ μὲν ὁρατὰ ὁράσει καταληπτά ἐστι τὰ δὲ ἀκουστὰ
ἀκοῇ καὶ οὐκ ἐναλλάξ, πῶς οὖν δύναται ταῦτα ἑτέρῳ μηνύεσθαι;

(84) ᾧ γὰρ μηνύομεν, ἔστι λόγος, λόγος δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ
ὑποκείμενα καὶ ὄντα· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ὄντα μηνύομεν τοῖς πέλας ἀλλὰ
λόγον, ὃς ἕτερός ἐστι τῶν ὑποκειμένων. καθάπερ οὖν τὸ ὁρατὸν οὐκ
ἂν γένοιτο ἀκουστὸν καὶ ἀνάπαλιν, οὕτως ἐπεὶ ὑπόκειται τὸ ὂν
ἐκτός, οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο λόγος ὁ ἡμέτερος.

(85) μὴ ὢν δὲ λόγος οὐκ ἂν δηλωθείη ἑτέρῳ. ὅ γε μὴν λόγος,
φησίν, ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν προσπιπτόντων ἡμῖν πραγμάτων συνίσταται,
τουτέστι τῶν αἰσθητῶν. ἐκ γὰρ τῆς τοῦ χυλοῦ ἐγκυρήσεως
ἐγγίνεται ἡμῖν ὁ κατὰ ταύτης τῆς ποιότητος ἐκφερόμενος λόγος,
καὶ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ χρώματος ὑποπτώσεως ὁ κατὰ τοῦ χρώματος. εἰ δὲ
τοῦτο, οὐχ ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἐκτὸς παραστατικός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκτὸς
τοῦ λόγου μηνυτικὸν γίνεται.

(86) καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἔνεστι λέγειν, ὅτι ὂν τρόπον τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ
ἀκουστὰ ὑπόκειται, οὕτως καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὥστε δύνασθαι ἐξ
ὑποκειμένου αὐτοῦ καὶ ὄντος τὰ ὑποκείμενα καὶ ὄντα μηνύεσθαι.
εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὑπόκειται, φησίν, ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῶν λοιπῶν
ὑποκειμένων, καὶ πλείστῳ διενήνοχε τὰ ὁρατὰ σώματα τῶν λόγων·
δι᾽ ἑτέρου γὰρ ὀργάνου ληπτόν ἐστι τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ δι᾽ ἄλλου ὁ
λόγος. οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδείκνυται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὁ λόγος,
ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα τὴν ἀλλήλων διαδηλοῖ φύσιν.

(87) τοιούτων οὖν παρὰ τῷ Γοργίᾳ ἠπορημένων οἴχεται ὅσον ἐπ᾽
αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον· τοῦ γὰρ μήτε ὄντος μήτε
γνωρίζεσθαι δυναμένου μήτε ἄλλῳ παρασταθῆναι πεφυκότος οὐδὲν
ἂν εἴη κριτήριον.

Plato, *Men.* 76a8-e4 [Meno-Sokrates].

τὸ δὲ χρῶμα τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; - ὑβριστής γ' εἶ, ὦ Μένων·
ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτῃ πράγματα προστάττεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ
ἐθέλεις ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπεῖν, ὅ τι ποτε λέγει Γοργίας ἀρετὴν εἶναι.
- ἀλλ' ἐπειδάν μοι σοὶ τοῦτ' εἴπῃς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρῶ σοι. - κἂν
κατακεκαλυμμένος τις γνοίη, ὦ Μένων, διαλεγομένου σου, ὅτι
καλὸς εἶ καὶ ἐρασταί σοι ἔτι εἰσίν. - τί δή; - ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἤ
ἐπιτάττεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τρυφῶντες, ἅτε
τυραννεύοντες ἕως ἂν ἐν ὥρᾳ ὦσιν, καὶ ἅμα ἐμοῦ ἴσως κατέγνωκας
ὅτι εἰμὶ ἥττων τῶν καλῶν· χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. -
πάνυ μὲν οὖν χάρισαι. - βούλει οὖν σοι κατὰ Γοργίαν
ἀποκρίνωμαι, ᾗ ἂν σὺ μάλιστα ἀκολουθήσαις; - βούλομαι· πῶς γὰρ
οὔ; - οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα; -
σφόδρα γε. - καὶ πόρους εἰς οὓς καὶ δι' ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ
πορεύονται; - πάνυ γε. - καὶ τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττειν
ἐνίοις τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι; - ἔστι ταῦτα. -
οὐκοῦν καὶ ὄψιν καλεῖς τι; - ἔγωγε. - ἐκ τούτων δὴ "σύνες ὅ τοι
λέγω,,, ἔφη Πίνδαρος· ἔστιν γὰρ χρόα ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων ὄψει
σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός. - ἄριστά μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτην
τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἰρηκέναι. - ἴσως γάρ σοι κατὰ συνήθειαν εἴρηται·
καὶ ἅμα οἶμαι ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ἔχοις ἂν ἐξ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν καὶ φωνὴν ὃ
ἔστι, καὶ ὀσμὴν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων. - πάνυ μὲν οὖν. -
τραγικὴ γάρ ἐστιν, ὦ Μένων, ἡ ἀπόκρισις ὥστε ἀρέσκει σοι μᾶλλον
ἢ ἡ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος.

5

Theophrastus, *Ign.* 73 (p.47, ed. Coutant)

ὅτι δ' ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ἅπτουσι τῇ ἀνακλάσει ἀπὸ τῶν
λείων [τί τὸ ἄπορον] (συμμιγνῦσι δὲ τὸ ὑπέκκαυμα), ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ
πυρὸς οὐχ ἅπτουσιν, αἴτιον δ' ἥ τε λεπτομέρεια καὶ ὅτι συνεχὲς

γίνεται μᾶλλον ἀνακλώμενον, τὸ δὲ ἀδυνατεῖ διὰ τὴν ἀνομοιότητα. ὥστε τὸ μὲν τῷ ἀθροισμῷ καὶ τῇ λεπτότητι διαδυόμενον εἰς τὸ ἔκκαυμα δύναται καίειν, τὸ δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἕτερον ἔχον οὐ δύναται. ἐξάπτεται δὲ ἀπό τε τῆς ὑέλου καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ χαλκοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀργύρου τρόπον τινὰ ἐργασθέντων, οὐχ, ὥσπερ Γοργίας φησὶ καὶ ἄλλοι δέ τινες οἴονται, διὰ τὸ ἀπιέναι τὸ πῦρ διὰ τῶν πόρων.

5a

Athanasius Alexandrinus, *Prolegomena on Hermogenes' Stat.*
(*Rh. Gr.*, vol.14, p.180,9ff., ed. Rabe)

τὴν δὲ τρίτην ῥητορικὴν περὶ γελοιώδη τινὰ τῶν μειρακίων τὸν κρότον ἀνεγείρουσαν καὶ κολακείαν ὑπάρχουσαν ἀναιδῆ, ἣν καὶ μετεχειρίσαντο ἐν μὲν χαρακτῆρι καὶ ἐνθυμήμασιν ἡμαρτημένοις οἱ περὶ Θρασύμαχον καὶ Γοργίαν, πολλῷ μὲν τῷ παρίσῳ χρησάμενοι καὶ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν ἠγνοηκότες τούτου τοῦ σχήματος, ἐν δὲ διανοίᾳ καὶ τρόπῳ λέξεως ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ καὶ δὴ καὶ Γοργίας αὐτὸς κουφότατος ὤν, ὃς καὶ τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν ταύτην ἐν τῷ ᾽Ἐπιταφίῳ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἰσχύων γῦπας εἰπεῖν ζῶντας εἴρηκε τάφους· διανοίᾳ δὲ ὑπεκπίπτει τοῦ δέοντος ὡς καὶ ᾽Ισοκράτης μαρτυρεῖ οὕτως φάσκων· 'τίς γὰρ ἂν κτλ.' [fr.1]

[Longinus], *De Subl.*3. 2 (ed. Russell).

ταύτῃ καὶ τὰ τοῦ Λεοντίνου Γοργίου γελᾶται γράφοντος, Ξέρξης ὁ τῶν Περσῶν Ζεὺς καὶ γῦπες ἔμψυχοι τάφοι.

Hermogenes, *Id.* I (p.248,26-249,7, ed. Rabe)

παρὰ δὲ τοῖς ὑποξύλοις τουτοισὶ σοφισταῖς πάμπολλα εὕροις ἄν· τάφους τε γὰρ ἐμψύχους τοὺς γῦπας λέγουσιν, ὧνπερ εἰσὶ μάλιστα ἄξιοι, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ψυχρεύονται πάμπολλα. ἐκτραχηλίζουσι δ᾽ αὐτοὺς αἵ τε τραγῳδίαι πολλὰ ἔχουσαι τούτου παραδείγματα, καὶ ὅσοι τῶν ποιητῶν τραγικώτερόν πως προαιροῦνται, ὥσπερ Πίνδαρος.

5b

Philostratos, *VS* I. 9, 5. (p.209, 12f., ed. Kayser); cf. Test.1a.

τὰ μὲν κατὰ τῶν βαρβάρων τρόπαια ὕμνους ἀπαιτεῖ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ
τῶν Ἑλλήνων θρήνους.

Isokrates, 4. 158 (ed. Mathieu-Brémond)

εὕροι δ᾽ ἄν τις ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους
ὕμνους πεποιημένους, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας θρήνους ἡμῖν
γεγενημένους.

(fr.6=᾽Επιτάφιος)

7

Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3. 14, 1414b29 (ed. Kassel)

λέγεται δὲ τὰ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοίμια ἐξ ἐπαίνου ἢ ψόγου· οἷον
Γοργίας μὲν ἐν τῷ ᾽Ολυμπικῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἄξιοι θαυμάζεσθαι,
ὦ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες. ἐπαινεῖ γὰρ τοὺς τὰς πανηγύρεις συνάγοντας.

8

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stro.* I 51 (II, p.33,18-22, ed. Stählin)

"καὶ τὸ ἀγώνισμα ἡμῶν κατὰ τὸν Λεοντῖνον Γοργίαν διττῶν [δὲ]
ἀρετῶν δεῖται, τόλμης καὶ σοφίας·" τόλμης μὲν τὸν κίνδυνον
ὑπομεῖναι, σοφίας δὲ τὸ αἴνιγμα γνῶναι. ὁ γάρ τοι λόγος καθάπερ
τὸ κήρυγμα τὸ ᾽Ολυμπίασι καλεῖ μὲν τὸν βουλόμενον, στεφανοῖ δὲ
τὸν δυνάμενον.

8a

Ploutarkhos, *Coniugalia praecepta* 43, *Moralia* 144 bc

Γοργίου τοῦ ῥήτορος ἀναγνόντος ἐν ᾽Ολυμπίᾳ λόγον περὶ ὁμονοίας
τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὁ Μελάνθιος "οὗτος ἡμῖν" ἔφη "συμβουλεύει περὶ
ὁμονοίας ὃς αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὴν θεράπαιναν ἰδίᾳ τρεῖς
ὄντας ὁμονοεῖν οὐ πέπεικεν"· ἦν γὰρ ὡς ἔοικέ τις ἔρως τοῦ
Γοργίου καὶ ζηλοτυπία τῆς γυναικὸς πρὸς τὸ θεραπαινίδιον.

9

Philostratos, VS I 9,4 (p. 209,3f., ed. Kayser); cf. Test.1

τὸν μὲν λόγον τὸν Πυθικὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ ἤχησεν.

10

Aristotle, Rhetoric 3. 14, 1415b32-1416a3 (ed. Kassel)

τὰ δε τοῦ δημηγορικοῦ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ δικανικοῦ λόγου ἐστίν, φύσει δὲ ἥκιστα ἔχει [προοίμια]...τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ Γοργίου ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἠλείους· οὐδὲν γὰρ προεξαγκωνίσας οὐδὲ προανακινήσας εὐθὺς ἄρχεται "Ἦλις πόλις εὐδαίμων".

(11, 11a = ʿΕλένης Ἐγκώμιον and Ὑπὲρ Παλαμήδους Ἀπολογία)

12

Aristotle, Rhetoric 3. 18, 1419b3-5 (ed. Kassel)

δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν διαφθείρειν τῶν ἐναντίων γέλωτι, τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπουδῇ, ὀρθῶς λέγων.

Plato, Grg. 473e

τί τοῦτο, ὦ Πῶλε; γελᾷς; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδὰν τίς τι εἴπῃ, καταγελᾶν, ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή;

Schol. on Plato, Grg. 473e

τοῦτο παράγγελμα Γοργίου, τὸ τὰς σπουδὰς τῶν ἀντιδίκων γέλωτι ἐκλύειν, τὰ δὲ γελοῖα ταῖς σπουδαῖς ἐκκρούειν.

Olympiodoros, in Grg. 20,5 (p.113, 24-27, ed. Westerink)

ἰστέον γὰρ ὅτι Γοργίου ἐστὶ παράγγελμα ὅτι "εἰ μὲν ὁ ἐναντίος σπουδαῖα λέγει, γέλα, καὶ ἐκκρούεις αὐτόν· εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνος γελᾷ σου σπουδαῖα λέγοντος, σύντεινον σαυτόν, ἵνα μὴ φανῇ αὐτοῦ ὁ γέλως".

13

Dionysios of Halikarnassos, *Comp.* 12,5.

καιροῦ δὲ οὔτε ῥήτωρ οὐδεὶς οὔτε φιλόσοφος εἰς τόδε χρόνου
τέχνην ὥρισεν, οὐδ᾽ ὅσπερ πρῶτος ἐπεχείρησε περὶ αὐτοῦ γράφειν
Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος οὐδὲν ὅ τι λόγου ἄξιον ἔγραψεν· οὐδ᾽ ἔχει
φύσιν τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰς καθολικὴν καὶ ἔντεχνόν τινα περίληψιν
πεσεῖν, οὐδ᾽ ὅλως ἐπιστήμῃ θηρατός ἐστιν ὁ καιρὸς ἀλλὰ δόξῃ.

14

Aristotle, *SE* 33, 183b36-184a8

καὶ γὰρ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς λόγους μισθαρνούντων ὁμοία τις
ἦν ἡ παίδευσις τῇ Γοργίου πραγματείᾳ· λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν
ῥητορικοὺς οἱ δὲ ἐρωτητικοὺς ἐδίδοσαν ἐκμανθάνειν, εἰς οὓς
πλειστάκις ἐμπίπτειν ᾤήθησαν ἑκάτεροι τοὺς ἀλλήλων λόγους.
διόπερ ταχεῖα μὲν ἄτεχνος δ᾽ ἦν ἡ διδασκαλία τοῖς μανθάνουσι
παρ᾽ αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες
παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐπιστήμην φάσκων
παραδώσειν ἐπὶ τὸ μηδὲν πονεῖν τοὺς πόδας, εἶτα σκυτοτομικὴν
μὲν μὴ διδάσκοι μηδ᾽ ὅθεν δυνήσεται πορίζεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, δοίη
δὲ πολλὰ γένη παντοδαπῶν ὑποδημάτων. οὗτος γὰρ βεβοήθηκε μὲν
πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, τέχνην δ᾽ οὐ παρέδωκεν.

Plato, *Phdr.* 261b-c

ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μέν πως περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεταί τε καὶ γράφεται
τέχνη, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίας· ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα.
- ἀλλ᾽ ἦ τὰς Νέστορος καὶ Ὀδυσσέως τέχνας μόνον περὶ λόγων
ἀκήκοας, ἃς ἐν Ἰλίῳ σχολάζοντες συνεγραψάτην, τῶν δὲ
Παλαμήδους ἀνήκοος γέγονας; - καὶ ναὶ μά Δί᾽ ἔγωγε τῶν
Νέστορος, εἰ μὴ Γοργίαν Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις, ἤ τινα
Θρασύμαχόν τε καὶ Θεόδωρον Ὀδυσσέα.

15

Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3. 3, 1405b34-1406a1 (ed. Kassel)

τὰ δὲ ψυχρὰ ἐν τέτταρσι γίνεται κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἔν τε τοῖς διπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν...καὶ ὡς Γοργίας ὠνόμαζεν πτωχομουσοκόλακας καὶ ἐπιορκήσαντας καὶ κατευορκήσαντας.

16

Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3. 3, 1406b4-11 (ed. Kassel)

καὶ ἔτι τέταρτον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς γίγνεται...οἷον Γοργίας χλωρὰ καὶ ἄναιμα τὰ πράγματα· σὺ δὲ ταῦτα αἰσχρῶς μὲν ἔσπειρας, κακῶς δὲ ἐθέρισας· ποιητικῶς γὰρ ἄγαν.

17

Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3. 17, 1418a32-37 (ed. Kassel)

ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἐπαίνοις, οἷον Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ· ἀεὶ γάρ τινα εἰσάγει. καὶ ὃ ἔλεγεν Γοργίας ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος, ταὐτό ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγων Πηλέα ἐπαινεῖ, εἶτα Αἰακόν, εἶτα τὸν θεόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίαν, ἢ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ ἢ τοιόνδε ἐστίν.

18

Aristotle, *Pol.* 1. 13, 1260a21-28; cf. Fr. 19.

καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδ᾽ ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης...καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτούς, ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετή, ἢ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων· πολὺ γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὁριζομένων.

19

Plato, *Men.* 71e-72a; cf. Fr. 18.

πρῶτον μέν, εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν, ῥᾴδιον, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν καὶ πράττοντα

τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, καὶ αὐτὸν
εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετήν,
οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν, ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὴν τὴν οἰκίαν εὖ οἰκεῖν, σῴζουσάν
τε τὰ ἔνδον καὶ κατήκοον οὖσαν τοῦ ἀνδρός. καὶ ἄλλη ἐστὶν παιδὸς
ἀρετή, καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἄρρενος, καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ἀνδρός, εἰ μὲν
βούλει, ἐλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει δούλου. 72a καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι
ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅ τι ἐστίν· καθ'
ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον
ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ
κακία.

20

Ploutarkhos, _Cim._ 10, 5.

Γοργίας μὲν ὁ Λεοντῖνός φησι τὸν Κίμωνα τὰ χρήματα κτᾶσθαι μὲν
ὡς χρῷτο, χρῆσθαι δὲ ὡς τιμῷτο.

21

Ploutarkhos, _De adulatore et amico_ 23, _Moralia_ 64C.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος οὐχ ὥσπερ ἀπεφαίνετο Γοργίας, αὑτῷ μὲν ἀξιώσει
τὰ δίκαια τὸν φίλον ὑπουργεῖν, ἐκείνῳ δ' αὐτὸς ὑπηρετήσει πολλὰ
καὶ τῶν μὴ δικαίων.

22

Ploutarkhos, _De mulierum virtutibus, prooem., Moralia_ 242ef.

ἡμῖν δὲ κομψότερος μὲν ὁ Γοργίας φαίνεται, κελεύων μὴ τὸ εἶδος
ἀλλὰ τὴν δόξαν εἶναι πολλοῖς γνώριμον τῆς γυναικός.

23

Ploutarkhos, _De gloria Atheniensium_ 5, _Moralia_ 348C.

ἤνθησε δ' ἡ τραγῳδία καὶ διεβοήθη, θαυμαστὸν ἀκρόαμα καὶ θέαμα
τῶν τότ' ἀνθρώπων γενομένη καὶ παρασχοῦσα τοῖς μύθοις καὶ τοῖς
πάθεσιν ἀπάτην, ὡς Γοργίας φησίν, ἣν ὅ τ' ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος
τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος, καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος τοῦ μὴ

ἀπατηθέντος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος, ὅτι τοῦθ'
ὑποσχόμενος πεποίηκεν, ὁ δ' ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος· εὐάλωτον γὰρ
ὑφ' ἡδονῆς λόγων τὸ μὴ ἀναίσθητον.

24

Ploutarkhos, *Quaestiones convivales* VII 10,2, *Moralia* 715e

Γοργίας εἶπεν ἐν τῶν δραμάτων αὐτοῦ [Αἰσχύλου] "μεστὸν Ἄρεως"
εἶναι, τοὺς Ἑπτὰ ἐπὶ Θήβας.

Aristophanes, *Ran.* 1021.

δρᾶμα ποιήσας Ἄρεως μεστόν. - ποῖον; - τοὺς Ἑπτ' ἐπὶ Θήβας.

**Philodemus, *Herculan. Volum. Coll. Altera* (1873) T. VIII, p. 15
(not included in any other edition of G.'s work)**

τοῦ Αἰσχύλου δ[...] Ἄρεως ἔλεγε.

25

**Proklos, *Chr.*, in *Vitae Homeri et Hesiodi*, p. 26, 14-20 ed.
Wilamowitz (cf. FGrHist 4 F 5b)**

Ἑλλάνικος δὲ καὶ Δαμάστης καὶ Φερεκύδης εἰς Ὀρφέα τὸ γένος
ἀνάγουσιν αὐτοῦ [Ὁμήρου]...Γοργίας δὲ ὁ Λεοντῖνος εἰς Μουσαῖον
αὐτὸν λέγει.

26

Proklos, *Hes. Op.*, 760ff. (p.232,12-14, ed.Pertusi)

οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἀληθὲς ὃ ἔλεγε Γοργίας· ἔλεγε δὲ "τὸ μὲν εἶναι
ἀφανὲς μὴ τυχὸν τοῦ δοκεῖν, τὸ δὲ δοκεῖν ἀσθενὲς μὴ τυχὸν τοῦ
εἶναι".

27

Schol. T on Homer, *Il.* 4. 450a

καὶ Γοργίας "ἀνεμίσγοντο δὲ λιταῖς ἀπειλαὶ καὶ εὐχαῖς οἰμωγαί".

28

Anonymous, ᾿Αποφθέγματα φιλοσόφων, No 34, Syrian Ms. of Sinai Abbey fol.148a (*Studia Sinaitica*) 1 (1894), p.35). For a translation and notes see Buchheim 1989 and notes *ad loc.*

29

Gnomologicum Vaticanum, 743, No. 166. (p.68, ed. Sternbach)

Γοργίας ὁ ῥήτωρ ἔλεγε τοὺς φιλοσοφίας μὲν ἀμαλοῦντας, περὶ δὲ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα γινομένους ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς μνηστῆρσιν, οἳ Πηνελόπην θέλοντες ταῖς θεραπαίναις αὐτῆς ἐμίγνυντο.

30

Gnomologicum Vaticanum, 743, n.167 (p.69, ed. Sternbach)

Γοργίας τοὺς ῥήτορας ἔφη ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς βατράχοις· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὕδατι κελαδεῖν, τοὺς δὲ πρὸς κλεψύδραν.

31

Sopatros, Διαίρεσις ζητημάτων (*Rh.Gr.* Vol. 8, 23,21-23, ed. Walz) .

Γοργίας μύδρον εἶναι λέγων τὸν ἥλιον.

ADDENDUM

Pollux, IX.1 (p. 148, ed. Bethe)

᾿Ονομαστικόν [τι] [βιβλίον] πεποίηται Γοργίᾳ τῷ σοφιστῇ, οὑτωσὶ μὲν ἀκοῦσαι παιδευτικόν, εἰς δὲ πεῖραν ἐλθεῖν ὀλίγου λόγου...τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα τὴν χρείαν αὐτῶν ἀποδέχομαι, καὶ ὅτι τὸν τῶν ὀνομάτων κατάλογον, ἔχοντά τι τῇ φύσει προσκορές, τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς διαθέσεως σεσόφισται πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον ἐν τῷ τῆς συντάξεως σχήματι, ὡς

μηδένα θᾶττον τῷ γνωσθέντι προκαμεῖν, τῷ τὸ μέλλον ἀκοῦσαι ποθεῖν.

The following fragments are cited in section C in DK (Μιμήσεις)

1

Plato, *Symposion* 198c.

καὶ γάρ με Γοργίου ὁ λόγος [᾽Αγάθωνος] ἀνεμίμνησκεν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς τὸ τοῦ ῾Ομήρου ἐπεπόνθη· ἐφοβούμην, μή μοι τελευτῶν ὁ ᾽Αγάθων Γοργίου κεφαλὴν δεινοῦ λέγειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπὶ ἐμὸν λόγον πέμψας αὐτόν με λίθον τῇ ἀφωνίᾳ ποιήσειεν.

Plato, *Symposion* 185c

Παυσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου - διδάσκουσι γάρ με [᾽Απολλόδωρον] ἴσα λέγειν οὑτωσὶ οἱ σοφοί.

2

Xenophon, *Symposion* II 26.

ἂν δὲ ἡμῖν οἱ παῖδες μικραῖς κύλιξι μικρὰ ἐπιψεκάζωσιν, ἵνα καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν Γοργιείοισι ῥήμασιν εἴπω...

COMMENTARY

11. *The Encomium of Helen*

I. The Argumentation

G., following his poetic predecessors, introduces his praise of *Hel.* with a Priamel, which according to Bundy (1962, p.5) "is a focusing or selective device in which one or more terms serve as foil for the point of particular interest". The topic-word in this Priamel is κόσμος;[1] G. proceeds by determining what is κόσμος for several elements (πόλει:εὐανδρία, σώματι:κάλλος, ψυχῇ:σοφία, πράγματι:ἀρετή), and he places the focal element last: κόσμος for a speech is truth. G.'s task then is to tell the truth about Helen, the notorious trouble-maker.

In a programmatic paragraph G. explicitly puts forward the very object of his speech; "to say rightly what ought to be said and to refute the critics of Helen". Who are the critics of Helen? Those who have listened to the poets and her nomen/omen. It is clear that for the purposes of his own argumentation, G. presents Helen as a woman unanimously criticised by the poets, though we know that the poetical tradition is divided. And her nomen/omen – a reminiscence of the archaic conception that the name brings out the nature of the subject it describes – is a further reference to the poets. The ignorance created by the poetical tradition must be replaced by the argumentation of the rhetor. Λογισμός is his own method: the rationalistic examination and the use of arguments are opposed to the account of the poets, whose words are the result of inspiration.

G. then gives an account of Helen's birth, he praises her incomparable beauty and composes a brief encomium of her suitors,

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[1] For this word see note *ad loc.*

which works as an implicit encomium of herself; for having attracted so many and so important men suggests that she herself must have been an important woman as well.

With a rhetorical *paraleipsis* (praeteritio) he bypasses her marriage with Menelaos, because as he says "to tell those who know what they know carries conviction but does not give pleasure." This disclaimer is to some extent misleading. Although, G. claims that the presentation of information already known does add credibility to one's speech, he does not claim that sacrificing the informativity of a speech detracts from its credibility. This is explained if we compare it with G.'s statement later, in ch.13, that a speech written with skill and not spoken with truth can please and persuade a large crowd. Evidently, in this case a reference to Helen's marriage would not be very pleasant and it would hardly fit in G.'s argumentation, whereas the presentation of her noble birth and of her noble suitors, create an encomiastic image of Helen. This is a good example of what the early theorists of rhetoric meant by the term *kairos* (cp.fr.13): presenting the right arguments in the right time and in the right occasion.

The presentation of the possible reasons that forced Helen to elope with Paris has now been prepared: divine power, violence, speech, love. It is evident that Helen, put under the pressure of so strong powers had no other choice; as de Romilly remarks, this principle is "repeatedly applied by the orators of Thucydides" and it is "in constant use in the arguments of tragedy and later also in the speeches of the orators". The main aspects of this "principle" are the following:

1. The invention of possible reasons (or excuses) is based on probabilities; G. says that these are the causes "which made it reasonable ($\epsilon\grave{\iota}\kappa\grave{o}\varsigma$ $\mathring{\eta}\nu$) for Helen's departure to Troy to occur". These probabilities are not mutually exclusive; each one is equally possible, though a combination of them is not to be rejected.

2. Their common denominator is that all of them possess a divine power or the possibility to work their will on their victims by

compulsion: gods are invincible by their nature, violence, though not personified in the *Encomium*, is presented by Hesiod (*Theog.* 383-385) as the daughter of Styx and Pallas and the sister of Kratos and Nike; speech is defined by G. as "a powerful ruler, whose achievements are supehuman (θειότατα)" and love (ἔρως is described as a god with a god's power.

3. The discussion of divine power, λόγος and love involves a good deal of theoretical argumentation, whereas the discussion of physical violence is straightforward.

Divine power is not dealt with exhaustively; defending Helen as a victim of divine power is as old as the *Iliad*; what is surprising is the presentation of the decisions of the gods in civic terms (ψηφίσμασι, βουλεύμασι 6) which belong to the proceedings of an Assembly. G. does not simply state that divine power is by its nature invincible; this political terminology prepares the rationalistic approach to the power of the stronger. With an axiomatic phrase, he states that " it is not natural for the stronger to be hindered by the weaker, but for the weaker to be governed and guided by the stronger, and for the stronger to lead and the weaker to follow." This typically Gorgian antithetical structure expresses a predominant theme of the moral and psychological problematic of the sophistic movement, that is the *nomos / physis* opposition and its implications concerning the right of the might.

Violence is discussed briefly; if Helen was forced to desert her husband it is not right to put the blame on her, who was the victim, but him, who as a barbarian committed barbarous crimes.

What follows is the discussion of λόγος. This part of the *Encomium* is of high importance since it provides one of the earliest theoretical approaches to the functions of human speech and its psychological implications. Poetry, magical spells, the psychotherapeutic value of speech, the pragmatics of human communication and its context, the philosophical discourse, the rhetorical persuasiveness will serve as examples.

"Speech (λόγος) is a powerful ruler. Its substance (σῶμα) is minute and invisible, but its achievements are superhuman (θειότατα)"; with this striking personification G. begins the discussion of speech. The λόγος to which divine power is attributed here is not any particular kind of speech, but speech as a whole. The divine nature of λόγος is not at this stage presented as the result of human craftsmanship. The human factor is deliberately kept back. In the present context, λόγος is an autonomous being with superhuman powers.

Two kinds of speech are adduced as examples of the power of λόγος: poetry and incantations. Poetry is defined as "a speech with metre". This definition is interesting because of the shocking assumption that the specific distinction between poetry and other kinds of speech is metre. By saying so, G. underrates poetry in the respect that it is implied that all the parameters of poetical language, except metre, are common with all the other kinds of speech. And G.'s poetical style is a clear manifestation that what is said here is in absolute accordance with his practices. Aristotle claims that "as the poets, although their utterances were devoid of sense, appeared to have gained their reputation through their style, it was a poetical style that first came into being, as that of G." (Test. 29). I consider that G.'s poetical style, with the abundant use of ornamentation, is not merely a capriciousness. He seems to have awareness of the fact that he is creating a new literary *genre* which will answer the demands of an increasing need for persuasive speech. As Untersteiner put it, G.'s emphatic definition of poetry seems to be "peculiar to a man who knows that he has created the modern sophisticated prose" (1961, p.99). The ability of poetry to mould the souls of the listeners (the ψυχαγωγία of Plato) and its charming form are the foundation stones of the new rhetorical prose.

The discussion of the emotions caused by poetry follows a pattern regularly used in the *Encomium*: poetical speech (the stimulus) comes into the soul of the listeners and it arouses fright,

pity and longing. The physiological signs or better the symptoms with which the soul expresses the affection are the tears and the shuddering (φρίκη) of the audience. In addition, G.'s remarks that poetical speech makes the soul experience a suffering of its own at the sufferings of others. The passage, with the combination of φόβος and ἔλεος, reminds us of the definition of tragedy in Aristotle's *Poetics*, but this verbal similarity is not a firm ground to say, as many scholars did (see comment *ad loc.*), that G. anticipates the 'κάθαρσις-theory' of Aristotle.

The second example of the power of logos comes from the realm of magic. Incantations are the spells that in the popular view can force someone to act in a way that does not correspond to his/her intentions and we have evidence that they were used for therapeutic reasons as well. Their power was derived from the gods. According to G., when the power of the incantation reaches the opinion of the soul it enchants it and the soul persuaded is now forced to change opinions, that is it adopts different views from those that it originally had. In other words the person is alienated from itself and its actions are in accordance with the commands of the incantation. This is because "sorcery and enchantment can mislead the soul and deceive the judgment".

After the presentation of the examples of poetry and incantations, the emphasis is placed on the recipients of *logos*. Most people persuade by creating a false speech.[1] But false speeches would not have been equally persuasive if men "possessed memory of the past, understanding of the present and foreknowledge of the future". But since it is not so "most men make belief the adviser of their soul".

This passage gave rise to several interpretations and it has regularly been used as a manifestation of G.'s epistemological distinction between knowledge and opinion. Scholars who take this

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[1] In his short introduction, G. claims that unlike the poets he intends to tell the truth; similar declarations of intention are frequent in Pindar as well; cp. *O.* 1. 46ff., *N.* 7. 20-4.

view claim that G.'s epistemological view is that men do not have access to knowledge and as a matter of fact they are condemned to trust opinion, defined here as slippery and unreliable. In my view, G.'s texts do not call for interpretations coloured by sustained epistemological, metaphysical or even ontological theories. What is said here is a clear argument: most, not all men, rely on belief, because it is not easy, not because it is impossible, to have access to knowledge. So if Helen was deceived, it is because she did what most men do.

If Helen was persuaded by words we should not put the blame on her, but on the man who persuaded her, because as we are told "persuasion, though not having an appearance of compulsion, has the same power". Πειθώ and ἀνάγκη are two basic Greek notions. Herodotos (VIII.111.2) says that when the Andrians refused to contribute money to the Greek side during the Persian Wars, Themistokles told them that the Athenians are coming with two great gods: Persuasion and Compulsion. Aristotle (*EE* 1224a39) clearly distinguishes them as well. G. seems to underrate this established distinction for the purposes of his argumentation.

The power of persuasion is demonstrated with three examples, taken from three different contexts of human communication: the accounts of the natural philosophers, the speeches delivered in the courtrooms, the discussions of the philosophers. From this point G. is not concerned with the extra-human power of logos, but with the persuasion as a result of human abilities, in other words we are in the realm of rhetoric in the widest possible meaning of the word. Let us throw some more light on the examples: the first example is taken from the theories of the 'natural philosophers', the 'cosmologists'; G. claims that these men make things otherwise invisible to the natural eye visible to the eye of the mind.

1. The argument seems persuasive: Anaxagoras 59A72 for example thought that the sun is a flaming stone. People, not being able to refute this theory on the basis of their natural senses, are persuaded by words. And this was probably what G. meant by the phrase:

"existence is not manifest if it does not involve opinion, and opinion is unreliable if it does not involve existence" (cp. fr.26).

2. The second example is pertinent to the speeches delivered in the courtrooms; "a single speech pleases and persuades a large crowd, because it is written with skill, not spoken with truth". The opposition of the one speech to the mob (ὄχλος) alludes to mass psychology. The self-consciousness of the speaker reappears; being persuasive means pleasing the audience.

3. The third example derives from the "conflicts of philosophical speeches"; in these debates an opinion is valid until substituted by another, imposed by the development of the argumentation of the opponent. The interlocutors of these debates are differentiated from the 'cosmologists' and the 'advocates' because they do not proceed with a speech composed in advance; their success depends on their alertness and the adjustability of their argumentation.

G. then, moves on to the demonstration of the power of persuasive speech and its impact on the human soul; by using a mathematical relation, he maintains that, "the power of speech bears the same relation to the ordering of the mind as the ordering of drugs bears to the constitution of bodies"; as there are drugs with therapeutic value and others which are lethal, in the same way there are speeches that evoke positive and speeches that evoke negative emotions. And there are other speeches which, by means of malicious persuasion (πειθοῖ κακῇ), harm the soul.

The fourth reason is love; but paradoxically the word love is from the very beginning of the argumentation substituted by the word ὄψις ('vision'); the argument is built upon the idea that we are not responsible for the appearance of an object. The argumentation involves once more the examination of the psychological parameters of the function of vision and its impact upon the soul. The emotions

caused by sight are divided into two categories: the negative and the positive. G. begins with the negative ones:

1. When soldiers face the offensive and defensive weapons of the enemy they flee because these very weapons foreshadow frightful events. So their fear makes them disregard the benefits of a victory. Frightful sights cause psychological disorders.

2. Things that people have seen in the past are engraved in their memory, and because of them, people still experience terrifying emotions in the present.

Several traits of "behaviourism" can be traced here: a stimulus produces through ἔκπληξις (panic) emotions of fear. The external display of these emotions can take various forms (e.g. the flight of the army). This inclusive typology of emotions allows G. omit further examples of frightful sights, because, as he says, they are 'similar to those mentioned"

The positive emotions are shown by the effects of the products of the fine arts on the soul. Two kinds of artistic activity are used: painting and sculpture.

With a clause of striking density G. describes both the process of creation and the effects of a painting: "when painters complete out of many colours and objects a single object and form, they please the sight".

Saying that the products of the fine arts can evoke the same emotions as speech, that is pleasure (τέρψις), is obviously an echo of the conception that both art and literature are mimetic; the difference between them, according to G., is that words please the soul, whereas fine arts please the sight.

But pleasure is not the only result of art; from the passive state of pleasure, the soul is now passing to the active action of love. This is the ἴδιον πάθημα which is invoked by poetry in the human soul (9): falling in love with soulless objects is the highest achievement of the mimetic process (ἀπεργασίας).

"So if Helen's eye, pleased by Alexander's body, transmitted an eagerness and striving of love to her mind, what is surprising?" The practical use of the theorisation concerning the sight is now obvious: It was not Helen who fell in love with Paris, but her eye, which was pleased by his 'statuesque' body.

With a repetition of the causes that made Helen follow Paris, G. reaches the end of his speech. In all of the cases Helen is not responsible for what has happened; she was the victim. But it seems that G. saw fit to tantalise scholars at the very end of *Hel.*, because after his statement that he has kept to the purpose which he set at the beginning of his speech, that is to remove infamy from Helen, he goes on to voice his personal intentions in composing this speech: it was meant to be an encomium for her, and a παίγνιον for himself!

II. παίγνιον

Authors do not always utter their intentions in their own texts; in deciding how one should interpret a text whose author prescribes in it how he means us to perceive it, there are, I believe, two routes: one either ignores the author's statement or one decides to bring one's interpretation into harmony with the author's stated intention. But all this depends on the meaning one gives to the word 'intention'. I readily exclude the following meaning: 'G. wrote *Hel.* to amuse himself', because it cannot be confirmed or rejected on any firm ground, and chiefly because it does not contribute to our understanding of his writing. On the contrary, I am ready to accept an investigation of the function of his statement that *Hel.* is a παίγνιον in the general context of this speech.

What is a παίγνιον? Isokrates, in his own *Hel.*, imputes to some 'sophists' that they deal with unimportant subjects, on the basis that these subjects are not demanding enough. In explaining his view, he maintains that serious subjects τοσούτῳ χαλεπωτέραν ἔχουσι τὴν σύνθεσιν, ὅσῳ περ τὸ σεμνύνεσθαι τοῦ σκώπτειν καὶ τὸ σπουδάζειν τοῦ παίζειν ἐπιπονώτερόν ἐστιν, and he then goes on to explain that

for this very reason no one has any difficulty in 'praising' salt, or βομβυλιούς (a kind of insect). Having said that, he praises καὶ τὸν γράψαντα περὶ τῆς Ἑλένης (who else but G.?) for undertaking the task of composing a speech for Helen. Interestingly enough, Isokrates locates an element in G.'s *Hel.* which makes his achievement open to criticism: 'Although he claims [sc. G.] that he has written an *encomion* about her, in fact what he says happens to be a defence of her'. Isokrates has the last words of G.'s *Hel.* in mind (or even before him), and his words acquire interesting implications if we take into account the fact that in this section of his *Hel.* he makes a distinction between σπουδάζειν and παίζειν, as two distinct intellectual activities. In other words, why does Isokrates present himself as ignorant of G.'s own statement that *Hel.* is a παίγνιον?

There are the following possibilities: a) he did not have G.'s text before him, or, in the version that he had before him that last word of the text was missing, b) he preferred to refer solely to the part of G.'s self-referential statement which would give him a more suitable *raison d'être* for his own *encomion*, c) he did not take G.'s statement as an honest confession, d) a παίγνιον may or may not be serious. (a) should be excluded; even if Isokrates did not have before him G.'s actual words, the antithetical, polished form of the sentence makes it extremely easy to memorise it; what is more, Isokrates' own words pick up G.'s ones (φησὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον γεγραφέναι περὶ αὐτῆς = ἐβουλήθην γράψαι τὸν λόγον Ἑλένης...; note that in the preceding paragraphs Isokrates uses ἔπαινος and ἐπαινεῖν , not ἐγκώμιον). (b) is harder to refute; it could have been the case that Isokrates deliberately turned a blind eye to the word παίγνιον, because he wanted to stress that his *Helen* exemplified what real ἐγκώμια should look like; yet, it is hard to explain why he fails to capitalise on G.'s own self-characterisation, when he has just mentioned that some people prefer the royal road to the stony serious subjects. (c) Whether G.'s statement were or were not

honest, Isokrates could in either case have proceeded by using it. Isokrates would not have been intimidated by G.'s dishonesty, as the wording in his massive criticism in 10.3 evinces. (d) seems to me the only possible explanation; Isokrates was certainly aware that G. thought his own work to be a παίγνιον, but he did not see fit to use this self-reference in his criticism. G.'s *Hel.*, and the *encomia* of others that Isokrates has in mind differ significantly.

The analysis so far shows that Isokrates at least did not find any absence of seriousness in *Hel.* That he adduces G.'s example to show what real ἔπαινοι should deal with points in this direction, as it does that he builds his own speech on the basis of what he deems as a minor misfire of G.'s speech. In this light, it appears that despite the word παίγνιον G. intends us to construe his speech as a serious piece.

We may now turn to modern views;[1] modern scholarship has more or less used the word παίγνιον as a catalyst, which has the potential to overturn the whole meaning of *Hel.* Accordingly, it has been suggested that if the word implies a humorous tone, then *Hel.* is a humorous piece, or at any rate that with this word G. underrates his own work (see Kennedy 1991, p.288); similarly, it has been thought that "he may have been equally aware of the usefulness of parody and pastiche as a means for focusing students' attention and making their memories more retentive" (Cole 1991, p.78). On the contrary, Poulakos explains that no teacher of rhetoric would conclude with an expression saying "you've been had" (1983, p.3). An interesting view has been forward by Verdenius (1981, p.125), who maintains that "this kind of 'Verfremdung' seems to be the main reason why he called the speech 'a diversion of myself'". Bertold Brecht's *Verfremdung*, Verdenius explains, means that "the audience should be stimulated by the author to keep a critical distance from the deceptive fictions and not to take images for

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[1] For further literature and summaries, see Untersteiner 1954, p.131 and n.106, Bona 1974, p.33, Caffaro 1995, p.73, Schiappa 1999, p.130-1.

reality". G., throughout the discussion of the third reason (8-14), keeps reminding us that persuasion is violent, that it *can* be malicious, and that it certainly affects our soul. So one may ask oneself: if G. shows *how* and *why* persuasive speech victimises its auditors, why should *I* become the victim of his own speech? This is potentially valid criticism; but there are some points to be made. There is no reason to suggest that παίγνιον refers solely to the discussion of speech in 8-14, and in any case, had G. *intended* to produce the effects of 'Verfremdung' by saying that his work is a παίγνιον, he would not have waited until the very end of his speech. His audience should have been warned earlier.

Schiappa (1999, p.130-1) has recently claimed that "there is plenty of textual material with which to work without overemphasizing the significance of the last word. After all, one might speculate that G.'s choice of *paignion* was merely a matter of acoustical preference, since *paignion* is a useful word to complete the melodious phrase *men enkômion emon de paignion*". Agnosticism in literary interpretation is perfectly justifiable and sometimes preferable; but it should not take refuge in formal embroidery. If this method is to be employed, then probably one may claim that ἐγκώμιον is an equally "useful word to complete the melodious phrase" μὲν ἐγκώμιον ἐμὸν δὲ παίγνιον.

As far as I known, no one has paid enough attention to the iconoclastic reconciliation attempted in *Hel.* of what normally is (or was thought to be) distinct; some obvious examples: a dualism is discernible in the examination of λόγος which serves both as an argument for Helen's case, but which also is a theoretical generalisation about it. Persuasion made Helen its passive object, but we know that G. employs persuasion to persuade us too. What is said in *this* speech serves *this* speech's aims, but the generalisation involved in it makes its contents applicable to *any* possible case where persuasion is involved. Helen is a mythical person, but every effort is made by G. to present her case as a real one; traditional and

modern are reconciled in an almost postmodernist pastiche. In the same connection, πειθώ, which is frequently depicted on vases alongside Helen and Aphrodite, is in this speech rationalised to the extreme with purely secular and somewhat trivial examples (cp.13). λογισμός is added to a traditional and mythological narrative, which, in fact, is never narrated, on the basis that λόγος, or the kind of λόγος uttered in this text, can overcome linear accounts. Love, a notoriously irrational power, is rationalised as well; its divine nature is referred to *en passant*, and even there it is no less rationalised (19), in a way which clearly echoes the rationalisation of divine power at 6. The *genre* to which G. aspires his work to belong was at his period monopolized by the poets, and it is thus a thrust at the normative horizon of expectations.[1] The highly poetical style used by G. is in constant opposition to the rationalisation he attempts (although one may here object that Empedokles and Parmenides expressed their philosophical credos in verse; but strictly speaking G.'s composition is not a poem).

Specific and general, divine and secular, rational and irrational, practical and theoretical all coexist in a text the character of which is undoubtedly unparalleled in what we possess from this period; *Hel.* is unbound by the restrictions of reality and real facts, even by the representation of factual reality which prevails in *Pal.* The word παίγνιον indicates, I think, G.'s awareness that he is creating a speech for speech's sake. Helen's case was in G.'s hands a toy, and a toy always gives you the possibility to play with it in the way *you* want.[2] That he *expresses* this awareness may be seen as a somewhat boastful declaration of the limitless power of λόγος, to which he overtly commits himself.

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[1] Dover (1968, p.237) suggests that "ἐγκώμιον and ἐγκωμιάζειν are freely used in the fourth century of formal praise in prose or verse, but in fifth-century usage ἐγκώμιον is especially a poem celebrating someone's victory"

[2] G. repeatedly in the speech betrays his easiness in dealing with Helen's case: δῆλον ὅτι... 7, οὐδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο χαλεπὸν ἀπολογήσασθαι...8, οὐ χαλεπῶς διαφεύξεται...15.

III. Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* and Euripides' *Troades*

a) Some introductory remarks

The view that there is some relation between G.'s *Hel.* and Euripides' *Troades* originated in the 19th century, but as happens so often, there is still a good deal of controversy as far as the extent and the quality of this relation are concerned. Some scholars, especially those who trace a hidden or an overt 'influence' when similarities between two works occur, have been ready enough to date G.'s work on the basis of its affinities with Euripides' *Troades*. Some others find in Euripides' *Troades* only what they would describe by the terms 'Sophistic' features or features of the 'sophistic rhetoric', which are in themselves problematic, if one bears in mind that not much of the work of the Sophists exists,[1] or that in any case, what exists is not always enough to serve as the basis for comparisons. I will not be concerned with the date of G.'s *Hel.*; the absence of any external evidence makes such an attempt shaky, and it seems to me that the arguments that have been put forward so far prove nothing but the fragility of the conclusions they are meant to support.[2]

I take as a starting point a disclaimer made by Croally:[3] "The question is not of priority, or even influence, but of similarity". I thus propose to commence my discussion by pointing out some similarities or dissimilarities between Helen's speech in the *agon* and G.'s *Hel.*; in this connection, I shall briefly discuss the possible affinities of Helen's speech with *The Defence of Palamedes*. I then propose to investigate the ever elusive issue of the presence in the

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[1] For 'sophistic rhetoric' see most recently Schiappa 1999, p.48ff.

[2] For a summary of views see Orsini 1956, p. 82-3, 87 n.1; for more recent views see Mazzara, 1999, 142-180; Croally 1994, p.155.

[3] See Croally 1994, p.155.

Troades of the individual arguments employed by G. A short postscript is devoted to one of the most obvious features of G.'s style which is discernible in Helen's speech in the *agon*. At any rate, the comparison will not be one between the *Troades* and 'Sophistic rhetoric'; on the contrary, I will confine myself to what seems to me a more moderate, but more feasible method, which is the comparison of some of the rhetorical aspects of this play with G.'s *own* rhetoric.

b) Gorgias' *Helen* and Helen's defence in the *agon*

The first obvious similarity between Euripides' speech in the *agon* of the *Troades* and G.'s *Encomium* is that they are both imaginary defences of a mythical person; the first obvious difference is that Helen's arguments in the *Encomium* are not answered, whereas in the *Troades* Hekabe's speech is designed to overturn the arguments put forward by the defendant, who, in an unusual reversal of the normal forensic[1] order delivers her speech first.[2] These basic remarks are not without importance, first because it should be remembered that G.'s speech is an Enkomion to Helen, and hence the person praised is not a defendant in a forensic sense.[3]

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[1] To avoid any misunderstandings, I wish to stress that I am well aware of the fact that the *Troades* is a tragedy, and that consequently I do not expect it to comply with the rules of forensic rhetoric. I even more fully appreciate that, even though every reader is perfectly justified in admiring the 'Sophistic' or rhetoric intellectualism of Euripides, whatever this might be, Euripides was probably primarily concerned with producing a good drama, and consequently the rhetorical elements that I discuss here contribute in the one way or the other to his dramatic purposes. These purposes have been and are still vigorously examined by others. My concern is with an as accurate as possible description of the rhetorical aspects of the *Troades*, as these are exemplified in the work of G.

[2] See Lloyd 1992, p.101.

[3] In this respect, the only other preserved speech by G., *The Defence of Palamedes* probably offers a more fruitful ground for an approach to the rhetorical formalities adopted by Euripides, for the hero in that speech defends his own life before an

If now one wishes to locate the most important feature that G.'s *Hel.* and Helen's speech in the *Troades* have in common, one should turn to their intention. Neither of them attempts to refute a fact; on the contrary, in both of them the *demonstrandum*, as it were, is the refutation of personal responsibility for an act the commission of which is never questioned.[1] G. clearly accepts that Helen 'did what she did' (6), and he points out that his programme is to show the possible reasons which prompted the elopement of Helen (καὶ προθήσομαι τὰς αἰτίας δι' ἃς εἰκὸς ἦν γενέσθαι τὸν τῆς Ἑλένης εἰς τὴν Τροίαν στόλον 5). Similarly, Helen, situated for ten years in the sacked city of Troy, is not in a position to maintain that she did not desert her husband or that she did not travel to Troy. Like G.'s *Hel.*, the Helen of the *Troades* seeks to disclaim responsibility.

But if there are similarities, there are dissimilarities as well. In the *Troades*, Helen has the advantage of addressing her prosecutor and her judge directly and thus of shuffling responsibility on to persons who are present. She blames Hekabe for giving birth to

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imaginary law-court whose members we are invited to believe are the leaders of the Greeks in the Trojan war. The speakers in both *Pal.* and Euripides' *Troades* need to persuade at least two audiences: the mythical judges and G.'s students (in the broader sense) in the former, Menelaos and the audience (in the broader sense) in the latter. This entails that formal constituent elements of forensic oratory which are undoubtedly present in the speeches of the *agon* can better be compared to *Pal.* than to *Hel.* It would suffice to mention some of the characteristics that these speeches have in common: in both the *Troades* and *Pal.* we find a *proemion* where the defendant seeks to define his/her position towards his/her judges (*P.*2, *Tro.*914-8); in both of them the issue of ἀντικατηγορία is raised (*P.*27, *Tro.*917); in both of them factual reality and possible motives are discussed ('reality': *Pal.* 6-12 *Tro.*938-41, 951-958; motives *P.*13-21, *Tro.*946f.). And, of course, in both the register is formal, with frequent indications on the part of the speaker of his/her self-awareness of the structure of his/her speech (see Postscript).

[1] For later theoretical discussions of the distinction between refutation of facts and refutation of responsibility see Gagarin 1997, p.122; Cole 1991, p. 78. For matters of responsibility elsewhere in the *Troades* and other Euripidean plays see Lloyd 1992, p.102.

Paris, and she blames Menelaos for going away and leaving her alone with his guest. No doubt, she blames Aphrodite as well, but since divine responsibility is an argument also employed by G., we should better discuss it when we address the possible similarities between the individual arguments used by G. and Euripides. At the moment, it would be enough to observe that responsibility is never attributed to a person in G.'s *Hel.* And it is equally true that in this speech G. never (unlike the Helen of the *Troades*) resorts to facts, as he amply does in his *Pal.* He is confident enough to deny Helen's responsibility on the ground of a general and to a great extent 'theoretical' discussion of the four causes (perhaps with the exception of the second one, that is 'violence'). In fact, the way he builds up his individual arguments is so disconnected from the specific case he defends that his reasoning, or parts of it could easily be applied to numerous other cases. The Helen of the *Troades* on the other hand tests the argument that she should have escaped from Paris' place after his death by reasoning in a manner that resembles cases where factual reality is involved. She says that she tried to escape, but the watches always stopped her on the walls, and she goes on to consolidate her argument by challenging her audience to check the reliability of her statement by questioning the guards. This type of argument, one of Aristotle's ἄτεχνοι πίστεις, is as may be expected frequently employed in *Pal.* (e.g. 7, 22-23), for in this speech what is at stake is not the responsibility of the hero, but the commission of the crime itself. But again, Palamedes does not simply narrate facts; he argues his case by proving that each necessary stage for the preparation and the commission of treason was in his case impossible, so that his discussion of 'factual' reality is largely based on argument from probability (εἰκός), an element that Helen's speech totally lacks.[1]

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[1] Argument from probability is used only by Hekabe at 976-982; she, like Palamedes, denies to refer to 'facts'; she rather reaches a *reductio ad absurdum* by showing that the goddesses had no reason to be involved in the Judgment.

It has perhaps been made clear that the defence of Helen in the *Troades* displays more significant generic similarities with G.'s *Pal.* than with his *Hel.*, and that the main feature that both these speeches by or on Helen share is that they both seek to free her from the responsibility of her actions. However, the means by which this aim is accomplished are considerably different; to this respect *Pal.* probably offers a better example of the kind of rhetoric that Euripides adopts, due to its forensic, if imaginary, character.

c) Gorgias' αἰτίαι in the *Troades*?

As is well known, G. disclaims Helen's responsibility for her acts on the basis of four causes (αἰτίαι): a) divine wish, b) natural violence, c) persuasion, and d) love. These reasons are not mutually exclusive, but even if it were only for one of them that Helen eloped to Troy, she is still clear of guilt. Scholars, now, who seek to establish a relation, chronological or other, between the *Troades* and G.'s *Hel.* tend to locate some or all of these reasons in the former work,[1] whereas those who deny such a relation argue that Euripides' play exhibits none or just a few and at any rate insufficient similarities with G.'s *Hel.*[2] In what follows I propose to show that no such direct relation can be established, or at least it cannot be established on the mere basis of tracing the four causes of

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[1] Croally 1994, p.155 is the most obvious example; Goldhill, 1986, p.237 claims that "Helen is given several of Gorgias' arguments to exculpate herself"; see also Conacher 1998, p.53. Wardy 1996, p. 165 n.46 solves the problem with great ease by referring to Barlow 1986, pp.207-8, who says: "by showing that persuasive words can persuade, but fail to lead to consistent action, Euripides may have in mind Gorgias' gross overestimation of them in his *Encomium* (10-14) and be demonstrating a different view"; Wardy clearly lacks Barlow's caution, for the latter elsewhere concludes that the *Encomium of Helen* is "a work which Euripides was probably familiar with, although the precise dating of it has not been established", 206.

[2] See Lloyd 1992, p. 100, and MacDowell 1982, p.12.

G. in the play by Euripides. If Euripides responded to G., or to the effects of his rhetoric, as some scholars believe,[1] he would have something more to say about *logos* and *peitho*. But as we shall see, the allusions to *logos* in the *Troades* do not appear to have any significant relevance to G.'s discussion of it in his *Hel*. Moreover, the mere location of some or all of the four causes in Euripides' play is not a convincing argument for its relation to G.'s *Hel.*; again, if Euripides had wished his play or parts of it to be construed as a criticism of G. he would not have restricted himself to a neutral reiteration of them. G.'s untraditional approach to the exculpation of Helen does not lie in the novelty of the causes he proposes, because some of them at least (certainly 'violence' and 'divine wish')[2] were already available in the mythical tradition. On the contrary, G.'s radicalism, as it were, is chiefly thanks to the way in which he modifies the traditional raw material for the purposes of his argumentation. This disclaimer ultimately suggests that if one is to accept any relation between the two works, one should draw this conclusion by also considering to a certain degree how the Sophist reasons for his four reasons. For the sake of clarity I propose to discuss each reason separately, although it is true that the argumentative schemata that G. employs to support the feasibility of his four causes frequently overlap.[3]

i. *Cause 1: 'Divine wish'*

The first of the causes seems to be the strongest argument in the hands of those who support the view of a Gorgian presence in the

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[1] See Scodel 1980, p.99.

[2] I would add persuasion on the basis of evidence deriving from vase-paintings: see Ghali-Kahil 1955, pp. 59-60, 225-230 and Noël 1989, p.140ff.

[3] I have suggested elsewhere (see Introduction) that the discussions of *logos* (8-14) and love (15-19) are marked by a very similar 'theorisation', and that for this reason the section about speech and persuasion is not more important than the rest of the reasons proposed by G. It is perhaps more pertinent to our interest in the pre-Platonic development of literary, rhetorical and linguistic theory.

Troades. G. argues that if it were Τύχης βουλήμασι καὶ θεῶν βουλεύμασι καὶ 'Ανάγκης ψηφίσμασιν that Helen did what she did, she is not responsible for her acts. It should be remembered, first of all, that G. does not here or elsewhere mention Aphrodite. In fact, the discussion of love, the fourth cause, proceeds in a rationalistic manner to an extent that only a passing reference to love (ἔρως) is needed (19). In both these cases G. argues by making use of the common view that god is superior to man, yet when it comes to love itself at 19 he brings in the pathology of ἔρως, which we learn is a human νόσημα and an ἀγνόημα, an ignorance of the soul.

It should be established then that when G. brings in divine responsibility, his approach is rationalistic. For as he says, it is nature that dictates that the weaker submits to the stronger, which in this case is divine power (τῷ θεῷ καὶ τῇ τύχῃ). G.'s argument here clearly echoes one of the most intense polarities of the philosophical investigation of his times, that is the relation between νόμος and φύσις. This is not the place to discuss this polarity, but as far as this particular argument is concerned G. seems to adhere to a sort of pragmatism which in this case has insignificant implications for the morality of his rhetoric, because no one would disagree that the god is superior to men. But who are the gods G. calls upon for the exculpation of Helen? As we have seen Aphrodite and the rest of the goddesses of the Judgment are clearly left out. Instead of them, G. refers to personified abstract notions: Τύχη and 'Ανάγκη, along with the general θεῶν,[1] which are now combined with technical terms from the field of the administration of the city (βουλεύμασι, ψηφίσμασι). It seems that G. intended to distance himself from the mythical tradition, and this instance is a good example of how myth is rehabilitated in fifth-century rationalism.

If now one turns to Euripides, one finds out that when Helen refers to divine responsibility the only immortal she puts the blame

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[1] Cp. Empedokles DK 31 B 115,1 ἔστιν 'Ανάγκης χρῆμα, θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν, whom G. may have in mind here.

on is Aphrodite. Conacher, now, claims that "If we look at the Euripidean Helen's defence (at *Tro*.914ff.), we will find that the power of Aphrodite is the only one which also appears in G.'s *Encomium*",[1] and Croally, who finds more similarities maintains that "it was Aphrodite who offered her to Paris (929-31), thus making her abduction a decision of the gods (Gorg. *Hel*. 6)".[2] Unfortunately, the "power of Aphrodite" does not appear in G. *Hel*. As I have shown G. makes every effort to distance himself from the details of the standard account of the mythical tradition; it is a part of his logical reasoning to argue by generalising, and by offering general schemata (in this case 'divine power is superior to human alertness') with a universal applicability. In Euripides on the other hand it is Aphrodite herself that Helen puts the blame on. She says:

$$\tau\grave{\eta}\nu \ \theta\epsilon\grave{o}\nu \ \kappa\acute{o}\lambda\alpha\zeta\epsilon \ \kappa\alpha\grave{\iota} \ \Delta\iota\grave{o}\varsigma \ \kappa\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\sigma\omega\nu \ \gamma\epsilon\nuο\hat{v},$$

$$\grave{o}\varsigma \ \tau\hat{\omega}\nu \ \mu\grave{\epsilon}\nu \ \ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\nu \ \delta\alpha\iota\mu\acute{o}\nu\omega\nu \ \ddot{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota \ \kappa\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\sigma\varsigma,$$

$$\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\eta\varsigma \ \delta\grave{\epsilon} \ \delta\sigma\hat{v}\lambda\acute{o}\varsigma \ \grave{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota \cdot \ \sigma\upsilon\gamma\gamma\nu\acute{\omega}\mu\eta \ \delta \ ' \ \grave{\epsilon}\mu\sigma\acute{\iota}.$$

(947-50)

The argument here is *a fortiori*: 'if Aphrodite is superior ($\kappa\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\sigma\omega\nu$) to all-mighty Zeus, how could I resist her power?'. Helen's allusion here is clearly to the power of love which is inflicted by Aphrodite herself.[3] The $\kappa\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\sigma\omega\nu$ of G. is different from the one to which Euripidean Helen resorts. It is a $\kappa\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\sigma\omega\nu$ general enough to include *all* the possible aspects of the compared elements: god (not goddess) is superior to man as far as 'violence ($\beta\acute{\iota}\alpha$) and wisdom ($\sigma\sigma\phi\acute{\iota}\alpha$) and the rest of the things are concerned'. The god himself that G. compares to human beings remains unspecified,[4] or it is as general as $T\acute{\upsilon}\chi\eta$ or $'A\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\kappa\eta$.

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[1] Conacher 1998, p.53.

[2] Croally 1994, p.155.

[3] Cp. also Eur. *Hipp*. 1-6, and 443ff.

[4] All the occurrences of the word θεός in *Hel*. 6 denote the divine factor in general: θεοῦ προθυμίᾳ ἀνθρώπου προμηθίᾳ; θεὸς δ' ἀνθρώπου κρείσσων; εἰ οὖν τῇ τύχῃ καὶ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναθετέον... Helen in the *Troades* also closes her speech

When G. later (19) refers to ἔρως himself, the argument will still be based on the relation of the superior to the inferior. At that point the argument is a hypothetical and disjunctive one: if ἔρως is a god (G. does not even take that for granted), as a god he is superior to mortals; if love is a morbid state of the human being and an ignorance of the human soul, then the blame should not be put on the person who suffers from it. In either case Helen is innocent. This argument comes at the end of the discussion of the fourth cause, namely love, which, it should be remembered, has up to this point been considered mainly with a rational examination of examples of the impact of vision upon the human soul, and it is thus meant to be a specification of what happened in the case of Helen. Had G. wished to bring in Aphrodite in the one way or the other this would have certainly been the most appropriate part of his speech to do so. But he does not. His discussion of love is clearly dissociated from Helen, and the responsibilities of Helen's action are thus not shifted on to any particular god. G. could not be less personal.[1]

It has then become clear, I hope, that scholars who are able to locate in G. the Aphrodite (or indeed the rest of the goddesses involved in the Judgment) simply do not realise that divine responsibility is presented in a very different fashion in this work than it is in Euripides' *Troades*. In this play, divine intervention in Helen's affairs has always a name, or at least this is certainly the case in both Helen's defence and Hekabe's refutation of it. In the *Troades* love inflicted by god remains an excuse, because the rationalisation attempted by G. in the *Encomium* is there absent. On the contrary, calling upon Aphrodite's power as a means of exculpation occurs elsewhere in tragedy, and certainly in other plays by Euripides, e.g. in his *Hippolytos*, which was written thirteen

with the words εἰ δὲ τῶν θεῶν κρατεῖν / βούλῃ, τὸ χρῄζειν ἀμαθές ἐστί σου τάδε, but who else can she have in mind but Aphrodite?

[1] See de Romilly 1976, p. 309-321, who claims that G.'s *Encomium* "la référence au mythe est soigneusement écartée...Là, la souveraineté de l'amour reste une excuse decisive, mais sans avoir besoin de se fonder sur des légendes", 319.

years before the *Troades*.[1] The fact that in the *Troades* it is Helen who employs it is certainly not in itself a sufficient reason to conclude that Euripides answers G..

ii. *Causes II and III: 'Physical violence' and 'Speech'*

Since there is very little in Euripides to suggest any affinities with G.'s third and four causes I discuss them together. The argumentation for the possibility that Helen was violently abducted is more straightforward than the discussion of any of the other four causes in the *Encomium*; G. very briefly suggests that if Helen was abducted by force it is not she that we should blame, but the violator who committed an unjust act. It seems now that the Helen of the *Troades* never claims that she was dragged away by force, because most editors and commentators bracket 959-60, a reading that makes the subject of ὁ μὲν βίᾳ γαμεῖ Deiphobus; but the point she makes is that she married Paris by Aphrodite's force.[2] This being the case, the only two other references to Helen's forcible abduction are the one in Hekabe's speech (998-1001), and one less frequently mentioned, if ever, in Cassandra's speech, where the prophetess maintains καὶ ταῦθ' ἑκούσης κοὐ βίᾳ λεληασμένης (373). That Helen

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[1] For more instances of the use of love as an excuse in tragedy see de Romilly 1976, p.17.

[2] Barlow 1986, pp. 211-12, who adopts Wilamowitz's reading, maintains "Helen is making the point that Aphrodite is the only *bia* and she sums this up at 964-5", 212. Similarly, Lloyd 1992, claims that "Nor does Euripides' Helen argue that she was forcibly abducted, and Hecuba's attribution of this argument to her is thus a mistake" (p.101). Croally 1994, p.155, accepts that Helen says that "Paris married her by force", as he, of course, argues for the relation of G. to Euripides. It is not clear to me if Meridor 2000, p. 20, thinks that Helen argues that she was abducted by force when in commenting on Hekabe's speech she says that "Hecuba now questions her opponent and asks which Spartan heard her cry for help when, as she claims, Paris abducted her by force".

does not use violence as an argument to improve her position, and thus avoid the punishment that Menelaos has decided for her manifestly weakens the possibility that Euripides draws upon G.'s *Encomion*.

The section about λόγος, which according to some scholars constitutes the pivotal argument of G.'s argumentation, is not used by Helen at all. There are however some allusions in the play to speech and persuasion, which are not sufficient to establish a direct relation between the two works.[1] At 909, Hekabe in a self-referential statement claims that her λόγος will be enough to kill Helen, which reminds us the limitless powers that G. attributes to λόγος in saying that λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν, ὃς σμικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ (8). And at 966-8, where the chorus urges Hekabe to defend her children and her homeland effectively against Helen's persuasion, for she is a sinister person who speaks well. Again, one may observe the existence of the recurrent polarity between deeds and words, which, as I am inclined to believe, G. largely neutralises in his work; in *Pal.* for instance the hero asks his judges μὴ τοῖς λόγοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἔργοις προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν (34), for εἰ μὲν διὰ τῶν λόγων τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν ἔργων καθαράν τε γενέσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι <καὶ > φανερὰν, εὔπορος ἂν εἴη ἡ κρίσις...(35). Similarly, in *Hel.* (13) where G. tries to show the effects of persuasion through examples from different kinds of λόγοι, he claims that one speech written with skill pleases and persuades a great mob, even if it is false (τέχνῃ γραφείς, οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ λεχθείς). Nevertheless, none of these instances proves that *Troades* draws upon G.'s *Hel.* All they show is an awareness of the power of λόγος, and its potential to misrepresent factual reality by clever interpretations of it.

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[1] Mazzara's points (1999, p.169ff) on ξεναπάτης at *Tro*.864-6 seem to me too pressed.

When G. starts his examination of Love as a possible αἰτία for Helen's elopement to Troy, he says: εἰ γὰρ ἔρως ἦν ὁ ταῦτα πάντα πράξας, οὐ χαλεπῶς διαφεύξεται τὴν τῆς λεγομένης γεγονέναι ἁμαρτίας αἰτίαν (15). But he then immediately goes on to maintain in an axiomatic manner that 'objects of our vision do not have the nature that we want them to have, by the one that each one of them happens to have', which is different from what we expect him to say, as this sentence introduces an apparently different topic, that is the relation between objects of the external world to human visual perception. In fact, the whole of the discussion of love as a possible cause proceeds by a rationalistic approach to human vision, and its impacts on the psychological realm. This discussion, whose underlying argumentative schemata are very similar to those used in the discussion of *logos* in 8-14, is meant to create analogies to Helen's particular case; in other words, G. attempts an argumentation where a score of irrelevant material about the impact of vision on human soul are employed so that his heroine's case may be presented as another example that confirms his general observations.

It is interesting now to pay some attention to the manner in which G. passes from the general discussion of vision to the specific case he argues for; at 19, he asks: εἰ μὲν τῷ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου σώματι τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης ὄμμα ἡσθὲν προθυμίαν καὶ ἄμιλλαν ἔρωτος τῇ ψυχῇ παρέδωκε τί θαυμαστόν, which means that since we accept that objects of the world have the appearance that they happen to have, and since they can affect our emotional world through our visual perception of them, as the examples adduced prove, we should not then be surprised if Helen fell in love with Paris: her eye (not Helen) was pleased by his body (not Alexandros), and she thus gave in. The impersonal tone attempted here is striking; human beings like Helen are presented with no personal will, and all responsibility is passed over in the name of psychological observations. This is undoubtedly

a radical rehabilitation of the traditional view that love starts from the eyes; what G. adds to it is a sophisticated explanation of *how* and *why* such a thing occurs.

This being the case in the *Encomium*, we may now turn to the *Troades*; Helen in her speech is never audacious enough to use Paris' beauty as an argument. She merely says that Kypris was amazed (ἐκπαγλουμένη 929) by Helen's beauty, and thus decided to offer her to Paris, if she were to win the contest. More relevant remarks about the interrelation of vision and love are actually made by her opponent. Hekabe. In the lines that precede Helen's appearance on stage, Hekabe pleads with Menelaos to avoid eye contact with his wife, because she may invoke desire in him μή σ' ἕλῃ πόθῳ. / αἱρεῖ γὰρ ἀνδρῶν ὄμματ', ἐξαιρεῖ πόλεις...(891-2). In fact, Hekabe is afraid that Helen's punishment will never take place if Menelaos sees Helen. As Scodel eloquently put it "there is a sort of circular irony here: the real defence of Helen lies in the very reason that her presumed guilt is not punished".[1]

There is another place, in Hekabe's speech this time, where seeing is related to love; in answering Helen's claims about the role of the goddesses she rather straightforwardly retorts that the Spartan woman was simply dazzled by Paris' beauty, and her mind was thus transformed into Aphrodite (987-8).[2] And a few lines later (991-996) she has more to say about her son's appearance, this time the emphasis being placed on his sparkling, oriental clothes. Helen, she maintains, was just lured by his glowing appearance, and she was thus tempted to secure a more luxurious life than the one she was offered by her Spartan husband.[3] In fact, Hekabe will at the end of

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[1] Scodel 1980. p.99.

[2] For a most recent discussion of ὁ σὸς δ' ἰδών νιν νοῦς ἐποιήθη Κύπρις (988) see Meridor 2000, p.18.

[3] I do not understand Meridor's point (2000, p.27-8) that "it is hardly irrelevant that Gorgias' list of likely causes for Helen's elopement...includes no passion for riches and luxury. Hecuba's speech may have been composed with Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* in mind". If she means that G.'s speech is earlier than

her speech rebuke Helen for being insolent enough to appear in smart dresses (1022ff.), instead of rags, and with her hair shaved. Apart from betraying her shamelessness, as Hekabe wishes to show, Helen's immaculate appearance could be read as a metaphor for her immaculate and sophisticated speech.

As was the case with the other three causes, the fourth one does not seem to have any presence in the *Troades*; Conacher, in discussing line 988, claims that "it is tempting to think that Euripides is picking up this Gorgian argument and mischievously using it against Helen instead of for her".[1] But apart from being tempting, the view that there is no evidence to support that Hekabe's point presumes G.'s observations about the impact of seeing on the soul. For Hekabe's argument is far less subtle and less sophisticated than G.'s one. And at any rate, love was interrelated with vision long before Euripides wrote the *Troades*. In this context it would suffice to mention two examples: the first is from a play by Euripides himself; in *Hippolytos* 525, the chorus says Ἔρως Ἔρως, ὃς κατ' ὀμμάτων / στάζεις πόθον. The second one is derived from a very different field, but it is probably not irrelevant in the present context; because if we turn to Empedokles' fragments 86, 87, 95, we soon find out that the creator of the eyes is no one else but Aphrodite.[2]

Postscript

One of the most obvious characteristics of the *agon* of the *Trojan Women* is the self-referentiality of Helen's speech, which

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Euripides' *Troades*, because G. has nothing to say about luxuries, then Meridor simply presses an unimportant point too much. And at any rate, as we have seen, G. argues in such a general manner that any specific mention of Helen's luxuries would be surprising. Meridor probably fails to understands the extent to which the Sophist theorizes in his speech.

[1] Conacher 1998, p.57.

[2] Cp. also Ibycus 287 *PMG*.

undoubtedly makes it sound like a formal, immaculate piece of rhetoric.[1] Helen does not proceed by simply arguing for her case;[2] she goes beyond that by relentlessly alluding to the manner in which her speech is organised. This sort of mannerism happens to be one of the most characteristic features of G.'s style,[3] whose fondness for marking the transition from the one part of his speech to the other is omnipresent; in both of his preserved speeches he programmatically announces his aim at the beginning and he then unfailingly signposts the passage from the one to the other subdivision of his argumentation, by referring either to the substance of what follows or to the manner in which he attempts to proceed.[4]

In the *proemion* of her speech, Helen claims that she will attempt with her speech to answer the charges that she anticipates will be brought against her, and this is expressed in a most Gorgian manner, with remarkable antitheses.[5] She then goes on to blame Hekabe for

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[1] See Lloyd 1992, pp. 5 and 101; as this scholar shows, this expressed self-awareness on behalf of the speaker is not peculiar to this *agon*, and it may well be true that to a certain extent the same practice is employed by Hekabe as well. As Lloyd (1992) maintains "The second half of Hecuba's unusually long speech shows far fewer signs of the philosophical and rhetorical influences that were so striking in the first half", p. 109. But Helen's speech serves better the purposes of this thesis.

