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Collaboration, Lone Wolves and Returners

Framing Terrorism in Swedish Counter-Terrorism Policies

Author: Hanna Edgren

Supervisor: David Wästerfors

Co-Supervisor: Teresa Degenhard

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Abstract

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Whereas a lot of research on social problems has focused on understanding them as objective conditions, the purpose of this study is to examine how terrorism is framed in three Swedish policies for countering terrorism. The three Swedish policies for countering terrorism, included in this study, were published between 2008-2015, and are important platforms wherein the framing of terrorism as a social problem takes place. Drawing on Donileen R. Loseke's perspective on social problems, I have examined the human activity of social problems work; this involves looking at how the parameters of the condition is set, and how meaning is created within three frames: the diagnostic, motivational, and prognostic frame. By analyzing processes of meaning-making, I have shed light on how claim-makers, in a process termed "piggybacking", make the so-called "new" terrorism seem familiar (notwithstanding the prefix of "new") by linking it to an already established problem, namely the "old" terrorism. It is argued that the narrative of terrorism encompasses elements of vagueness, the construction of identities, and a moral dimension, since it entails ideas pertaining to desirable and undesirable lifestyles. I have found that the inherent vagueness of the policies is not necessarily problematic. I, rather, suggest that vagueness – in a politically charged context as that of terrorism – may be viewed as an asset in that it enables complexity. Additionally, the watchword, *collaboration*, signifies a development, in which the responsibility for crime (terror) prevention and security are re-articulated. The notion of collaboration refers to the shared undertaking of terror prevention, involving both non-state and state actors. Within this multi-actor approach, which is closely linked to the prevention of "early initiatives", structural accounts of terrorism are increasingly overshadowed by individually-orientated explanations. Furthermore, in light of the British academic literature on counter-terrorism, the study at hand also comprises reflections upon the potential pitfalls of the preventive outlook as to terrorism in Sweden.

Keywords

Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Collaboration, Lone-wolfs, Policy analysis, Social problem

Populärvetenskaplig presentation

Den här uppsatsen handlar om hur terrorism framställs i tre svenska policydokument publicerade mellan 2008-15. Utgångspunkten är det samhällsvetenskapliga perspektivet socialkonstruktivism. Enligt detta perspektiv är verkligheten, eller delar därav, en produkt av interaktionen människor emellan. Företeelser som till exempel identitet, förstås således inte som naturliga eller förutbestämda, utan snarare som socialt skapade. I uppsatsen analyserar jag huvudsakligen hur terrorism som socialt problem konstrueras i tre nationella, svenska, counter-terroriststrategier (som syftar till att bekämpa terrorism). Utöver denna frågeställning, har jag även undersökt om det finns några skillnader i hur terrorism framställs i de olika strategierna och vilka lösningar som föreslås i dessa samt hur den svenska preventiva hållningen gällande terrorism kan förstås i ljuset av akademisk, brittisk, counter-terroristlitteratur. För att besvara den första frågeställningen använder jag mig av Donileen R. Losekes perspektiv på sociala problem. I skapandet av sociala problem, vilket Loseke refererar till som social problems work, finns å ena sidan de personer som via påståenden och uttalanden tillskriver ett fenomen mening och framställer det som viktigt (claim-makers), och å den andra de personer som dessa påståenden och uttalanden syftar till att övertyga, det vill säga allmänheten (the audience). Loseke identifierar fyra inramningar genom vilka processer av meningsskapande belyses. I den första inramningen, grounds, redovisas fakta. I den andra, diagnostic frame, besvaras frågan: Vad är det som orsakar problemet? I den tredje, motivational frame, konstrueras problemet som viktigt och oroväckande via appeller till emotioner och logik. I den fjärde och avslutande inramningen ges förslag på tänkbara problemlösningar. Med hjälp av Losekes teoretiska ramverk har jag åskådliggjort hur terrorism framställs dels som en förgrening av ett redan etablerat socialt problem ("piggybacking"), dels som ett allvarligt och ständigt föränderligt hot. Jag har även påvisat hur identiteter konstrueras och jag har dessutom noterat vagheter i strategierna, samt reflekterat kring hur dessa vagheter kan förstås. Därutöver har jag även identifierat en utveckling varigenom ansvaret för brottsprevention (terrorprevention) förläggs till "hela samhället". Gällande förändringar strategierna emellan har jag utifrån Ingrid Sahllins tankar om brottsprevention kastat ljus över hur en mer generell prevention - i allt högre grad - kommit att ersättas av mer selektiv sådan. Likaså har samhällsliga, strukturella förklaringsmodeller hamnat allt mer i skymundan till förmån för mer individorienterade förklaringsmodeller. Mot bakgrund av den brittiska litteraturen om counter-terroristens oroväckande implikationer har jag, i det svenska materialet, uppmärksammat liknande tendenser, till exempel normaliseringen av exceptionella åtgärder.

A Word of thanks

I would like to give special thanks to my two supervisors David Wästerfors (associate professor at Lund university) and Teresa Degenhardt (associate professor at Queen's university, Belfast). Both of you have provided me with guidance and support. Moreover, I wish to thank the informants for making the time to contribute.

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1. Introduction

During the 21st century, terrorism has engrossed enormous attention. It seems safe to say that terrorism, and the prevention of it, as of September 11th 2001, occupies a central position in the political agenda in a number of countries (Townshend 2011:2f). Before 1971 the term “terrorism” had not been indexed within Swedish parliamentary publications; its recorded use has, however, since July 2014, risen to 3,805 in the aforementioned publications (Strandh and Eklund 2015:363). Today, one may frequently read terror related news, and, one may just as often, hear politicians comment on terrorism and the prevention of it. What’s more, vast amounts of public resources are allocated to the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO), which has the overall responsibility of preventing terrorism. Solely during the first two decades of the new millennium, no less than three national strategies for countering terrorism were issued, in 2008, 2012 (an updated version of the previous) and 2015.

Sweden has historically been fairly spared from acts of terror. So, too from acts of terror which, especially during the 21st century, has been placed within the framework of the so-called “new” terrorism (of which more later) (Strandh and Eklund 2015:360, 363). For this reason, Sweden has had a modest experience of discussion on terror prevention, for instance in comparison with the United Kingdom (the “troubles” 1969-1998, see McKittrick and McVea 2012). So, Sweden has had a scarce experience of terrorism, still the commitment as to prevent terrorism in today’s Sweden is seemingly extensive. The said commitment to terror prevention, and the apparent societal changes transpiring around me in the Swedish context, is that which sparked my interest in studying counter-terrorism.

The main purpose of the essay at hand is to examine the ways in which terrorism is framed within three Swedish national strategies for countering terrorism. I shall try to accomplish this by examining how terrorism is constructed as a social problem, using Donilee Loseke’s (2003) perspective on social problems. Since the strategies aim to prevent terrorism, I am particularly interested in what preventive measures are suggested. Drawing on Ingrid Sahlin’s (2000) thoughts on crime prevention, I intend to scrutinize Swedish responses to terrorism. I will additionally try to make sense of the Swedish line of thought on counter-terrorism by using British literature on the said subject as a backdrop. The British counter-terrorism context is of particular interest as a point of reference for the Swedish material; primarily because Great Britain has been viewed as having embarked upon a dangerous path (c.f. Mythen, Walklate and

Khan 2012); but also due to the fact that the United Kingdom may still be viewed as one of the major geopolitical forces in Europe.

2. Material

The empirical material consists of the three latest national strategies for countering terrorism in Sweden, and a selection of British literature on counter-terrorism.

In the following the material is listed by priority: (1) the main source is that of three national policy strategies for countering terrorism in Sweden: "Förebygga, Förhindra, Försvåra – Den svenska strategin mot terrorism" (Skr. 2014/15:146), "Ansvar och engagemang – en nationell strategi mot terrorism (Skr. 2011/12:73)" and "Nationellt ansvar och internationellt engagemang – En nationell strategi för att möta hotet från terrorism (Skr. 2007/8:64)".¹ The strategies are 26 (2008), 40 (2012) and 45 (2015) pages (a total of 111 pages), and they are the latest three strategies published in Sweden. My hope is that the three different editions of the strategies will allow me to add a time dimension, albeit a modest one, in order to pinpoint possible changes in the discourse on terror prevention. Furthermore, (2) The academic literature on counter-terrorism in the United Kingdom will function as a sort of contrastive and comparative mirror against which the Swedish ideas on counter terrorism will be put. Lastly, (3) I have conducted three interviews with two chiefs of security of two Swedish municipalities, and a professional working at the the National Centrum for Countering Terrorism.

2.1 Three Swedish national strategies for countering terrorism published between 2008-2015

The Swedish strategy for countering terrorism, *Nationellt ansvar och internationellt engagemang – En nationell strategi för att möta hotet från terrorism*, was published in 2008 (Skr. 2007/8:64). In the strategy, the Swedish government accounts for the premises from which

¹ The official English names of the strategies are follow:

Prevent, Preempt and Protect - the Swedish Counter-terrorism Strategy (Skr. 2014/15:146).

National Responsibility and International commitment – A national strategy to meet the threat of terrorism (Skr. 2011/12:73).

Responsibility and commitment A national counter-terrorism strategy (Skr. 2007/8:64).

the country's work against terror will stem. Four headings entitled "Avert", "Prevent", "Protect" and "Handle the Consequences", encapsulate the overall intentions of the work. In the strategy's emphasis is placed on the work within the frame of "Avert", which addresses efforts from the police and legal system in combating terrorism. The "Prevent" section aims at thwarting the root causes of terrorism, and "Protect" is mainly about the protection of facilities important to society. The final passage, "Handle the Consequences" deals with societal agencies, on different levels, abilities to cope with potential crises.

The strategy document *Ansvar och engagemang – en internationell strategi mot terrorism* (Skr. 2011/12:73) is an update of its precedent from 2008, and is - subsequently - designed in a similar manner. Here the government's work against terror revolves around three parts: the threat scenario, premises and aims and measures to combat terrorism. In the first, the threat scenario is presented. In the second, Sweden's outset in the fight against terrorism is accounted for, and in the third the Swedish government describes the ways in which Sweden will deal with the threat from terrorism. This part revolves around three cornerstones: prevent, preempt and prepare.

The Swedish strategy in force *Förebygga, Förhindra, Försvåra – Den svenska strategin mot terrorism* (Skr. 2014/15:146) replaces the strategy of 2012. It constitutes the outset for Sweden's long-time work in the area of combating terrorism, nationally as well as internationally. The explicit aim of the strategy is to "create a clear structure for the work needed to combat terrorist crime" (Skr. 2014/15:1). The text is divided into three parts, reflected in its title: prevent, preempt and protect.

