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The Congress and Treaty of Paris, 1856

THE CONGRESS AND TREATY OF PARIS, 1856

BY

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THE CONGRESS AND TREATY OF PARIS, 1856.

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.

I. Causes of the Crimean War.

Internal Conditions in Turkey.

In 1785 the national finances of Turkey had become so complicated that it was arranged to issue interest bearing bonds to Ottoman subjects giving certain resources of the Empire as a guarantee of their payment. This was in imitation of the financial methods in vogue in Western Europe, and under good management should have been successful. But three years later forced loans and debased currency were resorted to with their usual result - greater distress among the poor and no real gain for the government. This second step was one of retrogression, since these questionable methods had been repudiated by strong European Governments in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. When in 1792 Turkey closed a five years' war with Russia, it was conceded that the failure of the former was due largely to the penury of her treasury.¹ The first reforming Sultan, Selim III., attempted to bring the finances of his government to a firm basis, but with little success, and "These endeavors were continued with scarcely better results by each of the succeeding Sultans up to the time of the Crimean War, and during the whole of the period the financial embarrassment of the empire was extreme."² The Spectator for March 19th,

1. Encyclopoedia Britannica, 11th ed. Vol. XXVII, p. 431.

2. Ibid.

1853, after summing up the whole situation in Turkey at that time, makes the significant statement, "Over all the complications of the Divan hangs the financial question."³ At the beginning of the Crimean War her allies assisted Turkey to the extent of a loan of £ 3,000,000, and in 1855 this loan was increased to £ 8,000,000.

Turning now to the political conditions in Turkey, for many years foreign wars had been uniformly unsuccessful, and added to this, her subjects had been given to frequent insurrection. As a nation she had been knocked about in any and every uncomplimentary way. She had "acquiesced in the incompatible pretensions" which Russia and France had alternately forced upon her. And now that England had apparently checked France, Russia was left to press her case more vigorously. "And, seeing that Turkey grows manifestly weaker, writers in this country have argued that it could not be helped if Turkey were despatched for partition between the two neighboring empires,

3. The Spectator, Mar. 19th, 1853. p. 267. "New rumours spring up almost daily respecting the critical state of Turkey, Prince Menzschikoff reached Constantinople on the 28th of February, he visited the Sultan on the 2nd of March, but abstained from communicating with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. On the 3rd, Fuad Effendi placed his resignation in the hands of the Sultan; on the 6th it was accepted, and Kiffaat Pasha was appointed to the Foreign Office. Then we hear, that on the demand of the Grand Vizier, the Charge' d'Affaires of England has sent despatches to Admiral Dundas, commanding the fleet in the Mediterranean, at present at Malta, requesting him to come with all convenient speed, and to anchor in the Archipelago!"

The Vienna correspondent of the Times, writing on the 12th, reports as follows on the departure of the late French Minister: "Before M. de Lavalette left Constantinople, he received the second class of the Meshid Order from the Sultan, and Mehemet Ali Pasha presented to him a ring of the value of 30,000 piastres,

Russia and Austria - her 'heirs' as they are called in Vienna."⁴

But the most important preliminary question, after all, so far as the present essay is concerned, is the religious atmosphere in the Ottoman Empire at that time. In the absence of definite records for the particular period those of a little later date are used, in the belief that the records furnished approximate the truth for the period in question. Until 1876 the Government of Turkey was a theocratic, absolute monarchy, the Sultan being accounted a caliph or successor of the prophet Mohammed.⁵ It was estimated in 1910 that 50 percent of the population were of the Mohammedan faith; 41 percent of the Orthodox church; 6 percent of the Catholic church; and 3 percent of Jews and other religious faiths. While the Government

3. (con't). for Madame de Lavalette. It is currently reported that Prince Menzschikoff's adjutant brought the news to Constantinople on the 23rd, that his superior was only waiting at Odessa for the departure of M. de Lavalette, and purposed leaving for Constantinople on the 2nd of March. The French Ambassador, who, by his impetuosity in the matter of the Holy Shrines, has got himself and the Porte into difficulties, was fated to receive a parting insult from his proteges. The vessel on board of which he was entered the Dardanelles a little before sunset; a few minutes after the sun had gone down, she was about to continue her voyage, but a couple of shots from the castles of the Dardanelles at once gave the Captain to understand that he would not be permitted to depart until sunrise. The want of consideration shown by the Turks is said to have much incensed the diplomatist. It is positively asserted at Constantinople, that a Russian army-corps is close to the Moldavian frontier, and a great part of the Russian fleet prepared to sail from Sebastopol. Since General Leiningen's appearance among them the Turks have grown nervous.

Over all the complications of the Divan hangs the financial question."

4. The Spectator, Mar. 12, 1853, Editorial, pp. 237-8.

5. Encyc. Brit., 11th ed. Vol. 27, p. 246.

and a majority of the people were Mohammedans, yet the Sultan was not short in promises to tolerate and to protect his Christian subjects. And, had his Christian subjects been united, they probably would have had little cause for complaint. But France had secured a pledge from Turkey that the former should be "Protector of the Holy Places" and have supervision of the Catholics in Turkey.⁶ This concession to France became a great offense to Russia; for, although the members of the Orthodox church numbered almost seven times as many as did those of the Catholic church, and although Russia had frequently and strenuously endeavored to secure a like concession in favor of the Orthodox church, nothing had been accomplished.

The "Eastern Question"

In considering this question the ambitions of Russia and Austria naturally come first. As mentioned above, it was believed at Vienna that Russia and Austria were the 'heirs' of the Ottoman Empire, which they confidently believed was very near its dissolution. For this reason they were both keeping a watchful eye on conditions there with the hope of profiting by them in the near future. The whole matter became so open and so public that Czar Nicholas talked freely on the subject to Lord Aberdeen, Sir Robert Peel, and the Duke of Wellington, on the occasion of a visit to London in 1844. In his speech he referred to the Ottoman Empire, as the "sick man". And again, in 1853, when Sir Hamilton Seymour was serving as British

6. The Spectator, Mar. 12, 1853, Editorial p. 237-8.

Ambassador at St. Petersburg the Czar once more raised the subject of the dismemberment of Turkey when talking with him.⁷ Because Turkey was or "seemed to be in a state of irretrievable prostration" and because of a "prophecy that in the year 1853, when four centuries would have elapsed from the taking of Constantinople, the Turkish Empire would be overthrown,"⁸ he felt it his duty to arrange matters with the diplomatic representatives at his court. In doing this he defined his position by saying that he did not contemplate a permanent occupation of Constantinople; but that he would not tolerate its being held by Great Britain, France, or any other great nation. Equally, also, was he opposed to a reconstruction of the Byzantine Empire, or an extension of Greece so as to make it a powerful State; and, even more strongly, was he opposed to the "breaking up of Turkey into little republics, asylums for the Kossuths and Mazzinis."⁹

Even after the war had begun, it seems that the Russian people were fully committed to the work as a part of their destiny, to overrun the Turkish Empire and make it a part of their own. "The war was regarded by many as a kind of crusade - even the Emperor spoke about the defense of 'the native soil and the holy faith' - and the most exaggerated expectations were entertained of its results. The old Eastern Question was at last to be solved in accordance with Russian aspirations, and Nicholas was about to realize Catharine II.'s grand scheme of driving the

7. Fyffe, Mod. Europe, Vol. III, p. 187.

8. Dyer and Hassall, Hist. of Mod. Europe, Vol. VI. p. 117-8.

9. Ibid. Hist. of Mod. Europe, Vol. VI. p. 117-8.

Turks out of Europe."¹⁰

But it is not human, especially not European, for England and France to look on complacently in such emergencies without a desire to check the aggressor. And, as already mentioned, France had taken steps to secure concessions which gave her an excellent opportunity to interfere very materially with Russia's plans. That she was ready and anxious to do so will be readily admitted when we reflect that Russia had been the leading member of the coalition against her during the closing years of the Napoleonic Wars. Besides, she had dynastic reasons, for the Czar had refused to recognize Napoleon III. in that he had addressed Napoleon as "my dear friend", when diplomatic usage would have required him to say "my brother." This unwillingness on the part of the Czar to recognize Napoleon's right as ruler of France kept alive in the latter's mind the fact that some of his own people were not reconciled to him, and made him feel the necessity of doing some great deed that would cause them to forget the past and to look upon him only as the hero of that glorious event.

As for England, she was further from the scene of action, but she had vital interests there, nevertheless. Besides, she looked upon such an extension of Russian territory and power as unwarranted. Therefore, when the Czar in 1844 and 1853, as above related, was trying to arrange for a dismemberment of Turkey, by which England was to get certain portions, his propositions were all rejected. Moreover, preparations were made to

10. Wallace, Russia, p. 436.

see that the ambitions of the Czar should not be realized.

Two Groups of Demands Made by Russia upon Turkey.

Since the eleventh century when the Crusades began, there had been difficulties without number in regard to the sites of the monuments of early Christianity in the whole of that territory known as Syria, east of the Mediterranean Sea and under the control of the Ottoman Empire. And, as remarked before, France had secured a concession from Turkey by which the former was to be the "Protector of the 'Holy Places'!"¹¹ But Russia considered that the Treaty of Kainarji of 1774 was not being kept by Turkey. By this treaty Turkey had agreed "to protect the Christian religion and its churches."¹² No doubt, Russia objected to the Turkish method of subletting the contract to France.

As reported above, about 47 percent of the whole population of the Ottoman Empire were Christians, and these were nearly all members of the Orthodox church; yet France had more privileges in directing the small minority, who were Roman Catholics, than Russia had for the majority. This was not a new condition of affairs; it had been a source of annoyance and dispute for years.

The Spectator, quoting the Gazette of St. Petersburg, says,

"Count Nesselrode declares that there is not one word of truth in the pretension which the newspapers have tried to fasten on Russia that she desires 'fresh territorial aggrandizement,' or

11. The Spectator, Mar. 12, 1853, Editorial, p. 237-8.

12. Fyffe, Mod. Europe, Vol. III. p. 188.

seeks 'the ruin and destruction of the Ottoman Empire'."¹³ Continuing, Count Nesselrode declares that the only purpose in view is the protection of the "Holy Places" and the Christians belonging to the Orthodox church.

This protest was made before any act of diplomatic or of warlike character had occurred to indicate definitely that war was inevitable. But that his protest had little weight is shown by the events of the next few years as well as by statements indicating that fact to be found in the numerous publications in London. For instance, when the war was over and Alexander II had published a proclamation to his people, The Times had this to say on the point in question: "But when the late Monarch, who was the sole cause of the war, is said to have been 'a stranger to all interested views', and only anxious to protect the rights of his own church, it is necessary at once to record a protest against the assumption.....Those who would persuade us of the Czar's disinterestedness must think that we have forgotten history. Scarcely any war with Turkey has been commenced by a ruler at St. Petersburg without the condition of the Rayahs being brought forward as among the causes of justification. Yet one province after another has been wrested from the Turks, and the world has seen the addition of Greeks, Armenians, Tartars, and Circassians to the Russian Empire, as a result of contests commenced nominally in behalf of the Christians throughout the East."¹⁴

13. The Spectator, June 25, 1853, p. 603-5.

14. The Times, April 11, 1856, p. 9.

Acts of Diplomacy Leading to War.

Czar Nicholas first mobilized a part of his army and navy and then sent Prince Menschikoff as his special Ambassador to the Sultan at Constantinople. He was instructed to protest that the Orthodox Christians in the Holy City had been slighted and that the Roman Catholics had been given privileges withheld from the former; which acts, he was to declare, were a breach of the Treaty of Kainarji of 1774. And further he was to demand "the exclusive protection of all the members of the Greek church in Turkey, and the settlement of the question respecting the Holy Places, on terms which would have left the supremacy to the Greeks."¹⁵ These demands, no doubt, seemed proper enough to the Czar, since so large a proportion of the Christian population belonged to his church. And under ordinary circumstances, had the message been delivered in strictly first class diplomatic form he would have secured, in all probability, all that was asked. But just here unforeseen difficulties arose.

Before Prince Menschikoff had secured an audience with the Sultan, the English Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, visited the former and persuaded him to separate his demands into two groups, and then to ask the Sultan for a settlement of the group concerning the Holy Places first.¹⁶ This Prince Menschikoff did and the Sultan promptly complied. The former thought he had the latter bluffed and the latter thought he had granted all that was reasonable; while Lord

15. Dyer and Hassall, Hist. of Mod. Europe, Vol. VI., p. 118.

16. The Spectator, May 21, 1853, p. 482.

Stratford chuckled over the prospect of the next move. Prince Menschikoff now boldly and rudely demanded a protectorate over all the Orthodox Christians of the Empire, who at that time, May, 1853, numbered no less than 12,000,000 people.

Lord Stratford had once been sent to St. Petersburg as an Ambassador, but had been rejected by the Czar, and he now took occasion to "return the compliment" by suggesting to the Sultan that he reject Prince Menschikoff's ultimatum. The French Ambassador also assured the Sultan of support; therefore, it is no wonder that with such friends as England and France, the reply to Prince Menschikoff's haughty ultimatum was easily determined and a rejection delivered by the Sultan. But whether Prince Menschikoff acted as he did only through ignorance of the real state of mind of the Sultan and of diplomatic etiquette is not quite clear. Some profess to believe that he did his undiplomatic acts purposely in order to cause a rupture; but as he is reported as "a mere child in diplomacy", it is quite possible the motive may have been mistaken.¹⁷ The Times says, "it is probable that by the violence and indiscretion of PRINCE MENSCHIKOFF the mine was sprung sooner than had been intended by the Court of St. Petersburg."¹⁸

As the French were already in control in this quarter and as the action of Russia was not only against Turkey but also distinctly hostile to France, it is little wonder that the French Ambassador, M. de Lavalette, supported Lord Stratford

17. Fyffe, Mod. Europe, Vol. III., p. 191.

18. The Times, Jan. 8, 1855, p. 6.

at this time; nor is it all surprising that he is reported as "the first to use threats."¹⁹ And while the ultimatum was in the hands of the Sultan, M. de Lavalette's successor, M. de la Cour, continued this policy by urging its rejection. And when it was rejected there was nothing for Prince Menschikoff to do but to take his staff and depart from Constantinople.

