Strengthening institutions or institutionalising weaknesses?

Interactions between aid and local institutions in Huíla Province, Angola

Maliana Serrano

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Maliana Serrano

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ACRONYMS

ACF	Action Contre la Faim
ACORD	Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development
ADCP	Associação para o Desenvolvimento Comunitário de Angola (Association for Community Development of Angola)
ADESPOV	Associação de Desenvolvimento e Enquadramento Social de Populações Vulneráveis (Association of Development and Social Integration of Vulnerable Populations)
ADRA	Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (Action for Rural Development and Environment)
AJAFDA	Associação Juvenil de Apoio às Famílias Desfavorecidas de Angola (Youth Association for the Support of Low Income Families in Angola)
AJPD	Associação Justiça, Paz e Democracia (The Justice, Peace and Democracy Association)
ALNAP	Active Learning Network of Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Assistance Programmes
AMI	Associação Médica International (International Medical Association)
ANC	African National Congress
BFA	Banco de Fomento de Angola (Angolan Private Bank)
CACS	Concelhos de Auscultação e Concertação Social (Councils for Social Consultation and Cooperation)
CAN	Copa Africana de Nações (Futebol) (African Cup of Nations)
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process (UN)
CBD	Community-based development
CBO	Community-based organisation
CDC	Centro de Desenvolvimento Comunitário (Community Development Centre)
CDD	Community-driven development
CEAST	Conferência Episcopal de Angola e São Tomé (Episcopal Conference of Angola and São Tomé)
COIEPA	Comité Intereclesial para a Paz em Angola (Inter-Church Committee for Peace in Angola)
CONGA	Comité de ONGs de Angola (Committee for Non-Governmental Organisations in Angola)
COSV	Comitato di Coordinamento delle Organizzazione per il Sevizio Voluntario
CRP	Community Rehabilitation Programme
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper (EU)
CVA	Cruz Vermelha de Angola (Angolan Red Cross)
DASEP	Departamento de Assistência Social, Estudos e Projectos (Department for Social Assistance, Studies and Projects), IECA
DESHUCU	Programa de Descentralização (Decentralisation Programme)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DHA	Department for Humanitarian Aid (UN)
DPA	Departamento de Política Agrária (MPLA) (Department of Agrarian Policy)
DPS	Direcção Provincial de Saúde (Provincial Health Directorate)
DW	Development Workshop

ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
EDA	Estação de Desenvolvimento Agrário (Agricultural Development Station)
EU	European Union
FAA	Forças Armadas de Angola (Angolan Armed Forces)
FAC	Forças Armadas de Cabinda (Cabindan Armed Forces)
FALA	Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola (Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola) (UNITA)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FAPLA	Forças Armadas Populares de Angola (Popular Armed Forces of Angola (MPLA)
FAS	Fundo de Apoio Social (Social Support Fund)
FFW	Food For Work
FLEC	Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (Cabindan Liberation Front)
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
FONGA	Foro de ONGs de Angola (Forum of National NGOs)
FOS	FOS-socialistische solidariteit, Belgium
FUGEM	Fundo para a Gestão Municipal (Fund for Municipal Management Support)
GDC	Grupo de Desenvolvimento Comunitário (Community Development Group)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoA	Government of Angola (Angolan Government)
GRAE	Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile)
GTZ	German Cooperation Agency
GURN	Governo de Unidade e Reconciliação Nacional (Government of National Unity)
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Project
ICCO	Inter church Organisation for Development Cooperation, The Nehterlands
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IECA	Igreja Evangélica Congregacional de Angola (Evangelical Congregational Church in Angola)
IESA	Igreja Evangélica Sinodal de Angola (Evangelical Sinodal Angolan Church)
IFAL	Instituto de Formação da Administração Local (Institute of Local Administration Training)
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
JMPLA	Juventude do MPLA (MPLA Youth Organisation)
LICUS	Lower Income Countries Under Stress
LUPP	Luanda Urban Poverty Programme
MAPESS	Ministério da Administração Pública, Emprego e Segurança Social (Ministry for Public Administration, Employment and Social Security)
MAT	Ministério da Administração Territorial (Ministry of Territorial Administration)
MDG	Millennium Development Goals

MINADER	Ministério da Agricultura e do Desenvolvimento Rural (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development)
MINARS	Ministério de Assistência e Reinserção Social (Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration)
MINFIN	Ministério das Finanças (Ministry of Finance)
MINPLAN	Ministério do Plano (Ministry of Planning)
MINSA	Ministério da Saúde (Ministry of Health)
MINUA	Ministério da Urbanização e Ambiente (Ministry of Urbanisation and Environment)
MONUA	Missão de Observação das Nações Unidas em Angola (UN Observer Mission in Angola)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
MSF	Médecins sans Frontières
NDC	Núcleo de Desenvolvimento Comunitário (Community Development Nuclei), PIDRB
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIE	New Institutional Economics
NWO	The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research
ODA	Organização de Desenvolvimento das Aldeias (Village Development Organisations)
ODA_1	Official Development Aid
OMA	Organização da Mulher Angolana (Organisation of Angolan Women) (MPLA)
PAANE	Programa de Apoio a Actores Não-Estatais (Support Programme for Non-State Actors) (EU)
PAR	Programe de Apoio à Reconstrução (Reconstruction Support Programme)
PDI	Programa de Desenvolvimento Integrado (Integrated Development Plan)
PEARSA	Projecto de Estudo e Apoio à Reabilitação da Segurança Alimentar, Huíla (Food Security Research and Rehabilitation Programme)
PGDR	Programa Geral de Desmobilização e Reintegração (Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme)
PHC	Primary Health Care
PIDRB	Programa Integrado de Desenvolvimento Rural do Bunjei (Integrated Rural Development Programme of Bunjei)
PMGM	Programa de Melhoramento da Gestão Municipal (Municipal Management Improvement Programme)
PMTCT	Preventing Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV
PNEAH	Programa Nacional de Emergência e Assistência Humanitária (National Programme of Emergency Assistance)
PRS	Partido de Renovação Social (Social Renovation Party)
RMS	Repartição Municipal de Saúde (Health Municipal Team)
SADF	South African Defence Forces
SCF	Save The Children Fund
SEAS	Secretaria de Estado para os Assuntos Sociais (State Secretariat for Social Affairs)
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
SRPA	Special Relief Programme for Angola
SRSG	Special Representative and Envoys of the Secretary-General (UN)

SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
UCAH	Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
UN	United Nations
UNACA	União Nacional dos Camponeses (National Farmers Union)
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIC	United Nations Information Centres
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Independence of Angola)
UNMA	United Nations Mission in Angola
UNOA	United Nations Office in Angola
USD	United States Dollars
UTCAH	Unidade Técnica para a Coordenação da Ajuda Humanitária (Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid)
WHO	World Health Organisation

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction: Aid and Institutions in Angola

1. Angola, football fever and reconstruction

This research aims to analyse the intended and unintended effects of aid interventions on institutions through which people address their needs at the local level, including state and non-state alternatives. It is based on a historical ethnography of aid interventions and local institutions in Angola, involving four broad themes of analysis: the multiple realities of conflict and aid; the characteristics and transformations of the institutional landscape; the processes of transition from war to peace and reconstruction, and the meaning and practices of institution-building interventions.

Ever since its independence from the Portuguese in 1975, Angola was immersed in a long civil conflict which lasted until early 2002. In 2009, barely 7 years after the establishment of peace, Angola organised a major international sports event - the football Africa Cup of Nations 2010 (CAN)[1]. The CAN acquired significant symbolic meaning as a testament to the country's reconstruction process. I have chosen to introduce this event as a window into issues that are central to this research, including the dynamics of war and reconstruction and the contradictions and problems the country currently faces. Witnessing the preparations for the event on the ground - following official discourse on its organisation, observing and listening to people's expectations and frustrations, and being part of the collective spirit in the lead up to the CAN – gave me insight into key aspects of Angola's current context that shaped the event. In other words, what the CAN represented for different actors, including the Angolan government and the population at large, and how it conforms to perspectives on the broader reconstruction process. My intention is not to present a detailed anthropology of football in Angola. Rather, I follow Armstrong's (2002) use of football to examine different aspects and the nature of Liberian society.

When I returned to Angola in the lead up to the CAN, I encountered a unique atmosphere of excitement and expectation. Matches were scheduled in the cities of Benguela, Cabinda, Luanda, and Lubango (the capital of Huíla province, where this research is based). During my journey from Lubango's airport into the city centre, the preparations for the event were evident. Large promotion posters stood at major road junctions, displaying support for the national team *Palancas Negras*[2]. Lubango had become a large building site with several construction works spread across the city, including a brand new international airport, a purpose-built football stadium, several hotels and other tourism infrastructure, extensive road works and various other projects to embellish the city. Most of the larger infrastructure projects were contracted out by the government to Chinese companies. With only weeks to go before the initial kick-off, these, just like the various private sector developments, looked far from completion. Nonetheless, as the city prepared for the arrival of the first team, dressing itself up in the colours of the Angolan flag - black, red and yellow - the bulk of the work was completed. The stadium was ready, the airport inaugurated, the roads were largely drivable and some hotels and restaurants opened their doors to the public.

Regrettably, although the CAN was intended to be iconic of peace and prosperity, it made international headlines due to a deadly security incident, even before its official start. The Togolese team suffered an attack by an armed group, as it was making its way by road from Brazzaville to Cabinda province (an enclave in northern Angola) for its first scheduled match. The incident resulted in two deaths and eight people being injured. It was followed by the subsequent withdrawal of Togo's team from the competition and controversially, to its suspension from the next two championships by the Confederation of African Football. The attack was later claimed by a faction of the armed movement for the independence of Cabinda (FLEC), which has been at the heart of the political struggle against the government in the enclave province (see Chapter 2). As the dust settled around the incident, the championship went ahead as planned. Angola was eliminated at the quarter finals and Egypt

took the title of African champions. In spite of the early security problems and the somewhat disappointing performance of the national team, the event was branded within Angola as a great organisational success. The Angolan President as well as other prominent national and international politicians publicly praised the organisation of the event, whilst the mainstream national media projected images of success and national pride.

War to peace transition

The CAN first of all, is representative of the transition Angola has undergone in recent years, from a war-torn society to one of the fastest growing economies in Africa. That an international event involving the most popular sport worldwide could be organised in the country, is a clear reflection of the progress made since the establishment of peace in 2002. Such a scenario was unimaginable during the long years of war, particularly outside of the capital Luanda. On closer analysis however, the CAN also reveals the many contradictions that underline current change processes. As I caught up with friends, colleagues and the latest news in Lubango, I became aware that alongside the CAN excitement, there was a mood of frustration and anxiety. Many people expressed discontent with what they perceived as a disproportionate focus by the government on the CAN. Everyday problems encountered by the population, such as access to water, electricity and a range of basic social services, remained largely unaddressed. In addition, the CAN was seen as (intentionally) overshadowing major political developments that were simultaneously unfolding, such as the reform of the National Constitution.

Conflict realities

Secondly, the incident involving the Togolese team exposes the multifaceted character of the Angolan conflict and its localised dynamics, as well as the fragility of the socio-political situation in the country. Opinions vary about the nature and intention of the attack. Some argue that it was meant to target the Cabindan police, not the Togolese team, in retaliation to on-going intimidation. Others argue that it was a sign of the revival of the independence movement. Others still that it was simply the work of a group of trouble makers. Cabinda is an oil-rich enclave in the north of Angola, which has always been politically strategic and contested and which has a long local history of conflict. Although interwoven with the broader civil war and current national politics, the Cabindan conflict has its specific roots and dynamics.[3] The government's decision to include Cabinda as a host city, instead of another major city, was strategic. It would show Angolans and the international community that contrary to frequent reports by international organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Global Witness, of persistent violence and human rights abuses, there was peace in Cabinda. This strategy literally backfired with the attack.

Whilst this research does not specifically focus on the case of Cabinda, it is concerned with how such discourses on conflict and peace emerge, and how they have co-shaped policy and practice of the response to crises. Dominant discourses on aid and conflict in Angola's post-colonial history tend to frame the political, social and economic conditions as directly resulting from the civil war between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Independence of Angola (UNITA). They neglect the multiple realities of conflict and peace. The official peace discourse on Angola bases itself on the final end to war in 2002 and has defined the response by the international community. Donors and aid agencies are now almost exclusively geared towards support to reconstruction. A closer look at the reality on the ground shows that continuities as well as discontinues between conflict and peace time exist, whereby peace building work or relief aid for persistent humanitarian needs may still be appropriate in the country.

State-society relations

Thirdly, the CAN provides an opening on the relationship between the Angolan state and its citizens, often referred to as the 'social contract'. It does so, on the one hand, by exemplifying the ways in which the government seeks legitimacy through such events. The CAN was instrumental in the government's rhetoric on nationalism through calls for patriotism and cohesion amongst Angolans in supporting the event and the national team. In a speech at the closure of the competition, the President highlighted the unity displayed amongst Angolans, and specifically the importance in such attitude of the national symbols: the national flag, crest, and anthem. The reference to the symbols was relevant because they had been central to the heated debates on the constitutional reform. Different opposition parties called for them to be changed because of their similarity and longstanding association with those of the ruling party – MPLA (ANGOP, 2010e). The CAN also served government efforts to negate the political rivalry that drove the conflict. The intertwining of the role of sports with political agendas is not a new phenomenon, nor is it unique to Angola. In several countries various sports have been created or promoted to sustain nationalistic visions or as a form of youth control (Blacking, 1987 in Armstrong, 2002). The colonial regime in Angola was effective in diverting young people's attention from politics to football (Birmingham, 2003: 175). For the post-independence government sports activities have been a regular strategy for social mobilisation and the promotion of nationalism. Famously during the 1980s, the then socialist government embarked on a large national project for the promotion of sports in schools, through the youth football movement *"Movimento Caçulinhas da Bola"*. Although this fizzled out, it is currently being revived (RNA, 2010, ANGOP, 2011), alongside other recent large-scale investments in international sporting events, such as the African Basketball Championship (Afrobasket) hosted by Angola in 2007.

Reconstruction models

On the other hand, the CAN is indicative of the relationship between the state and citizens by symbolising the model adopted by the Government of Angola (GoA) for the reconstruction and development of the country, which is a central theme of this thesis. This is based on a macro-level perspective, primarily involving the short-term rehabilitation and construction of major infrastructure. It is financed mostly from Angola's increasing oil production, and has been described as *"a classically high modernist, outwardly-oriented model of development"* (Sogge, 2010: 5). The government has sought demonstrable progress in living conditions and services also through reforms to improve public financial management (Shaxson et al., 2008). Its policies have had particular impact in terms of the movement of people and goods, as well as in extending access to social services through new infrastructure and the recruitment of human resources. They have also changed the reconstruction arena by allowing new actors such as China to emerge as major players, with distinct interests and motivations from Angola's conventional international partners.

The state's large scale reconstruction programming has not been geared towards social development or the social protection of the most vulnerable (Shaxson et al., 2008, Hilhorst and Serrano, 2010). People's everyday problems in accessing basic services and securing livelihoods, remain unaddressed, whilst events such as the CAN absorb considerable public resources. More than a year after the event, official figures on the total expenditure on the event have not been published (António, 2011). However, the construction of the four new stadiums alone was officially estimated to cost 600 million USD (COCAN, 2009). Unofficial sources reported an expenditure of some 30 million US dollars (USD) just for the preparation of the national team, which is far above what the top international teams spent in preparation for the 2010 World Cup in south Africa (António, 2010). In spite of the

government's claims that the CAN would benefit the population at large, through for instance its new infrastructure (ANGOP, 2010e), for the majority of Angolans it was a passing celebration that hardly improved their daily lives. As people told me, such investments *"are just for display, to improve the image of Angola abroad – they are not benefitting us"*. Moreover, their concentration in the asphalt cities reflected the urban-bias characteristic of broader government reconstruction efforts. Most urban suburbs and rural areas were completely bypassed by the event, and few people had the opportunity to follow matches. In some cases, the CAN had a direct negative effect on the lives of local people. Those living in the slums (known as *musseques*) of Lubango that were allocated to the construction of the Tundavala stadium were evicted from their homes. Contrary to official discourse, the CAN thus corroborates Armstrong's (2002) argument that football in reconstruction has the power for division as well as for cohesion. It also attests to the role of power relations in the discrepancy between the government's reconstruction efforts and the lived experiences and real needs of local people. In Angola's post-war phase, these have underlined the continuous neglect by the ruling elite of the wellbeing of the wider population.

Non-state actors

The government's view on reconstruction has been contested by several actors, including national civil society and some international aid organisations. National organisations, churches, and international NGOs continue to focus on micro-level reconstruction through the provision of basic services, the recovery of livelihoods and the promotion of local development. The CAN prompted critiques by civil society and analysts for the GoA's political co-option of the event, turning it into an affair of the state (OPSA, 2010b, Silva, 2010). Speculation emerged about the manipulation of the timing of the approval of the Constitutional reform to coincide with the CAN, and thereby limit public participation in the process (OPSA, 2010b, Pacheco, 2010b).[4] The CAN allegedly served also as a propaganda tool of the ruling MPLA and its leader. Several speeches by prominent national politicians referred to the event as exemplary, and specifically linked its success to the commitment of President Dos Santos (ANGOP, 2010d, b, e).

Underlying the contestation of the state's reconstruction priorities illustrated by the CAN, is the nature and development of its relationships with civil society and the aid community. During the war these non-state actors largely filled the role of the state in service provision. In the post-conflict phase, civil society has developed an important role in promoting and advocating for public space to influence decisions on national policies. Donors and aid agencies struggle to (re)position themselves vis-à-vis the GoA and its policies and to hand back responsibility for social issues. They appear unsure about how to deal with the paradox of Angola's extensive wealth, its poor human development indicators, its reputation for corruption and its serious limitations in institutional capacity. Economic interests are difficult to reconcile with state-building agendas aimed at strengthening state institutional capacity, and with their aspiration to act as government watchdogs and to expand public space.

Institutional realities

The last central aspect to this research, which emerges from the analysis of the CAN, concerns the question of capacity of local institutions to respond to the challenges of reconstruction. With reference to the CAN, this mainly refers to capacity of the state in terms of service delivery. Delays in the preparations of the event and the absence of follow-up to ensure the continuity of its activities and infrastructure, relate to this lack of institutional capacity. The new football stadiums did not, as had been claimed, serve any of the regional

practice matches in preparation for the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. Reports of the stadiums deteriorating or even being closed down have been put down to a lack of capacity and resources for infrastructure maintenance. Private sector companies and service providers are still awaiting outstanding payments for goods and services provided to the CAN's organising committee (ANGOP, 2010f, Candembo, 2010, Possas, 2011). Institutional weaknesses exemplified by the analysis of the CAN are also characteristic of the broader institutional landscape. Understanding the factors that affect institutional capacity and the processes through which institutions are transformed are central themes of this research. I am concerned not only with formal institutions of state services, but also with other non-state institutions that are part of local governance and service provision and that are affected by aid.

2. Aim and scope of the research

In conflict affected countries such as Angola, the local institutional landscape undergoes profound transformations, both during and in the aftermath of crises. Such institutional change results from the way actors invoke, play upon or work through particular institutions, as well as from wider processes such as conflict or planned interventions. This thesis is concerned with the specific interaction between institutions and aid interventions at the local level. That is how these affect each other and become mutually constitutive. Aid interventions are embedded within local societies and become part of the strategies people employ to cope and survive. They therefore simultaneously influence how local institutions develop and are affected by the existing institutional environment. As I shall elaborate in this thesis, aid interventions in conflict and reconstruction are frequently based on normative assumptions about local conditions. They tend to overlook the multiple institutional realities and change processes on the ground. State-building agendas of aid actors, which are currently dominant in war and post-war settings, are premised on the idea that specific institutional change can be achieved through external intervention. They present institution-building interventions as the way to strengthen local capacities, improve state-society relations and secure political stability. As shall be seen, planned interventions are transformed in practice, in unpredictable ways, producing intended and unintended outcomes.

This study starts from the idea that in order to understand the effects of past interventions on local institutions as well as the potential outcomes of current institution-building efforts in reconstruction, it is essential to examine the everyday practices of aid. Analysis of impact of humanitarian aid remains lacking, as highlighted by a recent review of Humanitarian Emergency Response by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID, 2011). Moreover, most existing evaluations such as this are donor-commissioned or internal to aid agencies, rather than being independent. This research addresses this analytical gap. It aims to contribute to the understanding of aid in conflict and to debates on humanitarian action and reconstruction. In addition, it intends to add to the knowledge base of Angola's conflict and post-colonial social transformation.

The research focuses on the case of Angola, specifically on Huíla province, given the long duration of Angola's conflict and its recent transition to peace and reconstruction. It is embedded in a wider research programme entitled "Aid under fire: people, principles and practices of humanitarian aid in Angola", funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), under the Vidi Scheme. The programme aims to provide insight into organisational processes in relation to aid and into the way aid is labelled, shaped, legitimised and made effective in practice (Hilhorst, 2005a). The methodology comprises an extended case study approach, consisting of two complementary research components in

addition to this study of aid and local institutions. One involves a PhD project by Hilde van Dijkhorst, on the impact of aid on local rural livelihoods. It was carried out simultaneously to this research but in differing localities of Huíla. The other by Dorothea Hilhorst, entails the analysis of the humanitarian complex in Angola and the development of an analytical framework on aid in conflict. During the course of the programme, this initial emphasis on aid in conflict shifted considerably towards the examination of reconstruction practices. At the time of formulation of the research, peace in Angola remained fragile. Large scale resettlement and integration processes were still underway, with significant humanitarian involvement. As peace was consolidated, reconstruction efforts became predominant.

Crisis and post-crisis

In this study I contrast the crisis and post-crisis contexts in terms of how local institutions evolve and how aid both shapes and is shaped by such institutional change processes. This means analysing different aid approaches and practices towards local institutions during the conflict and in reconstruction, including how various aid actors conceive of and engage with them. I examine on the one hand, how humanitarian aid interacted with and affected the re-ordering of local institutions during the different stages of the emergency. I am interested in the different dimensions of the social life of humanitarian action, as identified by Hilhorst et al (2010): the normative dimension based on principles and objectives, the complex processes that shape humanitarian aid in everyday action, and the ways in which it affects society at large. I pay particular attention to the legacy of these approaches for aid efforts in the transition to peace. On the other hand, I analyse post-conflict reconstruction approaches and their outcomes, with specific focus on efforts aimed at building resilient institutions for poverty reduction. Although I frame my analysis within national and provincial level processes, I am principally concerned with the interactions at the local level.

Aid approaches to local institutions and institutional capacity are frequently framed along the distinct perspectives of humanitarian/relief aid and development aid, as the two opposite ends of the aid spectrum. According to such divisions, during conflict humanitarian actors primarily focus on life-saving action. Concerns with building capacity and ownership of local institutions are left to their development counterparts. With the rising number of protracted crises in the 1990s, the mandates and activities of humanitarian and development actors increasingly overlapped. Whilst development actors are ever more engaged in emergency situations (Harmer and Macrae, 2004), humanitarian actors broaden interventions to include longer-term development objectives such as livelihood recovery, peace-building and institutional capacity building (Goodhand and Lewer, 2001, Minear, 2002, Suhrke, 2002, Hilhorst, 2005b). This shift partly resulted from the criticism of humanitarian action in the last two decades, of feeding into conflict (Uvin, 1999), replacing the role of the state and eroding local capacities (Smillie, 2001, Juma and Suhrke, 2002).

The role of local institutions in assisting local populations gained prominence also as humanitarians sought more durable solutions to protracted crisis. In such contexts, policies, institutions and processes are key determinants of vulnerability, given that they influence the control of assets and livelihood options (Jaspars, 2010: 3). In practice however, this attention to local institutions brought little change in actual aid responses (Christoplos, 2004, Harmer and Macrae, 2004). As shall be seen, humanitarian interventions throughout the Angolan emergency were geared towards life-saving action and peace-building, and continuously sidestepped rather than strengthened local state and community institutions. Explicit attention towards state-building and institutional development emerged only during reconstruction.

In aid discourse, reconstruction refers to the in-between phase that should bridge the transition from war to peace and from relief to development. However, post-conflict reconstruction is problematic in several ways. Most significantly, reconstruction suggests the

return to a pre-conflict situation. This is linked to the way crises and normality are constructed. Crises are considered temporary and exceptional situations - during which societies and their institutions collapse or become engrossed in the economies of war - and reconstruction is the process of a return to normality (Hilhorst, 2007). In reality, distinctions between the two are hard to draw as continuity and re-ordering processes occur in the transitions between conflict and peace (ibid). A return to the s*tatus quo ante* may thus be impossible or undesirable (Bakewell, 2000), particularly where it is involved in the cause of conflict (Barakat and Zyck, 2009).

The portrayal in dominant humanitarian and reconstruction discourses, of conflict as the breakdown of social order has been questioned, particularly in political economy perspectives (Le Billon, 2000b, Le Billon, 2000a, Bakonyi and Stuvøy, 2005) and ethnographic or socio-institutional approaches to war (Nordstrom, 2004, Richards, 2005b). These highlight the role and interplay of resources and power in conflict, as well as its localised dynamics. This research concurs with interpretations of conflict as an alternative form of social order, rather than its breakdown (Bakonyi and Stuvøy, 2005). Although established rules and procedures may be lacking or dysfunctional in conflict, people seek alternative arrangements to meet a variety of needs, from health care to dispute resolution. Non-state institutions and informal networks become important in such contexts. They include for instance traditional authorities or community-based groups, private service institutions, local civil society and church organisations, and international aid agencies. Aid interventions become part of people's strategies to address needs and get shaped within such complex realities. It is these institutions and interactions that I am interested in.

A key question which this thesis addresses is thus how reconstruction strategies and aspirations are translated on the ground, and with what effects for local institutions. The assumption that societies and institutions are overpowered by crises shapes actual reconstruction practices. For instance, reconstruction is widely depicted as an externally driven project to renew and fix a country (Hilhorst, 2007: 13). In fragile or post-conflict contexts donor reconstruction policies are aligned with dominant state-building agendas, with a strong focus on institution-building interventions to strengthen state-society relations. In Angola these range from training and technical assistance to social and productive sectors, to local governance and community-based citizenship programmes at community level.

From policy to practice

This research on the interaction between aid and institutions at the local level starts from the premise that these are mutually constitutive. It therefore questions the assumptions[5] on which planned aid interventions are based and the policies and theories that underline them. Policy in the dominant paradigm is understood as the pursuit of goals, or what we want to achieve (Colebatch, 1998: 42). Development policy refers to defining objectives, as well as the necessary means and actors (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009: 6). Policy has multiple uses and works in discursive ways, shaping reality on the ground (Hilhorst, 2007: 12). As Colebatch (1998: 13) argues, to understand policy thus means understanding how it is used by practitioners to shape action. As he also explains, there is however a *"disjunction between the way people talk about policy and the ways they experience it."* (ibid: 44). Often policy goals find little reflection in the outcomes of interventions on the ground, because policies are reinterpreted and translated into local conditions during implementation. It is therefore important to see empirically how the claims laid down by policy, for instance regarding capacity building, both explicitly and implicitly work out in practice. I am concerned not only with the planned results of concrete aid projects, but equally with the outcomes produced unwittingly. This means analysing the policies that underline aid interventions as well as the

concepts that inform and define them, and how these are translated into specific activities on the ground through the study of everyday aid practices.

Research questions

The research has been guided by the following principal question:

What have been the intended and unintended consequences of different aid interventions for local level state and non-state institutions in Huíla province, Angola, during the conflict and in reconstruction?

Several sub-questions structured the research objectives and the methodology:

1. What are the main basic service and governance institutions through which local people have addressed their individual and collective needs during and after the war?
2. What factors have contributed to institutional change at the local level?
3. What types of aid interventions have been present in Huíla, in the different phases of the conflict and in the post-war?
4. How do aid agencies and interventions with different mandates and objectives (to by-pass, substitute, strengthen, engineer or create alternative structures) perceive of and engage with local institutions? And how do different local institutions in turn interact with such interventions?
5. How do aid interventions affect the legitimisation processes of local institutions and themselves seek to build legitimacy and become institutionalised?

These questions are addressed throughout the thesis, although not in this particular order or explicitly in sequential chapters. They come back in the concluding chapter. The next section sets out the theoretical framework. I explain how aid interventions conceptualised as 'social interfaces', and institutions as 'frameworks of social ordering', come together under an actor-orientation. The methodological choices and research process are also presented and the research localities introduced. This is followed by an outline and main findings of the thesis.

3. Theoretical concepts

3.1 Institutions

The concept of institution, which is central to this research, is a widely debated one. Institutional approaches highlight different aspects of institutions, but tend to box institutions into certain categories. Institutions are often distinguished from organisations, or classified according to the degree of formality (formal, semi-formal and informal), hierarchical level (from local to global), or area of analysis (economic, political, legal, social, etc.) (Jütting, 2003). I distance myself from such categorisations of institutions because, as this thesis elaborates, they limit our understanding of the different ways in which institutions work in practice as well as of how actors interact with them.

Institutions refer to the norms and values, rules, organisations, and structures that give meaning to social life. They provide the framework for human behaviour and social interaction (Soysa and Jütting, 2006). In any society, multiple institutional arrangements co-exist and often compete in the way they are evoked by actors to fulfil different interests. Such institutional multiplicity is particularly important in conflict-affected societies where power is contested and legitimate state institutions may be absent. Various local institutions play a key role in aspects such as dispute resolution, security, and governance of entitlements (Hilhorst

et al., 2010: 1114). The interaction between these various institutions has significant implications for rule-making and ordering processes. For instance, the governance of natural resources such as land is often managed through a combination of formal and customary rule systems. Moreover, institutions are multifaceted. Formal institutions often operate and are managed by incorporating various informal institutions that co-determine outcomes. The patrimonial state is a clear example of how formal structures are governed in practice by informal institutions. On the other hand, so-called informal institutions may be much more regulated by customary practice and tradition, than the term would convey. Distinctions based on the formality of institutions therefore become redundant as they interact with one another and are misleading about the way institutions actually function.

I use a broad conception of institutions as *"any form of social ordering"* (Douglas, 1986), given my interest in the role of local institutions in people's survival and coping during and after crises. In other words, I focus on those institutions through which local people address daily needs and resolve problems, whether organisations or not, formal and informal. To this end, the research focuses on three broad sets of local institutions: service institutions of the state, such as local government administrations, health care institutions or rural extension services; non-state institutions including local civil society and religious organisations involved in social assistance; and alternative local institutions, including customary or traditional institutions, newly created community-based groups, and those created by rebel groups.

Institutions are in constant flux, they are not static. Institutional change is both an incremental and discontinuous process (Scott, 2001: 50). It comes about from the interaction between structures and practices, and the way actors invoke, play upon or negotiate particular institutions. On the other hand, institutional change is also influenced by engineered processes such as planned interventions. In societies affected by conflict, the dominant aid discourse assumes the complete collapse of livelihoods and local institutions. The Angolan crisis has often been framed in such perspective. *"The war touched all Angolans directly or indirectly: the economy collapsed; commercial ties broke down; social services stopped; agriculture ceased; families separated."* (Lanzer, 1996: 8). However, institutions are also resilient and are *"the more enduring features of social life"* (Giddens, 1984: 24).

Analysing conflict as an alternative form of social ordering, rather than its breakdown, allows us to understand the manifold ways in which institutions are altered during crises. What is more, institutional change in crisis-affected countries is not only related to conflict, but also to factors such as colonialism, political processes, and aid. Whilst some institutions may disintegrate or become weakened as a result of violence, displacement and increased mistrust, others may be altered or acquire a new meaning. Others still may emerge as new institutional arrangements. In terms of service provision these frequently involve external aid agencies, churches, civil society organisations, private actors or even armed movements parallel to the state (Hilhorst, 2005a, 2007). Formal economies and service institutions may erode rapidly during conflict, but local capacities exist and persist as people try to hold on to normality by continuing activities for survival. The continuation of the economies of production, transactions and distributions constitute what Hilhorst (2007: 8) designates as the 'economies of survival'.

On the other hand, it is important not to overestimate their resilience and to question the extent to which institutions continue to work during and in the aftermath of crises. As crises wear on, social support institutions show signs of weakening and people's room for manoeuvre is further constrained.

Aid organisations and their interventions are part of the local institutional landscape. They do not operate outside of societies but are embedded in local realities. They "…*exist in an arena of social actors with competing interests and strategies."* (Bakewell, 2000: 104).

Aid interlocks with various change processes (social, economic and political) taking place in society. It co-shapes local institutions and institutional transformation processes by working through, competing with, or reinforcing them, producing intended and unintended results. Current reconstruction efforts commonly seek to purposely engineer institutional change by strengthening and/or reforming existing institutions or by creating new institutional forms. The latter frequently include NGO-created community-based groups or grassroots organisations that act as alternative forms of governance as they determine access to services and assistance (Jaspars, 2010). This focus on institutional engineering has been primarily directed at formal services belonging to the state apparatus or at local civil society and religious institutions. Alternative institutional arrangements that emerge during crisis or informal structures such as traditional leaderships tend to muster considerably less attention.

The core of this research is to unravel how these various local institutions are conceived of and transformed by the interaction with aid interventions with different objectives – to by-pass, replace, strengthen, engineer or create alternative structures – and how these institutions and interventions are legitimised. Past interventions and their outcomes are important for understanding the potential outcomes of current institution-building initiatives.

3.2 Actor-orientation

In this research I use an actor-orientation in order to study the interaction between aid interventions and local institutions, and related processes of institutional change. This approach is particularly useful because it specifically addresses the relationship between institutions and actors. It is grounded in the everyday life experiences and understandings of people, and on the premise that social actors, people and institutions, have agency (Long and Long, 1992). This means that people are capable of reflecting on their situation and experiences and of using their knowledge to respond to changes and developments in their surrounding context. *"Agency is not simply 'acting' but is reflexive"* (de Bruijn et al., 2007: 17). It is more than people's intentions to do something, and actually refers *"to their capability of doing those things in the first place…"* (Giddens, 1984: 9).

The actor-oriented approach goes to the heart of the long-standing debate amongst social scientists over whether people make institutions or institutions make people. That is, whether it is the agency of individuals or the social structure in which they are embedded, that determines human behaviour and action. In approaches that emphasise the role of social structure, the subjective experience of individuals and their activity is either irrelevant or of secondary importance. These perspectives provide only a limited explanation of social behaviour and change however, because they imply that such change is only possible through an outside coercive source. They deny the multiple ways in which people experience and deal with external events, including crises.

Actor-based perspectives which emerged in the 1980s as a counter development paradigm, are more people-centred and contextualised (Chabal et al., 2007). They emphasise the role of individual actors' agency and reflexivity in human conduct and social change. An actor-orientation stresses the duality between actors and institutions. It recognises that *"institutions themselves are the outcomes of human interactions and aspirations, without being consciously designed in every detail by any individual or group, while historically given institutions precede any one individual."* (Hodgson, 2006: 8). In development studies such perspectives became prominent alongside discussions on globalisation and efforts to articulate micro/macro dimensions, local/global approaches and actor/institutional perspectives (Kalb et al., 2004). Agency emerges in the dialectical interplay between both actors and institutional structures and is thus not a 'state of being' but rather a 'process of becoming' (de Bruijn et al., 2007). Actors' strategies thus result from social process.

Individuals have internalised values and ways of dealing with everyday challenges. They draw on existing institutional frameworks (social, economic and political) in tacit ways, and in doing so reproduce them. In his influential theory of structuration on the ordering of social practices, Giddens (1984) explains this in terms of the 'duality of structure'. Structures are both the medium and outcome of social action, enabling and constraining such action. Rules and resources that allow a certain action to take place are produced and reproduced by actors through their practices (p. 16-17). This continuity in social reproduction across time and space happens *"...through the reflexively monitored activities of situated actors, having a range of intended and unintended consequences."* (ibid: 212).

An actor-oriented paradigm is particularly useful for understanding social change in conflict-affected societies. As already mentioned, such contexts are characterised by the co-existence of multiple institutional arrangements which present actors with distinct and often competing normative frameworks for action (Hesselbein et al., 2006). It is in this institutional multiplicity that people find room for manoeuvre to realise their projects and ambitions, by engaging with these different institutions and at times playing them out against each other. Long's (1992) actor-oriented approach thus stresses the need for the contextualisation of actors' behaviour (Hebinck et al., 2001). It frames the micro-histories of individuals in the broad historical regional or national changes. Unlike earlier forms of actor-oriented analysis, it focuses on various aspects of the broader context, such as culture, power distribution and resources, and how these affect individual choices. It is thus distinct from individual-centred perspectives that explain social behaviour and action on the basis of the rational, utility-maximising behaviour of individuals.

In conflict and post-conflict settings moreover, the role of individual actors in shaping institutions is often of particular relevance. Because rules and traditions are in flux, the way that individual actors give meaning to institutions can lead to significant change, including new institutional arrangements. The power these particular individuals command is important, given that it affects their room for manoeuvre. Power is defined by Weber as a social relationship and as the probability of actors to carry out their will even when opposed by others (Marshall, 1998). Power hierarchies thus affect whether human action is constrained or enabled. For instance, it is often relevant for the functioning of a particular service or institution, which individual bureaucrat fills a specific position. On the other hand, power is produced in the interaction of people and institutions (Nuijten, 2005). The production of agency through such interaction therefore also generates power (im)balances, inequalities and social hierarchies (de Bruijn et al., 2007: 14).

An actor-oriented approach lends itself to the study of planned interventions, including aid programmes with which this research is concerned, as it recognises that these are embedded and shaped within local society. As in all forms of external intervention, aid projects *"...enter the existing life-worlds of the individuals and social groups affected, and in this way are mediated and transformed by these same actors and structures."* (Long, 1992: 20). Their outcomes therefore largely depend on how they are received by various social actors, not least their intended beneficiaries. These are seen not as passive recipients of intervention, but rather as *"active participants who process information and strategise in their dealings with various local actors as well as with outside institutions and personnel."* (Long, 1992: 21). The study of planned intervention and social change thus involves identifying the relevant actors without preconceived ideas about categories or classes, studying ethnographically their social practices, and how their social relationships and resources are deployed (Hebinck et al., 2001: 4). This research examines how various social actors involved in social assistance – aid organisations and workers, programme beneficiaries and local communities, government officials and institutions – interact and shape aid interventions in everyday life.

Because it looks at practice where aid gets contested, an actor-orientation to the study of social change highlights the unpredictability of outcomes of interventions, and brings to question the core rationale of interventionist approaches. The latter underscore dominant aid theory and practice, and rest on the assumption that the 'makeability' of society is possible. That is, that planned interventions will produce desired social changes. However, in their interaction with social actors and institutions, aid interventions are interpreted and transformed in multiple and often unexpected ways during implementation, producing intended and unintended effects. The rise of agency perspectives in development circles is thus in contradiction with the interventionist project logic (de Bruijn et al., 2007). This raises key questions about current reconstruction models which focus on institution-building efforts, with the intent to create, reform or strengthen particular institutional arrangements. An actor-orientation guards against such notions that discount institutional realities by assuming a single program can make or break institutions.

3.3 Governance and legitimacy

In this study of the interaction between aid interventions and local institutions the concept of legitimacy is of particular relevance. I am interested in the ways in which aid affects legitimisation processes of local institutions and actors vis-à-vis local people and each other, but also in how aid interventions and actors involved in social assistance are themselves legitimated. In the development field legitimacy appears in two main discourses: in institutional development and systems approaches to sustainability, and as a concern for the representativeness and accountability of NGOs (Brinkerhoff, 2005a: 1). Broadly speaking, legitimacy frequently refers to normative expectations about certain actors or institutions, such as the state, an individual, or an organisation. For aid organisations, legitimacy (doing the right thing) and effectiveness (doing things right) have to do with how they are perceived (Dijkzeul and Wakenge, 2010: 1146).

In conflict-affected countries, legitimacy is most often discussed with reference to the state and its relationship with society, and to issues of governance. In state-building discourse, state legitimacy is assumed to be weakened or broken down during conflict. Restoring state legitimacy and authority is thus framed as a project (van der Haar, 2009). Legitimacy is considered key to improving state-society relations (Mcloughlin, 2010) and securing political stability and development (Putzel, 2007). External interventions such as service delivery strengthening programmes or support to government decentralisation are promoted on the premise that they contribute to the legitimisation of the state and to improved governance. They are underlined by implicit assumptions about the role of the state and its sources of legitimacy. However, as Van der Molen and Stel (2010: 11) point out, "*the state is not one homogenous entity, but represents a multitude of roles, positions, interests and relations*." Its legitimacy is thus not necessarily weakened everywhere, in every sector or activity, or at every level.

Legitimacy is relational and co-determined by people as they evoke different elements and functions of the state. It is contingent upon historical state-society relations, the presence and strategies of other non-state providers, the performance of services, and relationships of accountability between actors (Douma and Van der Haar, 2010). There is thus a need to understand how expectations towards the state are shaped in practice and how this affects its legitimacy in the eyes of local people (Van der Molen and Stel, 2010). This implies examining legitimacy as an empirical phenomenon, that can be defined as "*… a particular quality that is conferred upon a social or political entity by those who are subject to it or part of it, thus granting it authority."* (Bellina et al., 2009: 3).

Understanding legitimacy as a negotiated processes affected by competing strategies of various actors, begs the question of whether legitimacy can be managed and if so, which

capacities are associated with increasing legitimacy (Brinkerhoff, 2005a). Critics stress the lack of evidence for the capacity of external interventions to generate legitimacy, as well as the poor understanding or neglect of state legitimacy in different contexts (Mcloughlin, 2010: 55). Further, aid interventions may have a negative impact on state legitimacy and sovereignty if their objectives are in tension with local internal expectations (Bellina et al., 2009). However, people and institutions may enjoy considerable legitimacy even when normative expectations are not fulfilled, as in the case of non-elected governments that enjoy popular support (Bellina et al., 2009: 8). This is because legitimacy is socially constructed and involves socially validated attributions of performance and capacity (Brinkerhoff, 2005a). Legitimacy is "in the eye of the beholder." It ultimately rests on people's beliefs, perceptions and expectations, which determine whether a particular order, actor or institution is accepted or rejected (ibid). In addition, it is related to people's behaviour and conduct in response to certain situations (Van der Molen and Stel, 2010).

Literature on legitimacy often differentiates between different sources and types of legitimacy. Brinkerhoff (2005a) distinguishes between three broad types or organisational legitimacy: normative (where an organisation reflects acceptable and desirable norms, standards and values), pragmatic (it fulfils needs and interests of its stakeholders and constituents), and cognitive legitimacy (it pursues goals and activities that fit with broad social understanding of what is appropriate, proper and desirable). These categories are useful because they provide a starting point from which to analyse the different features and dimensions of legitimacy. Namely, that legitimacy is co-determined by expectations, practices and perceptions ant that is relational and negotiated. They are also helpful in problematizing legitimacy-building intentions of external interventions.

State-legitimacy is central to good governance agendas. These became prominent in the 1990s and have come to dominate reconstruction and state-building efforts in post-conflict countries. They focus on the reform of the state to strengthen democratisation, accountability and transparency processes. Governments in so-called fragile contexts frequently embark on policy and institutional reforms under external aid interventions that actively seek to promote changes in governance practices. Since the end of the war, the Angolan government has engaged in reforms ranging from land legislation to political decentralisation, both with external donor support. The good-governance agenda has been criticised for promoting western neo-liberal values and being dominated by the role of the state and its reform (Hamieh and Mac Ginty, 2009). Further, as Nuijten (2004) argues, these policy trends are based on normative and instrumental understandings of governance that risk overlooking how power and authority relations actually develop in practice.

In practice, governance is multifaceted and heavily contested, involving numerous actors. Particularly in fragile contexts, where state institutions and services may be absent and/or lack capacity, other actors such as the traditional authorities, NGOs or religious institutions, emerge as important players in local governance. Governance is thus about the interaction and relationships between these different actors, including relationships of power and accountability, which influence the access and distribution of services and resources available to local people. The governance of basic services in Angola, for instance, has been described as the way in which the state relates to citizens and local organisations, how it engages them in its activities and simultaneously complements theirs (Robson and Roque, 2001: 147). Beyond the relationship of the state with other actors, governance is also about the interaction between policy makers, service providers (state, private and informal), and citizens. It is in this interaction that the workings and outcomes of governance are defined and shaped. Understanding governance as *practice*, as Van der Haar (2001) does, brings out the various governance structures and actors that co-exist and compete in local governance of various domains. Governance here is understood as an analytical rather than normative

concept that refers to *"processes of steering, ordering, ruling and control."* (Nuijten et al., 2004: 123). This research explores the multifaceted nature of governance, with specific reference to social assistance and the delivery of services in Angola. It therefore focuses on the local level, where multiple state and non-state institutions including local government administrations, traditional authorities, and NGO governance structures encounter one another and directly interact, and where aid interventions actually unfold.

Given that alternative non-state institutions co-govern local resources and services, it is important to examine the processes through which their legitimacy is strengthened or challenged, vis-à-vis each other, local people and the state. Aid as part of such multiplicity that emerges in the absence of or in parallel to the state in conflict settings, is a key element of this. Aid actors are frequently criticised for not meeting expectations of being accountable to their donors, to beneficiaries and to local governments. Legitimacy-building through accountability mechanisms has thus become a major concern in the sector. According to Slim (2002: 6) legitimacy allows NGOs *"to operate with the general consent of peoples, governments, companies and non-state groups around the world."* I am interested in how different aid organisations and their interventions seek to gain legitimacy vis-à-vis various other actors, and it the sources of legitimacy they draw upon and how these enhance particular aspects of legitimacy. This entails, on the one hand, considering how legitimacy is attributed by elites and the public to state institutions and to other actors involved in social assistance (Van der Molen and Stel, 2010). On the other, it means looking into the processes and strategies of legitimisation employed in the everyday practices of various actors or institutions. I want to explore for instance, how a local church organisation, compared to other aid actors, seeks its legitimacy; how and why the perception and expectations of the traditional authorities by different groups change; or still, why certain community groups enjoy greater legitimacy than others and how this affects their institutionalisation.

3.4 Humanitarian aid and reconstruction

Humanitarian aid is defined as having the distinct purpose of saving lives and alleviating suffering wherever and whenever needed.[6] Its essence is the provision of assistance that is principled – needs-based, impartial, neutral and independent. Over the years, the policy and practice of humanitarian aid has evolved from this core purpose, to include broader objectives that traditionally lay within the development field. During the 1990s, many humanitarian actors shifted from a classic interpretation of relief as life-saving action, to more developmental or maximalist approaches (Hilhorst, 2007). These aspire to *"maximise the engagement of aid with society and build more on existing institutions, the protection of social and economic systems and the linkage between relief and development processes."* (ibid, 2007: 20). They seek to respond to strong criticism about the harmful effects of humanitarian aid, particularly the fuelling of conflict, the creation of dependency, and the erosion of local markets and capacities.

On the other hand, reconstruction in aid policy and practice refers to the period and process of rebuilding societies, their livelihoods and institutions, after a crisis. In the context of conflict, reconstruction is understood as the transition phase from war to peace and between relief and development. As already mentioned, it connotes the return to a pre-conflict normality. Reconstruction efforts by aid actors usually kick-in in the immediate aftermath of conflict. They may however, be part of broader peace-building and stabilisation processes where violence is still on-going, as in the well-known case of Afghanistan. Reconstruction is thus defined by Barakat (2005a: 11) as an integrated process intended to reactivate development and create a peaceful environment. Strengthening institutional capacity is a key ambition of state-building interventions in reconstruction contexts.

These ideal-models of humanitarian aid and reconstruction significantly differ from the actual realities of aid interventions on the ground. In what refers specifically to local institutions, a common criticism has been the failure of organisations and their activities to adequately understand and engage with them. This weakness underscores the above mentioned critiques of humanitarian aid. Classic and developmental relief have distinct perspectives on the role of local actors and institutions, but are quite similar in being generally blind to them in their everyday practices (Harmer and Macrae, 2004, Hilhorst, 2007). This has an impact on subsequent reconstruction efforts. According to Barakat (2005b), reconstruction practices being externally led and top-down, are characterised by the neglect of local actors and processes, as well as by a bias towards state institutions and technical assistance. In practice, they struggle to build effective state institutions (Barakat and Zyck, 2009). Moreover, programmes that specifically seek to build on local institutions and be contextually relevant, tend to be poorly adjusted to local realities as they are underscored by untested assumptions and ongoing mistrust in local actors (Hilhorst et al., 2010).

This research specifically examines the different aid approaches to local institutions over the course of Angola's conflict and reconstruction periods. It analyses the discrepancies between the intentions and actual workings of aid through an actor-oriented lens. This means looking at how interventions unfold and are shaped in the everyday practices of actors, as they encounter and interact with one another and local institutions at various points of implementation (Long, 1992, 2001). Dominant ways of writing about humanitarian aid and reconstruction are limited in understanding these everyday realities of aid in conflict and post-conflict settings. They are largely based on normative perspectives of what happens to society during and in the aftermath of crises, on a restricted set of actors involved in the provision of aid, and on a limited understanding of what constitutes social assistance. The role played by local institutions themselves in social assistance is outside of the gaze of the dominant paradigm. On the other hand, this paradigm gives a narrow view of what happens to local institutions, when they are themselves made into objects of external intervention. It is therefore limited in addressing my research questions on the interaction of aid and institutions.

Humanitarian space is the dominant paradigm through which humanitarian action is analysed. It is most commonly interpreted as *"an environment where humanitarians can work without hindrance and follow the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity"* (Spearin, 2001: 22). The notion of space has a geographical connotation, is often equated to beneficiary access and is portrayed as apolitical (Leader, 2000: 8). In practice, the aspirations of the humanitarian space construct have proved largely ineffective (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010: 1118). Its power as a construct for social action has nonetheless been argued by Dechaine (2002), who shows how the notion of humanitarian space influences public opinion and the terms of humanitarian engagement. He does so by analysing the particular case of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and how it constructs and reproduces its role and image through such discourse. Humanitarian space also implies that humanitarian action takes place within a humanitarian *system* consisting of an organised web of (international) actors. In practice, emergency and reconstruction contexts are frequently characterised by a chaotic scenario of multiple activities and actors. They are more accurately described as a humanitarian complex than by a neat system of actors with clear complementary roles and responsibilities (Borton, 1993, Hilhorst, 2002). The reality of humanitarian action according to Bakewell (2000), is a messy interaction between actors, all struggling to bring about outcomes that are favourable to their specific interests. I therefore propose that an alternative framework is needed for the analysis of aid *in practice* that looks at broader processes and actors of aid delivery.

The aid arena

I base my analysis of the history of aid and local institutions in Angola, on the alternative paradigm of the 'humanitarian arena'. This entails an empirical perspective on aid in conflict and post-conflict that focuses on everyday practices of policy and implementation. It conceptualises humanitarian space as an *arena* where multiple actors socially negotiate and shape the realities of aid (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010, Hilhorst and Serrano, 2010).*"...it is through social negotiation (which can involve an assortment of strategies including coercive violence, written statements, formal and informal interactions, and everyday gossiping) that aid is labelled as humanitarian, political or something else. The realities and outcomes of aid depend on how actors at points of service delivery – aid recipients, donors, field staff, government representatives, international non-governmental organisations and others – interpret the context, the needs, their own roles and each other."* (Hilhorst and Serrano, 2010: S184). In this negotiation, the principles, policies and intervention models of aid acquire a 'social life' of their own (Hilhorst, 2005a).

Aid interventions in an actor-orientation are conceptualised as social interfaces, which *"occur at points where different, and often conflicting, lifeworlds or social fields intersect*" (Long, 2001: 65), and where outcomes are negotiated. Interface analysis focuses on the linkages and networks between individuals or parties and *"...explores how discrepancies of social interest, cultural interpretation, knowledge and power are mediated and perpetuated or transformed at critical points of linkage or confrontation."* (ibid: 50). It is thus useful in examining how aid as an external factor becomes 'internalised' and becomes part of the institutional alternatives through which local people address needs. Moreover, it helps to uncover and explain the differential and unpredictable outcomes of planned interventions.

The arena framework takes issue with the assumption that humanitarian aid is univocal and uniform (Hilhorst, 2005a). It is particularly useful for the purpose of this study, firstly because it broadens the scope of what constitutes aid in conflict and reconstruction, by considering all forms of social assistance. Official (international) aid is only one of the ways in which people cope in crises and post-crises situations. Any research on the realities of conflict and reconstruction must look beyond conventional aid interventions, at alternative mechanisms people resort to in order to cope and survive. This research takes into account every type of aid, without privileging aid labelled as humanitarian. In Angola, although classic relief saved thousands of lives, it remained inadequate in responding to the scale of needs (Messiant, 2004a, Sogge, 2010). Secondly, this paradigm extends the analysis to the role of actors, besides that of principled humanitarians that are also part of the response to crises and service provision. It takes aid interventions as a broad category that is inclusive of various actors and their interventions, which co-determine access to resources and services - local people, civil society or religious organisations, political and military actors, traditional authorities, community groups or local governments. How these interact with external interventions and the practical consequences for their development and legitimacy, is a key aspect of the impact of aid. Donini (2010: S222) argues that the dominant humanitarian discourse has been blind to the informal humanitarian sector and those players and institutions that fall outside of Western notions of humanitarianism, but are nonetheless at the frontline of disasters. Examples besides local institutions include non-traditional donors such as China, or remittances from migrants and diasporas.

The framework of the aid arena also allows us to question other key assumptions of the dominant paradigm on aid in crisis. One is that conflict is at the centre of needs and assistance processes. As explained earlier, this disregards the potential continuities between crisis and post-crisis, for instance when needs are a continuation of normality, triggered by poverty or inequality. Another is that aid in crisis is apolitical and motivated by needs and the humanitarian impulse. In the arena perspective, multiple driving forces of aid delivery are

considered, including political motivations. In this research I explore how aid intertwines with other political processes and spheres of action, such as the government's development agenda or (external) economic interests. The table below presents the key differences between humanitarian space and the humanitarian arena framework in terms of scope, the perspectives on different actors and the way needs are defined. It highlights my analytical choices to address the core question about how different aid interventions view, engage with and co-shape local institutions.

TABLE 1.1: Humanitarian space versus humanitarian arena

	Humanitarian space	Humanitarian arena
Status	Dominant paradigm.	Proposed analytical framework.
Definition	Operating environment for humanitarian action in which humanitarians work according to the principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity.	Arena in which actors socially negotiate the policy and practices of aid.
Scope	Only aid labelled as humanitarian.	Encompasses all forms of service delivery during a crisis.
Humanitarian crisis	State of exception, separated from normality.	Acknowledges continuities and discontinuities between crisis and normality.
Actors and aid deliverers	International humanitarian agencies central in determining aid.	No a priori distinction between different deliverers of services. All stakeholders shape humanitarian action.
Humanitarian needs	Needs are triggered by the crisis.	Needs are partly a continuation of normality.
Local institutions	Either spoilers and causes of crises; or implementing partners in need of capacity-building by external actors.	Social actors with differentiated stakes in crisis and/or survival and/or peace.
International humanitarians	Driven by their principles, although shown by evaluations to deviate in practice.	Multifaceted actors driven by different values, politics and institutional interests.
Aid recipients	Victims or cheats.	Social actors that actively seek survival and co-shape the realities of aid delivery.
Analytical time frame	Period in which international humanitarian action is dominant.	Longer time frame covering entire crisis as well as its prelude and aftermath.

Source: Adapted from Hilhorst and Serrano (2010: S184)

4. The Angolan Case

The original research programme intended to fill the existing knowledge gap about social transformation and the history of aid in former Portuguese colonies. Angola's conflict was particularly long, lasting well beyond the end of the Cold War, and involving a variety of external actors with quite distinct motivations. As such, for most of the post-colonial period, Angola was known for its armed conflict, dire living conditions and massive humanitarian needs. From the early 1990s, the aid sector grew significantly. Political reforms allowed the emergence of national organisations and civil society groups, whilst the return to war in 1992 (following a short interlude of peace) generated substantial flows of international aid and the establishment of a large humanitarian system with numerous international donor and aid agencies. In 1995, Angola was ranked the tenth largest recipient of Official Development Aid (ODA_1) in Sub-Saharan Africa with a total of 602 million USD, a four-fold increase in relation to 1992 (UNDP, 1995: 10).[7] By the mid-1990s, it was also the site of the UN's World

Food Programme (WFP) largest food operation in the world (Hodges, 2004: 89). On the other hand, the impasse of political solutions to the conflict resulted in a drawn out war characterised by widespread destruction and humanitarian needs. It was the scale, intensity and duration of the conflict that informed images about the country for which it became known across the world. High profile figures such as the former United Nations (UN) Special Representative for Angola, Margaret Anstee, famously described Angola as an 'orphan of the Cold War' (Anstee, 1996), whilst Diana, Princess of Wales drew international attention to the country for having the 'greatest concentration of landmines per capita and the highest rate of amputees in the world' (Diana Princess of Wales, 1997).

The context has been changing considerably, both politically and in socio-economic terms since the establishment of peace and as the country moves along its reconstruction path. Other images of Angola have come to dominate, whereby the role of international relations and interests has come into sharper focus. These are linked to Angola's position as a major oil power in Africa, with a promising economic performance but in a context of lacking transparency in governance, high inequality, widespread corruption and poverty. Based on 2007 figures, Angola was ranked 146th out of 169 countries on the 2010 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2010). The aid arena has undergone significant changes as donors, aid agencies and national organisations seek to respond to challenges of reconstruction and transition to development. The meaning of aid in 'the land of plenty' as it is now often described, is a major dilemma for the international aid community. The political history of Angola and the multiplicity of actors and interests that that have been present in the country at different stages, including those involved in the provision of assistance, make this a rich case study of aid in conflict and reconstruction. *"By incorporating the historical and geographical context, the study can bring out the discourses, dynamics and connections of the international humanitarian complex in order to revisit theories of aid in conflict."* (Hilhorst, 2005a: 2).

Angola covers an area of 1.25 million km², 6,487 km of borders and 1,650 km of coastline. The territory is politically and administratively divided into 18 provinces, 154 municipalities (*municípios*) and 557 communes (*comunas*) respectively.[8] In the following chapter I explore in greater detail Angola's (post-colonial) political history, with particular attention to developments linked to its conflict. I also introduce and discuss the characteristics of the Angolan state, its key organising features and of its governance and service institutions. Next, I explain how I set out to address my research objectives by discussing the research process, strategies and methodological choices.

FIGURE 1.1: Administrative Map of Angola: Provincial Divisions

Source: United Nations, 2008

5. Research process and organisation

For the purpose of this research on how various actors give meaning to and shape aid through their everyday practice, it was essential to locate the research where the action is (Hilhorst, 2005a). That is, at the interfaces between aid interventions and local institutions, where these encounter and shape one another. This meant focusing on the provincial level and lower administrative divisions, which is where aid programmes mostly unfold, where multiple institutions co-exist and operate, and where local people directly interact with them. The selected research area of the Vidi programme within which this research is embedded, is the southern province of Huíla (Figures 1.1 and 1.2). The bulk of this thesis is based on data collected during 20 months of fieldwork in Huíla province in 2007 and 2008.

5.1 Huíla Province

Given the vastness of the country and its difficult accessibility, focusing on a single province made the study more feasible. However, it was essential for this study to capture the diversity in people's experience of conflict, in the causes and manifestation of humanitarian needs, and in the responses to those needs. Huíla province presented an interesting case to look into

these multiple realities. It was thus selected as the geographical focus area on the basis of its specific conflict and aid histories. On several occasions I was questioned about this choice, given that Huíla is frequently described as not having suffered from the effects of the war to the same extent as other provinces. While this is true for provinces lying in highly contested territory, such as Bié, Huambo and Cuando-Cubango, the image that Huíla was only *mildly* war-affected is inaccurate. It is based on the specific experience of its capital city, Lubango, which was largely spared from direct fighting. The extent of fighting, displacement and humanitarian needs within Huíla was in fact extremely diverse. Whilst the south of the province experienced relatively little war, the northern and north-eastern municipalities were amongst the most conflict-affected in the country. Caconda, Caluquembe, Chicomba and Chipindo, were particularly hard hit, experiencing high mortality rates and huge population displacements at various stages of the war. Many of the municipalities where fighting was less intense, for their part received large numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs[9]) and saw extreme humanitarian conditions. Moreover, in some of the areas least affected by direct fighting, such as Gambos municipality in the south, significant humanitarian needs stemmed from the recurrence of drought and impoverishment, rather than directly from the conflict.

The relative political stability of Lubango over the years made it a convenient location for aid agencies to set up offices and operations, from which to work in the surrounding areas. Huíla thus became a pole for aid initiatives where significant human capacity was concentrated. Moreover, due to the extremely high operating costs in Luanda, the establishment of offices in alternative locations was desirable for many international organisations. The geographical position of Lubango was also advantageous. Several important aid interventions were launched in the south, including the first coordinated humanitarian intervention programme launched in 1990 - the Special Relief Programme for Angola (SRPA). With the establishment of Namibia's independence, relief items could finally enter through the southern border. The proximity to the port of Namibe in the neighbouring province also facilitated the coordination of relief distribution from Huíla to the rest of the south. Major aid organisations were therefore institutionally present or based in Lubango, including those with which the research programme had established closer ties prior to the fieldwork: ZOA Refugee Care, CARE Angola and SNV. Several other national and international aid organisations were present in Huíla province during the course of the fieldwork, although many ended activities during that period. Table 1.2 gives an overview of the major aid actors, including international organisations and key national NGOs with which this research engaged.

Huíla has an area of 72,022 km² and borders six provinces: Benguela, Huambo and Bié to the north, Cuando-Cubango to the east, Cunene to the south and Namibe to the west. The province is made up of 14 *municípios* and 65 *comunas* as listed in Table 1.3 below, and has an estimated population of 2.61 million people (MAT, 2006). Its capital city is Lubango, known during the Portuguese colonial regime as Sá da Bandeira. It was founded in 1885 by *Madeirenses* (inhabitants of Madeira), brought in by the Portuguese to establish farming settlements. However, the first settlers of European origin were the Boers, who arrived from South Africa in 1880 (ANIP, 2001). Some 300 settlers were given land in the Humpata region, as well as Portuguese citizenship and a 10 year tax exemption, in the hope that they would help to control the local population and develop the local economy (Henderson, 1990: 79). In 1889 Sá da Bandeira became the Council headquarters (*Sede de Concelho*), and in 1923 it was officially upgraded to city status (Infopédia, 2003-2010). Under the early colonial regime Angola was divided into 5 provinces, 16 districts, 70 councils or circumscriptions, and 299 administrative posts. In 1951, changes to the Political Constitution turned each colony into a province of Portugal, and the province of Angola was thus divided into districts.

Until 1955, Huíla province included Moçâmedes and earlier also Cunene, present day Namibe and Cunene provinces (Angola Institute Edition, 1953, Mendes, 1958).

TABLE 1.2 International aid agencies and main national organisations present in Huíla province during the fieldwork period (2007 – 2008)

International aid agencies	UN Agencies	Major national organisations
Acción Contra el Hambre (Spain)	UNICEF	ADESPOV
ACORD (UK/Kenya)	WHO	ADRA
Alisei (Italy)	FAO	Angolan Red Cross
AMI (Portugal)	UN Coordinator´s Office	ADCP
CARE Angola		Prazedor
Caritas		
Christian Children's Fund		**Church based organisations:**
FOS (Belgium)		CARITAS
GTZ (German Cooperation)		IECA
Handicap International		IESA
ICRC		
Intersos		
OIKOS (Portugal)		
Samaritan's Purse (US)		
SNV (Netherlands)		
ZOA Refugee Care (Netherlands)		

The colonial system invested significantly in the development of Huíla, so that the province became a major centre of European settlement. Today, small population groups of European descendent are still found in the original areas of settlement. Through large infrastructure investments in roads and transports, such as the railway to the coastal city of Mocâmedes, and in agriculture and industry, Huíla developed a thriving economic life. Sá da Bandeira became known as the 'Coimbra' of Angola, in an allusion to Portugal's academic city, because of its range of higher education institutions. Huíla has significant variation in its physical geography and climate, with a large part being located on the central plateau of Angola, in contrast to the semi-arid conditions of the southern region. It is also populated by six main ethnic groups: Nyaneca-Nkhumbi, Umbundo, Nganguela, Quioco, Herero and non-Bantu (Porto et al., 2007: 30).

TABLE 1.3: Huíla's current administrative divisions, ranked by population size

Municipalities	Communes	Population	% Population
Lubango	Sede*-Lubango, Arimba, Hoque, Huíla	1.010.980	38.7
Quipungo	Sede-Quipungo	208.000	8
Caluquembe	Sede-Caluquembe, Calepi, Ngola	204.772	7,8
Chicomba	Sede-Chicomba, Cutenda	203.209	7,8
Matala	Sede-Matala, Capelongo, Mulondo	172.658	6,6
Gambos	Sede-Chiange, Chibemba	151.375	5,8
Caconda	Sede-Caconda, Cusse, Gunge, Waba	142.328	5,5
Chibia	Sede-Chibia, Capunda-Cavilongo, Jau, Quihita	133.701	5,1
Cuvango	Sede-Cuvango, Galangue, Vicungo	77.767	3
Jamba	Sede-Jamba, Cassinga, Dongo	72.785	2,8
Humpata	Sede-Humpata	65.125	2,5
Cacula	Sede-Cacula	65.000	2,5
Chipindo	Sede-Chipindo, Bambi	57.705	2,2
Quilengues	Sede-Quilengues, Dinde, Impulo	44.081	1,7
	TOTAL	**2.609.486**	**100**

Source: (MAT, 2006)
*Sede represents the municipal headquarters or capital.

FIGURE 1.2: Map of Huíla Province: Commune Divisions

Source: OCHA-SAHIMS - Southern Africa Humanitarian Information Management Network, Johannesburg – May 2005. www.sahims.net.

5.2 Case selection

My research strategy was not to be exhaustive in the analysis of different aid interventions and approaches, or of the entirety of institutional changes that occurred during the conflict and in reconstruction. Rather, my interest was to explore the interaction between these two elements, based on empirical analysis of the everyday practices of aid. As such, having defined the research area, I opted to narrow my focus to a specific set of local institutions, and to selected cases from which to follow aid interventions and investigate institutional change. Case-based research refers to *"a bound process that can be documented in time/or space"* (Druckman, 2005: 163).

5.2.1 Municipalities

The *municípios* (municipalities) were the initial units of analysis for this study, or the points of departure to identify specific aid interventions and local institutions of interest. It is at this level that concrete aid activities are implemented, and where the main formal service and governance institutions extend to. The two selected *municípios* thus became the extended cases for in-depth examination. The selection process involved various factors that emerged during the early stages of the fieldwork. These included the experience of conflict and displacement, the history of aid interventions during the conflict, the type of actors and interventions in the transition to peace and reconstruction, and the degree of socio-economic development. Prior to the fieldwork I had envisaged that the *municípios* would be selected according to aid types. I expected to analyse a *município* with humanitarian or minimalist aid programmes, one with developmental or maximalist programmes, and a third with no aid interventions at all. I wanted to understand how these different aid types viewed and engaged with local institutions, based on the hypothesis that those actors claiming to have mixed mandates would be more involved in institution-building than the purely humanitarian organisations.

In reality, the *municípios* could not be distinguished according to such clear cut distinctions, nor could aid interventions or aid agencies be easily boxed into such categories. Classic humanitarian actors like WFP and MSF had already closed operations in the country and the remaining agencies were alternating between emergency and long-term reconstruction activities in an attempt to adjust to the transition. I was made aware by my own misconception, of the power of dominant paradigms in defining humanitarian aid as different and separate from other forms of assistance. Particularly in the full-swing reconstruction phase in which Angola found itself, the majority of agencies and programmes encountered on the ground were neither purely relief nor developmental. And often times, there was a discrepancy between how programmes and agencies defined their mandates or objectives, and their actual activities on the ground. It was by taking the *municípios* as the starting point rather than specific aid interventions that these issues emerged.

I visited several localities and witnessed various aid programmes under implementation, but eventually opted to focus on the *municípios* of Matala and Chipindo, given that these provided different perspectives on the main aspects for analysis. The inclusion of a third *município* where aid had been absent as a form of 'control group' proved unfeasible. Communities within the other two *municípios,* where little or no aid had been received were looked at instead. Control groups are useful for the accuracy and validity of correlations, and in this case, to reveal what other institutional arrangements exist outside of the influence of aid interventions. The comparison of different *municípios* was not intended as the end goal of the research. Rather, the comparative function was framed as a means to explore the multiple realities on the ground. The selection of communities in each *município*

therefore involved following 'leads' such as specific aid projects or key local informants, and locating interfaces to tease out such diversity.

Matala

The *município* of Matala is located in the south of Huíla (see Figure 1.2), covers an area of 9,065 km² and is divided into four *comunas*: Matala Sede, Capelongo, Micosse and Mulondo. The main languages spoken besides Portuguese are Umbundo, Nganguela, Cokwe, and Nhaneca-Humbi. According to the government figures presented in Table 1.2, it is the 5th most populated *município* of Huíla with a population estimate of 172,658 for 2006. However, figures vary considerable according to the source. Estimates from 2008 put the population at 222,880, suggesting a higher population ranking in the province. Since colonial times, Matala has been a strategic region where significant investments were made to develop its socio-economic potential. Notable amongst the colonial infrastructure projects established to boom economic activity were the construction of a major hydroelectric dam along the Cunene River, a 45 km irrigation canal, and the railway line linking Matala to Lubango and the port of Namibe. The colonial administration developed Matala as an agricultural centre. It promoted farming through the establishment of population settlements of Portuguese families (*Núcleos de Junta do Povoamento*[10]) and the allocation of land plots within the 6,000 ha irrigated perimeter of the canal. In addition, support was given to animal husbandry activities of the local population.[11] At that time, Capelongo (previously known as Vila Folgares) was the administrative centre of the district council. With the construction of the dam Matala became a nucleus of economic development in the province and in the southern region. It therefore became the official administrative centre. The extent of this investment allegedly resulted in a substantial decline in trade in the provincial capital (Urquhart, 1963).

During the war, Matala remained under government control. A large government military base protected it from UNITA occupation. The town itself never came under direct dispute, but surrounding areas experienced frequent attacks and extensive destruction. Given this relatively security, it became a major reception area for IDPs fleeing from neighbouring municipalities and provinces, both during the conflict and in its immediate aftermath. Matala acted as a 'floodgate' protecting Lubango from even greater IDP flows.[12] For over 20 km along the road from Matala to Lubango, the ruins of small adobe houses and deforested land plots remain as evidence of the former IDP settlements. Several others have since become permanent.[13] Matala's political and geographical situation also transformed it into a centre for humanitarian activities in the 1990s, including large scale food aid distributions and medical assistance by agencies such as WFP and MSF, and smaller projects by various NGOs.

Matala has managed to regain much of its strategic importance since the end of the war. This relates to its economic potential, local resources, the proximity to the provincial capital (170km), its large population size, and the fact that a significant part of its infrastructure was preserved. Its potential for a relatively quick recovery in the post-war period has been recognised. The *município* has received considerable government investment since the establishment of peace, in the form of infrastructure construction and rehabilitation. It was also selected as one of 68 pilot *municípios* country-wide, to be decentralised under current administrative reforms. The road to Lubango, the irrigation canal, the railway line and various social infrastructures were rehabilitated, including primary, secondary and professional level schools, the community centre and recreation club. A new municipal hospital has been built and equipped and the administration offices were repaired and expanded. Some local industry has also been rehabilitated and private sector investment is growing. Matala has the only 'industrial park' in Huíla besides that of Lubango (Jornal de Angola, 2010). In recent years, the number of aid organisations working in Matala has been greatly reduced. During my fieldwork two international organisations, CARE and UNICEF,

were implementing major programmes in decentralisation support, capacity building of the agriculture extension services, and technical assistance to social service delivery.

The fieldwork focused on five communities in the *município*: Calheta, Catchope, KM15, Monhanangombe and Mupindi. The first four are located within the *Comuna Sede* (headquarter commune) around Matala town, whilst the latter lies within the *comuna* of Micosse. Mupindi suffered from direct fighting and was emptied out several times during the war, albeit for short periods, when people would seek refuge in Matala centre. KM15 and to a lesser extent, Calieta, are large *bairros*[14] that grew as a result of displacement and where the population is largely mixed with different origins and ethnicities. Catchope and Monhanangombe are the smallest in population terms, and also the oldest. In the latter, the majority of residents were locally born. The case of Matala is examined in detail in Chapters 6 and 7.

Chipindo

Chipindo is located in the north-east of Huíla province, 460 km from Lubango, and covers a total area of 3,895 km². It is divided into Chipindo Sede and Bambi *comunas* and further into 145 *bairros* or *povoações*. Official population estimates vary between 57,705 and 70,936, making it one of the least populated *municípios* in the province (see Table 1.3) (MAT, 2006; http://www.huilaweb.org). The fieldwork was carried out in the Bunjei region, which is treated as a third *comuna,* although it is still awaiting the approval of its official status. Bunjei's centre is situated 50km from the municipal capital town of Chipindo and its population estimates vary between 16,000 and 18,000 thousand people, distributed across three main ethno-linguistic groups – Umbundo, Nganguela and Cokwe.

Chipindo lies at the heart of the contested territory between UNITA and the Government and has therefore been heavily affected by fighting throughout the conflict. Both sides had important military bases in the area but Chipindo remained under effective UNITA control for long stretches of time. The population experienced violent and frequent displacements. In places like Bunjei the extent of the population exodus left entire areas deserted. The majority of its population was displaced to the 'bush'[15] rather than to IDP camps in neighbouring urban centres. There was a complete collapse of formal institutions and services in this *município* and the state administration was only re-established after the 2002 peace. This area remained completely isolated from external assistance until after the war´s end. In the last period of the conflict, Bunjei became what was described as a 'cemetery town' (Messiant, 2004a). It was the site of an encampment by government forces, to which people were forcibly moved and where humanitarian agencies had no access. Death tolls were amongst the highest witnessed in the country. As a result, according to aid agencies' reports, Chipindo has a lower than average family size with 3 members or less, compared to 4 in other areas (Schot, 2005: 5). The majority of the population that concentrated in Bunjei at the end of the war received aid for the first time in the second half of 2002, when a significant humanitarian operation was launched. This operation continued into the phase of returning and resettling people in their areas of origin.

The *município* has remained physically isolated from the provincial capital even in the post-war period because of the poor road infrastructure, the ongoing risk of land mines, and the distance from Lubango. Bunjei and the greater *município* remain characterised by very low levels of access and quality of services across the social sector. Contrary to Matala, Chipindo has not been a priority for government investment. Even the scant operational infrastructure was rehabilitated by NGOs. Formal commercial institutions and the private sector are almost inexistent and people rely on informal trade for practically all needs.

Despite this context of lacking services and persisting needs, the majority of aid organisations discontinued programmes at the end of the resettlement phase. At the time of

writing, only a local church organisation was present in the area, with an extensive integrated development programme being implemented in 20 of the 28 villages of Bunjei. I followed programme activities in three of these communities (Nguelengue, Caquela B and Rioco Centro) and selected a fourth (Bunjei village) where no aid programmes were present. Caquela B community was established with the arrival of IDPs in 2001/2, whilst Nguelengue and Rioco Centro communities date back to before the arrival of the Portuguese in the area. The first was included in the development programme since the start, whilst the other two were only added in the second phase. The case of Bunjei is elaborated in Chapter 5.

5.2.2 Institutions and social sectors

My analysis of how aid interventions and local institutions affect and shape one another has been framed with particular attention to basic social services, and in particular to healthcare institutions. The impact of the conflict on existing local institutions is particularly evident in the delivery of social services in Angola. These were virtually abandoned by the state and have consistently been a key area of involvement by the aid community. Health needs involve a range of aspects, including preventive, curative and environmental health. Humanitarian agencies during the war became the only available healthcare providers in many areas. However, people resort to a variety of alternatives to address their health needs. These include formal mechanisms, such as going to a hospital, informal services such as traditional healers and semi-formal alternatives, such as private/traditional practitioners linked to state services.

In Angola, healthcare has been provided by state institutions and by the non-public sector, which is made up of the army, the missionary sector, private providers, NGOs, international development agencies and the traditional healers (Fresta et al., 2000). Chapter 6 specifically explores the development of healthcare institutions throughout the conflict and post-conflict history. The diversity of actors within this sector provides fertile ground to explore how institutional multiplicity works out in practice. I am interested in the linkages, complementary or conflicting, between these competing institutions, in how this affects their legitimisation processes, and in how aid activities play into and are affected by such dynamics. My interest in the health sector is not in the health system itself, but rather on health organisation – that is, how people organise themselves to meet their health needs. I do not simply want to understand how social service institutions developed under specific aid interventions, but also how the surrounding institutions that govern access to those services functioned and interacted with them, and how aid was transformed in this interaction.

5.3 Methodology

5.3.1 Ethnography

This research has been based on an ethnographic approach. It defined the everyday practices of aid as the point of departure to understand how interventions get shaped at the social interfaces with local actors and institutions. Ethnography *"problematicizes the ways that individuals and groups constitute organizations (and societies) on a daily interactional basis."* (Schwartzman, 1993: 46). It encompasses a wide range of perspectives and activities. Ethnography is based on gaining first-hand experience of a particular social or cultural setting and relies primarily on participant observation (Atkinson, 2001 in Mason, 2002: 55). Ethnographic studies commonly use diverse and complementary research techniques such as the analysis of conversation and interviews, textual materials, discourse and narrative analysis, visual materials, oral histories and life stories. The use and documenting of oral history in Angola has been rare, yet it is an important source of historical knowledge and the understanding of collective memory (Neto, 2005). It is also key to grasping the stories people

tell and believe in about themselves and their history. An analysis of organising processes (events, routines, gatherings) and their relation to larger systems reveal information about social structure, cultural organisation and society (Schwartzman, 1993). Ethnography allows the gathering of data that cannot be obtained through other methods such as quantitative surveys or experiments. It is best suited to understanding rather than predicting behaviour, as it exposes a range of discourses and modes of interaction and how structure and daily action are interrelated (Seligmann, 2005). Participant observation involves the immersion of the researcher in a given setting to experience and observe dimensions such as social action, behaviour, interactions, relationships and events, as well as spatial, locational, and temporal dimensions (Mason, 2002). It is the basis for understanding everyday realities which are made up of the meanings and interpretations of (individual and collective) social actors, of their actions and those of others (Blaikie, 2000 in Mason, 2002). A large part of this reality cannot be articulated through the written or spoken word. *"Many aspects of livelihoods and institutions can only really be understood through extensive observation and contact…"* (Messer and Townsley, 2003: 22).

Because of the first-hand experience on which it is based, ethnography implies the encounter of the researcher with a multiplicity of actors, processes and realities, present in any social context. Ethnography can thus guard against 'the dangers of a single story', to paraphrase Nigerian writer Chimamanda Adichie, by exposing researchers to such diversity.

How they [stories] are told, who tells them, when they're told, how many stories are told, are really dependent on power. Power is the ability not just to tell the story of another person, but to make it the definitive story of that person. [...] The single story creates stereotypes. And the problem with stereotypes is not that they are untrue, but that they are incomplete. They make one story become the only story. [...]Stories matter. Many stories matter." (Adichie, 2009).

5.3.2 The aid arena: interface and discourse analysis

I approach my case studies as *arenas* where, as explained earlier, different service providers and social actors negotiate and shape the conditions and outcomes of aid. I draw on the notion of social interfaces, as the points of encounter between these various actors and institutions, to understand how such negotiations work out in practice. Interfaces at various levels and of different types are an important part of this study. They include for instance, those between aid workers, local populations and civil servants, between state and society, between international and national organisations, or between policy and practice.

The aid arena framework implies in addition, attention to the role of discourse in the social negotiation between actors (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010). *"Discourses are more or less coherent sets of references that frame the way we understand and act upon the world around us."* (Hilhorst, 2003: 8). Multiple and competing discourses always co-exist and actors draw on different discourses to advance their interests or ideas (Long, 1992). These are renegotiated at the local level by social actors, where they acquire multiple meanings (Hilhorst, 2000, Van Leeuwen, 2009). Discourses have the power to influence reality because they give authority to certain ways of understanding society whilst excluding others, as some discourses become more powerful and dominant (Hilhorst, 2000: 19, 2003). Policy decisions about aid, as well as implementation strategies and organisational practices are influenced by discourse. I am therefore interested in understanding how certain discourses inform and shape the policies and practices of different actors, including donors, aid agencies, and government. Further, I examine how the resulting aid interventions are transformed along the implementation chain and ultimately unfold at the loci of implementation, with particular focus on the effects for local institutions. For this purpose, as Christoplos and Hilhorst (2009:

5) propose, I treat the presuppositions about the key issues of this thesis (aid in conflict, reconstruction and institution-building) as discourses.

5.3.3 Combined methods

Although based on a qualitative research tradition, my fieldwork involved a combination of other methods. The bulk of my data has been obtained through interviews with a wide range of actors. These included firstly, local people within the research communities, whom I interviewed either individually to collect life stories or through focus-groups discussions. A semi-structured interview format was also used in all of the research communities in Matala and Chipindo, which included aspects for quantitative analysis. The data set obtained from this semi-structured survey represents 84 households. Such quantitative data complements qualitative information, by providing disaggregated data (by gender, age, displacement frequency, etc.) for instance, on membership in local institutions or participation in aid projects. The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods in social research can improve the reliability of results by offsetting the limitation and weaknesses of each with the strengths of the other (Seligmann, 2005). I randomly selected individual community members for interviews, but also sought out key informants. These included local civil servants and social workers (medical staff, private nurses, administration staff), traditional authorities, and members and leaders of specific groups or institutions. I had extensive interviews and discussions with aid agencies' staff, both locally-based and from headquarters, national and expatriate. Considerable amount of insight and information was obtained from everyday socialising and informal interactions with various individuals. Several interviews were also carried out with donor agencies' representatives and policy makers, primarily based in Luanda.

My position as a researcher was central to both the access and type of information obtained throughout the fieldwork. Within ethnographic tradition, the question of power of the researcher as the *story-teller,* as Adichie cautions with reference to the 'single-story', is recognised. It relates to the role of the researcher in influencing the very processes she seeks to explain. In interpretive approaches, reality and truth are not absolutes that are 'out there' to be found, but are decided by individual human judgement (Russell Bernard, 2006: 21). Social realities are constructed from social interactions. The researcher is a knower located in the everyday world whose knowledge and ways of knowing are part of social action and thus of social analysis (Campbell and Gregor, 2004). As such, ethnography recognises that the researcher cannot be totally objective - that *"what counts as the truth depends on where you are standing when you observe or participate in it, what you believe about it in the first place, and what you want to do with it..."* (Goodall, 2000: 12). What is important in ethnographic work then, is not to rid ourselves of our own experiences, but to become aware of them so as to transcend our biases (Russell Bernard, 2006).

The role of the ethnographer as an insider or outsider shifts frequently, according to his/her reflexive positioning as well as to the perception of others. Often during my fieldwork, certain aspects of my identity turned me into an insider or as 'one of the crowd', whilst at different moments, in different circumstances or with different people, they highlighted my outsider status. These processes work in unpredictable ways. Upon meeting people in rural communities - local aid workers, civil servants, farmers, and so on - I often stressed my Angolan identity and my role as an independent researcher. I wanted to avoid being perceived as a member of a particular NGO, as a representative of the government or political party, or as yet another expat aid worker, given that these labels carried certain expectations and could potentially condition access to information. I found however, that what most helped me to build rapport, rather than just being Angolan, was the fact that I was born in the neighbouring province of Huambo. Knowing I was from nearby, from another

majority Umbundo region, rather than the distant capital city, took me closer to local people. Contrary to my expectations, being white, female, or living abroad were of lesser importance in such contexts, but became relevant for instance in encounters with government officials in the city.

5.4 Other processes

In addition to the detailed study of Huíla, a number of other processes have been an important part of this research project, or have partly resulted from it. Several research trips were organised during the course of the four years of the project. These included trips to Luanda to collect documentation, conduct interviews and participate in relevant events.[16] Research trips were also undertaken with the team of the Vidi Programme to Portugal and to South Africa.[17] Important events attended as part of the research included the National and Provincial Civil Society Conferences (2007 and 2008), the Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (UTCAH) meetings with NGOs, and thematic meetings of Civil Society Organisations. Major events were also organised within the framework of this research, serving as platforms for discussion and validation of preliminary findings. These included a workshop organised in Lubango at the end of the fieldwork[18] on 'The role of humanitarian aid in Angola', attended by representatives of the provincial government, national civil society organisations, international NGOs and UN agencies, academics, church organisations and journalists.

A conference on 'The role of civil society in donor strategies and external actors in the current Angolan context' was also organized in Wageningen, in order to present and discuss the main findings of the research programme with Angola 'experts', academics, analysts and practitioners from (Dutch) aid organizations and Universities working with Angola.[19] This resulted from an ongoing cooperation with the University of Coimbra and the Catholic University of Angola under a research-action project on 'Democratic and Development Processes in Angola and Southern Africa'. This initiative has involved several other international and national events, including conferences in Brussels, London and in several provinces in Angola.[20] Lastly, the role in this research of the considerable network of individuals and institutions working with issues of social assistance and aid in Angola should also be highlighted. A specific outcome of this has been my participation in the establishment of a Centre for Development Studies, composed of national development professionals, working from Huíla in several provinces.

5.5 Data access and presentation

Any discussion on methodological choices with reference to research in Angola particularly that involving a historical perspective must address the problem of lack of data availability and reliability. This deficiency in information affects all of Angola's social and productive sectors. The last population census was carried out prior to independence in 1970 and hardly reflects the social reality of the country today. During the war, the gathering and updating of data was difficult due to large population movements, inaccessibility of large parts of the country and the lack of means. Presently, the lack of human and material resources persists, resulting in weak institutional capacity for data collection, analysis and update. As such, there have been few surveys or studies to track the social situation since the end of the war.

People's surprised reaction to my intention of researching present *and* past aid interventions and practices, was telling. It was frequently assumed that I would not be researching humanitarian projects that had already ended, or that a historic 'aidnography' was not possible, given the information gaps about past events, missing documentation and high staff turnover of aid agencies. Although I expected to encounter this problem, I had not

foreseen the extent of the situation on the ground. I found that there were hardly any official archives for consultation on specific aid interventions during the war period, either from aid organisations or from state institutions. The most striking case was my encounter with staff of the government's Provincial Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid. They were remarkably open to sharing what was available, but this amounted to two small boxes of papers, from an institutional history of over ten years. Documents had been moved during renovation works in the office building and were never retrieved. Accessing records of past interventions from international aid agencies' headquarters was also difficult. Organised physical and electronic archives were surprisingly few and the institutional memory of programme portfolios was lost with staff turnover. This reality of data deficiency reinforced the potential of grounding this research on an ethnographic approach and the importance of qualitative methods for the collection of (historical) data.

Lastly, a note on the use and presentation of primary data is in order. I make use of interview and oral history material in this thesis, often quoting directly from my field notes. In many cases these notes were made from the translation into Portuguese of interviews carried out in national languages. As such, interview excerpts and material presented in quotation marks should be read as a paraphrased version of the informants' speech, rather than a direct transcription of the original. Translation between national languages and Portuguese was done by local research assistants, and between Portuguese and English, by me. When presenting primary data, I have not identified individuals by their real names, and have omitted (official) titles where these could compromise the informants' positions or breach confidentiality agreements. I have chosen to identify the aid organisations by name in my case studies, as they were consensual partners of the research, and were both informed and interested in the objectives and outcomes of the study. I have also used real place names, given the specific intention of the broader Vidi programme to document Huíla's aid and conflict histories.

6. Outline of the book and main findings

This thesis presents an examination of Angola's conflict and reconstruction periods, in terms of the interaction between aid interventions and local institutions. The following chapters deal with the history and experiences of conflict and aid, including people's coping strategies and constraints during and after the war. This study provides as 'aidnography' of Angola (Hilhorst et al, 2010), showing how aid interventions have developed during the conflict and in the transition to peace and reconstruction. It focuses on the everyday practices of aid, with specific attention to its engagement with local institutions. The book consists of seven chapters, an introduction and a conclusion. All seven chapters have an empirical basis, but draw on relevant literature for the analysis of the realities on the ground and how these link to wider academic and policy debates. Across the chapters, multiple social realities emerge in the diversity of experiences of conflict and aid, in the variety of actors and motivations involved in assistance, and in the range of institutional arrangements encountered during the fieldwork.

Chapters 2 and 3 provide historical analyses of the Angolan conflict and of aid interventions respectively. Chapter 2 examines the history, dynamics and multiple realities of the civil-war, in terms of its main actors, motivations and effects. The development and effects of the conflict have a bearing on institutional change processes in crisis and on aid in conflict. The chapter starts with a review of the different phases of conflict, followed by a discussion of its impact on state-society relations, and on the workings of the state and its institutions. I analyse conflict from a combined socio-institutional and political economy

approach, in which war is a social process with multiple causes and localised dynamics. An empirical analysis of the local conflict experiences of four municipalities of Huíla is presented. It shows that conflict dynamics and socio-cultural institutions are mutually constitutive at the local level. The broader conflict interacted with local norms, institutions and power relations to shape the localised experiences of conflict. Moreover, the pace and realities of reconstruction in the four cases have been strongly shaped by their localised histories of conflict. The war also had a considerable effect on state formation, its relations with society and non-state actors, and on the development of governance practices. This has shaped current relations and practices and the state's capacity for reconstruction.

Chapter 3 presents the history of aid in Angola, based on an empirical examination of aid interventions and realities during different periods of the conflict and in peace. It challenges dominant writings on aid that lean on ideal-typical models of relief and reconstruction. These involve normative assumptions about what happens to societies and institutions affected by conflict, and whom and what constitutes social assistance. They are centred on the role of international actors and on their approach to aid, based on humanitarian principles. I take an alternative perspective that conceptualises humanitarian or reconstruction aid as *arenas*, in which a variety of social actors negotiate aid and shape outcomes (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010, Hilhorst and Serrano, 2010). Through this alternative analytical framework I demonstrate that social assistance in Angola was provided by a variety of actors besides international humanitarians, with different motivations and forms of assistance in addition to principled life-saving action. I look specifically at the role of local people, religious institutions, the state and other political actors, national civil society and international organisations. The principled aid of international humanitarians turned out to be as prone to being politicised as that of local actors, both in terms of upholding neutrality and of being needs based. My findings challenge established understandings of the role of aid in conflict and reconstruction settings. For the particular case of Angola, they reveal that the international aid response was key in averting further suffering, but was insufficient in relation to needs in terms of coverage and reliability.

Chapter 4 looks empirically at the debate on how institutions operate, evolve and are transformed in conflict affected societies. Dominant aid discourse assumes that institutions breakdown during conflict and become engrossed in war dynamics. A new body of policy and practice referred to as 'reconstruction from below' (Hilhorst et al., 2010) challenges such perspective. It highlights the potential role of existing local institutions in reconstruction efforts. This chapter examines first, how the institutional setting through which local people address needs changed during colonialism, conflict and in peace in Angola, and second, the factors that contributed to such transformations. Three broad conclusions are drawn from the analysis. First, conflict settings are characterised by institutional multiplicity. Various institutions, including state and non-state alternatives coexist, interact and compete in resolving problems and addressing needs. These often adapt and find continuity in reconstruction. Second, these multiple institutions are transformed in the interaction with one another and as reaction to various external factors, including but not limited to conflict. As exemplified through the analysis of the traditional authorities, colonisation policies, displacement and urbanisation trends, political underinvestment and aid interventions all had a role in institutional change. Third, institutions show considerable resilience and adaptability to crisis, yet their capacity for reconstruction efforts should not be overestimated. In Angola, both state and non-state institutions were significantly eroded during the prolonged civil-war.

Chapters 5 to 8 all build on the analysis of everyday practices of aid, exploring different aspects of interventions, in terms of programme types and actors. Chapter 5 presents the specific case of conflict and reconstruction in Bunjei. It is an example of local war dynamics in a heavily contested rural setting, under UNITA's control. It is also a case of

reconstruction in an area remote from decision-making centres. Bunjei remained isolated from aid and state services throughout the war. After its end, international agencies led the emergency response, but quickly withdrew following the resettlement phase, leaving Bunjei in a 'cycle of isolation and neglect'. The chapter looks at the political processes that underline and perpetuate this marginalisation. Moreover, building on the framework of the humanitarian arena, it analyses how and why the local church IECA (Evangelical Congregational Church in Angola) emerged as an alternative 'claim to governance' to the official state structure in social assistance and local development. IECA enjoys considerable local legitimacy which is derived and generated from different sources: its religious institutional identity, its long tradition and performance in social assistance, its organisational practices, and the behaviour and motivation of its staff. Moreover, IECA's perceived professionalism and legitimacy was defined in relation to the poor performance of other actors in the local arena governance and service arenas.

Chapters 6, 7 and 8 discuss the three broad categories of aid interventions that have dominated the practice of the aid community in Angola's reconstruction context: technical assistance for state institutions, support to the national decentralisation process, and support to community organisation respectively. For each of these three institution-building intervention types I set out the dominant discourses informing aid policies and practices, and contrast their intentions to the everyday practices of interventions. In doing so, I question the built-in assumptions of current state-building discourse in fragile states.

Chapter 6 analyses how aid discourses and practices regarding institutions have changed in the Angolan context, with specific reference to the case of support to healthcare delivery. The analysis traces how different aid interventions defined and engaged with local (state) institutions during war-time and in peace. It shows a dichotomy in approaches between relief and reconstruction. Whereas relief interventions largely avoided or neglected local institutions and actually contributed to their erosion, reconstruction efforts have focused on building or strengthening them. This is part of the state-building agenda in post-conflict contexts, in which building state legitimacy is framed as a project (van der Haar, 2009). This shift has proved too little too late in preparing local actors for reconstruction. The bypassing of local institutions during the emergency left a significant imprint on institution-building efforts in reconstruction. This was evident in the case of the programme for the revitalisation of health services, in the lack of qualified human resources and follow up capacity within healthcare institutions. This case also challenges the assumed links between service delivery, state legitimacy and the strengthening of the social contract. People´s perceptions of the state and its services depend on investment in service amelioration, but also on other available alternatives. Reconstruction programmes are state-biased and neglect such alternatives.

Chapter 7 focuses decentralisation support programmes and the alleged relationship between decentralisation and poverty reduction. It follows what happens to theoretical intentions of decentralisation initiatives along the implementation chain through a specific decentralisation support programme in Matala. It looks at its activities with both local government administrations and community-based citizens groups and at the key motivations and assumptions underlying decentralisation support. Some of these untested assumptions are inherent to the decentralisation rationale, others specific to how programmes are conceptualised. Analyses of the interfaces between local actors brought together under decentralisation activities – local governments, local communities and aid organisations - show that the outcomes are highly context specific and diverge from preconceived normative assumptions. I argue that in Angola decentralisation support has become a popular form of donor engagement, because it serves the agenda of both the government and of the aid community. Such policies are promoted irrespective of their failure to achieve the intended

objective of solving the problems of the people. Moreover, they risk doing more harm than good to the legitimacy of local actors, by creating unmet expectations for local people.

Chapter 8 explores how the institution-building discourse has translated into practice at the community level. Various empirical cases of aid interventions in Huíla are presented and analysed to determine how aid actors have engaged with community-based institutions. During the war community-based development (CBD) approaches were crowded out by the emergency culture. They became popular in reconstruction programmes, rooted in the concepts of participation and empowerment. These work with community-based organisations (CBOs), which are portrayed as drivers of local change, as the link between local society and state institutions and thus as legitimate channels for aid delivery. The chapter shows that in practice CBOs find it difficult to survive beyond the duration of projects, or to achieve broader and longer-term objectives besides immediate project tasks. Nonetheless, CBD approaches have remained prominent in such contexts because they are based on romanticised views of participation, community and empowerment and on assumptions about legitimisation and institutionalisation processes. Moreover, CBD approaches to reconstruction have been motivated by the lack of incentive for alternative interventions and the symbolic and moral value of community participation for aid actors.

In the last chapter, I summarise the main findings of this research under the five guiding research questions. I discuss the findings according to the two dimensions of analysis in the thesis - conflict and post-conflict. I also return to the specific case of the traditional authorities which have been a recurring set of institutions analysed in the different chapters. The book concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of the key findings of this research for aid practices in conflict and pos-conflict contexts. Three key lessons for aid practices are proposed: that the role of local actors and institutions be taken more seriously, that aid actors be more realistic about what planned interventions can achieve, and that academic research and aid policy and practice be more systematically integrated.