2.1.1 Understanding the Swedish context: Events of importance

A first glance at policy documents and the problem representations that are lodged within them, one may get the impression that the design was a given. This is certainly not the case. On the contrary, the formation of a policy involves numerous twist and turns. Thus, the "givenness" of a certain policy may be interrogated by tracing its genealogy (Bacchi 2009:10). As the endeavor of conducting a genealogy of terror prevention in Sweden is far too extensive a task to fit within the scope of this study – I intend to name a few events which most likely have influenced the shaping of the Swedish outlook on terror prevention up until the present. The selection of events in the upcoming review, builds on two articles by Sveriges Television (SVT), providing an

overview of terror attacks in Sweden since 1908 and 2001 (SVT 2015/1115; SVT 2010/12/13); but it also draws inspiration from a passage about focusing events in “Swedish Counterterrorism Policy: An Intersection Between Prevention and Mitigation” (Strandh and Eklund 2015:363-368).

As mentioned in the previous, the use of the term “terrorism” was not recorded before 1971 within the Swedish parliamentary publications (Strandh and Eklund 2015:363). Even so, Sweden has naturally had a series of events that have triggered discussions regarding national security and crisis management. To name but a few: the attack against Norrskenflamman in 1940, the 1972 Bulltofta aircraft hijacking, the murder of Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1986, the killing of Foreign Minister Anna Lind in 2003. After mentioning these domestic events, I now turn to international events which may have impacted on the development of terror prevention ideas in Sweden.

The events of “nine-eleven” constitute a significant landmark; which could also be referred to as a borderline event (c.f. Rösen 2005), whereby the rules and conditions for a variety of entities became dramatically altered, not least the global political climate. The international pressure on the Swedish criminal policy increased, and the words of George W. Bush (cited in Flyghed 2007:77) “[...] those who are not with us are against us” became an implicit mantra [my translation]. In the shadow of 9/11, other events, such as the international attention to Al Qaeda (and its offspring Isis), and the U.S-led invasion of Iraq (2003), resulted in an increased focus on various international threats. The EU’s role as nexus for fighting terrorism (and its impact on Sweden), is exemplified by the introduction of the law *Lag om straff för terroristbrott* (SFS 2003:148) (act on penalties for terrorist crimes, my translation) which was introduced in connection with the EU’s declaration on combating terrorism (2002). Although this is a law, and not a policy, laws affect policies and vice versa. The London bombings in 2005 and the Madrid bombings in 2004 brought the perceived threat closer; and in 2007 the Swedish artist Lars Vilks published a controversial drawing of the Islamic prophet Muhammad in a Danish newspaper, which led to tensions between various religious and political groups. Then, in October 2010 the Swedish Security Service upgraded the threat level of terrorism from “low” to “elevated”, and in December the same year, two bombs went off in central Stockholm, which brought the threat of terrorism to Swedish soil (Strandh and Eklund 2015:363-367, 372). The first explosion took place late afternoon on Olof Palmes gata at the junction of Drottninggatan in Stockholm. No one was harmed. The second bomb went off approximately ten minutes later, two hundred meters from the previous explosion site. A second bomb then went off but its sole

fatality was, however, the perpetrator himself. The bombings were believed to be an attempted act of terror (Ranstorp 2011:2). In April 2017 a stolen beer truck was deliberately driven into crowds along Drottninggatan in central Stockholm. As a result of the attack five people were killed, and at least 14 injured. The Swedish Security Service considered the attack an act of terrorism, and so did the Swedish media (SVD 9/21/17). Although this attack occurred two years after the publication of the latest stagey (2015), the April 8 attack will likely influence the development of future policy.

Based on this brief presentation, I by no means suggest that policy changes are driven solely by singular events (c.f Strandh and Eklund 2015:376). Rather, these events are, in my opinion, to be understood as important events in light of the political landscape in which they are empowered and work as a means of empowerment.

3. Literature review

In this section, I will present a brief contextualisation of the topic of terrorism. A summary overview of research conducted so far within the disciplines of criminology and sociology is followed by a closer look at four studies, all with relevance to the study at hand. Moreover, the present study is placed in context and its contribution argued for.

Research on the topic of terrorism has been undertaken even before September 11th 2001 (Laqueur 1977; Wilkinson 1986), though, admittedly, there has been an explosive growth in research on the topic since then (Silke 2004:25; Frilich and Lafree 2015). Criminological and sociological research on the subject cover topics such as the definition of terrorism (e.g Frost 2009; Deflem 2004, see even English 2009; Hoffman 2006; Schmid 2004), its causes and underlying motivations (e.g Pisiou 2014; Perry and Hasisi 2014; Bouhana and Wikström 2016; Agnew 2010), plausible solutions (Clarke and Newman 2006; Hsu and Apel 2015), and problematic features of newly introduced counter-terrorism measures and of the so-called “war on terror” (Fekete 2004; Mythen and Walklate 2006; McCulloch and Pickering 2009; Pantazis and Pemberton 2009). Despite an increased interest in the study of terrorism, much of the work still stems from disciplines other than that of sociology and/or criminology (Freilich and LaFree 2015:1). Taken together, it seems as if scholarly efforts to answer questions as to what terrorism is, and how to prevent it, have been pervasive; whilst there has been less concern with the

sociology of knowledge, e.g. how terrorism is spoken and thought of.² The purpose of my study is to address this imbalance by examining how the social problem of counter-terrorism is framed. It is of importance to examine the construction of counter-terrorism, as it frames the ways in which we think, act and speak about it; whereby it has concrete, “real lived” consequences. Hence, the framing of counter-terrorism has effects reaching far beyond the realm of language (Loseke 2003:97-121; c.f. Bacchi 2009:17-21).

In the following, I will present four studies that have inspired my analysis in different ways. The first study was an eye-opener to the complex and ever-changing nature of counter terrorism policy. The critical research on responses to terrorism in the United Kingdom have enhanced my understanding of the possible perils of counter terrorism. Finally, the last two studies illustrate how terrorism and counter-terrorism have been studied as discursive constructions.

3.1 The liquid nature of social policy

Counter terrorism policies are political ever-changing documents. Veronica Strandh and Niklas Eklund (2014) set out to understand how and why counter terrorism policy has changed since 2001. The empirical material consists of two Swedish strategies for countering terrorism, published between 2001-2014; and annual reports from the Swedish Security Service, published between 2001-2013. By looking at the coincidence between focusing events and policy changes; as well as changes pertaining to the threat scenario, Strandh and Eklund identify a transition from prevention to mitigation. To me it is somewhat unclear how this transition has been discerned, and what changes it entails. Of most relevance to me, however, is the final review, wherein the authors identify distinct features of the counter terrorism policy trajectory. To illustrate these, the conclusion is divided into three parts, each corresponding to different time periods. The first period (2001-2009) is characterized by an emphasis on the external enemy, Al-Qaeda. Nine eleven, Madrid 2004 and London 2005 are identified as focusing events. The second period (2009-2012) represents a significant shift as the threat of terrorism is brought to Swedish soil. The attempted terror attack in Stockholm 2010 is to be seen as an important focusing event that brought about such a change. The third and final period (2012-2014) focuses on those traveling back and forth between Syria and Sweden; and it is also

² Within a Swedish and Nordic context, scholars such as, Magnus Ranstorp, Linus Gustavsson & Peter Hyllengren (2015), Magnus Hörnqvist & Janne Flyghed (2012), and Tore Bjørgor (2013), are familiar names. They too have contributed to the definitional challenges of terrorism, and how to prevent it.

characterized by the institutional transformation, in which government are to collaborate with a multitude of social actors; and in doing so, their collaborative role, as well as the need for an exchange of information, is accentuated.

Like me, Veronica Strandh and Niklas Eklund (2014) applies a temporal dimension to understand changes in Swedish counter terrorism policy. Although they analyse how changes are brought about in light of focusing events, they are less concerned with how terrorism is constructed as a social problem. They do, as promised, identify some distinct features of different time periods, however, in my opinion, it would behove the study to comprise a more elaborated problematisation of these. In present study I intend to include such a problematisation.

3.2 Counter-Terrorism in the United Kingdom

As will be shown in section 9, a vast amount of research has been undertaken on the topic of terrorism and counter terrorism in the United Kingdom. A pervasive and somewhat controversial topic has been how counter terrorism measures impact on Muslim communities (c.f Fekete 2004; Pantazi and Pemberton 2009). In comparison with Veronica Strandh and Niklas Eklund's study, a large part of the British research is focused on problematizing the responses to terrorism, rather than to describe them. The British literature on responses to terrorism has been essential to my understanding of the potential pitfalls of counter-terrorism. The British literature will be discussed in depth in section 9 and 9.1, wherein it will be applied as a backdrop against which the Swedish material will be contrasted and compared.

Reading through my selection of critical literature on counter terrorism, I found that there was a lack of concern pertaining to social construction of the problem of terrorism. In line with, Donileen Loseke (2003) I hold that, in order to make sense of the framework of counter terrorism, an understanding of terrorism as a social problem is beneficial, as the design of the solutions are contingent upon the construction of the problem. Official texts are not just words but contributes to a society's understanding what terrorism is and how it should be prevented.

3.3 The discursive construction of terrorism as a social problem

An enormous amount of resources is committed to the large-scale project of countering terrorism. It is reasonable to presume that this would not be possible without a significant degree

of political and social consensus, a consensus achieved through language. In his book, *Writing on the War on Terrorism – language, politics and counter-terrorism*, Richard Jackson (2005) examines how the public language of the Bush administration has been deployed in order to justify and normalize the global campaign known as the “War on Terrorism”. By using a critical discourse analysis approach, Jackson scrutinizes official speeches, statements, texts, symbols, laws and policies to shed light on discursive constructions which the political discourse, the “War on Terrorism”, rests upon. His point of departure is that the manner in which terrorism is spoken of is not merely description of the world but reflects underlying assumptions and power relations. An important finding is that identity is discursively constructed, and that idea of the good American is constructed in relation to its opposite: the terrorist vs. the alien other. Moreover, the discourse is characterised by hybridity (as it draws on other narratives such as the “war on drugs” and “red scares”), consistency (the words used are identical and recurrent) and opacity (lack of definitions of central terms). And what’s more, the discourse is highly gendered. Men are portrayed as potential heroes, whilst women are portrayed as potential victims (Jackson 2005:80ff). Important arguments are that the “War on Terrorism” is to be seen as a powerful discourse as it has been normalised and institutionalized; and is in that sense also dangerous, as it has ruled out and/or marginalised other possible narratives. In his final discussion Jackson argues that the “War on Terrorism” endangers democratic values and that the greatest danger lies in “ [...] that we too become terrorist; and that as we demonise, dehumanise and brutalise the enemy ‘other’ it becomes a war *of* terrorism rather than a war *on* terrorism” (Jackson 2005:183).