The weakness and vacillation of the English Government may have had some effect upon the actions of the Czar at this critical time. Nicholas I. and Lord Aberdeen, Prime Minister of England, had been on quite intimate terms in their youthful days, when in Paris in 1814; and this intimacy had been renewed in 1844, when the former visited the latter in London.²⁰ Nicholas, therefore, depended upon Aberdeen not to precipitate a difficulty between their two governments because of the former's attempt to coerce the Sultan. And, possibly, if Lord Stratford or Lord Palmerston had been in Aberdeen's place, the Czar would have understood the situation better and would have refrained from the war or would have entered it with a fuller realization of its meaning. This weakness displayed by the Prime Minister, Lord Aberdeen, in not making it clear what the policy of the English Government would be, was also displayed by Lord Clarendon, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in that he had "a want of firmness and an undue reliance on the sincerity of Emperor Napoleon."²¹

19. Dyer and Hassall, Mod. Europe, Vol. VI., p. 118.

20. Fyffe, Mod. Europe, Vol. III., p. 182. Also Encyc. Brit. 11th ed. Vol. XIX, p. 653-4.

21. Sid. Lee, Dict. of National Biog., Vol. XX., p. 347-50.

As it was, Czar Nicholas made the mistake of believing that neither England nor France would alone fight him because of his move against Turkey; and also, that an alliance of the two against him was impossible.²²

Now that diplomatic relations were broken with Turkey, the Czar proceeded to send troops into Wallachia and Moldavia to seize these provinces,²³ not for permanent annexation but to be held as a pledge, until Turkey would see fit to comply with the demands he had sent Prince Menschikoff to deliver. In referring to this act the Spectator quotes the Morning Post as saying, "France and England consider this invasion as 'an act of war!'"²⁴ Then Nicholas issued a proclamation dated at Peterhoff, the 14th (26th) of June 1853 purporting to define his position. From this proclamation may be quoted the following: "We do not seek conquests; Russia does not need them. We demand satisfaction for a legitimate right openly infringed. We are ready even now to stop the movement of our troops, if the Ottoman Porte engages to observe religiously the integrity of the privileges of the Orthodox church. But if obstruction and blindness obstinately desire the contrary, then invoking God to our aid, we will leave to His care to decide our differences; and, placing our full hope in His powerful hand, we will march to the defense of the Orthodox faith."²⁵

22. The Economist. Vol. XIV., (1856) Article on "True Optimism" p. 389-90.

23. The Spectator, July 9, 1853, p. 651.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., p. 651-2.

The break had occurred May 21, 1853, and the invasion and his proclamation had, therefore, followed quickly. But added to these steps the Czar had issued a "Manifesto", which declared the Orthodox church in Turkey in danger. His act was practically equivalent to an appeal to all his subjects to engage in a religious war against Turkey. Austria was now thoroughly alarmed because these Principalities, which the Czar's troops had just occupied, were on her frontier and were closely associated with her own people. And yet for some reason, while England and France were moving to check Russian advance, Austria abstained from doing anything. In this attitude she was seconded by Prussia, whose sovereign, Frederick William IV., was the Czar's brother-in-law. The two countries were so close to Russia and had so much at stake that it seemed they could not take a bold stand; and as the war progressed Austria's course proved to be a tortuous one. As for Prussia, she maintained a steady course but it was one of unbroken neutrality.

A conference at Vienna.

Matters had progressed to such a point that it was evident that, unless some strong, united effort were quickly made, war would be inevitable. Accordingly, representatives of the four Great Powers, Austria, France, England, and Prussia met at Vienna, July 28, 1853, for the purpose of arriving at a satisfactory solution.²⁶ They believed it possible to draft a treaty acceptable to Russia that would still leave Turkey under less

26. The Spectator, Aug. 13, 1853, p. 773.

humiliating conditions than the forced acquiescence in Russia's demands would provide. For this purpose they drafted a note to which Russia agreed on condition that Turkey would accept it unconditionally. But Turkey amended it to include a guarantee by Russia that no interference would be made by the latter in the future. Thus the matter ended and war was thenceforth inevitable. But there is one point of detail which must not be neglected. It is at this point that the policy of Lord Stratford is seen as most emphatically opposed to peace. For diplomatically he advised Turkey to accept the note unconditionally, but personally he gave the Sultan ample opportunity to know that he opposed such action.²⁷ However, just how far we can go in saying that England's representative was responsible for the war, without stretching the statement beyond the realms of truth is not quite apparent; but the indications are very strong that he was responsible. Moreover, he is said to have "boasted" that the war was his answer to the Czar's refusal to accept him as an ambassador at St. Petersburg.²⁸

27. Cambridge Mod. Hist. Vol. XI., p. 314.

28. Miller, The Ottoman Empire, p. 207.

II. Events During the War until Arrangements
Were Made for the Congress.

While Russia and Turkey Were the Only Belligerents.

It was now a matter of maintaining every possible diplomatic advantage while at the same time gaining every possible military advantage. Russia waited to let Turkey strike first, because she wished to have the opportunity of declaring that she had been attacked. There seems to have been a stronger disposition on the part of Turkey to avoid striking first, for no move of importance was made until October 4, more than three months after the invasion of Moldavia by Russia.²⁹ But having exhausted every resource without accomplishing a withdrawal of troops or a reconciliation, and feeling that England and France were strongly supporting him, the Sultan sent an ultimatum to Russia demanding the withdrawal of the troops from the Principalities within 15 days. This ultimatum Russia refused to heed and thereupon Turkey declared war, October 23, 1853. Even now more than a month passed with nothing accomplished except that Omar Pasha, the Turkish commander, crossed the Danube and defeated the Russian force at Oltenitza. This delay gave the Great Powers an opportunity to revert to their plan for a reconciliation; but

29. Skrine, Expansion of Russia, p. 152, gives this date October 8; Dyer and Hassall, Hist. of Mod. Europe, Vol. VI. p. 119, says October 4; and Fyffe, Mod. Europe Vol. III. P. 196-7, says October 10. But The Spectator, October 22, 1853, p. 1009, says the following: "On the 4th of October, the Mussulman New Year's Day, the manifesto of the Sultan containing the declaration of war was read in all the mosques."

reconciliation was out of the question, now, for the reason that Turkey was very sure of support.

This assurance on the part of Turkey was not confined to secret advices given by Lord Stratford; for as early as the 13th of June a combined English and French fleet had anchored at Besika Bay and on October 22nd, just one day before the 15 days of the Turkish ultimatum expired, this fleet pushed through the Dardanelles and anchored in the Bosphorus in disregard of the "Convention of the Straits" of 1841. It is not strange, therefore, that the Sultan would refuse to consider reconciliation when this fleet had broken a treaty on the simple plea that disorders in Constantinople warranted the act; and especially when the action had been taken just at the proper time to strengthen the Sultan in his determination to make war.

But Russia was perfectly willing to assume responsibility, too, as was shown November 30th, when Admiral Nachimoff suddenly attacked Osman Pasha at Sinope during a fog and sunk his whole fleet with the exception of one vessel. The Four Great Powers acting at Vienna, apparently for the sake of appearances, asked Turkey to state her conditions for terminating the war; but Russia refused to accept Turkey's reply, because Russian evacuation of the Principalities was demanded as the first move. The Czar seemed disposed to accept the program prepared by Turkey, if this part of it should be placed last after Turkey had performed all of her own part of the program she had outlined. But just then there arrived at St. Petersburg, word that the Anglo-French fleet had "invited" the Russian fleet to

return to Sebastopol. Thus the Czar saw that the diplomatic intervention was not the only act indicative of the policy of the Great Powers. In fact, it was quite clear that England and France were more than likely to take part in the war. He made no reply, therefore, to the note and early in February, 1854, diplomatic relations between St. Petersburg and the two capitals of London and Paris were broken off.

Immediately, Nicholas endeavored to check England and France by sending Count Orloff to visit Vienna and Berlin to secure an agreement of neutrality on the part of Austria and Prussia. But Austria was almost as nervous because of the Russian invasion of the Principalities as Turkey herself; and she refused to consider the proposition until a withdrawal should be completed. Meanwhile England and France were drawing up an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops; but they neglected to ask Austria and Prussia to unite with them in these demands, although it is certain that Austria would have joined them, had the opportunity been given. Instead, Napoleon, acting for England and France alone, wrote a letter to the Czar proposing an armistice and the "mutual evacuation of Moldavia and the Black Sea."³⁰ To this the Czar replied indignantly that the combined fleets had broken a treaty by entering the Dardanelles, and had done so without a declaration of war. Then England and France sent the ultimatum that should have included Austria, if not Prussia, and the Czar ignored it. The action

30. Skrine, Expansion of Russia, p. 153.

at Sinope is blamed for the Anglo-French haste in this matter, because it inflamed the people to such an extent as to force action by the Government. Nevertheless, it is quite evident that, if they really desired to prevent a war, they should have included Austria in the ultimatum. Many were the regrets later that Austria was not in accord with them. As it was, a formal declaration of war against Russia was made March 27, 1854, by England and France.

The Extension of the War to Other Countries.

The little kingdom of Greece had for a few years been on very unfriendly terms with Turkey, and now there seemed to be a strong probability of war between them. Therefore France and England sent a detachment to occupy the Piraeus and to demand a guarantee from King Otho that he would maintain a strict neutrality.³¹ This was done May 10, 1854, and the occupation, though extremely offensive to King Otho and his Queen, was maintained until long after the Crimean War was at an end. The withdrawal actually took place no sooner than the latest date which the terms of the treaty of Paris would permit.

The Turkish troops, encouraged by the knowledge of their having both England and France as allies, and cheered by the presence of a few active young Englishmen among them, pushed such a vigorous campaign into the Principalities that the

31. Miller, The Ottoman Empire, p. 223-4.

Russians after two severe defeats began what soon proved to be a complete withdrawal from the provinces. Nasmyth, one of these young Englishmen, called the hero of Silistria, where the Russians were thoroughly defeated, was a reporter for The Times. And it is no wonder that "the closing events of the summer campaign in Bulgaria did so much to kindle the zeal which forced on the invasion of the Crimea and the statesmen and the people in England, were touched, were stirred, nay were governed by the tidings which came from the Danube."³²

Now that the Principalities had been evacuated, an opportunity was given for ending the war; and there was another effort made by the Four Powers at Vienna to do this. But England had not been in a war of any consequence for 40 years and her people did not know the horrors of war. The glory of victory predominated among all thoughts on the subject. Therefore, all efforts for peace were weak and spiritless while those looking to a vigorous prosecution of the war were strong and were hailed with delight by the multitude. "England had become so eager for conflict that the idea of desisting from the war merely because the war had ceased to be necessary was not tolerable to the people."³³

The Conference in Vienna.

The effort, just referred to, to end the war by diplomatic means, began in April, 1854. At this time the representatives

32. Kinglake, Invasion of the Crimea, Vol. III., p. 51.

33. Ibid., p. 72.

of the Four Powers met in Vienna and agreed upon certain general propositions, but nothing came of the effort. However, a second attempt in August of the same year by three of these Powers, England, Austria, and France outlined a particular plan of action; and a "note detailing four points which they professed themselves anxious to secure" was sent to Russia and Turkey for their consideration.³⁴ One can do no better than to quote The Times on the provisions of this note. "The memorandum of the 28th of December, 1854, which is prefixed to the protocols of the subsequent Conferences at Vienna, states in very plain and explicit terms the bases on which the negotiation was opened, and the objects which the allied Powers have undertaken to effect. It included the total abolition of the Russo-Turkish treaties with reference to the Principalities, by providing that none of the stipulations contained in them should be revived at the peace; it stated that, in order to secure the free navigation of the Lower Danube, the channel of the river should be withdrawn from the territorial jurisdiction existing by virtue of Article 3 of the Treaty of Adrianople; it proposed to connect the Ottoman Empire more closely with the balance of power in Europe, and to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea; and, lastly, to cause Russia to renounce her claim to an official protectorate of the Christian subjects of the Sultan belonging to the Eastern church, and to surrender all

34. Cambridge Mod. Hist. Vol. XI., p. 321.

the articles of former treaties on which that claim was founded. These terms were framed by France and England, adopted in the most formal manner by Austria, and accepted by Russia as the basis of negotiation.³⁵

In the meantime the Western Powers had pushed on from Varna to Sebastopol and although they had failed to make any great success of their campaign, they had succeeded in preventing the Russians from scoring a distinct success at Inkerman. The result of this failure induced the Czar to reply favorably to the note and to send Prince Gortschakoff with authority to discuss the matter. In all probability the discussion would have been without point and to no purpose had not Austria agreed, December 2, 1854, as was already said, to intervene in case of Russia's refusal.³⁶ Early in January, 1855, therefore, the acceptance by Russia, above mentioned, was received by the Western Powers.

A Distinct Effort for Peace.