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[1] The CAN took place from 10 to 31 January 2010.

[2] *Palancas negras* are a species of antelopes unique to Angola, used as a national symbol and adopted as the name for the national football team.

[3] See Box 1 in Chapter 2 for a discussion of the conflict in Cabinda.

[4] The process had been due to conclude in the second semester of 2010 following a public consultation round. However, the schedule was unexpectedly altered with final approval being achieved on the 21st January 2010 (OPSA, 2010b). This sparked critiques regarding the conduct of the overall process, its timing, as well as the content of the constitutional reforms.

[5] According to the Oxford English Dictionary, an assumption is something taken for granted, something assumed but not proved. A presupposition is something taken for granted or required as a prior condition. I use the two interchangeably.

[6] This rationale is rooted in the Geneva Conventions and International Humanitarian Law, which guide the protection of human dignity during war, and in the creation of the ICRC by Henry Dunant, in 1863.

[7] Such figures must be treated with care however, given the poor reliability of data. A European Commission report on aid flows to Angola in the 1990s, reports a contradictory figure of 417.8 million USD for the same year (EC Delegation in Angola, 2001: 59).

[8] Following Tvedten, (2003: 41), I will use the Portuguese terms *município* and *comuna* in order to differentiate from the English version which usually denotes locally elected governments with legal personalities. Many of these divisions date back to colonial times, although changes are envisaged under the ongoing reforms to the local administration system, including decentralisation and deconcentration processes.

[9] IDPs are distinguished from refugees in that they remain within national borders of a sovereign country, and in theory are the responsibility of its government. Although the root causes for displacement are often the same in both cases, this legal distinction has implications in terms of the level of protection and assistance that people are entitled to. They fall outside of International Law and the mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In 1998 the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were defined, to address this gap. They were only endorsed in 2006 by the UN General Assembly and are not legally binding (UNOCHA, 1998). This research is limited to the interaction of aid and local institutions within Angola. Works by Bakewell (2000, 2009) analyse the role of aid in the lives of Angolan refugees in Zambia.

[10] Other settlements included Castanheira de Pêra, Freixiel and Alges.

[11] Much of this historical information on Matala comes from an informal document (dated 16 April 2008) prepared for me by the member of staff of the municipal administration, responsible for following aid interventions.

[12] Its political situation also resulted in Matala hosting the official state administration of Cunene province, which abandoned its post due to heavy fighting with South African troops.

[13] See Chapter 2 for Matala's conflict and displacement history.
[14] The term *bairro* refers to a neighbourhood in a more urbanised area, usually in the main municipal town. *Povoações* are rural agglomerations of villages. A single village is called an *aldeia*. However, the territorial division of the state does not necessarily coincide with the traditional one. The later has as its starting point the village, but above these are the *embalas* (or *ombalas*) that are groups of villages, which in turn have their own leader/chief (*ossoma* or regedor) who is hierarchically above that of the village (ACORD, 2006: 16).
[15] This is a literal translation from the Portuguese term 'matas' which is commonly used to refer to displacement destinations outside of major centres such as municipal towns or cities. It is also used as a vague term to avoid specifying whether it was a government or UNITA area. As the leader (*soba*) of Caquela B community explained *"The matas are the areas where we fled to. There are also villages there with groups of people, but there was no peace so we were always conditioned by the fighting and having to run. Some 'matas' weren't villages at all. They were more like cities!"*
[16] In November 2007, January 2008 and November 2008.
[17] In October 2007 and June 2008 respectively.
[18] On the 14th November 2008.
[19] On the 23rd September 2010.
[20] On the 17th November 2009, 21st January 2010, and 9 – 18th March 2010, respectively.

CHAPTER TWO

The history and experiences of conflict in Angola

INTRODUCTION

Angola's civil war officially started at independence in 1975, although the country has a longer history of violence. Its main protagonists were the MPLA and UNITA. The war came to an end in 2002 with the death in combat of UNITA's leader. This chapter provides an analysis of its history, dynamics and multiple realities. Understanding the historical development of the conflict and its effects on society is central for the analysis of institutional change processes in crisis and of aid in conflict, both of which are core objectives of this thesis. Several sections of this chapter draw on an unpublished analysis of the conflict history, co-written with Hilde van Dijkhorst.[1] Our perspective on conflict, which I adopt in this thesis, is based on a combined political economy and ethnographic approach. It stresses the role of socio-cultural institutions in shaping the local developments and outcomes of war.

The chapter firstly intends to introduce the Angolan case, providing a brief history to the conflict, including its main actors, motivations and effects. Writings about the Angolan conflict have leaned on conflict theories that dominated over the course of its different phases. Many of these theories gained prominence in the aftermath of the Cold-War, but have since proved inadequate in explaining the intricacies of conflict. They have overlooked the multiple ways in which conflict develops and is experienced in practice. They were based on generalised assumptions about the causes of conflict in Africa, and often reduced conflict to single root causes, such as economic, ideological, environmental or ethnic (Kalyvas, 2003, Richards, 2005b). Most influential in Angola's case have been theories based on the role of its natural resource wealth in conflict (Power, 2001), such as the 'Greed-not-Grievance' theory (Collier, 2000), or the notion of 'the resource curse' (Auty, 1993). By forwarding particular interpretations of the conflict, such theories found their way into the discourse and practices of aid, shaping conflict-resolution initiatives, the humanitarian response and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. In recent years, alternative perspectives have emerged in the work of authors such as Kalyvas (2003), Richards (2005b) and Cramer (2006), that better reflect the actual workings of war. They focus on the interplay of diverse causes of conflict, including the role of the historical trajectory of societies, on the localised micro-dynamics of conflict, and on the social processes involved in such dynamics.

The second objective of this chapter is therefore to demonstrate how conflict plays out at the local level. I present the specific case of Huíla province based on the empirical analysis of the local histories and experiences of conflict in four distinct municipalities of the province.[2] Grounding the analysis of conflict in the local experiences of war and violence, highlights the diverse and multiple ways in which conflict unfolds and is experienced. An ethnographic approach to war as proposed by Richards (2005b), considers how the political economy of conflict interfaces with local socio-cultural institutions to shape the micro-dynamics of war. That is, how economic and political power are produced and distributed, and affect the development of conflict (Le Billon, 2000b). In addition, how the forces of the broader conflict interact with local norms, institutions, and power relations, to shape the localised dynamics of conflict and people's response to it. These processes are important in understanding the dynamics of aid in conflict and its workings in practice.

Thirdly, the legacy of the war remains an important part of Angola's socio-economic situation and of the workings of the state. The examination of how conflict evolved and its impact on societal processes helps to explain how the state has come out of the war and set out to reconstruct itself. I consider how the conflict has shaped 'the state' of the state in the post-war context. In line with the research objectives, my specific interest is in the state as a key set of institutions for governance and basic service delivery. These are also the central focus of my analysis of how local institutions and aid are mutually constitutive.

The chapter is based on literature on the Angolan conflict and on the state, as well as on interview material on the local experiences and perceptions of conflict. It starts with a review of the conflict history, which distinguishes between the pre-independence liberation war, and three different periods of the post-colonial civil war. This is followed by a discussion of broader issues emerging from the conflict history that are key to this thesis, including the role of different actors and motivations, and their implications for state-society relations. The specific case of Huíla is then presented, followed by a characterisation of the workings of the post-war Angolan state, its institutions, and their main organising features.

1. History of the Angolan conflict[3]

The dynamics of war largely followed internal political developments and the availability of resources for financing the war efforts of both factions. However, they were also significantly affected by the involvement of external factors, including aid. Understanding these conflict dynamics is important for explaining institutional change and its interaction with aid interventions, both during and after the war.

The discussion of Angola's conflict starts with the late period of colonial occupation, from 1961 to 1975, during which the liberation movements were formed and the armed struggle for independence intensified. By covering this period of history, the post-colonial civil war is contextualised in Angola's broader history of violence. Key events at this time shaped the political landscape that emerged at independence and that explain the multiple dynamics of the civil conflict (Birmingham, 1997, Cramer, 2006). The post-independence conflict has been divided according to major political markers, such as the signing of peace agreements or cease fires. They include the period from 1975 to the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accords; from the re-ignition of the war in 1992 to the 1994 Lusaka Protocol; and from 1994 to the signing of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding in 2002. This division does not necessarily coincide with how the war was perceived, recollected and experienced by local people. It is only one of the ways according to which the conflict history can be analysed. Pacheco (2005a) for instance refers to five separate wars during the conflict years, based on political events, the involvement of different actors, and its funding sources.[4]

1.1 Decolonisation and the liberation war: 1961-1975

Angola's contact with Europeans started some 500 years ago. The Portuguese reached its coast at the end of the 15th Century in search of profitable economic activities (Birmingham, 2003: 61). Prior to colonisation Angola's people already had a history of alliances, conflicts, networks of trade and population movements (Neto, 2001: 30). Actual colonial occupation varied significantly across the country. Luanda's occupation lasted 400 years, whilst Huambo, was only effectively colonised during 72 years (ibid: 32). Intensification of the colonial occupation process and economic diversification started in the late 19th century, but effective administrative control over the whole colony came only after World War II (Malaquias, 2007). It impacted on local populations through different forms of forced labour, taxation systems and the compulsory production of designated crops by the colonial administration. Such measures led to the early revolts in Bailundo and Bakongo regions in 1902 and 1911-13 respectively (ibid). In 1961, in the northern province of Malanje, uprisings of cotton and coffee plantation workers to large land expropriations and poor working conditions marked the beginning of the struggle for liberation. This episode resulted in a violent response from the Portuguese. Between 250 and 1000 white planters and traders and

thousands of black farm workers are estimated to have been killed, and many more to have fled across borders (Birmingham and Meijer, 2004: 13).

The start of the armed struggle led the Portuguese to step up immigration into Angola and expand economic activities, rather than to prepare for decolonisation. Immigration had been modest in the first half of the 20th Century, but was significantly increased from 1950 onwards. With the arrival of a quarter of a million Portuguese, Angola became one of Africa´s most dynamic colonies and the largest white colony in Africa after Algeria and South Africa (Birmingham, 2003: 24). The intensification of colonial expansion further dispossessed local peasants. Populations were displaced at various times during the 1960s and 1970s, as a result of violence linked to the smaller scale guerrilla wars (Robson et al., 2006).

The organised nationalist movements started to emerge in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The MPLA and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) were established under the leadership of Agostinho Neto and Holden Roberto respectively. The MPLA drew its support from the Mbundu and the African and *mestiço* intellectual elite in Luanda, whereas FNLA was linked to the Bakongo people (Malaquias, 2007). In 1966 Jonas Savimbi established UNITA after leaving the FNLA and its Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE). Savimbi´s support came from the rural areas of the Ovimbundu - the major population group in the country. UNITA developed a system of self-reliance that exploited ethnic linkages more explicitly to mobilise support (ibid). As Birmingham (1997: 440) explains, the waves of violence after 1961 fed directly into the social mobilisation and support-base of the three parties. Educated and westernised Africans formed the MPLA following their persecution by white vigilantes in the aftermath of 1961. Conscripted labourers that fled to the highlands following killings by angry coffee-pickers joined UNITA. FNLA drew support from the thousands of migrants that fled abroad, mostly to Zaire, following another wave of violence led by the Portuguese.

1.2 Civil war: 1975 to the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accords

War protagonists

Immediately after independence[5], which was negotiated between Portugal and the three independence movements, the latter entered into conflict. The inability of the different parties to join efforts against the colonial power, or to reach consensus after independence, allowed the internationalisation of the conflict (Comerford, 2004, Meijer, 2004). External interference by political players occurred within the Cold War context. The Angolan conflict at that time was a typical case of superpower struggle for influence and control. Cuba and the Soviet Union supported the MPLA. The FNLA and UNITA were supported by South Africa and the United States. The FNLA, which also received assistance from Zaire and China, became weakened and soon disappeared, leaving the MPLA and UNITA as the two protagonists of the war for the following 27 years. Other actors too were involved in the unfolding of events, including Eastern European countries and African nations. Guiné-Bissau for instance, sent troops to Angola in support of the MPLA (Vines, 2000, Pinto de Andrade, 2010).

Although both the MPLA and UNITA were ideologically based on Marxism, they had distinct support-bases and developed into different regimes. The MPLA had urban support and experience in major cities, and struggled to adapt itself to the rural realities of the people of the north and the highland regions of Angola (Birmingham, 2003: 184). UNITA also followed a Marxist ideology and was organised around Maoist principles and practices of guerrilla warfare and self-reliance (Malaquias, 2007). It has been described as having developed a society resembling a military dictatorship, controlled by a 'Stalinist-type discipline' and characterised by 'truly totalitarian social relationships' in which any tolerance

was absent (Messiant, 1994: 169-170). Notwithstanding its ideological basis, remarkably UNITA was portrayed by its backers as an anti-communist insurgency (Vines, 2000).

Foreign interference

The role of foreign (military) interference marked this period of the conflict, until the signature of the Bicesse Accords. The support from Cuba and the Soviet Union to the MPLA was important in securing its position in the post-colonial period. Cuba's military assistance in particular was decisive in giving the MPLA control of Luanda at independence. South Africa's involvement with UNITA was based on a 'divide-and-rule' strategy, aimed at preventing Angola's support to Namibia's independence movement – the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), and to anti-apartheid movements such as the African National Congress (ANC). It entailed aggressive invasions through the south of the country (Hodges, 2001). The Cassinga Massacre in Huíla province is a well-known case, in which the South African Defence Forces (SADF) killed hundreds in an operation allegedly targeting a camp of SWAPO members.

The support of the US was initially covert given the approval of the Clarke Amendment in February 1976. The amendment was established in the aftermath of the Vietnam conflict and was intended to prevent the US from giving aid to military groups in Angola. Nonetheless, it only partially limited US action and was unable to prevent financial support to UNITA and the continued recruitment of mercenaries for destabilising activities (Britain, 1998). It was repealed in 1985 by the US Government, after which time the US openly stepped up support to UNITA. Competing justifications for external involvement in Angola's war were forwarded by the superpowers, each maintaining that they were reacting to the involvement of the other (Britain, 1998, El Tahri, 2007, Hatzky, 2008). While external influences did not themselves create the divisions within the liberation movements, they did provide both the means and legitimacy for the war proponents to be strengthened and for violence to escalate. This fuelled and consolidated its dynamics in the proceeding period (Messiant, 2004b).

During this first period of war, fighting was mostly contained in rural areas where UNITA had its strongholds. External support had given it control of large parts of the south and central regions of the country (Hodges, 2001, 2004). This contributed to increased urbanisation as people fled towards towns and cities. Only at the end of the 1980s, with the changes of the international context - the fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the achievement of Namibian independence – did Angola's strategic importance to the superpowers decrease, allowing for the first steps to be taken towards peace negotiations. At the end of 1988 a Tripartite Agreement was signed by the Angolan, Cuban and South African governments, committing to the withdrawal of Cuban troops by July 1991. This announcement, combined with the major battle of 1987/1988 at Cuito Canavale, in which South Africa suffered a ´psychological defeat´. This led to the withdrawal of its troops from Namibia in 1989 and consequently to the disengagement from Angola (Vines, 2000).

Elections

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the dynamics and motivations for the conflict changed. It became increasingly apparent that it was turning into a personalized power struggle between ruling president Dos Santos and UNITA´s leader Savimbi (Douma, 2003). In June 1989, the two parties attempted but failed to negotiate a cease-fire. Negotiations led by a troika of Portugal, the US and the Soviet Union (USSR) eventually led in May 1991, to the signature of the Bicesse Accords. These called for a cease-fire, demobilisation process, and parliamentary and presidential elections. They gave the MPLA the recognition as the

legitimate interim government until the set-up of elections (Vines, 2000). However, the implementation of Bicesse was however, fraught with difficulties. There was widespread concern with the preparation of the elections, given the low demobilisation rates, particularly by UNITA. Nonetheless, the international community pushed for the scheduled date of September 1992 and the elections were declared free and fair. With 55% of the votes from a 92% voter turnout, the MPLA had a majority win over UNITA's 33% (Britain, 1998: 55). Savimbi rejected the results, leading to the suspension of the second round of presidential elections and to a return to war. Attempts by the troika and the peace-keeping efforts of the UN to secure peace quickly evaporated due to the *'deadly pursuit of military victory and hegemonic power'* by both parties, as well as the different interests of the international community (Messiant, 2004b). The latter was greatly criticised for its failure to establish and maintain peace through the two peacekeeping missions – United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I and II), established in 1981 and 1991 respectively.

Peace-building efforts

In a publication about her experience as the UN's Secretary General's Special Representative for Angola (1992-93), Margaret Anstee (1996) highlights the lack of international interest in the conflict after the Cold War. She argues that this translated into limited support for the UN to perform its role. Restrictions in mandate as well as lack of human and financial resources of its peacemaking and peacekeeping missions made the monitoring and enforcement of the peace process virtually impossible. The fact that the second UN mission (UNAVEM II) had a budget of $18.8 million compared to the $430 million of the UN's equivalent mission in Namibia, illustrates the modest commitment to the Angolan case (Paulo, 2004: 29). The international focus on the Bosnian conflict further contributed to the 'invisibility' of the Angolan crisis (Birmingham, 1997). In addition, interests by other external actors influenced the course of the peace processes and its subsequent failure. The US's intention to get UNITA to power also contributed to the rush towards elections, given their assumption that UNITA would win (Birmingham, 1997, Messiant, 2004b). With the victory of the MPLA however, UNITA was technically rendered as an illegitimate rebellion whilst the MPLA power was consolidated (Messiant, 2004b).

1.3 From 1992 to the 1994 Lusaka Protocol

The post-election war of 1992 was unprecedented in its scale and intensity, with an estimated 1000 deaths per day reported by the UN at the height of the crisis (Lanzer, 1996: 19). It is often referred to as the 'war of the cities' as it reached major urban centres for the first time. UNITA gained control of several provincial capitals, including Huambo, which was fiercely contested throughout the war, and held under siege by UNITA for 55 days in early 1993. By the end of that year, UNITA was estimated to control some 70% of the national territory (ACCORD, 2004). As urban centres became unsafe, large scale displacement continued, leading to one of the worst humanitarian crisis of the 1990s. With one in every three children dying before the age of 5, Angola became known as the worst country in the world to be a child (UNICEF, 1999 in Ostheimer, 2000). It was at this time that humanitarian efforts were scaled up considerably through an internationally led operation (see Chapter 3).

After drawn out negotiations mediated by the UN and troika, the warring factions were eventually brought together to adopt the Lusaka ceasefire protocol in November 1994. The government's adoption of the protocol instead of military action against UNITA was partly the result of pressure from the US (Vines, 2000, Vidal, 2006). Lusaka attempted to improve where Bicesse fell short, by planning for a power sharing model and by emphasising the importance of demobilisation. Crucially however, it did not address the deep mistrust

between the two parties, which underlined its subsequent failure to secure peace (Messiant, 2004b).

1.4 From 1994 to the Luena MoU 2002

No peace, no war

The Lusaka process created a situation of 'no peace, no war'. During the early years of its implementation, important political developments took place. The Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) was created in 1997, incorporating members of the opposition parties, including 63 UNITA representatives in parliament. The National Armed Forces (FAA) also absorbed some of UNITA's troops. Lusaka was described as 'artificial' however, as fighting and human rights abuses continued to be widespread (Robson, 2001b: 4). Again, the international community was unable to revert the situation, despite the deployment of its third peace keeping mission (UNAVEM III) in 1995. The lack of political commitment by the warring parties and particularly by UNITA, to the implementation of Lusaka, led the UN's Security Council in June 1998 to reinforce sanctions against UNITA. The first sanctions had been passed in 1993, banning the sale of arms and fuel. New sanctions ranged from restrictions on travel to the freezing of bank accounts and the banning of the purchase of UNITA diamonds (Hodges, 2004: 178).

The focus on diamonds as UNITA's main source of funding reflected the growing importance of natural resources in the dynamics of the conflict, particularly following the collapse of the Bicesse Process and the withdrawal of assistance from external political actors. Despite strong criticism of the effectiveness of sanctions, insider accounts revealed that they were felt within the UNITA regime. As explained by a UNITA security official working closely with Savimbi *"It was the sanctions that destroyed the armed faction and culminated in the surrender of UNITA in the cities. Initially there wasn't a lot of concern because we could organise the people to do things for us. But they also needed basic things to survive, like salt, and these eventually ran out. Our money abroad was frozen. Many UNITA people in embassies and key positions started to flee their posts and to join us in the bush."*[6]

The final war

By mid-1998, the peace process was once again in crisis. The government grew increasingly impatient with UNITA whilst UNITA accused the Troika of pro-government bias. In August the government ended the peace process and stopped dealing with UNITA, adopting a 'war-for-peace' approach and reverting once again to full-scale war. A new faction of UNITA (UNITA-Renovada) was established by former UNITA commanders, which the government thereafter considered its only legitimate negotiating partner. The UN observer mission MONUA which replaced UNAVEM III in June 1997, was ended in early 1999 (Paulo, 2004). This last stage of the conflict was characterised by the intensification of the fighting. The impact on local populations was aggravated due to the tactics of conflict towards guerrilla warfare and scorched earth practices. From this point onwards, areas under UNITA control were no longer accessible to the humanitarian community until the official end of the war, almost four years later. The significance of this for the humanitarian situation of people in these areas is discussed in Chapters 3 and 5. As UN sanctions on UNITA were tightened and the government stepped up its military offences in the course of 2000, UNITA was further weakened loosing several of the strategic areas under its control.

Angola's conflict eventually came to an end, not through negotiation and settlement of political differences, but through military victory. Savimbi was killed in combat on the 22 February 2002 in Moxico, and immediately after peace negotiations were set in motion by the government. The GoA's priorities included an amnesty for those directly involved in the

conflict, the demobilisation of UNITA soldiers and their reintegration in society. This process culminated in the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding in Luena, on the 4th April 2002 – the official date of the establishment of peace. The involvement of the international community in the mediation of negotiations was minimal. With the exception of Cabinda, explained in the next section, the Luena MoU has become the marker of peace in Angola. The 2008 legislative elections have been considered by many as the ultimate indicator of short-term stability. The MPLA won with a huge majority of 81.7% of the votes from a voter turnout of 87% (HRW, 2009a).

1.5 The multifaceted nature of conflict: the case of Cabinda

Cabinda province is an enclave separated from mainland Angola to the North, by the Congo River. It is located on the Western coast of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Cabinda has long been a strategic and contested territory given its natural mineral wealth, in oil and to a lesser extent, diamonds. It became a Portuguese protectorate already in 1885. Cabinda's conflict is characterised by its colonial and post-colonial histories, the resulting socio-economic and identity issues, and its natural resources (Mabeko-Tali, 2004: 37). Its history warrants specific attention outside of the discussion of the broader civil war, because although not completely separate, the conflict developed its own dynamics and driving forces.

Local conflict history

Cabinda's political situation has regularly come under the spotlight in recent years. As already described at the start of this thesis, it made international news headlines as the site of a deadly attack to the Togolese team during the 2010 CAN football cup. The incident highlighted the continuation of local grievances and violent contestation in the region, despite the official national peace discourse dominant since 2002. The attack was claimed by a faction of the separatist movement FLEC - Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda, specifically known as FLEC/FAC (FLEC/Armed Forces of Cabinda). The formation of FLEC's secessionist movement dates back to 1962. FLEC was originally involved in the liberation struggle against the Portuguese, and was no exception in being drawn into the dynamics of external intervention in the conflict. Like FNLA, it received support from the Zairian army in the lead up to independence, and has also experienced divergences and splits within the movement since the Luena MoU.

Official developments in the politics of the civil-war have been experienced rather differently in Cabinda from mainland Angola. In Cabinda the Bicesse interlude of peace in 1991 hardly took effect, given that FLEC was excluded from the peace deal. This was repeated in the 1994 Lusaka process. Further, the Luena MoU of April 2002 did not result in an immediate cease-fire in Cabinda as was the case in the rest of the country. In October of that year, the GoA was still launching its final counter-insurgency campaign in the province, before entering into a series of talks with the FLEC leadership (ACCORD, 2004).

Post-Luena

In 2006, the GoA signed a peace agreement with FLEC/Renovada, the officially recognised faction of the movement. The agreement established an amnesty and called for the demobilisation and integration of individuals into the national armed forces (FAA). Other factions were left out and were not recognised by the GoA, which branded them as criminal groups (Monteiro, 2010).

Since the 2006 agreements, the situation in Cabinda has remained ambiguous. Continued reports of violence and human rights abuses and the recent attack during the CAN

indicate that the political situation remains unresolved. When the last available information on IDPs was collected in 2005, 19,500 people in Cabinda were reported unable or unwilling to return home due to the conflict between government forces and FLEC (IDMC, 2009). A Human Rights Watch publication quotes that *"between September 2007 and March 2009, at least 38 people were arbitrarily arrested by the military in Cabinda and accused of state security crimes."* (HRW, 2009a). Previous reports from human rights organisations show a similar pattern of violence. The government response to the attack on the Togolese team has been considered heavy-handed, with military intervention and several arrests. Yet, attention to this incident has done little in the way of further scrutiny of the political situation of the province, as the GoA labelled it as the work of bandits and terrorists (IRIN, 2010c). The terrorism discourse has allegedly reinforced the GoA's international legitimacy (Monteiro, 2010: 11). Developments in the organisation and leadership of the exiled factions of FLEC during 2010 have sparked new tensions between the separatist movements and the GoA. The new leader in exile in France, called on the population to continue the struggle for sovereignty of the region (IRIN, 2010b). These movements reject the peace accord, while the government continues to deny the actual existence of the FLEC as an organised movement that threatens security (IRIN, 2010a).

The role of oil

Cabinda's strategic importance associated with its oil-wealth is ever growing. Hodges (2004) argues this is likely to be a greater driving force for secession than ethnic identity or even economic injustice. "*If it was an independent state, Cabinda would be one of the richest countries in the developing world in per capita terms. ...making it a sort of African mini-Kuwait."* (p. 159). In recognition of this, the government has strategically been investing rather heavily in Cabinda, in comparison to other provinces (ibid). Official government discourse has recently justified disproportionate budget allocations to Cabinda, on the basis of its contribution to the national economy. In an interview in mid-2009, the then Provincial Governor, claimed that it was the second province after Luanda to contribute the most to the national budget, outside of revenues from oil and customs (Freitas, 2009). On the other hand, analysts predict that unless calls for autonomy are addressed, the historical power of Cabinda patriotism is likely to continue driving violence in the region (Pacheco, 2010a: 243).

The analysis of the broader history of the civil-war has brought to the forefront the various actors and motivations involved in the dynamics of conflict over the years. These dynamics changed as the result of the interplay between internal factors and external interests. In addition, they were affected by Angola's specific historical trajectory, including its colonial experience and independence struggle. All these factors are manifested and play out differently at the local level, as seen for the case of Cabinda.

2. Conflict and broader processes

Several issues that emerge from the above analysis of the history of Angola's conflict are relevant for the broader examination of aid in conflict and reconstruction in this thesis. They include the shaping of relations between the state, society and non-state actors, the role of natural resources in governance, and that of international interests in Angola. These issues are important for analysing the effects of aid because they affect how interventions unfold on the ground. They can be discerned from a political economy of war perspective, which focuses on the production and distribution of power and wealth during conflict to understand the motivations for its occurrence and continuation (Le Billon, 2000b). Conflicts encompass

complex processes and issues of power. Wars can be alternative systems of profit and power that benefit particular actors (Keen, 1998). Some groups gain socially, politically and economically from maintaining a situation of war which in turn can drive processes of social transformation (Duffield, 2001). The role of socio-cultural institutions in such political and economic relations that affect conflict is key to understanding its dynamics. Aid interventions interact with these complex historical, social, economic and political aspects of war. As argued by Goodhand and Lewer (1999: 79), aid actors must therefore analyse such processes because they have *"a positive or negative impact on the local dynamics of conflict, through building or undermining community endowments of social capital."*

2.1 Relations between state, society and non-state actors

Relations between the state and other actors, including civil society, political actors, the international community and the wider population were shaped during the conflict. The above overview of the war history is indicative of some of these developments, as well as of how the Angolan state has set out to reconstruct itself in the post war. I shall return to the latter further on in the chapter. Regarding the role of non-state actors, it is significant that as the main political-markers in Angola's post-independence history, all three peace accords (Bicesse, Lusaka and Luena) were agreed between the two main warring factions, without the participation of other political or civil society actors. In the particular case of Cabinda, the FLEC movement, an important actor in the local conflict, was excluded from all negotiations. The implication of such exclusion is that the concentration of power within the governing elite is perpetuated, whilst the wider interests of society are bypassed (Comerford, 2004, Griffiths, 2004, Messiant, 2004b). According to Vidal (2006), the multiparty political system established in Angola since the end of the war, is characterised by the uneven power-balance between MPLA and UNITA that dominated at the time of the Luena negotiations.

In terms of state-civil society relations, the non-involvement of civic and religious actors in peace negotiations illustrates the GoA's perspective on their role in post-war reconstruction, as one limited to basic service delivery (see Chapter 6). The GoA has made clear its official position of not welcoming or tolerating international involvement in domestic political issues. This was demonstrated by its reaction to the alleged human rights abuses in Cabinda, and by a well-known incident in 2007, when an anticorruption campaigner of Global Witness was detained by the authorities. She was charged with espionage whilst investigating transparency in the oil-sector in Cabinda (BBC, 2007). The involvement of national civil society actors in politically sensitive issues has also been met with tough measures. In 2007, the director-general of the government's agency UTCAH, publicly stated that a number of national and international NGOs should be closed down as they were operating illegally in the country, by carrying out political activities and encouraging local populations to challenge government authorities (Jornal de Angola, 2007). These NGOs were specifically involved in lobbying against land evictions.[7]

2.2 Natural resources, the political economy of war and governance

The role of economic factors and in particular of oil and diamond reserves, as framed in the Greed-not-Grievance logic discussed earlier, has received much attention in writings about the Angolan war. Natural resources were relatively neatly divided between the warring factions. The government controlled oil resources whereas UNITA had access to and control of large diamond areas, a resource much more suited to guerrilla style structures. Alternative analyses of the role of natural resources in Angola´s civil war, highlight their contribution to the continuation of fighting, rather than as one of its root causes. Hodges (2004) contends that the control over these resources became a driving force that perpetuated the war, because of

the monetary value generated to sustain military action. This became particularly important after the end of the Cold War and the subsequent withdrawal of international financial backing to both parties. *"It was a war driven by personal ambition, mutual suspicion and the prize of winning or retaining control of the state and the resources to which it gave access"* (ibid: 18). In 1998 the oil revenues for the MPLA government totalled some 3 billion USD per year, whereas UNITA gained 500 to 600 million USD annually from its diamond resources (Le Billon, 2000a, Hodges, 2004). Despite the unequal budget availability for military spending between the two parties, UNITA was able to secure financial resources for continuing and even intensifying its war effort. Closer to the end of the conflict UNITA revenues from diamonds were significantly reduced due to increasing military successes of the GoA, lack of investment in new mines, and the effect of the UN sanctions on trade (Le Billon, 2001).

The role of resources in the political economy of Angola´s war has also been significant for governance practices and relations and for the post-conflict economic life of the country. The control of oil and diamonds provided opportunities to exercise patronage and corruption by both sides. For some, it was thus a motivation for the non-resolution of the conflict. In the case of UNITA, it could be a reason why it never sought secession of its territorial stronghold (Howen, 2001: 20). For the MPLA-led government, war presented an opportunity for governance structures to avoid justifying unaccounted for budget expenditures, or for instance, their redirection away from basic service delivery. According to le Billon (2001), the end of the war would potentially unmask this corruption and economic mismanagement as it would imply political and economic reforms for a more accountable and legitimate state. However, after the end of the war, this argument did not hold. For a long time, the GoA resisted to the pressure from the international donor community through International Monetary Fund (IMF) reforms to increase accountability on the national budget and financial flows. It only signed its first deal with the IMF in 2010, in the context of the global financial crisis.

Often, the role of natural resources in conflict is not so much about the actual commodities, as it is about the social relations that shape the power over such resources (Cramer, 2006). Sogge (2010) underlines the role of natural resource wealth in the shaping of patronage relations in Angola. Contrary to theories that resources lead to political chaos, he explains how a sophisticated centrally-managed patronage system allowed the distribution of wealth in a way that has actually been stabilising in Angola. The *"mere plunder and oppression to the neglect of statecraft has never been the MPLA approach"* (ibid: 3). After the war oil revenues continued to be distributed to a small minority, which le Billon (2000a) calls the oil *nomenklatura*. This includes state and private companies and some powerful elites closely allied to the President of Angola. These processes of empowerment of a few and the disempowerment of the majority of Angolans shaped social relations (Sogge, 2007).

The political economy of war does not just play itself out on higher state and international (economic) levels. It gets shaped and sustained in everyday practices of rebel groups, militaries and the people that are affected by war on an everyday basis. Moreover, the impact of war on local level economies is not necessarily linked to oil and diamonds, but to other resources Although Le Billon (2000b) argues that the continued neglect of people in Angola's conflict indicates they were not valued as part of the political economy of the war, people's life histories indicate otherwise. Ordinary citizens did not profit from the oil and diamond-fuelled war economy, but they were certainly part of local economies of war, either as resources or as active economic agents. War tactics meant that in many rural areas the conflict was about the control of people as key resources, be it as soldiers, human shields or agricultural producers (Brinkman, 2003). UNITA was known for kidnapping and forcing people into agricultural labour. MPLA in turn, conducted a 'scorched earth policy', forcing

people to abandon rural areas and destroying their livelihoods, in order to cut off access to food for UNITA rebels. Moreover, as Nordstrom (2004) describes, extra-state war economies function on all levels in society. Ordinary people profit from the lack of state control and shadow networks develop involving both ordinary commodities as well as resource and arms trade. In her book on violence, power and international profiteering, she gives an insightful ethnographic perspective on the micro-economic networks that arise and thrive during war, with Angola as an example. *"Shadows, as we define them, refer to the complex sets of cross-state economic and political linkages that move outside formally recognized state-based channels. We use the term* shadows *(rather than 'criminal' or 'illegal') because the transactions defining these networks aren't confined solely to criminal, illicit, or illegal activities, but cross various divides between legal, quasi-legal, and downright illegal activities"* (ibid: 106).

2.3 External interests

Natural resources also shaped relations with the international donor community. On the one hand, the government´s continued oil wealth made its neglect of social responsibilities less tolerable to the international community. Whilst the MPLA had gained international legitimacy by the failure of UNITA to accept the election results in 1992, it lost face internationally for its failure to provide for the basic needs of its people. This became even more obvious after the end of the war in 2002, and largely contributed to the disengagement of the aid community (see Chapter 3). Angola's real GDP growth rate went from 3.1% at the end of the conflict in 2001 to 26.9% by 2007 (OECD, 2007: 4). On the other hand, addressing the role of UNITA´s diamond trade in financing the war became an official part of the international response to the conflict, through the application of the UN´s sanctions.

Paradoxically, Angola´s natural resource wealth, particularly oil, has also been the main driver of external interests in the country and of controversial foreign policy in the post-war context. International economic interests are powerful in influencing how conflicts are financed and played out, as several authors have pointed out. Le Billion (2000b) asserts that for that reason, the term intra-state wars is misleading as it denies these international economic linkages. Cilliers (2001) argued that in order to end the Angolan conflict, the international political and business communities would have had to seriously engage in the clean-up of the oil-sector, as it served as the basis for the consolidation and conservation of power with the ruling elite. Sogge's analyses of the Angolan context over the years have highlighted the particular role of these external interests, in the creation of Angola's extroverted political economy and its contribution to war, corruption and poverty (Sogge, 2006, 2007, 2009). He contends that 'global good governance is also needed' to address Angola's development challenges (Sogge, 2006).

Lastly and notwithstanding the weight of economic interests in foreign relations in Angola´s reconstruction context, external interests have not been limited to the post-war, nor to the role of oil. They were also strongly motivated by political forces, as evidenced by the heavy involvement of international actors in the conflict dynamics during the Cold War.

This discussion of the linkages between the conflict history and the development of social relations, of the political economy of war and governance practices, has provided a general picture of the outcomes of war. However, there are local variations in these. The workings of the local political economy of war reiterate the need to understand the micro-dynamics of conflict through which multiple realities are produced. The following section exemplifies these variations by presenting the experiences of conflict in different areas of Huíla.

3. Local realities of conflict: the case of Huíla[8]

As this chapter has shown so far, explanations of the Angolan civil war must be sought in combinations of different internal and external elements, as well as the historical power void left by Portuguese colonialism, as newly formed parties struggled to take control over the country. Understanding the dynamics of conflict and its outcomes for society implies moving away from simplistic or rational economic arguments. I adopt a broad perspective on war as a social process, that includes the historical elements as well as the multiple factors that co-shape its workings in practice (Richards, 2005b). This means analysing the role of socio-cultural institutions in the distribution of power and resources that influence conflict. As Bakonyi and Stuvøy (2005) explain *"In addition to examining the functions of violence for economic purposes, the role of social institutions, norms, and rules for the behaviour of actors and for their economic activities in war must be addressed. [...] The conduct of economic activities is not isolated from patterns of authority, and thus, the market can neither be the sole nor the central institution of war economies."* (p. 361). A socio-institutional approach to war implies a focus on the local level, where the forces of the broader conflict interact with local norms and power relations, and the micro-dynamics of conflict are shaped. Individual loyalties in civil wars are often more informed by locally based cleavages than impersonal discourses of war, or are connected to local and personal conflicts (Kalyvas, 2001). As the case of Cabinda shows, the causes for fighting in one locality often had little connection to the violence experienced elsewhere.

The intensity of the fighting varied considerably over the 27 years of conflict and across Angola´s national territory. It produced processes that were widespread, such as displacement and urbanisation, but with distinct local manifestations. In Huíla alone, by September 2002 the number of displaced people had reached between 191,000 and 315,941, according to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS), respectively. The greatest concentration was found in the municipalities of Chipindo, Cuvango, Quilengues and Caconda (Porto et al., 2007: 31). The loss of assets, forced recruitment of soldiers and women, the collapse of basic social services and infrastructure, the breakup of communities and families and of rural institutions of solidarity, were also common outcomes of war with differing degrees of impact on people's lives and coping capacities (Robson et al., 2006).

For this research, it was essential to capture the diversity of experiences and perceptions of conflict, by grounding the analysis of conflict in the experiences of local people. Understanding how conflict impacted on their livelihoods and capacities is central to the study of aid in conflict. These localised and multiple realities of conflict are exemplified through the four case studies that follow, of different municipalities in Huíla. These represent various characteristics in terms of the political situation (government or UNITA controlled), the nature of displacement, the degree of urbanisation, the intensity of direct fighting, the availability of resources and aid, and the effects on the everyday life of local people. The cases show how political events at the macro level unfold on the ground and connect with local processes and dynamics of war. The discussion of the case studies draws on the notion of agency of individual actors, in line with Long´s actor-oriented approach (1992). It considers how local actors, both perpetrators and victims of violence, shape and respond to localised conflict through their strategies. The case studies are based on the narratives and perceptions of the war by local people who were affected by it on a daily basis. They draw on semi-structured and open interviews, life histories and surveys. These were collected over a period of one and a half years of fieldwork in various villages of Caluquembe and Chibia municipalities by Hilde van Dijkhorst and of Chipindo and Matala municipalities by me.[9]

3.1 The experience of four municipalities

3.1.1 Chipindo

Chipindo is likely the most remote and isolated *município* of Huíla province. Most local people live from subsistence agriculture and basic trade for non-food items. It is known for the severity of the conflict on its population. Although it remained under the control of UNITA for most of the war, it was heavily contested between the warring factions. Population displacement occurred on a massive scale. In the northern area of Bunjei, I did not come across a single individual who had not been displaced.

In the local experience of Bunjei, the take-over of the mission-hospital of the protestant church (IECA)[10] in the 1980s by Cuban troops, is recalled as a marker of the deterioration of security and living conditions. Foreign interference in the war is thus generally perceived as negative. Since the colonial period, the local mission and its staff had supported the local population with access to health and education services. The departure of foreign missionaries due to insecurity and the physical take-over of the mission directly impacted on people's welfare.

The first large waves of displacement started in the early 1980s. For the majority, displacement became a permanent condition as people spent as long as 15 or 20 years on the move. Many were born and raised in displacement, under the control of UNITA. Youngsters were frequently forcibly recruited as soldiers by the rebels, whilst skilled individuals such as health workers and teachers, were abducted to work for the regime in its Jamba headquarters. Several of these people were (staff) members of IECA's local mission who made up the educated elite with the skills needed by UNITA. Moreover, its leadership had strong links to the protestant church. UNITA used these considerably to mobilise support and gain legitimacy (Bakonyi and Stuvøy, 2005). IECA members were referred to by UNITA as brothers and sisters, and were sometimes given preferential treatment. Some young men were spared from military life because they belonged to IECA's community. Instead they were given education to become the future leaders of the regime. This created an ambiguous relation between UNITA and the local population, based on a mix of coercion and support.

The experience of the war years of individuals and their families living within the UNITA regime differed significantly from those of others displaced to the bush. Despite their violent recruitment, they were given access to basic services such as schooling, healthcare, food and physical security, until UNITA started to weaken at the end of the 1990s. The remainder of the population fended for themselves. They were often required to contribute part of their harvest to the regime, or to work on communal *lavras*[11] for their food production. Basic services were non-existent and people had no access to any form of external assistance throughout the war. They attempted to reproduce village life through smaller settlements and by electing new traditional authorities. In the post-war years, as people returned to their areas of origin, leadership positions sometimes had to be renegotiated as old and new leaders came to cohabit the same communities (see Chapter 4). Although tradition normally reinstates the original leader (*soba*), tension between individuals emerged in some communities, particularly where competing individuals were aligned with opposing political parties.

In Chipindo, the localised experiences of the conflict broadly followed military developments in terms of displacement and violence. However, particularly after the 1998 return to war, when both UNITA and the government resorted to scorched earth tactics, people recount being unsure of who was persecuting them. From 2000 they were constantly on the run, being unable to retain assets, produce food or build shelter. In the final months of fighting, hundreds of thousands were forcibly rounded up by the Angolan Army (FAA) into make-shift camps.[12] Most striking about the experience of this region is that contrary to

dominant perceptions of the civil war, it was at the end of the conflict that the population suffered the greatest, with high incidence of disease and mortality (Porto et al., 2007: 37).

Aid was unavailable throughout the war in this area, and it was only in the post-war period that it became part of the institutional environment and of local social relations. It is in this context that IECA has re-emerged as an important actor in local development (Chapter 5). However, given its historical links to UNITA, it still struggles to assert its political neutrality. The legacy of partisan politics of the conflict remains very much alive in Chipindo, as reflected in the strong presence of UNITA. As part of the national reintegration and reconciliation programme for instance, the government allocated several jobs to ex-UNITA cadres, namely in local health services. However, this was in the prelude to elections, and more recent appointments of school teachers are said to be discriminating against local teachers precisely because of their links to UNITA.

3.1.2 Caluquembe

From 1975 onwards, war only slowly started affecting people's lives in Caluquembe municipality, located in the North of Huíla province. First, it became increasingly difficult to access the area due to fighting along the access roads. Goods were not coming in anymore, and people from surrounding areas started moving towards the municipal center to find food as it became more difficult to continue production, either due to lack of inputs or because the area became the site of active fighting. During the 1980s the municipal center, Caluquembe-Sede, expanded substantially due to the influx of IDPs from other provinces, as well as from neighboring remote areas where troops were starting to fight each other. During the 1990s the influence of UNITA in Caluquembe expanded, and the area continued to encounter conflict and violence, especially before and after the 1992 elections.

The Caluquembe hospital and mission of the Evangelical Sinodal Angolan Church (IESA) had become a battleground for both troops. As Savimbi had a connection and affinity to the protestant church, having been educated in an IESA mission school himself, the mission and hospital struggled with issues of neutrality throughout the war. The hospital administrator watched the local population loot the hospital equipment, and after the war went from door to door to reclaim the goods. Christians were assumed to support UNITA due to their religion, and staff of the hospital and mission was asked to show their support to UNITA in aiding troops. In 1993 UNITA effectively took over the hospital and mission. In 1994 these became the target of government bombing, after which the MPLA regained its control over the town.

Depending on who you ask, the situation changed positively or negatively after 1994. For MPLA sympathizers the re-occupation of Caluquembe by the government ensured they could start living and working in town again. For people that were linked to UNITA, 1994 became a moment of displacement. Also, the (assumed) connection to UNITA informed people´s access to aid. For instance, the soba of one village near Caluquembe-Sede was said to have been ignored by the local administration and aid organisations due to his affiliation to UNITA. During and after the war, UNITA retained a certain power and legitimacy in the region. It received the majority of the votes in Caluquembe during the 1992 elections, which was an uncommon occurrence in the rest of the province (Schot, 2009). The local government administration of Caluquembe consisted of both MPLA and UNITA representatives, also as part of the Government of National Unity as had been proposed in the peace agreements. Tensions in local government were high however. In 2004, a UNITA municipal administrator mysteriously disappeared, fuelling rumors and tensions between members of the administration linked to either of the two parties (Schot, 2009).

Caluquembe town grew throughout the war. New neighborhoods were formed with refugees from surrounding areas. People were confined to the town as the roads had become

too dangerous to travel on, and the surrounding bush too dangerous to enter. People were not able to access their lands, or would do so in groups during the day, only to head back at night to the town to seek its relative safety. Firewood was collected within 10 kilometers of the town, leaving it deforested to this day. Displacement occurred in different directions, largely depending on party presence and strength. For instance, most of the population from the villages of Camucuio and Cue 1 which are located relatively far away from the municipal centre and are considered to be in 'the bush', fled to the municipal town and stayed there for many years as their region had been taken over by UNITA. On the other hand, Catala, a village along the main provincial road and close to Caluquembe-Sede, was deserted during the war as its inhabitants fled together with UNITA troops after Caluquembe-Sede was re-occupied by government troops in 1994. Some people from this village were also sent to so called 're-education camps' by MPLA for several years if suspicion of UNITA affiliation had fallen on them. These displacement movements brought along the curious situation that people from 'town' stayed in the deserted villages in the 'bush', which had been left behind by the people that in turn fled and occupied the empty houses in the towns.

Caluquembe is an example of an area that was severely contested by UNITA and MPLA and suffered the consequences. The hospital and evangelical mission became local sites where war politics were fought out. Party affiliation remains a hotly debated issue in local politics and beyond. Displacement in Caluquembe occurred in different waves and directions, linked to the political outcomes of the war and real or perceived party affiliation.

3.1.3 Matala

Matala is located in the south-east of Huíla. Matala town is one of the most thriving municipal capitals of Huíla with significant state and private sector investment. A large proportion of its current population are ex-IDPs who live in and around its centre, Matala-Sede, in roadside peri-urban *bairros*. Their livelihoods depend primarily on informal business (*negócio*). Because Matala-Sede remained under government control and was relatively sheltered from direct fighting, it became a major reception centre for IDPs from both its immediate surroundings and far away provinces. From the mid-1990s it was also a hub for the distribution of humanitarian aid.

Matala's particular conflict history explains why today the MPLA remains dominant in local government offices and in popular support. The fact that there appear to be fewer acknowledged ex-UNITA combatants in Matala compared to other municipalities, is telling. As the MPLA secretary of a local *bairro* explained, *"UNITA representatives can come here all they like, but nobody goes to listen to them. They are not wanted here"*. The local population witnessed the external interference in the war, when in the 1980s Cuban troops helped the FAPLA to secure the area against UNITA. Unlike Chipindo, this external influence is widely perceived as positive.

The various waves of displacement significantly affected the socio-economic makeup and relations of the area. Matala's population today is ethnically very diverse as a result. People's experiences of displacement varied, for instance according to their origin or time of arrival. Only those that lived within the relatively safe areas around Matala-Sede were never completely uprooted, as in the case of Monhanamgombe village. Yet, many recall several periods of having to 'sleep' in the bush, to escape night-time attacks to their villages. First wave IDPs arrived in the early 1980s and were hosted by local resident populations, mainly from the indigenous Muhumbi ethnic group. Through traditional practices of solidarity and mutual help, they were usually given land by the local *sobas* and assisted by residents with seeds and the use of animal traction in exchange for labour. Resident *sobas* thus carried significant power, even vis-à-vis the *sobas* of the displaced communities. As land became scarcer in later years, IDPs had to rent it and/or work for locals for as little as 2kg/day of

maize flour. Many became fully dependent on humanitarian aid. Over the years, first wave IDPs were thus able to establish themselves in the area and to some extent, to secure their livelihoods. They became the 'better-off' IDP group with the (economic) power to help later arrivals. Many have been unwilling to return to their areas of origin with the end of the war.

The post-election war of 1992 is remembered as the period of greatest population influx. Residents of villages in neighbouring *comunas* of Matala were forced to seek refuge from military attacks in Matala-Sede. Those from Mupindi community (Micosse *comuna*) fled there multiple times, usually on a temporary basis, ranging from a few days to a few months. They were mostly absorbed by family members rather than joining the swelling crowds in the local IDPs camps of Visaka, Ndjenvei, Chipopia and Kanjanguiti. Several of today's *bairros* and villages were created as reception areas for IDPs which became permanent settlements. *Bairro* KM15 was created in 1984. Today it is one of the largest in population terms[13], having its own state health centre and school. Other communities such as Calumbo emerged from the initiative of local government to relocate IDPs from overcrowded areas to those where more land was available. These settlements led to a certain 'segregation' of ex-IDPs in the current demographics of Matala.

Humanitarian aid was initially exclusively targeted to the most recent IDPs. As the general situation deteriorated, resident and older IDP groups also became eligible. Perhaps as a result of this change, there are few accounts of conflict between resident and IDP groups over access to aid. It was generally accepted that those that had lost everything were in greater need. With specific reference to the impact of aid, some individuals reported frustration with the long procedures and corrupt practices that emerged with its distribution. Relief aid significantly empowered local leaders such as the *sobas* and village secretaries, by giving them the responsibility of defining beneficiaries. This enabled instances of corruption and patronage. On the other hand, resentment of outsiders by local residents is still apparent in people's discourses about the difficult past and prospects for the future. Matala suffers from a high crime rate and from rampant cattle theft. Locals often blame this on youth from outside areas, where many IDPs have settled. Moreover, Matala's problems with unplanned urbanisation stem directly from war induced displacement. Road access is so limited that *'in some areas you can't even remove the coffin of a dead body."*[14]

Matala's case shows that conflict can develop localised dynamics, even where direct fighting is not involved. Here, the effects of large-scale displacement were behind the changes in the socio-economic conditions and in power relations between residents and IDPs, within different IDP groups, and between people and their leaders. Moreover, its political and economic importance during the conflict continues to shape its development outlook in the post-war.

3.1.4 Chibia

Chibia is a municipality located in the dry southern part of the province. Its original inhabitants are Nyanekas who rely mostly on cattle breeding and on occasional agricultural production. The semi-arid region suffers from drought once every decade, usually followed by famine. This was the case in 1988/1989 when a drought combined with unavailability of food stuffs and agricultural inputs due to the war, led to widespread hunger. Chibia wasn't a center of contention between MPLA and UNITA as other municipalities in the province had been. Most people were able to remain in their villages throughout the war, as they didn't come under direct attack. Most of the relatively large number of white settlers however, left the town from 1975 onwards and with them many of the shops closed, limiting the access people had to food, agricultural inputs and machinery and credit. One inhabitant of Chibia describes the war, its consequences for Chibia and the ideology of foreign interference as follows: *"When the foreigners came* (the Russians and Cubans) *the white settlers left Chibia,*

leaving the country or going to urban areas. Russian-style communism was a joke in the Angolan context, it didn't work. That Russian influence was the major reason for the war. It was a unilateral declaration of independence, although it is described as being an agreement between 3 parties. It wasn't a democracy it was a dictatorship".

From the start of the war in 1975 displaced people from other parts of the province started to settle in Chibia due to its relative safety. A large area around the municipal centre was vacated to allow displaced people to settle there. Within this area, Bairro 11 de Novembro is a neighbourhood, consisting of a group of about 500 people belonging to the Ovimbundu ethnic group, who were displaced from Quilengues (municipality in the centre of the Province). They were resettled to Bairro 11 de Novembro by the government after fleeing to Lubango from Quilengues in 1994. In 2003 after the end of the war, the GoA in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) started a resettlement program. About half of the community members of Bairro 11 de Novembro made use of this program while others decided to stay in Chibia. The main reasons for staying were lack of resources to restart their livelihoods back in Quilengues, having found livelihood opportunities in Chibia, but also out of fear for the parliamentary elections of 2008. As one inhabitant mentioned *"we have seen the confusion after the elections of 1992, we will wait and see what the elections of 2008 will bring"*. Some families made use of the resettlement program to Quilengues, only to return to Chibia after some time as they found that life was better for them there. Another factor that played a role in their decision to return to Chibia was that upon return many found that their plots of land had been taken by other refugees who had settled in their villages of origin since they themselves had become displaced. With the arrival of the displaced in Chibia, local conflicts over land between displaced and resident populations started to erupt.

Some resident populations resented the fact that only displaced people from different parts of the country were given aid by humanitarian organizations, while they felt an equal level of suffering due to droughts and subsequent periods of hunger. An inhabitant of Chibia noticed that the arrival of displaced from other ethnic groups influenced the Nyaneka population to adopt some of their socio-economic practices.

"The Ovimbundu have a lot of different skills, they practice masonry, carpentry, and own bakeries. Nyanekas normally only do some agriculture if nature allows them. The Nyanekas only practice agriculture during the rainy season. After the rains finish they will wait for 6 months for the new rains to start, and in between the rains tend to their cattle. The Ovimbundu actively search for alternatives in case agriculture fails, they always have some type of job to do, they will use that in between time to work as masons or carpenters. They started up some small industries and businesses here in Chibia. This ensured that the Nyanekas also had some more job opportunities. Now you see that some Nyanekas are doing the same, and opening up small businesses".

Although Chibia was mostly spared from the same level of violence and destruction seen in other parts of the province, the population had to deal with the consequences of war, most significantly with hunger due to cyclical periods of drought combined with lack of food and agricultural inputs. Tensions between IDPs and resident populations erupted over land and availability of aid. At the same time, interaction with groups of displaced has also caused some socio-economic changes to occur amongst the host population.

3.2 Analysis of the case studies

The cases of the four municipalities of Huíla province show the differentiated realities of how conflict unfolds, is experienced and is responded to at the local level. Three important aspects emerge from these. The first is that conflict dynamics and socio-cultural institutions are mutually constitutive at the local level. On the one hand, conflict changed local social relations and determined how these emerge in the reconstruction context. Such changes were related for instance, to the political rivalry between MPLA and UNITA which led to the reshuffling of power relations and to different political constellations in the various localities. Party affiliation, whether real or assumed, informed empowerment and disempowerment processes. In addition, social relations were altered by factors linked to the conflict, including displacement and access to aid. Traditional leaders were central in the distribution of resources among populations, including the allocation of land to IDPs and in access to humanitarian supplies. In some cases, leadership positions came under contestation in the post-war period when rural communities were (re)constituted. On the other hand, the dynamics of conflict and their outcomes varied according to the socio-cultural institutions at play. For instance, UNITA used religious links to mobilise political and social support through local missions. Moreover, although displacement was a widespread phenomenon, it took different forms and directions, because how it was deployed as a response to conflict depended on existing institutions. In some cases such as Bairro 11 de Novembro in Chibia it become permanent, in others such as Matala and Caluquembe it was a daily commute to hide from night raids. The overall perception is that people mostly fled from bush to town, but these cases have shown that the opposite was also true. Displacement was sometimes informed by actual or perceived party affiliation, depending on whether MPLA or UNITA was in control at a particular time. Frequently, however, it was a matter of finding security regardless of who the perpetrator was.

Second, the four municipalities show that the pace and realities of reconstruction have been strongly shaped by their localised histories of conflict. For instance, Matala´s recovery has been significant given that it suffered less destruction during the war, whilst Chipindo remains largely neglected. The post-war period saw the return and resettlement of people to their areas of origin on a massive scale, which was considered an important marker of reconstruction. Yet, these population flows varied in different places, according to various factors. People’s particular experience of violence in the aftermath of the 1992 elections was a strong determinant of the perception of elections in securing peace. Many chose to remain put indefinitely or until after the outcome of the elections of 2008. People’s access to resources to address needs in the post-war was another determining factor. Some displaced people established new livelihood opportunities and secured access to services like education for their children. This made the return to their areas of origin and former livelihoods less desirable. Existing social relations and how they affect people´s resourcefulness was also important in this regard. Increased competition over land and access to aid between the Nyaneka and Ovimbundo of Chibia had a long term impact on its socio-economic development and local power relations.

Third, conflict is only one of the factors that shape local realities in crisis. People often refer to everyday encounters with other forms of violence such as looting, banditry or cattle theft. Further, crises are not only associated with the direct consequences of political violence, but just as much with other local events such as droughts. For Chipindo’s population, the worst of the humanitarian crisis was not during, but after the end of the war. Several factors determined how conflict manifested itself in people´s lives. These include for instance the practices of the two parties towards local populations, as seen by UNITA´s sometimes preferential treatment of IECA members. UNITA provided for those directly under its regime, but it also forcibly abducted those same individuals. The MPLA partly

protected people in Matala, but equally abused those living in Chipindo to isolate UNITA. The resources available to people during the conflict, including aid, have also defined how they experienced conflict. Chipindo´s complete isolation from aid and basic services meant a strong reliance on traditional institutions and higher than average mortality rates. In other cases, people did not access relief during conflict because of perceived links to UNITA, as in one of Caluquembe´s communities. For many, help came from resident populations, albeit limited to the early phases of war. In Matala, first wave IDPs became established and economically better-off than later arrivals, primarily due to their access to land and seeds through resident communities.

4. The Angolan state post-war

The duration of the civil war and its emergence immediately after independence have been important factors in the development of the Angolan state and of its relationship with other actors. It is therefore important for this thesis to see how, in the course of the conflict history, the state has evolved and how its relationship with broader society has been shaped. Given the focus of this thesis on local institutions and on how local people relate to those institutions, a brief explanation is in order about the characteristics of the Angolan state, its key organising features, and those of its key institutions of governance and service delivery. When referring to the Angolan state I use the working definition of the state as the government and its institutions for enacting authority, administrative and service delivery functions. That is, the 'apparatus of the government' (Held, 1983: 1).

Given the history described here, it is no surprise that the Angolan state does not fit into the classic Weberian definition of the state in terms of its monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory under its jurisdiction (Weber, 1964: 154). Governance and authority were heavily contested from the early days of the post-colonial state. The very declaration of independence by the MPLA in 1975 and its claim to power as the first independent government was disputed by the other two nationalist movements, the FNLA and UNITA. During the ensuing civil war, the MPLA's authority was challenged by UNITA's pursuit of power, particularly in areas under its effective control. The MPLA regime was also contested from the inside. Its leadership formally adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology, but internal divisions soon emerged. These culminated in an attempted coup d'état in May 1977, by an MPLA faction led by Nito Alves. This was a violent event, followed also by a violent response by the official MPLA faction. It involved the execution of its main proponents and the persecution and intimidation of many others. Together with the high level of external intervention, this event resulted in an increasingly authoritarian character of the single-party state (Neto, 2001, Birmingham and Meijer, 2004).

Given this contestation of power and authority, classical perspectives on state formation would classify Angola as stateless or as a failed state. In fact, since its independence, Angola has been labelled as everything ranging from a failed, weak or fragile state, to one that is actually not so unstable, depending on the indicators and criteria used by different institutions. An UK Department for International Development (DFID) study on Service Delivery in 2004, circumvented the debate on labels by describing post-independence Angola as a ´difficult environment´ with the following characteristics: lack of perceived commitment by the government to the implementation of effective policies, high levels of insecurity, poor human rights record, weak institutions, lack of transparency and accountability to citizens (Fustukian, 2004: 2).

In 2009 Angola was ranked 55th out of 60 countries on the Failed States Index (1 being the most failed and 60 the least), showing an improvement from its 2006 position at

33rd (The Fund for Peace, 2009).[15] Differences in terminology and concepts that describe states affected by conflict or political instability are extensively covered in the literature (Brinkerhoff, 2005b, Fritz and Menocal, 2007, Bellina et al., 2009, Haider, 2010, Mcloughlin, 2010). Overall these labels say little about the actual workings of the state however, and do not deal with its complex reality (Sogge, 2009). They fall short in explaining the complexity underlying Angola´s institutional weaknesses. As I argue in this thesis, this weakness results not only from the direct effect of conflict, but from a combination of multiple historical and political factors, as well as the effects of external aid. Ostheimer (2000: 119) argues that the Angolan state is better characterised as weak rather than failed, because the MPLA government remained considerably resilient in the political crisis, despite its lacking monopoly of power. However, it developed three key areas of weakness: the de-linkage of the political elite from society; the lack of service delivery capacity; and the loss of political legitimacy (ibid).

The gap in service provision by the state was partly filled during the war years by actors such as the traditional authorities, NGOs or religious institutions, which therefore became part of the governance of public goods. My interest in the working of government lies at this level of local governance of services. I understand local government as an arena of negotiation and contention between various actors, rather than simply as an extension of the state apparatus (van der Haar, 2009, Van der Haar et al., 2009b). This is based on the perspective of governance as *practice* (Van der Haar, 2001) and as a multifaceted process involving various competing actors (see Chapter 1).

4.1 Political and administrative structures

Angola's national territory is administratively divided into provinces, municipalities and communes. Local government in Angola as the lowest tier of government is located at the level of the *municípios* and *comunas*. Beyond these, the establishment of autarchies (*autarquías)* are envisaged at municipal level, in ongoing political decentralisation and deconcentration reforms. These are locally elected bodies of autonomous local governance. The *autarquías* are intended to constitute, in conjunction with traditional authority institutions and *'other specific modalities of citizen participation'*, the organisations of local power (*Organizações do Poder Local*) (GoA, 2010). They have yet to be established as no local elections have taken place to date. Below the level of *comunas* there are *bairros* or *povoações* which are groupings of communities or villages, usually urban and rural respectively, although these definitions are fluid and can be determined by other criteria such as size (the *bairro* usually being larger). [16]

The current public administration system consists of the Luanda-based central government, the provincial governments and the local government administrations at municipal and communal levels. The provincial governors represent the central administration of the state in the province. They are responsible for governing the territory and ensuring the functioning of the local administration (GoA, 2010). Provincial Governors are assisted by two Vice-Governors, one for social and economic affairs and the other for organisational aspects and technical services (MAT, 2007). They are all appointed by and are accountable to the President of the Republic. The Angolan leadership and civil service remain strongly male dominated at this level of government, although the official target is for 30% of government posts to be filled by women. In terms of Government Ministers the figure has almost been reached with 9 out of 31 ministers being female, but drops to 15% for vice-ministers. For provincial governors and vice-governors the figures are 16,6% and 22% respectively, while for members of parliament it reaches 39.5% (OMA, 2010).

The *municípios* are headed by Municipal Administrators, who are supported by a Co-Administrator. Likewise, the *comunas* are led by a Communal Administrator and his/her Co-

Administrator. With the introduction of new legislation on the local state administration (Law Decree No. 2/07), the Municipal and Communal (Co)Administrators are proposed by the provincial Governor, but are appointed by and are accountable to the Minister of Territorial Administration. Municipal level administrations have a wide range of responsibilities, and are becoming increasingly important as *the* decentralised institutions of the state administration and as independent budgetary units. Chapter 7 deals with these aspects for the particular case of Matala municipality. It describes how local municipal administrations are organised and structured, including the principal services and divisions.

The *bairros* and *povoações* do not have official government representation and are linked to the state administration trough the traditional authorities. The traditional authorities have a semi-formal status in that they are recognised in the Constitution as *"the entities representative of power amongst their respective politico-community traditional organisation, according to the values and norms and in compliance with the Constitution and the Law."* (GoA, 2010: 80).[17] Their exact role vis-à-vis the local administrations and communities, as well as the system by which they are selected and recognised, remain unclear and in some instances, controversial. The composition of the traditional leadership and its functions, as defined by local government institutions, do not always coincide with those legitimated by local communities.

4.2 State-society relations

In terms of its relationship with society, the emergent regime after independence is frequently described as having developed a strong state at the expense of civil liberties (Pacheco, 2009c: 124). It is commonly characterised by a disconnection between the state and citizens and between the governing elite and general society.

State-society relations in Angola have not only been shaped by the conflict however. Various factors and manifestations come into play. Often the gap between the two is framed in terms of the geographical remoteness of the state apparatus from the everyday lives of local people. The provision of basic social services is an example. Even at the lowest administrative levels where local communities are located, there is little direct contact between local government institutions and the local population. As mentioned earlier, traditional leaders act as intermediaries, but their position and legitimacy remain ambiguous as they sit on the fence between the government and local populations, as representatives of both sides' interests.

The remoteness of the Angolan state, whether actual or perceived, is rooted in its historical trajectory, including colonialism and the post-independence political systems. As I shall argue in Chapter 4, both regimes pursued economic and political interests at the expense of addressing the needs and interests of citizens. This contributed to the erosion of expectations and state legitimacy (Chapter 6). Paradoxically, reference is frequently made to the opposite phenomenon of Angolans expecting the state, or NGOs in its place, to provide for them. *"During the war we got used to receiving things for free and to expecting NGOs and the Government to do everything for us, and now we need to solve our own problems."*[18] On the one hand this is allegedly linked to the legacy of the socialist ideology, whereby the single party regime accustomed people to accessing goods and services for free. In the next chapter I show that is unlikely because its social efforts were short lived. On the other hand, it is linked to the aid practices of replacing the state in service provision, contributing to people´s dependency attitude.[19]

Neto (2001: 47-48) explains these two aspects as follows: *"...the paternalistic concept of the state, as our "father" who should "sustain" us and who "punishes" us as well, is strongly implanted in Angola and is an obstacle to building responsible citizenship. With few*

exceptions, unfortunately, productive and service sectors outside the State system (including NGOs and international bodies) have taken a short-term view favouring immediate results (or, even worse, only reports and information considering these to be "results"). Naturally, the State is blamed when "fundamental problems" are not resolved, and "basic conditions" are not created, even though this was a factor from the start and is part of the environment in which these sectors should be capable of intervening."

The dissociation of the state from society also has to do with the strong interconnection between the government and the MPLA party. As the conflict history demonstrated, the single-party state evolved under the political context of the Cold-War, in which the MPLA and government were one and the same. Within central government, most individuals, particularly high-ranking officials are also members of the MPLA. At the local level, the MPLA has a deep-reaching structure into local society that is important in political life. Local administrations for instance, still rely on the MPLA party representatives within communities and *bairros* to engage with local populations (Tvedten and Orre, 2003). These are known as Party Secretaries (*Secretário/Comissário do Partido*). Much of the state's social mobilisation occurs through the MPLA's civic organisations, such as the women's and youth movements - OMA and JMPLA. In practice, the MPLA still operates as the real ordering mechanism of government, not just in the background of local politics, but quite explicitly. This is particularly true since the 2008 elections, through which the MPLA gained strength by winning 191 out of 220 parliamentary seats, whilst UNITA retained only 16 of its previous 70 seats (HRW, 2009b: 34). In the provinces, the MPLA's headquarters are always located in the central city square. In Lubango, its office building is labelled "The Party's Headquarters". The influence of the MPLA is very visible also in the extensive use of party propaganda. As explained in Chapter 1, this has been controversial in recent times because of the similarity between the MPLA party and national symbols. The reach of the MPLA at the local level is relevant in terms of the state's administrative organisation. However, the top-down nature of the party and the persistent urban-rural divide in Angola, does not allow for any significant vertical integration of local people into broader society.

The interwoven relationship between the government and the MPLA continues to strongly shape the governing practices during reconstruction, contributing to the problematic perception of the role of the state in providing for its citizens. Such dynamics have both an inclusionary and exclusionary effect, particularly for members of local communities in areas previously under UNITA control. As seen in the case of Bunjei, ex-UNITA health workers were intentionally integrated into the state's services after the war, whilst more recently IECA's teachers were left out of the enrolment procedures precisely because of their assumed sympathy for UNITA (see also Chapter 5).

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have reviewed the history of Angola's post-colonial conflict. This has shed light on the multiple and differentiated ways in which conflict develops and impacts the lives of local people. I have stepped away from dominant explanations of Angola's conflict that focus on singular root causes such as natural resources, or that conceptualise conflict as the break-down of society. Rather, I have taken a combined socio-institutional and political economy perspective, which sees war as a social process with multiple causes and manifestations, which are context specific and vary at the local level. This broadened perspective has shown that the workings of conflict in practice are affected by a combination of internal and external factors, and their interaction with specific historical elements. For instance, the external interference of the Cold War superpowers played into existing

dissonances between the warring factions, which in turn developed under the historical context of colonial rule.

Grounding the analysis on localised experiences of conflict has revealed how the dynamics of the broader conflict translate in local contexts into multiple realities and micro-dynamics. These emerged clearly in the examination of Cabinda's case. Its conflict only partly followed the developments and dynamics of the wider civil-war, and remains unresolved today. More relevant than the various cease-fires in explaining how Cabinda's conflict evolved, are the historical trajectory of its independence movements and the role of its oil-wealth.

Furthermore, the analysis of conflict through the specific cases of four municipalities of Huíla has highlighted three important issues relating to how conflict unfolds, is experienced and is responded to at the local level. First, conflict and local institutions are mutually constitutive. Conflict changed social relations, through the effects of displacement and party politics, as seen in the interactions between IDPs and residents, political and military actors, or traditional leaders and their communities. On the other hand, existing local institutions shaped the development and outcomes of conflict. Local churches for example were used by UNITA for political and social mobilisation, through a combination of coercion and support. Second, localised conflict histories have a bearing on post-war realities and capacities for reconstruction. Matala's modest destruction has been followed by a fast recovery, compared to the neglect of heavily war-torn Chipindo. Third, conflict is only one of the factors that shape local realities in crisis. Other forms of violence and local events such as droughts are important determinants of people's vulnerability. Moreover, how people experienced the effects of war largely depended on the resources at their disposal, including external aid.

This chapter has also shed light on how the state has evolved under conflict, and emerged in the post-war context. The effect of the war on state formation, on its relations with society and non-state actors, and on the development of governance practices has been considerable. Many of these have spilled over into the post-war period and continue to shape current relations and practices. They are thus key in understanding the state's capacity for reconstruction. The interwoven relationship between the government and MPLA party which developed under the socialist regime and persists to this day, is a clear example. Dominant perspectives on post-war reconstruction have tended to overlook these historical factors, and often base interventions on in-built assumptions about states and societies after crisis.

The review of the history of conflict, its multiple causes and dynamics and differentiated local outcomes is important for this research because it contributes to the analysis of the workings of aid in conflict and in reconstruction. The failed peacebuilding efforts of the international community partly reflect a lack of understanding of the multiple realities and specificities of the Angolan conflict. Moreover, the localised experiences of conflict suggest the need for differentiated aid responses and the likelihood that similar interventions will have distinct outcomes as they interact and are shaped by local institutions on the ground. Yet, as the next chapter will demonstrate, aid approaches during conflict were overwhelmingly standardised, and opportunities to diversify in contexts of relative peace were missed. With reference to the post-war context, the history of conflict brings an additional layer of understanding of local capacities for reconstruction, by explaining how local institutions, including the state were differentially affected by the war. This is important in analysing how reconstruction aid efforts unfolded in practice.

[1] I have indicated clearly where I have used parts of the original text, and would like to acknowledge the contribution of our extensive discussions to the overall development of this chapter.
[2] It was co-written with Hilde van Dijkhorst, based on original fieldwork material collected independently in two different *municípios* of Huíla province, in 2007 and 2008.
[3] This section largely draws on an earlier text co-written with Hilde van Dijkhorst.
[4] These include: 1) the war of independence (1961-75); 2) the war for power between the three liberation movements (1975); 3) the civil war between MPLA and UNITA with foreign influences (1975- 91); 4) the aggression by South Africa in support of UNITA (until the 1980s when Namibia won independence and apartheid ended); and 5) the post-election war, following the rejection by UNITA of the election results, largely financed by natural resources and causing the greatest destruction (1992 – 2002).
[5] On the 11th November 1975 the MPLA proclaimed the independence of the People's Republic of Angola.
[6] Interview with ex-UNITA official, 15 October 2008, Bunjei.
[7] They included Associação Mãos Livres, SOS-Habitat, Associação Justiça Paz e Democracia (AJPD), Open Society, as well as the foreign organisations National Democratic Institute and the Republican Institute.
[8] This section has been adapted from the analysis of Angola´s conflict history, co-written with Hilde van Dijkhorst.
[9] See Chapter 1 for a broad description of Chipindo and Matala.
[10] See Chapter 5 on the role of IECA in Bunjei.
[11] Agricultural plots.
[12] According to early NGO assessments, the population of Caquela *bairro* (a major IDP reception area in Bunjei) went from 1,500 in February 2002 to 24,000 by August 2002 (ZOA and ADESPOV, 2002).
[13] The total population size is 4,200 individuals, but reached 6,000 at the peak of displacement.
[14] Interview with Municipal Administrator, 24 April 2008, Matala.
[15] Angola was ranked 162 out of 180 countries in the 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, 1 being the least corrupt and 180 the most (Transparency International, 2009).
[16] See footnote 13.
[17] Author's own translation of Article No. 224.
[18] CARE staff at training session of the Decentralisation Programme in Micosse, 11 June 2008, Matala.
[19] Interview with provincial director of ADRA, 05 July 2007, Lubango.

CHAPTER THREE

The Aid Arena in Angola: Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction

INTRODUCTION

In the dominant framework of aid in conflict, humanitarian or relief aid is defined as having the distinct purpose of saving lives and alleviating suffering, wherever and whenever needed. It involves a principled approach to assistance that is needs-based, impartial, neutral and independent. Moreover, it is associated with the work of international humanitarian organisations. Reconstruction in turn, refers to the phase that bridges the transition from crisis to a post-crisis context or from war to peace. It is also generally conceived of as an externally led process that aspires to restore peace and security and to rebuild societies, their livelihoods and institutions. In these ideal-typical models of relief and reconstruction, activities are distinguished between life-saving actions during conflict, and longer term state and institution-building interventions in post-conflict reconstruction.

The realities of aid on the ground differ substantially from these representations of relief and reconstruction, both in terms of intervention outcomes and of implementation approaches. Aid agencies struggle to sustain normative expectations and principles in the complex contexts in which they operate, and have thus been extensively criticised over the last two decades in terms of performance, impact and legitimacy.

In this chapter I want to reconstitute the history of aid in Angola, by looking empirically at these aid realities during the war and reconstruction. This aims to fill the existing knowledge gap on the character of Angola´s post-colonial crisis, the history of aid and its outcomes. In order to unveil how aid interventions and local institutions affect one another, I want to first understand the multiple ways in which people address needs in crisis and post-crisis contexts, including different forms of assistance.

Dominant writings on aid in conflict and post-conflict, based on the ideal-typical representations of relief and reconstruction are limited in explaining these multiple realities. They are based on normative perspectives about what happens to societies and institutions during and after crisis. They overlook the multiplicity of actors involved in the provision of assistance, and have a limited view of what constitutes social assistance besides principled life-saving action. The role of local institutions in assisting populations is frequently ignored or relegated to the margins of humanitarian action. Local actors are often reduced to mere players in the conflict, as in the case of state or rebel institutions, or sidelined for their assumed lack of capacity, as in the case of local organisations. Literature on Angola´s aid history has been restricted to the role of the international humanitarian system and to the proliferation of national NGOs. It has repeatedly left out other key actors and forms of assistance. Dominant frameworks through which humanitarian action is understood discount the ways in which aid interventions get shaped during implementation, through the practices and interaction of these various actors and local institutions.

I take an alternative perspective that conceptualises aid as multifaceted rather than as homogenous or univocal. The "aidnography" of Angola presented in this chapter is framed in the humanitarian arena paradigm, as conceptualised in Chapter 1. In the aid arena, the outcomes of aid are socially negotiated and shaped in the everyday practices of policy and implementation (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010, Hilhorst and Serrano, 2010). In addition to conventional humanitarian agencies, this approach considers the role of a broad range of actors involved in the provision of aid. I look specifically at the role of local people, the state, UNITA and other political and military actors, the United Nations (UN) and international aid organisations, national organisations, and local churches and missions. The analysis of humanitarian aid includes basic service provision in addition to other pure relief activities. Services are central to the fulfilment of basic needs in crisis, they are a key element of the local institutional landscape, and are often the subject of state-building interventions in reconstruction.

The discussion has been divided into three periods of Angola's post-colonial history. Two refer to the civil war (from 1975 to the 1991 Bicesse Accords and from 1992 to the 2002 Luena MoU) and the third deals with the post-conflict phase (from 2002 until present). For each phase, I identify the various actors and aid types that make up the aid arena. The chapter starts with a brief discussion of the dominant perspectives on humanitarian aid and reconstruction, followed by the major critiques of aid practices. It then reviews the history of the humanitarian arena and ends with a discussion of the multifaceted nature of aid.

The chapter is based on key policy and academic literature on relief and reconstruction in conflict contexts and on material collected from interviews with various actors in Huíla and Luanda and during fieldtrips abroad. Large parts of the chapter draw on an article entitled ´The Humanitarian Arena in Angola 1975-2008´ published jointly with Dorothea Hilhorst (Hilhorst and Serrano, 2010). The overview of the history of aid also partly draws on an unpublished analysis co-written with Hilde van Dijkhorst.

1. Dominant perspectives on aid

1.1 Humanitarian aid: a principled approach

Humanitarian aid finds its motivation in the principle of humanity, which refers to the humanitarian imperative to alleviate suffering resulting from conflict or natural disasters by providing assistance whenever and wherever needed. It is guided by additional humanitarian principles that include impartiality, neutrality and independence. Impartiality refers to the equal treatment of people in need, rejecting any form of discrimination. Neutrality means not taking sides in hostilities or controversies that create divisions (political, racial, religious or ideological). Independence denotes not engaging with national or international politics or interest groups in any way connected to the violence (ICRC, 2009). Humanitarian aid is thus supposed to be purely based on needs and not driven by political motives or discrimination (Hilhorst, 2007). These principles are reflected in instruments such as the Code of Conduct for disaster relief and are rooted in the Geneva Conventions and in International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which guide the protection of human dignity during war. They imply an agreement between the belligerents to a conflict and humanitarian actors, whereby the former agree to respect the limits of war if humanitarians do not interfere in the conflict (Leader, 2000). Having been at the forefront of these initiatives, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) represents the gold standard of humanitarianism (Hoffman and Weiss, 2006: 14). Its establishment in 1863 followed Henry Dunant's initiative to provide care for wounded soldiers, after having witnessed the extent of their suffering in the 1859 battle of Solferino in Italy (ICRC, 2005). With World War I, the ICRC specifically turned its attention to the protection and humanitarian assistance for civilians (Forsythe and Rieffer-Flanagan, 2007).

The principles are the cornerstone of humanitarian action because they serve as the guiding ethical and practical framework for humanitarians to intervene in crisis situations. They have informed and influenced humanitarian policies and intervention models in conflict and post-conflict contexts. Yet, as this chapter demonstrates for the case of Angola, they are most difficult to sustain in practice. Humanitarians are faced with complex realities and hard decisions where the normative application of principles and standards is neither linear, nor apolitical. The creation of MSF in 1971 for instance, followed the involvement of its founders in assisting the victims of the Biafra war. They believed that in addition to providing impartial and neutral relief, humanitarians should speak out on the atrocities witnessed during war. Recent developments in the nature of conflict and in the international system have made the implementation of the principled approach all the more difficult (Leader, 2000: 19). This is reflected in the most prominent critique of humanitarian aid - that it can be harmful in conflict

settings as it becomes engrossed in the dynamics of war at the encounter with belligerents. Recognition of this potential negative effect of aid has challenged the very basis of the humanitarian imperative and the ethical framework of humanitarian action (Uvin, 1999, Leader, 2000, Weiss and Collins, 2000). It underlines the fact that the practical application of principles far from being a normative process, is subject to interpretation and negotiation in the interaction of social actors (Hilhorst and Schmiemann, 2002). Aid agencies, whether principled or not, are not exempt from manipulation to serve the interests of political actors.

Over time, humanitarian principles have been extensively debated and transformed. Since the ICRC´s original formulation, numerous actors have become involved in the provision of assistance during crises, adopting and adapting the principled approach in various ways. In recent decades official humanitarian expenditure also grew significantly. Between 1997 and 2006 it more than doubled from 3661 million USD to 8998 million (Borton, 2009: 7). This expansion of humanitarian budgets and actors, and the changing nature of conflict over the last two decades have produced a 'new generation of principles' (Hilhorst and Schmiemann, 2002). They include greater accountability, contextualisation, appropriateness, and subsidiarity of sovereignty (Minear and Weiss, 1993: 19).

With the expansion of the humanitarian sector, the policy and practice of humanitarian aid evolved to include longer term and broader developmental objectives. Based on separate ethical perspectives, two distinct approaches to humanitarian aid emerged. The minimalist approach is based on the imperative to act in any situation of suffering. To that end it forfeits being concerned with the causes of crises. The maximalist approach focuses on the consequences of actions and on the causes of suffering, even where this compromises the ability to alleviate suffering (ICRC, 1997). The former tradition includes agencies that focus on life-saving action, whilst the latter extend their focus to development objectives and peace-building (Goodhand and Lewer, 2001, Hilhorst, 2005b).

In practice, the majority of international NGOs consider themselves as having a mixed-mandate that includes developmental objectives. For example, efforts linked to institution building and capacity development with which this thesis is primarily concerned, have entered the rhetoric of humanitarian actors (Cain et al., 2002, Minear, 2002, Suhrke, 2002, Christoplos, 2004). Traditionally these lay in the development field, whilst humanitarian actors largely worked outside of state and community structures. Currently, only ICRC and MSF are considered as having a strictly humanitarian mandate. For these organisations, relief has a value in and of itself and protection and assistance are the end objectives of their work (Walker, 2005).

Notwithstanding the problematic application of principled approaches, policy and academic writings on humanitarian assistance centre on the importance of the humanitarian principles. As Hilhorst and Jansen (2010: 1117) contend, this is epitomised by the concept of humanitarian space, which remains the dominant framework through which humanitarian action is understood. It generally refers to the operating environment of humanitarians, in which the core humanitarian principles can be adhered to (Spearin, 2001: 22). The focus on principles has meant that dominant frameworks pay little attention to the role of local actors and institutions in assistance. Such role does not fit within these normative parameters. In being agency-centred, they do not adequately consider what happens at the interfaces between (principled) aid interventions and other actors and local institutions, where principles are negotiated and outcomes produced. The inclusion of local populations in this so called space, appears only in rhetorical discussions, and is limited to their ability to reach assistance and protection (HPG, 2010).

In this chapter I want to bring to the forefront and explain the role and motivations of precisely those actors that are outside of the gaze of principle-centred perspectives. I identify them, describe their particular activities in social assistance, and explain their relative position

vis-à-vis other actors over time. In Chapter 6 I zoom in on the more conventional set of aid actors that constitute the (international) aid community (donors, international agencies and NGOs), to analyse how they have perceived of and engaged with local institutions, over the different phases of the conflict and post- conflict.

1.2 Post-conflict reconstruction: bridging relief and development

In dominant aid discourse, post-conflict reconstruction refers to the period of transition from war to peace and from relief to development. It is the process through which societies recover from the effects of the crisis, and their livelihoods and institutions are rebuilt. It also involves the consolidation of peace and security. The objective of reconstruction is *"to reactivate economic and social development...[and] to create a peaceful environment that will prevent a relapse into violence."* (Barakat, 2005a: 10). The term reconstruction is often used interchangeably with recovery and rehabilitation.

Reconstruction efforts are closely entwined with higher-level state-building agendas in fragile and post-conflict countries. In situations of ongoing conflict, reconstruction processes are increasingly integrated into broader peace-building and stabilisation processes. This has become particularly relevant with increased security concerns, resulting from the 11th September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US. As observed by Zyck and Barakat (2009), post-conflict recovery has become highly politicised because it is now a domain dominated with concern over the national security of Western countries. Although such state-building efforts are a dominant aspect of the reconstruction paradigm, they are not at the centre of my analysis of aid practices. My interest is in reconstruction processes at the local level, particularly linked to the provision of social services. In post-conflict settings services are in high demand as people seek to address various needs, but supply is typically limited in terms of access and quality due to institutional weaknesses. As I show in Chapter 6, service provision is a key part of reconstruction efforts, based on the assumed relation between service delivery and state legitimacy, which involves multiple actors (Hilhorst et al., 2010).

Analysis of reconstruction realities in terms of basic service delivery has howeverm been limited. Discussion about service delivery is more frequently framed within the distinction between humanitarian/relief and development aid. Humanitarian aid is conventionally associated with the provision of life-saving assistance through basic commodities and services, including food, water, medicines and shelter. Development aid in contrast, is supposed to address longer-term problems linked to the root causes of poverty, vulnerability and conflict, and is thus more focused on building institutional capacity for service delivery. This divide between what is labelled as either humanitarian or development aid is partly rooted in the rationale of principled-aid, and in the way crisis and normality are constructed. Crises are portrayed as states of 'exception', which are supposedly short-lived. Reconstruction in such perspectives is conceptualised as the in-between phase bridging relief and development, during which a country supposedly returns to 'normality' (see Chapter 1).

The realities of post-war reconstruction are quite different from such representations. First, the underlying assumption that institutions are wiped out in conflict has been described by Cramer (2006) as constituting *"the great post-conflict makeover fantasy"*. The transitions between conflict and peace are characterised by continuities as well as discontinuities (Hilhorst, 2007). Distinctions between crisis and normality are thus difficult to draw, and the return to a pre-conflict situation may not be viable or desirable (Bakewell, 2000).

Second, reconstruction may appeal more to developmental ambitions including local capacity, sustainability and conflict-sensitivity, than to life-sustaining relief activities (Barakat and Zyck, 2009: 1072). However, in practice reconstruction processes often involve a mix and match or constant switching between these intervention modalities. Relief, recovery and development are in constant flux and overlap (ibid). Macrae (2001) characterises these two

sides of reconstruction in relation to service delivery. She refers to physical rehabilitation as the physical conditions for basic service delivery, such as infrastructure, and as the temporary filling of a service delivery gap. Functional rehabilitation in turn, is concerned with the softer side and longer term aspects of services, including policy, human capacity, sustainability of structures, etc. The traditional divide between relief and development approaches became more blurred after the Cold War, as the number of conflict related complex emergencies increased, in which both short and long-term needs coexist. The idea of a 'continuum' from relief to development in which intervention types should be sequential, was replaced by the vision that the two approaches occur simultaneously (Hilhorst, 2005b). This came to be referred to as a 'contiguum' (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005). Reconstruction is an embodiment of the relief-to-development contiguum, in which practices from both approaches are acceptable. For instance, the direct delivery of services by NGOs is common in post-war situations, as is the support to state services in longer term reconstruction.

Increasing recognition by aid practitioners and academics that the realities of reconstruction differ from theoretical claims has led to alternative more localised practices and perspectives on reconstruction (Manor, 2007). Hilhorst et al. (2010: 1110) elaborate the characteristics of 'reconstruction from below' as an emerging alternative paradigm that reflects recommendations and critiques of past approaches: the non-linearity of reconstruction, the local realities of (post-) conflict societies, the risks to generate new grievances, the local specificity of needs, opportunities and synergies to be gained, and issues of ownership. From their review of practice, they conclude that this alternative approach is not a panacea. It is underlined by four sets of problems: adjusting to conditions in the field, being based on untested assumptions, perpetuating mistrust in local institutions, and issues inherent to the aid machinery (ibid: 1119). These are in line with broader critiques made to the practice of aid actors, to which I now turn.

2. Aid under fire: a critique of practices

Humanitarian and reconstruction, despite supposedly representing distinct bodies of policy and practice, have both been extensively criticised on the basis of similar shortcomings. Particularly relevant to this research is *"their inability to adjust to local realities of emergency and post-emergency*." (Hilhorst, 2007: 5). During the 1990s in particular, aid came under fire over issues linked to quality and to the mandates, identities and legitimacy of humanitarian actors (Hilhorst, 2002). Some of this criticism was incorporated into alternative approaches, represented for instance by the maximalist and the reconstruction from below paradigms, as seen in the discussion above. In practice, interventions outcomes continue to be characterised by a discrepancy with stated intentions linked to many of the same limitations. In this section I therefore revisit some of the major critiques common to the two approaches that have a particular bearing on the relationship between aid and local institutions.

2.1 The politics of principled aid

The most prominent critique of humanitarian aid, as already mentioned, relates to its unintended effect of sustaining or fuelling conflict as it is drawn into the politics and dynamics of war. Notable examples include the Nigerian Civil War in the late 1960s, the conflict in the Balkans and in Somalia in the 1990s (Forsythe and Rieffer-Flanagan, 2007) and the atrocities of Goma refugee camps during the Rwandan conflict. Current crises like Iraq and Afghanistan typify the difficulty of reconciling humanitarian principles with long-term development needs and western foreign policy interests. In Afghanistan, the principles of neutrality are redundant to both sides of the conflict, but also to humanitarian actors, who

increasingly focus on building state capacity, rather than choosing to uphold neutrality (Harvey, 2009b). Leader (2000) neatly summarises the problematic application of principled aid.

"Humanitarian action has always been a form of politics, but one that was tightly circumscribed by self-imposed rules of impartiality and neutrality and a focus on the relief of suffering, It was thus a form of politics for which the pretence of being non-political was essential, and this was a fiction that soldiers and politicians were prepared to accept, within limits. The changing nature of conflict, the retreat of international politics from many ongoing conflicts, and the very size of the humanitarian system have all challenged this accommodation. This is why humanitarian action is increasingly being 'politicised' – by donors, belligerents and increasingly by humanitarian agencies themselves." (p. 4).

The engrossment in war dynamics is the most blatant expression of the deeply political nature of aid, whether principled or not. Aid is also politicised in other ways besides conflict. In post-war reconstruction, interventions also unintentionally become part of local political processes and existing power struggles between different local actors, such as local elites and populations (Hilhorst et al., 2010). This political nature of aid nonetheless continues to be overlooked in dominant aid discourses that inform intervention strategies. These therefore tend to base themselves on unrealistic expectations about what programmes can achieve.

2.2 The nature of humanitarian organisations

Another important set of critiques of humanitarian and reconstruction practices relates to the nature of (international) aid organisations. These are at the centre of dominant frameworks on humanitarian action, which portray them as implementing agencies directly involved in activities on the ground. While this is true of many, very often international aid agencies in conflict and post-conflict settings work through other organisations. These organisations are commonly referred to as implementing partners, and include international NGOs, national organisations, local churches, or a whole chain of these. This is the case even for agencies that are well known for their self-run operations, such as WFP. Partnerships between northern and southern organisations are particularly common as they are seen as a way to make aid more effective and to build local capacities (van der Haar and Hilhorst, 2009).

Although the notion of partnership is widely used to describe the relationship between these two sets of actors, it remains problematic in practice. Their relationship is permeated by an indiscriminate mistrust by aid agencies of local partner organisations (Christoplos, 2004, Hilhorst et al., 2010). Investment in organisational development and capacity building of local partners by international counterparts tends to be modest and narrow in focus during crises. In a review of capacity-building in the humanitarian sector, Christoplos (2004: 62) concludes that *"...capacity building is primarily promoted on grounds of increased efficiency and security, through partners who are expected merely to implement priorities chosen from above. Attempts to turn over the humanitarian agenda to 'them' are still relatively few and far between."* The implication of such relationships is that the potential to strengthen local ownership and capacity is undermined. This in turn compromises the sustainability of local organisations and activities once partnerships come to an end.

Organisational interests of aid agencies are also important determinants of their practices. They dictate the priorities and decision making by aid organisations, often at the expense of the quality of the response to local needs. For instance, access to beneficiaries is key to securing funds, and the fight for visibility often becomes the overriding priority. Smillie and Minear (2004: 11) stress the fact that a massive competition for funds has resulted from the increasing diversity of actors, motivations, competence and interpretation of

principles within the humanitarian enterprise, defined as *"the global network of organisations involved in assistance and protection."*.

2.3 The aid machinery

The last set of critiques I wish to highlight is linked to the character, organisation and workings of the aid system. The first refers to the top-down tendency of both humanitarian and reconstruction practices, which has repeatedly led to the neglect of local voices, capabilities and processes (Robson, 2003, Barakat, 2005b, Ramalingam and Mitchell, 2009). These have generally lacked downwards accountability towards beneficiaries and failed to significantly build on existing capacity and institutions or to strengthen local ownership (Christoplos, 2004, Reich, 2006, Davis, 2007). Alternative views on reconstruction that have sought to be more people-centred and locally grounded, have not significantly differed in their everyday practices in terms of engaging with local actors, because they are underlined by the same biases and assumptions (Harmer and Macrae, 2004, Hilhorst et al., 2010).

Second and linked to the above, is the short-term nature of aid interventions in crises and their aftermath. Even during reconstruction, when longer term engagement is supposedly more viable, practices of the humanitarian tradition spill over into the post-war. Reconstruction processes have thus been criticised for using too short time horizons (Barakat, 2005b). This largely relates to funding mechanisms and cycles, which in reconstruction are not significantly different or greater than those in emergencies, despite claims of interventions needing to be broader and longer lasting (van der Haar and Hilhorst, 2009).

The mentioned characteristics of the aid machinery feed into the unequal power relations between international agencies and local actors and the development of dependency. The dependency-syndrome, as it is widely known in aid circles, most commonly refers to the dependency of individual beneficiaries on aid. However, important works for instance by Harrell-Bond (1986), have demonstrated that such relationships of dependence are at least partly explained by the (non-participatory) way humanitarian aid is given, rather than the idleness of beneficiaries. Moreover, the question of dependency in terms of the long-term impact of aid, is perhaps most problematic in relation to local institutions. Local state services or civil society organisations responsible for sustaining services in the aftermath of crises often lack human and material means to do so, once their international counterparts withdraw. In reconstruction, NGOs often take on the job of immediate service provision, which may delay and undermine the development of government institutions (Hilhorst, 2007).

Current problems with humanitarian and reconstruction practices are not due to a lack of awareness that aid interventions interact with the broader processes, institutions and actors. The aspirations of aid to be more context sensitive, bottom-up, and locally grounded, illustrate this. Additionally, aid actors have developed several instruments in recent years to improve performance and learning. This indicates an understanding of the shortcomings of the past and of the need to fix them (ODI Opinion, 2010: 2). The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations in Disaster Relief[1], the Active Learning Network of Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Assistance Programmes (ALNAP), the Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP), the Sphere project and related standards, are some of the most prominent. Mary Anderson's (Anderson, 1996) Do-no-Harm approach has also been influential in averting the perverse effects of aid. However, as this discussion has also shown, actual changes in practice have been minimal. Aid interventions remain conditioned by the same past limitations and underlying assumptions - about social processes in conflict and its aftermath, the nature of local actors, and the organisation of the humanitarian system. In the next section I will show how some of these aspects have played out in practice over the years in Angola.

3. The history of the aid arena in Angola[2]

Angola's political and humanitarian emergency has been described as *"one of the most massive and longest-lasting humanitarian crises in modern history"* (Clark et al., 2003). Humanitarian needs reached overwhelming levels, even for the international humanitarian community. The scale of the response in terms of quantity of aid provided, its cost, duration and number of beneficiaries reached, has therefore dominated analysis of the aid history. *"Angola became the most expensive humanitarian operation in the world, with 10 United Nations' Agencies, 100 international NGOs and more than 420 national NGOs providing assistance to 2 million people."* (Porto and Parsons, 2003: 12). The realities of aid in Angola have been much more diverse than these images portray, in terms of its outcomes, actors and motivations. In this section, I aim to bring out these multiple realities and experiences, by reviewing empirically the history of aid in the country.

I frame my analysis in the humanitarian arena paradigm as conceptualised in Chapter 1. It proposes an alternative to the way dominant paradigms, such as that of the humanitarian space, analyse aid in conflict-affected contexts. By focusing on the everyday practices of aid, it steps away from pre-conceived notions of whom and what constitutes social assistance. Dominant perspectives focus attention on the role of international aid agencies and the aid they provide. They reduce local needs to those directly resulting from conflict, and overlook the different actors and motivations involved in aid delivery (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010, Hilhorst and Serrano, 2010). The alternative arena approach opens up the analysis to include a broad range of actors involved in the provision of aid and a broad range of services that are part of the assistance provided during and after conflict. It studies aid as an ensemble, rather than as individual actors and interventions (Hilhorst, 2003).