Christopher Baker-Beall (2014) has conducted a similar study, in another context, and with slightly different type of material. He explores the discursive construction of the counter terrorism discourse, the “fight against terrorism”, within the European Union. The approach taken is discourse analysis and the material is mainly that of European Council policy documents, but also reports and official speeches of the EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator. Baker-Beall argues that the analysis of meaning making-processes, reflected through counter-terrorism policy, is important as “discourses work to limit or constrain what it is possible to say about a subject” (Baker-Beall 2014:216); and, as such, discourses may be viewed as a form of social practice, in which language plays a performative role. Baker-Beall identifies three strands, all of which are central to the discursive construction of the “fight against terrorism” discourse. These are the following “ [...] terrorism as a criminal act; terrorism as an act perpetrated solely by non-state actors; and terrorism as a ‘new’ and ‘evolving’ threat to the EU”

(Baker-Beall 2014:231). Through these strands, the discursive construction of the “EU identity”, constantly contrasted with the terrorist “other”, is brought to light. An important result is that the identity of the EU is not simply shaped in relation to the external “other”, e.g. potential threats of terrorism emanating from third countries. It is also shaped in relation to constructions of the internal “other”, that is the “enemy within”, for instance the Muslim “other”.

While I find these studies inspiring, I hold that they could have benefited from an analytical perspective which offers an understanding of how social problems are constructed, i.e. how they are framed. By using Loseke’s (2003) approach to social problems, I hope to contribute an understanding of the construction of “successful” social problems, such as that of terrorism.

4. Research question

My main research question pertains to an interest in how the social problem of terrorism is constructed. This question encompasses three subqueries. In this first one, I look for changes over time betwixt the public antiterrorism strategies in Sweden. The second reflects my particular interest in counter-terror measures in Sweden. Loseke’s so-called prognostic frame is of particular interest in this respect. The third and final question addresses how responses to terrorism in Sweden may be understood against the backdrop of British literature on counter-terrorism.

How is the social problem of terrorism constructed in three Swedish strategies (2008, 2012, 2015)?

- Is there any temporal difference between the three strategies?
- What are the primary proposed solutions to terrorism, as expressed in the Swedish strategies?
- In light of the British literature on Counter-terrorism; how may the preventive outlook in Sweden be understood?

5. Theoretical framework

In this chapter I start by defining my terms of reference. I reflect upon the reasons why I do not prefer to use the term the “new terrorism”, and I explain my understanding and approach to the notions of terrorism and extremism. In the other half of the section, I account for the overall analytical perspective which has guided the analysis, drawing inspiration from – in particular - Donileene R. Loseke (2003) and Carol Bacchi (2009).

5.1 Point of departure: The notions of terrorism and extremism

The endeavour of defining terrorism is by no means a simple one. Some scholars like to make a distinction between terrorism and the “new” terrorism, as a new more lethal type of terrorism. The term, “new terrorism” although it had been used previously, really came into its own in the aftermath of 9/11 and is said to differ from its precursor in the sense that its practitioners pose a greater threat as they seek to yield mass casualties by using indiscriminate religiously inspired violence (Neumann 2010, c.f. Laqueur 1999). Moreover, the “new” terrorism is said to differ from the “old” due to its international scope, organisational structure (decentralized rather than centralized) and because of the fact that its justification rests on religious grounds rather than political motifs (Prunckun 2014:180; Mythen and Walklate 2006:380; Pantazis and Pemberton 2009:650; Spencer 2006:1f). Mockaitis (2004:22) stresses that the ethical codes which previously restrained terrorists have passed into oblivion. Although it is important to be aware of ongoing controversies pertaining to terrorism, the purpose of this study is not to make a judgment as to whether terrorism is to be labeled “new” or “old”. As for the study at hand, I have chosen to write the “new” terrorism within quotation marks, partly due to the vagueness of the term; as it has proven historically difficult to grasp a yardstick that is essential in order to ascertain the “newness” of the phenomena. Additionally, the semantics of “old” and “new” risk to make a complex phenomenon appear simple; and, along the same lines, I hold that the prefix “new” risks to shadow the historical dimension of the notion (c.f. Jackson 2005:58, 185). As such, the understanding of terrorism risks becoming a-historic.

Scholars have not yet agreed upon an unambiguous definition of terrorism; and, as mentioned in the literature review section, scholars still struggle with the analytical issues that lies within the definitional problem of terrorism (English 2009:viii; Hoffman 2006:1f; Aas 2013:110f). An important outset is, however, that terrorism may, depending on the beholder, include a wide range of activities; and, by the same token, the designation of the label terrorist, rests upon

moral and subjective judgments (Hoffman 2005:260; Skoczylis 2015:13:ff). “One man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist” is a familiar and illustrative phrase. Thus, the definition of terrorism is not just aimed at defining certain groups/individuals and/or activities, but tends to reflect the perspectives and/or the interest of those who are in the position of doing the defining. Adrienne Sörblom & Magnus Wennerhag (2016) stress that extremism, like terrorism, is a highly subjective notion. It is based on normative conceptualizations of reality, and as such, changes over time (c.f. Lööv 2017:21-37). Extremism has, generally, been associated with democratically undesirable ideals, whilst terrorism has been used to describe violent methods chosen by extremists to induce fear and uncertainty in order to promote some greater political agenda (thus, the former is usually considered to precede the latter; one may hold views which may be considered extremist without resorting to enacting said views in a violent fashion). A conflation of the two has, however, become prevalent as of late, and they are – in several instances - used in an inconsistent and uncritical way, within the public debate as well as within the scholarly community (ibid.15; Backes 2010:178f).

With this said, I do not argue that extremism or terrorism ought not be an objects for scientific analyses. Nor do I mean to imply that the usage of these notions has to result in a seemingly endless discussion pertaining to definitional issues. On the contrary, I hold that these notions ought to be used with critical awareness and caution. Nonetheless, it is of importance to acknowledge the complexities of the notions of terrorism and extremism, and therefore I will therefore apply a critical mindset towards these notions throughout my analysis. However, the notions will not function as tools aimed at describing or labeling entities; rather the way in which they are used will be the subject of the analysis to come (c.f. Sörblom & Wennerhag 2016).

5.2 Theoretical approach

The sociological study of social problems through a social constructivist lens dates back to the 1970's.³ Within this tradition, Malcolm Spector's and John Kitsuse's piece *Constructing Social Problems* (1987) and “Social problems as collective behavior” by Herbert Blumer (1971) represent important contributions. Donileen R. Loseke (2003) sites herself within this tradition, in which social problems are examined as constructions rather than as objective conditions. She

³ Although scholars have studied social problems from the vantage point of social constructivism prior to the 1970's, *Constructing Social Problems* (1987) is an important book, often credited with forming an intellectually coherent approach for the study of social problems within sociology.

holds that social problems ought to be understood as constructed by way of the human activity of social problems work, where defining some conditions as troublesome ones, which ought to be dealt with, is of the essence. A fundamental point of departure is that different constructions of social problems affect the ways in which humans create meaning of the world (including their own position in the society/world). Hence, the goal of claim-makers, that is those who construct the social problem (e.g. politicians or the mass media) is to persuade the audience members (those who are to be convinced) that their claims about a certain condition, are believable and important. To this end, a “package of claims” which, together form a narrative (“social problem formula story”) about a special condition, labeled a social problem, are delivered.⁴ Disparate claims may compete, and to claim-makers, it is of importance to persuade the audience that their specific set of claims is more believable and important than are other sets. There is a hierarchy of credibility among claim-makers and those at the top of the hierarchy, e.g. scientists, possess distinct advantages in persuading the audience (Loseke 2003:88-99). In this respect, Loseke (2003:20) uses the metaphor of a game in order to highlight the power dimension at play⁵. If one is successful and “wins” the social problems game, one’s narrative (social problem formula story) may turned into common knowledge, what Loseke (2003:93) refers to as “popular wisdom”, i.e. knowledge that is taken for granted.

To begin with, to qualify for the social problems game, claim-makers have to construct the *grounds* of the problem, that is the “facts” of the condition (e.g. what harm does it inflict and who is harmed). Herein the parameters of the condition are set. When the “facts” of the condition is defined, claim-makers ascribe them meaning. According to Loseke (2003) meaning is primarily created through three social frames, the *diagnostic*, the *motivational*, and the *prognostic* frame. These frames will be central to my analysis, as I am interested in the meaning making processes that underpins the framing of the social problem of terror prevention. In the following, I aim to elaborate further on these.

Within the *diagnostic frame* (Loseke 2003:59-63), the meaning and causes of the troublesome condition is presented. A social problem may, depending on the diagnostic frame, be constituted

⁴ Naturally, each and every person, most likely, would not accept all claims about a certain condition. Audiences consist of heterogeneous populations and, consequently, some claims will be evaluated as believable and important by some, whilst rejected by others. Moreover, audience members ought not to be understood as passive recipients, as they are continuously evaluating and reevaluating proposed claims (Loseke 2003:27f).

⁵ Loseke’s game metaphor of social problems game should not be dismissed as a simple game played just for “fun”, with one everlasting loser or winner. Instead, the social problems game is deadly serious one, as its outcomes shape our world; and recall that social life in ongoing and complex - hence, wins and losses are never eternal, but they may be partial and/or temporary. Despite this complexity of win and losses within the social problems game, they – nonetheless – are of great importance as influence our daily lives (Loseke 2003: 20f).

as (1) a problem caused by a certain societal condition, e.g. the social welfare system, and/or (2) caused by social forces, e.g. racism. So, too, causes (3) may be constructed as residing within an individual, e.g. due to his/her weak character. Different explanations of causes also raise questions regarding blame and responsibility. One common feature of diagnostic frames, is that they tend to bring about simplifications, as claim-makers apprehended simplicity as effective in making claims. Such simplifications most certainly ignore the complexity of real life.

Additionally, there are two ways in which claim-makers link “newly” constructed problems to already existing ones. The first strategy, referred to as *piggybacking*, is about linking one social problem to another well-known, already established problem, by constituting the “new” problem as a different instance of the aforesaid. The other strategy, known as *domain expansion*, has to do with how claim-makers expand the realm of an already acknowledged social problem, in order for it to comprise new conditions. These are often effective as they make a “newly” constructed problem seem less strange, and thereby familiarity is constructed. As such, claim-makers may evoke associations to “old” social problems that have already obtained a certain degree of acceptance.

