

THE QUEST FOR SELF RELIANCE, PARTICIPATION AND SOCIALISM:
Tanzania 1961-1982

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A man who has inherited a tumbledown cottage has to live in even worse conditions while he is rebuilding it and making a decent house for himself.

- President J.K. Nyerere

Development means liberation. Any action that gives (the people) more control over their own affairs is an action for development, even if it does not offer them better health or more bread.

- TANU 1971 Guidelines

If the people are to develop they must have power. They must be able to control their own activities... the best intentioned governments - my own included - too readily move...into acting as if the people had no ideas of their own. This is quite wrong... people do know what their basic needs are...if they have sufficient freedom they can be relied upon to determine their own priorities for development.

- President Nyerere

Our own reality - however fine and attractive the reality of others may be - can only be transformed by detailed knowledge of it, by our own effort, by our own sacrifices...

- Amilcar Cabral,
late President PAIEC

Politicisation, Participation and Consciousness Raising:
A Long March

Tanzania's dynamic of change and Tanzanian political and official thinking, language and tactics are distinctly different from those of most other "new (or would be) socialist states."

The reasons are neither absentmindedness nor parochialism - they are rooted in perceptions of what is necessary and possible in the Tanzanian context, perceptions which alter in response to successes, failures and external events.

The pre 1954 political consciousness of most Tanzanians was both low and diffuse. Oppression was seen in terms of colonial rule and racial arrogance. Exploitation was similarly viewed - ie most Europeans and most Asians, not capitalists as a class let alone capitalism (territorial or global), were the perceived enemy. This has been perceived to require politicisation both in the sense of mobilisation for successive limited goals and of parallel state/Party initiation of structural change. It has also been the basis for sustained emphasis on broad participation (and the rejection of a "Vanguard" or "Elite" Party), for an educational style of rhetoric and for an emphasis on a variegated array of educational approaches formal and informal, vocational and political. The underlying assumption - sometimes made explicit - is that politicisation and participation will create and sustain a dynamic toward higher levels of consciousness.

Because the initial consciousness was nationalist and the available level of real resources/productive forces low, several potentially divergent themes have been stressed:

- a) elements in pre-colonial African societies consistent with egalitarianism and communal participation/production/distribution which, if transformed, would create a basis for socialist transformation, ie "Ujamaa" is almost overtly, a unifying national political myth (like "social contract") not an historical exegesis or a call for return to pre-European or pre-capitalist formations;
- b) maintaining a broad consensus and avoiding the use of force against large minorities (class or otherwise defined) both on normative grounds and on practical non-feasibility ones;
- c) utilizing and building up a citizen technocratic - managerial - bureaucratic cadre whose consciousness was, and is, far from uniformly socialist (and still less pro-participation) and

whose nationalist, egalitarian and basic needs commitments had (and have) distinctly authoritarian and paternalistic strands, because no other technical vehicle was to hand;

- d) while systematically lowering the relative (and since 1972 real) incomes of this salariat and creating participatory (from village and workplace to national) structures to direct, monitor and review their performance (including their patterns of relationships with workers and peasants);
- e) in order to create over time a technical/professional cadre both genuinely competent and genuinely internally committed to socialist development;
- f) major emphasis on increasing levels of productive forces - because failure to achieve this clearly meant continued rural poverty and inability to provide basic services;
- g) in parallel with an emphasis on moving to universal provision of basic services (pure water, primary and adult education, preventative and basic curative medical programmes) and the opportunity for each household to earn enough to meet its own basic consumption needs;
- h) and a consistent emphasis on reducing inequality of income (and access to services and to the political process) inequality because at any plausibly attainable level of productive forces affluence for the few meant deprivation for the majority (and the need for an exclusive, repressive - not a participatory, consciousness raising! - political process to sustain it.

This set of approaches - which have been at the heart of Tanzanian political economic strategy and practice at least since 1967, and less coherently since TANU (now CCM, the single Party) was founded in 1954 - are derived from perceptions and understandings of Tanzanian reality not from lack of thought or of commitment to a socialist transformation (which have more to do with not infrequent partial deviations from, and conflicts with, the mainstream).

The perceptions of constraints may or may not in part be wrong. The conclusions on strategy and tactics drawn may not necessarily

follow from them - or may even be self contradictory or ultimately inconsistent with a transition to socialism. These are perfectly valid questions (and ones often canvassed in Tanzania). They are not very effectively pursued by laying down a set of blueprints from any other socialist transition and identifying all differences in Tanzania as deviations, heresies or mistakes. Tanzanian political thinking - at least, by proponents of socialist transformation - accepts there is one basic concept of and set of characteristics/ tests of socialism. But - with a limited number of elitist intellectual exceptions - it also contends that different contexts require very substantially different strategies, tactics, institutions, sequences of action and approaches to politicisation - mobilisation - consciousness raising.

Maji Maji, Mandate and Moderation: Milestones to Arusha

Tanzania's initial colonial experience under Germany was brief, dynamic, violent and brutal. The basic colonial economy and infrastructure were created in the two decades 1894-1914. German conquest was initially relatively easy - small, weak and disunited pre-colonial states ensured that. German repressiveness led to subsequent attempts to reverse the conquest - notably Maji Maji in the south - suppressed with great brutality and loss of life.

British colonialism was relatively short, passive and authoritarian but neither very exploitative nor repressive. As a mandatory and trust territory Tanzania was a backwater seen as a marginal peripheral source of markets and labour to Kenya, South Africa and Rhodesia. The pattern begun under German rule of a few - not very successful - settlers, a limited (sisal, coffee, tea) estate sector, a number of African small-holder areas and some labour reserves in a sea of territory and people of no real interest to the colonial power continued. Output for export increased slowly and fitfully - that (basically subsistence food) for local use almost as slowly and fitfully with recurrent severe foodshortages (and the beginning of a tradition of 'famine' relief). With a tiny European capitalist/bureaucratic/professional cadre and an Asian middle stratum, Africans were nearly all peasants,

unskilled workers or petty clerks with quite limited economic differentiation (other than in respect to the larger Kilimanjaro-Meru coffee growers and a few local notables used in the very diluted indirect rule apparatus). A less developmental system in economic or human terms would have been hard to devise but precisely for that reason it was not one which led to vehement grievances, recurrent violence or a high level of consciousness.

Politicisation on a mass level dates from the middle 1950s. TANU (always de facto the sole party) systematically mobilized by relating local grievances (from land grabs through arrogant officials and cheating dukawallahs to land use and animal dipping regulations) to colonial rule to create a mass, nationally oriented base. In parallel (indeed interlocked) economic activism against Asian middlemen created the first (and strongest) cooperatives in the Lake cotton zone (an African smallholder initiative of the 1945-60 period) and the West Lake and Meru-Kilimanjaro coffee zones. These were marketing cooperatives run by a salariat basically responsible to a would be kulak farmer minority of their membership.