In Angola, various actors have been involved in social assistance during the different periods of the conflict and post-conflict. In dominant writings, local people are usually reduced to beneficiaries in need of external assistance. In reality, they mostly cope on their own rather than as refugees or IDPs (Bakewell, 2000) and are the first to deploy mechanisms of self and mutual help in crisis. Yet, humanitarian literature refers to people as clients of aid programmes, according to different labels such as refugees, IDPs, ex-soldiers, or vulnerable women, or simply as victims (Agier and Bouchet-Saulnier, 2004). Local coping strategies are thus frequently left out of discussions on humanitarian action. *"Much of what is local and non-western in humanitarian action goes unrecognized"* (Donini, 2008 in Borton, 2009: 26). The state and other military actors are seen in turn, primarily as belligerents with no role in service provision, or in shaping aid efforts. Yet, as Harvey (2009b: 2) explains, *"In conflicts and complex emergencies, the state may be both an active party, and involved in regulating and coordinating humanitarian actors, raising difficult issues in relation to principles of neutrality and independence."*. It is thus important to understand the role of government, and in Angola's case, also of UNITA not just as a perpetrators, but also in conditioning the response to crisis (Hilhorst and Serrano, 2010). Other external political actors, such as the Cold War superpowers, besides engaging in military support, also provide or enable services. This can be seen as intrinsic to military strategies, as in the heart and minds discussion, or in the case of the central state, as part of post-colonial state-building assistance. Besides the conventional aid actors, such as the UN, international aid organisations, and national civil society organisations, I also look at the specific role of local churches and missions. Long before the civil war, this set of actors was already a crucial provider of basic services to local populations.

By considering these multiple actors, my analysis of Angola´s aid history considers the various forms of social assistance and services besides the life-saving activities of principled humanitarian actors. Attention to basic services is important because they are

crucial in meeting people´s needs in crisis and post-crisis and involve multiple state and non-state providers. Moreover, service provision is a major objective of aid interventions during emergencies, but also of state-building agendas in reconstruction. Alternative types of assistance which are considered in the analysis that follows include technical support to state services by political players like Cuba, solidarity mechanisms and social support of local communities, physical protection and services provided by rebels to non-military members of the regime, and peace-building efforts and service provision by local churches.

The analysis is divided into two phases of the civil war, and a third post-war period: from 1975 to the 1991 Bicesse Accords; from 1992 to the 2002 Luena MoU; and from 2002 until present. These timeframes were defined pragmatically, as a broad reflection of key political developments in the conflict, namely the two distinct periods of conflict separated by the interim peace of 1991, and the final peace agreement of Luena. These also reflect the major shifts in terms of the character of the aid response, as shall be seen. The analysis of these timeframes includes extensive detail, not all of which directly links to the core theoretical arguments of this thesis. Nonetheless, I have found it important to provide a systematic overview that contributes to the reconstruction of Angola´s aid history. Moreover, it provides an essential backdrop for the analysis of the specific interaction of aid and local institutions over time, which is the core of Chapter 6.

3.1 Civil war: 1975 to the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accords

In the later phase of colonialism, Angolan refugees that had fled the violence surrounding the 1961 nationalist uprisings, were assisted by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ICRC and church organisations in neighbouring Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) (Gorman, 1994). Aid organisations were otherwise not operating in Angola at that time. The humanitarian impact of the civil war was felt soon after its eruption in 1975. Fighting was largely confined to rural areas. Cities were 'islands' of government control and many people thus fled to urban areas, particularly towards provincial capitals. My interviews[3] revealed that 68% of respondents that had been displaced experienced their first displacement during the 1970s or 1980s. As shown in the previous chapter, the war tactics on both sides involved the cruel treatment of populations as belligerents sought to control and use them as resources of war (Brinkman, 2003). The surfacing of humanitarian needs was thus closely entwined with displacement and urbanisation trends. Existing social services in urban centres became overwhelmed with growing numbers of displaced populations and underinvestment by the state, and in rural areas services were eroded and abandoned (see Chapter 4). The result is that at the start of the 1980s there was already evidence of famine conditions linked to the effects of conflict (Duffield, 1994). Humanitarian needs in the South of the country also related to recurring drought conditions. However, Angola only started receiving significant international aid at the end of the decade.

Local people

People arriving in towns and cities during this period, resorted to self and mutual-help mechanisms in order to survive. Testimonies of populations in Huíla refer to the fact that during such displacement, many were able to avoid complete destitution compared to later displacements, by taking some of their assets along (such as cattle or seeds), because they were able to remain on the same spot for long enough to farm and eat from their harvests, and because of the help they received from resident populations.[4] Nonetheless, the majority still recall their first displacement as the most traumatic because it represented an abrupt rupture with their existing lives and livelihoods and a great uncertainty about the future. People overwhelmingly relied on their social networks and kinship ties during displacement, for

support in accessing land and productive means, or finding alternative livelihood strategies, rather than on external help. In Chapter 4 I explore in more detail how these informal strategies and institutions of solidarity changed and were weakened over time.

The state

The role of the government in providing assistance to the population during this phase was limited. Early investments made in the immediate post-independence period in sectors like education and health, were quickly reversed and services soon entered a process of decay. Vidal (2008) argues that until 1979 there was a concern and commitment by the (MPLA) government to improve social services, but that the first signs of erosion appeared still under Agostinho Neto's presidency from 1975 to 1979. In the course of the 1980s, the GoA received substantial external technical and personnel support primarily from Cuba in an attempt to maintain a certain level of social welfare.

In terms of official direct assistance to the population, the government used two main channels (Duffield, 1994). One involved subsidised food sales of imported commodities. These benefitted only an urban minority through state owned shops where rationed basic goods were distributed. These subsidies ended in 1992 following the effects of the drop in oil prices and of structural adjustment programmes of the late 1980s. Moreover, rural people I interviewed never referred to this. The second channel of assistance consisted of the government's relief institutions. This involved the State Secretariat for Social Affairs (SEAS), later converted into the MINARS. Both of these government efforts were limited in capacity. They restricted aid to (urban) areas under government control and dismissed refugees or drought victims as eligible (ibid). Other social initiatives linked to the government were those of the MPLA´s civic organisations (see below).

UNITA

UNITA did not provide humanitarian or social services for the general population under its areas of control. *"UNITA has never established even a notionally independent humanitarian arm."* (Duffield, 1994: 94). The regime created only a Social Welfare Department through which to control external aid. *"Food distribution had to be organized mainly through UNITA's Social Welfare Department, or, where possible, through CARITAS, which had an extensive local network within UNITA-areas because of its links with local churches."* (Ostheimer, 2000: 130).

As a former security official of Savimbi explained, *"UNITA was a very rude party in the way it treated people. After the signing of the Bicesse accords in 1991, the ICRC appeared to deliver aid packages to those considered captives. I also received this. We were given the opportunity to send some letters to relatives. It was the first time that aid of this type got to us. MSF brought medicines and a book called 'Where there are no doctors'. UNHCR also brought some food for people. There were no other organisations working in our area prior to 1991. WFP was never there. Even these organisations never set up operations like health posts and so on. They would just come, dump supplies, do that work and leave. It would be the FALA [UNITA's army] that would do the distribution to the population."*[5]

As the case of Bunjei presented in Chapter 2 demonstrated, people that had access to social services were those working with the regime, their relatives or those in some way strategically important for the functioning of its apparatus. Jeremias Sambo, a nurse who was captured by UNITA and taken to work at its base in Jamba, explained how this worked. "*In Jamba we did not receive a salary. We also didn't farm for food. We were given food from the stocks that they had there, so we received a generous ration with all kinds of things. We ate*

well there – meat, fish, vegetables. The education of our children was also good – they all went to school"[6] I return to the story of the Sambo family in Chapter 5.

People´s links with the protestant churches were also important in determining their access to UNITA´s restricted services. As João, an adult literacy teacher of IECA, explained, *"In the bush, after my mother was killed, I never joined the military but I did attend the schools of UNITA. There were groups or training centres for youth. People that belonged to these groups couldn't be recruited to fight because supposedly they were going to be the future leaders. It helped us a lot. They gave us a study pass in case someone tried to recruit us. Many with good grades would be awarded grants to go study abroad. We, the children of the (IECA) mission were well known for already having some schooling so we were immediately taken to the training centres."*[7]

Unlike the MPLA government, UNITA did not receive assistance other than military, from its external backers during the Cold War. South Africa's engagement in Angola was intended to isolate Namibia and its support was therefore limited to military equipment and training. As explained by a former member of the SADF forces in Angola and current political analyst, the South African motivation for intervention in Angola was purely military, with no ambition to win the hearts and minds of Angolans. "*In some areas, people may have received some help on the back of military operations, in the form of food or medical assistance. But it was not at all planned, just a by-product. Angola was seen purely as a host country to launch military attacks onto the enemy."*[8] UNITA representatives stated that they did not request such assistance as they wanted to keep relations to a minimum due to their resentment of the Apartheid system.[9] The United States also limited its support of UNITA to military aspects. Its humanitarian contributions were channeled through the UN system.[10]

External political actors

The government received large scale assistance from external political actors for various sectors. This included hundreds of Cuban professionals deployed to the health and education services, and to a smaller scale to other social sectors, such as housing.[11] The Soviet Union also gave some bilateral aid but their presence in the country was considerably smaller.[12] From 1980 to 1985 services were already in a state of rapid decline and underinvestment. The effect of the Cuban withdrawal in 1989 on these services was quite severe. The impact on health care was described as follows: *"Cuban doctors became the backbone of the health system in the 1980s, particularly in rural areas where Angolan doctors were not interested in working... when the Cubans left in 1989 the health system collapsed."*[13] Cuba's assistance to Angola, both in military and social terms, was grounded on an ideology of support to national liberation in the African continent (El Tahri, 2007). Cuban civilians in their thousands were part of the efforts to rebuild the country after the departure of the Portuguese (Britain, 1998). Notwithstanding the strong sense of solidarity, Cuba's support is also said to have had a self-serving element, involving political, social and economic interests (Hatzky, 2008). It entailed costs for the Angolan government[14], some of which allegedly afforded from oil revenues, ironically from US companies (Birmingham and Meijer, 2004). Hatzky (2008: 57) provides a compelling analysis of the civil Cuban mission in Angola, particularly in the education sectors. She highlights the political and personal dimensions of the relationship between the two countries, and the *"extremely complex network of interests, propaganda, symbolism and power"* that defined it.

International organisations and the UN

Until 1990, there were few international humanitarian agencies working in the country. Yet, records show that at the end of the 1970s humanitarian aid flows to Angola were already quite

significant. In those years the GoA requested the support of various UN and other international organisations, namely UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, FAO, WFP, the Red Cross institutions and Nordic donors such as Sweden and Norway (Vidal, 2008: 15). However, by the end of the 1980s, aid per capita figures were still only about half of those found in other sub-Saharan countries (Sogge, 2007: 4). In 1988 as few as six international NGOs were present in the country (Duffield, 1994: 33). The UN´s Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO - later turned into the Department of Humanitarian Affairs – DHA and then the Organisation for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - OCHA) was responsible for launching appeals, whilst the other UN agencies operated primarily in government areas (Lanzer, 1996).

The only international organisations working in UNITA controlled territory were the ICRC and MSF. The ICRC set up its offices in Angola in June 1975.[15] In 1981 it began distributing humanitarian aid to Angola's displaced (ICIHI, 1986), and from 1985 until the end of the war, it provided aid on a massive scale, turning Angola into ICRC's largest mission in Africa. It played a key role gathering data through surveys and needs assessments during the 1980s.[16] ICRC was operational in both government and UNITA territories. This was possible because of its long history in the country, its international reputation, and its approach on the ground. ICRC worked with two Red Cross national movements (Cruz Vermelha Angolana – CVA) - one established (in 1978) by the government and the other later on by UNITA in Jamba. Although internal rules specify that there can only be one national Red Cross society accepted by the state (Forsythe and Rieffer-Flanagan, 2007: 1), ICRC violated its own rules to secure access to populations on both sides.[17]

MSF was initially only operational in UNITA areas. Its first mission, led by the French branch in 1983, was running nutritional and other programmes, primary health care services in displacement camps, as well as supporting hospitals and smaller health structures (MSF, 05 March 2002). In 1989 MSF Belgium and Spain started interventions in government areas. MSF was stigmatised by the government because it was seen as having taken the side of UNITA in the conflict (Ball and Campbell, 1998). Moreover, the organisation had been associated with anti-communist movements in other parts of the world. (Sogge, 2007). Allegedly, it was averse to the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese regime of Phnom Penh, therefore suspending support from the Khmer Rouge refugee camps (Terry, 2002: 149).[18]

In the 1980s, only a few agencies were involved in development programmes, including Oxfam UK, German Agro Action, The Agency for Coordination and Research in Development (ACORD) and Development Workshop (DW). Most of the NGOs that arrived in Angola at this time were engaged in the first coordinated humanitarian intervention programme – the SRPA. Launched in September 1990 under the coordination of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the SRPA involved for the first time, the creation of a coordinating body for the humanitarian response, the Emergency Coordination Unit. It was this unit that first negotiated access with UNITA (Ball and Campbell, 1998). Significantly, the SRPA was officially established as a response to drought conditions. Its role as an instrument for peace was framed only as a by-product (UNICEF, 1991 in Duffield, 1994: 48). Duffield (1994) argues that this was a political decision to circumvent the structural causes of the crisis. This pattern was repeated in the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) - a yearly UN-led process that brought together various national and international humanitarian actors, government and donors, to define a collaborative assistance programme. The 1993 CAP defined the crisis as one of physical destruction, dislocation and material shortages, to be normalised with emergency aid. The SRPA allowed more people to be reached by aid than before, but the renewal of conflict in 1992 led to its interruption.

Decisions about aid in this period were also shaped by the set up of the humanitarian system. A reform process internal to the UN was taking place, whereby the humanitarian and political roles were moved closer under the same management structure. This allowed for

external political pressure from the US, to secure the inclusion of UNITA areas in the SRPA. Critics view this as political manoeuvre to attempt to replace South African assistance to UNITA (Duffield, 1994, Richardson, 2000).

National organisations

During this phase there were no national NGOs or civil society organisations to speak of. They lacked *"the social basis and the political freedom to flourish."* (Sogge et al., 2009: 55). Civic space had been restricted to the churches already under colonial times, and remained tightly controlled under the MPLA's socialist regime. Existing national organisations included those linked to Catholic and Protestant churches, the YMCA, and the Angolan Red Cross (ibid). Typical of Marxist regimes, civic organisations of the MPLA party, such as the Organisation of Angolan Women (OMA) and the youth MPLA movement (JMPLA), were prominent and had a role in social action. OMA, besides promoting the role of women within the party, was involved in training and protection activities linked to health and justice (Pereira, 2006: 249). Given the reach of its networks, it also carried out aid distributions.[19]

Churches and Missions

Local churches were key providers of social services, especially in rural areas where these were more remote or eroded, and with particular reference to health and education. Social assistance activities were often integrated within the churches' missionary and spiritual activities, rather than having specialised branches for social work. Because of their extensive networks and access to isolated areas, they became the main implementing partners for the few aid organisations operational in the country at the time. CARITAS was a major actor in UNITA areas for this reason, and in spite of UNITA's traditional link to the protestant churches. The World Council of Churches also provided substantial assistance through its rural missions. On the other hand, material assistance by local churches should not be overestimated as they were also weakened by the effects of war. IECA's mission compound in Bunjei for instance, was completely destroyed in fighting in the 1980s.

The churches in Angola were always enmeshed in local and national politics. Their relationship first with the colonial administration (see Chapter 5) and later with the post-independence Marxist regime was problematic. They suffered significant repression in this period. At independence a number of Catholic missionaries left the country due to the church's association with the colonial power. Those that remained were often working in rural missions, remote from the hierarchy of the church. Several Catholic and Protestant leaders were imprisoned, often without trial, whilst other churches, such as Jehovah's Witnesses were expelled (Henderson, 1990). UNITA for its part, adopted the practice of kidnapping Catholic priests, as in the case in 1982 of the Archbishop of Lubango (ibid: 401). From early on, different churches were associated with either party of the civil conflict. This is attributed to the fact that leaders of the various political movements were educated by different church groups (Comerford, 2005). The MPLA was said to be more accommodating of the Methodist church, which was linked to Agostinho Neto, than of the Catholic church, linked to the Portuguese, or the protestant stream linked to Savimbi (Sogge et al., 2009). As the earlier story of João showed, UNITA in turn, gave preferential treatment to evangelical churches such as IECA.

In their everyday practices, missionary workers involved in social assistance, strategized to avoid such political associations and maintain neutrality (Hilhorst and Serrano, 2010). Staff of IESA's mission hospital in Caluquembe municipality recounted how despite its association with UNITA, the hospital frequently treated patients from the MPLA ranks and Cuban troops, but did so discretely.[20] Likewise, the Chissamba mission hospital in Bié treated

wounded soldiers from both sides in the late 1970s (Henderson, 1990: 399). At the local level, political and religious actors recognized the role of the other.[21] For a long time, the perceived value of IESA's mission work protected it from military attacks. MPLA pilots charged to destroy the Mission would drop their bombs in a nearby forest and report they missed their target.[22] During this period, the churches also developed an important role in human rights and peace advocacy, given the absence of other civil society actors until the early 1990s (Vidal, 2006).

3.2 Civil war: 1992 to the 2002 Luena MoU

The period from 1992 until the end of the conflict in 2002 involved changes in the politics and intensity of the conflict, as well as several attempts to negotiate peace. The scale and nature of humanitarian needs also changed, although not uniformly. The aid response did not however, simply follow the changing humanitarian situation, as implied in principled approaches. Moreover, aid was deeply enmeshed in war dynamics in this phase. Access to relief aid had become strategically important to both conflict parties with the end of the Cold War and the consequent removal of external support (Lanzer, 1996, Ostheimer, 2000, Richardson, 2000). Between 1992 and the 1994 Lusaka Peace Protocol the war was extremely fierce. Estimates put the total number of deaths at 300,000 as a direct result of conflict, or due to landmine incidents and acute malnutrition (Hodges, 2001: 15). A total of 3.2 million people were considered to have been affected by this war (Duffield, 1994: 37), and some 40% of the population displaced: 4,288,000 as IDPs and 470,000 as refugees (Sapir and Gomez, 2006: 8).

The period after Lusaka until 1998 was characterised by a no-peace-no-war situation. Its relative stability did not achieve changes in the practices of the aid response. Moreover, it could not restore physical security or reverse displacement trends. As such, only a small proportion of the estimated one million IDPs remaining in 1997, were resettled (Porto and Parsons, 2003: 11). The 'final war' from 1998 to the 2002 Luena MoU followed the GoA's decision to abandon the Lusaka process. Mortality in this period and in the immediate post-conflict reached new peaks. Health, education and nutrition indices in 2001 placed Angola amongst the worst performing countries in the world. The average under five mortality rate for these years was 3.9 deaths per 1,000/day, almost double the established emergency threshold of 2 deaths per 1,000/day (Sapir and Gómez, 2006: 17). In northern Huíla, these figures reached between 7.6 and 17 deaths for the under-fives, and between 2.9 and 6.3 for the overall population (SCF, 2008). Several areas became inaccessible to relief aid.

Local people

Whereas in previous phases of the conflict fighting had been confined to rural areas, after 1992 the war spread to urban centres, many of which came under UNITA control. Reports of forced displacement were frequent at this stage. Displacement thus became more violent and services in urban areas increasingly overcrowded. Rural services and populations were largely abandoned. Once the war resumed in 1998, remote areas, particularly under UNITA, were cut off from aid. Over three million Angolans were out of humanitarian reach in UNITA territory and many more were forcibly moved by government troops to displacement camps without assistance (Sapir and Gómez, 2006). For people in Bunjei, this was the period cited most frequently as the 'worst' in the conflict in terms of violence and dispossession (see Chapter 5).

The intensity of the last phase of the conflict and the brutality of 'scorched earth' tactics by both sides during this phase of the conflict resulted in a huge blow to local coping capacities. People were constantly on the move, hardly having time or the means to farm and harvest, therefore experiencing extended periods of hunger. *"The attacks were constant. There was no food, and we couldn't farm. We survived on manioc."*[23] People´s access to education

and health care were seriously disrupted. Where available, the only alternatives were traditional medicine and makeshift schools that relied on the skills of community members. The cutting-off of the population from international humanitarian assistance was something that had not happened in previous phases of the war and which resulted from an attempt to exert control over the population as a war objective for both sides (MSF, 2002c: 11).

The state

In the course of the 1990s the government's role in social assistance and services was practically negligible. Basic service provision was left to the aid community to the extent that international aid agencies effectively took over the role of public service institutions (Christoplos, 1998). *"MSF was more of a Ministry of Health than the actual ministry. MSF staff was often placed within the ministry, and was cheap labour for the GoA."*[24] Many civil servants, frustrated with the deteriorating working conditions, took up jobs with NGOs. The government's involvement in the international humanitarian response was limited to aspects of coordination and access. Funding wise, it waived customs taxes on relief goods and co-financed some transport and petrol costs. Towards the end of the conflict, the GoA made some effort to provide social assistance, but these proved tokenistic in relation to needs. In 1999 for instance, the National Programme of Emergency Assistance (PNEAH) was launched to respond to the humanitarian crisis, and an Inter-Ministerial Commission for the Humanitarian Situation established to coordinate the programme. However, by 2002 it had earmarked (not spent) a total of $45.5 million USD, compared to the $75 million provided by the US government alone for that year (USAID, 2002).

The relationship between the GoA and aid agencies was problematic. The aid community saw the government as a perpetrator and as incompetent (see Chapter 6 on perceptions of the state). Donors thus avoided the GoA and preferred the neutrality of humanitarians (Sogge, 2007: 6). *"The UN suspected that the GoA discriminated people in the distribution of aid, so they opted for INGOs."*[25] The GoA perceived aid actors as intrusive but as a necessary evil for the provision of social assistance to the population (Jorge, 2006). It used heavy bureaucratic procedures relating to work permits and registration of organisations to retain control over these external actors. NGOs were resented by state institutions for absorbing most donor funds, for being patronising towards civil servants, and for draining state services of human resources. As a former Minister of Agriculture during this period explained, state institutions involved in assistance were overwhelmed by the presence of the aid industry. *"Government officials resented having to compromise on their interests and priorities in order to access donor funding. NGOs would assist farmers but without any policy guidelines or long-term plan. In addition, they spent large amounts on expensive administrative structures."*[26] On the other hand, relief aid gained a strategic importance for the government, both as a military tool and within the governance apparatus. In the 1990s as food aid replaced commercial food imports, several state institutions disputed the responsibility for the coordination of emergency aid (Duffield, 1994).

UNITA

As in the previous phase, UNITA continued to have no explicit role in assistance to local populations. Particularly towards the end of the conflict, under increased isolation and pressure through international sanctions, it largely relied on local populations to feed its troops through extortion taxes on harvests and forced labour on collective plots.[27]

Like the government, UNITA requested humanitarian assistance from the international community. Rather than pursuing welfare objectives however, both parties manipulated aid to serve political interests. UNITA made changes to its organisational structure in order to obtain

access to relief. This was motivated by the need to counter the new legitimacy gained by the GoA in winning the elections, and to replace diminishing resources (Duffield, 1994). The government in turn, inflated numbers of IDPs and humanitarian needs. The belligerents also used aid as a bargaining tool in negotiations for humanitarian access to civilians through the method of 'linkage'. *"UNITA set the precedent in mid-1993 of linking aid for one city's population to that of another city's, based on the premise that if Angolans in a government area received aid, then Angolans in a UNITA area had to be provided assistance too."* (Lanzer, 1996: 19). The government retaliated with similar strategies. This often led to a stalemate in operations and the deterioration of the situation of local people. Aid supplies were also prone to loss or leakage as a result of extortion by military and non-military actors during distributions. This has been estimated between 5 and 15% (Ostheimer, 2000).

Several security incidents took place in UNITA territory, such as the shooting down of two UN planes in December 1998 and January 1999 (Paulo, 2004: 30). Although in the mid-1990s the ICRC had a permanent base in Bailundo - one of Savimbi's headquarters - it also suffered an attack by UNITA in 1998. These events effectively ended all humanitarian access until after the end of the war in 2002. As explained by a former top security official of Savimbi, nobody could be guaranteed safe access to UNITA areas thereafter. *"At the time, these abuses were reported even by the BBC and Voice of America. We were under increasing pressure."*[28] Several areas under government control were also isolated from aid (MSF, 05 March 2002).

External political actors

Other external political actors had little influence in the development of the conflict and the crisis response, given that the Cuba and South Africa had withdrawn by this point. International political involvement was carried out through the UN and donor strategies.

International Organisations and the UN

The large scale humanitarian effort in Angola began with the arrival during the Bicesse peace period, of several international organisations, aiming to start up rehabilitation oriented programmes. The bulk of the aid distribution from this point onwards was thus implemented by international agencies. Many withdrew when the conflict re-ignited as access and security became serious problems. Others significantly downsized activities and capacity. NGO numbers grew from 6 in 1988 to 50 in 1991, but then halved again by mid-1993 (Duffield, 1994: 52, 99). Immediately after the breakdown of Bicesse, agencies such as WFP, UNHCR, ICRC and CARITAS were still able to transport some aid to a few provincial cities, but in an ad-hoc manner. ICRC, MSF and Save The Children Fund (SCF) attempted but failed to negotiate access with the GoA and UNITA separately (Richardson, 2000). During the Bicesse process, the ICRC lobbied the government to include the integration of the two Angolan Red Crosses into peace negotiations. Staff from the UNITA CVA was placed within the Luanda CVA and merged into one organisation. *"This integration of UNITA members did not facilitate access to UNITA areas because it was Savimbi himself that had to sign access permits after the return to war."*[29] Meanwhile, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) arrived during the 1991 peace to take over activities in the transition to peace, but ended up co-existing under the leadership of the ICRC until the end of the war.

In the course of the 1990s, hundreds of agencies became involved in social assistance. Angola received exceptionally high donations compared to other complex emergencies (Ostheimer, 2000: 133). Even under the competition from the highly media exposed emergency in Kosovo, it got $90 million per year between 1997 and 2001 (Olsen et al., 2003). Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) figures ranged from an annual average of USD 297

million in 1990-93, USD 447 million in 1994-96 and USD 359 million in 1997-1999 (UN, 2002a: 83). At the peaks of the crisis (1993/1994 and 2000/2001) the ICRC for example had some 60 expatriate staff in-country and 400 Angolan collaborators.[30]

The UN system became central in the management of the humanitarian effort. The SRPA was replaced by an emergency programme, under the UN's coordinating body - DHA.[31] The first consolidated appeal for Angola was launched in May 1993 and resulted in the creation of the UN Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UCAH). UCAH coordinated emergency operations and negotiated humanitarian access with the warring parties. It retained this mandate throughout the 1990s and until the end of the post-war emergency. The ICRC and MSF remained outside of the coordination mechanism of OCHA and negotiated access separately (Ball and Campbell, 1998). In 1998, OCHA helped to set-up a separate government structure - UTCAH, housed within MINARS. UTCAH was meant to build the government's leadership capacity for the operational coordination of humanitarian assistance. It established offices and provincial coordinators in all provinces, to oversee and raise funds for humanitarian operations.[32] At the time of writing these were still in existence, but their role and mandate were being debated. In Huíla UTCAH was almost inactive. Debate about UTCAH's mandate and future role in reconstruction was under way.[33]

OCHA's operation in Angola was one of its first. Particularly during its initial years it was considered successful in managing access under deteriorating humanitarian conditions (Anstee, 1996, Lanzer, 1996, Ball and Campbell, 1998, Paulo, 2004). OCHA and UNDP were the key institutions in planning and decision-making about humanitarian assistance. The appropriateness of aid strategies was thus closely linked to their organisational effectiveness and analytical capacities (Cain, 2001: 578). OCHA's image changed over time. This was linked in particular to the increased manipulation of aid by belligerents, to the perceived integration of the UN´s political and military roles, and to OCHA's failure to work with the existing NGO coordination bodies CONGA and FONGA (more on these below) (Christoplos, 1995). Combined with the failure of the peace-building efforts, this led to the UN's general loss of popularity and credibility including of its aid operations, towards the end of the 1990s (Richardson, 2000).

The politicisation of aid through mounting abuses by belligerents brought into question the ability of aid agencies to uphold neutrality. In 1998 a large humanitarian aid convoy headed from Lubango to Caluquembe was attacked on the road, resulting in the death of five people. Stories of incidents such as abductions of local staff further reveal that humanitarian agencies were unable, and perceived by some as unwilling, to pursue and secure their release.[34] Moreover, the cutting-off of aid to UNITA areas was considered partly politically driven by the international community. Messiant (2004b) argues that the UN consciously chose to abandon its mandate to negotiate peace and deliver humanitarian aid.

Another important aspect of the international aid response in this period, relates to coverage. Despite the scale of the humanitarian effort in the last decade of war, aid did not reach large parts of the population. It fell short of needs in terms of scope and reliability (Sogge, 2007). Malnutrition and mortality figures, and the testimonies of rural people, consistently reflect this. By 2001, Angola had the third worst under five mortality rate, one of the highest maternal mortality rates, and one of the worst life expectancies in the world at 39.9 years (Sapir and Gómez, 2006: 6).

Operational modalities and intervention approaches further undermined impact. Large amounts of aid money were spent on transport, salaries and overhead costs of international organisations (Sogge, 2007: 4). This was linked to the set-up of the humanitarian system, which relied on a chain of subcontracting of organisations to deliver aid, and to the political context which required much of the relief to be air-lifted. Moreover, the repeated prioritisation

of emergency relief distribution over other approaches meant that the longer-term effects of the crisis and its root causes were unaddressed.[35]

National organisations

National NGOs emerged as a new set of players in the humanitarian arena in this phase. Following the Bicesse peace process, legal reforms allowed the establishment of independent associations and with it the emergence of a body of national civil society organisations (CSOs). These included independent media, syndicates and specialised workers councils, neighbourhood associations, as well as religious organisations. According to Sogge et al (2009: 56), national NGOs emerged under three auspices: under the party-state structure, as in the most notable example of the Eduardo dos Santos Foundation (FESA); under the churches, including CARITAS and the social departments of protestant churches; and under foreign aid channels, through the direct creation of organisations, but primarily through the demand for local partners. In 1991, a Forum for Angolan NGOs (FONGA) was created, separately from the existing coordination group of INGOs (CONGA).[36]

Many local organisations thus became implementing partners of international agencies. They were able to reach remote rural populations in contested areas, as they had fewer security restrictions and greater ability to forge local networks. This relationship with international agencies contributed to the boom in local NGOs and to their organisational development and experience-base. National development professionals refer to the knowledge acquired during their work for INGOs or in partnership with them. Together with other CSOs, local NGOs played a role in the opening up of the public sphere independent from the state, promoting an environment and culture of advocacy for peace, human rights and citizen participation (Simões and Pacheco, 2008, Pacheco, 2009c, Sogge et al., 2009). In the case of the Angolan Red Cross (CVA), the Bicesse accords led to a merger of the two organisations (UNITA and government), and a new relationship with their international partners. The IFRC was handed over responsibility for capacity building of CVA, which thereafter stopped working in the same areas as ICRC.

Nonetheless, the relationship between international and national organisations was also problematic due to unequal power positions, differing approaches to aid delivery, and conflicting interests. Partnerships were often based on a subcontracting model of service delivery by local NGOs. National organisations relied heavily and often exclusively, on the funding from INGOs and donors for their functioning and running costs. As well as concerns over sustainability, this compromised their independence and ability to lobby international agencies to promote alternative aid approaches and interests. There were few exceptions where advances were made in this regard, often with backing of a more 'progressive' international partner. However, these fell short of achieving significant breakthroughs in changing aid practices, and were crowded out by the larger relief apparatus. This is illustrated in the example of the Angolan Action for Rural Development and Environment (ADRA) partnership with ACORD in Gambos municipality presented in Chapter 8.

The strengthened financial position of INGOs vis-à-vis local organisations as well as differences in working conditions and salaries between local and international staff further played into tensions. A recurrent theme in my interviews with national staff was how they resented being treated as untrustworthy or unknowledgeable, by expatriate staff and donor institutions. Heavy bureaucratic procedures relating in particular to reporting and monitoring processes of local NGOs were perceived as being the result of unfair suspicion by their foreign counterparts. *"Partnerships with INGOs focus on their monitoring role to control the reports, proposals and other work that the national NGO has already prepared with care*."[37] Expatriate aid workers often occupied the senior expert positions within organisations and programmes, even when they were seen to lack experience and knowledge of the Angolan

reality.[38] They were particularly criticised for having little understanding of Angola's conflict history and dynamics (Britain, 1998). References to inappropriate behaviour of some expatriate workers (such as arrogance and extravagance), indicate that this contributed to the damaging of relations and of the image of the humanitarian sector in this period.

Churches and missions

In this period, the role of the church as provider of basic services was less prominent than its role as mediator and peacebuilder. Within the context of failed peace negotiations they emerged as strong advocates for conflict resolution and the respect of human rights. Comerford (2009) explains how Protestant and Catholic churches, despite having different narratives, had a similar analysis of the conflict. In 1984, a pastoral letter by the catholic bishops, advocated for reconciliation as the way forward (Henderson, 1990). Later, with the Bicesse accords the churches' peacebuilding efforts included the promotion of multi-party democracy as the key to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. With the return to war, the focus shifted to promoting dialogue, discouraging political manipulation through the media, and highlighting the effect of the war on local people, without attributing blame to either side (ibid). The churches therefore became central in promoting 'a culture of peace' and in framing the conflict as a 'war against the people', instead of a war between two parties (Comerford, 2004, 2005). The intensification of the fighting after the Lusaka process led to the creation in 2000 of an organised church-based movement known as the Inter-Church Committee for Peace in Angola (COIEPA[39]) made up of the main Catholic and Protestant churches.[40] It became the most significant movement for peace (Comerford, 2009). In the 1990s the Independent or Afro-Christian churches grew in Angola and also formed important social networks where many Angolans sought spiritual help (PNUD, 2005: 90).

Notwithstanding their peacebuilding role in this phase, the churches continued to be linked to partisan politics, with practical consequences for their work. When ZOA Refugee Care set up offices in Caluquembe for instance, it decided to do so separately from its church partner IESA, so as to distance itself from the association of IESA with UNITA.

The churches' social work was also relevant in this period. Many were involved in the distribution of emergency relief to local people, either from donations of their churches and religious networks, or from international organisations. CARITAS' coverage of remote areas was significant. Other less visible assistance by the churches was also important. In Matala for instance, the car of the priests of the Catholic Mission functioned as a local ambulance for years, as it would transport the sick to various health facilities.[41]

Some churches adapted to the changing context by professionalising and modernising their institutions through internal reforms that separated social work from spiritual activities. In the case of IECA, this change came into effect after 1991 with the creation of a separate development department, DASEP (Department for Social Assistance, Studies and Projects). "*The lack of division between the social and the spiritual within our church was problematic because for example, when we built a health post with people from the church, then afterwards they wanted to distribute health cards to the church members to give them privileged access over other patients. People refused to pay. Everything was mixed and decisions were basically dependent on the pastor. The establishment of a division brought much more clarity. But it also brought tensions. The social side forgot that they are the 'arm' of the church and the spiritual side resented this.*"[42]

On the other hand, as in previous periods, the aid provided by the churches was limited in terms of reliability and coverage, and should not be overestimated. Only 3 out of 84 interviewees reported having benefited from material aid of the churches and only 2 in the following period.

"IECA had its traditional partners such as, the 'Igreja de Cristo' from the US. They helped us between 1995 and 1999, by sending food items such as beans, maize, etc. Matala was a privileged recipient area because it had many IDPs. But we didn't manage to have a regular beneficiary community as the arrival of goods was ad-hoc and irregular. When the goods would be about to arrive, we would go to the field sites and select the beneficiaries. This was difficult because we didn't have enough. There was only one occasion when we could distribute in 2 phases, all other times were one-off distributions. We would do the distribution ourselves, in coordination with MINARS. We hardly ever worked through other local organisations because you would never know what would end up being distributed."[43]

Like other aid actors, the churches were affected by problems with mismanagement, as their access to funds increased. As explained by a Catholic priest, *"In the past there were many incidents of fraud with money that was donated to us. This has damaged the reputation and potential for asking for help. Some people don't realise that this behaviour also happens within the church. People asked for money in the name of the poor and needy but used it to get rich."*[44]

3.3 Peace: 2002 until present

The opening up of newly accessible areas after the war, revealed a new peak in humanitarian needs and in the humanitarian response. Mortality and nutrition surveys show that distress levels went up during the transition compared to the conflict period, and then improved steadily until 2005 (Sapir and Gomez, 2006: 13). The period until 2005 was characterized by intensive demobilization and resettlement processes. Thereafter, the government declared all IDPs to have been resettled, reintegrated or returned, although there has been no system to monitor these processes (IDMC, 2007). The end of the war has not automatically translated into a general improvement of the socio-economic situation of either rural or urban populations. The rise in inequality that characterised the 1990s (from a Gini Coefficient of 0.52 in 1994-95 to 0.62 in 2000-01) (UNDP and GoA, 2005) is thought to be continuing in the post-conflict period, despite the lack of reliable figures. The diversity and specificity of needs and vulnerability throughout the country remain high. Urban and rural contexts face quite distinct challenges, relating for example to the rights of hundreds of thousands of urban dwellers living in *musseques,* or to the access of isolated rural communities to basic social services. These imply the need for different responses.

Local people

In the post-war period, local people have sought to improve their situations with whatever means available. Despite the large scale return and resettlement programmes after the conflict, some 70% of all of displaced people are estimated to have returned spontaneously and without assistance to their areas of origin. Because of the poor conditions found, many then went back to urban areas where they had taken refuge. Some 400,000 people actually opted not to leave their host areas in the first place (IDMC, 2007: 3). Several residents in communities around Matala where I did part of my fieldwork return to their villages only on a seasonal basis to farm the land. Matala is more urbanised and offers better access to services. Others sent family members back to their home villages, but themselves stayed in Matala as an economic and security backup strategy. In several cases, this was linked to the uncertainty about the outcome of the 2008 elections.

Since the end of the war, land and property rights issues have become seriously contested. In urban areas these have involved forced government evictions, as in the case of people evicted for the construction of Lubango's football stadium for the CAN. In Luanda, reports of evictions of shanty town residents are commonplace (Almeida, 2009). In rural areas

the main issue is land-grabbing by elites and private businesses. In southern Angola large areas were divided and handed to government officials, ex-generals, including from UNITA, allegedly as a buy-off by the government and big commercial farmers. This created tensions with local pastoralists whose access to grazing land was significantly restricted. Some pastoralists from these areas in 2009 indicated to NGO staff that they would be ready to pick up arms if the situation was not improved. Some land conflicts between residents, returning refugees and IDPs have also been reported (Clover, 2005). However, my interviews do not indicate this to be so widespread as to threaten peace. Nonetheless, in 2004 the government passed a new land bill and titling procedure, with the support of organisations such as the UN's FAO. The bill recognises for instance the right to collective land use. In practice, customary land tenure remains dominant despite not being recognized by law (Foley, 2007). Only one of my research communities in Bunjei had officially requested a communal land title, and none of the 84 rural households interviewed in Matala or Bunjei had individual titles for their land. This indicates local people's limited capacity to secure and claim rights.

The state

In the transition to peace, the GoA launched widespread relief operations through MINARS, supplying food and other items and organising food-for-work (FFW) schemes through its local Community Services. In Bunjei, the relief assistance of MINARS is remembered as having been the best in terms of quality and diversity, but was irregular and short lived, with only 2 or 3 actual distributions having taken place. The GoA also established legislation for various aspects of the demobilisation, return and reintegration processes including legal norms for resettlement and the aforementioned land bill. However, its lack of implementation and institutional capacity at practically all levels, has resulted in slow progress and limited impact. The main national demobilisation and reintegration programme (PGDR) for instance, was only established in 2004 and was still underway at the time of writing.

Immediately after the Luena MoU, the GoA attempted to beckon the international community to support the emergency response and reconstruction efforts through the negotiation of a donor roundtable. Donors' pressure to address transparency and corruption and the government's refusal to concede to an IMF reform programme effectively killed off the initiative. This had important repercussions for the availability of resources for reconstruction. As explained by a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, *"If the donor conference had happened it could have made a lot of difference. We would have been able to start programmes much earlier. All of us feel the responsibility after the elections to live up to the confidence given to us by the people."* [45]

External political actors

The failure of the donor roundtable significantly impacted the role of conventional donors in post-war reconstruction. Coupled with the fact that aid flows are of little significance to Angola's national budget given its substantial economic growth, it became a marker of the inability of the international community to exert significant influence over government policy.[46] In 2006, the total annual international assistance represented approximately 5% of the Government's annual budget or 2% of its GDP (Tollenaere, 2006: 1).

New political and economic actors entered the reconstruction arena, most pursuing interests in Angola's oil. Countries such as China, Brazil and India, and oil companies such as Chevron Texaco and British Petroleum have become increasingly prominent. China´s role has been particularly significant, especially in infrastructure rehabilitation, through oil-backed loans.[47] *"Chinese financial and technical assistance has kick-started over 100 projects in the areas of energy, water, health, education, telecommunications, fisheries, and public works"*

(Campos and Vines, 2008: 1). These have been controversial due to lack of transparency in the use of Chinese funds, and the dependency on Chinese inputs, workforce and know-how. Yet, they are in line with the GoA's reconstruction model, which seeks to build legitimacy through large-scale infrastructure developments, as seen in the case of the CAN (Chapter 1).

Based on past cooperation experiences, old political players are resurfacing. The government has recently turned to Cuba for technical support in the health and education sectors, on the basis of cooperation contracts. UNITA has had no prominent role in social assistance or in reconstruction processes, beyond its broad political opposition discourse, which has focused on the debates on the elections and constitutional reforms.

International Organisations and the UN

The first post-war years involved a large international humanitarian operation. The US alone contributed with 109.6 million USD for food aid in 2003, compared to 19.3 million in 1992 (USAID, unspecified). In this phase aid agencies concentrated on emergency assistance to displaced populations arriving from the bush to IDP camps or 'quartering areas', where ex-UNITA soldiers and their families were concentrated. UNHCR in turn, supported the return of thousands of refugees from neighbouring countries. The official end of the emergency period was marked by the closure in 2004 of UN OCHA and of ECHO (the European Office for Humanitarian Affairs). In the same year WFP ended relief operations to focus on recovery activities (WFP, 2005). Thereafter, the humanitarian effort centred on the processes of returning and reintegrating people into their areas of origin, supporting the recovery of agriculture and the (re)building of social service infrastructure.

A reduction of aid to Angola was set in motion and a quick withdrawal of several aid actors followed. Within one year, between 2004 and 2005, ODA_1 net totals dropped from 1145 to 442 million USD respectively (OECD, 2007). This reflected a shift in donors' policies towards Angola. International NGOs being dependent on donor funds, followed suit and began closing down or significantly downscaling operations. Many reduced their field presence to key offices in strategic provinces, and others still relocated headquarters outside of Luanda to reduce costs. In 2007, in Huíla province alone, seven major international NGOs closed down their offices and programmes. The ICRC downscaled and handed over its relief operations and by 2007 had closed many of its field offices and discontinued its assistance to orthopaedic centres. Its decision to withdraw was primarily to do with mandate (which defines that the IFRC takes over the leadership after conflict), but it was also linked to funding shortages, which it had not experienced before.[48]

Political motives were also key in these changes by the international community. They resulted from the redirection of funds to other crises, the poor performance of the GoA in fulfilling donor requirements, and their fatigue with being unable to get results in a country with plentiful resources (Simões and Pacheco, 2008: 282). High operating costs were cited as an important reason for withdrawal, yet they had never been a decisive factor during the conflict. As argued in Chapter 2, Angola's oil wealth juxtaposed on the GoA's poor social performance became less tolerable to the international community in the post-conflict political mood. The decline in aid during reconstruction was thus not based on a significant reduction in needs, or on the increased capacity of local actors and government to deal with the challenges of reconstruction. For the Dutch agency SNV for instance, the decision to withdraw was linked to the Dutch government's exclusion of Angola as an eligible beneficiary (due to the GoA's bad will), to high operating costs, and to an internal reorganisation process.[49] For many agencies, withdrawal at this time was also strategic as it became more difficult to prioritise and respond to needs. *"In a post-conflict stage, people's situations become more homogenous and it is difficult to choose where and how to intervene, and between quantity and quality."*[50] Within the ICRC, extensive debate was underway in

2008 about whether it still had a role in Angola´s context, and if so, what it should be. On the table were issues linked to the post-election monitoring, the Cabindan political situation, and the inclusion of humanitarian international law in the National Armed and Police Forces.[51]

The transition to peace has not been characterised by a gradual change in activities and aid actors specialised in longer term development, as the relief to rehabilitation discourse suggests. Rather, the reconstruction arena was filled by agencies that remained from the emergency period and sought to adapt towards longer term development interventions. After the closure of OCHA in 2004, an attempt to create regional representations of the Resident Coordinator's Office was dismantled following internal reforms. Aid actors turned from relief distribution towards livelihoods recovery, technical assistance, institution building and civic participation programmes such as decentralisation support. Many UN agencies have opted against direct implementation, in favour of technical and institutional assistance to state services and local organisations. Specific focus on capacity building of local institutions and communities only came after aid flows were significantly reduced. In that sense this was too late to secure local capacity for the take-over of activities. As the Head of the European Union (EU) Delegation explained, although budget lines were made available for NGO interventions in human rights, democracy and other areas, few organisation submit proposals because they lack the needed expertise.[52]

National organisations

National organisations were particularly hard hit by the drop in aid flows in the post-war period. Many proved unsustainable in financial and capacity terms and thus closed down. Local NGOs had become dependent on their international counterparts for funds, and these in turn failed to build the capacity of their implementing partners. When SNV withdrew in 2007, it struggled to find a national NGO with capacity to take over its activities and thus handed these over to an INGO. In the post-war context of reduced funds, local NGOs thus became less competitive. *"Donors would compare the capacity of national NGOs and INGOs to select where to invest funds. National NGOs would always loose out, because our working conditions were far inferior."*[53] Although there are no exact figures, estimates suggest that as many as 70% of the number of national NGOs present in the peak of the emergency, disappeared in the first five years after the war.[54]

In an effort to survive, many organisations sought alternative sources of financing, forging new relationships with government and the private sector. The Angolan Red Cross for instance, reached an agreement with the Ministry of Health, through which its staff is now on the government payroll.[55] Critics of this close relationship between certain civil society organisations with the GoA are based on their potential political co-option. *"Civil society is being used as a complementary instrument of state power to control and reduce public space and is losing its independence."*[56] In a reversal of the trend of the 1990s, many qualified personnel are opting to leave local NGOs for positions within government institutions, as the civil service becomes increasingly competitive. Private sector funds available to aid actors are mostly linked to Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives of oil companies. Critics question the interests behind such initiatives, calling them tokenistic (Paulo, 2009), and claim that they fail to engage with the public sector and can feed into patronage systems (Sogge, 2009). A small minority of local organisations have been able to survive the cuts in funding by exploring small income generating activities, and by diversifying activities and intervention areas to find strategic partnerships with INGOs. An example is the Lubango-based NGO ADESPOV, presented in Box 1.

In addition to changes in the funding environment, civil society has undergone other important developments in the post-war context. A growing though still limited number of NGOs, have expanded activities to include for instance rights-based work. S.O.S. Habitat and

Omunga are examples of specialised lobby organisations for the protection of land and property rights of urban populations. In 2007, the first National Civil Society Conference was launched, an unprecedented space for various civil society actors to come together and debate issues of common concern. In all annual conferences organised since, the relationship between civil society and the government, has been at the centre of heated debates. The GoA is criticised for restricting the operating space and access to funds of national organisations, for instance, by stalling their official registration process.

On the other hand, a growing movement of CSOs that are considered more 'radical', are critical of these very initiatives for an 'organised' or 'coordinated' civil society. They argue that these end up homogenising and de-politicising civil society, feeding into the GoA's agenda of restricting civil society to a welfare approach. The international community, by supporting such initiatives is thus seen as complicit with this political co-option.[57] As explained by the director of one such organisation (AJPD[58]), the international community chooses to remain silent on human rights issues and to be uncritical of the GoA, in order to secure its position in the country, and fund only those national NGOs that are also not involved in such issues (Macedo, 2009).

BOX 1.1: Surviving the post-conflict phase: the case of ADESPOV

ADESPOV was established in 1998 on the basis of Christian principles. Initially it was involved in the implementation of small agriculture and infrastructure rehabilitation activities to assist people during the emergency period. As a result of these earlier interventions, in 2000 the government requested that ADESPOV intervene in Cacula municipality, Huíla province, to support the population being resettled in the area. At that time, INGOs could not work in Cacula because it was considered unsafe and was listed as a no-go zone.

Over the years, ADESPOV developed partnerships with various international organisations, including ZOA, TROCAIRE, Tearfund CARE, and ACF, under different arrangements and in different sectors. The intervention with CARE was focused on demobilised soldiers, whilst that with ZOA and Tearfund involved support to return and resettlement process in Chipindo. The modality adopted with ZOA was direct joint implementation by the two organisations. TROCAIRE in turn, was solely a co-financer, whilst ADESPOV was in full charge of implementation.

The period from 2005 to 2006 was particularly difficult as many of these partnerships came to an end. To deal with the cut in funds, ADESPOV turned to small income generating activities of its own. These included a metal workshop, a small freight of cars for hire for the transport of goods, and a small mill. These enabled the organisation to survive until their project portfolio started to increase again at the end of 2006. More recently, a different type of partnership was established with ACF under a large EC-funded programme. ADESPOV was hired as a service provider, to carry out detailed needs-assessments and surveys.[59]

Churches and missions

Given their track record in social and peacebuilding work, local churches were particularly well positioned for supporting national reconstruction and reconciliation processes. However, much like local NGOs, they have experienced a reduction in capacity to provide assistance, stemming from a lack of funds. This is further exacerbated by the absence of a specific legal status for faith-based aid organisations. They also face the challenge of mobilising local populations to actively contribute to their maintenance and social work. As explained by the director of CARITAS *"All the CARITAS priests and nuns came from abroad and were paid for by their congregations. They even helped people on a personal basis when they could. This created the perception amongst local people that they do not need to help the church. So how can we convince them that the priests are their responsibility? Now that there are no projects and partners, there is no money. It´s leading to the death of CARITAS in places like Lubango and Moxico. We do not have local income sources. Five years ago this [Luanda] office had 45 staff members; today we are 14, the majority of which are support staff."*[60] Internally, the churches also struggle to manage changes and relations between their social and spiritual work. As the head of the social department of IECA explained *"We must*

challenge the church on its own role. The church is not currently providing anything for our social work, although it should contribute internal funds for social issues. The social department has more money than the church itself. But we depend on external donors."[61]

Notwithstanding these changes, the churches remain important actors in the local development of rural areas in the post-war context (see Chapter 5 on Bunjei). They have sought to re-establish their historical role as providers of education and health (Jensen and Pestana, 2010: 40). In addition, they continue to do significant peacebuilding work with local communities, particularly in social reintegration and reconciliation, through messages of peace. At a higher level, they have become involved in activities for social justice and transparency, such as the Economic Justice Unit of the Episcopal Conference of Angola and São Tomé (CEAST), to monitor revenues from the extracting industries (Comerford, 2009). In 2008 in Bunjei, the local Catholic and Protestant churches organised a joint celebration of the peace anniversary of 4th April. Church actors also advocate for the rights and voice of the poor. The Catholic Priest of Matala explained how he used his role as the President of the local participatory Forum, to listen to complaints about land appropriation by the government that were being neglected by the local administration.[62]

Table 3.1 summarises the type of humanitarian assistance given and the actors involved in peacebuilding activities and in aid provision during the different stages of the conflict.

TABLE 3.1: Timeline of conflict, peace-building efforts and aid interventions in Angola

Period	Aid Focus	International Peacebuilding Activities	Key Aid Actors & Interventions
1961-1974 **War for Independence**	Aid delivery to refugees in Zaire		-Local churches -UN agencies: UNHCR, UNIC
1975-1989 **Cold War**	Aid to refugee flows to Zaire and Zambia	1981: UNAVEM I established	-Local churches -UN agencies: UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, FAO, UNHCR -ICRC -MSF
1990-1992 **Bicesse Accords & Cease fire**	Assistance to displaced and drought-affected people, demobilisation of soldiers, reconstruction	Troika: Portugal, Cuba, USSR 1991: UNAVEM II established	Special Relief Programme for Angola (SRPA): large influx of humanitarian organizations. UNDP is lead agency.
1992-1994 **Civil war**	Emergency relief: food and medical aid programmes	1993: UN SRSG made responsible for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations	Limited humanitarian coordination - UN agencies: WFP, UNHCR -ICRC -CARITAS 1993: DHA set up Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit in Angola (UCAH)
1994-1998 **Lusaka Protocol**	Demobilisation and reconstruction: food aid; food-for-work (FFW) programmes	1995: UNAVEM III established 1997: MONUA replaces UNAVEM III	UCAH in charge of demobilisation 1997: DHA becomes OCHA Humanitarian agencies have access but limited in some areas.
1998-2002 **Civil war**	Emergency relief: food aid; FFW programmes	1999: MONUA withdrawn UNOA created 2000: COIEPA (church movement)	1999: PNEAH established -UN agencies: WFP -ICRC -UCAH UNITA areas inaccessible
2002-now **Post-conflict**	Relief and reconstruction: infrastructure rehabilitation, livelihoods recovery, institution building	2002: UNOA replaced by UNMA Local churches	UN agencies Humanitarian, developmental and mixed mandate organisations

Source: Compiled from various sources (Duffield, 1994, Gorman, 1994, Ball and Campbell, 1998, Richardson, 2000, Robson, 2003)

4. Analysis: the multifaceted nature of aid

4.1 Principal Actors[63]

In the previous section, I have reviewed the aid arena during different stages of Angola's conflict and post-conflict, in order to reconstruct its aid history. Contrary to ideal-typical models of relief and reconstruction, it has emerged that various actors and assistance types have populated the aid arena, with changing relative importance over time. Next, I specifically analyse their roles and motivations.

4.1.1 Local people

Contrary to dominant writings on aid in Angola, people mostly coped through their own strategies and capabilities, both during crises and in their aftermath. Outside assistance was often unavailable, insufficient or simply too slow. In the face of adversity, people thus coped and survived through their kinship ties, social networks, mutual-help mechanisms, and as a last resort, by abandoning their homes. Relief interventions lacked downwards accountability towards beneficiaries, and overwhelmingly neglected local voices and capabilities (Robson, 2003). On the other hand, the drawn out nature of the conflict severely weakened people´s agency and coping mechanisms. This increased dependence on external aid where it was available, or simply resulted in people perishing. Nonetheless, after the war the majority of people made their way unassisted to their areas of origin to restart their lives, or continued to rely on informal activities to make a living in urban areas. With reduced support from aid actors and hardly any government safety-nets, the majority continue to make use of what limited resources they have to secure livelihoods and access to services.

4.1.2 The state

The focus of humanitarians on the principles of impartiality and neutrality during the emergency meant that the Angolan state was boxed into the role of perpetrator, without any possible function in service provision and assistance. Only international humanitarian relief qualified as neutral, and assistance should thus be managed by external actors (Duffield, 1994: 43). As such, a state-avoidance approach was adopted, through which state institutions were bypassed, neglected, or replaced.

As I have shown however, the Angolan state did play a role in social assistance over the years, both directly through its own service provision initiatives, or indirectly by shaping those of others. Social assistance and protection efforts in the early independence days were short-lived and reversed as the civil war intensified. Particularly after the departure of the Cubans, services became eroded as the government disengaged from its social responsibilities. By the 1990s, service provision ended up almost entirely in the hands of international aid agencies. Government relief initiatives thereafter were modest and tokenistic, and were underscored by a lack of implementing capacity at all levels.

The GoA's role in addressing needs evolved along with and in relation to that of other actors in the aid arena. By replacing the functions of the state in service provision, aid organisations perpetuated the status quo of government neglect and ended up contributing to the erosion of its response capacity. In the post-war period, government´s legitimisation efforts have included initiatives to legislate for the rights of local people, such as the resettlement norms and revised land bill. However, their impact has been limited, largely due to lack of capacity and the continued prioritisation of investment in non-social sectors.

4.1.3 UNITA

My analysis has shown that UNITA's efforts to deliver services to local people in its areas of control were negligible during the war. Any assistance provided was limited to a small minority of active (albeit sometimes forced) members of the regime and their families, and included housing, education, healthcare and food. This opposes analyses such as Bakonyi and Stuvøy's (2005: 369) that claim that UNITA had significant welfare services from which it drew considerable legitimacy and local support. Whereas they present the feeding of troops by civilians as a neat 'division of labour', my interviews revealed this practice to be abusive and violent, involving informal taxation or outright pillaging.

UNITA, officially requested assistance from the international community at various times. Like the GoA, it used aid to pursue military and political interests, by manipulating

negotiations with humanitarian actors over access to populations. In reconstruction, UNITA has had no role in social service provision. Many of its members and former combatants became the target group of specific government and NGO aid interventions.

4.1.4 External political actors

The conflict period until the 1991 Bicesse process was characterised by the external interference of the main political and military actors of the Cold War. A key difference between the backers of the two belligerents was that both the US and South Africa limited their assistance to UNITA to military and financial support. The GoA in turn, received considerable technical support for social service provision, particularly from Cuba. After the end of the Cold War, external political involvement in the conflict and its response was greatly reduced and became dominated by the international community through the UN and donor policies. Since the 2002 peace, external relations have been dominated by economic interests, particularly in Angola's oil. These have shaped decisions about aid, and led to the emergence of new actors such as China, in the reconstruction arena.

4.1.5 International organisations and the UN

International humanitarian actors became a central part of the humanitarian arena in Angola, in the second phase of the war, following the breakdown of Bicesse. After that time, numerous aid agencies with different mandates and approaches became involved in the provision of relief and basic services to war affected populations, as Angola became one of the top recipients of aid worldwide. However, their aid fell short of needs both in terms of coverage and reliability. Moreover, despite the aspiration of many organisations to become more developmental in their work, practices were overwhelmingly dominated by a classic relief approach, centred on life-saving action and on humanitarian principles. International humanitarians proved to also be vulnerable to being enmeshed in the politics of conflict, and failed to make their activities more locally grounded or sustainable.

After the end of the conflict in 2002 international agencies were the main players in the emergency response in newly accessible areas and in assisting the return and resettlement processes. From 2005 onwards, despite the persistence of needs, they largely followed the political decision of donors to downsize or discontinue operations in Angola.

I have shown that the UN's role as an aid provider was more prominent than its political role, particularly given the failure of its peacebuilding efforts. In the 1980s some UN agencies were providing technical assistance to service institutions, a role which they returned to in the post-war. During the 1990s the UN took the leadership of the coordination of the international humanitarian response to the conflict, through OCHA, and in the direct provision of relief. However, its successful coordination function during the war did not result in effective coordination capacity in peace either by the UN or the state's coordination body which it had supported. The UN's humanitarian role was affected by the politicisation of aid. On the one hand this resulted from the manipulation by belligerents, whilst on the other from the poor performance of its political role in negotiating peace.

4.1.6 National civil society

National CSOs emerged as a new set of players in the humanitarian arena in the early 1990s, after the political reforms of Bicesse. Most developed in the emergency context as the implementing partners of international aid agencies, which contributed to their organisational development and learning. On the other hand, these relationships were based on unequal power relations and became problematic. CSOs became dependent on their international counterparts in financial and capacity terms. When aid flows substantially dropped in the post-

war period, many proved unsustainable and closed down. Those organisations that remain active in reconstruction, have sought to find alternative funding sources and to redefine their identity. New relations have been forged, particularly with private sector actors and in some cases, with the GoA. These have brought on controversy within the sector regarding ethics, political co-option and their effects on public space. On the other hand, a number of CSOs are seeking to move into rights-based work, at the same time as a growing movement for coordinated action of national civil society is developing.

4.1.7 Churches and missions

During and after the conflict, the role of local churches in social assistance with healthcare, education, social protection as well as spiritual support, has been crucial. The Catholic Church remains the largest in Angola, but others such as the Protestant churches have been important. The churches were drawn into the politics of the conflict due to historical associations with party leaders. They were also prone to problems of internal malpractice and corruption. Yet, they were important implementing channels of international aid because of their local networks, and sought to uphold neutrality in the assistance they provided. In the last decade of the conflict, it was their peacebuilding more than their social assistance role that was most prominent. They became the main advocates for a negotiated peace. Like local NGOs, the churches were also weakened by the transition funding gap. Notwithstanding, taken together they represent a more constant set of actors in Angola's aid arena than the international community (Hilhorst and Serrano, 2010). In reconstruction, they have sought to re-establish their historical role as service providers, particularly in rural communities, and remain important advocates for peacebuilding, human rights and social justice.

4.2 The politics of aid

The analysis of the history of aid over different periods, including the roles and motivations of its main actors, raises important questions about the assumptions of the ideal–typical representations of humanitarian aid and reconstruction in conflict contexts. These remain centred on the importance of humanitarian principles and thus on the role of conventional aid actors. As I have demonstrated however, a number of actors and forms of assistance that fall outside of the gaze of such dominant perspectives have been crucial in addressing local needs. The humanitarian arena framework has allowed us to consider how aid interventions are shaped in practice, in the interaction of these various actors. It substantiates the argument that all aid is inherently political and becomes enmeshed in local political processes, irrespective of its intentions and approaches. In this section I therefore highlight some of the ways in which this works, by looking at how principles are interpreted and upheld in practice, how actors' responses to needs are defined, and at the workings of the aid system.

4.2.1 Upholding principles

Principled aid approaches are valuable in providing a normative framework for action. However, principles are difficult to uphold in practice. They are interpreted and enacted in the everyday practices of organisations and their staff, and are thus shaped by individual moral and ethical frameworks. At the end of 2007, an incident involving an unexploded mine on the road from Lubango to Chipindo municipality, led to conflicting positions between the staff of two international agencies. The individual from the organisation involved in the incident felt it was his duty to alert the local representative of the humanitarian security system who would then trigger the security protocol. This involved the closure of the road to all international agencies, followed by a lengthy clearance procedure led by the UN in Luanda. The local representative of the security system was thus reluctant to trigger the process without further

investigation, to avoid the interruption of aid operations. Each claimed a moral duty to protect different interests. One, an expatriate, focused on the security of humanitarian personnel. The other, an Angolan citizen, focused on the impact for local beneficiaries and institutions. In the absence of an agreement, the incident was reported and the interventions suspended and later discontinued.

Principled humanitarians may claim to be neutral, impartial and independent, but they are not necessarily perceived or respected as such by others. As the review of Angola's aid history has shown, reference to humanitarian principles did not insulate aid against the politics of conflict or from other local political processes. The aid of humanitarians proved no less likely to be politicised than that of other actors in the aid arena.

Faced with such realities, aid organisations negotiate principles and adjust practices on the ground. This may mean choosing between adhering to rules and principles, or prioritising between them. In the early war years, the UN was confined to working in government areas whereas the ICRC and MSF operated (also) in UNITA territory. Influenced by the Cold-War political environment, this led the government to perceive MSF as being pro-UNITA. In order to guarantee access to local populations on both sides, the ICRC opted to break its own rules and work with a government and a UNITA Red Crosses. Non-principled actors, such as the belligerents also 'negotiated' around the principles to make themselves eligible to receiving aid. UNITA did so by creating structures parallel to those of government (such as the Red Cross, a Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator and a Social Department) and the GoA, by inflating beneficiary numbers and needs.

4.2.2 Negotiating neutrality

The humanitarian response to the Angolan crisis was based on the assumption that only international humanitarians could deliver assistance that was neutral. It meant that they chose to work alone and outside of state structures and local institutions. However, there was little room for neutrality throughout the war. Belligerents attributed political links both to principled organisations like MSF, as well as to local actors such as the churches. However, as seen in the everyday practices of IESA´s hospital staff, local actors too sought to provide non-discriminatory aid (Hilhorst and Serrano, 2010: S197). Local people in turn, aligned themselves with one or another party in order to secure physical protection or aid.

Moreover, de facto or perceived political affiliation was important in determining access of NGOs to populations, but neutrality is not always the main determining factor. UNITA granted access to its territory to very few aid organisations. Although it was traditionally linked to the protestant churches, it was strategic in allowing CARITAS to operate for years, as a channel to aid resources.

4.2.3 Responding to needs

Basing decisions about aid on needs is a core guiding principle for aid actors in crisis. This commitment was reiterated for instance in DFID's response to a recent review of humanitarian action, in which it stated that *"...aid will be delivered on the basis of need alone, not according to political or strategic objectives."* (ODI, 2011: 1). My analysis showed that aid during Angola's conflict and reconstruction fell short of such aspirations.

First, humanitarian aid played a key role in saving lives at various points of the crisis, but it fell short of needs in terms of coverage and reliability. Many areas were not reached by aid at all, others became inaccessible after 1998 when security became a problem, and others still saw only ad hoc interventions. In addition, humanitarians focused on life-saving action, but did not address the root causes of the conflict or its longer term effects, which were at the centre of needs. This was linked to the portrayal of the crisis as one linked to drought and

physical destruction, rather than as a political conflict (Duffield, 1994). It is estimated that of the total 1.5 million deaths during the Angolan conflict, only 11% were 'battle death', the remainder being the 'excess' of mortality (Lacina and Gleditsch in Sapir and Gómez, 2006: 27). These are associated with a decay in the quality and coverage of service institutions, such as the breakdown of health services.

Secondly, decisions about aid proved to be driven by various other motivations beside needs, including political ones. Despite evidence of famine conditions already in the 1980s, engagement of the international community in Angola was modest. This was due to other crises being prioritised, and the GoA's international relations and position regarding aid, in the Cold War political setting (Hilhorst and Serrano, 2010). Moreover, the disengagement of the aid community in the early post-war period was based on the perspective that the GoA had the necessary resources to take over reconstruction. It disregarded the reality of persistent needs and lacking local institutional capacity.

4.2.4 The aid system

The nature of the humanitarian system also influenced decisions about aid. Political processes internal to the aid machinery contributed to shaping such decisions and the practices of service delivery. In the case of the UN, the decision to integrate its humanitarian and political roles, allowed the interference of external actors in the allocation of aid, namely through the pressure by the US to include UNITA in the SRPA.

The financial dependence on donors and the resulting competition for funds and visibility amongst humanitarian actors, underlined the decision of agencies to withdraw from Angola soon after the end of war, and to redirect resources elsewhere. Moreover, the short-sighted perspective of aid in conflict and in reconstruction, has translated into a focus on classic relief approaches for immediate results, which do not take into account the longer-term effects of war and needs for reconstruction.

The aid system is closely intertwined with broader foreign policy agendas of donor countries, which in the current context of Angola, are centred on economic interest, particularly relating to oil. *"Angola is important for the US in Africa, because of oil and other potential natural resource wealth. Much US industry is present in Angola and investments are growing. As USAID's budget [United States Agency for International Development] is shrinking our strategy now is to leverage resources from the private sector such as BFA [Angolan private bank], Chevron and Texaco, and contract organisations to deliver services."*[64] An official visit in 2009 by the US Secretary of State, was also aimed *'to establish closer economic ties and discuss the US' support for reconstruction'* (Reuters, 2009).

4.3 The relief to reconstruction (dis)continuum

The discourse on linking relief and development, suggests that aid efforts during the war help to prepare local institutions for service delivery after the war. My analysis shows this not to have been the case in Angola´s transition to peace. Writings on aid in Angola often distinguish between different aid types according to implementation approaches. Robson (2003: 14) for instance, differentiates between three types of humanitarian aid: pure emergency life-saving action; indirect life-saving efforts focused on supporting local coping strategies, protection of vulnerable groups and peacebuilding; and interventions centred on sustainability, local capacity development and citizen participation. I found however, that implementation practices during the war and immediately after, overwhelmingly adhered to the first category, rather than more developmental forms of relief, in spite of the variety of aid actors, with different mandates and approaches. State and institution-building efforts typical of post-conflict contexts were largely absent after independence, and the international community did

little over the following years to prepare for post-conflict development (Hilhorst and Serrano, 2010: S197). *"During the war there was little real knowledge among INGOs on transition processes, and although now there is a more sophisticated discourse on emergency to development transition, it is more at a discursive than practical level."*[65]

The legacy of these aid practices during the conflict is important for understanding the realities of reconstruction. Explicit attention to existing local capacities or institution-strengthening initiatives of local organisations or state institutions only came when aid was being significantly reduced after the war (see also Chapter 6). In that sense, this was too little too late, to prepare these local actors to take the leadership in responding to the demands of post-conflict reconstruction. Moreover, no new aid actors specialised in reconstruction emerged. Further, the role of aid by the different actors in the aid arena during conflict, contributed to the erosion of the government's service delivery capacity and responsibility. Cuba's civil mission for instance, trained many local professionals such as medical staff, but also stalled the development of national social services (Hatzky, 2008).

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have reconstructed the history of aid in Angola, using the framework of the *aid arena*. This perspective offers an alternative to dominant paradigms on the analysis of aid that have a series of built-in assumptions about aid in crisis and post-crisis. Through the *arena* concept I have looked at aid as multifaceted and inclusive of all types of actors and forms of assistance and service delivery that fall outside the gaze of dominant perspectives. This has implied revisiting some of the main critiques of humanitarian action, and questioning several commonly held images about the role of aid in Angola.

Dominant writings on aid in countries affected by conflict are centred on the role of international humanitarian actors and principle-driven interventions. My analysis has shown however, that beyond principled humanitarians various actors were important in addressing needs. These include military and political players, local people, civil society and churches. By looking at the role of these multiple actors during the various phases of Angola's conflict and post-conflict, it becomes visible how service delivery is shaped in practice by each of them and by their interaction. In the review of Angola's aid history, local actors emerge as a key set of players in the aid arena, and in the interaction with external interventions of others. The churches were particularly important and proved to be more constant providers of healthcare and education to local populations throughout the various historical periods than humanitarian actors. They also had a prominent peace-building role. Military and political actors were multifaceted in that they also had a part in service delivery. During the 1980s, Cuban support helped to sustain state social services in human and material resource terms. The GoA and particularly UNITA did little to directly assist local populations, but they visibly shaped the aid response and the level of assistance, through political manipulation of access negotiations.

The international relief effort was crucial in saving lives during the conflict and in its immediate aftermath. However, by considering people's own strategies in the fulfilment of needs, I showed that many local populations first and foremost coped by themselves during the crisis, and during the return and resettlement processes. The international humanitarian system only became involved on a large scale in the second phase of the conflict, following the Bicesse peace process. This substantial aid was nonetheless inadequate in terms of coverage, reliability and in addressing different types of needs.

This was the outcome of a combination of factors that shaped the delivery of services and assistance, including political factors. It was not a direct response to needs, as principled

approaches imply. The reduction in aid flows to Angola after the end of the war, did not reflect a significant improvement in the humanitarian situation, but was based on the view by the international community that the GoA could and should take charge of reconstruction. As seen, local institutions remained too weak to effectively take this on.

Aid practices therefore did not follow the ideal-typical models of aid in conflict and in reconstruction, or of the transition between them. They were overwhelmingly dominated by classic relief approaches, despite aspirations of more developmental activities. International aid actors did little to build the capacity of local institutions during the war. This had the significant effect of undermining their ability to respond to the challenges of post-war reconstruction. It was partly influenced by characteristics inherent to the aid system, such as the short-term project approach and funding cycles, the dependence of agencies on donor funds and the competition between them. In addition, the focus on humanitarian principles, and in particular on neutrality, informed the choice of aid actors to work outside of and separate from local institutions. Dominant discourses are thus important in informing aid practices.

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[1] This Code was launched in 1994 and now has over 300 signatories (Hilhorst, 2005).
[2] Some parts of this section draw on an overview of the aid history, co-written with Hilde van Dijkhorst, later revised and adapted by me.
[3] Totalling 84 households.
[4] Interviews with farmers in Matala and Chipindo Municipalities, Huíla Province, 2007/8.
[5] Interview with former UNITA security official, 15 October 2008, Bunjei.
[6] Interview, 29 May 2008, Bunjei.
[7] Interview, 15 October 2008, Bunjei.
[8] Interview with political analyst, 24 June 2008, Johannesburg.
[9] Interview by T. Hilhorst and H. van Dijkhorst with Adalberto da Costa and Clarisse Kaputo, 6 November 2008, Luanda
[10] Interview with USAID representative, 16 February 2008, Luanda.
[11] See also Chapter 4 for a discussion on Cuba´s contribution to the social sectors.
[12] Interview by Thea Hilhorst and Hilde van Dijkhorst with Paulo Jorge, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, 05 November 2008, Luanda.
[13] Interview with Alain Cain, Development Workshop, 15 February 2008, Luanda.
[14] Interview with Nelson Pestana, 19 February 2008, Luanda.
[15] Its first mission involving the monitoring of detention centres of political prisoners dates back to 1970. Operations were suspended between 1976 and 1979, at which time it started its first orthopaedic centre (see Footnote 17).
[16] Interview with Programme Director and Disaster Preparedness Officer of CVA, 13 February 2008, Luanda.
[17] Interviews with national staff of ICRC and Angolan Red Cross, Luanda, 13 & 15 February 2008.
[18] In Afghanistan such association came from the fact that MSF as the most active NGO during the Russian occupation, directed its support particularly to Mujahidin controlled areas (Amstuz, 1986: 218).
[19] Interview by Thea Hilhorst and Hilde van Dijkhorst with Paulo Jorge, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 2008, Luanda.
[20] Interviews with ex-mission staff, 16 February 2008.
[21] Interview with Governor of Huíla, 05 January 2010, Lubango.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Interview with resident of Nguelengue village, 16 October 2008, Bunjei.
[24] Interview with former MSF Head of Mission, 18 February 2008, Luanda.
[25] Interview with former Minister of Agriculture, 05 January 2010, Lubango.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Interviews with various residents of Bunjei.
[28] Interview with former UNITA security official, 15 October 2008, Bunjei.
[29] Interview with ICRC Head of Communications, 19 October 2007, Luanda.
[30] Ibid.
[31] The Department for Humanitarian Aid (DHA), which became OCHA in 1997.
[32] Presentation of Huíla's Provincial Coordinator of UTCAH, 14 November 2008, Lubango.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Interview with National Director of INGO, 19 February 2008, Luanda.
[35] Chapter 6 argues that even in localities and periods of relative peace, there were hardly any efforts to step outside of the dominant relief approach. Chapter 8 in turn shows how the few efforts that existed to adopt a longer term perspective were isolated and overcrowded by the relief paradigm.
[36] Interview with Director of FONGA, 15 February 2008, Luanda.

[37] Interview with Institutional Director of a local NGO, 24 August 2007, Lubango.
[38] Informal communications with ADESPOV, IECA and ZOA staff.
[39] Also known as the Churches Ecumenical Peace Commission.
[40] These include AEA (Angolan Evangelical Alliance), CEAST (Catholic Church's Episcopal Conference of Angola and San Tome) and CICA (Council of Christian Churches of Angola).
[41] Interview with Catholic Priest, 05 August 2008, Matala.
[42] Interview with Head of Social Department of Protestant Church, 12 February 2008, Luanda.
[43] Interview with IECA Pastor, 28 August 2008, Lubango.
[44] Interview with Catholic Priest, 05 August 2008, Matala.
[45] Interview by Thea Hilhorst and Hilde van Dijkhorst with Paulo Jorge, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, 05 November 2008, Luanda.
[46] Interview with European diplomat, 19 February 2008, Luanda.
[47] These loans are free of the political preconditions of other donors. In 2007 China became the second trading partner to Angola (after Portugal) while Angola is China's largest trading partner in Africa since 2006. Furthermore, Angola currently represents 18% of China's total oil imports (Campos and Vines, 2008: 12-13).
[48] Interview with ICRC Delegate and Head of Communications, 15 February 2008, Luanda.
[49] Interview with County Director of SNV, 19 February 2008, Luanda.
[50] Interview with former staff member of INGO, 16 February 2008, Luanda.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Interview with Head of EU Delegations, 19 February 2008, Luanda.
[53] Interview with Director of FONGA, 15 February 2008, Luanda.
[54] Interview with representative of UN's Resident's Coordinator Office in Lubango, 20 June 2007, Lubango.
[55] Interview with Programme Director and Disaster Preparedness Officer of CVA, 13 February 2008, Luanda.
[56] Interview with political analyst and academic, 19 February 2008, Luanda.
[57] The series of publications under the research-action project "Democratic and Development Processes in Angola and Southern Africa" explores these different voices and debates within civil society. See www.ces.uc.pt/conferenciaangola2009/index.php
[58] This was one of the NGOs threatened with closure by the GoA's UTCAH in 2007, as explained in Chapter 2, under 2.1 Relations between state, society and non-state actors.
[59] Interview with Institutional Director, 24 August 2007, Lubango.
[60] Interview with Head of CARITAS Luanda, 18 February 2008, Luanda.
[61] Interview with Head of Social Department of Protestant Church, 12 February 2008, Luanda.
[62] Interview with Catholic Priest, 05 August 2008, Matala.
[63] This section is based on a paper co-written with Thea Hilhorst for the World Conference of Humanitarian Studies 4-7 February 2009 in Groningen, The Netherlands.
[64] Interview with Head of USAID in Angola, 20 February 2008, Luanda.
[65] Interview with Director of ADRA, 11 February 2008, Luanda.

CHAPTER FOUR

How local institutions develop in war and in peace

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is intended to deepen our understanding of how local institutions develop during crisis and post-crisis, in a similar vein to the previous chapter's analysis of the history of aid in Angola. It looks at how local institutions work and evolve in practice.

Dominant writings on aid in conflict and reconstruction in the 1990s tended to equate conflict to the breakdown of social relations and the collapse of livelihoods and institutions that sustain them. Aid interventions were thus premised on the idea that local institutions completely disintegrate or become engrossed in the dynamics of war. Such perspectives have been extensively criticised in recent years. A new body of policy and practice is emerging that highlights the potential role of existing local institutions in reconstruction efforts. This is encapsulated in what Hilhorst et al. (2010) refer to as the "reconstruction from below paradigm". This chapter looks into such debate by empirically reconstructing how this worked for Angola. In doing so, it sets the scene for the examination in subsequent chapters of this thesis, of how assumptions built into aid programmes foreclose certain developments.

Aid interventions are frequently based on particular notions of institutions, which I argue are limited in understanding the multiple ways in which they operate in conflict-affected societies, in three different ways. First, they tend to be centred on formal institutions, particularly those linked to state services. I want to show that people use their agency and resort to multiple and diverse institutions, including alternative informal mechanisms, in order to address needs during and after crisis. In addition, institutions are multifaceted and have a number of characteristics that coexist and shape them in practice, which are outside of the view of such perspectives. A non-state village health post can be simultaneously private, informal, traditional and even illegal, and still function as the preferred health facility.

Second, the premise that institutions completely break down during conflict, precludes the possibility that they are also resilient and not static. Institutions may evolve and adapt to contextual changes and external factors and new institutional arrangements may emerge as a result. In the absence of the state and formal institutions, economic transactions still occur, people find ways to settle dispute, formalise arrangements and address a range of needs.

Third, dominant perspectives of aid in war-affected countries are conflict-centred in explaining processes of institutional transformation and change. As I shall elaborate, additional factors besides war play into such processes and codetermine how institutions evolve, including aid. Discounting their role in institutional change has important consequences for institution-building interventions in post-war reconstruction.

In this chapter I explore how the institutional setting through which local people address needs changed over time in Angola, and what factors contributed to such transformations. I am concerned with basic social service institutions, as well as with alternative institutional arrangements that local people resort to.

The chapter starts by characterising and defining the local institutional landscape and is followed by a review of institutional change processes during colonialism, conflict and in peace. The latter period is given comparatively less attention here, because it is explored in detail in subsequent chapters. In this chapter I refer to key literature on institutional studies, on Angola's colonial history, and on aid in conflict and reconstruction. I draw extensively on field data, including a survey representing 84 households in Huíla, as well as interviews with village elders, rural people, aid personnel and government officials.

1. Exploring the concept of institution

The concept of institutions has been widely debated in academic and aid policy circles. Different institutional approaches often highlight distinct aspects of institutions. In this section I briefly examine what the key literature says about local institutions and institutional change processes with particular attention to conflict and post-conflict contexts.

1.1 Defining institutions

Broadly understood, institutions refer to the norms and values, rules, organisations, and structures that give meaning to social life and guide human behaviour and social interaction (Soysa and Jütting, 2006). However, there is no consensus among different theoretical perspectives on the definition and content of the concept. Nuijten (1999) thus refers to it as a conceptual "black-box". Given my objective of examining the outcomes of the interaction between local institutions and aid interventions, I lean on Douglas' (1986: 46) comprehensive definition of institutions as *"any form of legitimized social grouping"*.[1] However, any instrumental or provisional practical arrangement recognised as such is not considered an institution. For instance, a community-based organisation (CBO) established under an aid intervention would only become part of the local institutional landscape in as far as it could leverage the legitimacy of local actors. However, in my analysis of local institutions, I do not make a judgement about their degree of legitimacy or sustainability. I include arrangements such as CBOs precisely because I'm interested in the processes through which they become institutionalised or not. As Messer and Townsley's (2003: 10-11) explain arrangements through which people address needs *"can be more or less organised (and may include "organisations"), structured or unstructured, visible or invisible."*.

Writings on institutions often qualify them by distinguishing institutions from organisations. Mainstream development literature usually highlights the normative aspects of institutions and the structural aspects of organisations (Nuijten, 1999: 2). Such divisions became particularly influential following the rise in the 1990s of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) School, associated with the work of economist Douglass North on economic and institutional change. North (1993: 1) conceptualised institutions as 'the rules of the game' which serve to reduce transaction costs and increase efficiency, and organisations are the 'players in the game'. *"Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics.* [...] *Organisations are made up of groups of individuals bound together by some common purpose to achieve certain objectives."* Uphoff (1993: 614) argues that this distinction is useful in understanding institutionalisation and legitimisation processes, and that institutions and organisations are thus better understood as matters of degree. Organisations can become more or less institutionalised in practice, as they gain legitimacy and acceptance by people for fulfilling their normative expectations and needs. The opposite is also true when institutions become organisations. The earlier example of an aid-established CBO, where it functions solely as a project implementation instrument rather than becoming institutionalised, illustrates this point.

Institutional approaches also categorise institutions into different types, based on various characteristics and functions. The degree of formality is a major one. Formal institutions generally include constitutions, laws and regulations or formal organisations such as cooperatives and labour unions, as well as state service institutions. These tend to be more visible, better defined and organised, and thus attract greater attention in aid policy and practice than informal institutions. The latter in contrast, develop through informal interaction

and are therefore less likely to be as visible, or to have as clear a structure, written rules or organisation (Messer and Townsley, 2003). They range from self-help mechanisms of collective action to lose personal networks (Nuijten, 1999) and also include norms of behaviour, conventions, and traditional customs. Informal institutions are grounded in and emanate from society's culture and tend to be self-enforcing through mechanisms of obligation (Soysa and Jütting, 2006: 2-3).

Literature often stresses the role informal institutions in so-called fragile contexts, on the basis that 'normal' institutions may be weakened or absent so that people resort to informal (or even illegal) arrangements to pursue their interests (Jütting, 2003). They are also often presumed to enjoy greater legitimacy of local actors. Informal arrangements are sometimes said to be more resilient to crises such as conflict, government repression, negligence and co-optation than formal institutions (Marsh, 2003). As this chapter shall show however, the social fabric underlying such institutions also becomes worn under conflict and related pressures and contributes to the weakening of social capital. Social capital generally refers to the *"features of social organisation such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit"* (Putnam, 1993).

In practice, the sharp division between formal and informal institutions disappears as these interact and operate through one another. This interaction can be complementary, accommodating, competing or substituting, depending on the level of coherence and effectiveness between them (Soysa and Jütting, 2006). Formal rules that are not consistent with informal socio-cultural ones, may lack local legitimacy and risk being ignored or having to be enforced by coercion (Skoog, 2005: 23). Formal institutions often work in informal ways. Formal economic institutions for instance, determine the type of economic system in place, but informal rules such as informal markets and traditional ownership rights are key in shaping outcomes. Another example is the patrimonial state and the way in which its formal structures are governed by informal practices. In conflict-affected countries, this "informalisation" of formal institutions is all the more prominent (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009). In such contexts multiple institutional arrangements co-exist, interact and compete, and people do not see themselves in formal institutions. On the other hand, institutions qualified as informal, such as mutual-aid mechanisms may actually work according to long-established custom and tradition rather than implied ad-hoc practices. Informal institutions are shaped also by the penetration of formal state institutions or market forces, which can reduce their effectiveness (Uphoff, 1993).

Additional institutional categories are based on criteria such as different hierarchical or geographical levels - from individual, household or community to national or international levels; or different domains of applicability - from global institutions (such as international conventions within the UN system), pluri-lateral rules (such as within the EU), and bilateral rules (such as development cooperation agreements) (Skoog, 2005: 22). Ostrom (1990: 58) draws a distinction on institutions based on the level of influence, between *constitutional-choice rules* at the higher policy level, *collective-choice rules* and *operation* rules which shape daily decisions (in Skoog, 2005).

These divisions in the literature are useful to classify institutions and consider their various dimensions, but I do not subscribe to the argument that they are essentially different in how they work. I therefore distance myself from approaches that analyse institutions according to such normative categories, given that they constrain analysis of which institutions exist in crisis and post-crisis contexts, and how they operate, interact and are legitimated in practice. This research is concerned with those institutions through which local people meet their various needs and resolve their problems, whether organisations or not, formal or informal. Although my focus is on the local level, I also look at institutions at higher provincial and national levels.

1.2 Institutional versatility

As the above discussion already hinted at, institutions display significant versatility. They are multifaceted and fluid, containing power for harm and good (Hilhorst, 2003). As institutions evolve over time, they may acquire different characteristics and degrees of legitimacy. For instance, village health posts can be simultaneously private, informal and illegal, but may acquire varying degrees of formal recognition from the state through official training or the collaboration with state health services. Furthermore, as I shall elaborate, the traditional authorities in Angola have been labelled by different actors at different times, according to specific characteristics: their customary, traditional or community-basis, or the various degrees of formality (informal, semi-formal or formal). These different aspects are evoked to serve particular interests. In the case of relief aid interventions, being community-based was considered as giving traditional authorities legitimacy vis-à-vis local actors.

My interest here is not so much on what institutions look like, but how they work in practice. The significance of the multifaceted nature of institutions therefore is that besides being labelled differently, institutions also operate in these different ways. It is thus not enough to consider particular characteristics of institutions, as the aforementioned institutional taxonomies imply. An empirical examination of the performance of institutions is necessary.

The versatile way in which local institutions operate is partly explained by the fact that institutions are peopled. That is, underneath institutions are social actors and networks that either reinforce or contest them through alternative institutional arrangements. As explained in Chapter 1, a duality exists between actors and institutions in the way that they work through and shape one another. Social actors draw on existing institutional frameworks, to address needs and respond to change. Yet, they do so in reflexive and tacit ways, by deploying their agency, and in doing so, reproduce institutions. Structures thus act as both the medium and the outcome of social action, having an enabling and constraining power (Giddens, 1984).

1.3 Institutional multiplicity

In conflict and post conflict societies, a multiplicity of local institutions with varying degrees and sources of legitimacy play a vital role in aspects such as dispute resolution, security, and governance of entitlements (Hilhorst et al., 2010: 1114). These include what Hasselbein et al. (2006: 1) groups as four competing institutional systems: rule systems adopted by the state (statutory law); the rule systems evolved over time by older communities (customary traditions); the rule systems that communities or groups have devised for survival; and the rule systems hatched by non-state centres of power (warlords, bosses, criminal gangs). In addition, new institutional arrangements for service provision often emerge, in the form of external aid agencies, churches, civil society organisations, private actors or even through armed movements parallel to the state (Hilhorst, 2005a, 2007).

State-building discourse in fragile states is premised on the notion that existing institutions have been seriously eroded and have become ineffective, so that that they need to be re-established (Fritz and Menocal, 2007: 50). However, rather than an institutional void, post-conflict societies are characterised by significant institutional multiplicity. *"When states are not capable of imposing norms, this does not represent a vacuum, it is an opening where a range of norms can exist simultaneously."* (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009: 24). In post-conflict societies institutions are often more fluid and subject to change given the lack of legitimate state institutions, the contestation between different sources of power and legitimacy, the challenges resulting from violence and displacement, and the presence of external interventions (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009, Hilhorst et al., 2010).

This multiplicity may be problematic if it becomes a source of conflict, but is also an opportunity for local people to negotiate institutional arrangements (ibid) through distinct and competing normative frameworks for action (Hesselbein et al., 2006). It is in this multiplicity that actors find room for manoeuvre to pursue their interests and realise projects, by engaging with different institutions or playing them out against each other.

While it is true that formal economies and service institutions erode rapidly during conflict, it is also the case that local capacities are resilient to crises as people seek to give continuity to their lives and livelihoods. The continuation of these 'economies of survival' (Hilhorst, 2007) are highlighted in alternative works to mainstream writings on institutions in conflict. For example, King (2005) recounts that during Sierra Leone's conflict, it was the efforts of local people that helped to maintain social services and to find alternatives to lost infrastructure, such as re-establishing the local public transport system. Christoplos (1998) showed for the Angolan case, how field staff of service institutions at the local level found ways to continue to function, albeit modestly. This research explores how existing institutions survive and adapt to continue to provide services, how alternative institutions emerge, and what role they play during and after crisis.

I focus on three broad sets of institutions: state institutions, including local administrations and social services; non-state institutions, including private initiatives, NGOs, local civil society or religious organisations; and alternative local institutions, including customary or traditional institutions, collective action mechanisms, and aid related CBOs. These multiple institutions do not operate in isolation from one another, but rather interact through social actors. In doing so, institutions at different levels, of different functions and degrees of formality, are shaped and evolve. Institutional interrelatedness is thus a key part of institutional change processes, to which I now turn.

1.4 Institutional change processes

Institutions are not static. They undergo changes that are both incremental and discontinuous and should be understood *"not only as property or state of an existing social order, but also institutions as process, including the processes of institutionalisation and deinstitutionalisation."* (Scott, 2001: 50).

As already explained, institutional change is brought about by the interaction between structures and actors, and by the ways in which actors invoke, play upon or work through particular institutions. *"Institutions are shaped in the interaction between structures and practices. Because social actors invoke, negotiate and manipulate the meaning of institutions in their everyday life, institutional change happens all the time. Hence, institutions provide ordering, but there is never order. Systems of meaning never attain coherence and closure."* (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009: 24).

Institutions also evolve under the influence of wider processes. These include external events such as conflict, as well as engineered processes such as aid interventions. In conflict, institutions evolve in different ways. Some may disintegrate or become weakened, others may gain strength or become altered, and new institutions may also emerge. In terms of local service institutions, I argue that notwithstanding their different degrees of resilience, existing capacities are often eroded. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, both state and local church institutions as principal actors in service delivery, saw their services weakened over the course of the Angolan conflict. This results from both the direct and indirect effects of war, including violence, displacement and increased mistrust, as well as additional historical and political factors. As this chapter shall elaborate, colonialism, political underinvestment, and aid have had considerable effects on institutional change in Angola.

Engineered institutional change is at the heart of various types of aid interventions, particularly in post-conflict reconstruction contexts. State-building initiatives either focus on strengthening and/or transforming existing institutions or on creating new institutional forms. They are primarily directed at formal services belonging to the state apparatus, and in the second instance at local civil society institutions through capacity-building initiatives. Interventions at the level of local communities tend to involve the creation of new structures and CBOs. Alternative institutional arrangements that emerge during crisis or informal structures such as traditional leaderships, muster considerably less attention (Hilhorst et al., 2010). Several aid interventions that focus on strengthening institutional capacity, also seek to create linkages between different institutional types. This is based on the idea that institutions are interrelated and are shaped in the interaction with one another. For instance, decentralisation and service delivery programmes focus on linkages between state and non-state institutions, such as private enterprises or community-based organisations.

As I demonstrate in the later chapters of this thesis however, these engineered processes in practice work in unpredictable ways as they are based on untested assumptions about social change in conflict affected societies. Institutional change tends to be slow because it is characterised by *path-dependence*, *lock-in* and *embeddedness* in ideological (values and beliefs) and institutional heritage (Skoog, 2005: 31). Individuals' behaviour or the choice of arrangement to address a certain need is likely to be shaped by previous experiences in solving the problem as well as the current context. It is only as the same strategies are employed repeatedly in recurring situations and as they gain legitimacy among social actors, that the rules, norms and structures that make up a certain arrangement become established or institutionalised. Institutions like informal rules, social norms and customs either take particularly long to change, or may well be impossible to engineer (Jütting, 2003).

This unpredictability of outcomes of institutional interaction and change processes brings to question interventions intended on transforming institutions. The main purpose of this research is to unravel how diverse local institutions are conceived of and are transformed by aid interventions with different objectives – to by-pass, replace, strengthen, engineer or create alternative structures. The specific interaction between aid and local institutions is addressed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. This chapter reviews instead, how certain service and local governance institutions evolved through time in Angola, and identifies the key factors involved in institutional transformation.

2. Institutional change during conflict

Explanations of social change in Angola, as in other fragile or post-conflict countries, are centred on the effects of conflict on the erosion of local institutions. I argue that contrary to dominant writings on conflict, institutions have evolved and been transformed as a result of additional factors, not all of which are directly related to the civil-war. In this section I review the recent history of institutional development, focusing specifically on the late colonial period until and including the post-conflict context. I give a brief overview of the organisation of society before and outside of colonial intervention, so as to analyse how it was impacted by colonialism. I identify and describe how colonial occupation, displacement, urbanisation, political processes and aid have impacted on formal state institutions of governance and service delivery and on informal community level institutions.

2.1 Local institutions in pre-colonial times

Looking at how Angolan society was organised prior to and outside of colonial intervention, is important to understand how Portuguese colonialism engaged with and transformed local

institutions. Such contextualisation of the history of institutional change guards against two common misconceptions. One, that existing communities' civilisation were altered by various exogenous influences, to the point of losing its African culture. Second, that an archaic and "pure" society exists that remained static and impermeable to change (Neto, 2001). Contrary to such image of a static pre-colonial society, the boundaries of political and personal allegiances and cultural similarities shifted with conquests, peaceful culture influence and migrations (Minter, 1994: 82).

Angola's pre-colonial society was structured in states and kingdoms of different size and importance. As Minter explains, *"By and large the pre-colonial units of the political and cultural allegiance were either too small (the village or group of villages) or too large (states with subjects of a variety of languages and cultures) to correspond precisely to groups identified today as "tribes" or "ethnic groups.*" (Minter, 1994). In general states had a centralized political authority, assisted by chiefs. Smaller states were less centralized and were held together by cultural ties and common rituals, as in the case of the Ndongo state - one of the most powerful and enterprising of pre-colonial Angola (Oyebade, 2007: 21). By 1500, when Portuguese influence started to emerge, the leader of one of the Ndongo states gained wider acceptance and became dominant because of his role in settling disputes between different factions and defending communities on the basis of common rituals or of kinship relations (Fyle, 1999 : 54, Oyebade, 2007: 21).

Prior to colonisation, Angola's societies were not closed or isolated. Considerable political and economic links and interaction already existed between various peoples of the region, ranging from conflicts to trading networks and demographic movements (Neto, 2001: 30). When the colonial occupation of Africa intensified in the late 1800s, several legal systems and institutions were thus already in place (Guedes, 2007: 21).

2.2 Local institutions under colonialism

Personal experience of colonial domination is not part of the majority of Angolans' life stories, despite its relatively recent end, given the low average life expectancy, which currently stands at 47 years (UNICEF, 2010). Accounts of this period were collected from literature and from the life stories of older individuals and collective interviews with the village elders or counsellors (the *Sekulus*). These are intended to demonstrate how society was organised and operated according to colonial and traditional institutions and how these shaped one another. I am interested in how the colonial system, its rule and policies affected the livelihoods and institutions of local people, and on the other hand, how people encountered and used institutions in making a living and organising their lives.

The period of intensified colonial occupation, from the 1920s onwards, when European migration increased and capitalist systems of production evolved, was particularly significant in the transformation of rural societies (Silva, 2003: 6). However, the effects of colonialism were not homogenous. Colonial policies were implemented and received in very different ways, according to different regions, ethnic groups, livelihood practices, social structures, and not least, according to the strategic importance of certain areas to the colonial administration. Detailed studies of the agro-pastoralist peoples of Angola, found in the southern part of Huíla, show that colonial penetration in these areas was much more limited than in agricultural areas, in terms of forced labour, transformation of traditional authority structures, livelihood practices, and the social impact of Christianity (Heimer, 1972, Silva, 2003). I take up these different spheres in the discussion below.