Lord John Russell was appointed by the English Government to represent his country at this conference, and while he was yet on his way thither Czar Nicholas I. died; thus a great impetus was given to the prospects for peace. The Times, of March 3, 1855, in an editorial says, "No single event could have happened in Europe of such momentous importance at the present time to the whole family of nations, The

35. The Times, May 11, 1855, p. 9.

36. Ibid., Jan. 2, 1855, p. 6 and Jan. 9, 1855, p. 6.

summons of BELSHAZZAR upon the fiery wall was not more appalling, - the destruction of SENNACHERIB not more terrible." As he had been held both by England and by France to be the instigator of the war, and as his son and successor Alexander II. was considered more pacific, it seemed that peace would soon be arranged. But in this they were disappointed; for, although the conference was opened March 15, 1855, the treaty of peace was not signed for more than a year.³⁷

Lord John Russell has already been mentioned as England's plenipotentiary at this conference. The French sent M. Drouyn de Lhuys, their Minister of Foreign Affairs. Likewise Turkey sent Aali Pasha, who held a similar position in his Government; and Russia, Count Orloff, a diplomat of equal or higher standing. These men met at Vienna the plenipotentiary of Austria-Hungary, Count Buol, who had been the agent in bringing about the conference.³⁸ Their work proceeded smoothly until they reached the third point, which referred to the termination of the Russian domination of the Black Sea.³⁹ This point became the source of endless discussion and threatened to break up the conference altogether.⁴⁰ But, as these "four points" had been accepted by Russia as the basis of negotiation, the Western Powers felt that Russian sincerity was brought into question

37. The Times, Jan. 20, 1855, p. 9.

38. Ibid., April 2, 1855, p. 6

39. Ibid., May 11, 1855, p. 9.

40. Ibid., March 30, 1855, p. 8.

by Prince Gortschakoff's refusal to accept their interpretation of the third point. Prince Gortschakoff, on the other hand, felt that the question of interpretation was at least partly in his hands. He believed the third point could be arranged satisfactorily, but not in the way the Western Powers were outlining it.

Finally, Count Buol prepared a plan by which Russia was not to be prohibited from the Black Sea, but was to be limited to the same number of ships, and these of the same specified character, as were to be permitted to Turkey there. His plan provided for the maintenance of a few small war vessels there by England and France, too. His project became known as the "System of Counterpoise."⁴¹ Moreover, he succeeded in persuading both M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord John Russell that this plan was a good, safe, and reasonable proposition. But, as it was beyond the full powers granted them, it would be necessary to return for further instructions. Count Buol persuaded them to return to their respective capitals and secure the adoption of this change in policy on the third point, by promising to enter a triple alliance with England and France. This alliance had been sought by the Western Powers and the opportunity to secure it seemed good to these two plenipotentiaries, who proceeded to agree to a recess in their efforts at Vienna while they should visit Paris and London. But they were doomed to disappointment, as both Governments denounced the plan and

41. The Times, July 14, 1855, p. 8.

refused to make any such changes.⁴² M. Drouyn de Lhuys resigned within two days; but Lord Russell, when he found the proposition so objectionable, tried to cover up his real position in the matter, and did not resign until months later at a time when it was really humiliating. There had been frequent correspondence both by mail and by telegraph between the home Governments and the diplomats at Vienna and it seems a little strange that so great a misunderstanding should have occurred.⁴³

42. An extract from the letter of the Earl of Clarendon, dated April 3, 1855, to Lord John Russell, as given in The Times of July 14, 1855, p. 9. - "A reciprocal engagement between Russia and Turkey to maintain an equal number of ships in the Black Sea would secure the preponderance of Russia, whose ships would always be better manned, better armed, and in a better condition than those of Turkey, but Count Buol proposed that at the same time other Powers should maintain a limited number of ships of war in the Black Sea, for the special object of keeping clear the navigation of the Danube, and upon that I begged to observe that the special object might or might not be the real one, and Count Buol might be sure that England and France would not profess one thing while they intended another, But if England and France, under pretext of watching the Danube, were to send a force into the Black Sea to protect Turkey and keep Russia in check, then we should simply be continuing the present system, which effectually secures both these objects, but which system we are on every account desirous to put an end to."

43. From another letter published in The Times of July 14, 1855 and dated the same day as the former letter from which an extract is given; April 3, 1855; and also from the Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell:

It was then agreed:-

1. That the two systems, namely, that of the neutralization of the Black Sea, and that of the limitation of the naval forces of Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea, should be explained to Austria, and that she should be asked whether she would adopt either the one or the other, so as to cooperate with France and England in proposing it to Russia, undertaking further to co-operate in war with France and England if the plan so proposed should be rejected by Russia.

2. That it should be understood that France and England would prefer the system of neutralization if Austria

Thus the Vienna Conference which had begun with such promise of an early peace ended on June 4, 1855, without having accomplished any thing except discredit for England's plenipotentiary and disappointment for the Austrian Government to the extent that she terminated her treaty of December 2d with the Western Powers, and declared her intention of maintaining a strict neutrality.⁴⁴ By this act she not only gave herself a strong

43 (con't) should leave the choice to England and France.

3. That if Austria should refuse to bind herself to co-operate in war with France and England, in the event of Russia rejecting that one of the two proposals which Austria might concur with France and England in proposing, then France and England should propose the plan of neutralization, and if it be rejected by Russia the negotiation must be broken off."

Also this extract from a letter by Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon, dated April 10, 1855 at Vienna and published by the Times July 14, 1855, p. 9.

"Before Count Buol could answer, I requested his attention to what I conceived to be the position of Austria. From the first moment of Prince Menschikoff's leaving Constantinople I had thought that, with the assistance of Austria, we might easily defeat the designs of Russia in the East; that without Austria, we should have a long though doubtless a victorious contest..... I showed that the project of counterpoise was ineffectual, as we could not always have a large fleet at hand; humiliating to Turkey, if she were to always lean on France and England; unsafe for Europe, which would be kept in the perpetual ferment of preparation for war..... We were, however, ready to adopt the plan of limitation if Austria on its rejection, would join us in the war." Thus it will be seen the chief purpose of France and England was to force Austria into the war. Lord Russell failing to secure Buol's acceptance of any of these plans, wrote concerning Buol's plan, "In relating what passed at the meeting I have omitted to say that Count Buol, in the paper which he read to us, declared that if Russia were to refuse to guarantee the integrity of Turkey it would be a casus belli with Austria, - this from another letter dated April 12, at Vienna, by Lord Russell to the Earl of Clarendon. From this and many other letters published in the Times it will be seen that the two plenipotentiaries had good reason to believe they would succeed by going home to explain, and indeed the final draft

44. *Ibid.*, July 14, 1855, p. 8.

impulse in the direction of decline, but she opened the way for Sardinia to begin her ascendancy.

Sardinia's Entrance into the Conflict.

The position of Austria had now become peculiarly difficult. In her efforts to maintain proper relations with all the belligerents and yet remain at peace she found many perplexing problems.⁴⁵ But one cause of her devious course and of her many instances of vacillation was the position taken by M. Cavour, the very able statesman and Premier of the little State of Sardinia. Russia had never recognized Sardinia nor had she entered into any form of diplomatic relations with her, but no one, not even the King of Sardinia nor M. Cavour, wished to make this a pretext for war against Russia.⁴⁶ But for confirming the friendship of France and England so as to secure a participation in the congress at the close of hostilities in a distinct effort to supplant Austria in Italian affairs, M. Cavour thrust his little country into the war on the side of the Western Powers. The 15,000 troops thus placed at the disposal of the allies gave good account of themselves at the Tchernaya and other places of conflict, winning for Sardinia the coveted place in the congress at the close of the war.⁴⁷ And this participation of M. Cavour in the Congress had very much to do not only with the acts of the congress but

43.(con't). of the treaty was in this particular little different from Count Buol's plan.

45. Ibid., July 17, 1855, p. 9. Quotation from Indépendance Belge.

46. Ibid., April 14, 1856, p. 10.

47. Ibid., August 13, 1855, p. 9.

also with the course of events at its close.

The cause of the earnestness of Cavour in this matter was the state of the internal affairs of the Italian peoples. There had been no unity for them since the invasion of the Lombards in 568 A.D. And for most people there seemed to be little prospect for Italian unity in the future. But Cavour felt that, if Austria could be made to retire from the northern portions, France might be persuaded to retire from the center; and thus an opportunity would be given for the much hoped for and long desired unification of Italy.

There were many features that affected the belligerents which may be referred to as contingencies; of which it would be well to relate a few as side lights on the situation. There was quite a little jealousy shown one for another among the allies; especially was this true of England for France. The English people wanted war but were not prepared for it; and, therefore, blundered very grievously.⁴⁸ The French people were apathetic; their Emperor it was that wanted war. But the French gave a better account of themselves in the actions in the Crimea, especially toward the close of the campaign; and this caused an increase of that jealousy which threatened several times to make serious trouble. On the other hand there were distinct attempts to weld the alliance more firmly, as is shown by the fact that the Sovereigns of three of the allies visited at the homes of the others. First the Emperor Napoleon III. and Empress Eugénie visited London and were received with

48. Ibid., Jan. 3, 1855, p. 6.

great enthusiasm and applause.⁴⁹ Then Queen Victoria and Prince Albert visited Paris and rode down the Champs Elyseés in great splendor, receiving the plaudits of the nation.⁵⁰ And finally, King Victor Emmanuel II. of Sardinia visited both Paris and London, making friends on every side.⁵¹

But after these visits were all over and the war was continuing without apparent hope of an early settlement, the newspapers of the various capitals became engaged in a species of sparring that did not assist in strengthening the good feeling among the allies; and this practice continued, and even increased, as the settlement of the war became a daily expectancy.⁵²

The fall of Sebastopol after a year of siege on September 9, 1855, satisfied the French, who were now ready to make peace; and had England's part in this victory been more satisfactory to her, she would have been as ready to declare Russia sufficiently humbled. As it was, England manifested a disposition to continue the punishment of Russia. And Sardinia was dis-

49. Ibid., April 17, 1855, p. 8.

50. Ibid., Aug. 20, 1855, p. 6.

51. Ibid., Nov. 24, 1855, p. 6 and Dec. 3, 1855, p. 7.

52. To illustrate one may well take an excerpt from the criticism of the Paris correspondent for The Times published first in the Paris Moniteur and copied in The Times, March 26, 1856:

"In its number of the 22nd of March, The Times on the faith of its Paris correspondent, represents our army in the Crimea as wanting in everything in provisions and clothes, and as if abandoned by the Government of the Emperor, who is said to take no more care whatever, for those brave troops. The Times goes so far as to say that our soldiers are reduced to go and pick up the waste biscuit and refuse food thrown away by the English soldiers."

appointed in that the end was coming too soon for her to secure what she wanted. In the meantime Austria, realizing that her position was becoming less and less influential, determined to find some form of ultimatum, that would satisfy France, for sending to Russia. This she did because she wished to be the party concerned in the bringing of the war to a close, and because she felt the need of friendly relations with France. Behind such reasons, her real purpose was to supplant Sardinia in the affections of France. She proceeded therefore to draft an ultimatum embodying the essentials of the "four points", and then went to Napoleon III. in person for advice. When finally, England was given an opportunity to pass upon the ultimatum, the feeling that was already rising was heightened somewhat by the knowledge that the matter had been kept from her. However, after she had protested that a fifth point in regard to the prohibition of fortifications on the Aland Islands should be added, and after an explanation was made to her that a certain general clause would cover the point in question, she acquiesced rather peevishly.⁵³ Then the ultimatum was sent to St. Petersburg, its delivery being entrusted to Count Valentine Esterhazy.

53. A letter from The Times correspondent published December 13, 1855, and touching upon this subject of distrust for one another among the allies is not inappropriate:

"PARIS, TUESDAY, DEC. 18, 6 P. M.

The propositions which Count Valentine Esterhazy is carrying to St. Petersburg are completely adopted by the three Powers - France, England, and Austria. I have already informed you that whatever difference existed between the two former has disappeared, and however we may doubt as to the conduct of Austria in the event of their rejection

Some of the sparring referred to above pertained to the conditions of the troops in the Crimea and elsewhere. And it is very plain from all that was said on both sides that the conditions for months at a time among the English soldiers were extremely bad. There were two reasons given for this. In the first place the medical and commissary departments singularly failed to do their duty. And secondly, the weather was anything but propitious, so that partly as a result of these two causes there broke out an extremely malignant form of cholera among the troops.⁵⁴ The hospitals were overcrowded and many thousands died almost without having seen the enemy. That the French soldiers fared much better than the English is not to be believed and the evidence is sufficient to prove only that their conditions were probably a little better.⁵⁵ As for Turkey, her finances had had to be propped up; but otherwise she stood the test better, proportionately, than her allies. And her part in the conflict had been carried out with credit to herself, notwithstanding the popular apprehension in England at the beginning of the struggle.

But Russia had had difficulties, too. The Russian army had been very successful, considering the odds against which it was forced to operate. The distances were great, the roads impassable, the weather often extremely bad, the ravages

53. (con't) by Russia, it is certain that for the present she is with us, and that she thinks the conditions are such as Russia ought to accept."

54. The Times, March 26, 1856, p. 6.

55. Ibid., January 11, 1855, p. 6.

of cholera and typhus frightful,⁵⁶ and the number and strength of the enemy decidedly more than the Czar had anticipated.⁵⁷ Yet through the efforts of their capable military engineer, Todleben, they held their own for a surprisingly long time; and when, because of financial troubles besides those already named, they finally did agree to make peace on terms named by the allies, they were, even then, able to obtain by means of diplomacy, as will be more fully explained later, much that had seemed lost.