As for the *motivational frame* (Loseke 2003:76-96), questions as to “Why should we bother?” are answered. Two methods of persuasion are illustrated. The first alludes to what appears to be logical reasoning. Audience members have ideas about the ways the world ought to work. These ideas are part of a wider social context (historically and culturally specific), and could thus be understood as cultural themes. That which violates these themes are perceived as disturbing and, hence, important. For instance, a new condition considered to offend the same cultural themes as an earlier condition, often gains attention (c.f. piggybacking). Furthermore, as cultural worries may be hard to address directly, claim-makers may make so-called symbolic claims, which are about far more than they appear to be at first glance. Such claims are symbolic in that they reflect larger more diffuse cultural worries. To put it simply, claims that appeal to audience member’s understanding of cultural themes, usually are successful ones.

However, given the complexity and heterogeneity of today’s society, there will always be a lack of agreement as to diverse cultural themes. Hence, appeals to logical reasoning might not be sufficient; and the other method, which seeks to motivate the audience through emotional appeals may be needed. Appeals to emotions are beneficial to claim-makers, as emotions impinge upon the way we think and vice versa. For example, people usually take conditions seriously if they fear them. Humanitarian themes, that has to do with people’s capacity to care about others, may evoke certain feelings, such as sympathy towards the victims. This, in turn,

may motivate the audience to evaluate the condition as a social problem. “Darker feelings”, such as revenge, anger and hatred may, in the same fashion, encourage the audience to deem a certain condition intolerable. Although it is possible to experience something as being very personal, each cultural setting has its own rules of feeling, that is conventions surrounding how people “ought” to feel in a particular situation. If claim-makers appeal to said rules, they may be successful in stirring emotions that motivate audience members to feel and think about a certain condition in a particular way, namely as a social problem.

Lastly, the *prognostic frame* (Loseke 2003:97-117), tackles the query “What should be done?”. Within this frame, measures aim to resolve the harm as identified, plus those who should preferably carry out the actions are identified. These claims are of great important as they, by assigning some people the responsibility for changing the condition, as well as legitimizing some solutions (and not others), set limits upon what is possible to think, write or speak about a certain condition. For instance, the ways in which the solutions to terror prevention are constructed, set the limiting framework for how it is possible to speak of and think of the phenomenon. Furthermore, solutions raise issues of ethics, e.g. one proposed solution may be perceived as beneficial to one group, but may well be harmful to another. This understanding of solutions is important, as it recognizes the real lived consequences that proposed solutions may lead to, not least in the case of policy.

The prognostic frame highlights in what ways each frame, i.e. the diagnostic motivational and prognostic are interlinked. Let me give an example. If terrorism is described as a social problem, emanating from, e.g. conflicts and war (diagnostic frame), then the individual may be perceived as the victim of war toward whom feelings of pity may be directed (motivational frame). Hence, possible solutions will most likely revolve around structural changes, in which the government probably will be assigned the overall responsibility (prognostic frame). On the other hand, if terrorism is constructed as a problem generated by individuals, e.g. because of his/her beliefs or psychic problems (diagnostic frame) these individuals will, most likely, be evaluated as blameworthy villains, dangerous or pathological outsiders, rather than victims in need of sympathy (motivational frame). Suggested solutions will, probably, focus on changing and rehabilitating (if considered possible) the individual and protect the rest of society from him or her (prognostic frame). In light of this, it becomes evident that social problem formulae stories are moral in their nature; as they consist of value judgments as to what is wrong and why this is the case. In this respect, the prognostic frame comprises claims as to changes, in other words;

what ought to be done to correct this wrong. One significant way in which claim-makers may carry out social changes is through public policy.

The very existence of policy documents rests upon the presumption that policies constitute something useful. They are aimed at resolving or fixing conditions, usually referred to as social problems. That which is evaluated to be wrong is usually said to affect a significant number of people, but may, and even ought to be, changed and corrected. Such a change is not only achievable but desirable (pronounced through language). Consequently, the idea of change is embedded within social problems. As such, social problems do not merely affect our understanding of the world but also, the way in which they are framed, bring about changes to the social world. For this reason, scrutinizing the ways in which problems are shaped in public policy is of the essence, as the ideas presented in public policy are translated into lived, real experiences. They affect a plethora of dimensions in people's lives (Loseke 2003:97-121; c.f. Bacchi 2009:17-21).

Although I have chosen to deploy Loseke's perspective in the study of policy documents, there are endless different approaches to the study of terrorism. Murat Harner (2017), for instance, interview a former PKK terrorist, at the time of the study situated in a Turkish prison, about the "life of a terrorist". To speak with people who has been part of a terrorist organization about their experiences of terrorism may hence be one way to gain unique insights into why some people possibly are draw to terrorism. Additionally, through the method of interviews, one may also study various narratives of terrorism.

5.2.1 Crime prevention

Apart from Loseke's perspective, this study also makes use of Sahlin's thoughts on crime prevention. I will foremost draw on Sahlin's perspective in the prognostic frame as it is within this frame that different preventive ideas are most prominent.

The term crime prevention has, in itself, positive connotations, as it is seen as something new and proactive, aimed at restraining a potentially negative future development. Crime preventive ideas are therefore seldom subjected to criticism or ethical audit. Ingrid Sahlin (2000), however, critically examines the notion of crime prevention. She distances herself from the beliefs that crime prevention represents something new and necessarily positive, and that crime prevention

measures are always rational. Instead she holds that crime prevention and choices of preventive models are political in nature. Although preventive ideas continuously co-exist in society, one set of ideas may be dominant at a given time, in a specific historical and cultural context. Hence, contemporary political discourses influence what measures are, at any given time, perceived as preventive. Moreover, preventive choices, do not merely affect the preventive work in practice, but also the ways in which the problem, and even human nature, may be understood.

I will be applying an overarching division between social and situational crime prevention. This division is the most commonly used since the 1990s, and is usually motivated on the basis of epistemological premises pertaining to human nature (Sahlin 2000:86-87, 100ff). As for the social prevention the object is to alter structures or processes (external factors) which are assumed to predispose the individual to criminality. Crime is, hence, believed to primarily take place due to external, environmental factors, and it is not assumed to be an intrinsic part of human nature to commit crime (c.f. Merton 1968). The point of departure of the situational crime prevention is that people will commit crime if they are presented with the opportunity (Sahlin 2000:87f). The situational prevention hence, takes aim at manipulating the immediate physical environment in order to reduce the opportunities for crime. Situational crime prevention ideas may draw inspirations from theories such as Rational choice (Clarke and Cornish 1985), Broken Windows (Wilson and Kelling 1982) and Routine activity theory (Felson and Cohen 1979). Pat O'malley (1992:263) observes a trend, in which situational prevention triumphs over the social, especially in the Anglophone countries (c.f. Sahlin 2000:106f; Sarnecki 2009:479). Sweden has, however, historically, emphasized solutions to crime that bears resemblance to the social crime prevention; although, social prevention does not constitute a uniform set of ideas but, rather, offers a plethora of possible paths/orientations. One orientation may, for instance, emphasize changes to structures, another socialization, and a third "early interventions". In order to describe and compare different preventive ideas, I draw inspiration from criteria formulated by Sahlin (2000:84-89). My taxonomy builds on the following criteria: time frame (long or short-term), object of change (e.g the individual or social fabric), the superior value (e.g. the promotion of individual's development or society's safety) and the intervention phase of the preventive measures (primary, secondary or tertiary prevention).

Primary prevention is initiated to avoid a future negative development, secondary prevention seeks to change people, typically those at high risk of embarking on a criminal path and tertiary prevention is directed toward known offenders, to prevent re-offending. The prevention phases

are not solely differentiated based on their temporal distance to the predicted out-break of the problem, but also in relation to their magnitude (size of target group). Although Sahlin did not consider the topic of terrorism directly, I intend to use her analytical framework on crime prevention; as I view counter-terrorism measures and their legitimacy to be underpinned by ideas as to crime prevention.

5.2.2 A constructionist perspective on social problems

In the present study, social problems are not viewed as fixed, objective entities, which reflect a reality of truth. Rather, social problems are to be understood as dynamic social constructions, contingent upon historical and cultural conditions (Loseke 2003:4ff; Bacchi 2009:viii, c.f. Spector and Kitsuse 1987). With this said, I by no means suggest that social problems or troublesome conditions do not exist; nor do I mean to diminish human experiences of, e.g. fear and suffering. I hold that a social constructivist perspective may be viewed as but *one* way to make sense of the world. Moreover, the perspective ought to be seen as a complement, an important addition (rather than an exclusionary opposite), to other theoretical approaches which aim to offer an understanding of social problems (c.f. Loseke 2003:x). Naturally, choices of theoretical framing also entail different possibilities and limitations, as to which questions that may, or may not be posed. If I were to evaluate the effectiveness of a certain policy, a more materialist, e.g. an evidence-based approach, may have made more sense. However, as my primary interest lies in examining the construction of social problems, i.e. how they are framed (“problem-questioning”, rather than “problem-solving”), I find a social constructivist approach suitable (c.f. Bacchi 2009:xvii).

As explained in the previous, I do not reject the existence of the material world containing troublesome conditions (a criticism frequently directed to social constructivism). The perils of being far too relativist and contextless also lies herein. In this respect, two questions seem reasonable to pose: Which understanding of social problems may be achieved if they are to be understood as isolated from the surrounding world? And how may scholars advocate for the relevance of the study of a certain problem construction? With that being said, however, I do not mean to imply that each troublesome condition in the world is equivalent to one social problem; rather objective conditions may exist without subjective worry and vice versa. What’s more, an objective condition is not a social problem till it is given meaning and defined as such (Loseke 2003:13ff; Bacchi 2009:31f).

6. Method

To begin with, I will present my initial thoughts, I will then explain the choice/collection of data, after which I reflect upon its limitations. I thereafter account for the ways in which the material has been analyzed.

Initially, my first ambition regarding this study could be said to have been three folded as I: (1) intended to do a comparison between national strategies in Sweden and the UK, (2) a comparison between local counter-terrorism strategies in Sweden and the UK, and (3) a comparison between the local and national level in each country. I was, however, for various reasons, unable to fulfill these ambitions. Firstly, only one of the British strategies were designed in a similar manner as the Swedish, hence I found that a comparison, due to the different content of the strategies, would have been insufficient. To use British literature on counter-terrorism as a backdrop to make sense of the Swedish strategies appeared the better option. A second obstacle I encountered had to do with the lack of strategies for countering extremism or terrorism on the local level in the UK. I tried to circumvent this by conducting interviews with police officers working against terrorism at a local level. However, this too failed, as the police officers I came in contact with ceased to answer me after having first said that they would be glad to assist me. In Sweden I, however, came in contact with two chiefs of security of two municipalities, and a professional working on the national level, together with the national coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism (Nationell Samordnare mot våldsbejakande extremism). All three of them approved being interviewed. After this turbulent “start-up” phase, I decided to stick with the three national Swedish strategies for countering terrorism, plus a selection of British academic literature on counter-terrorism, and to conduct the three interviews.