I start with the particular story of *Mais Velho*[2] Simeão. I was introduced to him by my research assistant whose family came from the same village of Monhanangombe, 12 KM north of Matala town. The first thing he told me was that he was soon to be 107 years old. He insisted on showing me his official documents, immaculately kept in a wooden box, in which

his baptism certificate issued by the Catholic Church in 1988 specified the birth date of 6th February 1901. Whether such details were completely accurate or not is beside the point. What is compelling about his particular life story, which I introduce below, is his first-hand experience of the various phases and policies of the colonial regime. I therefore return to it at various points of the discussion. Simeão passed away six months after this interview.

"I´ve been living in this village since 1968 but I´m from Chicomba Municipality. I actually founded this village. Before that I was living in another area. Between 1924 and 1968 I paid taxes to the colonial administration in Capelongo[3]. In those days, the administration officers would come by to collect taxes. They would talk to the Sekulus of the villages. These would then identify those people who didn't have money, talk to the Soba about them and then they were handed over to the Administration. Sometimes the Sobas could bend the rules. They would try to keep at least one male family member around to make sure that they would look after the extended family including the elderly, and of their possessions, such as cattle. But there were also cases of people who had paid their tax, but would still be taken away to work. Those that were handed over to the colonial administration would be sent as 'Contratados'[4] to work in other parts of the country, like in Tômbwa´s fishing industry [Namibe province]. The administration would ask around in industries and businesses if they needed labour and would hand them over. People would have to work around 4 years to be able to pay their tax. Later the time was reduced to 2 or 3 years of work. They would also have to pay the tax for all the time that they had been away under the contract system. If after that they once again didn't have enough money to pay the next tax, they would be sent off again. I was sent away in this system, several times. The first time was in 1939 when I went to Tômbwa for 3 years. Then again in 1945 I went to work at the salt works in Namibe for 2 years. The third time happened when I had been living in the 'kimbus'[5] for a while and they started doing raids and I ended up being sent to Castanheira de Pêra[6] to work in the construction of houses and of the bridge. I had a wife and children who stayed behind with my brothers during these periods of absence. In this area many contratados worked with the whites in the construction of the Matala dam. There used to be many accidents because they had to use dynamite to make the explosions for the construction works. That part was always given by the white men to the blacks because it was so dangerous."[7]

2.2.1 Forced labour

Labour and economic policies of the colonial regime involved a hut tax system, under which rural households had to pay a tax to the administration. It was established as early as 1906, and converted into an individual tax in the late colonial period. As explained in an official document of the colonial regime, "*The system of taxation in Angola attains the civilized population in a different way from the one which attains the uncivilized one. [...] Its economic value is highly important, concerning not only the production, but also the consumption, as, with the new customs they get when in touch with the European civilization, the natives will have to buy, besides their own clothes, domestic and agricultural utensils which will improve the conditions of their life and production."* (Angola Institute Edition, 1953: 198-199). Traditional village leaders were made responsible for the collection of taxes and for handing over individuals who did not comply, and who would then be sent away as '*contratados*' to work on colonial enterprises. *Mais Velho* Simeão explained how this system was experienced in practice.

"We used to pay tax to the colonialist by selling our maize. Initially the tax was 60 Escudos, but later reached 150. This had to be paid once a year and everybody paid it, we had no choice. Otherwise we wouldn't get the written permits that allowed us to circulate in the area. The last payment reached 280 Escudos and then the system ended in 1974 when the

war came.[8] *We planted maize, peanuts, sesame to make oil, and we also produced honey, reared pigs, etc. We´d take that to the bush shop of the 'colono' and with the money we got there, we paid the tax. Those that didn't pay would become 'contratados'. As soon as you had hairs in your armpit, you´d be old enough to have to pay.* [...] *Things started changing in the tax system when the people of the coffee plantations of Uíge started rising up to the repression of the colonialists. When I left Castanheira de Pêra people had received a note saying that they no longer needed to pay tax. I cannot remember the year anymore - you had to have a white friend to tell you the year of important events, otherwise you wouldn´t know. But it was around the time the colonial war started heating up. The whites started to get scared that people would rebel even more if they continued with the tax system. They became more and more fearful. Then, with the rise of Agostinho Neto, the Portuguese ended up leaving one by one. At that moment, life changed for people because we could work freely on our land, for ourselves. We didn't have to pay taxes."*[9]

The contract system was in practice, a form of forced labour formulated by the Portuguese in an attempt to circumvent the pressure by other countries to end slavery. *"The Soba that didn't obey would be beaten up and arrested. People knew he´d suffer, so there was no arguing. If the soba did his job, he´d get a bit of money."*[10] Failure to do so, was legislated as jail sentence of anything between 60 days and a year (Moutinho, 2000: 167). Based on figures on cotton production from Angola and Mozambique, Moutinho (2000) estimates that in the period 1940 to 1960, taxes paid by producers reached between 70 to 80% of their earnings, and frequently exceeded their income altogether (p. 232). In 1954 the famous British journalist Basil Davidson reported that 379,000 contract workers had been enslaved to join a free labour force living on two shillings per day (Birmingham, 1997).

2.2.2 Racial policy

Portugal's model of public administration of its colonies was based on policies of assimilation (Guedes, 2007). This involved a system of differentiation between the "civilized" population, white, descendant of the Portuguese, and the "uncivilized" black population, also referred to as the indigenous or autochthones. The *Indígenas* were legally defined in 1926 as *"all those of black race, or descendent from it, whom by their illustration and customs do not distinguish themselves from what is common of such race*." (Moutinho, 2000: 137). In 1954 this was revised to "*...individuals of black race or their descendants, who having been born or living in those colonies, do not yet possess the illustration and individual and social habits presupposed for the integral application of the public and private law of Portuguese citizens."* (ibid: 138).[11] The *mestiço* population, born from black mothers and white fathers, was officially considered as indigenous. They were always a 'discomfort' for colonial policy. On the one hand their integration into European society was desirable as potential agents of colonialism. *"...Portuguese "lusotropicalism" exalted racial mixture as one of the means of spreading civilisation."* (Minter, 1994: 87). On the other it was seen as potentially threatening to the regime (Cruz, 2005).

The process of assimilation was presented as a form of 'upwards social mobility' for black indigenous individuals. It was based on the idea that African traditions and customs would be eliminated as local people would voluntarily give up their normative universes and affiliations and adopt the legal and political system of the colonial government, for greater rights (Guedes, 2007: 24). The *assimilados,* defined as *'children from non-white families, yet civilised people'* (Angola Institute Edition, 1953: 63) were entitled to the same educations as the whites for example. In practice, this policy was the basis for the denial or conditioning of people's rights to freedom of movement and of residence, and their access to services and resources. It kept people aspiring, yet it was reserved to a limited few. A large population of *assimilados* would have represented a threat to the very basis of the colonial system. To limit

this, the status was made conditional on the fulfilment of an extensive list of requirements, including the abandonment of customs of the black race, or the adoption of monogamy (Cruz, 2005: 101). By 1950, out of a population of 4.1 million, there were 79,000 whites, 30,000 *mestiços* and 30,000 *assimilados* (Guedes, 2007: 87).

2.2.3 Livelihoods

Colonial policies increasingly constrained people's livelihood opportunities, particularly as occupation efforts were scaled up in the late 19th century in a push for colonial expansion. The hut tax and labour policies meant that several people were forcibly taken as labour to work on various colonial projects. Others had to take up so-called salaried contract work, for example in the vast coffee plantations of the north, in order to be able to pay taxes. Agricultural policies involving the seizing of land and compulsory crops also significantly impacted local livelihoods. As *Mais Velho* Simeão explained, *"Before the time of the white man, the people here already worked the land with their traditional hoes. It was not them that brought us hoes. But when they arrived, they took the best land for themselves and we had to look for other land. Our lavras were more limited and less productive. After the whites left, they left some children here who kept the land of the parents. But in other cases, we could recover the land that had belonged to us."* The Central Plateau region (which includes the northern part of Huíla province), was a popular settlement area with Europeans due to its mild climate and the mythical fertility of its land (Pacheco, 2001). Lubango and its surrounding municipalities of Humpata and Chibia are also examples of early European settlements established at the end of the 1800s by Boers and *Madeirenses*.

The effect of this land grabbing was dramatic for rural populations as it became increasingly difficult to subsist on the available land, and as local agricultural practices became unviable due to the increased pressure on the land (ibid). For the agro-pastoralist groups in the Southern part of the province, the occupation of land resulted in a severe disruption of transhumance corridors on which people's livelihoods were dependent. However, it did not result in the complete breakdown of the traditional economic system. Agro-pastoralists adapted to the new circumstances by moving to unoccupied pasture land or by breaking up herds into smaller more manageable sizes (Silva, 2003: 15). In 1926 the Portuguese administration officially introduced the cultivation of compulsory crops. Cotton plantations became particularly prominent in the early 1940s and were only abolished in 1961, following the uprisings of plantation workers in Malanje (Chapter 2) (Moutinho, 2000).

Towards the late colonial period, as it attempted to retain its colonies, the regime made significant investments that changed relations between the colonial state and the rural population, and also affected livelihoods. As the white population increased, there was an injection of capital and an expansion of industries including agriculture and cattle raising, construction, communications and extractive and processing industries (Neto, 2001: 33). Other initiatives included the expansion of rural extension services, the promotion of pastoralist activity, such as cattle vaccination campaigns, and the establishment of water points. However, the benefits of these measures for local people were limited. They were primarily motivated by the economic gain for colonialists from the trade in cattle, for instance (Silva, 2003). Moreover, initiatives such as the extension services were never fully implemented (Pacheco, 2001).

2.2.4 Service provision

Colonial policies for social assistance and service provision were modest and largely formulated along the rationale of legitimating colonial presence. The official colonial discourse claimed, through its civilising mission, to provide assistance to the indigenous

population in the form of services. The right to assistance and education were legislated under the Indigenous Statute of 1929. In practice, this hardly benefitted local populations who were neglected and denied access to these basic services. *Mais Velho* Simeão reported that *"In those days we were forbidden from learning how to read or write. There were no schools or health services for us. When we got ill, we could only resort to the traditional healers. Only the 'contratados' were sometimes given medical assistance at the workplace to make sure they could keep on working."* Cruz (2005: 123) explains the motivation for such policies as follows. *"The assistance plan was inscribed in the double necessity to maintain, and if possible, reproduce, the number of indigenous workers. This presupposed on the one hand, an increase in their productivity, and on the other, the fulfilment of their needs as consumers, as well as those of the ever growing number of colonialists in the territory."*[12]

Regarding the health sector in particular, this duality was evident in the efforts by the colonial administration to address epidemics that affected the indigenous workforce, such as sleeping sickness and malaria. The logic was that the poor health of the indigenous population was *"one of the main factors behind the apathy and aversion to work of the indigenous worker"* and thus, *"Everything that is done in order to improve the health conditions of the African populations will have, as an immediate result, the increase in the productivity of the black worker and a reduction in the lack of indigenous workforce."* (Mendes, 1958: 46-47). Despite legislation on healthcare[13], services were limited in coverage and were not necessarily free as people had to pay for their own medicines. This in turn tied them to working for the colonial power. Some of the large colonial enterprises did have health facilities but access by the *contratados* was very limited. *"In the colonial days I was already farming, but also worked in the railway line for the colonial men. I would earn 250 Escudos a month. There were absolutely no health facilities for us, the only hospitals then were at Caluquembe and at Nandumbo. When people fell ill there was no medical care from the railway so we had to go in the bus system for the local people, to be treated at those hospitals. The trip to Caluquembe was via Lubango and took a long time."*[14]

Education and the churches

The provision of education for the indigenous population was closely linked to the colonial discourse of its civilising mission. Officially, this was to be achieved through education, but in practice this function was largely neglected. In 1950, less than 5% of children between 5 and 14 were attending school, and more than 97% of the over-15 population were illiterate (Moutinho, 2000: 140). In 1956, Angola had the lowest rate of schooling (0.98%) compared to Mozambique (4.5%) and Guinea (1.8%) (ibid: 159).

Although service provision to indigenous populations were considered vital for colonial relations, the colonial regime effectively delegated this to Christian missions (Moutinho, 2000). It was anticipated that Christian values would promote loyalty to the colonial rule and its economic projects. *"Missions were expected to teach colonial languages, create consumer demands that would benefit home industries, train clerical workers or artisans, and remove Christian converts from the influence of village headmen empowered by magic rituals."* (Birmingham, 2006: 9-10).

This was in direct tension with the Portuguese State's anti-clerical attitude, particularly after the institution of the Portuguese Republic in 1911, which separated state from church. Furthermore, Christian missions were also seen as subversive and disloyal by the colonial power. The protestant missions, which in Angola were established by British, Swiss, North-Americans and Canadians, were particularly problematic because they did not actively promote the interests of the Portuguese regime, and were thus seen as having a denationalising effect (Cruz, 2005). Several of the evangelical missions for instance, were known to protect people from slavery (Henderson, 1990). However, the Berlin Conference of

1884 committed Portugal to support the establishment of foreign missions in its colonies. The result was that the development of Portuguese Catholic missions and their service delivery capacity was weakened relative to that of other foreign missions (Moutinho, 2000, Birmingham, 2006).[15] Although the Catholic Church remained by far the largest, Evangelical and Adventist missions thus became important service providers (see Chapter 5). This effect was somewhat limited by the fact that education was supposed to be in Portuguese (Cruz, 2005). Many Angolan political figures were educated in mission schools during the colonial period. As seen in Chapter 3, this was central in the attribution of political association between various churches and political movements (Comerford, 2005).[16] To what extent religious missions were collaborators or opponents of colonialism in Angolan remains open to debate, but anti-colonial movements have been linked to religious congregations (Birmingham, 2003, 2006).

Outside of church education services, the official colonial education policy defined separate models for indigenous people and for whites and *assimilados*. Indigenous education was limited to skills training and omitted any academic subjects. It was even termed rudimentary schooling under the banner of 'education for work'. The single objective was to produce manual workers in such a way that the indigenous populations would not realise their inferior condition and as a consequence, revolt (Cruz, 2005). But even this type of education did not become widespread and the colonial state continued to lean on church services.[17] This was partly due to lacking resources to fund ambitious programmes established to increase coverage of services, and to the competition posed to Portuguese settlers by the development of semi-skilled indigenous labour. This indigenous workforce was more easily exploitable by the capitalist European enterprises than the European one (Freitas, 1964). In line with the attempt to consolidate and modernise colonial occupation, it was only in the late colonial period (1960s/70s) that the state education network was extended, particularly in urban areas, albeit modestly (Silva, 2003:10).

2.2.5 The social impact of Christianity

As described above, the provision of services by Christian Missions had a significant social impact. In a study of rural communities in Huambo, Pacheco (2001) concludes that Christian missions *"presented opportunities for access to medical services and, more importantly, to education (the gateway to modernisation), the civil service, and employment on the Benguela railway."* (p. 61). For many people I encountered, mission schools were an important stepping stone in livelihood and career opportunities.

Beyond this social assistance role, the spread of Christianity also contributed to changes in local power structures, as new community leaders linked to the church emerged. The churches thus became a dynamic part of society, as they acquired some of the spiritual and religious authority of the traditional leadership structures (Pacheco, 2001: 108). This pattern has remained until today. For instance, church representatives are now part of the traditional community councils (the *Onjangos* in Umbumdu). These councils are made up of respected community members and act as advisors and moderators of the traditional leadership, assisting (and challenging) in decision making and conflict resolution (Pacheco, 2005b: 5). Catechists were the group most commonly cited among my survey respondents as being important in community life, besides the traditional authorities and administrators. They were followed by the elderly and teachers and then by the state administration and members of the MPLA.

2.2.6 The traditional authorities

The exact structure of the traditional authorities varies for different groups within Angola, as does the terminology used to define them.[18] Today, the traditional chiefs or leaders of rural communities are commonly referred to as *Sobas*[19], and together with their council of elders (the *Sekulus*), make up the traditional authorities. Some areas also have a *Soba Grande* (or *Regedor*) who is above the individual community *Sobas*. Traditionally, the title of leader is and remains hereditary, although there are several cases where the leaders do not belong to the traditional lineage.

In the colonial days, the hierarchy of the traditional authorities as recognised by the Portuguese involved different levels. At the top was the *Regedor* (often equivalent to the *Soba Grande*) who headed a large territory referred to as a *Regedoria* or *Povoação* made up of smaller units. Next on the hierarchy was the *Sekulu*, which acts as an advisor or wise man. Below the *Sekulus* were the *Sobas* who are the village or community chiefs. Often this structure did not reflect the endogenous system of authority, which existed in different variations, for instance in terms of the territory where authority was exercised (Pacheco, 2001). Yet, the exogenous colonial model became dominant (ibid).

In official colonial discourse, traditional authorities were recognised and retained as part of social organisation, as a display of respect for local institutions and customs. In reality, this decision was out of political convenience for the colonial system (Moutinho, 2000: 168). Its interest was in building viable linkages between the colonial state and local chieftaincies that would forward its political interests. To that end, it established several policies to facilitate its relation with the traditional authorities. It attempted for instance, to shift the power from the Sobas to the Sekulus, with varying success, by semi-formalising the function of the latter, giving them remuneration and uniforms, and assigning them a number of administrative tasks. The *Sobas* were not given any official legitimacy (Silva, 2003). In addition, local chiefs were used by the administration as intermediaries in the tax collection process and in the recruitment of forced labour. They thus became progressively integrated into the colonial administrative system, with the purpose of ensuring the obedience of indigenous populations and the implementation of measures of administrative control. These included responsibilities such as denouncing practices of witchcraft or alcohol production.

As a result of this co-option by the colonial state, traditional authorities were inevitably transformed in their role and relationship with their people. Their position within local communities was significantly strengthened, as access to extra income for instance, allowed them to escape forced labour (Silva, 2003). *"The colonial administrative system weakened the horizontal and participative aspects of traditional governance systems, and strengthened the vertical, authoritarian aspects."* (Robson, 2001b: 12). *"Instead of being leaders or representatives of their people, the osoma*[20] *came to be seen as delegates of colonial power, responsible for collecting taxes and recruiting labour."* (Pacheco, 2001: 62).

On the other hand, leaders did manage to retain some important customary roles (Neto, 2001). *"In some cases the traditional osoma (legitimate heirs of the lineage that held power) were retained, but in great secrecy. The role of the osoma was also weakened by the emergence of new leaders who undertook new roles in society – a prosperous farmer in a new social structure, a clergyman, a catechist, or a teacher."* (ibid). Moreover, as recounted by *Mais Velho* Simeão, traditional leaders would sometimes bend taxation rules to protect households by not handing over all male members for contract work simultaneously.

2.2.7 Additional safety-nets

Notwithstanding the dire absence of services under the colonial administration, local populations found some safety-nets by entering into patronage-like relationships with colonial

traders. The role of *comerciantes do mato* or ´bush traders´ was notable. They were white Portuguese settlers established in remote rural areas to trade with Africans. Some also practiced farming, cattle raising and hunting. Their shops were the places where locals went to trade their produce and animals for other consumable goods.[21] Although they had huge profit margins and exploited local people, they also provided credit when people were really in need, such as during droughts. I came across many people that spoke nostalgically about these shops. *"In those days we lived from farming and would trade our products in the shops nearby. Close to here there was the 'Carvalho' shop and one other which falls within Huambo province. At that time, when there was little rain, we still didn't go hungry. We had a greater diversity of products, so it was ok."*[22] *"In the colonial time people already farmed. In times of crisis we could owe money to the shops of the Colono. People in this area [Matala] would go to Chinhanha, Nguenje and Kapelongo. Each customer would go to his bosses´ shop and people could pay in money or in kind, such as cattle."*[23] Nevertheless, as Silva (2003) explains, the credit system was a reproduction of the relationship of dependency between the bush traders and their better off suppliers, and resulted in the terms of trade that were invariably disadvantageous for the indigenous population.

This section has demonstrated the great impact of colonialism on Angolan society and institutions. As colonial enterprises were established, productive systems and livelihoods were transformed and population movements were restricted and conditioned. Families and communities were forcibly displaced and divided, transforming power relations and social practices. It also shows however, that colonialism did not penetrate so deeply into society as to completely overlay what had been there before. Policy outcomes did not always follow intentions and local populations sought to protect their interests within the restriction of the colonial regime. Emerging and existing institutions were tapped into in order to secure access to resources and services. For instance, the pastoralists of the south adapted their transhumance practices so as to preserve their traditional economic system. Education provided under the evangelisation mission of Christian churches was used as a door to modernity. Others expanded their rights by becoming officially assimilated into European culture. Rural peasants exploited patronage relationships with bush traders to safeguarded access to food during crises.

2.3 Local institutions during war

In this section I will show that the war had a direct erosive effect on both local state services and structures and on non-state social institutions. This corroborates much of the literature on the social impact of war and of the Angolan conflict in particular. *"Conflict further weakens institutions by breaking up communities, deepening mistrust and preventing the State from functioning in an accountable manner to distribute resources and manage conflicts."* (Robson et al., 2006: 87). However, I also demonstrate that such erosion in the longer-term was at least as much a result of the indirect effects of war and of broader social and political processes. I analyse the impact of other key factors in the development and transformation of local institutions. These include decolonisation, displacement and urbanisation, political interests, and aid interventions. In continuity with the previous section, I also specifically discuss the development of the traditional authorities during the conflict.

2.3.1 The impact of decolonisation

At independence there was a mass exodus of the colonial population which made up much of the skilled human resources. Major infrastructure was also abandoned. Hodges (2004: 9) estimates that around 5% of the total population left the country at that time. This transition

contributed significantly to the decline of local institutions (Robson et al., 2006). It resulted in a vacuum in the *"... administrative apparatus of the state, urban commerce and almost all the small merchants who, together with coercive state administrators had formed the link between peasant production and the market."* (Minter, 1994: 234). Services created to serve the Portuguese had been concentrated in urban areas and depended on their know-how. These biases made them unsustainable after independence and resulted in their rapid decline. *"The infrastructure inherited by the health sector at Independence was very large, mainly composed of tertiary hospitals designed to serve Portuguese settlers and of facilities owned and operated by large firms, such as railways and farms. [...] Facilities were concentrated in urban areas, leaving conspicuous portions of the countryside unserved. [...] The flight of most Portuguese skilled cadres reduced abruptly the human capital needed for operating such a large network."* (Pavignani and Colombo, 2001: 12). Some of this colonial service infrastructure remained in use by state services during the war, albeit with very limited capacity. In the reconstruction period, many such facilities are being reconstructed. In Huíla, the colonial secondary school Diogo Cão has recently been rehabilitated and converted into Mandume state university in Lubango. The Agricultural and Livestock School of Tchivinguiro, created in 1949, continues to be operational.

2.3.2 Local state administrations

During the conflict, the institutional capacity in nearly all branches of public administration declined, leaving it disorganised and in a leadership vacuum (Tvedten, 2000). Over time, the state became altogether absent in many parts of the country, particularly in UNITA territory but also in heavily contested or remote government areas. In Huíla, the administrations of the northern municipalities of Chicomba and Chipindo were only reinstated after the war ended in 2002. Several state administrations were temporarily relocated to neighbouring 'safer' areas. Matala hosted the administrations of Chicomba and of Cunene province. The latter was a battleground during the South African incursions due to its proximity to the Namibian border.

Even where local administrations were in place, they were practically inactive due to lacking financial and human resources. In a 2001 study of urban communities in Luanda, residents claimed there to be no visible local state administration. Communal administrators in turn, reported having no budget or salary with which to work (Robson, 2001a). In the early post-war period, state administrations at the lowest level were still largely neglected. In 2003, over 90% of technical staff was concentrated at provincial headquarters, whilst communal administrations accounted for only 1% of the total, and none of them possessed university level education (MAT e PNUD, 2003 in Pacheco, 2005b: 3). As shall be seen, this state vacuum also applied to social service institutions, resulting in a service delivery gap (Christoplos, 1998).

2.3.3 Displacement and urbanisation

Population displacement was not a phenomenon that emerged with the civil war. A record from 1915 for instance, shows that the southern Kwanyama people were already migrating to the mines of Namibia due to a sequence of epidemics, droughts, floods and locust plague (Clarence-Smith & Moorsom, 1977 and Neto, 1964 in Silva, 2003:12). Several waves of displacement occurred under colonialism, due to labour policies, natural disasters and economic factors.[24] During the 1960s, policies of "rural reorganisation" are thought to have forcibly displaced a total of one million people into labour reserves (Sogge, 1994: 95). The growth in urban population from the 1960s until independence was a direct result of intensified Portuguese immigration aimed to stimulate economic activity (Robson, 2001a).

Yet, at independence the majority of the population were small-scale farmers with only 15% living in cities (Pacheco, 2003).

Records show that displacement became more widespread as a result of the conflict, although statistics must be taken with caution. Large discrepancies exist between government estimates and those of the aid community. For example, GoA and OCHA estimates for 2002, varied between a total of 4.1 million IDPs and 1.4 respectively.[25] Access restrictions and the conflict dynamics hampered population tracking efforts. Further, different criteria were used to determine who qualified as an IDP. Over the years different categories of IDPs were constructed according to the wave of displacement during which people fled their homes. The terms 'new' and 'old' IDPs often used in aid circles, became problematic as they were fluid and changed with each new displacement wave.[26] The inclusion or exclusion of each category in IDP estimates accounts for much of the mentioned discrepancy in figures.

The majority of Angola's adult rural population was displaced at least twice, and often more frequently. According to my survey in Huíla, the average family was displaced 2.5 times. The first displacement in 68% of the cases ocurred during the 1970s or 1980s, 22% between 1991 and 2000 and 10% in 2001. In Matala people were displaced 1.8 times on average, whilst in Bunjei 3.1. Only three people reported never having been uprooted, all from Monhanangombe, one of the eldest communities in Matala.[27]

In the first phase of the conflict (up to 1991), displacement usually occurred from rural to urban and interior to coastal areas, as fighting was concentrated in the former. The outcome was an accelerated urbanisation process that continued throughout the war (see Table 4.1).

TABLE 4.1: Population Figures: percentage urban population for Angola

Year	% Urban Population
1950	6%
1960	11%
1970	15%
1980	24%
1990	37%
2000	60%
2010	66%

Source: (Compiled from Robson, 2001a, UN, 2002a: 59, Sogge, 2006: 6, Porto et al., 2007: 30, INE, 2010)

This trend also reflected a movement from UNITA (rural) to government (urban) areas. In combination with the fighting this was motivated by factors such as the ideological and political pressure exerted by UNITA on the population, the economic paralysis in its territories, and the presence of aid and livelihood opportunities in government areas (Pacheco and Roque, 1995: 214, Robson, 2001a: 169). I found that 68% of people that fled in this period from Chipindo which was under UNITA control for a long time, went in search of security. However, the search for job opportunities was still the most frequent reason cited by 24% of people.

The intensity of the renewed war after 1992 created a new peak in displacement, creating around 3.8 million IDPs (CISH, 2001). The post-Lusaka period of quasi-peace from 1994 to 1998, saw new population movements by those attempting to return home. Official IDP numbers dropped from 3.8 million in 1992 to 1.2 by 1997 (see Table 4.2). However, in my research areas, most people reported not having returned home because of the lack of security. The intensification of the war after 1998 again resulted in a sharp increase in displacement. Between April 1998 and September 1999 alone, new confirmed IDPs reached almost one million (UN, 1999: 1). In the entire four year period before the end of the war, a

total of 3.1 million new IDPs were uprooted (HRW, 2003). Reports by humanitarian actors linked this to the change in war tactics adopted by both UNITA and MPLA, including scorched earth policies and the use of villagers as combat tools (MSF, 2002d) (see also Chapters 2 and 3).

TABLE 4.2: Displacement figures for Angola

Year	No. of IDPs Countrywide	No. of IDPs in Huila Province	No. of Angolan Refugees in neighbouring countries
1960~	1,000,000		
1991*	800,000		
1992	3,800,000		
1994			
1995			
1996	1,300,000		330,000
1997	1,200,000		300,000
1998	1,380,000	146,675	
1999			
2000	Unspecified	Unspecified	unspecified
2001		125,309	
2002	4,100,000 (Gov) 1,400,000 (OCHA)	315,941(Gov) 191,000 (OCHA)	420,000 - 456,626
2003	3,500,000	194,778	441,000
2004			
2005	90,000		16,817

Source: (Compiled from Sogge, 1994, Pacheco and Roque, 1995, UN, 1996, 1997, 1999, Hodges, 2001: 178, UN, 2002b, 2003, IDMC, 2007)
* Until the Bicesse Accords.

Social institutions

As shown in Chapter 3, many IDPs in the early conflict phase were initially hosted or assisted by relatives and friends, or supported by resident communities and solidarity mechanisms. However, continued rural to urban displacement during the war put these social institutions under increasing pressure. This resulted from the erosion of formal state services which were strained beyond capacity in urban centres and virtually abandoned in rural areas. Self and mutual-aid mechanisms employed in earlier periods within affected communities or in their host areas, became weakened by war and displacement as the conflict continued.

The case of Matala described in Chapter 2 demonstrated that IDPs that arrived in the earlier phase of the war (in the 1980s) appear to have achieved a greater level of integration in their host communities, than later arrivals. They make up the majority of people that chose to remain in Matala after the war, rather than returning to their areas of origin. Most had access to land upon arrival, whilst later IDPs did not and were thus more likely to return to their homelands in periods of relative stability.[28] The residents of Monhanangombe village (Matala) explained this as follows:

"There were many displaced people that came here during the war. The very first arrived in 1985, 86 and 87. But then some left and the village got smaller again, until the next big wave of displacement - from 92 to 95. This whole area used to be bush before the arrival of the displaced. Then we had to clear it for them. In the 80s there wasn't that much fighting so the

people that arrived here had managed to move with a lot of their possessions. They had something to restart their lives with. The displaced would arrive here and would be allocated some land where they would build their houses and set up their lavras. But in the 90s people fled leaving everything behind, even their children sometimes. They got here with nothing."[29]

The post-1992 war significantly exacerbated the disintegration of social institutions. It resulted in the large dissolution of solidarity and hospitality traditions and eroded economic conditions to unprecedented levels (Pacheco and Roque, 1995: 216). As fighting reached provincial towns and cities for the first time, it created a wave of urban displaced that transformed cities into centres of poverty. Communities and families were violently broken up and their social structures weakened; material destitution was aggravated by the sudden uprooting that prevented people from collecting their limited assets; and resident populations became vulnerable to the pressures of increased competition for resources. In urban areas of Luanda, Robson (2001a) found no remnants of 'traditional' rural organisational structures *"There are no leaders who are able to speak of all people living in one area, even when these have recently arrived from the same area of origin."* (p. 173). In a study of collective action in peri-urban areas in Angola, Robson and Roque (2001) conclude that *"... after such a long period of social transformations in rural areas in the colonial period, followed by various decades of instability, rural institutions of solidarity have been strongly modified. Mutual aid may occur in rural areas, but less frequently than before."* (p. 37).

I found that people adapted their coping strategies where possible, but often were pushed into dependence on some form of external support. Residents of Micosse (Matala) for instance, limited their displacement to nearby Matala, because of the lack of land.

"We fled our village because of the war three times, in 1985, 93 and 99. Always to Matala Sede. In 85 there weren´t any camps for the displaced yet, so we went to Matala Sede and stayed with family for short periods of time. Then, until 2002 we continued to flee several times during the night, to escape UNITA attacks. But we never stayed there because in Matala, there was no land to farm anymore." [30] *"The war after 1992 was the hardest. That's why displacement was so huge, bigger than in the 1980s. Those in Matala without land or family support made a living from coal and wood selling. WFP helped, it was around for 3 or 4 years. But there was a lot of death. We had to carry the dead in a cart. In the first displacement in the 1980s, we managed to send the oxen and maize ahead of us, but in the post-92 war, there was no more time for that."*[31]

Besides the erosion of social institutions, there are indications that the social fabric or moral value-base for collective action was also weakened by conflict. My findings are mixed on this. On one hand, older community members in particular claimed there to have been greater solidarity in the past. They referred to past systems of mutual aid, like the *onjuluka,* where people help each other with agricultural activities through an organised rotating group to work on each other's plots. Another documented system of mutual assistance includes the *kixikila,* a community system of credit. I did not come across either of these in my fieldwork. On the other hand, I encountered other coping systems, including collective action linked to the churches (more below). My interviewees mentioned that in times of crisis such as illness, for example, they either borrow from a family member, or get credit from private nurses to obtain treatment. But this came only as a last resort when they were unable to raise money through the sale of agricultural products or small animals such as chickens, goats or pigs. Of 84 respondents 64% mentioned this as a source of funding for medicines, 16% used their salary, and 6% borrowed money or got credit, worked for cash and got them for free (Table 4.3).

TABLE 4.3: Sources of funding mentioned for the purchase of medicines

	Sell products	Regular Salary	Work for Cash	Credit	Free	Unspecified
Matala	36	2	2	1	2	4
Chipindo	18	11	3	4	3	6
Total	54	13	5	5	5	10
TOTAL %	64.3%	15.5%	6%	6%	6%	11.9%

Local churches

My fieldwork also revealed that new forms of solidarity have emerged, often based on old traditions. Rather than disintegrating completely due to displacement, these appear to have become the basis of other initiatives organised under different social networks and ties. The churches in particular have become highly significant in the social ordering of post-war rural communities. From the surveys I carried out in Matala and Chipindo, it emerged that organised mutual aid practices are almost always linked to a local church. However, the deployment of such practices is limited almost exclusively to situations of death and sometimes of serious illness within the community. In the event of death of a community member the normal practice is that all village members contribute something to help the family. Contributions can be in cash or in kind, with products such as maize for the preparation of food and drink. The churches are normally behind the organisation of these collections for the family. Many have a book of registered members and an organised "funeral group" which is assigned this role. I encountered an organised system of support with the loss of community members in every village, irrespective of the dominant church (Catholic, Protestant or Adventist). A similar system is sometimes employed to assist those that are gravely ill, either with money for treatment or for transport to a health care facility, or with workforce to help the family on the land. However, it is the family that was most frequently cited as responsible for caring for the sick. The other sources of help mentioned in such instances were, in order of importance, the churches, other community members and friends. In addition, 18% of respondents claimed that nobody provides assistance in such cases. These mutual aid mechanisms to assist other vulnerable community members such as widows, the elderly or disabled, are also rare outside of the family circle.

2.3.4 Political underinvestment

It is widely acknowledged that the lack of financial and human resource investment by the GoA in the social sectors has played a key role in the erosion of services in Angola. This trend was already characteristic of the colonial state and continued after independence. I call this the 'political underinvestment' because of two important political aspects that characterise the state's neglect of service institutions. First, the heavy engrossment of the state in the war effort was at the direct expense of investments in service delivery. As a result, the political system failed to guarantee access by the majority of the population to functioning social services. Second, the system's underinvestment in the social sectors was guided by the political interest of the governing elites, which developed a complete disregard for the needs of the most vulnerable sections of society. This translated into the majority of the population simply being excluded from the benefits of public resources as it became politically disempowered. As Sogge (2006) succinctly explains, *"The war explains, at least in part, why spending has been skewed, but elite politics explains a great deal as well. Government budgets reflect preferences of secure and well-off social strata."* (p. 7).

Several authors offer interesting analysis of such processes of political neglect by looking at different developments in the political and conflict spheres, including the role of

external interests. Hodges (2001, 2004) unpicks the workings of Angola's political-economy to explain the great deficits in economic and social development. In his view, the process of institutional decay and disruption follows not only from the devastation caused by the war but also from serious economic mismanagement and lack of governance capacity. Sogge (2006) distinguishes between four different periods: the collapse of colonial rule; the rollback war and aborted state socialism (1977-1990); aborted democracy, 'savage capitalism' and civil war (1991-2002); and at the post-war period. He calls attention not only to domestic elites' interests in hampering citizen empowerment, but also highlights those of foreign forces and the relation between them, particularly in relation to oil as 'chief profit-maker'. Vidal (2008) looks at policies towards the social sectors under different political contexts: the first and second socialist administrations (1975-1979 and 1979-1987), the transition to a multiparty system and then to a context of peace. He argues that such dynamics of institutional decay, public consciousness and exclusion of the most vulnerable groups in society developed as early as the time of the socialist administration and continued unabated until now, irrespective of different ideologies. *"At the time of independence, a slow but progressive and continuous process took root in Angola, bringing about an erosion of public consciousness and social solidarity, as well as the decay of social sectors people strongly depend on: education, health, housing, social assistance, and community services."* (Vidal, 2009a: 31). For Vidal too, external influences allowed the perpetuation of this system of power and control by ruling elites, maintaining the *status quo* and at times reinforcing what he calls 'modern patrimonialism'. He describes the current development assistance policies of donors in Angola as *"...leaving untouched the principle of patrimonial appropriation , and the control of public resources by a minority who hold political power."* (ibid: 42).

State social services

As described in the previous chapter, in the immediate post-colonial years, the newly-independent government made some efforts to improve the social condition of the population. The most noteworthy contribution to the social sectors at that time, involved the cooperation established with Cuba and other political allies, for technical assistance particularly in health and education. It is estimated that in 1977, there were some 5000 Cubans in Angola (Le Monde, 1977 in Vidal, 2008: 13). One of the principal government goals was to extend access to education throughout the country. By 1979, an estimated 1,9 million children had been enrolled in the schooling system, three times the figures of 1975 (Pereira, 2009: 188). Considerable investments in adult literacy programmes and teacher training were also made (Vidal, 2008). In the health sector, efforts included the creation and expansion of health care infrastructure, the hiring of foreign doctors to staff facilities (mainly from Cuba and the Soviet Union), the launching of vaccination campaigns and of training programmes for technical staff (Pavignani and Colombo, 2001, Vidal, 2008).[32] However, such efforts were short lived as government commitment started to wane, triggering a process of neglect and institutional decline. The number of adults enrolled in literacy classes dropped from 759,000 to only 100,000 between 1979 and 1980 (Secretariado do Comité Central, 1985 in Vidal, 2008: 13). As reported by the ruling party itself at the time, in the period 1980 to 1985, the decay of the social sectors was particularly bad (Vidal, 2008). During the 1990s, illiteracy rates increased again, reaching 47% to 50% for men between 1990 and 1995, and increasing from 68% to 70% for women in the same period (Pereira, 2009: 189). A drop in the quality of services also soon became apparent. In 1987 for instance, 60% of the national health workforce was unskilled, and those that received higher level training had insufficient experience to cover deficits in technical capacity, particularly following the departure of foreign specialists after 1990 (Pavignani and Colombo, 2001).

In rural areas government neglect was even more evident. Rural farming families were soon 'abandoned' to their own fate (Pacheco, 2003). Government attempts over the years, to diversify the economy from its oil dependence towards the rural world, have been few and short-lived. The Department of Agrarian Policy (DPA) and the National Farmers Union (UNACA) launched in 1990 by the MPLA were abandoned as soon as crude oil prices picked up (ibid). In many localities they were revived only after 2005.[33] Moreover, current agricultural reforms such as the attention to biofuels, are seen by critics as unrealistic considering the lack of investment in implementation capacity, and as likely to penalise small scale farmers (Pacheco, 2003, 2009a, b).

Political disengagement

The early disengagement of the state from social assistance is associated with the economic decay and redirection of funds linked to the increased engrossment in the war. Table 4.4 illustrates this with figures on government expenditure during the 1990s, in health and education, compared to defence. It shows that during the war, government expenditure in the social sectors was very low, with education scoring slightly better than health, but only once reaching above 6% of the national budget. In 1999, expenditure reached its lowest with only 1.5% and 1.8% spent on health and education respectively, compared to 31.3% on defence.[34] This coincides with the intensification of war efforts. Since the end of the conflict in 2002, social sector spending has increased but only modestly. Expenditure on health between 2002 and 2009 has averaged 5.7% compared to 3.2% for the period 1996 to 2001. For education, average percentages were 6.9% and 4.3% respectively. Expenditures remain low even within Southern African averages, showing a persistent disregard for social welfare.

This corroborates the argument that the neglect of social services is as much a product of political interests and processes as the engrossment in war. Vidal (2009b) argues that this process was linked on the one hand to a sense of economic and political comfort that developed amongst the ruling elite in neglecting the population. On the other, he relates it to the continued economic and social hardship and the disillusionment of the population following the repression experienced after the May 1977 coup d'état attempt.[35] Vidal explains that the GoA's disengagement actually started at a time of increased oil revenues and thus of increased resources, and when it had few extra costs for social assistance as it relied heavily on voluntary community work. Additionally, during that time the expenditure on military equipment is said to have remained relatively constant (ibid).

TABLE 4.4: Government Expenditure in Health and Education: Angola and Southern Africa

Year	Government Expenditure (% of OGE)		
	Health	Education	Defence and Public Order
1993			24.6
1994			33.7
1995			31.9
1996	2.9	4.4	33.5
1997	3.1	5.0	34.9
1998	3.3	6.2	27.2
1999	1.5	1.8	31.3
2000	3.3	3.1	14.8
2001	5.03	5.06	
2002	4.57	5.19	
2003	5.82	6.24	
2004	5.69	10.47	
2005	4.97	7.14	
2006	4.42	3.82	
2007	4.7	6.63	12.7
2008	6.7	7.9	
2009	8.38	7.9	

Source: (Compiled from Hodges, 2001: 187, UN, 2002a, Hodges, 2004), for 2001-2008 from (EC and GoA, 2008, Vidal, 2009a: 35)

2.3.5 The traditional authorities

After independence and during the conflict the traditional authorities underwent significant transformations, as a result of displacement, politics and aid. Under the MPLA, traditional leaders were transformed into partisan political tools by being made into 'committee heads' according to the revolutionary ideology (Neto, 2001: 35, 43). A relationship of mutual suspicion and of a "duality of distancing and opportunism" developed between them and the governing elite as neither understood the agendas of the other (Guedes, 2007: 29). Local chiefs were seen as political competitors particularly in rural areas, but as necessary conduits of power and legitimisation. Their role became particularly important in the 1990s as the war progressed and they became the only administrative presence in much of the country (ibid).

As a result of displacement, the *Soba's* role was further transformed. Communities that were split and fled in smaller groups or family units, re-establishing themselves in new areas, often chose a leader to be their representative. Where they joined an existing host community, the *Soba* of the displaced group would be subject to the authority of the existing resident *Soba*. Upon return to the areas of origin, there was often a need for the redefinition of the local leadership when the original *Soba* was no longer alive or present, and when *Sobas* of different groups came together under a single community and had to find ways to coexist. In general, this was resolved by gathering the local population to elect a new *Soba* or reinstate the old one. Preference normally goes to the lineage candidate, unless there are strong reasons to vote him out as inadequate. Examples mentioned included heavy drinking, a history of violence or of theft. The other *Sobas* then become part of his advisors.[36] However, these processes of negotiation over traditional governance institutions were sometimes contested and problematic, particularly in the post war, as I shall explain further on.

The effect of aid in conflict on the development of the traditional authorities was significant. During the emergency, it was common practice for humanitarian agencies to distribute food and other relief items through beneficiary lists drawn up by the *Sobas*. As analysed in more detail in Chapter 8, access to aid by the *Sobas* invested considerable power in them vis-à-vis other community members.

2.3.6 Aid and institutional change

As the interaction between aid and the traditional authorities indicates, the impact of aid on local institutions is a core element of institutional change processes at the local level. Key to understanding the role of aid in institutional transformation is defining how aid practices perceive and engaged with different local institutions. This is not limited to aid in conflict. In the transition to development the dominant state-building discourse promotes interventions premised on the idea that institutional change can be socially 'engineered'. Many aid agencies in Angola are engaging in specific institution-building efforts to strengthen state services and non-state social institutions. These have important effects for local institutions such as the traditional authorities. Programmes aimed to organise rural communities for instance, sometimes build on existing traditional structures, and other times attempt to create alternative forms of organisation that exclude existing leadership positions. They have the potential to either strengthen or challenge existing power structures and relations.

It seems striking, given the duration and extent of aid interventions in Angola, that existing literature hardly analyses aid as one of the factors that contributes to institutional change. Beyond the critique that aid replaces the role and responsibilities of the state, there has been little critical discussion about the effects of aid interventions in Angola. The government's continued neglect of the social welfare of its citizens was interwoven with the role played by aid actors in taking on these responsibilities. This became particularly evident after the 1991 political transition to a multi-party system, when the number of international NGOs increased rapidly and national CSOs emerged. The GoA, much like the colonial administration which left education and health care to religious missions, delegated social sector responsibilities to church organisations and NGOs.

The aim of this research is thus to investigate the interaction between aid and local institutions. I argue that the policies of the aid community and the practices of agencies on the ground have contributed to the intended and unintended changes undergone by both formal and informal institutions. I explain these change processes in subsequent chapters.

3. Institutional change in reconstruction

The establishment of peace is usually associated with a positive impact on local institutions as it creates an opportunity to reverse processes of institutional decay associated with conflict. However, there are several continuities in processes that affect institutional change between crisis and post-crisis contexts. Population movements for instance, continued to affect the development of state and non-state social institutions in the post-war period. First, as people moved from previously inaccessible areas towards urban centres and then, as they returned on a large scale to their areas of origin. Specific improvements in social service institutions are expected through a peace dividend, whereby military spending is reallocated to the social sectors. However, this often fails to materialise (Collier, 1999). In Angola, peace did not translate into increased human security and development or in the expected increase in investment in the social sectors (Ferreira, 2005).

State social services

The GoA's first priority in the post-war period was to re-establish its presence throughout the national territory, by reinstating municipal and communal administrations. Secondly, it embarked on the expansion and rehabilitation of social service infrastructure to serve the returning population in rural areas. Extensive recruitment of public service staff such as healthcare workers and teachers was also undertaken. Notwithstanding such efforts, progress has been modest in terms of coverage, actual investment and quality. In early 2010, many local services in more remote areas and particularly at communal level, were still functioning in very poor facilities, with hardly any qualified personnel. The administration of Micosse Commune (Matala Municipality) was operating from a bullet-ridden building that was heavily destroyed during attacks by UNITA.

Figures since the end of the war show modest increases compared to the conflict period, in budget allocations to the social sectors, as well as low implementation levels of those budgets. The effects of the global economic crisis are being felt at local level through budget cuts, as Angola's economic growth for 2009 was far lower than earlier projections. Growth figures were adjusted from 6.2% to 1.3% (dos Santos, 2009). In the budget year 2009, there was a general cut of 30% of an important budget line of all municipal administrations, directly attributed to the financial crisis.[37] An analysis by civil society organisations reports that in 2009, the approved state annual budget was revised half-way through the year, resulting in significant cuts in health and education and increases in the defence budget, without any public justification being given (Gomes, 2010). At the end of 2009 the government projected an allocation of 30% of the state's annual budget for 2010 to the social sectors (dos Santos, 2009). However, in a speech by the President only weeks later (28 December 2009), he announced among other major reforms, a readjustment of the budget in early 2010 (África 21, 2009). The poor investment in the social sectors is all the more flagrant when compared to large expenses on contested government projects such as the CAN or large urban regeneration programmes, such as Luanda's seafront regeneration.

Efforts to address quality aspects of services or to provide reasonable working conditions to the staff of basic service institutions appear to be insufficient. Recent reforms significantly increased the salaries of civil servants. However, local level administrations particularly in rural areas, still find it difficult to recruit qualified and quality staff for its services. As a senior staff member of Matala's municipal administration told me *"We have already used up all the people with relevant experience, qualifications, and still it is not enough. This is a huge problem. We don't have people with the right capacity. And it is difficult to attract people to the municipalities. Some accept that they will restart life here, under poor conditions. But they quickly get sucked into to the poor working culture."*[38] Moreover, despite earlier reforms and high inflation, public sector workers had no salary increase in 2008 (OPSA, 2010b). Throughout 2009 and 2010 delays in the payment of salaries were frequent and widespread. In Huíla this lead to organised strikes by teachers. Government reforms in the social sectors are also limited by the lack of capacity and resources. For instance, despite reforms to the education system, an estimated 258 school inspectors throughout the country only have one available vehicle with which to work (Melo, 2009).

Social institutions

The establishment of peace also brought with it transformations in non-state social institutions. As villages were (re)constituted new social constellations and relations emerged, which brought new challenges. Different people including IDPs, resident populations, or ex-soldiers, all with a diversity of backgrounds and experiences, were suddenly brought together under the same community and had to find ways to coexist. Other actors such as local

administrations and aid organisations also seek new ways to relate to local populations and each other. Earlier I described how communities adjusted the mechanisms of selection of the traditional leaders to the process of return to the areas of origin, illustrating the adaptations undertaken in such contexts of change.

The traditional authorities

Traditional authorities have been put under increased political pressure through the election campaigns of the two major parties. For traditional authorities that are not MPLA supporters, there continues to be little openness within local government representative structures, even in UNITA strongholds. This means that in certain cases, only those *Sobas* that show clear adherence to the MPLA are recognised by the local administrations, even if at the community level these individuals may not be the real power-holders. In one of Bunjei's communities, the official *Soba* supports the MPLA whilst his brother, Joaquim, is a UNITA sympathiser. Joaquim is a well-respected man in the community and clearly has a leadership role, even if unofficially. He was elected by his community to lead an NGO created group dealing with various village issues and is active in various aspects of village life. In the lead up to elections when campaigning was well under way, there was a dispute between the two brothers as to which of the two party flags should fly at the village *jango*[39]. Eventually, a compromise was reached and both flags were put up.

Traditional leaders are being further politicised by the way in which measures regarding their role are being implemented at the local level. Recently the government established a new system similar to that of the colonial regime, whereby *Sobas* are remunerated and given official uniforms. In an interview with the local administrator of Bunjei, when asked whether the *Sobas* of Bunjei were already receiving salaries, he told me: *"We do have some Sobas that receive salaries, but not all. Here the war split communities into different areas and so some Sobas had to be put in place when people were away. Now it's difficult to know who are the real Sobas that should be entitled to salary. The others won't be paid. We had to do a study about this, to find out who indeed is entitled. Individuals are waiting for payment."*[40] It later emerged from interviews that the Administrator was a fervent MPLA supporter, and thus considered 'real' *Sobas* as only those belonging to the MPLA. He allegedly made public threats to members of Joaquim's community that he would personally go and tear down the UNITA flag after the elections.[41] Tvedten and Orre (2003: 49) observe that *"The question of identifying the 'real' Sobas has led to local power struggles and quarrels at least since colonial times, and has continued since the post-independence state started to grant them quasi-formal recognition by employing them."*. The policy of paying traditional authorities is once again exacerbating the link of the traditional leaders to the state (and implicitly to the MPLA) and is clearly creating confusion over the extent to which the *Sobas* are representative of the interests of their people towards the government, or the other way around. My interviews revealed considerable confusion about the status of the *Sobas* and *Sekulus* vis-à-vis the state, particularly over whether they are officially part of the state's administration or not. When asked to specify who made up the traditional authorities, 23 respondents included officials of the local state administration, and 37 of the MPLA structure, including the village party secretaries and community coordinators.

The unclear role of the traditional authorities extends beyond community members to the traditional leaders themselves, as well as to the members of the civil services. The *Soba* Grande of Matala described an incident with the local police where he felt his position towards his people was totally undermined.

"I often participate in meetings with the administration to resolve issues. But one of the difficulties I face is that sometimes we don't have a good relationship with the police. Two

weeks ago the police declared that within two days all motorbike drivers circulating without a license or without helmets would be arrested. Here we have a lot of kupapatas [motorbike taxis] in these circumstances, so they asked me to negotiate with the police so that they would be given more time before the rule came into force. It costs a lot of money to get a license. So I went to meet the Police Commander to talk to him on their behalf. I didn't even get to touch on the issue of the kupapatas, but as I was leaving, he asked me who I thought I was, if I thought I was the president and wanted to rule the country. I told him 'no, but I am the father of the people'. A few days later I went there again with the kupapatas as they had arrested 8 people. They gave us a month to comply with the rules. He denied what he had said to me before. We then went to Lubango to complain higher up and they came here to investigate. In the end gave us extra time. But now, whenever there are problems people say 'go to the Soba Grande'. How can I resolve all this?"[42]

Guedes (2007: 32) argues that the political processes that shaped the relation of state with the traditional authorities over time, have created "neo-chiefs" that fall outside of the conventional format, who have a variety of interests, agendas and motivations. This may become problematic in the future integration of traditional authorities into local governance through decentralisation (see Chapter 7).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has analysed the main transformations undergone by local institutions in Angola, from the late colonial period, to the current post-war reconstruction context. I have focused particularly on local state administrative and service institutions, and on alternative non-state social institutions. My analysis has stepped away from dominant perspectives on institutions in conflict, on three core aspects. The first refers to the focus on formal and state institutions. The second is the assumption that institutions collapse in conflict and are unable to evolve and adapt. The last is the notion that institutional change and erosion result only from conflict. I want to draw three broad conclusions regarding institutional change in conflict settings.

First, in such contexts, multiple institutions (co)exist, interact and compete. Throughout time, Angolans have resorted to various institutions to resolve problems and address needs. Formal governance and service structures and traditional mechanisms have coexisted and evolved over the years. In the absence of formal services in crisis, alternative mechanisms and actors may become more prominent in addressing people's needs. Contrary to expectations of institution-building discourse, these do not automatically disappear after a crisis, as formal services are reinstated. Often they adapt and find continuity in reconstruction. Traditional leaders for example, remain key players in the resolution of post-war conflicts, such as land.

Second, these various institutions are transformed in the interaction with one another, and as a reaction to external changes. Such changes are brought about by various factors, not all of which are directly related to the dynamics and effects of conflict. As I have shown, colonialism, displacement and urbanisation, political processes, and aid, have all been important in the transformation of local institutions in Angola. The colonial system and the transition to independence were significant in shaping the post-independence state administration and social services. Colonial policies also altered existing power relations and livelihood practices. Phenomena such as displacement and urbanisation had an important impact on local institutions during the civil-war, but were also relevant during colonialism and in the post-war period. Urbanisation increased pressure and wore-down existing social services and institutions of mutual-aid between resident and displaced populations. Political underinvestment in the social sectors was a major reason for the weakening of social services.

It resulted both from the government's engrossment in the war, as well as from its disengagement from social welfare responsibilities. Aid interventions partially filled this social assistance gap by taking on the role of service providers. In doing so, they contributed to the political neglect and related institutional decay.

The discussion of the traditional authorities' changing relationships with communities and the state over different periods, illustrates how these various factors transform social institutions. Traditional leaderships have continuously evolved and adapted to changes associated with colonialism, the civil-war, displacement, the transition to peace, population resettlement, aid interventions, and more recently to political processes such as the elections and decentralisation. Distinct aspects of the traditional leadership have been evoked by different actors at various times and according to particular interests. The *kupapatas* of Matala appealed to the traditional role of the *Soba Grande* as their ultimate representative, to negotiate with the police. The police commander in turn, disregarded his position precisely because he lacked legal status and legitimacy.

Third, my findings concur with emerging perspectives that institutions are resilient and adaptive and thus have a key role in aid in conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. Examples of such resilience and adaptability include the preservation by the agro-pastoralists of the South of their transhumance practices, or the emergence of variations of old solidarity mechanisms under new social orders and actors such as NGOs or local churches. However, I have also found that over time and as the conflict progressed, there was an overall weakening of local institutions. Non-state institutions and traditional coping mechanisms eroded as communities were disintegrated and ruptured. Formal service institutions either became abandoned in rural areas or strained under the pressure of overcrowding in towns and cities. This overall erosion significantly restricted people's room for manoeuvre and coping capacities. I therefore caution against a romantic interpretation of perspectives based on the potential role of existing local institutions in post-conflict reconstruction. This includes aid interventions aimed at engineered institutional change. The interaction between such aid interventions and local institutions is the focus of later chapters of this thesis.

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[1] She draws on Durkheim and Fleck's notion of social group, applied to any group of social organisation (Douglas, 1986).
[2] The term Mais Velho literally translates to "older person", and is usually used for an elderly person, or as a sign of respect.
[3] Capelongo was the first capital of the district council of the Matala region. In the colonial days it was known as Vila Folgares.
[4] The term 'contratado' literally translates to contracted worker. In practice, it was a form of forced labour.
[5] A Kimbu is the area belonging to a family, made up of the houses, and surrounding land used by the household.
[6] Castanheira de Pêra belongs to Matala Municipality and was its capital in the early colonial times.
[7] Interview with Simeão, 25 January 2008, Monhanangombe Village, Matala.
[8] The permit (or caderneta in Portuguese), was a document imposed by the colonial administration from 1914, as a tool to control the indigenous population. It included detailed personal information, work and tax history and was where authorization for the circulation of people was given (Moutinho, 2000: 144). Interview with the soba and Sekulus of Nguelengue village, 28 May 2008, Bunjei, Chipindo.
[9] Interview with Sekulus of Micosse Sede, 20 December 2008, Matala.
[10] ibid.
[11] Author's own translations, based on Art. No 2. of the 'Political, Civil and Criminal Statute of the Indigenous of Angola and Mozambique' of 1926, and 'The Statute of Portuguese Indigenous in the Provinces of Guiné, Angola and Mozambique' of 1954 (Moutinho, 2000: 138).
[12] Author's own translation from the Portuguese.
[13] The conditions of medical assistance to the indigenous workforce were stipulated in the Code of Conduct of Indigenous Labour, and specifically in Angola, in the Legislative Diploma of 31 December 1956 (Mendes, 1958: 48-49).
[14] Interview with Soba of Catchope village, 08 August 2008, Matala.
[15] The Berlin Conference was a landmark in the scramble for Africa by the then colonial powers. Notable in Huíla were the Evangelical missions of IESA (Evangelical Sinodal Angolan Church) and IECA (Congregational Evangelical Church of Angola), established by the Swiss and Americans respectively. See Chapter 6 for a detailed account of IECA's history, specifically in the municipality of Chipindo.

[16] Jonas Savimbi (UNITA) was educated in the Evangelical Mission, Agostinho Neto (MPLA) in the Methodist Church and Holden Roberto (FNLA) in a Baptist Mission.
[17] Official estimates claim that for the school year of 1952/53, the Portuguese Catholic Missions had some 500 schools with 17,114 pupils. Furthermore, of the existing professional schools, only 7 belonged to the state where as 131 were part of those missions (Angola Institute Edition, 1953: 63, 65).
[18] Some authors question the applicability of the term "traditional" to local authorities, given their profound transformation over time (Guedes, 2007).
[19] The term Soba is an adaptation of some national languages, by the colonial system and retained until now. The Soba may be a different individual to that considered as the local leader within a community. Soba Grande literally translates to the Great Chief (Robson, 2001c: 12). He is at the top of the hierarchy, with a number of Sobas under his responsibility.
[20] This is the equivalent umbundo term for Soba, also meaning village chief or headman, as used in most of Huíla (Pacheco, 2001: 60).
[21] Products offered typically included food, alcoholic beverages, textiles and work or household tools, in exchange for agricultural products such as maize, millet, sorghum, potatoes, wheat (Silva, 2003).
[22] Interview with Soba of Nguelengue Village and village elders, 28 May 2008, Bunjei, Chipindo.
[23] Interview with Soba Grande of Matala, 18 December 2008, Matala.
[24] The term displacement is most often used for involuntary population movements linked to situations of conflict, violence and natural disasters. It does not explicitly include economic factors as a cause for involuntary migration, although these are often intertwined. I use the term broadly, for population movements in some way enforced by the surrounding context, including economic deprivation.
[25] For a contrast of government and OCHA displacement figures at the end of the war, see Porto and Parsons (2003), page. 13.
[26] In 1994 Pacheco and Roque (1995: 124) distinguished between IDPs from the pre 1991 peace, and the post 1992 elections. In 2001, the Global IDP Project (Global IDP Database, 2001: 26) listed 1) the "very old" displaced from the post-independence (1975-1991) and post-election (1992-1994) periods; 2) the "old or long-term" displaced from the post-Lusaka period (1994-1997); and 3) the "new" displaced following the collapse of the Lusaka Protocols in 1998. With the end of the war in 2002, however, a new wave of IDPs (the last of the war period) arrived from previously inaccessible areas.
[27] I did not come across people who were displaced abroad in either locality, perhaps due to the relative safety of Matala during the conflict and the geographical isolation of Bunjei.
[28] Interview with Sekulus of Micosse Sede, 20 December 2008, Matala.
[29] Interview with villagers of Monhanangombe, 06 August 2008, Matala.
[30] Interview with Domingos, resident of Micosse Sede, 21 November 2007, Matala.
[31] Interviews with residents of Micosse Sede, 20 December 2008, Matala.
[32] See Chapter 5 for further details on the development of the health sector.
[33] Interview with Soba´s Aide of Micosse, Matala municipality. 20 December 2008.
[34] These figures refer to the intended spending or budgeted amounts, rather than to actual expenditure, which tends to be even lower. The data had to be compiled from various sources as there is no single source that systematically publishes reliable statistics.
[35] See Chapter 2, section 4 – The Angolan state post-war.
[36] Interviews with members of the following communities: Rioco Centro, 27 May and 07 October 2008, Bunjei; Caquela B, 28 May and 09 October 2008, Bunjei.
[37] Interview with the Head of the Planning Directorate of the Municipal Administration of Matala, 10 December 2009, Matala.
[38] Ibid.
[39] The *jango* is the physical place (a round and covered structure) under which community meetings traditionally take place. It comes from the umbundo word *onjango* which is the name of the traditional institution of elders where important issues are debated and resolved.
[40] Interview with Administrator of Bunjei, 09 October 2008, Bunjei, Chipindo.
[41] Informal communication with local resident, 13 October 2008, Bunjei, Chipindo.
[42] Interview with the Soba Grande of Matala, 18 December 2008, Matala.

CHAPTER FIVE

Local churches in the service arena: the case of Bunjei

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is based on the case study of Bunjei, Chipindo municipality. This region lies in the heart of the contested territory between the Government and UNITA and is therefore notable for the extent to which it was affected by the war. It remained under UNITA control for most of the conflict. Today it continues to be geographically remote and politically marginalised. The chapter is concerned with the experiences of conflict and aid in rural contexts, life under the control of UNITA, and reconstruction in areas remote from decision-making centres. It is based on an empirical analysis of several key aspects pertaining to Angola's conflict and aid histories, already touched upon in earlier parts of this thesis. It investigates the localised dynamics and impact of the conflict on the population of one of the most isolated and conflict affected regions. In addition, it builds on the humanitarian arena paradigm by specifically exploring the role played by local aid actors in social assistance and reconstruction processes. I focus on the particular role of IECA (Evangelical Congregational Church in Angola) which has emerged as a major player in the local development and reconstruction of Bunjei. Since 2004 IECA has been implementing a large intervention to assist the development of local communities – the Integrated Programme for the Rural Development of Bunjei (PIDRB).

I characterise Bunjei as being caught in a 'cycle of isolation and neglect', whereby the absence of local services deters investment by the private sector, the government and aid organisations. The latter largely withdrew from the area, following the population resettlement phase. In this chapter I therefore want to shed light on the political processes that underline and perpetuate the neglect and isolation of the region. I am interested in unravelling how both state actors and aid organisations make decisions about when and where to focus assistance efforts, and with what effects for local populations.

IECA was the exception to this trend, developing a prominent role in local reconstruction. The third key objective of this chapter is thus to understand how this position evolved in local society. What drives this church-based organisation and its staff to work in such a marginalised context? Where does IECA draw its legitimacy from vis-à-vis local populations and other actors? How does its approach differ from that of other aid actors present in Bunjei? What factors affect its credibility and relationships of accountability?

A growing body of academic literature deals with the role of faith-based organisations on societal transformation (Hauck, 2010). Yet, literature about local churches in Angola has mostly focused on their role as providers of relief assistance during the war or as prominent advocates for peace-building in the later conflict years. Limited analysis exists of activities in the post-conflict period that specifically focus on reconstruction efforts and local development initiatives. The present discussion addresses this gap.

In the remainder of the chapter I explain the historical causes for Bunjei's marginalisation, how this has been perpetuated, and how it has impacted local development and the institutional environment. I do so by characterising some of its local communities, local service provision and its history of needs and aid interventions. This is followed by a historical contextualisation of IECA's social work, a comparison between its everyday practices and those of other aid providers and an analysis of its relationship with local government. The chapter is primarily based on field data collected in Bunjei. It also draws on literature on legitimacy and local governance, and on the role of religion in development, particularly in Angola.

1. Bunjei's conflict experience

Documentation and early interviews about Huíla highlighted Chipindo as a particularly interesting area for this research, given that it had only become accessible to aid actors in 2002 when the conflict ended. I was eager to visit, but it would take me around five months to organise my first trip to the *município*. Chipindo is referred to as the most isolated of Huíla's municipalities. At the time of fieldwork the 460km journey from Lubango to Chipindo translated to 12 hours of travel time due to the poor state of the roads.[1] My first hurdle was therefore to gain access to the area. For this I needed the support of an aid agency, because that was the only way to get there. Much time and effort went into negotiating access to the project sites and communities of an international NGO. This arrangement never took off due to lengthy internal procedures and security restrictions to obtain travel permission from the organisation. Eventually I went to Chipindo for the first time with a small UN monitoring mission. During this short first visit, I was struck by the visible isolation of the area and the sense of neglect local people and civil servants communicated during interviews. I became curious about the situation of local communities, about the running of services and state institutions and about the type of interventions aid organisations were implementing in this area. I decided to make Chipindo one of my research sites. I pursued contact with IECA and one of its donors for the project in Bunjei, both of which agreed to support my research..

1.1 The research communities[2]

The fieldwork on which this chapter is based primarily refers to 4 communities out of a total of 28. These were selected to reflect diversity in their history and origin, and in their experience with aid interventions. They therefore include long established communities and those set up as displacement camps, communities benefitting from different aid interventions or excluded from them, and communities integrated into IECA's programme at different stages.

The community Nguelengue is the largest of the selected four, and also the furthest at 19km from Bunjei. Its population consists of 309 families/households, although it continues to grow with the return of displaced families.[3] This village dates back to the first decades of the 1900s. As was the case in all the communities in the area, Nguelengue was abandoned during the war and was only repopulated after its end. Few individuals returned in the 1991/92 peace interlude. It has been part of IECA´s PIDRB since its inception.

The community of Caquela B is located at the heart of Bunjei town and was initially established as a reception centre for IDPs coming from the surrounding bush areas towards the end of the conflict and in the immediate post-war period.[4] It is therefore a 'young' community made up of previously displaced populations that decided to settle after 2002. As a result, the population is exceptionally mixed. Only about a quarter of the people I interviewed were born locally. Its population is estimated at 178 households or 478 people. It is the most densely populated of the research communities, because it is geographically limited within the centre of Bunjei. Caquela B was incorporated into PIDRB in its second phase, which started in May 2006.

The community of Rioco-Centro also joined PIDRB in its second phase. Its population is approximately half of Caquela-B's in total population numbers, but not in household terms (244 people or 40 households in Rioco compared to 478 people or 178 households). This relates to a difference in average household size, at least partly due to the distinct composition of the population in these communities. Caquela-B has a high proportion of displaced people and is home to many new residents, such as school teachers sent from the provincial capital. These are people whose extended family members are elsewhere, or that live alone whilst working in Bunjei, and therefore have smaller families.[5] Rioco-Centro´s residents on the other

hand, are mostly local and thus tend to live amongst large extended families. Rioco-Centro is an old community dating from before the colonial period, which was also abandoned during the conflict. After an influx of returnees, its population has now stabilised.

Bunjei village, situated 4km from the centre of Bunjei, was selected as an example of the only eight communities in Bunjei in which PIDRB is not present and where no other aid intervention is being implemented.[6] It has a population of 150 families and is the oldest of the communities. According to the local residents the village was established before the arrival of the first colonisers and is likely to have given the name of Bunjei to the wider region. It was an old *Soba* of Bunjei community that granted IECA's mission its land. The majority of residents are originally from the village itself. Bunjei village was not included in PIDRB given that at the time it was receiving support from another international organisation. In the meantime the organisation suspended operations in the area and Bunjei has since not benefited from external aid. In the remainder of this chapter, I refer to case studies from these communities, and where relevant draw on comparisons between them.

1.2 The cycle of isolation and neglect

The effect of the war in Bunjei is still visible on many levels. The physical environment suffered through direct destruction or lack of maintenance of infrastructure, rapid deforestation of land around the areas of IDP concentration such as Bunjei town, and ad hoc, unplanned construction. Several areas are still mined, which limits transport and access. The distance from the administrative provincial capital and the poor accessibility means that Bunjei's population mostly seeks services and develops trade links with Huambo city (136km from Bunjei). For that reason, several residents are of the opinion that Chipindo municipality should belong to Huambo rather than Huíla province.

UNITA controlled this area for most of the conflict, but regular fighting occurred as a result of government attempts to take control. This contestation resulted in an extreme scale of displacement. According to official provincial government estimates, 98% of the municipality's current population are ex-IDPs who returned to their areas of origin only with the post-war resettlement programme (Gabinete do Plano, 2009). The area is described as having been left practically empty of population and services with all infrastructure dilapidated for most part of the three decades of war. The war also led to the loss of livelihoods. Today the local population predominantly relies on small scale subsistence agriculture. Economic activities such as fishing and apiculture which were traditional of some communities, all but disappeared due to the collapse of local markets. Formal commercial institutions are inexistent in Bunjei. Trading relies on informal markets, such as that of Caquela where villagers sell their agricultural produce and buy other food and non-food essential items such as clothing, medicine, charcoal, etc. The only private enterprises employing local people are the dam construction project at Gove (Huambo province), and a recently privatised forest belt involved in the commercial exploitation of wood.

The political neglect of the region is also linked to the workings of party politics, which as I have argued in Chapter 2, are very much alive in Chipindo and Bunjei. UNITA remains influential in the region, as shown in the widespread display of its party flags in the pre-election period. Local actors speculate that this link with UNITA is a reason for the government's apparent disinterest in the development of the area.

Besides the dynamics of partisan politics, this political neglect must also be understood with reference to Angola's rural/urban divide. Ever since colonial policies, which concentrated economic and social infrastructure in the larger urban centres, the trend has been of a widening urban-rural gap. Rural areas such as Bunjei have been historically marginalised from investment in all sectors and services. The track record of post-independence government policies and implementation capacity, combined with recent post-war reforms,

continue to favour urban areas and macro-models of development over rural needs, such as investment in agriculture, which is Bunjei's main productive sector[7].

1.3 Life in the bush

Remarkably little is known and documented about the everyday practices of the UNITA regime and their impact on the daily lives of people living under its control. Writings about UNITA are centred on its role as a key belligerent of the conflict and perpetrator of violence. In Chapter 3 I extended the discussion beyond its military role, to include aspects of social assistance. Here, I want to explore people's everyday realities under the rule of UNITA. By those living under UNITA, I do not mean people politically aligned with the movement, but rather those living in UNITA controlled territory. These were not necessarily sympathisers of the movement. *"Here it was like this: Gove belonged to the MPLA and Bunjei to UNITA. But for us it made little difference. When one would come, we would belong to them. Then if the other came we would switch."*[8] I am interested in the experiences of people outside of the reach and attention of external assistance and of beneficiary lists and reports of aid agencies or of the government, and how they survived displacement in the bush. The analysis is based on a collection of life stories from the region. I refer to specific stories both as examples of, and as exceptions to the common experiences and strategies of Bunjei´s population.

The Sambo family

I start with the story of the Sambo family because its trajectory typifies the experience of many of Bunjei's residents in terms of displacement, loss and coping. However, the Sambos have a relatively privileged position in local society. Jeremias, who is into his 70s, is the patriarch of the family. He is an experienced nurse and runs the health post at the local IECA mission. His wife Mariana is also known because of her work as a traditional birth attendant with IECA's PIDRB programme. They have 12 children, two of whom live locally with their own families. I collected their family life story since independence, over several interviews. The following excerpt is from interviews with Jeremias.

"I worked from 1977 until 1982 for the state as a nurse at the Bunjei mission hospital when it still existed. After that I was captured by UNITA and taken to Jamba where I remained for 11 years. From 1982 the hospital was more or less abandoned because of the military attacks. Then in 1998 it got completely destroyed. I went with my entire family to Jamba - 3 grown children, 3 little ones, my wife, my mother and mother-in-law. When I arrived I was given a tent for my family and immediately started working at the Central Hospital there. It was big with many wards. First I worked as a nurse and later as a radiologist. I was captured because of my profession. Not for just being a nurse, but specifically because I was a trained radiologist. The South Africans had promised an x-ray machine for the hospital under the condition that they could find a trained person. UNITA heard I was working here in the Mission Hospital and I was head-hunted. This happened to a lot of people with other occupations: teachers, drivers, carpenters, and even some doctors from Huambo city. We had to walk from here until Cuando-Cubango and then we were put in cars and taken all the way to Jamba. In Jamba we did not receive a salary. We also didn't farm for food. We were given food from the stocks that they had there, so we received a good ration with all kinds of things. We ate well – meat, fish, vegetables. All our children went to school and got a good education. There in Jamba there was no war as such. We even forgot, living there, that there was a war in Angola! Our regular supplier of medical material back then was South Africa because they were allies of UNITA. I was even sent on a training to Pretoria. In the early 1990s when there was peace I was nominated to go and work in the central hospital in Huambo, so I left Jamba with my family. But I never even started working because in the

meantime we were caught in the 55-day war of Huambo. Many, many people died in the actual fighting in that period. There were bombs and explosions in the markets. The hunger came after. We survived through this time and then fled back to the village here in Bunjei to escape hunger. I set up my own health post in my home village of Santarém. At that time I could get medicines either here or from Huambo, but in 1996/97 the war started intensifying again and we had to flee to a nearby village. I stayed there for 5 years. I managed to set up another health post, although I could hardly get medicines anymore. In 2001 I came back to Bunjei. There were many people coming here already before the end of the war. When people were still hiding in the bush there was less hunger and disease than when we came here towards the end of the war – then people were really dying. Those that were living in the bush had lavras *there, to farm and eat from. By that time this whole area was under the control of the Government. What happened was that the troops would go on raids, taking people from here with them to bring back food and they would destroy and steal the crops of the people in hiding. So, those people were eventually forced to join them and come back here to Bunjei. In 2001/02 we would go to the* lavras *around here during the night and would steal food from other people, just so we could eat. MSF came in March 2002 and then WFP. We, the nurses from this post, went to work for them. I did a training with them at Caála. When they finished, they left material at the post for us to continue working. But I came here to the mission to open this post in September 2003, because I had some trouble with another nurse working at the state post in Caquela. Initially we were 16 staff here but now we're only 5. We used to receive medical supplies from the government services, but that ended in April 2004. The medicines that used to be funded by the church in Canada have stopped, so IECA is not helping us anymore. We don't have materials to treat all the patients. Our staff only gets a symbolic salary from the contributions of the patients, the rest is for buying supplies. We were all approved in the enrolment procedure for the government's health services, but are still waiting to be incorporated, I don't know why. With my years of service before and after Jamba, I should be able to retire by now, but until then I cannot stop working here."*[9]

As the story of this family indicates, displacement of the population of Bunjei started on a large scale in the 1980s, when people sought safety from violence or were captured by UNITA forces. The majority of those that fled went to the surrounding bush areas and only returned to Bunjei towards the end of the civil war or after the Luena MoU. My interviews with local residents show an average displacement frequency of 3.1 times, and not a single interviewee had stayed put through the duration of the war. Few attempted to return during the Bicesse peace in the early 1990s. Many of today's local youth were therefore born in displacement.

Humanitarian situation

The war was particularly hard on the population of this area. Reports of aid agencies indicate that Chipindo has a lower average family size than the surrounding areas, because of the high mortality rates resulting from the war (3 family members or less compared to 4 or more in other areas) (Schot, 2005: 5). People suffered continuous hardship and practically everybody lost family members and friends. *"I lost my first husband in the war. Then I had 4 sets of twins with my second husband, but I lost them all in the conflict. It was the bad diet, illness, parasites, and such things. That was the hardest period, after1995. Now I have to help my husband because he is maimed – he lost one of his arms."* [10] The majority of today's male population are ex-soldiers. Civilian populations in this area were victims of violence and exploitation by both sides. Often people did not distinguish between the warring factions. *"I can't really specify where we were displaced because it wasn't a fixed location. We'd be attacked by the enemy forces, from both sides I think, but I don't even know because we*

wouldn't wait to find out. They would come, kill and steal from us. Before the attacks they would investigate to know when we were about to harvest."[11] As the war intensified in the 1990s, violent attacks and pillaging of bush villages became common by both sides.

The period from 1998 to 2002 was identified by the majority of interviewees in this area as the most difficult. In all but two cases, the reasons mentioned were hunger spells resulting from the inability to farm, having to flee constant attacks, and after 2001, being forcibly moved to Bunjei by government troops. *"The last phase of the war from 2000-2001 was the worst because we had to run everyday. We didn't have a fixed place. We were under the control of UNITA. Then the government was chasing us to bring us here to Bunjei. We surrendered. We'd lost everything. We didn't even have blankets."*[12] *"We had no clothes, no salt, no houses. We slept in the open air."*[13]

Life within UNITA's regime

The situation for those living within or alongside the UNITA regime was quite unique. Tomás, one of the sons of Jeremias and Mariana, described how the family adapted to changes from life in Jamba under UNITA, to later displacements in the bush.

"I arrived in Jamba with my father. I followed courses in mechanics and electricity there, and worked as a truck driver for UNITA. In 1992 I went to Luanda to work for the Military House. Then to Huambo, just before the elections. I was the head of transports for UNITA. After that the conditions got terrible. The supplies ran out. There was no salt, no food. I decided to bring my father and my family to Bunjei so they could start farming, to escape the hunger in Huambo. Then I went back to join Savimbi's ranks in Huambo and didn't see my father for 4 years. In 97 I fell ill and that's when I was brought back to Bunjei, to my father. Between 92 and 97 this area was controlled by UNITA but then the government forces came and we had to flee to the bush until 1999. We went to a nearby village to stay with an uncle. During that time we managed to farm a bit. We lived more or less normally. Then the FAA[14] *began targeting the area. By 2000 we left that village and really went into the deeper bush. From then on we were running from one place to the next. In 2001 my father, my wife, my brother's wife and my children were captured. 4 hours after it happened, the FALA*[15] *told me that my father and one of my sons had been killed. But in 2002, before the memorandum was signed, we heard they were alive. So I came back to find them. All of my 4 children survived, but I had already lost 2 in the bush and one at birth. After the war, I didn't want to go back to the army. I didn't join the demobilisation process because I travelled to find work. When I got back I went to work for the administration, then for the NGO ZOA, and now for PIDRB. My wife has applied to work as a teacher and we live with our 8 children."*[16]

For the Sambo family, being captured by UNITA was a violent experience. Yet, accounts of family members indicate that their integration into the regime's structure provided relative safety from the wider violence and secured some of their basic needs. In Jamba they were given food without having to farm, all children got an education, and it was their role within the UNITA ranks that got them the (transport) means to escape the hunger crisis in Huambo. As already discussed in Chapter 3, UNITA was a perpetrator of violence and poverty, but for this minority it also represented a 'safety net' from war. *"Working with UNITA we had access to healthcare, medicines and schools. I studied there. There were no normal villages. There were the so called 'Produções' where we had to work common plots as well as our own. They would give seeds and we had to contribute from our harvest to the [UNITA] state. Later, in a different area, there was none of that. We had to cope alone."*[17]

Civilian life under UNITA

For the majority of Bunjei's local population who were civilians displaced within UNITA controlled territory but outside of its official ranks, the experience was very different. As many testimonies indicate, being under UNITA did not give them protection and many became victims of physical violence and forced labour. UNITA had remarkably well organised tax systems through which local populations were exploited. *"We had to pay the militaries with our crops. At the end of the harvest widows had to give 60kg and couples 120kg. We also had to pay other small taxes. All our men were forced to fight, except for the elderly and the disabled."*[18]

Several people fled to the nearest centres of Gove, Cuíma and Huambo city to access aid and physical protection. Others chose to go as far as the coastal city of Namibe so that they could keep fishing as a main livelihood. *"I went to Gove in 1980. In the 80s everyone had already left Bunjei and gone to the bush. In Gove we were better protected. The Red Cross was distributing food there. They would come with a truck and cover the whole area from Cuíma to Gove. I came back to Bunjei in 1991, during the first peace. But then we had to retreat to the bush again and I went to the embala*[19] *of Ngongo. We left there in December 1999, in a big group to an area with UNITA troops, so that we could have their protection. Then we went to the Samboto area in Huambo and then came here in 2001."*[20]

In terms of access to services and assistance, civilians were left to fend for themselves and were excluded from existing services. These in any case only existed at UNITA's central bases such as Cacuchi in Bié province or Jamba in Cuando Cubango. Education and health care were altogether absent. People relied entirely on traditional medicines such as plant roots to treat illnesses. In the absence of medicines and supplies, even formally trained health workers resorted to such alternatives. Yet, many report that the frequency of illness in the bush was low, compared to the later period at Caquela. Food needs were met primarily through subsistence agriculture in the bush. People farmed wherever possible, often adjusting their choice of crops to local conditions. Sweet potato and manioc kept many alive. Some also worked on the land of resident communities for food and traded produce for other items. *"When we fled to the bush, we were in Ganguela land, so we worked for them for food, as well as farming ourselves."*[21]

The intense fighting of the late war period severely weakened coping capacities. As the fighting intensified, people were no longer able to farm. Many had to resort to rather extreme strategies, such as taking each other's harvests. *"The toughest period for people here was in 2000. It was no joke. UNITA was pulling on one end and the government on the other. They took everything we had. You'd just finished putting up your house and they would come and burn it down. We could not farm anymore, only run. So we started eating from the 'lavras'*[22] *of others who had fled and left their crops. And in turn they would eat what we left behind. That's how it worked. We were left with nothing in the bush, so we had to come to Bunjei."*[23] This way of obtaining food was referred to by many people, although rarely, in terms of stealing. The severity of the situation made this exceptionally, an acceptable practice, described with terms like 'borrowing' or 'using'.

1.4 The post-war humanitarian crisis

The majority of the local population arrived in Bunjei between 2001 and early 2003. First as a result of the forced displacement by government troops, and later due to the end of the war. *"The FAA (Angolan Armed Forces) was capturing 100 people a day and was bringing them here."*[24] This was intended to empty bush areas of all rural population in order to isolate UNITA. People were concentrated at Caquela – Bunjei's town centre – where they found desperate conditions in makeshift displacement camps. Overcrowding was severe and people

simply had no access to food, water, farm land, firewood or health assistance. The population of Chipindo municipality increased three fold between 1995 and 2002, from 17,792 to 57,705 people (Porto et al., 2007: 31). Caquela's population specifically grew from 1,500 people in February 2002, to 14,000 in April, and to a further 24,000 by August of the same year, according to estimates by the provisional administration (ZOA, 2002:, ZOA and ADESPOV, 2002: 2). Such population explosion in such a short period of time, combined with people´s poor health status due to the harshness of life in the bush and on the run, triggered a huge humanitarian crisis.

By the time aid agencies reached Chipindo and Bunjei and the first estimates were made of death rates and humanitarian needs, the situation was catastrophic. Death rates were amongst the highest witnessed in the newly accessible areas throughout the country, resulting from starvation and hunger related illnesses. They made international news headlines. MSF press releases described Chipindo as a 'man-made famine' and one of the worst nutritional emergencies to hit Africa in a decade (BBC, 2002, MSF, 2002a, 2003). Estimates of daily death rates by local people and health workers vary between 20 and 80 at the peak of the crisis. The real number will never be known. *"So many people were dying, that we didn't have a chance to cry for our dead."* In any case, he first exploratory medical mission done by MSF revealed mortality figures of 6.1 for children under 5 and 4.5 for the general population, well above the emergency threshold mortality of 1/10,000 per day (MSF, 2002a). It was at this time that the first humanitarian agencies arrived and relief operations were started. The following section gives an overview of the humanitarian arena in Bunjei.

2. The aid arena in Bunjei

The history of external humanitarian aid in Bunjei is both recent and brief. Despite the toll of the war on local populations, the majority received aid for the very first time after the official end of the war. Even during the short peace of 1991/92, during which some people returned to the area, there was no assistance from NGOs, the government or churches. The opening up of Bunjei in the post-war period meant that relief could finally reach local populations, and that aid interventions became part of people's coping strategies.

Médecins Sans Frontières

MSF-Spain was the first aid agency to arrive in May 2002. It set up a relief operation with a team of ten people. They established a therapeutic feeding centre for children, and a health post to treat the most severely malnourished and ill (MSF, 2002a). In combination with its base at Caála (116 km away, in Huambo province) they saved the lives of hundreds of gravely ill people. In addition, MSF became involved in exposing the humanitarian situation and condemning the response of the aid community to the crisis in Chipindo, a role which became controversial with other international agencies. It accused them of delaying the response for the political goal of pressuring the government into action. Moreover, NGOs were criticised for failing to reallocate resources to the emergency, choosing instead to focus on existing programmes. The UN was specifically accused of attempting to prevent agencies from providing relief assistance, until an agreement on the terms of intervention with the Government was reached, because it was tired of its lack of commitment (MSF, 2002bb). MSF left Bunjei in December 2002. The temporary health facilities together with equipment and supplies were handed over to the government health services. In 2004, those facilities were relocated to the state health post at Caquela. MSF's relief interventions are well remembered by local people, and referred to with great appreciation. *"MSF did a lot for people. They treated the elderly, children and youth with vitamins, oil, biscuits, soap. The*

health services were working very well. Even after we had gone back to our villages, we would still take our children to the MSF centre in Caquela to get nutrition help."[25]

Government of Angola

The Government also launched a relief intervention in the area, implemented by MINARS (Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration) through its Community Services, a structure embedded in the local state administrations. MINARS initially carried out blanket distribution of food aid at Caquela, and later organised targeted FFW schemes involving the rehabilitation of small infrastructure such as bridges. *"The administration team would organise the distribution of aid by registering the different embalas, the number of villages in each and the number of Sobas. The Sobas came to us with a list of their population. We didn't have direct contact with the population. For the FFW schemes, the staff of the administration determined those eligible to participate."* [26] This aid was soon discontinued, despite having been considered by my interviewees as the best in terms of diversity.

World Food Programme

Large scale distribution of food aid by WFP started in Chipindo in May 2002 and in Bunjei in July 2002 (Governo da Provincia da Huíla, 2002). WFP carried out blanket distributions at Caquela once a month, on the basis of ration cards and lists of registered beneficiary families. WFP support later shifted from direct distribution at Caquela, to channelling food through ZOA Refugee Care in the villages (more on this below). This decision was intended to support the efforts by the local administration and aid agencies to encourage people to return to their villages and alleviate the overcrowded conditions at Caquela. The last distribution of WFP food in Bunjei's villages took place in 2004, although NGO reports indicate that it temporarily suspended operations in 2002, to prevent overlap with MINARS (ZOA, 2002: 6). Although some local residents lamented the decision to end food aid, most had harvested their first crops from the seeds distributed by ZOA, and report having been able to meet food needs.

ZOA Refugee Care

The Dutch Christian NGO ZOA Refugee Care arrived in 2003. Its decision to expand activities from other areas in Huíla province to Chipindo resulted from a request by the provincial government, to support the return and resettlement of displaced populations in the area. The INGO established its base at the mission of IECA in Bunjei. Initially, it worked through the local NGO ADESPOV, under a sub-contracting arrangement, with the intent of handing over activities to IECA at a later stage.[27] Its resettlement programme focused on rural recovery through the free distribution of food aid, seeds, agricultural tools and oxen for traction. This intervention was the first to take distributions from Caquela to the village level. The programme covered the whole population of Bunjei. *"ZOA had a mandate for the whole of Bunjei. There was already a reduced mortality rate at that time but the conditions were still bad. We all received help to resettle. ZOA also brought clothes and food, but after a while they would only give it at the actual villages, through the Sobas, so as to attract the population to leave Caquela. It was very difficult because people were scared to return to their villages."* [28] ZOA was also involved in the distribution of WFP food through FFW schemes. The organisation left in 2005. It reports having benefited 3,885 families or approximately 13,285 people with its programme (ZOA and ADESPOV, 2002: 3).

IECA

In May 2004, IECA through its social work department (DASEP), established the Integrated Programme for the Rural Development of Bunjei - PIDRB. This programme is still running and is funded by two German Christian organisations. It was in its third implementation phase at the time of writing. PIDRB started from a partnership with ZOA, through which it was supposed to give continuity to ZOA's resettlement programme after its withdrawal. However, the 'courting period' during which this arrangement was negotiated between the two organisations ended abruptly due to a disagreement over the merging of funding which each organisation had secured separately. The organisations thus decided to separate activities and intervention areas. ZOA intervened in 18 of Bunjei's villages and PIDRB in 10. When ZOA withdrew and PIDRB entered its second phase of implementation in April 2006, it doubled its coverage from 10 villages to 20.[29] PIDRB was the first intervention in Bunjei specifically aiming to go beyond relief activities and to promote the development of local communities. Its focus was on addressing low agricultural production and economic development, lacking health care and education and the lack of organisation within communities. Its activities therefore integrate a wide range of social sectors within seven thematic areas.[30] PIDRB was the only on-going aid intervention in Bunjei during the course of this research. I therefore return to it in a later section.

Acción Contra el Hambre (ACF)

In early 2006, the Spanish branch of the INGO ACF launched a food security and health care programme in Chicomba and Chipindo municipalities. Within Bunjei, the intervention areas were negotiated with PIDRB to avoid overlap, given the similarity of project activities. Following some contention, ACF took on 8 villages, which accounts for why IECA only took over 10 of the 18 villages left by ZOA. All 28 of Bunjei's villages were thus supposed to be benefitting from either IECA or ACF´s interventions. However, ACF's programme encountered a series of implementation problems, which eventually led to the closure of its Chipindo base at the end of 2007. One of the major operational hurdles was the poor accessibility of the area which made logistics and the international UN security requirements adopted by ACF, difficult to meet. The unexploded mine incident I described in Chapter 3, involving the disagreement between two agencies' over the reporting procedure, led to closure of road access to the project area from its main office in Lubango. Interviews with residents of Bunjei village, which was part of the project, revealed that various project activities including agricultural support were never implemented. Remarkably, local residents and community leaders were not aware that the organisation had withdrawn from the area or that the project had ended. They were under the impression that ACF would still turn up. No follow up was given to this programme due to an institutional transition gap, resulting from the departure of relevant expatriate staff and ACF's administrative relocation to Huambo.

ACORD

Further to the mentioned aid organisations, the INGO ACORD was involved in the General National Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (PGDR) [31] of the government in Chipindo, between 2005 and March 2007. This included livelihoods support to ex-soldiers, with agricultural inputs and oxen for traction. ACORD also worked on human rights and peace building issues and on capacity building of its local partner, the youth association to support low income families - AJAFDA (ACORD, 2006). However, I encountered only one respondent that participated in this intervention.

The history of Bunjei's humanitarian arena attests to the critical role of relief aid in assisting local populations in the peak of the crisis. People's accounts of the aid they received repeatedly highlight its importance for their survival at Caquela, and later for the recovery of livelihoods in the villages. *"Many people died at Caquela. Our mothers, our elderly. If it wasn't for the aid we received, I don't know what would have happened to the rest of us. There would be nobody here. We would have died. My children would be dead. They suffered so much as babies. I can't even get angry with them nowadays. It was the NGOs that helped us to survive. We had nothing. They helped the government to bring us doctors and the hospital. And ZOA brought oxen. It changed our lives until today."*[32] Notwithstanding, aid only became available to Bunjei's population with the unfolding of the humanitarian crisis in the immediate post-war phase. Besides, it was short-lived. Throughout the conflict, people relied on themselves and each other. Moreover, as argued by MSF, the international community might have reduced the human cost by intervening earlier, rather than politicising the decision to respond. Once local populations were resettled in their villages, aid agencies were quick to withdraw. The discontinuation of relief activities, including food aid, was timed with the ability of people to harvest their own food. However, it was the lack of follow up interventions to support local reconstruction and development that was most striking. By withdrawing organisations contributed to the perpetuation of its marginalisation.

3. Local service provision

The availability of services in Bunjei and greater Chipindo is limited. The role of local government and state services is described by a staff member of IECA as follows: *"The presence of the government here in Bunjei is very limited. We only see them in education, health and the police. The administration only asks our help to do things on its behalf or to be informed of any issues that are damaging their image. The government is confusing its mission here – it is more concerned with questions of the political party than with issues of public utility. There isn't any investment from the government here, except for the allocation of a few teachers and nurses. Even the infrastructure is someone else's."*[33]

The local government administration

The local government administration in Chipindo withdrew in 1978 as a result of the war that followed independence in 1975. From that time until after the establishment of peace in 2002, there was no state presence, except for a brief episode in 1997 when the fighting had lessened and government forces managed to gain temporary access to the area. In the initial period after the Luena MoU, the administration was run by a military official of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), from the local military base. It was only in 2004 that a municipal administrator was officially appointed. In Bunjei, the role of local government is complicated by the fact that the area is yet to be officially granted the status of *comuna*. As a result, the local administrator is not even on the pay roll of the government. The position has been filled by four different individuals in as many years. The administrator I met had been in his post since May 2007, and explained the operational constraints as follows: *"Bunjei is not yet officially a commune, it is considered a sector. This means that we are not entitled to any budget and are one hundred per cent dependent on the Municipality of Chipindo for any initiative. But Chipindo itself does not have a working budget. It is not like other municipalities that were chosen as pilots for the decentralisation programme, because it doesn't even have a banking institution."*[34]

From the perspective of local people, the role of the local administration is hampered by the fact that it is used as political tool at various levels. Several people mentioned to me

that the fact that the administrator was an avid MPLA supporter was at the source of various tensions between the administration and other actors, because he allegedly always put the party's interests first. Moreover, the position of local administrator of Bunjei within the local civil service hierarchy is seen as discrediting. It is therefore not a sought after job and results in the repeated appointment of poorly qualified staff. Those that are appreciated by the higher ranks have been quickly rewarded by being promoted to a post elsewhere. [35] Allegedly, the current administrator's nomination was a form of 'punishment' by the Municipal Administrator with whom he had on-going disputes. This manipulation of the local government function plays into the perpetuation of the negative image of Bunjei.

State social services

The coverage and quality of services in Chipindo remain poor, representing the greatest immediate problem in improving the living standards of the local population. Three years after the war, when some infrastructure had already been rehabilitated, there were no more than 9 schools in the *município,* for 23,647 pupils (Martins, 2009). That is, over 2,600 pupils per school. As discussed in Chapter 4, the government´s focus on the reconstruction of local service infrastructure such as new schools and health posts, has taken another pace in Chipindo. The only such local investment by the government was the construction in 2006 of a new health centre at the municipal headquarters. But even new services operate without supporting infrastructure and systems. There are no electricity or water provision systems in place anywhere in the municipality, and no means of transport for the health facilities (DPS Huíla, 2009c). Of the 12 existing health units in the *município*, only 5 are currently operational.

The remainder of the social infrastructure that exists, ranging from water points, to health facilities and schools, were constructed or rehabilitated by NGOs with foreign donor funds. At Bunjei´s headquarters the state health post and school were both built by an INGO with funds from the Italian cooperation. The only other state health care facility in Bunjei, is located in the village of Tchyioia (19km from Bunjei) and despite being state-run, was also built with the support of IECA's programme. Besides the main school at Bunjei's centre, there are only two state schools in the villages of Chuvica and Neguelengue, both primary level. Both were built and equipped by IECA. Other type of social infrastructure such as community recreational centres and sports facilities, which are normally prioritised by government because of their visibility, are also absent in the region.[36] Chipindo is one of the few municipalities in the province where no mobile telecommunications network was available at the end of 2008.

Alternative services

In the absence of functioning government services, institutional multiplicity in service delivery has been important in meeting the needs of local people in this area. Christian Missions such as the Catholic Mission of Sangueve and the Evangelical Mission of Bunjei have been particularly important. In Bunjei, IECA is currently the only non-state institution present and is providing support in various fields, from child and maternal health to agricultural production. The role of private initiatives by local residents, or the so called informal (and often illegal) institutions, is also crucial. Health care for instance is sought in the various private village posts, as well as in the well established health post of IECA´s mission in Bunjei. The latter is the only facility with official recognition from the government´s health department, as a private service provider.