Arrangements for the Congress.

Count Valentine Esterhazy arrived in St. Petersburg on Wednesday, December 26, 1855, and communicated the conditions of peace to the St. Petersburg Cabinet on the following day.⁵⁸ And on the 28th, Count Buol in Vienna explained to Prince Gortschakoff, the Russian Ambassador, the terms of the ultimatum. They are substantially as follows:⁵⁹

(1) The Protectorate over the Principalities must be terminated and a rectification of the frontier between Russia and Turkey arranged.

(2) Freedom of the Danube must be guaranteed to all the Powers and the right to maintain a few vessels there to protect these interests must be admitted.

56. *Ibid.*, March 17, 1856, p. 10.

57. *The Economist*. Vol. 14, (1856) p. 389-390.

58. *The Times*, January 4, 1856, p. 7.

59. *Ibid.*, January 11, 1856, p. 7.

(3) The Black Sea must be neutralized and thrown open to the merchant vessels of all nations but closed to the war vessels of all nations.

(4) Christian subjects of the Porte must be assured their religious and political rights, - Austria, France, Great Britain, and the Porte now agree and Russia must agree, also.

(5) "The belligerent Powers reserve to themselves the right which appertains to them of producing in a European interest special conditions over and above the four guarantees."

On January 18, 1856, The Times published this despatch from the French Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris:

"Count Esterhazy writes today from St. Petersburg that M. de Nesselrode has just notified to him the unconditional acceptance (l'acceptation pure et simple) of the propositions contained in the ultimatum, which propositions are to serve as preliminaries of peace."⁶⁰

60. An extract from a letter of the correspondent of The Times: "VIENNA, Jan. 26. (1856).....As you have already been informed, a kind of protocol of what had occurred was drawn up at St. Petersburg, and signed or 'paraphed'* by Count Nesselrode for Russia, and Count Valentine Esterhazy for Austria. A copy of the document arrived here on the 24th, and other copies of it were on the same day forwarded to Paris, and, as I believe, to London. The Russian Government has also expressed certain wishes in respect to the future preliminaries of peace, and one of them cannot fail to wound the pride of this Cabinet. Russia desires -
 1st, that the preliminaries of peace be paraphed in this city by the representatives of the four Powers, and,
 2dly, that they - the preliminaries - be signed in the capital of France. It is not clear why Count Nesselrode should desire to have the preliminaries paraphed here; but it is evident that when he expressed a wish that they should

At the same time The Times published a message from its own correspondent in Berlin, which represented the Czar as being influenced considerably by the representations of the Government of Prussia.⁶¹

Since Austria's actions had been anything but pleasing to Russia, and at the same time had been very disappointing to both England and France, Russia had little difficulty in locating the Congress in Paris instead of in Vienna. Moreover, Russia expressed a strong desire to have the unpleasantness ended and a peace concluded "as speedily as possible."⁶² Accordingly, all the belligerents and Austria proceeded to appoint plenipotentiaries, two each, who were to meet at Paris as soon as convenient. A protocol⁶³ was paraphed, February 1, 1856, at Vienna by Isam Bey of Turkey, Count Buol of Austria, Sir Hamilton Seymour of England, Baron de Bourqueney of France,

60. (con't) be signed in Paris he intended to kill two birds with one stone - to cajole the belligerent France, and to slight the mediator, Austria,"
 "*The meaning of the diplomatic expression 'paraphed' is, that the initials of the parties concerned are attached to a document."

61. The Times, January 18, 1856, p. 6.

62. Ibid., January 28, 1856, p. 7.

63. Ibid., February 7, 1856, p. 8.

and Prince Gortschakoff of Russia.⁶⁴ They made five copies or "expeditions" of the protocol, one for each of the respective Governments concerned. Then "Prince Gortschakoff requested that Prussia should be invited to take part in the conferences. Count Buol supported the request. The French and English Ministers took notice of it, ad referendum," and the movement

64. Ibid., February 6, 1856, p. 10. - From the regular correspondent at Vienna, dated February 1. "The French and British Ministers yesterday received instructions to sign the so-often mentioned protocol. Immediately after the receipt of their despatches Sir. H. Seymour and M. de Bourqueney communicated their contents to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and to the Turkish Embassy. In the course of the evening it was settled that the representatives of England, France, Turkey, and Russia should meet at the Foreign Office at 12 today, and then and there sign the important document in question. At the appointed hour the four foreign diplomats had assembled, and they and Count Buol attached their signatures to the subjoined protocol:-

"Par suite de l'acceptation par leurs Cours respectives des cinq propositions renfermées dans le document ci-annexé, sous le titre de 'Projet des Préliminaires,' les soussignés, après l'avoir paraphé, conformément à l'autorisation qu'ils ont reçus à cet effet, sont convenus que leurs Gouvernements nommeront chacun des Plénipotentiaires, qui, munis des pleins pouvoirs nécessaires pour procéder à la signature des préliminaires de paix formels, conclueront un armistice et un traité de paix définitif. Les dits Plénipotentiaires auront à se réunir à Paris dans le terme de trois semaines à partir de ce jour, ou plutôt si faire se peut.

Fait à Vienne ce 1er Fevrier."

(les Cinq. Signatures)

(Translation of the foregoing)

"In consequence of the acceptance by their respective Courts of the five propositions contained in the document hereunto annexed, under the title of 'Draft of Preliminaries', the undersigned, after having paraphed it, conformably to authorization received to that effect, have agreed that their Governments shall each nominate Plenipotentiaries, who, furnished with full powers necessary for proceeding to the signature of formal preliminaries of peace, shall conclude an armistice and a definitive treaty of peace. The said Plenipotentiaries will have to assemble at Paris

was fairly inaugurated.⁶⁵ France, apparently, would have been willing that Prussia be admitted to participate, but England continued to object; so that not until the work of the Congress was practically ended did Prussia succeed in securing places among the plenipotentiaries.⁶⁶

But little Sardinia, though unrepresented in the ultimatum sent to St. Petersburg, disappointed because peace was coming before she had been able to see her desires realized, and overlooked in the signing of the protocol at Vienna, was, nevertheless, invited to participate in the Congress, because she had participated in the war. Thus the number of plenipotentiaries was from the first twelve, and so remained until, when it became apparent that a revision of renewal of the Treaty of the 13th of July, 1841, to which Prussia was a signatory, was necessary, England withdrew her objections to Prussia's sending two more.⁶⁷

64. (con't). within the term of three weeks dating from this, or sooner if it can be done.

Done at Vienna, this 1st day of February, 1856"

(The Five Signatures)

65. Ibid., February 5, 1856, p. 8. Quoted from the Nord of Vienna.

66. Ibid., January 31, 1856, p. 9 " " " Borsen Zeitung.

67. Ibid., March 15, 1856, p. 10. " " " Moniteur

CHAPTER II. THE CONGRESS.

I. Personnel of the Congress

The protocol having been paraphrased at Vienna and a time limit of three weeks having been set for the meeting of the plenipotentiaries in Paris, it became necessary that the Governments concerned should choose representatives and send them on their missions without further delay. It seems best in speaking of these men to take them in order and deal with each somewhat in detail, so as to give some familiarity with the personnel of the Congress to be considered.

His Majesty, the Emperor of the French, appointed the Sieur Alexander Count Colonna Walewski, a Senator of the Empire, Grand Officer of the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honor, Knight Grand Cross of the Equestrian Order of the Seraphim, Grand Cross of the Order of St. Maurice and St. Lazarus, decorated with the Imperial Order of the Medjidié, of the First Class, his Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as his leading man for this important business. And for the second man he appointed the Sieur Francis Adolphus, Baron de Bourqueney, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honor and of the Order of Leopold of Austria, decorated with the portrait of the Sultan in diamonds, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty.¹ The former was, therefore, already in Paris and the latter was under the necessity of leaving Vienna for Paris as soon as possible. Count Walewski,

1. The Times, April 29, 1856, p. 12.

who was the son of Napoleon I. and his mistress Marie, Countess Walewska, was recognized as a very able man, and as time and necessity forced ability to the front he gave a very good account of himself, as will be evident as we proceed. The Baron de Bourqueney, however, having been the ambassador to Austria-Hungary, and feeling the necessity of showing some friendship for the country to which he was accredited, became too subservient to Count Buol; and therefore shared the latter's unpopularity which was probably not fully deserved.²

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was represented by the Right Honorable George William Frederick, Earl of Clarendon, Baron Hide of Hindon, a Peer of the United Kingdom, a member of Her Britannic Majesty's Most Honorable Privy Council, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honorable Order of the Bath, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State; and the Right Honorable Henry Richard Charles, Baron Cowley, a Peer of the United Kingdom, a member of Her Majesty's Most Honorable Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honorable Order of the Bath, Her Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of the French.³ The former has already been referred to a number of times, and it will be remembered that he had early made the intimate acquaintance of Nicholas I. who relied upon him to hold England back from interference in

2. Ibid., April 19, 1856, p. 10. From the letter of the Paris correspondent.

3. Ibid., April 29, 1856, p. 12.

the "Eastern Question." That he was a man of good intentions and of moderate ability, but lacking in the elements necessary to give Europe full knowledge of England's policy in a crisis, seems to be the generally accepted verdict in regard to Lord Clarendon. The latter was already in Paris, since, as has been said, he was at the time acting as Ambassador for the Queen. He was a younger man than Lord Clarendon and therefore took a secondary position in the Congress, yet he with Baron Bourqueney was a member of the sub-committee appointed to draft the treaty when the time came for that important duty.⁴

His Majesty Alexander II., the Emperor of All the Russias, appointed as his representatives, the Sieur Alexis, Count Orloff, his Aide-de-Camp General and General of Cavalry, Commander of Headquarters of His Majesty, a Member of the Council of the Empire and of the Committee of Ministers, decorated with two portraits in diamonds of their Majesties the late Emperor Nicholas and the Emperor Alexander II., Knight of the Order of St. Andrew, in

4. From The Times, March 19, 1856, p. 6, is obtained the following information: The sub-committee appointed to make a draft of the treaty included the following men: Lord Cowley, Baron Bourqueney, Count Buol, Count Cavour, Aali Pasha, and Baron Brunow. The correspondent gives this list without comment. Just why these members were chosen for this important work is not clear. That the choice included one representative from each country is evident. And that three of the countries had their abler representative in the list is a suggestion that the choice was for the purpose of securing skill, legality, and despatch together with harmony; and at the same time to leave England, France, and Russia each her abler member to use the recess in contemplation of the whole situation with the opportunity of taking the work of the sub-committee into review when it should be completed.

diamonds, and of the Orders of Russia, Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stephen of Austria of the First Class of the Black Eagle of Prussia, in diamonds, and of several other foreign orders; and the Sieur Philip, Baron de Brunow, his Privy Councilor, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Germanic Confederation and to the Grand Duke of Hesse, Knight of the Order of St. Wladimir of the First Class, of St. Alexander Newski enriched with diamonds, of the White Eagle, of St. Anne of the First Class, of St. Stanislaus of the First Class, Grand Cross of the Order of the Red Eagle of Prussia of the First Class, Commander of the Order of St. Stephen of Austria, and of several other foreign orders.⁵

The former has been mentioned in connection with the effort of the Czar to have Austria and Prussia maintain neutrality. He was a man well fitted for the task assigned him and it may be truly said that he did more for his country in the Congress than even Todleben, the only hero of the war, did in the armies of the Czar. The latter as was mentioned above, was an ambassador to the Germanic Confederation, and was therefore a man fitted by experience to be an assistant of his chief, the able Count Orloff. Baron Brunow was also honored with membership in the sub-committee which drafted the treaty at the close of their deliberations.

The Emperor of Austria, Francis Joseph II., appointed the Sieur Charles Ferdinand, Count of Buol-Schauenstein, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Leopold of Austria, and Knight of the Order of the Iron Crown of the First Class, Grand Cross of the

5. Ibid., April 29, 1856, p. 12.

Imperial Order of the Legion of Honor, Knight of the Orders of the Black Eagle and of the Red Eagle of Prussia, Grand Cross of the Imperial Orders of Alexander Newski, in diamonds, and of the White Eagle of Russia, Grand Cross of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, decorated with the Imperial Order of the Medjidié of the First Class, his Chamberlain and actual Privy Councillor, his Minister of the House of Foreign Affairs, President of the Conference of Ministers; and Sieur Joseph Alexander Baron de Hubner, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Iron Crown, Grand Officer of the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honor, his actual Privy Councillor, and his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of France. The former has been mentioned very often in the report of the diplomatic acts which finally led to the holding of the Congress in question. Until the beginning of the actual sessions of the Congress Count Buol seemed to be a large factor in the situation, but soon after this it became apparent that he was not in control; and, as we shall see, his influence continued to decline. The latter appears at no time to have had a prominent place in the Congress and this was probably permitted to continue partly on account of his being second to Count Buol whose star seemed to be setting.

His Majesty, the Emperor of the Ottomans, chose as his representatives Muhammed Emin Aali Pasha, Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire, decorated with the Imperial Orders of the Medjidié of the Merit of the First Class, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honor, of St. Stephen of Austria, of the Red Eagle of Prussia, of St. Anne of Russia, of St. Maurice and

St. Lazarus of Sardinia, of the Polar Star of Sweden, and of several other foreign orders; and Mehemmed Djemil Bey, decorated with the Imperial Order of the Medjidié of the Second Class, and Grand Cross of the Order of St. Maurice and St. Lazarus, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of the French, accredited in the same character to His Majesty the King of Sardinia. The former was concerned in several conferences held at Constantinople within the period covered by the above described conferences, at Vienna.* His ability was much above the average of the membership of the Congress, and he went to Paris with ready plans to gain as much, even more, than could have been expected of a representative from so decadent a country as his. His colleague was already in Paris and as Ambassador both to the French and to the Piedmontese he was naturally in a position to assist the movement in favor of Italy as opposed to Austria.