TANU's programme was nationalist. Not very surprisingly it was not socialist - no consciousness existed for such a stance and to have adopted it would have been to court colonial state repression and floating of seriously backed splitting parties (as occurred in Zanzibar). It was non-'tribal' (with a hundred and fifty cultural groups none with even 10% of the population, it could hardly have been 'tribal' but it could have sought a 'cross-tribal' coalition). It was also secular in the sense of opposing both theocracy and state intervention in religious belief or organization while broadly affirming the importance of sacral bodies as private institutions and the total non-acceptability of political appeals, or denouncements based on religious lines. (Again a 30-40% Islamic, 25-30% Catholic, 10-15% Protestant/Anglican, 15-20% other religious makeup gave pragmatic reasons to reinforce normative ones).

More surprisingly TANU was and remained anti-racist. Given a fancy multiple electoral college system this was arguably

tactically useful before independence, but its continuation and reinforcement after independence (there are directly and indirectly elected representatives and appointed officials of Asian, Creole, European and Arab ancestry) cannot be explained in that way. Initial mass consciousness was quite overtly and radically changed in this respect to:

- a) present the system (first colonialism and later global capitalism), not the individual, as the enemy;
- b) to insist that not all members of any community were oppressors or exploiters (and later to insist some members of all communities were);
- c) to demand that individuals be judged - and then accepted or rejected - as persons not as manifestations of a supposed mandithic community. This stand has been surprisingly successful - most Tanzanians have internalized it - so much so that it is easy to forget that as late as the eve of independence President Nyerere (the most determined anti-racist leader) had to threaten to resign to assure its continued dominance.

After independence TANUs programme - from its earlier years vaguely populist, left Catholic and/or social democratic in rhetoric - as enacted by the National Assembly and operated by the state machinery included:

- a) an open market economy based on "industrialisation by invitation" and yeoman farmers ("improving peasants" or "neo-kulaks");
- b) rapid citizenisation of public sector posts, especially in the bureaucracy proper and therefore a carefully planned high level personpower development programme;
- c) concentration on expansion of health, water and basic education but on a rather uneven basis with no meaningful scenarios for achieving universality;
- d) successful - in micro terms - building up of communal self help activity and conversion of the Party structure to a perceived (by peasants) means of seeking support but with no clear communal activity strategy nor Party interaction with the State.

The results were not very surprising:

- a) some growth was achieved (3 to 4% a year versus the colonial 1½ to 2½%) but its limits became painfully clear;
- b) inequality among Africans - individually, on a sub-class and on an urban-rural basis - grew very rapidly, political leaders began to become private businessmen at the same time;
- c) a cadre of Tanzanian civil servants of both competence and nationalist convictions was built up as well as the beginning of a broader state directly productivs sector;
- d) service expansion contributed to raising both expectations and inequality as much as access;
- e) Party and communal activity roles remained subject to diverse and contradictory inter-relations.

None of this is very surprising or unusual. The difference in respect to Tanzania and to its leadership and Party was the response. The major affirmation of shift and clarification in the Arusha Declaration will be treated below but before that came the restructuring of the Party and Party/State relations.

Because TANU candidates were virtually never defeated and because its adoption of Westminster Party procedures stifled debate, the move to a single Party was in part intended to (and did) increase competition in elections (which have in both State and Party been marked by relatively high turnover through voter rejection and promotion) and in dialogue/debate. It also legally established the supremacy of the Party over the Government as the basic decision taker for the State and the duty of the Government (including the National Assembly) to articulate, legislate and implement Party decisions. While clearly envisaging a necessity of day to day government autonomy (subject to review) and Party non-involvement in direct administration, the arrangements were not very clear on what this meant especially at regional, district workplace and village levels.

"Socialism and Self Reliance": Declaration and Interpretation

Tanzania's 1967 statement on "Socialism and Self Reliance" (Arusha Declaration) was a Party policy decision and has remained at the centre of strategy and policy for 15 years. It represented a radical shift from 1961-66 policy and practice, subsequent changes have been in terms of further steps, altered contexts and alternative instruments, not major changes of goals or principles. At least eleven main themes emerge:

1. Party supremacy - because this is a definitive strategy statement by the Party instructing the government to articulate and implement (which it promptly began to do);
2. People as the only end and justification and as the central means to development;
3. Human beings as existing fully only as persons within communities not as isolated individuals;
4. Priority to meeting the basic needs of all Tanzanians first (basic service provision, opportunity to earn decent household incomes; self reliance in the sense of self-respect and self-definition - and therefore participation in decision taking as elaborated more strongly in the 1971 and 1982 Mwonguzo ie Guidelines);
5. Therefore, concentration on the rural peasant sector where most people - and especially most very poor Tanzanians - are;
6. Egalitarianism via moving to universal service provision and reducing income inequality (in principle largely by evening up and secondarily by suppressing opportunities for exploitation);
7. Enhanced production to provide the resources for achieving socialism and self reliance;
8. State dominance in large scale directly productive enterprise ownership (including the entire financial and foreign trade sectors), state setting of the economic

context via planning and policy (basically on a managed market basis) and - less clearly and over a longer period - expansion of communal production at the rural, retail trade and workshop level (explicitly labelled socialism);

9. More participation of workers and peasants in decision taking as well as in implementation (latter elaborated to include a commitment to decentralisation of decision taking so ordinary people could get at decision takers);
10. Basic reliance on Tanzanian resources (especially people and policies) because only Tanzanians had the right to decide for Tanzanians or were primarily concerned with the welfare of Tanzanians and Tanzania;
11. Rigid separation of public and private business to limit conflict of interest and mixed loyalties (ie draconic leadership code for Party, Government, parastatal senior personnel and leading to limiting of Party membership to workers and peasants).

The subsequent use of Party power and state policy instruments - ranging from the leadership code through nationalisation of landlords and from systematic compression of urban wage/salary differentials and raising grower prices relative to the minimum wage to creating Workers and Village Councils and workplace Party branches - have been consistent with the Declaration's targets and with an evolving consciousness of their implications.