Very frequently people take individual or collective action to access services and solve problems. I encountered several instances of this. Local students of the evening classes at

Bunjei's school for instance, organised a monthly monetary contribution to cover the costs of a small electricity generator and fuel, so that they could continue classes after dark. In many of the communities that have an appointed teacher and where there is no state school, children are taught under a tree, in the local church facilities, or in schools built by the community. In some cases, communities were promised help from the administration to provide building materials. However, due to a lack of resources and capacity these commitments often go unmet. In Bunjei village the school collapsed under the rains as it waited for the roof titles to be delivered, and had to built for a second time.

Service Quality

In addition to the absence of services and infrastructure, there is a considerable problem with the poor quality of services, which perpetuates Bunjei's marginalisation. This was mentioned in every single interview I carried out with both end users and service providers. The sheer distance of the municipality from the provincial capital means that inputs for service delivery are irregularly supplied. The annual report of the local health services for 2009 refers to problems with the delivery of medicines and vaccinations, as well as with the insufficient amounts allocated for the area relative to demand. The government has made some investment in recent years in the recruitment of health workers and school teachers for the area. Yet, these remain insufficient. Government figures quote a total of 375 teachers for 25,000 pupils in the municipality (Gabinete do Plano, 2009), but this figure excludes children left outside of the education system. In Bunjei, there is only one school with secondary level education, which is heavily overcrowded and too distant for most children. At the time of writing there was not a single doctor in the whole of the municipality.

Besides lacking infrastructure, social services are also affected by a lack of human and technical capacity. The national farmers' union (UNACA) for instance, one of the few services with extensive reach in rural areas, existed only in theory at the time of my fieldwork. Local farmers were still to be organised and a local association created.[37] It was only in 2008 that the Ministry of Agriculture appointed a representative to the *município*, but he has the impossible mandate of covering the entire area alone.[38] He became the subject of jokes among local aid staff and community members, because of his lack of knowledge about local communities.

The recruitment of professionals for the area is problematic both due to the lack of qualified local people, and the lack of local conditions to attract and retain staff appointed from outside. Significantly, many of the state health workers were hired locally as part of the reintegration plan for people coming from UNITA areas. There are 19 nurses in the state post. The majority are local and had been away during the war. Many did their training in Jamba.[39] School teachers however, are mostly appointed from Lubango. For many this is the first job. Several teachers described Bunjei as the worst placement they could have wished for on the grounds that it is far from home, cut off from communication systems, and with living conditions that are too poor to consider bringing their families along. *"I was placed here as a school teacher. It's not easy to get a transfer to another place because nobody wants to work here. The contract said that after 5 years you could transfer, but for some colleagues this period has passed and still they have nothing else." "I came here alone in early 2008. It is my first post. I'm from Huambo but I applied for a post in Huíla. I didn't want to take it but you can only reject a placement once and I really had to work, so I came. But I'm married with a small child and my husband is in Lubango. I had to employ someone to look after my baby back home."*[40] These young professionals are simply 'sitting out' their time of service until they can ask for a transfer.

Absenteeism and conduct issues are common among staff of social sector services. Local people complained about the frequent absence of teachers. The problem of alcohol

abuse and related misconduct is also frequently brought up as a serious challenge to local development. IECA staff told me that since the end of the war it is said to be on the rise among the population at large and specifically within the service sector. I witnessed several incidents involving alcohol abuse, from the disruption of meetings and interviews by drunken *Sobas* or teachers, to violent drunken brawls in local villages. Particularly at the time of payment of salaries alcohol consumption and absenteeism rise as people have increased disposable income. These are the periods that many travel home without official leave, abandoning their posts for significant periods of time. The impact of alcohol abuse on society at large and on the functioning of institutions is widespread in Angola and affects various levels of government services. It is not uncommon for civil servants of all kinds of government departments to show up to meetings and events drunk. I experienced this several times in different provincial state services.

The low quality of services has a direct impact on the trust of end users and on user uptake. A significant number of people in Bunjei still go to private health posts as the first choice to get assistance, either due to the lack of available medicines for treatment or to the generally poor quality of the service, and only in the second place, due to the distance from health facilities. I discuss this question of trust in government services with particular reference to healthcare in the next chapter.

4. The role of local churches

In post-conflict fragile contexts, local churches may play an important role in reconstruction processes. Recent literature refers to the role of faith-based organisations in societal transformation in conflict affected countries and its potential contribution to development. Ter Haar and Ellis (2006: 362) argue that the notions of religion and development have much in common, and that religion can contribute to development processes in four key areas: conflict prevention and peacebuilding, wealth creation and production, governance, and health and education. *"Many of the communities or social networks that carry the burden of development have a religious form or convey religious ideas in some sense."* (ibid). However, as they go on to argue, besides its role in discouraging violence, religion also potentially legitimises it, having a negative effect on the development of conflict. The authors propose that in Africa ideas concerning the interaction with the spirit world are key to both these processes and as such, policy makers and organisations working in peacebuilding should take into account religion as representative of people's world-views. Religious institutions also have the potential to mobilise social capital because they bring together resources and people with a shared vision and beliefs, and are thus more effective than individuals acting alone (Hays, 2002: 250). Hauck (2010) reasons that local churches as a sub-set of civil society can contribute to governance and social capital in fragile states, particularly at the local level, through their authority and legitimacy, local networks and institutional links, and individual skills and capacities. Based on the analysis of Papua New Guinea, he concludes that local churches helped build social capital and connect social groups to achieve change, because they enjoy unique levels of trust and legitimacy among civil society actors.

A 2006 national opinion poll in Angola showed the churches to be the second most trusted institution for solving people's problems (by 49% of respondents), after the police (66%). NGOs were mentioned by only 7% (Republic of Angola National Opinion Poll in Shaxson et al., 2008: 22-23). In a trust survey carried out by the BBC in 2008, the churches came out as the institutions with the highest credibility, as 78.3% or respondents said they trusted them (BBC World Service Trust, 2008 in Jensen and Pestana, 2010: 1). They were

followed by the media and the Parliament, suggesting the need for caution in interpreting these. However, my observations corroborate this generalised popular trust in the churches.

Literature on the social work of local churches in Angola primarily focuses on their role during the colonial period, on the provision of relief aid to war victims, or more recently on peacebuilding initiatives during and after the conflict. There is scant analysis of the role of the churches in post-war development processes. To that end, discussions have been limited to the potential of religious institutions in promoting national reconciliation through messages of peace, unity and forgiveness. Jensen and Pestana's (2010) recent study has been exceptional in looking at the current role of the churches in poverty reduction processes. They find that although the core business of churches continues to be the evangelization mission, their historical and current role in social assistance and poverty reduction remains significant. Most have returned to their function of providers of education and healthcare in the post-war. Given the prominent advocacy role of the churches in the 1990s when they campaigned for peace, surprisingly few consider engagement in advocacy work a priority in the post-conflict era. In the following section I look at the specific case of IECA's role in local reconstruction and development processes. I look into its institutional history and everyday practices of social work, and compare it to other actors, including aid organisations and the state, to understand how it builds legitimacy and accountability vis-à-vis those actors and local people.

4.1 The history of IECA

Historically, IECA is the main church in the Chipindo area, the second oldest evangelical church (WCC, 2006) and the most significant protestant church in Angola (Jensen and Pestana, 2010). It was established in the country during the 19th century during Portuguese rule. Under the colonial system, different Christian missions were allocated different parts of the territory. Each church thus developed strong membership in certain regions. The evangelical churches, including IECA and IESA, were assigned the Angolan highlands populated by the Ovimbundo people. IECA developed in the central part of the country and along the railway corridor to Benguela province. Bunjei was one of its main missions. In rural communities the churches emerged as important new centres of power as leadership positions became linked to the church (Neto, 2001, Pacheco, 2001). The development of the churches was influenced by the ambiguous relationship of the colonial regime and the Christian missions, discussed in Chapter 4. The Portuguese left the role of social assistance to the churches and believed the colonial project and rule would benefit from the churches' evangelizing work. In 1900 there were 41 religious missions in Angola, 25 Catholic and 16 Protestant. By 1965 these numbers had increased to a total of 134 and 56 respectively (Henderson, 1990: 97). According to the National Institute for Religious Affairs, in 2008 there were 83 recognised churches in Angola and another 902 unrecognised ones (Jensen and Pestana, 2010).

IECA originated from the work of two missions - the American Missionary Society (AMS) established in 1880 and the Canadian Congregational mission established in 1886.[41] From 1957 onwards these missions joined efforts under the Council of Evangelical Churches in Central Angola, later called IECA (WCC, 2006).[42] The IECA mission at Bunjei was established on the 15 January 1923 by Henry McDowell, later joined by two missionaries, and was then known as the Evangelical Mission of Galangue. It was the first and only mission to be exclusively led by African-American missionaries due to its roots in the AMS, which had historically focused on the support and education of slaves liberated in the south of the US (Henderson, 1990).

IECA has *"an explicit and very strong focus on improving the social conditions of the society of which it forms part."* (Jensen and Pestana, 2010: 11). This role in service provision links back to its early days. The three founding staff became known for their professional

skills, particularly in the medical field as McMillan was a surgeon, but also in agriculture and industrial areas (Henderson, 1990). It set-up a significant number of schools as education was its primary evangelising instrument. Its education model was comprehensive and included components such as skills and vocational training. Early missionaries established the People's Improvement Programme, which involved training on carpentry, food preparation, water and sanitation and agriculture.[43] The mission schools marked the social fabric of many generations in Angola. Besides political elites, many religious, military and social elites were educated in them (Santos, 2008). It is largely through the links of political leaders with particular mission schools, that different churches came to be associated with the main nationalist movements. IECA has been strongly associated with UNITA, partly because Savimbi and other prominent UNITA figures attended their schools, and as UNITA consolidated its power in the areas of IECA´s presence. Moreover, prior to independence a leading IECA figure fled with UNITA to the bush (Henderson, 1991).

IECA's health care network was also well developed. *"In addition to 60 primary and three secondary schools, it had the most highly developed medical programme in the territory and an extensive rural public health service."* (WCC, 2006). The mission hospital at Bunjei provided essential treatment to the local population in the colonial period. Its American doctors were key in training local medical staff like Jeremias Sambo. At independence and as the civil war developed, most foreign missionaries were sent away from Angola. The first doctors left Bunjei´s hospital as early as 1976. Subsequently, the hospital was abandoned and later used as a military base by MPLA and Cuban troops during invasions. In 1998 it was eventually destroyed.[44] Today only its ruins remain. The mission was re-established after the war, with the arrival of ZOA in 2003. The first local pastor was assigned in 2004. IECA did not therefore assist local populations during the conflict.

The mission infrastructure has only partially been rehabilitated to date. In mid-2009, the provincial government announced that public funds would be used to rehabilitate it, on the basis of its role in local education (Jornal de Angola, 2009). IECA now has around one million members throughout Angola (IECA, 2006). It is believed to be the second most significant church in membership terms (Jensen and Pestana, 2010).[45]

Organisational development

Where IECA was present during the war, it adopted a longer-term approach with a view to supporting reconstruction. As early as 1991, when aid in Angola was predominantly relief-oriented, IECA underwent a series of internal reforms. These aimed to improve its social assistance work and its organisational response capacity to changing funding context and calls for improved internal transparency. DASEP was created separately from the spiritual branch of the church. Today, DASEP is an operationally autonomous entity with yearly financial audits and a portfolio of approximately 40 projects in 15 of Angola´s provinces. It focuses on literacy and education, health, agriculture, peace and reconciliation and human rights.

IECA has also sought to make itself more democratic internally, and several reforms are intended to increase consultation and participation by different staff and members in decision-making. Since 2004, DASEP itself is monitored through an annual consultation process that brings together all the social services of the church to define the department´s strategy for the following year.[46] These internal reform processes have been recognised and supported by donor organisations, such as the Dutch faith-based NGO ICCO, which funded a large institutional development project (Verbeek, 2007). Since the end of the war, DASEP has sought to revive its rural networks and to support sustainable community development. This focus, together with IECA´s historical links to Bunjei, explains its decision to return to the area to assist local populations after the war. PIDRB is IECA's key instrument to this end, and the most prominent social assistance intervention in the region. In the next section I explore

what drives IECA in its mission and the processes through which it has carved out its role in local society.

4.2 Seeking legitimacy

The legitimacy enjoyed by aid organisations vis-à-vis other actors, and the processes by which they are accountable to the various stakeholders, are key elements associated with the quality of their work. Aid providers are expected to be accountable to various actors, crucially to their donors and beneficiaries, but are often criticised for their single focus on upward accountability. Discussions about accountability mechanisms and other sources of organisational legitimacy are ongoing. In this chapter I am less concerned with IECA´s upwards accountability to its donors, and more with understanding how it crafts its legitimacy vis-à-vis local actors such as local communities, government, and other social assistance providers. Different actors derive legitimacy from a combination of different sources. Slim (2002) distinguishes between tangible sources that include support, knowledge and performance of organisations, and intangible sources such as trust, integrity and reputation. Different sources reinforce different aspects or types of legitimacy. Brinkerhoff (2005a) categorises legitimacy into three types described in Chapter 1: normative (or moral), pragmatic and cognitive.[47] He argues that church organisations tend to benefit from all three types of legitimacy, which in turn contributes to their performance capacity.

In IECA's case, its legitimacy is linked to various factors, not least its historical trajectory. Under the post-independence Marxist state the churches were ostracised. However, as I previously showed, they were already performing important social and spiritual work. IECA's normative or moral legitimacy is derived from its Christian identity, mission and values, and theological obligations. In addition to the evangelising mission of spreading the Christian faith, the churches are also guided by a search for social justice. The overview of IECA's historical development showed that it has always had a strong focus on social justice issues, from the early support to liberated slaves in the US, and a long tradition of social work. Compared to other churches IECA's perspective *"specifically articulates social action as part of evangelization."* (Jensen and Pestana, 2010:23). Service delivery functions were key to the development of the mission at Bunjei in the colonial period, particularly through its hospital and schools. Service provision has re-emerged as a key source of cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy for IECA in the post-war, through the implementation of PIDRB. Local people recognise and appreciate IECA for PIDRB's activities in their communities, which further strengthens its position in local society. In that sense, it benefits from the recognition accorded to non-profit organisations more generally, as pursuing socially beneficial objectives (Brinkerhoff, 2005a).

Local relations

Relevant for all types of legitimacy, be it moral, pragmatic or cognitive, is the way in which IECA relates to local populations, or the degree of its social embeddedness. Religion is part of the social fabric of most societies (Ter Haar and Ellis, 2006: 358). *"Religious beliefs, and religious institutions, play a central role in defining what is considered morally right, appropriate, sinful, wrong etc. in a society and in shaping people's political expectations and conceptions of authority."* (Bellina et al., 2009: 19). Well established faith-based organisations thus enjoy a significant degree of taken-for-granted legitimacy, because their structures, procedures and activities are understood and accepted by society (Brinkerhoff, 2005a: 5). Analyses of civil society actors in Angola shows that organisations have most credibility and legitimacy at the local level because of their current proximity and past support provided to local actors (Shaxson et al., 2008).

As one of the longest established churches, IECA has developed a close relationship with people at the local level. *"We always have a home to start from and a strong base and link to the community."*[48] It has deep-seated knowledge of local realities and personal and institutional relations from which it draws support. In addition, although other major churches were present in Chipindo, namely the Catholic church and IESA (the other large evangelical church), they each remained dominant in their particular areas of influence. At the local level there was thus little competition for services, which may partly explain IECA's legitimacy amongst Bunjei's population. This changed in the post-war period, when IECA and IESA entered in competition for funding partnerships with ZOA, as shall be seen later on.

From my observations, the most striking source of IECA's local legitimacy was its local staff. They have a remarkable sense of commitment to fulfilling the objectives of the intervention and to helping the local population. Local staff frequently go 'beyond the call of duty' to help members of the communities where they work. *"Sometimes I take some of my old clothes to give to the 'mais velhos'. It makes me feel bad to see them living in such poverty."*[49] This type of relationship with community members is not exceptional to IECA. The vast majority of local aid workers I came across in Angola displayed deep respect for their communities and project beneficiaries. The profile, reputation and motivation of local staff, as the representatives of an organisation, are key to the perception and relationships with other actors. It is thus essential to understand how they make sense of the local situation and build the trust and confidence of local actors through their everyday practices and decisions. Walkup (1997) argues that more attention should be given to the behaviour of individuals within aid organisations in understanding organisations' practices and their relationships with other actors, including local government and populations. Such behaviour is influenced by organisational cultures (shared assumptions and beliefs) and other institutions (written and unwritten rules, codes of conduct, patterns of interaction, procedures, rituals and myths) (Walkup, 1997: 38, Hilhorst and Schmiemann, 2002). In crisis, local civil servants or aid workers, through their creativity and commitment are often the backbone of the maintenance of rural services. Their daily choices and decisions thus beg more attention (Christoplos, 1998).

What sets IECA apart from most other aid organisations in this respect, is the geographical proximity of staff to the local populations, and their long term presence on the ground. PIDRB staff are rarely isolated from the people with whom they work. In their everyday lives there is no clear division between personal and professional relations and time. They expect and accept that local people show up at the mission unannounced to discuss all kinds of issues. Many are local to Bunjei and/or are members of IECA´s congregation. The technical personnel were recruited from the provincial office in Lubango, as they require specialised training and skills. However, support staff was largely selected locally in Bunjei. In both cases, individuals are not recruited as short-term field workers, temporarily assigned to the project. Even those recruited outside are expected to be part of local society. They teach or study in the local school, experience the same everyday problems as the local population, are part of collective events such as local weddings and sports activities, and also actively promote social activities. During the CAN qualifying matches for instance, PIDRB staff arranged for local people to go watch Angola's games at the mission offices where an electricity generator and television were available. This type of interaction with the local population has significant meaning for the building of trust and accountability. A case like the one of Bunjei village where residents were not aware of the withdrawal of the NGO ACF, would have been unlikely in one of IECA´s intervention villages.

Staff motivation

Given the isolation of Bunjei, the interesting question to explore is what drives and motivates IECA staff to work in the area. Until recently, a job with a local organisation like IECA represented a rare and valuable opportunity for income security and prestige. The financial incentive has lost some of its relative weight since the government started extensive recruitment for the civil service in rural areas, with significantly improved working conditions in terms of job security and remuneration.

Other considerations beyond economic ones drive local staff in their jobs. These include 'moral motivations' and are associated with notions of solidarity and altruism, that attract people to social work and charitable organisations across the world. For many of IECA's staff, religious values play an important role. Their work with local communities is looked at as part of the Christian mission to help others. Within the PIDRB team itself, a sense of camaraderie is fostered as people share their living space and domestic chores, meals and social time. As Hays (2002) observes, *"Religious institutions provide a community of like-minded persons who help the individual overcome his or her sense of isolation and powerlessness, both through shared ritual and through interpersonal relationships."* One of PIDRB's drivers explained how important being part of the IECA community was for him. *"I don't earn a lot of money and I work very long and irregular hours. I cannot even take evening classes as my colleagues do, so that one day I have a chance at finding another job if this one ends. But I really like my work. I get so much comfort from my colleagues and the church community. I lost a child not long ago due to illness. I was away in Namibia at the time and had to travel back for the funeral. When I arrived here, they had taken care of all the arrangements. It was all done. My brothers and sisters of IECA helped me so much."*[50]

Internal organisation

Also key to building staff motivation and morale, are IECA´s organisational development and internal reforms. Training opportunities, personnel coaching and internal accountability procedures contribute to building ownership, trust, and legitimacy within the organisation. At the project quarters in Bunjei, the question of internal accountability is taken very seriously. I was struck by the lengths to which the programme coordinator went to uphold transparency and fairness amongst the project team. I once came back from a day of fieldwork to find an official notice posted at the entrance to the mission´s office. It announced that two members of staff were being penalised with salary cuts for taking unauthorised leave. Details such as the dates and even salary amounts were specified. Programme staff stressed the importance of having access to training courses and teaching material on various themes and methodologies. DASEP has an established training programme for Community Development Agents and it partners with various organisations for joint training initiatives.[51] At field level, staff mentioned receiving support in their daily work from PIDRB's programme coordinator, who is trained on participatory methods. Moreover, IECA has institutionalised internal meetings for reflection and sharing of experiences, which local staff consider to be some of the most valuable learning opportunities. *"IECA's meetings of the social services bring together a lot of people from the outside. This is very useful, it opens up our own vision."* A female staff member of PIDRB, described the professional support she gets within the organisation.

"Internally IECA is a safe place for a woman to work. As a woman in this job, initially I had some difficulty in being respected in the position of advisor within the communities. Local community members would test me all the time. I really struggled to deal with them and to figure out how to handle their attitude towards me. It was actually the guidance of the pastors with whom I discussed these problems at IECA's meetings that helped me through this. There is a book a pastor lent me which has a lot of proverbs in Umbundo, with a translation to

Portuguese. Those proverbs helped me to communicate important messages in ways that would be understood and respected by the local people."[52]

By looking at IECA's organisational history and culture, and at the profile of its staff, it emerges that a mixture of sources of legitimacy are at play in determining its position in local society. Some are inherent to its organisational character, such as its religious roots. Others are linked to its tradition and past performance for instance in social work. Perceptions of IECA are also highly dependent on the behaviour and motivation of its staff, and that of other actors. Legitimacy is relational as it hinges on people's beliefs, perceptions, expectations and behaviour. It is also dependent on the strategies and activities of other actors involved in local governance and social assistance (Douma and Van der Haar, 2010). The perception and expectations of IECA are thus co-determined by actors such as the local state services and aid providers. The conduct of IECA's staff for instance, stands in contrast to that of staff of state services. As mentioned earlier, civil servants and social sector workers are often judged as being incompetent and inappropriate because of practices such as drinking and absenteeism, or as being driven by corruption or party politics. On the other hand, although also subjected to politicisation processes as shall be seen, IECA's staff is largely perceived as serious and professional, and is often entrusted with the mediation of community problems.

Many legitimacy and legitimisation processes such as this relational dimension, thus operate outside the direct intentions and action of organisations (Brinkerhoff, 2005a). Yet, IECA has been able to significantly influence such processes through its organisational practices - by motivating staff through investment in their capacity and in the creation of support networks - and through social control. Organisations may therefore seek to manage legitimacy by aligning themselves to their environment, not only in technical aspects (what they do), but also in terms of societal myths and ceremonies (how they frame and communicates what they do) (ibid). In the next section I compare IECA's approach to that of ZOA and look into its specific relationship with local government to explore in greater detail how these relationships influence its legitimacy.

4.3 Comparing implementation practices: IECA and ZOA

As explained in the earlier description of Bunjei´s aid arena, IECA was supposed to take over and give continuity to ZOA´s resettlement programme. However, PIDRB ended up being established separately, and the two organisations coexisted for approximately 1.5 years, albeit in distinct communities. It was only once ZOA withdrew from the area that PIDRB took over it its intervention areas. The programmes of the two organisations shared common goals and implementation strategies, but they were also characterised by significant differences in practices and how interventions were received on the ground. A comparison between the practices of the two organisations intends to shed light on what determines the current role of IECA in Bunjei´s local reconstruction process. It shows how the competition between IECA and ZOA as the other prominent aid actor in the local arena, shaped IECA's legitimisation processes.

Identity

Both ZOA and IECA are Christian based organisations. It was on the basis of this common identity that their initial partnership was created. However, their specific missions and profiles are quite distinct, not least because one is an international organisation and the other is part of a national church, albeit linked to and international structure. ZOA's mission focuses on providing relief to refugee and displaced communities during crisis and transition periods.[53] Its intervention in Bunjei was therefore conceived as an emergency project to assist the

displaced population with immediate needs and with their resettlement to local villages. IECA's social work on the other hand has been traditionally focused on the longer term needs of local communities, including the provision of social services such as education and health care, skills training and livelihood support. PIDRB was therefore conceptualised as a longer-term integrated development programme, with some flexibility for innovation. It is involved for example in adult literacy, a component rarely addressed by aid organisations in Huíla. It is also experimenting with the introduction of new crops like soya, and the recovery of old practices such as fruit production.

Interface between national and international actors

Distinct identities and orientations of the organisations are also reflected on their personnel. As seen earlier, IECA is fully staffed by nationals many of whom are local to Bunjei. ZOA, being an international organisation, was managed by expatriate staff, whilst project implementation was done by local staff of its implementing partner – ADESPOV. ZOA experienced personnel problems specific to the interaction between local and expatriate staff that led to implementation difficulties. ZOA's management attributed the problem to existing competition between local partners, whereby old rivalries between different local churches (in this case IECA and IESA) were being played out through ZOA.[54] However, according to local staff, different issues were at play. ZOA's expatriate management allegedly mistrusted its local partners, and its practices were perceived as favouring one local partner over the other. *"ZOA just used the local partners to get their funds. The project managers at the local field bases didn't even know what the total budget belonging to our project part was. The reason wasn't just lack of trust of local staff, but also because they wanted to use funds from this project to cover costs of other preferred interventions with their preferred partner IESA. For instance, the actual project truck you see driving around today was budgeted within our project, but only came to Bunjei in the end. It was being used in Caluquembe and Caconda by the project with IESA."*[55] By being kept in the dark in terms of resource management, the perception was created among IECA staff that their project was losing out in favour of IESA. This resulted in fuelling competition between them.

Implementation strategies

Beyond these basic differences in organisational identity and personnel, the practices on the ground were also distinct and had important consequences for expectations of beneficiaries. Notably, the aid provided by ZOA in the beneficiary villages was targeted to all members of each community, and it was distributed for free. The exception was the distribution of oxen which did not include all beneficiaries. It was organised through groups of various families, each receiving two oxen and a plough to work the land of the families on a rotation system. However, the animals were also given for free. PIDRB also established groups for the animal component, but did so through a credit system that required beneficiaries to reimburse the cost of the animals in kind or in money.[56] The idea was to ensure continuity and expansion of the animal credit and to create a sense of ownership amongst beneficiaries. Not surprisingly, local people resisted having to repay the animals, given that those in ZOA´s communities did not have to do so. There were also complaints that the poorest community members were excluded from the credit system due to their inability to pay. During a 'hunger spell' in 2004 caused by drought, ZOA started providing 20kg of maize per family. IECA in an attempt to maintain a development approach decided to only give 5kg per family, plus training on agricultural techniques. *"The communities were angry and rejected this. Some even threatened to use the 5kg of maize as food instead of seed. But eventually attitudes changed. One of the most reticent Sobas at the time ended up becoming one of our greatest allies and*

activists. But this approach takes time. Development takes a constant re-negotiation within communities."[57]

The way in which the organisations established community-based groups in their respective intervention villages was another major difference in implementation. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 8. For the purpose of the current discussion, two main points are relevant. First, ZOA established Management Committees which based themselves on existing traditional institutions, and therefore tended to mirror the hierarchy of the traditional authorities, involving the *Sobas*, *Sekulus* and their assistants (see Chapter 4) (ZOA and ADESPOV, 2002). PIDRB's Community Development Nuclei (NDC) in contrast, intentionally excluded the traditional leaders from specific group functions, in an attempt to extend decision-making power to other community members. Second, ZOA's Committees were primarily intended to support project related activities, such as the distribution of aid. They were therefore either discontinued or replaced by PIDRB´s groups when ZOA withdrew. The NDCs were conceptualised as more sustainable and independent from the project. Their intended role involved *"identifying community problems and needs, implementing small projects, coordinating activities of aid actors and managing local conflicts"* (IECA, 2006). In practice as Chapter 8 will show, they have encountered several problems and have yet to reach a degree of autonomy,.

The practical consequence of the different approaches of IECA and PIDRB were summarised by one of PIDRB's staff and former ZOA employee. *"PIDRB had many difficulties in establishing itself here because those villages that belonged to ZOA would receive free seeds and food whereas the IECA PIDRB villages would only get seeds on a reimbursement basis. Our only way out of this situation in the end, was the withdrawal of ZOA. Then the communities started valuing our capacity building activities and the project won its ground."*[58] I am not arguing that the approaches of PIDRB have been problem free, or making a judgement on whether they were more successful. Cost-sharing models such as IECA's are intended to increase efficiency and equity of public goods and services in the long term (Dijkzeul and Lynch, 2006). In the case of credit systems however, costs are reimbursed afterwards and there is a high risk of non-payment. *"We haven't yet reached 50% of the reimbursement of the oxen and in the meantime some animals have died of disease. So people are resisting payment."*[59] This impacts directly on the continuity and expansion of the programme, because these are based on a partial cost-recovery of distributed goods, including seeds and animals to benefit more people.[60] Indirectly, it affects programme and organisational legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of those that have paid. *"Here in our village we have reimbursed the full amount of the oxen. And now we're just waiting for the project to buy more but they are waiting for other villages which are late in reimbursing."* [61] The oxen component remains a source of conflict because of the exclusion of certain community members, the appropriation of the animals by others, and because the size of the animals has been inadequate for traction work.

Examining how IECA´s approach differed from that of ZOA highlights some issues that determine the way interventions are received on the ground. Although ZOA set the scene for aid interventions and contributed to IECA's capacity by initially working with/through it, it also set a precedent of expectations with local people that undermined IECA's position. Notably, IECA struggled to dethrone ZOA´s free distribution approach, which it could not keep up. Its own approaches also determine local expectations, for instance with reference to the reimbursement of animal credit.

4.4 IECA and the state

The relative absence of the state and its services from the lives of local people has undoubtedly contributed to IECA´s prominent role in Bunjei. The breadth of PIDRB in terms of geographical coverage and thematic focus is on the other hand, a response to the continued absence and dysfunction of local state institutions. IECA´s local legitimacy is largely derived from filling this institutional void and providing tangible assistance to the local population. As the director of IECA's social department explained, *"IECA is doing everything in Bunjei, from bridge building to vaccinations."*[62]

IECA's programme and its staff in Bunjei have become an alternative structure to the state for the provision of social services. This represents what van der Haar (in Nuijten et al., 2004) terms as a an alternative 'claim to governance', which involves an assertion of acting for and on behalf of the common interests of the public. *"Multiple, and potentially competing, 'claims to governance', i.e. claims to exercise competencies in the fields of administration, jurisdiction etc., are understood to co-exist in practice. To a certain extent these claims exist in parallel fashion, but they may enter into contradiction in specific domains or at specific critical junctures."* (ibid: 108). This role is observed in the expectations formulated by local people and local government.

Communities expect more of PIDRB than just the standard distribution of aid. Programme staff is often approached to help resolve individual or collective conflicts. Within family life, programme staff is frequently called upon to mediate disputes. As the human rights advisor explained, *"We train human rights promoters in each community to raise awareness on different issues and prevent and resolve community and family conflicts. But people still often come to me to help resolve disputes because they see me as a neutral party. But many I cannot resolve. Several conflicts in this region involve witchcraft and sorcery."* [63] IECA is also involved in the resolution of wider conflicts. An example includes a land dispute involving a community near the forest belt of Gove. This area was established by the colonial administration in 1971, for the production of eucalyptus as raw material for a paper factory. The factory was never built and ever since, the local population has been collecting firewood for charcoal production from the area. Recently, the forest belt was bought, allegedly by three military generals, and access by local populations has been blocked. Small but violent incidents between local security guards and community members have occurred and IECA has been asked by the community to intervene.[64] Local residents perceive IECA as having important negotiating power, and being trustworthy in representing their interests vis-à-vis external actors. Traditional authorities have little power of influence outside of their communities, and the local government administration is suspected as possibly siding with the military men. These expectations reflect IECA´s legitimacy and simultaneously consolidate it.

Where the state lacks capacity IECA's added value is promptly recognised by its representatives, and dynamics of accommodation and complementarity develop. The local administration frequently turns to IECA to address local problems, rather than to the state´s administrative hierarchy. When I asked the local administrator about the government priorities for the development of Bunjei, he responded: *"The government wants to have more activities to support agriculture here. Small-scale farmers don't have access to inputs or the means to acquire them, so a credit system would help. It would be very useful for an NGO to come and do this. In fact, I already talked to PIDRB's staff about this. The Government doesn't have the means to deliver services of this kind alone."*[65] Other examples of complementarity include one-off collaboration initiatives with certain state services. Within the local health system, PIDRB´s five traditional birth attendants have been linked to the state health post at Caquela. Although they are paid by the project, they regularly attend meetings and receive training at the post. In the area of water and sanitation, the government's water brigade has recently taken over from PIDRB the task of treating a number of water sources.

However, such examples of collaboration have largely been the result of the commitment of specific individuals and government officials, rather than of formal institutional links.

IECA and the state also enter into direct competition and confrontation. This underscores the tense relationship that has developed between the two. The local administration finds itself in direct competition for people´s recognition and authority. It becomes threatened by the legitimacy enjoyed by IECA and its staff, as illustrated in the above example of the land dispute, where the local community entrusted IECA to represent their interests. As explained by a senior staff of DASEP, *"We work with human rights issues in our communities. This is basically about civic education and may be perceived as challenging the government. Community members in Bunjei will more easily go to our human rights adviser to resolve conflicts than to the local government or even the traditional authorities. People will turn to those that are close to them, and that is us. But when they express gratitude or appreciation for IECA or NGOs, the government gets angry. They want that gratitude themselves and claim it on the grounds that they were the ones that allowed aid organisations to help in the first place."* [66]

The politicisation of the Bunjei arena

The role of IECA as a de facto competitor of the state in the governance of local service delivery is closely enmeshed and significantly weakened by the politicisation of the aid arena. A sense of mistrust between IECA and the state relates to the role partisan politics. On the one hand IECA is suspicious that governing practices and decisions of the local administration are dictated by (MPLA) party interests. On the other, IECA is still perceived as having links with UNITA and therefore of promoting anti-government sentiment. Such politicisation processes are expressed in dynamics of co-option of social assistance interventions. *"Many people will talk of the aid they received in the past as being Government aid or aid by the party [MPLA] and this is the fault of the leaders who say that it was the party that sent organisation x or y to come and help the people. That is why we give a lot of information about the funding sources of PIDRB, so that people know where it's really coming from."* This co-option has been blatantly directed at PIDRB. Programme staff recount that after the 2008 legislative elections, when they went to congratulate the administrator for the victory of his party, he simply responded that it was thanks to PIDRB's work that the population voted for MPLA - they were helping to implement the government's development agenda.[67] The staff perceived this as a clear provocation and was deeply frustrated.

Tensions arising from politicisation processes have important repercussions for IECA's claims to governance. When the government launched a competition for teachers to be incorporated into the education system, only two of PIDRB's pool of 35 government trained teachers were selected. The explanation amongst IECA staff was that priority had been given to MPLA supporters. It was even suggested that the municipal administrator had given a direct order to this effect, given that the only two selected candidates from PIDRB were also the two that were MPLA party secretaries in their communities. This event highlights the limited capacity of IECA to exercise certain rule-making or enforcement aspects of governance, in spite of its considerable legitimacy vis-à-vis local people.

The practical outcome of such tensions between local government and IECA has been an overall limited collaboration. PIDRB has focused on working at community level on various themes, but such efforts have not been paralleled at the level of state institutions, which remain weak. Aid activities that usually address this, such as decentralisation support, have not reached Chipindo municipality. Links between local communities and formal state institutions are absent. PIDRB's community consultation groups (NDCs) for instance, have yet to be linked to the local state apparatus as representatives of local interests. It is unclear

how this affects the legitimacy of both IECA and local government. Yet, there is a risk of delegitimizing local government if it fails to deliver on communities' expectations.

4.5 Contested legitimacy: IECA's future role

The comparison of IECA and ZOA's approaches and practices and the examination of its relationship with state have opened up the analysis of legitimisation processes to include the daily practices and performance of other actors and how they affect people's perceptions and expectations. They substantiate the perspective that legitimacy is a constant process of negotiation, rather than a given quality, that is therefore problematic to engineer. This has implications for IECA's future role in Bunjei. Although IECA has carved out an important position in local society and function in poverty reduction, its legitimacy is contingent upon its ability to respond to emerging challenges and adapt to changes.

Key in this respect is the growing importance of the civil service as a livelihood option for the local population. Large scale recruitment of civil servants, offering attractive salaries and employment conditions such as the right to retirement pension, have changed the job market considerably. Many of PIDRB's staff have also started to work part-time as school teachers or have enrolled in night classes to obtain the education level required for teaching, with the aim of joining the state education services full time. In addition, the emergence of private sector jobs, albeit modest, is encouraging locals to leave their communities. Many are key activists involved in PIDRB's activities. Although IECA's management recognises the positive impact these developments represent for the region, in discussions about the organisation's future and its role in reconstruction efforts, the loss of qualified personnel to the civil service was framed as a threat to its survival.

Seen from a different angle, the analysis of IECA's history in Bunjei shows that it was key in maintaining social services in the context of isolation since the end of the war. The investment in employment, training and community work, was perhaps its greatest long-term contribution to local capacities. Local state institutions will benefit from this, as they are now ready to absorb these human resources. This raises questions about the potential impact of such changes on the future legitimacy of state service institutions. Will the incorporation of these individuals contribute to making services more efficient for instance? On the other hand, IECA will likely need to reassess its focus and role in the local context. Given that local staff have been a key source of IECA's legitimacy and relationships with local actors, it is likely that these changes will affect legitimisation processes and its future position.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of Bunjei's specific conflict history and reconstruction process has underlined the multiple realities of crises and crises response, discussed in previous chapters. For people living in the isolated rural areas controlled by UNITA, as in the majority of Bunjei's population, experiences differed significantly from those near urban centres accessible by aid. Humanitarian aid reached this area for the first time only with the end of the war. Within UNITA territory people's war realities were also differentiated between the majority of civilians and a minority of people incorporated into the regime. Many of the latter were forcibly captured but later given access to basic services, food and protection. For civilians, the absence of humanitarian aid and functioning state services during the war, meant people had to fend for themselves and adapt coping strategies. Many resorted to displacement as a way to secure protection, farmed and worked the land of others for food, treated illness with traditional medicine, or as a last resort, took the harvests of one another to stay alive.

In the post-war context, Bunjei remains marginalised from broader national reconstruction efforts and investments by government, private sector and other non-state actors, including aid organisations. The latter largely withdrew and have stayed away as the post-war emergency subsided, thereby contributing to the perpetuation of the local cycle of isolation and neglect. Civil servants working in Bunjei's isolated context see their jobs at best as a stepping stone in their careers, and at worst as a 'sentence' to be served. The resulting persistence of poor service quality and availability of local services in turn highlights the crucial role played by alternative social institutions in addressing local needs.

Bunjei's reconstruction arena includes multiple institutional arrangements, including local state services, non-state service providers such as private services, and traditional institutions. From the analysis of this arena, the local church IECA has emerged as a particularly prominent in local reconstruction process, with considerable recognition of local actors. It stands in contrast with dominant aid discourses on reconstruction that are centred on the work of international agencies, as well as with existing analyses that reduce the role of the churches in Angola to peace-building. I have argued that IECA, its staff and intervention have come to represent an alternative 'claim to governance' to the official state structure and services in Bunjei. I showed that in practice this embodies various dynamics of negotiation, some of them involving accommodation, but most involving competition with local actors. The key question which I have sought to address in this chapter, is how IECA has carved out and maintained this role in local society.

Through various examples, I have demonstrated that IECA enjoys considerable levels of different types of legitimacy, including normative, pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy. Some sources of legitimacy are inherent to IECA's institutional identity, including its religious basis and evangelical mission. Others are linked to its long tradition and historical performance in social assistance, as well as to its internal organisational practices, such as investment in staff capacity, accountability mechanisms and support networks. How IECA is perceived by local actors and the kinds of expectations this generates, is also significantly affected by the behaviour and motivation of its staff. The proximity of its personnel to local communities for instance, has been key in establishing relationships of trust, credibility and accountability. Their motivations in turn range from religious values to professional ambition.

What also emerged as crucial to its legitimisation processes is the impact of the actions and performance of other actors in the local arena of governance of social services. IECA's professional image and the quality of its assistance in the eyes of local people, evolved against a backdrop of inadequate state services, and slack civil servants. Moreover, IECA's legitimacy was initially questioned in the light of the implementation practices of ZOA, which set standards that IECA could not maintain, such as the free distribution of assistance. Besides the effects of professional rivalry, the politicisation of the local arena has also impacted upon IECA's performance and legitimacy. IECA has been strongly opposed for its alleged links to UNITA. This has affected its capacity to exercise certain enforcement aspects of governance. The fact that its qualified teachers did not get enrolled into state services is telling. On the other hand, IECA's own practices are setting standards of service provision or staff conduct, which may delegitimise those of state institutions.

IECA's future role and legitimacy are likely to come under contestation and even become redundant as the local context changes. This is particularly relevant as the government's capacity increases in terms of providing viable employment options, if not yet in terms of service delivery. As such, it may well have to rethink its function in Bunjei's development processes.

[1] By the end of 2009, 105km of road between Kuvango and Chipindo municipalities had been rehabilitated (ANGOP, 2009b).
[2] See Chapter 1 for an introduction to the area.
[3] Population estimates for all communities are based on figures provided by the local village secretaries who are officially responsible for tracking population statistics for government administration. Their accuracy therefore depends on the frequency with which registration is done in each community.
[4] Caquela B is one of 3 neighbourhoods that surrounds Bunjei town. The others are Caquela A and Caquela C.
[5] My interviews confirmed this difference in household size, although to a lesser degree. Caquela B showed an average household size of 5.1 and Rioco Centro 7.8.
[6] Although this village shares the same name as the whole commune, it is not to be confused with the communities at the centre of Bunjei town. It is a separate village with its own *Soba*.
[7] Interview with Government Administrator of Bunjei, 09 October 2008, Bunjei.
[8] Interview with male resident of Nguelengue village, 16 October 2008, Bunjei.
[9] Interviews on 26 and 29 May 2008, Bunjei.
[10] Interview with female resident of Rioco Centro, 07 October 2008, Bunjei.
[11] Interview with female resident of Bunjei village, 13 October 2008, Bunjei.
[12] Interview with female resident of Bunjei village, 13 October 2008, Bunjei.
[13] Interview with female resident of Bunjei village, 15 October 2008, Bunjei
[14] The FAA (Forças Armadas de Angola) are the official national armed forces, created at the time of the Bicesse Accords in 1991. They integrated the former government army (FAPLA – Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola) and that of UNITA (FALA – Forças Armadas para a Libertação de Angola). With the return to war the FALA were reconstituted in UNITA areas.
[15] UNITA's army.
[16] Interview, 16 October 2008, Bunjei.
[17] Interview with male resident of Rioco Centro, 10 October 2008, Bunjei.
[18] Interview with female resident of Bunjei village, 13 October 2008, Bunjei.
[19] Embala – local Umbundo term referring to a grouping of several villages/communities.
[20] Interview with local catholic catechist, 15 October 2008, Bunjei.
[21] Interviews with resident of Nguelengue, 16 and 17 October 2008, Bunjei.
[22] Lavra – local term referring to the main plot of farming land.
[23] Interview with local catholic catechist, 15 October 2008, Bunjei.
[24] Interview with male resident of Bunjei, 16 October 2008, Bunjei.
[25] Interview with Soba and Sekulos of Nguelengue village, 28 May 2008, Bunjei.
[26] Interview with former head of Community Services, 15 October 2008, Bunjei.
[27] Interview with former ZOA Angola senior staff, 15 July 2009, Netherlands.
[28] Interview with former ZOA driver, 16 October 2008, Bunjei.
[29] This number was reduced in the third phase of the project, which started in January 2009, in response to a reduction in funds and the revised programme focus on community development.
[30] These included human rights, agriculture, maternal and child health, water and sanitation, community organisation, adult literacy and infrastructure development.
[31] Run by the Institute for the Social Reintegration of Ex-militaries – IRSEM, with support mainly from the World Bank.
[32] Interview with male resident of Bunjei village, 14 October 2008, Bunjei.
[33] Interview with PIDRB staff member. 29 May 2008, Bunjei.
[34] Interview with Administrator of Bunjei, 09 October 2008, Bunjei.
[35] Personal communication with local aid worker, 06 October 2008, Bunjei.
[36] By way of comparison, the local administration of Matala municipality for instance, recently announced the building of 12 new football pitches (ANGOP, 2009a).
[37] Interview with Administrator of Bunjei. 09 October 2008, Bunjei.
[38] Interview with Programme Coordinator of PIDRB, 20 May 2008, Bunjei.
[39] Interview with staff of Bunjei's state Health Post, 14 October 2008, Bunjei.
[40] Interviews with school teachers at Caquela B, 11 October 2008, Bunjei.
[41] These are both now national branches of the United Church of Christ, a merge of the Evangelical and Reformed Church and the Congregational Christian Churches.
[42] IECA's structure is organized into the General Synod, Provincial Synods, Local Synods, Pastorates and Congregations. It has a general assembly and an executive council.
[43] Interview with programme director of DASEP/IECA, 10 February 2008, Luanda.
[44] Group interview with staff of PIDRB, 20 May 2008, Bunjei.
[45] According to the World Council of Churches' figures based on a population estimate of 14.5 million from 2006, 94% of Angolans are Christian, 5% belong to traditional faiths and 1% to other faiths. Within the Christian faiths, 9.86 million are Catholics, 4.1 million are Protestant, 0.11 million are Anglicans and 0.74 are Independent. Other estimates from 2008 by the National Institute for Religious Affairs suggest 13.8 Million people to be Catholic, from a population of approximately 15 million (Jensen and Pestana, 2010: 12).
[46] Several procedures and strategic thematic areas have been revised and include for example, improving the gender balance within the organisation, addressing current issues, such as human rights, elections, and HIV/Aids.
[47] See Chapter 1 for more on this.
[48] Interview with director of DASEP-IECA, 10 February 2008, Luanda.

[49] Informal communication with human rights advisor, 09 October 2008, Bunjei
[50] Interview with PIDRB driver, 10 October 2008, Bunjei.
[51] Examples include COIEPA - an Inter-church Committee for Peace in Angola, and MOJUP- a United Youth Movement for Peace.
[52] Informal communication, 16 October 2008, Bunjei.
[53] Their official mission statement reads "ZOA-Refugee Care supports refugees, internally displaced (IDPs), returnees and others affected by conflict or natural disaster in their transition from instability and lack of basic needs towards a situation in which conditions enabling a process of structural development have been (re)-established." (www.zoa.nl).
[54] Interview with former ZOA management staff, 15 July 2009, Apeldoorn.
[55] Informal communication with former ZOA employee, 30 May 2008, Bunjei.
[56] See Chapter 8 for a discussion of these groups.
[57] Interview with head of DASEP, 10 February 2008, Luanda.
[58] Interview on 20 May 2008, Bunjei.
[59] Interview with coordinator of PIDRB, 30 May 2008, Bunjei.
[60] The recovery is partial because the amount requested from the reimbursement is not equivalent to the real market cost of the animals. Each group is expected to repay 60% of the value as the other 40% should be paid in the form of work by the animals on the land of 4 vulnerable people who are unable to pay.
[61] Interview with village elders of Nguelengue village, 28 May 2008, Bunjei.
[62] Interview with director of DASEP-IECA, 10 February 2008, Luanda.
[63] Interview with human rights advisor of PIDRB, 29 May 2008, Bunjei.
[64] Interview with PIDRB staff member, 20 & 30 May 2008, Bunjei.
[65] Interview, 09 October 2008, Bunjei.
[66] Interview, 10 February 2008, Luanda.
[67] Informal communication with PIDRB staff, 06 & 07 October 2008, Bunjei.

CHAPTER SIX

Aid and institution-building

INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyses the nexus between aid and institutions. It starts from the premise that aid influences institutional development through policy discourse and implementation practices. I want to analyse how this has applied to the Angolan case over the course of its conflict history and reconstruction phase.

At the heart of the interaction between aid interventions and local institutions, lies the notion of institution-building or strengthening, which has become prominent in aid agendas particularly since the 1990s. These highlight the role of local institutions in socio-economic development and stabilisation processes in fragile or conflict affected countries. Institution-strengthening interventions are an important part of state-building efforts in post-war reconstruction. This ambition to build local institutional capacity has also been adopted by humanitarian actors working in crisis contexts. Concerns with longer-term aspects of assistance have made these developmental relief objectives part of their response to crisis and post-crisis situations.

Dominant aid discourse sees the state in fragile contexts as unable or unwilling to meet its responsibilities towards citizens. State and institution-building agendas therefore focus on (re)establishing state-society relations. This is commonly framed within the notion of the 'social contract'. Implicit in this rationale are ideas about what the role of the state should be, where states draw their legitimacy from, and about what determines citizen's expectations and perceptions of the state. This logic has been extended to the provision of basic services, whereby service delivery interventions are assumed to contribute to state legitimacy. The notion of the social contract, as an ideal-typical representation of the relationship between states and citizens, underpins the strategies of aid actors for state-building interventions in post-war countries. It therefore begs elaboration.

In Angola's reconstruction context, a wave of institution-building interventions emerged based on this rationale. They resulted in three broad programme categories: technical assistance for service delivery, support to the national decentralisation process, and community-based development. In this chapter I focus particularly on the first category. The others are addressed in the next two chapters respectively. Institutional support for service delivery is most often provided in the form of technical assistance directed at state services. State institutions are therefore at the centre of this chapter's analysis on the interaction between aid practices and local institutions. I focus on the particular case of healthcare as a key social sector, which has received considerable support from the aid community in Angola. The health sector in conflict contexts is sometimes referred to as "a bridge to peace" (Kruk et al., 2010). I examine a specific programme that I followed during my fieldwork, involving the revitalisation of local health services.

As shall emerge from this analysis and already argued in earlier chapters, other non-state actors are also important in local service delivery and in legitimisation processes of the state vis-à-vis citizens. They include civil society organisations, private actors or community-based institutions. As I shall argue, these have received much less attention in capacity development efforts which have been state-biased in their approach to service delivery. Here they are discussed briefly, given that their specific interaction with aid interventions is addressed in later chapters.

This chapter intends firstly to shed light on the legacy and imprint of humanitarian approaches on longer-term reconstruction efforts. Secondly, it seeks to make an empirical contribution to the understanding of how institutions develop through the practices of aid interventions, in contrast to stated intentions. I do this by tracing how interventions perceived of and engaged with local health institutions during Angola's emergency, followed by an examination of institution-building efforts in reconstruction. This is based on fieldwork data,

project documents and writings on aid in Angola. The chapter starts by revisiting the notion of the social contract and its functionality for state-building discourse and intervention strategies. It refers to distinct bodies of literature on fragile states and institution-building. On the one hand it draws on policy and aid agency documents to identify the dominant aid discourses that structure interventions. On the other, it builds on a growing body of academic literature that criticises such discourses and questions the outcomes of interventions.

1. State-society relations and the social contract

Theories about aid and socio-economic development in poor and conflict-affected countries are underpinned by discussions on the role of the state and its relationship with society. In dominant aid discourses this relationship is commonly described as a 'social contract'. It is sometimes also referred to as a social pact or political settlement (Fritz and Menocal, 2007). The social contract broadly refers to the obligations and rights of citizens and governments vis-à-vis one another. Douma and van der Haar (2010: 23) refer to the social contract as a metaphor to describe the legitimacy of the state vis-à-vis its citizens. An effective and legitimate state presupposes the establishment of a strong relationship between the state and society. Aid actors also use this notion metaphorically, rather than as a literal objective. The social contract rationale underpins their strategies and structures intervention modalities. As a metaphor underlying aid interventions, the social contract thus solicits elaboration.

At its origin, social contract theory emerged as an imaginary of western liberal thought, to explain how social order is created by the way that social actors relate to one another. It concerns how and why people give up certain rights for an authority or government that overarches individual interests to establish political order. The roots of social contract theory go back to western philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Each of their social contracts highlighted distinct viewpoints about the individual before the creation of society or social order, which Hobbes called the 'State of Nature' (Curtis, 1981). Whether the state of nature was conceptualised as brutal, moral or idyllic according to these different views, they converged around the need for an overarching authority, which should emerge out of negotiation rather than of a natural right of some to govern over others (Friend, 2006: 1). All versions of the social contract described ideals rather than real distributions of power (Marshall, 1998). The social contract is seen as necessary to overcome the potential of conflict and disequilibria in society resulting from the unconstrained pursuit of individual interests, the division of labour, introduction of property rights and general inequality. For instance, Rousseau's conception of the social contract is based on the idea of direct participatory democracy and the need for legislation, in order to avoid elite capture of government (Cranston, 1968). The breakdown of the social contract was represented by the disinterest of people in participating in public affairs because their perception was that their interests would not prevail. *"As soon as any man says of the affairs of the State* What does it matter to me? *The State may be given up for lost."* (Rousseau, 1762: Book III in Curtis, 1981).

Assumptions of the social contract

Social contract theory touches upon important aspects of the role and purpose of the state (Marshall, 1998). This metaphor is therefore often referred to in donor discourses as an ideal-typical representation of state-society relations in fragile contexts. Such discourses have practical consequences in that they inform and influence decisions about aid strategies and interventions on the ground. However, such intervention modalities have been criticised for not producing the outcomes these formal discourses predict. The social contract is based on

several assumptions about the workings of the state in crises, its relationships with citizens, and about legitimisation processes, which are not grounded on practical realities.

In the state-building discourse of policy-makers and aid organisations, it is assumed that in conflict-affected societies and contexts of fragility, the social contract has broken down. Restoring the legitimacy and authority of the state is thus framed as a project (van der Haar, 2009). This so-called breakdown presumes that there was a prior robust relationship between state and citizens based on a consensus and acceptance in the negotiated agreement. In countries affected by or emerging from conflict this assertion may not be valid (Van der Molen and Stel, 2010). In some cases, conflict itself may be the result of the breakdown of the social contract, for instance following a struggle to acquire and safeguard valued resources (Addison and Mansoob Murshed, 2001: 3, Chandhoke, 2005). People's non-participation in public life may be a result of their intentional exclusion through violence or elite capture. Colonial regimes which preceded many civil wars in Africa were certainly not based on a social contract ideal. Moreover, the legitimacy of many post-independence states that replaced colonial rule was heavily contested from their early establishment. The social contract ideal of the early independent MPLA socialist government never took root in Angola (Pacheco, 2003). The eruption of the civil war between the different Angolan nationalist movements immediately after the independence meant the government was always contested. It never conformed to the Weberian models of governance and authority.

The link between conflict and the loss of legitimacy of the state implicit in the social contract rationale has also been questioned. During crises states may be weakened, but they hardly ever become irrelevant as they continue to fulfil certain functions by adapting and transforming (Van der Molen and Stel, 2010: 14). A state may continue to be legitimate and 'strong' on various levels that influence people´s lives, even when it shows weaknesses or failure in fulfilling its obligations towards citizens. Non-democratic authoritarian states are able to maintain successful social contracts despite denying political liberties (Addison and al., 2008: 98). The Angolan state for instance, has been described as having a dual nature, being weak in fulfilling its social responsibilities, yet displaying strength in its considerable resilience to the political crisis (Ostheimer, 2000) (see Chapter 2).

State legitimacy tends to be equated with the normative performance of states, judged by individuals conceptualised as purely rational beings that will react in predictable ways. However, as I have argued in Chapter 1, citizen's expectations and perceptions of the state hinge upon various other factors than simple output performance (Bellina et al., 2009: 15). Legitimacy is negotiated at various levels and in different domains. Individuals and their reactions are always historically located, gendered, race-conscious and a part of existing power structures (Friend, 2006: 16). In addition, often, crucial factors that affect the development of governance practices and state legitimacy are left out of the analysis of state-society relations. Sogge (2006, 2009) for instance, highlights the influence of external interests in Angola's oil industry, as a key factor contributing to the weakness of governance.

People's beliefs, perceptions and expectations that determine the legitimacy of the state are shaped in practice (Van der Molen and Stel, 2010). The ways in which these multiple processes operate and shape the relations between the state and its citizens in conflict contexts are outside of the gaze on dominant state-building discourse. This raises questions about the appropriateness of the social contract ideal in structuring interventions. As Bellina et al (2009) propose, social relations and legitimisation processes should be analysed empirically rather than on the basis of normative standards. In this chapter I want to contribute to this debate by looking at how it works in practice for the Angolan case, with particular reference to state-building interventions popular in the current post-war context. As I have explained in the earlier exposé about state-society relations in Angola (see Chapter 2), these have always been complex and characterised by a certain distance between the state and citizens. Moreover,

they have been shaped by a variety of factors besides the direct effects of the conflict, including the colonial and the post-independence political regimes. I start from the premise that building state legitimacy in the post-war is not simply a question of re-establishing previously existing relations, as the social contract discourse implies.

2. Aid and institutions: the discourse

2.1 Institution-building in development

In the last two decades, there has been increasing emphasis by the international aid community on working with local institutions. A scan of the global debate on institution-building is useful to see how it has informed donor and NGO practice on the ground, and how it applies to the Angolan experience. Literature on institutional reform in developing countries has focused on economic development, namely the (re)building of formal institutions that enable growth. With the end of the Cold War, policies explicitly started to link the economic benefits of free trade to the promotion of liberal-democratic political institutions (Jacoby and James, 2009: 6-7). This led to the support of public sector institutions centred on macroeconomic policy conditionalities.

The interest in institutional change in the 1990s followed from the failure of reforms promoted by the international financial institutions (IFIs) in the 1970s and 1980s, to generate significant growth. In Africa it was further informed by the experience of multilateral agencies in the transition economies of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and by the influence of institutional aspects on the perceptions of investors (Aron, 2003: 472). The subsequent failure of structural adjustment programmes was particularly influential in this shift. These were specifically criticised for the negative impact on social conditions, resulting from the roll back of the state and the ensuing weakening of its institutions. In the 1990s, the good-governance agenda became prominent, and later evolved into the state and institution-building agendas popular today, given that both are concerned with strengthening institutional effectiveness (Fritz and Menocal, 2007: 13). The good-governance discourse translated into two broad policy trends: one promoting the reform and reduction of the state and its institutions, the other involving the strengthening of civil society and the explicit support to NGOs. State reforms were not implemented directly through bilateral aid, but rather through multilateral agencies and NGO programmes. *"During the 1980s an orthodoxy developed that Africa's development crisis was precipitated by a failure of the state and that 'governance' had to be reconstructed, from the bottom up. Shaping civil society became the road to reforming the state."* (Hearn, 2000: 817).

In current state-building discourse, institution-building interventions are presented as the way to strengthen local capacities, needed to restore state-society relations and make the transition from war to peace and development. State-building has thus been adopted as a crucial objective in countries emerging out of conflict and for the so-called weak or fragile states, also grouped by the World Bank under the LICUS category (Lower Income Countries Under Stress). In such contexts, *"The weakness of the state is implicitly seen as the main cause of crisis and lack of development."* (Van der Borgh, 2008). State-building in the aid policy arena refers to *"purposeful action to build capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process to negotiate the mutual demands between the state and the citizen"* (INCAF/OECD in Anten, 2009: i). Brinkerhoff (2005b: 5) considers post-conflict governance reforms to involve three major interlinked areas: reconstituting legitimacy, re-establishing security and rebuilding effectiveness. State-building discourse is strongly echoed in international reconstruction policy efforts and associated interventions. *"…it seems as though it is the only conflict amelioration tool in the international community's*

toolbox. In a sense, peace-building has elided into state-building, and state-building has elided into governance." (Hamieh and Mac Ginty, 2009: 10).

Increased concerns over security and terrorism threats that followed the 11th of September 2001 attacks in the US, have raised the state-building agenda of western donors further, on the basis of the nexus between security and development. This view that aid interventions are needed to develop and securitize the world, through so called stabilisation efforts, has been criticised by various authors (Duffield, 2001, Cramer, 2006, Duffield, 2007, Jacoby and James, 2009, Barakat et al., 2010, Collinson et al., 2010). As I shall elaborate, state-building has concretely translated into a focus on service delivery, primarily involving technical assistance interventions. Angola has largely followed these trends in the post war. However, during the 27 years of civil war, donor engagement was focused on humanitarian relief. I argue that this humanitarian approach was more significant in defining the engagement of aid with state institutions, than were the institutional reform objectives of the dominant governance agenda, including the leading IFI reforms through most of Africa in the 1990s. Let me explain.

2.2 Institution-building in humanitarianism

Over the last two decades, humanitarians have broadened their activities beyond life-saving interventions. Agencies have sought to include broader development and peace-building objectives through maximalist approaches (Chapter 3). Principles derived from development, including accountability, partnership, participation and sustainability, have thus become important for humanitarian actors (Hilhorst, 2005b). In this section I explore how organisations went about pursuing such broadened objectives, with reference to the history of aid engagement with local institutions in Angola.

According to the widened scope of humanitarian interventions, beyond the humanitarian imperative of saving lives, humanitarians are also meant to build and strengthen local capacities to meet the needs of those affected by disaster or conflict. Capacity building is understood as the intent to *"...empower and strengthen institutions and the ability of people to take control of activities that affect their lives."* (Juma, 2002: 161). Concerns with capacity and institution-building have entered the discourse and practice of humanitarians in an effort to improve accountability. They have thus influenced how local institutions are addressed. This intention has been incorporated into key instruments guiding humanitarian action. It is articulated explicitly in several Articles of the Code of Conduct for Disaster Relief (see Box 6.1). The Code represents a body of shared principles that sets parameters for action, rather than providing a blueprint (Hilhorst, 2005b). Article 2 mentions that relief will be provided upon the basis *"of a thorough assessment of the needs of the disaster victims and the local capacities already in place to meet those needs"*. Article 6 further states that *"We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities"* and that local capacities shall be strengthened by using local resources, working with local partners and in cooperation with local government structures where possible or appropriate. Full community participation in the management of relief is also an explicit goal of Article 7.

As I shall elaborate, humanitarians struggle to implement these objectives, particularly in protracted crises where short and long-term needs coexist. Such limitation has been consistently identified in evaluations of humanitarian interventions. In a recent assessment of performance and progress of humanitarian action, Harvey et al (2010) argued that poor performance in building local capacities continues to be a core area of poor performance of the sector. This results from the ´false dichotomy´ between how humanitarians engage with state institutions in conflict and in reconstruction, in which relief is portrayed as state-avoiding and recovery as state-building (Harvey, 2009b). As Hilhorst (2007: 27) argues, the notion of linking relief to development and its implicit concern with enhancing capacities is

currently used exclusively for transition from crisis to post-crisis. It hardly refers to making aid during crisis more developmental. The next section shows that concrete efforts by humanitarians to increase the capacity of local institutions in Angola were both modest and limited. It corroborates earlier findings about the development of the aid arena in Angola analysed in Chapter 3, regarding the marginalisation and weakening of local institutional capacities.

BOX 6.1: The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief

Article 1:	The Humanitarian imperative comes first.
Article 2:	Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone.
Article 3:	Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.
Article 4:	We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.
Article 5:	We shall respect culture and custom.
Article 6:	We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.
Article 7:	Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.
Article 8:	Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs.
Article 9:	We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.
Article 10:	In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects.

Source: www.icrc.org

2.3 The role of basic services in state-society relations

In addition to increasing participation, equality, accountability and transparency, state legitimacy in post-conflict contexts is often associated with the state's capacity for basic service delivery (Brinkerhoff, 2005b: 5). The metaphor of the social contract has thus been extended to basic service delivery in fragile states (Douma and Van der Haar, 2010: 23). The 2004 World Development Report 'Making Services Work for the Poor' marked the current emphasis on service provision for poverty alleviation. It defined basic social services as including those most directly linked with human development, such as education, health, water, sanitation and electricity (World Bank, 2004). Others include physical infrastructure such as roads and bridges, or services such as the police or justice (Berry et al., 2004: 8). In this research I have concentrated on the first group and specifically focus on healthcare in the subsequent sections of this chapter. In Angola, given the impact of the war on all service sectors, basic service delivery became the core business of aid organisations, and has remained so to a large extent in the transition to peace.

Basic service delivery in fragile states discourse is assumed to be primarily the responsibility of the state, although the degree to which this is so, has varied according to different models that dominated over the years. Welfare-state models inspired by Weber´s conceptualisation of the state as being exclusively responsible for service provision have practically disappeared. They were strongly countered by neo-liberal models of service delivery through privatisation (Douma and Van der Haar, 2010, Hilhorst, 2010). However, such models also came under scrutiny for not being pro-poor and for competing with and weakening state institutions. There has therefore been a return of donor support to the state and public service institutions in recent years. Douma and van der Haar (2010) highlight the emergence of the decentralisation discourse in donor support to service provision in fragile states. It focuses on pro-poor localised implementation, and on the potential of public private partnerships. The role of the decentralisation rationale in service delivery will become apparent in my analysis of the Revitalisation Programme later in the chapter.

During crises, the concern with life-saving action means a strong focus by aid actors on basic service delivery to meet immediate short-term needs. Attention to capacity building by humanitarian agencies, albeit limited, mostly goes towards service delivery rather than broader issues involving for instance, civil society strengthening, good governance, or concerns with ownership or sustainability (Christoplos, 2004).

There is a strong current within the international community that sees the priority in post-crisis countries to also be the improvement in the provision of basic services. Berry et al (2004: 4) for instance, propose that service provision should be emphasised by donors as an entry point in difficult environments, because it contributes to achieving the targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), fulfils the humanitarian imperative, encourages pro-poor social, economic and political change, and acts as a conflict prevention mechanism. The logic is that improving access, quality and governance of basic services, will strengthen the social contract and reduce state fragility (Douma and Van der Haar, 2010). Points of service delivery are seen in such perspectives as interfaces between state institutions and citizens, where legitimisation processes can be shaped through planned interventions. The institution-building agenda is therefore being operationalised through programmes aiming to improve the provision of basic services to local people. Their underlying assumption is that people's perceptions of their government are contingent upon its ability to provide reliable services (Hilhorst, 2010: 7). According to Robson (2003: 38) for example, the de-linkage of the Angolan state and political elite from society has been articulated in the poor delivery of social services. He therefore argues that programmes supporting basic services (re)negotiate and improve the relationship between the state and citizens (Robson and Roque, 2001).

A growing body of literature is emerging that questions the linkages implied in institution building and fragile states discourse, between improved basic services and longer term objectives of state-building, peace and development. Kruk et al (2010) argue that there is a lack of empirical evidence for links between health systems support models for instance, and social and political aims. Eldon et al (2008) point out that support to the health sector may contribute to state capacity within the sector, but that the effects for wider state-building are unclear. Robinson (2007) and Wolf (2007) contend that decentralisation policies have had a negative effect on service delivery outcomes (access and quality) given the absence of additional necessary conditions, such as the creation of local capacity. Douma and van der Haar (2010) specifically question the linearity between efforts to improve basic services and state legitimacy and capacity. *"For improvements to reflect positively on state legitimacy, two steps must be covered. First, improvements must be perceived as such by the users, and second, they must attribute these improvements to the state. We would argue that it is not only objective measures of improvement, but the perceived improvements in effectiveness of the services that make a difference."* (Douma and Van der Haar, 2010: 24-25). As I have already argued, legitimacy is relational and co-determined by various factors that influence the perceptions, expectations and behaviour of people, including the action of non-state actors (Chapters 1 and 5). As Christoplos and Hilhorst (2009) have pointed out, the dominance of state-building agendas has resulted in the neglect of those factors in determining state legitimacy.

The governance of service provision involves various actors in addition to the state. It entails relationships of power and accountability between these various actors – policy makers, service providers and citizens. The World Bank´s accountability framework analyses how donors might choose to support basic service delivery according to the relationships of accountability in place. It suggests that where citizens can call policy makers to account through political representation, support to state service provision is advisable. This is the long route to accountability. Where this is absent due to a lack of willingness or capacity of the state or other actors, or due to lacking infrastructure, then the short-route of accountability

is preferred. In this case, clients place demands directly on service providers (Pavanello and Darcy, 2008). Approaches to service delivery in Angola were clearly split between the short-route during the war and the long-route in the post-conflict phases. The long-term impact, as I shall argue, is the marginalisation and weakening of local institutional capacities.

Healthcare as a bridge to peace

Accessibility and quality of health care in countries affected by war tend to be amongst the worst in the world given the destruction of infrastructure, supply systems and the loss of personnel. Healthcare has therefore remained a high priority in donor´s agendas during crises and in transition. Pavanello (2008) argues that this is related firstly to the paradigm shift in donor´s engagement in fragile states, from an emergency short-term and project-based approach to a longer term integrated approach. Secondly, to the realisation that support to health systems[1] is a potential entry point for broader governance reforms.

The rationale for building health sector capacity follows that explained for supporting basic services more generally. Eldon et al. (2008: 8) frame health 'systems strengthening' as state-building at sectoral level as they include objectives such as *"enhanced organisational and institutional capacity to formulate and implement policy; improved relationships between policy-makers, providers and service users (through information, leadership, etc.); more effective governance, stewardship, regulation and legitimacy; and improved resource mobilization and management."*. Support to healthcare is also justified with capacity building claims in reconstruction, beyond the health sector. *"For the health system is a face of the state, every bit as much as other core social institutions such as the police and the judiciary. Whether by design or by default, the dynamics of interaction between that system and the communities it serves will contribute – positively or negatively – to the reconstruction process."* (Kruk et al., 2010: 93). Health interventions have been explicitly linked to peace-building objectives, based on the *"health as a bridge to peace"* theory. This presents health as a shared super-ordinate value that can leverage for peace (ibid). Mozambique´s health sector recovery for instance, has been described as *"spearheading and giving credibility to the whole peace process*." (Pavignani and Colombo, 2001: 29).

In the Angolan case, the health sector has been identified as the locus of *"the most serious erosion of public services"* associated with institutional weakness (Ostheimer, 2000: 120). Aid interventions in this sector were crucial in assisting people during the war and remain relevant in current reforms being made to the health system. Recent health support programmes concentrate on building capacity for decentralised services specifically focusing on primary health care (PHC). PHC refers to essential health care that should be universally accessible to all, should involve community participation and be affordable and sustainable (Declaration of Alma-Ata, 1978).[2] Such interventions target state services and focus on technical assistance. The heading of technical assistance covers a wide range of programme types and activities, but is generally understood as the development of capacity of institutions and human resources in terms of knowledge and systems building and programme cycle management. According to Canavan et al (2008), technical assistance in the health sector is particularly important in transition contexts to assist governments to devise recovery strategies and adequate aid modalities. Health sector rehabilitation beyond relief-oriented action, requires investment in policy, planning and management systems and human resource development (Macrae, 1997: 192). In the subsequent analysis of approaches to healthcare support, I draw on experiences from both Matala and Chipindo, to illustrate how health support programmes have been implemented in practice.

3. Aid and institutions: the practice

3.1 Characterising healthcare in Angola

Health services in Angola, have suffered from the same difficulties identified in Chapter 4 for the social sectors in general. These include prolonged political underinvestment, the inherited biases of the colonial model of service delivery, and the inadequate policies of the post-independence state. The health system thus developed into a centralised hospital-oriented system, heavily dependent on highly skilled professionals rather than community health workers, and with a strong urban bias (Pavignani and Colombo, 2001).

Government investment

The lack of investment in healthcare relative to non-social sectors has continued into the post-conflict phase.[3] Health financing has remained well below the regional average for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In 2006, allocations for the health sector reached 5% of the national budget, higher than previous years, but still far from the 9.6% average of SSA (Connor et al., 2010: xxi). In 2010, a revision of the national state budget resulted in a reduction of 3.3% in the allocation to healthcare, compared to the budget amount in 2009. In contrast, the proportion allocated to defence was raised from 7.15% to 11.28% (OPSA, 2010a).[4] Social sector financing did go up in absolute terms however, but only due to the growth in the overall national budget. This growth created room for the GoA to make expenditures in healthcare. In line with its broader macro-model of reconstruction, it chose to invest primarily in the development of health infrastructure to expand the health network to various parts of the country. Between 2003 and 2009, the number of functioning health facilities country-wide almost tripled (Connor et al., 2010: 70). Sixty six new health facilities were built in Huíla alone, from 2000 to 2006, compared to a total of 33 for the period 1976 - 1999 (ibid: 8). The GoA has recently embarked on policy reforms that are intended to support institutional capacity development, including for instance aligning health policies with global aid instruments such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Millennium Development Goals (Fustukian, 2004). The recent abolishment of user fees for primary health care and initiatives such as the revitalisation and decentralisation of health services at municipal level, are also intended to make healthcare more pro-poor.

In practice, throughout Angola's post-independence history, investment in infrastructure development has been by far more significant than in any other aspect of healthcare provision, including capacity development of healthcare personnel. The lack of human resources continues to be one of the main constraints, as concluded in a 2010 assessment of the national health system. Specifically, the low and/or narrow clinical skills, underserved rural areas, doctor shortage, lack of medical schools, limited quality supervision, and few community-based health workers (Connor et al., 2010). Explicit efforts to improve staff capacity, beyond aspects linked to management policies and organisation of the health system, have been modest. As shall be seen, the international community has also largely neglected this aspect. Once again, the Christian churches have had a crucial role in the various phases of the Angolan history in training health workers through their specialised mission schools and health facilities. IESA and IECA continue this function to this day (see Table 6.2).

Performance indicators

The lack of financial and human resources combined with the low health status of the population, means that Angola remains amongst the worst performers in health terms in the world. This is apparent from the figures presented in Table 6.1. Global health status indicators

do not automatically reflect on citizen's perceptions of health services, but they are an important reference for decisions about aid by donors and NGOs. Such indicators are used as base-lines for comparisons between different contexts and thus are influential in decisions of agencies about where and how to intervene. They are also important for relationships of accountability with donors and the general public, and to justify the needs-basis of interventions.

TABLE 6.1: Health Status Indicators

Indicator	Measure	Angola		Sub-Saharan Africa	
		Source	Data	Source	Data (year)
Life expectancy	Life expectancy at birth (years)	WHO 2004	38 (male) 42 (female)	WHO 2004	47 (male) 49 (female)
Infant mortality rate	Infant deaths per 1000 live births	MICS 2001 IBEP 2008	115.7 150	WDI 2009	79 (2007)
Under-five mortality rate	Child deaths per 1000 live births	MICS 2001 WDI 2009 (2007 data) IBEP 2008	250 158 195	WDI 2009	124.9 (2007)
Maternal mortality rate	Maternal deaths per 100 000 live births	UNDP 2007 WDI 2009	1400 – 1700 1400	WDI 2009	832 (2005)
Fertility rate	Number of births per woman through the end of childbearing period	WHO 2004 UNICEF 2007	6.7 5.8	WDI 2009	4.9 (2007)
Prevalence of underweight children under-five	Low weight by age is < 2 standard deviations from average	MICS 2001 UNICEF 2007	31% 16%	WHO	24.9% (2001)
HIV prevalence	Prevalence of HIV among adults (15–49 years old)	UNGASS 2010	2.0%	UNAIDS 2008	5.75% (2007)

Source: Connor et al (2010: 5)

Despite the lack of reliable statistics, estimates indicate that in 1980, only 30% of the population had access to health services (Pavignani and Colombo, 2001: 12). Figures are predicted to have been even lower by the end of the war (Fustukian, 2004: 3). The under-five mortality increased from 258 for every 1,000 in 1990, to 271 in 1996, dropping slightly to 250 in 2001 (UNICEF and INE, 2003, UNICEF, 2004). The infant mortality rate went up from 150 to 166 and then to 150 for the same periods (ibid). Even after the war, improvement has been remarkably slow and in stark contrast with economic growth. As Table 6.1 shows, with the exception of HIV prevalence, Angola still scores significantly below the regional averages for SSA in all health status indicators. Maternal, child and reproductive health indicators are amongst the worst of SSA and high mortality rates are associated with preventable and treatable diseases such as malaria. Data from 2007 placed Angola in 16th place from the bottom on the under-5 mortality rank worldwide.

In Huíla, the health situation is still precarious. It has one of the worst health-worker to population ratios of the country - 12 out of its 14 *municípios* have less than 1.1 health workers per 1000 people (MINSA, 2008) in Connor et al (2010: 40). There is 1 hospital bed for every 3,000 people, 1 nurse for every 2,430 people and a doctor for every 83,000 people (UNICEF, 2008b). Lacking water and sanitation systems have made urban areas highly risk prone to epidemics. In 2008, an outbreak of cholera in Huíla affected 1,742 people, with 17 fatalities, according to official government figures (DPS Huíla, 2009b).

Alternative healthcare providers

In addition to state health services, other local and external actors have had a role in the provision of healthcare in Angola. Non-state actors typically make up the bulk of service delivery at local level in fragile states (Pavanello, 2008). In combination with state services they make up a "hybrid system" of health governance (Douma and Van der Haar, 2010: 25). In Angola these include the military, the missionary sector, private companies and practitioners, NGOs, international development agencies and the traditional doctors (Fresta et al., 2000). Their roles and relative importance have changed over the years, according to needs and the available alternatives. These are briefly described in Table 6.2. However, non-state actors have never been considered as an integral part of the health system. Already in 1989, a study about community health workers and traditional birth attendants, concluded that *"...supervision, information and supply lines of these programmes totally separated from those related to formal health services."* (Ministério da Saúde and UNICEF, 1989 in Pavignani and Colombo, 2001: 51).

TABLE 6.2: Non-state actors in the healthcare arena in Angola

Political actors
Cuban cooperation in state healthcare provision was crucial in the 1980s and is re-emerging under technical assistance contracts with MINSA (Health Ministry). In the late 1970s, 1260 health units were established across the country with such outside support. They deteriorated rapidly due to the lack of resources, poor coordination of medical supplies and transport difficulties to the provinces (Vidal, 2009a: 14).
Local churches
The churches have been vital in healthcare to local populations since the establishment of their missions in the colonial period. In Huíla the protestant missions were particularly prominent in creating and maintaining health care, training health workers and supplying medicines. IESA's mission hospital at Caluquembe municipality became renowned for its service quality. It established an extensive network of health services, including small hospitals in Matala and Quilengues and several health posts. It still trains its entire staff at Caluquembe.[5] IECA's mission hospital in Bunjei was the only provider of formal healthcare in the region during colonial times. It trained many health workers later captured to work in UNITA´s health facilities.
Military actors
The government's military absorbed a large proportion of financial and human resources from the health sector[6], but their health facilities had a limited role for the civilian population. Likewise, UNITA's health facilities were restricted to members of the regime, but had technical support and training from South Africa, its political ally.
Traditional/private practices
In isolated areas people resorted primarily to traditional medicine and private health workers. Both continue to play an essential role in addressing health needs locally. Private medical practices multiplied from the early 1990s following political reforms that allowed privatisation, but with little regulation (Pavignani and Colombo, 2001). This allowed the emergence of village health posts all over the country. These are set up by individuals with differing levels of (formal) training or experience. The majority lack official state recognition.
NGOs
NGOs have been the preferred channel of donors to implement support to health care in Angola. Most international organisations present during the war implemented projects linked to health services. At the time of the Bicesse peace process, 1,000 expatriates were estimated to be working in the health sector (Pavignani and Colombo, 2001: 14). By 1997, some 150 NGOs were active in the health sector, although less than half were formally collaborating with the MINSA (ibid).

3.2 The emergency approach to healthcare

In this section I describe the humanitarian approach to local institutions during the war, with reference to healthcare. My specific interest is to make the connection between the practices of the emergency phase with those of post-conflict reconstruction, to show what kind of imprint humanitarian interventions can have on processes of institutional development. From

the analysis of writings on aid in Angola, programme documents and interview material, the relationship between aid interventions and state institutions has emerged much more prominently than that with non-state actors.

3.2.1 Changing arena

Overall, the approach of the aid community to healthcare delivery followed the broader trends of aid in conflict, delineated in Chapter 3. The more significant changes occurred in the transition from the first decade of conflict, to the re-ignition of the conflict in 1992, at which time large scale relief operations started.

In the early independence period, the government directed policies to strengthening primary health care provision. These were short-lived due to the lack of resources, human capacity resulting from staff turn-over and brain-drain, and from political and military instability (Pavignani and Colombo, 2001). In this initial phase and until the mid-1980s, support to the health sector came mainly from the political allies such as Cuba, as well as from Nordic donor countries. By the end of the decade, the EU, Italy, and UNICEF joined them as major donors, supporting infrastructure, drug supply and immunisation (ibid: 13). During the 1990s major donor institutions in the health sector included the World Bank, WHO, EU and UK ODA, and countries like The Netherlands, Norway, Italy and Belgium (Pavignani and Colombo, 2001, Fustukian, 2004).

In the short peace of Bicesse, some existing aid organisations attempted to shift to development activities including training and capacity building of local institutions (Duffield, 1994, MSF Spain, 2007). However, the rekindling of the conflict meant that investments in local institutions were interrupted and soon crowded out by relief operations of dozens of new national and international NGOs. Local service institutions took another hard hit as infrastructure was destroyed and capacities further weakened. The unfolding of the humanitarian crisis resulted in a minimalist life-saving approach to service delivery that was to prevail until after the end of the war. Within the health sector, the focus was largely on establishing health posts and providing medical supplies. In the case of specialised medical organisations, they provided a full package of medical assistance, including expatriate staff, through facilities purposely established from scratch. In Matala for instance, the national NGO ADRA (Action for Rural Development and Environment) and INGO COSV rehabilitated and constructed various rural health posts, whilst MSF in addition to infrastructure development, worked in direct healthcare provision. MSF support was essential in maintaining some capacity to serve the population during the war, and in its aftermath. It worked with the state municipal health centre, which as a result became the referral facility for most of the surrounding areas. This included the Municipal Hospital at Capelongo, which was higher up on the referral hierarchy but much lower in terms of service quality given its continued erosion.

The humanitarian approach to local service institutions throughout the emergency period can be summed up as one of ´filling the institutional void´ left by the state. As I shall demonstrate next, these practices of the emergency period, impacted on the capacities and development of local state and non-state institutions for service delivery.

3.2.2 Engagement with state institutions

Implementation modalities

During Angola's prolonged emergency, certain aid modalities of engagement with state service institutions emerged and became more prominent. Major donors in the health sector during the early phase of the conflict, such as Cuba and the Nordic countries, worked with state institutions to improve its services. Most donors to the health sector in subsequent years,

did not engage directly with existing state institutions, or changed their policy in this regard. Sweden for instance, was a prominent donor to the national health system since 1977 (Stites and Leaning, 2002). However, an evaluation in 1991 showed its programmes to have been largely ineffective. *"Support had proliferated out of control, covering several vertical programmes, which contributed to the prevailing fragmentation. Worse, most special programmes were themselves poor performers. Only the Trypanosomiasis Control Programme was singled out as successful. Frustration and scepticism dominated."* (Andersson-Brolin et al., 1991 in Pavignani and Colombo, 2001: 50). Actors providing direct assistance, such as the churches and INGOs, likewise operated separately from state structures.

As the humanitarian arena expanded, donors repeatedly favoured the short route of accountability for service delivery. They clearly preferred to channel aid and resources through the UN and international rather than national NGOs or the state (Simões and Pacheco, 2008: 281). These humanitarian agencies in turn, most frequently opted to work outside of state structures, establishing parallel systems of service provision. This was the case even for aid that was specifically intended to support state institutions and services. Fustukian (2004) gives the example of the Health Transition Programme launched in 1995 and funded by the UK ODA[1]. It aimed to strengthen institutional capacity at different administrative levels but was nonetheless implemented through WHO and INGOs rather than with the Government structures directly. In the post-Lusaka period when the GoA had expressed renewed commitment to the peace process and donors were thus more open to engage with it, assistance for the reconstruction of state infrastructure and institutions was still largely implemented through the UN and INGOs (Fustukian, 2004: 3). The Social Support Fund (FAS) is a telling example. It is a fund established in 1994 to support the government with poverty alleviation activities, particularly social and economic infrastructure, to improve the delivery of basic services and increase implementation and management capacities. It was specifically created as an autonomous governmental agency by the World Bank and other major donors, completely separate from existing state institutions. Such choice of set up intended to circumvent the *"cumbersome state apparatus and its lack of poverty focus"* by establishing a separate body, rather than working within existing structures (ibid: 10). However, its functioning was undermined by the very limitations it sought to avoid, given that it had to operate within the same institutional environment and existing inefficiencies.[7]

This practice of establishing separate structures within or across government ministries was also common of healthcare support interventions during the emergency. The rationale was to create linkages and synergies across departments, while avoiding existing inefficiencies. The service delivery gap was largely filled through vertical programmes or a specific geographical focus. Vertical programming means addressing specific diseases (typically HIV/Aids, malaria and tuberculosis), whilst horizontal programming entails broader-based improvements in population health (including preventive measures, primary care services, and health workforce development) (De Maeseneer et al., 2008). These approaches contributed to the fragmentation of services and the reinforcement of the centralised nature of service delivery.[8] Macrae (1997) characterises fragmentation at two levels: institutional - where different actors end up doing different things in different places; and geographical - where different populations end up having differential access to health resources. By intentionally circumventing state institutions, or creating multiple (competing) structures within them, and by failing to coordinate action, state health services became more fragmented and unmanageable (Lanjouw et al., 1999). *"Fragmentation can attain extreme degrees, such as in Angola in the 90s, where about thirty vertical programmes (in some case real, but often rather virtual) were expected to support a large array of health activities."* (WHO, 2007 in Pavanello, 2008: 11). Information systems, supply lines and command

structures multiplied separately from those of the formal health services (Pavignani and Colombo, 2001).

On the other hand, the focus of aid on vertical programming meant that other crucial elements of health systems were overlooked, including human resource development. There were few initiatives explicitly addressing this aspect of capacity development, and they were often undermined by lack of government capacity for follow up. In 1993, the World Bank funded a National Plan for the Health Sector through which a training school for mid-level cadres was built in Huíla province. It had an intended capacity of 400 students a year, but the unsustainable cost structure of the programme (an initial cost of USD 9.5 million and an estimated annual running cost of USD 1.5 million), meant it soon had to be scaled down considerably (World Bank, 1998 in Pavignani and Colombo, 2001: 13).

Very often state institutions in charge of particular social sectors were completely bypassed by aid interventions working in their domain. Interviews with agency staff and civil servants revealed that most agencies limited their relationship with state institutions to pragmatic communication with relevant structures over the definition of intervention areas and the guarantee of physical access to beneficiaries. Locally, this communication was done through the provincial offices of the government's coordination body, UTCAH. However, as reported by its Provincial Humanitarian Coordinator for Huíla, even this was unsystematic given that *"many times NGOs skipped consultation with governmental bodies and intervened directly at the municipal level".*[9] Beyond this superficial contact there was no real engagement by NGOs with government, to devise policies or approaches for the provision of assistance. Nor was there much effort to build capacity for service delivery by the state.

Perceptions of the state

These practices regarding the engagement with state institutions were largely shaped by the perceptions of the state which dominated amongst donors and aid agencies during the conflict. These entailed concerns over the lack of government commitment, efficiency, management capacity and neutrality. State services were known to be under-resourced due to the government's neglect of the social sectors. Between 1988 and 1996-97 there was an estimated decline in the national budget allocation to health from 6.3% to 3.4%, with actual expenditure averaging about half of those amounts (Hardinam et al, 1997 in Fustukian, 2004: 5). Agencies thus opted to work 'alone', and to depend only on their own resources and capacities for the running of operations.

In addition, state institutions were considered unattractive to work with because they were perceived as largely inefficient and corrupt. Pavignani and Colombo (2001: 14-15) qualify the problem of inefficiency and corruption within the health system with the example of drug shortage. These shortages were believed to be linked to mismanagement and wastage rather than to a lack of funding. For 1995, it was estimated that 70-80% of the total essential drugs purchased were affected by pilferage (Johansson, 1995 in Pavignani and Colombo, 2001: 14). Inefficiency was also reflected in government policies, such as those meant to increase the number of health workers during the course of the 1990s. This resulted in overstaffed health facilities with poor professional skills. The number of MINSA employees rose from 24,000 in 1987 to 36,500 in 1998, even though only about 35% of those enrolled in health care training between 1989 and 1998 completed their course (UNICEF, 1991 and MoH, 1999 in Pavignani and Colombo, 2001: 16). Moreover, many health workers were pushed into the so called 'dual-practice' of taking on a second job, including with NGOs (Ferrinho et al., 2004). This was a result of inadequate working conditions and of the poorly implemented and monitored privatisation and deregulation reforms of health services, introduced in 1992. Many private practitioners I encountered started unlicensed businesses on this basis.

Concerns over neutrality had important consequences for the development of state service institutions. The GoA was seen as a belligerent and was thus intentionally circumvented by donors and agencies. These wanted to avoid being perceived as partial to the GoA so as to secure their negotiation power with UNITA. Together with suspicion about the GoA's capacity and commitment, this led to the situation where donors chose to work through the UN and INGOs, instead of bilaterally (Simões and Pacheco, 2008). On the other hand, humanitarian agencies working in UNITA territory had to accept being subjected to tight controls by the regime in the name of neutrality. UNITA was often said to use aid missions such as those of MSF as propaganda tools. *"Whereas government authorities looked prepared (even eager) to delegate responsibilities for service provision to external partners, UNITA made efforts to assert itself as the legitimate services provider in the areas of its control."* (Pavignani and Colombo, 2001: 13). These measures of aid actors did not prevent the politicisation of aid by both factions, as I have demonstrated in Chapter 3. Neutrality also justified inaction in relation to the purposeful neglect by the government and UNITA of social assistance responsibilities (Duffield, 1994, Ostheimer, 2000). The focus of humanitarians on upholding this principle meant that they chose to give assistance, irrespective of this actually letting the two belligerents off the hook in terms of social responsibilities. As aid actors continued to fill the service gap, they contributed to the continued erosion and disengagement of state institutions. As analysts of health sector support during the emergency have observed, major donors failed to implement policy reforms that addressed this prolonged neglect by the state (Pavignani and Colombo, 2001, Fustukian, 2004).

Alternative approaches

Notwithstanding the trend of service provision through parallel structures, there were local attempts to work with state services. These were mostly intended to minimise the negative effects of circumventing the state, rather than to explicitly build its capacity. The Luanda Urban Poverty Programme (LUPP) is a well known programme in Angola's aid arena, for having pioneered the approach of encouraging state-citizen engagement through basic services provision.[10] In health programming, MSF's dual approach is also relevant. MSF usually established their own independent healthcare and nutrition centres, but they also gave medical assistance by incorporating teams within existing health infrastructure. In Matala, MSF Spain was assisting the Municipal Health Centre already in the early 1990s with a team of 3 expatriate staff. They rehabilitated and expanded infrastructure, supported the establishment of small health posts in the surrounding area, supplied essential medicines and equipment and trained technical staff on specific issues. Healthcare workers from the Matala Centre recollect the knowledge gained in these short trainings and through the sharing of experience on the job as the greatest legacy of MSF's presence.[11] They also referred to MSF's key contribution in combating epidemics, such as the meningitis outbreak of 1994, and a cholera outbreak of 2003. *"Even during the war, Matala was considered quite advanced in the fight against malaria, in comparison with the rest of the country. It was because of the system that was in place, which MSF was supporting. They taught our local staff a lot. When they withdrew in 2003, they left a good stock of medicine at the centre and even topped it up once. But when this finished, our stock system didn't hold and we started having problems with securing supplies."*[12]

3.2.3 Engagement with non-state institutions

In this chapter, the role of non-state actors is only addressed superficially given the focus on state services and because the interaction between them and aid came out much less prominently and explicitly in the analysis. However, such interaction with non-state

institutions during the emergency, including civil society organisations and community-based institutions, was also important. As discussed in Chapter 3, national civil society organisations were most frequently treated as sub-contractors rather than as partners with long-term capacity building needs. Capacity building was often limited to training on the fulfilment of donor implementation requirements. Many became institutionally dependent on international partners and thus proved unsustainable when these withdrew.

Community based institutions on the other hand, were largely ignored, with the exception of the traditional authorities, unquestionably used as *the* legitimate representatives of beneficiary communities. Aid agencies failed to uphold their claims of downwards accountability by sticking to top-down relief approaches, with limited involvement of local populations (see Chapter 8).

3.2.4 Discussion

The above review of the emergency period has shown that the humanitarian approach to service delivery first and foremost consisted of filling the institutional void left by the state. This exposes an array of controversies regarding the interaction between aid and local institutions, and the link between aid discourses and everyday practices. Despite claims that humanitarian aid interventions should go beyond saving lives, organisations struggled to achieve these broadened objectives.

In the practice of aid actors there was an overwhelming lack of attention by donors and aid agencies to the development of local institutional capacity. Capacity development became a hollow concept, limited to short-term training to ensure the smooth implementation of programme activities, rather than preparing for the transition to peace. An evaluation of the humanitarian programme of the Swiss Development Cooperation in Angola over an 11 year period (1995 to 2006) concluded that overall, capacity issues were not sufficiently addressed. As Christoplos (2004: 30) explains, local institutional capacity building does not figure in many humanitarian contexts because although considered useful, local capacities are not essential for meeting short-term humanitarian objectives. In Angola, 90% of the humanitarian aid and relief sector for 1995, consisted of only food and emergency relief assistance (UNDP, 1995: 19). I argue, based on the development of the humanitarian arena, that aid practices during the emergency not only failed to build local capacities, but they actually contributed to the deterioration of existing local institutions (Serrano, 2009). This critique has been made by other authors on Angola (Ostheimer, 2000, Neto, 2001, Cain et al., 2002, Sogge, 2010) and echoed in broader analyses of humanitarian action (Smillie, 2001, Juma and Suhrke, 2002).

As the above review has shown, the practice of replacing state institutions rather than working with or through their service structures was dominant during conflict. This fed into the process of institutional decay and increased dependence on external support. Although the analysis has focused on state institutions, this finding also applies to non-state service institutions, as mentioned for the case of local civil society organisations and community-based institutions. The disregard by humanitarian actors for community participation in aid interventions and the lack of investment in creating strong partnerships with local organisations have compromised the sustainability of these institutions and their capacity to give follow up to aid activities. Moreover, by not explicitly addressing the lack of political will of the belligerents to provide social assistance to local populations, aid actors accommodated the manipulation of aid by political interests and thus contributed to the perpetuation of the crisis.

What has also emerged quite clearly is that in the Angolan emergency context aid actors were confronted with complex institutional and political realities within which decisions about how best to deal with local institutions were highly problematic. The reaction to the Swiss evaluation findings by an internal group (Core Learning Partnership) expresses

the dilemma of capacity issues for aid actors. *"[...] the evaluators overestimated clearly the capacities of local communities and governmental institutions in Angola, and underestimated the dramatic and precarious conditions and environment caused by war. Therefore, the CLP was surprised about the appeal for more reliance on local resources in a context well-known for armed conflict and weak public institutions."* (CLP in Folke et al., 2008: 5).

Notwithstanding these plausible reasons for the limited engagement with local institutions, I corroborate the argument that aid organisations could have done better at preparing local actors for the transition to peace. The review of approaches has shown that alternatives to build on state capacity that were more focused on the longer-term, or that at the very least did not override existing institutions were possible. The examples of the Cuban doctors working within the national health system and of MSF's contribution to capacity of local staff in Matala show that there were benefits to working closely with state services. Yet, in the latter case these came about as by-products rather than from explicit investment in capacity building activities. Further, initiatives such as the World Bank's programme for a healthcare training school, suggest that the challenge for capacity building activities during conflict were more to do with misconceived implementation strategies and follow up, than with the assumed impossibility of implementing development activities. However, such initiatives were shut out by the dominant short-term relief approach. Humanitarian actors considered the scale of the crisis too great to adopt activities specifically aimed at strengthening local institutions (Tvedten, 2001).

The most significant outcome of these aid approaches to local institutions during the emergency period is the long-term effect aid has had on their development and the impact this has for post-war reconstruction. Nonetheless, the legacy of relief practices on reconstruction is hardly ever considered in institution-building efforts, as I shall demonstrate in the next section which examines such interventions.

3.3 Rehabilitating the health sector post-war

New policy trends

In donor support to the health sector in reconstruction, explicit attention to institution-building came with the end of the conflict. Angola's economic growth linked to the booming oil industry triggered a shift in donor's policies. The government was thus perceived by the aid community as having the resources to take over the provision of services and the development of service delivery institutions (Chapter 3). This resource abundance raised governance and institutional capacity concerns. Against this backdrop the donor community substantially reduced allocations to Angola and raised institutional capacity development activities to the top of their reconstruction agendas. The changes in donor policies with specific reference to their engagement with local institutions are clearly illustrated by the European Union's (EU) changing strategy. These are summarised in Table 6.3, which is based on its two Country Strategy Papers (CSP) for the periods 2002-07 and 2008-2013.