The King of Sardinia, Victor Emmanuel II., chose as his plenipotentiaries, the Sieur Camille Benso, Count of Cavour, Grand Cross of the Order of St. Maurice and St. Lazarus, Knight of the Order of Civil Merit of Savoy, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honor, decorated with the Imperial Order of the Medjidié of the First Class, Grand Cross of several other foreign orders, President of the Council of Ministers, and his Minister Secretary of State for the Finances; and the Sieur Salvator, Marquis de Villamarina, Grand Cross of the Order of

* See above page 22.

St. Maurice and St. Lazarus, Grand Officer of the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honor, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of France. The former, Count Cavour, was no doubt the ablest diplomat of the Congress. He had partly given proof of this fact by the method he took to insure Sardinia's participation in the great event. It is usual that the greatest successes are scored by a nation only when military efficiency is well supported by diplomatic ability; and in this instance is a singular illustration of that fact. He was seconded by the Sardinian Ambassador to France whose position and associations were favorable to a closer alliance with France and England; and, therefore, to the consummation of the isolation of Austria which Cavour hoped to bring about.

When the Congress had almost finished its work and it had become evident that the convention of the 13th of July, 1841, would certainly become a factor in the negotiations, an invitation to His Majesty the King of Prussia to send representatives brought the following personages from the Prussian Court: the Sieur Otho Theodore Baron de Manteuffel, President of His Majesty's Council, and his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Knight of the Red Eagle of Prussia of the First Class, with Oak-leaves, Crown, and Sceptre, Grand Commander of the Order of Hohenzollern, Knight of the Order of St. John of Prussia, Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stephen of Hungary, Knight of the Order of St. Alexander Newski, Grand Cross of the Order of St. Maurice and St. Lazarus, and of the Order of the Nichau-Iftihar of Turkey; and the Sieur Maximilian Frederick Charles Francis, Count of Hatzfeldt Wilden-

burg Schoenstein, his actual privy Councillor, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of France, Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle of Prussia of the Second Class, with Oak-leaves and Badge, Knight of the Cross of Honor of Hohenzollern of the First Class. Thus it will be seen that Prussia sent the head of her Department of State and her chief representative at the Court of France. In making these selections Prussia was simply following the precedent set by the other States concerned; for four of them, England, Austria, Turkey, and Sardinia, had already selected, as a second representative, the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to France, while all of them had chosen the head of the Department of State as the first representative. The selections indicated clearly that the countries concerned considered the questions to be settled as of prime importance - as questions that demanded the careful attention of the ablest men and the highest officials of Europe. Herein lies the reason for designating their work as that of a Congress; although it may be well to note that with the exception of Cavour, the highest officials of that time were not men of conspicuous ability and that no Sovereign was himself a member.

But while no Sovereign was a member, yet Napoleon III. had great influence, for several reasons which are quite obvious. In the first place his army by comparison had been successful in the war, and he had become quite popular for that and other reasons to be discussed later. In the second place, Russia's choice of Paris as a place for retiring from the conflict gave

France and her Sovereign precedence over all others.⁶ Again, his presence in the city where the sessions were held had the effect usually felt in such cases. And finally, probably as an outgrowth of the last reason, five of the fourteen members of the Congress were resident Ministers at Paris; so that, including the two furnished by France, one half the membership belonged in France, and were accustomed to French influence.

6. An editorial in The Times of March 27, 1856, has an interesting comment on this subject, from which the following excerpt is taken.

No one can doubt that the reputation of the French EMPEROR and people has been much exalted by the present war. It requires but a small acquaintance with European opinion to recognize that France has, by the wisdom of her policy and the energy of her action, taken a higher place in the commonwealth of nations, and dispersed those doubts which had been generated by the commotions of 1848 and the following years. In the Crimea her armies have added new victories to the roll on which Austerlitz and Friedland are inscribed, and now a peace is about to be concluded in the French capital which will associate that city once more with the great landmarks of European history.

II. History of the Congress

The Arrival and Reception of the Plenipotentiaries.

As the seven members who were not at home in Paris began to arrive, considerable interest was given to the question of their choice of lodgings. The Paris correspondent of The Times on Sunday, February 10th, reported that Lord Clarendon's quarters would be "at the Hotel Bristol" and that Count Buol would "lodge at the Hotel de la Terrasse, in the Rue de Rivoli, near the Place de la Concorde." But on Wednesday following he reported that Count Buol would probably not be able to secure his apartments at the Hotel de la Terrasse, as the party occupying it declined to give it up. By Saturday, February 16th, the report was that both Lord Clarendon and Count Buol had arrived and that the former's quarters were "at the Hotel de Louvre", while the latter was "lodged at the Hotel Bristol, Place Vendome." The correspondent made no reference to the change made by Lord Clarendon. Both Count Orloff and Baron Brunow from Russia "took up their quarters at the Hotel of the Russian Embassy",⁷ probably because they felt that it would be well to remain aloof from the influence of the city and of the other diplomats. If this were their reason, they were soon aware of the futility of such an endeavor; for Baron Brunow was unable to meet Count Orloff at the railway station on the latter's arrival on account of being invited to a concert given at the Tuileries by the Emperor.⁸ The correspondent of The Times neglected to refer to the lodgings of Count Cavour and of Aali Pasha, but he mentions the arrival

7. Ibid., February 12, 1856, p. 8.

8. Ibid., February 25, 1856, p. 9.

of each and their audiences with the Emperor, such as were given to each of the Plenipotentiaries.

Although the agreement made in Vienna February first required the assembling of the Plenipotentiaries within three weeks. an actual meeting including an organization for work did not occur until Monday February 25th. On that day the twelve men came together at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and remained in session until half past 4 o'clock.⁹ Count Walewski, being the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sovereign in whose capital the Congress was held, was asked to preside.¹⁰ A very handsome table was fitted up for their use. It was covered with rich crimson velvet and surrounded by chairs highly suitable for such an occasion. They chose to seat themselves at this table in alphabetical order by countries. Count Walewski sat at the head of the table and his colleague, Baron Bourqueney at the foot.¹¹ Then They arranged themselves according to the following diagram:

Count Walewski

Count Buol


Lord Clarendon

(Baron Manteuffel)

Count Orloff

Count Cavour

Aali Pasha



Baron de Hubner

Lord Cowley

(Count Hatzfeldt)

Baron Brunow

Marquis de Villa

Marina

Mehemmed Djemil Bey

Baron Bourqueney

9. Ibid., February 27, 1856, p. 9. Quoted from The Moniteur.

10. Ibid., February 15, 1856, p. 8.

11. Ibid., February 21, p. 10.

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It will be remembered that the two Plenipotentiaries of Prussia, bracketed in the above diagram, were not present until just at the close of the sessions. Their places at the table would naturally be between the representatives of England and Russia; but, as the table was made for only 12, some provision for lengthening it must have been made.¹²

At the first session an armistice was signed which was to take effect immediately, that is on February 25, and was to last until March 31; but it was "to have no effect on the blockades now established, or that may be established."¹³ According to the Vienna correspondent of The Times, at this first meeting Count Buol "made the discovery that the atmosphere of the French capital" was "less favourable to Russia than that of Vienna, and to have found the French Government somewhat less inclined to make peace at any price than he had expected to find it."¹⁴ When they adjourned for the day they went to a banquet given by Count Walewski, at which all the Ministers, Senators, Deputies, and high dignitaries of the Crown were in attendance.¹⁵ But this was neither the first nor the last of its kind which the Plenipotentiaries were expected to attend. The Emperor had called a council of Ministers at the Tuileries five days earlier, and most of the Plenipotentiaries had been present and had attended the banquet given at that time by Count Walewski, who seems to

12. Ibid., February 15, 1856, p. 8.

13. Ibid., February 27, 1856, p. 9. (Taken from the Moniteur).

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., February 25, 1856. p. 10.


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have been prodigal of banquets.

Their sessions were behind closed doors and little could be learned of the progress made, as secrecy was maintained throughout. They did not meet daily nor even on alternate days, but at the times which would suit their convenience most. An interesting side light is reported by The Times correspondent at Vienna, in regard to the feeling there. Prince Gortschakoff was the Ambassador to Austria and had failed to maintain that country in a state of neutrality, as he had been expected to do. And now that Austria had sent the ultimatum to St. Petersburg, and the Czar had chosen others to represent him at the Congress, Prince Gortschakoff was in no very happy frame of mind. Therefore, when it was reported in Vienna that at one of the many social functions Emperor Napoleon III. had given slight attention to Count Buol in his speech, but had brought into strong relief Lord Clarendon, Count Cavour, and even Count Orloff; and, when about this time he received a summons to return to St. Petersburg, he let his feelings control his tongue. He is said to have declared that there was not a more despicable set of politicians in Europe than were to be found in that imperial city. It was said that he did not spare Austria, when conversing with his friends, because Russia had "piped" and Austria "had refused to dance."¹⁶

The correspondents for the newspapers were constantly watching and listening for any information of interest; and thus we have it reported on Monday, March 10, that, at a fête given for

16. Ibid., March 11, 1856, p. 11. (Vienna correspondent).



the Plenipotentiaries at the Palace of the Tuileries the evening before, a piece in two acts was performed after dinner. This little drama was entitled "Il n'y a pas de Fumée sans Feu", which may or may not have had something to do with the episode reported. It seems that the attention of almost the whole audience was attracted to two spectators who retired "to a distant part of the salon and to all appearances kept up a dialogue, which was perhaps less comic than what was spoken on the stage, but which was quite as interesting. These two were Count Orloff and Count Buol."¹⁷ Count Orloff showed supreme and vehement disgust and his gesticulations were threatening; while Count Buol met his demonstrations as diplomatically as possible. They held the attention of the audience until the drama was almost finished.

But, although secrecy remained the policy of the Congress, the fact that a peace was really being made leaked out in several ways. The Plenipotentiaries were known to have decided to come to an understanding on all those points involving a casus belli and to leave all secondary matters for later attentions. Therefore in an indirect way it was possible to learn that peace was assured as early as the 12th of March. The French correspondent of The Times included a letter from Berlin of that date saying "Count Orloff has made known at St. Petersburg that a definitive understanding has been come to on the fifth point, and that,, peace is assured".¹⁸ And

17. Ibid., March 12, 1856, p. 9.

18. Ibid., March 15, p. 10.

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Napoleon III. was anxious to have peace announced at the same time that the firing of cannon announced the birth of a son. The birth of the son occurred on March 16th, but the Plenipotentiaries were not yet ready to announce the peace, although they were practically through with the more important details, and the broken off understanding, together with the disappointment of the Emperor, led to a general knowledge that peace was at hand.¹⁹

Influence of the Sultan.

The Sultan was not pleased with several of the tentative arrangements which the Congress had made respecting Turkey, he therefore refused to sanction some of these and called a council at Constantinople. This Council directed Aali Pasha "not to consent to the insertion of the Sultan's late decree among the articles of peace." He objected to any arrangement by which the Powers were to dictate the administration of any portion of the internal affairs of the Turkish Government; and this decree, in regard to the Rayah subjects of the Sultan, affected internal affairs only. Again a discussion by the Congress of the union of the two provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia he considered prejudicial to his sovereign rights.²⁰ After several days of considerable excitement in Constantinople, "in spite of long interviews between the French and Austrian Ambassadors and the Ministers of the Porte," a protest was sent to the Congress. The Sultan practically gained his point, at least temporarily, and

19. Ibid., March 19, 1856, p. 8.

20. Ibid., March 26, 1856, p. 6.

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LECTURE NOTES

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the matter was settled amicably.²¹

And as regards the daring to assume a high and exalted place among the Plenipotentiaries Aali Pasha had no lack; for he issued 800 invitations to a grand ball to be held on the 10th of April, at which the Emperor was to be a guest, exactly as the Sultan had been a guest at a similar ball given by M. Thouvenel at Constantinople, shortly before. Moreover, he modelled his affair upon that which the Empress had given at the Tuileries in celebration of the birth of the heir to the imperial throne.²²

Gradual Changes in Relationships.