My main material, that is the three national Swedish strategies published 2008, 2012 and 2015, was downloaded from the Swedish government’s official webpage. Since my ambition is to examine how terrorism is constructed as a social problem, the three aforementioned strategies are of vast interest, as they could be viewed as significant platforms wherein the shaping of the social problem takes place. They may also be apprehended as representing discourses of status (c.f Bacchi 2009:36); as they are sanctioned by the Swedish government, and as such, they possess the prerogative in formulating the nation’s official outset pertaining to terrorism. Hence,

the three Swedish strategies, play an important role in both crafting and reinforcing the social conceptualization of the phenomenon of terrorism in Sweden.

Policy documents usually refer to its predecessors. This could, for instance, be seen in the strategy from 2011. As the strategy from 2008 does not refer to any previous work, I have come to the conclusion that this presumably is the first Swedish national strategy for countering terrorism. Policy documents are official documents aimed at guiding practical actors. Policy documents provide recommendations, while laws are standards and procedures that must be followed.

The British academic literature (secondary data) was found through library searches, and online searches via the university's online resources, e.g. the British Journal of Criminology. I wanted to find critical studies on the UK's responses to terrorism, wherefore I used the keywords "terrorism", "counter-terrorism", "the UK", and "problem". I also tried to do searches with the keyword "war on terror", which generated a very extensive result. As several studies were of the US "war on terrorism", I only used the key-word "war on terror" once or twice. I used two important criterions in my selection of British academic literature on counter-terrorism: (1) As the Swedish strategies were published after 9/11, I found that it was suitable to include British studies published post 9/11 (with two exceptions, Garland 1996 and O'Malley 1992). (2) The major part of the research included address counter-terrorism in the UK in a direct manner. I particularly searched for studies that deal with counter-terrorism in a critical manner, by looking at the effects of policies, laws and counter-terrorism measures. As the larger part of the research included analyses of policies, laws and counter-terrorism measures – on a theoretical basis; studies that deal with peoples' experiences of the these through, e.g. interviews, have been left out. Moreover, as I wanted to understand the preventive outlook in Sweden in relation to developments in the UK, I found that research that touched upon the problem of counter-terrorism, in a slightly more indirect manner, also ought to be included. This research includes studies which illuminate a broader preventive development (risk and security) within the UK.

As for the interviews conducted with professionals, I used a purposive sampling technique, and the fact that the interviewees - at different levels - worked with countering terrorism and extremism, was used as the basis of the selection. Although, my sample is too small to be representative; I hoped that the two chiefs of security from the two Swedish municipalities would give voice to a local perspective on countering extremism, whilst the professional working with the national coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism, would provide a national one. The interviews were conducted in the café of a library, as I

believed that this would be a setting in which the interviewees would feel relaxed. The interviews were semi-structured, and the questions revolved around counter-terrorism and extremism. Some of the questions directly addressed what they thought of collaborative arrangements employed to countering terrorism. Before the interviews began I informed all interviewees that their participation was completely voluntary, and that they are guaranteed anonymity; hence all names and geographical places are figured (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007:212ff). Likewise, I made clear that all data collected would be handled with confidentiality during the study, as well as after its publication. I judge these ethical principles to be necessary in order to protect the participation (Hennik, Hutter and Bailey 2011:70f). Two out of three interviews were recorded on tape (one interviewee did not want to be recorded as he claimed to have had bad experiences of being recorded). I was, due to the lack of time, unable to fully transcribe the recorded interviews. Because of this I have not made use of the interviewees in an extensive manner.

As Jackson (2005:24) argues, the social practice of language and the production of text may never be undertaken objectively. This is the point of departure for discourse analysis. The study at hand bears a clear affinity with discourse analysis, as it seeks to examine how meaning is created, and it is also inspired by the theoretical tradition of social constructionism. Despite these resemblances, my study differs from, for instance a. critical discourse analysis in the sense that it is less linguistically orientated. Its main goal is not to critically inspect how language serves to maintain power relations; but rather, to investigate claims that construct a social problem. Moreover, I hold that the study of social problems is a specific task. Whilst a discourse could be almost anything spoken, written or preformed or, even a photograph, social problems represent conditions thought of as widespread and changeable. Death, for instance, could very well be thought of as a discourse but is usually not defined as a social problem (Loseke 2003:6). I stress that my study may be viewed as a form of qualitative text analysis (see Hennik, Hutter and Bailey 2011:238) somewhat inspired by elements from discourse analysis, but it is however, above all, guided by Loseke's (2003) perspective on social problems. In section to follow we will take a look at how my main material has been processed.

The strategies have been analyzed in a systematic manner with Loseke's perspective on social problems kept in mind. Carol Bacchi's (2009) analytical tools (key-concepts and binaries) have also influenced the interpretation of the material. The work has consisted of four, closely interlinked, cycles.

In the first cycle, I carefully read through the strategies in order to develop a detailed description of the problem reflected in the material. As I gradually became familiar with the strategies, I was able to develop an understanding of the problem, and to place the problem in context (c.f. Hennik, Hutter and Bailey 2011:238-243). Hence, the practical work within this cycle, consisted of reading the strategies from cover to cover, writing summaries and reading literature of relevance. Additionally, I had telephone contact with Anna Carlstedt, the national coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism, and Lars Korsell, committee secretary at the National Centrum for Countering Terrorism, to gain a profound insight in the problem of terrorism. The development of a descriptive understanding of the problem may be equated with Loseke's first step, namely to look at "facts" and thereby identify how the parameters of terrorism are constructed. Looking at "facts" involves looking at how key-concepts are defined (although such activity has been present at all times). Key-concepts are words that are vital to the understanding of the social problem. These concepts, e.g. terrorism, are usually open-ended, contestable, and are hence, typically difficult to define (Bachhi 2009:8).

In the second cycle, I started to search for patterns (c.f. Hennik, Hutter and Bailey 2011:243-245). By comparing the strategies, I was able to identify patterns and to further explore the problem of counter-terrorism. The practical element consisted of reading through the strategies over and over again in depth. As I began to discern patterns, contrasting the three strategies against one another helped me to identify the process of meaning making. When comparing the strategies, I found that several aspects were present in all strategies, however, the difference between them lies in which feature (or features) that is emphasized in the given strategy. I studied how meaning is created by looking at, what the causes to terrorism are said to be, and by looking at the construction of familiarity. I was primarily, via Loseke's analytical tool of "piggybacking", able to develop an understanding of how terrorism by "riding on the back" of other, already established problems, is constructed as a familiar problem.

In the third cycle, I kept reading through the strategies, over and over. In my deep-reading of the strategies, I tried to think of in what ways terrorism is presented as an important and intolerable condition. By categorizing different ways to write of terrorism, and the actual threat of it, the occurrence of appeals to emotions and logic became more prominent. For instance, I gained insights as to how the threat of terrorism is depicted as escalating. Drawing on Loseke (2003:75-88), I was cognizant of how feelings influence thoughts and how certain emotions, in accordance with feeling rules, direct people's thoughts toward victims or villains. The third

cycle is closely interlinked to the next, as it was within these cycles that the major part of the analytical process took place.

In the fourth cycle, I continued the categorization on the basis of Loseke's perspective. By grouping categories together, I was able to discern what categories belonged to the proposed solutions (prognostic frame), and how these are related to other categories, e.g. the causes (diagnostic frame). By conceptualizing the categories, deploying Loseke's analytical thoughts on the prognostic frame, I began to develop an understanding of how the solutions are constructed, who is assigned the responsibility of "fixing" the problem and how proposed solutions differ in-between the strategies. The British literature on counter-terrorism, and the three interviews served to further improve my understanding of the prognostic frame. When my categorial procedure was elaborated further, binaries reflecting power relations and/or identities became salient. I could for instance make out how the identity of "us" is constructed, both in relation to the external and internal other. As I have identified patterns, categorized the content of each strategy and made comparisons in-between them, the "bigger picture", that is the over-all construction of terrorism as a social problem, became clear.

The analysis has consisted of an ever ongoing process of interpretation, and re-interpretation. Although it has been rare, I have sometimes been afraid that I, e.g. due to a vagueness of a formulation, have unconsciously attempted to make my interpretations fit within the theoretical framework. When this occurred I took a break from reading the strategies, and when I returned to them, I approached them with a fresh mindset. Another difficulty I encountered, has to do with the translation from Swedish to English. As always when translating from one language to another, one never achieves a verbatim translation. Some phrases from the strategies were difficult to translate, and I perceived the Swedish terms "driv- och dragkrafter" particularly challenging. I translated them into push and pull. The notion of push and pull is, however, normally associated with migratory and development studies, and within these fields they both serve to illustrate forces or processes external to the individual. I would say that the Swedish term "drivkrafter" is slightly more individualistically orientated; hence the translation into "push and pull factors" is, in my opinion, a somewhat unsatisfactory.

6.1 Reflexivity

I could not claim to have a vivid memories of the deeds of September 11th 2001. However, I remember part taking in a minute of silence in my school the following morning. I also have a vague memory of seeing the planes crash into the World Trade Center on TV. At that time, I did not reflect further upon the topic of terrorism as I was at mere child at the age of nine. Since then and especially during the last decade it is hard to avoid thinking about terrorism. The attacks in Madrid 2004, London 2005, Paris 2015 and Sweden 2017 have all influenced the overall intellectual climate in the West. I have just as many people around the globe felt fear, especially this past year. The history of the “troubles” were constantly present during my stay as an exchange student in Belfast this spring. Additionally, the attack outside the houses of parliament occurred whilst I was in Belfast; and the very day I flew home, the first attack in Stockholm took place. Same year, I visited London and Rome. The security measures in the public spaces in these countries, e.g. the Carabinieri in Italy, constantly reminded me of the potential threat of a terror attack. I would thus say that the potential threat of terror has been a fairly constant presence.

My fears are not only because of the various attacks in and of themselves, but also towards the reactions to the aforesaid. This essay could be seen as my attempt to examine the public discourse that may – in subtle and indirect manner – underpin my fears.

7. Analysis

My analysis is divided into four sections: *Grounds*, *Diagnostic frame*, *Motivational frame* and *Prognostic frame*. The first section deals with the definition of terrorism; namely, how the parameters of the condition are constructed. The second section attempts to answer questions as to what kind of problem terrorism is constructed as; more specifically, I examine how harm is specified and what the causes of the condition are said to be. In the third, I attempt to explore how appeals to logic and emotion frame terrorism as intolerable and hence, counter-terrorism as important. In the fourth and final section, I critically scrutinize proposed solutions and, what’s more, what preventive ideas that underpin these solutions.