The post-war context of Angola´s fast economic growth and donor funding cuts has reduced the capacity of the international community to influence government policies (Chapter 2). Moreover, the combination of the GoA's plentiful resources, weak institutional capacity and economic interests presents aid actors with a dilemma of how to best engage with the state. They have thus found in technical assistance to social sectors, a pragmatic way to connect to government. The representative of a major UN agency explained this as follows:

"The GoA wants to take leadership in development processes, but has no capacity. It needs technical assistance at national and local level, which is where we are currently investing our efforts. It is so different from other countries because it has so many resources and such limited human capacity. It is difficult to know how to give support in these areas. From my

previous experience, including Afghanistan, Iraq and Liberia, Angola is the most difficult because international agencies have very little influence. The government does not like it that the international media exposes the poor human development performance of the country in contrast to how wealthy it is. Officials are annoyed by it and want to show improvements. So this is the only leverage we have to bring about change."[13]

TABLE 6.3: Changes in EU policy priorities in post-war period

Policy Period	Country Strategy Paper 2002-2007		Country Strategy Paper 2008-2013		
	Overall Policy	Health Policy	Overall Policy	Health Policy	PAANE
Objectives	Short term consolidation of peace process Medium-term focus on selected sectors From 2006: Support to decentralised state services and private sector	From emergency programming to medium-term programmes focused on development of national capacity	Support to reconstruction and development	Strengthen capacity of municipal level health services	Support Programme for Non-State Actors launched in 2007: promotes the development of Angolan civil society, particularly in relation to democracy and human rights
Sectors	Shift from emergency Food Aid to integrated food security and social sectors	Healthcare delivery services at central and decentralised levels	Human & social development Rural development Governance support & economic and institutional reform	Planning capacity Human resource development	Capacity building of non-state actors
Activities	Combination of instruments including NGO projects	Institution strengthening and capacity building of central and local health services	Institutional support	Development of information system for planning Contribute to human resource development plan of MINSA	Promotion of dialogue with national and local authorities to bridge gap between state & non-state actors[14]
Remarks	Disappointing results of early strategy due to persistent emergency vision & poor human resources. Led to focus on intervention quality & institution building[15]	Sole focus on state services	Explicit support to CSOs to engage in reform of state institutions	Sole focus on state services	Heavily criticised by some CSOs for homogenising civil society and serving donor & GoA's interests.[16] Focus on CSOs.

Source: compiled from (EC and GoA, 2003, 2008)

As the quote suggests, the shift in donor policies in this post-war context was also strongly informed by broader state-building agendas focusing on the strengthening of institutional capacity. The underlying theme has been to create capacity for socio-economic development. The notion of a social and economic pact for the post-war development of Angola was explicitly mentioned in the 2004 Human Development Report (PNUD, 2005). A new wave of institution-building interventions thus emerged, including the three programme types identified earlier: technical assistance for state institutions, community-based development, and support to the national decentralisation process. Assistance to the health sector has involved action at all three levels, although it is currently focused on the technical assistance modality. Aid actors in this period have favoured interventions aimed at improved basic service delivery. These aim to raise life expectancy in the country and at the same time present an uncontroversial way to influence and engage with state institutions. They fit neatly within the GoA´s policy towards aid organisations, which promotes their welfare role whilst

discouraging human rights and advocacy activities. Support to social service provision has thus become the 'path of least resistance' for the implementation of state-building agendas.

Trends in healthcare support

With the establishment of peace three trends were observable in the health sector. Firstly, in the aftermath of the conflict, emergency health care given in temporary health facilities such as IDP camps was replaced by the building or rehabilitation of health infrastructure. Many NGOs in the initial years following the Luena MoU focused solely on the (re)construction of basic social service infrastructure. In Huíla, the Italian government for instance, was particularly active in funding NGOs to reconstruct health posts and schools in various rural localities, such as Bunjei (Chipindo) and Micosse (Matala). These are fully managed by the relevant government ministries.

Secondly, organisations providing direct healthcare to local populations withdrew. Funds for this direct support were generally discontinued after 2005 and facilities and materials were handed over to MINSA (Folke et al., 2008). Agencies such as MSF, with a clear emergency mandate, scaled down significantly and eventually left.

Thirdly, donors that continued to channel funds to the health sector increasingly did so through programmes specifically addressing capacity-building for improved healthcare. Such programmes have focused on technical assistance to MINSA and local state services, an example of which I analyse next. Few NGOs are still involved in direct healthcare provision. Health related activities in rural communities are implemented as part of other programmes, and are limited to information dissemination and awareness raising initiatives.[17] Technical assistance programmes have dominated efforts across a range of other socio-economic sectors, from finance to agriculture. Significantly however, technical assistance to state institutions is often implemented under the leadership of UN agencies and NGOs, rather than through state structures. In Huíla province, UNICEF has a prominent role in providing technical assistance in various sectors, including health, water and sanitation, education and decentralisation. Although the rhetoric on transition processes from relief to development suggests linearity between these three trends, in practice they did not follow on neatly from one another.

The withdrawal of NGOs directly providing healthcare, and the discontinuation of projects supporting local health services, had an immediate effect on the functioning of these services and for end users. Health workers and community members alike referred to the quick deterioration of service quality. Organisations withdrew before capacity for follow up had been created. Supplies of drugs and materials often finished and were not replenished, so that the level of services could not be maintained. As early as 2004 aid agencies' reports expressed concern with the effects of the transition funding gap on their ability to deliver basic social services (Fustukian, 2004). Emergency funds dried up whilst development funds were not forthcoming. Many international organisations downsized and withdrew abruptly (see Chapter 3). This funding gap also impacted institution-building programmes aimed at improving services to local people. Processes started by NGOs, such as the establishment of new community groups, the drawing up of local development plans or municipal health programmes, and the implementation of reforms, were interrupted as agencies left.

State focus

Looking at the aid arena in Angola's post-war period, it is apparent that the rhetoric of institution-building for service delivery has primarily translated into interventions directed at state institutions. Comparatively little attention and clarity exists about the potential role of non-state institutions, including civil society organisations, community-based institutions and

the private sector, much of it informal. I did not come across any initiative in Huíla that specifically worked with the private sector in the delivery of basic services. Regarding the capacity-building by international agencies of local civil society organisations, as in the emergency period, efforts have been modest. The EU funded Support Programme to Non-State Actors - PAANE (see Table 6.3) is an exception in terms of funding volume, geographical coverage and content specifically allocated to organisational support.

Efforts to strengthen local communities' development capacity have been largely taken up by local civil society organisations, churches and some international NGOs.[18] These organisations go back to their traditions of community empowerment and participation to mobilise social action. My analysis of the everyday practices of institution-building at community level in the next two chapters shows that aid interventions struggle with the sustainability of community-based institutions and with linking them to the state. Next I analyse the Revitalisation Programme as a typical case of decentralised health sector support.

3.4 Providing technical assistance: the Revitalisation Programme

The Revitalisation Programme is examined here as an example of technical assistance support to the social sectors, which as I have shown, has become a popular strategy by aid donors in Angola's reconstruction context. I want to see how such interventions unfold in practice and in relation to intended objectives. I am specifically interested in unravelling the alleged connections between activities to improve health services and citizen's perceptions and expectations. That is, on the elusive relationship between service provision and state-society relations, implicit in the state-building discourse of aid actors.

3.4.1 Objectives and strategy

The Revitalisation of healthcare strategy is being actively promoted by the MINSA since 2005. It is linked to the process of administrative and fiscal decentralisation currently under way in Angola, intended to take services closer to the people.[19] It focuses on the delivery of health care at municipal level by shifting responsibility and creating capacity for primary health care (PHC) in the *municípios*. It is centred on maternal and child health components. The revitalisation process has been supported by various donors such as the World Bank, the EU and UN agencies. In this section I refer specifically to the programme supported by UNICEF in Huíla, where 4 *municípios* were selected according to population density and existing capacities and resources.[20] They included Lubango, Caconda, Caluquembe and Matala.[21] I followed activities in the latter.

The programme aims to secure the provision of an integrated basic service package (instead of vertical programming) to improve PHC to all families at municipal level (UNICEF, 2008a). It addresses "*the institutional weaknesses of the health system and its heavily centralised structure*" (UNICEF, 2008b).[22] The problem of substandard healthcare is framed as one of lacking capacity in planning, budgeting and execution. The programme is implemented by the Provincial Health Directorate (DPS), but costs such as materials, equipment, trainings and meetings are funded by UNICEF (DPS Huíla, 2009a). It has supported the development of the municipal health plan, in which local priorities and investment areas were defined. It also involves the reorganisation of services in terms of access, availability and use, as well as securing a certain level of human and financial resources. Programme activities are implemented at the level of geographical 'health units' (*unidades sanitárias*). Sixteen health units were identified in Matala (see Figure 6.1). Programme interventions areas include nutrition, PMTCT (Preventing Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV), HIV/Aids and water and sanitation.

Programme activities in the direct provision of healthcare involve three types of services:

1) Fixed services at established health care facilities: these provide various services including pre-natal care, vaccination, mosquito net distribution, etc.
2) Advanced / mobile services: these cover villages more than 5km away from fixed services through monthly visits, to provide various services, including vaccinations.
3) Community level services: these aim to raise awareness of good practices in hygiene, sanitation, nutrition, clean births, how to care for certain illnesses, etc. through community-based voluntary workers (*agentes comunitários)*.

Capacity building is a major component of the programme and entails training of staff at different levels and on different aspects. The municipal team (*RMS - Repartição Municipal de Saúde*) which has the overall responsibility for health services in the *município* receives training on various planning and management skills, including stock and supply management, monitoring and supervision. Staff within the health units is trained by provincial and municipal staff higher up on the service hierarchy, on the delivery of the integrated package, as well as data collection and reporting. They also receive one off external trainings. Capacity building of community workers in turn involves knowledge on improved health practices and on how to support fixed and mobile teams and is done also by local health staff.

The programme was first launched in 2005 with preparatory activities including mapping exercises, needs assessments, and operational plans. Practical implementation of activities and services started only in 2007. At the end of 2008, the first monitoring session of the programme in Huíla was carried out, first at municipal level, then at provincial and national levels. I followed this process in Matala. The event brought together stakeholders from various institutions (MINSA, UNICEF and WHO) and from various levels of health services (provincial, municipal and from the 4 health units). The wide participation in the monitoring event and the exercise of reviewing programme implementation and progress since its inception, provided insight into several key aspects of the overall revitalisation process and the specific programme.

FIGURE 6.1: Health units selected in Matala for the Revitalisation Programme 2007-2009



Source: (DPS Huíla, 2009a)
NB: At the time of fieldwork, only 4 health units were included in the revitalisation process: Capelongo, Matala Sede, Micosse, Mulondo. These were later extended by an additional 9.

3.4.2 Implementation realities and practices

Scale and scope

The first most striking aspect of the revitalisation process is the sheer scale and breadth of the effort required. It shows that reforming basic service delivery systems is a considerable undertaking. The focus on widened access means taking health services all the way to local health units where end-users are located and interface with service providers. This involves activities at various levels of the health system, from national down to individual communities, making its implementation complex and costly. As Pavanello (2008) observes, this is particularly true of contexts where governance is weak and the history of neglect long. The specific UNICEF Programme represents an important effort towards meeting the general objectives of extending PHC to even the poorest households. Few would disagree with this overall rationale of the programme, as it moves away from centralised services, is more pro-poor and focused on vulnerable groups such as mother and children. Monitoring indicates that coverage rates in the revitalised health units show improvements compared to non-revitalised areas. In Matala, 13 of the 16 health units are already undergoing revitalisation reforms. That said, the programme also clearly reveals the difficulties within and outside of the health system, in implementing change.

The paradox of local capacities

The implementation of programme activities is underlined by a fundamental paradox. While technical assistance support holds capacity building as a key intervention area, at the outset it requires a certain level of existing capacities ‘in house’ to build on. In rural Angola however, there is a serious lack in quality and number of human resources, particularly in the social

sectors. This was mentioned repeatedly in my interviews with staff, as the key hurdle in various components of the programme. More broadly, it was also identified in the 2008 report on 'Strengthening Public Institutions' as one of the key drivers against the improvement in transparency and efficiency in state services in Angola (Shaxson et al., 2008).

The choice of the initial municipalities and health units to be included in the Revitalisation Programme was largely determined by the potential of existing structures and human resources for the implementation of activities.[23] This may be contributing to the development gap between different regions, because those areas which already lag behind in socio-economic terms are repeatedly left out. The previous chapter showed the practical implications of this for the case of Bunjei, Chipindo municipality. When compared to Matala, such differences are visible. Table 6.4 shows that the number of inhabitants per health facility is more than twice as high in the latter, yet it is not included in the revitalisation initiative, primarily because of the near absence of local institutions.

TABLE 6.4: Health Sector Data for Matala and Chipindo Municipalities

DATA	MATALA	CHIPINDO
Population size (MINSA 2006 estimates)	137,574 people	70,362*
Administrative divisions:		
• No. of communes	4	2
Health facilities:		
• Municipal Hospital	2 (1 under construction)	0
• Municipal Health Centre	1	1
• State Health Post	14 (+ 3 non-operational)	3 (+6 non-operational)
• Official private health posts	16	1
• Informal posts	unknown	unknown
• Military Hospital	1	0
Resources:		
• Inhabitants / health unit	8,598	19,235
• No. of beds / 1000 inhabitants	0.89	0,1 (66 total)*
• Number of doctors	0	0
• Number of health workers		117*
No. of health areas of revitalization plan:	16 identified, 13 selected	0
No. of organisations supporting health sector in 2008	4	2

Source: compiled from (INE, 2006, MINSA, 2006, DPS Huíla, 2009c); interviews with Head of Matala's Health Section 15 January 2008; Interview with Health Centre Staff, 09 October 2008, Bunjei.

Even in Matala however, the lack of service delivery capacity is widespread. At the time of fieldwork, there were only 11 nurses and one recently appointed foreign doctor in the whole *município*. The Head of Matala´s Health Section - the highest authority of the health system at municipal level – has middle-level training rather than higher education. This was mentioned as potentially problematic, if in the future resident doctors are appointed to the municipalities and start competing for resources and authority. Most existing health workers are low or medium-level trained and are concentrated in the larger health facilities rather than in the smaller community posts. The number of healthcare workers is insufficient at all levels of services. During an outbreak of cholera in Matala, staff from surrounding posts was summoned to support the influx of patients at the Municipal Centre, having to leave their posts completely unattended. When the Matala health services were restructured in 2007, the Administrators of the two major health facilities (Capelongo Hospital and Matala Health Centre) were simply swapped around, rather than new people being recruited for the job, as none were available.

The issue of low skills was further exacerbated with the post-war national reconciliation strategy defined under the Luena MoU. hundreds of new workers were recruited into the health system, many from UNITA areas, as in the case of Bunjei. Due to their long isolation, many had limited technical training (Shaxson et al., 2008, Connor et al., 2010). I was struck by the low level of technical skills demonstrated by health workers during the monitoring exercise. Various basic questions came up about the treatment and handling of medicines and materials which most were already administering for a long time. For instance, health workers asked about the prescription of a specific anti-parasitic drug to pregnant and lactating women, although it was already being widely distributed. The lack of qualified staff also leads to overworked personnel, making reforms difficult to implement. Management staff referred to the low levels of motivation and initiative on the part of health workers as problematic. My observation of the working conditions and routines indicates that this is as much related to the heavy patient load and the evident lack of material and financial resources. Medical and administrative staff of local health facilities therefore struggled to incorporate specific Programme activities into their already heavy workloads.

On the other hand, the implementation practices adopted in the revitalisation process did not prioritise human capacity at the end points of service delivery. The community-based component of the programme lagged well behind other activities. It was supposedly implemented by voluntary community-based workers (*agentes comunitários*), who train and mobilise community members on health related issues. It was only in early 2009 following several delays in recruitment, that the programme reported that 100 *agentes comunitários* were being trained in Matala (DPS Huíla, 2009a). The low priority this component received within the programme is also reflected in the fact that these individuals are recruited on a voluntary basis. In Luanda, where the Municipal authorities decided to remunerate community workers, the recruitment and training process was much faster.[24] These individuals are the direct link between people and service providers. Their work has the potential to positively affect this relationship, not just by raising awareness of local people, but also by providing an understanding of their health practices and alternatives to state service providers. In that sense, their neglect represents a missed opportunity.

Resource dependence

The Revitalisation Programme has a strong focus on the supply-side of service delivery. It plays an important role in the financing of non-recurring costs of local health services. These include supplementary distribution of essential medicines and medical kits, transport means for all levels of services (the municipal health section, mobile units and community workers[25]), running costs for the mobile teams (petrol and meals), training costs, meetings, etc. Outside of the programme's contributions, local health facilities suffer from a serious lack of financial and in-kind resources, including budgets for ad-hoc or regular maintenance costs, or for securing stock-flows of drugs and equipment. A recent assessment of the Angolan Health System at municipal level found that it continues to suffer from inadequate human resources, stock-outs of essential products and uneven funding on recurring (non-salary costs such as drugs, water, fuel and supplies) at municipal level (Connor et al., 2010). The most common problem faced by the mobile health units was the breakdown of their motorcycles because of lack of means to repair them. Under such circumstances, the most seemingly simple tasks become problematic. In one of the exercises of the monitoring event, copies of a form had to be made for discussion amongst participants. This turned out to be impossible. The photocopier had ran out of ink, the two available computers had broken down, and the overhead projector could not be used because there were no electricity sockets in the new meeting room where the event was taking place.

It is unclear how the MINSA intends to maintain and expand the revitalisation process in the future, as stated in its policy plans, independent from donor contributions. As shown earlier, allocations from the national budget to the health sector continue to be low and no alternative local income sources such as user fees are in place. Low budget allocations are in turn associated with the lack of capacity for implementation and lobbying for funds, resulting from the fact that *"the most skilled and capable officials were not appointed to these ministries, and the dysfunction in the [health] ministry flowed, essentially, from there. This, then, had a knock-on effect creating low allocations."* (Shaxson et al., 2008: 7).[26] The consequences of the funding gap had already become apparent by the end of 2009, in the failure to expand the programme to six additional *municípios* in Huíla.[27]

3.4.3 The imprint of relief practices on healthcare

The analysis of the implementation realities has revealed that the programme is being affected by existing problems within the health system. I have shown that these partly developed under the practices of humanitarian interventions. For instance, the focus on vertical programming reinforced the centralised and hierarchical nature of the system, in terms of decision-making. Shaxson et al (2008) observe that the centralising tendency at provincial level, is a legacy of the powerful position provincial governors developed during the war. Furthermore, the fragmentation of services resulting from the set-up of several structures parallel to those of the state services, did not allow the system to be reformed.

These effects have led to the overall poor absorption capacity for new health support interventions such as the Revitalisation Programme. For instance, ruptures and shortages in the stock-flow of drugs and supplies are still characteristic of most health facilities below the provincial level. This is strongly affected by the hierarchal distribution system from the central MINSA down to the provincial, municipal, and community facilities.[28] In addition, the disarticulation that developed between the different institutional levels (national, provincial, municipal and local) remains problematic in practice. During the monitoring exercise, it emerged that local staff in charge of the management of the vaccination cold-chains in community health posts, had been instructed by the central level, that they need not track the temperature of cooling devices on weekends and bank holidays. Standard procedures require that this be done twice a day, every day.

The capacity for services to make the best of changes brought about by the Revitalisation Programme has also been limited by the way the decentralisation process is evolving. As the next chapter clearly shows, this is being implemented erratically and unevenly, and has yet to establish a track record of capacity. As such, the absence of elements such as locally elected local governance structures, investment in local human resources, institutional capacity, monitoring systems and coordination mechanisms (WHO, 2003) have a direct impact on the programme. This raises questions about what externally led interventions can achieve. As explained by a donor representative, *"There is a risk that the projects of the NGOs are of a much higher standard than that which can be achieved at the level of government institutions which are lacking in absorption capacity."*[29] As Fustukian (2004) observes in relation to Angola, external funding cannot compensate for existing shortages in service delivery, nor can it be effective or efficient within a policy vacuum. Similarly, Pavignani and Colombo (2001) argue that as a bridge to peace, health sector support can only have a positive role in the transition process if a previous sustained investment has been made in the sector so that it becomes politically significant.

Non-state actors

As I have mentioned in earlier discussions with reference to Matala and Chipindo, non-state service providers have been extremely important over the years for meeting health needs of rural and peri-urban populations. Yet, major healthcare support interventions tend to overlook these actors. The Revitalisation Programme's focus on the supply-side of health care delivery has been at the expense of other aspects and actors that also affect end-user's choices. These are frequently perceived as sub-optimal and temporary and are less favoured than state services, when in resource poor areas they should be seen as real alternatives (Douma and Van der Haar, 2010). For instance, collaboration between traditional and formal providers of health was hardly explored during the war (Habgood, 1998). However, interviews with local health workers reveal that such collaboration does exist. Even in the current context, private (informal) nurses often participate in state led immunisation and awareness rising campaigns, or in fighting an outbreak such as cholera. These happen in an ad hoc manner at the discretion of local healthcare management staff, rather than based on institutional initiatives. Health posts belonging to the churches, which played a crucial role in helping local people, particularly in more remote areas, are now closed or left struggling to survive.[30] Current aid priorities in the health sector do not include support to these actors although they have trained and experienced personnel. The IESA health post at Bairro Cdte. Cow-Boy in Matala was created in 1991 and became famous for its specialised treatment of leprosy and tuberculosis patients. Currently it is struggling to remain open as it depends almost entirely on internal donations from the church.

People´s perception and expectation of services are affected by their performance, by the available alternatives, and by the degree of trust and legitimacy these enjoy (Douma and Van der Haar, 2010). The demand-side of health services thus depends on the role and legitimacy of the alternative healthcare providers listed in Table 6.2. In the past, displaced rural populations relied on private health posts/nurses and on traditional doctors to address health needs. These individuals continue to enjoy a high level of trust despite most not being officially recognised institutions. Several informal village or community posts practice without license or training, but they remain close to local people and their realities. They are often considered more trustworthy and reliable than state health services. This phenomenon is well-known even amongst health practitioners and high level officials. As explained by the Head of the Provincial Public Health Department *"Even within Lubango, people often resort first to the kimbanda*[31]*, then to private nurses and only after to the state services. This is because of the bad service they receive in the latter and the lack of trust in the medical teams of their health units. People still believe that injectable treatment is the most effective and in the state services we only use this in specific cases. So our priority to change this has to lie on the quality of treatment and service and on building trust."*[32]

As Table 6.5 indicates almost one third of respondents in Bunjei and Matala, reported they still go to private health posts as the first choice to get assistance, despite having to pay for consultation and medicines. Although the distance from the state post is an important factor in this decision, it would be expected that in Matala more people would go first to state posts, given that these are much more numerous and are benefitting from the Revitalisation reforms. Two of the villages have their own post, and none of the others are more than 6 km away from the nearest state facility. Still, over a third of respondents go first to private practices. More important than the distance, the most frequently cited reason for this choice was the lack of medicines at state services. As state facilities are frequently out of stock of supplies, the standard procedure is to give patients a prescription to go and purchase medicines from pharmacies, private posts or the local market. As a result, people rarely expect to obtain the full treatment there and often prefer to pay a private nurse. In Nguelengue village in Bunjei, which is 19km from Bunjei's centre, none of the respondents reported going to the

state post as their first choice, but some do go to the private post of Jeremias Sambo at the IECA mission which is the same distance. As he explains, *"Many people prefer coming here than going to the state post. People know that here they see the nurse, get the prescription, the medicines and can pay later if they don't have the money. At Caquela there are never any medicines even though we know they receive regular kits from the Government. But already two days later they say they are out of stock. Only they know how they manage the supplies, but what else can one think about what they do with the stocks?!"*

As suggested in this quote, the perception of state services being corrupt for instance in the management of stocks, also affects people's expectation and behaviour regarding treatment choices. I heard several complaints that people are referred by state services to private posts to buy medicines, because these often belong to members of staff working at state posts. It is assumed that these individuals misappropriate materials and medicines to sell privately. Other stories mentioned the need to bribe health care workers in order to get assistance and medicines.[33] *"I normally go to the state post, but sometimes directly to the private post because I trust them more. There is one private nurse who also works at the state post, and one other person that sells medicines. Besides, I had a problem with a tooth and at the state post they don't even do extractions. Then I went to the mission post, and then to Huambo."*[34] Whether the implicit accusations of corruption and malpractice are real or not, the fact that these stories are chosen as plausible reasons for avoiding state healthcare is indicative of a significant degree of mistrust. The mistrust of the state health system is also internal. Due to the unreliability of the availability of supplies, and to the poor state of the roads, medical referrals from Bunjei health post are routinely sent to the central hospital of Huambo province (136km), rather than to the new health centre in Chipindo (50km away). In Matala, it is the Health Centre at Sede rather than the Hospital at Capelongo that has been at the top of the referral hierarchy. The Revitalisation Programme has not had an eye for these aspects of healthcare which affect actual practices. The key question to which I now turn is why this is the case.

TABLE 6.5: Frequency table: Use of different health facilities

Community	State post		Private post		Traditional Doctor		Other	
	1st Choice	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
Rioco Centro	7	0	1	4	0	1	0	0
Bunjei Sede	8	2	2	4	0	0	2	3
Caquela B	8	2	2	4	0	0	2	2
Nguelengue	0	0	6	4	0	0	0	4
Total Bunjei	**23**	**4**	**11**	**16**	**0**	**1**	**4**	**9**
Calheta	2	3	7	0	0	2	0	4
KM15	7	1	1	0	0	1	0	5
Mupindi	8	0	0	3	0	0	0	4
Catchope	3	4	5	2	0	0	0	2
Monhanangombe	5	0	1	3	0	0	0	3
Total Matala	**25**	**8**	**14**	**8**	**0**	**3**	**0**	**18**
TOTAL	**48**	**12**	**25**	**24**	**0**	**4**	**4**	**27**

4. Analysis

The new wave of institution-building programmes for service delivery that have emerged in Angola's post–war period, have shown a clear shift from the short route of accountability (mostly through support to aid agencies) to the long-route (now primarily through state institutions). These have come about as a result of various factors such as the changing relations between the GoA and the international aid community, and changing practices of aid agencies. They have also been informed by broader aid discourse on state-building in post-conflict contexts, which links improved service delivery through institutional support, to strengthened state-society relations. In many respects it is still early in the process to make inferences about these alleged links in Angola. However, the analysis in this chapter has indicated that there are reasons to be cautious about the practices proposed by the state-building agenda in order to achieve such goals. From the Revitalisation Programme and the broader review of aid approaches and practices to local service institutions over time, two aspects emerge as prominent: the legacy of the emergency in post-war reconstruction efforts and the state-focus of interventions. These in turn have implications for state-building efforts.

Current aid attempts at improving the delivery of healthcare have faced challenges relating to the legacy of the conflict and of aid organisations' humanitarian approaches to service provision. The Revitalisation Programme for instance, is clearly limited by the lack of institutional capacity, the dependence of the system on external resources, the fragmentation of services and funding, and the disarticulation between institutional levels. that developed under the emergency. This suggests that interventions in reconstruction must consider and address the effects of such legacy.

Most notable among them is the question of institutional capacity, which represents a conundrum for aid actors. Institution-building interventions are intended to strengthen local capacity, but are simultaneously undermined by such lack of capacity. Aid agencies in Angola dealt with the lack of capacity during the emergency by simply sidestepping local institutions, which I have argued, further weakened them. Current interventions clearly struggle to reverse such processes and build capacity and trust in local institutions. Despite the ambitious wording of capacity-building interventions, from my observations, these tend to be limited to training of human resources be it within state institutions or CSOs, in various aspects of project management skills. It is unclear from such approaches how such capacities are to be retained and reproduced in the future. *"The way in which capacity building of national organisations is currently being done, has little impact. Donors prefer to split the money they have available into several capacity building activities so that they have more visibility, rather than investing in longer-term activities. Courses of 3 days only raise awareness, they aren´t enough to create capacity. They forget that our human resources are poor - we are not Benin! Often the trainers come with pre-conceived training packages that don´t take into consideration the level of the participants. If they don´t take care, lots of money will be spent in Angola, without impact."*[35]

Moreover, there appears to be little structural capacity-building for actual improvements in service delivery. Sen's (1999: 90) notion of capability is useful for understanding this because it shifts attention from the means to the ends of capacity-building. Capability refers to *"the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations (or, less formally put, the freedom to achieve various lifestyles)"* (p. 75). That is, what an actor is able to do, and what opportunities or freedom he has to do it. Institutional capacity for service delivery means that local institutions and their staff should have both the technical capacity to provide services, but also the set of capabilities or opportunities to provide those services, including the necessary resources. As O'Neill (2001: 189) explains, agents and agencies must dispose of capabilities which are "*specific, effectively resourced capacities*

which they can deploy in actual circumstances." External capacity-building interventions tend to overlook the capability aspect of institution-building.

The poor performance in capacity development in the Angolan crisis is a demonstration of the failure to bridge the divide between humanitarian and longer-term development programming. By filling the service gap, aid agencies became part of the process through which the state became delinked from society. Yet, this is not explicitly addressed in aid efforts that now seek to restore this relationship in the post-war context.

The focus of aid interventions in Angola's reconstruction context on support to state institutions has been overwhelming. This is clearly in line with dominant aid discourse on state-building in post-conflict countries. Support to service delivery has translated almost exclusively to state-centred technical assistance programmes. The Revitalisation Programme has a built-in bias towards the state. It has not invested in finding out how healthcare actually works in practice at community level. Instead, it has gone ahead on the assumption that healthcare is a matter of the state, thereby overlooking non-state providers that are also involved in healthcare provision. Local people in rural Angola continue to seek treatment and medicines in private posts and pharmacies, with traditional doctors, and at local markets. As I have shown, these are key in shaping expectations of local people and the relationships of trust and accountability they develop with various actors, including state services.

This in turn suggests that investments in service alone will not result in improved service delivery. Efforts to revitalise local health services are also affected for instance, by the absence of a conducive policy environment, such as broader decentralisation processes. It is not enough to give village health post staff increased responsibilities when ultimately they remain dependent on a hierarchical, irregular supply system for material resources.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has analysed how aid discourses and practices on institution-building have changed over the years in the Angolan context. The specific case of aid support to the health sector has shown a dichotomy in approaches between relief and reconstruction. Whereas relief interventions largely avoided or neglected local institutions, reconstruction efforts have focused on building or strengthening them.

By following how policy discourse was translated along the implementation chain to concrete activities on the ground, I have highlighted major discrepancies between the rhetoric and practice of institution-building. I have argued that humanitarians did not live up to their developmental relief ambitions of capacity development of local institutions. The dominant approach by humanitarians was to fill the institutional void left by the state, often by establishing parallel structures and services. Existing institutions were ignored, circumvented, or re-invented. As such, aid interventions played into the disconnect of the state from society, by allowing it to continue to neglect its social responsibilities. Moreover, by replacing its welfare role, aid interventions reinforced the idea of the state as incompetent or incapable, thereby contributing to the de-legitimisation of state services.

These practices partly evolved as a result of the limitations of the conflict context, including concerns with neutrality, state inefficiency and lack of state capacity. However, I have argued that aid actors could have done better at preparing for the transition to peace. By taking a longer-term perspective on their relationship with local state and non-state institutions, they could have reduced the degree of local institution's dependence on external actors and developed their capacity to take over in reconstruction. I have argued that in failing to do so, these practices had the significant effect of not only marginalising institutional capacity, but also contributing to its erosion. Although this is largely based on the analysis of

state services, I have suggested it also applies to non-state actors in service delivery, including national civil society organisations, private actors and community-based institutions.

An important consequence of these effects of aid on institutional development is that current-state building efforts focused on service-delivery strengthening are strongly shaped by the legacy of these practices. The neglect of state services in the past is behind many of the challenges faced by current technical assistance programmes aimed at improving their quality. The Revitalisation Programme as a window into the practices of institution and state-building efforts demonstrated how this is manifested during implementation, for example, through the lack of qualified human resources or follow up capacity within the health system. Notwithstanding the degree to which past practices shaped the institutional landscape in the post-conflict phase, this imprint on the development and capacity of local institutions is surprisingly understated in reconstruction efforts.

What has also clearly emerged from post-conflict reconstruction programmes in Angola is that these have been informed by dominant state-building agendas in fragile countries, which focus on basic service delivery and have a built-in bias towards the state. As such, they overlook other factors affecting the perception of services and user uptake. As seen for Matala, despite the revitalisation efforts of state health services, a large number of local people continue to seek private healthcare first due to the perceived lack of quality and trust in state services. The state-bias of programmes thus overlooks the fact that legitimisation processes and people's behaviour are co-determined by what alternatives they have and the relationships of trust they develop with different actors.

My analysis thus corroborates perspectives that question the state-building rationale, which links service delivery with increased state-legitimacy and the restoration of the so-called social contract. It has suggested that people's perceptions and expectations of the state and its services are not determined by a linear relationship with investment in service amelioration. State-society relations are contingent upon a variety of factors and are also historically determined. Building state legitimacy in post-war contexts is rarely a case of re-establishing previously existing relations with society, or previously functioning services, as the social contract discourse implies.

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[1] According to the WHO, a health system *"comprises all organisations, institutions and resources devoted to producing actions whose primary intent is to improve health. Most national health systems include public, private, traditional and informal sectors. The four essential functions of a health system have been defined as service provision, resource generation, financing and stewardship."* (http://www.who.int/topics/health_systems/en/). *"The ultimate goal of the health system is to improve people´s health by providing comprehensive, integrated, equitable, quality and responsive essential health services."* (Barry, 2010: 14)

[2] It involves *"promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative services accordingly" and "includes at least: education concerning prevailing health problems and the methods of preventing and controlling them; promotion of food supply and proper nutrition; an adequate supply of safe water and basic sanitation; maternal and child health care, including family planning; immunization against the major infectious diseases; prevention and control of locally endemic diseases; appropriate treatment of common diseases and injuries; and provision of essential drugs."* (Declaration of Alma-Ata, 1978: VII)

[3] See Table 4.4, Chapter 4 for an overview of government expenditure on health and education in the last two decades.

[4] Health budget execution rates have also remained low (71% compared to 98% for defence in 2006) due to the lack of implementation capacity (Connor et al., 2010).

[5] Interview with head of IESA´s health centre of Bairro Cdte. Cow-Boy, 29 January 2008, Matala.

[6] As estimated 50% of medical doctors graduated in 1991 were placed within the military (Feret and Gardete, 1992 in Pavignani and Colombo (2001: 23).

[7] The FAS has been heavily criticised through its different phases of implementation among other things for its urban and gender bias, its failure to reach the poorest of the poor and to address the erosion of social capital particularly in rural areas. In the post war phase the FAS was redirected towards socio-economic recovery and supposedly more attention given to the recovery of social institutions through greater community participation and capacity building of local structures (Fustukian, 2004).

[8] Such fragmentation was especially evident in the pharmaceutical sector as different actors became responsible for the provision of drugs in different provinces, often working according to different criteria and lacking in coordination with the MINSA (Pavanello, 2008).
[9] Interview, 27 August 2007, Lubango.
[10] LUPP was started in 1999 by CARE, DW, One World Action and Save the Children UK. It specifically aims to *"strengthen and build lasting democracy and accountability through focus on basic needs."* and includes basic service provision, livelihoods support and civil society building activities (Ngoma, 2009).
[11] Interviews with two local nurses, the Administrator of the Municipal Health Centre and the Head of the Health Section of Matala, 12, 14 and 15 January 2008, Matala.
[12] Interview with the Administrator of the Matala´s Municipal Health Centre, 14 January 2001, Matala.
[13] Interview with UN Agency Director, 20 February 2008, Luanda.
[14] Interview with EC staff member, 24 November 2007, Luanda.
[15] (ibid: 56)
[16] (Macedo, 2009, Vidal, 2009a)
[17] Examples from Huíla include the Integrated Rural Development Programme of Bunjei (PIDRB) which has a specific health component and the PEARSA programme of ACF.
[18] Typically in Huíla these include integrated development programmes focused on food security, implemented in several municipalities by international and national NGOs such as Action Against Hunger, ADRA, CARE, GTZ, IECA and ZOA Refugee Care.
[19] See Chapter 7 for a detailed explanation of the national decentralisation and deconcentration processes.
[20] Interview with Provincial Head of Public Health, 16 December 2009, Lubango.
[21] The programme covered 16 *municípios* in 4 other provinces - Luanda, Bié, Cunene and Moxico.
[22] The programme is also supported by other UN agencies such as UNFPA and WHO for example at the level of policies and norms.
[23] Interview with Head of Provincial Health Department, 16 December 2009, Lubango.
[24] Informal communication with UNICEF staff member, 11 January 2008, Matala
[25] These each receive a car, motorbike and bicycle respectively.
[26] At the time of writing it was unknown how the funds allocated through the decentralisation mechanism to Matala´s administration would be managed in relation to healthcare activities.
[27] Interview with Head of Provincial Health Department, 16 December 2009, Lubango. The intended *municípios* were Chibia, Gambos, Humpata, Jamba, Quilengues. Quipungo.
[28] The national policy for the supply of materials and medicines is to supply Provincial Departments on a yearly basis, and for the latter to then supply the municipal services once a month. This is problematic because it requires very frequent travel to ensure stock-flow.
[29] Interview with EC diplomat, 24 November 2007, Luanda.
[30] Interviews with staff of IECA mission post at Bunjei, 26 and 29 may 2008, with IESA post in Matala, 29 January 2008.
[31] Traditional doctor.
[32] Interview on 16 December 2009, Lubango.
[33] Interviews with residents of Rioco Centro community, 07 and 10 October 2008; Caquela B community, 09 October 2008, Bunjei.
[34] Interview with male resident of Caquela B community, 09 October 2008, Bunjei.
[35] Interview with Director of FONGA (Forum of National NGOs in Angola), 15 February 2008, Luanda

II Visão

Matala até 2025, será
um município urbanizado
com uma economia diver-
sificada (agro-pecuário, indus-
trial, turístico) onde toda a
comunidade especialmente
(mulheres, jovens e crianças)
têm acesso aos serviços sociais basi-
cos, para o seu bem-estar.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Everyday practices of institution-building in reconstruction: decentralisation support

INTRODUCTION

This chapter specifically examines aid interventions supporting the decentralisation process in Angola. Decentralisation policy reforms have been widely promoted by governments and the international aid community in Africa and in war-affected and fragile contexts. It is important therefore to analyse how they are being implemented in practice and with what effect. I am particularly interested in the motivations underlying the decentralisation agendas of these different actors.

In Angola, decentralisation policies have their roots in the political shift of 1992 from a single-party system to a multiparty democracy. However, it was after the 2002 transition to peace that the state made a 'come back' in terms of its physical presence at the local level, and of its role in the country's development efforts. With the end of the war, as the government initiated political reforms, aid agencies sought new forms to engage with it. Decentralisation plans and the de-concentration of the state apparatus and governance system gained prominence in this light. Aid programmes supporting these processes have been a key area of post-war reconstruction efforts. Their approach has been rather innovative in Angola. Unlike the other two prevailing categories of post-conflict institution-building interventions[1], they work with both government and communities at the local level, where people's lives are directly affected. The reconstruction period since the 2002 peace, represents that of greatest presence of the post-colonial state in the everyday lives of many Angolans. It is thus important to examine what this means for local populations.

Dominant aid discourse tends to present decentralisation as a panacea for a more accountable and responsive government, and for a more participatory and inclusive society. This rationale is premised on the idea that local governments are more legitimate and accountable to local people. They are thus expected to be better at providing services to the poor and reducing fragility in post-conflict settings. Few would dispute the value of a government that is closer to the people. However, as previous chapters have argued, reconstruction practice, of which support to decentralisation policies is an important component, have been informed by normative and prescriptive approaches implicit in state-building discourse. The relationship between decentralisation, poverty reduction and state legitimacy has been questioned in several academic works. Existing evidence suggests that the outcomes of decentralisation policies are highly context specific and are deeply influenced by local dynamics, as well as broader political processes.

In this chapter I argue that the decentralisation rationale is based on a number of untested assumptions, which are reflected in the design of decentralisation support initiatives and are reproduced in the practices of aid organisations. I wish to identify and unravel these assumptions to understand how normative expectations are transformed in unintended ways. I draw on the methodology used by Guijt (2008) in her study of monitoring for collective learning in rural resource management interventions in Brazil. Guijt identifies key presuppositions on which mainstream monitoring discourse is based, and contrasts them with actual monitoring practices to determine empirically the extent to which the presuppositions are retained.[2]

In Angola, decentralisation policies have been endorsed by the aid community with little debate about their viability or desirability. Writings focus on technical, legal and administrative aspects, rather than on impact. In the wider context, there is little research on whether the assumed conditions of decentralisation exist or produce the desired outcomes (Ribot, 2002). This chapter aims to contribute to this gap by following what happens to theoretical intentions of decentralisation initiatives along the implementation chain.

I argue that such interventions are underlined by assumptions relating to three key aspects: local capacity for implementation, processes of democratic participation, and

legitimisation and institutionalisation processes. The analysis is based on the specific case of DESHUCU decentralisation programme, implemented by the international NGO CARE in partnership with UNICEF, in Matala municipality. I examine the social interfaces between local actors brought together under decentralisation activities - local governments, local communities, and aid organisations. Relations of power, local political forces and cultural practices emerge at the encounter of these actors with their different interests and life-worlds, and co-shape outcomes.

1. Decentralisation rationale

Decentralisation reforms have been common in developing countries for several decades. *"It is estimated that 80% of the developing countries is experimenting some form of decentralization."* (UNDP and Government of Angola, 2004). The rationale of decentralisation policies rests on several key aspects:

- Decentralisation policies are strongly linked to democratic governance values and structures. They are often presented as the counter governance model to authoritarian regimes that are centrally organised (van Walraven and Thiriot, 2002). Reforms mostly address centre-local relations by strengthening local governance structures (Ribot, 2002). Since the 1980s, decentralisation discourse has been framed more within democratisation, pluralism and rights-based approaches (Ribot, 2002: v).
- Decentralisation conceives of local governments as the loci for reform, capacity building and democratisation efforts. As Van der Haar (2009) argues, local governments are at the 'fringes' of the state, and are important sites to study state transformation and state-building projects, because they are *"where the spheres of the state and civil society meet and interpenetrate"* (p. 3). It assumes that local government will be locally elected, that it will have *de facto* power for decision-making and that it will have the necessary financial and human resources to implement local development plans.
- Policy analysis often distinguish between different dimensions of decentralisation - including fiscal, institutional and political - but in reality these are inherently linked (Smoke, 2003). Policies and practices of decentralisation differ significantly in the extent to which responsibility, power and resources are given to local state institutions. Table 7.1 below summarises the characteristics of two key forms of decentralisation. Administrative decentralisation, also referred to as deconcentration, entails the transfer of responsibilities from central state institutions to their local counterparts or line services. It has been referred to as a weak form of decentralisation in terms of accountability, compared to political decentralisation models (Ribot, 2002: iii). It does not involve local autonomy in the form of the transfer of authority and political power. Political or democratic decentralisation, involves locally elected institutions that are autonomous from the central state, and accountable to their electorate. This is known as the devolution of power and implies that local governments have the power to independently manage resources from the central state and those generated locally (Tvedten and Orre, 2003). Given that in Angola no local elections have yet taken place, decentralisation can be characterised as the deconcentration of administrative functions rather than the devolution of power.
- Decentralisation policies have become integral to broad poverty reduction and improved service delivery interventions. For instance, these are an important part of efforts to achieve the MDGs' objectives (Robinson, 2007), and as seen in the previous chapter, in the reform of healthcare services in Angola's reconstruction. Actual implementation of decentralisation reforms involves institutional capacity-building activities of state

institutions and services, particularly in post-conflict countries where government services have been inefficient or absent.

TABLE 7.1: Characteristics of administrative and political decentralisation

Decentralisation Types	Responsibilities & power of local government services	Resources
Administrative decentralisation/ Deconcentration	Transfer of power to local branches of central state / line ministries Local governments not necessarily elected Administrative & service delivery responsibilities No decision-making autonomy Accountable to central state & line ministries Central government strengthens control of local areas	No resource management power No own budget
Political/ democratic decentralisation Devolution	Locally elected governments Autonomy from central state Local governments have legal personality Accountable to local electorate Central government cedes control to local areas	Independent resource management Own resources Rights to tax and spend

Source: (Compiled from Ribot, 2002, Tvedten and Orre, 2003, Orre, 2007);

Intentions

Several normative expectations underline decentralisation policies. These include first, the presumption that decentralisation will contribute to the creation of a more responsive, accountable and transparent government; second, that it will promote ownership and participation by local communities, and third that it will create more efficient social services and contribute to poverty reduction. Local governments are expected to be better at doing and achieving what a central government cannot (Chabal, 2007). State legitimacy is supposedly enhanced because local governments, being closer to the people, are better positioned to have information and response capacity to a range of local needs. (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006: 7). Further, by being more visible locally, they are also expected to be more downwardly accountable to local people and inclusive of their participation. It is anticipated that these attributes contribute in turn to improved state-society relations, local development and poverty alleviation.

1.1 The realities of decentralisation

Despite the overwhelming interest in decentralisation within state-building discourse of aid actors, there is little evidence for the conditions under which decentralisation is successful. Policy-related literature on decentralisation centres on expectations and discourse rather than on practice and outcomes (Ribot, 2002). *"Much of the decentralisation literature focuses on its often-problematic performance and positive writings tend to be based on anecdotal instances of success or enthusiastic rhetoric about its benefits."* (Smoke, 2003: 7). In practice, there is great variation in the degree to which the assumptions of decentralisation are met in actual implementation models.

Several recent studies raise concerns about various aspects of decentralisation and the alleged outcomes for increased state legitimacy and local development. Jutting et al. (2004) have argued that decentralisation can actually have the opposite of its intended effect. Based on a comparative study of 19 countries[3], they claim that poverty may increase with decentralisation, where the capacity for performing basic state functions is low. "*In roughly one third of the case study countries reviewed, decentralisation has helped to reduce poverty through either increase in participation, decline in vulnerability or improved access to services. However, no positive impact could be identified in the majority of the countries. On*

the contrary, it appears that in some of the poorest countries with weak institutions and in post-conflict situations decentralisation has had negative impacts." (p. 22). Based on the case of Benin, Slootweg et al. (2007) found no evidence of a correlation between 'ingredients' promoted under decentralisation - greater social capital, ownership and participation, and strong leadership - and increased state capacity to implement development plans. In terms of impact on basic services, Robinson (2007) questions the alleged benefits of decentralisation for improved service provision, arguing that there are very few cases where service delivery improved in terms of equity and efficiency.[4] Conyers (2007) contends that the effect of decentralisation on service quality has been particularly poor in African countries, due to common governance characteristics: the centralisation of power, weak accountability systems and weak civil societies.

Decentralisation does not necessarily entail weakening the powers of the central state, as shall be seen for the case of Angola. Ruigrok (2010: 48) reasons that it is *"the overall balance of power within the state administrative system, and increased participation, including across regions"* that is most relevant in the Angolan decentralisation context. Based on cases from sub-Saharan Africa, Crook (2003) argues that the expectation that decentralisation leads to increased responsiveness of governments to the poor, is primarily contingent upon the politics of local-central relations and the commitment of the central political authorities to poverty reduction (p. 77). Local government reform programmes in war-torn and fragile states have been criticised for being top-down and largely dictated by interests of central governments, rather than by actual needs and priorities of local governments and citizens (van der Haar, 2009, Van der Haar et al., 2009a).

On the whole, such critiques emphasise that decentralisation outcomes are much more context-specific than dominant discourse tends to suggest (Botes and Rensburg, 2000). *"The extent or nature of decentralisation may simply be a proxy for deeper underlying factors, in which case misleading inferences of its impact could be drawn if these factors are excluded or unobserved from the analysis."* (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006: 10). The success of decentralisation in contributing to development objectives is said to ultimately depend on the quality of state governance (Chabal, 2007: 2). According to Jutting et al (2004), the outcome of decentralisation is determined by background and process conditions. Background conditions include the country setting, its capacity, social institutions and political power structures. Process conditions refer to the ability and willingness to carry out reforms, transparency and participatory cultures, elite capture and corruption, and policy coherence.

These critiques of decentralisation raise important questions about its normative expectations and about the actual impact of reforms on local governments and populations. Such expectations obscure for instance, the political dynamics in which local governments are embedded, how these co-shape interventions and their effect for reconstruction efforts (Van der Haar et al., 2009a). Decentralisation is part of what Hilhorst et al. (2010) describe as an emerging 'reconstruction from below paradigm', which is described as locally focused, context specific and bottom-up. They argue that reconstruction practice continues to be based on a series of untested assumptions about economic, social and institutional conditions for recovery and is therefore not the magic-bullet aid agencies expect (p. 1119). Reeler (2007) highlights the problematic premise of a cause and effect logic that underlines 'project approaches' dominant in development social change theory and practice. In policy circles there has been little discussion about the assumptions underlying decentralisation.

Building on these critical perspectives, I argue that decentralisation support interventions should be questioned and analysed on the basis of the everyday practices of organisations, from which these processes can be discerned. As I will show, recent decentralisation support programmes are shaped not only by the assumptions inherent to the decentralisation rationale, but also by their own set of assumptions. These are (re)produced as

organisations operationalise objectives such as capacity-building, increased participation and accountability. In this chapter I want to unravel these assumptions and how they work out in practice. I further want to contribute to the knowledge gap about decentralisation reforms in Angola. Analysis of impact of interventions is lacking, although decentralisation has been officially adopted by the government and widely embraced by the international aid community. The first question to which I now turn refers to the motivations for the promotion of such reforms in Angola.

1.2 Decentralisation agendas in Angola

In post-conflict Angola, decentralisation has been promoted by government and the aid community alike. In official government discourse, the objective of the policy reform process of the local administration, as stated in the Government's Programme for 2009 was *"To create a Local Administration and Local Power that respond, with efficiency and effectiveness, to the needs of local communities and to the development of the country."* (GoA, 2008a). Decentralisation has thus been officially promoted as the policy route for the state to fulfil these functions. It has also been important in fulfilling other less explicit elements of the state's political agenda. As I shall elaborate below, decentralisation policies gained momentum in the lead up to the 2008 elections, when it was particularly important for the MPLA-led government to show its willingness to reform and to improve its image internally and abroad. Examining the motivations behind decentralisation policies is key, because their objectives determine the kinds of relationships that develop between central and local levels that ultimately affect outcomes (Crook, 2003). As I shall argue, the course of decentralisation reforms in Angola appears not to be intent on redistributing the balance of power to the local level, but rather in consolidating power with the ruling elite.

Amongst the aid community, support to decentralisation has also become a new trend. Together with technical assistance and community development (Chapters 6 and 8), decentralisation programmes constitute the main institution-building efforts of donors in the reconstruction context. The Spanish Cooperation for example, which is an increasingly prominent donor, is focusing its support on democratic governance and rural development, with particular emphasis on municipal decentralisation projects, and institutional support to IFAL – the national Institute for the Training of Municipal Administrations (BOE, 2009, Cooperando, 2010). On the one hand, this trend is in line with broader state-building agendas promoted by aid actors in fragile and post-conflict contexts. Concerns over governance practices and the lack of transparency of the GoA specifically contribute to making this a policy priority in Angola. On the other hand, similarly to what I argued in relation to basic service delivery, donors appear to find in decentralisation programmes an appealing form of engagement with the Angolan state. They are seen as channels to address otherwise sensitive issues relating to undesirable governance practices, such as corruption and mismanagement.

International NGOs and national civil society organisations have thus carved out a position in the implementation of such reforms. They were considered particularly well placed to fill a gap in capacity in this area. As explained by the Provincial Governor of Huíla, *"It is hard for public institutions to have contact with local communities. NGOs can create spaces for this. State services are not well structured. From 1992 onwards we destroyed what little there was left. Local governments struggle to gain legitimacy as there is no stability within the central government. NGOs can assist in this respect."*[5] Other intervention areas (such as emergency aid) have either been in decline due to the changing context and funding shortages, or they are considered too politically sensitive (such as human rights). Decentralisation as an official part of both government and donor's agendas has therefore emerged as an important intervention sphere for organisations seeking to remain operational in Angola.

Unlike other contexts where decentralisation has been donor-imposed, I argue that in Angola it seems to have come about as a result of the convergence of interests of the GoA and the international community. It can be described as having been donor-encouraged in the opportunity it presented to the GoA to secure continued external support for (decentralised) social service delivery, and to improve its image and legitimise its position. It has also been government-induced, through the inherent promises of the official decentralisation discourse, of governance reforms and greater engagement with international actors. These overlapping agendas, despite having distinct motivations, have been mutually-reinforcing in practice. They led to the adoption of decentralisation as a panacea for local development, despite failing to deliver the promised results at local level. The case of Matala will illustrate this.

As Table 7.2 shows, several actors have been involved in the implementation of the decentralisation process in pilot municipalities across the country, and in the particular case of Huíla province.

TABLE 7.2: Aid actors in decentralisation arena

ACTOR	Activity description	Huila Province
National NGOs	*ADRA and Development Workshop*: most prominent national NGOs in capacity building support to local administrations	*ADRA*: provided training in various municipalities, including Matala; collaborates in larger INGO projects.
International NGOs	*German Cooperation through GTZ:* capacity building of government institutions already during the war. In post-war, support to the reintegration process, through technical training of local governments for service delivery. Supported the elaboration of the Handbook of the Administrators (*Manual do Administrador*), a reference document published in 2002 for all local administrations. *SNV (The Netherlands Organisation for Development)*: capacity building during the war; focused on strengthening organisational capacity of local administrations and civil society organisations; support to Provincial Water Services; pioneered the approach of tailor made training modules.	*GTZ*: supported Quipungo's administration and IRSEM, with a reintegration programme for refugees, IDPs, and demobilised soldiers. *Italian NGO COSV*: main actor in the direct support to Matala's local administration; various institutional capacity building activities. *ACORD & Action Against Hunger Spain*: one-off activities in Matala. SNV had a strong presence in Huíla. It withdrew in 2007, but gave origin to the DESHUCU decentralisation programme (see below).
Consortia of local and international NGOs	Consortia between national and INGOs have been popular for large decentralisation programmes: *Luanda Urban Poverty Programme* (LUPP)[6]: implemented by CARE, DW, Save the Children and One World Action; funded by DFID. *Reconstruction Support Programme* (PAR) phase II [7]: funded by the EC since 2002 focused on decentralisation	*CARE Angola and UNICEF*: launched DESHUCU programme in Huila (Matala and Lubango pilot municipalities) and Cunene; inherited from SNV,
UN Agencies	*UNDP*: Decentralisation and Local Governance Programme - launched in 2004 and extended until 2011; focuses on support to MAT. *Other UN agencies*: Interventions integrated into UNDP's programme, including FAO's land rights programme (Projecto Terra) (PAR, 2006).	*UNICEF:* co-managed DESHUCU with CARE Angola
Private sector	*Partnerships with donors & NGOs*: Chevron & USAID fund several programmes, such as Municipal Development Programme	
Government	*Social Support Fund* (FAS – Fundo de Apoio Social)[8]: engaged in Municipal Development since Phase III (from 2003), with World Bank funds.	*FAS*: supports decentralisation in Chibia and Humpata pilot municipalities.

Source: Compiled from interviews and (PAR, 2006, Trezzi and Rosário Mario, 2006)

Substantial resources have been committed to decentralisation support, which in itself calls for an examination of such initiatives. For instance, the UNDP's Decentralisation and Local Governance Programme received an initial budget of USD 9.3 million in 2004, and was revised and funded for an additional period of 3 years with another USD 9.45 million (UNDP, 2009). The government's Third Social Support Fund (FAS) was allocated US$10 million by the World Bank for the period 2003 to 2008, specifically for a Municipal Development component (World Bank, 2010: 4).

2. Decentralisation in Angola

2.1 The centralised state

The shaping of the Angolan state has been strongly influenced by its colonial and post-colonial political trajectories and conflict history. In Chapters 2 and 4, I discussed such history to explain the transformation of state institutions and the legacy of political changes on service delivery. Here I highlight these historical dimensions to explain its strong centralised character, crucial to current governance reforms. The development of centralised governance under colonial regimes have typically affected how the bureaucratic foundations of post-colonial states evolved (Chabal, 2007: 12). The system of indirect rule through traditional authorities described in Chapter 4, left its imprint on local power relations in Angola (Tvedten and Orre, 2003). It led to a divided system of rule between urban and rural areas. Urban areas were ruled by a direct administration regime of modern civic written law. Administration in rural areas was based on customary law and traditional authority (Orre, 2007). The post-independence political trajectory reinforced the urban-bias and the centralisation of the state apparatus. The socialist model adopted by the single-party MPLA government, further entrenched its heavily centralised structure, and weaved government and party together. Until 1989, when the first reforms were attempted, the official policy was one of 'centralised planning' in the management of government functions, including of public finances. Notwithstanding such trends, local governments were allegedly more accountable to local people during the first republic than after the democratisation reforms of 1991, because of the system of Provincial People's Assemblies of the single-party (UN, 2002a: 73). Engrossment in the war effort further enhanced the need to centralise decision-making power and resources. The consequence of such trends, as Isaksen et al (2007) explain, was that *"A 'culture of dependence' in the relations between the administrative units at the bottom and the higher up units or levels was created and resulted in very slow decision making processes and policy and programme implementation."* (p. 7). Current state-building efforts such as administrative decentralisation and local democratic governance reforms are implemented against this background.

The first national legislation specifically referring to government decentralisation emerged during the Bicesse process of 1991/92. Despite the reforms of the political transition to a multiparty democracy, that accompanied these peace negotiations, no real advances in implementation were made until the end of the conflict. There is a strong current of opinion that even after the end of the war and the legislative elections of 2008, the concentration of power within the MPLA and Luanda has increased. The massive victory of the MPLA (with 81.6% of the votes) has reinforced its position of power (see Chapter 2). Local administrations are still strongly shaped by such state/party politics.

The new Constitution which was officially approved on the 21st January 2010, at the height of the excitement of the CAN, has also created much controversy around the consolidation of existing power structures.[9] The Constitution was approved by 186 votes in favour, 2 abstentions and no votes against, although UNITA's 16 members of parliament abandoned the process without voting. It established a presidential-parliamentary system, which is seen as extending and securing the powers of the party and of the president. The latter is now chosen as the head of the list of the winning party or coalition of parties, rather than by direct popular vote. This has been particularly contentious because the 2008 elections took place under the previously existing constitutional law, with the expectation that presidential elections would follow. Under the new Constitution José Eduardo dos Santos, who has been in power since 1979, became the Head of State, Head of the Executive and Commander in Chief of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). Angola has one of the largest governments in the world (Isaksen et al., 2007), even after the recent reform to slim down the

state apparatus. In early 2010, the president announced a reform promising ´zero tolerance´ to corruption and a leaner government. The government went from 31 to 27 ministries and from a total of 96 ministers and vice-ministers to 85 (FREITAS et al., 2010). Of these 85, a total of 30 were still high level ministers (MPLA, 2010: 92-94).

This consolidation of power is taking place within the parameters of what are considered normal processes of democratic transition in state-building discourse: the holding of elections, specific legislation on local governments and additional political reforms, such as the new land bill. In dominant liberal democracy perspectives, these are held as indicators of greater transparency and democratic culture. In practice they risk legitimising rather than challenging existing power structures. The outcome of the 2008 elections in strengthening the position of the MPLA is a case in point. It was reflected in the official decentralisation model adopted by the state, based on MPLA's proposal. This was the model involving the greatest concentration of power with central government and provincial governors, giving only partial power to municipalities. UNITA proposed to decentralise according to six regions with greater powers than the municipality option and with a role of participating in national development plans. PRS (the third party with 6 elected MPs) opted for a federal model with six states, the same six proposed by UNITA, with rights to local resources, and responsibilities for social services and socio-economic development plans (Tito, 2006: 332).

The theoretical intentions of decentralisation reforms, which include the shift of power balance towards the local level and the increase in citizen participation, sit uncomfortably with these realities of the political system. Paradoxically, in Angola the decentralisation discourse and supporting legislation have developed and gained strength concurrently to this concentration and consolidation of power within the governing elite. This raises questions about the effects of decentralisation programmes on local government and communities at the interfaces of implementation. It corroborates the need to consider how decentralisation, as a form of state-building 'from below', interacts with and responds to state-building 'from above' (Van der Haar et al., 2009a). From an analysis of governance dynamics in Angola, Orre (2007: 195) concludes that interventions aimed at strengthening the service delivery capacity of a local state that is not downwardly accountable, as in the case of the GoA, risks strengthening one-party regimes. The implication is that, whilst decentralisation support may be politically convenient for aid agencies in the short-term, it may inhibit the development of other forces that could lead to greater gains in service delivery in the long run. It is against this backdrop that I analyse the specific case study of decentralisation in the Municipality of Matala. First, I will give an overview of the key aspects of the overall development of decentralisation policy and practice in Angola.

2.2 The legal framework

The post-independence Constitution of 1975 already included the concept of locally elected, autonomous local government. However, it was the 1992 Constitutional Law which launched the administrative de-concentration and the decentralisation of power from central government to local units known as autarchies. The autarchies were conceptualised as the locally elected bodies for autonomous local governance, to be established at municipal level - the lowest administrative tier of government.[10] Although these are key ingredients in decentralisation rationale, in Angola they remain an intention, as no local elections have taken place thus far. The new 2010 Constitution mentions the possibility to create autarchies at higher or lower administrative levels (Art. 218). The autarchies are one of the three officially recognised pillars of the 'local power' institutions (*poder local)*. The others are traditional authorities and civic organisations. Local autarchies are ultimately intended to be responsible for managing and regulating issues of local public concern and for collecting and managing local taxes. They appear to be intended as separate from existing local administrations (Dias,

2010). Being locally elected, once established, autarchies should have the decision making power on local issues, whilst local government administrations would be responsible for their implementation (FAS, 2007). However, it is unclear whether they will eventually replace or coexist alongside these. There is also little clarity about who is eligible for election within the autarchies or how this will be defined.

Additional legal tools have since been introduced, of which three are particularly important. First is the law-Decree nº 17/99 on the Organisation of Provincial Governments and of Municipal and Communal Administrations. Most notably, it shifted the responsibilities of the line ministries to the provincial levels (FAS, 2007).[11] This increased the power of the governors over the ministries (UN, 2002a). Given that the governors are appointed by the president, it further centralised power in the hands of his clique. Second, the GoA published the Strategy for De-concentration and Decentralisation in 2001, from which implementation steps were defined and initiated. Three were most significant: a) the notion of gradual implementation (*gradualismo)*, whereby responsibilities are de-concentrated as experience and local capacity to deal with them is created; b) the incorporation of traditional authorities and civil society representatives in local consultation forums; and c) in line with *gradualism*, a number of pilot municipalities were selected for the implementation of the autarchies (FAS, 2007). The third legal instrument is Law-Decree n° 2/07 which *"establishes the framework for the attributes, competencies and juridical regime for the organisation and functioning of the Provincial Governments and the Municipal and Communal Administrations."*[12] (MAT, 2007). It is the most sophisticated and recent instrument guiding the functioning of local government. The most significant aspects of Law 2/07 include the establishment of municipalities as independent budgetary units of the national state budget; the reinforcement of citizen participation; the establishment of the Councils for Social Consultation and Cooperation[13] (CACS); and the promotion of public-private partnerships to improve local services. The law also transformed the previous municipal representations of different social service sectors into municipal divisions (*repartições municipais)* made accountable to the Municipal Administrations. These are further divided into sections.

This most recent legislation was exceptional in that it officially involved a public consultation process that included CSOs, churches and other actors. Table 7.3 shows how the local administrative structures at municipal level are organised according to Law 2/07. Most relevant is the introduction of consultative bodies (the CACS), which I shall elaborate further on. Table 7.4 presents the specific structure of Matala's administration. Besides the three legal instruments mentioned, the new Constitution has further enshrined the political decentralisation principle (ANGOP, 2010a).[14] Several ministries are involved in decentralisation. This has made the roles and responsibilities for its implementation confusing. The most ministries include the Ministry of Planning (MINPLAN), the Ministry for Territorial Administration (MAT) and the Ministry of Finance (MINFIN).

TABLE 7.3: Current administrative structure at Municipal Level

Organs/services of municipal administration	
Consultative Support Organs	CACS
Technical Support Services	Secretariat for the Municipal Administration
	Studies and Planning Division
Instrumental Support Services	Office of the Municipal Administrator
	Office of the Municipal Co-administrator
	Information and Documentation Centre
Deconcentrated Services of administration	Municipal Divisions

Source: (MAT, 2007: Art. 53)

2.3 Implementation track

The approval of Law 2/07 was seen by the aid community as indicative of the government's commitment to decentralisation. It created both enthusiasm and concern amongst civil society and social activists, particularly regarding the lack of local implementation capacity. As decentralisation became fact, most of these actors seem to have embraced the process. Discussions have thus focused on how to make decentralisation work, rather than whether it is viable or desirable. The director of an INGO working with decentralisation issues summarised the prevailing mood in an interview in mid-2007 *"This is an exciting period in Angola. There is some hope that new space is being created for civil society to influence government´s decisions as the example of the consultation process for the decentralisation legislation has shown. There are critics that say that this good will of the government is about the election campaign. But even so, once the door is opened for people to participate in these processes, it is very difficult to shut it again."*[15] After the elections (September 2008), this cautious optimism changed considerably, as organisations and administrations become better acquainted with decentralisation reforms. In the second National Civil Society Conference at the end of 2008, the decentralisation process was a key discussion topic. On the one hand it was referred to as an achievement of and an opportunity for civil society, whilst on the other, as lacking in transparency and public participation (Vidal, 2009b).

Despite the perceived progress at the level of legislation, practical implementation has been troubled by the lack of capacity and means at the local level to take on the changes entailed in such legislation. For instance, due to lacking human resource capacity, many municipalities have been unable to adopt the new system of decentralised social service divisions, which should be dependent on the local administrations. Instead they continue to depend on provincial line services, in turn dependent on Luanda.[16] Interviews with local civil society activists, aid workers and civil servants at the end of 2009 revealed this changing atmosphere. As stated by a senior staff member of Matala´s administration *"In terms of the decentralisation and de-concentration processes, 2009 was a year of slowing down in comparison to 2007 and 2008."* [17] Looking at the wider political context, it is obvious that this trend has been the result not only of technical and administrative hurdles, but more significantly, of the predominant political developments. As was explained by a decentralisation expert from a major national NGO, *"In Angola public space is being reduced! Critical voices are being silenced. In relation to the decentralisation process, there is more of a decline than there is progress. The local autarchies are just a pipe dream. Honestly, I don't see the political will in Angola, for sharing power in the management of public resources!"*[18]

According to the notion of *gradualismo,* the government initially defined 41 municipalities where the process should be piloted with the view of establishing local autarchies and from which lessons would be taken. This number was later increased to 47 municipalities and then again to 68 municipalities.[19] Of these, 4 were in Huíla province: Chibia, Humpata, Lubango and Matala.[20] Initially, the decision was that only the pilot municipalities would receive a yearly budget from the central government with which to implement their local development plans. However, in an unexpected move in 2009, the government passed law Decree 08/08[21] through which all 163 municipalities of Angola would become independent budgetary units, receiving an annual block transfer of 5 million USD each. This came shortly after a civil society report about the national budgeting process that highlighted the problems relating to preparation and execution of the budget, showing the limited public participation in policy decisions. The problems referred to the lack of capacity of local administrations and of social sectors, to the authoritarian attitudes from a hierarchical bureaucratic-military system, to the lack of autonomy, and to poor linkages between local and central levels (Isaksen et al., 2007). As explained by an NGO worker "*In some respects, the*

government is moving quicker on decentralisation than people are ready to absorb it. They already decentralised some funds and the danger is that they are not managed well or in a participatory way, for example, spending big amounts on physical infrastructure when this could be funded from another source or not be a priority for the majority."[22]

The extent to which this policy of municipal budgetary units was implemented remains unclear as no official data were available at the time of writing. Initial experience with decentralised funds has been described by Yilmaz and Felicio (2009), as a 'governance fiasco', given the lack of compliance with management and reporting rules, due to the absence of checks and balances. Moreover, implementation appears to be highly uneven. In Matala's case, it received the 5 million USD in 2008 as it was one of the pilot decentralisation municipalities, but only received around 15% of this supposed yearly budget in 2009. The administration suffered an additional cut of 30% on another decentralised budget line specifically relating to its running costs, allegedly due to the financial crisis.[23] In the second half of 2010, the GoA increased attention to the issue of local resource generation and taxes, in an attempt to minimise the effects of these recent budget cuts (ANGOP, 2010c). The ability of local government to raise revenues remains low however, as financial administration has been concentrated at central level (Mac Dowell et al., 2006).[24]

The review of the legal framework and implementation track of decentralisation policies, indicates that despite being externally supported by aid actors, these processes have been defined and their pace determined largely by the Angolan government. The decentralisation trajectory has been marked by significant advancements in terms of legislation, particularly in the lead up to the 2008 elections, but policy formulation has been confusing and implementation highly uneven. The most recent trend has involved the reversal of policy decisions and a general slowdown of the process. Taken together with the model adopted by the government and its political motivations for decentralisation, this indicates a lack of political commitment to the redistribution of power to the local level.

2.4 State-citizens interfaces: the traditional authorities, the CACS and the Forums

In Angola's decentralisation policies and practice, there are three key interfaces where government and citizens encounter one another. The first refers to the traditional authorities, which function as channels or intermediaries between local people and local administrations. The others include two distinct purposely created spaces – the government's Councils for Social Consultation and Cooperation (CACS), and the NGO-created Local Forums.

The traditional authorities

Recent legislation specifies the traditional authorities as one of the pillars of local power. However, official government discourse remains vague about the exact functions of traditional leaders and how they shall be integrated into the future decentralised local autarchies. It is unknown for instance, whether traditional leaders can run for local elections, and how they should reconcile the basic incompatibility between the envisaged administrative divisions and their traditional areas of jurisdiction (Tito, 2006). The new Constitution recognises the status, role and function of the institutions of traditional power, but does not increase or clarify their power. In Chapter 4 I discussed the transformations undergone by these traditional institutions from colonial times until the present. Here, I wish to raise the potential effects of decentralisation reforms for their position and power vis-à-vis other actors: local communities, local administrations, the future autarchies and the alternative local governance structures being created under decentralisation programmes.

Aid organisations have become aware of the problematic aspects surrounding the role of traditional authorities and have thus been unsure about how to deal with them. Local

communities have been victims of excessive powers of some traditional leaders, and these have in turn been co-opted by political actors' interests. As I elaborate in Chapter 8, recent programmes have thus opted to exclude the *sobas* from leadership positions in community-based organisations. This is also the case for community-groups created under decentralisation programmes. *"The traditional authorities have not gained more power with the new legislation. They will continue to be used by the ruling party, not least because there is an increasing politicisation (by the MPLA) of almost all governance institutions. And this does not allow any constructive divergence from the point of view of the exercise of civic rights and democracy."*[25] Regardless of the official role given to the traditional authorities in decentralisation legislation, in practice this is likely to continue changing, as they interact with other local actors and interests, such as community-groups, participation fora and the future local autarchies. As Jackson (2006) has argued for the case of Sierra Leone, it is the dynamics between existing traditional actors and new local groups that determines the outcomes of local governance for local people.[26] However, he also warns against the danger of old politics continuing to dominate new political constellations, thereby leading to the neglect of local governments. New political groups risk being co-opted by historic elites and *"...the situation will either remain the same or worsen from the point of view of those who have been excluded."* (p. 110).

Local consultation councils – the CACS

The government has created spaces for citizen participation in local development. The most notable example is the establishment of the CACS[27]. These are institutions created under Law 2/07 at the three levels of local government: provincial, municipal and communal.[28] They are labelled as 'consultative' support organs to the local administrations and aim to assist them with the appraisal and definition of political, economic and social measures. Local governments, at any one of the three levels, should hear the opinions of the CACS before taking decisions on development plans, or before submitting them to the administrative level above in the hierarchy. At the municipal level, the council is presided by the municipal administrator and is made up of his co-administrator, the communal administrators, and the heads of municipal divisions (such as health, education, etc). Other participants include representatives of local traditional authorities, of the public, of the private business sector, of farmer's associations, of legally recognised churches and NGOs, and any other entity invited by the municipal administrator.[29] Although on paper these councils are innovative, in that they are the first legislated spaces for the participation of society on locally relevant issues, in practice they have shown limitations, which I shall discussed with reference to Matala. Their representativeness, participation and decision-making power are limited (Orre, 2009), and their implementation and use has been uneven (Yilmaz and Felicio, 2009) .

Local Development Forums

Civil society organisations, have also been involved in the creation of what Cornwall and Coelho (2007a) refer to as invited spaces, which are intended as local 'spaces for change'. The Local Development Forums have been promoted by NGOs in various communes and municipalities. These are supposed to mimic and therefore prepare for the elected assemblies of the future autarchies. The Municipal Forum of Matala is composed of representatives of government and community institutions, including local administrations, NGO networks, Village Development Organisations (ODAs) and their federations, churches and associations. The presidency of the Forum is rotational and limited to three mandates. Decisions taken at the Forum are presented at the CACS, and each municipal Forum is preceded by communal Forum and sectorial meetings, where agenda points are defined. The Forums are based on the

community level Village Development Organisations (ODAs) and are thus separate from the CACS. However, the two are often confused as being the same and are seen to overlap in functions.[30] Their ownership is unclear even for those directly involved. For instance, the invitation and programme for the meeting of the Matala Forum were distributed on official Government headed paper, wrongly suggesting it is a government initiative.[31] Moreover, the Forums exist only in the selected localities where NGOs have been operational. During my fieldwork in Bunjei for instance, I never heard of either the Forums or the CACS. Even in Matala, when I asked about existing institutions and structures dealing with collective community issues, the Forums and the CACS were only ever mentioned spontaneously by the administration's staff, but not by members of rural communities. This indicates that their role is still restricted.

In the following section I look at the specific case of DESHUCU decentralisation programme, from which it emerges that the CACS, Forums and the traditional authorities are limited in their intended functions, including of ultimately creating links between state and society. Diagram 7.1 shows the different participation structures from village to municipal level, and how they supposedly link to one another, with reference to an example from the *comuna* of Micosse, Matala.

FIGURE 7.1: The structuring of Village Development Organisations (ODAs) and their links with the government CACS. Micosse commune, Matala Municipality



3. The case of DESHUCU

In the remainder of this chapter, I will analyse the everyday practices of decentralisation support, with reference to the particular case of DESHUCU, a programme implemented by CARE Angola in partnership with UNICEF. DESHUCU is an example of the wave of decentralisation support programmes being promoted by the aid community in the current reconstruction context. These programmes differ from the other two categories of institution-building interventions (technical assistance to service delivery and community organisation), in that they specifically set out to strengthen both local state institutions and local community-based institutions, and to create linkages between them. In the Angolan context, it is the first time that such an approach is being used on this scale, given that, as earlier chapters have shown, local institutions have been largely neglected and bypassed by past aid interventions. This specific programme was selected because of its prominence in Huíla province, and its timing which enabled me to follow the implementation process from the start. It was implemented in two *municípios* of Huíla (Lubango and Matala) and one in Kunene province (Kwanhama). My focus is on the specific case of Matala.

The analysis of the everyday practices of decentralisation reforms entailed identifying the various actors involved at the local level, understanding their different roles, interests, and interactions with one another. It also meant following routine programme activities with the local administration and local communities alike and attending one-off events. The purpose of this case study is to uncover how the underlying assumption of the decentralisation rationale, play out in practice at the social interfaces between different actors. In particular, I want to understand how the various actors involved in decentralisation go about fulfilling their own agendas, and how this impacts on outcomes.

Matala is one of the 68 municipalities initially selected as decentralisation pilots, largely because of its strategic importance for the province, linked to its economic potential. Here, a note is in order, regarding the potential long-term effect of this selection process in widening regional inequalities, as less developed municipalities are left further behind. As Crook (2003: 83) argues, decentralisation by definition is likely to exacerbate such discrepancies. Redistribution efforts are therefore crucial, if also problematic, particularly in countries dependent on oil or mineral wealth. In Matala, the government has invested significantly in the rehabilitation of local infrastructure and services since the end of the war. The local administration offices for instance, have been fully rehabilitated and expanded. In human resources terms, the administrative structure itself has been adjusted according to law 2/07, as presented in Table 7.4. As part of a reform to attract qualified human resources, the *município* has been defined as a Category B in terms of services and structures required, which means civil servants receive better salaries.[32]

TABLE 7.4: Matala´s administrative structure

Leadership	No.	Organ	Functioning
Municipal Administrator	1	1) Consultative Support Organ Municipal CACS	Yes
Municipal co-administrator	1	2) Technical Support Organ Secretariat for the Municipal Administration Studies and Planning Division	Yes
Communal Administrator	4	3) Consultative Support Organ Communal CACS	No
Communal co- administrators	4	4) Instrumental Support Services Office of the Municipal Administrator Office of the Municipal Co-administrator Information and Documentation Centre	Yes
		5) De-concentrated Services of the Municipal Administration Registrations Division Health Division Education Division Tax Division Economic and Productive Affairs Division Social Affairs Division Technical Services Division	Yes
		6) De-concentrated Services of the Provincial Delegations Finance Division Ministry of Interior Services	Yes

Source: Compiled from (África 21, 2009)

The partnership between the UNICEF and CARE for DESHUCU was established on the basis of UNICEF's existing programme for the revitalisation and decentralisation of health services, presented in Chapter 5. DESHUCU set out to develop and institutionalise Integrated Development Plans (PDI[33]) in the municipalities of intervention, intended to support decentralised service delivery.

According to project document, *"The program will work with Municipal Administrations, communities, and the different sectoral departments to develop and implement municipal plans that will include programs specifically focused on child health, nutrition, education, and protection. The main goal of this intervention is to contribute to the attainment of the millennium development goals related to child survival and basic services. [...]It is expected that support to participatory planning and management of service delivery will devolve the responsibility of bringing together different actors that are involved in sectoral/thematic work, development agencies and higher level planning, to contribute to the same developmental goals and objectives in the municipality."* (CARE Angola, 2008).

The history of this programme also involved the Dutch organisation SNV, which worked in Huíla since 1997. Its programme strategy in Angola included decentralisation and basic service delivery as key components. In 2007 SNV withdrew from the country due to funding cuts.[34] Its exit strategy was to identify partners with capacity and experience to take over existing activities, including decentralisation support. Negotiations with UNICEF and CARE started on this basis. UNICEF's profile as a leading actor in basic service delivery support and its regional presence were an obvious link. CARE in turn, was experienced with decentralisation and local government support in Luanda and Lunda Norte, and was considered well versed in donor language and relations.[35] This thematic area suited CARE's focus on governance programmes since the end of the war. Over 80% of its programmes are

said to focus on helping government, civil society and community groups meet and cooperate on local development issues (CARE, 2008). CARE became responsible for the capacity building component of the project, whilst UNICEF provided the technical know-how specifically in the area of health.

Actual implementation practices were determined not only according to the organisations profiles and experience, but also by the division of labour that developed. The day-to-day implementation and management of the project was carried out by CARE, which took over the office, staff, materials and funds from SNV. UNICEF adopted more of a monitoring and advisory role, focusing efforts on the Revitalisation programme itself, and contributing to DESHUCU with additional funding. As a result, the intervention logic and methodology adopted were largely defined by CARE alone, on the basis of its previous experience in Angola and elsewhere. It defined three main intervention domains: 1) creation of political will with government officials, 2) creation of community consciousness and 3) creation of processes and spaces for dialogue between the governing and the governed (CARE Angola, 2008). Key activities were separated into capacity building of local communities and of municipal administrations (see Table 7.5). Each of these two sets of actors became the responsibility of a different project officer.[36]

DESHUCU was launched in November 2007, with an intended duration of two years. Contrasting this timeframe with the specified objectives of the programme highlights the first fundamental assumption underlying this intervention. That is, that the conditions and capacities needed for effective decentralised services, can be created within the two years of programme life. The programme ended up being extended for a few months, but without additional funding. It ended in early 2010. As I shall elaborate, DESHUCU rests on a number of additional assumptions, many inherent to the intervention logic and strategy. First, I briefly describe its methodology.

TABLE 7.5: Key activities of DESHUCU programme

Build capacity of communities for:	Build capacity of Municipal Administrations for:
- strengthening community organisation, integrating aspects of child survival - participatory and integrated analysis of problems with a focus on children - improving community conditions with a focus on children (basic services) - engaging with local government in decision making for pro-poor policies - participating in the planning, budgeting and management of projects - advocating for own rights	- technical assistance for officials - engaging communities in decision making for pro-poor policies - involving the community in planning, implementation and monitoring of projects - assuming the role of serving the governed - storing, updating and disseminating information - implementing the 11 government commitments to the plight of children - institutionalising the PDI process

Source: (CARE Angola, 2008).

3.1 DESHUCU project methodology

Prior to DESHUCU, a detailed participatory methodology had been developed by the Italian NGO COSV in Matala (see Table 7.2). It involved the development of needs-assessments, the systematisation of data collection and the introduction of dialogue forums, named Municipal Frameworks for Social Consultation. Despite being considered innovative and influential at the time, most of the programme's information and knowledge fell into disuse at the end of the programme. The DESHUCU strategy opted for separate and distinct methodology and terminology, based on CARE´s own experience and design. This strategy involves the creation of a chain of structures for citizen consultation and participation in local issues and

specifically in the definition, execution and monitoring of the Integrated Development Plan (PDI). The basis of such structure is the village level, where the Village Development Organisations (ODAs)[37] are created. The ODAs are analysed in detail in the following chapter, as examples of exogenously-created community groups, with reference to their potential role as drivers of change in local development. Here I limit my discussion of these structures to their place in the project logic and methodology vis-à-vis local government. The ODAs are then regrouped into Federations, firstly at the level of sector (this is an unofficial territorial division below the *comunas*), then at the commune level, and finally at the municipality level. The Municipal ODA is the body that ultimately represents local communities in the municipal Consultation Fora (the CACS), and is the space where the whole community consultation system officially connects to the state.

The CACS are the institutions legislated to ensure consultation by the state administration on local issues. The project establishes additional spaces for dialogue on local issues, known as the local Forums, which are separate from the CACS. These are established both at the communal and municipal level where the ODAs meet with other actors. Diagram 7.1 shows for the specific case of the ODA Federation of Micosse, one of Matala´s *comunas*, the organisation of these structures at the different levels, and how they link upwards until the level of the municipal administration through the CACS. The CACS in Matala were established in November 2007. They include civil society, churches, NGOs and the Heads of Sections of the administration, who meet ordinarily twice a year.[38] Matala's PDI was approved in its third session.[39]

During the process of establishing the Matala PDI, I took part in activities in all the different intervention areas of the DESHUCU project: the creation of ODAs and ODA federations with local communities, workshops for the administration staff on the elaboration of the PDI; and the Municipal Forum bringing together community representatives and local government for the presentation and approval of the PDI. All of these events were characterised by the encounter and interaction between the various local actors with their different perspectives and interests. In the next sections, I recount the highlights of these events, to show what happens at these social interfaces where these actors and lifeworlds meet and outcomes are negotiated.

3.1.1 Building community capacity: the Village Development Organisations (ODAs)

The ODAs, as the intended structures through which local people are given a voice on local development issues, are created under the initiative and guidance of the project team. They are unique compared to other community groups, in that they are intended to feed directly into government through the CACS. The process involves participatory methodologies for collecting information about the local reality, such as group discussions on community problems and their prioritisation. Existing community structures are mapped out and a list of ranked problems is drawn up according to their perceived importance. The ODAs are then constituted. The structure of the ODAs includes 10 to 12 people and involves the following five functions: a coordinator, a secretary, a treasurer, a monitor and the advisors.[40] The procedure goes as follows.

"We explain what an ODA is and give the community guidelines with all the different responsibilities. The purpose of the ODA is to assist sobas and administrators to identify problems and how to solve them. The members are individuals chosen by the people, but they should be able to read and write. Registration of candidates is voluntary. In practice, it is usually the soba that calls upon trustworthy people to put themselves forward. Normally, we advise that those with the least votes are named advisors to the ODA so as to make sure that nobody is unhappy with the outcome. Also, in each community we encourage the election of a

representative to link up to the Rede Criança [Children's Network] and Rede Mulher [Women's Network], to ensure a link with the promotion of the government's 11 commitments to children."[41]

Within the project timeframe and staff capacity, only certain villages could be selected for the ODA structures. This was done jointly by the Administration and project staff on the basis of pragmatic criteria like access and proximity. *"...the selection of the villages or bairros where we work was done according to accessibility. But for example in Capelongo we were asked by the local administration to include a more distant sector to improve representativeness. Whenever we go to a community to create an ODA, we try to take someone from the Administration. This has been very helpful for us. We also try to involve someone from the Communal Administration, given that this is in effect a project of the government. We, as CARE are only facilitating the process."*

Near the end of the project, when it was decided to stop with the creation of new ODAs due to a lack of human capacity and time, 58 village ODAs and 14 Federated ODAs had been established under DESHUCU. The project team reported receiving various requests from additional villages, to be included in the programme, as they did not want to be left out of the process. However, they regretted not having the capacity to respond to this demand. They have been described both by the local administration and the CARE staff as the most significant achievement of the programme. As a senior civil servant put it *"Matala is the exception when it comes to organisation, because now it has the ODAs and the Federations. Normally, from the communal level downwards, there is not even any administrative presence. And this is where most work remains to be done."*[42] I return to these groups in the next chapter.

3.1.2 Building local government capacity: the Integrated Development Plan process

Capacity-building activities for the local administrations centre on technical assistance to the PDI process. This methodology is widespread. According to Matala's administration it was adopted because it has been considered a good practice of sustainable development planning and good governance (Governo da Provincia da Huíla, 2008: 5). Activities include training workshops on methodological tools, data analysis, project planning and management, legal instruments and community development. The other programme objectives of capacity building as mentioned in Table 7.5 such as strengthening the administration's role of serving the governed do not figure explicitly in the activity plan for implementation. These entail changes in attitudes, which is less tangible and therefore difficult to operationalise.

The process of preparing the PDI for Matala involved a series of steps and inputs, from its conception to its presentation at the Municipal CACS. According to the methodology used by CARE, the PDI is a summary of all the activities that the municipality has to carry out in order to implement its projects. Its elaboration should take some 45 days, from the initial SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis per sector, to the official approval of the document.[43] Ideally, the consultation and data collection processes that inform the PDI, should take place over the course of a year. In practice, in Matala the process was scheduled for less than 30 days. The timeframe of the PDI is 5 years and its formulation involves four phases: defining the development vision, the strategy for implementation, integration with other existing plans and final approval. I took part in three events in the lead up to this, including a workshop organised by CARE on methodology for the elaboration of the PDI; a three day seminar for definition of the Matala PDI, and a Municipal Forum meeting in Matala for the official presentation of the PDI.[44]

All three events were organised by CARE and moderated by its project staff. They brought together participants from the three Municipal Administrations, although they

focused on Matala as an example. The objective of the first workshop was to train staff of local administrations on various tools and methodologies for the elaboration of their own PDIs, including project cycle management and budgeting. The event revolved around the completion of a planning matrix listing all local projects and relevant stakeholders and their respective roles. These were integrated into existing sectoral plans and government programmes such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy, the 11 government commitments to children, the land bill, HIV/Aids prevention, etc. The formulation of the matrix, projects and budgets was however, based on guesswork given the absence of technical experts. The two day workshop in Matala, involved more concrete tasks. Most participants were staff of the local administration, who was actively involved in all activities. SWOT analyses were done for different sectors, from which key programmatic themes were identified.[45] Smaller working groups were then challenged to come up with a vision statement for the PDI of Matala. The following was the winning statement:

> *In 2025, Matala shall be an urbanised municipality with a diversified economy (agriculture, industry and tourism), where the whole community, especially youth, women and children have access to basic social and financial services and to employment necessary for their well being.*

This vision was the central message of the third event – the Municipal Forum, which precedes the CACS. Members of the local administration, of local communities, of civil society, as well as other actors, came together, to discuss and approve the PDI and the vision statement under the facilitation of CARE. The meeting took place in the large, recently rehabilitated local community leisure centre. The amount of preparation set it out to be an important local event. The vision statement hung on a wall alongside the photos of the two Angolan presidents, and of a poster that read *"That which concerns everyone, by everyone should be resolved."*[46] However, sharp divisions were immediately apparent in the formality of the set up. Public servants and the local administrations' staff sat on one side of the hall, and on the other, the community member representatives. The current president of the Forum, the local Catholic Priest, sat at the front. The event followed a pre-defined agenda, with speeches by various actors: the vice municipal administrator; the Forum's president (on the election of the Forum´s secretariat); CARE's programme coordinator (on PDI objectives); and the head of the Administration's planning division (on the key problems and main programme lines). Lastly, the steps to be followed for the approval of the PDI and vision were defined.

3.2 Solving the problems of the people: the assumptions of DESHUCU

The purpose of decentralisation was often explained by programme staff using Agostinho Neto´s famous words that *'the most important thing is to solve the problems of the people'*. DESHUCU's specific programme objectives fit neatly into the broader reasoning that decentralised services are more accountable and efficient and thus more likely to contribute to poverty alleviation and state legitimacy. It is therefore underlined by the same assumptions described earlier, that characterise the decentralisation rationale. In addition, I argue that the programme entails assumptions inherent to its own implementation logic.

Based on the analysis of the key objectives and activities of the programme, three main sets of assumptions come to the fore. The first concerns local capacity for decentralisation reforms. The second refers to assumptions about democratic participation processes. The third entails assumptions about legitimisation and institutionalisation processes. These first two sets are linked to what are usually considered as the main bottlenecks for good local governance and development: the lack of government planning capacity, and the lack of citizen participation in planning processes. The third refers to how instruments and activities, such as the Integrated Development Plan and surrounding process,

become institutionalised and accepted. Each of these broad sets of assumptions is underlined by different presuppositions. In the remainder of this chapter I will draw on specific events, activities and encounters of DESHUCU, to discern what happens to these assumptions in the actual implementation of project activities.

3.2.1 Planning and implementation capacity

The first broad assumption is clearly implied in the objective of DESHUCU to define and institutionalise municipal development plans. This presupposes that what local administrations need in order to be effective is the ability and skills to regularly plan. The activities defined for this objective thus involved capacity-building of civil servants on technical skills and planning know-how. They translated into several trainings and workshops. Assumptions about their buy-in and participation were also implicit. Participant observation of the Matala PDI workshops revealed that in practice, several factors determined the extent to which civil servants followed the neat steps in the idealised planning process.

Capacity-building as training

The capacity-building agenda of the programme was defined by assumptions underlying the project design, rather than by the needs of the administration's staff. The focus on the elaboration of the PDI, a predefined methodological tool introduced by CARE, was what determined the training needs of local bureaucrats. The PDI workshops involved the completion of a planning matrix, specifying all the activities to be carried out by the administration, and all the actors involved and their respective responsibilities. This proved problematic. Local government officials were unwilling to commit to tasks on paper without significant negotiation. For them, the main challenge was not drawing up a matrix or even defining who should be responsible for what. The real concern was their lack of *de facto* autonomy for decision making and implementation in relation to the central government. An exchange between the workshop facilitator and Matala's Administrator is illustrative.

Administrator: *I'm too small to be able to guarantee that the commitments we make here are fulfilled on time. How can I influence Luanda?*
Facilitator: *Support for the local plan has to start from the município. Then you can lobby the central government. I think they will be happy to receive local plans that are well made and supported by the people – they are more likely to fund projects.*
Administrator: *But when the medium-term development plan of the government was presented last year for the period 2009 to 2013, it was all already defined, without any of our input. So what are we doing here? Aren't we just playing around?*
Facilitator: *It will take time to change practices and mentalities. But the decentralisation law is already there and that is the first step. Some municípios already presented their development plans to the provincial government. This is a sign of change.*

This exchange raises another important aspect of capacity-building that may be more significant than its top-down nature. That is the implicit expectation that predefined training agendas, mostly consisting of short-term courses and trainings, will achieve changes in attitudes and bureaucratic culture that ultimately result in improved governance practices. On the last day of the Lubango workshop, the facilitator became exasperated during a group exercise to design an imaginary infrastructure project. When one of the groups was asked to present its work, the senior member of the Kunene administration explained that the very last step of their project design was a meeting with the local community, *'to inform them about the planned activities'*. The need for community involvement was emphasised by the facilitator in every step of the planning process. However, this was clearly not perceived as a

priority by the group. For them, as power holders, the main concern was to get the infrastructure up and running. This was the ultimate indicator of effectiveness and downwards accountability, not some community consultation meeting.

Changing governance practices involves changing attitudes and mentalities, which are deeply embedded in existing power relations and the dominant working culture. The bureaucratic culture of the civil service in Angola is characterised by the markedly hierarchical structure of government and is generally regarded as inefficient - slow procedures, endless paper-shifting, lack of transparency and corruption of officials and poor service orientation. Changing cultural practices and behaviour is not a simple matter of introducing new ways and skills for doing things differently. Cultural practices are often perpetuated to serve specific interests and agendas. The marked hierarchy of government was sometimes presented in programme activities as the subject to be challenged whilst in others it was employed as a form of resistance to proposed changes. Rather than being a structural ruling force, cultural practices are evoked by actors at different times and for different ends, in a clear expression of human agency (Hilhorst, 2003).

The reform model of externally led workshops does not take these aspects into consideration. It is based on the idea that such profound changes can be achieved within such short-term interventions. The limited timeframe of decentralisation programmes and the capacity-building models adopted are unable to address the major deficit in local government that is human resource capacity. This was also apparent in the previous chapter on the revitalisation of healthcare. In Matala, the administration has struggled to find people with the qualification requirements for the positions under the new administrative structure. A senior local government official explained: "*We need to modernise civil servants so as to increase the quality of the services we offer, both in terms of motivating staff and so that the population feels that they are being well served. We don't have people with the capacity. This is a huge problem. It is difficult to attract people to the municipalities. We have only filled the posts within the supposed Divisions as stipulated by the Law 02/07, to some 30%. We simply cannot find people that meet the requirements. On that front there is little that I can see any NGO intervention can do.*"[47] In theory however, the PDI process presupposes that the full administrative structure of local government is in place.

Government buy-in

Assumptions about the buy-in and motivation of government officials underline the whole rationale of decentralisation support, through capacity-building to local government. Their motivation to participate in the process and to be trained hinges on several factors. Local administrations engage with decentralisation projects, firstly because they are instructed from above to do so.[48] But besides fulfilling an order, the prospect of receiving funds for their own local plans is a strong motivation, mentioned especially by top officials. The degree to which civil servants commit to the process varies according to individual interests, relations with the NGO staff, and the degree of trust between them. It is therefore often complicated by the historical mistrust between NGOs and the state. *"The administrations think of us as awakening the people against the government and of encouraging clashes between them. So sometimes they don't like us or our activities. It takes a while to win mutual trust."*[49] CARE staff claim that local government officials of Matala's administration have been very open and responsive to the process. In Lubango, which is a much larger administration, with a broader resource base, and where the programme therefore has a lower relative weight, their colleagues struggle to engage local officials.[50] As a whole, DESHUCU has struggled to involve the more senior officials in particular, who hold decision-making power for the project activities. *"I have trouble mobilising other Heads of Division from the administration because they are on the same level as me on the hierarchy. So they just send young*

inexperienced people to these events."[51] Senior civil servants were often absent from key events and project activities, such as the PDI workshops for instance.

The capacity-building activities of the programme, and the interactions within them, have shown that activities are top-down and based on various assumptions about existing capacity needs, motivations and planned outcomes. In reality, training workshops are not events where changes follow pre-defined agendas and client constructions. Other factors such as cultural practices, power relations, and individual aspirations, (co)determine their outcomes.

3.2.2 Participation spaces and processes

The second set of assumptions relates to the issue of lacking participation of citizens in decisions that affect them, as a bottleneck for local development. The issue of participation is framed as one of the inexistence of structures through which local people can come together and debate local issues. On the other hand, it implies the absence of spaces in which people can meet with local government officials to communicate about those issues. The programme objective of increased citizen participation is therefore operationalised through the creation of structures (the ODAs) and spaces (the Forums) that fill those gaps, and linking them to existing ones (the CACS). The programme is less clear about the role of the traditional authorities, which, as I have shown earlier, is significant as an interface between state and communities. I address the issue of participation in the next chapter in detail, with reference to community-based approaches to reconstruction. Here, I am particularly interested in the underlying assumption of the intervention logic that the creation of spaces and structures for participation will create linkages between local communities and government, and that such structures can be shaped to ensure representativeness and inclusion.

Representativeness

Representativeness in these spaces is a basic ingredient for legitimising the decentralisation process and making local government accountable. Securing representativeness is always a challenge for participatory approaches, not least in a process as broad as the elaboration of the PDI. Despite the promotion of gender-balance in DESHUCU's intervention logic for example, women were either absent or significantly underrepresented in most events.