As the work of the Congress proceeded it became evident to Count Orloff that Napoleon was the real leader in European affairs and he was diplomatic enough to change his policy so as to benefit by the forming of a more friendly attitude. The facts are that Napoleon had been pushing to the front for some time as is shown well in an article in the Spectator for December 15, 1855, entitled, "Peace and the French Alliance", which said in part: "Louis Napoleon is no longer the parvenu, excluded from the recognized synod of royalties, whom Nicholas of Russia would not greet with the title of frère: he is without any question the foremost man in Europe - the man whose single will can do more than any other will, whose abilities and character are recognized most unmistakably to belong to the first order, whose alliance is eagerly welcomed.....If the war should terminate without giving our navy an opportunity to retrieve the comparative

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., April 4, 1856, p. 10.

inaction and want of daring that have characterized the last two campaigns, Englishmen will naturally feel a passing wish that it might have been otherwise..... If the hatred and envy of Continental powers have found in actual disasters ground enough for absurd misconception or at least misstatements of the decline of England's military power, one might, without being considered bloodthirsty, wish for another campaign to test what we could do, now that the surprise of the war has worn off, and the nation is thoroughly roused to a sense of the importance of the struggle."²³

The sentiment expressed in the latter half of the above quotation gives one cause for the alienation of England and the growing affinity of France for Russia. How different was the sentiment expressed in Paris may be seen readily from an article on the "Necessity of a Congress for Pacifying Europe" dated Paris, December 20, 1855, and published in the Living Age. From this article is taken the following: "In the plans of arrangement now in course of negotiation no one has any idea of humiliating Russia, or depreciating the just share of influence and authority which she is called on to preserve in the councils of Europe."²⁴ And Fyffe, quoting a Russian source, says, "In the course of the deliberation, whenever our (Russian) plenipotentiaries found themselves in the presence of insurmountable difficulties, they appealed to the personal intervention of the sovereign (Napoleon)

23. Littell's Living Age, Feb. 9, 1856, pp. 380-2. Quoted from The Spectator, Dec. 15, 1855.

24. Ibid., Feb. 16, 1856, pp. 433-5.

and had only to congratulate themselves on the result."²⁵

The above sentiments seem to have been corroborated by those expressed by Count Walewski on the occasion of a banquet given him on the 31st of March, just after the treaty had been signed. Besides the plenipotentiaries the French Cabinet and other high functionaries of State were invited; in all there were about 40 people in attendance. Count Walewski presided and Lord Clarendon and Count Buol took their usual places next to him, but the other plenipotentiaries alternated themselves with the members of the diplomatic corps. The plenipotentiaries were in full uniform and wore decorations of the orders to which they belonged. On this very solemn occasion Count Walewski proposed a toast saying that he drank to the duration of the peace they had just signed, all the more as that peace was effected without inflicting humiliation on anyone, and was a peace worthy of the nations which had made it; it was humbling to no one, and highly honorable to all.²⁶ Count Orloff was expected to reply to this sentiment but he refrained from doing so and the one speech of Count Walewski was the topic of conversation for the rest of the evening with considerable speculation in regard to why Count Orloff remained silent. But the next report said, "The Emperor continues to be marked in his attentions to the Russian Envoys, and the Russian Envoys still more enthusiastic

25. Fyffe, Hist. of Mod. Europe, Vol. III., p. 230. Quoted from Dip. Study II. 377, (a Russian publication).

26. The Times, April 3, 1856, p. 7.

in their admiration of His Majesty."²⁷

Continuing in the same vein it is well to take something from the Vienna correspondent of The Times: "Not long since the Austrians were loud in their eulogies of the Emperor of the French, but the evident desire of that potentate to ingratiate himself with Russia has excited both their jealousy and their fears. Men in office are extremely guarded in their conversation, but they are in an ill temper, and hint that the French Government has not paid sufficient attention to some of the wishes expressed by the representatives of His Majesty the Emperor Francis Joseph. It is also a great grievance to the official politicians of this city that the Sardinian Plenipotentiaries have been permitted to play such a prominent part at the Paris conferences, and that Count Orloff has taken so much notice of Count Cavour, 'the Minister of a country which, for the last eight years, has displayed such a hostile feeling towards Austria'."²⁸ As a consequence of this feeling Austria ceased to flatter the French and to abuse England since she perceived that a Russo-French Alliance was not beyond the bounds of probability. Count Orloff continued to take advantage of every opportunity to show favors to Count Cavour and it was evident that the very name of Austria was an offense to him.²⁹

As stated above,* Sardinia had never been recognized by Russia and it was amusing to see Count Orloff now so friendly,

27. Ibid., April 5, 1856, p. 10.

28. Ibid., April 10, 1856, p. 9.

29. Ibid., April 14, 1856, p. 10.

* See page 26.

But when it is understood that it was through Austrian influence that Russia had ignored the Government of Sardinia, the whole matter is as light as day. The facts were that Austria was becoming almost completely isolated and at the above mentioned great fête at the Ottoman Embassy it was remarked that Count Buol was hardly addressed by anyone.³⁰ After the treaty had been signed and the Plenipotentiaries were waiting for the ratifications to be sent in, they were concerned about a number of minor subjects which thus far had been omitted from their deliberations on account of the necessity for speed. It was during this interval that Count Cavour succeeded in pressing his interests to the front, and through the Emperor's influence, had the Italian question brought formally before the Congress.

It is reported that Count Cavour displayed great courage, zeal, and perseverance during the whole trying period that the Congress continued to meet. And although he secured no definite concessions nor even reliable promises yet he had placed the Italian question fairly before Europe in such a strong light that it was evident to all that results favorable to Italy would likely follow in the near future. On the other hand wretched Austria was bearing a burden equal to that usually carried in such a Congress by a vanquished Power. To give an opportunity to understand the situation one can not do better than to quote the words of the Paris correspondent of The Times:

"At a dinner given by Prince Napoleon the other evening

30. Ibid., April 19, 1856, p. 10.

neither M. de Buol, M. Hubner, nor M. de Bourqueney, who is, justly or unjustly, regarded as decidedly Austrian in his tendencies, was present, It is difficult to suppose that this omission was not known, or disapproved by the Emperor."³¹ Again he says: "M. Cavour left Paris last night, and has, I suppose, before this reached London, Count Buol leaves today for Vienna. These two Plenipotentiaries carry very different feelings with them as they separate. The former has cause to be proud of the position his Government occupies before Europe, and he cannot be otherwise than satisfied with the manner in which he himself has performed the arduous duties confided to him. He may look back on the past with pleasure, and to the future with hope. Count Buol returns sullenly home, conscious that he has conciliated no one, and stung by the thought that, in the council room or out of it, his Government was an object of suspicion to all. She is disliked and feared by Prussia, hated intensely by Russia, all but defied by Piedmont, probably despised by France, and most assuredly not loved by England; but the enmity of Russia probably causes her more pain than anything else."³²

31. Ibid., April 19, 1856, p. 10.

32. Ibid., April 21, 1856, p. 10. Continuing, the correspondent said:

Hardly an occasion passed that Count Orloff did not show his resentment or insinuate contempt - not the less keen because conveyed in polished terms - for the Government of which Count Buol was the representative at the Congress. This occurred in various ways. It is certain that when the Russian Plenipotentiary asked one day of Count Cavour, in a good-humoured expostulating manner, "what could have induced Sardinia to make war on Russia?" Count Cavour replied that Russia had never recognized the constitutional Government of

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Related Events.

The feeling of assurance that a successful termination of the war was at hand caused the allied Governments to send orders raising all measures of blockade which were keeping Russian commercial vessels in neutral ports.³³ This was done as early as April 4th, although the final ratification of the treaty did not occur until the 27th.³⁴ The allies also withdrew many of their troops from Russian and Turkish territory as early as their action in raising the blockade.³⁵

Count Orloff seemed to be on very friendly terms with the Ambassador from Spain, M. Olozaga, and there was a rumor that he would probably recommend to the Czar the recognition of the


32. (con't). Piedmont, and spoke and acted as if, in fact, Piedmont had ceased to exist, and that she was obliged to declare war, if it were only to prove that she was still alive and moving. "My dear Count" said the Russian, "if we did not recognize you it was those Jesuits of Austrians (clutching his hand) who prevented us."

At a grand banquet given one day by the President of the Senate to the Plenipotentiaries at the Luxembourg Count Orloff and Count Buol were standing near each other looking at some beautiful malachite vases, said to have been the gift of the Emperor Alexander to the first Napoleon. The Russian drew the attention of his Austrian colleague to some of the pictures with which the room was hung, and which represented the battle of Austerlitz, and others in which the Austrians more particularly figured, but not to their glory, during the wars of the Empire. "Look here, Count," said Orloff, "these ought to interest you more than me." Count Buol looked, and smiled grimly; "Never mind - never mind", Orloff continued, "I am sure these pictures were not left here expressly to awaken any unpleasant reminiscences in your mind or to vex you. Our hosts are too delicate to pain you. The servants no doubt forgot to remove these pictures, though they knew you were coming; but don't mind - don't mind." The consolation was the unkindest cut of all.

33. Ibid., April 5, 1856, p. 9.

34. Ibid., April 29, 1856, p. 12.

35. Ibid., April 7, 1856, p. 10.



Government of Queen Isabella of Spain, which the Czar had neglected, much as he had done for Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia. It will be remembered also that Nicholas attempted to refuse recognition to Napoleon a few years earlier; and it may be asserted without hesitancy that the war and the Congress had taught the Russian Government a much needed lesson in diplomatic courtesy.


The Ratification.

To Prince Lichtenstein was assigned the duty of bearing Czar Alexander's ratification of the treaty to Paris.³⁶ But just how the other copies were carried to and from the capitals of the Powers concerned is not to be learned readily. The Vienna correspondent of The Times reported the Post Amt Gazette as saying:

"The treaty of peace, with the Imperial signature attached to it, will be sent to Paris immediately. The treaty is written on parchment, with the first page only lithographed. Each copy is enclosed in an elegant leather case, the great seal being in a gilt box."³⁷ From the above statement it is possible to know there was special care as to the form and the appearance of the several copies of the important document as well as to the content of it. And it may be of interest here to mention the high compliment paid to Empress Eugenia when the treaty was signed. She had taken a feather from an eagle in the Jardin des Plantes and had had a pen made from this feather. At her request the treaty was signed with this pen; and then, after having been decorated with emblems by the Crown jeweller, it was presented to her with the

36. *Ibid.*, April 26, 1856, p. 11.

37. *Ibid.*



compliments of the Plenipotentiaries.³⁸

Immediately after the treaty had been signed at 2 o'clock on the afternoon of March 30, 1856, the Plenipotentiaries left the Foreign Office and proceeded to the Palace of the Tuileries, to communicate the fact to the Emperor, who, attended by the officers of his household, received them in the Salon des Ambassadeurs.

In many ways, no doubt, the event of closing their labors was a happy one for all; and for some at least, a time to be remembered with pride. Even Baron Von Manteuffel, who had been present but a few days, received recognition from his Sovereign in the conferring upon him of the order of the Black Eagle, the highest order in Prussia and one of which there is only one class. This honor was given not so much because of the participation in the Congress as in appreciation of his success in steering the ship of State through all the vicissitudes of the times without wrecking it on the rocks of war or letting it run aground in an alliance with Russia.³⁹ And by Imperial decree the President of the Congress Count Walewski was raised to the rank of Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor for the "eminent services which he had rendered as Minister of Foreign Affairs." And his colleague the Baron de Bourqueney was given "the dignity of senator for his services during the late diplomatic negotiations."⁴⁰ Emperor Francis Joseph had not forgotten his representatives, much as they were being slighted at Paris, for he sent Count Buol the

38. Baron d'Ambes. Intimate Memoirs of Napoleon III. V. II., p. 86.

39. The Times, April 3, 1856, p. 7. (Berlin correspondent)

40. Ibid., April 3, 1856, p. 7. (Paris correspondent)

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
Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stephen and a highly complimentary autograph letter.⁴¹ *

The actual number of times of meeting while in the performance of their duties as a Congress, is not to be determined readily, but apparently they met 18 times between the 25th of February, the date of their first meeting, and the 30th of March, the date of signing the treaty. After this date they met a number of times and were busily engaged with minor points, the most important being the disposition of Italy and of the Provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia. These and other subjects considered will be discussed in the next chapter. The social affairs, in which a great part of their time and attention was engaged, probably numbered as many as the business sessions of the Congress; and considering all the relationships, friendships, and jealousies, to say nothing of the premeditated and intentional slights which these affairs fostered, it is not an exaggeration to say that their effect upon European conditions was fully equal to that of the Congress itself. It seems fitting, too, to mention once more the very great influence which the then popular Emperor

41. *Ibid.*, April 10, 1856. p. 9. (Vienna Correspondent).

* . There may have been others who received decorations, though the following is the only further record obtained:

The Emperor, (Napoleon), it appears, was very anxious to give his Lordship (Clarendon) the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour, an honor which M. de Manteuffel has already received. Lord Clarendon, (so the story runs) explained to His Majesty that no British Minister or British subject can accept a foreign decoration unless for military services; "and such being the fact", he added, "my case has not an inch of ground to stand on, as my services in Paris have been especially pacific." - Taken from the letter of the Paris correspondent of The Times, published April 21, 1856, page 10.



Napoleon III. and his gay capital, the birth of his heir at the critical moment, and his close diplomatic, official, and personal associations with a majority of the members had upon the final draft of the treaty. By April 27, 1856, the ratifications had all been received and acknowledged, the work of the memorable Congress had been concluded, and they therefore adjourned sine die and went their several ways rejoicing, though evidently not in equal measure.

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CHAPTER III. THE TREATY.

I. Contents of the Treaty.

As soon as the treaty was ratified and the ratifications all filed in Paris, as it had been prescribed, the Honorable William Stuart, the first attaché to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy at Paris, was despatched to London with a copy of the long expected document. The London Gazette immediately published it as an "Extra", the issue appearing on the 28th.¹

The treaty itself contained 34 articles and one additional and transitory article in reference to the Straits and evacuation of troops. Annexed to the treaty are several conventions - the first containing 4 articles; the second, 3 articles; the third, 2 articles; and the fourth 1 article on four very important points of international maritime law.

The first article consists of a formal and dignified declaration of peace and friendship between the belligerents, "their heirs and successors, their respective dominions and subjects, in perpetuity," as soon as ratifications are made.

The second article provides for the reciprocal evacuation of all territories occupied by the armies, as promptly as possible, according to special arrangements to be made.

The third provides for hussian restoration of the citadel of Kars and other Turkish territory captured during the war.

The fourth engages the allies to surrender and evacuate the towns and ports of Sebastopol, Balaklava, Kamiesch, Eupatoria,

1. The Times, April 29, 1856. p. 12.

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Kertch, Yenikale, Kinburn, and all other Russian territories occupied by their troops.