Naturally, a social problem may have multiple diagnostic, motivational and prognostic frames, and depending on choice of perspective, different elements will be given attention. Loseke's theoretical framework thus offers but one of many possible understandings of social problems. Her approach enables me not only to spot certain aspects of social problems, but it also constrains my understanding of other ones. Hence, the analysis to come is not exhaustive; as that which is brought to light only represent one, of many possible selections.

7.1 Grounds

In this section, I analyze how the "facts" of terrorism are constructed and, consequently, what type of problem terrorism is framed as. The lion's share of what I have analyzed in this section is aggregated from the introductory part of the respective strategies; as I view that these parts answers questions as to: what is the condition, what harm does the condition cause and how many people are harmed.

In the strategy from 2008, the direct terrorist threat to Sweden and Swedish interests is described as relatively low, two troublesome conditions are, however, presented. Firstly, there is the well-known, less severe threat posed by domestic separatists, anarchist and far-left groupings. These groups aim to inflict damage upon that which symbolizes governmental power; such as, the police, the military and government buildings. However, since the 1990s, a new severe threat from religious Islamic extremism has emerged. Mass violence, destruction and suicide attacks are all part of the *modus operandi* used, and the goal sought after is often diffuse. Hence, innocent civilians are at risk (Skr. 2007/8:3). Based on these "facts", the informed reader may freely "fill in the blanks" (c.f. Loseke 2003:56) about the changed nature of the threat, which theoretically resembles, or even perfectly matches ideas about the "new" and the "old" terrorism (c.f. Prunckun 2014:178f). In policy document, the "old" terrorism is given less attention in favor of a "new" terrorism. According to the new definition of terrorism, it has become international, more severe and, to a greater extend, started to target civilians. In the strategy harm is defined as the physical damage which causes injuries or fatalities (Skr. 2007/8:3). Although there is a lack of statistics on the number of attacks and/or victims over the past years, the terror attacks in USA 2011, London 2005 and Madrid 2004 are mentioned (Skr. 2007/8:5-6).

As for the strategy from 2012, "executed and interrupted attack plans have shown both that there is a real risk of terrorist attacks in Sweden, or against Swedish interests" (2011/12:3, my

translation].⁶ The strategy beings by introducing the attempted terror attack in Stockholm December 11th 2010, and the deeds of the Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik in 2011. These events illustrate a new tactic in which individuals prepare and commit violent acts alone, without ties to any command-structure, and without any material assistance (the so- called “lone-wolf” terrorism) (Skr. 2011/12:5-6). These new tactics/methods belongs to the “new” terrorism (drawing inspiration from Al-Qaeda), with which we made acquaintance in the strategy from 2008. Another issue briefly touched upon, is that of people traveling to conflict-zones from Sweden, in order to train and partake in armed conflict (Skr. 2011/12:6).

Although two other types of terrorism are presented, far left and far right wing terrorism; the international terrorism, i.e. the “new” terrorism stemming from Islamic extremism, is still deemed the greatest threat, as its adherents aim to achieve a large number of civilian casualties (Skr. 2011/12:5). Again, the “new” international terrorism is, in comparison with the “older” forms of terrorism, given greater space. Furthermore, this type of terrorism is not solely perceived as a threat towards people’s lives, properties, the functionality of society, but also against “our fundamental values” (Skr. 2011/12:4). Hence, the “new” terrorism is more complex, as its nature has changed to comprise new tactics; and what’s more, harm is no longer defined as primarily physical, but also symbolic.

In the hitherto latest, strategy from 2015, there is, unlike in the previous strategies, no clear-cut statement making inferences as to the threat towards Sweden or against Swedish interests. However, a number of attacks and interrupted attack plans are mentioned. Amongst other, the attack in France (Paris) 2015, Denmark (Copenhagen) 2015, Tunisia (Sousse) 2015; and the interrupted attack plans in Denmark 2010 and Paris 2015 (2014/15:3). In cases where the terrorists’ plans were implemented, the total number of victims is indicated. It is noteworthy that in this instance, statistics are given as a means of specifying the harm done. Statistics may be used in order to construct the notion that a problematic condition is widespread (Loseke 2003:6f).

In the first paragraph, it is stated that: “terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Violent acts from *non-state or non-parliamentary groups* have long been used to destabilize societies, create social disorder and fear, with the overall purpose of harming institutions, groups and individuals, to influence the development of society and democratic decisions” (Skr. 2014/15:3). From this, one may conclude that states or parliamentary based organizations is not

⁶ This, as well as all quotes to come have been translated from Swedish by me.

to be considered terrorists. Although the same three types of terrorism as in the strategy of 2011 are presented, the major threat is deemed to come from actors inspired by Al-Qaeda and Isis. Likewise, the incidence of “home grown terrorists”, so-called “lone wolfs” remains seriously problematic (Skr. 2014/15:4). The issue regarding those individuals who travel from Sweden to “conflict-zones”, where they participate in “terrorism training” and thereafter return, is brought to attention (Skr. 2014/15:4). As opposed to the previous strategy of 2012, the vocabulary has evolved, and those who travel back and forth from these zones are termed “returners” (Skr. 2014/15:4, 31). Hence, the parameters of international terrorism have changed; it is now constructed as comprising two problematic conditions “lone wolfs” and “returners”. As in the strategy of 2012, international terrorism may not only harm people’s physical well-being, but the overall state of human rights and fundamental democratic values as well (Skr. 2014/15:3).

From this brief presentation, I have shown that the way in which harm is specified changes, as does the parameters of the condition. Consequently, that which may be thought of as “objective facts” of a condition is not fixed. This understanding of “facts” is important to keep in mind, as “facts” constitute the basis from which meaning is created. Now, let us take a closer look at how meaning is shaped through the diagnostic frame.

7.2 Diagnostic frame: *Constructing causes - Blame and responsibility*

In the original strategy from 2008, the casus of the troublesome condition emanates, primarily, from “weak fragile and/or underdeveloped states” (Skr. 2007/8:18-19), that lack functioning democratic institutions, e.g. an independent juridical system, due to internal conflicts and structural issues such as poverty (Skr. 2007/8:15-16, 18-19). By constructing causality as due to social structures, individuals may be seen as victims and, as such, they may - to some extent - be spared from blame. As that which needs to be corrected is found on a structural level, responsibility is, most likely, directed towards the state (c.f Loseke 2003:60). However, it is important to bear in mind that, to a certain degree be relieved from blame ought not to be equated with being completely absolved from it. The same applies to responsibility. Hence, in this case, when that which causes the troublesome condition are located outside the national realm (Skr. 2007/8:17-18), the problem of terrorism is likely to be thought of as a social problem exterior to Sweden, and other “developed states”.

Although constructed as rare, there do exist individuals residing in Sweden (foremost youths) which are “seduced” into terrorism (the word seduced implies passivity) (Skr. 2007/8:15). In Sweden, the causes too are located at the structural level. *Social forces* such as discrimination, segregation and exclusion, are seen as causes of terrorism (Skr. 2007/8:14). Once again, individuals may be relieved from blame, as the responsibility is directed towards the broader society and state.

Both explanations have in common that individuals are protected from blame but there is one important difference. In the first instance, that is, when the causes are located outside Sweden (the EU and if one wishes the West), the labeling of some states as “weak” serve to prove the inferiority of these states. Here, *dividing practices* are at hand, as two binary categories, “underdeveloped” and “developed” countries, are constructed; and on a micro-level, individuals from certain alleged countries may typified as “other”, and/or even dangerous (c.f. Bacchi 2009:16).

Furthermore, in 2008’s strategy, terrorism is understood as a criminal act (c.f. Baker-Beall 2014:220). This relationship between terrorism and crime is reinforced by direct statements in the strategy claiming that terrorism ought to be considered a crime (Skr. 2007/8:7-9). Terrorism is, additionally, intermeshed with organized crime as it is seen as a similar type of activity that requires similar responses (Skr. 2007/8:4). Terrorism is, alongside other modern threats, such as natural disasters, viewed as a branch of globalization and, in a similar fashion, the so-called “new” terrorism is constructed as a different facet of the “old” terrorism. In all of these cases, terrorism has been *piggybacked* onto claims about “old terrorism”, crime and globalization. As such, terrorism feeds on the achieved level of acceptance of already established problems and; by the same token, it appears somewhat familiar without risking audience saturation (boring the audience). Herein, meaning is created via the construction of familiarity (c.f. Loseke 2003:60f). Moreover, if the “old” terrorism, as written about in the strategy, was somewhat narrow, in the sense it mainly included terrorism in Sweden (see Skr. 2007/8:3), claims about the “new” terrorism certainly allows for the expansion of its scope, and thereby also for the embodiment of new conditions, in this case international elements (see Skr. 2007/8:4). This categorical augmentation could be understood in terms of *domain expansion* (c.f. Loseke 2003:61) but in this case I would suggest that it is more about a change of focus. To me, domain expansion is underway when new contents are added to a condition already deemed a social problem and thereby expands its scope. But in this instance, the inclusion of a domestic

dimension functions not to expand the condition but, rather, to overshadow an international dimension. I will return to this topic.

In the updated strategy from 2012, the causes are still thought of as emanating from so-called “particularly vulnerable regions” (Skr. 2011/12:14]. These causes are, however, emphasized to a lesser degree. Instead, focus of the strategy is on hindering radicalization in Sweden, expressed through the idea of “lone wolfs” (Skr. 2011/12:5, 9-10). Although there is a lack of definition, the concept radicalization certainly puts more focus on individuals residing in Sweden. As illustrated in the following quote one aim is to ”support individuals in order to help them avoid being drawn into violent extremism” (Skr. 2011/12:10). Hence, individuals are not apprehended as having deliberately chosen to become terrorists. As such, they may be freed from a lot of blame, and the overall responsibility to – in this instance support individuals – lies with the society. Although, social forces such as racism, including antisemitism and islamophobia are still mentioned (Skr. 2011/12:13) (though given less space), the reason as to why (some) people become radicalized remains elusive.

In the strategy, that of 2015, counteracting radicalization the overarching goal. Although, the meaning of radicalization is not specified, radicalization is an important key-concept (c.f. Bacchi 2009:16) as it is said to cause terrorism (so too in the strategy of 2012). By way of radicalization, individuals may be “pushed to commit acts of violence” (Skr. 2014/15:4). In this quote, individuals are still not seen as actively choosing to become terrorists. But there is a lack of consistency as to whether one is drawn into terrorism (Skr. 2014/15:4), if one ”chooses to join terrorist groups” (Skr. 2014/15:12); and even, if one actually “chooses to commit terror offences” (Skr. 2014/15:12). Such an inconsistency complicates the allocation of blame.