Representativeness is also problematic in the very spaces and structures created as part of the decentralisation process. The CACS are limited in this respect, in how they were conceived and how they are being implemented. Membership is dominated by government officials and thus by the MPLA, and the inclusion or exclusion of other members of society is left to the discretion of the administrator. This compromises the ability of participants to act as real watchdogs and to strengthen local democracy, given potential conflicts of interest. Orre (2009) makes a similar observation based on a study of the experience of Kalandula municipality (Malanje Province) *"With weak representation, and weak accountability functions of the council, it is also difficult to see how the CACS could contribute much – in its own right - to making governance* responsive *to popular interests."* (Orre, 2009: 14). The ODAs for their part are only established in selected villages and are prone to the same politics of inclusion/exclusion of wider society. Local power relations that affect representativeness can be more or less explicit and express themselves in different ways. Local party politics are amongst the more obvious. The dominance of the MPLA in state administration in practically the entire national territory makes it highly unlikely that members of other political movements or their sympathisers would find a place either in the leadership of a local ODA, or as a member of the CACS. Indeed, political parties were not part of the CACS or of the Municipal Forum. The latter event included 74 participants from the administrations, ODAs,

associations, NGOs, churches, private sector and traditional authorities (Governo da Provincia da Huíla, 2008: 17).

Language and power relations

Representativeness is also affected by more subtle expressions of power relations, including for instance, the use of language. I chose language as an example because I was struck by the frequency with which it became a central issue in the interaction between different sets of actors at the various events. Language is key to questions of identity in Angola and therefore influences the degree to which specific groups or interests are represented. At the meeting for the establishment of the communal ODA of Micosse, the project staff unanimously decided to communicate in Portuguese given that there were many local languages spoken amongst the participants. This resulted in frustration among staff and community members, as many participants, particularly the elderly, were unable to understand and complete training assignments. At the Municipal Forum, participants were asked whether they preferred Portuguese or a national language (usually Umbundo as the most widely spoken). Opinions were split almost evenly between the administration staff who preferred Portuguese and community representatives who asked for Umbundo. Portuguese predominated given that most official speakers were from the administration. Matters were further complicated by the use of very formal language and technical jargon with which most people were unfamiliar.

The level of formality of decentralisation events was also noteworthy. It is at odds with the messages given at the ODA meetings - about people´s right to speak out and be heard. At the Municipal Forum meeting there was hardly any interaction between speakers and participants, despite several appeals from the president and CARE staff for the ODA representatives and traditional authorities to contribute with ideas. The procedure adopted for people´s contribution to the discussion was hardly inclusive. It required people to write their names on a paper to then be called by the chairperson, thereby excluding those that are illiterate. Such formality and the dominance of the discussion by government officials is likely to be echoed also at the CACS, as these follow a similar set up, and thus to weaken their representativeness.

The analysis of the everyday practices of participatory processes brings to question presuppositions about their representativeness and impact on inclusion/exclusion dynamics. The various anecdotes indicate that even at the points where community interests and local government meet, planned processes interact with, and are transformed by existing power relations in local society. Invited spaces such as the CACS and local forums are social interfaces between different actors and their competing interests and are sites for the negotiation of outcomes of interventions. This appears not to have been taken into consideration in the programme design, which was based on the idea that the creation of spaces for interaction would guarantee representative participation.

3.2.3 Institutionalisation and legitimisation processes: the coming to life of the PDI

The third major set of assumptions on which the programme is based follows from the previous two. It refers to the idea that once local government officials have produced a local integrated development plan, with the participation of various local actors, the Integrated Development Plan (PDI) will come to life. In other words, it is assumed that the PDI will be implementable, will become institutionalised and legitimate. The institutionalisation of the PDI depends on a number of factors. They include the sustainability of the spaces for participation - CACS, Forums and the ODAs, which was mentioned repeatedly as a key ingredient for the success of decentralisation in reforming governance. As I have shown, the future and effectiveness of these spaces in turn, hinge on a number of factors, including their

representativeness and buy-in. On the other hand, whether the PDI is implementable depends on several conditions such as human and material resources and monitoring mechanisms being in place.

My observation of everyday practices suggests that these are aspects that decentralisation support programmes, as they are currently conceived, can do little about. Aid actors, as the implementing partners to the GoA´s decentralisation process, have had little influence on the design of actual decentralisation policies or on the pace and resource allocation for their execution. These have been primarily government driven, and as I have shown, rather erratic. For instance, the hastened decision to allocate funds to all municipalities in 2009, including those without local development plans, created concern among aid actors about lacking local capacity. The actual implementation of this decision turned out to be weak for this very reason. Yet, aid actors' critiques achieved little in terms of reversing the decision. In the case of Matala, the establishment of the PDI with its specified development objectives was not matched by the necessary yearly budget for implementation.

This gap between programme intentions and the available means often reached extremes. An anecdote of an encounter with a senior local government official exemplifies this point.

"The decentralisation programme has given us an organisational heritage through the ODAs and the PDI. This document is the official guideline for the actions to be taken for the development of our municipality. It is useful. But we only have one paper copy here in the administration. Every time I need it, I have to go and ask the Administrator to borrow it. It's a large document and so far we did not have funds to make copies, not even to disseminate it among the communal administrations. Besides, we have had enormous difficulties to implement the programme as defined in the PDI. Soon I will have to stand up at the Municipal Forum and explain to people why we have not done the things that we said we would do. They will wonder where the money went. If I say that the money did not come, they might not believe me."[52]

Programme staff felt this detracted from the perceived value of the DESHUCU programme.

Most significantly however, this touches upon what is likely to be the most serious misconception of decentralisation support programmes. That is, the effects of implementation practices on the legitimacy of local governments. Contrary to the theoretical intentions of such interventions, the inability of the local administration to deliver on commitments made during the trajectory of the decentralisation process has risked damaging its legitimacy vis-à-vis local communities. Moreover, it also reveals that decentralisation programmes are too limited to influence policy and decision making at a national level, to reverse such trends. Tvedten and Orre (2003: 68) make a similar observation about the modest impact outsiders can have on the restructuring of the state into local autarchies (p. 68).

The implementation of established local development plans is also affected by factors inherent to the intervention logic of aid programmes. Their duration has emerged several times now, as a major one. DESHUCU staff was under a clear time pressure to accelerate the process of the Matala PDI due to the duration of the funding contract. Many important steps were only implemented superficially in order to meet deadlines. For instance many of the ODAs and ODA federations were created without in-depth consultation or widespread participation from communities, in order to finalise the PDI in time for it to be presented and approved at the Municipal Forum. At the actual Forum, participants that raised issues outside of the agenda points were repeatedly told that the phase of needs assessment had passed and that they should now focus on the issue at hand - the approval of the vision statement. In this sense, participation appears to involve a certain form of control and disciplining. Programme

staff recognised the negative effect of such practices on the legitimisation of the process, yet felt impotent to address it.

Also relevant was the reliance of the programme design on the development of personal relationships between programme staff, the administration's personnel and local communities. The programme took a major blow when the two key staff left their positions within the first year of implementation.

Most of the defined Integrated Development Plans are currently under implementation and the national decentralisation process is ongoing. In that respect it is still early to make inferences about the future implementation of the PDI and the sustainability of the various participation spaces. [53] What is clear from the examination of implementation realities is that the PDI will not come to life if material resources, human capacity and political commitment are not forthcoming. The legitimisation of the PDI process and of local government does not follow automatically from the programme methodology and design. As I have shown, decentralisation practices can be more damaging than beneficial for the legitimacy of the whole process and for local governments, by creating expectations that cannot be met.

4. Life after the Integrated Development Plan (PDI)

Having hinted at the constraints for the implementation of the PDI, I now discuss what has happened since the approval of the plan. By focusing on life after the PDI, I want to turn the discussion about decentralisation towards the actual impact of reforms on local government and local communities. This raises important questions about aid actor's overwhelming support to decentralisation in post-conflict reconstruction.

The PDI for Matala for 2009-2013 resulted in the elaboration of detailed sectoral plans (a total of 16), the definition of 38 projects, and over 266 short to medium term activities. Projects range from rehabilitation of economic infrastructure such as roads and local industry, to micro-finance projects for female heads of household. They mostly refer to future projects rather than to existing projects awaiting completion. For instance, the building of new health posts is planned for, but not the solving of the deadlock surrounding the opening of the new hospital which has been ready since late 2008 but continues to await inauguration (ANGOP, 2008 , Amaro, 2010). Failure to address these outstanding issues may be a missed opportunity to build local legitimacy. At the time of writing, the annual evaluation meeting of the first year of implementation of the PDI had not yet taken place. However, interviews at the end of 2009 and early 2010 indicated that very little had been implemented. Local projects that were recently completed were either under way prior to the PDI, or were funded outside of it.[54] The reasons behind this slow implementation can be divided into the lack of resources and the lack of political will. It is unclear how local administrations will raise the funds needed for the various activities established in the plan. From the funding sources specified in the PDI document, the decentralisation budget (of 5 million per year for 5 years) only covers some 6% of total requirements (Governo da Provincia da Huíla, 2008). The Government´s Municipal Management Improvement Programme (PMGM) through which these decentralisation funds were paid out, was officially suspended in the first half of 2010, as a result of the financial crisis and lack of capacity (MDP, 2010: 2). The GoA is only now turning attention to mechanisms through which local governments can raise own funds.

The erratic changes in official policy regarding local governance are now broadly perceived as a lack of political will to implement decentralisation reforms. This is most apparent in the continued delay in the scheduling of local autarchic elections. There is less confidence now that local autarchies will eventually be established, than in earlier years when key legal instruments were approved (such as the 2007 decree). This is the case in spite of

some *de facto* deconcentration of bureaucratic responsibilities. As explained earlier, other recent political developments such as the elections and the new constitution and electoral law, indicate that political power is being centralised and concentrated in the hands of a small political elite and of the MPLA. Elite capture at provincial and municipal levels continues, as exemplified by the dominance of government and MPLA officials of spaces such as the CACS (Yilmaz and Felicio, 2009). This process is deeply rooted in the political and administrative culture of government (Tvedten and Orre, 2003: 57). Although these political processes are apparent from the everyday practices of decentralisation support, they are masked in the dominant discourses of aid actors and government.

Unintended effects of aid

Further to explaining the limitations of programmes in fulfilling their theoretical intentions, it is essential to also examine what other changes have happened as a result of planned interventions, in order to better understand the impact of decentralisation support. From the analysis of the underlying assumptions of decentralisation, it emerges that such changes do not follow normative expectations, but mostly come about unintended. Capacity-building events and invited spaces such as the ODAs, CACS and Forums, became arenas for the interaction and negotiation between different actors, from which new power constellations may emerge. Decentralisation events may not automatically lead to greater representativeness or participation, but often provide opportunities for individuals to experiment new ways of relating to others or to break away from cultural practices. At the Municipal Forum, a local government official felt 'safe' to publicly reprimand a fellow colleague for his lack of involvement in the PDI formulation phase, thereby breaching a norm of behaviour amongst co-workers. In several workshops, unlikely discussions on sensitive issues such as government malpractice or corruption emerged. Stories about local business men using payments from government contracts to buy new cars, and about money being spent irresponsibly by senior officials were frequent.

The creation of these new political spaces is perhaps the most encouraging of changes associated with decentralisation. But as various authors have argued, they should not be overestimated. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006: 49) explain that they tend to represent the potential for change in governance practices and poverty reduction, rather than actual achievements. In order to reap the potential benefits of such spaces, there is also a need for political will from the state, strong, legally empowered design; and effective mobilisation and representation by citizens to enter and use them (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007b, Benequista, 2010). My analysis of centralisation practices corroborates Orre's (2009: 13) argument that *"...the identification of the potential for increased voice and accountability does not automatically mean that the current institutional and legal framework will bring out the full potential envisaged for the discourse on democratic decentralisation and participatory local governance. Hence, this observation should not be taken as a confirmation that the right institutional recipe has been found in Angola, and that it is now a mere question of emending the current practices."*

Another unintended outcome of interventions is that changes to working practices came from unexpected corners. I found that innovative ideas were often put forward by young civil servants or NGO extension workers, rather than from higher-ranking power-holders. It was precisely these younger civil servants that were most enthusiastic and committed to the decentralisation process. It is important therefore, to examine how these actors find room for manoeuvre within wider political dynamics. For many, being sent to a workshop was more than obeying authority, it was also about professional status, gaining a voice, and simply breaking the routine. However, the design of the programme and the broader decentralisation process target almost exclusively the senior government staff, because of their perceived

power to make changes. For instance, the government's Institute of Local Administration Training (IFAL), focuses on senior public officials, neglecting the training needs to lower level staff (Yilmaz and Felicio, 2009).[55] Moreover, contrary to what may be expected due to the existing hierarchy and internal competition, several senior officials expressed support for greater involvement of young people. By side-lining young bureaucrats, programmes are likely miss opportunities for mobilisation within the administrations.

The recent political developments in the decentralisation process combined with the unintended outcomes of aid programmes described above, raise questions about the policies and practices of aid actors is decentralisation support. The recent slowdown of the implementation of reforms indicates a half-hearted commitment of the GoA to decentralisation. However, aid practices were hardly adjusted to these realities. Moreover, the case of DESHUCU showed that normative approaches to decentralisation fail to take into consideration the multiple and competing motivations of different actors. The result is that their underlying assumptions are rarely retained. At stake is the future role of aid organisations in supporting the decentralisation process as it unfolds.

CONCLUSION

Decentralisation has been an important part of Angola's national reconstruction and state-building efforts. The process has been largely state-led and donor encouraged, receiving considerable support from external actors. Since the end of the war, the government has taken significant steps in terms of policy formulation and legislation. The overall decentralisation process has nonetheless been rather erratic. The implementation of reforms has followed the ebbs and flows of broader political developments taking place in the country. Particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 legislative elections, it appears to be slowing down considerably. This is raising serious questions about the political commitment of the GoA to see the implementation of local autarchies through to its end.

Decentralisation support programmes typically involve capacity-building of local civil servants, and the promotion of citizen participation and consultation, with the aim of improving state-society relations and promoting development. I have argued that such rationale is based on normative expectations about the links between planned activities and governance outcomes. Based on the analysis of the everyday practices of decentralisation, through the specific case of DESHUCU, I showed that these do not accurately reflect how reforms actually impact on local governments and populations.

Implicit assumptions are translated into the design of decentralisation support initiatives and are reproduced in the practices of aid organisations involved in their implementation. I identified three broad sets of such assumptions. They refer firstly to capacity-related issues, secondly, to participatory spaces and processes, and thirdly to legitimisation and institutionalisation processes. By looking at specific events and programme activities, I have shown that most of these assumptions are not retained at the interfaces between different actors with their own interests and agendas - local communities, civil servants and aid workers.

Decentralisation programmes become part of local political dynamics. They are also affected by broader political processes, such as the apparent lack of government commitment to the *de facto* decentralisation of power and resources. As a result, interventions and outcomes are transformed in unintended ways. Programme events for instance, became the sites of ongoing power struggles, but also represented opportunities for individuals to break away from cultural practices and experiment with new forms of interaction. These processes are overlooked in programme designs. The built-in bias towards high ranking government

officials resulted in missed opportunities for change through enthusiastic young civil servants for instance. Moreover, programme established structures did not automatically improve representativeness or participation as intended. More significantly, rather than strengthening the legitimacy of local government, decentralisation reforms in Matala have negatively affected it. Changes in the political environment resulted in severe resource shortages for the implementation of the local development plan, thus creating unmet expectations.

In spite of these implementation realities, aid practices have not been adjusted and decentralisation continues to be widely promoted among aid actors. Implementing organisations are aware that the sustainability and institutionalisation of their activities is compromised by these factors, particularly by the GoA. The question then is why they continue to engage in this form of state-building. I argue that decentralisation is serving the interests and political agendas of both donors and the Angolan government, but not of local communities, whose problems remain largely unaddressed. Donors' interests are being fulfilled through increased engagement with the GoA and supposed improvements in governance practices. The government's political agenda of improving its image is in turn fulfilled through decentralisation as a controlled political reform that does not require central government to be weakened. These interests are mutually reinforcing in legitimating the actions of both actors, irrespective of the failure to solve the problems of the people. The inherent assumptions and standardised methodologies of decentralisation support, suggest that in practice programmes represent more of a 'blueprint approach' to state building in post-conflict states than the 'reconstruction from below' model to which they supposedly aspire.

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[1] These include technical assistance programmes and community-based development, and are addressed in Chapters 5 and 8 respectively.

[2] She arrives at these presuppositions by firstly comparing theoretical definitions of monitoring and evaluation, by identifying the steps generally considered necessary for monitoring, and lastly by asking what the pre-conditions and capacities for achieving the expected outputs are (Guijt, 2008: 52).

[3] Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Malawi, Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Vietnam.

[4] See also Chapter 6 for a review of critiques made to the decentralisation of basic service provision.

[5] Interview on 05 January 2010, Lubango.

[6] LUPP was preceded by another project that became influential in the establishment of local development organisations and development forums, the Luanda Urban Rehabilitation and Micro Enterprise Project (LURE). This was implemented by CARE in an urban neighbourhood of the capital.

[7] The PAR had a significant component of support for reconstruction at municipal level, including infrastructure and administrative capacity.

[8] The FAS is an autonomous government institution, created in 1994 to support the government with poverty alleviation activities, particularly social and economic infrastructure. See Chapter 8 for more on this.

[9] As mentioned in Chapter 1, amongst the most controversial aspects in the constitutional reform process were those related to the national symbols, the balance with the government system, the election procedure of the President, and land issues (Filipe, 2010, Lusa, 2010).

[10] In practical terms this means for instance, that the municipal level is charged with elaborating and executing the municipal development plan (according to Law 2/07) whereas the communal level merely contributes with proposals referring to its territorial domain, such as the budget, to be integrated into the municipal plans.

[11] Provincial directorates (*Direcções Provinciais)* were created and made accountable to the provincial governor rather than to central ministries, supposedly moving them closer to local problems. The Ministries of Finance, Interior and Justice have retained their Provincial Delegations and account directly to their line Ministries at central level.

[12] Author's translation of the heading of Law 2/07 of 03 January.

[13] Author´s own translation from the Portuguese *Conselhos de Auscultação e Concertação Social*. These have commonly been translated to *Councils of Community Consultation and Cooperation* (Orre, 2009), but due to their questionable community representativeness, explained further on, I have opted for the literal translation of the term ´social´.

[14] Heading VI of the Constitution (Articles 213 to 225) addresses local power institutions under 3 chapters that refer to the general principles, local autarchies and traditional institutions, respectively (GoA, 2010).

[15] Interview with country director of CARE Angola, 04 December 2007, Lubango.

[16] Discussion with administration staff of Lubango, Matala and Kwanhama Municipalities at decentralisation workshop, 10 July 2008, Lubango.

[17] Interview, 10 December 2009, Matala.

[18] Email exchange with Programme Director of a national NGO, 28 January 2010.
[19] In the biannual plan of the government for 2005/6 and in law 02/07 respectively.
[20] Decentralisation is being supported by FAS in Chibia and Humpata and CARE in Lubango and Matala.
[21] It was through this law that the Fund for Municipal Management Support (FUGEM) was established, to finance services and investments prioritised locally in the 68 pilot municipalities (Yilmaz and Felicio, 2009).
[22] Interview with country director of INGO, Lubango, 04 December 2007.
[23] Interview with Head of Planning Division of Matala's Municipal Administration, 10 December 2010, Matala.
[24] In 2004 and 2005, provincial governments accounted for only around 15% of national expenditures, whilst the central government structure accounted for 84.5% and 84.7% (Mac Dowell et al., 2006: 19). Moreover, in 2005, local government revenues contributed with only 13% of the total local revenues collected by the state (in the value of 9.522,2 million USD), in contrast to 75% from oil companies and 12% from other sources (ibid: 30).
[25] Email exchange about the new Constitution, with Programme Director of a national NGO working with decentralisation, 28 January 2010.
[26] The role of chiefdom in decentralisation and governance reforms has been debated for the case of Sierra Leone in 3 notable articles with distinct arguments, by Richards (2005a), Fanthorpe (2005) and Jackson (2006).
[27] See footnote 15.
[28] Specified in Articles 21, 54 & 76 respectively.
[29] This structure is similar at the other two levels, although at provincial level, it is the Governor that presides the forum, and labour unions are also invited.
[30] For instance, a Practical Manual published by FAS, mentions the CACS and the Forums exchangeably (FAS, 2007: 18).
[31] The header stated: Ministry of Territorial Administration, Government of the Province on Huíla, Municipal Administration of Matala.
[32] Law Decree 09/08 established a division of municipalities between 3 categories (A, B and C) according to i) the degree of socio-economic development, ii) population density and iii) resource potential. Benefits are given to attract staff, up to 50% of salary for category B (Yilmaz and Felicio, 2009: 15).
[33] I use the Portuguese acronym PDI (*Plano de Desenvolvimento Integrado)* to avoid confusion with the English acronym IDP, which is commonly used to refer to Internally Displaced Persons. These plans are defined under Law 17/99 as Municipal Guiding Plans *(Plano Director Municipal)* but there is no standardized model. They are referred to by different names by various organizations and in distinct localities. The PAR uses ´Programme and Plan for Municipal Rehabilitation´, and FAS uses ´Municipal Development Plans´.
[34] Interview with SNV Country Director, 19 February 2008, Luanda.
[35] Interview with SNV Regional Director, 25 June 2007, Lubango.
[36] These made up the Project team together with a driver, and responded to the Programme Coordinator in Lubango.
[37] I use the acronym ODA, from the Portuguese *Organizações de Desenvolvimento das Aldeias*.
[38] Interview with Head of Social Sector of the Municipal Administration of Matala, Matala, 17 April 2008.
[39] This took place on the 3 October 2008.
[40] The coordinator attends meetings and represents the ODA outside the village, the secretary minutes the meetings, the treasurer is responsible for the management of money with the bank, the monitor controls the work and finances, and the advisors are consulted on several issues.
[41] CARE project official responsible for the community capacity building component. Meeting of project staff with the local administration, 23 April 2008, Matala.
[42] Interview with Head of Planning Division of Matala's Municipal Administration, 10 December 2010, Matala.
[43] Informal communication, National programme director and Workshop Facilitator, 10 July 2008.
[44] These took place in Lubango, from 07 to 11July 2008; in Matala from 15 to 16 July 2008; and in Matala on 17 July 2008 respectively.
[45] These were: small scale agriculture, local economy development, urbanisation and land use, basic social services, community/social development, capacity building of local administrations.
[46] Translated from the Portuguese "O que diz respeito a todos, por todos deve ser resolvido".
[47] Interview with Head of Planning Division of Matala's Municipal Administration, 10 December 2009, Matala.
[48] An official government communications, from a meeting of the Council of the MAT on 21 May 2009, recommends that all provincial governments accelerate the elaboration and approval of planning instruments for local administrations (MAT, 2009).
[49] Interview with staff member of CARE in Matala, 11 December 2009.
[50] Interview with CARE project team, 23 April 2008, Matala and with Project Coordinator in Matala, 11 December 2009, Matala.
[51] Head of Planning Division of Matala's Administration, PDI workshop, 11 July 2008, Lubango.
[52] Interview with Head of Planning Division of Municipal Administration, 10 December 2009, Matala.
[53] Monitoring and evaluation of the PDI includes regular reporting at the CACS, a yearly evaluation conference, and an intermediate evaluation through the Municipal Forum and a final evaluation by external actors (Governo da Provincia da Huíla, 2008).
[54] Examples include the building and equipping of the new local administration and the rehabilitation of the train line linking Matala to Lubango and Namibe.
[55] Interview with Programme Director of a national NGO, 29 December 2009, Lubango. IFAL is the main government instrument for the capacity building of human resources at local level, but is itself restricted to Luanda and suffers from many insufficiencies.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Everyday practices of institution-building: community-based institutions

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the everyday practices of institution-building interventions, with specific reference to community level institutions. This is the last of the three types of institution-building programmes, which I identified as being dominant in Angola´s post-war arena.[1] In line with previous chapters, I contrast aid approaches of the emergency period with those of the transition to reconstruction. I analyse how aid actors have perceived of and engaged with community-based institutions at different times and in different contexts of Angola's post-colonial history. Based on empirical data collected in various locations of Huíla province, examples of institution-strengthening programmes at community level are presented. The analysis once again highlights that the emergency approach largely neglected community institutions. The impact of this for longer-term efforts is thus analysed in relation to local capacities and aid practices. As explained earlier, it is since the conflict ended in 2002 that concerns with local institutional capacity have been explicitly addressed in the emerging state-building agenda. These have been extended to community-based institutions.

The transition from conflict to peace meant that aid organisations had to adjust to new realities on the ground. They had to consider how to best support local populations with resettlement in their areas of origin, the recovery of livelihoods and the broader reconstruction of their communities. The changes in how organisations related to local actors and institutions as they attempted to take on a more developmental approach are apparent from the various intervention types that emerged since the end of the war. In the post-conflict phase many adopted a locally-grounded approach to reconstruction, rooted in the notions of community-based or community-driven development (CBD or CDD), participation and empowerment. The majority of NGO projects, whether explicitly working on the organising aspects of communities or not, base their interaction with beneficiaries on the creation or strengthening of some sort of collectivity of community members. These are broadly referred to as Community-based Organisations (CBOs). In such perspectives, CBOs are conceptualised as agents of local change and development and as the link between local society and state institutions. CBOs are intended to become institutionalised and last beyond the project life. I therefore treat them as local institutions, without making a judgement about their degree of legitimacy and sustainability, which as this chapter will show, vary significantly.

The rationale of participatory community-based approaches is not new and has been the subject of extensive debate since gaining prominence in the 1980s. However, empirical analysis of the impact and practices of such approaches is still lacking. This gap is particularly evident in what concerns the role of CBOs in post-conflict transitional contexts, where they are increasingly promoted. This chapter addresses this analytical gap by examining key questions. What happens to these community-based groups after they have been established or once aid programmes end? What differences exist, if any, in the intended roles of various models of CBOs? In how far do they achieve their intended objectives? What assumptions underline approaches to community-development? As I shall elaborate, these largely fail to achieve the broadened objectives of strengthening local capacity and democratic participation. This relates to the fact that they continue to lean on simplistic images of community and on assumptions about participation, empowerment and institutional transformation, in spite of the multiple times these have been disproven. I examine the reasons for this. The lack of incentive for alternative intervention models and the symbolic and moral value of community participation emerge as important drivers of participatory approaches to reconstruction. I start by critically reviewing the rationale for participatory community-based approaches in humanitarian, transitional and development interventions. This is followed by a characterisation of aid approaches to community institutions during the emergency and in the post-conflict period in Angola.

1. Rationale of participatory community-based interventions

Participatory community development is a central concept in aid discourse and practice. It has become widely known as community–based development (CBD). The term community-driven development (CDD) is sometimes used to refer to a subset of CBD interventions, specifically involving the empowerment of community groups (ADB, 2006). I use CBD as the overarching term for participatory community-based approaches. The notions and values on which it is based are however not new. For a long time, the potential role of local people´s involvement in development efforts has been at the core of aid policy discussions and practices. The endorsement of participatory methods in development projects gained momentum in the 1980s with the promotion of people-centred development through the work of influential authors such as Chambers' (1983) 'Putting the Last First' and Cernea´s (1985) 'Putting People First´.

Concerns with community participation in rural development circles were reflected in two broad approaches. One focused on the role of community participation in increasing the efficiency of planned interventions - the interventionist approach (Nuijten, 1992). The other on the empowering potential of participation in decision making about development processes (ibid). In other words, participation came to symbolise a fundamental right aimed at collective action, empowerment and institution–building (Pretty, 1995: 1251). The second modality of participation in governance rather than in project implementation alone became more prominent from the end of the 1990s (Gaventa, 2004). Such trend was influenced by the shrinking role of the state in service provision (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007b). It followed the failure of large government-led programmes and the subsequent structural adjustment reforms of the 1980s. These precipitated the need to find alternative aid channels with direct links to beneficiaries. Such emerging orthodoxy in development praxis stressed participation, empowerment, bottom-up, indigenous knowledge, and process rather than blueprint projects (Stirrat and Henkel, 1997: 67).

The participation trend has accompanied the rise of democracy and good-governance agendas, which conceive of popular participation as a political tool to achieve changes. In this rationale, civil society is attributed a key role in promoting a participatory culture (Stiglitz, 2002). Democratic participation continues to be central in the currently dominant liberal democracy model that is promoted internationally. The 'deepening democracy project', as described by Gaventa (2007: x, xii), implies participation beyond superficial political processes, towards a more "*substantive and empowered"* participation, where *"citizens exercise ever-deepening control over decisions which affect their lives through a number of forms and in a variety of arenas."* Many of the intervention types found on the ground in post-conflict contexts are based on this approach, promoting participation *in* and *for* governance, rather than on the more straight forward interventionist approach.

1.1 The promises and myths of community participation

There are several reasons why popular participation is seen as beneficial and has been so widely embraced in development circles. The involvement of community members and local knowledge is expected to improve the targeting of interventions, their cost-effectiveness, to strengthen the sense of ownership, accountability and legitimacy, and ultimately to ensure sustainability. Interventions that advocate for participation ultimately intend to have an empowering effect on the communities they aim to benefit.

Participation in practice has different meanings and can take different forms. Relations of power between people and their motivations to participate are affected to different degrees. Arnstein (1969) captured these differences in a typology of citizen participation, later adapted by Pretty (1995) to development programmes and projects. They range from 'manipulative

participation' - a make-believe form of participation, to 'citizen control' – where citizens have actual decision making power over the use and management of resources and can act independently of external actors, what Pretty calls 'self-mobilisation'.[2] For Arnstein (1969), participation remains tokenistic when it is limited to information giving and consultation, as citizens have no real power to change the status quo. It is only above these levels on the participation ladder that citizens are given differing degrees of decision-making power (ibid). Participatory efforts of aid agencies have been criticised for being in the tokenistic category. Bad practices such as the tendency for empowerment activities to involve men, the better-off and those of higher-status groups, rather than women, the worse-off and of lower status, have had exclusionary and marginalising effects for the poorer and most vulnerable community members (Chambers, 1997).

The various concepts on which the participation discourse is based – community, collective action and social capital, and empowerment – are loaded with different meanings and levels of complexity. These also shape how participatory programmes are conceived of and unfold. Again, they are not new concepts and have thus been debated extensively in the social sciences. However, they deserve attention because as I will show, they continue to inform aid practices on the ground.

Community

Implicit in the majority of aid interventions are ideas of what constitutes community based on an identifiable, homogenous group, or a social unit, usually geographically-bound and ideally, with coinciding administrative and social boundaries. Such images lend themselves to the normative aspects such as unity, solidarity, mutual help and constructive collective action, which make the concept appealing and desirable for participatory approaches (Strand et al., 2003: 13). However, they obscure the fact that communities are heterogeneous and unequal. In Angola, communities were redefined, re-assigned and relocated as a result of the war (Stites and Leaning, 2002) and of other social processes. In Huíla, physical location was rarely a defining aspect of community identity as villages had often moved places over the years, either for environmental, economic or political reasons. Additionally, divisions within communities emerge along several lines. The most evident include gender, age, economic status, ethnicity, or religious. Within Angola's conflict history, additional categories are important, such as political-affiliation (MPLA/UNITA), status (ex-soldier/civilian), origin (resident/displaced), occupation, level of schooling, etc. As I shall elaborate, the diversity within communities plays into local power relations and processes of inclusion and exclusion. It is therefore central to how aid interventions unfold on the ground. Cleaver (1999) proposes that community is better understood as *"...the site of both solidarity and conflict, shifting alliances, power and social structures."* (p. 604). She further argues that conceptions of community in development circles tend to overlook the interplay between agency and structure in social action. Communities are imagined as having endless pools of resourcefulness with little consideration for the realities of structural constraints.

Social Capital

Social capital is commonly used to refer to those aspects or ingredients of social organisation and in relationships within society that enable collective action and cooperation for pursuing common interests. These include networks, norms and social trust (Putnam, 1993).[3] Community-based approaches assume that some social capital exists or that it can be created through participatory activities. Social capital is also linked to characteristics of local societies, normally associated with problematic aspects of social organisation, such as

patronage systems, corruption and conflict (Fine, 1999, Richards et al., 2004). These sit uncomfortably with the notion of empowerment promoted in development circles.

Moreover, social capital is not equally available to all members of a society or community and is thus better seen as an individual rather than collective resource. For Bourdieu (1986), social capital *"is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships"*. These are not a given but are a form of power through which inequalities are (re)produced. The network is *"the product of investment strategies, individual or collective, consciously or unconsciously aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships that are directly usable in the short or long term"* (ibid). Power as defined by Max Weber is relational and unequally distributed, so that the ability to obtain economic, social and political resources differs (Marshall, 1998: 518). It is produced in the interaction of people and institutions (Nuijten, 2005). In an analysis of social capital building in rural communities of Angola, Yngstrom (2004) shows that processes of strengthening social capital can be positive for certain groups, whilst simultaneously excluding others, such as IDPs or women.

Empowerment

Also linked to the participation discourse is the notion of empowerment. Grass-roots organisations and social movements around the world have embraced it as a means to achieve their objectives of social justice, or as their very *raison d'être.* Many have found inspiration in works with marginalised groups, such as Paulo Freire's 'Pedagogy of the Oppressed' (1970), which advocated for unity among the oppressed and for education as a tool for their liberation. Implicit in such ideas are two major aspects of empowerment: empowerment through voice and participation, and empowerment through the control of resources.

In CBD approaches, the allocation of funds directly to the communities is an essential part of the empowerment process, as these are supposed to be directly decided upon and managed by the community. They presume that this will contribute to achieving inclusive and sustainable poverty reduction (ADB, 2006). Besides the transfer of resources however, CBD programmes are vague about the mechanisms through which empowerment is supposed to take place.

One of the core critiques of aid interventions in their application of participatory principles has been the neglect of issues of power. As I shall argue, empowering aspirations of participation go to the heart of relations of power and are inherently political. Cleaver (1999: 597) describes participation as 'act of faith' in development, precisely because it implies an unquestioned belief that it is inherently a good thing. Its success is depicted as primarily dependent on using the right techniques, whilst issues of power and politics are considered undesirable and to be avoided. Dudley (1993: 160) frames this paradox as follows: *"The romantic view of participation focuses on the personal fulfilment which it can bring. But true participation is about power, and the exercise of power is politics. This kind of participation inevitably becomes simply a manifestation of a broader political process. If community participation is to be encouraged as an end in itself, it cannot be divorced from its political context and consequences."*. Notwithstanding such perspectives, just how individuals should empower themselves and their communities through aid projects remains 'conveniently fuzzy' and depoliticised (Cleaver, 1999: 599). The empowerment discourse was accompanied by a parallel trend which portrayed NGOs as the appropriate vehicles for empowerment and development because of their supposed depoliticised nature.[4]

In this chapter I wish to shed light on how aid programmes go about pursuing the empowerment of beneficiary communities in practice, and deal with these political dynamics. These simplistic interpretations of participatory processes continue to inform practices of aid agencies despite their widely known limitations. I argue that this does not simply relate to a

lack of understanding of community dynamics by practitioners and policy makers, but also to factors linked to the development and structure of the aid system. These include the dichotomy between relief and development approaches; the imprint of aid practices during crises on recovery efforts; assumptions about what planned interventions can achieve, and the symbolic value of participation. I elaborate on these below, starting with a review of community involvement in aid practices during the emergency.

1.2 Humanitarian aid and community involvement

The adoption of notions such as beneficiary participation and capacity-building in the rhetoric of humanitarian relief and recovery was slower than in development circles, particularly in its translation into practices on the ground. However, concerns with making humanitarian aid more developmental put this issue on organisations' agendas (Minear, 2002, Suhrke, 2002, Christoplos, 2004, Hilhorst, 2005b). As explained in Chapter 3, such concerns with accountability are reflected in various instruments and methodological innovation tools such as the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, The Code of Conduct, and the Sphere Standards. The latter for instance specifically lists participation as its "Common Standard 1".[5] As statements of intention, these have not however, been able to resolve the critique that humanitarian interventions perform poorly in adapting and responding to needs specific to each context. The 'reconstruction from below' paradigm introduced earlier, draws on notions of the community-driven development tradition, promoting a people-oriented model of reconstruction that is local, bottom-up and context-specific, and that includes non-state institutions and supports endogenous development and local ownership (Hilhorst et al., 2010: 1109). On the ground, this approach is problematic because it is based on various untested assumptions about socio-economic conditions and the (un)trustworthiness of local institutions, as well as being conditioned by problems internal to the aid system that affect agencies´ capacity to adjust to local contexts (ibid: 1119). As I will show in this chapter, this trend is recognisable in the Angolan context, where community-based approaches have gained prominence since the end of the war but struggle to respond to the needs in the transition.

1.3 Community-participation in the transition to peace

In conflict and post-conflict contexts, the interest in community-based approaches has been largely influenced by the dominant reconstruction and peace-building discourses, or the "participation in governance" approach described above. These state-building agendas advocate for the democratisation of political systems and societies, through state institutional reforms and increased spaces for citizen participation, as seen in the case of decentralisation policies in the previous chapter.

CBD and CDD have been widely promoted by the aid community. The World Bank defines CDD as representing *"a bottom-up approach to development and poverty reduction, based on the participation and empowerment of economically poor people."* (Strand et al., 2003: 11). Similarly to other major aid agencies, it is a proponent of community-based approaches as the appropriate alternative to make the transition from relief to rehabilitation and development in conflict contexts. The Asian Development Bank explicitly promotes a CDD approach in situations of local institutional failure, including post-conflict and post-disaster contexts, because *"… it allows for micro-level recovery, building of social cohesion, and a rapid and efficient use of emergency resources."* (ADB, 2006: 11-12). The potential of CDD to address the challenges of war-affected countries is justified as *"contributing to social and governance outcomes, while building infrastructure assets."* (World Bank, 2006: 6). These challenges refer to the disruption of social networks and the fragmentation of societies,

high levels of inequality, weak government institutions, low levels of trust, and the lack of social service infrastructure.[6] The peace-building potential of CDD is thus linked to an extensive list of additional objectives: improvements in governance by strengthening links between communities, government and civil society; the stimulation of economic recovery; and the facilitation of reconciliation and conflict resolution activities.

Programme documents and accounts of aid workers indicate that even before the end of the war, this approach was being promoted in Angola, albeit more rhetorically than in practice. A DFID-commissioned report explicitly recommended that donors support participatory approaches to poverty-reduction as a form of peacebuilding. *"Tackling poverty and peace-building need a common approach. [...] In both cases the process of change is enhanced by empowering marginalised communities to influence their political environment, beginning at the local level. [...] The community participatory approach therefore reflects a convergence of the aims and methods of effective humanitarian relief, urban regeneration, sustainable development and peace-building."* (Howen, 2001: 44).

A typical CBD approach in conflict-affected countries involves the support to the establishment of Social Funds. Characteristically, these programmes involve *"national NGOs or other associations working with community groups/councils to identify community infrastructure needs and to prepare sub-project proposals. The proposals are submitted to the NGO or agency, which in addition to being responsible for facilitating local initiatives also handles the distribution of resources funding the local sub-projects."* (Strand et al., 2003: 25). This modality within the World Bank was also applied in Angola through the Social Support Fund - FAS. The FAS started in 1994, but its conflict and community-development components were only specifically incorporated into its third phase, after the 2002 peace.[7] Implementation reports of the FAS show regional variation in results and indicate several limitations. For instance, incentives for the mobilisation and participation of community and government at the macro-level have been lacking. The sustainability of the groups and the coordination and engagement with other social sectors has also been weak (Strand et al., 2003, World Bank, 2006). Similar problems in other countries are frequently reported even in the documents of major donors and proponents of CDD and CBD approaches (ADB, 2006). Yet, they continue to be the *"fastest-growing mechanisms for assistance"* for donors and agencies alike (ibid: 1). The obvious question is why this is so. Critiques tend to focus on operational constraints, rather than looking at practices of CBD, or how agencies respond to them. This chapter aims to contribute to this knowledge gap.

1.4 The how: Community-Based Organisations (CBOs)

The participation paradigm within the aid sector shifted debates from whether to involve local communities to how to go about 'doing' development in a participatory way. This raised fundamental challenges for policy-makers and practitioners. Should aid organisations work with existing institutions, and if so, under what circumstances, or should they seek new forms of organisation? Arguments for the involvement of existing institutions and organisational forms to promote sustainability and ownership are countered by the risk that they will be co-opted by local elites, reinforce existing unequal power relations, or fail to reach the most vulnerable households or individuals. These debates have implied an increase in attention to aspects of organisation of rural people and local-level groups through which aid interventions might engage with their intended beneficiaries.

CBOs are a key element and the main channel for the implementation of CBD, given that they are the interface of the community, local government and aid agencies. CBOs are commonly defined as either formal or informal voluntary organisations whose members, usually from the same village or area ('the community'), come together voluntarily around a specific interest. They are separate from government and different from NGOs (Dongier et al,

2002 in Strand et al., 2003). I use the term CBO loosely to include all types of groups formed at local level, whether institutionalised or one-off arrangements, endogenous or exogenously created. In some cases CBOs are intended simply for mobilising local people to achieve project objectives. In the governance focused interventions however, they are often explicit objectives, intended to last beyond the project life. In CBD discourse, the creation of CBOs is expected to *"build trust among the involved parties and aid the post-conflict reconciliation process."* (Strand et al., 2003: 41). CBOs, like local governments, are key elements of the longer-term institution building enterprise (Krishna, 2003: 369). In conflict and post-conflict contexts, CBOs often emerge out of a need to address the void left by the absence of state institutions and to organise aid delivery. Richards et al (2004) for example, attribute the origin of Village Development Committees in Sierra Leone, to NGOs operating in the power vacuum of the late 1990s emergency, in order to mobilise local resources and labour. In Angola this was also the case, although the establishment of CBOs became more common after the end of the conflict.

Important critiques have been made of the way community-level institutions are conceived of in aid interventions. CBD implicitly assumes that community groups are the best channel for representation and that this form of representative democracy is the best model of participation (Cleaver, 1999). Nuijten (1992: 202) highlights the problematic tendency of aid agencies to see local organisations through formal bureaucratic organisation and rationality lenses. This results in the inability to understand *"the dynamics of existing or emerging forms of organisation"* that do not conform to preconceived notions of a local organisation. As shall be seen in the examples that follow, this formalisation tendency dominates practices. CBOs are created along formal structures with specific requirements (such as quotas for women participants) and functions (typically a president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer and advisors). Although CBOs are conceived according to formal lines, they rarely become (legally) formalised, which as I will argue, can also be problematic for their legitimacy for example, vis-à-vis the state. Cleaver (1999) contends that there is a paradox in the tendency of aid interventions to focus on formal institutions. On the one hand, formalised institutions are considered stronger, whilst on the other they follow a similar model of the same (bureaucratic) institutions that are seen as inadequate in addressing needs. Hilhorst et al (2010) argue that local institutions outside the formal realm are increasingly recognised by aid actors, but that they continue to be mistrusted and engagement with them limited.

The persistence of community-based approaches among the aid community in spite of these well-known critiques is partly explained by the fact that alternative approaches, such as more serious investment in needs assessments are not readily available or encouraged. Agencies rarely get negative evaluations of these intervention models that result in reduced future funding and thus have little incentive to innovate. It appears that for political reasons within the aid system, participation ambitions underlying CBD approaches have a legitimising effect like no other, regardless of how these actually unfold in practice. This is also partly informed by the perceptions and lack of trust of the aid community in existing local institutions, including state services and local organisations, as discussed in Chapter 6.

2. Community institutions in Angola's emergency

In previous chapters I described the lack of participatory tradition and experience of citizens in political life and decision-making processes in Angola. The effects of colonial rule and of the single-party system were key determinants in this, as were the eruption of the civil war, and the subsequent failed peace-building efforts. The earlier analysis of the decentralisation process showed that in the current political context too, participation in governance and local

development efforts is at an embryonic stage. During the war years, social mobilisation by the government was largely limited to the (MPLA) party-based organisations such the women's and youth movements (OMA and JMPLA) (see Chapter 2). These lost prominence in the last decade of the war however, and have not had a significant role in social assistance since. The closest attempt at participatory approaches during the emergency involved rural development policies of the early 1980s, focused on local knowledge and capacity. They included the agricultural development institutions (EDAs) and farmer associations that were piloted in selected regions. According to Pacheco (2008b: 13) they *"...represented an attempt at participatory development on the basis of grassroots communities, without brutally destroying their traditional structures."*. These experiences were soon neglected in relation to other economic reforms and war efforts and were thus short-lived.[8] However, many NGOs in the reconstruction period are attempting to revive this system through agricultural recovery projects, as shall be seen. First I look at how aid actors engaged with local communities during the emergency.

2.1 Participatory relief?

During the emergency phase, humanitarian interventions in Angola were overall very limited in their support to community based institutions. Despite the rhetoric of humanitarian aid building local capacity and ownership, humanitarian organisations failed to uphold such principles. Attention to community participation was supply-driven and restricted to superficial assessments, often intended to validate and legitimate pre-conceived ideas of needs and pre-determined forms of assistance.

Accounts of aid workers and rural people alike, attest to the practice of what Arnstein (1969) qualifies as 'non-participation or tokenistic participation'. Community involvement was reduced either to information giving or consultation of aid recipients by humanitarian staff with the purpose of facilitating access to beneficiaries, as well as their identification, registration and the logistical organisation of activities. The overwhelming majority of aid during the war period fell into the humanitarian aid and relief category, rather than into capacity-building (Chapter 6).

Distribution mechanisms

Humanitarian aid was provided by the major international organisations, such as the WFP, ICRC, MSF, and partner NGOs, many of which also international. Distribution mechanisms outside of this standardised set up were rarely considered. The WFP for instance, worked with ration cards and beneficiary lists. These were compiled through a registration process conducted by humanitarian staff, where local community leaders would act as witnesses for enlisted beneficiaries. Many other NGOs involved in the distributing of relief items, either on behalf of the WFP or from other sources, did not carry out their own registration process. Instead, they obtained beneficiary lists directly from community leaders, the *Sobas*. Typically the *Soba* and the village secretary[9] were approached by aid organisations and requested a list of the families eligible for a relief distribution project. In several interviews with rural people in Huíla, there were claims of individuals having been excluded from beneficiary lists by the traditional leaders, due to personal disagreements or because they were demanded a fee, which they were unable or unwilling to pay.[10]

In the *bairro* of Catchope (Matala), the community coordinator explained that *"During the war, CARE distributed food here, but I never got any. It was meant for refugees and for residents. But even if you needed it, you´d have to be pushing people in queues because the distribution was only done in a short period. Besides, some village secretaries would ask for money to register your name. So I felt de-motivated to go."* Another member of the

community told me *"WFP worked at the Bembere bridge. I never gave my name for their lists. Here there was hunger but I coped with my own harvest and the sale of maize. I preferred not to waste my energy there. It was far and I knew I would have to pay the secretaries for them to register me."*[11]

Although I cannot assert that this is representative of a widespread practice of *Sobas*, what it does indicate is the potentially dangerous effects of uncritically relying on traditional institutions to reach beneficiaries, simply because they were assumed to be legitimate, representative and equitable. In some cases this also contributed to an accountability gap, whereby the *Sobas* depended less on the legitimacy from local people as they commanded more external resources from aid. These aid practices during the emergency have contributed to the strengthening of existing power relations between their leaders and the remaining members of the community.[12] Access to aid, particularly during times of severe shortages, often acted as a tool through which to exert power through potential exclusion and discrimination. Aid workers were aware of this effect. However, pressure to show results made it an acceptable practice.

Recent aid efforts in the reconstruction phase have attempted to address this. In the words of a former aid worker *"Initially aid was distributed according to the beneficiary lists that the Sobas of the various localities would be asked to draw up. But it became apparent that there were problems with this type of beneficiary selection because all the power was put in the hands of the Sobas to decide who would receive or not. It was common to arrive in communities where people were standing around in meetings, scared of speaking up about interventions. As it would later come out, their names hadn't been included in the lists of beneficiaries. The Soba had asked them for a payment which they couldn´t afford. These problems led to the later approach of organising the community differently to deliver aid, through various types of groups."*[13]

Capacity-building

The lack of attention and investment by aid agencies during the emergency period to creating or strengthening the capacity of local community institutions was captured in an interview with the National Director of an INGO that worked in Angola during the emergency and in the transition. *"The serious concern with community development came with the fourth and last phase of our intervention. Before that we went through the phases of relief assistance to IDP camps, of the establishment and support to temporary transition camps, and of facilitating the return of people to their areas of origin. The focus then was on the physical rehabilitation of infrastructure. After that, in the last phase we paid more attention to the software of service provision – of health, water provision, education and specifically to community (re)organisation. We moved from assisting individuals or families, to assisting communities as a whole."*[14] The question is why, despite capacity building intentions, there was such lack of attention to community institutions. I argue that this is linked to two main reasons, which I shall elaborate below. One refers to a recurring theme from earlier chapters - the emergency working culture. This is characterised by practices that developed according to the notion of a dichotomy between relief and development approaches. As I have already elaborated, in such perspective institution-building is relegated to the development sphere, because of the principled nature of the humanitarian system (Chapter 3) and the dominant perceptions of the state by aid actors (Chapter 6).

The other, also stems from these practices, and specifically refers to the lack of understanding or outright neglect of local institutional dynamics. This is in turn symptomatic of a number of issues. The emergency context was characterised by short-term projects aimed at saving lives and reaching the highest possible number of people quickly. The pressure for

quick impact and the competition for visibility and funds amongst agencies which are associated with these projects, contributed to a further underinvestment on detailed studies and needs assessments and on building knowledge of local environments (Pacheco, 2001, Robson, 2003). This phenomenon is frequent and has been referred to as the hard-issue bias (Botes and Rensburg, 2000). Soft issues such as social and cultural aspects including community involvement are neglected at the expense of technological, financial, physical and material aspects (ibid). Consequently, these repeatedly took precedent over concerns with the longer term effects of aid and the development of a longer-term vision towards the resolution of the Angolan crisis.

Reflections of aid professionals about the emergency period revealed that overall community participation was simply not valued. Simões and Pacheco (2008: 287) argue that the absence of real direct involvement of communities in the definition and implementation of activities was primarily the result of the undervaluing by donors, international agencies and the government itself, of the importance of knowledge about the social reality and thus of the capacity of communities to assume their own destinies. The effect of these practices is that they continue to shape current relief operations in how they deal with community institutions. For instance, the government's assistance programme to the elderly through MINARS still involves food aid distribution through beneficiary lists drawn up by the *Sobas*.[15]

The Community Rehabilitation Programme (CRP)

Notwithstanding the dominant practices during the war, there was some recognition amongst the aid community that Angola had become a complex crisis and that alternative, longer-term solutions ought to be explored. Efforts were made by some aid organisations to this end. Although these were eventually side-lined by the dominant practice, they are still worth mentioning because analysing their development, sheds light on why and how institutional neglect prevailed. One such example involves the Community Rehabilitation Programme (CRP), which was established to support national reconstruction following the 1994 Lusaka peace process. This peace never fully materialised and instead a "no war, no peace" situation developed. The CRP involved the organisation of a donor roundtable in Brussels, during which donors demonstrated their support by pledging over 800 million USD for the programme, more than what was requested by the government (UNDP, 1995). The programme included four components: the reactivation of production, labour and income, the re-installation of social services, the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, and the provision of institutional support. It involved the setup of a Trust Fund of donor contributions, managed by the GoA and UNDP, through which community initiatives would be financed. The CRP had a strong community basis and buy-in. Combined with a wide intervention scope, it was expected to help with the reintegration of displaced populations and demobilised soldiers, and thereby contribute to peace-building.

The programme is recalled by those involved as having had considerable potential for impact and having generated enthusiasm both at community level and among donors. However, it was soon overcome with implementation problems. By 1998 it had been completely suspended, having completed only 5 out of 159 community-based project requests (Cain, 2001). The failure of the government to 'provide effective leadership and coordination' was judged as crucial to this failure (Hodges, 2004). It proved unable, in conjunction with the UNDP, to bring together the two key ingredients for peace-building - community motivation and donor resources (Cain, 2001). As argued by Cain (2001) however, the most serious failure of the CRP was the disengagement of local communities and the NGO sector from the process, as expectations created by the programme did not materialise. *"This loss of confidence was provoked by extremely long and complicated project approval processes (some small projects took 3 years from conception to the release of funding) or the complete*

failure of delivery of promised funding. These delays undermined the confidence of communities in their own local leaders, associations and Angolan NGOs who were involved in mobilisation, designing and negotiation of promised project support. Serious damage was done to the credibility of these local actors as well as the image of UNDP who were too often seen by local partners as the owners of the CRP programme." (p. 581). Hodges (2004) explicitly links the failure of the programme to a return to a messy and uncoordinated aid system. This system in turn, came to be implemented mainly through NGOs and was detached from a broader post-war recovery plan.

On a smaller scale, individual organisations also experimented with longer-term approaches during the war. One example involves a local community based programme by the national NGO ADRA, which invested in an alternative approach to humanitarian aid through an intervention in one of Huíla's municipalities – Gambos. Let me explain.

2.2 Beyond continuum thinking: the case of Gambos

Gambos lies in the southwest semi-arid region of Huíla province. It is populated by nomadic pastoralist groups with very different livelihoods strategies and social systems to the rest of the province's population (Morais and Correia, 1993).[16] This region was little affected by the direct effects of the conflict. It therefore did not produce or host significant numbers of IDPs, or receive relief aid for the war affected.[17] Its experience of external humanitarian assistance has been modest and has primarily been in response to drought conditions that regularly affect the region. ADRA´s project in Gambos started in 1993 in partnership with the international NGO ACORD[18], to support local agro-pastoralist communities. Its objective was to *"strengthen local social organisations, to enable the populations to manage and control their own resources, under a context of vulnerability and existing external pressures."* (ADRA, 1996: 4). The objective was defined on the basis of a thorough study and needs-assessment of the agro-pastoralist peoples of the region carried out jointly by the two organisations. It concluded that outside support to the rural communities of Gambos should not replace, ignore or override existing institutions, practices, values and capacities. Despite being limited on their own, these were assessed as being a part of the delicate balance that allowed their survival (Morais and Correia, 1993).

An integrated approach was adopted, addressing various aspects of rural life. It was divided into two major components. One was the construction and rehabilitation of basic service infrastructure (such as health, education, water points), and of the local government administration. The other entailed the strengthening and creation of local organisations and government institutions. The strategy from the beginning was to support emerging forms of organisation within the communities themselves. ADRA thus worked with several groups, which came together and were organised around specific issues or objectives. These included for instance the construction of a school or a health post, or groups with common interests such as the *Ovatumbi* - traditional cattle herders seeking to preserve transhumance practices. One particular group - Grupo Estrela – has had a long trajectory and gained significant local prominence. It was created in 1994 when ADRA started discussions with a group of teachers, about the potential of organising local communities for development activities.[19] In 1995 Grupo Estrela, through ADRA, became involved in the distribution of food aid made available by WFP's drought response. This set up resulted from ADRA's lobby of WFP to distribute aid through community structures, so as to counter the dominant relief practice and address sustainability concerns.[20] Rather than free distribution, several FFW schemes were set up to build and rehabilitate infrastructure.

The involvement of Grupo Estrela in the relief operations helped to establish the organisation. Financially, it traded food for certain non-food items such as soap and salt,

which it sold to generate small funds. Over time the group started to implement small scale infrastructure projects with funds from various donors, in-kind contributions from WFP, and training from ADRA. This arrangement lasted until 2002 and was determinant in the survival of the group after WFP's withdrawal.[21] The end of the war marked a new era for Grupo Estrela. ADRA handed over several of its responsibilities, and from 2004 made considerable changes to the nature of its work. The component of infrastructure creation and rehabilitation was discontinued as it was jointly agreed with the local administration that the focus should be on improving the functioning of existing infrastructure. As such, efforts were concentrated on training and capacity-building activities such as project management, strategy building and activity planning for local government and CBOs. From 2006/07 onwards, attention turned to the establishment of linkages between Grupo Estrela and the local government administration, to ensure Estrela's ability to lead and support other CBOs and their eventual legalisation. Estrela is now a legally independent organisation.

ADRA´s exit strategy was to be replaced by the group. ADRA's role vis-à-vis Estrela has therefore been reduced to the negotiation of funds on its behalf and to direct institutional support through training activities.[22] Grupo Estrela is now supporting various local groups ranging from activists working on HIV/Aids related issues, to the Rural Veterinary Agents Group. It is even involved with a human rights group dealing with land conflicts between pastoralists and farm owners, which has brought Gambos under the political spotlight in recent years.[23] The group is still regularly involved in the distribution of food aid, which has recently been provided by the government during drought periods.[24] It has also secured a place in the government´s municipal Social Consultation Council (CACS), in addition to leading an alternative discussion forum (*Espaço de Concertação*) established by ADRA, that seeks to be more inclusive and less partisan than the CACS (see Chapter 7).

The question raised by this particular case, is what made this approach possible and a lasting one. The absence of war in this region no doubt made it more suitable to experiment with such alternative approaches to aid and relief distribution. This inherently conditioned its potential for multiplication in other areas. However, I argue that there were factors other than the absence of direct fighting that were determining for the approach adopted and for the project outcomes. These have more to do with the flexibility to think outside of the emergency box, than with the structural limitations of conflict.

ADRA's profile

The organisational character of ADRA with its mandate and mission were of significance. It was one of the first national NGOs to be established in the early 1990s, focusing on rural development issues with a longer term vision of seeking sustainability of actions and durable solutions. Influenced by the participatory development discourse, its work was rooted in community-based activities that supported its organisation and capacity to address local needs. The logic was that NGOs should shift from help to self-help (Pacheco, 1991). Although nowadays this is hardly unique amongst NGOs everywhere, the approach was exceptional in Angola at that time. First, there was no established national civil society when ADRA emerged. Second, the spotlight then was almost exclusively on food distribution.

On the other hand, ADRA itself largely attributes its experience and growth to the support and knowledge it gained from its partnership with ACORD, established in Angola in 1991. ACORD´s presence in Huíla was actually the reason why the province became the ´laboratory of ADRA´s field work´ (ADRA, 1996). Moreover, being at the start of its trajectory as an organisation, careful internal reflection on practices and strategies was encouraged. As Gambos was one of its pilot community-development projects, this provided the flexibility to make adjustments to the intervention over the years. Such process of internal

reflection is particularly evident in documents of the early years of the project (ADRA et al., 1995, ADRA, 1996, ADRA and ACORD, 1997, ADRA, 1999).

The specific engagement of this project with government institutions in order to provide for the needs of the local population was also exceptional in the emergency context. There was an effort to systematically involve the relevant local government sections (health, water, etc.) in project activities, to include the local administration in infrastructure rehabilitation initiatives, and to make a considerable investment in the training of local civil servants. As explained by a government education officer, *"ADRA has been and continues to be a great school for me. I've completed eight training modules on community development in Lubango. Based on what I learnt, I would like one day to write up my experiences with Grupo Estrela".*[25] This long term commitment to the capacity-building of both community groups and local civil servants required significant human resources capacity by ADRA. The field team reached a total of 15 people at its peak, which was large in comparison with other areas. It also allowed the relationship between the organisation and local government to be consolidated, and for a certain level of trust and legitimacy to be established. By consequence, Grupo Estrela was also able to establish links with the administration, including official partnership agreements through which responsibilities were defined. For instance, if Estrela would build a school with the community, the administration would commit to providing the teachers. This process also contributed to strengthening the legitimacy of the project and its staff vis-à-vis the local population.

"Initially, when ADRA arrived, we found it strange that they would come and work here. They were not well accepted. At the time there was a lot of movement with political parties and so on, so we were suspicious. But then we started seeing some of the work they were doing in other communities, like building schools and health posts and some of our local people started working for them, so we became more open. They started with organising groups to get work done, like wood cutting and para-veterinaries. Then they involved us in the physical work to provide us with food. When one group is not working well, the other groups come together to resolve it."[26]

The experience of the collaboration between ADRA, ACORD and Grupo Estrela was not flawless however. A number of difficulties and problems were encountered over the years. For instance, much of the project's infrastructure fell into disuse.[27] What I wish to highlight from this case however, is that because of the long-term support over 15 years and the flexibility of the programme to innovate, adjustments to the programme were made that allowed lessons to be learnt. This case shows that in spite of the war context, going beyond the continuum thinking was possible (Korf and Bauer, 2002, 2004). ADRA's approach involved reducing its role to a minimum as it passed on responsibilities to Grupo Estrela, which contributed to a relatively smooth transition to peace and reconstruction.

The analysis of aid interventions in the emergency period has shown that the dominant practices did not pay attention to the institutional environment at the local level, reducing claimed support for local community-institutions to tokenistic participation. Contrary to dominant discourse, this was not solely the result of the war context and the consequent lack of security often blamed for the inability to carry out more in depth or thought-through analysis of local contexts. Instead, the lack of understanding and the neglect of local institutional dynamics had more to do with the dominant everyday practices of organisations and staff that came to constitute the emergency culture. This was largely characterised by what Angolans call *assistencialismo*, the rationale of humanitarian interventions based on aid handouts. Such practices conditioned the flexibility to try alternative ways of implementing assistance, with more genuine attempts at participation. The Gambos experience is a clear example of how aid organisations were able to make the most of contexts and periods of

relative peace to build relations and capacity with local community and state institutions. ADRA's long term and intensive commitment to the programme and local community was key in this, but represented an exception relative to other attempts at participation.

This example further confirms that community empowerment for reconstruction is more about changes to relief agencies' attitudes than about the community itself, which is already engaged in spontaneous reconstruction (King, 2005). On the other hand, the conceptualisation of the CRP in a period of fragile peace (after the Lusaka Protocol), showed that there was recognition of the need for alternative approaches to address the complexity of the Angolan crisis. Longer-term solutions that would contribute to the consolidation of peace were to involve both formal state institutions but also the local community. The failure of its implementation was partly due to bad practices such as long bureaucratic procedures, and to lack of commitment of different partners to persevere. It thus represented a missed opportunity and reflected a lack of commitment and trust of donors and organisations alike, to embark on such innovative programming. The end result was that the emergency approach crowded out alternatives seeking more durable and locally-grounded solutions. How then did these approaches change in the transition to peace? This is the question to which I now turn.

3. Community institutions in the transition

In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, agencies faced great pressures in dealing with large numbers of beneficiaries and having to work on different fronts simultaneously: the rehabilitation of social infrastructure, the distribution of food aid and of agricultural inputs to kick start production, the organisation of logistical operations, and ensuring a minimum level of health and education services. On the ground, many of the practices from the emergency context were rolled over into the resettlement phase. For example, they continued to rely on traditional leaders for identifying and targeting beneficiaries. With the consolidation of peace, different approaches emerged to deal with the changing nature of the needs and aid modalities. In this transition phase, the CBD discourse entered aid practices more systematically. The organisation of communities into groups or community-level structures became a widely used strategy for involving local people. This is what Pretty (1995) defines as 'functional' participation – *"participation seen by external agencies as a means to achieve project goals, especially reduced costs. People may participate by forming groups to meet predetermined objectives related to the project."* Every single aid programme I encountered in rural Huíla during my fieldwork, had as the basis of its implementation strategy the structuring of community-based groups of some sort. Resettlement programmes relied on user committees around specific services (e.g. water) or specific project activities (e.g. animal traction); integrated recovery programmes worked through community development groups with broader mandates; agriculture extension and knowledge transfer programmes established farmer groups and supported existing (government created) cooperatives; and decentralisation programmes set up village development organisations and federations to create linkages with local authorities. Next I discuss some examples of these groups, looking in each case, at their objectives and functions, their composition and rules, and at their legitimacy and sustainability. These are summarised in the table below.

TABLE 8.1: Characteristics of Community-Based Groups in Angola's post-conflict reconstruction

CBOs	User/interest groups & Commissions	Community-development groups	Agricultural groups (Farmer Schools)	Decentralisation support groups
Period	War	Immediate post-war (2002 - 2005)	Reconstruction	Reconstruction
Function	- Aid distribution - Specific project tasks - Conflict resolution	- Project tasks - Representatives on local issues to state	- Knowledge transfer - Savings group	- Citizen engagement in governance
Composition	- Elected members - Soba included - Women invited	- Elected members - Soba excluded - Women's Groups	- Elected members - Soba included - Quota for women	- Elected members - Soba excluded - Quota for women
Outcomes	- No conflict resolution role - Not expanded	- Focus on project activities - No links with government - "Orphaned"	- Little initial buy-in, but sense of ownership	- PDI done but no implementation resources - Potentially de-legitimating
Sustainability	- User-groups last longer than others - Handed to government services. E.g. EDAs	- Survive whilst supported - No follow-up capacity - Few own projects	- Survive but at risk when handed over to EDA due to lack of capacity	- Unknown - Threatened by lack of political will

3.1 Managing resettlement: interest-based and user groups

Oxen groups

As the nature of the assistance provided widened, so too did the amount of groups created around specific services and interests. One type which became common in resettlement support programmes was the establishment of groups for the management and distribution of animals for traction. In Huíla for instance, ZOA Refugee Care was involved in large scale distribution of oxen in several municipalities. In Chapter 5 I introduced the particular case of oxen distribution in Bunjei. Such distribution was organised by forming 'solidarity groups' consisting of ten families (numbers varied according to place and NGO) selected by the community. Each group received a span of oxen and a plough that members used on their plots on a rotational basis. They were also to be trained on animal breeding to increase the animal population and thus expand the programme to benefit additional people. The groups were intended to function on the basis of solidarity whereby the core members would help work the land of additional individuals considered most vulnerable, such as widows. These were however, reported to be functioning *"at a rudimentary level"* and mainly limited to the *"coordination of the use of the distributed traction animals."* (ZOA, 2007: 4).

Management commissions

Another common type of NGO-created group in the early recovery phase was that of Management Commissions *(Commissões de Gestão)*[28]. These were made up of several individuals and included also the *Soba* and some of his advisors, in response to the concern with respecting traditional social structures (ZOA and ADESPOV, 2002) but also because it was considered *'difficult to enter a community without it being through the Soba'*.[29] The commissions were supposed to include a minimum number of women (in ZOA's case, 3 out of 7 members) but this varied in different organisations. They had broader objectives than specific user groups. Management commissions were given the responsibility of mobilising

the community to participate in various project activities such as food and agricultural inputs distribution, construction works or other FFW activities, the management of local services and the resolution of conflicts. They were referred to as 'the seeds' of the community organisation approach that ZOA would carry out later, through its Community Development Centres (CDCs – see below).

The practical reality of these Commissions was that they emerged to help implement pre-determined solutions, without actual consultation on needs. This directly contradicts their intended role as markers of the shift in approach to local development. Interviews with NGO workers and beneficiaries indicate that they were established primarily out of pragmatic and operational needs, rather than concerns with participation or ownership. A former staff member of ZOA explained the history of the intervention strategy: *"We weren't so much concerned with the 'what' as with the 'how' to help people. Especially concerning basic needs it is not necessary to ask people, you just know. Our own staff were displaced, so they could relate to what was necessary. The question was rather how to provide it. We based ourselves on the notion of action-reaction, looking at how people react to the interventions that you do."*[30] The Commissions also became a way to deal with the mushrooming of small groups addressing different aspects of social service and livelihood support, by consolidating activities under a single structure in each community. In addition, they became essential in resolving human capacity shortages. As explained by a previous field coordinator of the programme in Bunjei *"ZOA was working in many villages and we were understaffed. So the creation of the Management Commissions was a strategy to deal with the lack of human resources. We would dump products at the communities and the groups would take care of the distribution."*[31]

Given these implementation realities, it is hardly surprising that the Commissions were unable to fulfil broader functions beyond the organisation of project activities and distribution components. The programme´s final evaluation claimed that the group helped to settle disputes over the oxen distribution (ZOA, 2005). However, as seen in the case of Bunjei (Chapter 5), even these problems were a direct result of the project design. The implementation modality meant that only those able to afford repayments were able to join the cattle groups, and conflicts emerged over misappropriation by certain members. The conflict mediation component of the Commissions was limited. "*The vision at that time was to eventually transform the groups into conflict resolution nuclei, but then the groups weakened and eventually fizzled out or were partly replaced by the IECA groups when ZOA left."*[32]

Sustainability

The majority of user-groups created by aid organisations to deal with specific project components and the broader management commissions were introduced in the early phase of recovery. As such, the programmes under which they were established were short-term, frequently less than a year. For the large part, the groups simply dissolved with the end of the projects or soon after. The most notable exceptions encountered in this research were groups linked to water and sanitation, which were responsible for the use and maintenance of wells and water points. These were frequently still in place and members were well known to the wider community. Similar observations have been made for other contexts. Uphoff (1985) claims that organisations that begin with single, specific tasks, and take up more as they grow in experience and acceptance, tend to be more lasting. Richards et al (2004) propose that school parents associations in Sierra Leone have unique potential for the capacity building of the rural poor, partly because of their specific focus.

In the case of Huíla, the degree to which community-level interest and user-groups remained active after the project end seems largely dependent on whether they were supported

by subsequent aid interventions. In the case of the animal traction groups, there is little evidence of a long term legacy. In only 8 interviews with community members in either Matala or Bunjei, was there a mention of NGO-created oxen groups that were still active. The vast majority of people were not included in such groups. They were either too late to register, the number of animals was insufficient for all, or people were simply not aware of this aid component. The most common explanations for the discontinuation of the groups were that the animals had died or had been sold by (particular) group members. These factors were specifically mentioned in Bunjei by 12 respondents in all 4 research communities, and in Matala, by 5 in all but one of the selected communities. This problem was often put down by aid organisations as corruption or power struggles within the groups, which meant that certain members sold the oxen for their personal benefit. However, closer analysis and observation of group dynamics revealed that in some cases this was a collective decision amongst several of the group's members. The oxen were too small to be put to work on the land and it was considered worthwhile to sell them and use the money for something else or towards the purchase of larger oxen or cows for reproduction. However, nowhere did I hear of a group managing to acquire more animals and expanding their membership to support others on the basis of the project.

The Management Commissions too were discontinued with the end of the programmes particularly in areas where there were no follow up interventions. This was the case with the ACF intervention in Matala. Less than half of the people interviewed in the beneficiary communities knew of the existence of the ACF Associations that were created in 2004.[33] Those people that knew all mentioned the complete disintegration or inactivity of the Commissions. This was in spite of the fact that they were handed over to the local agricultural extension services (EDA) when ACF withdrew in 2005. Even where there was a follow up and the methodology of the Management Commissions was adjusted to incorporate new objectives, new groups (and terminology) were often constituted, rather than building on existing ones. This was partly justified with the need to discard of the problematic history of past commissions. CARE, which worked on and off in Matala over the different periods, had no knowledge of any groups from previous interventions still existing. During gaps between projects, groups had already disintegrated, staff had changed and community membership and composition likewise. Although both of these agencies handed over groups to the local EDAs, these institutions did not have the capacity or resources to give continuity to activities. Building their capacity had not been a priority in the strategy of either intervention.[34] *"The association had a community lavra and a warehouse. But it has been empty for 2 years and is only used to store some tools from EDA. Many people took part in the association but not anymore. It didn't go well because the NGO left and handed the association over to EDA which means that now people have to pay for stuff and we don't have money for it. ACF left in 2005 and that is when things started going badly. Before then, we harvested and managed to store some produce. But whatever went into the warehouse, disappeared. People lost motivation because they could not see results."*[35]

As these cases have shown, the early recovery period saw more attention to collective aid interventions than previous times. However, I argue that this did not represent a heightened concern with participation in the sense of empowerment. Whether user-based or broader Management Commissions, these groups are better seen as a different modality of aid distribution, whereby community participation served to maximise efficiency and overcome operational hurdles, rather than shifting the decision-making power to beneficiaries. In refugee assistance programmes of agencies like UNHCR, the instrumental value of community-development approaches, is explicitly defined in the objective to increase cost-effectiveness (Bakewell, 2003, Muggah, 2005). Although agencies made the effort to create links with state institutions, this did not bring people tangible results. The notion of

'participation in governance' as an intervention objective only came later with the consolidation of peace. Next I discuss community interventions that emerged in that context.

3.2 Promoting livelihoods and integrated development: community development groups

Community-development groups created under livelihoods and integrated development programmes are the closest to the model prescribed by the blueprint of the CBD approach. Generally, they are conceived of as groups whose members are locally elected. Their mandate is to oversee and coordinate not just aid projects' activities, but also wider community issues, as well as being community representatives vis-à-vis the local authorities. They are seen as the channels through which the sustainability of aid interventions will be ensured. The emergence of these groups characterised the shift in aid practices that occurred from 2005 onwards when the resettlement phase was officially over. This shift entailed three major moves: 1) from aiming to kick-start production towards (re)building agricultural livelihoods; 2) from free distribution of relief and agricultural inputs to credit-based support; and 3) from targeting individuals and households to focusing on collective action. For the most part, they emerged within rural development and food security programmes.

Overall, these integrated programmes involved a much more in depth analysis and needs assessment than previous interventions, as documented base-line studies of various organisations show. This was partly facilitated by the fact that the organisations involved in the new integrated rural development programmes, were already present on the ground. ACF's Food Security Research and Rehabilitation Programme in Huíla (PEARSA) for instance, defined a detailed study and needs-assessments of the social, economic and agricultural situations in 25 villages as a major component, from which priorities, technical capacity-building and other non-agricultural activities were then defined (OHCHR, 2007).

In the case of ZOA Refugee Care, it developed the explicit focus on community organisation through its longer-term intervention in Huíla - *Okulima* Food Security Programme. This translated into the creation of the Community Development Centres (CDCs).[36] The intention of the CDCs was that they would become discussion fora on a broader spectrum of development issues, resulting in several locally conceived projects. In practice this component was hardly developed. Their identity was strongly shaped by the agricultural component of the programme, so that they became almost exclusively known for and involved in the management of the reimbursement of agricultural inputs (such as seeds and animals) provided on credit. The CDCs were established in many communities with existing groups (such as the oxen Solidarity Groups and the Management Commissions) which made their function and structure even more unclear to community members. This was acknowledged in a project report: *"There has been confusion with the functioning of the CDCs and the Management Commissions of the seed banks. This indicates the still limited performance of the CDCs. Activities have been mainly focused on those related to seed distribution and reimbursement and have not yet been enlarged to wider community based activities."* (ZOA, 2007: 2). Such enlargement would never take place because soon after this assessment, internal changes within ZOA led to its premature withdrawal from Angola. Activities were handed over to a local partner, but it had little capacity and resources to do the necessary follow up. In the words of a former staff member, *"We left Angola too early, and left the CDCs as orphans because of that. Only some 2 or 3 out of the 20-30 CDCs were successful."*[37]

Institutional contestation

IECA's local development programme in Bunjei (PIDRB) discussed in Chapter 5, is another example of the approach of establishing community-level organisations as a way to promote

integrated local development. IECA created the NDCs[38] in a very similar logic to that of ZOA's CDCs. The NDCs aimed at *"identifying community problems and needs, implementing small projects, coordinating activities of aid actors and managing local conflicts"* (IECA, 2006). From my analysis, the NDCs stand out from other community development groups in two aspects. Firstly, within each NDC a sub-group of women (4 out of 9 people) was created for consultation on issues specifically affecting them. This was an attempt to overcome previously frustrated efforts to be more inclusive and responsive to women's needs.[39] Secondly, although the NDCs were also constituted on the basis of voting in each community, they explicitly exclude the *Sobas* from having an official function within the group.

The creation of a structure outside of the traditional leadership was officially justified with the argument of not wanting to overwork the *Sobas* with added responsibilities. This was not passively accepted by the local leaders who felt their authority was being questioned. Significant time and effort was therefore invested by programme staff in order to get this model accepted. *"All the Sobas, regedores and village secretaries had to be trained because the NDCs became a threat to them. We explained that they were not intended to take power away from them but rather to help them with their work. The Soba still has to be the one mobilising the community."* [40] Underneath this discourse of inclusion by IECA, as it later turned out, there was also the desire to challenge existing power relations. Interviews revealed that this intervention strategy was used to introduce checks and balances on the activities and power of the *Sobas*, and to avoid the politicisation of the group *"because Sobas usually have a partisan link to the MPLA"*.[41] This component of IECA's intervention thus intended to provide institutional alternatives in the form of the NDCs, through which the power of the local governing elites could be contested. This is an example of how institutional multiplicity may be used by local actors to negotiate arrangements and realise projects, by engaging with different or competing institutions, as discussed in Chapter 4.

In spite of these efforts to (re)balance power relations, the way the NDCs were set up resulted nonetheless in the unintentional exclusion of additional community members. Female-headed households did not participate in the credit-based oxen distribution given that only those candidates likely to be able to afford to pay the reimbursement were selected by the community as beneficiaries. Widowed women were automatically sidelined given their low economic status. Overall however, the NDCs managed to go further than the CDCs in terms of their organisational development. A few got to implement small projects such as animal breeding, rehabilitation and building of small infrastructure and the creation of collective *lavras* (agricultural plots). *"From the 20 NDCs, only 5 are working properly in line with this methodology. Some are still developing, but most cannot yet walk alone."*[42] According to project staff such achievements largely depend on the drive of individual members. It also appears to relate to the fact that some NDCs were built upon existing user-groups or upon the Management Commissions left by ZOA. The most significant factor however, is that they continue to be supported by IECA's programme already in its third funding cycle, and have thus had time to develop. This is likely to change in the future given that the latest funding negotiations resulted in the decision to reduce the number of intervention communities and NDCs, focusing only on those with the most potential.

Institutional linkages

Looking at how these community-development groups are implemented and evolve in practice, as opposed to their intended outcomes, reveals a number of issues that underline participatory community-based approaches in the transition from relief to development. Although these groups are meant to facilitate the forging of linkages with local government institutions, I found that the majority of cases do not have such explicit connections. For

instance, the NDC in Caquela B village reported having no links to the local administration apart from on one specific occasion when a registration of the population was carried out. In Rioco Centro, one of the NDC showcases, there was no history of relations with the administration at all. *"If I approach the administrator or his assistant and tell him that I am the leader of a group of the Community x, they will laugh in my face and ask me to provide official documentation. Only the Soba can try to talk on our behalf."*[43] The only link between community members and the formal state apparatus often continues to be the traditional leadership, mainly the *Sobas* and secretaries, or aid agencies' staff. *"The vision for the NDCs is that one day they participate in the CACS to represent their communities. Our actual programme already takes part, but the NDCs themselves are still weak. We don't yet have a structure of how to make that connection. We have thought of training the Administration itself. But, we need to be mindful that this may end up empowering the administrator rather than the population."*[44]

Moreover, relations with the local administrations are tainted by partisan political links. *"Currently the link that exists is informal and depends on the willingness of the Administrator. In Bunjei he has changed 4 times in as many years. However, as they are very partisan and some of the NDC coordinators belong to UNITA, this space for dialogue doesn't yet exist."*[45] Attempts to involve other state institutions have frequently been frustrated due to the persistence lack of capacity.

The role of community groups in integrated development and livelihoods programmes has been more thought through than in previous approaches. More effort went into needs assessments and there was more flexibility to invest in participatory approaches. Agencies have started to confront problems of exclusion and power relations more head on. This attests to the fact that aid practitioners are often more aware of local institutional dynamics, than is often assumed when explaining project shortcomings. Experimentation with different composition of local groups such as sidelining traditional leaders may be problematic, as institutional multiplicity may result in competition and power contestation. However, it also recognises that past practices that took traditional institutions at face-value are not good enough. In that sense, there has been an attempt to move from "tokenistic participation" towards a more empowering form of participation. CBOs in these programmes have nonetheless, been unable to go much further than specific project related activities and to become drivers of local development. The lack of attention of past aid interventions to state institutional capacity in parallel to community-based activities, and the (early) withdrawal of agencies, have been the most evident contributing factors.

3.3 Transferring knowledge: Farmer Schools

For many organisations, adjusting interventions to the reconstruction context has meant moving away almost entirely from material input support towards programmes aiming at knowledge transfer. A popular modality is the setup of Farmer Schools. These consist of groups of farmers who work together with an extension worker on communal demonstration plots, with alternative crops and techniques. One such example is the three year conservation programme implemented by CARE Angola in Matala municipality.[46] The programme has two main intervention components. The first component addresses differences in productivity among farmers in the same area, by facilitating the exchange of knowledge and experience. It involves the creation of Community Development Groups (GDC) intended to manage the membership and activities of the school and again, to be a representative voice vis-à-vis the authorities on local issues. Membership is open to all community members and the GDC coordinates activities with the project NGO staff. These include the identification of a common plot of land to serve as an experimental field for training. Seeds and some subsidised

tools are provided by the project for this common plot, whilst other inputs such as organic fertiliser, tools and labour come from the school members. The harvested products are property of the school and their use is decided upon collectively. At the time of writing none of the schools were yet at that stage.

The second component addresses the shortage of animal traction, by supporting collective savings for the purchase of oxen. It works through existing farmer cooperatives which are linked to the local extension services (the EDAs). One of CARE´s strategies was to embed its staff within these structures so that they will give continuity to the work once the organisation withdraws. However, the lack of capacity of the EDAs has been a cause for concern. The farmer field schools methodology has been criticised elsewhere for the tendency to fail to create linkages with service providers and with appropriate technologies (Longley et al., 2006). The savings groups receive training on savings methods and management and are the link to private banks. As such, their membership can, but does not automatically coincide with that of the local farmer school. To complicate matters further, the ODAs created a few months later by CARE's decentralisation programme (see below) in some of the same communities of intervention of the Farmer School programme, often created yet another structure.

Of the community approaches used in the reconstruction of rural societies in Angola, the Farmer Schools model involves the least amount of material inputs from the implementing NGO. However, material contribution was still identified by participants as essential in encouraging this type of collective action. Given the significant reliance on communities' own input of time, labour and land, staff claims that the buy-in for these programmes is initially particularly difficult. Many people, who had registered to be part of the schools, ended up never actively participating when it became clear that there were no tangible short-term gains. On the other hand, this setup appears to have made the groups more locally grounded. I perceived a strong sense of ownership and pride amongst group members, in their collective plots.

However, because the groups are constituted in a similar way to the other CBO models, they are prone to the same problems linked to composition, representativeness and inclusion. For instance, the voted in management group of the school in Calheta village (Matala), ended up with a structure that almost mirrored the hierarchy of the traditional authorities: the Soba was elected president of the school, the village administrator (and MPLA secretary) as vice-president, the assistant-administrator as the secretary, and the wife of the administrator as the school´s treasurer. This happened in several other cases. In the Calheta example some school members split away from the established group, and requested support from the programme to create a separate school. They had been unhappy with the elected leadership because many of the individuals had been involved in the corruption practices that led to the failure of a previous NGO-created association, and were fearful it would happen again. Unable to directly challenge the leaders, they used the programme to bypass them, by claiming that the communal plot was too small for everybody, and finding a second plot to set up their own school.

3.4 Building local democracy: Village Development Organisations and decentralisation

The last modality of CBOs being implemented in the current Angolan context are those established by programmes supporting the decentralisation process. In Chapter 7 I gave a detailed account of the DESHUCU programme as an example, explained the structure and functioning of the ODAs and their federations, and their linkages to state institutions from the local to the municipal levels. As I argued, many of the rural development programmes described above also had the intention of transforming community-based groups into representatives of local interests vis-à-vis the local authorities. However, decentralisation

programmes are unique in that they create groups with the specific purpose of forging institutional links with government and facilitating communities´ participation in discussions and decisions on local development issues. They are based on what Pretty (1995) labels as 'interactive participation' where *"people participate in joint analysis, development of action plans and formation or strengthening of local institutions. Participation is seen as a right, not just the means to achieve project goals."* (p. 1252).

CBOs created under decentralisation programmes are also the closest to what Cornwall and Coelho (2007b) describe as 'new democratic spaces'. These refer to spaces for citizen participation, at the interface between state and society which can include 'one-off consultative events' or 'regularised institutions' with a longer presence (ibid). The particularity of these CBOs lies precisely in their intention to integrate existing institutions and create horizontal and vertical linkages. The ODAs are also established to feed into existing local fora set up both by civil society (such as the Communal and Municipal Development Forums) and by the state (through the Communal and Municipal Social Consultation Councils - CACS).

Empowerment

The overall structure in which the ODAs are embedded presents a series of problems in relation to achieving the objective of empowering local communities to influence decisions that affect them. As I have shown in Chapter 7, spaces and fora through which the ODAs supposedly have a voice, including the CACS and the Development Forums, suffer from weak representation and accountability, and from exclusion processes linked to their composition. The ODAs themselves have a limited geographical coverage. The ODA members are voted in by the community after putting themselves forward for election. The ODAs are presented as auxiliary local governance structures to the traditional leadership. Agencies find it difficult to relate to traditional authorities in decentralisation, because the relevant legislation is ambiguous about their role in future local autarchies. They are therefore not part of the formal structure of the ODAs, but are supposed to supervise the functioning of the group. It is apparent that in practice, the *Soba* strongly influences who presents themselves as a candidate for the ODA and is part of every single decision-making event.[47]

In spite of the decentralisation CBOs being the youngest generation of community groups of aid interventions, their sustainability is already under threat due to the recent slowdown in the decentralisation process. The ODAs´ *raison d´être* of determining local development priorities to influence policy makers and the Municipal Integrated development Plans (PDI), has taken expectations to a different level from other CBOs. The creation of links with the state, while unique in its potential for change, also raises the stakes for real impact. As the previous chapter showed, when government commitments fail to materialise, the degree of disillusionment with the process can be dramatic for the credibility and legitimacy of local government and of aid agencies. In the case of DESHUCU as the project was nearing its end, very few of the PDI commitments for 2009 had been implemented. *"The administration made a promise at the Municipal Forum meeting where the PDI was presented, to build certain infrastructure, and so on. But they didn't deliver because of the shortage of funds from the budget they were supposed to have received. This takes away from their credibility*."[48] The future of the ODAs is fragile as NGO programmes are coming to an end. Notwithstanding, this has been the most thorough process of community organisation and consultation that rural populations have experienced to date.

4. The realities of community-based approaches

The previous sections have given an overview of aid agencies engagement with local populations during Angola´s emergency and in the transition to post-conflict reconstruction. Table 8.2 summarises the differences in the way emergency and reconstruction interventions have engaged and interacted specifically with traditional authorities. It contrasts for the two contexts, the specific role of the traditional authorities, the purpose of their involvement, how they are perceived by aid agencies, and the outcome of these approaches.

The cases presented show that the everyday practices of institution-building at community level are more complex than the participation paradigm suggests. During the conflict, aid agencies aligned themselves with the classic relief approach that had *"a blind eye for local actors and institutions"* (Douma and Van der Haar, 2010), and engaged only directly with traditional leaders. Many of the challenges of putting local populations at the centre of interventions have remained unresolved in the post-conflict phase. Aid agencies have found in CBOs a practical model through which to reach and engage with their intended beneficiaries, as well as to build bridges between them and local state institutions. The rise of community-based approaches related to the need to do things differently from the emergency phase, but was as much to do with the necessity to overcome operational hurdles in the transition from relief to longer-term development. Community-based groups have in practice primarily acted as alternative aid distribution channels based on 'passive participation', or aid management structures based on 'tokenistic participation' (Pretty, 1995). Beyond this, CBOs have had difficulty in achieving the level of empowerment for participation in governance (or democratic participation), in terms of contributing to social and governance outcomes.

The cases indicate that the participatory and CBD discourses that promote community involvement as the answer to local development challenges are based on several assumptions that do not reflect the reality on the ground. The limitations of CBD practices are voiced not only in literature but also in interviews with agencies' staff, indicating that the problem is not simply one of lack of awareness among practitioners and policy makers. What is surprising then, is the scant analyses of how aid actors immersed in the participatory paradigm, deal with these shortcomings. This chapter addresses this analytical gap and supports calls for critical analysis of how participatory community approaches are translated and transformed in policy practice, beyond discussions on methodological tools (Macedo, 2009). The preceding discussion indicated that these approaches tend to be informed by simplistic notions of participation, community and empowerment and by assumptions about social and institutional transformation. The symbolic value of participation thus emerges as an important driver of these practices. I discuss each of these broad headings below.

TABLE 8.2: The role of the traditional authorities in emergency and reconstruction interventions

Aid interventions	Emergency	Reconstruction
Specific role in interventions	– Traditional leaders as only direct counterpart from communities. – *Soba* or village secretary draw up beneficiary list for relief distribution.	– Traditional leaders as first point of entry into communities. – Responsible for initial mobilisation of community. – *Soba* acts as witness for community members.
Purpose	• Targeting and access to populations. • Validation of intervention as community-based.	• *Soba* explicitly excluded from certain CBOs. • Mobilisation and buy-in of community. • Validation of intervention.
Perception of aid agencies	– *Soba* seen as the legitimate community representative. – Efficient and more equitable channel of aid.	– *Soba* seen as state & MPLA representatives; corrupt and co-opted; authoritarian and conservative. – Inefficient and undemocratic channel for aid delivery.
Outcomes	• Power of *Sobas* reinforced. • Community empowerment sometimes undermined (Wille in Robson, 2003). • Imprint on current interventions. MINARS still channels food aid according to *Sobas'* beneficiary lists	• Community-based groups emerge as new actors in local governance. • *Soba* retains de facto decision making power and continues to influence inclusion/exclusion dynamics. • Unclear position in decentralisation support programmes as *Sobas* are recognised by state as local power figure.

4.1 De-romanticising participation

The overview of past and present community-based approaches in Angola has confirmed their tendency to present communities as homogenous and participation processes as apolitical and as a panacea for local development. Either the *Soba* was assumed to be *the* legitimate representative of all interests, or CBOs are imagined as neatly organised structures driven by consensus and common agendas. However, having looked at how CBOs develop once they have been established showed that these NGO-created groups cannot be taken at face value. They often become spaces of contestation, which both reflect and shape existing power structures and local politics. These in turn influence participation processes and inclusion and exclusion dynamics within communities and state institutions. Such effects are visible in the everyday practices of aid interventions and their outcomes, notwithstanding specific implementation models that seek to circumvent political dynamics.

Participation in practice

Institution-building interventions at community level are underscored by the assumption that people want and choose to participate. The expectation is that once a group is established, people will automatically and constructively engage with one another towards collective goals. This has been disproven multiple times, as the cases presented also indicated.

The degree of social mobilisation and participation that CBOs are able to leverage depends on very practical considerations relating to incentives and costs, material and otherwise, including time and effort. As Richards et al (2004: 42-43) argue, participation may thus be restricted to the better off who can afford time and resources for brokerage activities, or in the specific case of women, to only those belonging to powerful lineages. I also found this to be the case for women within CBOs. However, in the case of Farmer Schools, which involved significant investment by local people to experiment with collective activities, there was a greater sense of ownership than other groups. Within, the NDCs, members frequently had to quit their functions to take up paid work elsewhere. "*This is a real problem for the sustainability of activities because we depend on these people to get things done. If the NDC*

promoters would get some kind of compensation for their work, then they would not leave so easily. It is always a difficult decision to make, to leave your village, so even a small amount would make a difference."[49] The difficulty of aid agencies to mobilise members to participate in the CBOs was also reproduced within communities. Established groups struggled to get the community involved in collective activities because *"People were simply not interested in the NDCs. Each is concerned only with their own situation."*[50]

As Chambers (1997) contends, participatory and empowerment objectives of aid interventions must take into account the multiple local realities that shape outcomes. Local people's *"values, preferences and criteria are typically numerous, diverse and dynamic, and often differ from those supposed for them by professionals."* (ibid: 162). In addition, such objectives are also affected in practice by broader historical aspects. As I have pointed out in earlier discussions, in Angola these include the historic absence of a participatory tradition in political processes, and the absence of collective organisations outside of partisan initiatives with a track record of participation. In addition, the legacy of relief aid practices hardly set a precedent for genuine participation. If anything, it consolidated the leadership role of the traditional authorities by uncritically defining them as the link to local communities. The combined effect of these factors on planned interventions partly explains the trend of aid actors 'renting' rather than building local institutional capacities (Christoplos, 2004: 33).

Implementation models

Aid organisations have adopted different implementation models to promote local participation, and address some of the limitations of past approaches. I found that most often these are unable to significantly alter the factors that condition participation. In Angola's reconstruction context, agencies have attempted to influence the composition of community groups to widen participation. For example, they establish quotas for female representatives, or explicitly leave out the *Sobas* from formal group structures. From my analysis of several community interventions, it emerges that such measures do not 'neutralise' local power structures. These should not therefore be automatically sidelined. Uphoff (1985: 387) makes a similar observation. *"Although it is desirable to avoid having project plans and benefits co-opted by the better-off elements of rural society, it should not be assumed that this stratum is always inimical to progress for lower strata or that it can be readily bypassed."*

Despite being excluded from community groups, the *Sobas* continue to exert significant influence and control over how these operate in practice. In Viseu village (Bunjei), although not part of the NDC, the *Soba* rejected oxen from the IECA programme for his community. He refused to act as a witness for people that wanted to join the credit-based distribution because in a previous occasion, several people had defaulted on repayments and had secretly sold off the animals. The community was resentful of his decision and accused him of using his position to prevent others in the community from obtaining cattle - a status symbol he allegedly wanted to retain for himself. In the case of the CDCs, although there was no outright exclusion of traditional leaders, there was an incident in a village of Cacula Municipality, where the *Soba* was intentionally left out by the project facilitator. This followed several accusations of his appropriation of collective goods for personal gain, including the reimbursed seeds belonging to the community seed bank. This undermined the overall reimbursement scheme. Such decision proved costly however, because the *Soba* reportedly started to sabotage project activities, as he remained the primary link to the local administration, on which the project was partly dependent.

The model of locally electing representatives as a way to guarantee democratic participation does not prevent the cooption of groups by local elites. On the contrary, it may serve to further legitimise those in powerful positions, as they often end up being the ones elected into leadership positions within the groups. Furthermore, the tendency to formalise

CBOs by creating set functions (typically including a president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer and advisors) has resulted in the exclusion of certain individuals. Specific requirements or skills, such as being literate, are only met by a selected few. In the case of women´s participation in CBOs, irrespective of established quotas, there were few cases of women being elected into CBO structures. Those that filled such positions habitually came from the lineage of the *Soba* or of other powerful male community members. Project facilitators explained that precisely the fact that group members were defined by means of elections meant that women were repeatedly left out. A compromise was reached between staff and community members to have women occupy secondary positions in terms of decision-making power. This typically translated into the election of female treasurers, because women are considered more trustworthy with money than men.

Despite its limited impact, this involvement of women is an example of the potential inclusionary effect of community-based models. The review of practice suggests this to be modest, but it nonetheless deserves to be mentioned, not least because it has the potential to extend the power-base to a slightly larger elite within a community. In the case of Calheta, this is how community members found room to create a second Farmer School separate from that led by the local leadership.

Political dimension

These practices of participatory community-based approaches have shown how local power relations shape intervention outcomes. In order to decide on collaboration with local actors and institutions, aid organisations should therefore consider how power relations affect the allocation of resources (Hilhorst, 2005b: 361). Partisan politics are an important factor in shaping local power relations that affect the realities of participation, because they influence inclusion and exclusion dynamics. Until the early 1990s, the influence of the MPLA on social mobilisation and assistance was evident through the state's party-based organisations. Since then, these lost prominence and their role is now restricted to political activism. The power of the MPLA in shaping participation dynamics is nonetheless still visible in informal ways, such as its influence in determining who gets to be part of local state services or who is considered a legitimate community representative. As we have seen, this in turn affects the composition and workings of NGO-created community groups, as local power holders retain significant influence over local decisions. Participatory structures and groups under CBD approaches, therefore operate as arenas where the 'micropolitics of encounters' are played out (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007b: 11). They can become spaces of contestation and negotiation, rather than following the normative expectations of the empowerment paradigm.

4.2 Institutionalising community groups

The preceding analysis of the realities of CBD and participation shows that most CBOs do not become institutionalised or survive beyond the duration of aid projects. For a long time problems with the sustainability of interventions were justified with the limitations posed by the emergency context. However, as seen in the example of Grupo Estrela in Gambos, the lack of long term vision and commitment to genuine community participation was at least as relevant as the conflict itself. The idea that CBD approaches are particularly appropriate in transition contexts, does not reflect the challenges I have identified for community groups to meet their broader objectives, to gain local legitimacy and to become established.