The fifth promises a blanket amnesty to all who may have been in any way compromised by the war in so far as their participation in it may have been favorable to the enemy.

The sixth provides for the immediate release of all prisoners of war.

The seventh is an important article; for it is here that the Christian Powers pledge themselves to permit the Sublime Porte "to participate in the advantages of the public law and system of Europe", and "to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire." Moreover, they guarantee in common "the strict observance of that engagement" and promise that they will consider any act tending to its violation as a question of "general interest."²

And the eighth article was hoped to be an exceptionally wise and useful one for the preservation of peace, in that it provided for delay and opportunity for the intervention of all the other interested parties in case of any misunderstanding which might arise between two or more of the signatories. Like all other efforts of like kind it has proven ineffectual; the apparent result being to increase the difference of potential by the delay, and thus make the stroke all the more violent when it comes.

In the ninth is found the result of the consummate diplomatic skill of the Sultan and his two Envoys, Aali Pasha and Mehmed Djemil Bey. Like the policy of the German Government toward the

2. Taken from the text of the treaty as found in The Times, April 29, 1856, p. 12.

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Socialists of the present day, - to grant, in an Imperial way, so many of the demands of the Socialists that little is left for a propaganda - the Porte communicated to the Western Powers and Russia that wonderful firman the "Hatti-humayun" of 1856, spontaneously emanating from it, and furnishing convincing proof of constant solicitude for the welfare of all the subjects of the empire without respect to race or religion. To say that the envoys from the Christian Powers must have been overfed with nourishment not convenient for them or that they were suffering from the results of keeping late hours, or both, is to give but a very paltry excuse for their collective agreement to recognize the high value of this communication and to pledge themselves not to interfere collectively nor separately with the internal administration of the empire.

The tenth declares that the "Convention of the Straits" is revised by common consent and as revised is annexed to the treaty to have as full effect and force as if a part of the treaty itself.

The eleventh and twelfth articles neutralize the Black Sea and throw it open to the merchant marine of every nation but close it to the naval vessels of all the world except for health, customs and policing purposes, as further detailed in articles 14 and 19 of the treaty. Russia and Turkey agree to admit consuls into Black Sea ports in conformity to the principles of international law.

The thirteenth is a relinquishment by Turkey and Russia of any rights they may have had to maintain on the shores of the Black Sea any military-maritime arsenals.

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The fourteenth declares that Russia and Turkey have signed a convention in regard to the number and character of vessels to be maintained for the above mentioned duties at the ports of the Black Sea and that this convention is annexed to the treaty, to be annulled or modified only by the assent of all the Powers who are signatories of the main treaty.

The fifteenth applies the principles of the free navigation of rivers which separate different States, as laid down by the Congress of Vienna, to the Danube River; and provides that with the exception of levies for policing, guaranteeing, and facilitating traffic "no obstacle whatever shall be opposed to free navigation."

The sixteenth provides for a European commission consisting of one delegate from each of the seven Powers to see that the sand bars and other obstructions at the delta of the river are removed; and gives the Commission power to fix a rate of toll to reimburse them for the expenses necessary. The Commission is to be controlled by a majority vote and the flags of all nations are to be treated by it "on a footing of perfect equality."

The seventeenth provides for a permanent River Commission to take charge of the navigation of the Danube when the Commission of the sixteenth article has finished its work. This permanent Commission is to consist of seven members, one each from Austria, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Turkey and also one each from the three Danubian Principalities, the nomination of whom has been approved by the Sublime Porte. Its duties as given are as follows:

1. To prepare regulations of navigation and river police.

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2. To remove any impediments to navigation, still remaining, which prevent the application of the principles laid down by the Treaty of Vienna.

3. To execute the necessary works throughout the whole course of the river.

4. To maintain the mouths of the Danube and the neighboring ports of the sea in a navigable state.

The eighteenth requires that the European Commission shall have finished its work in two years; and that the River Commission shall have done all that is named in numbers 1, and 2, Art. 17, within the same two years. Further it requires that at the end of the two years the European Commission shall be dissolved and its duties automatically turned over to the River Commission by the Powers assembled in conference.

The nineteenth grants to each of the contracting Powers the right to station two light vessels at the mouths of the Danube to secure the execution of the regulations of the River Commission.

The twentieth "rectifies" the frontier between Russia and Turkey in the Province of Bessarabia, giving the mouths of the river back to Turkey; and provides that delegates of the contracting Powers shall fix the line in detail.

In the twenty-first provision is made for the territory ceded in that it is to be considered a part of the Province of Moldavia. The inhabitants are given the choice of remaining where they are or of departing within three years, and perfect freedom in the disposition of their property.

The twenty-second is an important article in that it leaves

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the Provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia under the suzerainty of the Porte, but imposes the collective guarantee of the Powers. It expressly forbids any one of the guaranteeing Powers to exercise exclusive protection over the Principalities and to acquire any separate right of interference in their internal affairs. This, therefore, gives the Principalities autonomy but not complete independence. Evidently, Russia and Turkey were both being checked in their ambitions, while Austria was not assisted in hers.

The twenty-third article guarantees to the Principalities an "independent and national administration as well as full liberty of worship, of legislation, of commerce, and of navigation." But it proposes to revise the laws and statutes and for that purpose arranges for a commission to meet at Bucharest without delay.

The twenty-fourth provides for a Divan in each of the Provinces to be convoked by the Sultan for the purpose of determining the wishes of the inhabitants in regard to the organization to be effected. The relation of these Divans to the Commission at Bucharest is to be provided by the Congress; so it says, though where or what they are, is not clear, unless they be found in the first section of the following article. Here we find the Commission is simply required to take "into consideration the opinion expressed by the two Divans" and to "transmit without delay to the present seat of the conferences (presumably Paris) the result of its own labours." Article twenty five goes on to say:

"The final agreement with the Suzerain Power shall be recorded in a convention to be concluded at Paris between the high contracting parties; and a hatti-sherif in conformity with the stipulations

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of the convention shall constitute definitely the organization of those provinces placed thence-forward under the collective guarantee of all the signing Powers."

By the twenty-sixth article permission is given to the Principalities to maintain an army for purely police and defensive purposes; and the following article places one more prohibition upon Turkey in that it denies to her the right to assist the provincial army in putting down an insurrection without first coming to an understanding with the contracting Powers.

With this parting injunction, the Principality of Servia is next considered; and two articles, the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth, stipulate terms very similar to those for the Danubian Provinces, guaranteeing as much and checking Turkish intervention equally.

Article thirty declares the Asiatic frontier between Russia and Turkey is to remain as it was before the war; but, to prevent any possibility of dispute, provides for a Commission to establish the line definitely. This Commission consists of two Russian, two Turkish, one English, and one French representative, and is to complete its work within eight months after the ratification of the treaty.

The evacuation of territory by the several Powers is by the thirty-first article fully arranged for and promptness is emphasized.

By the thirty-second the commercial treaties in existence before the war are revived, and it is stipulated that "in all other matters their subjects shall be respectively treated upon the foot-

ing of the most favoured nation."

The thirty-third speaks of the annexed convention between England and France on the one side and Russia on the other, in respect to the disposition of the Aland Islands in the Baltic Sea. It is declared to have the same force and validity as if a part of the main treaty.


The last article, the thirty-fourth, provides that the ratifications shall take place within four weeks, or sooner if possible, and shall be exchanged at Paris where the Plenipotentiaries will wait for them. Since the treaty was signed March 30th with the ratifications exchanged April 27th it is evident that the four weeks were none too long for the accomplishment of the task.

The signatures were placed in alphabetical order by countries, the same as the seating at the table while at work; except that France took its proper place alphabetically instead of at the head and the foot, and that England exchanged with Austria - England taking first place and Austria second - for some reason which can only be conjectured, possibly because Count Buol felt that under the circumstances he did not desire the prominence of first place.*

The additional and transitory article simply provided that the convention regarding the Straits should not apply to the vessels of war performing the acts of evacuation, but should take effect when evacuation was complete.

This convention of the Straits is a short one of four articles in which the Sultan agrees to retain his former prohibition of foreign war vessels from entering the Dardanelles and Bosphorus,

* Or because in French Angleterre would precede Austriche.



while the Powers guarantee their respect for that principle; but two exceptions are named - for the light vessels in the service of the missions of foreign powers, and those which have just been authorized to station themselves at the mouths of the Danube "to secure the execution of the regulations relative to the liberty of that river, and the number of which is not to exceed two for each Power."

The second convention which is annexed to the treaty is one between Russia and Turkey; each of these is to maintain on the Black Sea a maximum of six steam vessels of 50 meters length and 800 tons displacement and four smaller vessels not to exceed 200 tons displacement each.

The third convention is the one which refers to the Aland Islands. It stipulates that these islands "shall not be fortified and that no military or naval establishment shall be maintained or created there." With this convention the work of the Congress, as such, closes; but the same men remained at the task of providing for their respective countries what they believed would be of benefit, and which they thought would accord with the spirit of their duties, even if not exactly with the letter of their instructions. To this end they drew up what has since been named the Declaration of Paris. Its purpose was to put an end to a number of deplorable disputes in regard to international maritime law in time of war. Its provisions were:

1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished.
2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war.

3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag.

4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective - that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.

This declaration was signed on April 16th and the Plenipotentiaries agreed to invite the nations not represented to accede to it.

Notwithstanding its value and its evident promotion of civilization, the United States of America found excuses for declining to be one of the many nations which acceded to it.*

* The text of the treaty is found in The Times, Apr. 29, 1856, p. 12. Also in the original French language in Marten's Nouv. Recueil Général De Traités XV., 770-92.

II. Criticisms of the Treaty.

The Delay in Becoming Public.

The long delay occasioned by the waiting for ratifications made it necessary for the monthly magazines to get out their May numbers without further knowledge of the treaty than what had chanced to leak out accidentally. The publishers were not in a state of mind to be pleased over small favors. This is illustrated by the Tait's Edinburgh Magazine where it says:

"The treaty of peace should have been long ere now described to the British Parliament. Its terms have been communicated to European Courts, whose subjects never spent a thaler or lost a drop of blood in the war."³

This may have referred to a belief that Austria and Prussia had more knowledge of it than England.

There seems to prevail a feeling in England that the peace which was being made was one to be ashamed of; this is shown in an article by Walter Savage Landor entitled "The Peace Negotiations," published in the Living Age. In this he says: -- "was it ever agreed that a purse should never be taken from the grasp of a pickpocket, that his honor not be wounded? We are leaving the picklock keys and the revolver in each hand of an assassin, and seem perfectly sure he will not fire at us when we turn our backs, nor ever attempt to commit burglary again."⁴

Again it is reported that a politician, not in the Congress but present at one of the many social functions immediately follow-

3. Tait's Edinburgh Mag. May 1856, p. 257.

4. Living Age, April 5, 1856, p. 63. (Originally published in The Examiner).

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ing the signing of the treaty, said that the Plenipotentiaries had signed "une Paix but not la Paix." ⁵ And in the same vein an article of the time contained the following lines:

"To-morrow would have given us all--
Repaid our pangs, repaired our fall;
Guerdon of many a painful hour,
To-morrow would have given us power
To rule, to shine, to smile, to save--

And the Conference at Paris have decided that that morrow is not to be ours." ⁶ Lord Derby denounced the act as "The Capitulation of Paris." ⁷

An article entitled The Peace gives an idea of the reception of the treaty in England. Among other like statements are found the following:

"Parliament reassembled to hear the announcement with less excitement than precedes many a second-rate party-debate; and the Premier, usually so punctual, that day by accident (?) came too late to make his statement at the proper time and finally announced the Peace with hardly a congratulatory word, and to a thin House!" ⁸

It seemed to be understood that the treaty was itself quite objectionable, even if the failure of the British army and navy to make a good showing should be neglected. The same article has this to say on the treaty:

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5. The Examiner, April 5, 1856, p. 209.
 6. The Economist, April 5, 1856, pp. 568-9.
 7. Sidney Lee, Dict. of National Biog. XX., pp. 347-50.
 8. Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, V. 79. Jan. to June 1856, p.608.

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"The so-called 'neutralization' of the Black Sea now agreed to by the Allies, is the very scheme of equipoise rejected by them at the Vienna Conferences a year ago; and as to the stipulation for the non-fortification of the Aland Isles, it must be remembered that the system of earth works adopted by Todleben allows of the strongest fortifications being erected anywhere in a few weeks."⁹ Even as early as 1856, therefore, the trench warfare, about which we now hear so much, was understood to be the coming type.

From an address by Major-General Sir Richard Airey, Quartermaster of the Forces, another shade of color is given. He says:

"What may be called the domestic bearing of Great Britain during the late war will not read well in history. It was too confident at the beginning, too exulting towards the middle, and too desponding towards the end."¹⁰ And another shade may well be given. At an effort to celebrate with illuminations and fireworks, a man in the West-End "exhibited a transparency, in which, within a broad black border, was seen a legend to this effect: 'In mourning for a disgraceful peace, the inevitable result of a disgracefully conducted war'." But the comment was that, although the mob seemed to like his courage, it was only "a small minority who took such a gloomy view of the peace as this gentleman did."¹¹

But there were other counsels; not every criticism was of the character given above. To give a few of the saner criticisms by

9. Ibid., p. 615.

10. North British Review, V. XXV., p. 493.

11. British Quarterly Review, V. 24, p. 209.

British writers, is necessary to the real understanding of the situation. Here is one that shows moderation:

"Every candid person, we think, must agree with us in saying that, so far, the Treaty, if not all that might have been desired, is all that could well have been expected. All the provisions are in the right direction."¹²

And this criticism from another and probably a still saner source is more nearly the truth, in all probability than most of the others:

"That all parties are heartily tired of the war, has been for many months past evident; and certainly of all the belligerents, Russia has the most reason to be so.....But both England and France have also many and cogent reasons for desiring peace."¹³

Another article entitled "The New Loan and Funding of Exchequer Bills", in the same magazine, gives the financial condition of England at the time:

"Should, as is contrary to general belief, the negotiations commenced in Paris not be carried to a successful conclusion, there will be "no other resource for the Government but to raise additional money through a loan or largely augment the existing rates of taxation." ¹⁴

But the Economist seems optimistic in regard to the treaty as a whole and wildly so in regard to the worst feature of the entire document. By becoming too enthusiastic where there is evident reason to be calm the criticism given loses much in value.