[2] This rhetorical practice is discernible in Agathon's speech (cp. Pl. *Symp.*196d), and it is parodied in Aristophanes' *Frogs* 906-7; Isokrates picks it up in 10.8 (τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου ποιήσομαι τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ γένους αὐτῆς [sc. of Helen]).

[3] See MacDowell 1982, p.18-19.

[4] Some examples: in *Pal.* 5 the hero outlines the two main arguments against the charge of treason: 'Even if I had wished to betray the Greeks to the Trojans I would not have been able to do so, but even if I had been able to do so I would not have wanted it'; sometimes the demonstration of the arguments is smoothly completed by a reiteration of what has just been proved (cp. *Pal.* 12, 21, and *Hel.* 20, where the four causes are repeated in the reverse order).

[5] Line 918 (τοῖς σοῖσι τἀμὰ καὶ τὰ σ' αἰτιάματα) has been though to be spurious (e.g. by Diggle), because "it misleadingly implies that Helen addresses Hecuba directly at some point whereas she never does" Barlow 1986, p.210; Conacher 1998, p.56 quotes and translates it. With or without keeping the line the style of the opening of Helen's speech is anyway antithetical, but it is worthwhile noticing

giving birth to Paris, and the old man (πρέσβυς 921).[1] It is clear that Helen presents first what would come first in a logical representation of 'factual' reality, and this is amply brought out by the wording (πρῶτον μὲν ἀρχὰς...δεύτερον). The same process is discernible in the section of *Pal.* where the hero refutes the possibility of committing the crime of treason by demonstrating that each necessary stage for the preparation of such a crime was impossible; there as here it is emphasised that the starting point of the argumentation should coincide with what should come first in the only possible logical sequence of events (ἐπὶ δὲ τόνδε τὸν λόγον εἰμι πρῶτον...ἔδει γάρ τινα πρῶτον ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι τῆς προδοσίας, ἡ δὲ ἀρχή...6; πρῶτον μὲν οὖν καὶ δεύτερον καὶ μέγιστον, διὰ παντὸς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος ἀναμάρτητος ὁ παροιχόμενος βίος ...). G.'s *Hel.* provides us with no fewer examples of this technique, but due to the nature of this speech which is meant to be an ἐγκώμιον, it is not the defendant who explains how she will proceed, but the rhetor himself. In this context, it would suffice to bring in an example from the part of the speech where G. is about to present the four causes (5):

τὸν χρόνον δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸν τότε νῦν ὑπερβὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος λόγου προβήσομαι καὶ προθήσομαι τὰς αἰτίας...

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that antitheses or other devices expressed with pronouns are very regular and very distinct in *Pal.*, especially when, as Helen does here and as she will do later at 945, he addresses someone: in 23 he addresses Odysseus (τὸ σέ γε τῶν γενομένων, ὡς σὺ φής...τῶν δὲ μὴ γενομένων ἐμέ), and later at 28 and 33 he addresses the judges (πρὸς δ' ὑμᾶς...περὶ ἐμοῦ λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ ὑμῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔστι μοι λόγος). These occurrences also serve as examples of G.'s marking the passage from the one section of his speech to the other, and the same holds for *Troades* 945.

[1] Some scholars identify him with Priam (e.g. Barlow 1986, note *ad loc.*), others with the old shepherd (e.g. Lloyd 1992, p. 102 and note 29).

With a *praeteritio* G. makes the statement that his speech is not meant to deal with factual reality, because what really matters is whether Helen was responsible for her elopement, not the fact that she eloped. No doubt, this is manifestly accepted by him.

The same sort of formal (and rather formulaic) indications of transition appears also in the main body of Helen's speech; the marked passage to the second argument (that is the Judgment of Paris) with the ἐνθένδε τἀπίλοιπ' at 923 is clearly an invitation to understand it as a logical inference from what has already been said, and it is thus employed by Euripides with the intent both to add cohesion to the speech and to ensure that this cohesion will be evident to the audience, should this be Menelaos and Hekabe or the spectators. It is with exactly the same words that Helen will pass to the third argument (that is the benefits that the outcome of the Judgment secured for the Greeks). She says τὸν ἔνθεν δ' ὡς ἔχει σκέψαι λόγον (931).

These formulas of transition are repeatedly used by G. in his *Pal.*; at 24 the hero has just shown that Odysseus accused him without having any knowledge of the facts, and he then assumes that the only remaining possibility is that Odysseus relied merely upon his opinion δόξα; the words he uses are τὸ δὴ λοιπόν... At 13, Palamedes invites his judges to σκέψασθαι κοινῇ καὶ τόδε, that is to recollect that no possible motives would have been fulfilled by the commitment of treason. Before Helen passes to the discussion of her possible motives at 945, she utters an εἶεν, which is a way of passing to the following argument by partly and tentatively conceding that even if what has been said up to this point is not accepted, what follows excludes any possibility that she could reasonably be held responsible for her acts. The very same word is used by Palamedes in the section of his speech where he shows that all the necessary stages for the preparation of treason were in his case impossible (*Pal.* 10). To this instance one could add various more formulas that serve the same purpose (ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο τῷ λόγῳ

δυνατὸν γενέσθω 7, φήσει τις 9, καὶ δὴ τοίνυν γενέσθω καὶ τὰ μὴ γενόμενα 11).

NOTES

1

κόσμος...ἀλήθεια: G. begins his prose-encomium by employing a literary device which is amply used in poetry, namely a Priamel; although it seems that G. does not attempt to create a climax, the elements that he selects as foil for the notion that he wishes to focus on (λόγῳ δὲ ἀλήθεια) are not arranged haphazardly. The first one, πόλις, is an inclusive entity, and the following four form two antithetical pairs: the first of them (σώματι/ψυχῇ) comprises the two constituent parts of human existence (G. seems to accept the independence of those two elements), and the second the common rhetorical distinction between works and words. It is clear that G. lays the emphasis on the very last element, namely true speech. As the programmatic statements that follow amply bring out, G.'s intention is to restore Helen's reputation by offering a rational examination of her case. G., by expressing his commitment to truth, implies that his speech possesses κόσμος. This quality, which is forms the topic word of the Priamel, persistently resists interpretation. The main meanings of the word are a) ornament, and b) order. In this context, G. uses κόσμος as a signifier with multiple signifieds, all of which depend upon and are determined by the element defined. For a city κόσμος is the robustness of its men, for body it is beauty.... As MacDowell puts it κόσμος is "the proper condition in virtue of which a city is a good city, a body is a good body etc." (1982, p.33). Although it is clear what κόσμος is for the particular elements, the meaning of κόσμος itself remains obscure. Untersteiner renders it with the word 'harmony' (1961, p.88), G. Bona (1974, 5ff.) translates 'perfection' and observes that it cannot be taken to mean ornament, for "neither the absence nor the presence of an ornament... would make an object be worth blaming

or praising in its own right" (pp.5-6). More recently Wardy has argued that "this unqualified exclusion of 'ornament' is thoroughly misguided" and concludes that "the last thing readers should do in reacting to par. 1 is to suppress their initial responses to *all* the connotations of *kosmos*" (1996, p.156 n.8). I find Wardy's reading attractive and consequently I consider that κόσμος should be construed as flexibly as possible. Sykutris' general description of G.'s style fits perfectly these lines: "ἐκεῖνο ποὺ χαρακτηρίζει τὸν φραστικὸν τρόπον τοῦ Γοργίου εἶναι ἕνα ὕφος κατ' ἐπικράτησιν ὀ ν ο μ α σ τ ι κ ό ν, ὄχι ρηματικόν...μὲ τὴν λογικὴν αὐτὴν ἀοριστίαν ἐνισχύεται ἡ μουσικότης καὶ ἡ συναισθηματικότης τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ ὁ λόγος μεταβάλλεται εἰς παρέλασιν παραστάσεων καὶ εἰκόνων πολυχρώμων" (the emphasis is mine; Sykutris 1934, p.137). To these remarks we should add that the construction is strikingly symmetrical: the cola following the topic-word κόσμος are constructed in exactly the same manner, (a) Noun (dat.) (b) Particle (c) Noun (nom.), and unlike the poetical Priamels there is no increase in the length of the individual elements (cp. Race 1990, p.10). The interchange in the quanity of syllables is as follows: (a)2-(c)3, (a)3-(c)2, (a)2-(c)2, (a)3-(c)2, (a)2-(c)3.

εὐανδρία: the quality of men is stressed here, as MacDowell observes (1982, p.33; cp. Xen. *Mem*.3.3.12-3: οὐδὲ εὐανδρία ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ὁμοία τῇ ἐνθάδε συνάγεται; Ar. *Nub*.297-8: παρθένοι ὀμβροφόροι, / ἔλθωμεν λιπαρὰν χθόνα Παλλάδος, εὔανδρον γᾶν...).

σώματι: 'body' in a physical sense; it is significant that it precedes 'soul' and that it is distinguished from it, as the next pair λόγος / πρᾶγμα presents two notions typically opposed to each other. Each one of them seems to acquire independence, as it is attested from 14. Musti (1993, p.864) contends that "il significato fisico del termine [sc. body] sia ben rappresentato nella letteratura greca arcaica e classica" and he also remarks that its usage in G. is "realistico, e perfino crudo". σῶμα admittedly plays an important role in *Hel.*: it was the 'body' of Helen that attracted the bodies of her noble suitors

(4), it was the body of Paris that attracted Helen's eye (19). Helen's beauty attracted the bodies of noble suitors, and this attractiveness is used in the (only) purely encomiastic part of *The Encomium of Helen*; Paris' beauty attracted Helen, and this seduction is used for her *defence*. In his relativistic definition of 'body', G. attributes to it a property (κάλλος), which will be proved to be double-edged, as far as the persons who possess it are concerned. ψυχῇ δὲ σοφία: it is difficult to understand what G. had exactly in mind when he joined 'wisdom' with 'soul'. Wisdom belongs to the same lexical field with sophist, and it has a great range of meanings (see Gladigow 1965). Kerferd holds that "According to the received account...these terms ('wise' and 'wisdom') went through a kind of evolution in their meanings, from (1) skill in a particular craft, especially handicraft, through (2) prudence or wisdom in general matters, especially practical and political wisdom, to (3) scientific, theoretic, or philosophic wisdom...this sequence is artificial and unhistorical, being essentially based on Aristotle" (1981, p.24). In *Hel.* σοφία recurs in 4, listed among other virtues of Helen's suitors and it is presented as something acquired by men through learning, it is an ἐπίκτητον skill. What G. has in mind specifically as 'wisdom in the soul' may emerge – though not conclusively – from Helen 11: most people are deceived because, due to absence of memory of the past, of judgment for the present and of foresight of the future they *employ opinion* (δόξα) as counsellor of their *soul*. We may infer from this passage that probably the presence of these qualities is what makes the human soul wise. πράγματι δὲ ἀρετή: "one might have supposed that ἀρετή just meant 'merit', virtually equivalent to κόσμος. But it is in accordance with the archaic use of the word to regard it as applicable primarily to action" (MacDowell 1982, p.33; cf. Arist. *EN* 1098a 7-12, where ἀρετή is presented as the perfection of ἔργον: εἰ δή ἐστιν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτό φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπυδαίου...προστιθεμένης τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ

ἔργον). Wardy (1996, p. 156) criticises this reading on the basis that, "although it is true that *pragma* could mean 'action', there is no evidence for a limitation of *generalized 'aretê'* to action... My alternative reading takes *pragma* as equivalent to 'thing' in the widest possible sense". But Wardy does not do justice to the text; action is traditionally opposed to λόγος and it is not accidental that they are juxtaposed here. They form an antithetical pair, picked up in the following sentence . λόγῳ δὲ ἀλήθεια: it is generally and commonly assumed that G., as a pure rhetorician, was not interested in truth; Dodds (1959, p.8) contends that his works "make the impression of a dazzling insincerity, an insincerity so innocently open as to be...entirely void of offence". Many scholars tend to assume that G. was uninterested in truth, so that his practices amount to nothing but mere deception. This criticism is as old as Plato; in *Phaidros* 267a, we read: Τεισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε ἐάσομεν εὕδειν, οἳ πρὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἶδον ὡς τιμητέα πλέον. There is no doubt that G. sometimes uses probabilities in his speeches, especially in *Pal.*, but there is no evidence suggesting that he deliberately ignores truth. On the contrary, it would be extremely foolish for a rhetor to ignore truth, that is factual reality, since it undoubtedly provides him with unshakable evidence (see Gagarin 1994, p.46-57). Similarly, Kerferd's view that "G. is introducing a radical gulf between logos and the things it refers to" and that because of this gulf "we can understand quite easily the sense in which every logos involves a falsification" (1981, p.81) is unattractive, for it relies much upon the ontological autonomy given to logos in *ONB*, without considering that it is very unlikely that G. put in that text any systematised theory to which he was himself committed. As Schiappa (1999, p.125) has recently put it, "propositions of the form 'G. had a theory of X' are potentially misleading", because "they overestimate the maturity of a theory's development by implying more coherence and completeness than can be demonstrated with the available evidence" and also because "the attribution of a number of theories to ancient writers on the

basis of isolated or few fragments mischaracterises the process of intellectual investigation in ancient Greece during the sixth and fifth centuries". Consequently, there is no reason to suspect that when G. says that 'truth' is κόσμος for λόγος he is dishonest. In 2, he programmatically announces that he intends to show the truth, and we may thus assume that he considers (and that he would wish us to believe) that his λόγος is not a λόγος of ἀκοσμία. It is a λόγος which proceeds with λογισμός, that is with logical argumentation 2, a speech which is opposed to the speech of the poets.

ἄνδρα δὲ...ἐπιθεῖναι: all these elements can be the objects of praise or blame according to their qualities. "Some of the nouns are the same as in the previous sentence, others not" (MacDowell 1982, p.33). The same scholar suggests that there is not a "significant distinction between ἔργον and πρᾶγμα", since G. intends to "achieve an even number of items in his list". This view is correct, and it gains even more ground by the fact that G. attempts symmetrical sounds (*lo – gon / er – gon*, and *p - olin / p –ragma*) within antithetical pairs (with the exemption of city / action). The antithetical character of the introductory sentences is also brought out by the statement "praiseworthy things should be praised", whereas what is not praiseworthy (not what is blameworthy) should be blamed. This deontological statement is tricky; is G. saying that what is not praiseworthy is *always* blameworthy? An easy answer would be that the question is too subtle to have any significance for the interpretation of the passage, especially when nothing guarantees that G. wished anything more than a polished formality (notice the alliteration of /p/, the antithesis ἄξιον / ἀναξίῳ the *polyptoton –* combined with a repetition – and finally the isocolon all of which coexist after the impersonal, and deontic χρή). A more satisfactory answer is perhaps that G. needs a polarisation, in the form of a *tertium non datur*, functionally supported by the form. It is true that when a person, thing or situation is not praiseworthy, this does not necessarily entail that it is blameworthy. Nevertheless, G.' s speech

cunningly polarises these qualities: Helen must either be praiseworthy *or* blameworthy. The tone from the very beginning establishes that what is at stake here is serious. If Helen is not elevated to the heights of praise, she will necessarily tumble all the way down to blame, where she has already been placed by the poets (G. does not of course bother to take into account Stesikhoros' *Palinode*). An implied blackmail, yet an attractive one, since it gives G.' s speech its *raison d' être*.

ἀμαθία: the same noun is used in the characterisation of the state of mind established by the poets (2, and in 21 it appears combined with δόξα). In fact, the phrase ἴση γὰρ ἁμαρτία καὶ ἀμαθία forms a *hysteron proteron*, for ἁμαρτία is brought about by ἀμαθία. We may be reminded at this point that Sokrates postulated that no one is willingly bad, which means that human morality is primarily a matter of knowledge (see Calogero 1976, p.408-421; for its use in Plato cp. Pl. *Gorg.*477b7, and Dodds 1959 ad loc.).

μέμφεσθαί τε...μωμητά: with this axiomatic statement G. implies his obligation to praise Helen (for the common epinician χρέος-motif cp. Pi. *O.* 8.72-75, and especially *N.* 8.38-9: ἐγὼ δ' ἀστοῖς ἁδὼν καὶ χθονὶ γυῖα καλύψαιμ', / <u>αἰνέω αἰνητά,</u> μομφὰν δ' ἐπισπείρων ἀλιτροῖς, which is stylystically close to G.'s expression. See also Schadewaldt 1928, 277, Carey 1981, p.28, and Gerber 1982, p. 153, with further literature). The construction is stylistically striking; notice the chiasm with one infinitive and its cognate noun in the centre of the construction and its opposite in sense, with its cognate noun. At the beginning and at the end of it (μέμφεσθαι – ἐπαινετὰ - ἐπαινεῖν – μωμητὰ), combined with isocolon and homeoteleuton.

μῶμον: "generally poetic; the usual word for 'blame' in later prose is ὄνειδος" (MacDowell 1982, p.33); it is picked up in 20 and 21 (μώμου ἀδικίαν; it appears personified in Pl. *Rep.*487a6: οὐδ ἂν ὁ Μῶμος, ἔφη, τό γε τοιοῦτον μέμψαιτο).

2

τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς...ἐλέγξαι: A lacuna has been suggested by Dobree after ἐλέγξαι; Diels completed ad sententiam: τὸ λεγόμενον οὐκ ὀρθῶς· προσήκει τοίνυν ἐλέγξαι. This is not accepted by Untersteiner, Buchheim, and MacDowell, who rightly claims that "no supplement is really necessary; the sense and construction are satisfactory without it, and it is not for us to foist on Gorgias yet another redundant antithesis" (1982, p.33). G. throughout this paragraph programmatically announces his task. His statement refers to both the content and the method of his speech. He has to say rightly, that is by using the appropriate language, what is appropriate to be said about Helen, and to refute her critics. δέον has been related to the notion of καιρός (cp. fr. 13 with notes; see also Fränkel 1975, pp.447-8 and n.14), a possibility which is strengthened in the light of *Epitaphios*: τοῦτον νομίζοντες κοινότατον καὶ θειότατον νόμον, τὸ δέον ἐν τῷ δέοντι καὶ λέγειν καὶ σιγᾶν καὶ ποιεῖν...saying τὸ δέον, the appropriate thing at the appropriate time, along with the accuracy in diction are properties of those praised through the speech, and it is in virtue of these properties that they are (not were, because they are mortal immortals) praiseworthy. G. surely hopes that Helen will also, at the end of the speech, be considered a praiseworthy woman (for τὸ δέον see Macleod 1983, p. 52 and n.4). Moreover, the combination of λέξαι with ὀρθῶς is reminiscent (though it cannot be proved that it is dependent upon) ὀρθοέπεια, a term that can be rendered as 'correct diction' (Guthrie 1971, p.205, Kerferd 1981, p.68). Linguistic investigation was undoubtedly one of the most significant contributions of the Sophistic intellectual activity; Prodicus is said to have placed his interest in synonymy, Protagoras focused on grammatical categories. There can be little doubt that their discussion of language was chiefly prescriptive, as it is shown in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, where Protagoras is satirised for his efforts to reconcile the grammatical with the natural gender.

ὁμόψυχος: although the word is not traced elsewhere in classical Greek (its cognate ὁμοψυχία is common in modern Greek), no emendation is required. G. encapsulates in a single word the impact of λόγος on the soul of the audience. In 13 we learn that one single logos can persuade a mob (ὄχλος), so that ὁμόψυχος explicitly indicated the unifying function of speech, its power to create a consent.

ἥ τε τῶν ποιητῶν...πίστις: The emendations proposed are not necessary (see Diès 1913 p.193-4). The Mss reading is satisfactory, though it has been taken either to mean a) 'the opinion of those who have heard the poets', or b) 'the opinion of those that the poets have heard'. The first meaning is strongly supported by numerous texts where Helen is criticised on the basis of her morality. Stesikhoros was forced to write his *Palinodia*, because he had slandered Helen, and it is interesting that later biographers attribute Homer's blindness to his criticism of Helen. Alcaeus B10L. - P contrasts the immorality of Helen with the excellence of Thetis, and he closes his poem with the following words: οἱ δ' ἀπώλοντ' ἀμφ' Ἐ[λένα / καὶ πόλεις (cp. Aiskh. *Ag.* 681ff.). In Euripides' *Troades* (892-3) Hekabe praises Menelaos' decision to kill Helen, because she αἱρεῖ γὰρ ἀνδρῶν ὄμματ', ἐξαιρεῖ πόλεις, / πίμπρησιν οἴκους ... Diès on the other hand, has proposed that "ἀκουσάντων πίστις équivaut à *fides ex auditu*", and that "sous l'ἀκουσάντων de Gorgias," may be found "le souvenir de quelque légende de cette sorte où soit l' instigation à écrire, soit même la révélation de vérités jusque-là ignorées ou travesties seraient venues au poète...d' un oracle ou d'une apparition d' Hélène" (Diès 1913, 195). Segal (1962, p.145 n.63) following Norden, and Untersteiner (1961, p.90) holds that G. means the inspiration that poets accept from the Muses; Bona (1974, p. 30 n.1) also accepts (b), and more particularly what the poets have heard is the oral tradition they have inherited from oral

tradition. It is interesting now that Segal (1962) disagrees that ποιητῶν is "genitive of source" depending on ἀκουσάντων, whereas MacDowell (1982, p.34) takes the opposite view on the basis that there is no genitive "to denote the source of what is heard". However, it is hard to take sides. (a) is certainly plain: it refers to the recipients of (some of) the poets' account. (b) would be attractive under the light of the method proposed by G.. Where he self-consciously (βούλομαι) proposes a λογισμός as his own method, the poets, being manipulated by the Muses, merely reproduce what they are dictated by them. Probably G.'s wording is deliberately ambiguous.

ὀνόματος φήμη...γέγονεν: "Gorgias produces a pair of parallel phrases by adding a genitive to each, but the parallelism of construction is artificial, because τοῦ ὀνόματος is a subjective genitive...but τῶν συμφορῶν is an objective genitive" (MacDowell 1982, p.34; he compares 10 ψυχῆς ἁμαρτήματα καὶ δόξης ἀπατήματα, 19 ψυχῆς ἀγρευμασιν..., and 3 ὁ μὲν ἀνδρῶν κράτιστος...). φήμη: 'significant sound' (MacDowell 1982, p.34); Helen's name brings out the reality of the subject it names (cp. Aiskh. Ag. 681ff.: τίς ποτ' ὠνόμαζεν ὧδ' / ἐς τὸ πᾶν ἐτητύμως, / μή τις ὄντιν' οὐχ' ὁρῶμεν προνοί- / αισι τοῦ πεπρωμένου / γλῶσσαν ἐν τύχᾳ νέμων, / τὰν δορίγαμβρον ἀμφινει- / κῆ θ' Ἑλέναν; ἐπεὶ πρεπόντως / ἑλένας ἕλανδρος ἑλέ- / πτολις ἐκ τῶν ἀβροτίμων...). The archaic idea that the name reveals the truth of the object it denotes (cp. Heraclitus 48DK) which seems to be found here is refuted by G. himself in ONB. In that text it is clearly stated that λόγος is different from the objects it denotes, in other words a name is arbitrarily related to the object it refers to. This disclaimer further shows (as is held throughout this thesis) that the comparison of passages so as to support theories allegedly put forward by G. is methodologically inappropriate. In this context G. intends to oppose the irrational and uncritical account of the poets to his logical argumentation. We may then assume that probably her name is

reminiscent of calamities because of its poetical usage, as it is shown by the Aeschylean passage quoted above. μνήμη: combined with φήμη also in Lysias 2.3 μνήμην παρὰ τῆς φήμης λαβών. G. clearly aspires to create a speech unbound by temporal limits. λογισμός unchains him from the linearity of poetical narration; it is worth noting that in 5 we are told that through his *present* λόγος (τῷ λόγῳ) he can bypass the events of the *past* (τὸν χρόνον τὸν τότε).

ἐγὼ δὲ βούλομαι...δούς: the emphatic statement of his own method (introduced with the ἐγὼ δὲ which expresses G.'s intention to distance himself from his predecessors) has undeservedly been overlooked by scholars (it is worth mentioning that the same boastful expression is uttered by Agathon in his 'Gorgian' speech in Pl.*Symp.*194e4: ἐγὼ δὲ βούλομαι πρῶτον μὲν εἰπεῖν ὡς χρὴ μὲ εἰπεῖν...). The self-reference denotes personal and free will on behalf of the rhetor (. His speech is not fact-bound; the method that he will follow is a matter of personal selection. Linguistically speaking, after the *theme*, that is something already known (in this case the poets' account) comes the *rheme*, that is the new information which is undoubtedly in a relation of contradistinction with what has already been said. This phrase serves thus both as an announcement of the method that will be followed by G. and as a comment on the practices which have already been followed by those who have previously dealt with the same subject (cp. 21 ἐβουλήθην). λογισμόν τινα: Verdenius (1981, p.117) claims that G. "declares that he will use a special kind of argument,... but this is not specified". Nevertheless, the emphasis here is not on a special kind of argument, but on the argumentative speech itself (see MacDowell 1982, p.34). λογισμός indicates G.'s own method, which is going to be logical argumentation (that the word means 'reasoning', 'logical argumentation' is confirmed by the contexts cited by Schiappa 1999, pp.122-123). Segal (1962, p.119) saw a "rationalistic approach to persuasion in *Palamedes*" and an

"emotional approach in the *Helen*", and Verdenius applauded this view (1981, p.118 n.17). This is an artificial distinction, and G.'s announcement that he intends to proceed through λογισμός is not deceptive, as Verdenius thought. For the function of the soul and the impact of (an irrational) logos on it is one thing, and the examination of this function and its impact quite an other. *Hel.* proceeds in an equally logical way. All the main arguments are "remarkably orderly and well-sign-posted" (MacDowell 1982, p.17); the argumentation is apagogic, as is the case in the examination of the possible motives in *Pal.* The examination of the impacts of logos upon the human soul (8-14) and that of vision upon it (15-19) proceeds with a good deal of theorisation. There is no reason thus to suggest that *Hel.* is irrational. G. by his own admission uses λογισμός in his speech.

ἐπιδεῖξαι καὶ δεῖξαι τἀληθὲς καὶ...: ἐπιδεῖξαι καὶ δεῖξαι is the MSS reading, and there is no reason to change it to δείξας καὶ ἐπιδείξας with Blass. MacDowell (1982) prints ἐπιδεῖξαι καὶ δεῖξαι τε τἀληθὲς , taking the ommission of τε as the product of an haplography. But this is probably redundant. The second καὶ replaces the ἤ of the MSS ("for confusion of ἤ and καὶ, compare, for example, And. 1.78, Is. 5.5, D. 3.27", MacDowell 1961, p.121).

3

Gorgias proceeds with a praise of Helen which is based on the mythical account concerning her birth, her beauty, and finally her suitors. Apart from these references in 3-4 very little is otherwise relevant to her person in the speech. Even her name is rarely mentioned in a speech which is intended to be an encomium for her.

φύσει...πρώτων: a recurrent motif of an encomium is the connection of the praised hero to a divine parentage. In this way the praise

becomes worthwhile, and at the same time the hero is distanced from the human community, so as to avoid the resentment of men.

πρῶτα: the neuter plural adjective refers here to one individual (see MacDowell 1982, p.34); cp. Aiskh. *Pers.*2, 681, *Eum.* 487; in prose Thuc. 3. 82 τὰ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν, 6. 77 ὅτι οὐκ Ἴωνες τάδε εἰσίν.

οὐκ ἄδηλον...ὀλίγοις: with this double litotes G. stresses that the superiority of Helen is beyond doubt; notice that the presentation of her birth begins with the word δῆλον.

μητρὸς μὲν Λήδας: Helen's mother was Leda, the daughter of the king of Aetolia Thestius, who married her to Tyndareos, king of Sparta. When Leda was taking her bath in the River Eurotas, Zeus transformed himself into a swan, so as to avoid an eagle. He hid himself away in her arms, and the product of their intercourse was an egg from which Polydeukes and Helen were born; like Helen, Ἔρως was also born from an egg (cp. Dunbar 1997, comments on 695ff.)

πατρὸς...δὲ τύραννος: a demanding construction, concerning Helen's paternity: 'her real father was a god, but according to the rumours a mortal, Tyndareos and Zeus, of which the one was thought to be because he was, whereas the other was shown not to be because he claimed that he was, and the one was the mightiest man the other the ruler of all'. Helen's paternity is attributed to Zeus (1), and Tyndareos (2); the construction os perfectly balanced (1,2 / 2,1 / 1,2 / 2,1) It is worth mentioning that according to Pausanias (3. 17. 14), Tyndareos' tomb was believed to be next to the temple of Zeus Kosmetas in Sparta (cp. Pausanias 3. 17. 14), which is tantamount to saying that they were both worshipped at the same place. διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἔδοξεν: a phrase highly reminiscent of B26. διὰ τὸ φάναι ἠλέγχθη: MacDowell prints ἐλέχθη; "ἠλέγχθη is translated by Diels-Kranz 'die Fama trog', but it cannot mean this. If correct, it would have to mean something like 'he was proved not to be because he claimed he was'; but διὰ would then be absurd" (MacDowell 1961, p.121). Wardy (1996, pp.31-2) defends the reading of the MSS, and

interestingly he claims that "Gorgias daringly inverts the description of Tyndareus...The idea, presumably, is that so brilliant is the sight of Helen's 'divine beauty' (4) that it immediately suffices to give the lie to the mortal's pretension: we can clearly see that her beauty is 'divine' in the strict sense of the word" (see also p.156, n.9, and Porter 1993, p.276-7). For an unsuccessful mimesis of the Gorgian construction, see Isok. 10. 18.

4

ἰσόθεον κάλλος: Hesiod compares Helen with Aphrodite, as far as her beauty is concerned (ἣ εἶδος ἔχεν χρυσέης 'Αφροδίτης... fr.197, 5), and Homer compares her to Artemis (ἐκ δ' 'Ελένη θαλάμοιο θυώδεος ὑψορόφοιο / ἤλυθεν, 'Αρτέμιδι χρυσηλακάτῳ ἐικυῖα Od.4.121-2; see also Od.8. 174; on ἰσόθεον see Furley 2000, pp.7-15, esp.10).

πλείστας δὲ πλείστοις...ἐνειργάσατο: 'in many men she implanted much love-desire'; with the repetition of πλειστ- G. stresses the great number of Helen's suitors and the strong emotions of love invoked in them by her. The story of Helen's suitors goes that, when Tyndaros announced that he was planning to marry off his daughter Helen, numerous men turned up in Sparta from all over Greece. Tyndareos, out of fear that if he favoured one of the suitors, he might provoke the wrath and the enmity of the rest of them, asked for Odysseus' support. The latter, one of Helen's suitors, advised him to bind the suitors with a pledge: if somebody ventured to stain Helen's husband's reputation, all of them were obliged to assist him. Helen chose Menelaos, and when Paris seized her, Menelaos adduced this pledge. The follow-up is well-known: the Trojan expedition. A catalogue of the suitors is offered by Hesiod (fr.197-204), Apollodorus, and Hyginus.

ἐνὶ δὲ...σώματα: the antithesis between ἐνὶ and πολλά recurs in the context of 13, where it is claimed that one λόγος persuades many people. The attractiveness of Helen's body is equally strong. Helen's body has the power to join the cream of Greek men in a

battle against a common enemy. Buchheim (1989, p.162) has plausibly seen an affinity of the wording here with Empedoclean philosophy; more particularly he contends that "Denn das Zusammenbringen von vielem durch die Attraktion des einen (nämlich der Kypris bzw. Philotes etc.) ist ein empedokleisches Grundmotiv; vgl. z.B. Emp. DK 31B 35,5...oder B21, 8". Helen in this paragraph is praised indirectly; after the demonstration of her noble and divine birth, the praise of the men she attracted proves analogously her own nobleness (cp. Hes. fr. 200, 34, 39: δύ᾽ ἄνερες ἔξοχ᾽ ἄριστοι...πολλὰ δ᾽ ἔεδν<α δίδον>, μέγα κλέο<ς ἔσκε γυ>ναικός). It is worth noting that this indirect encomiastic manner is largely followed by Isokrates in his *Helen*, where a considerable part of the speech is devoted to Theseus; "The real object of praise is the figure of Theseus, that is, the city of Athens itself through its illustrious mythological representative" Wardy 1996, p.28 (cp. Isok. 10. 22-2).

ὧν οἱ μέν...ἔσχον: Immisch thought that a lacuna follows after πλούτου, to attain a symmetry: N(oun, gen.) {Imm. A(djective, gen.) ἀρχαίου} – N (gen.) A (gen.) N (acc.) – N (gen.) A(gen.) N(acc.) – N(gen.) A(gen.) N(acc.), but nothing suggests that this should be done (one should also notice the homoeoteleuton formed in the two central phrases: εὐδο-ξίαν, εὐε-ξίαν, and the repetition of sounds πλου-, -εγ-, -γε-, παλ-, strengthened by the three compound words starting with an ευ-). Rostagni (1922, p.192, 195) observes that in the speech of Pythagoras to the young (Iamblichus, Περὶ τοῦ Πυθαγορικοῦ Βίου, 8, 42-43), there is an encomiastic speech to wisdom (σοφία) "che ha per base l' identico schema" (Untersteiner 1961, p.92). Pythagoras, according to this source, categorises praiseworthy things into inborn and acquired, permanent and temporary. Wealth and offices are inherited privileges, which, when legated, their owner seizes to possess them (τὰ δὲ τὸν προέμενον οὐκ ἔχειν αὐτὸν 8, 43). Physical power, by contrast is a mere personal (ἰδίας) characteristic, which cannot be donated to anyone

(οὐχ' οἷόν τε εἶναι παρ' ἑτέρου ματαλαβεῖν 8, 42). To all the aforementioned charismata is opposed wisdom (παιδεία), an acquired virtue, which, when achieved by a person, is never lost. On the contrary, the person who acquires it is in a position to impart it through teaching to others (δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ παρ' ἑτέρου μεταλαβεῖν καὶ τὸν δόντα μηδὲν ἧττον αὐτὸν ἔχειν 8, 43; notice that the opposite is claimed in the *Dissoi Logoi* 6, as an argument against the teachability of virtue: if virtue is teachable, then the person who hands it over to somebody else does not possess it anymore). The fact that G. calls 'wisdom' ἐπίκτητος ('acquired') is not of course coincidental: a central theme of the Sophistic problematic is the issue of the teachability of wisdom. On the traditional view, a person is gifted with wisdom by nature; Pindar explicitly supports this conception when in his 2nd Olympian Ode he contends that σοφὸς ὁ πολλὰ εἰδὼς φυᾷ. The fifth-century intellectuals cast doubt on this idea; wisdom can be acquired, provided that one wishes to learn. Protagoras maintained that φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῖται (80 B 3 DK). That wisdom is thought of by Sophists as teachable cannot be doubted; if this were not true their own mission would have been a self-contradiction. What is perhaps more radical, is the fact that G. considers the wisdom of the Greek leaders to be acquired; we may then assume that even Odysseus was taught wisdom, he did not owe it to his nobility. G. is here an iconoclast of the first rank (note that Andromache attributes similar virtues to her husband in Eur. *Tro.* 673-4: σὲ δ', ὦ φίλ' Ἕκτορ, εἶχον ἄνδρ' ἀρκοῦντά μοι / ξυνέσει γένει πλούτῳ τε κἀνδρείᾳ μέγαν).

φιλονίκου φιλοτιμίας: for an antithetical usage of these words see Pl. *Parm.*128e1-2: ὅτι οὐχ' ὑπὸ νέου φιλονικίας οἴει αὐτὸ γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας.

ὅστις μὲν οὖν...οὐ λέξω: a rhetorical *aposiopesis*; with this phrase G. brings the praise of Helen to an end. MacDowell (1982, p.35) holds that the person referred to here is "Menelaos" who "married Helen and succeeded Tyndareos as king of Sparta". However, the construction is ambiguous; the participle λαβών may refer both to marriage ('I will not mention who...fulfilled his desire for Helen after his marriage with her'), and abduction ('I will not mention who...fulfilled his desire for Helen after having carried her off'). Specifying λαβών, would be tantamount to the involvement in an unpleasant and degrading narration. Both husband and lover receive G.'s bitter neglect.

τὸ γὰρ τοῖς εἰδόσιν...οὐ φέρει: 'to say known things to those who already know them carries conviction to the speech, but it does not carry pleasure' (κόρος is a recurring theme in encomiastic poetry; cp. Pindar *O*. 2. 95; *P*. 1. 82-3, 8. 28-32; *N*. 10. 20-2). Untersteiner (1961, p. 62) glosses τέρψιν: "motivo edonistico della dottrina estetica di Gorgia: l' artista è un giusto ingannatore...al servizio della τέρψις". This view unjustifiably systematizes scattered evidence. The metarhetorical axiom serves as an explanation: 'I do not mention the person...because it will be unpleasant for my audience, although it would add credibility to my speech'. It is interesting that G. concedes that information on known things adds credibility to the speech, but he does not at the same time say that sacrificing things already known for the sake of pleasure detracts from the credibility of the speech. Is this mere flattery, or a statement of the self-consciousness of the rhetor? πίστις and τέρψις are inextricably interwoven. Pleasure leads to persuasion, and certainly unpleasant speeches are unconvincing (see 13 ἔτερψε καὶ ἔπεισε; notice that Philostratos Test. 1, 2 holds that the stylistic

devices of G.'s style amount to a λόγος which ἡδίων ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεται καὶ σοβαρώτερος cp. Isok. 5. 57 λόγοι ἡδίους εἶναι καὶ πιστότεροι; for the victimisation of audiences through pleasurable speeches in Thucydides and G., see Hunter 1986). In later rhetoric it becomes a *topos* (cp. for instance the opening lines of Demosthenes' *On the Crown*); in Segal's words, "through the artistic elaboration of the *logos* as a form of *poiesis* a chain of emotional reactions will occur leading from the aesthetic τέρψις to the final ἀνάγκη of πειθώ....The aesthetically satisfying *logos*...has great practical implications which lie within the form itself" (1962, p.127; for a different view, see Verdenius 1981, p.118 n. 17). Since known things are boring, we may assume that G. now widens our horizon of expectation. Something new (in *Pal.*, novelty is considered as a merit in speech, καινὸς ὁ λόγος 26) is about to be said: a new method of rational approach replacing the linear, mythical narration.

τὸν χρόνον...ὑπερβὰς: an abstruse construction; τὸν χρόνον - τὸν τότε, τῷ λόγῳ - νῦν. G. is able through his speech to create a speech diachronically valid, unbound by the reality of the events of the past.

ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν: the transition is once more clearly indicated (cp. the beginning of the syllogisms in *Pal.* 6).

αἰτίας: the reasons that made Helen desert her husband and follow Paris to Troy will be presented in ch.6.

εἰκὸς ἦν: 'reasonable'; argument from probabilities does not play an important role in *Hel.* In fact, it is traceable only in the invention of the reasons that made Helen do what she did. The absence of this type of argument in *Hel.* should chiefly be explained by the fact that this speech does not seek to question facts or actions falsely attributed to the defendant, as is the case in *Pal.* In this speech it is admitted that Helen's departure to Troy is true (cp. ἔπραξεν ἃ ἔπραξεν 6). The demonstration of what *might* have happened and

not of what *has* happened gives G. the opportunity to create his own vital space.

6

Gorgias now presents the possible reasons for which Helen eloped to Troy. Norden, cited by Untersteiner (1961, p.93) has observed that Gorgias is the first to present his material in the order it will be developed in the main body of the speech. The reasons set forth by Gorgias are the following: divine power (developed in 6), represented by Tyche, the gods, and Ananke, (natural) violence (7), logos (8-14), and finally love (15-19). The argumentation will be apagogic: each one of them will be dealt with separately, and it is also noticeable that none of these reasons mutually excludes the rest of them. The list is also exhaustive, so that the recipient of the speech cannot easily conceive of any other possible αἰτίαι. It is also true that "his four alternatives dissolve into a series of approximations and analogies. They are convergent to a point of analogy" (Porter 1993, p.274). A close examination of the four reasons shows that they have some common denominators: the compulsion imposed by the divine power is attributed to λόγος; gods have supremacy over men in violence; love is a god with divine power, and it is natural for mortals to follow his commands etc. In Porter's words again (p.275), "If Gorgias is trying to keep his αἰτίαι apart, he is trying no less hard to make that text next to impossible." MacDowell accurately observes that "the first reason is expressed by three phrases (each being a dative plural noun with a genitive), the other three by one phrase each (a participle with a dative), so as to produce a symmetry: three phrases precede and three follow the central ἔπραξεν ἃ ἔπραξεν" (1982, p.35).

ἢ γὰρ Τύχης...ψηφίσμασι: it is interesting that G. combines here divine power with secular processes of public decision-making. Τύχης βουλήμασι: τύχη personified, "is a goddess with wishes of her own; cf. Pindar *Olympian Odes* 12. 1-2, Soph. *Antigone* 1158,

Menander *Aspis* 147-8, and Demosthenes *Epistles* 2.5" (MacDowell 1982, p.35). Pindar includes her in the *Moirai* (fr.21), and it is possible that even gods may submit to her wish (cp. *Trag. Adesp.* 506 Kannicht-Snell: πάντων τύραννος ἡ Τύχη 'στι τῶν θεῶν).

βουλήμασι denotes the 'wish'; its usage here in decision-making (cp. Pl. *Lg.* 802c τὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου βουλήματα). βουλεύμασι: Untersteiner (1961, p.92) prefers X's reading, κελεύσματι, which, however, is not in accordance with the political vocabulary of the passage. βούλευμα, in political vocabulary denotes the decision of the βουλή, and generally a political decision (cp Hdt. 3.80 τούτων ὁ μούναρχος ποιέει οὐδέν, πάλῳ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχῆς ἄρχει, ὑπεύθυνον δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχει, βουλεύματα δὲ πάντα ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἀναφέρει). In the plural it can also mean 'contrivances', as in Pind. *Nem.* 5. 28 (see also Sykutris 1928, p. 12).

'Ανάγκης ψηφίσμασι: 'Ανάγκη is here personified, though this is a rare instance (Smith 1999, p.130 argues that "the only new personification in the early Classical period that represents an abstract concept is also a political entity: Ananke (Necessity) may be represented by a winged woman with a torch, on an early Classical lekythos in Moscow"); it is a power that forces men to act in a manner which is independent of their own wish (cp. Eur. *Phoen.* 1000, 1063 αἱ ἐκ θεῶν ἀνάγκαι) .'Ανάγκη and Τύχη are interrelated, since they are both superior to the gods (cp. Simonides 5. 21'Ανάγκᾳ δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται), and it is interesting that in Soph. *Aj.* 485 they are conjoined: τῆς ἀναγκαίας τύχης οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν μεῖζον ἀνθρώποις κακόν. ψήφισμα: a decree, a proposal accepted by the majority; MacDowell (1982, p.36) observes that the word is rarely used for decisions of the gods, although there is one occurrence in Ar. *Wasps* 376-78: ἵν' εἰδῇ / μὴ πατεῖν τὰ / τοῖν θεοῖν ψηφίσματα. A very similar construction occurs in Empedocles (31B115DK), a passage which G. probably had in mind: ἔστι τι 'Ανάγκης χρῆμα, θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν.

<ἔρωτι ἁλοῦσα>: the fourth reason, followed by most editors; Immisch added <ὄψει ἐρασθεῖσα>. His conjecture is attractive, because the development of the fourth reason is chiefly a theorisation of the function of ὄψις ('vision'), and its impact upon ψυχή ('soul'). However, Immisch's proposal unjustifiably emphasises ὄψις (notice that λόγος and βία are in the dative followed by a participle), whereas it is clear that the fourth reason put forward by G. is love (cp.15 εἰ γὰρ ἔρως ἦν ὁ ταῦτα πράξας).

εἰ μὲν οὖν...ἀπολυτέον: G. passes to the discussion of the first possible reason; the argumentation here is apagogic: in the first instance it is maintained that if Helen was forced by divine power (διὰ τὸ πρῶτον), the blame should be put on the blameworthy. This is followed by an argument concerning the right of might: the stronger leads and the weaker follows. Lastly, G. particularises: if god and Tyche are responsible (the stronger), then Helen (the weaker) should be exculpated. It is also important that the argument used here derives from or reminds of a major and recurrent discussion of the Sophistic movement: the relation between νόμος and φύσις. It is impossible to present the whole issue here (the reader is referred to Heinimann, 1945, Guthrie 1971, pp.55-131, Kerferd 1981, pp.111-130, Kahn 1981, pp.92-108, esp. 105-108, Beikos 1991, pp.67-92). It will suffice to say that φύσις denotes 'nature', whereas νόμος signifies a human 'convention'. In the fifth-century these two notions are polarised, and accordingly, in social matters, some intellectuals defend φύσις, whereas some others νόμος. Some examples: does religion exist naturally, or is it created by men? Is the superiority of Greeks to Barbarians natural, or is it a matter of an arbitrary belief? This theoretical examination of the νόμος - φύσις polarity had an interesting implication for the ethics of power; evidence from several texts shows that a number of intellectuals gave a clear priority to nature. Callicles, in Plato's *Gorgias*, seems to hold the view that law is an invention of the weaker members of society, which is used so as to control the

stronger. An explicit demonstration of the 'right of the might' is found in Thucydides' description of the negotiations between the Athenians and the Melians, and in what followed after their dialogue: οἱ δὲ ἀπέκτειναν Μηλίων ὅσους ἡβῶντας ἔλαβον, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἠνδραπόδισαν (Thuc.5.116). In Kahn's words "What is new is not the theoretical contrast between *nomos* and *physis* but the positive evaluation of the latter as freedom for the strong, as rule by those who are naturally superior" (1981, p.107). Justice, thus, applies to those who are equally strong; cp.Thuc.5. 89: δίκαια ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσι, the latter part being reminiscent of G.'s τὸ δὲ ἧσσον ἕπεσθαι. Should we then assume that G. was a supporter of the right of the might? Nestle (1940, p.229), based on this passage, asserted that G. was an immoralist, and admittedly he had several allies (a fervent one is Harrison 1964, p.192). However, the alleged immoralism of G. cannot be proved from this passage, and there is no supporting evidence that he encouraged it. Here the Sophist simply claims that generally it is natural (πέφυκε) for the stronger to impose his manners and his will on the weaker. In this case the stronger is the god, and there is no doubt that the majority of Greeks believed in the omnipotence of the divine nature. They appeal to their gods in order to support them in everyday life, they ask them to foresee their future, they stage them in a way that customarily accepts their unavoidable power. Accepting that divine power is superior to human, and using this disclaimer as an argument (G. is not the first to exculpate Helen on the basis of divine responsibility; cp. *Il*.3.164, cited by MacDowell 1982, p.35) is one thing, and using one's own superiority as an argument in order to justify one's ability to impose one's own brutality on others is quite another (see Tsekourakis 1984, p.657). Athenians did not need G.'s *Hel.* to commit their atrocities in Melos.

προμηθίᾳ: it would be attractive to think that apart from the phonetic similarity with προθυμία, there is a pun here with the name of *Prometheus*, the hero who was shackled by Zeus.

θεὸς δ᾽…καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις: 'god is superior to men in violence, and in wisdom, and in everything else'; the superiority of gods is well attested in literature, so that G.'s statement seems rather trivial; cp. Hom. *Od.* 10. 306 θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα δύνανται. For the superiority of gods in wisdom see the recurrent: θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα ἴσασιν *Hom.* 4. 379, 468, and Heraclitus B78DK ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, θεῖον δὲ ἔχει).

τῆς δυσκλείας ἀπολυτέον: cp. fr.22 where it is said that G. believed that a woman should not be known for her beauty, but for her good name (μὴ τὸ εἶδος ἀλλὰ τὴν δόξαν εἶναι πολλοῖς γνώριμον τῆς γυναικός).

7

βίᾳ: the second possible reason for which Helen might have travelled to Troy; in general, the one-paragraph argumentation for this possibility is marked by the usage of legal terminology. In Untersteiner's words, "le distinzioni sinonimiche di questo paragrafo (βίᾳ-ὑβρίσθη, ἀνόμως-ἀδίκως, στερηθεῖσα-ὀρφανισθεῖσα) dipendono da reminiscenze giuridiche" (1961, p.97). It is clear that this terminology is anachronistic, since it is applied in a mythological context.

ὑβρίσθη: the interpretation of ὕβρις is always a difficult task; G. surmises that Helen was seized, raped, and finally suffered *hybris*. Thus her sufferings form a climax: rape is certainly more serious offence than mere abduction, and practising *hybris* is worse than mere rape. It is probable, thus, that G. wishes to charge Paris with ill-motivation as well. If seizure is the first step towards violent sexual fulfilment, practising ὕβρις implies an additional motive in

committing the act of rape: the humiliation of the sufferer. This reading is in accordance with some evidence that shows that ὕβρις is an act through which one dishonours another. In Demosthenes' *Conon* we learn that the defendant was attacked by a mob of youngsters, and that their act was not simply an act of brutal violence; the youngsters committed ὕβρις, because their intention was to ridicule him. ὕβρις is thus distinguished from mere violence in that violence is used for humiliation (cp. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1374a 13-15; for a full discussion of ὕβρις see MacDowell 1976, Cohen 1995, pp.145ff., Fisher 1992, and Cairns 1996).

δῆλον ὅτι...ἐδυστήχησεν: G. turns the first and the last verbs of the preceding period into participles, and the adverb ἀδίκως into a verb; the only new word is ἐδυστήχησεν.

βάρβαρος βάρβαρον: a *polyptoton*; the first word is a noun and it refers to Paris, who was not Greek. The second is an adjective, and it refers to his brutal deeds. The construction clearly underlines that his deeds were in conformity with his origin. We may safely assume that G. shared the idea that Greeks are superior to barbarians, and that the Greeks should unanimously fight against them (cp. fr.5b).

καὶ λόγῳ καὶ νόμῳ καὶ ἔργῳ: see MacDowell (1982, comment ad loc.); he rightly observes that "the use of καί does not mean that Paris actually used all three methods...it is just 'by any possible means', just as δικαίως καὶ ἀδίκως means 'by fair means or foul'. Cf. the oath quoted in Andokides 1. 97: κτενῶ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ καὶ ψήφῳ καὶ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ χειρὶ, ἂν δυνατός ὦ, ὃς ἂν καταλύσῃ τὴν δημοκρατίαν."

λόγῳ μὲν...τυχεῖν: the repetition of the datives stresses that the wrong-doer should suffer exactly the same sufferings suffered by the victim. G. asks 'a tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye'. ἀτιμίας and ζημίας can both be legal terms. The first means 'disfranchisement', loss of rights, whereas the latter is used of

'punishment' (cp. Dem.19. 126: τῶν τοιούτων ὁ νόμος θάνατον τὴν ζημίαν εἶναι κελεύει). The usage of technical forensic wording within the frame of mythological material adds verisimilitude to the speech, and brings it closer to every day city-experience.

εἰκότως: 'reasonably'; from the aforementioned it follows that Helen should be the object of our pity.

δίκαιον οὖν: 'it is appropriate to sympathise with her and to hate him'; this emotional reaction will be in accordance with our sense of justice, if, of course, we are ready to accept the possibility set forth by the rhetor. The second possible reason thus transforms Helen from a notorious trouble-maker into a sufferer. The following reason, namely λόγος, is hardly less violent. Violent compulsion colours the whole attempt of Helen's exculpation.

8

εἰ δὲ λόγος...ἀπατήσας: the third possibility; 'if *logos* persuaded and deceived the soul'. G.'s speech becomes now impersonal (no doubt G. still defends Helen, but he deliberately avoids using the pronouns of the preceding paragraph referring to Paris and Helen, and Helen's name is hardly mentioned in 8-14; notice that where passive voice predominates in 7, the opening lines of 8 place the emphasis on the active *logos*). The theorisation about λόγος has just commenced. λόγος: a polysemous word (see LSJ), as can be attested even through a rough examination of its occurrences in *Hel*. It would be convenient to render the word as 'speech', for *logos* is still unspecified here, it is speech in general. πείσας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπατήσας: cp. 12 λόγος γὰρ ψυχὴν ὁ πείσας, a context that makes it clear that persuasion is a violent power with effects similar to that of divine will and natural violence. In this relation Wardy (1996, p.35) is acute in saying that "A conventional piece of forensic rhetoric would plead compulsion on Helen's behalf; if she were forced to go with Paris, she deserves to be exonerated, maybe even pitied. What

one therefore anticipates is an argument that she did *not* yield to persuasion. Then standard polar opposition between force and persuasion entails that succumbing to a merely verbal seduction is altogether blameworthy. Instead...he [G.] unnervingly collapses the polarity". Persuasion will be examined in 12-14 (on πειθώ see comments on 12). Verdenius (1981, p.125) has claimed that G. identifies persuasion with deception; this is not true. From the discussion of persuasive λόγος that follows, it emerges that λόγος might be deceptive on some conditions only. It is equally wrong to ascribe to G. theories of deception, because they are unjustified and unsupported from other evidence. Kerferd's view (1981, p.81-2) that, for G., λόγος is always deceptive because human knowledge is incomplete is a dangerous use of evidence from *ONB*. The same holds for Rosenmeyer's view that the Gorgian concept of deception lies in the fact that speech is not representational. In fact, Rosenmeyer's analysis illustrates the unjustified, modern systematisation of G.'s views on *apate*, when he maintains that, "the term *apate* became prominent in the vocabulary of G. because he placed a positive accent upon what prior to him had been regarded as a negative situation: the frequent discrepancy between words and things" (Rosenmeyer 1955, p.232). The word ἀπάτη *is not* frequent in G.'s vocabulary (in *Hel.* it occurs twice: 8, and 11 ἀπάτημτα, in *Pal.* once 33). Much has been said about fr.23 in relation to G.'s 'theory of deception' as well (see for instance Untersteiner 1961, p.98), a fragment preserved by Ploutarkhos, where G. is said to have claimed that in tragedy, 'he who has deceived is more just than he who has not and he who has been deceived is wiser than he who has not been deceived'. This fragment may clearly be used as evidence against those scholars who commit themselves to the view that it is methodologically safe to use scattered evidence on G. as the basis of interpretation of his texts. Fr.23 clearly refers to tragedy and only to it. If by generalising we venture to apply it to every kind of speech, then we should be ready to accept that Paris was more just than a

person who has not attempted to deceive Helen through speech (and in 19 every effort is made to establish that Helen's eye –not Helen herself – was seduced by Paris' body), and accordingly that Helen became wiser after her deception by Paris. But this is obviously the opposite from what G.'s intended us to understand.

λόγος δυνάστης...ἐπιτελεῖ: a famous description of λόγος; there is no doubt that λόγος is here personified. It clearly acquires a physical substance (we may note that in Sextus' account of *ONB* (86) λόγος is presented as having its own ontological independence), for he possesses a body (σῶμα; see Guthrie 1969, vol ii, p.111 n.2). The incarnation of *logos* is not a Gorgian novelty; it is as old as the Homeric poems, where ἔπεα (words) possess wings (πτερόεντα), with which they travel from the speaker's mouth. The word δυνάστης denotes the ruler, the person who concentrates power, both secular and divine. The super-human power of λόγος implied by the word δυνάστης is in harmony with the nature of the deeds it accomplishes (θειότατα). To the all-mightiness of λόγος is opposed his minute body, and this establishes a further antithesis: λόγος is as effective as natural violence, which however presupposes a physical superiority. The personification is so strong that it almost compels us to visualise it: a small, physically unimpressive ruler, who is paradoxically proved to be extremely threatening. Buchheim (1989, p.164) cites an interesting parallel from the corpus Hippocraticum, where δυνάστης is also involved in a rationalistic, physical explanation: οὗτος δὲ (sc. ὁ ἀήρ) μέγιστος ἐν τοῖσι πᾶσι τῶν πάντων δυνάστης ἐστίν, Περὶ Φυσῶν 3. Another interesting implication of the description of λόγος, is that it is associated with deeds; λόγος and ἔργον are normally construed as two antithetical notions in Greek literature (see note on 1; the opposition between them amounts to a rhetorical *topos*: it is impossible to express through words the honourable deeds of important men; cp. Thuc. 2.35.1-3, Lys. 2.1-2). G. seems to have remarked that speech may have a function equivalent to that of acts: speech acts, it *does* divine

things. In connection to the divine accomplishments of λόγος Segal (1962, p.121) is telling: "The significance of the attribution of divine qualities to the *logos* is twofold. First, it continues the line of poetic tradition (e.g. *Iliad* 2. 385ff) which regarded the power of artistic utterance as a divine gift...The second significance...is the *power* thus assigned to it and the emotion it created. The association of τὸ θεῖον with sheer physical force of irresistible intensity appears in the three other places in the *Helen* where G. refers to the divine" (namely 6, 19, 20). When G. explains the 'divine deeds' of λόγος we soon find out that they all are related to human emotions.

δύναται γάρ: a *schema etymologicum*; *logos* is a potentate (*dynastes*) because it has the potential (δύναται). Adkins (1983, p.109-10) observes that "etymologically speaking, a *dynastês* is simply 'one who can'; and what G. says *logos* can (*dynatai*) do is uncontroversial and based on empirical observation. But since the 'for' clause is an explanation of *dynastês*, and follows it, the incautious reader may suppose that G. has justified his use of *dynastês* in the full sense of 'potentate'; as the reader will certainly have interpreted it, since *dynastês* never occurs in its etymological sense".

καὶ φόβον...ἐπαυξῆσαι: at the beginning of the paragraph, G. alleged: 'if it was logos that persuaded and deceived the soul'; now he explains what λόγος can do in the emotional world, and he thus justifies his characterisation of λόγος as ruler. The demonstration of the impact of λόγος upon the soul is being developed. The emotions invoked by the omnipotent ruler are divided in a balanced manner. The first two, fear and misery are negative, the second two, joy and sympathy, positive. It should be noticed however that at this stage λόγος is presented as a consolatory power, for it removes fear and misery, and it instils joy and sympathy. Segal (1962, p.124) holds that "the order is perhaps deliberately varied, for joy and pain belong together as the passive effects, fear and pity as the active

ones", and he compares the construction with 19: τύχης ἀγρεύμασι...παρασκευαῖς (pp.149-50 n.97), where the two inner and the two outer elements also "correspond in meaning". His comment on ἔλεον ἐπαυξῆσαι (p.126) is too subtle to be true. Based on the usage of the verb ἐπαυξῆσαι ('to augment') Segal assumes that G. assigns to the soul the existence of a certain amount of ἔλεος before the coming of λόγος to it. But MacDowell (1982, p.36), who claims that "the verbs are varied for the sake of rhetorical balance, not because of any difference of meaning between the first two or between the second two" seems more realistic to me. For an analogous presentation of the relation between *logos* and emotions cp. Soph. *O.C.* 1281-3: τὰ πολλὰ γάρ τοι ῥήματ' ἢ τέρψαντά τι, / ἢ δυσχεράναντ', ἢ κατοικτίσαντά πως, / παρέσχε φωνὴν τοῖς ἀφωνήτοις τινά.

λύπην ἀφελεῖν: although G. has not mentioned poetry yet, it is not irrelevant to observe that this phrase brings us very close to the power that Hesiod recognises in poetry (see Heath 1987, p.6).

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ταῦτα δὲ...δείξω: G. devotes the passage to the demonstration of the power of *logos*, a demonstration which consists in two examples: the λόγος of poetry, the λόγος of incantations. In *Hel.* proof-through-examples plays an important role in the overall argumentation, especially in passages where 'theorisation' is employed.

δεῖ δὲ καὶ...ἀκούουσι: an obscure construction on which both Mss agree; some emendations: δόξαι [δεῖξαι] Diels, κἄδοξα δεῖξαι Immisch, δόξαι δεῖξαι Sykutris. MacDowell rightly observes that "no explanation or emendation so far suggested is quite convincing" (1982, p.36). Moreover, the agreement of the Mss suggests that our

efforts should be based on the text as it stands. There have been two discrete manners of interpretation: a) δόξη is an indirect object governed by δεῖξαι (Untersteiner 1961, pp.98-9); this view is weak, for the syntax would require a genitive (ἀκουόντων), whereas the existing ἀκούουσι clearly serves as the object of the infinitive. b) δόξη is a dative denoting the instrument (MacDowell 1982, p.36 'by opinion', Kalligas 1991, p. 223 'μέσῳ τῆς πεποίθησης'). The latter is the only possible way of explaining the function of the dative in this context. However, the meaning ('to show it by the means of opinion') is unclear. The difficulty is primarily because G. wishes to add something new, which remains unclear. In the last sentence of 8 he says: I will show that this is the case. He then goes on to put forward something programmatic, as is clearly shown by δεῖ δέ. The following καί is an obvious indication that what follows will be an addition of a new element to his discourse, and it goes without saying that G. intends us to become aware of it, because the whole construction is otherwise redundant (the example of three different situational contexts which prove the ability of persuasion to mould the soul in 13 is introduced without any announcement; the same holds for 16, where the example showing that vision affects the soul is there introduced with αὐτίκα γάρ). Which is then the meaning of this self-referential sentence? One should turn to the meaning of δόξα. Throughout *Hel.* the word 'opinion' (for the belief / truth pseudo-distinction see comments on 11) is attributed either to the producer of a *logos* (not necessarily of G. himself; see 13), or to the recipients of it; we may call the first as 'active', and the second as 'passive' opinion (see also Segal 1962, p.111). In our context, according to the syntax we have adopted earlier, it is a form of the 'active' opinion that we have. 'It should be proved by the means of *doxa* to the hearers'. I suggest thus that δόξα here is nothing but the rhetor's 'opinion'. But his 'opinion' is admittedly very different from any other opinion. It is not simply *his own* opinion; his opinion aspires to be uttered in a general enough manner, so as to acquire a

universal, 'theoretical' verification. If we were not in danger of indulging in anachronisms, we would happily render δόξη with the word 'theory', in so far as this term can denote a discourse which tends to universality. In this light, the whole sentence may acquire a fresh, interesting implication. Apart from being construed as a self-reference, or as an expression of self-awareness of how the speech should proceed, it can also be seen as a clear indication that the view that Gorgian teaching of rhetoric is based solely on model-speeches which should be reproduced by students of rhetoric is too simplistic. If *Hel.* is a model-speech, it notably encloses some theoretical prescriptions addressed to his students. The present sentence, impersonal as it may be taken to be, can be read as advice: persuasion should use theorisation, because it impersonalises a case. The way in which this 'theorisation' proceeds (or should proceed) will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs.

καὶ νομίζω καὶ ὀνομάζω: a pompous introduction of the definition of poetry; νομίζω emphatically stresses what he, the speaker, thinks of poetry; it introduces a convention, in the way that a law (νόμ– ος) can be considered as a convention.

τὴν ποίησιν...μέτρον: a definition of poetry, which introduces the first example; scholars, by paying too much attention to the meaning of the definition, have not realised that the definition itself has its own independent value. Schiappa has recently observed that "Helen may be our earliest example of the practice of explicating precisely what a particular word means in one's own discourse" (1999 p.127). It is the last part of Schiappa's statement that interests us more; for in his "own discourse", G. wishes to show that poetry is primarily a kind of λόγος. Metre then is not a determinant factor as far as the raw material of poetry is concerned; it is simply the formal element that turns a speech into poetry. That the emphasis is placed here upon speech also emerges through the analogous wording in the discussion of incantations. There, as here, it is the verbal aspect of spells that preponderates (διὰ λόγων). At any rate, it is the drastic

impact of λόγος upon the soul that G. wishes to exemplify through the paradigms of poetry and incantations. An unavoidable question: does the confinement of poetry to mere metrical speech entail a scornful view of poetry on the part of G.? Is he deliberately – and this is perhaps more serious – unqderestimating poetry, so that the new genre represented by him should emerge (as Dodds explicitly states 1959, p.325)? My view is that G.'s line of argumentation does not require here a distinction between genres on the basis of the presence of the absence of a formal element such as metre. Although from the phrase 'poetry is speech with metre' one may infer (if metre is taken in the wider possible manner, so as to include poetical mannerisms in general, see Segal 1962, p. 150 n. 102, who allows for that possibility) that poetry is nothing more than a kind of speech, there can be no better demonstration of how other kinds of speech can partake of poetical formalities than one's own participation in the performance of *Hel.* itself. Acute, or even commonsense hearers of *Hel.*, could hardly overlook G.'s poetical style, as it is well attested by later literature (see Introduction; poetical style is explained by Aristotle as an effort of ancient speakers to balance the unimportance of the subject-matter with poetical expression *Rhet.* 1, 1404a24-27). There can be little doubt, then, that G. aspires to invoke through his speech (or rather through this form of speech) the emotions that he will soon present as invoked by poetry. In Segal's words (1962, p.127) "Gorgias, in fact, transfers the emotive devices and effects of poetry to his own prose, and in so doing he brings within the competence of the rhetor the power to move the psyche by those supernatural forces which Damon is said to have discerned in the rhythm and harmony of the formal structure of music". It would not be surprising, though this is mere speculation, if some day we learned that apart from reading and commenting on poetry (cp.frs.23-25), G., by practising his compositional skills, composed some poetical pieces as well.

A similar conception of poetry to the one depicted here occurs in Isokrates' *Evagoras* 10-11, where it is claimed that if one does away

with μέτρον in poetical language, then our esteem for poetry will soon be seriously undermined. Another similar context is to be found in Plato's *Gorgias* 502c5-7; there, it is also stressed that, if one strips a piece of poetic creation of melody, rhythm, and metre, what is left over is speech (cp. also the description of lyric poetry in *Rep.* 398d1, and the interesting experiment performed by D. Hal. in *De Comp.* 26 on Simonides 543 *PMG*). The view that poetry is merely speech wrapped with formal elements is refuted by Aristotle in his *Poetics* 1447b 13-16: πλὴν οἱ ἄνθρωποί γε συνάπτοντες τῷ μέτρον τὸ ποιεῖν, ἐλεγειοποιοὺς, τοὺς δὲ ἐποποιοὺς ὀνομάζουσιν, οὐχ ὡς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν ποιητάς, ἀλλὰ κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορεύοντες. , on the count that although both Homer and Empedocles composed texts in verse, τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον ἀποκαλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητήν

It is also worth mentioning that several scholars (Pohlenz, Rostagni and most importantly Cataudella. all cited by Untersteiner 1954, p. 127 n.53, who follows them) have thought that Gorgias does not refer here to poetry as a whole, but solely to tragedy (contra Lanata 1963 and Bona 1974). This view, which is certainly rooted in the verbal similarities of the following lines with some passages of Aristotle's *Poetics* (some scholars have actually thought that G. anticipates in *Hel.* 9 Aristotle's theory of κάθαρσις; see comments *ad loc.*) is obviously wrong. First, because tragedy would normally be expected to be described as a spectacle, whereas G. immediately after the definition of poetry uses the participle ἀκούοντας (as far as I know, this conspicuous point has never been detected so far). Secondly, because in the definition of poetry G. explicitly says 'poetry as a whole' (ἅπασαν), which means poetry in its entirety, poetry in its different kinds (cp. Pl. *Ion* 532c 8-9: ποιητικὴ γὰρ πού ἐστιν τὸ ὅλον). Thirdly, because the emotions invoked by poetry in the human soul, as they are described in what follows, are not the monopoly of tragedy, unless one considers superficial word-affinities with the *Poetics* as a firm ground for

valid comparisons. Fourthly, I do not see why tragedy, and only tragedy, should be described as 'speech with metre', when it is well-known that every single piece of ancient Greek poetical creation is metrical. The identification of G.'s general reference to poetry with the *genre* of tragedy is clearly another concomitant of the view that he is putting forward theories which are not otherwise discernible in his texts.

One more view should be added to what has already been said; that of de Romilly (1973; see also Segal 1962, p.128: "the divine inspiration of the poet...plays little part in the actual *poiesis* for Gorgias"). Through a thorough examination of earlier tradition, de Romilly concluded that a change in the standpoint from which poetry was traditionally viewed is observable in *Hel.* More particularly, she points out that poetry is depicted in *Hel.* as the product of human craftsmanship (τέχνη), it is not inspired by divine powers or the Muses. This view has been refuted by MacDowell, who claims that "the inference [sc. de Romilly's] is shaky, because the words ἔνθεοι and τέχναι 10 show that, for Gorgias, a τέχνη is not incompatible with divine inspiration" (1982, p.37). It should also be noted that λόγος is not presented as the product of human skill before paragraph 11 (from this point, and until paragraph 14, several kinds of speakers emerge: abstract reference to those who persuade 11; Paris implied 12, astronomers, 'rhetors', participants in philosophical conflicts 13). Before 11, it is *logos* in its endogenous potential that is focused on.

ἀκούοντας: poetry is, of course, in Greek culture primarily performed and recited, not read in libraries and studies (see Gentili 1998, pp.4-5; cp. Pl. *Rep.* 603b 7-8 ἢ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοήν, ἣν δὴ ποίησιν ὀνομάζομεν;). The oral performance of poetry, usually in the form of 'folk-songs', was still current in Greece – and elsewhere of course – until very recently; one may be reminded of Erotokritos, a composition still recited by older people in Crete.

εἰσῆλθε: throughout *Hel.* a common pattern is used when emotions are described; here words penetrate into humans and they affect their souls. This pattern, anachronistically speaking, is basically 'behaviouristic', in the sense that the words of poetry represent a stimulus which bring about certain psychological reactions, which manifest themselves through physical "symptoms" (shuddering, tears etc.; see Segal 1962, Lanata 1963 note *ad loc.*, pp.107f., Mourelatos 1982, 229-230, the first to use the term 'behavioral' in explaining *Hel.* 14, although he fails to observe that the same pattern is used in 15-19). This 'psychosomatic' pattern (to indulge in modern medical terminology) also recurs in the discussion of the impact of vision upon the soul in 15-19 (see Introduction), so that we may safely claim that it forms the foundation stone of G.'s 'theorisation' in *Hel.* In connection with this structure we should examine the verb εἰσῆλθε, in relation to other expressions describing the S + soul process. In 10 the incantation 'meets' or 'is unified with' (συγγιγνομένη) the opinion of the soul, in 13 persuasion approaches to *logos* (προσιοῦσα); in 15 vision 'moulds' (τυποῦται) the soul, in 16 vision 'proceeds', 'comes' (ἐλθοῦσα) presumably to the soul, in 17 vision 'engraves' (ἐνέγραψεν) the images of things seen on what we may roughly render as mind (φρόνημα). As far as λόγος is concerned, there is always a mobile element (poetry, incantations, persuasion) which tends to approach the soul and enter it, whereas in the case of vision there is a more static process of stamping. This is understandable if we are reminded that the flexibility of λόγος, indispensable for his mobility, is guaranteed by G. in his definition of λόγος in 8: speech is an all-mighty ruler with a minute, almost invisible body. λόγος then enters the human body physically, carrying emotional load.

φρίκη περίφοβος...φιλοπενθής: notice the sound-play. With a construction of three nouns with three adjectives G. brings out both the emotions and the physical manifestations evoked by poetry (see Segal 1962, p.124-25). It has been though that G. here anticipates

Aristole's *Poetics*; there is little doubt, that *prima facie* terms used in this context *are* reminiscent of Aristotle's *Poetics*. In 1453b 4-5 for instance φρίττειν καὶ ἐλεεῖν coexist, whereas in the 'definition' of tragedy he claims that κάθαρσις is attained through ἔλεος and φόβος. The superficial wording similarities being asserted, we may move to the examination of those who move a crucial, if dangerous step further. Pohlenz (1920, p.142-78) pointed out the affinities of the description of poetry here with tragedy. Anticipation of the 'κάθαρσις-theory' by G. is also accepted by Duncan (1938, p.412) and Nestle (1908, pp.561-62). A clearly circular argument can be traced in Untersteiner (1961, p.99) when he maintains that through these words it becomes evident that "G. pensa alla tragedia" (he cites S ss, p.85). Wollgraff (1952, p.93 n.5) seems to be able to reach the conclusion that Aristotle makes use of G.'s φόβος (=φρίκη) and ἔλεος, and not the word πόθος. This summary of views is enough to show the fragility of the arguments put forward by scholars. Furthermore, they all postulate that G. is referring to tragedy, which as we have shown is shaky, to say the least. Similar emotions to those presented here *can* be invoked in human soul through other kinds of poetry as well. Let us compare *Hel.* with Plato's *Ion* 535c-d:

The performer

ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅταν ἐλεινόν τι λέγω, δακρύων ἐμπίμπλανταί μου οἱ ὀφθαλμοί· ὅταν τε φοβερὸν ἢ δεινόν, ὀρθαὶ αἱ τρίχες ἵστανται ὑπὸ φόβου καὶ ἡ καρδία πηδᾷ.

Sokrates then asks Ion the rhapsode if he has realised that he provokes within the audience the same emotions; here is Ion's reply:

The audience

καὶ μάλα καλῶς οἶδα· καθορῶ γὰρ ἑκάστοτε αὐτοὺς ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος κλάοντάς τε καὶ δεινὸν ἐμβλέποντας καὶ συνθαμβοῦντας

τοῖς λεγομένοις. δεῖ γάρ με καὶ σφόδρ' αὐτοῖς τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν·
ὡς ἐὰν μὲν κλάοντας αὐτοὺς καθίσω, αὐτὸς γελάσομαι ἀργύριον
λαμβάνων, ἐὰν δὲ γελῶντας, αὐτὸς κλαύσομαι ἀργύριον ἀπολλύς.

In this dialogue Sokrates talks with Ion the rhapsode about poetry; a few lines earlier a clear reference has been made to the contents of Ion's repertory: recitation of Homeric epic and explanation of it. There is nothing then obstructing us from contending that it is epic that may create the same emotions and the same reactions. As Heath (1987, p.7) has pointed out, in *Hel.* 9 "there must be a tacit limitation to the 'serious' forms, tragedy and epic".

Those entertaining the hypothesis that G. anticipates Aristotle's κάθαρσις are manifestly on the wrong, because they explain it by projecting on it a notion whose meaning is still unknown to us: unfortunately, Aristotle never explains what the meaning of κάθαρσις is. There is only one element that both G. and Aristotle have in common: the emphasis that they lay on 'pity and fear' as emotions that are distinctly engendered by tragedy (and according to G. poetry in general; cp. Russel 1981, p.23). But the emphasis laid on this pair of emotions (along with πόθος φιλοπενθής) is not inaugurated by G. Homer is certainly aware of the power of poetry to offer pleasure by making people experience negative emotions (cp. *Od.* 15.339-400, 23.301-8; see also Heath 1987, pp.11-15, esp. p.11, and Macleod 1982, pp.4-8).