The characteristics that have raised doubts in some observers (Tanzanian as well as external) whether this does constitute a socialist transformation include:

- a. length - in fact Tanzania moved to public sector economic dominance and effective Party supremacy in less than a decade which is not particularly slow if GDR figures for private sector up to 1960 are to be credited;

- b. non-violence - whatever the virtues of a running start at the end of a civil or liberation war TANU could hardly have created (or justified creating) one. And - in contrast to Chile - domestic capitalist sub-classes were far too weak and external ones too little concerned to overturn or subvert the Party or regime;
- c. mass party - TANU and CCM ideology includes a quis custodiet custodiet? (who is to watch the watchers?) view as to the elite cadre approach in the Tanzanian context. CCM does have a cutting edge against indiscipline, has - within limits but substantially - enforced the Leadership Code and has developed higher and sharper levels of consciousness over time;
- d. tendency to play down class struggle - arguably a verbal tactic more than an analysis of policy - the powerful capitalist sub-classes were foreign finance/external trade/industrial units, domestic proto-kulaks (and their creative the old-coop movement) and - more arguably - landlords and retail traders. All have been "struggled against" and either reduced to very subsidiary roles or substantially weakened. The deliberate use of relatively subdued language in respect to sub-classes and social groups (other than cattle thieves, smugglers, hoarders, profiteers - fairly specifically defined - and exploiters - so generally defined as not to have much potential for unplanned enthusiastic violence against anybody) has been based partly on a normative commitment to the broadest consensus possible without losing course (not to universal agreement or non-use of state power to compel) and of arguing and educating rather than shouting and ordering, but also to a real perception of how fragile the new state and nation were (much less true today).
- e. non-standard terminology - is a criticism of talking plain Swahili (or English) in preference to strange (to the audience) Marxist technical and rhetorical terminology and/or a distinct

aversion to treating any secular document (including President Nyerere's) as Holy Writ. CCM leaders see the former as consistent with actually relating to and being subject to removal by peasants and workers and the latter as more "scientific socialism" than laboured, out of context, textual exegesis to "validate" concrete, contextual measures;

- f. a certain zig zag approach to priorities in the medium term policy/action nexus. This approach (which is arguably dialectical and in one sense Maoist) turns on a commitment to concentrating on tackling a limited number of crucial, potentially immediately surmountable problems (antagonistic secondary contradictions) and - when temporary syntheses are attained - moving forward to the next set;

- g. the bureaucracy has become the new class - is debatable - much of CCM (especially the President) perceive this as a major risk and repeatedly warn against it albeit the requirements of politicisation and leader initiatives to force the pace of consciousness raising create an acute tension in this respect. But the civil service - managerial elite have accepted and in large measure implemented (and to a lesser and less uniform degree internalized) a socialist transformation ideology, lost ground absolutely and relatively economically (with surprisingly little organised dissent or even foot dragging and subterfuge) and (with more delaying and resisting tactics but no real counteroffensives) had their relative power and status (vis a vis peasants and workers) eroded. That pattern does not fit very well with the hypothesis of a dominant, neo (or state) capitalist technocracy as a sub class for itself.

Three caveats are needed in respect to this TANU/CCM ideological tour d'horizon. First, while practice broadly corresponds to ideology, it is substantially imperfect and on occasions marked by internal contradictions - especially in respect to anti-

elitism and effective worker/peasant participation in decision taking and control over leaders. Second, as President Nyerere stresses "mistakes are mistakes... exploitation is exploitation.." and both have occurred at micro (and less frequently macro) level with correction sometimes lagged and partial. Third, TANU/CCM and its leaders are not romantic idealists, utopian intellectuals or Holy Idiots. The Party has gained, held and exercised power and sees that as a necessary (not sufficient) pre-condition for attaining any of its substantive goals. President Nyerere is most certainly not naive and soft - a socialist (or any other) statesmen to succeed requires many characteristics and styles very different from Mother Theresa (and vica versa). While generally using minimum force, CCM (including, indeed perhaps notably, the Chairman) will in the last resort smash opposition with a clenched fist - as such varied groups as large landlords, the Ruvuma Development Association, Oscar Kambona and his colleagues, the elitist intellectual 'left' fraction of the Party and Idi Amin have learned to their cost.

Social and Political Relations: Change and Inertia

Tanzania's transformation is revolutionary in goals and - in many aspects - cumulative results. However, it had a virtually standing start and is perceived as in constant danger of being pulled to a halt by inertia if acceleration is reduced (as arguably was the case in 1977-78 and is now a major contradiction given real resource constraints).

The political structure is a parallel one. The Party basically bottom up: 10 House Cell, Village/Workplace/ Residential Area Branches, District (Constituency) Conference, Regional Conference, National Congress (in principle every 5 years, in practice every 1 or 2), National Executive, Central Committee (full time), Chairman with the

top four levels supported by a (somewhat exiguous) national and the others by (yet more exiguous) regional secretariats. Membership is of the order of 2,500,000 (25% of adults), discussion is reasonably open, elections are competitive with substantial turnover. Party wings exist for Labour, Women, Parents and Youth - the first three at least with substantial, self defined programmes.

The Party is the supreme policy making and review body. Once it arrives at decisions these are to be administered by the government. During that process the Party is supposed to participate, comment, if necessary call on its own higher organs to investigate apparent violations of policy but not to act directly to reverse government actions (except at Congress-NEC-CC-Chairman levels) nor to administer. In practice substantial grey areas and tensions exist. Most Party officials are not Public Sector senior functionaries and vica versa.

The Government's representative side consists of President-Prime Minister-Cabinet-National Assembly (about 60% competitive direct elections after Party nomination, 30% indirect competitive elections, 10% Presidential appointment). Its duty is to articulate and implement policy via the civil service (central ministries, and decentralized regional 'multi purpose ministries') and parastatals.

The Party and representative systems are competitive and relatively open. The bureaucracy (and to a somewhat lesser degree the managocracy) is relatively civil and of service to policy instructions and usually fairly diligent (sometimes surprisingly so but sometimes in odd ways) in articulating and implementing. Its degree of civilness to "clients" varies widely with the lowest levels (who see themselves as having no status except power to say "No" and are ordered from above to be participatory) the most resistant to change. The dominant ethos probably is paternalistic/mildly authoritarian/quasi hierarchical but with

significant participatory/client service/democratic tendencies.

The dominant voluntary organisations are churches and mosques which have a greater or lesser claim on the allegiance of three quarters of all Tanzanians. Relatively little conflict (not none, eg with Lutherans over family planning, Catholic bishops over blanket condemnation of violence in South Africa, Watchtower over definition of secular authority as satanic) has arisen but there are also relatively low and uneven levels of sustained interaction and dialogue (again not none - the Christian Medical Commission and YMCA/YWCA are significant).

Other voluntary organisations (beyond non-agricultural co-ops) are neither very large nor significant. A bevy of Western ones from Scouts and St. John's Ambulance to Roundtable/Rotary (which is of some importance) exist as do some traditional ones but none has wide membership nor a really large programme (albeit in some areas eg education of handicapped, eye clinics they are critical). Most voluntary/communal efforts are in fact Party, Party Affiliate or Village based.

The political influence of the Armed Forces (never used at home) is low albeit because they are not seen as inherently separate from society members can become leaders (usually on leave of absence) - as can clergy. The Police have no political influence. Given their limited numbers they are surprisingly effective against crimes of violence and robberies of the urban poor but their weak technical capabilities (including prosecution) create a tendency (by no means unique to Tanzania) to third degree and long pre-arraignment detention tactics (officially disapproved and sometimes exposed by lawyers and press with subsequent state sanctions). They are not by world standards brutal nor very corrupt.