Furthermore, radicalization is said to depend on different risk factors, termed “push and pull”⁷ (Skr. 2014/15:5, 6, 9). The push and pull factors are centered around the individual; his or her personality, life situation (push factors) or social context, e.g. relation to friends (pull factors) (Skr. 2014/15:5). So, the strategy also offers an explanation as to why some people are radicalized whilst others are not. Through the perspective of push and pull (especially the former), a reallocation of blame becomes possible as some individuals may be perceived as “having a weak character”, e.g. thrill seekers (c.f. Katz 1988), or having weak interpersonal relationships (c.f. Hirshi 1969). None of the causes presented focus on structural flaws and/or

⁷ As already mentioned the Swedish terms “driv- och dragningskrafter” were a bit complicated to translate into English. The terms push and pull emphasizes conditions external to the individual to a larger degree than do the Swedish terms “driv- och dragkrafter”.

social inequalities, e.g. discrimination; and the perspective of “push and pull”, together with terms “lone wolfs” and “returners” (Skr. 2014/15:4) pave the way for an understanding in which the causes are, to a greater extent, constructed as found inside the individual or in his immediate context (c.f. Loseke 2003:60).

In this passage, I have looked at how meaning is created by examining how causes are constructed and, consequently, how blame and responsibility is apportioned. Taken together, the ways in which the causes are constructed in the policies marks a shift toward: (1) locating the causes within rather than outside Sweden and; (2) to and an increasing extent disconnecting the causes from conditions exterior to the individual and, in doing so, redirecting them towards the individual.

It is also notable that, when the causes are constructed as exterior to individuals residing in Sweden, these are never constructed as due to shortcomings of the state’s capacity (as in the case of “underdeveloped states”), e.g. an insufficient welfare-system. To give the audience a sense of what the “new” terrorism is about may not be sufficient to claim-makers, as they seek to change society (or parts thereof). Claim-makers need to persuade the audience that the condition is not to be tolerated or; put differently, claim-makers depend upon the audience to evaluate the condition as intolerable (and consequently important). In the following, I shall put forwards some of the ways in which this is done by appeals to logic and emotions.

7.3 Motivational frame: *Appeals to logic and emotions*

In the first half of this section, I aim to account for the most salient appeals to logic and emotions, identified in the strategies. These are chosen on the basis of their recurrence and their relevance to the construction of terrorism as an intolerable and important condition. In the other half of the section, I look at how images of people, in this case, victims and villains, are constructed in relation to the overall emotional atmosphere of the strategies. This passage could have been part of the diagnostic frame but I hold that it better suited here, as victims and villains are not merely constructed in relation to blame and responsibility. Rather, they are constructed in a wider emotional context.

Terrorism is presented as a social problem that threatens to violate the social order and our understanding of how the world ought to work. Generally, cultural themes are contingent upon cultural and historical contexts; thus, a condition regarded to threaten and/or to violate a specific

cultural theme in one setting, may be considered perfectly benign in another (Loseke 2003:63f). This is, however, hardly the case when it comes to terrorism.

The most explicit endangered cultural theme present in all the strategies (but most prominent in the 2008 strategy), is our right to a free and peaceful life (Skr. 2007/08:20, Skr. 2011/12:9, Skr. 2014/15:24). The “right to life” is regulated in article 3 in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948). However, the idea that all human beings have the right to live a free and peaceful life without being harmed, could be said to be a worldwide cultural theme. The ways in which people think about a condition is connected to the way they feel about it (Loseke 2003:77). If the cultural theme “right to life” is perceived as threatened, feelings of fear of actual physical harm are, naturally, evoked. In the following I will mention three distinguishing features of the strategies that may enhance fear. The first (1) feature has to do with the belief that anyone anywhere at any time, may be a victim of terrorism, as the terrorist’s modus operandi of the terrorists yields victims indiscriminately (Skr. 2007/8:3, Skr. 2011/12:4-5, Skr. 2014/15:3) (Loseke 2003:80f; c.f. Best 1999). This notion is inherent in the “new” terrorism, and may be reinforced by the fact that no particular target group is discerned in the strategies. Additionally, (2) terrorism is framed as condition hard to get rid of, and this may trigger fear. The durability of the threat is expressed through the following quotes: “the threat of terrorism will remain for a long time to come” (Skr. 2007/8:4) and “today, there are no signs that this trend will decline” (2014/15:1). Lastly, (3) the framing of the threat of terrorism as exacerbated between 2008 and 2011 may add to already existing fears. Feeling of fear may, of course, also have been augmented by the violent events that took place in the passing years.

Moreover, the threat scenario is, as illustrated in the following quotes, escalated between 2008 and 2011: “the direct terrorist threat to Sweden and Swedish interest is relatively low” (Skr. 2007/8:5) and “there is a real risk of terror attacks in Sweden or against Swedish interest” (2011/12:3). In the strategy published in 2015, there is no explicit description of the threat scenario, however, terrorism is said to “threaten international peace and security, international security and our fundamental rights” (2015/11:1). One *logical* conclusion is that a condition that threatens both international and national peace and security, is presumably, quite severe. In fact, even associations to war may be called to mind, since what else than war may imperil both international and national security? In brief, the fear of psychological harm is escalated along with the threat scenario. Such a framing of the problem of terrorism, most likely, induces fear (c.f. Culture of fear, Furedi 2002); and that which we fear, we will usually take seriously, as we deem it to be of importance.

Although emphasis is on the physical threat, another threat, more salient in the two later strategies, has been identified; namely the threat towards the cultural theme of *democracy* (c.f. Loseke 2003:66ff). This threat is expressed in slightly differing ways, however, this is usually made with references to “human rights, our fundamental rights” and/or “our values” (Skr. 2011/12:4; Skr. 2014/15:1). If democracy is portrayed as threatened, an audience that wishes to live in a democratic country is encouraged to care on *logical* grounds. No conceivable definition of democracy is offered. In Sweden, however, as well as in the rest of the West, ideals emanating from the age of Enlightenment and the French revolution have informed the general understanding of democracy. However, these ideals do not represent one, but rather a number of ideas (thought of as democratic rights); as such it could be argued that which constitute democracy may be a plurality of values and, hence contested. Although, freedom of speech (Skr. 2007/8:17; Skr. 2014/15:10) and the right to demonstrate (Skr. 2011/12:12) is mentioned in the respective strategies, there is still a certain degree of opacity as to exactly what democratic rights are endangered. The phrase “our values” is similarly opaque, but it may also evoke associations to George W. Bush’s rhetoric (Jackson 2005:54) on the “War on Terror”, in which liberal Western values are said to be threatened by Islam (c.f. “Clash of Civilizations”, Huntington 1996). In this respect, “our values” may be apprehended as a *symbolic claim* (Loseke 2003:67), as it addresses fears often perceived difficult to approach in a direct manner.

In sum, terrorism is undoubtedly, via appeals to logic, presented as threatening to various cultural themes, such as that of democracy, which the Swedish audience – in all likelihood - will hold dear. Additionally, appeals to emotions, e.g. fear, are present, although fear is not merely evoked toward the psychical threat, but, rather, towards something “bigger” that is ascribed symbolic value. Taken together, these appeals to logic and emotions may enhance perceptions of terrorism as intolerable and, hence an important condition.

7.3.1 Victims and Villains

In the strategy of 2008, terrorism is spoken of in the same breath as other, all too familiar, dangerous phenomena (referred to as crises), e.g. natural disasters and global epidemics, which may be perceived to lie beyond the confines of the state’s control (Skr. 2007/8:20). This may induce fear, however, fear is neither the only, nor the most salient emotion. One may, for instance. Take the following quote: ”we are effected by what is happening in the rest of the world, and we cannot afford to stand by and watch, whilst others act” (Skr. 2007/8:5), as an

appeal to people's desire to help others, and to make the world a better place (c.f. global village, Harvey 1990). The task of assisting "weak states" (Skr. 2007/8:18) may similarly be read as an appeal to people's capacity to care about others. These appeals could consequently be perceived as calls to solidarity, but they may just as well be viewed as having the added objective of gaining popular support for military intervention. Anyhow; appeals to humanitarian themes (c.f. Loseke 2003:77) motivates the audience to care as the problem of terrorism is framed as intolerable, important and changeable. And as noted by Loseke (2003:78), such feelings, e.g. compassion and solidarity, tend to follow certain *feeling rules*, which brings the victim to the fore. Constructing victims, as opposed to villains, may be strategically clever as it may be hard to construct persuasive claims about villains, due to the complexity of social problems (c.f. Loseke 2003:85).

In the updated version from 2012, the humanitarian theme is present, but it is - to a great extent - eclipsed by other emotions. As ideas of the "lone wolf" (Skr. 2011/12: 5-6) brings the threat closer to Sweden, fear is generated. In addition, the Swedish armed forces are said to be in a needed state of rearmament (Skr 2011/12:18). This may expand feelings of fear as associations to conventional warfare may be made. Appeals to "darker feelings" such as fear may, due to feeling rules, be associated with hatred and blame, and hence draw attention to the villain (Loseke 2003:83). In strategy of 2012 blame, however, is deflected from the individual as s/he, by way of radicalization, is "drawn into violent extremism" [p, 10]. Radicalization is, thus, constructed as something which, to a large extent, is to be found outside the individual. This makes the individual less frightening. Parallels may be drawn to alcoholism constructed as a disease (c.f. Loseke 2003:86).

In the final strategy from 2015, feelings similar to those found in the strategy of 2012 are present. Through the ideas of "lone wolves" and "returners" (Skr. 2014/15:4, 19, 15), fear dominates the emotional atmosphere. Again, focus is on the villain. Due to the inconsistency regarding the causes of terrorism (mentioned in the diagnostic frame), two types of emotional reactions pertaining to the villain, are possible. As in the previous strategy, blame may still be deflected from the villain and thus, portray him/her as less frightening. On the other hand, an explanation of terrorism, inspired by the perspective of "push and pull" (Skr. 2014/15:5,6, 9, 11-12), may possibly contribute to an arousal of fears toward specific individuals. As I have read between the lines, I have found that the villain is constructed as a young man (see Skr. 2014/15: 4,9-10,11,33). However, this image of the villain may seem too obscure; hence, in

order to make sense of the world, people may turn to typification. In doing so there is, indeed, a risk that certain individuals are identified as dangerous outsiders (c.f. Loseke 2003:85) and, at this point, the step towards stereotyping is not far off. In today's political climate, and due to the US and UK influence on the conceptualization of terrorism, Muslims may conceivably be pigeonholed as dangerous (c.f. "suspicious community", Hillyard 1993).