φρίκη περίφοβος: the first word literally means 'shuddering', and it thus denotes the external manifestation of fear (cp. Soph. *El.* 1408, *Trach.* 1044; for occurrences of the words of this context in prose cp. Thiele 1901, p.238). The adjective, normally attributed to humans to denote intense fear, is attested combined with fear in Aiskh. *Supp.* 736, as MacDowell observes (1982, p.37; περίφοβον μ' ἔχει τάρβος).

ἔλεος πολύδακρυς: the noun signifies the emotion of 'pity', 'sympathy' for the sufferings of another person. In *Ion* 535c6 ἔλεος also brings tears (cp. 7 where G. invites us to 'sympathise' with Helen). For πολύδακρυς cp. Eur. *El.* 126: πολύδακρυν ἀδονάν.

πόθος φιλοπενθής: MacDowell defines the noun (found only in A, which is of course correct; X has φίλος) as "longing for a person absent or dead" (1982, p.37; for a longer discussion see Segal 1962, p.124). For this function of poetry cf. Pl. *Phil.* 48a5-6 τάς τε τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις, ὅταν ἅμα χαίροντες κλάωσι, and my general note *supra*. MacDowell observes that the word is unparalleled elsewhere before Ploutarkhos (1982, p.37).

ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίων...ψυχή: ἐπὶ governs εὐτυχίαις καὶ δυσπραγίαις; the meaning is that through poetic discourse the soul experiences emotions of its own in the joy or the sorrow of strangers. Poetic speech thus makes us react as if the sufferings of others are our own sufferings and more importantly it forces us to partake of their emotional state. It reminds us thus of the Platonic idea of μέθεξις, as it is presented in *Ion* 535c, where the rhapsode admits that when he recites a passage from the epics he has the feeling that he is situated in the place where the action recited by him takes place. We may also compare the *Republic* 605d 3-5, where we read: οἶσθ' ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅ τι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῇ.

10

αἱ γὰρ ἔνθεοι...γίνονται: 'divine, word-incantations, bring pleasure and remove misery'; G. turns to verbal magic. According to de Romilly (1975, ch.1) the function of poetry, as it is developed by G., is analogous to that of magic and she goes on to suggest that "he was deliberately shifting magic into something rational" (p.20). MacDowell (1982, p.38) claims that the "the connection between them [sc. poetry and magic] is somewhat overstated by de Romilly"

(criticised by Wardy 1996, p. 161 n.24). It is certain that poetry and incantations are connected in the respect that they both exemplify the power of their vehicle, that is λόγος; they both affect the human soul, and they both are divine, as far as their deeds are concerned (this is guaranteed in 8 and at any rate this is G.'s demonstrandum). That poetry employs incantatory tropes is shown by de Romilly, but it is otherwise not explained or even implied by G., unless we are ready to commit ourselves to de Romilly's view that G.'s style is a rationalised use of magical features, serving his practical need for persuasiveness. This, although it is not unlikely, cannot be proved in any way, and it is wise to bear in mind that Plato frequently presents rhetoric as a kind of incantatatory speech (see below). Magic was largely used by people with the purpose of attracting the attention of their beloved, or of destroying a love-affair. When compared to the paradigm of poetry, incantations could have been closer to the knowledge of G.'s audience concerning practices followed by everyday people. ἐπῳδή ('incantation') belongs to magic terminology, it denotes the 'spell', and it is ἔνθεος because it appeals to divine power (Segal, however, 1962, p.128, based on the repetition of the word τέχνη in 10, 13 – see notes on 9 as well – emphasises the effects of λόγος as a human product; see also de Romilly (1975), but I doubt that G. denies here the divine origins of spells; human ability to affect the soul in the (divine) way that incantations do is one thing and their divine nature quite another). For one more time G. insists on the power of speech to act, and interact with the human soul. Incantations may be curative: cp. Pl. *Charm.* 155e5, αὐτὸ μὲν εἴη φύλλον τι, ἐπῳδὴ δέ τις ἐπὶ τῷ φαρμάκῳ εἴη, ἣν εἰ μέν τις ἐπάδοι ἅμα καὶ χρῷτο αὐτῷ, παντάπασιν ὑγιᾶ ποιοῖ τὸ φάρμακον ἄνευ δὲ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἴη τοῦ φύλλου; opposed to drastic curative methods in Soph. *Aj.*581-2; for their use by the Pythagoreans, cp. 58D1,13DK. Affinities with *Hel.*'s wording, in connection with the function of incantations see Eur. *Hipp.* 478-9 εἰσίν δ' ἐπῳδαὶ καὶ λόγοι

θελκτήριοι· / φανήσεταί τι τῆσδε φάρμακον νόσου; this passage integrates terminology which appears in the final paragraph on λόγος (14), which explicitly brings in medicine and which largely draws upon what is said here. Plato uses ἐπῳδή, so as to describe the impact of rhetoric on audiences; cp. Pl. *Euthyd.* 290a1-5, where incantations are classified: some of them appease the beasts and cure, whereas some others appease (κήλησις) and console audiences in civic congregations: ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπῳδῶν ἐχεών τε καὶ φαλαγγίων...ἡ δὲ τῶν δικαστῶν τε καὶ ἐκκλησιαστῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων κήλησίς τε καὶ παραμυθία τυγχάνει οὖσα; so Thrasymakhos is said (*Phdr.* 267c=B6DK) to have had the ability to control the emotional reactions of audiences: ὀργίσαι τε αὖ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονε καὶ πάλιν ὠργισμένοις ἐπᾴδων κηλεῖν; cp. also Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.12-13: ἄλλας δέ τινας οἶσθα ἐπῳδάς; οὐκ ἀλλ' ἤκουσα μὲν ὅτι Περικλῆς πολλὰς ἐπίστατο, ἃς ἐπᾴδων τῇ πόλει ἐποίει αὐτὴν φιλεῖν αὐτόν (on magic and G. see Parry 1992, pp.151-153)

συγγινομένη γάρ...τῆς ἐπῳδῆς: 'when the power of the incantation meets the opinion of the soul'; the incantation comes close to the soul in a rather physical manner, as the participle attests (the possibility that the imagery draws upon sexual intercourse cannot be ruled out). For δύναμις of incantation, cp. Pl. *Charm.* 157b; see Untersteiner 1954, p.128 n.60. The word is picked up in 14, as λόγου δύναμις, in an analogy with medicine. In the light of that context, δύναμις can denote the action, the potency of incantations, in the way that we are referring to the action or the potency of a drug.

ἔθελξε: a gnomic aorist; Verdenius observes that "when Homer uses the verb θέλγειν of human beings, it refers to skilful speeches usually consisting of lies" (1981, p.122 with examples). Note that in Eur. *Hipp.*478 we find the expression λόγοι θελκτήριοι.

γοητείᾳ: 'sorcery'; we have doubtful evidence (Test.3) that G. was initiated in the art of magic by Empedocles (αὐτὸς παρείη τῷ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ γοητεύοντι).

γοητείας...εὕρηνται: a demanding construction; Segal (1962, p.112) takes it with ψυχῆς...ἀπατήματα. Another line of inquiry suggests that δισσαὶ τέχναι are particular arts of μαγεία and γοητεία, and they define them through speculation (i.e. Untersteiner 1954, p.116; see also p.128 n.64 'poetry and artistic prose' and so Lanata 1963, p.201; this is refuted by Bona 1974, p.20. Verdenius takes it to refer to "the art of ἐπῳδός and that of the orator" 1981, p.122 n.37). MacDowell (1982, p.37) gives the most satisfactory solution: "the two genitives define the two τέχναι: i.e. 'there exists an art of sorcery and an art of magic'". According to this reading G. says: 'In addition (δὲ), two arts, that of sorcery (γοητεία), and that of magic, have been invented'; the rest of the construction explains the two arts. If this explanation is to be accepted, the presentation of γοητεία along with μαγεία may seem rather abrupt, and the information that two arts have been invented may appear as a redundant and incoherent insertion. But one should bear in mind that they are both now elevated to arts, and that μαγεία is an uncommon word in Greek literature (this may be the first occurrence of the word, unless Timotheus 51. 102) antedates G. At any rate, G. says here something new, for he classifies both sorcery and magic as arts, although the fact that this is a novelty is not *prima facie* understandable. This formal classification is stressed by δισσαὶ τέχναι, (which shows that these two τέχναι are distinguishable, but G. does not bother to explain *why* they are); G. is fond of using δισσός, and then explaining it (cp. *Pal.*: δισσῶν δὲ τούτων ὄντων 2, διὰ δισσῶν ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω τρόπων 6, δισσῶν γὰρ τούτων ἕνεκα πάντες πάντα πράτουσσιν, ἢ κέρδος τι μετιόντες ἢ ζημίαν φεύγοντες 19; *Epitaphios*: καὶ δισσὰ ἀσκήσαντες μάλιστα ὧν δει, γνώμην...).

11

ὅσοι δὲ ὅσους...πλάσαντες: 'how many have persuaded how many people...', not 'all those who persuade...'. G., in this particular

case, does not generalise, as some modern scholars do; it is wrong to see a Gorgian 'theory' of deception everywhere, especially when G. makes careful announcements: some persuaders prefer falsification, some do not; in any case G. seeks to show that Helen was the victim of a malicious persuasion, and it would have been foolish to emphasise the honesty of her seducer's speech (MacDowell 1982, note *ad loc.*, compares the construction with *Palatine Anthology* 7. 740. 6 γαίης ὅσσης ὅσσον ἔχει μόριον and Soph. *Aj*.923 οἷος ὢν οἵως ἔχεις, to show that "subtler authors employ this exclamatory polyptoton…to express a contrast"; but it is a contrast brought out in *Pal.* 22 …τοιοῦτος ὢν τοιούτου κατηγορεῖς· ἄξιον γὰρ καταμαθεῖν, οἷος οἷα λέγεις, ὡς ἀνάξιος ἀναξίῳ). With the repetition of ὅσος G. refers to the-speech maker, the recipients of his speech and to the subjects of the speech itself.

εἰ μὲν γάρ…ἦν: <ἔννοιαν> is Reiske's satisfactory addition; A has ὅμοιος ἦν, and X ὅμοιος ὤν; in either case ὅμοιος does not give an appropriate meaning. G. clearly intends to contrast what happens (τὰ νῦν), that is lack of memory, judgment, and prognostication, with an ideal situation in which men, by possessing these qualities, would not have been the victims of a false speech. MacDowell (1982, note *ad loc.*) gives the simplest and thus more economical solution; he takes ὅμοιος as a dittography from the preceding ὁμοίως, and obelises it; ὁμοίως then gives the meaning 'not with the same intensity'. Sauppe's ἠπάτα (after ὁ λόγος) certainly smoothens the meaning, but it is palaeographically unjustified. Kerferd (1981, p.81), who seems to accept ὅμοιος, claims that "if men did possess knowledge, the logos would (visibly) not be similar (to that of which they possess the knowledge)". This thesis has been refuted by MacDowell mainly on the basis of textual points; but apart from his valid arguments, one should also add two more: a) Kerferd 1981, pp.81-2 (for scholars before him see Untersteiner 1954, p.128 n.65) foists on G. a distinction between 'opinion' and 'knowledge' (Untersteiner 1954, p. 116: " The contrast is not, as usually

believed, between truth and opinion...but rather between two ways of knowledge: on the one side stands doxa ...on the other side is logos" and "thus [logos] overcoming by an irrational ct the impossibility of acquiring objective knowledge..."), which does not appear in *Hel.* (though it appears in *Pal.* i.e. 3), and which is a systematisation of scattered evidence (the opposition knowledge-opinion is of course traced in Plato's *Republic*, for which see Annas 1981, pp.190-216, and Plato elsewhere concedes what he calls 'true opinions', δόξαι ἀληθεῖς for which compare *Menon* 97e-98a). In *Pal.* the distinction merely develops the argumentation and it is intended to question the reliability of the opponent (thus in 24 it is called ἀπιστώτατον πρᾶγμα), who relies upon δόξα. Moreover, δόξα is presented here as the common, not the only, existing human condition, as it is frequently taken to be. b) Kerferd (1981, p.80) transfers evidence from *ONB*, where it is admittedly claimed that λόγος is different from things; but conclusions based on comparisons of G.'s texts are not safe.

When we turn to the actual argument we find out that G. here clearly sets forth the state of mind of the *audiences* so that a deceptive λόγος may be established. The potential of logos to persuade is not solely an intrinsic characteristic of it; audiences play an important role as well. But why the absence of these three abilities leads to the evil of δόξα is not clarified. Probably G.'s thought is as simple as the following: most people lack critical approach to reality which is attained through memory of events of the past (offering a ground of experience), ability to judge present conditions, and finally the possibility to foresee possible developments of a certain issue on the basis of what given and present information dictates.

ἀλλὰ νῦν γε: MacDowell's ἀλλὰ νῦν γε, which is closer to the Mss, gives the exact meaning.

εὐπόρως ἔχει: a further proof that G. does not mean that the acquisition of these qualities is unattainable.

περὶ τῶν πλείστων οἱ πλεῖστοι: ὅσοι and περὶ ὅσων of the introductory sentence becomes now 'most people on most issues'; again G. avoids saying *everyone*. The person who persuades is here absent, for he is the one who compels most men to resort to δόξα.

τὴν δόξαν: 'opinion', for which, as Segal (1962, p.111) remarks, no alternative is offered.

σύμβουλον: 'counsellor'; δόξα is almost personified.

εὐτυχίαις: a *lectio recentior* for ἀτυχίαις, AX; Untersteiner (1961, p.102) prefers the latter reading and explains: "vuol dire che l' opinione porta a οὐ τυχεῖν, di modo che questo οὐ τυχεῖν risulta σφαλερὸν καὶ ἀβέβαιον, cioè i due aggetivi presentano valore prolettico"; but G.'s argument is that those who employ δόξα as the product of misjudgment provides those who employ it with tentative and lame success. εὐτυχίαις has been accepted by Sykutris and most of the editors.

σύμβουλον...παρέχονται: cp. Isok. 8.8 ἀλλ' ὡς δόξῃ μὲν χρωμένους, ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ δὲ γενησόμενον, οὕτω διανοεῖσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν.

12

τίς οὖν αἰτία...ἔχει: the text is heavily corrupt; only an *ad sententiam* restoration is possible. G. clearly seems to introduce the subject of persuasion, which according to him is as effective as natural violence and compulsion. I render this portion of the text as follows: 'what reason disallows us from believing that Helen has come because of speech, equally unwillingly, as if she had violently been seized? Persuasion makes one lose one's own reason; for although persuasion does not have the form of compulsion, it [persuasion] is as strong as it [compulsion] is'. Some points: I remove ὕμνους and I replace it with λόγων because G. a few lines later says 'if it was speech that persuaded her...', which seems to expand the analogy between persuasive speech and compulsion. I prefer οὐχ ἑκοῦσα instead of ἄκουσα, because it fits better the MSS'

senseless reading ἂν οὐ νέαν οὖσαν. For ἐξηλάθη and νόημα instead of A1 ὁ δὲ νοῦς, cp. 17 ἐξήλασεν ὁ φόβος τὸ νόημα).

Persuasion according to Buxton (1981, p.31; readers are referred to his detailed discussion of *peitho*; in this context only relevant aspects of it will be developed) "is a continuum within which divine and secular, erotic and non-erotic come together"; this dualism is apparent in *Hel.* (for depictions of her in art where *Peitho* is also present see Shapiro 1991, pp.190-8): speech is a great ruler who accomplishes *divine* deeds 8, persuasion is equally effective with 'compulsion', already personified in 6, where it is listed among other divinities, but in 13, persuasion's potential to mould the soul will be exemplified through purely "secular" (to use Buxton's term) paradigms.

A vital aspect of G.'s discussion of persuasion is that he equates it with violence (βία as opposed to πειθώ is also discussed by Buxton, 1981, pp.58-62; see O' Regan 1992, p. 14-5). This equation is rather radical (but see Pindar *P.*4.216-9 μάστιξ πειθοῦς, Aiskh. *Ag.* 385 βιᾶται τάλαινα Πειθώ, Eur. *Hec.*816 Πειθώ δὲ τὴν τύραννον ἀνθρώποις μόνην), because normally persuasion is viewed as a civilized, non-violent way of trying to make others consent to your intentions, whereas natural violence is considered as a means of making someone follow you unwillingly (see Aristotle's *Eth.Eud.*1224a 39 ἡ πειθὼ τῇ βίᾳ καὶ ἀνάγκη ἀντιτίθεται; notice that he places both 'violence' and 'compulsion' in opposition to 'persuasion' as G. does). In Lysias 2. 19 it is the decisive element that illustrates the superiority of men over the conditions of the beast: θηρίων μὲν ἔργον εἶναι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων βίᾳ κρατεῖσθαι, ἀνθρώποις δὲ προσήκειν νόμῳ μὲν ὁρίσαι τὸ δίκαιον, λόγῳ δὲ πεῖσαι; see also Isok. 3. 6, 4. 48, 15. 254; see also Pl. *Kriton* 49e-51e, Xen. *Mem.*1.2.10., Soph. *Ant.* 354f. Soph. *Phil.*102-3 reads: τί δ' ἐν δόλῳ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ πείσαντ' ἄγειν; / οὐ μὴ πίθηται· πρὸς βίαν δ' οὐκ ἂν λάβοις, where Odysseus seems not to recognise any effective way of taking Philoctetes' bow other than either

persuading or forcing him to surrender it. Herodotos brings evidence that when the Andrians refused to contribute money to the Athenians during the Persian Wars, Themistokles claimed ὡς ἥκοιεν Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ ἑωυτοὺς ἔχοντες δύο θεοὺς μεγάλους, Πειθώ τε καὶ Ἀναγκαίην (interestingly enough Ploutarkhos *Vit. Them.* 21 has Βία instead of Ἀνάγκη).

It is clear, I hope, that persuasion in *Hel.*, is not the civilized, non-violent and human canonical persuasion. Persuasion through words can be seen as a civilized means of making people adhere to one's views if and only if one is prepared to racognize in the recipients of *logoi* the possibility of free will. G., by equating persuasion to ἀνάγκη, ultimately rules out the existence of this possibility, because, as Ostwald observes, "they [sc. ἀνάγκαι] exert compulsion only because those affected by them perceive no viable alternative course of action is open to them" (1988, p.19). Persuasion is an art that πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῇ δοῦλα δι' ἑκόντων, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῖτο (Pl. *Phil.* 58a-b; note that the emphasis is not on διὰ βίας through violence, but on the enslavement). The willingness of the persuaded person to be persuaded can be opposed to the unwillingness of the victim of persuasion in Sappho *PLF* 1.18: τίνα δηῦτε πείθω / .].σαγην [ἐς σὰν φιλότατα; τίς σ' ὦ / Ψά]πφ', ἀδικήει; / κα]ὶ γ[ὰρ αἰ φεύγει, ταχέως διώξωι, /< αἰ δὲ δῶρα μὴ δέκετ', ἀλλὰ δώσει>, <u><αἰ δὲ μὴ φίλει, ταχέως φιλήσει / κοὐκ ἐθέλοισα></u>. The meaning is that persuasion is the only other power that can be equally effective as natural violence, not that persuasion is not violent. Plato (*Phlb.*58a-b) admittedly corresponds to what may be considered purely Gorgian: persuasion has the compulsive effects of physical violence. In Buxton's words "Gorgias propounded what amounts to the most radical confession of faith in *peitho* known to us from Greece" (1981, p.53).

ὁ πείσας...ποιουμένοις: no English word can accurately render the meaning of πείθειν. Buxton (1981, p.48) observes that "the middle πείθομαι can usually be translated by one of the three English words

'obey', 'trust' or 'believe'. All three have in common the notion of acquiescence in the will or opinions of another. Correspondingly, the active πείθω, conventionally translated as 'persuade', can perhaps best be understood as a factitive, meaning 'get (someone) to acquiesce in (some belief or opinion)', or, more explicitly, 'get one's way over someone in such a way that they πείθεσθαι'" (see also MacDowell 1982, p. 39). Persuasion is thus here presented as making the persuaded soul consent to what is said and act in the manner dictated by the persuader (since there is a chiasm συναινέσαι — λεγομένοις — πιθέσθαι — ποιουμένοις expressing the standard antithesis between word and deeds). ἣν ἔπεισεν: G. theorises about λόγος, so that generalisation is necessary; *every* persuaded soul is enslaved and bound from necessity. ἠνάγκασε: cp. Pl. *Sph.* μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκαίας.

ὁ μὲν οὖν πείσας...κακῶς: G. reuses the passive/active voice interchange: passive voice for Helen (the victim), active voice for Paris (the wrongdoer), which further stresses the affinities of persuasion with physical violence. In this context, the subject of the active verbs is speech, whereas that of the passive voice the soul. Wardy (1996, p.43, following Adkins: see n.26 on p.161) claims that the " 'he' and 'she' in the last sentence refer indifferently to *logos*/Paris, soul/Helen". This may be true, and there is nothing to suggest that G. did not intend it to be construed in this manner. However, his disclaimer "the deliberate feminisation of the *psyché* plays on the Greek cultural assumption that the female as such is a passive object shaped by a dominating masculine force. Thus, perhaps, every male citizen who yields to rhetorical *logos* is comparable to a man...whose masculinity is thereby humiliated: the successful orator performs physical rape" is beyond my imagination, and does not add much to the interpretation. Wardy (1996, p.161 n.28), in corroborating his view, cites Dover's statement that, "It seems to have been felt that the boy who yielded had assimilated himself to a *hetaira*" (1974, p.215). But when πειθώ, G.'s actual

subject, is brought in we find out that it can be exercised by a woman as well: "a number of scholars have persisted in identifying Peitho exclusively with the pattern: man persuades woman. This quite simply flies in the face of the evidence" (Buxton 1981, p.37, who compares a passage from Athenaios where a prostitute from the temple of Aphrodite at Corinth is named Peitho), and concludes "Peitho was thought to be operative both in this and the reverse pattern". One may also be reminded of how Menelaos was 'persuaded' not to kill Helen, when the latter exposed her breasts.

μάτην: 'unjustly', 'undeservedly'.

13

ὅτι δ' ἡ πειθώ...ἐτυπώσατο: 'that when persuasion meets speech, the soul is moulded by it...'; the description of the process of the 'moulding' of soul is once more physical (see note on 9; for the τύπος- metaphor see Segal 1962, p. 142 n.44). ἐτυπώσατο is an aorist of experience; G. frequently uses gnomic aorists in *Hel.*, especially in passages where he argues by using 'theoretical' generalisation (ἐποίησαν, ἔτερψε καὶ ἔπεισε 13, ἐλύπησαν... 14).

χρὴ μαθεῖν: 'one should observe' (cp. Hdt.7.208 ὁ δὲ τοὺς ἔξω ἐμάνθανε...καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐμάνθανε...). Diès' addition (μαθεῖν ὁρῶντα) is redundant. G. brings in three examples from three situational contexts: the discourse of the 'astronomers', speeches from court-rooms, philosophical quarrels. In all these types of discourse persuasion is involved. Even 'scientific' speculation involves persuasion, and we are almost invited here to be reminded of Parmenides' appeal to Persuasion in 2.3-4.

πρῶτον μὲν: introduces the first example (δεύτερον δὲ...τρίτον <δὲ>); G. always indicates the structure of his arguments.

μετεωρολόγων: 'astronomers', 'physical philosophers'; though the emphasis is on those who observe the universe, it may also include wider, interdisciplinary speculation, including physics, cosmogony, mathematics etc. G. is not referring to an activity which by his time

had declined; for, in spite of the fact that Thales, the proverbial astronomer (cp. Ar. *Clouds* 180) who is said to have foreseen a solar eclipse (Hdt. 1.74) belongs to the early 6th century, Anaxagoras and Hippias (to mention two prominent figures) developed astronomical theories in the second half of the 5th century. Aristophanes' *Clouds'* main theme is modern intellectual activity. Sokrates is there presented as the head of a Thinkery (φροντιστήριον) where several disciplines are taught, one of which is astronomy. When first Sokrates appears in the play he pompously states that he 'observes the sun', and when Strepsiades asks him why he is sitting in a basket hanging from the ceiling he replies: οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε / ἐξηῦρον ὀρθῶς τὰ μετέωρα πράγματα / εἰ μὴ κρεμάσας τὸ νόημα καὶ τὴν φροντίδα (see Dover 1968, esp. pp. xxxvi-xxxvii).

τὰ ἄπιστα καὶ ἄδηλα...ἐποίησαν: 'they made that which is otherwise unbelievable and unseen visible to the eyes of opinion'; the 'eye of opinion' belongs to the recipients of the logoi of the astronomers, and the changeable opinions belong to themselves. Judging from the argument from antinomy in *ONB* G. must be pointing at the views held by different philosophers; with the development of astronomy, a new 'theory' takes the place of the previous one. ἄπιστα καὶ ἄδηλα: what the opinions of the astronomers refer to; a passage from Anaxagoras' 59A42 reads: ἥλιον δὲ καὶ σελήνην καὶ πάντα ἄστρα λίθους εἶναι ἐμπύρους συμπεριληφθέντας ὑπὸ τῆς αἰθέρος περιφορᾶς...εἶναι δὲ τὴν σελήνην κατωτέρω τοῦ ἡλίου πλησιώτερον ἡμῶν. ὑπερέχειν δὲ τὸν ἥλιον μεγέθει τὴν Πελοπόννησον. τὸ δὲ φῶς τὴν σελήνην μὴ ἴδιον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου...None of the remarks made by Anaxagoras can be ascertained through human senses; what he says can only become clear if one is ready to accept his rationalistic approach. The opposition between the ἄδηλα καὶ ἄπιστα of intellectual rationalisation and commonsensical views is, of course, exploited in Aristophanes *Clouds*; in 376-78, for instance, Sokrates, the Aristophanic representative of intellectualism, 'explains' to Strepsiades how a thunderbolt is created: when the clouds are filled

with much water they collide with each other and burst forth. Strepsiades' 'eye of the opinion' is unskilled, and he offers his own explanation: χὤταν χέζω, κομιδῇ βροντᾷ, παπαπαππάξ, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖναι (when I shit, what a thunderbolt, just like they do 391). φαίνεσθαι: 'to become visible', 'make something appear'; it would be tempting to assume that G. is playing with a second possible meaning of the infinitive, since φαίνεσθαι can also denote the rise of a star (cp. Hom. *Il.*1.477, 2.456, *Od.*2.1; Hes. *Works and Days* 598 εὖτ' ἂν πρῶτα φανῇ σθένος 'Ωρίωνος).

τοὺς ἀναγκαίους...ἀγῶνας: in this second example the agent of the speech is absent, so that the meaning of the word ἀναγκαίους is unclear (cp. 10 αἱ γὰρ ἔνθεοι διὰ λόγων ἐπῳδαί). Two lines of interpretation have been suggested (see also Buchheim 1989, p.169): a) 'the persuasive argumentation that compels the hearers to accept it' (Melikoff-Tolstoy 1929, p.28), or (b) 'argumentation used under compulsion' as opposed to the speeches of the astronomers and the philosophers which are unbound from necessity (Immisch 1927, Sykutris 1928, MacDowell, 1982, pp.39-40, Gagarin 1994, p.67 n.26; Wardy 1996, pp.162-3 thinks that it affords an interpretation combining both meanings). (b) is also accepted by Diels who brings in Pl.*Tht.*172e οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκεν. (a) could be corroborated from 12, where persuasion is related to compulsion; but if we turn to *Pal.* 4, we find out that the situation in which the hero is entangled is described as παρούσης ἀνάγκης, that is he is under compulsion to defend himself; moreover ὄχλος in this context can be something more than a mere mob, since in *Grg.* 453b6, 455a4 Plato refers, not without contempt, to juries as ὄχλοι. Both intepretations are strong enough, although (b) seems to me to fit the context better.

εἰς...ὄχλον: a fine antithesis (cp. 4 where Helen's one body attracted many male bodies); speech has the power to unify people in a consent through pleasure. ὄχλος is unjustifiably taken by

Untersteiner (1961, note *ad loc.*) to refer to the *Eliastai* (see the preceding note).

ἔτερψε καὶ ἔπεισε: cp. 5.

τέχνη γραφείς...λεχθείς: Immisch wrongly adopts ἔτρεψε (see Segal 1962, p.149 n. 93). The homoeteleuton underlines that τέχνη in some cases is the counterpart of truth. The common assumption about G. is that he was entirely uninterested in truth. This is not correct; what G. says is that a realistic approach to common experience shows that in some cases at least the form of a speech is directly related to its persuasiveness (Palamedes is the first obvious example). At any rate, even seen under the light of opportunism, factual truth provided chiefly by witnessess *is* undoubtedly the most convincing means of persuasion (see MacDowell 1982, p.40, Gagarin 1994, p.58). γραφείς: when G. was composing *Hel.*, writing was already used in law-court speeches' composition (see Gagarin 1994, p.60-3, and 1997, p.4-5 and 32-4). In *Against the Sophists*, Alkidamas openly criticises the using of writing in early rhetoric; at any rate, G.'s teaching of rhetoric must have been considerably enhanced by writing, so that we can hardly be persuaded by Aristotle's disclosure that G.'s teaching was solely based on memorisation of model-speeches (see fr.14, with notes). Examination of structure and formal elements, emphasis on the arrangement of reasoning and the transition from the one argument to the other, these along with other technical aspects of rhetorical skill must have been taught more efficiently with the use of writing.

φιλοσόφων λόγων ἁμίλλας: 'in the debates of philosophical speeches'; φιλόσοφος qualifies λόγων (cp. Pl. *Phdr.*257b5-6 ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς πρὸς Ἔρωτα μετὰ φιλοσόφων λόγων τὸν βίον ποιῆται). Several scholars have endeavoured to identify particular philosophers; Untersteiner (1961, p.105) follows Bux (1941, p.405) who thought that G. refers to the Eleatics. Diès (1913, p.205) and Nestle (1940, p.326) think that G. has in mind eristic philosophers, Dümmler (1889, p.35) prefers Sokrates himself. But it is not

necessary to identify any specific philosopher; G. wishes to emphasise the readiness with which philosophers put one view aside and employ a new one in their discussions, so as to fulfil the need for new arguments (so correctly Süss 1910, p.54, MacDowell 1982, p.40).

γνώμης τάχος: Immisch rightly suggests that γνώμη does not equal δόξα; it is the 'organ of thought' as in Heraclitus (1927, p.33; cp. Pl. *Lg*.672b). γνώμη can be construed as the process of the production of a view and the view itself. Flexibility in thought is what really distinguishes philosophers from astronomers and the more static speech-makers. This suggests that G. has in mind philosophical, oral discourse.

εὐμετάβολον...πίστιν: the attachment to a (still-born) view is changeable because of quick thinking. The passage is reminiscent of *Menon*, in connection to what is known as 'true opinion'; in that context 'opinions' are compared to the statues of Daidalos (97e-98a καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσιν, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα καὶ πάντ' ἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται· πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσι ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου). εὐμετάβολον: a rare word, which is normally used of human character (Isok.15. 243, Xen. *Hell*. 2.3.92; but cp. Pl. *Rep*.503c9: οὐκοῦν τὰ βέβαια αὖ ταῦτα ἤθη καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάβολα).

14

λόγον: the word is used twice in the sentence here it means 'relation'. 'The impact of speech upon the order of soul is analogous to that of the order of drugs upon the nature of body' (drugs / body : *logos* / soul). The comparison is more complicated than it appears to be; its second element could hastily be identified with medicine, but the shadow of magic has not been removed. The magical terminology of 10 is largely reiterated, especially in the description of the emotions experienced by human soul through speech. The φάρμακον, a double-edged word, also attests to that, since it can

either be a medicine or a poison; the most poisonous function of speech is 'malicious persuasion' (πειθοῖ τινι κακῇ). To this respect λόγος also acquires a double function: it is both a φάρμακον and a poison. So when Segal claims that "the processes of *psyche* are treated...as being susceptible to the same kind of control and manipulation by a rational agent as the body by the drugs of the doctor" (1962, p.104; see also de Romilly 1973, p.162, 1975, p.21) he fails to see the other side of the same coin. A similar view is also traced in Demokritos' B31, cited by Segal (1962, p.104): ἰατρικὴ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ Δημόκριτον σώματος νόσους ἀκέεται, σοφίη δὲ ψυχὴν παθῶν ἀφαιρεῖται. MacDowell (1982, p.40) cites Isokrates 8.39, who perhaps was influenced by G.: τῶν μὲν περὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσημάτων πολλαὶ θεραπεῖαι καὶ παντοδαπαὶ τοῖς ἰατροῖς εὕρηνται, ταῖς δὲ ψυχαῖς ταῖς ἀγνοούσαις καὶ γεμούσαις πονηρῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἄλλο φάρμακον πλὴν λόγος, see 15. 180-5. λόγος is still a fundamental element of psychotherapy, and Antiphon could have been the first to establish a clinic: ἔτι δ' ὢν πρὸς τῇ ποιήσει <u>τέχνην ἀλυπίας συνεστήσατο, ὥσπερ τοῖς νοσοῦσιν ἡ παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν θεραπεία ὑπάρχει·</u> ἐν Κορίνθῳ τε κατασκευασμένος οἴκημά τι παρὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν προέγραψεν, ὅτι δύναται τοὺς λυπουμένους διὰ λόγων θεραπεύειν, καὶ πυνθανόμενος τὰς αἰτίας παρεμυθεῖτο τοὺς κάμνοντας. νομίζων δὲ τὴν τέχνην ἐλάττω ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν εἶναι ἐπὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀπετράπη (Antiphon A 6 DK). The analogy medicine/speech is obvious (ὥσπερ τοῖς νοσοῦσιν...), and it is also clear that Antiphon focused on the cure of 'depressive syndromes'. Medicine is also used by Plato as the antipode of rhetoric; in *Grg.* 456b Plato has G. claim that rhetoric is superior to any other art, because it is through rhetoric that he persuades the patients to accept the hardships of curative methods used by doctors. In 465e1 Sokrates concludes that rhetoric is for the soul what the products of unhealthy cookery are for the body, and this cookery has already been defined as the opposite of medicine, in the way that hair-styling should be opposed to gymnastic ("Plato was not the first to draw analogies between the arts. But his conclusion stands in sharp

opposition to the view of the historical G., who claimed that rhetoric was to the mind what medicine was to the body" Dodds, 1959, p.227; but it escapes Dodds' attention that G. does not speak of a merely positive contribution of 'medicine' to the body; see also *Phdr.* 270b1ff, *Tht.*167b-c; Aristotle *Rhet.*1355b8-14). For rhetoric as magic in Plato see n. on 10, and for the psychotherapeutic power of poetry 9).

τάξιν...τάξις: speech affects the 'order' of the soul, the 'prescription' of drugs affect human body (cp. Pl. *Pol.*294e τὴν τοῦ λυσιτελοῦντος τοῖς σώμασι ποιεῖσθαι τάξιν; see Segal 1962, p.141 n. 37, MacDowell 1982 p.40).

ἄλλα χυμούς: 'humours', a plausible emendation of ἀλλαχοῦ (AX); a balanced coexistence of the humours in the body is a presupposition of health. Ancient medicine accepted the existence of four 'humours' in the body: αἷμα, φλέγμα, and the two kinds of χολή (the 'yellow' and the 'black' one).

καὶ τὰ μὲν...παύει: cp. Eur. *Hipp.*512 οὔτ' ἐπὶ βλάβῃ φρενῶν / παύσει νόσου τῆσδ', ἢ σὺ μὴ γένῃ κακή.

οὕτω καὶ τῶν λόγων: speech is a φάρμακον; G. is attributing to λόγος powers which are traditionally recognised as belonging to 'drugs'. In *Od.* 4. 220ff. Helen mixes wine with a φάρμακον, which is νηπενθές τ' ἄχολόν τε, κακῶν ἐπίληθον ἁπάντων, in the way that λόγος in the present context can bring pleasure and make the hearers take heart. But there are speeches that ἐφαρμάκευσαν (as we would say in modern Greek, speech is a φάρμακο and a φαρμάκι), that is they poisoned the soul, and they killed it, that is they made lose its independence through charming.

οἱ μὲν ἐλύπησαν...κατέστησαν: positive and negative emotions; the aorists are gnomic.

ἀκούοντας: I suggest a semicolon after ἀκούοντας; what follows should be stressed as it brings out the more destructive power of speech, in the form of malicious persuasion.

πειθοῖ τινι κακῇ: 'with an evil persuasion'; this kind of λόγος does not simply affect the soul in a positive or a negative manner. The ability of speech to invoke emotions in the soul is a milk-and-honey aspect of its action, when it is compared to the lethal dose of a malicious persuasion. The power of this kind of persuasion as a φάρμακον equals the power of the φάρμακα used by Medea (Eur. *Med.*1126, 1201); in her case death is brought to her own children, whereas 'malicious persuasion' kills off every soul. The acceptance on behalf of G. of the existence of this kind of persuasion is also depicted in Plato's *Gorgias* 457c, conveyed through a wrestling metaphor. The teaching of rhetoric, however, is morally neutral; the only person to be held responsible for its misuse is the one who uses it for malicious ends (see Dodds 1959, p.212). Plato in this case certainly does justice to G.; he certainly objects to the possibility of morally neutral teaching of rhetoric, and this is exactly why he does not need to misrepresent G. τινι: it is tempting to assume that it means a 'quantity' of persuasion (cp. λογισμόν τινα 2), in the way that one would speak of the 'dose' of a φάρμακον.

ἐφαρμάκευσαν καὶ ἐξεγοήτευσαν: 'they poison and charm the soul', not in the past, but achronically; Untersteiner (1961, p.107) thinks that Plato is parodying G. when he says that Love is δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σοφιστής (*Symp.*203d).

15

G. asserts to his audience that he has completed his examination of speech-persuasion as a possible reason for Helen's elopement, and proceeds with the fourth possible reason, namely love. This fourth reason corresponds to what may be called the 'traditional' mythological account; Helen fell in love with Paris, and for this reason she deserted Menelaos. By bringing love into his argumentation, he integrates in his speech the cornerstone of the poetical (2) accusations against Helen. Love, now, is undoubtedly an invincible deity, and one may have thought that G. could argue

in the way he argues in 6; in fact he partly does so, when in 19 he reminds us of the divine nature of love (ἔρως). The main argumentative line, is, however, different: love is elevated from an excuse to a serious reason. This elevation is based on argumentative patterns which are very similar, if not identical, to those employed in the discussion of speech in 8-14. Instead of referring to love, G. refers to vision (and this mutantis mutandis reminds us of Lykophron, who, when he found it hard to praise the lyre as he was asked to do, praised a star bearing the name Lyra, cp. 83A6DK) by rationalising a common idea of Greek literature about how love springs (see Introduction). Once more the logic of the argumentation is based on analogy: if vision affects the human soul in the way it is shown it does, then Helen's falling in love with Paris because of love is not surprising. The rationalistic approach to vision is built up as follows: the objects of our vision have their own nature and vision can affect our soul (15); this can be shown through the example of frightful images perceived by soldiers in the battlefield (16), and it can also be attested that shocking images lead to madness. Fine arts by contrast contrary provide us with pleasure (18); we should not then be surprised if Helen's eye fell in love with Paris. The argumentation here, as in 8-14, relies much on a behavioural examination of vision, as it is mainly shown in the example of soldiers which, of course, entails that psychological parameters play an important role. In short, in 15-19 G. attempts a rationalisation of a notoriously irrational emotion; this rationalisation is based on the demonstration of how and why love is an invincible power.

τὴν τῆς λεγομένης...αἰτίαν: 'the accusation of the impropriety which is said to have been committed'; G.'s wording belongs to a cautious advocate. The name of Helen is not mentioned; it is not the accusation itself, but an impropriety which will be refuted; the impropriety has not been committed, *it is said* that it has been committed.

ἃ γὰρ ὁρῶμεν...ἔτυχε: 'the objects of our vision do not have the nature we want them to have, but the one each of them happens to have'; the first step of the argument is an axiom. Vision is dependent on the nature of the objects we see, not on the person who perceives them through his senses. Early Greek theories of vision fall into three groups. "According to one the eye was the agent, sending out rays from its own 'fire' to the object; according to another it received more or less passively 'effluences' or 'images' directed to it from the object; in the third, both eye and object are active..." (Guthrie, 1969, vol.ii, p.234). G. here clearly builds his argumentation by attributing a passive function to the eye, without, of course, putting forward or being himself committed to any 'theory of vision', which would, anyway, fall short in the light of the subjectivism adopted in the second major part of *ONB*. He simply wishes to reach the conclusion that Paris, as an active object of vision, was perceived by Helen's passive and thus irresponsible eye.

διὰ δε...τυποῦται: the new information is that soul is 'moulded' by ὄψις. Psychological parameters of sense-perception are thus brought in, and the use of τυποῦται further attests to the analogies between the discussion of love-vision and that of speech (cp.13).   τοῖς τρόποις: 'the character'; the values accepted by a person, and which, by and large, make him behave accordingly. It is better understood from the example in 16, where it is claimed that instances of deserting because of fear show the power of vision to make the soul adopt manners which normally are uncharacteristic of it (cp. Pl. *Leg.*841c5: τό τε θεοσεβὲς ἅμα καὶ φιλότιμον καὶ τὸ μὴ τῶν σωμάτων ἀλλὰ τῶν τρόπων τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντων καλῶν γεγονὸς ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ). It is hard to see if τρόπος is a synonym of τάξις in 14, but at any rate both τάξις and τρόποι of soul are affected through emotions instilled through speech and vision respectively (cp. Segal 1962, p.104 "a term [sc. *tropoi*] which may itself have physical connotations like the *taxis* of the psyche in 14").

αὐτίκα γὰρ...ἐκπλαγέντες: the text is corrupt, but the general meaning is clear; the textual problems have been discussed by Donadi, who, however, wrongly assumes that G. does not refer to real battlefields, but to a restaging of Aiskhylos' *Seven Against Thebes* in 405, which in this view serves as a basis of dating *Hel.* The argument is too fragile (see MacDowell 1982, p.41) and it has not been influential. Some remarks about the reading I adopt: (a) ἐπὶ πολεμίᾳ ὁπλίσει is Sauppe's good conjecture, for ἐπὶ πολεμίοις ὁπλίσει A, and ἐπὶ πολέμι ὁ πλίσει X, where an alternative ὁπλίσῃ is brought in, perhaps as a correction. In A, the function of ὁπλίσει is unclear; Diels-Kranz (recently Buchheim) adopt ὁπλίσῃ X , but the subject of the clause ὅταν... remains unclear. (b) τοῦ δὲ προβλήματα AX, Diels suggests πρόβλημα, presumably because ἀλεξιτήριον is singular. However, "since" προβλήματα "unlike ἀλεξιτήριον is a noun, there is no reason to reject the plural as several editiors do" MacDowell (1982, note *ad loc.*; see also Sykutris 1928, p.16 n.2). (c) θεάσηται: from Sauppe's εἰ θεάσηται, for εἰ θεάσεται AX; Sauppe's emendation, with the omission of εἰ, gives a normal temporal clause. MacDowell conjectures ἐπιθεάσηται, which is closer to εἰ θεάσεται, but it can be the case that εἰ in both AX is due to the fact that the verb comes two lines after ὅταν.

πολέμια...πολέμιον...πολεμίᾳ: a polyptoton, combined with an hyperbaton (πολέμιον...κόσμον), stresses the intensity of the stimulus that makes an army fly.

κόσμον...σιδήρου: shields are made out of bronze, swords and spears are made out of iron (cp. Pl. *Lg.*956a).

τοῦ μὲν...προβλήματα: MacDowell (1982, p.41) compares the chiasm with that in 3 τοῦ μὲν γενομένου...Διός.

ἀλεξητήριον: 'something that keeps off'; it should be taken with κόσμον, because it is the bronze and iron weapons of the enemies that keep the soldiers off them.

προβλήματα: cp. Aiskhylos' *Septem* 539-40 ἐν χαλκηλάτῳ σάκει, κυκλωτῷ σώματος προβλήματι, which also brings out that a σάκος is made out of bronze.

ἐταράχθη καὶ ἐτάραξε: the subject is ὄψις. The alarm caused in vision leads to the alarm of the soul. It seems thus that ταραχή is not experienced only by the human soul, but by vision too. The external manifestation of this internal emotion is flight.

φεύγουσιν ἐκπλαγέντες: the subject is absent, but a word denoting 'soldiers' fits the sense; MacDowell plausibly suggests that "posssibly πολλοί has been lost from the text by haplography before πολλάκις", Panic, as an emotion caused in battles, appears in Thucydides (see Segal 1962, p.108, 143 n.50, de Romilly 1988, pp.167-172).

ἰσχυρὰ γάρ...εἰσῳκίσθη: AX give ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ νόμου, which does not make sense; several emendations have been proposed: συνήθεια Diels, ἐπιλήθεια Immisch. I prefer MacDowell's (1961, p.21) ἡ ἀμέλεια which gives good sense with the Mss' εἰσῳκίσθη (Diels accepts Reiske's ἐξῳκίσθη). The verb εἰσῳκίσθη is also in conformity with the recurrent pattern of the physical entrance of an element into the soul (cp. εἰσῆλθε 9, συγγιγνομένη 10, προσιοῦσα 13, ἐλθοῦσα in the following line; here it is fear through which the ignorance of law enters the soul).

τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως: specifies the type of fear; another type of fear is the one caused through poetry 9, and generally speeches in 14.

ἀμελῆσαι: for AX's ἀσμενίσαι (see Donadi (1977-78), p.58); AX's reading is absurd, since ἀσμενίσαι means 'to bring pleasure'. Donadi is however ready to accept it on the basis that it refers to the feelings experienced by the audiences of tragedies through their κάθαρσις from the emotions of fear. But the thesis that G. has here tragedy in mind has already been refuted (a further argument against

it can be derived from the context of paragraph 17, where G. says that he will not mention any other examples of things causing fear because they are the same as those already mentioned; this clearly shows that the fear of the soldiers in battle is merely one among other possible examples demonstrating the potential of vision to evoke emotions in the souls).

καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ...γινομένου: a symmetrical construction; the order after the verb is the same in both phrases: Object (genitive) + Prepositional Phrase (διά + accusative) + Participle (genitive). Apart from the homoeoteleuton the isocolon and the hyperbaton traced in both cases (τοῦ...κρινομένου, τοῦ γιγνομένου), each particular syntactical entity contains the same amount of syllables in both phrases, and it is also worth noticing the correspondence of the syllables stressed. Moreover, a play with the sounds can hardly escape our attention. Two levels are discernible here: the public and the individual one. The καλόν refers to the responsibility of the soldier to defend the interests of his city as it is prescribed by conventional civic rules (κρινομένου; for a similar use of the verb cp. Soph. *Aj*.443-444), and as a matter of fact it is related to the honour with which the city should embrace his individual efforts. The ἀγαθόν on the other hand is associated with the personal gains of each soldier.

17

ἤδη δέ: 'in the past'.

καὶ τοῦ παρόντος...χρόνῳ: a hyperbaton which plays with the double meaning of the word παρών; psychic sanity is present (παρόντος), until a terrifying vision deranges it ἐν τῷ παρόντι χρόνῳ (at this very moment).

πολλοὶ δέ...περιέπεσον: an *a fortiori* arrangement of the results of the following sentence; all the three elements (unjustified labours, terrible illnesses and hard-to-cure insanity) refer to the aftermath of facing horrible images from the past. The observation comes from

common human experience (we all know that many people who fought in both World Wars suffered from nightmares, and that some of them ended up in clinics), but it is ingeniously integrated into the discussion of vision, as it forms the climax of the description of negative emotions experienced because of fearful visions. ματαίοις πόνοις καὶ δειναῖς νόσοις: A, ματαίαις νόσοις καὶ δεινοῖς πόνοις X; unlike Immisch and Untersteiner I prefer (with MacDowell) A's reading, because ματαίοις πόνοις gives a better sense; it means 'aimless labour' (for a similar use cp. Pl. Tim.40d4-5 τὸ λέγειν ἄνευ δι᾽ ὄψεως τούτων αὖ τῶν μιμημάτων μάταιος ἂν εἴη πόνος). A very similar wording is employed in Pal. 25, where madness is defined as accomplishing aimless actions (ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀδυνάτοις, ἀσυμφόροις...cp. also 68C3DK: ἐγώ...δὲ γελῶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀνοίης γέμοντα...μηδεμιῆς ἕνεκεν ὠφελίης ἀλγέοντα τοὺς ἀνηνύτους μόχθους, and Dem. 21. 69: μανία γὰρ ἴσως ἐστίν ὑπὲρ δύναμίν τι ποιεῖν; see Segal 1962, p.118).

δυσιάτοις μανίαις: it is interesting that some kinds of madness are regarded by G. as not ἀνίατος (incurable), but δυσίατος (hard to cure).

εἰκόνας...ἐνέγραψεν: not the object of our sight itelf, but the image of what we saw is engraved on our mind. φρονήματος: different from τοῦ παρόντος φρονήματος; it is closer to ψυχή in 15. ἐνέγραψεν: is used metaphorically (engraved), as in Xen. Cyr. 3.3.52 εἰ μέλλουσι τοιαῦται διάνοιαι ἐγγραφήσεσθαι ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἔμμονα ἔσεσθαι).

καὶ τὰ μὲν δειματοῦντα...τὰ λεγόμενα: 'many of the things causing fear are passed over, for they are similar to those which have already been mentioned'; it is reminiscent of the τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ... "the stock formula used in drafting amendments.., etc., in order to avoid needless repetition" (Dodds 1959, p.199).

ἀλλὰ μὴν: a new example is introduced.

οἱ γραφεῖς: 'painters'; painting, as a form of art, also exemplifies how vision affects human soul. In fact, paintings and statues have a very similar function with that of poetry, and generally artistic speech. According to Simonides painting is tacit poetry, and poetry speaking painting (ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν μὲν ζωγραφίαν ποίησιν σιωπῶσαν προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ ποίησιν ζωγραφίαν λαλοῦσαν), a statement which brings out the difference between the raw material of poetry and painting and the common effects they both achieve. Ploutarkhos, who actually preserves Simonides' remark, comments on it: ὕλῃ καὶ τρόποις μιμήσεως διαφέρουσι, τέλος δ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις ἐν ὑπόκειται (Πότερον Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ πόλεμον ἢ κατὰ σοφίαν ἐνδοξότεροι 246F). This similarity between poetry and fine arts is also traced in Plato, in his more elevated theoretical criticism of arts (cp. Rep. 603b 6-7 μιμητικὴ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν καὶ τὴν ἀκοήν; Arist. Poet. 1447a 18-20 ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι πολλὰ μιμοῦνταί τινες ἀπεικάζοντες...ἕτεροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς...).

ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν...ἀπεργάσωνται: the mimetic character of arts is discernible in G.'s discussion of fine arts; in the process of the production of a work of painting, the painter chooses his raw materials from the real world, so as to make his work as similar to it as possible (cp. Dissoi Logoi 3,10 ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς τέχνας τρέψομαι καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν. ἐν γὰρ τραγῳδοποιίᾳ καὶ ζωγραφίᾳ ὅστις κα πλεῖστα ἐξαπατῇ ὅμοια τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς ποιέων, οὗτος ἄριστος). The mimesis-theory is fully developed by Plato in his Republic, especially in books 3 and 10. In Plato's view, the artist is twice removed from truth, since his work is a mimesis of the real world, which, of course, is not identical with his ideal world of Forms. The mimetic character of arts is also examined by Aristotle in Poetics; it is the mimetic chracter of works of art that gives pleasure to humans, for μιμεῖσθαι is inherent in them. Nevertheless, in the context of Poetics ἀπεργασία (the technique) is an alternative cause

of pleasure, which occurs when μίμησις does not offer any pleasure, because one has never seen before the object of the *mimesis*, that is the model of the artistic reproduction (οὐχ ἦ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν ἢ τὴν χροὰν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν, Arist. *Poet.* 1448b18). Moreover ὄψις in Aristotle acquires a technical character (it denotes 'spectacle'), and it is one of the constituent elements of tragedy, but the one less peculiar to it (1450b17), for a good tragedy does not need any staging or actors and what is more κυριωτέρα περὶ τὴν ἀπεργασία τῶν ὄψεων ἢ τοῦ σκευοποιοῦ τέχνη τῆς τῶν ποιητῶν ἐστιν.   ἐκ πολλῶν χρωμάτων καὶ σωμάτων: it has been suggested (Nestle 1940, p.235) that G., in saying that a work of painting is produced by the use of several χρώματα and σχήματα, has in mind the case of Zeuxis's painting of Helen for the temple of Hera in Croton. According to the tradition, Zeuxis used as his models the most elegant parts of the bodies of the most handsome girls of Croton (cp. Pliny *N.H.* 35,64, Cicero *de Inv.* 2.1.3; cp. also Xen. *Mem.* 3.10). This view cannot be proved on any possible basis, nor is it necessary to assume that G. has a real incident in mind, but it is a charming speculation. The basic colours used in contemporary painting were four (white, black, yellow, red; cp. Democritos A135DK = Theophr. *de Sensu* 73, and the rest of the colours κατὰ τὴν τούτων μίξιν). It is not clear if G. refers to the four basic colours as πολλά, but it is more likely that more than the basic colours are meant here.   Empedocles (B 23 DK) describes the production of numerous elements with a painting-metaphor which is similar to G.'s wording: ὡς δ᾽ ὁπόταν γραφέες ἀναθήματα ποικίλλωσιν / ἀνέρες ἀμφὶ τέχνης ὑπὸ μήτιος εὖ δεδαῶτε, / οἵτ᾽ ἐπεὶ οὖν μάρψωσι πολύχροα φάρμακα χερσίν, / ἁρμονίῃ μείξαντε τὰ μὲν πλέω, ἄλλα δ᾽ ἐλάσσω, / ἐκ τῶν εἴδεα πᾶσιν ἀλίγκια πορσύνουσι, / δένδρεά τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἀνέρας...(for the identity of the four basic colours with the four basic elements of Empedocles' philosophy see Guthrie 1969, vol. ii, p.148).

ἀπεργάσωνται: 'to complete a work' (cp. Pl. *Soph.* 235e1); Immisch (1927, p.26) translates *imitantur*, but this presses the point too much. That G. regards the arts as *mimetic* is simply implied here, it is not stated explicitly.

τέρπουσι τὴν ὄψιν: it is interesting that, whereas λόγος has a psychic action, painting is pleasurable to vision: vision and soul can experience the same emotions (notice below θέαν ἡδεῖαν παρέσχετο τοῖς ὄμμασιν; see Segal 1962, p.106, 143 n.45).

ἡ τῶν ἀνδριάντων...ἐργασία: G. brings in another kind of fine arts, namely sculpture. ποίησις: not poetry, but 'creation'. ἐργασία: Plato would have probably called it τέχνη χειρουργική; it echoes ἀπεργάσωνται.

θέαν: Keil's emendation (accepted by Diels) for the MSS ὅσον; Dobree reads νόσον (followed by MacDowell 1982, p.42 who explains "there is something 'wrong' with one's eyes, because one seems to see a man when one is really looking at paint or stone"), which is undoubtedly very close to the MSS reading; but I prefer a more plain reading here.

τέρπειν: I accept MacDowell's emendation (Diels proposes κηλεῖν), since it is likely that the MSS reading (ποθεῖν) is due to dittography (πόθος in the following line). I also take it that τὰ μὲν...τὰ δέ refers to fearful sights (16-17) and products of art (18) respectively; G. nowhere seems to attribute negative emotions to the fine arts.

πολλὰ δὲ πολλοῖς πολλῶν: a polyptoton.

πόθον...σωμάτων: Immisch (1927, 50-1) refers to the case of Pygmalion, the sculptor who falling in love with his own creation (Galateia) asked Aphrodite to put life into it. The active relation of the person who has before him a piece of sculpture is paralleled to the state of the soul when it is affected by poetry. Poetry makes the soul suffer an ἴδιον πάθημα (9), whereas sculpure ἐνεργάζεται longing, it makes you feel that the lifeless material which stands before you could be (or actually is) the object of your passion. This is the climax of G.'s description of the emotional response to

illusions: τέρψις, λύπη, χαρά, ἔλεος, φρίκη, φόβος, ἔλεος, ἡδονή, θάρσος are all strong emotions; but nothing is like ἔρως. G. could not have prepared more efficiently the passage from the world of the artistic illusion to the particular case of Helen which follows. Now we know *why* love is a strong emotion. Helen's example will simply be one more example which shows that love-through-vision is unavoidable.

19

εἰ οὖν: the passage to the particular case (see below ὃς εἰ μὲν θεὸς..., εἰ δ᾽ ἐστίν...); it marks the analogical argumentation: if Helen fell in love, this is nothing but another example that shows that vision affects us (see Sykutris 1928, p.16).

τῷ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου...ἤσθέν: only in texts of high-level diplomacy can one find such a circumspect wording: it was not Helen who saw Paris, but her eye (an eye can never be held responsible). It is the eye which is emphasised here, because it was the function of vision which was being developed from 15 up to this point. Helen is a sample in the laboratory of vision-experiments, not a morally responsible person. And the body of Alexandros (that is Paris) can double the pleasure (ἤσθέν) that a lifeless statue can give.

τί θαυμαστόν: if this question had been posed at the beginning of this text it would have seemed absurd; after the theorisation about vision it is intended to be construed as a natural thing.

θεὸς...δυνατός: the god is Ἔρως, the winged divinity; G. reiterates the argumentation that he has already used in the discussion of the first reason (ὁ ἥσσων is a generalisation, 'the inferior', as is made clear from the neuter τὸ ἥσσον in 6). Different authors attribute Love's parentage to various divinities: Ἄρης - Ἀφροδίτη, Οὐρανος-Ἀφροδίτη - Οὐρανος - Γῆ. In Plato's *Symposium* 203b-203d his birth is rationalised; he is the son of Πόρος and Πενία and he becomes Aphrodite's attendant because he was born on the day of her birthday. Like most (if not all of) the divinities mentioned in 6,

Eros can impose his will upon both humans and gods (cp. Hesiod *Theog.* 116-122, Soph. *Ant.*787, but cp. ἀνθρώπινον νόσημα). θεός...<ἔχων>: another polyptoton; <ὧν ἔχει> is Blass's emendation (followed by Diels; see also MacDowell 1982, p.42, and 1961, pp.121-2, whose conjecture disturbs the *polyptoton*). δυνατός: picks up δύναμιν (cp. 8).

νόσημα: from this point until the end of the paragraph everything is expressed in isocola and homoeoteleuta; Untersteiner holds that "tale concezione dell' amore è in genere estranea al popolo ellenico e a soi poeti" (1961, p.119), but one of its standard adjectives in lyric poetry is λυσιμελής. In Soph. *Antigone* 790 the chorus says that the person who has it is 'mad' (μέμηνεν; cp. also *Tr.* 445, 491, 544;see Biggs 1966, 227-31), and in Plato's *Symp.* 207a-b we read δεινῶς διατίθεται πάντα τὰ θηρία, ἐπειδὰν γεννᾶν ἐπιθυμήσῃ καὶ τὰ πεζὰ καὶ τὰ πτηνά, νοσοῦντά τε πάντα καὶ ἐρωτικῶς διατιθέμενα. Prodikos (B7DK) contended that ἐπιθυμίαν μὲν διπλασιασθεῖσαν ἔρωτα εἶναι, ἔρωτα δὲ διπλασιασθέντα μανίαν γίγνεσθαι.

ἦλθε...: gnomic aorist expressing a general statement about Ἔρως, not Helen. The pairs that follow are antithetical: ψυχῆς ἀγρεύμασιν and ἔρωτος ἀνάγκαις are opposed to γνώμης βουλεύμασιν and τέχνης παρασκευαῖς to the extent that the former are beyond human manipulation, whereas the latter are deliberate actions.

ψυχῆς ἀγρεύμασι: 'snares of the soul'; cp. Aiskh. *Cho.*998 ἄγρευμα θηρός; Reiske's emendation τύχης is not irrelevant, since the wording throughout this paragraph picks up that of 6, but there is no other reason to suggest changing the MSS' reading.

βουλεύμασι: cp. 6

ἔρωτος ἀνάγκαις: 'compulsion of love'. Indulging in love is not thus solely a matter of personal ignorance (ἀγνόημα), but a matter of succumbing to a super-human, uncontrolled power.

παρασκευαῖς: 'premeditation'; the point is that there was no intention, and consequently that Helen is free of responsibility. The

word has forensic overtones, as many examples illustrate; cp. Antiphon 6.19 μηδ᾽ ἐκ παρασκευῆς γενέσθαι τὸν θάνατον τῷ παιδί; in the hands of orators it becomes a *topos* for the speakers to claim that they have not prepared a speech, that they are ἀπαράσκευοι.

20

πῶς οὖν χρή: Bona (1974, p.11) rightly maintains that χρή is related to that in 1. The refutation of the responsibility of Helen has now been completed, and G. is now able to claim that it is just to hold Helen as a reprehensible person.

εἴτε...: the reasons that made Helen depart are repeated here in the reverse order of that in 6. The end of *Hel.* indicates that G. intended his work to be cyclical. In the beginning of his speech G. sets out the task he hopes to undertake, he then argues for it and at the end of the speech we find ourselves once more at the starting point (for ring-compisition see Groningen 1958, pp.51-56; for a discussion of the use of this technique in a prose author, see Herington 1991, pp.149-60).

ἔπραξεν ἃ ἔπραξε: cp.5

πάντως: "not just 'completely', but 'in all four cases'" (MacDowell 1982, p.43; cp. *Pal.* 12).

21

ἀφεῖλον: the self-referential conclusion is stressed by the fact that all the verbs expressing what G. has done are placed at the beginning of the clauses (ἐνέμεινα, ἐπειράθην, ἐβουλήθην).

τῷ νόμῳ ὅν...λόγου: X MacDowell emends it to τῇ γνώμῃ ἦν, but X's reading makes sense. G. (as Bona has shown, 1974, p.12), in a self-referential statement (λόγῳ refers here to this particular speech), claims that he 'stuck to the conventions' he laid down at the beginning of his speech (the enactment of a law is regularly expressed with the verb τίθημι e.g. Dem. 18. 6). This convention is I think the programmatic announcement in 2, that the same man ought

to say what ought to be said, and refute those who blame Helen. Untersteiner (1961, p.111) associates the word with the rhetorical law "formulata, per Gorgia, da Plat. Phaedr., 267A...e da Cicerone", but this seems very unlikely. G. surely refers to something which should be traced in his own speech.

11a *The Defence of Palamedes*

I. The Myth

Homer has nothing to tell us about Palamedes;[1] the earliest source of information is the *Cypria*, followed by the preserved fragments of the tragic poets. As a matter of fact, our knowledge is chiefly formed by texts of later antiquity, which obviously involve a good deal of repetition and which occasionally drift into interpretative approaches of the mythological elements.

In this chapter I shall present the main incidents of Palamedes' life,[2] that is his birth, the unmasking of Odysseus' false-madness and his contributions to the Greek army, his unjust death and finally the manner in which his father sought to take revenge. In addition, some light will be thrown on his inventions, which establish him as one of the most resourceful (πόριμος) heroes of Greek mythology.[3]

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[1] cp. Arist. *Poet.* 1451a26; in Philostratos' view, had Homer integrated in his narration Palamedes he would have unavoidably given a degrading image of Odysseus (*Life of Apollonius* 4.16).

2 The fullest survey on Palamedes can be found in Lyra (1987). A critical approach to the sources has been attempted by Scodel (1980) 43-63, esp. n.7 (see also Jouan 1966, pp.339-363). For the needs of the present dissertation, a linear narrative order will be sufficient.

[3] Stanford (1954), p.257 n.8 calls him "a kind of superfluous Prometheus in his inventiveness and a superfluous Odysseus in his prudent counsels".

a) *The hero's birth*

Palamedes' father was Nauplios, the son of Poseidon and Amymone;[1] however, we cannot be certain about his mother, since according to Apollodoros (*Bibl.*ii.1.5) there are three different versions: the tragic poets make Palamedes' mother Klymene, the daughter of Katreus; according to the author of the *Nostoi* it was Philyra, and if we adopt the version of Kekrops his mother was Hesione. Palamedes' mother – whoever she was – also gave birth to Oiax and Nausimedon, of whom only the former plays an important role in the myth of his brother.

b) *Palamedes' inventions*

In Aristophanes *Frogs* 1451 Dionysos sarcastically compares Euripides to Palamedes, the wise man, obviously with the purpose of mocking him. Apart from the possibility that this may be an allusion to Euripides' play *Palamedes*, the obvious point of the joke is that Euripides' foolishness is opposed to the proverbial wisdom of Palamedes.

If one were asked to describe Palamedes' personality with one single word one should surely chose the word resourcefulness (εὐπορία). This hero should be considered as the archetype, the model of a hero who – by the means of his resourcefulness and his wisdom (σοφία) – sacrifices his life for the sake of the development of the community in which he belongs. However different the inventions attributed to him, their common denominator is that they all contribute to the development of an already *civilized* community. As M. Detienne has accurately pointed out "Palamède ne se signale pas par la découverte du feu, des vêtements ou de la nourriture qui viendraient séparer les hommes et les bêtes".[2]

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[1] Virgil *Aen.*2.82 says that Palamedes belongs to the family of Belus (*Belidae nomen Palamedis*), for Amymone was the daughter of Danaos, the son of Belos; see also Phillips 1957 p. 267-8, esp. n 4.

[2] Detienne (1986), p.1228.

This characteristic of his inventions is explicitly expressed in G.'s text; in *Pal.* 30, the hero lists his inventions as a further proof of his morality and as a justification of his self-characterisation as a great benefactor of the Greeks and of humanity in general. All the inventions listed there – with the exception of the battle lines – are followed by a short comment on their significance in the development of the community: laws are the written guardians of justice, letters serve as the tool of the (collective) memory, weights and measures make commercial transactions easier, numbers are the guardians of money, the beacons are the more powerful and the fastest messengers, and lastly, games are the best preoccupation during leisure.

Generally the inventions of Palamedes can be sub-divided into the following categories:

i.   Writing; this invention should be associated with the art of numbering[1] and with the board-games,[2] since in Greece the basis of arithmetic is the knowledge of the alphabet and the art of the numbers uses the same tools as the action of counting,[3] Palamedes is

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[1] Alkidamas, *Od.*22, Soph. *Nauplios* (fr.432 Radt), adesp. 470.

[2] Sophokles *Nauplios* (fr.429 Radt) καὶ πεσσὰ καὶ πεντάγραμμα καὶ κύβων βολαί, *Palamedes* (fr.479 Radt) πεσσούς κύβους τε, τερπνὸν ἀργίας ἄκος; Schol. Eur. *Or.* 432 κύβους, πεττούς, *Myth.Vat.*35 *tabulam*. The difference of the games of πεττοί from that of the κύβοι is explained by Hesykhios: διαφέρει δὲ πεττεία κυβείας. ἐν ἧ μὲν γὰρ τοὺς κύβους ἀναρρίπτουσιν· ἐν δὲ τῇ πεττείᾳ αὐτὸ μόνον τὰς ψήφους μετακινοῦσι (see note in Jebb – Pearson 1917, p.85). Suidas s.v refers to the invention of these games by Palamedes with the word τάβλα. Both the calculation of numbers and the games described here were based on ψῆφοι; "En Grèce, le calcul se fait communement avec les jetons, appelés *psephoi* qui designent à la fois les cahiers de comptes, les jetons de vote, les pieces de jeux et encore des ossolets utilisés dans des pratiques divinatoires, dans des consultations oraculaires" Detienne 1986, p.1129.

[3] In Plato's *Phaidros* 274d, we are told that the Egyptian god Theuth invented numbers, arithmetic and geometry, astronomy and the game of draughts and dice and above all letters. All these inventions are attributed by different authors to Palamedes as well. That the art of arithmetic presupposes the existence of the alphabet is shown in Plato's *Gorgias*, where Sokrates points out that the art of

not the only mythical person considered as the inventor of the Greek alphabet or the transmitter of the Phoenician one. He is sharing this invention with Orpheus, Cadmus and Linus. In some versions, Palamedes appears as the inventor of letters;[1] from several other authors we can draw the conclusion that he was thought to be either the transmitter of the Phoenician alphabet,[2] or the person who was credited with the addition of several letters.[3]

ii. The organisation of the Greek army; the military hierarchy is attributed by Aiskhylos to Palamedes (fr.182 Radt): καὶ ταξιάρχας †
καὶ στρατάρχας καὶ ἑκατοντάρχας † ἔταξα...The invention of the tactics of the army is also important (μέγιστον εἰς πλεονεκτήματα in G.'s words, 30), since before Palamedes' inventions the soldiers acted like animals.[4]

Palamedes is also said to have invented the system of watches;[5] moreover, when the Greek army was in Aulis, and the soldiers were

'arithmetic' uses logos, and Aristophanes' *Wasps* 960-1: ἐγὼ δ' ἐβουλόμην ἂν οὐδὲ γράμματα, / ἵνα μὴ κακουργῶν ἐνέγραφ' ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον; moreover, the Scholiast on Eur. *Or.* 432 says that by inventing letters, Palamedes made the distribution of food easier. Since the computation of equal proportions of food should naturally be based on arithmetic, we may assume that when the Scholiast links the distribution of food to the invention of letters he brings out the association of the arithmetic with the use of letters. Detienne (1986, p. 1129) says that "La notation numérique utilise les signes de l' abécédaire: connaître ses lettres, c' est déjà savoir ses nombres. Et entre les nombres et les jeux de loisir... comme tous les Grecs, Platon n' établit pas une différence radicale".

[1] Stesichoros *PMG* 213, Alkidamas *Odysseus*, 22, Chrysostom XII.21, Philostratos *Heroicus* X.1, Tzetzes *Antehomerica*, 320.

[2] Schol. Eur.*Or.* 432.

[3] Euripides *Palamedes* (fr.578) ἄφωνα καὶ φωνοῦντα συλλαβάς τε θείς...; a full discussion of the letters added by Palamedes can be found in Bérard 1952 – 1953, p.76; see also Philips 1957, pp. 277-8.

[4] Dio Chrys. 13.21 links the invention of numbers to the subordination of τάξεις, since until then the commanders were not able to count their soldiers, as the shepherds count the sheep of their flocks. Cp. Pl. *Rep.*522d.

[5] Sophokles' *Nauplios* (fr.432 Radt; see Jebb – Pearson 1917, note *ad loc.*, p.89), Schol. Eur. *Or.*432, *Eustath. ad Il.* 2.308.

quarrelling about the proportions of food provided to them, it was Palamedes who made the distribution impartial (ἀνεπίληπτον).[1] Sophokles[2] also credits Palamedes with the invention of the Greek wall.

iii Communication through signs; φρυκτωρία[3] is the beacon by which the soldiers could make signals to each other. It is exactly by means of this invention that Nauplios avenged the death of his son, by drawing the Greek fleet returning from Troy on the rocks of Caphereus. In addition, Palamedes taught men how to use the observation of the stars for the needs of navigation and he is also depicted in some sources as a connoisseur of astronomy.[4]

iv. Weights and measures; this pair is associated with numbers and this triad (ἀριθμοί, μέτρα, σταθμά) is probably a *locus communis* of the Greek world.[5]

v. It is worth mentioning that Palamedes was also considered a poet; in Eur. fr.588 he is called 'the nightingale of the Muses' and in fr.580 he is called a friend of music. This aspect of his personality is also reinforced by Suidas according to which Korinnos composed an epic poem under the title *Iliad*, dealing with the Trojan War, which was still in progress. This poet appears as a student of Palamedes, who used the alphabet invented by his teacher.

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[1] Schol. Eur. *Or.*432; Aiskhylos (*Palamedes* fr.182 Radt) says that a third meal was given to the soldiers σῖτον δ' εἰδέναι διώρισα, / ἄριστα, δεῖπνα δόρπα θ' αἱρεῖσθαι τρίτα.

[2] *Nauplios* (fr.432 Radt); see also my note on *Pal.*12.

[3] Soph. *Nauplios* (fr.432 Radt) and Schol. Eur. *Or.*432; G. *Pal.* 30 and Alkidamas *Od.*22 are using the word πυρσοί.

[4] Soph. *Nauplios* (fr.432 Radt); in Phil. *Her.*II.3 we learn that Palamedes explained an eclipse; see also Jebb – Pearson, p. 89.

[5] Genzmer 1952, p.482; Sophokles *Nauplios* (fr.432 Radt). Eur. *Palamedes* (fr. 578) χρημάτων μέτρον; the Scholiast on Eur.*Or.*432 and G. 30 combine the μέτρα with σταθμά, whereas Alkidamas accumulates the inventions separately. Philostratos (*Her.*II.1) says that before Palamedes, οὐδὲ νόμισμα ἦν οὐδὲ σταθμὰ καὶ μέτρα οὐδὲ ἀριθμεῖν. According to Aristoxenos the musician, the first to invent weights and measures was Pythagoras (fr.12 DK).

Moreover, Suidas on *Palamedes* says that he was himself a composer of epic poetry (ἐποποιός) and that his poems were destroyed by the descendants of Agamemnon.

c) *The Trojan Expedition and the Madness of Odysseus*

According to Dictys (I.4), when the Greek commanders received the news that Helen had been seized by Paris, they were in Crete. Palamedes then took the initiative to organise the Trojan expedition and he suggested that some representatives should visit Odysseus in Ithaca and persuade him to join the Greek army.

When the commanders arrived in Ithaca Odysseus, not willing to join the Greek army,[1] pretended that he was mad.[2] There are two versions concerning his madness: Odysseus either yoked an ox with a horse (or an ass) [3] or he started sowing his land with salt. Palamedes, unlike the other leaders, was not deceived by Odysseus and thus unmasked his stratagem. He threatened Odysseus that he would kill Telemakhos, either with his own sword or by putting him in the way of the plough.[4] Odysseus then admitted that he was not

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[1] An explanation of his keeping back is given by Hyg.*Fab*.95 *si ad Troiam isset, post vicesimum annum solum sociis perditis egentem domum redierunt.* The Schol.*Od*.24.115 says that Odysseus reluctance was not due to cowardice, but to his awareness that the expedition would be hard. His reluctance is hinted at in Aiskhylos,*Ag.* 842 and Sophokles, *Phil* 1025 (see n.21).

[2] This must have been the content of Sophokles' tragedy 'Οδυσσεὺς Μαινόμενος (see Jebb – Pearson 1917, p.115-118). Cicero *de Off*.III.26.97 claims that the madness of Odysseus is an invention of the tragic poets.

[3] Hyg.*Fab*.95, Pliny *NH* 35.129 a horse; Lykophron 815 and Schol. Lykophron 815 an ass. Loukianos 10.30 does not specify (τὸ τῶν ὑπεζευγμένων ἀσύμφωνον). It is striking that both Aiskhylos (*Ag*.842) and Sophokles (*Phil*.1025) present Odysseus joining the Greek army ζυγείς exactly as he yoked two inappropriate animals.