The Militia are normally non-political (a cross section of workplace or village), and non-useable except for home defence or against a small, unpopular minority position. The exceptions occur when younger age groups or poorer peasants dominate but their political influence then is more as a voluntary organisation than as militia.

Tanzanian culture/cultures are varied on local, ethnic, "modernisation", education lines in a way perhaps more variegated than but not radically dissimilar from - say - turn of the century Britain. Ethnicity/parochialism is also analogous to that model - mild distrust of 'outsiders', jokes/denigration of some groups, normally willingness to evaluate individuals as persons. Tanzanians are now notably non-racist - a consciousness almost certainly resulting from Party (and especially Presidential) 'mass education'.

The basic support groups for the Party's strategy ideology are peasants, urban workers (with more reservations), a majority of intellectuals, and (with substantial reservations and a number of exceptions) managers - professionals - civil servants. Business attitudes are very mixed.

Opposition centres on kulak/economic activist proto sub-classes (clearly threatened by Socialism and participation), a minority of civil servants and managers (same perceptions), a minority of intellectuals (largely left elitists who view participation as inherently fraudulent and assert they represent "true" peasant and worker consciousness but have historically had rather high proportions of racial chauvinists and defectors to compradorism) and - in a very passive (tendency to withdraw literally) way - many of the Asian community (clearly threatened - at least in future generations - by egalitarianism as well as socialism, given Tanzania's poverty).

Serious internal threats (since the 1964 army/trade union mutiny) have not existed with the possible exception of the post-Arusha Kambona defection and coup attempt. The sub-class bases and the structures of the opponents are very weak and fragmented and even among most of them nationalism and acceptance of the State's legitimacy are significant barriers to serious sedition.

The Party and official political/intellectual spectrum are rather broad. The dominant tendency is non-orthodox, participatory socialism but a social democratic (in UK sense) tendency is of some significance and a New Left one has been at times, while there are recurrent outbreaks of neo-authoritarianism (usually over the messiness of enthusiasm and slowness of participation).

Human rights are seen as comprising civil/political (eg freedom of speech, right to participate in decisions - including elections, independent judiciary) and social/economic (eg opportunity to earn decent income, universal access to basic services, ability to organise at village and workplace level to complement State action to achieve these). CCM, on the whole, views both areas as requiring progress but the former as more advanced (and posing fewer basic obstacles to progress) than the latter. It does not see these as "individual" or "collective" since it sees freedom of speech as necessarily in a community and the right to eat as necessarily applying ultimately to individual persons.

Women's liberation (not by that title) has received rather uneven and, until 1975 limited, attention. On the other hand tertiary education is now 25% female and middle level personnel perhaps 10% (versus say 10% and 2% in 1967) as are most representative bodies. Similarly universal primary education (basically achieved), universal literacy

(75% achieved), accessible pure water (85% urban, 40% plus rural), rural wood supply (a growing programme) and family spacing - health education - child and mother care (priority health sub-sectors albeit the first is largely under a "quasi voluntary" umbrella for tactical reasons) benefit women disproportionately, enhance their status and have very strong (male as well as female) support. Women's participation in communal, self organized groups and household decisions is very uneven and often very subordinated (by locality, community, age group) but apparently rising.

Basic services (education, health, water and - less systematically - housing), access to decent employment/self employment opportunities and participatory organisation are seen by CCM as the main routes to social transformation both materially and in terms of human relationships. The first has been clearly articulated and allocated very substantial resources. The second has received more resources (and a degree of institutional enforcement) but arguably has been less systematically (or attainably?) articulated. The last - while making very substantial progress over 1967-82 - is the least advanced and the area of the most opposition (even from within the Party) and partial setbacks.

Repression in Tanzania is low - for one thing there is not very much to repress. Fear of repression is apparently wider - but very often publicly expressed to casual acquaintances and senior leaders alike which casts some doubt on how severe it is. In general repression flows from three sources:

- a. "clear and present danger" - ie Kanbona Coup group, certain agents (or believed agents) of outside enemies, foreign exchange racketeers/smugglers (seen as clear danger to national economic security);
- b. inability of the (independent but also rather slow and limited capacity) prosecutorial/court system to cope (eg petty economic offenders, accused cattle thieves);

- c. Police and local administrator authoritarianism (eg local rate offenders, vociferous lunatics, habitual petty criminals, "nuisances").

There are currently no political prisoners (never more than 20 mainland ones) but perhaps 100-200 "economic security" detainees (Presidential order), 300-500 regional/district administrative detainees (legal for 24-48 hours but subject to abuse) and 500 up non-arraigned "Police detainees" and unduly delayed "undertrials." This is an issue of concern to the Party, eg the Attorney General at a public meeting agreed there were abuses and the use of detention should be narrowed and the basic paper calling for ending it was presented (as an individual) by a serving (then and now) Senior State Attorney. How much worker and peasant concern there is may be quite different (ie "lock more up" is most likely view). Police and administrator abuses have been acted against by the Ombudsman, press, lawyers and Party - with some effect. When administrative detention and police detention/torture resulted in deaths (1968 and 1977) trials (and convictions) for manslaughter of senior administrators/police officers ensued.

Regulation of publication, organisation and assembly is draconian on paper (largely inherited from before independence) but - except for public marches - rarely in practice. The real constraints on publication/communication are cost, limited - fragmented audiences, shortage of paper/ink (foreign exchange). There is a substantial independent newspaper (Church) and printers (Church and commercial), usually several journals (usually left critics or vehement populist) and a number of critical volumes (and newspaper features, leaders, letters to editor) from the public sector press (largely from the left or non-ideological programmatic). The Party would not claim freedom of expression is fully effective but would argue the causes were material not ideological or repressive. However, support for local wall newspapers or village video-tape

efforts has been near-nil (admittedly the present barriers are bureaucratic hostility but the Party could overcome them if it gave the issue of local two way communication priority).

The Quest for National Economic Integration

Tanzanian economic development policy parameters flow fairly directly from the basic goals in or evolving from the Arusha Declaration. They can best be summed up as national economic integration (of production/use structures, of geographic areas and of household opportunities to earn decent incomes) within managed market planning and reduction of exploitation.

Rural transformation is perceived to be the base of the national economy and its development as elaborated in the following section. Infrastructure provision has had a high priority to prevent or reduce power, water and transport barriers to enhanced production. Industrial development has been seen as a key to integrating production and use structures, reducing import dependence and raising average levels of productive forces and surplus generation. Financial infrastructure creation has been promised an increasing control over resource allocation, raising and centralizing surpluses and avoiding purely financial (as opposed to real resource) constraints on economic development.