Legitimisation and institutionalisation processes relating to participatory spaces and practices imply changes in behaviours, attitudes and power relations. Such social transformation processes are slow and lengthy as they are influenced on past practices. Yet, most of the interventions reviewed in this chapter were short-term and limited in their

capacity-building components, beyond the initial establishment of the groups. This partly relates to factors external to interventions, which have influenced the legacy of CBOs for local development objectives. The degree to which the ODAs will remain active, be expanded or scaled-up for instance, largely depends on the broader political developments of the national decentralisation process. However, it is also the outcome of factors internal to the aid system.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy processes in conflict contexts are particularly difficult. As I have referred in earlier discussions of legitimisation processes (see Chapters 1 and 5), legitimacy relates to people's beliefs, perceptions, and expectations of institutions (Bellina et al., 2009), as well as those alternatives available to them (Douma and Van der Haar, 2010). CBOs find it difficult to build local legitimacy, particularly cognitive and pragmatic, because they do not have a legal status, and because they lack a track record of performance and reputation. The lack of formal status has sometimes been problematic for gaining the recognition from state institutions. New CBOs in particular are at a greater disadvantage in terms of support based on past performance, as people are less likely to contribute money, labour and other resources (Krishna, 2003). In some cases, the reputation of particular individuals within CBOs and the legitimacy of the social networks that underline them may thus be important in determining their success (Hilhorst, 2000).

The lack of legitimacy of CBOs simultaneously exacerbates and emanates from their inability to create solid linkages between communities and local state institutions. These weak links often result from the limited scope of the groups, their institutional designs and inexperience (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007b). The examination in this research of the everyday practices of local institution-building in Angola has shown a desynchronised approach between community-based and state institutions. The result, as seen from Chapters 5 and 7, has been that local governments are unable to respond to the needs and demands of local populations. Expectations created throughout participatory approaches go largely unmet. This is damaging for the legitimacy and institutionalisation of CBOs, particularly in the case of the ODAs, but also for that of local governments. Bakewell (2003) also identifies the differing expectations of various actors as a key factor undermining the objectives of community-based approaches with particular reference to refugee assistance. He found organisations to be primarily concerned with capacity-building and community development, whereas refugees expected material benefits. The expectations amongst aid workers varied substantially, but generally tended to overestimate the capacity of refugees for self-reliance.

The aid system

As I have argued the characteristics of the aid system tend to discourage longer-term alternatives to community organisation and institution-building. Interventions largely focused on the efficiency, rather than the empowerment aspect of participation (Macedo, 2009). Internal practices and perceptions of aid agencies thus contributed to the observed lack of sustainability of the community-based groups, so that these rarely become institutionalised alternatives of addressing needs. In an analysis of CBD approaches in North Darfur, Jaspars (2010) also concludes that these positively contribute to food and livelihoods security, but cannot alone address the scale of needs in protracted conflicts.

The early disengagement of donors and agencies in Angola's post-war was also a problem in this respect. Many programmes were discontinued without any follow up, leaving CBOs as 'orphans'. The disintegration of ZOA´s CDCs and ACF´s Associations are clear

examples of a failure of the NGOs to secure the capacity for follow up of the community groups, either through local partners or with the state´s agricultural services.

Another important factor in this respect refers to the lack of trust that permeates the aid system. The suspicious treatment of traditional authorities in aid interventions is the most obvious example. Nevertheless, this mistrust is also extended to beneficiaries and local state actors. In the example of the oxen groups, agencies assumed that the sale of the animals had been motivated by corrupt practices, disregarding other factors such as the collective rational decision to invest earnings in more profitable activities. The mistrust of state institutions entailed concerns with corruption and lack of capacity. As explained by an NGO staff member, *"Creating farmer associations was a highly politicized venture."* The government wanted all associations to fall under UNACA. NGOs were unwilling to do this and handover control to state services. *"Looking back, the community groups created by the project should have had more links to various local government structures to ensure continuity."* [51]

Underlying the mentioned assumptions of CBD approaches about legitimisation and institutionalisation processes is an implicit lack of understanding of local institutions and their dynamics. This is evident from the way aid agencies engaged with traditional authorities in the emergency and in the transition, as summarised in Table 8.2. First, they were blindly relied upon for implementation, and later they were sidelined and seen as suspicious. In both cases their complex and changing role in society was overlooked. On the other hand, this drastic shift in approach reflects the fact that aid practitioners and policy makers were aware of the limitations of earlier approaches and saw that alternatives were required. The persistence of assumptions underlying CBD thus seem to lie with the traits of the aid system, which perpetuates institutional blindness and overestimates what interventions can achieve. As highlighted by the Listening Project, an innovative initiative that explores the ideas and insights of those in aid recipient societies, *"The systems of international assistance bias the ways that agencies and aid workers listen and do not listen, what they listen to, where and when they listen, and to whom they listen."* (Anderson and Brown, 2007). As I shall argue below, the symbolic value of participation also explains the persistence of CBD approaches.

4.3 The symbolic value of community participation

Notwithstanding the weak evidence-base for the benefits of community-based participatory approaches in relief and reconstruction, these continue to be widely advocated by policy makers and practitioners alike. The question is why this rhetoric remains so strong and why despite the well-known challenges to implementation, agencies continue to strive for improved community involvement. I argue that this is associated with the symbolic value attached to community participation. This refers to the moral worth implicit in the participation and empowerment rhetoric. That is, the merits of the contribution, opinions and capacities of communities and their members. As Cleaver (1999) explains, this symbolic and moral value underlines the argument that participation in and of itself is a worthwhile objective. *"Such conflation of efficiency and empowerment arguments is not necessarily cynical, or even conscious; indeed participation in itself is considered by many as empowering, regardless of the actual activity undertaken."* (ibid: 598). This argument emerges frequently in the logic of community-based interventions and in the personal motivations of aid workers. Robson and Roque (2001) maintain that aid agencies in Angola should continue with participatory community-based approaches, precisely because working together with local people is a necessary step to resolving their practical problems (p. 624).

This perspective of participation as a goal in itself is appealing in as much as participatory processes can encourage the development of trust and create empathy among different groups and individuals. They may also provide opportunities for interaction between

actors that may otherwise not meet, where spontaneous collective action may emerge. Whether such community interaction involves NGO staff, civil servants or researchers, such spaces may also have a dignifying effect for local people who are otherwise accustomed to being treated as 'less fortunate' or as 'victims'. Community members often expressed gratitude for my interest in their stories and opinions. Likewise, disenchanted civil servants of Matala´s municipal administration regained job motivation from their involvement in the establishment of the village ODAs. They told me they felt proud and useful in doing something with *their* people. For aid workers, on the other hand, support to democratic participation symbolises what Stirrat and Henkel (1997) label as 'the gift of self-realisation'. By focusing on institution-building, NGOs are 'helping the poor to help themselves'. They are carrying out what is considered as proper development work (encouraging community groups, participation and self-empowerment), and avoiding the charge of being patrons to beneficiaries (ibid: 73). Eyben (2006: 95) explains how as the head of DFID in Bolivia, she supported participation and ownership focused programmes because they fulfilled her ideal of state-citizen relations thus giving her personal satisfaction.

On the other hand, the community participation discourse is not innocent. It produces significant long-term consequences. Its symbolism fulfils not only the moral value of aid agencies and staff, but also their organisational needs. Participatory approaches in practice provide 'phantom' exit strategies for organisations, by forwarding notions of sustainability and self-reliance that tend not to materialise. This was seen in the various examples of CBOs presented earlier. NGOs become involved in the mundane world of power, patronage and inequality, and end up reinforcing the very differences between donors and recipients, which they aim to deny (Stirrat and Henkel, 1997: 74). According to Eyben (2006), aid continues to be largely practiced as a charitable gift despite being dressed up under new aid modalities, thus failing to examine how power operates in aid relationships.

Unintended effects

In addition to these problematic outcomes of the community participation discourse, the positive associations with its practices are often found in the unintended effects of interventions, and in the way CBOs are unwittingly transformed during implementation. For instance, in an analysis of NGO-sponsored participation processes in peri-urban areas of Luanda, Roque and Shankland (2007) conclude that *"[...] while the 'invited spaces' created by these NGOs may begin as conventional participation-in-development models, in the particular social and political context of Luanda they mutate into other forms of participation."* (p. 203). This, they go on to argue, is an expression of agency of local actors in the face of changing conditions and becomes an opportunity to express 'political energy'. I also found examples of unintended developments of CBD approaches that can be considered positive, in the adjustment made to the composition of the NDCs and ODA groups by the community to better adjust to local realities[52]; the creation of a parallel Farmer School in Calheta as a way to circumvent the hierarchy of the traditional authorities; or the dismantling of rotational oxen groups as animals were sold off to address other needs.

However, outcomes produced unwittingly, for example, as the result of competition between multiple institutions, can also have negative effects for different actors. Muggah's (2005) analysis of the practices of community-development approaches in refugee assistance in Nepal, stresses for instance, the long-term impact of unintended outcomes. Bhutanese refugees became highly disillusioned, tensions with resident populations increased, and thus durable solutions to the refugee problem were undermined.

In my view, the unpredictability of outcomes is thus another reason why the symbolic potential of CBD approaches needs to be considered by aid actors more critically. It again highlights the inadequacy of the normative expectations of predesigned interventions. As

pointed out in the work by the Citizenship, Participation and Accountability Centre, interventions are always subject to political processes and change. CBOs intended as 'new democratic spaces' for citizen participation in governance, are demonstrated to be unpredictable in how they evolve. Often, in contrary ways to normative expectations, and without any guarantee that they will become spaces for change (Gaventa, 2007: xv).

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have examined how aid practices have changed over time and in different contexts, in the way interventions perceive of and engage with local community institutions. A marked shift occurred from the emergency phase to the transition to peace. Organisational approaches moved from largely neglecting local institutional dynamics and uncritically relying on traditional leaders, to the widespread adoption of participatory community-based approaches and viewing traditional leaders with suspicion. In terms of impact and outcomes, this shift has been less pronounced than the CBD discourse suggests. Old practices spilled over into the reconstruction phase; operational limitations to local participation persisted; and few community-based groups survived or became more than alternative channels for aid distribution. The case of ADRA's community programme in Gambos during the war showed that alternatives to the dominant relief approach were possible during conflict. Likewise, the Community Rehabilitation Programme (CRP) reflected concerns with longer-term capacity issues. These cases revealed on the one hand that facilitation and commitment by aid organisations were key to the success of such alternative approaches. On the other, they showed that factors other than conflict also limited the engagement of aid with local communities. Bad practices, the lack of political will and the dominant emergency mentality, crowded out more durable and locally-grounded efforts.

In the post-conflict context community-based organisations of all kinds emerged as the main implementation channels for CBD approaches. I have argued that this was motivated by the operational needs of agencies, at least as much as by concerns with participation, or the recognition that emergency practices had been inadequate. CBO models are diverse and vary substantially in their objectives. They have included user-groups, management commissions for project activities, community development groups and local governance organisations. Some aim to manage project related activities and integrate them into broader community concerns. Others seek to become community representatives on local issues vis-à-vis the state.

As seen from the different cases presented, in practice CBOs generally find it difficult to survive beyond the duration of projects, or to achieve broader and longer-term objectives besides immediate project tasks. I have argued that this is linked to the fact that community-based interventions are based on romanticised views of participation, community and empowerment and on assumptions about legitimisation and institutionalisation processes. Collective action is imagined as a need or gap to be filled by aid interventions. The analysis of the various CBD programmes showed that these images and assumptions find little reflection in the realities on the ground. They overlook the fact that participation is strongly shaped by existing power relations that influence inclusion and exclusion dynamics. Yet, the merits of participation continue to be promoted with little attention to the processes that influence who, why and how people participate in collective action.

CBD discourse and its underlying assumptions have remained prominent in countries affected by conflict, notwithstanding the weak evidence-base for their success. The key question which this chapter has sought to address is why this is the case. I have argued that this is linked to three key factors. First is the persistent lack of understanding of local institutional dynamics and of legitimisation processes. During the emergency this was put

down to the urgency of the war context. However, this trend has persisted during reconstruction, despite the marked shift towards greater community involvement. This was seen in the problems linked to the composition and sustainability of the various community groups.

Second and linked to the previous point, is the nature of the aid system, which often contributes to perpetuating inadequate practices and can undermine the intended outcomes of community-based interventions. CBD approaches remain dominant because of the lack of capable alternative institutions, but also partly because aid organisations have no need or incentive from donors to innovate with alternative approaches. Moreover, the aid system is characterised by a dichotomy between relief and development approaches and the imprint of the emergency culture on reconstruction efforts. These have entrenched the neglect of community institutions into organisational practices, again discouraging alternatives to the emergency culture. Further, aid interventions in post-conflict settings are typically focused on the short-term, when the processes of legitimisation and institutional transformation they aspire to, require time and the building of trust. Combined with a lack of trust in the capacity of local institutions, this trait of the aid system led to the early withdrawal of the aid community from Angola, leaving various CBOs as 'orphans'. These processes significantly impact the legitimacy of various local actors, including CBOs, aid organisations and local governments.

Third, the symbolic and moral value of community participation for aid practitioners and policy makers is a driver of CBD approaches. Participation in this perspective is considered as worthwhile in and of itself because it gives beneficiaries a voice and control over their own destinies. This is valuable in facilitating interaction and building local relationships. It also creates alternatives through which contestation between institutions can be exercised. However, I maintain that this symbolism alone is not enough to justify the uncritical pursuit of community-based and participatory approaches. I subscribe to the perspective that interventions should be based on detailed analysis of how these approaches work out in practice, including of the unintended outcomes of interventions.

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[1] Previous chapters have addressed the other two: technical assistance for service delivery (Chapter 6) and decentralisation support (Chapter 7).
[2] Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation consists of: manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power and citizen control. Pretty's typology consists of: manipulative participation, passive participation, participation by consultation, participation for material incentives, functional participation, interactive participation, self-mobilisation.
[3] See also Chapter 4 on 'social capital'.
[4] See Section 2.1, Chapter 6.
[5] 'Common standard 1' states that "The disaster-affected population actively participates in the assessment, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the assistance programme" (www.sphereproject.org).
[6] The effects of conflict on local institutions in Angola were discussed in Chapter 4.
[7] FAS III was funded under the Transitional Support Strategy of the World Bank and was preceded by FAS I and II which focused on service delivery and infrastructure. It is overseen by the Ministry of Planning and implemented by NGOs and civil society organisations (World Bank, 2006). See also Chapters 6 and 7.
[8] See also Chapter 4 for the example of the National Farmer's Union, UNACA.
[9] The village secretary is appointed by the MPLA and is also the party secretary. He is the person responsible for keeping records and supplying data on the village's population.
[10] Interviews with local woman in Bairro Kilómetro 15, Matala, 28 January 2008; with local farmer, Nguelengue Village, Bunjei, 13 October 2008; with resident of Catchope Village, Matala, 19 December 2008.
[11] Interviews with residents of Catchope Bairro, 19 December 2008, Matala.
[12] Based on surveys with aid beneficiaries and interviews with traditional authorities in various villages of Matala and Chipindo.
[13] Interview with CARE Field Coordinator, 12 January 2008, Matala.
[14] Interview, 15 July 2009, Utrecht.
[15] Interview with female member of Kilómetro 15 community, 18 December 2008, Matala.
[16] 94% Gwame - Nyaneka-Humbi, 6% Hakahona and Dimba - both Herero (Morais and Correia, 1993).

[17] Interview with Vice-Administrator of Gambos Municipality. 04 September 2007, Gambos.
[18] ACORD stands for Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development and was at the time a Northern based consortium of NGOs. It underwent a restructuration process between 2002 and 2006, redefining itself as an African-led international alliance working for social justice (www.acordinternational.org).
[19] Initially the group joined an existing national movement of associations, establishing itself as the Association of the Friends of Gambos (Associação Natural Amigos dos Gambos). Due to political connotations of the movement, its name was changed to Grupo Estrela. That too was associated with the MPLA because *Estrela* (star) is the central symbol of the party's flag. Although the name was changed to Organização Horizonte para o Progresso e Desenvolvimento, (OHPD), 'Grupo Estrela' stuck. Its assembly was constituted in July 1995. (Interview with Founding Member and Advisor of Grupo Estrela. 04 September 2007, Gambos).
[20] Interview with ADRA's National Director. 11 February 2008, Luanda.
[21] Interview with Founding Member and Advisor of Grupo Estrela. 04 September 2007, Gambos.
[22] Interview with project coordinator of ADRA. 03 September 2007, Gambos.
[23] Gambos is known for regular land conflicts between local pastoralist communities and private landowners. The establishment of several large farms by powerful and wealthy individuals has resulted in the disruption of transhumance corridors, traditionally used by local pastoralists for their livelihoods. Water is a scarce resource in this region and local populations have thus been deeply affected by such changes. Resulting conflicts are highly politicised because several of the private farms belong to members of the political and economic elite. Clashes are regularly reported by civil society organisations and the issue often appears in the national press (Pacheco, 2004, Vieira, 2007, TPA, 2010).
[24] I witnessed one such distribution in the Panguelo Municipality, on the 4th September 2007.
[25] Interview with Founding Member and Advisor of Grupo Estrela. 04 September 2007, Gambos.
[26] Group interview with community members of Panguelo. 04 September 2007, Gambos.
[27] Interviews with ADRA Programme Coordinator and Assistant Administrator of Gambos. 03 and 04 September 2007, Gambos.
[28] Several organisations adopted this methodology in Huíla, including ACF, ADESPOV, ADRA, CARE, OIKOS, SNV and ZOA. Some initially experimented with different terminology like 'Committees' (*Comités*) but because of the political connotation and association with the MPLA Committees, the term Management Commission was more widely adopted.
[29] Explanation by ZOA staff member at an inter-agency meeting on food security, 22 March 2007, Lubango.
[30] Interview with senior former ZOA country staff, 15 July 2009, Utrecht.
[31] Informal communication, 30 May 2008. See section 3.2 below, for details on the IECA groups – the NDCs.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Figures are based on 50 individual interviews carried out in 5 communities in Matala: Monhanangombe, Mupindi, Kilómetro 15, Catchope, and Calheta and on group interviews with Farmer School Members.
[34] Interview with CARE Field Coordinator, 12 January 2008, Matala.
[35] Group interview with Farmer School members of Calheta Village, 24 April 2008, Matala.
[36] See also Chapter 5.
[37] Informal communication, 06 July 2009, Apeldoorn.
[38] *Núcleos de Desenvolvimento Comunitário* in Portuguese. These were established in the second phase of the project in 20 villages, in 2006.
[39] Interview with coordinator of PIDRB, 20 May 2008, Bunjei.
[40] Interview with Community Organisation Advisor of PIDRB. 30 May 2008, Bunjei.
[41] Interview with coordinator of PIDRB, 30 May 2008, Bunjei.
[42] Interview with Community Organisation Advisor of PIDRB, 30 May 2008, Bunjei.
[43] Interview with NDC members of Rioco Centro, 13 October 2008, Bunjei.
[44] Interview with PIDRB coordinator, 30 May 2008, Bunjei.
[45] Interview with Community Organisation Advisor of PIDRB, 16 October2008, Bunjei
[46] At the time of the fieldwork, there were 14 established schools and the intention was to expand to 80. The programme operated in a total of 5 municipalities in Huíla. Interview with Field Coordinator, 12 January 2008, Matala.
[47] Interviews with DESHUCU programme staff and Mupindi ODA Members. 23 April 2008 and 20 December 2008, Matala.
[48] Interview with DESHUCU Programme Officer, 11 December 2009, Matala.
[49] Informal communication with field staff member of PIDRB. 10 October, 2008, Bunjei.
[50] Interview with *Soba* of Caquela B, 11 October 2008, Bunjei
[51] Interview with ex-ZOA staff, 06 July 2009, Apeldoorn.
[52] This specifically refers to the cases of Caquela B in Bunjei and of Mupindi in Matala.

CHAPTER NINE

Conclusion

STRENGTHENING INSTITUTIONS OR INSTITUTIONALISING WEAKNESSES?

This research set out to contribute to the understanding of the role of aid on the development of local state and non-state institutions, in conflict and in reconstruction. It is concerned with the people, principles and practices of aid in the Angolan context. In conflict affected countries, social assistance and protection of people by formal state institutions is often weak or absent. Local people find ways to address their needs in the transformation of existing institutions and through alternative mechanisms and service providers. However, such institutions and networks which make up the social fabric also erode or disintegrate in crises. This study has been particularly concerned with the role of aid as one of the alternatives through which Angolans coped during the war or have sought to improve their lives and livelihoods since its end in 2002. It is based on the premise that aid and local institutions become mutually constitutive as they interact. This has meant looking at aid interventions, not in isolation, but in how they interlock with broader social, economic and political processes and actors.

Aid never operates in a complete institutional void, not least during crises. Nonetheless, humanitarian action in particular, has been heavily criticised for neglecting existing local institutions and undermining their capacity and potential development (Juma and Suhrke, 2002). My research interest has therefore been to revisit ongoing debates about aid in conflict and reconstruction, with particular reference to local capacities. I have sought to understand how different aid actors perceive of and engage with local institutions in contexts of war and peace. In other words, how aid interventions and local institutions interact and transform one another, and with what practical effects for how local people resolve problems or pursue interests. This has entailed looking at two aspects of institutional capacity. One refers to the effect of aid on the change processes of institutions through which people directly address their needs. That is both state institutions and non-state institutions, including informal social ones, found at the local level, within the lower tiers of government and within (rural) communities. The other, refers to the impact of aid on the institutional capacity and development of local aid organisations and providers of social assistance.

In the past, ideal-typical approaches to aid in conflict implied a separation between relief and development tasks and actors. In such perspective issues of local capacity of state institutions and community participation were left to the latter as they were considered longer-term concerns. From the 1990s onwards, as humanitarianism came under fire, organisations widened their gaze towards the capacity and involvement of local actors. Institution-building as an explicit objective is now part of reconstruction efforts in conflict and post-conflict contexts. The comeback of the state as a major actor figures prominently in this paradigm and in the broader state-building agenda of improving state-society relations (Harvey, 2009). It is partly a response to the critique that aid substitutes the state and thereby allows it to evade social responsibility.

Interventions designed to promote and enhance institutional capacity in post-war contexts are now widespread. It remains important therefore to understand what their intended and unintended effects are in practice. That is, how they strengthen capacities, of whom and with what effect? These effects are rarely explicitly addressed within the aid sector. Discussions on aid outcomes tend to be limited to internal rather than independent evaluations. These are often based on rapid appraisals that miss the dynamics and unintended effects of interventions, and are limited in their scope as they measure outcomes against objectives. This study addresses this gap. It is centred on unravelling how local institutions are conceived of and are transformed by interventions with various objectives – to by-pass, replace, strengthen, engineer or create alternative structures – and on how these are legitimised.

The examination of aid discourse and practice in this research has shown that institution-building interventions are underscored by several assumptions about social processes and outcomes, which are not based on evidence of the everyday realities on the ground. They take for granted the underlying assumptions and paradigms of humanitarian interventions (Stirrat and Henkel, 1997: 68). As these assumptions are not clear in project documents, they can only be discerned from an analysis of the everyday practices of aid efforts. On the basis of such analyses, the main argument of this research is that aid interventions, irrespective of their intentions, frequently fail to strengthen local institutions, but in addition also unwittingly contribute to institutionalising their weaknesses.

1. The how

In addressing the central question of this research regarding the intended and unintended consequences of different aid interventions on local institutions during and after the conflict, I identified four broad themes for analysis. These were introduced at the start of the thesis, through the window of the football African Nations Cup (CAN). They include firstly the multiple realities of conflict and aid, in terms of their history and localised dynamics and effects (Chapters 2, 3 and 5). The second concerns the characteristics and transformation of the institutional landscape (Chapter 4 and 6). The third refers to the how the transition to peace and reconstruction is perceived by different actors (including the state, aid actors and local people) (Chapters 3, 5). The last theme relates to the everyday practices of institution-building (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). I have framed the analysis of these four themes within the core theoretical concepts which I summarise below.

1.1 Core concepts

1.1.1 Local institutions

In this research I have adopted a broad conceptualisation of local institutions that includes all forms of arrangements through which people address needs and resolve problems, including state services, non-state institution of social assistance, and alternative local institutions. I moved away from normative categorisations of institutions, for example based on their degree of formality, which are dominant in institutional studies and aid circles. As I have argued, these limit the scope of analysis of the manifold ways in which institutions operate in practice and interact with different actors. Institutions are multifaceted. Aid interventions are biased towards formal institutions, but these are often managed by informal structures. Looking beyond the role of formal (state) institutions at non-state institutional alternatives, reveals that multiple institutions coexist and often compete, to determine how local people cope in crises and post-crises. A broadened perspective on institutions has meant examining different aid interventions and how they interlock with local institutions and processes of legitimisation and institutionalisation. One example was the way that decentralisation programme activities interlocked with the cultural working practices, the individual aspirations of bureaucrats, and existing power relations within the local administration, resulting in a limited government buy-in of the decentralisation process.

1.1.2 Actor-orientated approach

This research has been based on an actor orientation, which addresses the relationship between institutions and actors, and is premised on the idea that social actors, people and institutions have agency (Long and Long, 1992). This approach has meant focusing on the everyday life experiences of local people, and on their capacity to reflect and respond to

challenges during and after crises. It considers multiple realities of aid and conflict and avoids "the danger of the single story" (Adichie, 2009). It has also allowed the exploration of how actors and institutions are mutually constitutive in practice, by considering how individuals tacitly draw on particular institutional arrangements and in doing so reproduce and possibly alter them. With specific reference to the study of aid, this perspective is particularly useful because it looks at practice and sees interventions as social interfaces, where aid gets contested and shaped (Long, 2001). In other words, it recognises that aid is embedded and shaped within local society and is part of the multiple institutional alternatives people resort to. An actor orientation opens up the analysis of aid to the unintended as well as the intended outcomes of interventions. It indicates that there is a need to question the built-in assumptions of planned interventions, regarding for instance institutional capacity issues.

1.1.3 Governance and legitimacy

In aid discourse the concept of legitimacy usually appears explicitly in discussions about the governance capacity of the state and the strengthening of state-society relations. It also refers to the representation and accountability of aid organisations. Legitimacy in this research has been seen as a conferred quality of actors and institutions, rather than as a given trait, and as involving legitimisation and de-legitimisation dynamics. Moreover, legitimacy-building is a negotiated and relational process affected by competing strategies of various actors. This perspective allowed me to question the assumptions of state-building interventions about legitimisation processes, namely that legitimacy of the state always breaks down in conflict and that it can be externally (re)generated. The concept has been useful in examining how aid affects the legitimisation of local institutions, including the state, and how aid interventions and organisations are themselves legitimised.

An empirical approach to legitimacy has benefited from the focus of this research on the local level, where multiple institutions interact and where aid interventions unfold. This focus has also been useful to examine how the governance of services and resources is negotiated on the ground. Understanding governance as *practice* has brought out the various actors involved in social assistance, and allowed me to compare how they seek to establish their legitimacy, how they are perceived by other actors, and become more or less institutionalised.

1.1.4 Humanitarian and reconstruction arenas

My analysis of the history of aid in Angola has been framed within the concept of the *arena*, in which multiple actors shape and negotiate the outcomes of aid at the interfaces of implementation. It focuses on the everyday practices of policy and implementation. The arena framework challenges the ideal-typical models of humanitarian and reconstruction aid that dominate understanding of service delivery in conflict and post-conflict. These cloak various factors and processes that shape the realities of aid. This alternative paradigm has opened up the scope of analysis of what happens to societies affected by conflict and after crises, and of whom and what constitutes aid and social assistance. There is greater diversity in terms of actors, their motivations and the type of services they provide, than dominant aid discourses imply. For example, local institutions such as the churches have had a crucial role in social assistance during and after the war. Yet, they fall outside of the gaze of dominant perspectives on aid. Moreover, the arena framework lends itself to the analysis of the multiple processes involved in the transition from conflict to peace and from relief to reconstruction. It has allowed me to step away from conflict-centred perspectives on social assistance, to consider the potential continuities and discontinuities between crisis and post-crisis contexts.

1.2 Assumptions, unintended consequences and everyday practices of aid

This research is premised on the idea that aid gets shaped at the interface of encounters of different actors, resulting in differential outcomes of planned interventions. I have thus been concerned as much with the unintended outcomes of aid, as with those produced intentionally. These two dimensions are important in explaining both what works and what does not, in terms of achieving programme objectives. The unintended effects of action contribute to our understanding of the way in which institutionalised practices are (re)produced, as they are systematically fed back into day-to-day action (Giddens, 1984). They are as important as the intended outcomes in explaining how aid becomes internalised by local actors.

Unintended effects of interventions inevitably result from the tendency of aid organisations to reduce the complexity of the contexts where they operate and to simplify reality (Heyse, 2004, van Leewen, 2008). My study includes various examples of such simplification, from the simplistic views on the causes and effects of conflict (Chapter 2) to the way communities are conceptualised in reconstruction programmes as homogenous entities (Chapter 8).

In such simplification processes, assumptions and presuppositions are made at a discursive level and along the aid chain, from policy formulation to the actual implementation of interventions. They reinforce the idea that social processes can be engineered through planned action. Throughout the thesis I have been concerned with teasing out the assumptions that underline dominant aid discourses on conflict, institutions and state-society relations. I have done this by juxtaposing intentions implicit in policy discourse on actual practices on the ground (Guijt, 2008). That is, by examining the everyday practices of specific relief interventions in conflict and of institution-building interventions in reconstruction.

2 Findings

The main findings of this research are summarised in the following section, according to the five research sub-questions that guided this research, as presented in Chapter 1. These speak directly to the central research objective of investigating the intended and unintended consequences of different types of aid interventions for local governance and service institutions in rural Huíla, during the conflict and in reconstruction. In my discussion I divide findings into conflict and post-war reconstruction, in line with the recurring two dimensions of analysis in the various chapters. It is not my intention in doing so, to argue that aid approaches should be understood within these separate contexts of war and peace. Quite the contrary. This research has highlighted the multiple continuities that exist between crisis and normality in the ways people address their needs and in the everyday practices of aid. The distinction between the two contexts is nonetheless useful because it helps me to organise my findings according to key political developments and major approaches of aid.

2.1 Main institutions through which local people address needs

Institutional multiplicity

My analysis of the Angolan case substantiates observations that fragile and conflict-affected countries are characterised by multiple and often competing institutional arrangements through which people address their needs, resolve problems and secure livelihoods (Hesselbein et al., 2006, Hilhorst et al., 2010). The examination of the development of local governance and service delivery institutions highlighted that throughout time, formal state structures have coexisted with non-state alternatives and informal arrangements. Examples of

such alternatives discussed in this thesis include self-help mechanisms and personal networks, private service providers, traditional structures, and national and international aid organisations involved in social assistance.

The conflict significantly eroded the functioning of state institutions, particularly in more remote rural areas where these virtually collapsed. In the absence of functioning formal services, non-state alternatives became essential for addressing needs. In the bush, private and traditional healers were often the only healthcare alternative. In urban areas, kinship ties, social networks and self and mutual-aid mechanisms were key coping mechanisms for IDPs. They provided access to cash, food and productive means such as seeds and animal traction, through borrowing, in exchange for work or even as gifts (Chapter 4).

Aid was also an important part of the multiple ways in which people sought to meet needs during the war. International humanitarian interventions were crucial in saving lives, but as I have shown in Chapter 3, were insufficient relative to needs, in terms of quantity, coverage and reliability. Their role became particularly prominent from the 1990s onwards, when humanitarian operations started on a large scale. Aid provided by other social assistance actors, such as local churches, was already important in colonial times.

With the end of the war the institutional landscape was significantly transformed. Formal service institutions have since been re-established, although not uniformly. New institutions have emerged, including CBOs created under aid projects with the aim of filling existing institutional gaps. However, as chapter 8 shows, these have yet to become institutionalised as real alternatives for addressing needs. Such institutional transformations have therefore not supplanted the importance of existing non-state alternatives. As I have demonstrated, people continue to turn to informal and traditional institutions, as formal service availability and quality remain lacking. For instance, they resort to the *Sobas* to resolve conflicts that emerged during the resettlement phase, or to informal private facilities for healthcare rather than to state services (Chapter 6). As service delivery in crisis is fragmented, mapping institutional landscapes appears thus very important, both for the analytical understanding of service delivery as for designing aid interventions.

Institutional resilience

This research has also uncovered that local institutions in crises display considerable resilience and adaptability to external changes and pressures. Institutions are transformed as social actors deploy their agency in response to changing circumstances. For instance, I found that certain traditional mutual-aid mechanisms within rural communities became rare in the course of the war, but they have served as the basis for new institutional arrangements during reconstruction. The churches' solidarity groups and NGO-created community-based organisations are examples of this (Chapters 4 and 8). Moreover, the recurring reference in this thesis to the traditional authorities and their changing relationship with local populations and the state is an illustration of the constant flux and multifaceted nature of local institutions. From the colonial period to the current context, these institutions have always retained an important role in local governance, although with considerable variations in relationships of power. These dynamics challenge perspectives within conflict and aid discourse that institutions completely collapse during crises.

My findings build on the emerging "reconstruction from below" paradigm (Hilhorst et al., 2010), which focuses on the role of existing local institutions in reconstruction. However, I argue that the notion of institutional resilience should also not be overestimated. My analysis has shown that local institutions generally undergo a process of deterioration in situations of prolongued conflict, albeit to different degrees according to the localised experience of conflict. This is true also of non-state alternative institutions, which despite having had an important role during the war, ended up also being significantly weakened

over the years. This overall erosion reduced people's coping capacities and contributed to an increased dependence on external assistance.

Perhaps what is of greatest significance regarding the institutional multiplicity and transformation dynamics that characterise post-conflict contexts, is the fact that they are not taken into account in aid practices. These continue to be divided into interventions addressing state institutions, where non-state actors are overlooked, and community-based interventions, where links with the state are missing. Such interventions therefore miss the interactions between different institutions, including how they compete or complement one another, for instance in conflict resolution or in healthcare.

With regards do my first research question "What are the main health and governance institutions through which local people address their health and other individual and collective needs during and after conflict?", I can now conclude that local actors find room for manoeuvre to fulfil interests in multiple institutional arrangements, including state and non-state alternatives. These institutions are resilient but are generally weakened by prolonged conflict. Institutional multiplicity is also relevant for addressing needs in post-conflict reconstruction.

2.2 Main factors contributing to local institutional change

In earlier chapters I showed that humanitarian aid discourses are conflict-centred in explaining institutional transformation. I have argued that they provide a limited understanding of what happens to societies during and after conflict, because they overlook the multiple realities and micro-dynamics of conflict, and the multiple factors that affect institutional development.

The impact of war on institutions is determined by the micro-dynamics of conflict and the specific local institutional environment. Local conflict and local institutions are mutually constitutive and institutional transformation in war comes about from their interaction. My analysis of the histories of conflict and aid in Angola (Chapters 2 and 3) from the perspective of localised experiences has revealed that their effects on people's lives and institutions have been highly diverse and localised. The resulting distinct realities of conflict persist in the post-war context, as evidenced by the sharp differences between life in the two research areas of Matala and Bunjei. Bunjei continues to be marginalised from reconstruction processes, while Matala is recovering its former strategic position in the region. This diversity is often masked in dominant explanations of Angola's conflict and humanitarian crisis.

Such explanations are important because they influence decisions about aid and the response to crisis. By overlooking the historical roots, localised dynamics and differentiated effects of conflict, these decisions were frequently misadjusted to local realities and needs. Chipindo's population and institutions, for example, were much more affected than those of Matala, yet they have received considerably less investment by the state and aid actors. This has reinforced existing inequalities.

Conflict was not the only determinant of changes in local institutions. The colonial system and the transition to independence were essential in shaping service institutions and the post-independence state administration. It was during the colonial period that religious missions for instance, emerged as important providers of social assistance. Colonial economic and social policies transformed local livelihoods, power relations and social practices (Chapter 4). Other phenomena such as displacement and urbanisation had an important bearing on institutional change. Although these were entwined with the conflict dynamics, they had roots in the preceding colonial period and in other factors such as droughts or disease. Moreover, political disengagement and underinvestment were central in the deterioration of social protection and related institutions. The government directed significant resources to the war at the expense of investment in the social sectors and human

capacity. In addition, governing elites and external actors' economic and political interests, dominated over any concern with the welfare of the population. My findings clearly show that institutional transformation resulting from these various factors has not been homogenous. Some areas were more sheltered from colonial occupation, conflict and displacement, others benefitted from greater political investment, and some institutions proved more resilient than others.

In addition to these external processes and phenomena, institutional transformation also results from the engineered processes of aid interventions. Because aid interventions are embedded in local societies, they both shape and are shaped by its institutions. State services, as well as alternative coping mechanisms and non-state providers are altered by aid programmes. However, these changes often happen in unintended ways. For example, by filling the institutional void in service delivery, aid caused a brain-drain from state institutions and contributed to the disengagement of the state from its social responsibilities. These factors, as I have argued throughout this thesis, had the perverse effect of weakening the state's service delivery capacity as its institutions continued to disintegrate under the effects of neglect.

This erosion of local institutional capacity has in turn, had a serious impact on all areas of service delivery in the reconstruction period. Several examples were discussed in this thesis of the practical implications of this capacity gap for institutional development interventions. They include the problems with the functioning of the local administration and health services of Matala (Chapters 6 and 7), with the survival of civil society organisations after the withdrawal of INGOs (Chapter 3), and with the institutionalisation and sustainability of CBOs (Chapter 8). Aid organisations often base decisions about whether to intervene, on the existence of local capacities, so as to ensure some success. This was a key criteria for selecting the intervention areas of the decentralisation and the revitalisation of health services programmes.

In conclusion to the question "What factors have contributed to institutional change at the local level?", I argue that these include external phenomena, including but not limited to conflict (namely political processes, colonialism, urbanisation and displacement); and engineered processes of aid interventions. The latter produce both intended and unintended effects on local institutions. These unintended effects often have a lasting effect on local capacities.

2.3 Intervention types during and after conflict

Multiple actors

In conflict-affected countries, aid is frequently characterised by a division between relief actors and approaches during war, and developmental actors and approaches in peace. Reconstruction usually refers to the in-between transition process and period. This research has revealed that aid agencies struggle to sustain the normative expectations and principles that underline such ideal-typical aid models. I have thus challenged their representations of relief and reconstruction on two key aspects.

First, I have shown that contrary to the widely held images about the nature and role of aid in Angola, aid efforts during and after conflict, were not limited to international agencies or to principled and neutral actors and forms of assistance. Through the lens of the *aid arena*, multiple actors besides those conventionally labelled as humanitarian, with diverse identities, motivations and mandates emerged as key aid providers. The 'aidnography' presented in Chapter 3 shows that social assistance comprised local people, local church organisations, political and military actors (including the warring factions and their political backers during the Cold War), international aid organisations and UN agencies, and national

NGOs. In the post-war context, the composition of the aid arena changed as new actors emerged, including the private sector and external economic partners, as old ones adapt to changing circumstances, and as they negotiate and reposition themselves vis-à-vis one another. The particular case of Bunjei (Chapter 5) substantiated the importance of local actors in relief assistance and in the local post-war development of more isolated areas. It highlights the specific role of local churches in post-conflict reconstruction processes, and supports the argument that religious organisations have been more constant providers of social assistance than international actors (Hilhorst and Serrano, 2010: S199).

An important finding of this research regarding the role of various actors in service delivery was that there was little difference in the aid they provided. Principled aid did not prove more resistant to being enmeshed in the politics of the conflict than other aid actors. International humanitarians also struggled to base decisions and practices on needs, whilst upholding their neutrality and impartiality. For most of the 1980s the Angolan crisis was relegated to second priority within the broader political context and in relation to other emergencies, despite evidence of significant needs. In the post-war phase, the aid community substantially reduced its engagement, also based on the political position that the Angolan government should and could take over social assistance, in spite of the scale of needs and lack of institutional capacity. Differences in aid practices were therefore less about agencies' mandates, and more about their level of operation. Whilst all aid became politicised at the national level, at the level of implementation frontline workers of principled humanitarians and of local actors such as the churches, equally strived for neutrality.

Transitions from relief to reconstruction

The second aspect of relief and reconstruction models which I challenge is how they each conceive of the role of local institutions. My review of aid approaches during Angola's crisis and post-crisis substantiates Harvey's (2009a) argument that a "false dichotomy" persists between aid in conflict and reconstruction. Relief is portrayed as state-avoiding and recovery as state-building. In reality, several continuities as well as discontinuities exist between crisis and post-crisis. This has been visible in the persistence of needs in the post-war context. Models of aid in conflict and post-conflict maintain that relief, reconstruction and development answer to different sets of needs and involve different activities. Over the years, it has become widely accepted that for aid interventions to be effective and sustainable, these different spheres of action should be linked and implemented contiguously. Most organisations shifted focus from classic relief to developmental relief approaches, whereby they aim to incorporate longer-term objectives such as peace and institution building.

This paradigm shift in humanitarian approaches in conflict, did not take root in Angola, particularly in what concerns engagement with institutions for increasing their capacity. Instead, an emergency culture of short-term relief projects (consisting primarily of food aid, food for work, medical assistance, tools and seeds distribution and social infrastructure (re)building) developed and predominated during the war. Many such practices rolled over into the transition to reconstruction. As such, despite aid organisations' shift towards explicit institution-building objectives after the war, in reality, their practices remained largely unchanged.

It was only at a later phase of reconstruction and as part of state-building agendas, that specific institution-building interventions emerged. The examination of such interventions revealed that they tend to be affected by the legacy of relief practices. In the case of the health sector, its capacity to absorb new health support interventions has been limited by the centralised and hierarchical nature of the health system, which was reinforced by aid programmes during the war (Chapter 6). The Revitalisation of Health Care Programme in Matala is an example. It is beset by factors such as the lack of institutional capacity, the

dependence on external resources, the fragmentation of services and funding, the disarticulation between institutional levels, as well as shortcomings linked to the aid system itself. The legacy of past aid interventions on current reconstruction practices in Angola, is largely understated. Yet, it deserves attention given that engineered institutional transformation is a key part of state-building agendas.

In response to my third research question on "the types of aid interventions in the different phases of the conflict and in the post-war", I have shown that various interventions by different actors with distinct motivations, assisted local populations. Besides international actors these included local people, political and military actors, local civil society and church organisations. At the local level there was little difference between the aid they provided, in terms of responding to needs. Approaches of aid organisations in war and in peace were split according to conventional models of relief and reconstruction, but in both contexts an emergency culture dominated practices. This continues to significantly affect current reconstruction efforts.

2.4 Aid approaches to local institutions in war and in peace

Filling the institutional void

One of the key concerns of this research has been to understand how different aid actors have perceived of and engaged with local institutions in conflict and in peace. I have focused in particular on state institutions, community institutions and local aid organisations. My findings indicate with reference to all three types of institution, that aid actors during the emergency largely ignored or bypassed existing institutions. Humanitarian interventions focused on filling the institutional void in service delivery. With specific reference to healthcare, aid interventions involved either direct service provision separate from state services, or support to state institutions via aid organisations and the UN, and via the establishment of new (parallel) structures rather than working through existing ones.

I have argued that the aid community could have done a better job at preparing for the transition to peace by investing in the capacity of local actors during the war to take a leading role in reconstruction. Instead, most aid actors ignored, circumvented or re-invented existing local institutions. I found this to be dictated by the nature and politics of the humanitarian system at least as much as by the limitations inherent to the conflict context. Concerns with neutrality justified the state-avoiding approach of humanitarian actors. State institutions were considered corrupt, inefficient and were consequently sidestepped with the ultimate effect of being replaced by parallel aid structures and systems. This further reinforced the image of the state as incompetent and incapable. An example of the more serious consequences of this practice of bypassing state institutions is the fragmentation of health services discussed in Chapter 6, the effects of which still condition efforts to improve healthcare delivery. As already mentioned, this became clear in the Revitalisation Programme that was intended to decentralise and extend primary health care to local communities.

The potential role of non-state institutions was likewise ignored in the emergency culture. Community institutions were neglected because of the pressure for quick results that discouraged detailed knowledge of local contexts and genuine community involvement and ownership. Instead, traditional leaders were uncritically stamped as *the* genuine community representatives, with significant consequences for the relations of power with local people. Additionally, local civil society and church organisations were an important part of the aid implementation infrastructure. However, they developed in the shadow of international organisations as subcontractors rather than as genuine implementing partners. Capacity-building of local organisations was either not a priority or was limited to training on how to fulfil reporting and operational requirements of international partners and donors.

Institution-building

In the reconstruction context, aid actors came to prioritise institution-building interventions. I have argued that the changing form of engagement of different aid organisations with institutions at the local level has had more to do with the change in context from war to peace, than with their identities or mandates. This shift happened irrespective of the relief or development mandate of organisations. Organisations of different pedigrees neglected or replaced local institutions during the war whilst in peace-time interest amongst aid actors in strengthening existing capacities has been widespread. Several types of institution-building interventions have emerged, which I have grouped under three broad categories: technical assistance for service delivery, decentralisation support and community-based development programmes (chapters 6, 7 and 8 respectively).

I have argued for the first two types of interventions, that they have a built-in bias towards formal state institutions. Implicit in such interventions is an image of states as the sole legitimate provider of services. The countervailing power of non-state actors is largely sidelined. Community-based development programmes on the other hand, set out to strengthen communities' organisational capacity, but in turn find it difficult to create and sustain linkages with other institutions. The bias towards the role of the state in reconstruction has turned its institutions into competitors of civil society organisations in access to donor funds and in terms of human resources. Whereas during the emergency there was a brain drain from state services towards NGOs, in the current reconstruction period the trend has been reversed due to improved working conditions of civil servants.

The various examples of aid interventions have also demonstrated that major discrepancies exist between the rhetoric and practice of institution-building. Planned interventions do not unfold according to formal objectives, but rather are negotiated and shaped in the everyday practices and encounters between social actors. These discrepancies are linked to the legacy of previous aid practices and to the workings of the aid system, as already mentioned, and not least, to the various assumptions built into aid interventions.

I have shown that these assumptions are often not retained in practice. Technical assistance programmes target state institutions with the aim of improving their service delivery capacity, which is expected to contribute to better governance and state-citizens relations (Chapter 6). These are in line with broader state-building agendas commonly promoted in fragile states, in which the 'come-back of the state' is a prominent feature. The examination of the Revitalisation Programme challenged the alleged links between service delivery and state legitimacy. It indicated that improvements in service delivery are complex, and that people's perceptions and expectations of the state and its services are not determined by a linear relationship with investment in service amelioration. Support for decentralisation processes is said to promote local development by fostering a more accountable and responsive government and a more participatory and inclusive society (Chapter 7). In Angola this approach has been unique in its explicit attention to strengthening both state and community institutions. However, the link between decentralisation, poverty reduction and improved governance remains unclear. As the review of the DESHUCU programme showed, most intentions of decentralisation policies such as improving representativeness and participation of local people in decision-making, have been difficult to achieve. Community-based development programmes promote self-reliance and participation through the creation and/or strengthening of community-based organisations (CBOs) as agents of local development. As seen in the numerous examples in Chapter 8, in practice these struggle to survive beyond the duration of projects, and to achieve the broader objectives of strengthening local institutions and democratic participation. Various factors and processes influence who, why and how people participate in collective action. CBOs are unable to circumvent or neutralise these power and political dynamics.

Regarding the question of "how aid agencies and interventions with different mandates and objectives perceive of and engage with local institutions; and how these in turn interact with aid interventions" I draw the following conclusions. First, that there was a shift in aid agencies' approaches from institutional neglect in war to institution-building in peace. Second, that this shift was too little too late, for it came at the time interventions were already being reduced and organisations were withdrawing. The aid community could have done a better job at securing the capacity of local actors to take over and lead reconstruction activities. Third, that major discrepancies exist between the rhetoric and practice of all three institution-building intervention types, due to their built-in assumptions, the imprint of previous aid practices, and the characteristics of the aid system.

2.5 Aid interventions and legitimisation and institutionalisation processes

Legitimisation and institutionalisation processes were specifically dealt with in chapter 6 for the development of state-society relations; in chapter 5 for the role of the local church IECA in local development processes in Bunjei; in chapter 8 for the functioning and sustainability of NGO-created groups; and in chapter 4 for the transformation of the traditional authorities.

In state-building agendas, strengthening the legitimacy of the state is framed as a project. Interventions are based on assumptions about legitimisation and institutionalisation processes, namely that the social contract breaks down in conflict and that legitimacy can be externally generated. Whether it is through administrative and political decentralisation, support to service delivery, or strengthened community involvement, aid programmes are premised on the idea that they can contribute to increased legitimacy.

This research adds to literature that questions whether legitimacy can be externally managed (Brinkerhoff, 2005a). I found that that legitimisation and institutionalisation processes operate outside of intentions of organisations and their interventions. For instance, the decentralisation programme in Matala created expectations amongst the population about local development processes. The fact that these expectations were not fulfilled ended up delegitimizing both the state and the organisations involved. In addition, interventions often aspire to formalise and institutionalise practices and structures including linkages between different sets of actors and levels. However, my findings show that such linkages often appear in the informal sphere rather than as formalised institutional relationships, because they largely depend on personal relations.

Legitimacy is contingent on a variety of factors, many of which cannot be manipulated through interventions. IECA was able to somewhat strengthen its legitimacy through its internal organisational practices and social control, but its religious identity and historical performance in service delivery were more important sources of legitimacy vis-à-vis local actors (Chapter 5). In state-building discourse social services are conceptualised as interfaces where state-society relations can be shaped. However, state legitimacy depends on its performance, but also on people's trust, perceptions, expectations and behaviour, as well as on its historical relation with citizens. As seen in the case of healthcare in Matala, external support to service delivery has done little to change the perceived lack of quality and trust in state services.

My findings also highlighted that legitimacy is relational and depends on what institutional alternatives are available. In addition to the above sources of IECA's legitimacy, the absence of an institutional alternative such as an effective local state to compete in service provision, was a key factor in its development as an alternative claim to governance. Furthermore, actors and institutions often enjoy different degrees of legitimacy vis-à-vis different players. For instance, NGO-created CBOs are legitimated by aid actors and donors, but not necessarily by local populations or the state. Because they lack both a track record of

performance and a formal recognition, many have failed over the years to become sustainable and institutionalised.

I found that the legitimacy of actors is continuously being contested and negotiated at different levels, particularly because in Angola, as in other conflict affected countries, institutional multiplicity is important in addressing people's needs. IECA's future role in Bunjei hinges on such negotiation, particularly as the state increases its local presence.

Aid organisations are not only concerned with building the legitimacy of other actors, but also in legitimising themselves and their interventions. Often, the drive to legitimate action towards donors predominates in their decisions. All three types o institution-building interventions popular in Angola's reconstruction, find legitimacy at this level, because they speak to the agendas of donors *and* of the Angolan state. I showed that support to service delivery has been a key area of donor engagement in Angola, because it accommodates its relatively low financial and political leverage in relation to the GoA, as well as the capacity-building needs of state institutions (Chapter 6). In the case of decentralisation programmes, Chapter 7 showed that these continue to be supported despite the evident lack of commitment by the government for real power transfer to the local level, because they fulfil the governance reforms under state-building agendas of donors and allow some engagement with the Angolan state. Decentralisation support therefore appears to be dictated more by the agendas of the GoA and the aid community than by concerns to achieve the stated objectives. Community-based development is also strongly promoted despite widespread recognition of its limited achievements. I argue that this is due to unrealistic expectations of participation, empowerment, and institutionalisation processes, but also has to do with the symbolic and moral worth of participation for aid practitioners and policy makers. CBD approaches serve to legitimise interventions as promoting self-reliance, and provide 'phantom' exit strategies that claim to guarantee sustainability (Chapter 8).

With reference to my last research question on "how aid interventions affect the legitimisation processes of local institutions, and themselves seek to build legitimacy and become institutionalised", I conclude that interventions aspiring to influence legitimisation processes repeatedly overlook the multiple factors that play into legitimacy as well as the negotiated nature of legitimisation outcomes. Moreover, planned interventions are often dominated by the need to be upwardly accountable to donors. They are therefore as much about the politics and the legitimisation of aid itself as about achieving stated objectives.

2.6 The traditional authorities

Although I did not have a specific research question on the traditional authorities, they emerged as an important set of institutions in the various themes analysed in this research, regarding the interaction between aid and institutions. I therefore wish to give a conclusion about them in this section.

In Angola, the traditional authorities have been and remain a key set of institutions involved in local governance, the allocation and management of resources and in rule-making. Their ambiguous role as in-between representatives of the formal administration and of local communities, or of both, attests to the multifaceted and versatile nature of local institutions.

The traditional authorities are also an example of the multiple dynamics of institutional change. Their transformations over the years did not come about only as a result of conflict, but also of factors such as colonialism, politics, population movements, and aid. Through such changes they showed the resilience and adaptability of institutions to crisis situations and in their aftermath. Traditional leaders played a vital role in managing resources, in the organisation of local communities and in conflict resolution during displacement *and* after the war. Since then they have continued to be transformed by new

circumstances. For instance, during the election period, traditional leaders were targets of political cooption by the main parties. In addition, the current decentralisation process has put the traditional authorities at centre stage, as potential players in the future autarchies, strengthening their position in local society.

The traditional authorities have always been an important set of actors in the interaction of aid interventions with local institutions, albeit not always explicitly. Relief approaches either neglected them or used them to legitimate action. In the latter case, they were labelled as *the* genuine community representatives, responsible for defining beneficiaries and allocating aid. Recently, these local leaders have come to be seen with suspicion as potentially 'fraudulent'. They are thus being increasingly sidelined in aid interventions. These practices of aid influence legitimisation dynamics. Aid interventions such as the community-based programmes discussed in Chapter 8, are creating new institutional arrangements that complement but also compete with the traditional authorities. This was seen in the case of the NGO-created CBOs that exclude the *Sobas* from their organising structure. As I have argued, although the sustainability and institutionalisation of these groups is questionable, their creation does have a bearing on local power dynamics. The prominence of the traditional authorities in all these processes of local institutional change corroborates the importance of tracing institutional trajectories for designing aid interventions.

3. Implications of the research

During this research I have been asked two recurrent questions about my findings. One refers to the *real* impact of aid interventions for local institutions on the ground. The other involves what specific recommendations I have to improve practice. These questions came from different corners, including aid agency staff, academics and policy makers. Sometimes they were a call for accountability to those individuals and organisations with which I engaged during the research. Most often however, they were motivated by a genuine desire to gain insight into problems which practitioners themselves had been grappling with. They wanted to know the concrete value of my conclusions for changing practices and improving results. As I often had to explain, the aim of this study has been to shed light on what actually happens at the interfaces between aid interventions and local institutions, rather than to come up with prescriptive recommendations. I often found this explanation unsatisfactory however. I found it disconcerting that rather than adding clarity to aid realities and dilemmas with straight forward suggestions, my answers usually added to their complexity. By reflecting on the unintended outcomes of planned interventions, this research highlights the unpredictability of aid efforts. The unpredictability of aid is problematic in that it is at odds with the need of relief and development efforts to plan aid and promise certain outcomes. Growing recognition amongst practitioners and policy makers of the complexity of local realities, and of individuals' capabilities to reflect and respond to change in unexpected ways, has not resolved this paradox with interventionist approaches.

Three key lessons:

Concurring with Ramalingam et al (2008), I hope that the alternative insights into the problems of aid that I provide are relevant to arrive at better intuitions and actions on how to deal with 'messy realities'. The challenge remains to come up with *"...norms, actions and relationships that will make development and humanitarian practice more attuned to reality, more sensitive to context, more adaptive, less reductionist and less simplistic."* (Chambers in

Ramalingam et al., 2008: vii). In line with this argument, I put forward three broad lessons for the practice of aid in crisis and post-crisis.

First, is that the aid community should take the role of local actors and institutions seriously. Throughout this thesis it has emerged that local actors have been an important part of the aid arena during conflict and its aftermath and in local change processes. Yet, they have been repeatedly overlooked. They often play a significant role in the provision of social assistance, and at times in hampering access to it. The treatment of the traditional authorities by the aid community is an example of the erratic and inconsistent approach to local institutions.

Second, aid organisations should be realistic about what their planned interventions can actually achieve. Social change processes to which institution-building interventions aspire are lengthy and complex and require long-term commitment. Such commitment is uncharacteristic of both relief and reconstruction efforts, which moreover tend to be based on normative assumptions about what happens to societies during and after conflict. This often leads to overly ambitious claims about potential change processes. In doing so, they set interventions up for failure. This is also true of state-led efforts. As I have demonstrated, the promises of participatory community-development approaches or of decentralised governance plans have gone largely unfulfilled in Angola's context. In the latter case, the inability to meet local expectations led to the loss of face and de-legitimisation of local actors and institutions.

Third, this research indicates that a much more serious and systematic integration of academic research and aid policy and practice is called for. An understanding of local social processes within which aid interventions are embedded, and of their potential effects, including unintended ones, is key to improving aid practices. Knowledge produced in the academic sphere should be part of decisions about aid, whilst academic research should seek to address the dilemmas of aid in conflict and reconstruction.

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SUMMARY

Angola was immersed in a long civil war that lasted from its independence from Portugal in 1975 until early 2002. In the course of the conflict and in its aftermath local institutions through which people address needs and resolve problems, including state and non-state institutional alternatives, were transformed profoundly. Several aid efforts to assist local populations were implemented during that time. This study examines the interaction between aid interventions and local institutions. It starts from the premise that in this interaction they transform one another and become mutually constitutive, producing both intended and unintended outcomes. I analyse such effects for different types of aid interventions and of local level institutions during the conflict and in reconstruction.

This study is based on an actor-oriented approach, according to which interventions are embedded in society and are shaped in the everyday practices and encounters between various actors. In my analysis of the history of aid I build on this approach with the notion of the aid *arena*. The *arena* framework broadens the analyses of whom and what constitutes social assistance. It considers the role of multiple actors beyond conventional international organisations.

In dominant aid discourse it is assumed that conflict leads to the breakdown of societies and of the institutions and livelihoods that sustain them. Aid policy and practice are informed by such assumptions about social transformation in crisis. Aid approaches to local institutions and institutional capacity are often framed along ideal-typical representations of humanitarian/relief aid and development aid, as two opposite ends of the aid spectrum. Reconstruction is understood as the in-between phase of transition from war to peace and connotes the return to a pre-conflict normality. According to such divisions, during conflict humanitarian actors primarily focus on life-saving action and on filling the institutional gaps in service delivery. In post-conflict state-building agendas, creating or strengthening the capacity of local institutions is framed as a project, and is translated into different types of time-bound institution-building interventions.

This study examines empirically how these different aid approaches to local institutions play out in the case of Angola. It looks at how interventions with various objectives (to by-pass, replace, strengthen, engineer or create alternative institutions) conceive of and engage with local institutions, and at how these interventions are legitimised.

Three core arguments are developed throughout this thesis. The first is that in contexts of conflict, multiple institutional arrangements coexist and compete in addressing local needs, given that legitimate state institutions are often absent. The second is that ideal-typical models of relief, reconstruction and development find little reflection in the realities of war, peace and in the transitions between the two. In practice, rather than a clear division between war and post-war contexts, continuities and reordering processes occur between them, both in terms of needs and of aid practices. Moreover, conflict and aid develop differentiated dynamics and outcomes at the local level, as they interact with specific institutional environments. The third is that aid interventions despite intentions to strengthen local institutional capacity, often fail to do so and actually contribute to their erosion. This largely relates to the emergency culture, in which local institutions were either ignored, circumvented or reinvented. Its legacy continues to affect reconstruction efforts post-war.

This study consists of a historical ethnography of aid interventions and local institutions, based on the case of Huíla province and on the specific experiences of the two municipalities of Chipindo and Matala. The methodological choices, the research questions, objectives and organisation, as well as the conceptual framework, are presented in the introductory chapter. The research focuses on the governance and provision of basic services as a key area of social assistance. It explores, through the particular case of healthcare

providers, how institutional multiplicity works out in practice. I take a broad perspective on local institutions, to include the multiple arrangements that people resort to in order to address needs and resolve problems. This includes service institutions of the state, non-state institutions involved in social assistance, and alternative local institutions, such as the traditional authorities.

Chapter 2 examines the history of the conflict in terms of its main actors, motivations and effects, particularly on state-society relations and on the workings of the state and its institutions. An empirical analysis of the local conflict experiences of four municipalities of Huíla is presented. It shows that conflict dynamics and socio-cultural institutions are mutually constitutive at the local level. Localised experiences of conflict are produced in the interaction between the broader conflict and local norms, institutions and power relations. These largely determined the pace and realities of reconstruction in the four cases. The war also had a considerable effect on state formation, its relations with society and non-state actors, and on the development of governance practices. This in turn shaped current relations and practices and the state's capacity for reconstruction.

Chapter 3 presents the history of the humanitarian and reconstruction *arenas* based on an empirical examination of various aid efforts. This 'aidnography' challenges dominant perspectives on aid in conflict, which are centred on the role of international actors and the aid they provide. Through the *arena* framework I demonstrate that social assistance was provided by a variety of other actors, with different motivations and forms of assistance in addition to principled life-saving action. I look specifically at the role of local people, religious institutions, the state and other political actors, national civil society and international organisations. The principled aid of international humanitarians turned out to be as prone to being politicised as that of local actors. Both struggled to uphold neutrality and to be needs based. Moreover, the international aid effort was a key part of the humanitarian response, but was insufficient in relation to needs in terms of coverage and reliability.

Chapter 4 examines empirically the debate on how institutions operate, evolve and are transformed in crisis affected societies. It traces Angola's institutional development during colonialism, conflict and reconstruction, and identifies the main factors that contribute to such transformations. My analysis challenges the dominant perspective that institutions collapse during conflict. Institutions show considerable resilience and adaptability to crisis. However, their capacity for reconstruction efforts should not be overestimated, as both state and non-state institutions were significantly eroded during the prolonged civil-war. Moreover, people resort to multiple institutional arrangements in crisis. These often adapt and find continuity in reconstruction. Furthermore, institutions are transformed in the interaction with one another and in reaction to various external factors, including but not limited to conflict. These included colonisation policies, displacement and urbanisation trends, political underinvestment and aid interventions.

In chapter 5 the histories of conflict, aid and institutional development are analysed for the specific case of Bunjei (Chipindo). Bunjei was under UNITA's control and was isolated from aid and state services during the war. The chapter examines the political processes that underline and perpetuate its marginalisation from national reconstruction efforts. It analyses how the local evangelical church (IECA) emerged as an alternative to the official state structure in social assistance and local development. IECA enjoys considerable local legitimacy derived from its religious institutional identity, its long tradition and performance in social assistance, its organisational practices, the behaviour and motivation of its staff, and its perceived professionalism relative to the poor performance of other actors in the local governance and service arenas. Yet, this legitimacy is under constant contestation and negotiation.

Chapters 6 to 8 each look at one of the three types of institution-building interventions that have been dominant in Angola's reconstruction. Chapter 6 discusses technical assistance for service delivery with specific reference to the case of healthcare. It traces how different aid interventions defined and engaged with local institutions during war-time and in peace. It shows a dichotomy in approaches between relief and reconstruction. Relief interventions were hardly concerned with strengthening the capacity of local actors and institutions, whereas reconstruction efforts have focused on building or strengthening them. During the war humanitarians focused on filling the institutional void in service delivery and adopted a state-avoiding approach. By replacing and bypassing state institutions, seen as inefficient and corrupt, aid contributed to their erosion. It also failed to build the capacity of local civil society and community institutions. The shift towards institution-building ambitions in the post-war proved too little too late in preparing local actors for reconstruction. My findings challenge the alleged links between service delivery, state legitimacy and the strengthening of the social contract. People´s perceptions of the state and its services largely depend on available alternatives, which reconstruction programmes tend to neglect.

Chapter 7 focuses on decentralisation support programmes and their alleged contribution to poverty reduction. It follows a specific decentralisation support programme along its implementation chain in Matala. Analyses of the interfaces between local actors brought together under decentralisation activities – local governments, local communities and aid organisations - show that the outcomes are highly context specific and diverge from normative expectations. I argue that in Angola decentralisation support has become a popular form of donor engagement, because it serves the agenda of both the government and of the aid community. Such policies are promoted irrespective of their failure to achieve the intended objective of solving the problems of the people. Moreover, they risk doing more harm than good to the legitimacy of local actors, by creating unmet expectations.

Chapter 8 explores how the institution-building discourse is translated at the community level. Various empirical cases of aid interventions in Huíla are presented and analysed to determine how aid actors have engaged with community-based institutions. Community-based development (CBD) approaches were crowded out during the war, but became popular in reconstruction programmes. They work with community-based organisations (CBOs), seen as drivers of local change, as the link between local society and state institutions and thus as legitimate channels for aid delivery. In practice CBOs find it difficult to survive beyond the duration of projects or to achieve broader and longer-term objectives besides immediate project tasks. CBD approaches nonetheless remain popular because of the lack of incentive for alternative models, the symbolic and moral value of community participation and empowerment, and assumptions about legitimisation and institutionalisation processes.

In the last chapter, I summarise the main findings. These indicate that aid practices in reconstruction do not differ significantly from those under the emergency culture, in the way agencies engage with local institutions. Although institution-building has become an explicit objective of interventions, these continue to be biased towards formal institutions and to neglect the role of non-state alternatives. Moreover, they are strongly shaped by the legacy of relief practices on the legitimacy of local institutions, and on the functioning of the aid system, including its short-term focus and funding cycles. As such, as the title of this thesis suggests, aid interventions rather than strengthening local institutions, often institutionalise their weaknesses. Three key lessons for aid practices in conflict contexts are proposed: that the role of local actors and institutions be taken more seriously, that aid actors be more realistic about what planned interventions can achieve, and that academic research and aid policy and practice be more systematically integrated.

RESUMO

Angola esteve envolvida numa longa guerra civil que durou desde a sua independência de Portugal em 1975 até ao início de 2002. Durante o período de conflito e também no pós-conflito, foram ocorrendo transformações profundas nas instituições locais que eram utilizadas pela população para atender às suas necessidades e resolver os seus problemas, fossem elas instituições do Estado ou alternativas não-estatais. Durante este período, foram efectuados vários esforços para prestar assistência às populações locais. Este trabalho de investigação examina a interacção entre as intervenções de ajuda e as instituições locais, partindo da premissa de que nesta interacção cada parte transformou a outra e ambas se tornaram mutuamente edificadoras, causando simultaneamente efeitos desejados e não-desejados. Portanto, é feita uma análise destes efeitos para os diferentes tipos de intervenção da ajuda e de instituições de nível local durante as fases de conflito e de reconstrução.

Este estudo baseia-se numa abordagem orientada para os actores, partindo do princípio que as intervenções estão inter-relacionadas com a sociedade e são transformadas através das práticas e dos encontros diários entre os vários actores. A minha análise da história da ajuda, incorpora a noção da *arena* da ajuda. O conceito de *arena* torna a análise mais abrangente sobre quem e o que constitui a assistência social, e inclui o papel de múltiplos actores, para além das convencionais organizações internacionais.

O discurso dominante da ajuda parte do princípio que os conflitos levam à ruptura das sociedades e das instituições e sistemas de vida que as sustêm. As políticas e práticas da ajuda baseiam-se nestes pressupostos sobre transformação social durante situações de crise. As abordagens da ajuda em relação às instituições locais e à capacidade institucional são muitas vezes enquadradas dentro de representações típicas ideais da ajuda humanitária/de emergência e da ajuda ao desenvolvimento, como sendo dois pólos no espectro da ajuda. A reconstrução é entendida como a fase de transição entre a guerra e a paz e pressupõe um retorno à situação de normalidade que existia antes do conflito. De acordo com estas divisões, durante o conflito, os actores humanitários concentram os seus esforços em acções dirigidas a salvar vidas e a preencherem os vazios institucionais existentes na prestação de serviços. No período pós-conflito, as agendas visam o reforço do Estado, criando ou reforçando a capacidade das instituições locais por meio de projectos específicos, de tempo limitado, que se traduzem em diferentes tipos de intervenções de reforço institucional.

Este estudo examina empiricamente a forma como diferentes abordagens da ajuda em relação às instituições locais funcionam no caso de Angola, analisando especificamente como intervenções com diferentes objectivos (ultrapassar, substituir, reforçar, reformar ou criar instituições alternativas) encaram e se relacionam com as instituições locais e como essas intervenções ganham legitimidade.

Ao longo desta tese, desenvolvem-se três argumentos de base. O primeiro é que em contextos de conflito, múltiplos arranjos institucionais coexistem e competem entre si para atender às necessidades locais, quando as instituições estatais legítimas estão ausentes. O segundo é que os modelos ideais típicos da ajuda de emergência, reconstrução e desenvolvimento reflectem pouco as realidades da guerra, da paz e da transição entre as duas. Na prática, em vez de existir uma separação clara entre os contextos de guerra e pós-guerra, ocorrem entre eles processos de continuidade e de reorganização, quer em termos de necessidades, quer em termos de práticas da ajuda. Além disso, o conflito e a ajuda desenvolvem dinâmicas e resultados diferenciados a nível local, uma vez que interagem com ambientes institucionais específicos. O terceiro é que as intervenções da ajuda apesar das intenções de reforçar a capacidade institucional local, muitas vezes não o conseguem realizar e contribuem até para a sua erosão. Este fenómeno está relacionado com a cultura da ajuda de

emergência, na qual as instituições locais são ignoradas, ultrapassadas ou até reinventadas. O seu legado continua até hoje a afectar os esforços de reconstrução do período pós-guerra

Este estudo consiste numa etnografia histórica das intervenções de ajuda e das instituições locais, e baseia-se no caso da Província da Huíla e em experiências específicas em dois municípios, o Chipindo e a Matala. No capítulo introdutório são apresentadas as escolhas metodológicas, as perguntas de investigação, os objectivos e a organização da pesquisa, e ainda a sua base conceptual. A investigação concentra-se na governação e na prestação de serviços básicos, como uma área fundamental na assistência social, analisando, através do caso particular dos prestadores de serviços de saúde, como é que a multiplicidade institucional funciona na prática. Utiliza uma perspectiva alargada do que são as instituições locais, tomando em conta os arranjos múltiplos aos quais as pessoas recorrem para satisfazer as suas necessidades e resolver os seus problemas. Estas incluem instituições estatais, instituições não-estatais envolvidas na assistência social, e instituições locais alternativas, como as autoridades tradicionais.

O Capítulo 2 examina a história do conflito em termos dos seus principais actores, das suas motivações e dos seus efeitos, particularmente para as relações Estado-sociedade e para as funções do Estado e das suas instituições. O capítulo inclui uma análise empírica das experiências locais de conflito em 4 municípios da Huíla. É aqui mostrado que a dinâmica do conflito e as instituições socioculturais são mutuamente edificadoras a nível local, o que se observou nas experiências localizadas do conflito produzidas pela interacção entre o conflito alargado e as normas, instituições e relações de poder a nível local. Estas determinaram o ritmo e as realidades da reconstrução nos 4 casos. A guerra teve também um efeito considerável na formação do Estado, nas suas relações com a sociedade e com outros actores não-estatais, assim como no desenvolvimento de práticas de governação. Estas por sua vez transformaram as relações e as práticas actuais e a capacidade do Estado para a reconstrução.

O Capítulo 3 apresenta a história das *arenas* humanitária e de reconstrução, por meio duma análise empírica dos vários esforços da ajuda. Esta análise desafia as perspectivas dominantes da ajuda durante conflitos, as quais se baseiam no papel dos actores internacionais e na ajuda que estes oferecem. Através do conceito de *arena*, demonstra-se que a assistência social foi prestada por uma variedade doutros actores, com diferentes motivações e formas de assistência, para além das acções essencialmente dirigidas a salvar vidas. Aqui presta-se uma atenção particular ao papel das populações locais, das instituições religiosas, do Estado e doutros actores políticos, da sociedade civil nacional e das organizações internacionais. A ajuda do mundo humanitário internacional, assente em princípios humanitários, provou afinal ser tão vulnerável a ser politizada como a dos actores locais, lutando ambos por se manter neutros e se basear em necessidades reais. Além disso, apesar dos esforços internacionais de ajuda representarem uma parte fundamental da resposta humanitária, eles foram insuficientes em relação às necessidades em termos de cobertura e de fiabilidade.

O Capítulo 4 analisa empiricamente o debate sobre como operam as instituições, como se desenvolvem e se transformam em sociedades afectadas por crises, apresentando o desenvolvimento das instituições em Angola durante o colonialismo, o conflito e a reconstrução, e identificando os principais factores que contribuíram para tais transformações. A análise põe em causa a perspectiva dominante de que as instituições são destruídas durante o conflito, quando afinal mostram considerável resistência e adaptabilidade a crises. No entanto, a sua capacidade para esforços de reconstrução não deve ser sobrestimada, pois tanto as instituições estatais como as não estatais se degradam significativamente durante situações prolongadas de guerra civil. Além disso, as pessoas recorrem a arranjos institucionais múltiplos durante crises, que muitas vezes se adaptam e vão continuando durante a reconstrução. As instituições vão sendo também transformadas pela

interacção entre umas e outras e como reacção a vários factores externos, incluindo mas não exclusivamente, o próprio conflito. Destes destacam-se ainda as políticas de colonização, a deslocação das populações e as tendências de urbanização, o fraco investimento político e as intervenções de ajuda.

No Capítulo 5 são analisadas as histórias do conflito, da ajuda e do desenvolvimento institucional para o caso específico do Bunjei (Chipindo). O Bunjei esteve sob o controlo da UNITA e portanto afastado da ajuda e dos serviços estatais durante a guerra. O capítulo examina os processos políticos que caracterizaram e perpetuaram a marginalização em relação aos esforços de reconstrução do país, analisando como a igreja evangélica local (IECA) emergiu como uma alternativa de assistência social e desenvolvimento local, à estrutura estatal oficial. A IECA goza de uma legitimidade local considerável devido à sua identidade institucional religiosa, à sua longa tradição e desempenho na assistência social, às suas práticas organizacionais, ao comportamento e motivação do seu pessoal e ao seu reconhecido profissionalismo face ao desempenho de outros actores na governação local e na arena de serviços. No entanto, a sua legitimidade está sob permanente contestação e negociação.

Os capítulos 6 a 8 dizem respeito respectivamente a cada um dos três tipos de intervenções de reforço institucional que dominaram o período de reconstrução de Angola. O capítulo 6 discute a assistência técnica para a prestação de serviços com referência específica ao caso da saúde, avaliando como diferentes tipos de intervenções da ajuda se definiram e envolveram com as instituições locais durante o período de guerra e na paz, revelando uma dicotomia nas abordagens entre a emergência e a reconstrução. As intervenções de emergência não prestavam grande atenção ao reforço da capacidade dos actores e instituições locais, enquanto que os esforços de reconstrução se concentravam especificamente em criar ou reforçar essas capacidades. Durante a guerra, os humanitários preocupavam-se em colmatar o vazio institucional na prestação de serviços, através de práticas que evitavam o envolvimento com o Estado e suas instituições. Ao substituir e ultrapassar as instituições estatais, vistas como ineficientes e corruptas, a ajuda contribuiu para a sua erosão. Esta impediu também a criação de capacidades da sociedade civil local e das instituições comunitárias. A viragem para ambições de fortalecimento institucional no período do pós-guerra mostrou ser demasiado modesta e demasiado tardia para preparar os actores locais para a reconstrução. Os resultados deste estudo põem em causa as alegadas ligações entre a prestação de serviços, a legitimidade do Estado e o reforço do contrato social, visto que as percepções das pessoas sobre o Estado e os seus serviços dependem largamente das alternativas disponíveis, aspectos que os programas de reconstrução têm tendência a negligenciar.

O Capítulo 7 incide sobre os programas de apoio à descentralização e sobre a sua alegada contribuição para a redução da pobreza, acompanhando a execução dum programa específico de apoio à descentralização na Matala. As análises das interfaces entre os actores locais que se juntaram devido às próprias actividades de descentralização – governos locais, comunidades locais e organizações da ajuda – mostram que os resultados dependem de cada contexto e são diferentes do que se esperaria dos objectivos das intervenções. O argumento que se apresenta é que o apoio à descentralização em Angola se popularizou junto dos doadores porque servia a agenda tanto do governo como da comunidade internacional. Estas políticas continuaram a ser promovidas apesar do seu fracasso em atingir o seu objectivo, o de 'resolver os problemas do povo', correndo ainda o risco de prejudicar mais do que beneficiar a legitimidade dos actores locais, criando expectativas que não eram cumpridas.

O Capítulo 8 explora como o discurso de construção institucional se traduz ao nível comunitário, sendo aqui apresentados vários casos de intervenções da ajuda na Huíla, para determinar como os actores locais se envolveram com as instituições comunitárias de base.

As abordagens de desenvolvimento comunitário (community-based development - CBD) foram preteridas durante a guerra, mas tornaram-se populares nos programas de reconstrução, que trabalharam com organizações comunitárias de base (community-based organisations - CBOs), que eram vistas como motores de mudanças a nível local, como o elo de ligação entre a sociedade local e as instituições do Estado, e assim, como veículos legítimos para a prestação da ajuda. Na prática, as CBOs encontraram dificuldades em sobreviver após o período de duração dos projectos e em atingir objectivos alargados e de longo prazo, mais além das tarefas imediatas a eles inerentes. Apesar de tudo, as abordagens de desenvolvimento comunitário continuaram a ser populares devido ao pouco incentivo para a procura de modelos alternativos, ao valor moral e simbólico da participação e do empoderamento a nível comunitário e aos pressupostos sobre os processos de legitimidade e institucionalização.

No último capítulo são apresentadas as principais conclusões, que indicam que as práticas da ajuda na reconstrução no que diz respeito à forma como as agências encaravam as instituições locais, não diferem significativamente daquelas durante a situação de emergência. Embora a construção institucional se tenha tornado um objectivo explícito das intervenções de ajuda, elas continuaram a favorecer as instituições formais e a negligenciar o papel das alternativas não-estatais. Além disso, tais intervenções foram fortemente influenciadas pelo legado das práticas de ajuda de emergência na legitimidade das instituições locais e no funcionamento do sistema de ajuda, particularmente no que se refere ao curto prazo dos projectos e dos ciclos de financiamento. Assim, tal como sugere o título desta tese, as intervenções da ajuda em vez de reforçarem as instituições locais, muitas vezes institucionalizaram as suas fraquezas. Três lições essenciais para as práticas da ajuda em situações de conflito são propostas: que o papel dos actores e das instituições locais seja tomado em consideração mais seriamente, que os actores da ajuda sejam mais realistas sobre o que realmente as suas intervenções podem alcançar, e que a investigação académica e as políticas e práticas da ajuda sejam mais sistematicamente integradas.

SAMENVATTING

Angola was verwikkeld in een lange burgeroorlog die duurde vanaf de onafhankelijkheid van Portugal in 1975 tot begin 2002. Tijdens het conflict en de nasleep ervan, ondergingen de lokale instituties, zowel overheids- als niet-overheidsinstituties die mensen aanspreken om bepaalde noden en problemen op te lossen, diep ingrijpende veranderingen. Verschillende hulpinitiatieven om de lokale bevolking te ondersteunen werden tijdens die periode geïmplementeerd. Dit onderzoek bestudeert de interactie tussen hulpinterventies en lokale instituties. Het gaat uit van de vooronderstelling dat deze twee door hun interactie elkaars karakter wederzijds veranderen en versterken, wat leidt tot zowel gewenste en ongewenste uitkomsten. Ik analyseer zulke effecten van verschillende typen hulp en van lokale instituties tijdens de oorlog en de wederopbouw.

Deze studie is gebaseerd op de 'actor' benadering, die stelt dat interventies verweven zijn in de maatschappij en gevormd worden door de alledaagse praktijk en ontmoetingen tussen verschillende actoren. In mijn analyse van de geschiedenis van hulp bouw ik voort op deze benadering met het gebruik van het begrip van een hulp *arena*. Het *arena* raamwerk verbreedt de analyse over wie sociale dienstverlening uitvoert en wat precies inhoudt. Het beschouwt de rol van verschillende actoren, naast de conventionele internationale organisaties.

In de toonaangevende opvattingen over hulp wordt ervan uit gegaan dat conflicten leiden tot een verbrokkeling van de maatschappij en daarmee van de instituties en bestaanswijzen die deze in stand houden. Hulpbeleid en praktijk worden geïnformeerd door zulke veronderstellingen over sociale transformatie ten tijde van crisis. De soorten van hulpverlening aan lokale instituties en hun uitvoeringsvermogen worden vaak bezien vanuit een ideaaltypische voorstelling van humanitaire/noodhulp en ontwikkelingshulp die zich aan de twee uiteinden van het hulpspectrum bevinden. Wederopbouw wordt beschouwd als de tussenliggende fase van transitie tussen oorlog en vrede en een terugkeer naar vooroorlogse normaliteit. Gezien vanuit dergelijke divisies zouden humanitaire actoren tijdens conflicten zich vooral bezighouden met levensreddende activiteiten en de gaten in dienstverlening opvullen. In de post-conflict staatopbouwende agenda , wordt het creëren of versterken van de capaciteit van lokale instituties gezien als een project en vertaald naar verschillende types van tijdsgebonden institutie-bouwende interventies.

Deze studie bestudeert op empirische basis in het geval van Angola hoe deze verschillende hulpbenaderingen ten aanzien van lokale instituties uitwerken. Het bekijkt hoe diverse interventies met uiteenlopende doelstellingen (er omheen werken, vernieuwen, versterken, bouwen of alternatieve instituties creëren) tegen lokale instituties aankijken en ermee samenwerken, en hoe deze interventies worden gelegitimeerd.

Door dit proefschrift heen worden er drie centrale argumenten ontwikkeld. Het eerste is dat er in de context van conflict, veelvoudige institutionele ordeningen naast elkaar bestaan en met elkaar wedijveren bij het lenigen van lokale noden, gezien het feit dat legitieme overheidsinstellingen afwezig zijn. Het tweede argument is dat ideaaltypische modellen van noodhulp, wederopbouw en ontwikkeling nauwelijks een afspiegeling zijn van de realiteit van oorlog, vrede en de transitie tussen die twee. In de praktijk is er, in plaats van een duidelijke scheiding tussen de conflict en post-conflict context, meer sprake van continuïteiten en herschikkingsprocessen tussen deze twee periodes, zowel in termen van behoeften als het geven van hulp. Bovenal, conflict en hulp ontwikkelen een verschillende dynamiek en uitkomsten op lokaal niveau omdat zij interveniëren in specifieke institutionele contexten. Het derde argument is dat hulp interventies die de intentie hebben om het lokale institutionele capaciteit te versterken, dit vaak niet waarmaken of zelfs bijdragen tot verdere institutionele afbrokkeling. Dit heeft veelal te maken met de nood cultuur , waarin lokale

instituties werden genegeerd, overgeslagen of zelfs opnieuw uitgevonden werden. Deze erfenis heeft nog steeds zijn weerslag op de naoorlogse inspanningen bij wederopbouw.

Deze studie behelst een historische etnografie van hulp interventies en lokale instituties, gebaseerd op de casus van de provincie Huíla en op de specifieke ervaringen van de twee gemeentes Chipindo en Matala. De methodologische keuzes, onderzoeksvraag, doelstellingen en organisatie, alsook het conceptuele kader worden gepresenteerd in het inleidende hoofdstuk. Het onderzoek richtte zich op het bestuur en het verschaffen van elementaire diensten als essentieel gebied van sociale dienstverlening. Onderzocht wordt, aan de hand van gezondheidsdienstverlening, hoe institutionele multipliciteit uitwerkt in de praktijk. Mijn aandacht richt zich op een breed gamma aan lokale instituties om de uiteenlopende voorzieningen in kaart te brengen waartoe mensen zich wenden met hun noden en problemen. Hieronder vallen onder andere uit dienstverlenende staatsorganen, niet-overheidsinstellingen op het gebied van sociale dienstverlening en alternatieve lokale instituties zoals traditionele autoriteiten.

In hoofdstuk 2 wordt de geschiedenis van het conflict bestudeerd met oog op de hoofdactoren, de motivaties en effecten op overheid-maatschappij relaties en de werking van de staat en zijn instituties. Een empirische analyse van lokale ervaringen met conflict in vier gemeentes in Huíla wordt gepresenteerd. Het laat zien dat de dynamiek van conflicten en de sociaal-culturele instellingen op lokaal niveau elkaar beïnvloeden en vorm geven. Lokale ervaringen van conflict komen voort uit de interactie tussen het grotere conflict en lokale normen, instituties en machtsverhoudingen. Dit heeft ook zijn weerslag op de snelheid en de praktijk van wederopbouw in de vier gemeentes. De oorlog had verder ook een groot effect op de vorming van de staat, zijn relatie met de maatschappij en niet-overheids actoren, en de ontwikkeling van bestuur. Dit bepaalde vervolgens de vorm van de huidige en relaties en de praktijk alsmede van het vermogen van de staat om de reconstructie ter hand te nemen.

Hoofdstuk 3 geeft de geschiedenis weer van de humanitaire en wederopbouw arena's, gebaseerd op een empirische analyse van verschillende hulp initiatieven. Deze 'aidnography' zet vraagtekens bij opvattingen over hulp ten tijde van conflict, waarin de rol van internationale actoren en de hulp die zij bieden doorgaans centraal wordt gesteld. Door het gebruik van het arena raamwerk toon ik aan dat sociale dienstverlening door een verscheidenheid aan actoren werd verzorgd, elk met verschillende motivaties en vormen van assistentie, naast de levensreddende activiteiten die werden ontplooid vanuit humanitaire principes. Ik heb specifiek gekeken naar de rol van de lokale bevolking, religieuze instanties, de staat en andere politieke actoren, het nationale maatschappelijk middenveld en internationale organisaties. Ondanks de hoogstaande principes waarmee internationale humanitaire actoren opereerden bleek hun hulp even gevoelig voor gebruik voor politieke doeleinden als de hulp die geboden werd door lokale actoren. Beide hadden moeite hun neutraliteit te bewaren en met hun hulp aan de werkelijke noden tegemoet te komen. Weliswaar speelde de internationale hulpactie een sleutelrol in de algehele humanitaire respons, maar was qua reikwijdte en betrouwbaarheid maar nog steeds onvoldoende in relatie tot de schaal van de behoeften.

Hoofdstuk 4 is een empirische analyse van de manier waarop instituties opereren, zich ontwikkelen en transformeren in een maatschappij in crisis. Het volgt de institutionele ontwikkelingen in Angola ten tijde van kolonialisme, conflict en wederopbouw, en identificeert de belangrijkste factoren die van invloed zijn op deze veranderingen. Mijn analyse zet vraagtekens bij de dominante veronderstelling dat instituties instorten in tijden van conflict. Instituties laten juist veerkracht en het vermogen tot aanpassing zien ten tijde van crisis. Toch moet hun vermogen zich voor wederopbouw in te spannen niet overschat worden, aangezien zowel overheid als niet-overheidsinstellingen aanzienlijk aangetast waren door de jarenlange burgeroorlog. Ook zoeken mensen in tijden van crisis hun toevlucht tot

meerdere institutionele voorzieningen. Deze worden veelal in aangepaste vorm voortgezet en vinden continuïteit tijdens de wederopbouw. Verder ondergaan instituties veranderingen in hun interactie met andere instituties en in reactie op verschillende externe factoren, inclusief maar niet uitsluitend onder invloed van conflict. Externe factoren zijn onder meer koloniaal beleid, ontheemding en urbanisatie, politieke onderbesteding en hulp interventies.

In hoofdstuk 5 wordt voor de specifieke casus van Bunjei (Chipindo) de geschiedenis van conflict, hulp en institutionele ontwikkeling geanalyseerd. Bunjei werd bezet door UNITA en bleef verstoken van hulp en overheidsdiensten ten tijde van de oorlog. Dit hoofdstuk laat de politieke processen zien die hieraan ten grondslag lagen en die vervolgens ook de achterstelling in wederopbouw activiteiten informeerden. Het laat de opkomst van de lokale evangelische kerk (IECA) zien die fungeerde als alternatief voor de officiële staatstructuren voor sociale dienstverlening en lokale ontwikkeling. IECA geniet aanzienlijke lokale legitimiteit dankzij haar religieuze institutionele identiteit, haar lange traditie en uitvoering van sociale dienstverlening, de organisatorische praktijk, gedrag en motivatie van werknemers, en de professionaliteit waarin zij zich onderscheidt van andere actoren in lokaal bestuur en dienstverlening. Toch ligt deze legitimiteit constant onder vuur en is onderdeel van debat.

Hoofdstukken 6 tot en met 8 behandelen drie types van institutionele opbouw interventies die tijdens de wederopbouw in Angola dominant zijn geweest. Hoofdstuk 6 bespreekt technische assistentie voor dienstverlening specifiek op het terrein van de gezondheidszorg. Het laat zien hoe verschillende hulpinterventies vorm gaven aan lokale instituties en met elkaar in relatie stonden ten tijde van zowel oorlog als vrede. Het laat de tegenstelling zien in benaderingen tussen noodhulp en wederopbouw. Noodhulp interventies hielden zich nauwelijks bezig met capaciteitsopbouw van lokale actoren en instituties, terwijl wederopbouw activiteiten juist hun focus hadden op capaciteitsopbouw en versterking. Tijdens de oorlog waren humanitaire organisaties vooral bezig met het opvullen van de institutionele leegte op het gebied van dienstverlening, waarbij men een staatsontwijkende benadering nam. Door staatsinstituties die als inefficiënt en corrupt werden beschouwd, te vervangen en omzeilen, droeg hulp juist bij aan de verdere afbrokkeling van deze instituties. De hulp heeft evenmin geleid tot capaciteitsopbouw van het lokale maatschappelijke middenveld en gemeenschapsinstituties. De naoorlogse omslag naar institutieopbouw kwam te laat om de lokale actoren voldoende voor te bereiden op de wederopbouw. Mijn bevindingen trekken de veronderstelde link tussen dienstverlening, legitimiteit van de staat en het versterken van het sociale contract, in twijfel. De perceptie die mensen hebben van de staat en haar diensten hangt vooral samen met de beschikbare alternatieven, iets waarvoor dat wederopbouw programma's vaak geen oog hebben.

Hoofdstuk 7 focust op de decentralisatie ondersteuningsprogramma's en hun veronderstelde bijdrage aan armoedebestrijding. Het volgt een specifiek decentralisatie ondersteuningsprogramma langs de implementatie keten in Matala. Analyse van de raakvlakken tussen lokale actoren die bijeengebracht zijn onder de decentralisatie activiteiten – lokale overheden, lokale gemeenschappen en hulporganisaties – laat zien dat de uitkomsten erg context specifiek zijn en afwijken van normatieve verwachtingen. Ik stel dat donoren zich graag bezig houden met ondersteuning aan decentralisatie in Angola, omdat het zowel de agenda van de overheid als de hulpgemeenschap dient. Dit beleid wordt gestimuleerd, ongeacht het feit dat de doelstelling om problemen van mensen op te lossen niet gehaald wordt. Bovendien bestaat het risico dat deze programma's de legitimiteit van lokale actoren aantast, doordat er verwachtingen worden geschapen geschept die niet waargemaakt kunnen worden.

Hoofdstuk 8 onderzoekt hoe het discours over het bouwen van instituties zijn weerslag krijgt op gemeenschapsniveau. Verschillende empirische voorbeelden van

hulpinterventies in Huíla worden aangedragen en geanalyseerd om te begrijpen hoe hulpactoren zich bezig hebben gehouden met lokale gemeenschapsinstituties. Benaderingen voor lokale gemeenschapsontwikkeling (CBD) werden niet ingezet tijdens de oorlog, maar werden juist zeer populair tijdens de wederopbouw programma's. Er werd gewerkt via 'community-based organisations' (CBOs), die werden gezien als motor van lokale veranderingsprocessen en als link tussen de lokale maatschappij en staatinstituties, en daarom als legitieme kanalen voor hulpdistributie te fungeren. In de praktijk houden CBO's meestal op te bestaan na afloop van projecten en weten naast de directe projectdoelen geen lange termijn doelstellingen te realiseren. Toch blijft de CBD benadering populair vanwege het ontbreken van een prikkel om alternatieve modellen te introduceren of de noodzaak deze te zoeken, de symbolische en morele waarde van gemeenschapsparticipatie en 'empowerment', en veronderstellingen over processen van legitimering en institutionalisering.

In het laatste hoofdstuk vat ik de meest belangrijke bevindingen samen. Deze laten zien dat hulppraktijk in de wederopbouw fase niet erg verschilt van die welke tijdens de noodhulp cultuur wordt gehanteerd. Ook al is institutieopbouw een expliciete doelstelling geworden in interventies, ze blijven een beperkte blik houden op formele instituties ten koste van de rol van de niet-overheid alternatieven. Bovendien zijn de interventies sterk gevormd door de erfenis van noodhulp praktijken op de legitimiteit van lokale instituties, en op het functioneren van het hulpsysteem, inclusief de korte termijn focus en budgetcycli. In plaats van het versterken van de capaciteit van lokale instituties, institutionaliseren deze hulp interventies juist de zwaktes, zoals de titel van dit proefschrift weergeeft. Er worden drie belangrijke lessen voor hulp in conflict aangegeven: dat de rol van lokale actoren en instituties meer serieus dient te worden genomen, dat hulp actoren realistischer behoren te zijn over wat geplande interventies kunnen bewerkstelligen, en dat wetenschappelijk onderzoek en hulpbeleid en praktijk meer systematisch zou moeten worden geïntegreerd.

About the author

Maliana Serrano was born in Huambo, Angola in 1978. She completed her BA in Geography and Environmental Studies with Development Studies at Sussex University in 1996, and later did an MSc in Development Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies. Her dissertation focused on the coordination of humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons in Angola.

In 2006 she joined the Disaster Studies Group at Wageningen University, as a PhD candidate for a research programme on the history of humanitarian aid in Angola, where she spent 20 months of fieldwork. During this period Maliana became involved in the creation of a local Centre for Development Studies.

Prior to the PhD Maliana worked with several international NGOs, including the Fondo Índigena (Latin America and The Caribbean), EuronAid (Network of European Food Aid and Food Security NGOs), and CARE International UK.

Annex to statement
Name Maliana Marcelino Serrano
PhD candidate, Wageningen School of Social Sciences (WASS)
Completed Training and Supervision Plan

Name of the activity	Department/Institute	Year	ECTS
A) Project related competences			
CERES Seminar 'Rethinking the State'	CERES, Amsterdam	2006	1
Writing research proposal	WUR	2006/07	6
Presentation Research Plan	Provincial Group on Civil Society, Huila, Angola	2007	1
Organization workshop "The role of humanitarian aid in Angola", and presentation 'Humanitarian aid and local institutions'	Lubango, Angola	2008	2
Presentation of research project	National Conference on Civil Society, Luanda, Angola	2008	1
Poster presentation "Studies on Africa in the Netherlands and Belgium"	NVAS, The Hague	2009	1
Organisation International Conference and Book and Report launch "Southern Africa: Civil Society, Politics, Development and Donors Strategy"	European Parliament, Brussels	2009	1
Presentations 'The humanitarian arena in Angola 1975-2008' and 'Humanitarian aid and local institutions: practices and challenges of the Angolan experience'	World Conference of Humanitarian Studies Groningen	2009	2
Presentation 'Aid under fire: people, principles & practices of humanitarian aid in Angola'	Angolan Catholic University, University of Coimbra	2009	1
Presentation 'The history and effects of aid for local institutions in Angola'	Christian Aid, London	2010	1
Presentation 'The people, principles & practices of humanitarian aid in Angola'	SOAS, London	2010	1
B) General research related competences			
CERES Orientation Course	CERES	2007	5,5
Oral History and Life Stories Course	Huizinga Institute, University Amsterdam	2007	1
Research Seminar Disaster Studies	WUR	2009/10	2
Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction, RDS 34806	WUR	2009	5,5
Poster presentation at CERES Peer Review	WUR	2009	1
C) Career related competences/personal development			
PhD Competence Assessment	CERES, WUR	2007	0,3
Consultation on organizational learning research	SNV Angola/ATOL, Lubango	2007	2
Presentation 'The relationship between international institutions and CED: opportunities and challenges'	Development Studies Centre (CED), Lubango, Angola	2008	1
Networking with international organisations	VIDI programme, Disaster Studies WUR	2006-2010	3
Total (minimum 30 ECTS)			39,3

*One ECTS on average is equivalent to 28 hours of course work

Pictures in text:
Author

Front cover picture:
Title: ONG (NGOLA MIRRORS series)
Artist: Mário Tendinha
Photograph: José “Tonspi” Pinto
Private Collection of Ana Clara Rivera

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