[4] Apollod. *Epit*.III.7, Luc.10.30; Pliny *HN* XXXV 129 says that Parrhasios had painted in Ephesus a picture, depicting Palamedes threatening to kill Odysseus'

insane, and this was the beginning of a passionate hostility. It seems that Odysseus never forgave Palamedes for making him desert his home and his beloved land for twenty years.

d) *Palamedes' Death*

In Polygnotos' 'Nekyia' Palamedes was depicted with Thersites and Ajax of Salamis playing dice, while the other Ajax was watching them.[1] All of these heroes were some of the victims of Odysseus' maliciousness, but we should preferably make a distinction between Palamedes' case and all the other ones, since it is clear that our hero was the victim of a personal and abysmal hatred. As Stanford put it "other ruthless actions (sc. of Odysseus)...had at least the excuse of being *pro bono publico*".[2] The cause of this particular hostility was of course Odysseus' resentment. But whether Odysseus' decision to kill Palamedes was due to the fact that the latter unveiled the pretence of the former in Ithaca or to his resourcefulness remains unclear, for some authors attribute Odysseus' plot generally to the resentment caused by Palamedes' incomparable wisdom and others to his unmasking of Odysseus' 'madness', and as a consequence to his obliging him to part from his family.

There are several different versions concerning the plot employed by Odysseus. The *Cypria* tell us that Odysseus accompanied by Diomedes killed Palamedes while they were fishing by drowning him.[3] A very cruel version is given by Dictys:[4]

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son (cp. Plout. *Mor*.18a). The plough-version is preserved by Hyg.*Fab*.95 and Servius *ad Aen*.II.81.

[1] Pausanias X.31.1. Sokrates, in Plato's *Apologia* 41b1-2 says that in Hades he will meet Palamedes and Ajax, the son of Telamon, who were the victims of an unjust verdict.

[2] 1954, p.84.

[3] Jouan (1966, n.6 p.357, with further reference on this issue) maintains that, since Homeric heroes did not normally eat fish, the fact that they went out fishing is a sign that there was a famine in the Greek camp.

[4] *Belli Troiani* II.5.

Odysseus and Diomedes lured Palamedes by telling him that they had found a treasure in a well; they then asked him to go down, and when he reached the bottom they stoned him; this very well became his tomb.

The most famous story is that Palamedes was the victim of a stratagem conceived by Odysseus. Hyginus says that Odysseus told Agamemnon that he had a dream that the camp should be moved for just one night. Agamemnon, following Odysseus' advice, moved the camp and it was then that Odysseus buried some gold in Palamedes' tents with a letter ostensibly sent by Priam to Palamedes, written by a Phrygian captive. The following day the letter and the gold were found in Palamedes' tents and Agamemnon was persuaded that Palamedes intended to betray the Greeks to the Trojans.[1] The end of all these stories is common: Palamedes was found guilty and put to death.[2]

e) *The revenge*

When Nauplios, Palamedes' father, learnt about the unjust death of his son he sailed out to Troy to obtain justice for the killing of his son.[3] The Greeks treated him scornfully and he left unsatisfied,

[1] The same account is given by Apoll. *Ep*. III.8; Eur. *Or*.432 is slightly different: Agamemnon and Diomedes are presented as accomplices, and the Phrygian captive, after writing the letter is killed and the task to place the letter with gold under Palamedes' bed is undertaken by a slave. See also Phillips (1957, p.271 n.22).

[2] This intricate plot is an invention of the tragic poets. Polyaenus I.*Prohem*.62 says that this stratagem was related (ᾄδουσι) by the tragic poets. See also Koniaris 1973 pp.85-112, Scodel (1980), Sutton (1987). Scodel (p.140; with bibliography) thinks that Euripides' *Palamedes* was referring to the prosecution of Anaxagoras and Sutton (p. 133-142) to the trial of Protagoras.

[3] Naupliosmust have appeared in Aiskhylos' play (see Jebb-Pearson 1917,vol. ii., p.133, Scodel 1980, p.52 and Woodford 1994, p.165). That Nauplios went to the Greek camp in Troy is attested by Apoll. 6.8 and Schol.Eur.*Or*.432. Pearson also suggests (1917, p.133) that Nauplios' arrival occurred in Sophokles' *Palamedes* as well.

since the army preferred to obey Agamemnon.[1] But how did Nauplios learn about the killing of his son? Apollodoros and the Scholiast on Euripides' *Orestes* do not give any explanation. On the other hand, the Scholiast on Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazousai* 771 provides us with the information that Euripides in his *Palamedes* presented Palamedes' brother Oiax writing on oars what has happened to his brother, in the hope that they would reach his father Nauplios.

No matter how Nauplios found out about the shameful death of his son, he certainly decided to take revenge. Again, there are several versions about the manner in which Nauplios avenged the death of his son. The most famous one is that when the Greek fleet was returning to Greece, Nauplios used false beacons so as to draw the ships onto the rocks of the extremely dangerous cape of Caphereus in Euboia. This version can probably be traced back to the *Nostoi* and according to Tzetzes to a poem by Stesichoros,[2] and it was certainly known during the fifth century.

According to several other sources, Oiax spread the news to the wives of the Greek commanders that their husbands were unfaithful to them and as a result they deceived them with several lovers.[3]

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[1] Both Apoll. 6.8 and Schol.Eur. *Or.*432 say that every man in the army agreed (Apoll. Χαριζομένων, Schol. κεχαρισμένον) with the king. Jouan (1966, p. 353-4), says that Agamemnon probably did not allow Oiax to bury the corpse of Palamedes as he had not allowed Teukros to offer a funeral to his brother Ajax.

[2] *Posthomerica* 750; at any rate it is certain that the first to use this story in the 5th c. BC is Sophokles (cp. Jebb-Pearson 1917, p.80); in Euripides' *Helen* 767 we read: τὰ Ναυπλίου τ' Εὐβοικὰ πυρπολήματα (cp. also 1125f.; see Woodford 1994, n.29 p.166). The stratagem of Nauplios can also be found in Strab. 8.6.21, Verg. *Aen.*11.260, Lykophron 384-386, Phil. *Her.*11.15, Apoll. 6.11, Loukianos 45.46, Hyg. *Fab.*116.

[3] Clytemnestra with Aegisthus etc; see Apoll. *Epit.*6.9-11, Hyg. *Fab.*117, Dictys 6.2. In Euripides' *Orestes* 431-4 is said that Oiax persecuted Orestes so as to take revenge for the death of his brother: τίνες πολιτῶν ἐξαμιλλῶνταί σε γῆς; / Οἴαξ, τὸ Τροίας μῖσος ἀναφέρων πατρί. / συνῆκα· Παλαμήδους σε τιμωρεῖ φόνου.

Nauplios is also said to have punished Odysseus by throwing Penelope into the sea, or by causing the mother of Odysseus to commit suicide, by spreading the false news that Odysseus was dead.[1]

II. Gorgias' *Defence of Palamedes* and the myth

G. does not make ample use of the mythical elements; his own method is chiefly based on a logical argumentation which develops with the invention of probabilities substituted for the facts as they are known from the myth. For instance, in the first part of his reasoning, instead of trying to prove that it was Odysseus who placed the gold and the letter ostensibly written by Priam in Palamedes' tent, he presents the preparatory stages of an alleged treason.

At first sight the defence of a mythical person in the fifth century, who as everyone knows has already been condemned to death by mythical judges, is a paradoxical composition and it is difficult to find a parallel example from the literature of our times. How would the listeners or the readers of *The Defence of Palamedes* have perceived the resuscitation of a hero defending himself in the first person and addressing his opponent in the second person? Which was their reaction when Palamedes states that the trial has nothing to do with his death, but with the manner of his death? How did contemporary legal terms uttered by a mythical person sound to their ears? All these questions justify our description of this speech as a paradoxical composition.

It is clear that two levels are discernible in *Pal.*, the one contrasted with the other: the first level forms the background of the speech; it is the level of the tradition. The second level is the logical

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[1] Penelope: Eustath. *Od.*p.1422,8; Anticlea: Eustathios on l. 202, but this is not in accordance with *Od.*11.197ff.

argumentation which develops in a hypothetical courtroom of the fifth century. But this contrast is superficial, for however paradoxical the title of the speech may appear, the argumentation developed in this speech does not distort the myth, not at least in the form(s) preserved to us. G.'s persuasiveness does not rely upon a selective presentation of the mythical events; the *narratio* (διήγησις) is totally absent from his speech. On the contrary the basic mythical *motifs* serve as a presupposition of our understanding of his argumentation. The characterisation of the opponent for instance does not include any reference to his pretence of madness in Ithaca; it is merely based on the demonstration of the logical contradictions of his accusation.[1]

Palamedes serves here as a symbol: he is the best example of a just person who by supporting the community becomes its victim. Palamedes' personality is the contrasting background, which manifestly brings out the injustice of his accusers. But the case of Palamedes is for an additional reason advantageous to G.'s forensic skill: the opponent is the symbol, the archetype of eloquence in Greek mythology.[2] In other words, G. - by defending Palamedes - implies that rhetoric is not a malicious art by its nature, since one may use it as a παίγνιον so as to write an encomium for a notorious woman such as Helen, but one can also use it so as to defend a tragic victim of a knavish plot. Moreover, he implies that if one - like himself – were to use speech effectively, one should not abandon oneself into despair, even if his opponent is a man as eloquent as Odysseus.[3]

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[1] Stanford 1954, p.260 n.18 says that "nothing noteworthy is said about Odysseus elsewhere in this excessively stylized speech"; but G.'s intention was not to compose a biography of Odysseus.

[2] See Stanford 1954, pp.71-2, p.255 n.10.

[3] Long (1982, p.238) is certainly right when he points out that "Gorgias could make the worse appear the better cause, but he could also apply equally strong eloquence to an innocent man's defence, a point often overlooked in assessments of the Sophists which reflect the bias of Plato". Poulakos (1983), who read the

Before we examine the elements of the myth used by G., it is worth making a distinction, which will save us from a serious misunderstanding. *The Defence of Palamedes* is in part a more fact-bound speech than the *Encomium of Helen*. This is understandable if we consider that in the former G. attempts to acquit Palamedes of the charges brought against him, whereas in the latter he intends to offer a logical interpretation of the acts of Helen.[1] But the term 'fact-bound' when applied to speeches dealing with mythical persons is probably misleading, if we do not make it clear that by using this term we do not mean the 'facts' of the myth, but rather the facts invented by G. with the method of probabilities. Seen in this light, the term 'fact-bound' does not mean that G. – who is not under the same constraints as an orator like Lysias or Demosthenes who defend real persons – has to refer to or be conscious of the real facts. It means that G., by the invention of probable facts, intends to proceed with an argumentation less theoretical than the *Encomium of Helen*, an argumentation that substitutes the 'real' facts of the myth with the probable factuality of a hypothetical case of treason. The presentation of the necessary stages that Palamedes should have employed if he had wished to give away his compatriots, for instance, not preserved in any mythological narration; they are not 'real' mythological facts, but facts invented by G. for the purposes of his argumentation.

The most abundant use of the mythological elements is made by G. in his presentation of the inventions of Palamedes; all this part (30) of the self-characterisation of the hero is intended to show that the defendant was a person of high moral standards. The inventions mentioned by G. have already been discussed and generally they are

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Encomium of Helen as a metaphorical defence of rhetoric, might have found more explicit arguments in *The Defence of Palamedes*.

[1] In *Hel.* 5, G. says that Helen did what she did (ἔπραξεν ἃ ἔπραξεν), whereas in *Pal.* the facts are disputed; in this respect he seems to be conscious of the στάσις theory of Aristotle (see Introduction).

in accordance with the inventions attributed to our hero by other authors.

It is also interesting that some inventions of this hero are mentioned as the means that he might have used, so as to ferment treason. In (6) we are told that it is impossible to send a message without the use of letters, which as we know is one of his most important inventions and in (9) he concedes that he might have made a pledge with Priam by obtaining an amount of money. In (10) he says that there are many sentinels in the camp, so that the transportation of money was impossible and in (12) he holds that it was impossible to climb the wall of the Greek camp, because it was full of watches. The letters, the money, the system of watches are all mentioned in 30, among his inventions, and even the wall, according to Sophokles (fr.432 Radt) was his own invention. It is difficult to say whether G. deliberately used these aspects of the resourcefulness of his client or not. But even if this is a mere coincidence it still adds much to the persuasiveness of this part of the speech, seeking to prove that it was actually impossible for Palamedes to perform the actions that he was accused of. Everyone could recognise that these inventions were originally intended to support the Greek army and one could hardly imagine the great benefactor of Greece using his inventions as a tool for malicious ends.[1] But even if some judges failed to grasp this obvious moral antinomy, Palamedes, by implying that even his inventions were not of much help, reinforces the argument at stake: that is the impossibility of the commission of the actions that he is accused of.

The most important aspect of the use of the myth is probably the regular use of the notion of resourcefulness (εὐπορία). This is a recurring theme in *The Defence of Palamedes*, which establishes the tragic profile of the hero. In the prologue of this speech the

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[1] One should note that Palamedes at the end of the recitation of his inventions (31) declares that the only reason he refers to them is to prove that it was impossible for a man who engages in those tasks to perform any immoral actions.

defendant admits that he is in a situation of ἀπορία, for he does not find a way to express himself. The hero, who was traditionally deemed as an example of resourcefulness (who made the life of men πόριμον ἐξ ἀπόρου 30), is now found, compelled by a situation externally imposed on him, in a state of great difficulty in helping himself. The man who by his talented nature was the benefactor of the community is compelled to defend himself against the accusations levelled by the same community. In his own words, his opponent accuses him of wisdom and resourcefulness (25). Even the judgment is not εὔπορος (35), because it is not possible to reveal the truth with words (especially words which are the products of a situation of ἀπορία).

G. is deliberately playing with the word ἀπορία; should a man like Palamedes be in such a situation, then anyone within the frame of the *polis*, whether it is a benefactor of it or not, could be found in his place. Men involved in political intrigues – inspired by the irresistible lure of political vainglory – always found a way into the arena of politics through conspiracy and detraction. Even at the most humble level of personal animosity men sometimes prefer to settle their disputes by mud-slinging tactics. Within a social frame where a man might be brought before a court of law any number of reasons (political antagonism is just one obvious one), everyone, even a man of Palamedean morality, should, in one way or another be able to defend himself efficiently through words. But this is exactly what G. professed to do.

III. The argumentation

The opening paragraph of *Pal.* presents the three main stages of a trial: the prosecution, the defence and finally the judgment are presented in their natural order. The defendant makes it clear that

the trial has not to do with death, since nature (φύσις) has decreed death for all men with an open vote. As a matter of fact, the *raison d' être* of this speech of defence is not merely death, but the manner of it, that is a δίκαιος or βίαιος (violent) death. The overall result of the opening phrases is two-fold: on the one hand from the very beginning of the speech the orator G. interprets in a relativistic way the consequences of the charges brought against his client so as to create the frame in which he will develop his argumentation - and he thus indirectly underrates the power possessed by the jurors; on the other the sophist G. is trying to remove from the minds of his audience the mythical account that presents Palamedes' death as a fact and he thus prepares the transition from the realm of myth to the real world of courtrooms.

The argumentation develops with a disclaimer referring to the aforementioned notions of βία and δίκη (2); the defendant states that the jurors totally control βία, whereas he rules over *dike*. This seems natural since he recognizes that the jurors have the power to work their will on him (βουλόμενοι δυνήσεσθε), whereas his only power is δίκη, that is the knowledge of his innocence. The power of the jurors is more than enough to put him to death; the knowledge of his innocence is not enough at all. What he (and every man in his place) is compelled to do is to prove with words that he is innocent, since a mere statement of innocence would hardly convince the jurors.

The notions of knowledge (ἐπιστάμενος) and opinion (δοξάζων) are presented in the following paragraph as the only possible bases upon which Odysseus could have built his prosecution. What is surprisingly interesting is the fact that G. admits on behalf of his client that, if the prosecutor had relied on opinion he would have been a just man, as if he had relied on knowledge, provided that his motive was to save Greece, not to catch up Palamedes in a web of contrivance. I say surprisingly, because in (24) opinion is emphatically described as 'the most unreliable thing' (ἀπιστότατον πρᾶγμα) and a common state of the human mind (κοινὸν ἅπασι). Is

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this a real contradiction? The answer is given by G.: Odysseus does not rely on knowledge because Palamedes knows that he has not committed the crime of which he is accused and at any rate it is impossible to have knowledge of something that has never happened; the only real possibility is that the prosecutor relies on opinion. But this is exactly what Palamedes has to show.

With a string of rhetorical questions depicting his difficulty in expressing himself with words (4) the defendant states that he is in a situation of ἀπορία; unproved accusations lead to panic (ἔκπληξις), and because of this embarrassing emotional situation Palamedes faces ἀπορία, a typical state of entangled tragic heroes. This tragic profile is reinforced by his statement that the only way to overcome his difficulties is to be dictated a solution by truth and the present compulsion (ἀνάγκη) and by the fact that he (as well as the whole of humanity) is well aware that he is a resourceful (πόριμος) person *par excellence*. But what do the words truth and compulsion mean in this context and why are they described as 'dangerous teachers'? Truth is the knowledge of his innocence, that allowed him say - although this is not a desirable privilege – that he rules over δίκη; truth in other words is the presupposition of δίκη, that now must be substituted by the argumentation (λόγος), which will not be truth, that is a mere statement of innocence, but an approximation of truth, that is to say a complicated process based on well-organised reasoning. Compulsion means the limits imposed on the defendant and generally on a speaker by the situational context of a court of law. Palamedes, like innumerable other innocent men, has to defend his own life and his honour not by choice, but is compelled to do so (for compulsion and probabilities see Introduction).

The keystone of G.'s argumentation is stated at the end of the prologue (5). His programmatic statement runs as follows: if I had wished, it would have been impossible to betray the Greeks to the barbarians (6-12) and if it had been possible I would not have

wished to do it (13 – 21). It is clear that the schema followed here consists in a combination of opportunity and motive.

The discussion of the lack of opportunity is by its nature associated with real facts. But this does not mean that G. constructs his argumentation on the basis of real facts. Palamedes is a mythical, not a real person. The myth provides G. with the raw material and to a certain extent it frees him from a fact-bound account. In other words the myth gives the teacher of rhetoric a way to demonstrate the effective use of probabilities (εἰκότα).

This part of *Pal.* is based on a model combining probabilities and the process of elimination. The use of probabilities consists in the fact that G. does not present real facts. By using the basic elements of the mythical account he offers the necessary stages usually employed by a person who commits the crime of treason. The presentation of the sequence of the arguments and the way in which the coherence of the argumentation is maintained is perhaps more interesting than a detailed discussion of the stages recapitulated by G. with an asyndeton in 11 ('I met him [sc. Priam], we negotiated, we understood each other, I took money from the enemies and I escaped from the watches, I hid it').

G. makes an abundant use of conditionals. Stage A was necessary for stage B, but stage A was impossible; but even if stage A was possible then stage B was necessary for stage C etc. In this way each conditional introduces a new argument (that is a necessary stage) and at the same time it highlights the presumptiveness of the previous argument. The same schema is used in the *ONB*, where G. argues that a) nothing is, b) if it is, it is not knowable, c) if it is knowable, it is not communicable. The keyword for this kind of argumentation is *concession*.

Palamedes has shown that it was impossible to betray the Greeks to the barbarians and the discussion of motives itself is introduced as a concession to the conclusion of the first part: "Even if it had been possible for me to perform these actions had I really any good reason for doing it?"

The motives set forth are the following: power, financial gain, honour, security, helping friends and harming enemies, avoidance of a fear, or of a labour or of a danger.

The main aspects of the argumentation dealing with motives are the following: a) each motive is treated separately, b) the motives are surveyed under the prism of popular morality and c) according to G.'s typology two types of motives exist universally: the positive and the negative one.

We may start with the first aspect: I consider that the motives presented here are conceived of (as the stages of the first part of the argumentation) on the basis of probabilities, in the respect that they are derived from common experience. But each one is dealt with separately since the persuasiveness of the present argumentation lies in the exhaustive accumulation of motives gradually proved to be worthless. In addition the motives are not mutually exclusive and we can hardly add any other possible motive.

This part is apparently a survey of popular morality that regularly appeals to traditional values. The intention of the defendant is to dispose the judges in his favour by showing them that he is a respectful man. Two examples will be enough: in 15 Palamedes suggests that one may claim that he betrayed Greece with the intention of monetary gain. But as he says 'I have a moderate amount of money, and I have no need for much. Those who spend much money need much, not those who are superior to pleasures of nature, but those who are slaves to pleasures and seek to acquire honours from wealth and show'. That self-restraint is a common idea of popular morality is shown by Plato's *Gorgias* 491d9-11, when Socrates agrees with 'most people' (οἱ πολλοί) that a person with self-control is the person who is prudent (σώφρων) and possesses self-restraint. A number of other texts are in support of the same idea. The second example is taken from paragraph 18, where Palamedes says "But was I anxious to assist friends or harm enemies? For someone might commit injustice for these reasons." We have evidence from Plato's *Meno* 71e (= fr.19; see comments *ad*

loc.), and probably from Xenophon's *Cyropaideia* 1.6.31 that acting unjustly with the purpose of helping your friends is an idea put forward by G.

Let us now pass to the third aspect; in a proverbial fashion G. maintains that human motives are divided into two discernible types: human actions are either the result of the pursuit of gain or of the avoidance of loss. Profit is elevated here to an absolute criterion of human action. Under this light, the means employed are of minor importance; what really matters is the attainable aim. The probative value of this generalisation is obvious: Palamedes has shown that he had not had any motive. The only thing that he would have achieved if he had given away his compatriots to the enemy, would have been to harm himself. His life would have been unlivable. G., instead of making his client say that he is a just man (as he will do later), makes him say why he had no reason to be unjust. Hence, my suggestion that the persuasiveness of this method lies in the exhaustive accumulation of motives. Now we can add the theoretical generalisation, which comes as a result of both the self-consciousness of the rhetor and the knowledge of the devices of his art.

The following part of *Pal.* is an examination of the credibility and the validity of the accusations. Palamedes now uses the second person, adding theatricality to the speech, and he begins with an interrogation (ἐρώτησις) of the prosecutor. The keyword of the opening paragraph is the word 'worthless' (ἀνάξιος). But the characterisation of the litigant as ἀνάξιος is not a mere description of his (*ethos*); in the case of the opponent, G. does not derive elements from the stock of mythology (although he could do so as he implies in 27: 'I do not want to introduce in reply the many enormities, both old and new'), as he will do later (30) in the short biographical account of his client, nor does he indulge in a general disparagement (διαβολή). On the contrary Odysseus' *ethos* surfaces through a rationalistic examination of the groundless basis upon

which he has based his accusations. The argumentation is twofold: the defendant first (22-24) is endeavouring to prove that his opponent has based his accusation on an unproved opinion, not on clear knowledge, and he then (25-27) locates contradictions of logic in the argumentation of the opponent, which prove that he is a liar.

Two points of the truth/opinion argumentation require scrutiny. Palamedes makes it clear to Odysseus, that if he really has knowledge of the crime allegedly committed by him, this can be due to three reasons: a) he was an eyewitness, b) he was an accomplice, or c) he was told by an accomplice; the senses are here elevated to the sole vehicle permitting access to knowledge; the value of the triple distinction is evident: it transforms the opponent from prosecutor into an accomplice or a witness. Not only is Odysseus an unreliable prosecutor, but he is also an unreliable witness. Unlike Odysseus, Palamedes is not able to produce even false witness. Therefore, it is evident that he does not possess knowledge of the real facts and that he trusted his opinion (δόξα). But with regards to δόξα, no one is wiser than any one else, since opinion is nothing but the common state of the human mind.

The contradictory nature of the accusations and the inconsistency of the opponent are shown by means of a schema of logic as well; Palamedes complains: 'Where you [sc. Odysseus] say that I am artful (τεχήεντα) and clever (δεινόν) and resourceful (πόριμον), you accuse me of wisdom, and where you say that I was betraying Greece, you accuse me of madness'. But wisdom and insanity are opposed to each other and they cannot coexist in the same person. He then (26) poses a question: 'do you think that wise men are witless (ἀνοήτους) or intelligent (φρονίμους)?' If he thinks that they are witless, his argument must be merited as a novelty but refuted as untrue. If he thinks that they are intelligent, then Palamedes, as an intelligent person, would have never taken the risk to endanger his own life and act wrongly for the sake of precarious benefits. So if he is to be considered a wise man he has not performed the actions

accused of; if he had performed the actions accused of then he is not a wise man: in both cases Odysseus is not telling the truth.

In the rest of the speech Palamedes addresses the jurors; this part can be divided into two sub-units: the first one (28-33) is self-referential (to you, O judges, about myself) and the second one refers to the judges (to you and about you).

The self-referential account is a short autobiography of Palamedes. After a statement that what he is about to say may inflame the resentment of the judges, Palamedes defines the account of his own life that follows with a legal term: 'For I am now undergoing scrutiny and furnishing an account of my past life' (εὐθύνας καὶ λόγον ὑπέχω). εὐθύνα was the examination of a public official's conduct. Palamedes is a mythical hero, so the content of his account is his previous life and achievements. The legal term is deliberately chosen by G., since, what for others would be a compulsory examination, is presented here as a discretionary option of the hero in order to defend his own life. Palamedes is of course compelled by the present situation (ἀναγκαῖον) to refer to himself, but it is G.'s own choice to define this presentation with a legal term.

The self-portrait highlights both the benefits he offered to the community and his incomparable morality. He first claims that his life is faultless (ἀναμάρτητος) and that he himself is a great benefactor of humanity, since through his inventions he made men's life resourceful (πόριμον) and wellordered (κεκοσμημένον). After a presentation of his inventions (30), in an apologetic tone, he declares (31) that the reason why he reiterated all these benefactions to the judges was to make it clear that a man applying himself to such moral preoccupations is not to be considered capable of applying himself to such immoral actions as treason. The argument reminds us of the one used by Palamedes when he proved that wisdom and insanity cannot coexist in the same man. The last stroke of his brush creates the picture of his conformity to morality: he

does not offend the elderly, he helps the younger, he does not resent prosperous men, he experiences sentiments of pity for those who suffer; he does not disdain poor men and he values virtue above wealth; he is a good citizen, he is obedient to his commanders, he is a conscientious man.

And suddenly Palamedes remembers that he is not the appropriate person to praise himself; though he does have a good excuse: he was compelled to do so by circumstances (καιρός) and by the (unjust) nature of the accusations. καιρός is a prominent notion of rhetorical theory; probably G. himself had written a treatise on καιρός (see fr. 12, with notes). But what does this term mean? It has been shown that the word does not obtain the meaning 'profit', or 'opportunity' as usually translated. In the present context, the word means 'the present situation', in other words it signifies the situational context and the pragmatic conditions in which Palamedes is defending his life (see also notes on *Hel.* 2). In this light it is important that the word is combined with compulsion (ἠνάγκασε); the rhetor composes his speech in a frame already created by the situations: the nature of the audience, the nature of the case, the personality of the defendant etc. Apart from being a skilful writer, he must also know *when* and in which context an argument is likely to be demonstrated more effectively.

His apostrophe to the judges develops with the presentation of the criteria upon which the judges must base their judgment so as to reach a just decision, and of the dangerous consequences of an unjust decision. Palamedes first claims that it is not appropriate to try to move them with lamentations and with the help of his friends. On the contrary, what he does is to try to show them the truth, not to deceive them.

This is Palamedes' responsibility; their own responsibility is to focus their attention on deeds, not words, to value the examination of truth above accusations, and to deliberate for a longer period of time so as to make sure that they will reach the proper conclusions.

This is what serious men do, when they recognize the seriousness of the situation and the definitiveness of their decision.

Palamedes in a proverbial phrase declares that it is impossible to demonstrate the truth through words, because if it were so, then the judges would have already been able to reach a conclusion from what has been said. This is why they must keep him imprisoned, until they make up their minds. This will permit them to come up with the right decision. And then he claims that it is their reputation which is at stake. And a bad reputation is worse than death. So, as Odysseus had been transformed from a prosecutor into an accomplice or a witness, G. now claims that the judges' life is in danger, as is the life of his client. If they put him to death it will be they, not the prosecutor who will stain his good reputation, because the final decision belongs to them.

With the statement that it is inappropriate to remind good judges of what has already been said, Palamedes concludes the case for the defence. We know that Palamedes was finally put to death; was it because G. was not his advocate?

NOTES

1

ἡ μὲν κατηγορία...κρίσις: the words κατηγορία, ἀπολογία and κρίσις represent all the three main stages of a trial and it would thus be preferable to follow Deichgräber's <καὶ ἡ> κρίσις; κατηγορία is the speech delivered by the prosecutor and ἀπολογία the speech delivered by the defendant. From the very beginning of his speech G. uses legal terms; it is a common practice of G. to present mythological subjects in the legal phraseology of his time, as he intends to make his audience (or his readers) believe, that they are attending a trial of the fifth century B.C. G.'s *Pal.* is probably not the first ἀπολογία of the hero in Greek literature: "a speech of this kind probably occurred in the Palamedes of Aiskhylos as well as in the play of Euripides bearing the same name" (Jebb-Pearson 1917 vol.ii, p. 132; cp. Aiskh. Fr.182, Eur. Fr.578). Plato also implies a speech of defence in tragedy: *Lg*.856c. Παγγέλοιον γοῦν, ἔφην, στρατηγὸν ᾿Αγαμέμνονα ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις Παλαμήδης ἑκάστοτε ἀποφαίνει. Polyaenus also gives the information that the tragic poets presented a trial in which Palamedes was defeated by Odysseus: οἷόν δε κἀκεῖνο στρατήγημα ᾿Οδυσσέως οἱ τραγῳδοὶ ᾄδουσι (Polyaen. I *prohoem*.12) The word κρίσις means 'the judgment of a court'.

οὐ περὶ θανάτου γίγνεται: 'the trial has not to do with a death penalty'; γίγνεται was proposed by Aldus, and given that G. defines the object of his speech the indicative expressing an irrefutable argument seems more likely than the inf. γίγνεσθαι. The disclaimer stated here is one of great importance because it does not merely mean that P. does not care about his life. The orator's intention is to remove from the minds of his audience the mythical narration that presents P.'s death as a fact, while at the same time to 'legalise' the

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existence of his speech. The *raison d' être* of his defence is not
death as such, but the manner of this death (but when it comes to the
responsibility of the prosecutor and the judges, Palamedes stresses
that death is a serious and irrecoverable penalty: τολμᾶς ἄνδρα περὶ
θανάτου διώκειν; 24, ὅταν ἄνδρες ἄνδρα περὶ θανάτου κρίνωσιν, 34).

ἡ φύσις: 'nature'; the personification of *physis* in a context
dominated by legal terms is a reminiscence of the *nomos / physis*
controversy (Heinimann, 1945, Kerferd, 1981 ch. 10, 12, Kahn,
1980 p. 105-108) and it is remarkable that the criminal proceedings
of a court of law are instituted here by *physis*. Nevertheless, we
should neither suppose that G. expresses his personal point of view
nor that he declares against law. In fact, *physis* is used here to
underline that what is at stake is not death itself, but the manner of
this death (δικαίως / βιαίως, μετ' ὀνειδῶν) and as a consequence the
idea of 'natural death' is explicitly reflected in the word φύσις and
not implicitly in the word δικαίως (Sykutris, 1927 p. 860). The
association of the *nomos / physis* controversy with death appears in
Antiphon: τ<ὸ δ' αὖ> ζῆν ἐστι τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν, καὶ
τὸ μὲν ζῆν αὐτ<οῖς> ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμφερόντων, τὸ δὲ ἀποθανεῖν
ἀπὸ τῶν μὴ ξυμφερόντων (DK87B44 col. 3).

φανερᾷ τῇ ψήφῳ...κατεψηφίσατο: '*physis* has decreed death for all
men with an open vote'; φανερὰ ψῆφος emphasises the
definitiveness of the decision of *physis*, as it is usually associated
with oligarchic governments: Lys.13.37 οἱ μὲν γὰρ τριάκοντα
ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων, οὗ νῦν οἱ πρυτάνεις καθέζονται· δύο δὲ
τράπεζαι ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τῶν τριάκοντα ἐκείσθην· τὴν δὲ ψῆφον οὐκ
εἰς καδίσκους ἀλλὰ φανερὰν ἐπὶ τὰς τραπέζας ταύτας ἔδει
τίθεσθαι; Thuk.4.74. καὶ τούτων πέρι ἀναγκάσαντες τὸν δῆμον
ψῆφον φανερὰν διενεγκεῖν (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 2.4,10, and Pl. *Lg.*767d,
Dem.19.239).

περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀτιμίας καὶ τῆς τιμῆς: 'dishonour' and 'honour' not
'deprivation of the civil rights'; ἀτιμία was a penalty imposed for
various offences; a case of hereditary ἀτιμία for treason is that

imposed on Antiphon, Archeptolemos and Onomakles who had been sent by the 400 to Sparta to treat for peace (Ps.Pl. *Vita An.* 834a; cp. Thuk. 8.90.1-2).

ποτερά με χρή...ἀποθανεῖν: G. now states the kernel of his speech by using an antithesis heavily weighed on the second clause, on which he lays the emphasis. δικαίως ἀποθανεῖν: 'whether I will deservedly be punished', not 'according to nature'. The latter interpretation was proposed by Sykutris (1927, p. 860); Heinimann (1945, p.105) has shown that this meaning of δίκαιος occurs in Solon (fr.11) and in medical contexts opposed to βίαιος. Untersteiner (1954, p.138 n.1) follows Sykutris and compares δίκαιος with Aiskh. *Cho.* 996 (ἐνδίκου φρονήματος), where ἐνδίκος seems to have a different meaning (see Garvie 1986, note *ad loc*; Soph. *El.* 37 ἐνδίκους σφαγάς fits better the present context). The interpretation of δικαίως ἀποθανεῖν as natural death especially in opposition to βίαιος is apparently reasonable, but those who support it do not take into account the following sentence, where P. states that he rules over δίκη (cp.36 ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἀποκτείνητέ με); it should thus be preferable to see in δικαίως its common meaning ('justly', 'based on the right criteria'; see also note on 33).   βιαίως ἀποθανεῖν: a violent and udeserved death will be imposed on him by the jurors. To die with dignity is an archaic ideal regularly depicted in tragedy and associated with the fame of a hero after his death. A βίαιος θάνατος will stain Palamedes' reputation for ever (cp. Soph. *Aj.*479-480 ἀλλ᾽ ἢ καλῶς ζῆν ἢ καλῶς τεθνηκέναι / τὸν εὐγενῆ χρή).

2

τοῦ μὲν ὅλου: we should take ὅλου with τοῦ μὲν as well as with κρατεῖτε, as P. and his jurors do not rule over the same ὅλον; 'I totally rule over the one thing (δίκης) and you over the other (βίας)'. τῆς μὲν δίκης...ὑμεῖς: P. rules over δίκη because he knows (5) that he is innocent, and jurors rule over βία because they can kill him if they decide so (cp. Hom. *Il* 16. 385 ὅτε λαβρότατον χέει ὕδωρ /

Ζεύς, ὅτε δή ῥ᾽ ἄνδρεσσι κοτεσσάμενος χαλεπήνῃ, / οἳ βίῃ εἰν
ἀγορῇ σκολιὰς κρίνωσι θέμιστας,/ ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάσωσι, θεῶν ὄπιν
οὐκ ἀλέγοντες). The opposition between δίκη and βία is emphasised
by the chiastic arrangement of the sentence -which brings P. in the
middle - and the repetition of the pronouns: ὑμεῖς...ἐγώ...ἐγώ...ὑμεῖς.
ἀποκτεῖναι...ῥαδίως: G. places the infinitive at the beginning of the
phrase to emphasise its violent meaning and creates a *hyperbaton*
that binds together the verb with the participle.   γάρ με: the
sentence explains the meaning of τῆς μὲν δίκης...ὑμεῖς, so A²'s μὲν
is not necessary (Skouteropoulos p.231).   δυνήσεσθε βουλόμενοι:
the combination of the two verbs will be the basis of P.'s
argumentation (οὔτε γὰρ βουληθεὶς ἐδυνάμην ἂν οὔτε δυνάμενος
ἐβουλήθην ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν τοιούτοις 5). What for his jurors is an
indisputable right, becomes for him the object of his speech. In other
words, the jurors have the right to use violence in order to work
their will on him and he has to prove that he is not a traitor.
Potential opposed to truth is frequent in prose (cp. Hdt. 7.15; Thuc.
3.39.3, 6.34.1, 6.57.3; Isok. 20.2, 12.143).

3

ὁ κατήγορος ᾽Οδυσσεύς: The only reference to the name of his
prosecutor; κατήγορος is used here as an adjective. It is remarkable
that G. uses only one qualitative adjective to characterise Odysseus:
τολμηρότατε (24).

ἢ σαφῶς ἐπιστάμενος...ἢ δοξάζων: Knowledge is opposed to
supposition; but in 5, P. claims that he is well aware of the fact that
Odysseus does not rely on knowledge. Coulter suggests that "It
should be noted that at the very beginning of the defense the
familiar and important distinction between *doxa* and *aletheia* is
introduced" (1964, p.280), but the emphasis here is not placed on
the knowledge / opinion antithesis, but on the motives of the
plaintiff. In both cases – if his motives were moral – he had a good
reason to accuse him.   προδιδόντα: One of the few elements from

the myth that occurs in *Pal.* is that Palamedes had been accused by Odysseus of having attempted to betray Greeks to the Trojans (see Introduction).   τὴν Ἑλλάδα τοῖς βαρβάροις: Ἑλλάς is repeated three times, probably because P. wants to proclaim his patriotic feelings. As far as we know G. shared the traditional ideas about the superiority of Greeks to barbarians: τὰ μὲν κατὰ τῶν βαρβάρων τρόπαια ὕμνους ἀπαιτεῖ τὰ δὲ κατὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων θρήνους (fr.5b); probably he was pushing through the idea of Panhellenism as well (fr.8a).

γ' ἀμῇ: 'in a certain way' (LSJ); the manuscripts have δοξάζοντά με, but Diels' correction maintains the symmetry between the participles σαφῶς ἐπιστάμενος and δοξάζων in the nominative, both of which refer to κατήγορος.

πῶς γὰρ <οὐχ>...τιμωρούμενος;:<οὐχ> is necessary because the sentence expresses a positive statement (Denniston 1954, p. 86; cp. for instance Pl. *Soph.* 240c2). The passage explains in detail the phrase δι' εὔνοιαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος. The accumulation of the benefits is expressed with an *asyndeton*.

εἰ δὲ φθόνῳ...τὴν αἰτίαν: the second probability; the motives of my accuser are immoral. The three motives – expressed by three datives – are not mutually exclusive.   φθόνῳ: the first probable motive is envy, which was caused either by P.'s inventiveness or because of the stratagem he had used in order to reveal the 'madness' of Odysseus (cp. Xen. *Mem.*4.2.33. τὰ δὲ Παλαμήδους οὐκ ἀκήκοας πάθη; τοῦτον γὰρ δὴ πάντες ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς διὰ σοφίαν φθονηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ἀπώλετο; Schol. Eur *Or.* 432 ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὲ φθονήσαντες οἱ περὶ Ἀγαμέμνονα καὶ Ὀδυσσέα καὶ Διομήδην τοιόνδε τι σκευωροῦσι κατ' αὐτοῦ).   κακοτεχνίᾳ: 'the suborning of perjury', 'conspiracy' (LSJ) is a very rare word; the latter meaning is more reasonable in our context. πανουργίᾳ: 'knavery'; it denotes a degraded form of σοφία (cp. Pl. *Menex.*246e πᾶσά τε ἐπιστήμη χωριζομένη δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς πανουργία, οὐ σοφία φαίνεται; cp. also Lys. 22.16 and πανουργεῖ at *Pal.*18).

συνέθηκε: 'fabricated the charges'; P. deliberately does not use the verb ἐποιεῖτο (as at 3 and 5), as he implies that Odysseus made the charges up.

ὥσπερ...ἂν εἴη: δι' ἐκεῖνα refers to εἰ μὲν...τιμωρούμενος; the antithesis is symmetrical both in form and in content (the opposites κράτιστος / κάκιστος along with the last words of each sentence create an impressive assonance).

4

ἀνεπίδεικτος: 'unproved'; it was probably G. who coined this compound word (see Introduction), which is unattested elsewhere in the prose of classical times. G. implies that Odysseus has not brought evidence against him. ἔκπληξιν: "the result of a groundless accusation" (Segal 1962, p.117). The same word is used in *Hel.* 16 to describe the terror created by *opsis*. Groundless accusation causes panic (ἔκπληξις), leading the defendant to ἀπορία (cp. Antiphon 5.6. ταῦτ' οὖν ἔκπληξιν πολλὴν παρέχειν ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ τῷ κινδυνεύοντι). ἀπορεῖν τῷ λόγῳ: P., in the psychological state of ἔκπληξις, is helpless because he is in need of words, and his ἀπορία is only superficially opposed to πορίμωτέρων, because 'compulsion' and 'truth' are dangerous teachers (cp. Aiskhin. 2.41: αὐτὸν μὲν ἔσκωπτε καὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν τὴν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ συμβάσαν ἑαυτῷ; for a different context see Pl. *Ion* 536c περὶ μὲν Ὁμήρου ὅταν τις μνησθῇ, εὐπορεῖς, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπορεῖς).

ἂν μή τι...μάθω: The only way to overcome his difficulties is to learn something from truth and compulsion. ἀλήθεια: in *Hel.* it is defined as the virtue of λόγος: κόσμος...λόγῳ δὲ ἀλήθεια (1); the word is associated with δικαίως and δίκη of chapters 1-2. P. knows the truth because he is aware of the fact that he has not committed the crime with which he is charged (for knowledge see *Hel.*11). τῆς παρούσης ἀνάγκης: 'the present compulsion'; ἀνάγκη describes the situational context of the trial. P. has to defend himself in a court of law, and thus create a speech dictated by ἀνάγκη in order to prove

that he is innocent (32 ὁ δὲ παρὼν καιρὸς ἠνάγκασε καὶ ταῦτα...) .
In *Hel.* 13 we find the phrase τοὺς ἀναγκαίους διὰ λόγων ἀγῶνας
opposed to the speeches of philosophers. So a speech delivered by
someone because he is compelled to do so ἀναγκαῖος is ἀναγκαῖος.
Diels compares this passage with a passage from the Platonic
dialogue *Theaetetus* (172e) οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε ἀεὶ λέγουσι —
κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ῥέον — καὶ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν
ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος
ἐφέστηκεν.

διδασκάλων...τυχών: διδάσκαλος is the 'teacher', and the words
ἀληθείας and ἀνάγκης are thus personified (cp. Lys. 12.78.
δεινοτάτων ἔργων διδάσκαλος καταστάς) ἐπικινδυνοτέρων ἤ
πορμωτέρων: 'more dangerous than resourceful teachers'. Why are
truth and compulsion dangerous teachers? In the particular context
the word ἀλήθεια does not strictly mean truth. If P. remained
confident in his belief that truth can release him from the charges he
would not deliver a speech of defence at all. Mere declaration of his
innocence would have been enough. But the orator is well aware of
the fact that judges are not usually convinced by truth; P. is not a
witness but the defendant and he knows that his only hope of
salvation is his speech. That is exactly why we should not expect
him simply to state the real facts. Instead, he will substitute the facts
of his case with probabilities (εἰκότα) and logical reasoning, because
this is what truth means under the compulsion (ἀνάγκη) imposed by
the pragmatic situations of a court of law. So, in 33 where he claims
that τῷ σαφεστάτῳ δικαίῳ, διδάξαντα τἀληθές...με δεῖ διαφυγεῖν
τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην, he means that he has revealed the truth, not
necessarily that he has managed to do it by demonstrating real facts.
In *Phaidros* 259e, Plato attacks the probability arguments, because
rhetors are not based on truth, but on what passes with their
audience for truth, ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαντ' ἂν πλήθει οἵπερ δικάσουσιν (for
the Platonic polemic see Introduction). The difficulties provoked by
ἀνάγκη are better understood in the light of another Gorgianic

passage, which deals with the same problem; in *Hel.* (13) G. proposes that in forensic procedures εἷς λόγος πολὺν ὄχλον ἔτερψε καὶ ἔπεισε τέχνῃ γραφείς, οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ λεχθείς (see note *ad loc.*): the defendant knows that he delivers his speech 'under compulsion', and the speech of the prosecutor will probably be proved more effective (for a different discussion of the passage see Coulter 1964, p.280-284, who focuses on the *doxa / aletheia* antithesis).

5

ὅτι μὲν οὖν...τὸ μὴ γενόμενον: P. claims that Odysseus does not rely on knowledge (of truth), but bases his accusations on opinion which is defined as ἀπιστότατον πρᾶγμα (24). Untersteiner compares the idea expressed here with G.'s *ONB*: "This proposition seems to be universally valid, but in fact it is not so, as G. will prove, not only at the end of this speech but also and especially in his great epistemological work [sc. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος]" (1954, p.33). I am not convinced that this passage should be examined within the scope of that text, since first the reading of the latter depends much on the intention attributed to it, and secondly because it is evident that by polarising opinion and knowledge Palamedes provides himself with the opportunity to employ an argument from antinomy (see Introduction). The structure of the period is an example of the style of G.: the chiastic arrangement is emphasised by the striking repetition of cognitive verbs, underlying P.'s conviction: οὐ σαφῶς <εἰδώς>/σαφῶς οἶδα – σύνοιδα γὰρ ἐμαυτῷ σαφῶς /οὐδ' ἔοιχ' ὅπως ἂν εἰδείη. The repetition of the adverb σαφῶς offers added emphasis to the cognitive verbs. <εἰδώς>: in a context dominated by cognitive verbs the suggestion of Reiske seems reasonable. οὐδ' ἔοιχ': Radermacher's emendation is closer to the Ms' οὐδὲ οὐχ, than Diels' οὐδὲ οἶδ'. ὄν: Diels is perhaps right in adding ὄν after εἰδείη τις, since the phrase does not mean ignorance of the 'existence' of that which has not happened, but that one cannot claim that he is aware of the truth of something that has

never happened (this use of the Greek verb 'to be', which Kahn (1966, p.249) terms veridical, is, of course, frequent in the *ONB*).

εἰ δὲ οἰόμενος...κατηγορίαν: this sentence picks up the wording of 3.

διὰ δισσῶν ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω τρόπων: 'I shall demonstrate in two different ways that he does not tell the truth'; it is a common practice of G. to describe the stages of his speech and the transition from the one to the other (see Introduction).

οὔτε γὰρ βουληθείς...ἐβουλήθην: 'For if I had wished I would not be able nor I would have wished if I were able'. With the chiastical arrangement of rhyming words G. presents the keystones of his argumentation. The first part will be discussed in ch. 6-12 (12 πάντως ἄρα καὶ πάντῃ πάντα πράττειν ἀδύνατον ἦν μοι) and the second in ch. 13-21.

The first part of the main body of the defence (6-12) is based on a model, combining probabilities (εἰκότα) with the process of elimination (ἀπαγωγή). The use of probabilities consists in the description of the stages normally employed by someone who commits the crime of treachery and the use of the process of elimination in the fact that the defendant gradually demonstrates that each one of these stages would have been impossible, and as a consequence that even if he had wished, it would not have been possible to betray his compatriots. But the keystone of his argumentation is concession, which pushes the argumentation forward in two ways: on the one hand the conditionals introduce the new argument and on the other they underline the presumptive character of the previous stage (8 καίπερ οὐ γενόμενον, 11 τὰ μὴ γενόμενα). The verbal expression of this twofold concession requires attention since it is based on repetition: 7 ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο τῷ λόγῳ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, 8 ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο γενέσθω, 11 καὶ δὴ τοίνυν γενέσθω. Bux (1941, pp.394-398) suggested that G.'s argument is based on the method of reductio ad impossibile (ὁ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου

συλλογισμός) described by Aristotle in his Analytica Priora; Untersteiner follows him: "The argumentation in P. relies on the demonstration of logic" (1961, p. 112); so does Skouteropoulos who claims that "the schema used does not come from the dicanic action but from the logic of natural philosophy" (1991, p. 258, n.14). Long claims that Gorgias "proceeds by the 'Chinese box' sequence" both in P. and in his treatise ONB (1982, p.235) and he compares the method applied in P. with Sextus Empiricus' method of eliminating alternatives and he considers that "it is likely enough that Sextus Empiricus, or his source, were influenced directly by Gorgias in their method of eliminating alternatives" (p. 236). The same scholar takes the view that the method used here is radical: "In a casual way examples of the technique can be found in the Attic orators, but I know of nothing comparable to its use in the Palamedes" (p. 235, examples n. 5, p. 241). To sum up, probabilities and logic are both discernible in the first part of P.'s defence and they are both related to the nature of this part, that deals with real facts and not with motives (for the method of argument see Introduction).

6

λόγον: 'argument'; the word has a great range of meanings, but it is clear that here it means argument (note that λόγος in the following lines is used to denote 'oral communication'). The first argument is that he was not able to betray Greece to the Trojans (ἀδύνατός εἰμι) and it is reasonable to suggest that the word λόγος includes the argumentation as well.

πρῶτον: 'first'; with a temporal adverb G. says what he is going to do first. It is interesting that the wording is arranged in a manner that harmonises the sequence of the facts with the stream of the logical reasoning attempted throughout this section (6-12) by G.: ἐπὶ τοῦτον...πρῶτον, πρῶτον ἀρχήν, ἡ δὲ ἀρχή, πρὸ γὰρ τῶν μελλόντων...πρότερον.

τοῦτο: Blass prefers ταῦτα; it is not necessary to follow him, since the plural ἔργοις (5) is pejorative, whereas in this context the word has a neutral sense. The repetition introduces us to the λόγος / ἔργον relation (τοῦτον τὸν λόγον — τοῦτο πράττειν).

λόγος: 'speech' generally; G. does not define here what kind of speech he means, because he states a general principle which is not confirmed by the real facts of this particular case. The λόγους and λόγοι refer to the specific case discussed here and take on the meaning 'discussions', or even 'negotiations'.

μήτ᾽ ἐκείνου...ἐλθόντος;: Although the meaning of the period is generally clear, there are some textual difficulties. Two readings are worth quoting: (a) μήτ᾽ ἐμοῦ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἐλθόντος; and (b) μήτε <τοῦ> παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἐλθόντος; The first is the reading of A (followed by Kalligas), and (b) was proposed by Blass, who adopts the παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ of A². If we were to go with Blass then the meaning would be that P. did not send anyone to Priam, as Priam did not send anyone to P. The reading of the Ms. is slightly different: 'if he did not send anyone to me and if I did not go to him'. It does not seem necessary to correct the Ms., since in 7- 8 G. discusses the alleged negotiations between P. and Priam. The symmetry is striking: both phrases end with participles that form a *homeoteleuton*; the symmetry is also supported by the *parisosis*.

γραμμάτων: 'letters'; it is not necessary to read γραμματείων with Diels ('tablet on which one writes', LSJ), since the emphasis is not necessarily placed on the writing techniques, but rather upon the impossibility of communication (cp. Eur. *IT* 594: κούφων ἕκατι γραμμάτων σωτηρίαν). The letter here is not the same with the one known from the myth, as the latter is a part of Odysseus' stratagem and ostensibly sent by Priam to P. with the gold.

ἀφῖκται: 'arrives'; this is an 'empiric perfect' that sets forth a commonly accepted truth and we should translate it with the present tense.

ἀλλὰ δη: "After a rejected suggestion" (Denniston 1954, p.241); cp. 8, 18.

τῷ λόγῳ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι: Bekker changes the verb to γενέσθω; Long (1982, p.241 n.4) agrees with him: " Gorgias is not stating real possibilities, but *conceding* possibility for the sake of his argument, only to demolish it later". But the dative τῷ λόγῳ means 'for the argument's sake', 'supposedly' (cp. the beginning of 6, where λόγον also means 'argument', and ὡς ἀδύνατος, which has now become δυνατὸν γενέσθαι), and thus Bekker's alteration is unnecessary, unless a pleonastic expression is required here; but this is doubtful (cp. 11 καὶ δὴ τοίνυν γενέσθω..., where the imperative is clearly meant to denote that what is said is for the argument's sake only).

καὶ δὴ τοίνυν... ἐγώ: καὶ δὴ τοίνυν occurs mostly in Plato (cp. 11; see Denniston 1954, p.578 (2), n.1). The period – and generally ch. 7 – is a striking example of the style of G.. It is remarkable that here the *hyperbaton* (σύνειμι...κἀκείνῳ ἐγώ) creates two chiasms the one (external) containing the other (internal): 1. σύνειμι – σύνεστι – κἀκεῖνος ἐμοὶ – κἀκείνῳ ἐγώ, 2. κἀκεῖνος – ἐμοι – κἀκείνῳ – ἐγω. The first obvious result of this arrangement is to isolate the persons from their actions. The second one is that due to the word-order the transitive verb σύνειμι appears here as intransitive, and thus we have the impression that P. and Priam met separately 'he met me and I met him'; this idea is explicitly stated in the sentence πότερα μόνος μόνῳ; The overall result is that the form depicts the content, that is the impossibility of the alleged encounter.

τίνι τίς...μόνος μόνῳ; This passage creates autonomous sub-units by using small sentences in an *asyndetic* arrangement which gradually reaches the main point, that is the impossibility of communication (ἀλλ᾽ ἀγνοήσομεν τοὺς ἀλλήλων λόγους).

Ἕλλην βαρβάρῳ: on G.'s opinions on the superiority of Greeks see 3. πῶς ἀκούων καὶ λέγων; The participle ἀκούων here means 'hear and understand' (cp. Aiskh. *Pr. 448* κλύοντες οὐκ ἤκουον).

Language is usually conceived as a strong criterion of nationality; Herodotos (8. 144) claims that the unity of the Greeks is reflected in four different aspects of their common life, one of which is their common language (ὁμόγλωσσον). ἀγνοήσομεν: the Ms reads ἀγνοήσωμεν; but G. goes on (ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἑρμηνέως;) with the discussion of the alleged λόγοι with Priam.

ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἑρμηνέως;: 'was it with the help of an interpreter?', a *hypophora* with ἀλλά; the idea is that if their negotiations had been assisted by a translator, then the latter would have been aware of the content of their discussion. For ἑρμηνεύς, cp. Hdt. 3.38 εἴρετο, παρεόντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ δι' ἑρμηνέως μανθανόντων τὰ λεγόμενα. Hall maintains that "Gorgias...exploited the problem involved in making mythical Greeks and barbarians communicate with one another" and compares "the argument invented for Palamedes" (1989, p.117 n. 56). The word ἑρμηνεύς is also applied to someone who can decode an intricate meaning (in relation to poetry see Pl. *Ion* 534e4 οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἑρμηνῆς εἰσιν τῶν θεῶν).

8

μετὰ τούτους: 'after the speeches'; the plural here refers to λόγοι in the middle of 6, and not particularly to ἀλλήλων λόγους, since G. simply intends to remind us of the general idea of the first argument. πίστιν δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι: πίστις is 'that which gives confidence', 'a pledge'; the meaning is that after the discussion it would have been necessary for both parties to give a pledge. The πίστεις discussed in ch. 8-10 are the following: 1. an oath (8), 2. hostages (8), 3. money (9,10; it is interesting that all of them would involve μάρτυρες, as Palamedes explicitly says when he mentions the possibility that he communicated with Priam by using an interpreter: τρίτος ἄρα μάρτυς...8). With his argumentation P. will prove that it was impossible to bind Priam with a pledge (cp. Pl. *Phdr.* 256d.

πίστεις τὰς μεγίστας ἡγουμένῳ ἀλλήλοιν δεδωκέναι τε καὶ δεδέχθαι).

πότερον...ἔμελλεν; The first possible pledge presented by the defendant is an oath; the untenability of this possibility is demonstrated on the basis of morality: in what way would the enemies have trusted the very person who betrayed his own compatriots? All the other arguments concerning πίστεις will be attributed to difficulties provoked by the circumstances. The same idea recurs in ch.21, where πίστις is presented as a prerequisite for a livable life (cp. Lys.12.77 πίστεις αὐτοῖς ἔργῳ δεδωκὼς καὶ παρ' ἐκείνων ὅρκους εἰληφὼς and Ar. Lys.1185).

ὅμηροι: 'hostages'; this is one more invented possibility (we do not know of any exchange of hostages from the mythical accounts) used to add verisimilitude to the speech. The exchange of hostages was a common practice during wartime and at the suspension of hostilities, and as a consequence the exchange presented in this context – initiated by a traitor – seems strange (see Amit 1979, p. 129-147). But at any rate we have to suggest that it helps G. to develop his argumentation.

οἷον ἐγώ...τῶν ὑέων τινα: We know that P. had two brothers, Oiax and Nausimedon; we do not have much information about the latter and we ought to suggest that G. here refers to Oiax, whose name appears in several sources. As far as we know, Oiax took part in the war of Troy and according to Hyginus (Fab.117) he was the one who informed Clytaemestra about the relations of her husband with Cassandra and it was this news that led her to plot Agamemnon's death. He also tried to persuade the Greeks to banish Orestes after the death of his mother (Eur. Or. 430-4). The Scholiast of the Thesmophoriazousai tells us that Euripides in his tragedy Palamedes presents Oeax sending the news of the death of his brother to their father, Nauplios: ὁ γὰρ Εὐριπίδης ἐν τῷ Παλαμήδῃ ἐποίησε τὸν Οἴακα τὸν ἀδελφὸν Παλαμήδους ἐπιγράψαι εἰς τὰς ναῦς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ, ἵνα φερόμεναι αὗται ἔλθωσιν εἰς τὸν Ναύπλιον τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπαγγείλωσι τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ.

231

ὥσπερ Οἴαξ τῷ Ναυπλίῳ γράφει ἐν τῷ Παλαμήδῃ Εὐριπίδου. ὁ γὰρ Οἴαξ ἐγχαράττει πολλαῖς πλάταις τὰ περὶ τὸν Παλαμήδην καὶ ἀφίησιν εἰς θάλασσαν, ὥστε μιᾷ γέ τινι τὸν Ναύπλιον προσπεσεῖν (Schol. Ar. *Thesm.* 771). It would be senseless to mention Priam's sons, because they were no less than fifty (among them Hektor and Paris)!

ἐμοί τε...παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ: the *parisosis* in combination with the τε...τε structure (see Denniston 1954, p.503) sets off the fact that the exchange of hostages would have been a secure pledge in equal terms.   πιστότατα: The opposite word recurs in ch.24 attributed to δόξα (ἀπιστοτάτῳ πράγματι).

9

φήσει τις: The future of the verb φημί is used here instead of a potential mood and offers variety to the speech, as G. uses it instead of the constructions with γίγνεσθαι (7, 8, 11) denoting the *concessio*, and it serves as an anticipation of a possible argument that could be used against his own reasoning (προκατάληψις). In effect, no one claimed that P. was paid by Priam, and even in the mythical account the money placed by Odysseus in his tents was not a part of the preparations for the betrayal, but P.'s 'recompense' for a crime already committed. This suggestion is reinforced by the supposition in 10 (ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐξελθών...εἰσῆλθεν); but the myth tells us that the money was brought to P's. tents by a slave bribed by Odysseus. The creation of alleged charges gives the orator the opportunity to demonstrate his skills, and thus offer rhetorical education.

οὐκ εἰκός: 'it is not likely'; Untersteiner remarks that this is the only occurrence of the word in this text, because as he explains the argumentation here relies on the truth / opinion antithesis (1961, pp.117-18; for the probabilities see notes on ch.6).

ὑπουργημάτων: 'services'.

τίς οὖν ἦν ἡ κομιδή; The question is adverbial: 'how could one transfer the money?', not 'Who was the go-between?' (Kennedy 1972, p. 56).

πῶς δ ἂν ἐκόμισεν <ἢ εἷς> ἢ πολλοί; εἷς was proposed by Keil, but it is possible that an ἢ before it was ommitted due to haplography.

πολλῷ γὰρ...φερόμενον ἦν: the structure of the antithesis is symmetrical; the two participles (κομιζόντων – κομίζοντος) are placed at the beginning of the sentences in the same place and the repetition of the quantitative words (notice that he does not write ὀλίγον but uses a *litotes*) bind the period together (πολλῶν - πολλοὶ - ἑνὸς - οὐκ ἂν πολύ) chiastically. μάρτυρες τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς: 'witnesses of the plot' (for ἐπιβουλή cp. Thuc. 4.77); G. was certainly aware of the use and the misuse of witnesses (see 23), and generally of what Aristotle later termed ἄτεχνοι πίστεις.

10

ἡμέρας ἢ νυκτός; the genitives express time; note that G. passes to the discussion of the time that the alleged crime took place without indicating it (possibly the schema of προσβολή), but this may be explained by the fact that he goes on dealing with the same argument.

ἀλλὰ <νυκτός>: it is better to make this a question corresponding to ἀλλ' ἡμέρας;

ἀλλὰ γε...τοιούτοις: 'but the light is an enemy of such things'; ἀλλά γε is very rare, 'objecting, in hypophora' (Denniston 1954, p.23).

εἶεν: the word is simply transitional, 'Well' (cp. Eur. *Tro.* 944); G. makes the assumption that P. finally escaped the watches in order to pass to the next argument.

συνήλθομεν...ἔκρυψα: With this chain of verbs G. summarises the stages of the alleged treason discussed in detail in 6-10; all these necessary stages invented by him with the assistance of probabilities (what a man who is planning to betray his country would be expected to do) have been proved logically impossible. This string is given in *asyndeton* (cp. 21 ἐλθέτω, φανήτω, μαρτυρησάτω), which introduces the last general argument of this part and consequently this is the last concession of the defendant. ἔλαθον λαβών: cp. *Hel.* 4: λαβοῦσα καὶ οὐ λαθοῦσα.

ἔδει δήπου...ἐγένετο: 'I should perform that for the sake of which all these had been done, shouldn't I?'; δήπου is slightly ironical, and thus I render it with the expression 'shouldn't I?' (Denniston 1954, p.267). Palamedes now passess to the commission of the act of treason itself, as the repetition of πράττειν in 11-13 shows (πράττειν, πράττων 11; πρᾶξις, πάντως ἄρα...πράττειν 12; πράττειν).

τοῦτο τοίνυν...ἀπορώτερον: notice the allitteration. τῶν εἰρημένων: refers to all the hypothetical stages developed in 6-10. It was even more difficult for him to commit the act (for the reasons that he will present in 11-12) than it was to prepare it.

πράττων μὲν...ἢ μεθ' ἑτέρων; we should make this a question, because there is clearly another *anthypophora* here; the following construction starting with ἀλλ' οὐχ is the answer that the rhetor gives to the question.

τῶν συνόντων: Reiske's correction is preferable to the Ms' reading τῶν νῦν ὄντων; σύνειμι appears in the next line and probably G. indulges in another repetition here.

τίς ὑμῶν ξύνοιδε; λεγέτω: the deed was not the work of one man; the meaning is, 'I could not perform this action by myself and thus I needed accomplices: they must be among you'. The same argument is used for the prosecutor in 22 εἰ δὲ μετέχων...

δούλοις δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἄπιστον;: 'How could one believe that I used slaves?'; the idea is expressed with a *litotes*.

ἑκόντες...κατηγοροῦσιν: <τε> Reiske; single τε is rare in prose (Denniston 1954, p. 503; cp. *Pal.* 8, and *Hel.* 14), but it occurs in Antiphon (see Gagarin, 1997, p.27). ἐπ' ἐλευθερίᾳ: 'so as to be liberated' (see MacDowell 1978, p. 83); Lys. 7.16 εὖ γὰρ ἂν ἤδη ὅτι ἐπ' ἐκείνοις ἦν καὶ ἐμὲ τιμωρήσασθαι καὶ αὐτοῖς μηνύσασιν ἐλευθέροις γενέσθαι. χειμαζόμενοί τε δι' ἀνάγκην: 'forced by torture'; the phrase expresses the process of *basanos*, that is the statement given by a slave under torture (see MacDowell 1978, pp.245-247 and 1964, p.79 n.22, and especially Thür 1977). The evidence given by a slave was taken into account only if it was given under torture and usually the courts trusted the veracity of their statements (cp. Isaios 8.12 καὶ ὁπόταν δοῦλοι καὶ ἐλεύθεροι παραγένωνται καὶ δέῃ εὑρεθῆναί τι τῶν ζητουμένων, οὐ χρῆσθε ταῖς τῶν ἐλευθέρων μαρτυρίαις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς δούλους βασανίζοντες, οὕτω ζητεῖτε εὑρεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν γεγενημένων). Nevertheless, it is wiser to assume that the orators had an opportunistic opinion about the reliability of slaves, that depended much on the circumstances of each individual case; Antiphon, for instance, in 5.32 maintains that the statements of slaves are affected by what they consider as advantageous for them (ὅσ' ἂν ἐκείνοις μέλλωσι χαριεῖσθαι) whereas in 6.25, he takes the view that torture compels them to tell the truth (καὶ ἐξείη μὲν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ὅρκοις καὶ πίστεσιν ἀναγκάζειν, ἃ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις μέγιστα καὶ περὶ πλείστου ἐστίν, ἐξείη δὲ τοὺς δούλους ἑτέραις ἀνάγκαις, ὑφ' ὧν καὶ ἦν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι κατειπόντες, ὅμως ἀναγκάζονται τἀληθῆ λέγειν). δι' ἀνάγκην: opposed to ἑκόντες. κατηγοροῦσιν: 'denounce', not 'bring charges against someone'; the verb is here intransitive (cp. Lys.14.46, Aischin.1.175).

12

κρείττονας ὑμῶν: 'the enemy in larger numbers than you'; the idea is that it was not practical for P. to bring in enough of the enemy.

ὑπὲρ τειχέων: an 'Ionic' form, instead of the 'Attic' τειχῶν; the wall of Troy was built by Poseidon and Apollo and it was ἄρρηκτον (Il. 21.447), whereas the Greek wall was constructed by mortals in the hope that it would protect themselves and their ships (Il. 14.67-68).

ἅπαντα γὰρ πλήρη φυλάκων: Diels prints φυλακῶν; the same word appears in 10 but the meaning is there different. The word here refers to the guards of the walls, not to the watches. In the Iliad (10.56) we learn that the Achaean wall possessed a φυλάκων ἱερὸν τέλος that counted seven leaders and one-hundred warriors under the supervision of each leader (9.80-88). It is interesting that a similar argument is employed by Helen in Euripides' Troades (955-8), where she claims that it was impossible for her to escape from the Trojans, and that the guards of the wall can serve as her witnesses (implying that each time she attempted to escape they stopped her).

ἄρα: 'logical' cp. πάντως ἄρα... (Denniston 1954, p.40-1)
ὑπαίθριος γὰρ...ἀδύνατον ἦν μοι: G. closes the argumentation of the first part with a striking repetition of παντ-, that creates a remarkable alliteration. The repetition is not confined to the last statement expressed in the last line, but begins in the preceding period, which deals with the openness of the military life. The intention of the rhetor is to create a gradual intensity before he reaches the conclusion of this part. A parody of this kind of rhetorical expression can be traced in Plato's Menex. 247a ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ὕστατον καὶ διὰ παντὸς πᾶσαν πάντως προθυμίαν πειρᾶσθε ἔχειν, ὅπως μάλιστα... ὑπαίθριος: 'outdoors'; cp. Xen. An.7.6.24 ὑπαίθριοι δ' ἔξω ἐστρατοπεδεύετε. μέσος δὲ χειμὼν ἦν <πάντες>: Reiske's suggestion is correct, because it adds the missing subject and maintains the symmetrical arrangement with the repetition of the same word (πάντες) in the place of the subject of

the same verb (ὁρῶσι / ὁρῶνται) repeated in the active and the passive voice; πάντας, proposed by Blass, seems unlikely as it does not give any solution to the missing subject and disturbs the symmetry. πάντως ἄρα...ἀδύνατον ἦν μοι: the argumentation of the first part creates a circle, as the conclusion picks up the opening words. The defendant has just proved that even if he had wished to betray Greece to the barbarians he would not have been able to do it.

In the second part of his speech Palamedes discusses in detail the second part of his programmatic sentence (5 οὔτε δυνάμενος ἐβουλήθην); he argues that even if he had been able to commit the crime of treason, it would have not been advantageous for him. The examination of possible motives is presented as a concession to the first part. P. concedes - for the sake of his argumentation- that it was possible to perform actions, which have already been proved impossible (εἰ μάλιστα πάντων ἐδυνάμην...). The method of this part is a combination of probabilities, in the respect that he invents probable motives that would justify his action (notice the use of potential moods), and of a survey of a demonstration of an idealised morality, in the respect that our actions must be in accordance with what is commonly accepted. But we should not assume that Gorgias implies that a man should be moral just because this is a good thing. In the frame of the sophistic relativism he treats each motive separately (as the four probable reasons that made Helen follow Paris in Helen), under the light of the most important criterion expressed in a general and proverbial way in ch.19: men perform these actions either as they pursuit gain, or because they try to avoid a loss. Each individual action then should be judged in connection to the συμφέρον and the ὠφέλιμον. The motives presented are the following: a) power, b) monetary gain, c) honour, d) security, e) helping friends and harming enemies or e) avoidance of a fear, or of a labour, or of a danger. Two types of motives are discernible: the positive, where a man takes active initiatives in

order to gain advantages and the negative where a man is compelled to act in a certain manner so as to avoid a loss. Untersteiner (1954, p.135) who bases his interpretation of this part of Palamedes on the 'epistemological' treatise of Gorgias, links the main idea of will to the knowability of the object that had been willed and suggests that "now the new pivot consists in the impossibility of knowing that which cannot have been willed, and therefore that which, since it does not exist as willed, cannot be the object of objective knowledge". But I am inclined to believe that Long (1982, p.237) is on the right track when he claims that: "This is rhetoric at its purest. We are being told that Palamedes plays all the roles which should dispose the judges in his favour, and that it is their role, as judges, to expect to hear such a recital of virtues" and that he knows "of no more comprehensive survey of Greek popular morality". The rhetor must be aware of these motives, so as to add credibility to his speech. One more point is worth our attention. Up to ch.19 Gorgias deals with the motives and he then (20-21) passes to the discussion of the unlivability of the life of a traitor. These two chapters undoubtedly belong to the second part of the speech as well, as they present the negative consequences of the immoral actions that precede and because Gorgias explicitly states that he has reached the end of his argumentation dealing with the impossibility of the existence of such a will at the end of 21.

13

σκέψασθε κοινῇ καὶ τόδε: Reiske prefers τοίνυν, but the same phrase, as Diels has shown, appears in Plato's *Protagoras* 330b (see also *Cr.*48d, *Tht.*151e, *Alc.*117c, 124d, *Lach.*187d, *Gorg.*498e), and it is not necessary to change the Ms's reading. The orator calls for the attention of his audience with a verb of thinking, as he does at the beginning of ch.20.

προσῆκε βουληθῆναι...ἐδυνάμην; the verb προσῆκε introduces us to the discussion of motives; P. does not simply say 'for what reason

would I have wished', but 'for what reason was it appropriate to wish'. εἰ μάλιστα: it is not necessary to add καί with Aldus, since μάλιστα expresses the needed concession sufficiently; what follows is a concession to what has already been proved impossible in ch.6-12.

κακότητα: 'wickedness'; the word is not very common: it has a considerable appearance in Herodotos (cp. 2.124,126,128, 3.80 and elsewhwere), and it appears also in Thoukydides (5.100) and Antiphon (6.1).

προῖκα: 'without any gain', here adverbially; cp. Pl. Ap.19e οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βούλονται... τοὺς μεγίστους...κάκιστος: μεγίστους κινδύνους refers to all the necessary stages for the preparation of the treason, as presented in detail in ch.6-12, and τὴν μεγίστην κακότητα to the crime that he allegedly committed. In this phrase Calogero (1976, p.413) discerns a prelude to the famous Socratic principle *nemo sua sponte peccat*. The admittedly impressive similarities between the *Defence of Palamedes* and the Platonic *Apologia* both in form and in content were first demonstrated by Gomperz (1912, p.9ff.), and discussed in detail in more recent articles (Coulter 1964 and Feaver-Hare 1981). Notice the *schema etymologicon*.

ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τούτων; (καὶ αὖθις πρὸς τόδ' ἐπάνειμι): Sauppe reads τοῦ, and the Ms τούτων; our decision depends much on the interpretation of the τόδε in the brackets, which should be taken with the τίνος ἕνεκα of the opening sentence; however, the Ms' τούτων gives a clear meaning, as it is a specific reference to the detailed discussion of the motives that follows; it also makes easier the passage to the first proposed motive, expressed with the word πότερον of at next line.

τυραννεῖν: in a general sense 'gain dominion'. The first reasonable motive with which the defendant proceeds to the argumentation of the second part of his speech.

ἀλλ' ὑμῶν; ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον: Aldus deletes the second ἀλλά, but it is preferable to retain it and add a question mark before it, and thus produce one more *anthypophora*, of which this part of *Pal.* makes an overuse.

τοσούτων καὶ τοιούτων...πόλεων: this is a brief, indirect ἔπαινος of the defendant's compatriots, who are presently his judges. The meaning is that it would be impossible to gain power over them, since they possess so many strengths. Some of the virtues cited here recur in G.'s *Hel.* 4, where he praises the suitors of Helen. But here, the main element of praise, that is σοφία, is not mentioned at all. This fact is understandable, if we consider that P. has the monopoly of σοφία, and as all men acknowledge his wisdom, which was proverbial (see note on ch.16). Furthermore, it was unadvisable for P. to stress his wisdom, for fear that envy might be felt by the juy of the Greek leaders (cp. note on ἐπίφθονον, 28). The ἔπαινος is defined by Aristotle as λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς (*Rhet.* 1367b28), and elsewhere he divides the ἀγαθά into those acquired by our efforts (δυνάμεις) and those attributable to mere chance (τύχην 1360b28); a typology of praiseworthy elements is presented in *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 1440b: δεῖ διελόμενον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὄντα. In Iamblichus' *De Vita Pythagorica*, we find that Pythagoras, in a speech addressed to young people, made a distinction of praiseworthy attributes, between those assimilated and those which are inborn (ὥστε τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τῶν ἐπαινουμένων τὰ μὲν οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι παρ' ἑτέρου μεταλαβεῖν, οἷον τὴν ῥώμην, τὸ κάλλος, τὴν ὑγείαν, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, τὰ δὲ τὸν προέμενον οὐκ ἔχειν αὐτόν, οἷον τὸν πλοῦτον, τὰς ἀρχὰς ἕτερα πολλὰ τῶν παραλειπομένων, τὴν δὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ παρ' ἑτέρου μεταλαβεῖν, καὶ τὸν δόντα μηδὲν ἧττον αὐτὸν ἔχειν 8, 42-43).