The evolution of ownership has been toward state (including joint ventures seen as individually transitory, but as a sub-sector long term) dominance in large and medium scale production with near 100% in finance and external trade; peasant and - in the long term - communal small scale rural production (with limited large state and private exceptions for a few crops); a substantial but relatively declining medium and small scale domestic private sector; a very small (residual) foreign owned private sector and a growing decentralized public sector and non-agricultural co-operative

small and middle sized sector.

The actual evolution is along these lines except in relation to the last sector. Beyond village level (where results are mixed) decentralized public sector enterprises (in trade, transport, agriculture and manufacturing alike) have a record of nearly uniform disaster - in sharp contrast to state owned parastatals which through 1978 had an uneven but generally fairly good (better than private sector) productivity and profitability record. Co-operatives (other than villages) have remained negligible and small private industry proved more dynamic than expected.

Industrialisation strategy after 1967 evolved toward a basic industry - ie broadly consumed products, intermediate inputs into their production, basic construction materials, spares and engineering aspects of capital goods plus initial equipment/machine building, value added enhancing pre-export processing or manufacture (the most contentious area) - pattern which was formalized over 1974-76. This did produce relatively high intra sectoral linkages and low direct import levels (20 to 25% average) in the sector as well as high growth rates until 1974 and over 1977-78. However, because of the shift in investment makeup toward machinery and equipment it barely held the import content of investment at two thirds.

Further because sectoral exports lagged, it remained dependent on foreign exchange surpluses from other sectors to maintain its trend capacity utilisation of 70% - as the fall to 25-30% in 1982 under massive import constraints illustrates-with the difference (as opposed to direct manufactured goods imports) that each shilling of unavailable foreign exchange extinguished five shillings of pre tax manufactured goods supply (say eight to nine at retail prices) and four of domestic production, two or more of government sales and company tax revenue and over one of investible surplus.

Tanzania over 1967-74 became a planned economy but not one with a close resemblance to either the Soviet or Western academic models. The least dissimilar parallel is Hungary but this was not a direct influence and the evolution of the system was heavily influenced by the much greater macro and sectoral planning priority of the Treasury than of the Ministry of Planning (which gave primacy to micro public sector project budgeting at least until the late 1970s). Its main elements were market management by price and tax incentives/deterrents backed by allocation of commercial bank (and less systematically public enterprise surpluses, 'Development' Budget allocations and investment bank credits) as well as of foreign exchange. Pre-1974 physical balance planning was negligible as neither the Treasury nor financial institutions had the capacity nor Planning the interest. Public sector investment was - and is - basically on a decentralized initiative (from village or parastatal up)/centralized coordination and allocation pattern with some financial but few physical consistency tests.

Since 1974 some ad hoc physical balances planning and allocation has been done: staple foods (fairly effectively), basic consumer goods (oddly with significant resultant deliveries to a number of small towns and rural areas), fuel (with major 'leakages') and basic construction materials (with no evident results). However, no coherent approach to cross checking financial and physical consistency at macro and sectoral level (as opposed to scarce, key item allocation) has evolved.

Personnel constraints - now primarily in middle level personnel with top level apparent gaps the result of negligible backup below - have always been severe. The combination of 4-5% trend rates of real growth, increasing production/services/government complexity and a minimal independence lay high (or even middle) level citizen cadre meant that even massive planned personpower development efforts (from 1961 in respect to high level and - on a

decentralized basis - from the early 1970s at middle level) and achievements left substantial shortages. The two worst areas have been applied engineering and accountancy with dire effects on technological capacity (including maintenance) and financial control.

Massive reduction of inequality at intra-urban and urban-rural levels (but apparently not intra-rural for which results are ambiguous) was sought and achieved. Pre tax differentials between the top 5% and bottom 20% of wage/salary earners in the government fell to about 4.5 to 1 and in the public enterprises to under 6 to 1 by 1981. (Post income tax top 1% to bottom 20% differentials were under 6 to 1.) Average rural consumption power rose to 60-75% of minimum wage/urban self employed by 1977 (possibly only slightly above 1961 ratios but radically above 1966). Tax policy reinforced both of these trends as did increasingly broad access to basic services.

However this sustained trend had three phases. To about 1972 it was evening up - promotions offset static salary scales for most of the citizen salariat. Over 1972-1981 moderate cuts in real wages were in contrast to much higher ones in real salaries (and modest increases in real grower prices) while in 1982 it has been a clear case of "all boats float lower." Since 1978 a clear exception has burgeoned - "entrepreneurs of adversity" (or efficient, flexible capitalists or two legged/wingless vultures if you prefer) - ie bribe takers, engrossers and forestallers, smugglers and Forex dealers - who have waxed fat as vultures usually do during crises.

Government expenditure as a proportion of GDP (excluding 1978-80 over related defence spending) peaked in 1974. Since 1979 (ie beginning 1980) real government spending has been cut annually probably 20% by 1982. The revenue base collapse from imported input constraints has meant that this has barely reduced the real recurrent deficit.

Over 1973-80 government employment rose on a 5-6% a year trend and real government wage/salary bill was virtually static - a telling indicator of real salary and wage cuts. It has led to a pathological situation of far too many staff to work fully with existing supporting resources leading to frequent low morale and enforced idleness often becoming habitual. (Staff reduction - as in 1975 under active consideration - would reduce the deficit and inflation, alter consumption power patterns but not raise supporting resources much as these are foreign exchange constrained.)

Exports crucial role in transforming domestic resources into necessary imports was overlooked, misunderstood or denigrated over 1967-72 (with a few dissenting voices), only verbally deferred to in 1973-1979 and raised to the priority action agenda only over 1980-81. Through 1973 this appeared a minor error - the balance of payments including readily available concessional flows was rather well under control. The 1977 coffee/tea boom masked the secular damage done to the external balance by 1973-75 relative price changes and (as reserves rose to a record level late in the year) created a false sense of non-urgency cruelly dispelled over 1978-82.

Results from 1967 to 1977 (including the 1974-76 Emergency Programme) were broadly in the right direction and at acceptable rates. Overall production was on a 4½ to 5% growth trend and agricultural about 4%, manufacturing was growing and deepening, basic services were increasingly available (with universal literacy, pure water supply and basic health service access by the mid 1990s looking quite plausible), life expectancy reached 51 (from 35 or 42 at independence - the data are contradictory), inflation settled back to 6-8%, the foreign balance appeared to be under control, inequality fell with some grumbling (at the top over erosion and the bottom over modesty of gains), personpower resources - and to a degree efficiency of public sector operation - rose. The 1978-82 picture -

as elaborated in the penultimate section - is very different, most succinctly summed up as facile descensus Avernum. By 1981 terms of trade losses and enhanced security costs meant that per capita national resource use power (excluding defence) was about a sixth below 1977 and 5-6% below 1972 despite static constant price output per capita over 1977-82 (+ 5-6% 77-80, - 6% 81) and over 6% growth since 1972.