12. Ibid., p. 226.

13. The Bankers' Magazine, V. XVI., Feb. 1856, p. 74.

14. Ibid., March 1856, pp. 141-2.

This is the way the periodical delivers itself:

"We rejoice to see that the Allies have given up the unfortunate idea once entertained of degrading the Power they took up arms to aid, by establishing a right of interference between its subjects and itself, wholly irreconcilable with the principle of real sovereignty."¹⁵

However, in a later issue this periodical gives some very worthy and pertinent criticisms that help materially to lift the Congress out of the rather discreditable position in which some would declare it to be. These are given under "Parliamentary Discussions on the Treaty of Peace." One of these is to the effect that few treaties had been so unanimously accepted by the members of the English parliament. Reference is made to the treaties of Utrecht, 1713, of Paris, 1763, and 1783, of Amiens, 1802, and of Paris, 1814, all of which "gave rise to acrimonious discussions and protracted party conflicts." Another states the position which the treaty imposed upon Russia in these words:

"By some clauses in the treaty we remove her (Russia's) temptations for encroachment; by others we diminish her facilities for encroachment; by a third class we destroy her excuses for encroachment; while by a fourth class we convince her that she cannot encroach either with success or impunity."

Some writers claimed that Russia should have been forced to pay a large indemnity as a security for the observance of the treaty, professing to believe that a large addition to the public

15. The Economist, May 3, 1856, pp. 473-4.

debt of that country would act as a "grand civilizer." Besides being required to return to Turkey the costs of the last Russian invasion which Turkey had been forced to pay, the Russian "should have been chained down to a debt that could not have been easily paid." But Russia was not required to pay an indemnity nor to perform any other act humiliating to her pride, except the cession of a portion of Bessarabia back to Turkey.¹⁷ The source of the leniency toward Russia was conceded to be France.¹⁸ And as for the failure of Russia, it could not have been otherwise, when so great a coalition had been formed against her. A large public debt was really not necessary to put her on the road to civilization. Her defeat was a sufficient blessing of that nature; "Compression from without was probably indispensable to force the cultivation of her powers within."¹⁹

But others were even more willing to be fair with Russia and contended that the cession of even a small portion of her territory, together with the surrender of her supremacy on the Black Sea, was sufficient to prove her genuine desire for peace. And these were probably less overcome by false patriotism and prejudice than those who would have humbled her more.²⁰

To continue the line of reasoning, expressed above, that France was the source of leniency to Russia, it was felt by some that Napoleon could see no real gain to him in a continuance of the

17. The Economist, V. 14, pp. 389-90.

18. Ibid., May 1856, p. 263.

19. The Economist, V. 14, pp. 389-90.

20. Brit. Quar. Rev. V. 24, pp. 217-20.

war. For a continuance would eventually bring about English supremacy of the sea which could not be to the interest of France.²¹ Besides, after the birth of an heir, Napoleon's policy of financing the war by means of loans so as to prevent large increase in the taxes but which left a burden for future generations, failed to look good to him longer. The prospect that his son might meet difficulties which he had avoided made him see the matter in a new light.²² His rather rapid change to the leadership of the friends of Russia caused alarm in England; and it is no wonder that many considered the Anglo-French alliance as existing only as a phrase - a memory of bygone days.²³

Count Walewski would have arranged for a union of the two Provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, and he was supported by Clarendon, Orloff, and Cavour, but Buol and Aali Pasha objected and the matter was dropped. Another proposition of Count Walewski was the request that something be done to suppress the Belgian revolutionary periodicals that were considered extremely hostile to the Government of France. But while they all vehemently condemned "the excesses in which the Belgian newspapers indulge with impunity", yet they felt that nothing could be done about it without the danger of a European War.²⁴ Therefore this matter was permitted to go unsettled, because Europe had had war enough. But when Europe had rest from war until its horrors were too nearly forgotten a similar condition between Austria and Servia was al-

21. Blackwood's Edinburgh Mag. V. 79, P. 611.

22. Ibid., p. 613.

23. Brit. Quar. Rev. V. 24, p. 228.

24. Ibid., pp. 231-2.

lowed to precipitate a most deplorable war.

Another matter which developed until it held the attention of Europe more and which changed the map considerably within the next fifteen years was brought forward by Count Cavour. As said before, he had entered the war so as to be permitted to take part in the Congress. But at the Congress no opportunity came for him to present his case until the sub-committee was delegated to draft the treaty. And even then he was a member of the committee and had little chance to bring forward his propositions. However, on the 27th of March he was given an opportunity to speak.²⁵ He

25. Ibid., pp. 233-7. To quote the words as given here:
 "In this note the story of the wrongs and miseries of Italy, under Austrian domination and military occupation, Pontifical tyranny, Neapolitan brutality, and French intervention, was told over again in diplomatic language; and the Plenipotentiaries were called upon to decide whether, having talked in such a high strain about the duty of maintaining the integrity and promoting the welfare of a Mohammedan Empire, and having shown such zeal for the practical attainment of these objects, they could separate without extending a little of the same enthusiasm and the same charity to Italy." He did not ask that they do all that he would desire, but recommended to their consideration the following:

1. The withdrawal of Austrian troops from those parts of Italian territory held only by military usurpation.

2. The secularization of those parts of the Papal States known as the Legations, that is, that regular government officials be substituted for the atrocious Cardinals and Jesuits.

3. The recommendation by the Congress, with the whole force of its moral weight, that Austria, Naples, and the other native kingdoms establish "a more liberal and popular mode of government in their respective dominions." According to another authority Cavour's propositions were:

1. To relieve the Pope of temporal power.

2. To relieve the horrible conditions in the two Sicilies through the allied Powers' influence.

3. To establish a customs union binding the Italian States as the German Zollverein does the German States, - taken from the North British Review V. 25., p. 260.

According to the Paris correspondent of The Times, Cavour "showed the inconsistency of an occupation of territory,

called upon the Plenipotentiaries to consider whether their solicitations for the Christians in Turkey and in other lands without a thought for those nearer home was not a matter to be reformed. But having done all that he could, which, by the way, was more than any other man present would likely have been able to do for a similarly heartfelt matter, "the Treaty was drawn up and signed, without any mention being made in it of Italy." 26

As for Turkey, it has already been said that she failed to secure an indemnity, a return for what she had paid Russia in former wars, but it was said of her that she "fought well and gained much - especially freedom from interference and permission

25. (con't). contrary to the will of its population, by foreign troops, and dwelt on its inutility, and the impossibility of such a state of things lasting for any time. In truth a moment must come when such an anomaly must cease..... A French army cannot forever occupy Rome; and if its occupation be continued it ought to be to aid the Pope in establishing necessary reforms in his internal administration"; published in The Times, April 14, 1856, p. 10. And on April, 19, 1856, p. 10 - "Austrian statesmen ridicule the idea of Parma and Modena being annexed to Sardinia, and declare that no territorial changes can be made in Italy unless by force of arms." Also, April 8, pp. 8-9. "The domination of Austria and the privileges of the priesthood were clearly seen to be the chief impediments to prosperity both in Piedmont and in the States of the Peninsula."

26. Ibid., p. 235.

to join the concert of the Powers."²⁷ The North British Review gives quite a discussion of the effect of the treaty upon Turkey. Her territory was enlarged and its integrity guaranteed. Her military successes added much to her prestige. Politically, so far as the control of the Principalities is concerned, she had lost considerable of her former rights. Civil, racial, and religious rights were bettered both in the Empire at large and in the Principalities; that is, so far as "scraps of paper" go. And commercially she would gain with all the other nations by the opening of the Black Sea and the Danube River, to the traffic of all nations. The double aim of that treaty rests in the consolidation of the Turkish Empire, against the arm at once of the external violence and of internal revolution."²⁸ The Bankers' Magazine remarks "Constantinople is safe from the grasp of the Muscovite for at least a century to come."²⁹

On some points there was wide variation in the sentiments expressed; as, for instance, the value to be attached to the Sultan's firman which was made a part of the treaty. As already given above the Economist seemed to think that matter a worthy one; while the British Quarterly Review considered it as amounting "only to a new paper guarantee".³⁰ But all the Powers were agreed that the opening of the navigation of the Danube was a distinct gain for humanity, irrespective of nationality or allegiance. Austria was really disappointed in that the final treaty was so nearly the same as that which Count Buol asked them to sign a year

27. The Economist, V. 14, pp. 389-90.

28. North British Review, V. 25, pp. 281-313.

29. The Bankers' Mag. V. XVI., pp. 73-78.

30. Brit. Quar. Rev. V. 24, p. 215.

earlier,³¹ before so much shedding of blood, such havoc by disease, and last, but not least, before the shift to Paris and the decline of Count Buol's influence. The British finally fell back and declared the treaty was as good a settlement as they could have expected under the circumstances. They gave Lord Clarendon credit for the "Declaration of Paris" appended to the treaty and at first felt it "a signal gain for Great Britain and a lasting service to the cause of peace."³² But some of them doubted whether after all they had not surrendered "a weapon of defense with which the chief maritime and commercial power can ill afford to dispense." Turning to later writers,

Andrews says, "the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, the admission of that State into the concert of Europe, and the solemn renunciation of all right of control over the internal affairs of the Empire itself, - was probably the most ill-advised and suicidal diplomatic action that has ever been taken by a body of representatives discussing international questions."³³ The Turk he says "rejoiced to be free from this surveillance of the foreign Powers". Continuing he declares "no wonder Lord Stratford could say that he would rather have cut off his right hand than have signed that treaty"..... "The treaty of Paris not only postponed indefinitely the settlement of the Eastern Question, but it increased tenfold the difficulties of the problem."³⁴

31. Liv. Age., May 31, 1856, pp. 566-7.

32. Sid. Lee, Dict. of Nat. Biog. V. XX., pp. 347-50.

33. Andrews, Mod. Europe, V. II., p. 87.

34. Ibid., p. 88.

And Fyffe says, "The terms of the Treaty were in fact such as might have been imposed if the Western Powers had gone to war with Russia for some object of their own, and had been rescued, when defeated and overthrown, by the victorious interposition of the Porte."³⁵

III. Conclusion

How insignificant and ephemeral all the efforts of man prove to be is very clearly illustrated by the short life of the provisions of the treaty under discussion; for "history has condemned the policy of the war and stultified its triumphs."³⁶ Wallachia and Moldavia were soon united in the independent kingdom of Roumania, Servia threw off the Turkish yoke, Russia took occasion in 1870, to repudiate the clause neutralizing the Black Sea. The territory ceded by Russia was returned in 1878. Austria ignored the agreement to respect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other nations have done likewise. The Danube clause, however, has been in the main carried out. The firman which the Sultan used "to pull the wool over the eyes" of all the distinguished Plenipotentiaries, while he had an opportunity and was clear sighted enough to recognize the fact, was never put into practice fully. The man who really had seen the trend of the times was Nicholas I. and his policies continued to be carried out after his death more than those of the Treaty of Paris.

35. Fyffe, Hist. of Mod. Europe, V. III, pp. 224-5.

36. Phillips, Mod. Europe, pp. 358-9.

"The Sultan gained in importance from this war; the French Emperor gained military glory and prestige; the King of Piedmont was shortly to be amply repaid for his efforts by the aid of Napoleon III. in his Italian policy. The Crimean War had this further result that, showing the inefficiency of the Russian Government, it was a main cause of the wave of reform which swept over that country in the early years of the reign of Alexander II. As a solution of the Eastern Question the War was a flat failure."³⁷ But even if the reform in Russia touched many institutions it certainly did not become general, for Wallace in speaking of Sebastopol, the city of the great siege, says:

"At the time of my visit, in 1873, the town was still in pretty nearly the same dilapidated condition as when the allies left it. The streets, had of course, been cleared, but the great majority of the houses were still roofless and in ruins, and there was a general air of desolation about the place, as if the siege had just been finished and the inhabitants had not yet had time to return to their homes."³⁸

Yet Wallace declares that the intellectual and moral improvement in Russia due to the war was very great.³⁹ The improvement would have had to be revolutionary in character to bring Russian conditions to anything like the standard in Western Europe.

Again the treaty did not establish a lasting peace; for Europe, though relatively free from war for more than a generation

37. Hazen, Europe Since 1875, p. 616.

38. Wallace, Russia, p. 436.

39. Ibid., p. 437.

before the Crimean war, was forced to bear the burden of five cruel wars within twenty-five years after it was signed. But it is not correct to judge the treaty as a failure because changes came in rapid succession immediately after its ratification. It was the treaty of Paris that paved the way for the unification of Italy, and the decline of Austria. And these two great changes could not take place without bringing about two others equally important - the loss of temporal power by the Pope and the hegemony of Prussia.

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