ἀριστεῖαι: this is probably the only occurrence of ἀριστεία in the plural, which is anyway a very rare word in prose (other occurrences include: Pl. *Lg.*942c, 943b; Lyk. *Leokr.*71.4). After ἀριστεῖαι Blass prints μαχῶν, and although all the virtues are expressed with a noun

with a genitive, we should rather suggest that the symmetry is better maintained without Blass's addition: genitive noun, genitive noun, ἀριστεῖαι, noun genitive, noun genitive.

14

εἷς ὢν πολλούς; 'for I am one and they are many'; the author of the *Anonymous Iamblichi* clearly allows for the possibility that one single man can impose his will on the majority, but at the same time he overtly stigmatises the means by wich this is achieved: δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον, ὃς τὴν δίκην καταλύσει καὶ τὸν νόμον τὸν πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ συμφέροντα ἀφαιρήσεται, ἀδαμάντινον γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει συλήσειν ταῦτα παρὰ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἷς ὢν παρὰ πολλῶν (7.15).   πείσας ἢ βιασάμενος; see notes on *Hel.* 12.

ἀλλά γε ταῦτα...δέξασθαι: 'but it is very foolish to accept and concede these things'; μωρίας: Untersteiner (1961, p.120) explains that "il disprezzo comperso nella parola μωρία corrisponde al criterio intellettualistico dell' epoca", and he compares the word with *Anonymus Iamblichi* (7,13), where μωρία is attributed to those who believe that someone can become king or tyrant without using devious means (cp. also Soph. *Ant.* 469-470, σοὶ δ᾽ εἰ δοκῶ νῦν μῶρα δρῶσα τυγχάνειν, / σχεδόν τι μόρῳ μωρίαν ὀφλισκάνω; Hdt.1.131, Pl. *Prot.* 317a, Thuc.4.64.1, 5.41.3). πιστεῦσαι καὶ δέξασθαι: Diels prints πιστεῦσαι, but he suggests that πιστῶσαι would fit equally well, meaning 'ransom given for freedom', but the Ms' reading gives a very clear meaning (ταῦτα, internal acc.). G. simply states that it is not reasonable to accept that the barbarians would prefer slavery to power, just in order to recompense P. for his services. The infinitives are close synonyms, but G. uses the schema ἓν διὰ δυοῖν.

ἀλλὰ χρήματα...κέκτημαι: Blass prints μέτρια μὲν, but the contrast here is with the preceding clause. μέτρια: 'enough money' (cp. Xen. Cyr.2.4.14. ἀλλ' εἰ θέλεις, ἔφη, ἐμὲ πέμψαι, ἱππέας μοι προσθεὶς ὁπόσοι δοκοῦσι μέτριοι).

ἀλλ' οὐχ...ἡδονῶν: self-restraint is connected to the popular view of σωφροσύνη. As North (1966, p.93) puts it in her comparison of the moral aspects of Pal. to those of Hel., "such conformity to tradition is probably more essential in a juridical speech – even a model speech – than in epideictic". That such an expression was of common use is shown in Plato's Gorgias 491d οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ (cp. Pl.R.430e-431a, Xen.Cyr.8.1.32., Is.3.44; see Dover 1974, pp.124-6, 208-9). An echo of this kind of morality can be traced back to Hesiod's Works and Days (286-292). Schmid (1940, p.68) claimed, and Untersteiner followed him (1961, p. 122), that what is stated here contradicts G.'s aesthetic views, where hedonism is dominant. But if we believe the testimonia (Test.13), the idea expressed here is in conformity to G.'s way of life; when asked to explain how he attained longevity he answered: 'because I did nothing for my own pleasure' (see Introduction). And what is more important, G. is chiefly interested in producing a perfect portrait for his own defendant, not in being consistent with his personal views.

ἀπὸ πλούτου...κτᾶσθαι: 'from wealth and showing off'; The same idea is found in Xenophon's Oeconomicus 14.10, where the difference between a greedy and a φιλότιμος is that the latter wishes ἐπαίνου καὶ τιμῆς ἕνεκα καὶ πονεῖν ὅπου δεῖ καὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ αἰσχρῶν κερδῶν ἀπέχεσθαι.

μάρτυρα πιστὸν...ἐστέ: 'My witness is my life, and you are the witnesses of this witness'; the Ms reads ἦτε; but a hortatory subjunctive is more usual in the first person plural. Blass's ἐστέ,

setting off a real fact seems more likely (cp. And. 1. 37 ἐν ὑμῖν γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι, καί μοι ὑμεῖς τούτων μάρτυρές ἐστε, and Dem.21.18, Lys.10.1, 12.74) παροιχόμενον βίον: repeated in 22 and 29. G. conceives of a stratagem; given the lack of witnesses (οὐδέτερος ἡμῶν παρέχεται μάρτυρα 22) he transforms the judges into witnesses, as he will soon transform the prosecutor into his accomplice.

16

καὶ μήν: 'progressive' (Denniston 1954, p.351)

τιμῆς ἕνεκα: 'for honour'; this is the third possible motive.

μέσως φρόνιμος: 'moderately wise'; but P. was not only a moderately wise man, but also a man chiefly honoured for his wisdom. Notice that φρόνιμος recurs in 26, opposed to ἀνοήτους and closely related to the concept of wisdom.

κακότητος: 'wickedness'; see note on 13.

ἐπιμώμην...ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ: With the chiastic arrangement P. characterises both the judges and his virtue with the same adjective. His intention is not merely to flatter the judges, but also to stress his own virtue, given that it is important to be praised for something honourable by honourable men. This is an indirect praise (as the one of the suitors of Helen in his Hel. 4). The wisdom of P. was proverbial (cp. Ar. Frogs 1451 εὖ γ' ὦ Παλάμηδες, ὦ σοφωτάτη φύσις and Pl. Phdr.261d).

17

ἀσφαλείας οὕνεκα: 'for the sake of security'; notice that the opening words of this paragraph (καὶ μὴν οὐδ') are identical with the preceding one. Blass rightly corrects ἀσφαλές to ἀσφαλείας and deletes ὧν. The insecurity of the life of a traitor will be discussed in ch.20,21, in terms of a βίος ἀβίωτος. In Plato's Meno (71e) the idea that the man who possesses ἀρετή takes precautions, in order to ensure his ἀσφάλεια is attributed to G..

τὸν μὲν γάρ...ἀτιμάζει: the explanation of why one who betrays his country becomes an enemy of the law, of justice, of gods and of men is given with a striking repetition. Diels rightly proposes that τὸ δὲ θεῖον ἀτιμάζει should be placed before τὸ δὲ πλῆθος διαφθείρει, as G. would hardly avoid the creation of one more symmetrical period (cp. *Hel.* 7).

ἀσφάλειαν: G. enjoys circular composition and thus he closes another paragraph with the word that he uses in its first sentence.

18

ἀλλὰ δὴ φίλους...ἀδικήσειεν: 'But was it because I wanted to help my friends and harm my enemies? For this is a good reason for someone to act unjustly'; this is a traditional concept. It is possible that G. himself considered that someone who acts according to this concept is in conformity with the requirements of ἀρετή (cp. Pl. *Meno* 71e τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς; evidence is also offered by Xenophon (*Cyr.*1.6.31: διώριζε δὲ τούτων ἅ τε πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ποιητέον καὶ ἃ πρὸς ἐχθρούς...καὶ τοὺς φίλους δίκαιον εἴη ἐξαπατᾶν ἐπί γε ἀγαθῷ καὶ κλέπτειν τὰ τῶν φίλων ἐπὶ ἀγαθῷ) if, of course, we believe, with Nestle 1939-1940, that the διδάσκαλος of this passage is G. (more important information on this issue is provided by Ploutarkhos, for which see fr.21 with notes *ad loc.*) Helping friends and harming enemies is presented as a justification of an unjust act (cp. *Dissoi Logoi* 3.6; on the relations of this common concept and justice see Blundell 1989, p.50). Untersteiner (1961, p.122; see also 1954, p.179) claims that the meaning here contradicts ἀξιῶ in 31, and thus there is a διασσὸς λόγος which is peculiar to G.'s ethics, and this can be explained on the basis of καιρός. This interpretation seems biased, since in 31 G. asks the judges to treat him exactly as he treated them, that is justly.

ἀγαθῶν...ἡ πρᾶξις: The criterion upon which men should rely in order to reach a secure estimation of the effectiveness of their actions is the acquisition of a good. Up to this point G. deals with

motives related to the pursuit of gain'. ἔγκτησιν: Reiske proposed κτῆσιν for the Ms' senseless ἔκτισιν, but since ἔγκτησιν (adopted by Kalligas) is closer to the Ms' reading, which offers a compound word, it should preferably be adopted. It is certainly a rare word, but it is traced in Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.19, and Arist. *Oec.*1347a2.

19

τὸ δὲ λοιπόν ἐστιν...: In this paragraph the negative aspect of motives is discussed briefly; the phrase means that after the elimination of all the positive motives, what is still probable is that he performed these actions in avoidance of a loss (for a similar construction see Pl. *Soph.* 219d5).

εἴ τινα φόβον...κίνδυνον: 'in avoidance of a fear, or of a labour or of a danger'; in this context the words may refer to military virtue. In *Hel.* 16 these words are used to describe the psychological state of fighters who face the armature of their enemies. πόνον: the inconveniences of military life. A good soldier should normally be able to endure them and this was considered as a moral behaviour; cp. Xen. *Hell.*5.1.16: εὖ ἴστε ὅτι τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐκτήσατο οὐ ῥᾳθυμοῦσα, ἀλλὰ ἐθέλουσα καὶ πονεῖν καὶ κινδυνεύειν, ὁπότε δέοι (the subject is ἡ πόλις).

πάντες πάντα...φεύγοντες: This is the definition of human motives: the actions of men obey this rule universally. What is said does not correspond to the conformity to tradition and common ideas of the preceding chapters. On the contrary, this economical formulation demands both the analytical skills and the accuracy in expression of an intellectual. And this potential is of course attributable to G..

ὅσα δὲ...κακῶς ἐμαυτὸν ἐποίουν: It has been assumed that after the word πανουργεῖται there is a lacuna; the emendations proposed are the following: a) <μανίας ἐστίν. ὅσα δὲ>, proposed by Sauppe and adopted by Untersteiner, b) <κακοῖς περιβάλλειν εἴωθεν μεγάλοις τὸν πράττοντα. ὡς δὲ μάλιστ᾽ ἂν> Keil and Diels, and c) Sykutris

(1927 p.859) and Melikoff-Tolstoj suggest that it is not necessary to assume that there is a lacuna. Sykutris considers that G. could have easily passed from a general statement to the particular case of Palamedes; he thus adds δέ after κακῶς and he deletes – with Aldus – γάρ, although he does not make up his mind whether it should be attributed to a dittography from the following πράττειν, or to a misreading of an abbreviation added to the margin. Melikoff-Tolstoj (who inserts the necessary ὅτι) brings evidence that the stucture ὅσα δέ...<ὅτι> κακῶς...ταῦτα [γάρ] πράττων, οὐκ ἄδηλον is possible in prose. I consider that (a) and (b) presuppose a great dose of conjecture. (a) links this passage, with the discussion of madness (25-26) which seems to me irrelevant to the content of this passage. (b) renders a more neutral sense, but repeats what G. says after the lacuna. I think that we should follow Sykutris, as his suggestion does not affect much the reading of the Ms, and because G. could easily pass from a general statement to the particular case of P. (cp. *Hel.* 8-9 ταῦτα δὲ ὡς οὕτως ἔχει δείξω. δεῖ δὲ καὶ δόξῃ δεῖξαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι).

ἀξίωμα προγόνων: 'the dignity of my ancestors'; cp. Dem.18.149 τὰς δὲ κοινὰς προαιρέσεις εἰς τὰ κοινὰ τῶν προγόνων ἀξιώματ' ἀποβλέποντας.

ἱερὰ πατρῷα: 'ancestral cults'; cp. Bekker, *Anecdota* 1.297 πατρῷα λέγουσιν οἱ ῥήτορες χρήματα καὶ κτήματα καὶ τόπους, πάτρια δὲ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ μυστήρια καὶ τὰς ἑορτάς, πατρικὸν δὲ φίλον ἢ ἐχθρόν, but hardly can the meaning be separated. We should suggest that at least the two first words take over different meanings in different contexts (cp. *Dissoi Logoi* 3.7, Is. 2.46, Din. 1.99; see Strauss 1993, 24-5).

ἃ δὲ πᾶσι...ἐνεχείρισα: 'I would have entrusted what are commonly considered the most precious things to those who have harmed them'. ἀδικήσασιν: Diels, for the Ms' ἀδικηθεῖσι; active voice is needed, because P. refers to the Trojans, and we do not expect him to call them ἀδικηθεῖσι. G. attempts a *reductio ad absurdum*.

σκέψασθε δὲ καὶ τόδε: the phrase picks up the beginning of ch.13, as G. constantly invites the judges to follow his vivid reasoning by using their own minds. The idea of 20, 21 is that if P. had betrayed Greece, his life would have been unlivable both in Greece and in the territory of the barbarians.

ἀβίωτος ὁ βίος: 'an unlivable life'; Untersteiner says that "this is an Empedoclean expression" (1961, p.124) and he compares it to 31B2,3. But Calogero (1976, p.415, n.14) has shown that this passage is irrelevant, and that the Empedoclean phrase, as given by Untersteiner, is a conjecture of Scaliger. He also points out that the same expression occurs in Plato's *Apology* 38a (there it is ἀνεξέταστος βίος that is unlivable), to which we may add Antiphon 2.2.10: ἐπί τε γὰρ τῇ τοιούτου διαφθορᾷ ἀβίωτον τὸν λοιπὸν βίον διάξω (see also Xen. *Mem.*4.8.8, and Ar. *Wealth* 967-9).

ἀπείχετό μοι: literally, 'hold oneself off a thing', but here the meaning is 'who...would not have attempted to kill me'.

καλλίστης τιμῆς: namely, σοφίας (cp. 16).

παροιχομένῳ βίῳ...ἀπορρίψαντα; These πόνοι will be discussed in his brief autobiographical account of ch.29-32. The idea is that it would not be reasonable to reject his fame and all the efforts he has made in his previous life for ἀρετή.

21

πιστῶς ἂν διεκείμην: it picks up ch.8, where P. claimed that even the barbarians would not believe him. The person who betrays his country to its enemies comes to be considered untrustworthy by those same enemies as well.

ἀπιστότατον ἔργον: the action is called ἀπιστότατον, but ἀπιστότατος is in fact the man who performs such actions (*enallage*).

ἀποβαλόντα – ἐκπεσόντα – φυγόντα: Reiske reads ἀποβαλών, ἐκπεσών, φυγών, and Diels follows him. Untersteiner (1961 p.124) on the other hand follows Sykutris (1927), who has shown that the verb ἀναλάβοι can take on the meaning φιλικῶς ὑποδέχεσθαι and φιλοξενίαν ἀποδιδόναι (he compares the Plato's *Epistle* 7.329d) and that the phrase ὁ δὲ πίστιν instead of πίστιν δὲ is dictated by a reversal of the subject (cp. περὶ τούτων δὲ λέγων 4). ὅτι μὲν οὖν...οὔτ' ἂν δυνάμενος ἐβουλόμην: it is necessary to add a phrase repeating the keystones of his argumentation, since it is a common practice of G. to create circles. μετὰ ταῦτα in 22 also indicates that G. intends to go on with a new argument. It would be better to adopt Leo's conjecture which corresponds to the order of the argumentation of 6-21, rather than Keil's, which reverses the order.

In the following part of his speech 22-27, Gorgias addresses the prosecutor. He elaborates his argumentation with an interrogation (erotesis), which is addressed directly to the litigant. It is thus reasonable that this part of the Defence *is written in the second person, which obviously adds theatricality to the arguments. But given that this speech does not refer to real facts the questions posed by the defendant are never answered by the prosecutor. The overall result of this interrogation is to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecutor; this is achieved by two different ways. In 22 – 24, the emphasis is placed on the truth / opinion antithesis. In other words, Gorgias discusses in detail what has already been outlined in 5, namely the suspicion that Odysseus has based his charges on* δόξα. *In 25 – 26 his efforts are concentrated on the demonstration of the contradictory character of the charges brought against him by Odysseus, who had claimed that in P.'s personality there is a coexistence of two opposite, and mutually exclusive characteristics (*μανία / σοφία). *In 27 he introduces the description of his* ἐπιεικές *ethos.*

πρὸς τὸν κατήγορον διαλεχθῆναι: G. introduces the *erotesis*; Coulter (1964 p.276, p.302, n.23) notes that an interrogation of the opponent is also found in the Platonic *Apology* 24b-28a and that "although rare, is nevertheless found in three of the Attic orators" (Dem. 46.10, Lys. 12.25 and 22.5, And. 1.14).

τίνι ποτέ: 'What in the world do you trust then' accurately translated by Kennedy (1972 p.79); it may be that G. uses a *prosbole*, as he passes immediately to the question at stake. τίνι is neuter and expresses both ἀλήθεια and δόξα, and ποτὲ adds intensive force (cp. Pl. *Ap*.21b).

τοιοῦτος...κατηγορεῖς: the first τοιοῦτος refers to Odysseus and the second to P. himself and they have a bad and a good sense respectively; the alliteration of /t/ is worth attention as well (cp. Soph. *Phil*. 1049 οὐ γὰρ τοιούτων δεῖ, τοιοῦτός εἰμ᾽ ἐγώ).

οἷος ὢν...ἀνάξια: my suggestion is a combination of the emendations of Blass (οἷα λέγεις ὡς) and Kalligas (οἷος ὢν λέγεις ὡς ἀνάξιος ἀνάξια). The former emended the οἶδάς γε ἴσως of A, but the οἷα λέγεις can hardly be explained by ἀναξίῳ. Kalligas prints Blass's ὡς, but he does not adopt οἷα λέγεις, which creates a Gorgianic symmetrical chiasm. The sophist is well aware that the judges in the context of a courtroom consider the *ethos* (οἷος ὢν) of the litigants as presented in their *logoi* (οἷα λέγεις), and this is why he will not try to present the negative aspects of Odysseus as a πρόσωπον at all (cp. 27; see Introduction). Odysseus' *ethos* will be presented only in connection with the proportion of truth that can be traced in his words, whereas P. will fully discuss his own *ethos* in 28-32.

εἰδὼς ἀκριβῶς ἢ δοξάζων;: the idea expressed in 5 will now be fully developed. These are the qualifications that transform Odysseus into either ἄξιος or ἀνάξιος. But as will be shown (22-24), the prosecutor is lacking the first and relying on the second; hence his chracterisation as ἀνάξιος from the opening lines. δοξάζων: is

more emphatically opposed to an absolute knowledge than δοκεῖν (Schmid cited by Untersteiner 1961 p.125).

εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰδώς: this possibility will be gradually refuted; the schema used for this refutation is based on a string of hypotheses (ἰδών, μετέχων, πυθόμενος). The objective knowledge of a deed is presented here as much dependent on senses. G. is clever enough to transform the prosecutor into an eye-witness, an accomplice or a mere witness of the crime allegedly committed by the person he defends (see note on 11).

τοῦ <μετέχοντος>: Blass's addition of the participle contributes to the cohesion of the text, since the idea is repeated (τοῦ μετέχοντος ἀκούσας).

φράσον...τὸν χρόνον: <τὸν τρόπον> is the conjecture of Blass; Radermacher's suggestion is φράσον τοὺς τρόπους (1914 p.88 n.1) and he does not seem particularly interested in the number of the noun ("in irgend einer Form"). The suggestion of Blass is preferable since the singular corresponds better to the τόπον and χρόνον. Radermacher has also pointed out that the last two categories express the notion of καιρός. Kennedy, who follows him (1963 p.66-7), holds that "Any given problem involves choice or compromise between two antitheses so that consideration of kairos, that is of time, place, and circumstance (e.g. Pal. 22), alone can solve the dilemma and lead to the choice of relative truth and action". This seems to me an irrelevant remark: literary καιρός (see fr. 13) should be distinguished from the argument built on the examination of the circumstances in which the crime that Palamedes is accused of was allegedly committed. Buchheim (1989 p.180, n.29) believes that in this expression there is something ("etwas") from the threshold of the philosophical categories of Aristotle (Categories IV 1b25ff). Kalligas maintains that this is the first time that a rhetor creates probable arguments based not only on the πρόσωπον as Corax and Teisias did, but on the place, the time and the particular circumstances of the case he deals with (1991 p.259, n.21); cp.

Quint. *Inst. Orat.* 3. 15 *sed quid res poscat, quid personam deceat, quod sit tempus, qui iudicis animus intuiti, humano quodam modo ad scribendum accesserimus.*

ἐλθέτω...μαρτυρησάτω: one more asyndeton creating a climax (cp. 10 συνήλθομεν...).

οὐδέτερος ὑμῶν: neither the prosecutor, nor the defendant have called a witness. P. has said in 15 that the most credible witness he can produce is his own life.

23

ὡς σὺ φής: the phrase refers to γενομένων; P. has already stated that he has never performed the deeds of which he is accused (5). So the meaning is 'according to your account', namely that P. betrayed the Greeks to the Trojans. P. uses material from the opponent's speech, which was delivered before the speech of defence. But as this is a model speech, it is G. who creates the opponent's statementens only to be answered in the defence of the hero.

τὰ μὲν γάρ...μαρτυρηθῆναι: 'It is impossible to bring evidence for something that has never happened'; the Ms reads ἀγένητά πως ἀδύνατα μαρτυρηθῆναι which makes perfect sense, and no emendation is required (πῶς <οὐκ> ἀδύνατα Aldus, πῶς ἂν δύναιτο Radermacher, followed by Kalligas, πάντως ἀδύνατα Keil). The impossibility of having knowledge on the truth of something that has never occurred (cp. 5), now turns into impossibility to communicate something that has never happened. This shift reminds us of the argument of the incommunicability of truth in *ONB*. πῶς adds ironical tone to argument

περὶ δὲ τῶν γενομένων...εὑρεῖν: The passage presents textual difficulties. The suggestions can be divided into two groups: a) Diels and Reiske, followed by Kalligas (who prints Diels' addition) suppose that there is a lacuna between ἀλλά and σοί; the former prints <καὶ ἀναγκαῖον· ἀλλά>...<τὲ μὴ> μόνον, and the latter <καὶ δίκαιον καὶ πάνυ ἀναγκαῖον>...οὖν ἦν οὐ μόνον, b) Sykutris -

followed by Untersteiner and Buchheim - has shown that it is not necessary to assume the existence of any lacuna, for it leads to a misinterpretation of the phrase, and thus he prints περὶ δὲ τῶν γενομένων οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥᾴδιον, οὐδὲ μόνον ῥᾴδιον, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οὐκ ἦν οἷόν <τε> μόνον μάρτυρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψευδομάρτυρας εὑρεῖν (Untersteiner and Buchheim do not print a comma after the μάρτυρας). I follow (b) because the necessity of a μαρτυρία in a context discussing the possibility of such a μαρτυρία seems irrelevant (see Buchheim 1989 p.180, n.30). The equitability (ἴσον) does not imply responsibilities, but the possibility (or the impossibility) for each litigant to bring witnesses. Odysseus could make his accusation more credible (πιστοτέραν) if he called witnesses (22), and this implies that the use of false witnesses (which explains the ῥᾴδιον) cannot not be overlooked. And to put it in a more cynical way the one who is facing the ἀνάγκη (defined in ch.4 as a dangerous teacher) is P. who defends his life, not Odysseus who wishes to put him to death (see also Untersteiner 1961 p.126).

οὐδέτερον: picks up οὐδέτερον of 22, where P. states a fact, whereas here it is explained why *he* is not able to bring witnesses of any kind.

24

ὅτι μὲν...φανερόν: the subjective knowledge of 5 expressed in the first person (σαφῶς οἶδα) became through the argumentation an objective and obvious (φανερόν) truth.

τὸ δὴ λοιπόν...δοξάζειν: given that Odysseus does not know the truth, he relies on *doxa, et tertium non datur*.   τὸ δὴ λοιπόν: cp. 19.

εἶτα: expresses surprise and sarcasm (LSJ); cp. Ar. *Wealth* 79 εἶτ' ἐσίγας, Πλοῦτος ὤν;

τολμηρότατε: with a negative sense (cp. Antiphon 2.3.1 ἀναιδής καὶ τολμηρός). This is the only adjective used in the characterisation of Odysseus.

δόξῃ πιστεύσας...οὐκ εἰδώς: δόξα plays an important role in G.'s rhetoric. The word has both an active and a passive sense, as it can be used by the rhetor in order to impose his own opinion on his audience through the power of *logos* and at the same time it is the thing that men chiefly trust although it is ἀπιστότατον. In other words a rhetor must be aware of the fact that men, unable to have a thorough knowledge of things, are condemned to rely on their δόξα, which in *Hel.* 13 is opposed to τέχνη, not to truth as in *Pal.* (see Segal 1962, 145, n.59, and note on *Hel.* 11) and this knowledge in combination with the effectiveness of speech (λόγος τέχνῃ γραφείς *Hel.* 13) – defined as δυνάστης μέγας in *Hel.* 8 – is what offers the rhetor the possibility to mislead his audience (δόξα is found again in 35).

περὶ θανάτου διώκειν: 'bring capital charge against someone' (cp. Xen. *Hell.* 7.3.6 ὦ ἄνδρες πολῖται, ἡμεῖς τουτουσὶ τοὺς ἀποκείναντας Εὔφρονα διώκομεν περὶ θανάτου); it is interesting that the outcome of Odysseus' conspiracy in the myth is used by G. as the penalty with which P. is threatened. But betrayal was not always punished with death penalty (see MacDowell, 1978, p.177).

τολμᾷς: picks up τολμηρότατε; his acts correspond to his character (*ethos*).

τό γε δοξάσαι...σοφώτερος: δόξα is something that all men are sharing (but in *Hel.* 11, one finds a more elaborate discussion of it). This phrase creates a logical gap: how would Odysseus be able to approach and state the truth, since he, as everyone, is a victim of δόξα? The only way was to trust his senses (22) and then bring evidence of what he has seen or heard. But his intentions were obviously other than to produce an accusation on the basis of knowledge of truth. κοινὸν ἅπασι περὶ πάντων: doxa is here presented as the state of mind of all men, whereas in *Hel.* 11 some men, namely those who possess the λόγων τέχνη, have freed themselves from the bonds of *doxa*. It is evident that *doxa*, conceived of as a universal state of the human mind, detracts much

from the prosecutor's credibility. σοφώτερος: the comparative is here ironical.

ἀλλ οὔτε...δόξης: Goebel (1989 p.48-9) compares this passage with Antiphon 2.2.10 and says: "What is subjectively a conjecture is objectively a probability, and it is clear that G. is here exploiting the antithesis of truth and probability in the same way as Antiphon [...] the 'knowledge' he claims is merely his own 'certain knowledge'".

25

σοφίαν καὶ μανίαν: G. is using these antithetical notions, so as to prove that the prosecution is inconsistent (the so-called *dillema* or *dillematon*). It is impossible to give one definition of what G. means by the word σοφία, since it is his common practice to describe the same notion in different ways (cp. *Hel.* κόσμος ψυχῇ...σοφία (1), σοφίας ἐπικτήτου (4), φιλοσόφων λόγων (13); in *Pal.* ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ (16), τῶν ἄλλων σοφώτερος (24); fr.23 ὅ τ' ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατηθέντος). The discussion of the various meanings of the word is a very difficult issue (for a detailed analysis see Gladigow 1965; see also Kerferd 1981 pp.24-25). Buchheim has accurately stated that μανία and σοφία are also traced in the *Symposium*, where Plato is trying to bring them together under the prism of Love (203e5; μανία and ἔρως combined, in *Phaidros* 242a and 244aff. See also Prodikos DK B 7: ἐπιθυμίαν μὲν διπλασιασθεῖσαν ἔρωτα εἶναι, ἔρωτα δὲ διπλασιασθέντα μανίαν γίγνεσθαι).

τεχνήεντά τε...πόριμον: Buchheim (1989 p.180, n. 32) observes that these adjectives are "sophistic" and can be found in the description of Love in the *Symposium* (203d5ff.); Ἔρως...θηρευτὴς δεινός, ἀεί τινας πλέκων μηχανάς, καὶ φρονήσεως ἐπιθυμητὴς καὶ πόριμος, φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σοφιστής (see also note on *Hel.* 14).   δεινόν: see Voit 1934 p. 10 (cited by Untersteiner 1961 p.126).   πόριμος: in the *Symposium* 203b3 Πόρος is presented as the father of Ἔρως and can be

considered as the representative of practical wisdom (cp. Alkman fr.5 Page with Most 1987). The idea of εὐπορία is deliberately omnipresent in the *Pal.* (4, 10, 11, 30; see Introduction), associated with the wisdom (σοφία) of P. G. deliberately repeats this word in all the possible forms, since he intends to underline the main and more important virtue of P. as known from the myth (30 τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον πόριμον ἐξ ἀπόρου) and to present him as the representative of practical wisdom. At the same time he draws attention to the difficult position into which he has been brought by Odysseus: if a πόριμος man like P. is in a situation of ἀπορία, then what would have happened if one among us (or of the audience) was brought into the same situation? Could G. puff more effectively the crucial necessity of his art?

μανία γάρ...καταστήσει: the definition of μανία is given in three levels: a) madness is to perform impossible, disadvantageous and disgraceful deeds, which b) harm your friends and help your enemies and which c) will make your life ignominious and insecure. The ἀδύνατα ἔργα is similar with the ματαίοις πόνοις in *Hel.* 17. The second level picks up 18, where helping friends and harming enemies is presented as a good reason for someone to act unjustly. The (b) joined with (c) in their positive perspective are presented in Plato's *Meno* 71e (=fr.19; see notes *ad loc.*) as G.'s definition of ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή. Madness related to the helping friends and harming enemies *topos* appears in Aiskh. *Pr.* 975ff. (see Padel 1995, pp.206-7). σφαλερόν: cp. *Hel.* 11 σφαλεραῖς εὐτυχίαις.

ὅστις τὸν αὐτὸν...λέγει; Mazzara (1982, p.125ff) noticed that the argument follows a logical schema discussed by Aristotle in his *Metaphysica* (IV 3-4); (see also Buchheim 1989 p.180, n.34 and Introduction).

26

πότερον τοὺς σοφούς...φρονίμους: with πότερον G. introduces an argument from antimomy (see Introduction); for this reason he treats

φρονίμους as a synonym of σοφούς, which are distinguished by Aristotle in *EN* 6,7 1140a25-28: δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως; note that the characteristics that Aristotle attributes to φρόνιμος are similar to those brought in by G. a few lines later.

καινὸς ὁ λόγος: The Ms has κενός which does not create the schema κατ' ἄρσιν καὶ θέσιν that G. means to employ; from the antithetical structure (καινὸς...ἀλλά) we may infer that G. probably merited καινολογία (cp. *Hel.* 5 τὸ γὰρ τοῖς εἰδόσιν...φέρει, and Pl.*Phdr.* 267 καινά τε ἀρχαίως τά τ' ἐναντια καινῶς). The same sylistic device is attributed by Aristotle to Theodorus *Rhet.*1412a26 τὸ καινὰ λέγειν, that means novelties in the style). But it seems that the criterion for an effective καινολογία was its truth or its verisimilitude (ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀληθής). In *Hel.* κόσμος for λόγος is ἀλήθεια (1).

μᾶλλον αἱρεῖσθαι...ἀγαθῶν: 'prefer bad things to the goods that already exist'; Calogero (1976 p.414-5) has discerned here, as eslewhere, similarities between *Pal.* and the Platonic *Apology*.

παρόντων: πρότερον τῶν, Ms; my reading (based on Diels's πρὸ παρόντων) requires less drastic alteration.

δι' ἀμφότερα...ψευδής: cp. Pl.*Apol.*25e ὥστε σύ γε κατ' ἀμφότερα ψεύδῃ. This is the 'logical' inferrence resulting from the use of the argument from antinomy.

27

ἀντικατηγορῆσαι...ταῦτα: ἀντικατηγορία (what Aristotle would term as διαβολή) is just implied; G. with a rhetorical ἀποσιώπησις (οὐ βούλομαι) avoids going into detail, and prefers to pass to the description of Palamedes' *ethos* (τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἀγαθοῖς; see Süss 1910 p.56, Untersteiner 1961 p.112, p.128). <βούλομαι>: Aldus' addition

of the verb is necessary before γάρ, and it is possible that G. himself meant to stress the ἀποσιώπησις with an ἀναστροφή.

In ch. 28 – 36 P. addresses the judges. His apostrophe is twofold: first (28-32) the defendant will try to draw their attention to his ethos, and then (33-36) he will proceed by explaining the criteria upon which they must rely, in order to dispense real justice.

28

πρὸς δ' ὑμᾶς...εἰπεῖν: G. juxtaposes the jurors and the defendant (πρὸς δ' ὑμᾶς...περὶ ἐμοῦ; cp. περὶ ὑμῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς 33). In this way he passes from the interrogation of the prosecutor to the apostrophe of the jurors. It is possible that this use of the pronouns is also suggestive of the ὑπόκρισις.   κριταί: rarely used for the jurors; it usually refers to the judges of poetic contests (cp. Lys.16.21). But G. is not bound by the situational context of a real courtroom and above all his intention is to provide rhetorical instruction which demands a more general and flexibly applicable wording (but in his conclusion he uses the word δικαστάς).

ἐπίφθονον μὲν...προσήκοντα: G. has in mind a general rule dictated by the context of a trial; the idea is that the speech must be in conformity with τὸ δέον. In other words he must say the appropriate things in the appropriate time (καιρός), as P. will claim in ch.32. P., lacking witnesses, is compelled to offer an account of his previous life and to describe his ἐπιεικές ethos. But he also knows that speaking in praise of himself can be considered a sign of vanity. This is why he has to explain the reason why he indulges (ἥδιστόν μοι) in a self-referential discourse. Notice that the period is dominated by antithetical clauses. ἐπίφθονον: 'invidious'; it is interesting that φθόνος and διαβολή are also the motives attributed by Socrates to his prosecutors (Pl. *Apol.* 18d, 28a). The defendant of Lys. 24 claims that he, a poor and disabled man is unjustly

prosecuted, as his life deserves more ἔπαινος than φθόνος, which implies that men are prone to envy men of consequence (the same common idea is expressed adverbially in Soph.*Aj*.157: πρὸς γὰρ τὸν ἔχονθ' ὁ φθόνος ἕρπει; cp. the *Epitaphios*). P. himself (3; see note on φθόνος) suggested that one of the possible motives of his own prosecutor is φθόνος and in his self portrait he will state that he himself is not φθονερός to prosperous men. οὐκ ἀνεκτά: Diels emends the reading of the Ms to ἂν εἰκότα; but the word of the Ms is quite frequent in prose (cp.Pl. *Lg*.861d, *Tht.* 154c,181b), and at any rate I cannot see why G. should refer to probabilities in this context. Provided that we accept the minor addition <μὴ ἀνεκτά>, the reading of the Ms gives a perfect meaning: 'what for someone who is not prosecuted is not tolerable, this very thing becomes appropriate for someone who is prosecuted'.

νῦν γάρ...ὑπέχω: P. briefly summarises what he is going to discuss next; G. deliberately integrates in his text an outline of this very text, as he intends to provide his students with general instructions concerning the structure of a persuasive speech. The wording here belongs to the legal terminology of Athenian public life; εὔθυνα combined with λόγους (notice that G. employs an ἓν διὰ δυοῖν) refers to the process of the examination of a public official's conduct as a whole (MacDowell 1978 pp.170 – 172; cp. Lys. 9.11, 24.26, 30.3, 5; information on the process of the examination of public officials is given by Aristotle in his *AP* 48.3, 54). Here, P., a mythical hero, is going to give an account of his public life voluntarily. G.'s stratagem is one of high intelligence, as P. will not undergo this investigation, but he will create it himself (this is why it is ἥδιστον for him to do so), in order to prove that he is a benefactor of the community. The overall result of this anachronism is to add verisimilitude to the text; a more important reason is perhaps that G. implicitly draws the attention of his students to the way in which such an account should be composed, so as to be effective.

φθονῆσαι: picks up ἐπίφθονον.

ἀναγκαῖον: P. is in a condition of ἀνάγκη (4); it is the παροῦσα ἀνάγκη (namely that he is accused of terrible crimes that he has never committed, κατηγορημένον δεινὰ καὶ ψευδῆ) that make him refer to his own merits (cp. Dem. 18. 4). P. defends himself by referring to acts (34), but he is also aware that the way (that is the time, the form of his speech etc) in which he is going to present them is more important than mere facts, hence the apologetic tone of this passage.

ἐν εἰδόσιν...ἥδιστόν μοι: what for others, namely the process of a public examination, is an ordeal for P. is a pleasant process. The phrase ἐν εἰδόσιν ὑμῖν 'to you who are aware of these things' reminds us of τὸ γὰρ τοῖς εἰδόσιν...οὐ φέρει in *Hel.* 5 (see note on ch.26). The phrase is not in contradiction with what is said there, since the *kairos* has changed. Here the repetition of the defendant's benefactions (who has already explained why he is about to do something ἐπίφθονον) corroborate his statement of innocence.

29

ἀληθῆ: Odysseus' charges have of course proved to be nothing but lies.

πρὸς ὑμᾶς περὶ ἐμοῦ: picks up the first line of ch.28; but here he refers to the speech of the prosecutor.

εἴρηκεν ὧν εἴρηκεν: Kalligas, *contra mundum*, deletes ὧν εἴρηκεν; but the repetition is in accordance with the Gorgianic style (cp. ἔπραξεν ἃ ἔπραξεν *Hel.* 5, 20).

οὕτως...δύναται: 'thus his speech has the power of an unproved abuse'; ἔλεγχος means 'proving wrong through an investigation', and λοιδορία is by its nature a groundless abuse (cp. Pl. *Phdr.* 267a1).

οὐκ ἂν ψευσαίμην...ἐλεγχθείην: the wording deliberately picks up the words used by P. in his criticism of the account of Odysseus. His λοιδορία does not have ἔλεγχος and the charges brought against him are δεινά and ψευδῆ, whereas he relies on real facts.

εὐεργέτης: 'benefactor'; P. calls his inventions εὐεργεσίαι. This word expresses an important Greek value. The term in this context could be associated with the function of εὐεργεσία in the relations of states. Probably G. intends to place emphasis on the contribution of P. to the unity of the Greeks (as is shown by the word 'Ελλήνων; ὑμῶν refers to the judges who are the flower of the Greek army: cp.33 and ch.13). Karavites (1980, pp.67 – 79) discusses the term in the light of intercity relations and brings evidence from Herodotos and Thucydides; he concludes that "there were traditional assumptions which were expected to affect the conduct of the Greek city-states in their mutual relations [...] the attitude of the Greeks in the Fifth century toward the principle of *euergesia* is indicative of the importance the Greeks attached to their traditional values. Furthermore, whenever infractions of *euergesia* were observed, the Greeks criticised the violators, regardless of the cause of the infractions" (p.79). Probably P. appeals to these common values shared by the jurors and this is why he refers to the Greeks separately. However, one may possibly see in this context another manifestation of G.'s Panhellenism, which was fully developed in his *Olympic Oration* (cp. Soph. *Trach.*1045-1111, where Herakles presents the εὐεργεσίαι which he offered to Greece).

οὐ μόνον... <καὶ>: Reiske, followed by Diels and Kalligas; Sykutris (1927 p.862) suggests οὔκουν τῶν νῦν ὄντων, ἀλλὰ <καὶ>; Radermacher (1941 p.175-6) follows him and prints, – καὶ τῶν ἀπάντων..., οὐκ οὖν τῶν νῦν ὄντων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων εἶναι; πόριμον ἐξ ἀπόρου: the *Leitmotif* of the speech; G. has repeatedly used the πορ- words (see note on ch.25). Buchheim compares this

phrase with Pl. *Grg.* 448c: ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην.

κεκοσμημένον ἐξ ἀκόσμου: κόσμος is the first word of *Hel.*; it is extremely difficult to interpret this word. The main meanings of κόσμος are a) order and b) ornament. The second meaning is irrelevant to this context (as in the context of *Hel.*), because I do not understand how the invention of laws, letters etc can adorn human life. In this context the word 'order' seems more likely, meaning the order in a human community produced by the knowledge of practical wisdom (this interpretation is in accordance with fifth century theories of progrees, see Guthrie 1971, pp.60-3, and Introduction). But I am inclined to believe that the term remains uninterpreted and untranslatable and that all the interpretative approaches involve a great dose of divination.

τάξεις τε πολεμικὰς...ἄλυπον διατριβήν; For a discussion of P.'s inventions see Introduction.

31

τὸ γὰρ ἐκείνοις...ἀδύνατον: these are two contrasted and mutually exclusive things. The logical schema is similar to the one used by P., in order to show that the prosecutor's charges are contradictory and that the prosecution is inconsistent in 25 – 26. It is not reasonable to assume that an inquisitive man, whose mission is to help men, can also be prone to badness.

ἀξιῶ δε...ἀδικηθῆναι: the idea that one should treat others exactly as one is treated by them can be found in several Gorgianic passages: *Hel.* 7 ἄξιος οὖν...ζημίας τυχεῖν; fr.6 ὑβρισταὶ εἰς...ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς. Buchheim (1989, 181) has discerned that this attitude is censured in Pl. *Rep.* 359a-b.

32

οὐκ ἀνωφελής: a litotes; cp. χρήσιμον in 36, and οὔτε...ἄχρηστος in 32.

τοῖς εὐτυχοῦσιν...οἰκτίρμων: cp. fr.6 θεράποντες μὲν τῶν ἀδίκως δυστυχούντων, κολασταὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδίκως εὐτυχούντων.

οὔτε πενίας...προτιμῶν: see note on 15.

ὁ παρὼν καιρὸς ἠνάγκασε: it is worth attention that the word ἀναγκαῖον is found in the opening chapter of this part of *Pal.*, and the meaning of the whole phrase is very close to τῆς παρούσης ἀνάγκης at 4. The rhetor claims that he was compelled to proceed with a self-portrait because of the difficulties of his case. In other words it does not merely matter what one says, but it is equally (or more) important when (where, how etc) he is saying it.

ταῦτα κατηγορημένον: picks up κατηγορημένον δεινὰ καὶ ψευδῆ in 28.

33

περὶ ὑμῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς...τῆς ἀπολογίας: from the περὶ ἐμοῦ πρὸς ὑμᾶς the defendant passes to the τὰ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς which is the last part of his argumentation. Once again G. gives to his audience (and to his students) the opportunity to notice what he is doing and with a proleptic phrase he announces what he is going to do (παύσομαι τῆς ἀπολογίας), that is to end the defence.

οἶκτος μὲν οὖν...παραίτησις: Süss (1910 p.56) has maintained that the rhetorical common practice expressed here is taken from Thrasymachus' Ἔλεοι; but since our knowledge of the content of this treatise (evidence is given in 85B5,6) is wanting, we can take the argument employed here as a rhetorical *topos*. Antiphon (fr.1c in Gagarin's edition, 1997) follows the same trunk line, περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐλεεῖν ὑμᾶς ἐμὲ ἐδεήθη δείσας μὴ ἐγὼ δάκρυσι καὶ ἱκετίαις πειρῶμαι ὑμᾶς ἀναπείθειν and Socrates, as depicted in the Platonic *Apology*, presents ἔλεοι as a common practice in the courts of law (38e), and states that although he faces the heaviest penalty, he will not be tempted to employ them so as to be pitied (ibid 34c), ἐδεήθη

τε καὶ ἱκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη...ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω. Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1354a16-18) holds that διαβολὴ γάρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν. οἶκτος: here, 'lamentation'; cp. And. 1.48 ἦν δὲ βοὴ καὶ οἶκτος κλαόντων καὶ ὀδυρομένων τὰ παρόντα κακά. παραίτησις: 'entreaty', is a rare word (cp. Dem. *Phil.* 3, 37 καὶ τιμωρίᾳ μεγίστῃ τοῦτον ἐκόλαζον καὶ παραίτησις οὐδεμί᾽ ἦν οὐδὲ συγγνώμη).

ἐν ὄχλῳ μὲν...χρήσιμα: the word ὄχλος in this context has a negative sense as it is opposed to the leaders of the Greek army, who will remained uninfluenced by emotionla appeals. In *Hel.* 13, πολὺς ὄχλος is opposed to the power of one single speech and in that context it has a neutral sense, as in the *Gorgias* 455a3 of Plato οὐδ᾽ ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶν δικαστηρίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων. Untersteiner (1961 p.132) holds that this is an anachronism and that the word refers to the Eliaia that consisted of more judges than the mythical court of G.'s text. But we should not go that far since we do not have evidence that G. undervalued the Eliasts. We can preferably read this phrase as an example of how a rhetor can effectively dispose the judges in favour of the defendant and as an indirect praise to the *ethos* of P. who prefers truth to silly supplications (for a comparative approach of the word ὄχλος and the semantic similarities in G. and Thucydides see Hunter 1986 pp.412-429 esp. n. 6 and 38).

τοῖς πρώτοις οὖσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ δοκοῦσι: the phrase is an echo of the διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἔδοξεν in *Hel.* 3 and probably, though not necessarily, of sophistic relativism. The idea expressed here is in striking accordance both in form and in content with fr.26. Notice that the importance of the coexistence of εἶναι and δοκεῖν is reinforced by the *homoeoteleuton*.

οὐ φίλων...οἶκτοις: the repetition of words or phrases in reverse order is characteristically Gorgianic (cp. *Hel.* 20, where he repeats

the possible reasons for which Helen followed Paris to Troy). In this way he creates a long chiasm which brings together the two opposed elements, that is the leaders of the Greeks and a mob: οἶκτος καὶ λιταὶ καὶ φίλων παραίτησις – ἐν ὄχλῳ – παρὰ δ᾽ ὑμῖν τοῖς πρώτοις οὖσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων... – οὐ φίλων βοηθείαις...οἴκτοις.

τῷ σαφεστάτῳ δικαίῳ...τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην: the wording of the phrase picks up the beginning of *Pal.*, where δίκη (2) has been opposed to βία and ἀλήθεια (4) described as dangerous teachers. P. has now shown the truth and it is not necessary to try to deceive the judges. For τὸ δίκαιον meaning 'criterion', 'test', cp. Antiphon 6.24, Dem.54.27.

34

ὑμᾶς δὲ χρὴ...νομίζειν: P. demonstrates – in the form of antithetical pairs – four different principles upon which the judges will have to rely in order to reach a conclusion that will be in accordance with truth. But at the same time these suggestions bring out the problematic of justice and pose the question whether a court of law can dispense real justice. Hence the anxiety of P. and the density of the text. τοῖς λόγοις...τοῖς ἔργοις: it is strange that G. (through P.'s mouth) does not feel very confident and he asks the judges to pay more attention to deeds than to the (prosecutor's) words. How could this be justifiable for the man who claimed that λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν, and who is presented as the first one to develop rhetoric? Untersteiner (1954 pp.137-138) interprets it (as always) under the light of the 'epistemological' treatise *ONB*. Long, (1982 p.237) who, I am inclined to believe, has more accurately than anyone else understood and interpreted *Pal.*, is not on the right track when he says that "Undercutting his own rhetoric G.'s comments on the gap between eloquence and the perspicacity of truth are an ironical admission that he is only an advocate. His job is not the revelation of truth, but the provision of the best possible

arguments on his client's behalf." The case here is not the same as that in *Hel.*; Odysseus seeks to put P. to death, so a παίγνιον or an ironical tonality would have been extremely dangerous. I suggest that the answer to this question can be found in 35 (εἰ μὲν οὖν...οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; see note *ad loc.*). μηδὲ τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ἐλέγχων προκρίνειν: it picks up 29 (οὕτως λοιδορίαν οὐκ ἔχουσαν ἔλεγχον); the prosecutor's αἰτία is nothing but mere λοιδορία, whereas the defendant's argumentation is an ἔλεγχος (29), based on probabilities and reasonable arguments. μηδὲ τὸν ὀλίγον χρόνον...κριτήν: G. is perhaps referring to the time limitation imposed by the *clepsydra*; what is questioned with this antithesis is the possibility that the defendant can defend the whole of his life (τοῦ πολλοῦ) and the judges reach the truth in a limited period of time (ὀλίγον χρόνον). In Plato's *Gorgias* 455a5-6 Socrates says: οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὄχλον γ' ἂν δύναιτο τοσοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα (cp. Pl. *Ap.*37a ὀλίγον χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διαλέγμεθα and 19a; *Tht.* 201a). This practice is characteristically depicted in fr.30; Antiphon (fr.79) in a more serious way claims that τέως μὲν γὰρ ὁ πολὺς χρόνος τοῦ ὀλίγου πιστότερος ἦν (cp. also Aristophanes *Aves* 1694– 1701= fr.5a). μηδὲ τὴν διαβολὴν...νομίζειν: although the idea is expressed in a general way it refers to specific parts of the argumentation: διαβολή is an αἰτία on the level of λόγοι (μηδὲ τὰς αἰτίας...), whereas πεῖρα is knowledge resulting from the scrutiny (ἐλέγχων) of ἔργα (cp. Soph. *Trach.* 590-4: οὕτως ἔχει γ' ἡ πίστις, ὡς τὸ μὲν δοκεῖν / ἔνεστι, πείρᾳ δ' οὐ προσωμίλησά πω. / ἀλλ' εἰδέναι χρὴ δρῶσαν, ὡς οὐδ' εἰ δοκεῖς / ἔχειν, ἔχοις ἂν γνῶμα, μὴ πειρωμένη.

τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν: the phrase is deliberately repeated in 35.

εὐλαβείας: the word, as Schmid (1940 p.583, n.5) has first discerned, is a sophistic notion and it is related to καιρός; P. challenges the judges to think of their own συμφέρον by allowing a sufficient period of time (see n. on χρόνος; cp. τὸν δὲ πλείω χρόνον ἐπιμείνατε) and by using πρόνοια until they reach a faultless

conclusion. εὐλάβεια can be defined then as the precaution taken by someone, in order to avoid being exposed to dangers or reaching ineffective decisions (for a similar forensic use of the word cp. Antiphon 2.3.11: πολλὴ εὐλάβεια ὑμῖν τούτων ποιητέα ἐστί, and Pl. *Apol.* 17a-b: μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἓν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρὴ ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν). This rationalistic, and probably opportunistic way of thinking is opposed to a straightforward heroism and it can be (under the oppression of authoritarianism it certainly is) perceived as cowardice (cp. *TrGrFr* 3, 1052.7 οἱ γὰρ πόνοι τίκτουσι τὴν εὐανδρίαν, / ἡ δ' εὐλάβεια σκότον ἔχει κατ' Ἑλλάδα, / τὸ διαβιῶναι μόνον ἀεὶ θηρωμένη). A striking example of the way in which the word can be interpreted as prudence, when the purposes of the argumentation alter is Demosthenes 19. 206 τίνα δ' οὗτοι μὲν ἄτολμον καὶ δειλὸν πρὸς τοὺς ὄχλους φασὶν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ' εὐλαβῆ.

τὰ δὲ ἀνήκεστα...μᾶλλον: The words ἀνήκεστος and ἀκεστός mean 'irrecoverable' and 'recoverable' respectively. Stephanus' emendation ἀκεστῶν (for Ms ἀνηκέστων) is certainly correct, since it preserves the antithesis (cp. Antiphon 5. 91). G. is using three medical terms (ἀνήκεστα, ἀκεστῶν, ἀνίατα) linked to the idea expressed in 35: ἡ δὲ τῷ βίῳ νόσος. In other words, the irrecoverable effects of their ill-decision will turn out to be their chronic ailment. Blass (1887, p.77) has compared 34, 35 and 36 with Antiphon's 5.86, 91, 89, where the similarities both in form and in content are striking (cp. also Lys. 4.20 ἱκετεύω ὑμᾶς καὶ ἀντιβολῶ, ἐλεήσατέ με...μηδὲ ἀνηκέστῳ συμφορᾷ περιβάλητε).

τῶν δὲ τοιούτων...κρίνωσιν: the general ideas of the preceding lines are now brought to the very case of this speech. ἄνδρες ἄνδρα: one more example of the originally Gorgianic usage of repetition, where the subject and the object are juxtaposed. περὶ θανάτου: picks up the περὶ θανάτου διώκειν 24, where P. discusses the criteria upon which the prosecutor has based his κατηγορία (namely his δόξα),

whereas here he is discussing the criteria upon which the judges must (or must not) rely.

35

εἰ μὲν οὖν...ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων: this hypothesis has raised numerous interpretations; Untersteiner interprets the text under the prism of what has been termed as Gorgianic ἀπάτη and of the "terza proposizione del trattato gnoseologico-ontologico" (1961 p.133). Kerferd (1981 p.81) links it to the truth / opinion antithesis and maintains that "What is needed is to attend not to logoi but to real facts. Earlier in the speech Knowledge of what is true is opposed to Opinion (par. 24) and we are told that logos by itself is inconclusive unless we learn also from actual Truth itself (par. 4)". Long, who takes a different view, criticises Kerferd's assumption and says that "on his client's behalf Gorgias, the orator, plays a part which his audience will recognize as quite self-conscious, stylized advocacy. The supreme irony and instance of this role-playing appears in section 35 [...] I find no deep conceptual or epistemological significance in these remarks, nor am I tempted to see them as a part of a consistent Gorgian philosophy on the obscurity of reality". I consider that, as Long puts it, the meaning of this passage is perfectly clear and I doubt whether its interpretation is less sophisticated if we confine it to the particular context. But I do not follow Long in the respect that this is a 'role-playing' as the latter - certainly traceable in *Hel.*, where combined with the 'self – conscious stylized advocacy' appear in a more appropriate context- would not be in conformity with the intentions of *Pal.*, that is the acquittal of P. G. is simply dealing with a fabricated charge which was solely based on words; he thus recognizes that the most effective (and tragically the only) weapon of his client is the logical argumentation that preceded. What is questioned then, is not

generally the possibility of the words to express the truth, but the impossibility of bringing the judges by means of argumentation to the same level of knowledge, the knowledge of something that has never happened (cp. 23). This is why ἀλήθεια (and ἀνάγκη) are described (4) as dangerous teachers. Since his words cannot make the decision of the judges easier, mere statement of his innocence would have been equally persuasive. But this is what ἀνάγκη means: the tragic ἀπορία in endeavouring to prove your innocence by using words in a process which by nature is based solely on words (cp. Pl *Tht.* 201b-c ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσιν δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἐστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μή, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες, εἴπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν;). εὔπορος: G. deliberately picks up ἀπορία of 4. His ἀπορία of words is now an ἀπορία of the judges who must not rely on words. His judges and himself have been brought to the same situation: he has to defend himself and they have to reach a decision for a crime that has not been committed.

σῶμα: here it means 'life'; it is a frequent word in G.'s preserved texts (*Hel.* 1, 4, 8, 14); P. asks the judges to use his 'life' as a pledge, until they reach their verdict (the word has recently been examined by Musti 1993, pp.853 – 864, but he does not discuss the meaning of the word in *Pal.* 35).

φυλάξατε...ἐπιμείνατε...ποιήσατε: G. places the rhyming verbs at the end of the clauses adding emphasis to the stages that will secure real justice. ἐπιμείνατε: cp. Pl. *Ap.*38c εἰ γοῦν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον.

αἱρετώτερος...αἰσχρᾶς: with a masterstroke G. - on behalf of his client - tells the judges that they are facing the possibility of a penalty worse than death. The phrase echoes the beginning of the speech (1), where P. had claimed that the very object of the trial is not merely death, but the manner of this death (seen note *ad loc.*). If they now impose on him a death penalty (τῆς δὲ βίας ὑμεῖς [sc. κρατεῖτε]), then they themselves should prefer death. δόξης

αἰσχρᾶς: a rhetorical *topos;* cp. Is. 4. 95 see Dover 1974 p.227 and my note on ch.1. Ill-reputation is here presented as an illness.

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ἐὰν δὲ...φανερόν: Socrates claims the same thing at Pl. *Ap.* 38c: ὄνομα ἕξετε καὶ αἰτίαν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε. The argument that a death penalty unjustly imposed by a court of law is as wrong as homicide is found in Antiphon 5. 92 καὶ μὴν τὴν ἴσην γε δύναμιν ἔχει, ὅστις τε ἂν τῇ χειρὶ ἀποκτείνει ἀδίκως καὶ ὅστις τῇ ψήφῳ.

καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν...ὁ κατήγορος: cp. Antiphon 5. 89 καὶ οὐκ ἴσον ἐστὶ τόν τε διώκοντα μὴ ὀρθῶς αἰτιάσαθαι καὶ ὑμᾶς τοὺς δικαστὰς μὴ ὀρθῶς γνῶναι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτων αἰτίασις οὐκ ἔχει τέλος, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑμῖν ἐστι καὶ τῇ δίκῃ.

ἄθεον, ἄδικον, ἄνομον: a striking asyndetic privative tricolon which G. probably borrows from poetry (cp. Hom. *Il.* 9. 63: ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιός ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος, Soph. fr. 4 Radt: ὡς ὢν ἄπαις τε κἀγύναιξ κἀνέστιος; for a polysyndetic privative tetracolon, cp. Antiphon 1.22: ἀθέμιτα καὶ ἀνόσια καὶ ἀτέλεστα καὶ ἀνήκουστα; cp. also 1.21: ἀθεῶς καὶ ἀκλεῶς).

Ἑλλάδος, Ἕλληνες, Ἕλληνα: one more striking repetition, combined with an *anadiplosis*, which brings together the Greek defendant with the Greek judges.

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In a very short epilogue G. uses a statement that regularly occurs in oratory; before good judges it is inappropriate to summarise what has been discussed in detail.

καὶ παύομαι: P. fulfils his promise (ὃν εἰπὼν παύσομαι τῆς ἀπολογίας 33).

διὰ μακρῶν εἰρημένα: P.'s jury are not ordinary jurymen (ὄχλῳ 33, φαύλους δικαστάς), and therefore the usual ἀνακεφαλαίωσις is neither appropriate nor necessary.

τοὺς δὲ πρώτους τῶν πρώτων: for a similar construction cp. *Hel.* 3: ὅτι μὲν οὖν φύσει...τὰ πρῶτα τῶν πρώτων.

῞Ελληνας ῾Ελλήνων: another *anadiplosis* with these words (cp.36), which amounts to a further attempt on the part of the defendant to appeal to the patriotic feelings of the judges.

6 Epitaphios

Several hypotheses have been put forward about the date of G.'s *Epitaphios*. Blass (1887, p.62), who agrees with Wilamowitz, placed it in the second half of 420, almost immediately after the peace of Nicias (so Untersteiner 1954, p. 95; see also p.98 for a summary of suggestions). Schmid (1940, iii, p.75) proposed 412, whereas Aly (1929) thought that it was delivered by G. *himself* some time between 421 and 416. Mathieu (1925, p.24) entertains the view that it was composed after 382 and similarly Loraux 1986, p.431 n.32 claims that "the epitaphios dates from the early fourth century" and she explains (p.382 n.72) that the datings of those who place it in "the aftermath of the peace of Nicias...rest on the interpretation of the text of Philostratos (the Athenians' *eros* for empire) as an allusion to Athenian ambitions before the Sicilian expedition". She then concludes that "it may also refer to the climate of the years following 395, when the Athenians were thinking of rebuilding their empire and were allied with the Persians against the Spartans. Indeed the *Olympicus* is incontrovertibly dated to 392. The similarity of inspiration in these two orations might be an argument in favor of a closer dating".

It seems thus that scholars mainly tend to date the *Epitaphios* on account of historical events, which seem to them more or less fit the overt generalizations propounded in the preserved fragment. Before even asking ourselves if the present text 'reflects' the political environment in Athens of any given period (Untersteiner 1954, p.95 takes it for granted that it does), we should first assess our feeble knowledge about G.'s life. Untersteiner for instance contends (1954, pp.93-4) that after G. had visited numerous Greek cities, "he must have returned to Athens at the time of his *Funeral Oration*", thus

providing us with a perfectly smooth sequence of events, which, however, relies heavily on a circular argument.

To these views we should add Buchheim's hypothesis (1989, p.190) that the *Epitaphios* was actually delivered by G. himself; this scholar bases his speculation on Thuc. 2.34: ἀνὴρ ἡρημένος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὃς ἂν γνώμῃ τε δοκῇ μὴ ἀξύνετος εἶναι καὶ ἀξιώσει προήκῃ, λέγει ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἔπαινον τὸν πρέποντα, which, according to him, shows that the speakers of the *Epitaphioi* were not necessarily Athenian citizens. I find his contention inconclusive; firstly, because the passage he quotes does not explicitly mention foreigners, although it is well-known that Periklean rhetoric frequently stresses Athenian tolerance and openness, as opposed to the Spartan 'xenophobia' (cp. Thuc. 2.39). Secondly, G.'s *Epitaphios*, or the extant portion of it, has all the characteristics of a model-speech, and it serves thus more as an exemplification of the elements and the qualities that a speech that belongs to this *genre* should possess.

My view is that the *Epitaphios* cannot be dated; it is a model-speech with no specific references to historical events. In fact, there is no good reason to suggest that G. was actually in Athens when he composed the *Epitaphios*, and its affinities with later representatives of this genre ought not to be explained on this basis. This speech could have been composed anywhere, although it was, of course, designed to meet Athenian expectations. In fact, G. was a relentless traveller (Isok. 15.155-6 = Test.18) and it is hard to decide whether he wrote the speech in Athens or elsewhere (Philostratos, Test.1, who says ὁ δὲ ἐπιτάφιος, ὃν διῆλθεν ᾿Αθήνησιν probably did not have more firm knowledge than modern scholars who entertain this hypothesis do). G.'s *Epitaphios* combines, I am inclined to believe, both the qualities of a model-speech and the formulaic elements of the *genre* it purports to belong to.

τί γὰρ ἀπῆν...προσεῖναι; the construction is picked up in Plato's *Menexenos* 234c: οἳ οὕτω καλῶς ἐπαινοῦσιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ προσόντα καὶ τὰ μὴ περὶ ἑκάστου λέγοντες κάλλιστά πως τοῖς ὀνόμασι ποικίλλοντες γοητεύουσιν ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχάς. It has been shown (see Vollgraff 1952, p.5-7, Loraux 1986, p.313) that Plato intends his readers to construe this passage as an allusion to G.'s own *Epitaphios*, and it is worth pointing out that this is attained both by the citation of the Sophist's own words and mainly by the reference to the form of his speech; the charming of the audience (γοητεία is itself used in *Hel.* to describe the effects of λόγος; see Vollgraff 1952, p.5 n.2 and my comments on *Hel.* 10) is the result of ὀνόμασι ποικίλλοντες, as it is certainly true that the style of this sentence is even more Gorgian than that of the other texts of G.. Plato's point is that through *Epitaphioi* each and every citizen has his own share in a polished, if untrue, praise. But Plato is no less competent in using Gorgian style, for as Loraux puts it "parody is the only effective weapon against the mirage of the epitaphioi" (1986, p.312; cp. for instance Pl. *Menex.*247a ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ὕστατον καὶ διὰ παντὸς πᾶσαν πάντως προθυμίαν πειρᾶσθε ἔχειν ὅπως μάλιστα μὲν ὑπερβαλεῖσθε καὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς πρόσθεν εὐκλείᾳ).

εἰπεῖν δυναίμην...δεῖ: another antithetical chiasm; it is a common Gorgian feature to oppose ability to willingness, and it may well have been that in view of its general applicability he had developed it to a *topos* of argumentation. Having said that, we should bear in mind (as Loraux invites us to do) that this polarity is in the present context integrated in a text with its generic restrictions and peculiarities; in this light it should be seen in relation to the normative distinction of the *Epitaphioi* between what can be expressed through words and the excellence achieved by the acts of

the dead. Loraux (1986, p.228, n.25) offers a good number of parallels from other exponents of the genre and concedes that "whereas the epitaphioi oppose *logos* to *erga*, Gorgias seems to have no other aim but that of *making a speech* (εἰπεῖν δυναίμην) according to the 'rules' (ἃ δεῖ); there is no reference to 'reality'"(1986, p.432, n.52), and she explains this deviation on the basis of the autonomous nature given to *logos* by the Sophists. This explanation draws upon a systematisation of what 'Sophistic *logos*' is and it seems to me unnecessary; when Palamedes gives an account of his achievements (30), no such distinction is discernible and he is there presented as being conscious that his beneficial activity may cause the envy (φθόνος) of his audience. Similarly, the 'human envy' that G. wishes to avoid will certainly be provoked by the excellent deeds of the dead, and at any rate ἃ δεῖ, apart from referring to a speech in compliance with the 'rules' may also plausibly be taken to refer to 'words that are needed to do justice to the acts of the dead' (. At any rate a few lines later speech and acts are clearly presented as separate (καὶ λέγειν καὶ σιγᾶν καὶ ποιεῖν).

λαθὼν μὲν...φθόνον: G. wishes to avoid the divine punishment and the resentment or the envy of the living; Vollgraff 1952 (note *ad loc.*) explains the phrase as the concomitant of G.'s awareness of the "audace des thèses qu' il va présenter". However, what G. intends to say is what he ought to say, which is dictated by the excellence of the dead and their acts. What lies behind his confession that he wants to avoid divine and human resentment directed at him is the implication that, if he is to praise the dead with words consonant with their qualities, this avoidance is almost impossible (envy is very common in encomiastic poetry; cp. for ecample Pi. *O.* 6. 7-8, *P.* 1. 84-5, 7. 18-9, 11. 26-9, *I.* 1. 43-4, and Ba. 3. 67-8, 5. 187-90). It comes as no surprise that this element can be traced in other preserved *Epitaphioi*; In Thucydides' 2.35 Perikles is presented as saying that ὅ τε ἄπειρος ἔστιν ἃ καὶ πλεονάζεσθαι, διὰ φθόνον, εἴ τι ὑπὲρ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἀκούει...τῷ δὲ ὑπερβάλλοντι αὐτῶν

φθονοῦντες ἤδη καὶ ἀπιστοῦσιν (see Race 1990, pp.73-4). When Demosthenes is about to praise the dead for being 'the soul of Greece', he also expresses his hope that καὶ φθόνος μὲν ἀπείη τοῦ λόγου (Dem. 60. 23; cp. Pl. *Menex.* 242a4)

ἔνθεον μέν...τὸ θνητόν: 'the virtue they possessed was divinely-inspired', not 'they received virtue as a divine gift', because in that case ἐκέκτηντο would have been an inappropriate oxymoron (cp. σοφίας ἐπικτήτου *Hel.* 4, with notes); what they shall then be remembered for is a divine characteristic, though their mortal *physis* is a human one. Vollgraff's (1952, p.10) view that the virtue here has affinities with the definitions of it in *Meno*, namely the ability of a citizen to govern others, relies much on his presumption that the qualities ascribed by G. to the dead in the rest of the *Epitaphios* are peculiar to the teaching of the Sophists.

πολλὰ μὲν δή...λόγων ὀρθότητα: the two clauses are complementary and by and large they express a very similar pattern (this is highlighted by the chiastic arrangement); the invariable stability of (written) law represented by the two central phrases τοῦ αὐθάδους δικαίου...νόμου ἀκριβείας is opposed to the variable, personal feeling of justice, inherent in every man, which takes shape after consideration of the existing individual situations of every different case in its own right (notice that this is almost explained by the τοῦτον νομίζοντες..., where a different, divine 'law' shared by all humans is said to have been the law that *they* established and respected). τὸ παρὸν ἐπιεικές: Spengel's correction πρᾷον distorts the emphasis that G. lays on καιρός; παρόν, the MSS reading, here takes on the meaning 'that which on each different occasion is ἐπιεικές' as opposed to the rigid, and thus αὔθαδες δίκαιον. The ἐπιεικές ('fairness') / δίκαιον polarity is hardly restricted to G.; Herodotos 3. 53 already contends that πολλοὶ τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἐπιεικέστερα προτίθησι and it also appears in a context where the notion is meant to be understood as Sophistic in Aristophanes *Clouds* 1399-1400 (see Pucci 1960, pp.13f.); Aristotle defines it

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both in *E.N.* 1137a31f, 1143a21-22 (see Gauthier–Jolif (1970), pp.432-3 and in the *Rhetoric* (1374a26-8) where he maintains that τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δίκαιον, and he then (1374bf.) goes on to discuss ἐπιεικές in more detail in connection with different types of human action by distinguishing between ἁμάρτημα and ἀδίκημα, ἁμάρτημα and ἀτύχημα, and by explaining for whom it is to judge on the basis of ἐπιεικές and upon what criteria one does so by employing it (cp. also Isok. 7.33; note that at Soph. *O.C.* 1127, Oedipus in praising Athens before Theseus, includes ἐπιεικές among other properties – namely τὸ εὐσεβές, τὸ μὴ ψευδοστομεῖν – peculiar to this city). An exhaustive discussion of passages related to ἐπιεικές is provided by Vollgraff 1952, pp.10-20). A far-fetched, over-systematised treatment of 'fairness' in G. is developed by Untersteiner (1954, pp.176-8), who sees it as a solution to the problem posed by tragic dilemmas. Vollgraff (1952, pp.11-12) observes that the emphasis on ἐπιεικές and λόγων ὀρθότητα betrays G.'s intention to praise the characteristics of those who have received the Sophistic education, and therefore, that what is said here refers neither to the civic nor the military potential of the dead as it normally happens in *Epitaphioi*. It is possible, especially in view of the connection of the whole saying to *kairos*, that G. praises the opportunism of the dead and their rampant political ambition, characteristics which are readily ascribed to the Sophists (this is discernible both in Untersteiner's and Vollgraff's analysis; Loraux, 1986, p.228-9 is also ready to discern Sophistic relativism in the formula, her crucial opposition to Vollgraff's thesis being that G. "has turned to the advantage of his own thought themes proper to the funeral oration"). However, there is nothing to suggest that, when G. praises the dead for their preference for ἐπιεικές, he does so because 'fairness' (as opposed to rigid law) avails men with greater freedom in justifying acts that serve their own συμφέρον. As Loraux herself claims, it may mean that "the Athenians are on the side of the oppressed" (a

recurring theme in the *Epitaphioi*) or that "before being 'violent toward the violent', they are good at seeking agreement" (an element which she traces in Lysias' *Epitaphios* 20). In addition, they are θεράποντες τῶν ἀδίκως δυστυχούντων and κολασταὶ τῶν ἀδίκως εὐτυχούντων, characteristics that necessarily go far beyond what is required for a person to be simply law-abiding. ἐπιεικές then is peculiar to active citizens, who are ready to act complementarily to the demands of the laws, when their conscience dictates otherwise.

νόμου ἀκριβείας: the rigid 'accuracy of written law', as opposed to the flexible and creative attempt to achieve rightness in speech. In Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1374b11-12 ἐπιεικές as μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθέτου ὁρᾶν) λόγος represents the exact words of the laws, in modern Greek τὸ γράμμα τοῦ νόμου ('the letter of the law'). Aristotle, unlike G., uses λόγον to denote 'obey the laws to the letter without demur'.

λέγειν...σιγᾶν: 'saying and avoid saying and doing'; Sauppe and DK after ποιεῖν print καὶ ἐᾶν, which is a plausible addition as far as the antithetical structure of the sentence is concerned, but which is not necessary for the sense, and since it does not appear in the Mss I do not see fit to include it in the text. Vollgraff (1952, p.22-23) provides evidence showing that δέον and καιρός can be treated as synonyms. However, his association of καιρός with opportunism is less happy (for a discussion of καιρός see fr.13 with comments). Knowing when to speak and when to remain silent is rather a common criterion for the evaluation of someone's respect for decorum (cp.Aiskh. *Cho.*582, Isok. 2.41; for λέγειν τὸ δέον see *Hel.* 2).

γνώμην <καὶ ῥώμην>: the phrase extends the distinction between speech and deeds; the addition has been proposed by Foss. τόλμην could be an alternative, and one which admittedly disentangles us from the implications involved in the body / mind opposition. Nevertheless, combined intellectual and physical potential is a recurring theme in *Epitaphioi*; in Lysias 2 it appears in 41, 42 and it

undoubtedly dominates Perikles' one in Thucydides 2, especially in connection with the ability of the Athenians to enjoy an intellectual civic environment, while always being on a military footing (cp. for instance καὶ μὴν καὶ τῶν πόνων πλείστας ἀναπαύλας τῇ γνώμῃ ἐπορισάμεθα 38; διαφερόντως γὰρ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν ὥστε τολμᾶν τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι 40). Similar views about the Athenians are expressed in the famous comparison of the Athenians with the Spartans, which Thucydides puts in the mouth of the Corinthians (1.70). Vollgraff (1952, p.28-30) cites again a number of parallels, but most significantly one from the tragic poet Agathon: γνώμη δὲ κρεῖσσόν ἐστιν ἢ ῥώμη χερῶν (fr.27); Agathon was one of G.'students, and he is presented in Plato's *Symposium* delivering a Gorgian speech on ἔρως, so that the line quoted probably supports the reading καὶ ῥώμην, because of Agathon's familiarity with his master's works.

θεράποντες...εὐτυχούντων: 'compassionate to those suffering undeservedly, committed to punish those who enjoy undeserved prosperity'; the theme of compassion is too common in *Epitaphioi* for Vollgraff's (1952, p.31) contention that G. means that "l'advocat ou l'homme politique qui désire faire carrière ne doit pas se charger d'affaires de peu d'intérêt, *genus causarum humile*, mais aspirer à se faire en grand style le champion des pauvres et des opprimés et se poser comme dénonciateur du vice et des actions injustes, pour que l'opinion publique le porte aux nues" to be true. His argument that what Aristotle names ἀρεταὶ καθ' ἕτερον are dealt with after σεμνοὶ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, is an attempt to have what G. says here construed independently of what seems to be a *locus* in other *Epitaphioi*, presumably because G. was a Sophist. Nevertheless, if we turn to *Pal.* 32 we find that the hero contends that he is τοῖς εὐτυχοῦσιν οὐ φθονερός, τῶν δυστυχούντων οἰκτίρμων, which shows that neither text is a basis for generalisations concerning "la pensée de Gorgias"; for it is appropriate for a defendant to claim that he does not resent the prosperity of others, whereas *Epitaphios*

provides a suitable context for the rhetor to counterbalance compassion for sufferers with the punishment of those causing the sufferings. In the former context, if the speaker had been presented as κολαστής, he would have been in danger of being thought of as πολυπράγμων; in the latter, the dead being collectively characterised as κολασταί, they are elevated to public benefactors. This is not the only place where the Athenian dead are praised for this virtue: Lysias employs it repeatedly in his *Epitaphios* (τοὺς μὲν ἀδικουμένους ἐλεοῦντες 14 and προθύμως γὰρ τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις ἥξουσι βοηθήσοντες 22; τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἀδικοῦντας ἐκόλασεν 16, τοὺς κακοὺς κολάζοντες 19), Thucydides 2. 40 καὶ μόνοι οὐ τοῦ ξυμφέροντος μᾶλλον λογισμῷ ἢ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῷ πιστῷ ἀδεῶς τινὰ ὠφελοῦμεν, and *Menexenos* 244e3 ὡς ἀεὶ λίαν φιλοικτίρμων ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ ἥττονος θεραπίς (referring to Athens; cp. also Isok.4.53 διὸ δὴ καὶ κατηγοροῦσί τινες ἡμῶν ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλευομένων, ὅτι τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους εἰθίσμεθα θεραπεύειν).