Community and Communal Activity: Toward Rural Transformation

Tanzanian rural transformation strategy has had five abiding - basically complementary but sometimes contradictory - themes:

1. creating communities as a basis for fuller human interaction and greater self reliance (than isolated homesteads or hamlets);
2. providing basic services (pure water, basic education, preventative and basic curative health services) on a path leading to universal access;
3. raising rural production to enable households to meet their basic consumption needs (and in so doing to feed the non-rural sectors and expand the industrial and export base);
4. building up communal production and investment (in infrastructure, housing, services and manufacturing/repair as well as agriculture);
5. increasing peasant power both within rural communities and vis a vis outside officials and manager.

Land reform (conversion from freehold to communally allocated tenure generally and abolition of quasi-feudal tenure in one region) pre-dates the Arusha Declaration. In general inequality of landholding (especially in land scarce areas) is low but specific patterns of inequality and land "consolidation" via manipulating communal allocation procedures have been acted against since 1967 to some effect. Neo-kulak farmers are no longer a growing sub-class albeit in their strongest areas - near Mounts Meru and Arusha - they have not lost existing holdings nor been prevented from continuing moderately successful capitalist farming.

Ujamaa (communal) villages have gone through three stages. Until 1969 they were diverse, few and peripheral to policy and practice. Over 1969-71 the strategy was rapid movement to largely communal production in a limited number of villages. In response to a demonstrated peasant preference for many

villages with lower initial levels and slower buildup of communal production, the policy shifted to "broad front" over 1971-73 by the end of which year about 30% of peasants were in Ujamaa villages broadly defined (and 15% in 'traditional' villages). Over this period fairly major educational, rhetorical, resource and policy inputs were provided. Coercion (both pro and con) was relatively rare but far from unknown.

After 1973 Ujamaa in villages continued (and continued to expand) but villagization - in the community and community government senses - was made compulsory by the Party Congress to be implemented over 1974-1977. A grass roots wave of 'enthusiasm' (apparently dominantly local party official - certainly neither central nor civil service) led to a remarkable number of technical errors and unprecedentedly high levels of coercion in 1974-75. In that year perhaps 30% of peasants moved - at most one third (probably less) relatively or very unwillingly. In 1975-76 rather more were shown as 'villagizing' but half were by redefining traditional villages. More notable sharp Party reaction to 1974-75 'enthusiasm'/coercion prevented its repetition.

Village self government - with more or less content - is universal. Village communal investment (totalling \$150-200 million) is nearly so albeit very unequal by village. It is dominated by water facilities, health and education buildings, minor roads and houses with godowns, vehicles, afforestation/woodlots, land clearing, stores (and contents) and workshops also significant. Communal economic activity is common with agricultural marketing and retail trade by far the dominant areas. Perhaps 3% to 5% of crop production (and about the same proportion of acreage) is communal concentrated in under a tenth of all villages (albeit communal agricultural service provision is somewhat commoner) while - beyond village dairy herds, oxen or breeding stock - animal production is virtually 100% household based.

Ujamaa and villagization have had no clear macro effect on output (1974 declines, 1975-78 rises and 1979-82 relative stagnation cannot be related to post harvest 1974 through mid 1976 moves - they can be related to weather, wartime dislocation and imported input availability). At micro level positive and negative cases can be identified. While the service provision aspects of villagization have been exploited, the technical possibilities (e.g. for extension, crop rotation) have not been nor have some of the problems (e.g. more intensive land use near villages, erosion) been handled adequately. This relates in large measure to the passive hostility of many (and the active hostility of an influential minority) of agricultural personnel - backed by the autonomous, dominant policy body of the 1975-79 period (Marketing Development Bureau) to the whole idea of villagization because it meant change, new approaches and greater peasant power vis a vis officials. In the face of effective peasant resistance to coercion most passively said whatever a particular auditor wished to hear and did near nowt. Interestingly education, health, water and forestry (and less clearly or uniformly local government) reacted much more positively and creatively.

Co-ops have a chequered history. Instituted by a non-peasant 'economic activist', proto kulak alliance in export crop zones as part of the nationalist struggle they built up on largely autonomous national institutional power structure and were extended - often by fiat - to other areas. Most were capitalist oriented, many were horrendously inefficient - high cost and/or corrupt, a majority were both. From 1967 to 1976 a campaign of erosion first clipped their institutional (especially rural credit and banking) power and imposed government supervision and then transferred primary society functions to villages while abolishing higher tiers. At the time the move was popular except in areas which had had strong, efficient co-ops (notably Kilimanjaro). Ironically the openly capitalist, kulak co-op (Tanzania Farmers Association) was treated as a special case and left unscathed.

1982 moves to restore co-ops (along with the long awaited recreation of district representative institutions envisaged but delayed since 1974-75) are not a simple restoration of the old order. The village primary societies remain the base (with voluntary 'production team' co-ops an optional addition). They will be able to create district/regional co-ops clearly as representative bodies but also to carry out as yet to be determined in detail storage, transport and intra-regional marketing functions. Their power structure is likely (not certain) to be significantly more participatory than over 1961-76.

Production policy has been largely price incentive (including input subsidy) based. Our 1976-70 and 1974-81 peasant prices for officially purchased crops rose faster than the cost of living (or - especially since 1974 - than wage and salary or urban small self employed incomes). However over 1975-79 price relativities were set incredibly badly nearly destroying the fourth ranking (and most promising) export - cashew nuts. 1979-82 modifications have partially restored rationality but with the rapid decline in real global prices of export crops and equally rapid rises in real transport costs, real price incentives to their producers mean deficits to be met from taxation (even if crop authority efficiency is recreated in several cases - e.g. grain, tea, tobacco, pyrethrum; augmented - e.g. cotton, cashew or raised from relatively high levels - coffee).

Education in agricultural production (as opposed to sanitation, construction, afforestation) has been very weak as noted above with usually inadequate extension backed by usually still less adequate or tested research despite relatively high expenditure levels on them. Rhetorical incentives have tended to be just that in respect to production (except the "grow more or starve" campaign of 1975 following 1973 and 1974 droughts) and with predictably meagre results. Coercion - despite rather lavish enactment of by-laws - is in fact uncommon and - except in special cases where backed by village community pressure - quite ineffective. The net effect of this trio has usually

been negative - bad advice, wordy irrelevance and occasional harrassment grow no maize, pick no cashewnuts, and at least moderately alienate some peasants.