αὐθάδεις πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον: it is far from clear what the exact meaning of the phrase is and how it should be explained in the context of an *Epitaphios*; Vollgraff's view that G. does not refer to the interests of the city as a whole is again based on his presumption that G. praises the virtues of the pupils of the Sophists, and thus their aptness to serve their own interests. This he thinks is also evinced by the absence of any reference to δίκαιον; more particularly he claims that "Il ne dit pas à l'éloge...qu' ils pratiquaient la justice dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions publiques et dans le commerce avec leurs concitoyens" (p.36), and this absence is taken to confirm Plato's presentation of G. in *Gorgias*. But Vollgraff fails to observe that later G. says δίκαιοι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀστοὺς τῷ ἴσῳ (although in his comments ad loc., pp.73ff., he strives to show that δίκαιοι has nothing to do with 'justice'). I would prefer to take πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον modally; this function is also acceptable for τὸ πρέπον, and I would consequently translate the phrase as follows: 'bold without going against the interest [of the

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city]'. That G. does not imply the personal interest of each one of the soldiers should be taken for granted if we consider the restrictions imposed upon him by the generic characteristics of *Epitaphios* (αὐθάδεια is a very negative characteristic); at any rate, such a vigorous polarity as the one between personal and civic interests cannot be appropriate in public epideictic or deliberative oratory. Was not it Perikles who reminded the Athenians that καλῶς μὲν γὰρ φερόμενος ἀνὴρ τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν διαφθειρομένης τῆς πατρίδος οὐδὲν ἧσσον συναπόλλυται, κακοτυχῶν δὲ ἐν εὐτυχούσῃ πολλῷ μᾶλλον διασῴζεται? (Thuc. 2.60.3).

εὐόργητοι: Aristotle defines it as follows: τὸ γὰρ εὐόργητον καὶ τὸ πρᾶον ἐν μεσότητί ἐστιν ὀργῆς καὶ ἀναλγησίας τῆς πρὸς ὀργήν (*MM* 1, 1186a23). It is a relatively rare word, but it occurs (in other forms) in Thuc. 1. 122: ἐν ᾧ ὁ μὲν εὐοργήτως αὐτῷ προσομιλήσας βεβαιότερος, ὁ δ' ὀργισθεὶς περὶ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐλάσσω πταίει and in Eur. *Ba.* 641 and *Hipp.* 1039.

τῷ φρονίμῳ τῆς γνώμης...<τῆς τόλμης>: after ἄφρον Sauppe printed <τῆς ῥώμης>, whereas Vollgraff prefers <τῆς δόξης>, as he traces affinities with relevant passages in *Hel.*, and he concludes that "Gorgias exalte ici la puissance bienfaisante de la rhétorique". But he probably overlooks the importance of the opposition between deeds and thinking in *Epitaphioi*, as well as the effect resulting from such an opposition here. G., by referring to the dead as αὐθάδεις and εὐόργητοι, increases the pathos of his speech, and now he wishes to revert to their prudence, before passing on once more to a fully emotional and somewhat aggressive tone. The meaning of the phrase is that those praised were brave enough to act boldly, but at the same time they were prudent enough to check violence for violence's sake. The recurrent distinction between τόλμη and γνώμη in *Epitaphioi* has already been discussed; we may now cite a sentence from Demosthenes' *Epitaphios* which parallels G.'s formula: ἔστι γὰρ ἔστιν ἁπάσης ἀρετῆς ἀρχὴ μὲν σύνεσις, πέρας δὲ

ἀνδρεία· καὶ τῇ μὲν δοκιμάζεται τί πρακτέον ἐστί, τῇ δὲ σῴζεται (17).

ὑβρισταὶ εἰς τοὺς ὑβριστάς: this is the first in a string of four *anadiploseis*, all of which are designed to express cases where reciprocity in behaviour becomes a praiseworthy element. Indeed, the phrase 'hybristic towards the hybristic', especially in an *Epitaphios*, which purports to elevate the dead to the heights of immortality, is *prima facie* appalling. It is not so much that it may irritate the (somewhat superficial) modern reader because of its bringing out a 'tooth-for-a-tooth and an eye-for-an-eye' pattern of thought and reaction, for this is not uncommon in the Greek code of moral values (for instance, paying your enemy(or your friend's enemy) with the same coin was for G. a perfectly acceptable reaction as fr.21 shows). Given that in no *Epitaphios* do the dead come second, this is not the place for G. to develop the passive-sufferer / active-violator polarity, which he admirably expands in *Hel.* 7 (notice the ὑβρίσθη / ὑβρίσας repetition there). G. would preferably avoid saying that those praised suffered *hybris*, and it is reasonable to speculate that the *hybris* of the dead was directed against third parties (i.e. enemies) or against those in need who appealed to the Athenians (but see Fisher 1992, p.96 with his valid criticism of Vollgraff 1952, p.26 n.80). The meaning of the phrase may be very close to Lysias' formulation: τοὺς μὲν ἀδικουμένους ἐλεοῦντες, τοὺς δ' ὑβρίζοντας μισοῦντες (2.14). To these people the Athenian dead are ὑβρισταί, in a sense which cannot be very far from the κολασταί of the ἀδίκως εὐτυχούντων.

δεινοῖς: it is hard to decide if this is a neuter, but judging from the context it must be masculine.

μαρτύρια δὲ τούτων...δὲ ἀναθήματα: this sentence (and the one following it) have received an extensive discussion by Vollgraff (1952, p.58-71), who once more saw fit to propose textual alterations, so as to bring the sense closer to what he thought appropriate for a Sophist, both in form and in content. He thus

claims that Διὸς μὲν ἀγάλματα, τούτων δὲ ἀναθήματα is an "antithèse fausse, indigne d'un écrivain de talent"; ἄγαλμα certainly means 'something evoking pleasure', but even if the text requires emendation, I do not see how the ἐαυτῶν δὲ ἀγάλματα (*Ipsorum decus* p.60 n.1; the parallel he alludes to, Aiskh. *Eum.*920, seems to me irrelevant) is any clearer than Διὸς ἀγάλματα, meaning statues of Zeus (he himself admits that "le trophée élevé sur le champ de bataille...est consacré à Zeus"), and ἐαυτῶν δὲ ἀναθήματα (DK, instead of τούτων of the Mss), meaning 'their own dedications' (none of the parallels he offers refers to ἀγάλματα). Moreover, Διὸς ἀναθήματα is void of sense, since it means 'dedications of Zeus'; the phrase requires a dative. At any rate, the trophies of victory are a recurring theme in Lysias' *Epitaphios*, as they appear four times (20, 25, 53 and 63), of which the last one is strikingly similar to G.'s phrase (τρόπαιον μὲν τῶν πολεμίων ἔστησαν, μάρτυρας δὲ τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς ἐγγὺς ὄντας τοῦδε τοῦ μνήματος τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων τάφους παρέχονται).

οὐκ ἄπειροι...εἰρήνης: Vollgraff prints οὔτε ἐμφύτου ἔριδος...οὔτε ἐνοπλίου ἄρεος, a correction which is characterised by Loraux as "ill founded to say the least" (1986, p.432 n.45). ἔμφυτος Ἄρης (Ares meaning 'war' is a common metonymy in Greek) Vollgraff found too bellicose, and thus out of place in a public speech. But ἔμφυτος denotes something 'inborn', and as such unavoidable, as opposed to the specific quality of the ἔρωτες that the dead turned to, that is a form of love which is conventionally accepted. By thus defining war and love G. makes sure that the praised will not run the danger of being charged with excessive activity or that they possessed an overdeveloped aspect in their character. They are prone to war to the extent that *physis* privileged them with such a predilection, and similarly their love-activity does not overcome the established limits dictated by *nomos*. G. simply employs a common characteristic of the *Epitaphioi*, namely the distinction between peace and war, so as to claim that the praised warriors were competent in both situations.

One-sidedness is imputed by Thucydides to the Lacaedemonians (see 2.39), whereas the Athenians are ἀνειμένως διαιτώμενοι, and at the same time ready for adventurous expeditions. But Athenian φιλοκαλία, G. implies, does not amount to feminization, and it would have been strange if he had not referred to the military aptitude. νομίμων ἐρώτων: it is hard to see what G. has in mind by referring to 'legitimate love'; it certainly alludes to the activity of the dead in peace, as it is opposed to ἐμφύτου Ἄρεος, and Vollgraff (1952, p.65) renders it 'aspirations légitimes', which is wide enough to include more than sexual relationships. Vollgraff also cites Wilamowitz's explanation "Wünsche und Aspirationen, die, so hoch sie gehen, doch nicht παρανομοῦσι" (this extended meaning of the normal use of ἔρως is very common in Pindar; a good example is traced in *P*. 10. 60 καὶ γὰρ ἑτέροις ἑτέρων ἔρως ὑπέκνισε φρένας. See also Carey 1981, p.87). A very similar expression is traced in a different context (Aiskhines 1.136 ἔρωτα δίκαιον), which is discussed by Dover 1978, p.42, 45f. φιλοκάλου εἰρήνης: cp. the well-known phrase in Perikles' *Epitaphios* in Thucydides (2.40) φιλοκαλοῦμέν τε γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας.

σεμνοί: Vollgraff is correct in translating 'respectueux' (1952, p.69 with more translations cited; this active sense of the adj. is relatively uncommon, but cp. Isok. *Evag.* 44: σεμνὸς ὢν οὐ ταῖς τοῦ προσώπου συναγωγαῖς, ἀλλὰ ταῖς τοῦ βίου κατασκευαῖς). However, the opportunism that he locates in G. when he maintains that "ils [G.'s students] envisagent peut-être que cela pourra leur être profitable dans une autre vie, si toutefois les dieux existent" does nothing but betray his ill-founded views on the Sophistic movement.

ὅσιοι...θεραπείᾳ: the responsibility of children to look after their parents is a formulaic element in the *Epitaphioi* (cp. Thuc. 2.46.1, Lysias *Epit.* 75, Pl. *Menex.* 248e4-249c3).

εὐσεβεῖς...τῇ πίστει: cp. notes on fr.21.

τοιγαροῦν...ζώντων: 'when they died the longing for them did not die with them, but it still lives a deathless life in bodies that are not deathless'; it is hard to say whether G. had in mind ἀποθανόντων when he decided to create a *paronomasia* (and a *parechesis*) with πόθος or the other way round. Vollgraff (who cites an interesting parallel from Ploutarkhos *Oth.* 17) concludes that πόθος expresses here "l'enthusiasme, l'élan irrésistible qui peut animer un homme émotif" (1952, p.86) and that it does not have a specific object (88). It is true that the construction is complicated, but I think that the correct meaning is brought out if we take πόθος (usually meaning longing for someone who is not there) with οὐ ζώντων (a genitive of the object which comes too late by thus creating a *hyperbaton*): 'the longing...for those who are not still alive'. This would bring the formula closer to something repeatedly traced in the *Epitaphioi* (cp. Lysias 2. 23, 24 and more markedly in 81, ἐπειδὴ θνητῶν σωμάτων ἔτυχον, ἀθάνατον μνήμην διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν αὐτῶν κατέλιπον).

οὐκ ἐν ἀθανάτοις σώμασι ζῇ: probably a consolatory reminding that the tantalising πόθος will not last long, since the relatives (and the other members of the community) of the dead are mortal, and thkus their own death will soon bring an end to it. Perikles in Thucydides 2.44 (ὅσοι δ' αὖ παρηβήκατε, τόν τε πλέονα κέρδος ὃν ηὐτυχεῖτε βίον ἡγεῖσθε καὶ τόνδε βραχὺν ἔσεσθαι) is more explicit, to an extent that, when I was being taught his *Epitaphios* as a school-boy, I found it almost macabre and rude; but it can simply be a verbal expression of the emotions of those (parents or partners) who, during funeral ceremonies, sometimes utter in despair their intention to be buried with their loved person. The modern Greek phrase that people address to the dead is also telling: καλὴ ἀντάμωση ('may we meet soon').

3 On not Being

I.   Gorgias' Περὶ τοῦ μὴ Ὄντος

The interpretation of Gorgias' *On not Being or On Nature (ONB)* is an extremely difficult task. This is clearly brought out when one attempts to approach it through modern scholarly work. Robinson claims (1973, p.60): "I am quite willing to entertain the hypothesis that Gorgias took the work on nature seriously. What I am not willing to do is to take it seriously myself"; Kerferd is explicit as well: "Its general thesis might conceivably amuse those to whom all attempts at philosophy are inherently absurd, but such persons could hardly be expected to work through the difficult arguments which make up the contents of the work" (1955, p.3). Gomperz (1912, followed by others) thought that it is a piece of rhetoric, and others assumed that the theory about *logos* developed by Gorgias in this treatise, namely that *logos* does not represent reality, liberates him from the chains of truth: "Gorgias, penseur de la rhétorique, débarasse ainsi le langage de sa fonction d'information pour mieux dégager sa fonction d' influence" (Brunschwig 1971, p.83; this view is very close to the conclusions that Rosenmayer 1955, p.225-60 draws in his discussion of the role of ἀπάτη in Gorgias). For Guthrie (1971, p.193-4) it is a parody of Eleatic philosophy; this scholar reminds us that "it is a mistake to think that parody is incompatible with serious intention. Gorgias's purpose was negative, but none the less serious"[1].

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[1] Assessments of *ONB* are summarized in Untersteiner 1954, p. 163 n.2, Newiger 1973, p. 1-8, Mazzara 1982, p. 13-18.

Far from intending to question the authority of scholars who have previously undertaken the task to shed light on *ONB*, I consider that this plethora of divergent views probably confirms Gorgias' argument that due to subjectivism, it is impossible to say what is really true. Every text is open to interpretations, but in the case of *ONB* no agreement has been reached even on its 'nature': farce, parody, rhetoric, quasi-philosophical, pure philosophy. I take it that some of the disagreement is attributable to the fact that we do not possess Gorgias' original text. But even so, nothing guarantees that, if we possessed it, a consensus would have been attainable. That this is the case can be asserted by the unsolved problems of interpretation of the poem of Parmenides, of which an important part is preserved. It should be added, of course, that very little (probably nothing more than mere titles) of the argumentation and the problematic developed by the Sophists themselves is preserved, and it is thus impossible to examine *ONB* in its context[1]; as Kerferd has pointed out *ONB* is "probably the nearest we have or will ever have to a complete technical presentation of an articulated sophistic argument from the fifth century B.C." (1982, p.93). The absence of any substantial comparative grounds admittedly obscures our view of this text. It should also be stressed that prejudiced assumptions about the sophistic movement and its leading figures have not helped much. The view that Gorgias was primarily interested in practical means of persuasion, in other words that he was a 'pure' rhetorician presupposes a clear-cut distinction between philosophy and rhetoric, inaugurated by Plato and uncritically adopted by

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[1] We know that Protagoras wrote a text under the title Περὶ τοῦ Ὄντος, the contents of which are unknown to us. It seems likely that this work included anti-Eleatic arguments, and it is thus possible that aspects of the reasoning developed there were similar to G.'s own text. Mansfeld (1990) lays much emphasis on Protagoras' now lost treatise, and he thinks that it influenced G.'s own polemic, as it is represented in *ONB*.

modern scholars[1]. It is more than certain that Sophistic education involved wider philosophical and 'scientific' activity, and this is well attested in Aristophanes' *Clouds* (Dover 1968, p.xxxiv-xxxv); *Helen* 13 can also serve as evidence that G. was at least sceptical about the 'theories' held by natural philosophers ($\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\omega\rho o\lambda \acute{o}\gamma o\iota$) and about the role that the speech plays in their explanations of various phenomena.

Having outlined the main lines of interpretation of *ONB*, we may now pass to the main questions: What does this text intend? In what manner does it fulfil its intention? And lastly, does the strategy followed in it secure its acceptability by its recipients?

Paradoxically, I wish to start from the last question, because I consider that its answer may shed some rays of light on the other two as well. From the compendium of modern approaches presented above, it emerges that some modern students of this text are not ready to accept it as a serious piece of philosophy. Nevertheless, its meaning to us is one thing, and the way in whih it was perceived by later philosophers in antiquity quite another. For instance, those scholars interested in applying formal logic so as to demonstrate the flaws of argumentation in *ONB* are perfectly legitimate, as long as they realise that this is not a safe criterion for the assessment of its value and its position in the history of ideas. Should this have been the case, we would have to concede that some syllogisms that occur in Plato's texts are worthless. Any serious attempt to assess the perception of *ONB* should, I think, be based on a synchronic approach. The term 'synchronic' should not though be taken strictly, because there is only slight contemporary evidence. However, if our scope is to investigate the intentions and the perception of *ONB* we

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[1] Kennedy (1994, p.20) holds that "there was, however, no sharp division between philosophy and rhetoric in the fifth century and all sophists explored the themes of truth and opinion, nature and convention, and language and reality". The artificiality of this distinction has been shown very recently by Schiappa 1999, p.7ff.

should necessarily turn to readings chronologically closer to it, those of Plato and Isokrates[1].

We may start with Isokrates; in his *Antidosis* 268 (=fr.1) he classifies the views of 'old intellectuals' (παλαιῶν σοφιστῶν) about the number of ὄντα. Some (unidentified) say that they are infinite, Empedocles four (only two of them, νεῖκος and φιλία, are mentioned), Ion no more than three, Alkmeon two, Parmenides and Melissus one, and Gorgias none at all. It is interesting to observe that the string begins with an infinite number and is gradually reduced to nothingness represented by Gorgias. This passage is significant because Gorgias is listed along with a number of philosophers whose theories he himself criticises. In the second part supporting his first thesis (namely, 'nothing is') he examines the possibility that 'being' is either one or many, and he concludes that it is neither one nor many, so that 'being' is not.

Isokrates classifies Gorgias among a number of philosophers in his *Helen* as well. In the opening lines he claims that some people grew old by denying the possibility of falsehood and by maintaining that it is impossible to utter two (contradictory) λόγοι about the same things. Isokrates then goes on to say that these people do not realise that their activity is not radical, since earlier generations of intellectuals have produced more thorough treatises on the same subjects. Gorgias (among Protagoras, Zeno and Melissus) is one of them. This list is printed in part as 82B1DK, but the opening lines are omitted, and generally they have not attracted the attention they deserve.

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[1] Dodds (1959, p.7-8) claims that "Plato certainly knows nothing of the "philosophical nihilism" with which Gorgias has been credited on the strength of his notorious "proof" that (a) nothing exists...", and this is used as a proof that "equally dubious, in my view, is the now fashionable contention that Gorgias was an original philosophical thinker". But as we shall see, it is very likely that Plato *was* aware of Gorgias' "philosophical nihilism", whatever this means, and that he probably saw it as a threat to his own theory of forms.

The view that it is impossible to say anything false forms the central argument in the second division of *ONB* seeking to establish that 'if anything is it is unknowable', although *MXG* does not make it clear if Gorgias committed himself to this idea. Sextus certainly seems to understand that Gorgias claimed that false statements are impossible, as long as one conceives of a thing with one's mind. Argumentation from antinomy is the chief pattern of reasoning in the second part supporting the first major thesis ('nothing is') as it is clearly brought out by Anonymous' preamble, where we are told that Gorgias collected contradictory properties attributed by earlier philosophers to *onta* (979a13ff). There is no doubt that Gorgias' case is not unique. Protagoras' subjectivism undoubtedly entails the impossibility of falsehood, and antinomical argumentation had already been exploited by Zeno[1]. But still, how are we to interpret Isokrates' reception of *ONB*?

It is true that in all the relevant contexts Isokrates' tone is the tone of contempt. Isokrates, far from intending to be descriptive, prescribes what young men should avoid. This disclaimer is useful, if we bear in mind that Gorgias' own classification of earlier philosophical activity is not neutral. Both of them object to abstract philosophical speculation. Guthrie (1971, p.195 n.1) has noticed this identity of feelings and maintained: "I confess to a slight feeling of uneasiness, because, if Isocrates knew Gorgias's treatise as an ironical exposure of Eleatic reasoning, he would surely have claimed him as an ally rather than attacked him along with the rest. He was, however, above all things an advocate, ready to press anything into the service of his immediate case. His criticism of Gorgias would be that by bothering at all about the philosophers and refuting them with their weapons he put himself in the same class". Guthrie' criticism reveals, I think, the kind of conclusions reached

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[1] For the affinities of *ONB* with Protagorean and Zenonean processes see Mansfeld 1990, p. 243-271. For the impossibility of falsehood see Palmer 1999, p.124-134.

when we apply ready-made categories. If we accept that Isokrates assumes that Gorgias ridiculed himself by refuting early philosophy, then why did Isokrates himself bother about Gorgias by writing *Helen*? Guthrie simply endeavours here to make Isokrates' evidence fit his own reading of *ONB* as a parody. An easier assumption should be made: Isokrates saw in Gorgias' *ONB* a continuum in the history of what we may now call 'philosophical speculation', and this is further evidence against those who tend to support the view that *ONB* is a work motivated by mere practical needs. Isokrates objects to the value of this speculation, but he is honest enough to say so. In his own mind *ONB* belongs to what we arbitrarily label as pre-Socratic philosophy.

We may now move to Plato; Jaap Mansfeld has recently shown that some of the deductions in the second part of Plato's *Parmenides* are extremely similar to arguments put forward in *ONB*. It is not necessary to discuss them here (see comments), but we may simply quote Mansfeld's (1990, p.119) conclusion[1]: "If one does not want to assume that the 'special argument' is a historical fake, the only valid inference is that at *Parm.*162a Plato used Gorgias". What is perhaps more telling, is another passage from *Parmenides*135a, which corresponds to the three major theses developed in *ONB*. In *Parmenides* 135a, Parmenides warns Socrates that someone who has heard his reasoning about ὄντα, might probably object and reason that a) they do not exist, b) if they exist they are unknown (ἄγνωστα), and c) that only a prodigy, after having investigated them, will be able to make them known to others. Gorgias is not mentioned here, but Hayes (1990, p.335) is right in concluding that: "Plato was indeed aware of the *ONB* as were most of his educated contemporaries. Moreover, he knew that its arguments had posed formidable challenges to Eleatic philosophy, and that his own quest

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[1] See also Palmer 1999, p.108-117.

for forms was particularly vulnerable to the same arguments because its ontological assumptions were similar to those of the Eleatics"[1].

This evidence suggests, I think, that *ONB* was a well-known text; it must have been influential, and this view is corroborated by the fact that its tripartite division with the well structured argument made it memorable. There is no evidence that it was perceived as a piece of hilarious philosophising activity.

Given that ancient criticism seems to take *ONB* rather seriously, how are we to interpret it? What does this text invite us to understand? Wardy (1996, p.24) poses some important questions: "Was Gorgias a part time or erstwhile honest, and honestly deluded, Parmenidean philosopher? Or was he the sophisticated 'sophist' constructing an intellectual pitfall? If so, with what motivation? Without answers, in a quite serious sense we simply do not know what *On What Is Not* is saying. My suggestion is that this vertiginous uncertainty is itself the primary message (better, *non-message?*) of the text...Gorgias is deliberately transmitting a message which consists largely of noise; in so doing he gets us to think about what any act of communication must be like, and about what philosophers claim their messages are like ". Wardy's approach is promising because it does not seek to unveil a 'hidden meaning'. Most of the scholars have tried to identify the target of Gorgias' criticism by tracking down apparent similarities. So that Loenen (1959) reached the conclusion that Gorgias' target is solely Melissus.

Gorgias does not put forward any theories; *ONB* is a text that examines the limits of philosophical speculation and of its methods[2].

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[1] Similarly Palmer (1999, p.117) holds that "The *Parmenides*'s First Deduction suggests that Plato saw reflections of Gorgias' anti-Parmenidean stance in more parts of his treatise than the personal demonstration . It is very interesting to see Plato giving Parmenides the chance to respond to Gorgias' attack".

[2] This does not entail that I adopt Blass's (1887, p49) point that it shows the uselessness of philosophical speculation. This view implies again that Gorgias'

Under this prism it is pointless to make any assertions about Gorgias' philosophical views on the basis of this text, and what is more, it is methodologically unsafe to use it as evidence, so as to confirm 'theories' or ideas that emerge in his *Encomium of Helen* or *The Defence of Palamedes*.

ONB however is not as cryptic as it appears at first sight; the methods of argument that G. uses in this text are certainly not peculiar to it. He constantly argues by using antinomies, as he does in *Palamedes*. He certainly polarises 'being' and 'not-being' in the 'original proof'; similarly, he manifestly employs argument from antinomy in the section where he seeks to prove that 'being' is not, by showing that each member of the pairs one / many, generated / ungenerated, in motion / [at rest] when attributed to ὄντα is impossible; the same polarisation is employed, according to my line of inquiry in the second division of *ONB*, where he distinguishes between sense perception and thought as vehicles through which one approaches truth (the same polarisation appears also in the third division of *ONB*, but it does not constitute there the foundation stone of G.'s reasoning). In this respect thus, we should not allow G. or his summarisers to perplex us.

This being the case with the method by which G. argues, one should address the problem of the theses that G. targets so subversively. Being, concepts and language form a triad that has unceasingly been investigated by philosophers throughout the centuries. That G. seeks to address all these three elements collectively, and that in many cases he does this with reference to aspects of the reasoning utilised in the other two, is undoubtedly amazing. His discussion of language, for instance, neglected until very recently, involves surprisingly 'modern' approaches to it. As far as I know, G. is the very first intellectual in the Western world to express the view that language and things are two distinct entities, a

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adopted the superiority of rhetoric to philosophy, but it has been suggested that this distinction is the product of later 'epistemological' dichotomies.

view that brings us very close to the theory of the 'linguistic sign' put forward by F. de Saussure at the beginning of the 20th century. And it is at least inappropriate to get rid of these approaches by pointing out that they are simply employed in the course of an argumentation that seeks to establish the impossibility of communication or that they emanated in a social context in which the needs for 'practical' manipulation of speech were increased. Yet, however interesting the independent views developed in the *ONB* may be, the triad comprising the major theses that G. seeks to deny is clearly Parmenidean.

Parmenides, in fr.6 says: χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι; this formulation, in the reverse order, is identical with the three theses of G.'s *ONB* as they are encapsulated at the beginning of both Anonymous's and Sextus's versions. It is hard to believe that G. had anything else in mind when he decided to compose his text, but this does not mean that the *ONB* is simply anti-Parmenidean, because, as we have already seen and it will perhaps be made clearer when we will be concerned with the separate arguments, G. attempts an attack on philosophical speculation in general. This Parmenidean formula probably served as the pretext for the composition of G.'s heretical text, which in all likelihood was meant to be perceived by men of high intellectual standards.

ONB cannot and should not be evaluated on the basis of simplistic dichotomies; rhetorical or philosophical, this matters very little. What matters is that G. attempts to question philosophical speculation, for which he openly expresses his reservations in *Helen* 13. In paraphrasing the three major theses of *ONB* we may say: philosophical entities do not exist; the conception of them either through the senses or through our mind is impossible; even if the conception of them were possible no one would be able to communicate them. One more point should be made; I take it that by the term ὄντα in the first division of *ONB*, G. refers to philosophical speculation, but in the two following ones the word is used to denote the objects of external reality as well. If this is the case, is it

possible that in the second and the third theses G. has philosophical speculation in mind? I take it that the answer to this question should be positive. G. very frequently argues by using analogies (see Introduction), and it is safe, I believe, to assume that when he refutes the possibility of acquiring knowledge or communicating it, this refutation can be applied to philosophical speculation as well. This is at least how Plato conceived *ONB*, as is shown in *Parm.*135a.

II. The versions: Anonymous'*MXG* 5-6, 979a12-980b21 and Sextus' *Adv. Math.* 7, 65-87

Unfortunately, Gorgias' original text under the title *On not Being* (*ONB*) does not exist; all the information we possess on its content is due to the accounts of the Anonymous author of the treatise *De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia* (*MXG*), and that of Sextus Empiricus' *Against Mathematicians* (VII. 65-87). The identification of the author of *MXG* goes far beyond the scope of this study, and it will suffice to mention that *MXG* has relatively recently been studied by Barbara Cassin in a massive volume under the title *Si Parmenide: Le traité anonyme De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia* (1980), and that Jaap Mansfeld has also attempted to investigate the text "in its own right" (1990, p.200).

Another question, which seems more relevant to the scope of this study, is related to the reliability of these two accounts. Older generations of scholars have thought that priority should be given to Sextus' account (an idea strongly supported by Loenen 1959, "The task before us is to reconstruct the meaning of Gorgias from the wording of Sextus" p.180; see also p.178 n. 7). The superiority of *MXG* has been defended by a number of scholars (for further literature see Untersteiner 1961, p.38), and Migliori went as far as to hold that Sextus is dependent on *MXG* (1973, p.54, a possibility hinted at by Kerferd 1955, p.4: "It has never I think been seriously

suggested that Sextus took his information from the author of *MXG*").

It is now true that *MXG* presents serious textual problems, which in some cases are insoluble. However, this does not entail that it should be rejected as a source of information (as Loenen, 1959, thought). *MXG* is by far more economical in its demonstration of Gorgias' arguments and this might be taken as a first sign that it is unembellished (or at least that it is less embellished than Sextus' version) . It is also true that when Anonymous offers his own assessment of Gorgias' theses, he clearly states that he does so (e.g.979a35, where Anonymous clearly indicates that he provides as with his own criticism of Gorgias' 'orginal proof'). Moreover, there are some cases in which the two versions are so similar, that there is no point in trying to establish the superiority of the one to the other.

Kerferd has clearly shown that the arguments supporting the first thesis "are in fact identical" (1955, p.9) in both summaries. From a methodological point of view this implies that a sober consideration of *ONB* should take into account both versions. The same, I am inclined to believe, holds for cases where the two versions are remarkably divergent.

Thus, the line of inquiry followed here presupposes that – especially in the absence of Gorgias' original text – we do not have the privilege of ignoring either of the versions. Any serious investigation of what G.'s *ONB* looked like should be based on a close reading of both summaries in comparison. Due to the economical description of *MXG*, our comparative approach will normally proceed by presenting first the separate arguments as they appear in this text. That this is methodologically preferable is corroborated by the fact that *MXG* (especially in the first division) makes use of a terminology which is more appropriate for a Fifth century intellectual, like Gorgias (see Calogero 1932, p. 158 n.4, Kerferd 1955, p.14; contra Loenen 1959, p.178-79 n. 7), and by the fact that Anonymous provides us with a number of arguments unparalleled in Sextus. Because of the lack of direct evidence, the

degree to which both versions represent Gorgias' original arguments is for most of the time a matter of conjecture, and I consider it legitimate not to bring in any objections to the arguments as they stand in the accounts available (objections to particular arguments proposed by some scholars are discussed within the frame of my comments on these arguments).

Both Sextus and Anonymous seem to agree on the tripartite character of *ONB*; nothing is, if it is it is unknowable, and if it is and it is knowable it is impossible to communicate it [or: our knowledge] to others (the passages recapitulating these major theses have been compared by Gaines 1997, p.1-12). The main difference is that Anonymous preserves the argument in indirect speech, whereas Sextus uses direct speech.

Anonymous then continues with the announcement of the second set of arguments supporting the first major thesis. He informs us that Gorgias based his argumentation on a collection of contradictory properties attributed by earlier philosophers to ὄντα, and that in some cases he argued against them by using their own arguments (the names of Zeno and Melissus are brought in). However, Anonymous clearly states that this set of arguments came after the 'original proof', the demonstration of which follows immediately. This preamble is unparalleled in Sextus, who instead presents the structure of the arguments for the first major thesis: if anything is it is either a) being, or b) not being or c) both being and not being. He then commences the detailed demonstration of the arguments starting from (b).

This discrepancy concerning the argumentation supporting the first thesis is proved to be puzzling, for *prima facie* Anonymous seems to provide us with two sets of arguments (the 'original proof' coming first, and afterwards the argument based on contradictory properties), whereas Sextus prefers to offer a clear-cut distinction between three separate arguments. The location of this discrepancy between the sources led Gigon (1936, p.192-93) to hold the view that they differ to an extent that disallows us from saying which one

is consistent with Gorgias' original arguments. Kerferd (1955) convincingly argued that the two sources are identical, and in fact, close reading of this first part of *ONB* points to that direction.

The similarities emerge when one undertakes the task of examining the separate arguments: in the 'original proof' (in *MXG*) the first argument seeks to establish the possibility that 'not-being' *is*, by using the verb 'to be' equivocally. Sextus' text is more clear: 'not-being' is and is not; in the respect that it is conceived as 'not-being' it is not. But since we may say that 'not-being' is 'not being', then it is. But this is absurd, because it is impossible for something to be and not to be at the same time. It is obvious then, that the important point of this first argument is exactly the possibility of holding that 'not-being' is, and this is confirmed by the fact that the second argument both in *MXG* and Sextus has as its starting point the hypothesis 'if not being is' (the only difference is that *MXG* uses the term μὴ εἶναι, and Sextus μὴ ὄν). Both sources then state that these two elements are contradictory, so that if we concede that 'not-being' is, then it follows that 'being' is not. Which is the inference of this argument? Sextus says: 'in no way being is not, so that not-being is not' (or to make it more clear, it is not 'not-being' that it is not!).

So far so good. But why then, if 'in no way being is not', does he immediately proceed (68) with the demonstration supporting the thesis that 'being is not'? The answer has been given by Kerferd: "the argument which Gorgias is using proceeds by a *reductio ad absurdum*" (1955, p.16). It is the elliptical wording in *MXG* that actually obscures the point (εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔστι. τὸ εἶναι μὴ εἶναι προσήκει). Sextus, with the phrase οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν, sheds a ray of light on what must simply be understood in *MXG*.

The last argument of the 'original proof' puts forward the possibility that both 'being' and 'not-being' are. But in this case, 'not-being' is not, as well as 'being' since it is the same with 'not-

being'. This argument in Sextus comes after the arguments from antinomy (75-76), and it was exactly its place there that puzzled Gigon. Why does Sextus present it at this place? First of all it should be noted that Sextus' own account presents an internal inconsistency: in his outline he follows the order a) if 'being' is, b) if 'not-being' is, c) if both 'being' and 'not-being' are. In the detailed discussion of the arguments, (b) comes first, and (a) second, an arrangement which is in accordance with Anonymous, who clearly states that the arguments for (b) came after the 'original proof'. This discrepancy between the outline of the arguments and their actual discussion may be explained on the assumption that this was the arrangement in the summary he had before him (Palmer 1999, p.255). That (c) comes after (a) and (b), whereas in *MXG* it is included in the 'original proof' is explained by the fact that Sextus simply reformulated the arrangement. All the chances are that he considered it more appropriate to present the arguments concerning 'not-being' and 'being' first, and then to pass to their synthesis. The effort on behalf of Sextus to present a smoother and more 'logical' arrangement may be taken as a sign that *MXG* is closer to the original, Gorgianic arrangement.

In *MXG*, the arguments from antinomy follow Anonymous' criticism of the 'original proof'. Both versions turn to the investigation of the implications of the assumption 'if anything is'; although the separate arguments are not identical, it is not possible to maintain that the two versions differ to such a degree which prevents us from recognising Gorgias' arguments. The first obvious difference is that *MXG* includes an argument unparalleled in Sextus, namely the one about motion, although the latter, because of the irrecoverable textual difficulties in *MXG*, is our only source of information on the antinomical pair one / many.

Both versions begin with the pair generated / ungenerated; the terms used in *MXG* are γεντητόν / ἀγένητον, whereas Sextus instead of ἀγένητον uses the word ἀίδιον. It is also worth stressing that

Sextus thought that an argument combining both properties (ἀίδιον ἅμα καὶ γενητόν) had its place at this point. The demonstration in *MXG* takes as its starting point that if it is ungenerated it is unlimited, a thesis based on an (undefined) axiom of Melissus. This axiom, never stated explicitly in this version – which however has already dealt with Melissus in its first chapter, is voiced in Sextus: if it is eternal, it does not have a beginning (ἀρχήν), which entails that it is unlimited. The implications of this difference have been explained by Mansfeld (1990, p.114): "this proves that *MXG* 5-6 cannot have been Sextus' source, because ἀρχήν is not found there and because it is unlikely that Sextus would have 'translated' Anonymous' reference about Melissus into an argument which only dealt with ἀρχή".

From the assumption that being is unlimited both versions infer that it is nowhere. Once again, Sextus' account is more detailed; for in *MXG* it is merely assumed that it cannot be either in itself or in anything else, because in that case there would be two things, the container and the contained. Sextus on the contrary, examines the inferences of these two possibilities: a) if it is anywhere, it is different from that in which it is, so that the contained is not unlimited. In that case, the container will be bigger than the contained, which is absurd because nothing is bigger than the unlimited. Conclusion: the unlimited cannot be anywhere. b) it is not self-contained; if it were self-contained the contained and the container would have been the same thing, so that being will become two things, a location and a body. But this is absurd. It seems that in Anonymous' version the argument 'one would become two' covers both possibilities: 'being' is in itself or 'being' is in something else. This corresponds only to the second argument in Sextus, namely the one examining the possibility that 'being' is in itself. This discrepancy illustrates once again that Sextus did not use *MXG* (Mansfeld 1990, p.116).

Both versions then conclude that if it is nowhere it is not at all. In *MXG* this is the third step of the arguments supporting the thesis that 'what is' is ungenerated, and it is based on what Anonymous calls 'the argument of Zeno concerning space' (see comments *ad loc*). In Sextus this conclusion is the final element of a string recapitulating the steps of the argumentation concerning the 'ungenerated': 'if being is eternal, it is unlimited, and if it is unlimited, it is nowhere, and <u>if it is nowhere it is not at all</u>'.

Both versions proceed with the discussion of the alternative hypothesis: if the assumption that 'being' is generated is to be confirmed, then 'being' has generated either from 'being' or from 'not-being'. Anonymous introduces his arguments more straightforwardly, whereas Sextus begins with a hypothesis: 'if being has generated, it must be either from being or from not-being'. The arguments against these two possibilities are not the same in the two accounts. Anonymous contends that 'if 'being' changes into something else, then it is not 'being' anymore', and this seems to be elevated to a rule, for he is too ready to assert that the same applies for 'not-being' as well, before he actually passes to the refutation of this second possibility. Sextus on the other hand, prefers to say that 'if being is, it has not been generated – it already existed'. Anonymous then goes on to give the reasons why it cannot be generated from 'not-being'. This is due to that a) 'if not-being is not, nothing is generated from nothing, and b) 'if not-being is, for the reasons that it cannot be generated from being, from the same reasons it cannot be generated from not-being' (that is in that case 'not-being' would have to change). Sextus' argument against generation from 'not-being' is conspicuously out of key with what might be considered as Presocratic terminology. 'Nothing can generate from 'not-being', for that from which anything generates should itself partake of existence'. The discrepancy has been explained by Kerferd (1955, p.21): "Both these arguments are attributed by Aristotle to early philosophers in general terms (*Phys.* 191a 23-31). This suggests a possible answer to the discrepancy

between the two versions – it may be that Gorgias gave a series of arguments to establish each point, and as the theme was a well worn one, only one argument is reported in each case".

Sextus now in a passage which is unparalleled in *MXG*, goes on to investigate the possibility of attributing both properties to ὄν at the same time. He says that 'being' cannot be both eternal and generated, because these two elements are mutually exclusive. Calogero (1932, p.182) thought that this argument is spurious (for further literature see Untersteiner 1954, p.169 n.43; see also Loenen (1959), p.189, Migliori 1973, p.58). The view that it is merely an encapsulation of the structure of the antinomical argument, which corresponds to 979b34, where Anonymous summarises this first argument, is attractive, especially in the absence of an analogous argument in *MXG*. Moreover, Sextus is prone to dialectical synthesis, as the demonstration of the third argument of the 'original proof' shows, and it is hard to explain why he omitted such a dialectical synthesis in the context of the following argument concerning the pair 'one' and 'many'. However, it is worth noting that this "synthetic" argument is announced from the very beginning (ἢ ἀίδιον ἅμα καὶ γενητόν 68), and this programmatic announcement probably entails that what we have here is not an enlarged version of a phrase simply summarising the argument in Sextus' source. The easiest assumption is that a mere recapitulation in Gorgias' original text was elevated in some versions which, of course, we do not possess now, to a separate argument, and Sextus, who had before him one of them, proceeded analogously. A comparison with *Palamedes* 26 can perhaps serve as demonstration of what this summarising formulation looked like. In that context Palamedes concludes, that if he is wise he had not committed the crime, and if he had committed the crime he is not wise:

Palamedes 26	*Sextus 72*
εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰμι σοφός, οὐχ' ἥμαρτον·	καὶ εἰ ἀίδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, οὐ γέγονεν,
εἰ δ' ἥμαρτον, οὐ σοφός εἰμι.	καὶ εἰ γέγονεν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀίδιον.

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Any comparison of the passages demonstrating the arguments about one / many, and in motion / at rest, is impossible. The first argument is practically preserved only in Sextus, due to the bad condition of the text in *MXG*, and the second is totally absent in Sextus.

We may turn to the second major division ('if it is it is unknowable'); again the condition of the text in *MXG* is bad, and to some extent its interpretation should necessarily be dependent on the readings one is ready to adopt, and for the same reason the comparison with Sextus' account should necessarily be tentative.

MXG is again shorter, but probably more accurate, than Sextus; at the beginning of *MXG* (980a10) there is a lacuna, which I think has been satisfactorily reconstructed by Palmer (1999, p. 257-58). In Sextus there are two main headings: a) 'if objects of thought are not [or: are not the case]', and b) 'if objects of thought are [or: are the case]'. Palmer must be on the right track when in his reconstruction of the lacuna in *MXG* he brings them in. His reconstruction runs as follows: a) if it is, says Gorgias, it is unknowable. b) if objects of thought are not [or: are not the case], what is the case is not thought of. c) If this is the case, being [or: what is the case] is unknowable. d) if objects of thought are [or: are the case], what is the case is not thought of.

There are two main points that afford comparison; the first one concerns the (im)possibility of falsehood. Anonymous (980a12) claims that 'all things that are objects of thought should be, and what is not the case, if in fact it is not, should not be an object of thought'; he then suggests that if this is true then no one would utter a false statement even if one held that there are chariots racing on the sea. Sextus on the other hand, argues that 'if objects of thought are the case, then all objects of thought are true'; he then brings in the example of chariots so as to show that the preceding syllogism is absurd, and he concludes that 'objects of thought are not true' (79). The arrangement of argument in the two versions differs

significantly; where Anonymous with the suggestion that 'no one would utter a false statement even if one held that there are chariots racing on the sea' allows us to think that this might well be a valid statement, Sextus clearly uses it as a proof that the suggestion 'all objects of thought are true' is absurd.

The possibility of thinking of things that are not true is covered by Sextus in a context investigating the consequences of the statement 'if objects of thought are the case, what is not the case will not be an object of thought' (80). This argument is supported by the fact that these two elements (what is and what is not the case) are antithetical. But again this results to an absurdity, because some things which are not true (he adduces the example of Skylla and Khimaira, unparalleled in *MXG*) *are* thought and conceived of by human mind. From that, Sextus infers that what is the case is not thought of – presumably because things that are not the case are thought of, so that their opposites, namely things that *are* the case, are not thought of. The argument has been reformulated by Sextus; one should notice the ὡς παραστήσομεν at 78, which is then followed by the conclusion οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὃν φρονεῖται (picked up at 80, that is in the conclusion of the demonstration simply announced at 78).

The second argument in *MXG*980a14-19 is related to the acquisition of knowledge through senses. The view I tend to take is that this second argument (corresponding to Sextus 81-82) deals with this alternative means of attaining knowledge (see Levi, quoted by Untersteiner 1954, p.155), an argument which gains ground, if we consider that the distinction between the senses and the mental or noetic processes is a recurrent theme in earlier philosophy, and consequently it is likely that Gorgias, a thinker prone to arguments from antitheses, would not have failed to argue on the basis of this intellectual conflict, so as to prove that *both* senses and noetic processes are unreliable.

I believe that Sextus' representation of this argument is far from what Gorgias might have said. That he has misunderstood the

argument can be brought out by comparison with what we have in Anonymous' account. At *MXG*a14 we are told that things seen and things heard are true, because each one of them is conceived of by our mind. Intellectual activity is now considered as a means of testing the truth of things perceived through senses. It is held that, in the way that what we see (vision represents here sense-perception) is not [true], in the same way what we see is not more true than what we conceive through our mind (noetic processes). This is reinforced by the observation that (and here the synthesis of the two opposed elements is brought about) many people might see other things and some others conceive of different things, and it is impossible to say which of them are true and which are not. Both the first step (knowledge through noetic activity), and the second (knowledge through senses) are shown to be invalid on the basis of subjectivity.

Sextus construes the argument differently; he seeks to establish the ontological independence of each one of the senses, as well as the independence of mental perception in relation to senses as a whole. This independence is said to be due to that each object of sense is perceived through a different organ, appropriate to it. As a matter of fact, objects perceived through the mind, such as chariots racing on the sea, should exist, even if one does not see them. What must have been an argument from antithesis, now takes the form of a *reductio ad absurdum*.

The third division of *ONB* puts forward the idea that if anything is knowable, it cannot be communicated to others. In this context, the differences between the two accounts are considerable, in Kerferd's words (1982, p.215), "in the third section, at least for the greater part, we have two quite distinct sets of arguments...the two sets must be treated as complimentary if we are to recover Gorgias' original argument".

In *MXG*980a20-b2 it is maintained that it is impossible to convey through words things perceived through our senses, because different objects are perceived through different senses. Sextus 83-85 makes exactly the same point (his account is more detailed), and

it is safe to assume that a similar argument must have been put forward by Gorgias himself, of which a shorter version has been preserved to us. Both versions thus make it clear that in the first instance Gorgias proceeded by establishing a gap between λόγος and senses. Both versions conclude that λόγος is different from things (*MXG*980b2 καὶ λέγει ὁ λέγων, ἀλλ' οὐ χρῶμα οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα; Sextus 85 μὴ ὢν δὲ λόγος οὐκ ἂν δηλωθείη ἑτέρῳ).

*MXG*980b3-9 offers an argument unparalleled in Sextus (see Kerferd 1982, p.219); this argument turns to the relation of senses to thought (that Gorgias argues both from senses and thought in this third division of *ONB* is a further argument in favour of our view that in the second division he proceeded in an analogous manner as well). The first point is that a thing that does not exist in one's own mind cannot be conveyed to him by another. If the first is to conceive of it, then he should perceive it through his senses. The second point, complementing the first, is that a colour (that is an object of a sense) cannot be conceived of through mind, but seen. This second point, is an objection to what can be labelled as conceptual theory of meaning (see comments *ad loc.*). From this standpoint, it can be claimed that Gorgias refutes the idea that if someone utters the word 'red', then the hearer will necessarily conceive of this colour.

The following steps in the two versions are entirely different. *MXG*980b3ff. examines the problems of communication (discussed in my commentary). Sextus 83-851.1 on the other hand "feels the need to deal with two possible objections" (Kerferd 1982, p.218) to the main argument 83-85 1.1. The first one (85), which is attributed to Gorgias (φησίν), maintains that it is the objects of the world that invoke *logos* and not vice versa. The second one puts forward the view that *logos* has an ontological substance, as objects of perceptions do. But *logos* differs from them, in the way that each one of them differs from the others (see comments *ad loc.*).

NOTES

MXG: Anonymous' Introduction (979a12-24)

<u>979a12-13</u>

These are the three divisions of the ONB; the εἰ δὲ...εἰ δὲ καί...ἀλλά construction makes it clear that the argumentation is based on a *concessio*, and we thus have a chain of three consecutive arguments. (1) G. first shows that nothing is; (2) he then concedes that it is and shows that it cannot be known, and finally, (3) after conceding both that it is and is knowable, he says that it cannot be communicated to others. Apart from (1), which at any rate is the starting point of the argumentation, the second and the third steps (2,3) presuppose the denial of accuracy of their preceding arguments (1, if not 1, then 2, but if not 1 and 2 then 3). This argumentative process in its general features is adopted in *The Defence of Palamedes*, although there are some differences in the details (see Introduction).

The full arguments supporting the first thesis are given in 979a23-980a10: first we have the ἴδιος ἀπόδειξις of Gorgias (979a24-33), followed by its criticism by the author of *MXG* (979a34-b19), and then the second argument of the first division (979a20-980a9). The second thesis, concerning the unknowability, is dealt with in 980a10-980a19 and the third thesis concerning the impossibility to transmit our knowledge to others is developed in 980a20-980b19. A general statement of the author of *MXG* is closing his own version of the arguments of Gorgias.

A strikingly similar parallel for the three stages of argumentation in the *ONB* can be traced (see Hays 1990, p.335-337, Palmer 1999, p. 108-110) in Plat. *Parmenides* 135a3-b2, which runs as follows: "As a result, whoever hears about them [sc. the εἴδη and the ἰδέαι of τὰ ὄντα] is doubtful and objects (1) <u>that they do not exist</u> [sc. ὡς οὔτε ἐστι ταῦτα], and that, <u>even if they *do*</u> [sc. εἰ τε ὅτι μάλιστα εἴη], (2) they must by strict necessity <u>be unknowable</u> to human

nature [sc. ἄγνωστα]; and in saying this he seems to have a point; and, as we said, he is extraordinarily hard to win over. Only a very gifted man can come to know that for each thing there is some kind, a being itself by itself; but only a prodigy more remarkable still will discover that and (3) be able to teach [sc. διδάξαι] someone else who has sifted all these difficulties thoroughly and critically for himself" (trans. M. L. Gill – P. Ryan, *Plato, Parmenides* (1996), p.138; the underlining is mine). What is at issue here are the possible objections that Socrates may have to face in his attempt to define the forms and the ideas of the ὄντα. These objections would be that (1) that it does not exist (ὡς οὔτε ἔστι ταῦτα = οὐκ εἶναί φησιν οὐδέν MXG, ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ἔστιν Sext.66), (2) that even if they do (εἴ τε ὅτι μάλιστα εἴη = εἰ δ' ἔστιν MXG, εἰ καὶ ἔστιν Sext.66), they must necessarily be unknowable (ἄγνωστα τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει = ἄγνωστον MXG, ἀκατάληπτον ἀνθρώπῳ Sext.66; cp. also the impossibility of having noetic access to τὰ ὄντα in *Parm*.133b4) and that "even if a very gifted man can come to know..." (ἀνδρὸς πάνυ μὲν εὐφυοῦς τοῦ δυνησομένου μαθεῖν = εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ γνωστὸν MXG, εἰ καὶ καταληπτόν Sext.66), (3) "only a prodigy...will be able to teach someone else" (ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστοτέρου...καὶ ἄλλον δυνησομένου διδάξαι = ἀλλ' οὐ δηλωτὸν ἄλλοις MXG, ἀλλὰ τοί γε ἀνέξοιστον καὶ ἀνερμήνευτον τῷ πέλας). Stage (1) is conceded in both Plato and the two versions of Gorgias' treatise, so as to give way to the second stage (2); though this is not conceded with a clear hypothesis in Plato, it is nevertheless presupposed that only a very competent man will be able to reach knowledge (a point which is not found in Gorgias) and what is more, (3) only a really extraordinary man will be able to teach it to someone else.

The use of the vertebral arguments of Gorgias in the text of Plato show that the latter was at least aware of the *ONB* (Hays 1990). That they are presented as the possible knocking over of Socrates' theory about the ὄντα is perhaps more interesting, especially under the light

of what is said at 128c6-d1; in that context Zenon tells Socrates that he wrote his treatise (which is read before the dialogue starts, though it is not quoted by Plato) with the intention of defending Parmenides against those who made fun of his arguments concerning the One. Is Gorgias one of them? And if so, did Plato read the *ONB* as a mainly anti-Parmenidean text?

Nestle 1922, p.551-62 has argued that Gorgias antedates Zenon and on the grounds of this chronological *manoeuvre* he reached the conclusion that Zenonn's treatise was pointing at Gorgias' text. Although the transference of the date cannot be accepted, it should be noted that the connection of Gorgias with Zenon's arguments – in Plato's book – acquires an interesting implication. As Palmer (1999, p.109; for a general discussion of what he calls the "sophistical appropriation of Parmenides" in 110-117) has pointed out, "the Gorgianic scepticism...should be compared both with the antagonism of Parmenides' detractors in the earlier portion of the dialogue and with Gorgias' own personal demonstration against Parmenidean Being in 'On What-Is-Not'". It is possible that Plato saw Gorgias' arguments in the *ONB* as a threat against him (see Hays 1990, p.335) and this is why he gave Parmenides the opportunity to answer Gorgias (or even Gorgias as the programmatic opponent of the anti-Parmenidean or the anti-Eleatic conclusions). In Hays' (1990, p.336) own words "he knew [sc. Plato] that *his own quest for forms was particularly vulnerable to the same arguments* because its ontological assumptions were similar to those of the Eleatics" (the italics are mine).

οὐκ εἶναί φησιν οὐδέν: the first thesis of Gorgias is given in indirect speech, hence the infinitive εἶναί (instead of the οὐδὲν ἔστιν, Sextus 66). It should be noted, that Isokrates *Hel.3*, *Ant.268* depends the word ὄντα from οὐδέν (*Hel.3* οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἔστιν, *Ant.268* παντελῶς οὐδέν); οὐδὲν should be taken in a general way and it "can include Being, Not-Being and particular existences in its negation"

as Levi (1941, p.13, cited by Untersteiner 1954, p.166 n.20) has pointed out (also Migliori 1973, p.26 n.4). Gorgias does not undertake the task of attacking solely the Being of Parmenides – he has a wider scope. The 'nothing' of this first phrase implies a total denial of the theoretical constructions of the philosophers and it must be related to the subject of the ἴδιος ἀπόδειξις: οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι. Both 'being' and 'not-being', together with what may be attributed to them as their characteristics by philosophers, are described by this perileptic οὐδέν of the opening lines of *MXG*. That the word includes both being and not-being is also brought out by the contexts of 979a30 οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη (the result of the second argument of the ἴδιος ἀπόδειξις) and 979a32 οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐδέν (the result of the third argument of the ἴδιος ἀπόδειξις), where οὐδέν expresses the impossibility of the existence of either being or not-being, if those were identical (ταὐτόν; see Palmer 1999, p.70). It may be added that οὐδέν, meaning the impossibility of attributing a specific characteristic to ὄντα without contradictions resulting is brought out in 979a20.

979a14-18

This short passage (unparalleled in Sextus) is an example of what may be called early, or sophistical doxography (see Mansfeld 1990, p.22-28, 59-64) and it is not paralleled in Sextus' version. It would probably be more accurate to say that we have a classification of doctrines of earlier philosophers, an outline of their fundamental *credo*, which – it should be noted – in the case of Gorgias is not intended as a neutral accumulation of their ideas. It is clear that those doctrines quoted here, will be the very target and the very weapon of Gorgias' attack. The refutation of the premises of earlier philosophers is based on their contradictory character (λέγοντες τἀναντία).

In addition we know that Protagoras had written a book under the title (?) Περὶ τοῦ Ὄντος, where he argued against the monists (πρὸς

τοὺς ἓν τὸ ὄν εἰσάγοντας, cp. Porphyry (B2 DK)). It must then be safe to conclude that in this treatise Protagoras had also collected the ideas of the monists with the purpose of attacking them (see Mansfeld 1990, p.62, who holds that Gorgias was inspired by Protagoras and – with less certainty – that he combined the arguments of Protagoras against the monists with those of Zenonn against the pluralists).

It seems that Hippias had also composed a collection of earlier ideas, which according to Athenaios had the title Συναγωγή (86B4DK); in 86 B6 DK we read· τούτων ἴσως εἴρηται τὰ μὲν Ὀρφεῖ, τὰ δὲ Μουσαίῳ κατὰ βραχὺ ἄλλῳ ἀλλαχοῦ, τὰ δὲ Ἡσιόδῳ, τὰ δὲ Ὁμήρῳ, τὰ δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν ποιητῶν, τὰ δὲ ἐν συγγραφαῖς τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι τὰ δὲ βαρβάροις· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐκ πάντων τούτων τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὁμόφυλα συνθεὶς τοῦτον καινὸν καὶ πολυειδῆ τὸν λόγον ποιήσομαι (for Hippias as a common source of Plato and Aristotle see Snell (1944), reprinted in Classen 1976, p.478-490, Classen 1965, p. 175-181, Pfeiffer 1968, p. 52, Patzer (1986), Mansfeld 1990, p. 84-96, with more references on p.71 n.9; contra Stokes 1971, p.282 n.106; see also Guthrie 1971, p.282-283 and Kerferd 1981, p.48-49).

The summary of the arguments given in the form of antithetical pairs are not presented here in the same order as that in the second part of the first division (that they were presented in the second part, that is after the ἴδιος ἀπόδειξις, is made clear from three passages: a) 979a24 μετὰ τὴν πρώτην ἴδιον αὐτοῦ ἀπόδειξιν, b) 979a33 οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ πρῶτος λόγος ἐκείνου – if Diels reading is adopted – and c) 979b20 μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον φησίν). The counter-arguments about the (1) one and many dichotomy (ἓν / πολλά), which comes first in the summary, are discussed after the arguments concerning the pair (2) generated-ungenerated (ἀγένητα / γενόμεντα); both arguments are followed by an argument concerning [3] motion, which is not included in the summary (unparalleled in Sextus). Schematically, in the summary we have (1)→(2), whereas in the

second part of the first division we have the converse order with the addition of the argument about motion (2)→(1)→(3).

On the basis of obvious similarities with a passage from Xen. *Mem*.I.1.14, we could safely draw the conclusion that Gorgias' classification as it is given in the version of *MXG* had an impact on Xenophon (see Mansfeld 1990, p.59-61, 99-101, with references to others p. 80 n.193, and p. 81 n.197), when – for the needs of his text – he summarises the ideas of some of the Presocratic philosophers. This summary follows the statement that Socrates neglected the philosophers, because of the fact that they had different views. The summary of their premises, as it is given by Xenophon is the following:

τῶν τε περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως μεριμνώντων τοῖς μὲν δοκεῖν

(a) ἓν μόνον τὸ ὂν εἶναι, τοῖς δ᾽ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος,

(b) καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀεὶ πάντα κινεῖσθαι, τοῖς δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἄν ποτε κινηθῆναι,

(c) καὶ τοῖς μὲν πάντα γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι,
τοῖς δὲ οὔτ᾽ ἄν γενέσθαί ποτε οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀπολέσθαι.

Some remarks: (1) the order in which the premises are listed in Mem. I.1.14, is not the identical with that of the summary MXG. The order of the arguments in both summaries is the following: 1:a, ∅:b, 2:c. (2) It is safe to conclude that Gorgias' original summary also contained the pair motion/rest. (2a) The pair motion / rest, which comes second in Xenophon (and is missing from the summary of MXG) shows that it may also be safe to deduce that Gorgias, in his argumentation, had also included an argument concerning rest. (3) Both Gorgias and Xenophon do not name the philosophers to whom they attribute these premises.

Under this light the passages from Isokr.Ant.268 (=86B1DK, where only the last portion of the passage is printed), Pl. Soph.242c-243a and Arist.*Ph*.184b15-25 and *Met*.1028b2 seem to have a common denominator: they are all related to the first element of the

Gorgianic summary (the one/many dichotomy) in the respect that they all classify the several views of the early philosophers concerning the number of the o[nta. In Isokrates' classification Gorgias himself is included (he is the last one in the list: some (who?) say that the o[nta are infinite, Empedocles four – the two of them mentioned, i.e. νεῖκος and φιλία – Ion no more than three, Alcmeon only two, Parmenides and Melissos only one) for – according to the orator – he held that the number of o[nta is oujdevn (Gorgias is also mentioned in Isokr.Hel.3; see Mansfeld 1990, p.100-101; for others who have discerned those similarities, Mansfeld 1990, p.71 n.9)

συνθεὶς τὰ ἑτέροις εἰρημένα: The participle συνθεὶς (which is also used by Porphyry to describe the collection of earlier views by Hippias) shows that the summary that we have in *MXG* existed in Gorgias' original text. The 'others' of the text are not the Eleatics exclusively. Gorgias is interested in a total attack upon the abstract philosophical speculation as a process. That he does not have only the Eleatics in mind is shown by the fact that pluralism is also at stake as opposed to monism. It is the philosophical argumentation as a process – which compensates philosophers with contradictions – that Gorgias wants to bring to the surface.

περὶ τῶν ὄντων: the abstract and fundamental being(s) of the philosophers; it is the first occurrence of the term τὸ ὄν in the text. In *Helen* 13, we are told that physical philosophers, by substituting the one view for another make unbelievable and hidden things visible to the eyes of their minds. This passage (cited by Mansfeld 1990, p.99; see Introduction) is, if nothing else, an indication that Gorgias had remarked – and what is more, he was able to integrate these remarks in his argumentation- that philosophers have a great flexibility in their argumentation and that he was aware that in philosophical conflicts, there are always disagreements and a great

stock of (flexible) ideas. These very unbelievable constructions and those disagreements are now his target.

The first occurrence of τὰ ὄντα in a context where the predominant theme is the ascertainment that philosophers have expressed totally controversial ideas about it is a sign that Gorgias' polemic has as its object *all* the theoretical conceptions of being (Levi 1941, p.32-34, Lloyd 1966, p.119 n.2). That ὄντα signifies the philosophical constructions is also shown by Isokr. *Ant.*268, where Gorgias is mentioned along with other philosophers (the way that Faggi 1926 puts it is remarkable "è questo l' Essere solitario, schematico, astratto, geometrico, inerte e senza vita, che Gorgia nega", p.227; see Iaso Rensi 1938, p. 99 n.1; Guthrie 1971, p.199; more recently Mansfeld 1990, p.102-103 and Palmer 1999, p. 67). The plural should not be considered as an exclusive allusion to the pluralists. The ὄντα is the intersection where the different philosophical speculations about the being arrive from opposite directions.

This passage shows clearly that Gorgias does not intend to discuss the phenomenal world, the phenomena (as Calogero, 1932 first thought, followed by Kerferd 1955 and Newiger 1973).

τἀναντία: in a way it foreshadows the method that Gorgias will use in the second portion supporting the first thesis; this method can be labelled *argument from antinomy*. Cassin (1980, p.436) rightly concludes that the antithetical views of the philosophers "forment ainsi, face à Gorgias, un bloc contradictoire qui anéantit son propre dire". This strategy is used again in *The Defence of Palamedes* (25-26), where Palamedes addresses his opponent, Odysseus and he says that his accusations are contradictory. In that context we have a man (Palamedes) who is accused of two opposite things (δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα): wisdom and madness. In this context we have a fundamental philosophical notion (being) predicated with opposite (τἀναντία) characteristics: one/many, generated / ungenerated, motion / rest. In addition, in both texts, it is postulated that only one

characteristic (979a21 τούτων ἂν θάτερα εἴη) can be attributed to one given thing without contradictions resulting; but the examination of each alternative (συλλογίζεται κατ' ἀμφοτέρων 979a18, cp. δι' ἀμφότερα ἂν εἴης ψευδής The Defence of Palamedes 26) leads to the conclusion that none of those characteristics can be attributed to it. In the same manner the two major arguments of Palamedes already mentioned have the same character. Facing the question "Has Palamedes performed the actions accused of ?", two alternatives are given and both of them are proved to be groundless. The same holds for the exhaustive argumentation showing that he was not able to perform the acts accused of (did I commit the treason alone or with accomplices, was it night or under the daylight); two alternatives are given and then it is shown that both were impossible (for this pattern of argumentation see Introduction).

Schematically: suppose that something exists x (εἴ τι ἔστι); if it exists it must either be y (ἕν) or –y (πολλά), q (γενόμενον) or –q (ἀγένητον)... But neither y, nor –y, neither q nor –q...exist, so –x (980a9 εἶναι οὖν οὐδέν).

κατ' ἀμφοτέρων: κατὰ + gen. here 'against', not 'concerning'; G. argues against both members of all those pairs of characteristics attributed to ὄντα.

979a 19-24

φησίν: After the summary of the premises of philosophers, we have now an outline of Gorgias' own refutation.

εἴ τι ἔστι...γενόμενα: Bonitz; εἴ τι ἔστι <ἢ ἕν ἢ πολλά εἶναι καὶ ἢ ἀγένητα ἢ γενόμενα. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔστι> μήτε... is Diels' reading (followed by Levi 1941, p.10), but it cannot be accepted, because Gorgias, in the second portion of his first thesis (979b20ff.), does not discuss the possibility of μὴ ἔστι (see Untersteiner 1954, p.166 n.24, Cassin p.437-8, 443-4); on the contrary, by tracing the antinomies of the arguments of philosophers about being he concludes that there is οὐδέν (cp.979b20, 979b35).

μήτε ἀγένητα μήτε γενόμενα: Note that in the discussion of this pair (979b21) we read ἀγένητον / γενόμενον in singular (see Mansfeld 1990, p.113 and my comments *ad loc.*).

θάτερα: It is clear that if something exists, then a choice should be made; for these pairs include two antithetical notions which cannot be attributed to one single thing. Consequently, the following step will be the proof of the impossibility of either entity of each pair.

ὅτι <δ'> οὐκ ἔστιν...γενόμενα: <δ'> Untersteiner 1961, p.58 (citing *Hel.*13 ὅτι δ' ἡ πειθώ); all the characteristics attributed to being (with the exception of motion) are repeated here paratactically, since the idea is that none of them can even separately describe it.

τὰ μὲν ὡς Μέλισσος...δεικνύειν: 'à la manière de'; the author of *MXG* means that Gorgias in the argumentation following the ἴδιος ἀπόδειξις picks up and combines arguments and argumentative processes used by those philosophers. Hence the ἴδιος ἀπόδειξις is a contradistinction to this method. τὰ μὲν...τὰ δε: they should not be taken strictly as an anaphoric reference. They should be taken with the more general meaning 'some...and other', because otherwise what is said here would be inconsistent with the contents of the full discussion of each one of these premises (Calogero, cited by Untersteiner 1961, p.59-60).

μετὰ τὴν πρώτην...ἀπόδειξιν: 'after his first original proof' (equivalent with the λόγος of 979a33); the 'original proof' of Gorgias comes first, though the summary of the arguments of the second part in favour of the first thesis has already been given by the author of *MXG*. Several translations have been proposed for the ἴδιος ἀπόδειξις ('special' demonstration: Kerferd 1955, 'originale dimonstrazione': Untersteiner 1961 and Mazzara 1982, 'spezialbeweis': Newiger 1973, 'démonstration bien à lui: Cassin 1980, 'special proof', 'particular proof': Mansfeld 1985, 1988, 'eigenen Beweis': Buchheim 1989, 'personal demonstration': Palmer 1999). Wesoly (1983-1984, p.23), has rather recently argued (Palmer, 1999, p.69, also adopts her view) that the 'argomento

proprio' of Gorgias owes its name to the fact that it is an original ('originale') refutation of Parmenides, whereas the other arguments are based on the contradictory character of the arguments of his successors. Her disclaimer is clearly feasible and it is reinforced by the argumentative process of Gorgias, who – to an extent and in a specific way – is using Parmenides as an intertextual presupposition for his own proof that nothing is (see following notes).

ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν...μὴ εἶναι: both 'to be' and 'not to be' are the target of Gorgias original demonstration. Kerferd (1955, p.19 -who endeavours to reconcile the version of *MXG* with that of Sextus) took this phrase as a quotation of Gorgias own words by the author of *MXG*. In other words he (mistakenly) thought that Gorgias was repeating at this place his 'whole thesis', so as to make feasible his interpretation of the ἴδιος ἀπόδειξις as an exclusive refutation of 'not to be' (τὸ μὴ εἶναι). But that the text is clear and in his own words sound (p.6) is shown by the repetition of the whole phrase later (979b1). What is more the author of *MXG* emphatically states (ἐν ᾗ λέγει) that in his 'original proof' Gorgias maintained that *both* 'to be' and 'not to be' are not (contra Kerferd see Mansfeld 1990, p.215-6 n.58). Despite this point, the interpretation of Kerferd is not without interest. For the starting point throughout the 'original proof' is not 'to be' or 'being', but its opposite 'not to be' or 'not-being'. But evidently saying that Gorgias is refuting solely 'not to be' or 'not being' is one thing and saying that he is starting from 'not to be' or 'not-being' with the intention of objecting to both 'to be' (and 'being') and 'not to be' (and not-being) is quite another.

The First Thesis (979a25-980a9)

The 'original proof' (979a25-33)

The 'original proof' is perhaps the most demanding part of the *ONB*, as it is given in *MXG*. This is not due to textual difficulties (with

only one exception; there are other parts of this version whose content is practically based on conjecture), but to the extremely economical manner in which the author of *MXG* decided to preserve it. If one wishes to appreciate the argumentation of this part one should not be oblivious of the fact that what we have here is a short summary of an original Gorgianic argumentation. This entails of course that we do not possess the form in which Gorgias expressed his complicated ideas. The very intricate content of this part – with the antithetical notions of 'being' and 'not-being', the necessary repetitions, and the logical transitions from the one argument to the other – is enough to make even the most naïve reader of Gorgias realize that the original text, especially here, would have been full of stylistic devices ("we do not have this proof in its original and majestic Gorgian form" Mansfeld 1990, p.218).

The 'original proof' is developed in three stages or rather we have three arguments closely related. The whole argument runs as follows:

(1) a. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναί ἐστι μὴ εἶναι,

For, <u>if</u> **not being** *is* **not being,**

b. οὐδὲν ἂν ἧττον τὸ μὴ ὂν τοῦ ὄντος εἴη.

not being would *be* no less than **being,**

c. τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὄν ἐστι μὴ ὂν καὶ τὸ ὂν ὄν,

because **not being** *is* **not being,** and **being** [sc. is] **being**

d. [ὥστε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ οὐκ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα]

[<u>so that</u> things no more are than they are not.]

(2)   a εἰ δ' ὅμως τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔστι,

<u>But if</u> **not being** is,

b τὸ εἶναι, φησί, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀντικείμενον.

being – its opposite – , he says, is not

c εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔστι,

<u>Because</u> if **not being** *is*

d τὸ εἶναι μὴ εἶναι προσήκει

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<u>Then</u> it follows that **being** is not.

(1)÷(2)   ὥστε οὐκ ἂν οὕτως, φησίν, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη,

<u>So that</u> in this way, he says, nothing would be,

(→3)   εἰ μὴ ταὐτὸν εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι.

unless **being** and **not being** are the same.

(3)   a   εἰ δὲ ταὐτό,

But if they are the same,

b   καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐδέν·

even in this way nothing would be;

c   τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπείπερ γε ταὐτὸ τῷ μὴ ὄντι.

<u>because</u> **not being** is not, and the same holds for **being**, because it is the the same with **not-being**.

Some remarks: it is clear from the words signifying transition (the underlined words) that both the first two arguments are structured in the same way. There is an hypothesis (1a, 2a) followed by a logical follow on (1b, 2b); then there is an argument (1c, 2c) and finally a conclusion. The discussion of the first and second arguments (1,2) is followed by a general disclaimer or conclusion, which I take it to be deduced from both of them, and not merely from the second one. The third argument is announced by a phrase combining both elements (being and not being), which is picked up, so as to form the assumption of it (3a). It is then asserted that even in this case nothing would be (3b), because, as it is argued, not-being is not and being, being the same with not being is not as well.

An objection to the translation of the passage as it is cited above would probably be that it renders almost everywhere εἶναι, μὴ εἶναι with the terms 'being' and 'not-being', which would normally correspond to the alternative terms τὸ ὄν, τὸ μὴ ὄν also traced in the text. But I take it that the syntax of an infinitive with an article (a very important property of the Greek language in terms of description of abstract notions) does justify this choice, which – and

this is perhaps more important – clarifies the opposition of 'being' with the negative 'not-being', as two contrasted terms.

Putting these details aside, we can now pass to the interpretation of the 'original proof' as a whole. Gorgias seems to make experiments with the double semantic value of the verb εἶναι ('to be'); *ONB* is the first extant work where the route designated by Parmenides, the great father of ontology, is seriously questioned. Gorgias' strategy has, it appears, as its starting point the observation that the verb 'to be' has a double function: it can be used either existentially or as a copula. In the latter case it can also be used so as to assert the identity of two terms, as happens in the case 'X is X', or 'Y is Y', where 'Y is –X'. In modern terms he presupposes the implication of existence in a rather functional linguistic element (the 'copula' of the traditional grammars). According to Gorgias thus, 'X is X' implies that 'X exists'.

One may object here that this interpretation, by using the distinction between 'existence' and 'copula' does not take into account the modern surveys on the Greek verb to be, and more particularly the influential conclusions of Charles Kahn. In many articles this scholar has shown that the 'copulative'/ 'existential' dichotomy – as far as the Greek verb 'to be' is concerned' – is an artificial one, and that it originally does not exist in the Greek language. He mainly argued against the concept of 'existence', as a separate category of the Greek language, and he thus proposed – among others – the 'veridical' use of the verb 'to be' (though he concedes that "when we are talking about truth and reality, the existential and copulative uses of *be* are never far away" Kahn 1979, p. 330). The point cannot be fully discussed here; what may be said is that without denying the predominance of the veridical usage of 'to be', we may feel free to use the term 'existence'. We are not here beginning our interpretation with the presupposition of a separate 'existential' meaning of the verb 'to be'. We are simply realizing that Gorgias *does* presuppose that such a distinction exists (and it is recognizable by the recipients of his argumentation), just in order to

make use of it. Under this light, we can compare the words of Kahn (*ibid*, p.329) with the use of the verb 'to be' made by G.:

> "Of course, we can easily see how the existential and copula uses of *be* will also turn up, if we think of the reality in question as expressed by a subject-predicate sentence –for instance by the sentence 'The sun is shining'. For if this sentence is true, then <u>its subject</u> (the sun) <u>must exist</u>. And the sentence <u>uses the copula verb *is* to predicate something of this</u> <u>subject</u>, namely *that it is shining, or that its light reaches us*."

(the underlining is mine). G. presupposes that the sentence 'not-being is not being' is true and he thus "shows" that 'not-being', namely the subject of the sentence, exists. Whether this kind of argumentation is logical and productive (Plato would certainly have his objections) is a debatable point.

It has been almost unanimously accepted that the 'original proof' is – in one way or another – related to Parmenides' concept of being. Nestle 1922, pp.551-62, Calogero 1932 and Broecker 1958, 425-438) all thought that Parmenides is the exclusive target of G.'s criticism; Cassin (1980) saw it as a "catastrophic repetition" of the Parmenidean argument and Kerferd – in the phrase announcing the scope of the 'original proof' (979a24) – saw an obvious parallel with fr.2.3 and 6.23 of Parmenides ("it is likely that Gorgias had these phrases of Parmenides in mind"; more recently Palmer 1999, p.71, argues that G. chose Parmenides, because, by attacking him, his argument would acquire a more general application to all the philosophers putting forward different fundamental entities).

Whether G. had in mind Parmenides cannot be certified directly; we can only rely upon suggestions. We have already said that probably the ἴδιος ἀπόδειξις in a contradistinction to the second portion of the argumentation supporting the first thesis (where other philosophers were at least used, as the summary of *MXG* witnesses) owes its name to the fact that in this part G. offers an original attack

on Parmenides. But still Parmenides is not mentioned by name either in the *MXG*, or in Sextus.

That Parmenides is probably the target of G. gains credence by the striking similarity between the arguments used in the 'original proof' and those used in Plato's *Parmenides* 162a. Guthrie (*Hist. Gr.Phil.* vol.V, p.55 n.4) saw a 'close parallel' and Cornford (1939, p.226) thought that 'Gorgias might be directly answering the argument of G.'s (see also Brumbaugh1961, pp.21-22 and n.4; a detailed discussion in Mansfeld 1990, pp.264-5). The passage from Plat. *Parm.* 162a is the following:

> the one *is* a not-being...So if it is not to be, it must have *being* a
>
> not-being as a bond (δεσμός) in regard to its not-being,
>
> just as, in like manner, what is must have *not-being* what is not,
>
> in order that it, in its turn, may completely be.

(transl. M. L. Gill – P. Ryan)

Mansfeld (1990, p.265) concluded that "at *Parm.* 162a Plato used Gorgias...[sc. who] anticipated one of Plato's major contributions to philosophical discussion".[1] So, if it is the case that we have here an adaptation of the Gorgianic argumentation concerning not-being, then the suggestion that G. is attacking Parmenides is strengthened; in other words it is likely that Plato in this context has Parmenides using the very arguments employed by G., so as to show that it cannot be claimed that not-being *is not at all* (notice that Brumbaugh, *ibid.*, pp.21-22 n.4 uses the term 'double irony' concerning the relation of Plato to G.).

The conclusion that the specific target of G. in the 'original proof' is Parmenides may be tantalising; for it is well known that despite the progress in the interpretation of Parmenides' ontology, a point of common consensus has not yet been reached. His poem,

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[1] He rightly, of course, points out that G. did not go so far as to show that not-being is relatively not – as Plato did – but he was content to adopt the idea that it does not exist at all, though we should not accept that while G. merely played with a consciously ambiguous use of the words, and saw not being as "a sort of toy", by contrast Plato was much more profound in trying to define why "words have different meanings" simply because G. is an earlier philosopher, or what is

partly because of its poetical form, is too open to various interpretations. One would now think that the interpretative difficulties become more intricate if one realises that our task is not merely to unlock Parmenides' text, but also to scrutinize the relation between this text and a secondhand account of the criticism of a later sophist. I wish to take a more optimistic view by suggesting that apart from the variety of modern readings of Parmenides we possess the reading of a person who was (chronologically at least) closer to him, that is the reading of G. himself. In saying this, I do not, of course, mean that G.'s approach is the key to our understanding of Parmenides, for G., or what we have from G.'s original text, is an attack on Parmenides. What I mean is that the obscurity of Parmenides' passages which are related to the interpretation of *ONB* should not prevent us from reading it as its intertext (as Kerferd thought, 1955, p.7), because G.'s criticism unavoidably integrates and incorporates a discernible manner of perception of his target.

It has already been said that G.'s programmatic phrase announcing the agenda of his criticism in the 'original proof' (οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε εἶναι, οὔτε μὴ εἶναι 279a24) can be related to Parmenides' two routes of inquiry fr.2.3,5:

3. ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι,

5. ἡ δ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι.

G.'s experiment in its process clings to the second route and objects to *both* the alternatives 'it is either for being (ἡ μὲν)...or for not-being (ἡ δ'). This serves perhaps as a further argument that the 'original proof' can be read as anti-Parmenidean: had G. intended to deny *merely* the controversial entities of the philosophers, a declaration that 'it is not for being' in the programmatic phrase would have sufficed (see Palmer 1999, p.70). But since he wants to

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more, because Gorgias is Gorgias and Plato is Plato; it might be more rewarding

address Parmenides, he includes both 'being' and 'not-being', that is both the routes of Parmenides.

If this analysis is so far correct we may now see *how* G. is organising his argument against Parmenides. G. is making a choice: he is taking μὴ εἶναι (the second route) as his starting point. In other words, facing two alternatives, the positive 'being' and its negation 'not-being', he chooses the second.

I consider that the argumentation of the 'original proof' can be elucidated if we use two terms of modern linguistic theory, that is the terms 'marked' and 'unmarked'. It is of course impossible to discuss fully those terms here, but for the purposes of our discussion some examples will suffice. A characteristic of an unmarked category is that it can be traced in contexts where the unmarked category would not be normally expected. For the words 'long' and 'short', both denoting 'length' we can say that 'long' is the unmarked category, for in our possible question concerning the length of a given object we normally ask "How long is it", rather than "How short is it?" The same generally holds in matters concerning gender: we may say "What a nice dog!" (and normally not "What a nice bitch"), without knowing whether the dog we are referring to is male or female (a discussion of gender in relation to marked/unmarked categories can be found in Lyons 1977, pp.305ff.). So generally (the subject is of course more complicated) the category male is the unmarked, whereas the female is the marked one. In those terms negation – which interests us here – is the marked category, as contrasted to non-negative statements. When we want to take information concerning the content of a box, we normally ask "What is in the box?", instead of asking "What is not in the box?", though the latter is of course grammatically acceptable.

It is clear then that G. proceeds by using as his starting point the marked 'not-being'. This allows him in the first argument to

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to take into account that their intentions are different.

predicate not being with itself and thus to conclude that "it is no less than being". If he had chosen the unmarked category 'being', then the predication ("if being is being") would have been useless (in fact he predicates 'being' of 'being' in 979a27: καὶ τὸ ὂν ὄν; but no argument can be deduced from this phrase, which at any rate offers an analogy to the τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὂν ἐστι μὴ ὄν. One may also observe that the latter sentence is stressed by the use of the verb ἐστι, while the former is given elliptically). For the affirmation 'being is' does not serve as the necessary presupposition for the desired consequence on, that is 'if not-being is', then 'being' being its opposite is not. G. then, by using the marked 'not-being' both as subject and predicate, infers that 'it is' and he thus passes to the second argument (2), by taking for granted the conclusion of argument (1). In the third argument (3), he presupposes that the alternatives are identical. Having done away with the difficulty of the non-existence of 'being' he can easily and without any compunction assert that 'not being is not' (979a34) – this has not of course been proved, but it is axiomatically asserted – and also that 'being' is not – this has been proved on the basis of the assertion that 'not-being' is.

Has G. succeeded in his attack? Is his argumentation coherent? Very recently, on the basis of logical analysis of the arguments of G., Palmer (1999, p.73, whose analysis – in my view – is otherwise the most economical and the most accurate one) has concluded that "Gorgias' personal demonstration ends up confirming Parmenides' injunction against the second path...thus confirming the value of Parmenides' original injunction to stay on the first path". This may be true. It is also clear that G.'s 'original proof' is partly inconsistent, and we have already pointed out that in the first argument he establishes the existence of 'not-being' and in the third one he takes it for granted that 'not-being' is not (οὐκ ἐστι). Without having any intention to vindicate the sophist, I should like to insist on the point that if the 'original proof' has any value, we will not

trace it in its coherence or in the cohesion and the accuracy of the arguments. Even if G. did not succeed in knocking over Parmenides' point, however flagrantly inconsistent his argumentation may be, the value of his proof lies elsewhere. It can be traced, I am inclined to believe, in the contribution of G. to the history of ideas. What is important is that he did not hesitate to take the Eleatic bull by the horns, and he thus gave scope for an elaborated discussion of not-being by Plato. Mansfeld (1990, p.119) concludes: "What Plato did with it is what really matters to the history of philosophy...this ancestor really was begotten by his offspring". But what might have happened if this ancestor had not existed?

979a25-29

εἰ μὲν γάρ...μὴ εἶναι: Kerferd (1955, pp.8-9), εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι <ἔστιν>, ἦ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι, reading ἦ for ἤ, R; the reason is that the final sentence of this argument ὥστε...τὰ πράγματα (see notes ad loc.) creates a *non sequitur*. He thus translates "For if it is possible that it should not be, inasmuch as it is (possible for it) not to be...". Though his remark that the last sentence is a *non sequitur* is correct, I prefer to bracket it because I am inclined to agree with Mansfeld (1990, p.219) who entertains the hypothesis that ὥστε...τὰ πράγματα is an interpolation. In this first sentence G. predicates 'not-being' of itself, so as by using the verb 'is' as a copula to infer that 'not being' or 'what is not' *is*.

οὐδὲν ἂν ἧττον...εἴη: 'not-being would be no less than being' means that 'not-being' is; G. has shifted from the identity of 'not being' with 'not being' ('Y is Y') to the attribution of εἶναι to 'not-being'. Hence the criticism of the author of *MXG* that there must be a distinction between a ἁπλῶς and a ὁμοίως εἶναι. This distinction is made by Aristotle, who claims that the 'dialectical paralogism' of the obfuscation of the εἶναι ἁπλῶς with the εἶναί τι is peculiar to the eristic (*Rh.*1402a3-6 ἔτι ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς παρὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τί, γίγνεται φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, οἷον ἐν

μὲν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὅτι ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὂν [ὄν], ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ ὄν; see Wesoly 1983-4, p.28. Kahn (1966, 263-264) maintains that εἶναι ἁπλῶς in Aristotle does not generally mean 'exist'; it is "ultimately synonymous with the old Homeric (and post-Homeric) use of ἐστί for 'is alive'", though he concedes that at Aristotle's *Soph. El.*167a1-4 "an existential nuance is possible"; see Mansfeld 1990, p.218 n.66). In this light the avoidance of the use of ἐστί by Lykophron, as it is attested by Aristotle (=83 B 2 DK) so as to avoid confusion (λελεύκωται, instead of λευκός ἐστιν) is very interesting (see Kerferd 1955, p.25).

ὥστε οὐδέν...πράγματα: Mansfeld's (1990, pp.108, 219) suggestion that the final phrase is an interpolation of the author of *MXG* – equivalent to οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων εἶναι – seems correct. This sentence is unparalleled in Sextus and it creates a *non sequitur*. From the preceding sentence G. adduced that 'not-being', like 'being', is. By inferring now that 'things are no more than they are not' is a contradiction which, I think, is not committed by G. (De Lacy in his survey on οὐ μᾶλλον, 1958, pp. 59-71 casts doubt on whether G. used this phrase). Palmer (1999, p.72) thinks that from this conclusion we must infer "that they are not, which is tantamount to the conclusion in the two subsequent arguments that nothing is". But this conclusion does not result from the dubious usage of the verb 'to be' so far. The case may have been then that G. is taking from the first argument the necessary conclusion of the possibility of the 'existence' of 'not-being' (without at this stage confirming its 'non-existence', as he does for 'being' at 979a31), which at any rate is the most difficult task. Having set out this ground, it is easy for him in the third argument to postulate that 'not being' is not (the arbitrariness of this syllogism is depicted by the phrase οὐκ ὂν νοεῖται in Sextus). Mansfeld's correction thus admittedly has the advantage of creating a logical passage to the second argument (979a30ff). But his suggestion to transpose the sentence after 979a24, that is after the programmatic announcement of the scope of

the original proof, is not necessary (though he himself admits that such a transposition would be made if we wanted to preserve it "at all cost"). πράγματα: has been interpreted in various ways; Calogero (1932, p.197), takes it to mean the "molteplicità empirica del reale"; he is followed by Kerferd (1955, p.5, 1981, p.96), who thinks that in the first part of the *ONB* G. is also concerned with the phenomenal world ("...is also concerned with the status of objects of perception" and he claims that τὰ πράγματα "makes it clear that...it is not the existence of Being or Not-Being which is in question, but something wider"; the same view is taken by Newiger 1973, pp.21-22). Both Kerferd's and Newiger's arguments are based on the passages from Isok. *Ant.*268 and *Hel.*3, for which we have already adopted a different interpretation (see notes on 979a14-18). Levi (1941, p.15 cited by Untersteiner 1954, p.167 n.27) goes too far in saying that τὰ πράγματα refers to "the particular things that arise either from a single first principle or also from the *peras* and *apeiron* of the Pythagoreans, or from the many first causes of pluralism, things which by this very derivation involve change and Becoming, and therefore aspects of Not-being" and Untersteiner's (1961, p.60) connection of the word with χρήματα of Protagoras is not likely. Migliori (1973, p.30), attributing to it a more general meaning by suggesting that "si può, quindi, considerare la frase nella sua genericità, ritenendola una conferma dell' acquisita identità tra essere e non essere", is more accurate. However, I consider that the view taken by Mansfeld, that τὰ πράγματα is a general term – which in this first major thesis of *ONB* represents τὰ ὄντα (1990, p.102 and Palmer 1999, p.72 and n. 32) – is the most convincing. It is not necessary to repeat our argumentation concerning τὰ ὄντα (see notes on 979a14-18, and Introduction). We can simply add here that the word πράγματα is used by the author of *MXG* at least once to denote the fundamental entities of philosophers. This passage can be found in the account concerning Melissos in *MXG* 975a2: καὶ μὴ πολλὰ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα,

meaning that "*things that are* cannot be many..." (as it is rendered by Mansfeld 1990, p.207; the italics are mine). This does not of course imply that all the occurrences of πράγματα in the *MXG* replace τὰ ὄντα.

εἰ δ' ὅμως...ἀντικείμενον: the argument is characteristically Gorgianic; facing the question of 'existence' of both 'not-being' and 'being', and having (for the time being) answered positively to the first, he adduces that 'being' *is not*. Why is it not? Because it is the opposite of 'not-being', the touchstone of 'existence' and because (as G. knows very well: cp.*The Defence of Palamedes* 25) two opposite qualities cannot be attributed to one single thing. G. in the first argument singled out 'not-being' and in the second he excludes 'being'. Everything is ready to deny both of them in the third argument. ὅμως: Mansfeld (1990, p.219 n.73) suggests ὁμ<οί>ως, because of the *distinguo* made by Anonymous in the criticism (979a36, b5), and because the transmission from the previous argument is in this manner smoother. I do not find it necessary to contaminate the demonstration of G. with a term which was later to become technical, especially when the tradition of the text does not demand it. The transition with the δ' ὅμως on the other hand is rather satisfying, as it does not obscure the fact that the assumption of the second argument is based on the argument of the first one. ἀντικείμενον: "the Stoic term for a member of an exclusive conjunction...it fits the context *ad sententiam*" (Mansfeld 1990, p.219).

προσήκει: 'it follows' from what has been shown in the first argument.

οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη: the conclusion of the second argument.

εἰ μὴ ταὐτόν...μὴ εἶναι: Reinhardt (1916, p.36-39) thought that this third argument makes a triple analogy with the three arguments of Parmenides (B 6, 8-9). This is not accepted by Palmer (1999, p.72 n.36; see also Untersteiner 1954, p.167 n.30).

οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐδέν: the conclusion of the third argument. Notice that this is an alternative form of the conclusion of the second argument. τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὄν...τῷ μὴ ὄντι: the argument proceeds again by starting from 'not-being'; the present statement that 'not-being' is not, and which in fact contradicts what has been said in the first argument, is in formal conformity with Parmenides' second route. But instead of predicating 'not-being' of itself G. absolutely claims that 'not-being' is not and then – by following the opposite method of the one used in the second argument – he says that 'being' is not either, because it is the *same* as 'not-being'. Schematically: Argument 2: {+} 'not being'≠'being'→{-} 'being' (where {+} for 'is', {-} 'is not'); Argument 3:{-} 'not-being'≈ 'being'→{-} 'being', ('not-being').

πρῶτος: instead of αὐτός of the Mss; the suggestion of Diels has been followed by Kerferd (1955), Untersteiner (1961), Newiger (1973, p. 33 n.64), Buchheim (1989). αὐτὸς ὁ Foss, ὁ αὐτοῦ Mullach. Cassin's reading, who accepts the Mss' ὁ αὐτός, is consistent with her view that the anonymous author of *MXG* is actually giving the exact words of G. ("l'identité du sens n'est garantie que par l'identité littérale" p.447); this is wishful thinking, not a realistic approach.

Anonymous' criticism (979a34–b19)

The following paragraphs are devoted by the author of MXG to his criticism of the 'original demonstration' of Gorgias. The arguments of this criticism will not be discussed in detail here; this is the task of those who are concerned with the assessment of MXG as such and for the identification of its author. In any case, the text of MXG as a contribution to the history of ideas has thoroughly been examined by Mansfeld (1990, pp.200-237) and Cassin (1980), to whom the reader is referred (Kerferd 1955 has also commented on the criticism). Notes on textual problems are unavoidable due to the obscurity of the text (in some cases at least).

ἃ γάρ...διαλέγεται: R ἀποδείκνυσιν, L ἀ..ποδεικνύουσιν; καὶ ἄ<λλοι> ἀποδεικνύουσιν Diels (followed by Untersteiner 1962, p.60), καὶ ἄ<ντα>ποδείκνυσι Kassel, καὶ α<ὐτὸς ἀ>ποδείκνυσιν Kerferd. The reading of R must clearly be accepted. G.'s 'original proof' has already been distinguished by the author of *MXG* from the second part (979a14 τὰ ἑτέροις εἰρημένα). Moreover τοῦτο at 979a37 is referring to the corrupted ἢ ἔστιν...μὴ ὄν, which is an economical modification of something clearly attributable to G. (see Cook-Wilson 1892, pp.441-2, and Kerferd 1955, p.9). Kerferd's addition of αὐτὸς is unnecessary, since the reference of the verb ἀποδείκνυσιν to the 'original proof' is clear. διαλέγεται: 'examines', is also sound (διελέγχεται Wandland, adopted by Untersteiner, a concomitant of the ἄ<λλοι> ἀποδεικνύουσιν).

εἰ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔστιν: Anonymous' starting point is the same as that of G.; he has remarked that G. singled out 'not being' and that he argued that it *is*. So at this point he merely repeats the hypothesis of the first argument of the 'original proof' (cp. 979a25).

ἢ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν <ἂν> εἴη <ἢ > καὶ ἔστιν ὅμοιον μὴ ὄν: Untersteiner's reading is preferable, as it is economical and closer to the reading of the Mss. (ἢ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν εἴη καὶ ἔστιν εἴη καὶ ἔστιν ὅμοιον μὴ ὄν R, ἢ ἁπλως εἰπεῖν εἴη καὶ ἔστιν ὅμοιον μὴ ὄν L); ἔστιν ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἔστιν ὁμοίως μὴ ὄν Foss, ἢ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἢ καὶ ἔστιν ὁμοίως μὴ ὄν Diels, ἢ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἢ ἢ καὶ ἔστιν τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ ὄν Apelt (see Cassin 1980); Mansfeld reads ἢ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν <ἂν> εἴη <ἢ> καὶ ἔστιν ὁμοίως μὴ ὄν. The whole period is a perileptic repetition of G.'s own distinction: if we say that 'not-being' *is*, then this '*is*' can either denote 'existence' (ἁπλῶς) or a 'similarity', such as 'Y is Y' (ὅμοιον).

τοῦτο δέ...ἀνάγκη: τοῦτο refers to the preceding sentences; Anonymous is stating that G.'s double function of '*is*' as either existential or 'similar' (as 'being is being' in the 'original proof') is

not feasible (for φαίνεται and ἀνάγκη see Mansfeld 1990, p.220 n. 80,81).

ὡσπερεὶ δυοῖν ὄντοιν: 'as if there were two things'; Kerferd suggested that ὄντοιν shows that it is not 'being' and 'not-being' that are considered, but 'things in general' (1955, p.11), for 'not-being' "would not be included under ὄντοιν". However, Anonymous is here assuming that we have a pair of two opposite *things* in a general manner. It is not necessary then to think that he is strictly referring either to 'things' (according to Kerferd meaning the 'phenomenal world') or to 'beings' (namely, the fundamental philosophical entities). The meaning is made clear from the following sentences.

τοῦ μὲν...μὲν μὴ ὄν: L, δοκοῦντος R (Apelt, Newiger (1973) p.42, Cassin (1980), p. 455, 461-3, Mansfeld (1990), p.220); Anonymous establishes a distinction which is distorted by the δοκοῦντος (though the latter is a *lectio difficilior*). He says: 'as if there were two things, the one being, the other not-being', then the only thing we can say is that the first is true (τὸ μὲν ἔστι, 'veridical' meaning of the verb 'to be', note the opposed οὐκ ἀληθές) and the second is *not* true (it is false), that is 'not-being' *is not* in an *absolute* way (cp. that the statement τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστιν is θαυμάσιον and merely conceded at the context of 979b7). So, the first argument of the criticism is that the existential use of the verb to be does not equally pertain to both 'being' and 'not-being'. 'Not-being' then *is not*, unless one feels free to use the verb 'to be' equivocally.

διὰ τί...μὴ εἶναι; Anonymous is picking up the announcement of the 'original proof' and is making it a question.

τὸ δὲ ἄμφω ἢ τὸ ἕτερον οὐκ ἔστιν; τὸ δὲ L, τὸ R; τί δὲ ἄμφω <ἢ> οὐθέτερον οὐκ ἔστιν Diels, τί δὲ ἄμφω οὐδὲ θάτερον οὐκ ἔστιν Kassel, τὸ δ' ἄμφω οὐθ' ἕτερον οὐκ ἔστιν Cook-Wilson, τὸ δὲ ἄμφω, οὐθ' ἕτερον, οὐκ ἔστιν; Calogero 1932, p.174 n. 2 (and Untersteiner 1962 p.63), τὸ δὲ ἄμφω ἢ τὸ ἕτερον οὐκ ἔστιν; Kerferd (1955 p.12 n.1, cp. Pl. *Hipp.Min.*376a3), τὸ δὲ ἄμφω

οὐδέτερον οὐκ ἔστιν Cassin (1980, pp.455, 463-4) τάδε ἄμφω οὐθέτερον οὐκ ἔστιν, Mansfeld (1990, p.221 n.82). I follow Kerferd (τὸ ἕτερον could also be θάτερον as we have θάτερα at 979a21) because the second member of the disjunction – corresponding to μὴ εἶναι – is answered by the argument of Anonymous (introduced by γάρ) which is identical with the first argument of the 'original proof'.

οὐδὲν γὰρ <ἧττον>...τοῦ εἶναι: Foss's ἧττον is necessary; Anonymous by repeating the basis of the first argument of the 'original proof' is reaching the opposite conclusion. Having posed the rhetorical question '...why *is it not* either the one or the other' [sc. εἶναι /μὴ εἶναι] he is saying that according to G. (φησίν) 'what <u>is not</u> (or 'not-being') is no less than <u>what is</u> ('being')'. Consequently, the second alternative (ἕτερον) *is* – as of course and by definition 'what is' *is* (979a39).

εἰ δὲ καὶ...τῷ [μὴ] ὄντι: μὴ does not belong in the text because it makes the statement senseless.

ἔτι: where 'not-being' *is* only if predicated of itself, 'being' *is* by definition. So as to infer that 'Y *is*' (Y being 'not being' and X being 'being') we have to say 'Y is Y', whereas for X we can either say 'X is X' or 'X *is*' in an absolute manner.

εἰ δὲ...ἀληθές: the opposite of the preceding argument; "if we concede that not being *is*" in an absolute manner, that is if we attribute to it an exclusive property of 'being'.

(ὡς δὴ θαυμάσιον...): explicitly shows that the hypothesis εἰ δὲ...ἀληθές is hardly accepted even as a concession.

πότερον <οὐ>: Kerferd's addition is accepted, because it ascertains that the only logical answer is ἅπαντα εἶναι.

τοὐναντίον: the opposite of what G. inferred (οὐδέν for which Anonymous has πάντα; see Mansfeld 1990, p.222).

οὐκ ἀνάγκη...μὴ εἶναι: Anonymous picks up the hypothesis of the second argument of the 'original proof' and claims that 'if not-being *is*, it does not follow that being is not' which is the exact opposite of

the conclusion of that argument (τὸ εἶναι, φησί, οὐκ ἔστι, τὸ ἀντικείμενον 979a30).

<τι>: Foss; it specifies that there would be 'something', namely 'not being'.

κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον: Anonymous is using afresh an argument of G. which he has already rejected (see Mansfeld 1990, p.222 and n.84).

εἰ δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστιν: a straightforward attack upon the third and final argument of the 'original proof'.

ἀντιστρέψαντι: self-referentially Anonymous makes his tactic in this argument explicit. G. said (ὡς γὰρ κἀκεῖνος λέγει) that 'if not-being is the same (ταὐτόν) as being, both being and not-being are not' (a slightly modified version of that at 979a33-35, in the respect that here it is not explicitly said that 'being' is not, because it is the same as 'not-being' which is not) and he concluded: ὥστε οὐδὲν ἔστιν ('nothing is'; cp. 979a33 οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐδὲν); Anonymous from the same argument feels free to infer the opposite position ("all things are"). Anonymous reaches the opposite conclusion because he takes the conclusion of the first argument of the 'original proof' ("not-being is") and he asserts that 'being' *is*.

The antinomies (979b20-980a8)

The second portion of the argumentation supporting the first general thesis of G. is developed with the process of arguments from antinomy; in order to show that οὐδὲν ἔστιν (a recurring phrase in this second part) G. expresses the hypothesis 'if it is' (and by this something we still mean the fundamental theoretical constructions of the philosophers, ὅσοι περὶ τῶν ὄντων λέγοντες τἀναντία 979a15) and he then attributes to this 'something' properties such as generated / ungenerated, one / many, in motion / at rest. In its turn, now, the examination of each one of those properties proves to be fruitless so that in all the cases the hypothesis εἰ δὲ ἔστιν is rejected. Schematically 'Ex' (x is) presupposes either Fx or −Fx, Yx

or –Yx, where F / -F, Y / -Y... represent the antithetical pairs of properties attributed to ὄντα. The examination of each one leads to the conclusion that the hypothesis 'x is' is not feasible, so as to have –Ex.

Two interrelated questions arise here: who is the target of G. and why is this argumentation from antinomies necessary at all? G. has already proved his first thesis (οὐκ εἶναι οὐδέν) in the 'original demonstration', but now it seems that this was not enough. Should we then draw the conclusion that this second portion is redundant? We have already argued that the *ONB* is a general attack on the theoretical constructions of the philosophers. It should be added now – and this is perhaps more important – that the *ONB* (especially its first part) can hardly be interpreted us a *direct* attack upon the premises of the philosopher as such. In other words, the reading of the *ONB* which aims at the identification of the philosophers criticised by G. – which undoubtedly is a part of our task – is, in my view, heading for failure (see Introduction).

G. is not putting forward a new theory of his own, in preparation for whose announcement he has first to do away with the theories of others. On the contrary he is an intellectual who knows that every single idea acquires substance by the means of linguistic utterance and that from the moment that something is argued in words the relentless activity of interpretation is about to be launched. What is questioned thus is not primarily the feasibility of the one or the other theory, but the possibility of establishing a firm theoretical system which aspires to partake of the absolute truth. Under this prism the part of the *ONB* under discussion is not – strictly speaking – intended to knock over any theory of any philosopher. By using the argumentative tools of philosophers, G. is seeking to show that once one is using arguments to support one's thesis, one should be aware that there are other arguments (sometimes one' s own) that can potentially be used against oneself. Hence the *pastiche* of a variety of contradictory (and incompatible) attributes, whose common denominator is that they have been used inflexibly by various

philosophers, as the only true properties of their theories. Each one of these (indispensable) properties contradicts another and so infinitely.

Putting those programmatic remarks aside we may now pass to the presentation of the arguments as a whole (see also notes on 979a14-18).

I. The first notional pair is that of ungenerated / generated. The argumentation against those alternatives (A, B) is the following:

(A) καὶ εἰ μὲν <u>ἀγένητον</u>,

    if it is <u>ungenerated</u>

a) <u>ἄπειρον</u> αὐτὸ τοῖς τοῦ Μελίσσου ἀξιώμασι λαμβάνει·

    he takes it to be <u>unlimited</u> in accordance with the premises of Melissos.

b) τὸ δ' ἄπειρον <u>οὐκ ἂν εἶναί που</u>. οὔτε γὰρ <u>ἐν αὐτῷ</u>, οὔτ α ν ἐν

ἄλλῳ   εἶναι· <u>δύο</u> γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἢ πλείω εἶναι, τὸ ἐνὸν

                καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ.

But the unlimited is <u>nowhere</u>. For it is neither in itself nor in anything else; in this case it would have been two or more, the one that in which it is and the other that which is in it.

c) <u>μηδαμοῦ δὲ</u> ὂν <u>οὐδὲν</u> εἶναι κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγον περὶ τῆς χώρας.

But if it is nowhere it is nothing according to the argument of Zenon about space.

The arguments about generated follow a transitional phrase which announces them:

Transition: ἀγένητον μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτ' οὐκ εἶναι,

        For those reasons it is not ungenerated,

(B)   οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ <u>γενόμενον</u>. γενέσθαι γοῦν οὐδὲν ἂν οὔτ ἐξ

ὄντος οὔτ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντος.

as <u>it is not generated</u> either; for nothing can be <u>generated</u> **either** from <u>being</u> or from <u>not-being</u>.

a) εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὂν μεταπέσοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτ' εἶναι τὸ ὄν,

because if being underwent such a radical change, it would not be being anymore

b) ὥσπερ γ' εἰ καὶ <u>τὸ μὴ ὂν</u> γένοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι εἴη <u>μὴ μὴ ὄν.</u>

as, if <u>not-being</u> came into being, it would not be not-being anymore.

Transition: οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκ <μὴ> ὄντος ἂν γενέσθαι·

But of course nothing can be generated from <u>not-being</u>

a′) εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν,

for if not-being is not,

οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκ μηδενὸς ἂν γενέσθαι·

nothing can be generated from nothing;

b′) εἰ δ' ἔστιν (αὖ) τὸ μὴ ὄν,

but again if <u>not-being</u> <u>is,</u>

δι' ἅπερ οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος,

for the reasons that hold for <u>being</u>

διὰ ταῦτ' ἂν οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γενέσθαι.

for those very reasons it cannot be generated from <u>not-being.</u>

Some remarks: the argument against non-γένεσις proceeds in three steps; the first one (after the hypothetical 'if it is ungenerated') is assuming (rather arbitrarily by appealing to the authority of Melissos) that if it is ungenerated it is unlimited; from that (b) G. deduces that it is nowhere, that is it cannot be spatially (?) located. And he concludes, on the ground of the argument of Zenon that if it is nowhere it is nothing or it is not at all.

The argument about generated is developed in two pairs of arguments (a-b, a'-b'). The second step of the first pair (b) presents a problem: if the meaning is 'if not-being changed into being', then it is a repetition of b' — where we have the discussion of the coming-to-be from not-being — with the additional problem that in the context of b' we are told that nothing can be generated from not-being, for the *same reasons* (that is because it would change into something different) as for being. The problem has been located by Cook-Wilson 1892, p.445-6) and Kerferd (1955), who posits a reasonabe explanation. He says that the "comparison between the two halves [sc. a, b] is simply formal". So from (b), we may generally infer that if a thing changes into something else then it ceases to be the same as that which was before. Generally the second members of each pair (b, b') remind us of a joke to be found in Plato's *Euthydemus* 283d: Kleinias' friends, we are told, wish to make him wise, and to make him not be an ἀμαθής; that is they wish to make him what he is not, and to make him not be what he is now. But what kind of friends are those who want to kill their friend (ἐξολωλέναι)?

II. After a general conclusion pertaining to the first argument as a whole, the author of *MXG* gives the second pair, namely one / many. The text is preserved in an extremely bad condition, full of lacunae and our knowledge about it is practically dependent upon the version of Sextus. The first phrases are announcing the notional pair, and in the usual way, it is reported that 'if it is' it is either one or many, because if it is neither of them then there is nothing.[1]

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[1] Apelt has ventured a *constitutio* of the text, which runs as follows: καὶ ἓν μὲν οὐκ εἶναι, ὅτι ἀσώματον ἂν εἴη τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἕν, καθὸ οὐδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος. ὃ ἀναιρεῖσθαι τῷ τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγῳ. ἑνὸς δὲ μὴ ὄντος οὐδ' ἂν ὅλως εἶναι οὐδέν. μὴ γὰρ ὄντος ἑνὸς μηδὲ πολλὰ εἶναι δεῖν. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἕν, φησίν, μήτε πολλὰ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν ἔστιν.

It is impossible to make any comments on this part of the argumentation, to which we shall turn in the discussion of the version of Sextus (we may point out here that Sextus devotes a very short part of his version to this pair).

III. Finally, the argument against motion (or / and) change – which does not appear in the general 'doxographical' preamble at 979a14-18 (see notes ad. loc.) – is given briefly. It has plausibly been argued that it followed an argument against rest (see Untersteiner 1954, p.149 and p. 170 n. 56 with further references; more recently Sicking 1964, pp.225-47 and in Classen 1976, 384-407, Newiger 1973, pp.87ff., Mansfeld 1990, p.263 and Palmer 1999, p.115 and n.35; contra Gigon (1936), p.200. Loenen 1959, pp.191-2 thinks that the argument about motion is a "personal addition on the part of the Anonymous"). But even the argument against motion (or / and change) that Anonymous decided to include in his text is obscure. All we can say is that it seems that G. makes a distinction between motion as qualitative change and locomotion. The two arguments that we have are the following:

οὐδ᾽ ἂν κινηθῆναί φησιν οὐδέν·

Nothing, he says, would move;

a) hypothesis εἰ γὰρ κινηθείη,

because if it <u>moved</u> [sc.changed]

argument [ἢ] οὐκ ἂν ἔτ᾽ εἴη ὡσαύτως ἔχον,

it would not have been in <u>the same state</u> **any more,**

conclusion ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν <ὂν> οὐκ ὂν εἴη, τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ὂν γεγονὸς εἴη.

but, instead, on the one hand being would be <u>not-being</u>, and not-being would <u>acquire existence</u>.

b) hypothesis ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ κινεῖται καὶ ἓν < ὂν> μεταφέρεται,

Futhermore, if it <u>moves</u> and being one it <u>changes place</u>,

argument οὐ συνεχὲς ὂν διήρηται τὸ ὂν οὐδ᾽ ἔστι ταύτῃ.

being, not being <u>continuous</u> any more, is <u>divided</u> and it is not at the same place.

conclusion   ὥστ' εἰ πάντῃ κινεῖται, πάντῃ διῄρηται.

so that if it <u>moves</u> everywhere it is <u>divided</u> everywhere.

The argument is rather difficult to follow. First of all as it stands it does not show – as the other arguments do – that '<u>if something is</u>' it cannot be in motion, so as to conclude that it is not at all. On the contrary it is *prima facie* a refutation of motion as such. For this reason Foss suggested that at the beginning (and at the end) of the argumentation there must be a lacuna. But suggesting a lacuna is an easy way to pass over the problem. The problem is, I am inclined to believe, linked to the fact that the author of *MXG* records only the argument against motion and not that against rest. Discerning the reasons why he did not include the latter in his version is based on speculation (for possible answers see Palmer 1999, p.115 n.35), but it is certain that in each case G. argued from *both* alternatives (see Sicking 1964, p. 230). The argument from antinomy is peculiar to G. and the systematic abolition of each argument occurs both in the first pair (A) as it is given by Anonymous and in Sextus' version (on whom we rely exclusively for the argument about one / many). Moreover, the argument against ἀγένητον implies an argument against rest, for both were attributed to the 'being' by the Eleatic monism. And it is also worth our attention that the pair at rest / in motion is found (among others) in Plato's *Parmenides* (the affinities of this part of *ONB* with this dialogue are discussed below).

It is thus possible (though not certain) that a general announcement containing the hypothesis εἰ δ' ἔστι τι... followed by the two alternatives (at rest, in motion) was placed before the discussion of the first alternative (see Newiger 1973, p. 80). The phrase οὐδ' ἂν κινηθῆναί φησιν οὐδέν is thus introducing the second (that is the preserved) alternative about motion, which is similar to the transitional phrase with which Anonymous is passes from the

discussion about ungenerated to that about generated (οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ γενόμενον) – with the conspicuous difference that here we are lacking an implicit reference to the (not preserved) preceding argument.

A striking similarity should also be noticed; we have seen that the argument against γένεσις had as its starting point the hypothesis that if something were generated from either being or not being then both of them would have changed into something else – they would have been transformed into something different from that which they were before this *change* took place 979b27-9. The first argument against motion (III a, which deals with motion in a qualitative sense, namely change) obviously proceeds in a similar manner (cp. I a-b; at b, stating generally that if not being came to being then it would not be not-being anymore, occurs the verb γένοιτο, and in the context of 980a3 we have the form γεγονὸς εἴη. See Migliori 1973, pp.44-5).

This similarity has an interesting implication for it is not unique. The second argument against change is based on the idea of the *divisibility* of being, which – as is attested by Sextus 73 – has also been used in the argument against One. Another similarity with *Parmenides* 139a2-b3 is also telling; at that point, Parmenides argues that the One (for which we have 'being' in G.) is at rest (ἀκίνητον), on the basis that it is not "either in itself or in something else" (139a6-7) From this it is inferred that what is never in the same thing is neither in motion nor at rest, so that τὸ ἓν ἄρα...οὔτε ἕστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται. But this argument (though more subtle in Plato) has already been used as a step of the reasoning against the possibility that being is ἀγένητον.

If my suggestions are so far correct, it may be tempting to think (though for the lack of the original argumentation of G. we cannot prove) that the notional pair [at rest]/in motion is not traced in the summary of Anonymous (979a14-18), because the arguments against each individual member of it were identical with or very

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similar to those already employed in the preceding pairs. It may of course be objected that seeking to restore the text on the basis of what is said in Plato is methodologically unsound, but these similarities certainly merit our attention (they have undoubtedly drawn the attention of several scholars); that they do not reproduce the original argumentation is more than clear.

We may now pass to a short examination of the similarities between this part of *MXG* and Plato's *Parmenides*. These similarities have been shown and explained by Mansfeld (1990, pp.112-18) and Palmer (1990, pp.111-7). The latter claims that "the *Parmenides*'s First Deduction suggests that Plato saw reflections of G.'s anti-Parmenidean stance in more parts of his treatise than the personal demonstration" (p.117). Apart from the verbal similarities or the discernible relation between separate arguments, both G., and Plato, in his first deduction, are proceeding with arguments from antinomy. Plato's argumentation is more exhaustive and a considerable amount of the pairs used in *Parmenides* do not appear in G.. However, it is interesting that the structure of the argumentation is methodologically identical.

We may better turn to *Parmenides* and try to investigate these similarities, by examining the arguments in the order that they appear in *MXG*:

I.   The argument against ἀγένητον begins with the assumption that if being is ungenerated, then according to the axiom of Melissos it is unlimited, and we also remember that Anonymous has already told us (979a23) that in the second portion of the first thesis G. proceeds in the manner of Melissos and Zenon. The same thing is asserted at the beginning of the first deduction of *Parmenides* at 137d7. This axiom is also traced at *MXG* 974a10 (30 B 5,9DK) ἀίδιον δὲ ὂν ἄπειρον εἶναι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει ἀρχὴν ὅθεν ἐγένετο, οὐδὲ τελευτὴν εἰς ὃ γιγνόμενον ἐτελεύτησέ ποτε (cp. Mansfeld 1990, p.114). G. then infers that if it unlimited it is nowhere, because it is not in itself or in anything else, for it would thus be two or more (the argument in Sextus is rather different and it corresponds better to Plato, see

Mansfeld 1990, p.116). In *Parmenides* now we are told (for the full argument see Palmer 1999, p.114) that the One being cannot be either (a) in itself or (b) in anything else. Both points are argued in Plato (whereas in *MXG* it is arbitrarily stated that it would either be in itself or in something else). From (b) Plato infers that the One, being contained in itself, would no longer be one but two, which corresponds to the argument of G., as is given by Anonymous. Argument (a), which is absent in *MXG* is given (not in every detail similar to Plato's) by Sextus (69). The third step, namely that if it is nowhere, it is not at all, based – according to Anonymous – on Zenon is not attested in this context of *Parmenides* (see Mansfeld 1990, 116-17), and what is more we do not possess his argument that if it is not somewhere it is nothing. We may then assume that our only source about this argument is Anonymous (although he does not record the argumentation by which Zenon reached this conclusion). But a famous passage from *Timaeus* 52B (cited by Kahn 1966, p.263, with more examples and a convincing discussion), puts forward the idea that if τό ὄν is to be at all, it must be located in some place, and it seems that this idea was a *locus communis* of Greek thought. It is worth our attention that in *Parmenides* 138b5-6, when Parmenides says that the One is not placed anywhere – neither in itself nor in anything else – Aristotle (his interlocutor) simply retorts οὐκ ἔστιν. It is safer then to conclude with Mansfeld (1990, p.117) that where G. merely elaborated a common assumption, "all Anonymous did was to swap this elaboration for a learned but utterly uneloquent reference to Zenon".

II.   The argument about one / many has been preserved in a poor condition and we cannot draw out much from it with any certainty.

III.   The argument against motion does not present the same degree of similarity. Plato's account (138b-139a) is more elaborate, as he clearly distinguishes between two distinct types of κίνησις: change and motion; motion is further divided into 'turning round in a circle'

or 'changing place'. The only argument in *MXG* which has affinities with Plato is that of change (ἀλλοίωσις; cp. *Tht*.181b-c). At *Parmenides* 138c1-3 we read: ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ τὸ ἓν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδύνατόν που ἓν ἔτι εἶναι, for which in *MXG* we are told that if it were changed it would not longer be in the same condition, and the same holds for not-being (see Palmer 1999, p.115-6).

We may now move on to the identification of the philosophers attacked by G.. The target of G. is a general one, including both monists and pluralists (see Untersteiner 1954, p.147 and p.169 n.36). In particular, it is clear that the Eleatics are still his target, because both the properties of non-generated and One are pointed at (along with that of rest, which does not occur either in *MXG* or Sextus). It should also be noticed that the first alternative of each pair is a refuted Eleatic attribute of Being (this is a further reason to suppose that the argument against rest preceded the argument against motion; on motion and Parmenides see Kirk-Stokes 1960 answered by Bicknell 1967). Empedocles as a pluralist may have been included in the criticism of many, but the problems with interpreting his ideas concerning γένεσις and death do not allow us to reach safe conclusions (see Kirk-Raven-Schofield 1983, p.292; Empedocles accepted that his *rhizomata* are coming into being). His ideas about motion must have also been targeted by G. (see Mansfeld 1990, p.61). Mansfeld (1990, pp.61-2) adduces "physicist monists who did not deny γένεσις and motion" and Heraclitus's theory about motion.

979b20-34

μετὰ...φησίν: after the 'original proof'; this is the beginning of the second portion of the argumentation supporting the first general thesis of G..

εἰ δὲ ἔστιν: it introduces the first antithetical pair; the same phrase is used at the beginning of the second argument about one / many and it must have been originally used in his own text. It has already

been used at the introduction of Anonymous (979a19). Calogero (1932 p.177 n.1) saw a relation of πάντα at the end of the criticism with the εἰ ἔστιν (in the light of his belief that the point at stake throughout *ONB* is the phenomenal world). Anonymous has clearly finished his criticism and he passes to the argumentation already promised at the beginning of his version (see Migliori 1973, p.36 n.38).

ἀγένητον ἢ γενόμενον: 'generated or ungenerated'; in the introduction, Anonymous presented this pair in the plural, and the following step will be the hypothesis that if it is unlimited it will then be *two or more*. Mansfeld (1990, p.113) argued that either an argument against "ageneticist pluralists such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras has been suppressed"...or that "an argument against the ageneticist monists...implied one against the ageneticist pluralists" and he concluded that we cannot be certain of either of these two possibilities.

ἄπειρον...λαμβάνει: cp. DK30B2,3,4 and *MXG* 974a9-10 (on the source used by Anonymous see Mansfeld 1990, p.114, Newiger 1973, p.58-9); Nestle (1922, p.555) has imputed to G. that he is obfuscating spatial and temporal unlimited (as Aristotle does with Melissos, cp. *Soph. El.*167b13ff. (=30A10DK) οἷον ὁ Μελίσσου λόγος, ὅτι ἄπειρον τὸ ἅπαν, λαβὼν τὸ μὲν ἅπαν ἀγένητον (ἐκ γὰρ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν ἂν γενέσθαι), τὸ δὲ γενόμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενέσθαι εἰ μὴ οὖν γέγονεν, ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔξειν τὸ πᾶν, ὥστ' ἄπειρον οὐκ ἀνάγκη δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν· οὐ γὰρ εἰ τὸ γενόμενον ἅπαν ἀρχὴν ἔχει, καὶ εἴ τι ἀρχὴν ἔχει γέγονεν; see Kirk-Raven-Schofield 1983, p.394, Guthrie 1969, vol. ii, p.109; various interpretations summarised by Reale 1970, pp.73-86). Untersteiner has argued that 'eternity and infinity' are inextricably interwoven (1954, p.169 n.38, with further references and Migliori 1973, p.38).

δύο ἢ πλείω: ἀπείρω Bonitz; but the reading of the Mss is preferable. Anonymous has already used this formula (*MXG* 974a11-12) and his is now repeating it (see Cassin 1980, pp.488-9, Mansfeld 1990, p.124 n.54). The 'two' then refers to the case in

which 'being' would have been in itself (Sextus 70 δύο γενήσεται τὸ ὄν, see Kerferd 1955, pp.20-1).

μηδαμοῦ...εἶναι: see the general introduction on this part of *MXG* above.

κατὰ τὸν...χώρας: 29A24DK; but this is not *a proof* that what is nowhere is not at all. It is an argument showing that the place of ὄν is not, because it is in an other place, which again must be in another place and so on *ad infinitum* (cp. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν εἶναι τὸν πρῶτον τόπον, μὴ μέντοι ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ἐκείνῳ κ.τ.λ; see Mansfeld 1990, p.116-17).

διὰ ταῦτα: for the reasons given in the previous paragraph.

οὐδὲ γενόμενον: the other leg which will prove to be equally untenable.

οὔτ' ἐξ ὄντος...μὴ ὄντος: the argumentation is twofold; the two alternatives are presented in the order in which they will be discussed.

μεταπέσοι: if it undergoes a change (cp. Melissos 30B8, ch.6: ἦν δὲ μεταπέσῃ, τὸ μὲν ἐὸν ἀπώλετο, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γέγονεν. οὕτως οὖν, εἰ πολλὰ εἴη, τοιαῦτα χρὴ εἶναι, οἷόν περ τὸ ὄν...).

τὸ ὄν: L, R; αὐτὸ Apelt (follwed by Untersteiner); but the meaning is clear without the emendation.

ὥσπερ γ' εἰ...εἴη μὴ ὄν: it is an analogical formula; the full discussion of the change of 'not-being' is found in the following paragraph (see Kerferd 1955, p.22 and Introductory notes above).

εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἔστι: the first alternative; G. is flirting again with the ambiguities of the 'original proof'.

αὖ: it makes the necessary contrast to the preceding possibility; the 'existence' of 'not-being' has been 'shown' in the first argument of the 'original proof'.

δι' ἅπερ...τοῦ ὄντος: namely because it would change into something else (cp. οὐκ ἄν ἔτ' εἴη, 979b29).

εἰ οὖν μὲν...καὶ εἶναι: explicitly shows the method of argumentation from antinomies; if something is, it is necessary

(ἀνάγκη) for it to be either generated or ungenerated. Since both alternatives are impossible (<ἀδύνατα>, following the reading of Newiger), it is impossible for it to be at all.

979b35-980a1

ἔτι εἴπερ...ἐστίν: <τι, ἤ> Foss (followed by Skouteropoulos), but it is not necessary; the comma should be placed after ἔστι and a semi colon at the end of the sentence.

εἰ δὲ...οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη: again the argumentation from antinomy is made clear.

Ζήνωνος: cp.29 B2 DK.

980a2-8

ὡσαύτως ἔχον: it would not be the same, it would alter. The argument echoes that against γένεσις. __

The Second Thesis (980a10-19)

The second major thesis of the *ONB* is related to problems of cognition and reception of 'reality'; G. has now completed the arguments supporting the first major thesis, which is now conceded, so as to pass to the second one. Even if something is, it is unknowable.

The account given by the author of *MXG* is conspicuously compressed, and the textual difficulties make our understanding of it extremely difficult. The transitions from the one argument to the other are obscure, if they exist at all, and any reconstruction of the contents of the argumentation of G. is in many cases necessarily dependent upon the several interpretational approaches of its modern students. It is also unavoidable to conclude that G.'s original argumentation must have been more detailed, since Anonymous' account of it is disproportionally shorter than that of the other two major theses.

Let us attempt to present the arguments as they are given in *MXG*: the starting point (?) (a lacuna precedes this point, see notes ad. loc.) is that (1) the objects of thought must be (Mansfeld 1990, p.103, has plausibly argued that in this second thesis "the verb 'to be' is used both in the veridical and in the referential sense"), and that not-being, since it is not, cannot be the object of thought. This must have been the follow-up to something stated in the portion of the text which has not survived. From this it is inferred that the possibility of false statements must be excluded (and this is directly attributed to G.: φησίν), so that one may justifiably hold that there are chariots competing in the middle of the ocean (the example occurs in Sextus also, and it must have originally been used by G.). Why is that? Because all those things would have been – that is they would have been the case, they would have been true (πάντα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα εἴη). (2) Now, things seen and things heard (that is the objects of vision and the objects of hearing) are (true), because each one of them is conceived. But exactly as things we see (are not, i.e. are not true), in an analogous way things that we see are no more true than things thought. Because as in the first case many people may see the same things, in the second many people may think of the same things, but it is unclear which of them are true (ποῖα δὲ τἀληθῆ, ἄδηλον). (3) So that even if things are, they are unknown to us.

The structure of the argumentation has been interpreted in various ways. Untersteiner thought that it is a tripartite argument, moving from philosophical doctrines (the first part of 1) to poetical creations, and finally to sense-perceptions. The last stage is further divided by him (he actually follows Levi, see Untersteiner 1954, p.155) into thought including sense-perception and the opposite of it, that is sense-perception distinguished from thought. I am not inclined to agree with such a formal division, which seeks to establish relations between this second major argument of G. and particular human activities; in the case of the 'poetical creations',

for instance, the identification of the image of chariots racing on the sea with *Prometheus* 129-30 (see Untersteiner 1954, p.171 n.71) does not offer a firm ground supporting the idea that G. really had it in his mind.

A more auspicious interpretation is given by Mansfeld, who divides the argument into two steps; in the first one (in which he includes the sentences καὶ γὰρ τὰ ὁρώμενα...αὐτῶν) he saw echoes of the Protagorean doctrine *homo mensura*, whereas in the second he took it to be heavily reformulated in a Pyrrhonist way (he describes it as a "Pyrrhonist ring", 1990, p.264, though the ring is created by his adding of a word in the text; see notes on text ad loc.). The interpretation of Mansfeld (the same, basically, holds for Migliori 1973, p.63 n.110) has the advantage that it does not presuppose a drastic emendation of the text, as does the one proposed by Newiger (1973, p.141) who thinks that the argument about the subjectivity of different opinions should (apart from 980a26-17) also be placed in 979a15, that is in the context of the passage discussing the relations between thought and sense-perception.

Some points should be made about the first argument (1); it follows a lacuna and it mainly says that a possibility of false statements does not exist. If I think of chariots racing in the middle of the sea, then the truth of my thought cannot be objected to on the basis of an absolute truth which dictates that chariots cannot race in the sea. We have already argued that similarities with poetical texts do not support much the view that G. is referring to the truth of poetical activity (as Untersteiner thought; see supra). Is it then an example, which in virtue of its oddness is adduced to support a refutation of the thesis that what is thought of must be the case? In other words should we infer (a) that things perceived do not necessarily partake of truth, or on the contrary (b) that since a thing is perceived, it is true for the person who perceives it – and probably not true for a person who does not perceive it? Sextus, to name an ancient reader of G., prefers (a) (see 79; the same view is taken by

Newiger 1973, p. 137 and Sicking 1964, p.338); Mansfeld on the contrary prefers (b), in the light of Protagorean echoes, as he was the first sophist to put forward the idea of non-contradiction (1990, pp.104-6; see also Pepe 1985, p.503). Palmer has shed fresh light on the issue by comparing a passage from *Euthydemus* 286c, where the principle of non-contradiction is perhaps attributed to the Eleatics (Palmer 1999, p.128 n.17). G.'s ἅπαντα δεῖ τὰ φρονούμενα εἶναι reminds us of Parmenides' τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι and it might have been the case that a modification of this dictum fitting the purposes of the second major thesis of *ONB* had originally been employed. However, we must be cautious because we do not possess G.'s own argumentation, and as Palmer suggests "even if it [sc. our evidence for the original arguments of Gorgias and Prodicus] were better, it might still be unclear whether anything like an 'interpretation' of Parmenides lies behind their appropriations".

Taking sides in such an intricate subject is unwise; G. had probably argued in a more dialectical way than the version of *MXG* allows us to discern (see Palmer 1999, p.258). It may, however, be possible to reach a tentative conclusion on the basis of a Gorgian dictum preserved in Proklos (=fr.26): τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἀφανὲς μὴ τυχὸν τοῦ δοκεῖν, τὸ δὲ δοκεῖν ἀσθενὲς μὴ τυχὸν τοῦ εἶναι. This is a Protean formulation, for in virtue of its prophetic wording it can be interpreted in various ways; but for our present needs it is illuminating because, if it is originally Gorgianic, it shows that in G.'s mind reality (or truth) and thought have a mutually complementary relation, so that seeking to assert that G. is either refuting or supporting the possibility of falsehood is pointless. In Palmer's words (1999, p.258) "One should note that although Gorgias is prepared to employ an argument against the possibility of falsehood, the fact that it might have been embedded in this type of dialectical structure makes it unclear whether he felt himself committed to the thesis". The question may then be left open.

We may now pass to the second argument; its compressed form has given rise to a number of interpretations and consequently drastic emendations, which I find unnecessary. I consider that this second argument (2) can be read along the lines of the attack on the Presocratic philosophy and that it could have been put forward by G. himself (and I follow thus Buchheim, whose emendations are confined to merely linguistic points that do not effect the meaning of the text). Lloyd (1971, pp. 121-2) in what he names "typical controversies in the pre-Platonic period" includes 'reason' and 'sensation' as two means by which knowledge is attained (though he concedes that they "do not involve pairs of opposite terms"; for a brief and learned discussion on the relation of the senses to common sense in Presocratic philosophy see Kirk (1961).

This controversy – too complicated to be presented here in every detail, especially with regard to its relation to the several philosophical systems as such – has a very interesting implication, relevant to the argument employed by G.. My line of interpretation is that in this second major division of *ONB* G. attempts to make the most of this epistemological divergence between reason and sensation. This possibility is strengthened if we realise that the most fervent supporter of "thought" – with tantalising influences on the development of philosophy – was Parmenides, who accepted 'reason' (λόγος) as the only vehicle through which man can reach knowledge, and who repugnantly refuted the senses (cp.B 7.4,5B νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουὴν / καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον...). The same holds for Melissos (30B8.5DK; see Kirk-Raven-Schofield 1983, pp.398-400) who maintained that we perceive things οὐκ ὀρθῶς, and partly for 'obscure' Heraclitus who seems to say that senses are not of much use for men with 'vulgar soul' (βαρβάρους ψυχάς; the word soul represents here a rational function of man; see Kahn 1979, pp.106-7).

Philosophers after Parmenides did not readily accept this anti-sensational dogmatism; Empedocles accepted the senses on the condition that men will learn through his teaching to use them efficiently (31B2,3DK; see Kirk-Raven-Schofield 1983, pp.284-5, Guthrie 1969, vol. ii, pp.138-9). We may add the Atomists and especially Demokritos (B 11 DK) who held that knowledge through διάνοια is genuine (γνησίη), whereas the one through senses is 'obscure' (σκοτίη), and he thus seems not to exclude sense-perception. More examples could be added here, but what has already been said, with the addition of Protagorean relativism, is enough to show that this is what G. inherited from earlier philosophers.

I take it thus that G. in this second argument supporting his second major thesis proceeds once more with an argumentation from antinomies. The one pole of his antithetical pair (knowledge through rationalistic approaches) is guaranteed by the special target of his 'original proof': Parmenides and the Eleatics; the other pole (knowledge through senses) is a neutralisation of theories 'legalising' sense-perception under conditions. Their common denominator is that *both* fail to furnish knowledge, or that – in the phrasing of *MXG* – things perceived by the senses (represented by vision, ἃ ὁρῶμεν) are no more true (οὐδὲν μᾶλλον) than things thought (ἃ διανοούμεθα). Why is that? Because as in the first case many people may see these (or the same) things, in the second many people may think these things (or the same things). Things seen by some people may conflict with things thought by other people, so that no firm knowledge can be established, on the basis of a relativism which applies both to perceptions and intellectual activity. Epistemological certainties about lines and methods of inquiry of truth have been overturned (as ontological certainties had been disparaged in the first major thesis).

980a9-19

λέγει <ταύτας>...εἶναι: I follow Buchheim; Untersteiner (following Gercke and followed by Migliori 1973, pp.64-5) prints λέγει[ν] ἀπατᾶν and he does not accept the existence of a lacuna, because he thinks that the absence of a phrase of transition indicating the passage to the second major thesis stresses "the close dialectical relationship between the theme of the first part and that of the second" (1954, p.171 n.66); the argument is weak, because such a phrase marks the passage from the second major thesis to the third, which are related more closely (980a20). Hence he proposes ἀπατᾶν, which he includes in the conclusion of the first major thesis (the ontological one) on the basis that it is chiefly of gnoseological interest (1961, p.69). The point is far too pressed; throughout this part of *MXG* Anonymous makes the announcement of a new theme clear (cp. 979a23, 979a33, 979a20, 980a20, 980b17; note that this second argument in Sextus' version is formally introduced in the form of a concession 77). γάρ thus does not denote the transition from the first major thesis to the second, but rather a follow-up from something missing. Cook-Wilson, in order to make the text clearer, suggested that the phrase <εἰ τὸ ὂν φρονεῖται> should be added either before ἅπαντα or after εἶναι, and the second suggestion has been reluctantly followed by Newiger (1973, p.125). The whole point has ingeniously been discussed by Palmer (1999, p.257-8). He proposes an "*exempli gratia* reconstruction" of what must have been in the lacuna, which fits the text *ad sententiam*. a) εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστιν φησιν ἄγνωστον εἶναι b) εἰ γὰρ τὰ φρονούμενα οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, τὸ ὂν οὐ φρονεῖται c) εἰ δ' οὕτως, τὸ ὂν ἄγνωστον ἐστίν d) ἔτι δὲ εἰ τὰ φρονούμενα ἔστιν ὄντα, τὸ ὂν οὐ φρονεῖται. The first addition makes the transition clear (analogous transitions had been proposed by Foss <εἶναι ἄγνωστα πάντα>; see also Apelt in Cook-Wilson). (b) he takes from Sextus (77,78), (c) is inferred from (b) and (d) is opposed to (b), followed by the ἅπαντα δεῖν γάρ...This interpretation has I think the advantage of corresponding to G.'s common practice of putting forward antinomical arguments (see

Introductory notes also). (d) directly contrasts to (b) in a formulation reminiscent of the arguments of the first major thesis.

ταῦτα: 'thoughts of this kind'; ταύτῃ Apelt, but it is not necessary, for it refers generally to the example of chariots.

ἀλλ' ὥσπερ...διανοούμεθα: ἀλλ' <ὅτι πολλοὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁρῶσι, τὰ ὁρώμενα ἔστιν,> οὕτω γ' οὐδὲν μᾶλλον..., Newiger 1973, p.141. But such an emendation is redundant (for the meaning of the phrase see Introductory notes). The criterion of intersubjective truth, that is of relative personal truth, is not necessary here, since the point at stake is that earlier philosophers' suggested methods of inquiry, reason (Parmenides and the Eleatics) or (rational and creative) use of the senses – as a quasi-antithetical pair – do not guarantee access to any kind of absolute knowledge. One may feel the need to object that *both* senses and thought *are* presented by G. as means by which men acquire knowledge in *Pal.* (23 for the senses, 35 for thought); but this is a text of a different nature, and I propose that comparisons between the *ONB* with any other text of G. should be made if and only if they concern argumentative patterns, or strategies of reasoning. This is why I do not agree in every respect with Mansfeld's analysis of this second argument, for which he largely relies upon *Palamedes*. The same scholar (1990, p.224 and n.90) maintains that the formulation is a Pyrrhonist ring, and he thus prints: ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον [τὰ φρονούμενα] <ἢ> ἃ ὁρῶμεν ἔστιν, οὕτω <γ' οὐδὲν> μᾶλλον ἃ ὁρῶμεν ἢ <ἃ> διανοούμεθα. But it is the word φρονούμενα that makes the ring; without it there is simply an analogy of the truth of vision (representing the senses) to the truth of vision as compared to the truth of thought.

τὸ οὖν μᾶλλον δη...α τοιάδ' ἐστί: the meaning is clear with Mansfeld's (1990, p.224 and n.91) <τα τοιά>δ' ἢ <τ>ἁ τοιάδ', who changes τὸ to τί (with Apelt). I propose a modification of this reading, which I think makes the passage to the next sentence smoother – the question introduced with τί is hardly answered by it

– and which brings out the antithesis more clearly: $\tau<\dot{\alpha}>$ οὖν μᾶλλον $<\tau οι \dot{\alpha}>\delta$ ' ἢ $<\tau>\dot{\alpha}$ τοιάδ ' ἐστί;

The Third Thesis (980a20-b16)

The third major thesis of G. develops with the problematic of language. It is conceded now that knowledge is possible (though it has just been shown that it is impossible), and the new argument is introduced encapsulated in a question: "how can one make things clear (or communicate them) to another?" The answer is that this is impossible, for reasons developed in this third part and summarised at the very end of Anonymous' account on G. (980b18-19), namely because a) things are not λόγοι, and b) because no one understands the same thing as other persons. This perileptic reproduction of the arguments brings out the dual form of the (extremely interesting and in some cases very similar to modern) argumentation concerning language in this third thesis: language is discussed a) in its properties of signification, which implies an investigation of how it is (not) possible to refer to objects of the world, and b) in its function in inter-human communication, which implies an investigation of how it is (not) possible for one (the sender) to transmit new information to someone else (the receiver), and this information to acquire in the mind of the latter an identical meaning with the one that existed in the mind of the former. I consider that this descriptive model (provided by *MXG*) is economical and that the constituent arguments are embraced by it.

The argumentation may now be presented, and a discussion of it will follow later. The arguments run as follows:

A i. If things are knowable, how would one, he [sc. G.] asks, make them clear to another? How would one, he [sc. G.] asks make clear what one has seen by the means *of logos*? Or how would this be

made clear to the hearer, who has not seen it? For, exactly as vision does not recognize utterances, in the same manner hearing does not hear colours, but utterances; and the speaker *does* speak, but he does not speak a colour or a thing.

ii. And that which one does not understand [personally], how is one going to understand it from someone else through words or any other sign that is different from the object, unless by vision if it is a colour, or by hearing it if it is a sound? For, truly, the speaker does not speak a sound, nor a colour, but *logos*; so that it is not possible to think of a colour, but to see it, nor [to think of] a sound, but to hear it.

B i. But even if it is possible to have knowledge of a thing and to speak this knowledge, how will the hearer understand the same thing? For it is not possible for the same thing to be in many different people; in this case a thing which is one would be two.

ii. But even if, he says, it were in many and still the same, there is nothing preventing it from appearing different to them, since they themselves are not the same even when they are in the same state; for if they were in the same state, they would be one, not two.

iii. And it seems that the same person does not perceive similar things at the same time, but some [things] by his hearing and other [things] by his vision, in a different manner now and in the past. So that hardly could one perceive the same thing as another.

I have divided the argument into two sets (A, B), corresponding to those given in the summary at 980b18-19 (see above). (A) is the one concerning problems of signification and reference, and (B) is pertinent to material that I included under the heading of inter-human communication. This does not of course mean that problems of communication are excluded from (A), for the third thesis as a whole basically discusses communication. My point is that (A) is a discussion of communication from the perspective of problems of signification, to the extent that here *logos* is examined as a medium

expected to enable men to refer to the world, whereas (B) moves to a discussion which is marked by the elevation of the participants to a determinant factor, by examining the role of *personal* differences in the transmission of a message and the possibilities for it to be decoded by the receiver in a way that will secure its identity with the message as it was originally encoded by the sender. The same division is made, basically, by Mourelatos (1982, p.223), who labels our (A) as 'κατηγορικὴ θέση' and (B) as 'θέση ἰδεατῆς ταυτότητας'.

The two groups of arguments should now be examined separately. The first part (i) merely says that the object of vision (which a subject has perceived, and is about to communicate to someone else) cannot be rendered in words, because vision does not perceive φθόγγους and in the same manner hearing does not perceive colours, but φθόγγους. It is important to discern that this first argument focuses primarily on the sender, the person who encodes a message linguistically. This is shown by the phrase 'and the speaker *does* speak (καὶ λέγει ὁ λέγων), but he does not speak a colour or a thing'. So, at this point the issue at stake is the impossibility of the receiver's understanding of what he/she is told because of the inherent problems of *logos* as a medium; because, although vocal utterances are sounds (and G. does not rule out the possibility of perception of sounds through hearing: ἡ ἀκοὴ...ἀλλὰ φθόγγους 980b2), they differ from other types of sounds in the respect that they purport to carry meaning, which entails that their role is to refer to objects (and properties such as χρῶμα) of our world. But language is not the things that it denotes, the objects of the real world. The names of things do not bring out the reality of the objects they signify, names and objects are ontologically different. A word *is not* its referent.

The second argument (ii) extends the problematic of the first one (though Mansfeld 1990, p.123 n.40 thinks that it repeats what has already been said; contra Newiger 1973, pp.153-4, followed by Kerferd 1982, p.219). The point made now is that one cannot

perceive in one's mind what one is told by someone else, unless one has personal experience of it. If it is a colour one must see the colour, if it is a sound one must hear the sound. This means that if one should at any cost try to communicate something to anyone else, one should not do it by using a representational system such as language. One should rather present colours and reproduce sounds (so that we might think that G. did not have any difficulties with onomatopoeic words). From this point it is inferred that it is impossible to think of a colour or of a sound; the only alternative is to see or hear them respectively. Now, it is interesting that the perceptions of hearing (notice that the word for the object of hearing is no longer φθόγγος, but ψόφος, that is a mere, non-verbal sound, which can include a noise; for further literature see Mansfeld 1990, p.123 n. 40, who does not accept the distinction; recently Wardy 1996 p.19) and seeing are substituted here for both language (λόγῳ ἢ σημείῳ τινὶ ἑτέρῳ) and thought (διανοεῖσθαι). Why is that? Because language and thought are interwoven, in the respect that when communicating an experience (or information) through words, the receiver's mind should necessarily receive it in a form of a representation which clearly is not equivalent to the experience or the object itself. What lies behind this combination is, I think, the refutation of a conceptual theory of meaning. Mourelatos 1982, p.228, saw traces of this theory in 980b15-6; he is using the term "ideational theory of meaning", but I follow Lyons' linguistic terminology (Lyons 1977, pp.109-144). Probably, what G. has in mind is the idea that when one is referring to a colour, say blue, then it may be assumed that the listener 'visualises' in his mind this colour (the idea expressed by the word διανοεῖσθαι). But G. answers that this is not feasible, because colours and sounds cannot be the objects of concept, but the objects of vision and hearing respectively (Kerferd saw in διανοεῖσθαι the introduction of a "gulf...between sense experiences and words" 1982, p.220).

The next set of arguments presents a model of communication; that G. is moving from an examination of λόγος as a medium to a system which implies speech is shown in the very beginning of this part (980b8), where it is conceded that one may be able to utter a verbal message (λέγειν). For argument's sake what has been refuted is tentatively accepted as a possibility. The type of communication which G. has in mind is one in which a sender encodes a message in *logoi* and a receiver decodes it so as to perceive exactly the same (notice the repetition of ταὐτό, τὸ αὐτό) message (so correctly Wardy 1996, pp.19-20; Mourelatos (1982 p.223) names G.'s thesis as one of "ἰδεατή ταυτότητα", see supra). One may see more clearly what G. conceives of as human communication (I do not necessarily imply that he commits himself to this conception) if one compares the words of one of the most important connoisseurs of semantics of our days: "Under a fairly standard idealization of the process of communication, what the sender communicates...and the information derived from the signal by the receiver...are assumed to be identical. But there are, in practice, frequent instances of misunderstanding; and we must allow for this theoretically" (Lyons 1977, p.33). G.'s idealized demands of communication form the keystone of his refutation of it.

The first argument (i) poses the problem that the hearer of a statement will not be able to have in mind exactly what the speaker has uttered. For in that case what he is saying will not be one thing any more, but two, which implies that what the hearer will perceive will necessarily be something different. The thought pattern of the one becoming two has been used at 979b24, in a different (anti-Eleatic) context, and it is likely that it is here picked up (see Newiger 1973, p.156 and Kerferd 1982, p.220). The reverse of this argument is used in the following one.

A point should be made here; in order to denote the message sent by the sender (or speaker) to the receiver I have already used the rather vague term 'statement'. What kind of meaning does this

'statement' carry? Does it refer to (a) an external object, let as say to a 'tree', or should we assume that it denotes (b) the 'concept' of a tree, existing in the mind of the speaker, who in that case hopes to impart it to the hearer's mind, so that the latter will have the same 'concept' in his mind. This is a crucial point, and it has been answered by Mourelatos (1982, pp.224-5), who says that if we had (a) then 'the one' would not have been 'two' (as it is in the text) but three. This disclaimer entails that G. is here conceding a 'conceptual' theory of meaning as well (since a theory of this type has – in my view – been refuted at Aii).

In the second argument (ii), it is suggested that even if two people, as a result of their communication, had the same concept in their minds (that is if by any chance the two were one; Mourelatos 1982, pp.225-6 is talking about "ἀριθμητική ταυτότητα"), nothing stops us from assuming that this would not appear similar to them. This is explained by the fact that two different persons are not in every respect similar. Emotive parameters and the different backgrounds of the participants evidently creep into the argumentation, as these parameters have the property of maximizing the subjectivism of perception in virtue of a tactic based on the matter of the degree of similarity.

The third (iii) argument reinforces the feasibility of the preceding one; in an informal way it may be reformulated: "if one man perceives at the same time different things through different senses, and in a different way now and in the past, imagine what happens with two different persons!" In this argument two phases are discernible (see Mourelatos 1982, p.226): a synchronic (ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ) and a diachronic one (νῦν τε καὶ πάλαι διαφόρως).

In the first phase we are told that a man at the same time perceives different things through different senses; this is an obvious observation, for a man who sees and hears a car passing by perceives the image of the car through his vision and the sound of the machine of the car through his hearing, so that the same person

is in a way necessarily divided, as far as the object of perception is concerned. Given that all this argument is employed so as to strengthen the difference between two persons, it can be interpreted very simply if we admit honestly that what is said at this point is a question that we put numerous times to ourselves, in the following manner : "How am I to believe that the way *I* see an object is exactly the same as the way the person standing beside me sees it?" Moreover, it may be a question of contradictions resulting from perceptions through different senses; my hearing makes me believe that a car is coming, though I cannot see it, because I am standing on a blind hill. Or it may be that a car according to my hearing is closer to me than my vision makes me believe.

The diachronic phase poses the problem of interpretation resulting from the development of an individual. Because I perceive something now in a particular way, this does not mean that I always perceived it in the same way. And what is more I am not always able to remember how I perceived a particular thing in the past, because my memory (according to G.'s *Hel.* 11) is a notoriously weak adviser of my soul. If one person is so divided, divided in the present and in the past, then two different (ἄλλῳ 980b16) people are two people further divided, and the more the people are, the more the subdivisions will be. The overall result of this argumentation is clear: a subjectivism which excludes the identity of perceptions with objects of perception.

The third and final major thesis of G.'s *ONB* is extremely interesting for two main reasons: a) it is one of the deplorably few sources of information on the Sophistical investigation of language. In his article on the ideas of the Sophists about language Classen (1959) concluded that G.'s (and the other philosophers') interest in language was above all practical. Under the same prism, the interest in the theses put forward in this last part of *ONB* has been reduced simply to their pertinence to rhetorical practices. But it seems that G. had developed a more theoretically oriented speculation. However weak or even unattractive one may find his argumentation,

his remarks about the relation between words and objects, between words and concepts of objects are striking (one may compare *Cratylus* here). It is interesting that the archaic idea that names bring out the reality of the object they signify has been removed. One may compare here Heraclitus' fr.48, where the name of the bow is taken to bring out the reality "of the unity between death and life" (Kahn 1979, p.270 with more examples). The same feature can be found in Aiskhylos' *Agamemnon* 680ff., where the name of Helen brings out the reality of her notorious character (cp. *Suppl.*584ff. for Δίκη as Δι-ός Κό-ρη).