Surplus extraction from agriculture is now - by almost any empirical test - negative. (This was very much not the case over 1961-67 and probably not until 1978 albeit, excluding coffee, the turning point may have been 1974.) Net government, private sector and financial institution transfers are non-peasant to peasant sector. Physical output ratios for peasants are lower than for most non-agricultural sectors when compared to world levels (i.e. by Amin's - though not Emmanuel's-definition the "unequal exchange" is rural biased). Relative to minimum wages grower prices rose from a base of 100 in 1975 to 145-160 in 1981 (the real minimum wage unlike the grower prices fell). The middle 40% (and top 20%) of peasants have on balance more food, usually (not always) more housing but markedly less manufactured consumer goods, 'nugatory household expenditure' (e.g. transport to work, urban rates) and access to services than urban minimum wage earners (and the bulk of urban self employed who are in the 70 to 120% of minimum wage range). The peasant sector produces vital inputs into other sectors and - by producing exportables - allows their surpluses to be transformed into foreign exchange for imports; but it is itself apparently a net user not provider of surplus; a situation eminently consistent with Tanzanian strategy but making restoration of a 20% national monetary saving to monetary product rate very difficult.

Production growth has been uneven by year, by crop and among series. The least bad estimate of 1967-82 trend is $3\frac{1}{2}$ - 4% annual growth overall, 4 to $4\frac{1}{2}$ % for peasant production, $4\frac{1}{2}$ % for total food production ($4\frac{1}{2}$ - $5\frac{1}{2}$ % peasant alone) and $-\frac{1}{2}$ to -1% for industrial/export crop output (0 to $+\frac{1}{2}$ % for peasant production alone). Overall this record is marginally above the 1960-61/1965-67 trend but much higher for food and lower for other crops. The physical estimates, however, have a spurious stability - reporting officers estimate acreage changes better than those in yield. Thus 1976-78 output is understated and 1979-81 overstated.

The evident food supply problem - urban except in isolated rural crop failure cases - does not seem to turn primarily on production problems. It has at least four other components: high losses related to bad non-peasant storage (e.g. 600,000 tonnes loss 1976-79); poor (and high cost) transport; rapid shifts to rice and wheat which outstripped possible short run production enhancement; a qualitative change in per cent of food buyers (basically urban) from 3% to 20% of the population over 1961-81 with growers falling from 97% to 80%. Historically Tanzania has never been a net food exporter on a sustained basis, larger swings since 1972 may relate to longer weather cycles, more intra year losses and better support of consumption levels than to output problems narrowly defined.

"A world we never made...":The External Setting

Tanzania has followed an independent foreign policy and maintained a firm opposition to (not to say prickliness about) attempts to interfere in or pressure its domestic or foreign policy since well before the Arusha declaration. Its foreign policy in both substance (e.g. sustained support for Chinese entry into the UN and for condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) and style (fairly urbane and skillful dialogue with a relatively high intellectual, compromise and analytical content) is more readily related to its domestic orientations and goals than to any standard "East-West" dichotomy.

The majority official position certainly perceives global capitalism as an inequitable system but sees the ambitions and influence of superpowers (USA, USSR) and, on occasion, near superpowers (Federal Germany, Japan, and - in Tanzania's context not so oddly - the UK and France) as presenting more immediate dangers. Middle level (e.g. Scandinavia, Canada, Netherlands, Italy, EEC as an institution), African (e.g. Front Line States, Algeria) and other Third World states (e.g. China, Yugoslavia, India and less consistently several of the Gulf States, Cuba, Brazil and Mexico) have been seen

as more equal and compatible partners. This relates partly to lack of a will to (or capacity for) hegemony, partly to believed common interests or concerns - especially in respect to negotiating international economic reform, partly on positions in respect of Southern African liberation and in many cases some overlap in attitudes toward egalitarianism and priority to basic human needs.

There is in fact no standard ideological pattern either to Tanzania's preferences in external relations nor to external attitudes toward Tanzania's attempts to achieve a transition to socialism and self reliance. On balance the positive elements have predominated most in respect to left liberal, social democratic and heterodox socialist countries. Indeed "Trade Union of the Poor" and Southern African liberation ideological tests tend to give a better fit to attitudes to and relations with Tanzania.

Tanzania has been too small, too weak, too far from conflagrations, with too few internal dissidents and too independent for any major state to see suppression, subversion or co-optation as worth the cost. Aid suspensions have been not infrequent but smacked more of petulance than purpose whether by the USA, USSR, Federal Germany or UK. On the other hand, it has usually been - because it seemed unusual, to some attractive, regionally influential and fairly clear and cogent in international discourse - perceived by most states with active foreign policies as worth keeping at least on terms of polite discourse.

In Africa the position is somewhat different but also complex. Tanzania has been unusually (if unevenly) outspoken about abusive regimes (e.g. Amin, Micombero) and - to the extent its policies have succeeded or been believed by radicals to succeed - a source of some disquiet to some conservative states (notably Kenya). On the other hand Tanzania's commitments to regional cooperation - economic and vis a vis South Africa - on the principle of in unity is strength

and to national self determination mean that it has good relations with a number of quite conservative states (e.g. post Amin Uganda, Botswana, post Micombero Burundi, Rwanda and - somewhat surprisingly - Guinea) and quite correct and fairly consequential ones with others (e.g. Zambia, Nigeria, Sudan, Egypt, Swaziland, Zaire).

Tanzania has probably given more priority to regional collective self reliance than any other Third World state. After the collapse of the East African Community (related more to Amin's regime in Uganda and to ill judged Kenyan regional hegemonic ambitions than to socialism or external influence) it has concentrated on specified common interest promoting groupings notably the FLS, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference and the Kagera Basin Authority. Ideologically this represents an emphasis on state management, specific goods and production over laissez faire, general themes and trade - partly because Tanzania has come to see the latter (by whoever promoted) as, at best, foreign capitalist intellectual imperialism and as objectively unsuited to African contexts, most of all among states with significantly different political economic orientations.

Tanzania has been the object of border raids, invasions or the threat of one or the other or engaged in defending friendly states (Seychelles, Mozambique, and - most unsuccessfully - Comores) in every year since 1967. Numerically the greatest number relate to Southern African liberation (including RSA based coup attempts in Seychelles) but the most serious and costly, by far, was Amin's invasion and involvement in subsequent Ugandan liberation and stabilisation. While clearly related in most cases to Tanzania's strategy and orientation, these attacks were not particularly related to its specifically socialist components.

The global economic setting has become increasingly uncertain and hostile for Tanzania since the early 1970's - as it has for most Third (or even First and Second) World countries. Real exports per capita peaked in 1966 measured in volume and 1966 or 1973 measured in import capacity with only 1977 even vaguely comparable since (on the import capacity side) while real aid per capita peaked in 1973-1975, fell precipitously to 1977, partially recovered to 1980 and is again declining. Tanzania's ideology has probably attracted more aid than it has deterred. However, the present crisis has given leverage to IMF and World Bank efforts to enforce programmes on Tanzania which clearly conflict with its strategy (as well as being arguably inappropriate on objective criteria) and to deter rises in bilateral aid while negotiating with Tanzania.