The same holds for G.'s remarks about human communication. The analysis of λόγος in *ONB* (along with the information that we possess about Protagoras and Prodicus) evinces that those involved in the Sophistic movement took a profound interest in language; and it is inappropriate to deny this interest on the basis that G. was obsessed with formulating dazzling arguments to meet the practical demands of persuasion. And the fact that these linguistic observations are integrated in an argumentation that supports "paradoxical" theses does not imply that they did not contribute to the development of the linguistic investigation.

b) Some of the remarks that occur in the third part of *ONB* are amazingly pertinent to modern theories of language (see Mourelatos, 1982); several ideas used by G. have been issues of dispute both for ancient and modern philosophers, and it is for this reason that forthcoming histories of linguistic theory should, I think, reconsider the rationality of placing the origins of linguistic investigation with Plato and Aristotle. *ONB* clearly shows that language had been a pivotal philosophical subject *before* Plato; we shall hardly have a comprehensive history of linguistic investigation, unless we realize that Presocratic philosophy and especially the Sophistic movement deserve more attention than they usually receive.

εἰ δὲ καὶ...ἄλλῳ; it announces the passage to the third and final part of *ONB*; knowledge is conceded and it is argued that it cannot be made clear through words to another.

ὥσπερ γὰρ...ἀλλὰ φθόγγους: It has been suggested that the idea put here should be interpreted in accordance with Empedocles' theory of ἀπορροαί (Gigon 1972, p. 110). Mourelatos has challenged this view on the basis that G.'s ideas are extremely paradoxical, so that if they are to be understood, they must be expressed in a plain manner, without reference to complicated ideas (Mourelatos 1982, p.224). It is possible that G. employs the common idea among some of the Presocratic philosophers (Empedocles is one of them) of the perception of the like from the like, without necessarily committing himdelf to the theory of ἀπορροαί.

αὐτό: for the Mss αἰτεῖ, which does not seem to make any sense; it refers to the preceding sentence.

σημείῳ: "It is interesting to notice that language is probably now being widened to include its written form as well as its spoken form" (Kerferd 1982, p.219). Perhaps this is true, but it is even more interesting if G. refutes every possible available representational system of communication, where a sign stands for a meaning (see also Mansfeld 1990, p.123 n.34).

<ψόφον ἀκού>σας: with Diels; Cook-Wilson ψόφος; it is difficult to decide because of the obscure neuter (χρῶμα); but the acc. provides the object of the participles.

οὐ <ψόφον> λέγει <ὁ λέ>γων οὐδὲ χρῶμα: οὐ λέγει ὁ λέγων γ' ὃ εἶδε χρῶμα Newiger, Kerferd; the text is lacunose; the addition by Wilson (followed by Buchheim) is the counterpart of χρῶμα with which it appears in the final sentence of this argument. The reading proposed by Newiger 1973, p.153, οὐ λέγει ὁ λέγων γ' ὃ εἶδε χρῶμα fails to include the object of hearing as well, though it is closer to the obscure reading of R.

δύο γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕν: An argument which reminds us of the one employed against the possibility of τὸ ὄν being ungenerated (979b24). According to Kerferd (1982), it is an Eleatic argument applied to a non-Eleatic field. It may be safer to say that a thought pattern is here picked up, for the reverse of it can be traced in the following argument.

εἰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ...εἶεν: A combination of the emendations by Cook-Wilson (εἰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ) and Apelt (εἷς ἂν ἀλλ᾽), made by Newiger, followed by Buchheim.

νῦν τε καὶ πάλαι διαφόρως: cp. Pl. *Tht.* 154a6-8 τί δε; ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἆρ᾽ ὅμοιον καὶ σοι φαίνεται ὁτιοῦν; ἔχεις τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι οὐδὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ ταὐτὸν διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν.

Introduction and the first division (65-76)

Sextus begins his account of *ONB* by presenting the three major theses (65); however, the 'doxographical' summary including main ideas of early philosophers is not traced here. On the contrary, Sextus passes straight away to the demonstration of the first thesis, namely that 'nothing is' (οὐδὲν ἔστιν 66). The arguments supporting this first thesis are further summarised and divided into the following: either a) being is, or b) not-being, or c) both being and not being. But neither being is, nor not-being, nor both being and not-being. It is clear that Sextus offers a tripartite division of the argumentation supporting the first thesis. But when we turn to the detailed discussion of the arguments Sextus does not follow the same order; instead of starting with the discussion of 'being', as it is announced in his brief summary, he starts with 'not-being', that is with (b), so that the order which we actually get in the body of the first part in Sextus is (b), (a) and (c).

Another obvious point is that (c), that is 'both being and not-being', forms a separate argument; but in Anonymous' account, this argument is embedded within the 'original proof', which seeks to establish that it is not either for 'being' or for 'not being'. In Sextus this argument is dealt with separately in 75-76, after the discussion of (a), which as Anonymous confirms followed the 'original proof' of G.. The discussion of 'being' in Sextus is based solely on the antithetical pairs generated / ungenerated, one / many, so that the pair in motion / at rest tracked down in *MXG* is missing. Moreover, Sextus' version does not indicate the intertexts on which G. has based his criticism; the names of Zenon and Melissos are absent here. It should also be mentioned that the arguments supporting (b) in 67 are suppressed in Sextus, and although there are no serious textual problems here, Anonymous' textually problematic account in the 'original proof' brings out the equivocal usage of 'being' on

the part of G. more effectively (for a comparison of the two versions see Introduction).

We may now pass to a closer examination of the arguments of the first thesis. The argument against 'not-being' is twofold: in the first instance it is shown that 'not-being' is not to the degree that it is conceived of as 'not-being', and that it is to the degree that it *is* 'not-being'. But it is absurd for something both to be and not to be. Conclusion: 'not-being' is not. This is a reformulation of the first argument of the 'original proof' in *MXG*. The being of 'not-being' is taken again from the predicative use of the verb 'to be', as is shown by the phrase ἦ δὲ ἔστι μὴ ὄν. The second proof runs as follows: if 'not-being' is, 'being' is not, for these two are opposite to each other, and if it is the case that 'not-being' is, the case for 'being' will be that it is not. But saying that 'being' is not is absurd, so that 'not-being' is not. The point of this second argument is that if we concede existence to 'not-being', then we should accept the absurd consequence that 'being' is not, because of the fact that 'being' and 'not-being' are mutually exclusive. The demonstration is again analogous with the one in *MXG*.

In both arguments therefore the argumentation has as its starting point 'not-being' (see Kerferd 1955, p.18), that is the marked element of the antithetical pair consisting of the positive 'being' and the negative 'not-being' (see the introductory notes on the 'original proof'). On the whole, the purpose of these two arguments is the denial of 'not-being'.

After this very short discussion of 'not-being', Sextus passes to the demonstration of the arguments refuting the possibility of 'being'. That the argumentation proceeds with contradictory properties attributed to ὄντα is clear, and generally the structure of the arguments is similar to that in *MXG* 979b20-980a8. Sextus summarises the argumentation of the first pair: "if 'being' is, it must be either eternal (69-70), or generated (71) or both eternal and generated (72)"; but each one of these possibilities is invalid, so that 'being' is not. Let us follow the thread of the arguments.

If 'being' is eternal (ἀίδιον), it does not have a start (ἀρχήν) which entails that it is infinite. But if it is infinite it is nowhere; for if it is anywhere it must be different from that which contains it, and in that case being would not be infinite, for it would be located in a container which is bigger than the contained. But there is nothing bigger than the infinite so that the infinite is nowhere. On the other hand it cannot be contained in itself, because that in which it is and that which is in it would be the same, so that 'being' would be two things: the location (τόπος) and body (σῶμα). This is absurd, so that 'being' is not self-contained. These two sets of arguments support the view that 'being' is not eternal (notice that Mansfeld 1990, p.115, claims that these two arguments, as they are represented in Sextus "correspond to both of Plato's arguments" at *Parmenides* 138a-b; see above *The antinomies*).

The second member of the pair is now examined (71): "'being' cannot be generated". Two alternatives are put forward: if 'being' has come into being, it is either from 'being' or from 'not-being'. Both possibilities are unfeasible: if it came into being from 'being', it has not come into being at all, but it existed before. That it has come into being from 'not-being' is impossible too, because nothing generates from 'not-being', as the latter does not partake of existence at all. In both cases 'being' is not generated.

The possibility that 'being' is both eternal and generated is refuted on the basis that these notions are mutually exclusive, so that "if 'being' is eternal, it has not come into being, and if it has come into being, it is not eternal" (it is an argument from antinomies whose structure may be compared to the one in *Pal.* 26; see Introduction).

The second pair is now introduced (καὶ ἄλλως 73): if it is it must be either one or many. The first alternative is divided further into four possibilities: if it is one it is a) either a quantity, or b) a continuum or c) a size or d) a body. But if it is one of those it is not one, for if it is (a), it will be divisible, if it is (b) it will be divisible,

if it is (c) it will not be indivisible, and if it is (d), it will have length and breadth and depth. Since it is absurd to claim that 'being' is none of those alternatives, being is not one.

The second part of this argument concerning the possibility a plurality of beings is based on the assumption that many is created by putting together (σύνθεσις) single entities, so that if one of the constituent entities is destroyed the possibility of a plurality is destroyed as well.

Up to this point Sextus has discussed the refutations of the possibility of either 'being' or 'not-being'; what follows is the refutation of both 'being' and 'not-being' (ἀμφότερα 75). Again we have two arguments, the first of which corresponds to the third one in the 'original proof' in *MXG* (see Kerferd 1955, p.19, Migliori 1973, p.59). It runs: If 'not-being' and 'being' are, in so far as their existence is concerned, 'not-being' will be identical with 'being'. For this reason neither of them is: for it has been agreed that 'not-being' is not and it has been shown that 'being' is the same as 'not-being'.

A second argument (76) is put forward, which in Kerferd's (1955, p.19) words "rounds off" the first one; if 'being' is the same as 'not-being', it follows that it is impossible for both of them to be. If *both* are, they are not identical, and if they are identical, the possibility that *both* are is not feasible. This is another argument from antinomy.

The reasoning in support of the first major thesis is summed up with a repetition of the three sets of arguments: if neither 'being', nor 'not-being' nor both of them are, then nothing is (οὐδὲν ἔστιν), for no other alternative beyond those three can be conceived of.

The second division (77-82)

The second thesis concedes the first; 'if anything is unknowable and unconceivable by human mind'. Sextus' representation of the second major thesis is twofold. In 77-80 Sextus formalises G.'s arguments in relation to the consequences of two hypotheses: a) 77-78 objects of thought are not (or are not the case), b) 79-80 objects of thought are (or are the case). In 81-82 sense-perception is brought in, though this second part is conspicuously the product of drastic reformulation and embellishment on behalf of Sextus (in Loenen's words, the most fervent supporter of Sextus' version "he [sc. Sextus] must have been completely at a loss as to G.'s real meaning", p.194).

The first hypothesis runs as follows: if objects of thought are not the case, then what is the case is not an object of thought (this is directly attributed to G., φησὶν ὁ Γοργίας, and repeated in 78). This seems reasonable to Sextus (καὶ κατὰ λόγον), who is ready to embolden it with an example: exactly as, if objects of thought are white, it follows that white things are objects of thought, analogously, if it happens that objects of thought [are things that] are not the case, it is necessary that what is the case is not thought of. This passage is difficult to translate; more particularly, the phrase 'it follows that white things are objects of thought' (κἂν συμβεβήκει τοῖς λευκοῖς φρονεῖσθαι) has been taken to mean that 'thought is a property of white things'. Kennedy (1972), for instance, translates "'being considered' would also have been a possible attribute of what is white", and Barnes "being thought of belongs to what is white" (Untersteiner 1954, p.155 is even more explicit in using the word 'predicate'). But if my reading is correct, what is at stake here is not the possibility of predicating of 'thought' to 'whiteness'. What is at stake is the following analogy (I reverse it for clarity):

> IF objects of thought are not the case : IF objects of thought are
> white
>
> What is not the case is not thought of : White(s) are thought of

If this, or something similar, is what Sextus means, Skouteropoulos' rendering (1991, p.190) is more attractive: "Γιατί ὅπως ἀκριβῶς, ἄν συνέβαινε αὐτὰ ποὺ νοοῦμε νὰ εἶναι λευκά, θα ἦταν ἰδιότητα τῶν λευκῶν πραγμάτων νὰ ἀποτελοῦν ἀντικείμενο τοῦ νοεῖν..."

Now, according to Sextus the argument 'if objects of thought are not the case, what is the case is not thought of' is a valid and cohesive syllogism, on the basis that objects of thought are not [necessarily and always] the case, so that what is the case is not thought of. With the phrase 'it is clear that objects of thought are not the case' he announces and immediately passes to the second hypothesis.

If objects of thought are the case, whatever is thought of is [true] – in whatsoever manner one conceives it. But this does not make sense. For, if one conceives of a man flying or chariots racing on the sea, this does not entail that it is the case that a man is flying or that chariots are racing on the sea. The hypothesis as it stands affords two readings: a) whatever is thought of (since it is thought of) is true, hence the impossibility of falsehood, or b) whatever is thought of is not true (since it is not validated by reality). Sextus (like some modern scholars, e.g. Kerferd 1981, p.97: "Gorgias is *not* accepting the view...that it is not possible to say what is false"; see also my comments on *MXG*) obviously adopts the second reading: both the phrase ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀπεμφαῖνον and the examples which are here corroborating it point to this direction (especially if compared to the neutral and unbiased phrasing in *MXG* 980a11). From this string it is thus inferred that objects of thought are not the case.

Sextus establishes now a fresh argument (πρὸς τούτοις), which is an argument from antinomy. The argument proceeds with the assumption that if objects of thought are [true] (in passing I should

mention that in Sextus' account of the second part of *ONB* ὄν is chiefly 'veridical'), what is not [true] cannot be thought of. But what is and what is not [true] contradict each other, so that if what is [true] is thought of, what is not [true] will not be thought of. The argument from antinomy brings about, according to Sextus, an absurdity: a score of things which are not [true] *are* conceived of (for instance the mythical monsters Skylla and Khimaira; if this example is originally Gorgianic or not has divided scholars: Calogero 1932, p.207, Gigon 1936, p.204 believe it is not; contra Untersteiner 1954, p.172 n.77). Accordingly, what is [true] is not conceived.

The following argument (81) is – as I have already held – far from what G. must have maintained. Unfortunately, any accurate reading of the relation of sense-perceptions to the acquisition of knowledge should rely on the too lacunose *MXG*. Since the unreliability of Sextus' account of this issue should be demonstrated in comparison with Anonymous' one, in this context I shall confine myself to presenting it as it stands. Sextus proceeds with an analogy: exactly as things seen are called visible because we perceive them through vision and things heard bear this name because they are perceived through hearing, so that we do not rule out visible things because we do not hear them and things heard because we do not see them (each one of them should be distinguished on the basis of the same sense, and not of any other), in the same manner, even if objects of thought are not perceived through vision and heard through hearing, they are, for they are perceived through the appropriate *criterion*. So, if one thinks of chariots racing on the sea, even if one does not see them, one should accept that there are chariots racing on the sea. This is absurd. Consequently, what is [true] is not thought of nor perceived. That Sextus has missed the point is clear from the fact that his conclusion applies to ὄν (see Loenen p.195). What had to be shown was that if anything is it is unknowable (ὅτι δὲ κἂν ᾖ τι 76).

The Third Division (83-86)

The third major thesis concerning the incommunicability of an allegedly possessed knowledge is now introduced. As Kerferd has observed (1982, p.217) it is divided into two sets of arguments: the first (83-85 l.1) is a criticism of the one-to-one relation between things and their signifier, namely λόγος. The second set consists of two arguments, which in Kerferd's words: "are...answers to possible objections to the main argument" (1982, p.217).

The starting point of the first argument picks up what has already been said in connection with the second major thesis (81): objects of the external world are perceived through a sense which pertains to their nature. Visible things are perceived through vision, audible things are perceived through hearing. A wider spectrum of senses is now opened (καὶ κοινῶς αἰσθητά), which goes beyond the paradigmatic use of hearing and, mainly, vision. If this is the case, how is it possible to communicate objects perceived through senses to others? The answer is given at the first line of 85, and it is a negative one: It is not possible. Why is that? Because λόγος, the medium through which we signify, is different from objects of the external world. And as it is impossible to hear something visible (or to see something heard), in the same way we cannot transform objects into words, for they are not words. In other words, the problem that emerges here is one of ontological order. Objects and λόγος are two distinct things, so that λόγος cannot *represent*.

We may now consider the implications of this argument, which is encapsulated in the formula οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ὄντα μηνύομεν τοῖς πέλας ἀλλὰ λόγον, ὃς ἕτερός ἐστι τῶν ὑποκειμένων. If *logos* is different from objects, as it is, then would it be more efficient to use objects themselves? "I observed a cow passing by, whereupon I pointed to her, and expressed a desire to let me go and milk her. This had its effect; for he led me back into the house...She gave me a large bowl full, of which I drank very heartily, and found myself

well refreshed" (J. Swift, *Gullivers' Travels*, Penguin, p.277). The hero is in the land of the Houyhnhnms and he does not speak their language. He observes a cow (in other words, a ὑποκείμενον) and he expresses a desire (with body-language presumably) to milk her. The native understands his desire and he arranges for him to receive a large bowl of milk. The hero who was desperate for a refreshment has now fulfilled his desire. Why then does the hero, in the following chapter, endeavour to learn their language, so as to relate his adventures to his master? If his adventures consist in a string of itemized perceptions which have never been experienced by the master, will the latter be able to follow the story? With some difficulty he does (in English!).

Was G. unaware of the fact that elevated communication, or simply written language, unavoidably involves a degree of representation? It is unlikely. First, because the argument, as it stands, seeks to establish the incommunicability of knowledge, and so it is embedded in a negative, critical discourse; in short, there is not a positive theory of λόγος to be tracked down in this context. Secondly, from a historical point of view what matters is mainly the valuable observation that there is no such a thing as a one-to-one relation between objects and words (see Introductory notes on *MXG*).

There are two consequent arguments. The first one explores the relation of words with objects, and it defends the idea that external objects produce speech, and not vice versa. It is maintained that the external objects – those perceived by humans – lend λόγος its substance, and Sextus exemplifies that by saying that it is the fact that we taste a soup that brings about a λόγος corresponding to its quality, and the fact that we see a colour that produces an utterance concerning this particular colour. Conclusion: it is not λόγος that indicates external objects, but external objects that give meaning to λόγος.

In modern terms this is a pseudo-dilemma (any discussion concerning the origins of language falls outwith the scope of modern linguistic theory); the question "is it objects that validate the meaning of words or words that give meaning to objects" is a chicken-and-egg one. It is perhaps more interesting to see what lies behind this argument (if it is originally Gorgianic; see Untersteiner 1954, p.174 n.98 with further literature). Kerferd (1982, p.218) holds: "Exactly what theory this implies about the origin of language for Gorgias we are not told". Nevertheless, it may be possible to construe its meaning if we consider its affinities (see Untersteiner 1954, p.174 n. 98, though I disagree with his conclusions) with the discussion of the fourth possible reason that made Helen follow Paris to Troy in the *Encomium*. In that context (15), we have a stimuli-response pattern. Objects of the external world – for the external appearance of which men should not be held responsible – invoke emotions within the soul, and lead to action. We may assume, though it cannot be proved, that in this context G. has the same pattern in mind. External objects stimulate men who produce a *logos* dependent on the nature of the stimulus. At any rate the priority goes to the stimuli, not to λόγος.

The following argument (86) runs: admittedly λόγος – like visible and audible things – has its own substance, which entails that it can signify objects of the external world. That this disclaimer is put forward as "a possible objection" (in Kerferd's words, 1982 p.218) is shown by the fact that it is followed by an argument objecting to it. This argument concedes (εἰ γὰρ καί) that even if λόγος has its own substance (cp. *Hel.* 8, where λόγος is defined as an omnipotent ruler with a minute and invisible body), it differs from other objects perceived through different senses. So, even if we allow for an ontological independence of *logos*, the fact that it is perceived through a different channel infers that it fails to denote a score of objects (in the way that audible things cannot be grasped through vision and so on – ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα τὴν ἀλλήλων διαδηλοῖ φύσιν).

The argument as it stands can be reformulated as follows: articulated (oral) λόγος makes use of sounds (cp. φθόγγοι *MXG* 980b2). But speech is perceived through one ὄργανον and visible things through another. Consequently, most existing things cannot be conveyed through speech.

This argument has an interesting implication. In *Hel.* λόγος is presented to enter human beings in a mechanistic way; in Sextus' account λόγοι are perceived through an unidentified ὄργανον. Are we to suppose that this ὄργανον is simply the sense of hearing, which allows men to perceive articulated speech? Is it possible that mental and cognitive processes of perceiving speech are hinted at as well? To what extent is this a Gorgianic argument? If the answer to the last question is to be positive, the lack of any grounds to give any positive answers to the other two questions does not much improve our knowledge of G.'s ideas on speech-perception, if they existed at all. It may merely be said that *prima facie* the argument can be supported from a clear-cut distinction between hearing and the rest of the senses. But it is tempting to suppose that an exegesis of the differences in perception between sounds and articulated utterances was included as well. Nevertheless, for lack of conclusive evidence this issue should be left undecided.

FRAGMENTS

4

The passage provides us with an approach to colour which is ascribed by Plato to G. Still, it is hard to see how much of what is said here can safely be considered as a quotation from G., but we will not be far from truth if we claim that *Meno* is haunted by G.'s shadow. At the very beginning of the dialogue, Meno is presented as G.'s student, and when he later goes on to define 'virtue' ($\dot{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\dot{\eta}$) he gives a definition which is explicitly said to be the fruit of both G.'s and Meno's knowledge about it (see fr.19). In that context, instead of defining 'virtue' in an absolute manner, Meno presents a relativistic definition of it: different attributes are $\dot{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\dot{\eta}$ for different kinds of people. It is vital, now, to realize that the present passage is the concomitant of Sokrates' dissatisfaction with this definition, because the consecutive definitions of shape and colour are an attempt to exemplify what a (or rather any) valid definition should look like.

The present exemplification through colour has already been announced in what precedes it; at 74b Meno accepts that he is unable to locate one virtue which can be applied to everything ($\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$ $\dot{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\dot{\eta}\nu$ $\lambda\alpha\beta\epsilon\hat{\iota}\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\dot{\alpha}$ $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu$) and at this Sokrates undertakes to ease the progress of the discussion by developing the definition of shape which has already been used as an example in passing (73e). At 75e Sokrates gives the first definition of colour: 'shape is that and only that among beings which is always followed by colour'. This Meno finds naïve, because it is a definition which defines the unknown through the unknown (evidently, colour has not yet been defined). Sokrates then gives a second definition (76e): 'shape is the end ($\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha s$) of a solid thing ($\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\epsilon o\hat{\upsilon}$)'. No comment is made by Meno; he now urges Sokrates to do away with some unfinished business

and he thus asks him for a definition of colour: this brings us to the beginning of our fragment.

Some explanation should be given now about the portion of *Meno* cited here. So far, editors of G. omit ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδάν μοι σὺ τοῦτ᾽ εἴπῃς...πάνυ μὲν οὖν χάρισαι; I take the view that such an omission is unjustified for two main reasons. The first one is that it is closely related to the pivotal characterisation of Meno as ὑβριστής; Bluck comments: "Meno is not really arrogant, and Sokrates does not mean this seriously" (1961 note *ad loc.*). This may be so; the following lines, however, invite us to determine why Sokrates calls Meno an ὑβριστής. This characterisation is *partly* justified by Sokrates by stressing that Meno demands from an old man a definition of ἀρετή; Meno promises to give his definition, but *not before* Sokrates gives his own one about colour. Sokrates is now introducing an explicitly erotic vocabulary; every effort is made to present Meno as a blackmailer, who founds his tyrannical activity on his beauty. This decisively completes the presentation of Meno as ὑβριστής. His attitude is hybristic exactly because he takes advantage of his beauty which, in a way, victimises Sokrates who is now compelled to indulge (see Dover 1989, pp.34ff., esp. p. 36).

The second reason brings us closer to G. himself; Sokrates, according to the words that Plato puts in his mouth, seems to allude to the despotic nature of speech as it is presented by G. in *Hel.*, something which is perhaps corroborated by the love-wording of the speech (λόγος and love are interwoven in *Hel.*). I would defend this thesis on the basis of the following arguments: a) τυραννεύοντες could be taken as an allusion to the definition of speech as δυνάστης in *Hel.* 8 (the possibility that ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, apart from 'in the discussions', can also take on the meaning 'through your speeches', cannot be excluded, and such a possibility further stresses a general reference to speech) and to the compelling power of love, to which attention is drawn here in an explicit manner. Moreover, the emphasis on speech is manifestly strengthened when Sokrates

alleges that Meno's beauty would have been obvious even if someone had his face covered. Meno is literally becoming speech. b) The expression ὅτι εἰμὶ ἥττων τῶν καλῶν may be a (sarcastic) reiteration of the discussion of the first reason in *Hel.* 6 (see also 19), where the word ἥσσων and its opposite are dazzlingly repeated. c) It cannot be mere coincidence that what follows is a reply κατὰ Γοργίαν; the proposed reading of the lines preceding it – as an implied allusion to G.'s own theses – serves thus as a prelude to the definition of colour.

οὐκ ἐθέλεις: a somewhat 'hypocritical' anxiety of Sokrates to hear the Gorgian definition of 'virtue'(cp. Pl. *Ion* 541e οὐδὲ ἅττα ἐστὶ ταῦτα περὶ ὧν δεινὸς εἶ ἐθέλεις εἰπεῖν...).

κατὰ Γοργίαν: *à la manière de*; Sokrates assumes that Meno, being familiar with G.'s tropes, will be in a position to comprehend more easily (and accept) the definition of colour.

λέγετε: G. and his followers, the representative of whom in this dialogue is Meno.

ἀπορροάς...κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα: 'effluences of beings...following Empedocles'; Empedocles' theory about the function of the senses cannot fully be discussed here. As the next two questions uttered by Sokrates show, sense-perception was the result of the combined function of both the sense-organ and the object of perception. He accepted that some πόροι existed through which the ἀπορροαί ('effluences') passed, and that for this reason a symmetry between them was necessary (cp. 31A86-89, B3, 84, 89 DK; see Diels 1884, Wright 1981, pp.229-30).

«σύνες ὅ τι λέγω»: Pindar 105a Snell-Mähler (= 94 Bowra, 121 Turyn) addressed to Hiero; cp. Pl. *Phdr.* 236d, Ar. *Birds* 945.

ἔστιν γὰρ χρόα...αἰσθητός: at last Sokrates' gives the definition of colour; whether or not this is Empedocles' own definition as it was quoted by G. we cannot tell, especially due to the absence of direct evidence from G.'s own preserved texts. It is possible that although

he accurately conveys its content, at the same time he gives to it the form that would make it seem κατὰ Γοργίαν. σχημάτων: in the margin of T χρημάτων, accepted by Diels-Kranz and Unterseiner; Richards prefers σωμάτων (cp. Alexander Aphrodosias comments on Aristotle's *de sensu* 24,9 Wendland). I accept most editors' reading because "possibly Plato wrote ἀπορροή χρημάτων, or possibly Empedocles talked about ἀπορροαί of *things*, but Plato chose to speak of effluences of σχήματα because σχῆμα has been defined whereas χρῆμα and σῶμα have not" (Bluck 1961, note *ad loc.*). Note the interesting coexistence of all the proposed readings at *Hel.* 18.

τραγική: much has been said about the meaning of this attribute and it seems to me that no definitive answer has or can be given (see Untersteiner 1961, p.75 with further literature; Bluck (1961a), 289-95 summarises more views; see also Buchheim 1989, p.188-89). It seems to me that Bluck (1961a) is right in concluding that "τραγικὴ in our present context alludes...to its [sc. the definition's] high-flown language and to what Sokrates chooses to treat as its grandeur or profundity. *These* are the qualities that make it Gorgian, and at the same time cause Meno to admire it" (p.295).

5

For an interpretation of the fragment see Diels 1884, pp.361ff., where he puts forward the view that it comes from an unpreserved writing of G. on natural philosophy (see also Untersteiner 1961, p.76).

5a

All the three passages offer examples of what is considered an unjustifiably grandiloquent style, which is explicitly pointed at by Hermogenes' ψυχρεύονται (for ψυχρόν see fr.15). The description of beasts as 'living tombs' is an image which regularly recurs both in ancient and modern literature. An interesting example is traced in Hdt. 1. 216: ἐπεὰν δὲ γέρων γένηται κάρτα, οἱ προσήκεοντές οἱ

πάντες συνελθόντες θύουσί μιν...ἐψήσαντες δὲ τὰ κρέα κατευξωνται. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ὀλβιώτατά σφι νενόμισται, τὸν δὲ νούσῳ τελευτήσαντα οὐ κατασιτέονται ἀλλὰ γῆ κρύπτουσι (cp. also 3. 38, 99; the custom of the Massagetai is also described in *Dissoi Logoi* 2.14). Latin literature provides us with some depictions of this undoubtedly macabre image; in Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* 5. 993 we read *viva videns vivo sepelieri viscera busto* (more instances in Meurig Davies 1949, p.73). It is also interesting that this image is a reversal of the image presented in the final words of the *Epitaphios*, i.e. ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος οὐκ ἐν ἀθανάτοις σώμασι ζῆ οὐ ζώντων. For a similar image (birds eating bodies) in Greek literature cp. Aiskh. *Septem* 1020-1, Soph. *Antigone* 1081 and *Electra* 1487f., and Eur. *Ion* 933.

The characterisation of Xerxes as the 'Zeus of the Persians', which is attested by Longinus, is related by Russell (1964 note *ad loc.*) to Herodotos 7.56 where an Hellespontean man says: ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δὴ ἀνδρὶ εἰδόμενος Πέρσῃ καὶ οὔνομα ἀντὶ Διὸς Ξέρξην θέμενος ἀνάστατον τὴν Ἑλλάδα θέλεις ποιῆσαι. But it can also be seen in the light of Isokrates' *Panegyricus* 151, where we are told that monarchy led the Persians to cowardice, and that they thus called their ruler δαίμων, although he was a mortal man (cp. also Aiskh. *Persae* 80: ἰσόθεος φώς, of Xerxes, and δαίμονα 642, θεομήστωρ 654, ὡς θεός 711, ἰσόθεος 856, of Darius).

(fr.6=*Epitaphios*)

7

The date of the speech remains uncertain (for some suggestions see Untersteiner 1961, p.85). According to Aristotle (who in this part of his *Rhetoric* presents an exemplified classification of the proems of epideictic speeches), G. in the prologue praised those who founded the πανηγύρεις (Lysias 33.1 praises Herakles for establishing the Olympic games), whereas Isokrates (*Panegyricus* 1) blames them

because they do not honour wisdom (a view which goes back to Xenophanes). An indication of its content is given in 8a (for an expanded version of the fragment see Buchheim 1989 with notes). For the ideal of Panhellenism in the fifth century see Flower 2000, esp.92-93.

8

The first to identify these two sentences with G.'s Ὀλυμπικός was Bernays (1853), and this identification made the word αἴνιγμα ('riddle') appear inappropriate; Bernays himself proposed αἴσιμα, Diels πλίγμα. Ferguson (1921), now, thought that αἴνιγμα gave good meaning, because he thought that G. intended to compare his ability to expand publicly on any sublect with Oedipus who was bold enough to face the Sphinx, and he also maintained that καλεῖ μὲν...δυνάμενον did not necessarily belong to G.'s oration. In my view the only part of the fragment that could safely be attributed to G. is this: τὸ ἀγώνισμα ἡμῶν...διττῶν δὲ ἀρετῶν δεῖται, τόλμης καὶ σοφίας. Clemens brings in G. at a point where he criticises philosophical investigation (especially that of the Epicureans and the Stoics), and ἡμῶν, which probably existed in the quotation of G.'s speech that Clemens had before him, is meant to distinguish this kind of (hedonistic as Clemens himself calls it) philosophical investigation from the one dictated by Christian faith, which reveals itself with αἰνίγμασι καὶ συμβόλοις ἀλληγορίαις τε αὖ καὶ μεταφοραῖς (*Stro*.5. 4,21).

Similarly, I think that Clemens's allusion to the herald at the Olympic games does not prove that the second sentence is a quotation from G.'s oration. This sentence has several Gorgian overtones, the most remarkabe one being the βουλόμενον / δυνάμενον antithesis. But the subject of the verb καλεῖ, speech (λόγος) is not the Gorgian speech; Clemens's *Stromateis* is devoted to the Christian λόγος. Buchheim (1989, p.194) cites a parallel that clearly shows how superficial similarities may lead to

misinterpretation: ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ὀλυμπιακοῖς ἀγῶσι καλεῖ μὲν ὁ κῆρυξ τὸν βουλόμενον, στεφανοῖ δὲ τὸν νικήσαντα· τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἁγνείας.

It is possible that G. used ἀγώνισμα to refer to his own speech, by bringing it closer to the situational context in which he delivered it. τόλμη and σοφία are both required for success in both *his* and the athletes' activities (note that γνώμη and ῥώμη are presented antithetically in the *Epitaphios*). By bringing himself close to the athletes, G. is probably the first to use the antagonistic enviroment of the games as a metaphor for rhetoric.

8a

The passage is cited only because it refers to the contents of G.'s speech, for Isokrates suggests that G. never got married (see Test.18). The important information is that G.'s demand was for ὁμόνοια between the Greek cities, not solely within them, and it should of course be associated with what is put forward in 5b; the Olympic games was an appropriate occasion for someone to propound the Panhellenic ideal, because it was a Panhellenic festival, which also entailed the suspension of any existing hostilities.

9

Nothing is known about G.'s Pythian speech; Philostratos gives us the vague information that it was delivered at the altar of the temple of Apollo (ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ ἤχησεν, Test.1).

10

Again the content of the speech is unknown; nevertheless, we should distinguish this speech from the Pythian and the Olympic in view of its locality. It is unclear if ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἠλείους is the title of the work, or a specific reference to the preamble of G.'s speech

(see Buchheim 1989, pp.195-6). It is likely, however, that his speech was a praise of the city of Elis. The possibility that G. delivered this speech before or after a visit to Olympia is feasible (see Untersteiner 1961, p. 87). The phrase πόλις εὐδαίμων is a recurring formula, for which see Ar. *Birds* 36.

(frs.11,11a= *Encomium of Helen, The Defence of Palmedes*)

12

The symmetrical antithesis is typically Gorgian, so that there can be little doubt that Aristotle quotes G.'s own words; judging from the existing evidence he must have been the first to observe the importance of laughter in public speaking. The wording of the fragment does not make it clear whether γέλωτι, as a weapon against the threatening seriousness of the opponent, means a) 'by laughing', or b) 'by arousing laughter in the audience'. Halliwell (1991), p.293 accepts (b), and he contends that "the formulation strongly points to the use of rhetorically induced laughter not so much for a direct expression of animosity, as in order to win one's audience's amused approval and thus to manipulate the mood of a public gathering in one's own favour". But (a) is no less plausible, especially in view of the Platonic passage (cp. *infra*), and perhaps more importantly, in view of the fact that laughter is so frequently an expression of enmity, a gesture which in some cases, as Greek literature abundantly brings out, can cause irrecoverable damage to the honour and the social status of a person.

In *Grg.* 473e, a passage whose relevance to the Gorgian contention about the function of laughter has been accepted by Dodds (1959, note *ad loc.*), Sokrates delays his conclusion that 'the more miserable person is the one who escapes the danger and becomes a tyrant' to ask: 'What's up now, Polus? Do you laugh? Is this another kind of scrutiny [ἐλέγχου], that is laughing when one says something, instead of scrutinizing one's own words?' The

theatricality of the passage is overt; Plato invites us to imagine a smile on Polus' mouth which is enough to cut off Sokrates, who at this point in the dialogue says nothing hilarious. The emphasis placed on Polus' laughter, expressed with two staccato questions, elevates what could otherwise be an unimportant smile to a philosophical method of examination. There can be little doubt then that Plato, by drawing his readers' attention to Polus' laughter, intends them to construe it as a practice of his circle, and more particularly that of G. himself, whose view about the function of 'laughter' must have been known to Plato.

This passage acquires added significance in the light of what follows; Polus' reply to Sokrates is another question: "Do not you think that the falsity of your view has already been proved, when you maintain views that no one else maintains? You may ask anyone of those who are now present". Polus seems to wish to ripen the grapes of his 'laughter'; we may imagine that while he was laughing his head was turned to the members of the rest of the company and we may infer that it was with the intention of winning over his audience that Polus resorted to γέλως. It is needless to say that Sokrates turns Polus down on the basis of his political inexperience, which, as he says, the year before, when he was elected a βουλευτής, provoked laughter in numerous people.

The Platonic passage thus 'stages' the Gorgian theoretical advice, and it brings out the duality of its character: the laughter of G.'s 'student' aspires to arouse his audience's laughter and in this way to predispose it against Sokrates who, of course, does not fail not to be victimized. This brings us to (b): we have seen that in *Grg.* 473e it is laughter itself that preponderates with further implications pertaining to the importance of the audience's laughter. But unfortunately (b) cannot be defended in connection to direct or indirect evidence about G.. Nevertheless, it is hard to see any reason why this dimension of the Gorgian dictum should be excluded; for the importance of arousing laughter in audiences clearly emerges from later oratorical practice (actually the plethora of evidence

makes any attempt towards a full presentation of the theme impossible in this context), which in a way draws back to G.'s contention.

Despite the different approaches, it has amply been shown that G. paid tribute to pleasure (τέρψις) as a means of attaining persuasiveness (explicitly in *Hel.* 5, 13), so that his prescription about the usage of laughter cannot be seen independently of this parameter. The role of pleasure and laughter in persuasion is attested in Aristophanes' *Wasps* 567; in that context Philokleon explains to his son the privileges of being a juror by referring to defendants' striving for acquittal. Among other means of persuasion, they also "narrate myths to us [jurors], others comic stories from Aisopos; others make jokes, so as to make me laugh and thus to appease me. And if we do not change our minds...". This comic exploitation of the function of laughter points to its power to win over audiences in courtrooms, and thus to its contribution to the acquittal of those involved. In fourth-century rhetoric things are rather different; without intending to systematize evidence (this has been done by Halliwell) it seems feasible to maintain that pleasure through laughter is there inextricably interwoven with 'slander' (λοιδορία), an element which is undeveloped in G.'s preserved texts. This is eloquently expressed in Demosthenes 18.3 (ὃ φύσει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑπάρχει, τῶν μὲν λοιδοριῶν καὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἀκούειν ἡδέως), and later at 138 (cp. also *Philip.*3.54, 19.23; Aiskhines 1.35). Laughter in oratory is thus chiefly integrated within the characterisation of the opponent in which even false evidence about his life can be employed (a good example is the presentation of Aiskhines' parentage by Demosthenes; for false evidence and the identity of litigants see Halliwell 1991, p.288; see also Harding 1994, who investigates the impact of Old Comedy upon rhetoric).

So far I have been stressing the role of laughter; we may now see the role of stubborn seriousness as opposed to 'playful' laughter. In Demosthenes' *Against Conon*, Ariston, the plaintiff, in anticipating his opponent's arguments claims that among other things he will say

that his (and his company's) misbehaviour was due to a 'playful' mood (εἰς γέλωτα καὶ σκώμματ᾽ ἐμβαλεῖν πειράσασθαι 13); he then says that Conon will claim falsely that he (Ariston) and his brothers are heavy drinkers, ὑβρισταί, ἀγνώμονες and πικροί. Much has been said about *hybris* in the context of this speech; it will suffice here to say that Ariston himself claims that he did not prosecute his opponents for *hybris*, because, as he explains, he was told by his relatives not to do so. But how are we to interpret the words ἀγνώμονας and πικρούς in contradistinction to the 'playfulness' of his opponents?

Both attributes give the impression of a stubborn, inflexible person, a character with no sense of humour; Ariston, in short, alleges that Conon will present him as a person with no understanding, and it seems that he cannot feel confident enough that even the judges will abstain from laughter at the representation of the facts by Conon (20). It is for this reason that he there dramatises his sufferings and invites the judges to visualise them. This short presentation clearly brings out the dangers involved in seriousness; Ariston may justifiably claim that no one would laugh, if it happened to be an eye-witness of the incident, but at the same time he is anxious not to present himself as prejudiced against playful activity. Demosthenes in defending him is aware of the possibility that the judges will perhaps be more influenced by the 'staging' of slapstick comedy with the prosecutor playing the role of the foolishly touchy protagonist than by the actual sufferings of a complainer who is overdoing it (for brief comments on this fragment see Untersteiner, 1961, p.134, and Buchheim 1989, p.196).

13

Dionysios' information about G.'s writing on καιρός is clearly marked by a sceptical, if not polemical, tone which is founded on

the axiom that καιρός is an elusive subject of investigation due to its inherent association with δόξα. I take it that this tone can potentially be useful in relation to the nature of G.'s own writing because it points to a general, 'theoretical' analysis of this important parameter of eloquence.

καιρός is a fundamental notion in the circle of the Sophists which could simply be defined as the consideration of the right time at which one should act; both the words 'time' and 'act' should be read in the wider possible way: time should necessarily include a 'spatial' meaning, that is the pragmatic constraints imposed on a speaker by the context in which he delivers his speech, the audience and the horizon of its expectations, which unavoidably entails their political, religious or other dispositions etc. In short, καιρός, as a technical term, results from the observation that communicating a view effectively does not merely depend on the clarity of a message, but on the speakers' timing as well.

According to Diogenes Laertios (IX. 52=A1,52DK), Protagoras (not G. as Dionysios says) was the first to display καιροῦ δύναμιν. The doxographical divergence about who was the first to discuss καιρός cannot be discussed here; in Diogenes it is presented as one among other Protagorean novelties. Skouteropoulos is too ready to accept the doxographers in claiming that "Ἐνῷ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἦταν ὁ πρῶτος ὁ ὁποῖος ἐπισήμανε τὴ σημασία ποὺ ἔχει ἡ αἴσθηση τῆς κατάλληλης περίστασης...πρῶτος ὁ Γοργίας, ὅπως σημειώνει ἐδῶ ὁ Διονύσιος ὁ Ἁλικαρνασσεύς, ἐπιχείρησε νὰ προσδιορίσει καὶ τοὺς τεχνικούς κανόνες γιὰ τὴν ἐφαρμογή αὐτῆς τῆς ἀρχῆς στὴ ῥητορική" 1991, p.261; see also Gomperz 1912, p.165ff.) A number of other Sophistic works also mention καιρός; in *Dissoi Logoi* quite a good deal is said about it. At 2.20 we read: πάντα καιρῷ μὲν καλά ἐντι, ἐν ἀκαιρίᾳ δ' αἰσχρά (see also 5,9) which shows that καιρός is not here viewed on the level of its oratorical implications (although this does not justify Schiappa's (1999, p.74) conclusion that "the absence of any rhetorical treatment of them in the *Dialexeis* implies

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that the disciplinary matrix connecting these concepts to persuasive speechmaking either had not emerged or was not yet fixed in Greek language or thought"). Alkidamas, probably one of G.'s students and a fervent supporter of oral speech, also contended τῷ καιρῷ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐστόχως ἀκολουθῆσαι καὶ τὸν προσήκοντα λόγον εἰπεῖν (*On the Sophists*, 3; see also Isokrates 2.33).

καιρός is traced in G.'s preserved texts expressed with the word τὸ δέον (for this term as a synonym of καιρός see Vollgraff 1952, p.20-27); in the *Epitaphios* those honoured are praised for doing and saying the right thing at the right time; similarly in the opening of *Hel.* the rhetor defines his task as an expression of that which ought to be said (τὸ δέον), a statement which has widely been explained as an allusion to καιρός (see notes *ad loc.*). The phrase ἐφιεὶς τῷ καιρῷ in Test. 1a is rightly taken by Guthrie (1971, p.272 n.4 with further literature) to refer "to his gift of improvisation" as in that context it is the practice of public display that it is discussed.

It is possible now to return to the nature of G.'s writing about καιρός; I have already suggested that it is likely that it was a 'theoretical' work where general rules were put forward; Dionysios' objection is that καιρός is something that cannot be studied systematically, and accordingly no universal rules can be set about it, because it depends decisively upon personal, subjective considerations (this is said in what follows the passage cited by Diels-Kranz; Kerferd 1981, p.81 almost invited future editors to include this part, hence Buchheim 1989, p.82 and Skouteropoulos 1991, p.260); in short καιρός cannot be judged independently of a given occasion. That this is accepted by him as an axiom, is shown by his all-encompassing contempt towardst philosophers and rhetoricians expressed at the beginning of the passage cited. All this suggests a 'theoretical' discussion of καιρός to the extent that Dionysios finds it unpractical. What such a dissertation on καιρός may have included is mere speculation; probably suggestions about

its importance (this, according to Diogenes Laertios, was the content of Protagoras' work on καιρός) or about the modification of arguments dictated by the expectations of the audience. These prescriptions could have been supported by the analysis of examples of real speeches.

(For καιρός see, Süss 1910, pp.iii and 17ff, Gomperz 1912, pp.165ff, Untersteiner 1961, p. 134-136, Kennedy 1963, p.66-68, Wilson 1981, 418-420, Consigny 1992, Noël, 1998, Schiappa 1999, p.73-74)

14

Aristotle scornfully presents G.'s method of teaching through an analogy; he compares the learning of model speeches by heart as a teaching-method of rhetoric to a hypothetical teaching of shoe-making, which solely consists in the presentation of many different kinds of shoes. According to Aristotle this is a process which involves learning from the products of art (ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης) and which unavoidably fails to lead to the acquisition of the art itself. This passage has frequently been discussed by modern scholarship, which, it should be added, in recent years tends to find in it support for the contention that rhetorical meta-language is absent throughout the fifth century. The feasibility of this statement is also partly connected to the explanation of what Aristotle means by λόγους; other scholars take it to refer to whole speeches, others to parts of speeches or recurring themes labelled *loci communes* (commonplaces).

Wilcox (1942, p.153) takes the view that "we should accept Aristotle's testimony in the *Sophistici Elenchi* that the theory was extensively developed and unlike the *communes loci* of G.". Kerferd (1981, p.31) also maintains that Aristotle has in mind the *loci communes* of the kind Cicero describes in *Brutus* 46-47 (= Test.25), and he concludes that: "It can hardly be in doubt that it is commonplaces of this kind which the pupils of G. were required to

learn by heart...rather than whole speeches as is sometimes asserted" (the same view is taken by Natali 1986, p.106). Kennedy (1994, p.35, and 1959), in discussing the rhetorical handbooks, discerns two traditions: "the theoretical...including Tisias and Theodorus, and the tradition of the exemplar or collection of commonplaces...including G." (1959, p.172). Cole (1991, p.92), who offers a detailed discussion of τέχνη, holds that "sample speech parts, like sample shoe parts, can be constructed in such a way as to minimise idiosyncrasy and so point more clearly than would a random selection of such objects to the general principles on which their construction is based" and he encapsulates his view of fifth-century rhetoric as follows: "The analytical metalanguage characteristic of fourth-century treatises may have had purely oral antecedents of which all reports have disappeared. Yet the completeness of the disappearance...suggests otherwise." Similarly Schiappa (1999, p.45) concludes that "The 'Arts' attributed to G., Thrasymachus, and Antiphon are probably the result of the publication of exemplary speeches...there were no theoretical 'Arts of Rhetoric' written in the fifth century B.C.E.".

There is thus a consensus about the 'practical' and markedly exemplary character of G.'s teaching, the divergence of views being chiefly located in the examination of G.'s tools. Moreover, it is clear that, as far as G. is concerned, scholarly work tends to take Aristotle's testimony for granted, and thus to found its conclusions upon it. However, both the statements that G. had not developed any theoretical meta-language and that his teaching proceeded solely with the memorization of model-speeches cannot be true.

Firstly, it should be pointed out that Aristotle is not acting as an impartial historiographer of rhetoric; his contempt for the display of model-speeches, or parts of them, can only be considered soberly if one is ready to see it in comparison to his own elevated analysis of rhetoric. As he says G.'s practice falls short because it employs τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης and by the same token because it fails to present the

τέχνη itself. Retrojecting this term almost one century before Aristotle's time and thus reaching conclusions concerning the teaching of rhetoric is unsafe. τέχνη in Aristotle's time has already a long history in which Plato's philosophy plays the most important role, particularly with the distinction between τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη. In Aristotle's philosophy τέχνη takes on a specific meaning, for he places it between ἐμπειρία and ἐπιστήμη, and more particularly he relates it to the third of the three kinds of ἐπιστήμη, that is ποιητική (cp. *Meta.* 981b25-982a1, 1025b21, 26, 1046b3; *Eth.Nic.*1139b14-1141b8). The emphasis is thus placed on the process, not on the finished work for that belongs to the realm of τυχαίον and τέχνη tends (as ἐπιστήμη does) to the καθόλου, the difference between them being that τέχνη is περὶ γένησιν (namely the passage from a shapeless material to a form). It is with such a philosophical background that Aristotle criticises G.'s teaching; apart from that, we should point out that if τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης are either *loci communes* or parts of speeches, as most scholars agree, composed for memorization, their obvious *raison d' être* was to provide people with generally applicable arguments (or possibly clichés for other parts of a speech), and they were thus concerned with *what* one says rather than with the way in which one says it, there is even one more reason why we should not be surprised by Aristotle's criticism. For it cannot be accidental that the subject-matter of speeches is excluded by Aristotle in his study of rhetoric, on the basis that it is related to other disciplines (ethics, politics etc).

It is thus not the absence of 'theory' in the way *we* construe the term that Aristotle locates in G.'s teaching method, nor does he say that the latter proceeded solely by display. But is it feasible to contend that rhetorical metalanguage was unavailable in G.'s teaching? First of all, no one can seriously put forward the view that any teaching is possible without conveying the principles that underline the discipline taught, at least in the way that the instructor has them in his / her mind. Common experience shows that queries

cannot always be answered by the means of paradigms, and some generalization is always involved. It is equally true that teaching is by nature a kind of communication where oral speech is primarily employed (electronic technology has certainly facilitated distance-learning in our days), and insofar as antiquity is concerned, difficulties related to the publication and distribution of books would make teachers of successful public speaking prefer to write down what they considered appropriate to meet the practical and immediate needs of their audience. Moreover, relentless mobility is a common characteristic of the representatives of the Sophistic movement, and certainly of G. himself. This is tantamount to the fact that such a thing as a school like Plato's Academy or Aristotle's Lykeion is something unattested in G.'s days; for this reason it is legitimate to speculate once more that written composition of paradigms was of more general applicability, and thus preferable to 'theoretical' discussion of the function of rhetoric, especially in view of the fact that this teaching was addressed to people unacquainted with a developing genre. All this suggests, I think, that the non-theoretical orientation of the fifth-century 'rhetorical' writings does not necessarily entail the absence of a metarhetorical language.

Absence of theoretical perspective in the study of rhetoric in the fifth century has convincingly been refuted by Gagarin (1994), who rightly places his interest chiefly in the writings of this period, and not in fourth-century assessments of them. For our purposes it will suffice to present briefly some aspects of metalanguage in G. To start with indirect evidence, we know that he had composed a treatise on καιρός, which is criticised by Dionysios as unsuccessful (see fr.13). Regardless of the quality of this work, its existence is a first indication that G. had actually discussed an aspect of rhetoric which undoubtedly has a diachronic value. Segments of meta-rherorical language can be traced in G.'s extant texts. *Hel.* 8-14 includes a discussion of λόγος, which undoubtedly establishes a metarhetorical language, to the extent that it deals with matters such

as persuasion, acceptability of arguments, emotional appeal, pleasure and its relation to effectiveness etc. The same *mutatis mutandis* holds for the third part of *ONB*, which paves the way for serious philosophical approach to language and which has frequently been underrated by scholars who connect it with G.'s practical ends. Independently of the context in which these discussions appear, they certainly suggest an increasing interest in discussing speech both in its endogenous characteristics and in its role in social discourse (one may also mention G.'s advice about the importance of laughter in one's argumentation). There is no doubt that this evidence is highly random and that it does not amount to a systematic, theoretical approach to rhetoric; but this is rather different from saying that metarhetoric is unattested in G.'s writings. It would be more accurate to contend that G.'s teaching is a hybrid, where practice and theory have a complementary function. To a certain degree, metalanguage can be traced even in what could be seen as a sample of purely paradigmatic rhetoric of general applicability, that is *Pal.* The typology of motives leading to criminal action at 19, to mention one example, is a remark of great significance (for more such remarks, see my commentary on the text).

In conclusion, Aristotle's view about teaching ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης is a criticism which is based on a syncresis with what he himself defines as τέχνη; thus Buchheim is certainly right in printing οὗτος γὰρ βεβοήθηκε...παρέδωκεν, because this portion of the text illustrates Aristotle's own criterion, to which, in his view, G.'s end is opposed. Similarly modern suggestions that metarhetoric is absent in G.'s teaching (and time) fail to give a clear meaning to the term metarhetoric, as they almost invite us to construe it in the terms of fourth-century philosophising. On the contrary, examination of G.'s own texts suggests an unprecedented (in existing evidence) amount of language which is designed to explain language, and which

allows us to infer that much more theoretical language was employed in everyday contact with students of eloquence.

15

Aristotle examines what ψυχρόν style arises from; there are four main causes: a) compound words, b) obscure and difficult expressions (τὸ χρῆσθαι γλώτταις, c) the use of epithets which are either μακροῖς or ἀκαίροις or πυκνοῖς, and d) inappropriate metaphors. This technical term frequently recurs in Greek criticism and it is variously defined (for an examination of it see Van Hook 1917, pp.68-76). In this fragment we have examples of compound words, which are unattested elsewhere in G.'s preserved writings; he is certainly fond of compound words (see Introduction), but nothing similar to πτωχομουσοκόλακας can be tracked down in his extant work.

πτωχομουσοκόλακας: 'wanting-in-wisdom flatterers'; the MSS have πτωχόμουσος κόλαξ, but Vahlen's suggestion has justifiably been accepted by most scholars.

ἐπιορκήσαντας κατ' εὐορκήσαντος: I prefer Ross's reading to the MSS' ἐπιορκήσαντας καὶ κατευορκήσαντας, because it brings together in an antithetical structure what is otherwise an example which consists in two separate words.

16

These are examples of ψυχρόν arising from metaphors; for a full discussion of the textual difficulties see Solmsen 1987, pp.500-2, who rightly suggests that we should "separate the second sentence σὺ...ἐθέρισας from the preceding one, for these two quotations...have no connection with one another" (p.500); see also Buchheim 1989, pp. 197-8.

17

Skouteropoulos (1991, p.265) rightly relates this passage to Plato's *Phaidros* 267a, where we learn that G. along with Tisias had invented a technique by which they could both prolong their speeches. In the same connection, it is useful to remember that according to Aristotle (*Soph. El.* 174b 32), when Lykophron found it hard to praise the lyre as he was asked, he praised a star bearing the same name with this instrument.

Nestle (1940, pp.313-14) takes it for granted that G. composed a speech for Achilles, but it is equally possible that Aristotle uses Achilles' name *exempli gratia*, in order to illustrate how G. developed his praises by referring to *partly* relevant material. That Aristotle did not perhaps have a specific speech in mind is a hypothesis corroborated by the reasoning employed in *Hel.*, and by the wording in with which he introduces his explanation (εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγων...). If we wish to find an extant speech that develops exactly in the manner that Aristotle describes in this part of his *Rhetoric*, we should turn to Isokrates' *Helen*, where eventually the hero praised is Theseus, not Helen.

18, 19

The passage from Plato's *Meno* is usually taken as an exemplification of the type of definitions that Aristotle ascribes to G. in naming him as the representative of those who 'enumerate' (ἐξαριθμοῦντες) virtues (in including Aristotle's reference to Sokrates I follow Buchheim, because Aristotle does not merely record G.'s method of definition, but he opposes it to Sokrates' own). It is thus generally taken for granted that Aristotle's information is correct and that it is in accordance with the first definition of virtue in *Meno* 71e (e.g. Guthrie 1971, p.254 claims that "But he [sc. Meno] is introduced as an admirer of G., and we know from Aristotle that G. did not approve of attempting a general definition of *aretē*"; Bluck 1961, note *ad loc.*, claims that "Aristotle...is probably thinking of the present passage, and

attributing the views expressed by Meno to his master G."). An interesting implication of the comparative reading of these passages is that some scholars take the view that 'enumerating' was the *only* practice employed by G. in giving definitions; this view is explained variously: Guthrie (1971, p.254) associates it with the Protagorean relativism and Untersteiner (1961, p.140) with καιρός. However, G.'s repugnance to absolute definitions is refutable and consequently Aristotle's accuracy should be scrutinised.

Levi (1966, p.201-2) remarks that Aristotle's evidence is disputable by observing that "vari passi del *Menone* riconoscono o implicano che Gorgia aveva definito la virtù in generale (71c; 73c-d; 76a-b)". None of the passages referred to by Levi *proves* that G. had put forward a general definition of 'virtue' (the more telling instance is 73c-d, where, once more, the definition given is said to belong both to G. and Meno), but this scholar's contribution consists chiefly in his questioning the validity of Aristotle's information.

Unlike Levi, several scholars (Guthrie 1971, p.254, Buchheim 1989, p.198, Skouteropoulos 1991, p.266) see in G.'s preserved texts (*Hel.* 1, *Epitaphios*; for the function of this type of definition in *Hel.* 1 see comments *ad loc.*) a verification of what Aristotle says here, which undoubtedly entails that they take his statement as a general reference to G.'s *unique* way of defining things. However, whereas the passage from Aristotle affords this reading, it is necessary to make it clear that Plato's student is either selective or that he systematises evidence from G.'s texts. Even if "practical" and "rhetorical" aspects of definition are brought in (this is implied by Guthrie 1971, p.254, when he alleges that "G. would no doubt have claimed that Sokrates was trying to extend a method appropriate to natural science beyond its proper sphere") a monolithic insistence on relativistic definitions (x is y for a, p is q for b...) is not always helpful. The argument from antinomy at *Pal.* 25 furnishes us with a good example for the necessity of absolute definitions: Palamedes is there describing madness through an enumeration of the acts that it leads to; this method he employs

there is 'absolute' enough to apply to any individual situation (other absolute definitions: *Hel.*: of speech 8, of poetry 9; of human motives *Pal.* 19). Consequently, neither Aristotle nor modern scholars who take his account for granted are right in maintaining that 'enumerating' attributes was G.'s only method of defining things.

We may now examine the definition of 'virtue' as it is given by Plato; once again the parentage of the definition is a hybrid: at 71d it is clearly said that the definition that follows is an exclusive privilege of the knowledge of G. and Meno. Two levels are discernible in it: on the first one Meno displays what is ἀρετή for a man and for a woman and on the second one it is merely expressed that different things are virtues for different groups of people. These groups of people can further be divided into two categories on the basis of two criteria: age and sex. But when we turn to 73c, where Meno offers the second Gorgian definition of virtue, we find out that he gives an 'absolute' definition (εἴπερ ἕν γέ τι ζητεῖς κατὰ πάντων) which is reminiscent of theses held by G.'s pupils in *Gorgias*: τί ἄλλο γ᾽ ἢ ἄρχειν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων; It has already been said that Levi, in showing that Aristotle's view is inaccurate, suggests that this is an example of an absolute definition attributable to G. Bluck 1961 (note *ad loc.*) is more cautious in explaining that, "here again, Gorgias himself may have said something of this sort, though it is an ideal that was not confined to a few", and he goes on to compare it to similar views expressed in *Gorgias* and in the *Republic*. We may now see why neither the first nor the second definition can safely be ascribed to G.

As Bluck observes, the distinction between age and sex as a determinant factor of what 'virtue' is for groups of people is not necessarily an invention of any of the Sophists; on the contrary, it involves characteristics which are recognizable in what should be considered as mainstream morality. In short, it is hard to see why efficiency in civic life and compliance with its rules for males and

devotion to males by women should be attributed specifically to G.'s definition of virtue. In the same connection, the teaching of efficiency in public affairs is not peculiar to G.; in a number of passages it appears as a common Sophistic ideal (see Kerferd 1981, p.38). Plato does not thus seem to be concerned with the actual content of "Gorgias'" definition, but with its 'relativistic' nature. The particularly Gorgian style of the last phrases of the definition should not make us feel unconfident; Plato is always ready to dress what is presented as Sophistic in the appropriate gown.

One is even more alert when one examines the second "Gorgian" definition of virtue; once again, the ability to ἄρχειν is a basic Sophistic ideal (see Bluck note *ad loc.* with references to *Gorgias*), and it is unnecessary to accept that G. was either the first or the only person to have held such a view. In the same way that by the first definition Plato intends to stress its relativism, so the second one paves the way for Sokrates to bring in the theme of δικαιοσύνη and then to ask him if this is *a* virtue or *the* virtue, so as to catch him again in the web of a multitude of other virtues.

It is unsafe then to suggest that in *Meno* Plato quotes G.'s definitions of virtue. These should preferably be considered in the context of the dialogue; their function within *Meno* and the way in which they contribute to the progress of the discussion there cannot be discussed in the context of this thesis. The general conclusion is, once more, that our approach to the Sophists through Plato's writings should be extremely careful.

καὶ πράττοντα: if we read 'in so doing' we are close to G.'s views about friends (see fr. 21), because this would suggest that helping friends and harming enemies is more important than being a good citizen. Still, this is not enough to say that the definition is Gorgian, since helping friends and harming enemies is too common in Greek ethics to be purely Gorgian.

εὐλαβεῖσθαι: cp. *Pal.* 34, with note ad loc.

καθ' ἑκάστην...ἐστιν: Meno provides the parameters which determine ἀρετή; the *polyptoton* with the repetition of the word ἕκαστος is Gorgian. What is presented as Gorgian in content is also expressed in the appropriate style.

ὡσαύτως δὲ...κακία: κακία is presumably offered as the antonym of ἀρετή; the construction is reminiscent of the opening lines of *Hel.* As in that text G. first defines what is κόσμος and then explains that the opposite is ἀκοσμία, in the same way here Meno first defines what is virtue and he then explains that the (absence of the) same characteristics (ὡσαύτως) are κακία.

20

For similar views see Antiphon B53, 54 and Anon. Iambl. 7, 1-3; a detailed interpretation is developed by Musti 1984, pp.129-153.

21

G.'s view of φιλία depicted in this passage from Ploutarkhos is in accordance with *Pal.* 18; in that context it is both helping friends *and* harming enemies that motivate a wrong-doing. Further evidence is offered by a passage from Xenophon's *Cyrop.*1.6.31 (διώριζε δὲ τούτων ἅ τὲ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ποιητέον καὶ ἃ πρὸς ἐχθρούς...καὶ τοὺς φίλους δίκαιον εἴη ἐξαπατᾶν ἐπί γε ἀγαθῷ καὶ κλέπτειν τὰ τῶν φίλων ἐπί γε ἀγαθῷ), if one accepts that the διδάσκαλος referred to there is G. (see Nestle 1939, pp.36ff.; For acting justly/unjustly and its bearing on φιλία, see Blundell 1989, p.50-1; cp. also the interesting example of an excuse for transgressing an oath in *Dissoi Logoi* 3.6-7). Public offices and failing to favour friends is a matter posed by Thrasymakhos in Pl.*Rep.* 343e).

22

We do not know the context in which G. claimed that a woman should rather be known for her good reputation than for her beauty. Scholars have accepted that there must be a certain relevance of this

view with the one put by Thucydides in Perikles' mouth: τῆς τε γὰρ ὑπαρχούσης φύσεως μὴ χείροσι γενέσθαι ὑμῖν μεγάλη ἡ δόξα, καὶ ἧς ἐπ᾽ ἐλάχιστον ἀρετῆς πέρι ἢ ψόγου ἐν τοῖς ἄρσεσι κλέος ἦ (2. 45, 2). Kerferd (1981, p.160) claims that Pericles' advice "was inserted by way of reply to G. (DK82B22) who had said...". This assumption (Untersteiner 1961, p.142) is weakened if we consider that Pericles is there referring to widows (see Lacey 1964, pp.47-49; Schaps 1977, pp.323-330 is also interesting), not to women in general, as Ploutarkhos's wording shows.

23

This fragment (along with fr.24, and *Hel.* 9) convincingly shows that G. took a serious interest in poetry, and tragedy in particular. Nevertheless, the exact meaning of G.'s contention remains obscure, and none of the interpretations proposed so far seems to me to be conclusive. The main problems that bar our way to an efficient appreciation of G.'s contention are the following: a) we do not know how much of what Ploutarkhos says belongs to G., b) we are unaware of the context in which G. expressed this view, and c) the dictum is elliptical to such an extent that it is hard to see the exact meaning that the words ἀπατήσας / ἀπατηθείς, δικαιότερος, σοφώτερος take on.

In my view, it is safe to ascribe to G. only that portion of the text which is purely antithetical, because what precedes ὡς Γοργίας φησίν is certainly meant to introduce a new subject in Ploutarkhos' own text. The sentence starting with ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος... is, I believe, Ploutarkhos' attempt to explain G.'s view, and it may possible that he himself did not possess a more extensive portion of the context in which G.'s contention appeared than the one he preserves (for further literature see Dosi 1968, pp. 36ff.).

Much has been said about the role of ἀπάτη in G.; Verdenius (1981) elevated deception to a Gorgian doctrine, and concluded that

"Gorgias' idea of tragic deception was his own idea and that it was based on a transference from rhetorical to poetical speech"; Rosenmeyer (1955, p.232) contends that "*apate* bacame prominent in the vocabulary of G. because he placed a positive accent upon what prior to him had been regarded as a negative situation: the frequent discrepancy between words and things", and Kerferd (1981, p.79) maintains that "deceit is only possible in relation to what is actually true". Dosi (1968, p.83) contends that "la definizione risulta infatti assolutamente conforme a tutto il sistema filosofico gorgiano". All these views are discernibly influenced by theses held in *ONB*, and especially by the distinction that G. draws between words and things. In fact, *apate* is not "prominent" in G.'s vocabulary, as it is commonly assumed: it appears in *Hel.* 8, 10, and *Pal.* 33.

My line of inquiry is that G.'s contention about tragic deception should be addressed autonomously, without drawing general conclusions about the role of deception in his thought. What G. says in this fragment is very close to his examination of poetry in *Hel.* 9. Almost anticipating Platonic poetics, he there explicitly contends that ἐπ᾽ ἀλλοτρίων τε πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων εὐτυχίαις καὶ δυσπαραγίαις ἴδιόν τι πάθημα διὰ τῶν λόγων ἔπαθεν ἡ ψυχή (one may compare the Athenians' response to Phrynikhos' Μιλήτου Ἅλωσις; cp. Hdt. 6.21: καὶ δὴ καὶ ποιήσαντι Φρυνίχῳ δρᾶμα Μιλήτου ἅλωσιν καὶ διδάξαντι ἐς δάκρυά τε ἔπεσε τὸ θέητρον καὶ ἐζημίωσαν μιν ὡς ἀναμνήσαντα οἰκήια κακὰ χιλίῃσι δραχμῇσι). In this context G. refers to poetry generally, not to tragedy, but we have reasons to believe that in general, he tended to see in the products of arts the potential to make their recipients identify themselves with them. This hypothesis is further strengthened on the basis of the analogy that G. draws between the effects of the products of sculpture and painting and the way in which love and desire are inflamed within the human soul. In *Hel.* 18, G. makes it plain that humans can fall in love with soulless products of art

(πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων). It is possible then that when G. contends that the deceived is wiser than the undeceived, he refers to the wisdom of those spectators who go to the theatre ready to be deceived, those, in other words, who are ready to concede that what happens on the stage concerns them personally. The dissimilarity between this fragment and the function of poetry and arts as it is presented in *Hel.* is that in the latter the recipients of art are doomed to experience emotions, whereas in the former being wise is a matter of some of the spectators' wisdom, as σοφώτερος shows.

If this is the case with the spectators, what does G. mean by saying that the poet who deceives is δικαιότερος than the poet who does not? Rosenmeyer (1955, p.227, and n.7,8) interprets it by saying "he plays the literary game more correctly than the one who does not", and Verdenius (1981, pp.117-18) maintains that "in ordinary circumstances a deceiver is considered to be unjust, but that deception is so essential to tragedy that the poet who puts it into practice is to be called just". Both these views are worth attention because they correctly assume that there is a distinction to be drawn between immoral *apate*, and morally neutral tragic *apate*. In this connection, Ploutarkhos' explanation that the poet who deceives is more 'just' because τοῦθ' ὑποσχόμενος πεποίηκεν gains ground if it is seen in the light of the overtones of *apate* in G.'s two preserved speeches; in *Pal.*, a distinctly forensic speech, deception is presented as an inappropriate tool of persuasion, because the judges need to hear the truth concerning the acts (see 33). The logical argumentation is at work to free the defendant from the groundless accusations. In *Hel.* though, G. is certainly more open to *apate* because he intends his work to be a παίγνιον, and thus much closer to the purposes of poetical work. G. not only proceeds to produce an *apate* of the kind that good playwrights do, but he is confident enough to say that he does so: he brings his speech to an end by saying that ἐνέμεινα τῷ νόμῳ ὃν ἐθέμην ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου; this

brings him very close to the δικαιότερος tragic poet, whose role is to deceive people who *know* that they are being deceived.

This fragment is valuable because independently of the manner in which one decides to interpret it, it certainly brings out that G. saw tragedy (and poetry in general, as *Hel.* 9 makes us believe) disconnected from its moral implications. In a good deal of texts, poets appear as the procurers of lies who deserve punishment (more distinctly in Heralclitus' fragments); Aristophanes, a contemporary of G., appears in his *Frogs* very concerned with the morality of the messages that the tragedy conveys (cp. for instance *Frogs* 909, where Euripides imputes to Aiskhylos that ha was ἀλαζὼν καὶ φέναξ οἵοις τε τοὺς θεατάς / ἐξηπάτα).

24

It is unknown who was the first to describe Aiskhylos' *Septem* as 'full of Ares'; Ploutarkhos clearly attributes it to G., and this may be related to his source (according to Pfeiffer 1968, p. 281 "These polemics against G. stressing the point that *all* the plays of Aeschylus are 'full of Dionysus' are derived from a Peripatetic source, probably Chamaeleo Περὶ Αἰσχύλου"). Nothing can be said with certainty about the parentage of the saying; *Frogs* was staged in the year 405, and this makes it possible that it is G. who quotes Aristophanes. However, in the absence of other evidence (for references to further possible relations between Aristophanes' criticism and Sophistic theses see Pfeiffer 1968, p. 47 n.1) we depend much on Ploutarkhos' information; at any rate, G.'s attested interest in poetry makes it possible that he expressed this view. Immisch (1927, p.29) was a strong supporter of the view that it was G. who took it from Aristophanes, whereas most scholars take the opposite view (Pohlenz 1920, p.452, Untersteiner 1961, p.144, Pfeiffer, 1968, pp. 46 and 281, Buchheim 1989, note *ad loc.*, Dover 1993, note *ad loc.*).

Ἄρεως: 'full of war', a common metonymy; cp. ἐμφύτου Ἄρεος in the *Epitaphios*.

25

Hellanikos , Damastes, Pherekudes = frs. 4F 5b, 5F 11F, 3F 167 in the FGrHist. respectively. See also Untersteiner 1961, p.145.

26

We do not know in what context G. expressed the saying that Proklos attributes to him, but its content is not unparalleled in G.'s preserved work. In *Hel.* 4 we find the formula ὁ μὲν διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἔδοξεν referring to Helen's divine father (Zeus), and in *Pal.* δόξα as opposed to what is true plays an important role (most prominently in 24; cp. also τοῖς πρώτοις οὖσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ δοκοῦσι 33). This Protean motto seems to introduce the relation between εἶναι and φαίνεσθαι, which undoubtedly prevailed in the Sophistic circles; Protagoras is the intellectual whose contribution to this philosophical issue was particularly felt, as Plato's *Theaetetus* 166dff shows. In that context, also known as the 'defence of Protagoras', the Sophist explicitly says that μέτρον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μή, μυρίον μέντοι διαφέρειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἄλλα ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα.

It seems that G.'s saying puts forward a complementary relation between εἶναι and δοκεῖν (so I think that Mazzara 1999, pp.16-19, is right in observing an objective and a subjective level in this fragment) as εἶναι is obscure or invisible if it cannot be conceived, and δοκεῖν is weak, if it does not correspond to reality (notice that G. uses the second leg of this antithetical construction in *Hel.* 13, when he says that the astronomers δόξαν ἀντὶ δόξης τὴν μὲν ἀφελόμενοι τὴν δ' ἐνεργασάμενοι τὰ ἄπιστα καὶ ἄδηλα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς τῆς δόξης ὄμμασιν ἐποίησαν). It is difficult, if not impossible, to fathom whether G. himself accepted dependence of either of these

qualities on the other, because the only other context which includes similar observations, *MXG* 980a9-13, bringing in the example of chariots racing on the surface of the sea, does not make it clear whether or not G. commits himself to the view that whatever is thought is true. If what he means there is that not all thoughts are true, then Proklos does justice to him by ascribing to him the view that δοκεῖν is weak if it does not correspond to reality. But if on the other hand, what he means is that, due to subjectivism, such a thing as a falsestatement does not exist, then Proklos misrepresents G.

27

G. uses a Homeric antithesis (*Il.* 4.450: ἔνθα δ᾽ ἅμ᾽ οἰμωγή τε καὶ εὐχωλὴ πέλεν ἀνδρῶν) as a basis to create a stylistically pompous expression, by adding to it another one λιταῖς / ἀπειλαί. He thus forms a chiasm, and the antithesis becomes symmetrical, with the use of two words denoting almost the same thing: λιταῖς, εὐχαῖς. λιταί also appears in *Pal.* 31 (see comments *ad loc.*). It is perhaps worth noting that G.'s modification of the Homeric antithesis achieves more intense *pathos* by the passage from ἀπειλαί to οἰμωγαί, as the former implies the still existing power to threaten, whereas the latter expresses the results of a defeat.

ADDENDUM

Kerferd (1981, p.45) rightly claims that "there is no reason to doubt the attribution to him [sc.Gorgias] of the *Onomastikon* mentioned by Pollux". What the content of this book was we cannot tell with certainty, but we know that Demokritos worte a book under this title. Pollux says that, unlike other similar books, G.'s *onomastikon*

was arranged in a fashion that made its reading pleasant, and he cocnludes his short description of it with a homoeoteleuton which makes us wonder whether he borrowed it from G. or not. Perhaps all he wanted to do was to to colour his account with a touch of Gorgian expression.

What is perhaps more important is that Pollux's information makes our knowledge about G.'s interest in language more palpable. It is possible that in his *Onomastikon* G. collected and explained words and phrases which could be used by his students, or that among these 'lemmata' one could find words which were coined by G. himself.

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