Tanzania has diversified external dependence sharply since 1967 and reduced it sharply relatively and moderately absolutely in respect to foreign personnel. While the production structure is more integrated and more oriented to national demand than in 1967, basic import requirements are absolutely higher (even if lower as a share of GDP) and cannot be covered from export earnings plus normal grants and loans (as they could be over 1967-73 and 1976-77). Technological dependence (broadly defined) is high. Foreign economic relations - with states, state corporations, private TNCs and international agencies - are evaluated in terms of Tanzanian requirements, the potential partner's ability to meet them and Tanzania's ability to maintain control of broad policy and outcome in Tanzania. In some cases a certain naivety has been evident in judging when 'technical' or 'institutional' packages had ideological implications although the overall pattern has been one of fairly clearly designed and moderately effective negotiation.

"No worst there is none"? - The Post 1977 Crisis

1978-1982 have seen a series of economic setbacks and debacles in Tanzania with a continuous, fluctuating, but basically deteriorating crisis since early 1979. While overall growth held up moderately well until 1981 (when it went negative for the first time since independence) industrial output declined from 1979 on, the recurrent budget went into dramatic imbalance from 1978-79, inflation leaped from 6-10% a year (mid 1975-mid 1978) to 30% (1980-82) and the external imbalance came to cripple production, the fiscal base and investible surplus generation.

It is necessary to look at causes for two reasons. To the extent they were external - while evidently requiring Tanzanian domestic response - they do not directly imply a basic criticism of Tanzanian transition strategy. To the extent they were internal, key questions are whether they flowed from the strategy, from mistakes in applying it or from deviations basically contrary to it.

The external causes and rough direct costs over 1978-82 are: the Amin invasion and consequential costs (\$700 million), bad weather - 1979-82, not 1978 - (\$500 million), terms of trade deterioration (\$1,350 million) for a direct cost of \$2,500 million or 60% of GDP. The indirect dislocation cost of the war (\$250 million) and the multiplier impact of unfinanceable imports from terms of trade losses and lost exports (\$2,000 million) bring the total above \$4,500 million or the equivalent of a full year's output loss over five years. Few economies - especially very poor ones - can sustain that level of sustained shocks; indeed a number of Sub-Saharan African economies have crumbled faster and/or further with lesser external loss magnitudes.

The internal causes include:

1. unsound liberalisation of import controls in 1977 and delays in restoring them;

2. 'contracting out' most agricultural policy to a non (or externally) responsible expatriate parallel technocracy whose achievements include the loss of 600,000 tonnes of food reserves and over \$200 million by the largest parastatal they were to supervise, report on, advise;
3. fiscal laxity over 1977-78/mid 1979-80, and a pronounced deterioration in quality of public enterprise accounting and financial control over 1975-1980;
4. a basic misjudgement of the 1978 and 1979 world economic context seeing 1978's commodity price break and 1979's OECD area recession as transitory like their 1973-74 'precedents';
5. failure to identify export expansion as critical to self reliance even verbally before 1972-74, to place serious political priority on it until 1980 or to begin priority programme articulation until 1981.

Fairly evidently the first two causes are deviations from, not part of the strategy. Given the general emphasis on austerity because of an abiding realisation of resource scarcity, so is the third. The fourth is non-ideological and very far from unique to Tanzania - the number of accurate national forecasts of 1978-82 in 1977-78 is close to nil.

The fourth error is an internal contradiction or an analytical failure. "Delinking" enthusiasts (Tanzanian and expatriate) were heard to argue that the first thing to do to increase self reliance was to reduce exports. The counterattack that transformation required an absolute increase of imports, only earned import capacity (i.e. export proceeds) was under Tanzanian control and widening external resource gaps would deliver the strategy bound hand and foot into the jaws of creditors and donors was articulated from 1970 but did not establish its supremacy before 1980-81.

The additional failures - breakdowns in transport, increases in corruption, inconsistency in cases of physical allocation of key inputs or consumer goods, micro misjudgements in import allocation, increasingly poor maintenance of capital stock - capacity utilisation - service quality are quite real but consequential. Were import capacity to be restored to 1977 levels they could be reversed - not necessarily easily or automatically as some have a life of their own by now - as could recurrent budget deficits and 30% inflation rates.

Prospects or Portents

A major change of strategy by CCM is unlikely. Both the 1981 Mwongozo and the 1982 Chairman's address to the Party Conference reassert the principles of the Arusha Declaration and 1971 Mwongozo. Interestingly both see increased participation, more elected posts, protection of as much as possible of basic services and concentrating whatever gains can be made on poor workers and peasants as the central requirements to make austerity, export development and rural production incentives (broadly defined) effective. The present leadership is prepared to bargain and to cut to secure interim external resources but not to turn its coat.

Irritation and anomie have risen - on the other hand cheerfulness, morale and belief that the Party and State can reverse the tide are (perhaps surprisingly) quite common. Corruption has increased but is by no means either the norm or accepted - none would publicly say that the basic purpose of public office is private gain and to be seen to act in that way (beyond fairly marginal areas) frequently (usually?) does lead to summary removal from office. A slightly flippant commentator observed: "Well, in Tanzania six people seized an airplane and in Kenya 16,000 seized a capital city... what does that say about relative levels of alienation?"

The basic constraint is import capacity to maintain and operate the existing capital stock and productive forces. The export development strategy cannot yield it in time. Whether either a fortuitous partial terms of trade recovery (ending of OECD-CMEA 1979-82 depression? consecutive weather/disease destruction of much of the Brazilian coffee crop over two seasons? oil price collapse plus three consecutive good weather years?) will do so is very doubtful. What can be achieved in IMF-World Bank-bilateral negotiations is quite unclear.

To be optimistic is difficult - even Gramsci's prescription of "Pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will" is hard to sustain. Two more appropriate touchstones, given present Tanzanian Party and State determination (with relatively broad support and little overt opposition) to press ahead, might be the Lord Krishna's injunction to Arjuna on the field of battle "Not fare well but fare forward voyagers" or T.S. Elliot's "We who are only undefeated because we have gone on trying". Because for Tanzania and Tanzanians "Socialism and Self Reliance" are simply not an experiment nor perceived as a dispensable luxury, discussion of a transition to neo-liberalism, or to a Zairean or a Ugandan magendo model (both relatively viable in their own terms) is not an actual option. To go on trying - whatever the apparent prospects of success - is a necessity.

Notes

1. Reg Green has been a student of Tanzania since 1964. He has been an adviser, university faculty member and civil servant off and on since 1965. However, none of this paper is based on confidential information nor are the views and analysis to be taken as anything other than his personal judgement, opinion and responsibility.
2. This paper is in fact limited to mainland Tanzania. The other member of the United Republic, Zanzibar, is significantly divergent in enough respects to require a separate analysis.