As demonstrated, the overall emotional atmosphere shifts betwixt the strategies. In the first published strategy, the overall mood is characterized by the humanitarian theme, whilst appeals to "darker" feelings are more pervasive in the latter two. As the emotional atmosphere shifts, so too does the focus – from the victim to the villain. The villain may, from the perspective of "push and pull" be despised, e.g. due to his or her weak character; and perhaps, even by some, perceived as dangerous (particularly in the later strategy). Yet, the Swedish construction of the villain differs from that in other contexts, e.g. an American context. The villain, as constructed in the strategies, is not portrayed as evil and vicious; nor are words such as "innocent victims", "hidden, crazy, evil and deadly enemy" (Jackson 2005:160, 168) used. In the American context, these words serve to justify and separate the struggles between what is framed as good and evil. Due to the absence of such rhetoric, I would argue that the Swedish construction of the villain contains fewer dehumanizing elements than does the American (c.f. Jackson 2005:185).

In the path so far traveled, I have examined how the parameters of terrorism are constructed. I have also shone light on how the social problem of terrorism is ascribed meaning. In the most recent section, I have demonstrated how appeals to logics and emotions encourage us to care, and in doing so, to evaluate terrorism intolerable, and hence counter-terrorism as important. These claims are part of a problems formula story about terrorism, and together, they set the stage for what is next to come, namely the prognostic frame.

7.4 Prognostic frame: *Constructing solutions*

In this final section, my ambition is to scrutinize how solutions to terrorism are constructed. The solutions reflect ideas concerning what actions ought to be implemented to counter terrorism and who should carry out these actions.

In the strategy from 2008, that which causes terrorism is, to a great extent, located outside Sweden (diagnostic frame) (Skr. 2007/8:18-19, 21). So too are the solutions. Sweden's engagement in "underdeveloped countries", and so-called "conflict-zones" is thus pushed for

as the security of Sweden is framed as dependent on the security and stability of other – usually referred to as “fragile” states (Skr. 2007/8:18-19) (c.f. Duffield 2007:29, 162, 170ff). Moreover, these “fragile” states are perceived as unable to solve ongoing internal conflicts, and hence also to combat terrorism (the silence as to the origins of these conflicts is noteworthy, e.g. the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003) (Skr. 2007/8:19f). Consequently, some states are framed as being in need of help, whilst others are designated the task of helping. This binary construction involves a power dimension.

As demonstrated in the following quote: “questions regarding national security can no longer be differentiated from international security” (Skr. 2007/8:5), Sweden’s national security is now viewed to transcend its sovereign territory. There is, doubtlessly, a blurring of national and international security. In this regard, there may be competing claims pertaining to the consequence of the solutions proposed (c.f. Loseke 2003:99). Scholars such as McCulloch and Pickering (2009:631f) have warned against such dangerous rhetoric, as it may function to justify, in this case, Sweden and other “developed states” military interventions in the affairs of other states. Remembrance associated with colonialism may be conjured up, however, potential interventions would not, in such a case, be in the guise of civilizing or developing, but rather, in the guise of countering terrorism. Additionally, Aas (2013:108) argues that the blurring of national and international security is problematic, as it may challenge the distinction between crime and war.

International cooperation is seen as a prerequisite for successful terror prevention (c.f. “the war on drugs” Aas 2013:130f). Sweden alone may therefore not resolve the problem of terrorism, but is dependent upon international collaboration with other states and transnational organizations, e.g. the EU and UN. One interpretation of this is that the state’s role as the ultimate protector of citizen’s security and rights, which has been its trademark since its formation, is weakened (c.f. Zender 2009:26-49). Another interpretation is that transnational collaboration lends Sweden the opportunity to position itself in the global arena by way of *identifying* with, for instance, the UN and/or the EU (particularly the latter). Sweden’s affinity with the EU is illustrated in the strategy: “that which happens to our European neighbors may happen here too” (Skr. 2007/8:5) and “the major attacks in European countries in recent years – especially the ones in Madrid and London – have brought terrorism closer to our country in both time and space” (Skr. 2007/8:5). Through this time-space compression, social space extends beyond the boundaries of physical space; and through it, the construction of “us” and “them” is unveiled. “We” ought to protect ourselves from “them”, in this case non-EU citizens.

If the aforementioned citizens are considered a threat to the EU's internal security, they may be denied entrance (Skr. 2007/8:21) (c.f. "Fortress Europe", Loader 2002). Consequently, the solution of border controls builds on the binary construction of "us" and "them"; once again, dividing practices are in play.

On the national level, authorities are encouraged to collaborate to counter terrorism (Skr. 2007/8:3, 7-9, 12). The Swedish Security Service (SÄPO) is, however, assumed to have the main responsibility of fighting terrorism (Skr. 2007/8:3). Although the mission of SÄPO, as well as the regular police force, includes several repressive elements, its non-repressive tools are emphasized. SÄPO's main terror preventing task is to be present, to make contact with citizens and to initiate dialogues with them about democracy and terrorism (Skr. 2007/8:16). In this context, the Swedish Prime Minister's dialogue with Muslim representatives in Sweden, in connection to the Lars Vilks drawing, "Rondellhunden" (published in 2007), is given as an example of a constructive dialogue. This dialogue is said to have contributed to an increased mutual understanding between religious and ethnic groups (Skr. 2007/8:16). Discussions and dialogues are hence put forward as plausible solutions to the problem of terrorism.

Here, a direct connection between the prognostic and diagnostic frames becomes visible; since dialogues and discussions would not be conceivable solutions, if there is not also an understanding of terrorism as caused by some sort of conflict. Alongside discussions and dialogues, long-term changes to what is referred to as the structural level are underlined. This is exemplified in the following quotes: "the majority of the preventive work today is aimed at structural factors" (Skr. 2007/8: 16), "the government's goal is to fight segregation, discrimination and exclusion" (Skr. 2007/8:15)", and "to create equal living conditions" (Skr. 2007/8:15). These ideas belong to a *social crime prevention* perspective, in which general efforts (primary prevention), rather than selective ones are sought after (c.f. Sahlin 2000: 32-35). However, no suggestions are made as to improvements of social institutions (the term welfare system is nowhere to be found in the strategy); its focus is instead on encouraging citizen participation (Skr. 2007/8:15), and to make the citizen reflect upon implications of democracy. These measures are believed to integrate individuals and, hence, promote a positive development.

Based on this, I would suggest that the social prevention emphasizes *socialization*, rather than changes to the social fabric (c.f. Sahlin 2000:89-97). Furthermore, as often the case when it comes to this type of prevention, general preventive efforts - at times with a special focus on youths - is advocated for (Skr. 2007/8:16,18) (c.f. Sahlin 2000:36, 96f). At the same time as

individual development is promoted, the individual is also assumed to internalize healthy social norms, and as a consequence of this, be steered away from the lure of crime. Based on this, a logic conclusion is that it is not in human nature to commit acts of terror, but rather, that people are radicalized, primarily, due to external factors, e.g. environmental ones (c.f. Sahlin 2000:89ff, c.f. Hörnqvist and Flyghed 2012:319). Despite these social measures, repressive elements may be part of the solution. These consist of temporary laws (whose duration are to be evaluated) which permits secret coercive measures, e.g. bugging. These measures are less emphasized and when discussed, possible tensions between society's safety and individual liberties are explicitly mentioned. Amongst these, civil liberties are framed as an important value (Skr. 2007/8:7).

In the strategy from 2012, focus is on the idea of "lone wolfs" and the threat from "within". This threat is constituted by Swedes, or people residing in Sweden that are radicalized (diagnostic frame) (Skr. 2011/12:5-6, 9, 12, 15). Sanctions, such as freezing of assets, which since the treaty of Lisbon (that entered into force in December 2009), are now possible even against EU-citizens (not states) (Skr. 2011/12:25). Despite the idea of free movement within Schengen, Sweden introduced controls at the Swedish border (albeit only for one day). These controls were implemented with reference to there being a serious threat to the public order (Skr. 2011/12: 20). These new "possibilities" signify a new trend, in which preventive measures also may affect those residing in Sweden and/or the EU. The omnipresent idea of "lone wolfs" not only brings forth such a change but it also brings the domestic realm to the fore.

On the national level, increased financial means are given to SÄPO and the regular Swedish police. To initiate dialogues and discussion, as well as to promote democratic values amongst, particularly, youngsters, is seen as important parts of SÄPO's and the regularly police preventive work (Skr. 2011/12:910). These preventive elements, in which socialization is a central feature, resembles those of 2008s strategy. However, other types of preventive ideas are present as SÄPO is also assigned the task of hindering radicalization by spotting "individuals who, in action, have begun a process towards supporting or partaking in any form of violent extremism" (Skr. 2011/12 :9). When identifying these individuals, the freedom of speech ought to be cherished; and for that reason, it is stressed as important that focus ought not be on the arguments and ideas that underpin a certain action (Skr. 2011/12:9). A significant difference between a prevention that revolved around socialization, and this type of preventive ideas, is the increased focus on certain individuals. Control measures are aimed at a selective part of the population; youths who have already displayed their deviance trough committing criminal acts

(c.f. Broken Windows, Wilson and Kelling 1982), and those youths considered to be likely to become deviant (Skr. 2011/12:11-12) (c.f. secondary and tertiary prevention, Sahlin 2000:36ff). As general efforts are replaced by more selective ones, a shift from socialization to control is illuminated; and along these lines, a positive development of the individual, is – to a greater extent – subordinated to the safety of society (c.f. Sahlin 2000:106f). Although the terminology is being developed further in the next strategy, part of the preventive ideas current in the strategy of 2012 bring to mind, that which Sahlin (2000:42ff) refers to as “early interventions”.

To attain control of individuals a continuous collection of information, achieved through collaboration, is necessary (Skr. 2011/12:10, 12, 15, 18-19).⁸ Collaboration solely between authorities is no longer sufficient. Other social agencies, and even individuals are encouraged to partake in the preventive work in order to “affect their own life situation and society at large” (Skr. 2011/12:13). As demonstrated in the following: “the general public may contribute to authorities’ work with detecting and preventing attacks” (Skr. 2011/12:26) and “the government, thus, stresses the need of further developing the possibilities of the general public to get in touch with law enforcement agencies in order to contribute to the detection of, for instance, preparatory terror activities” (Skr. 2011/12:26-27). The general public is hence expected to provide information to authorities, although it remains unclear in the strategy exactly what kind of information is to be passed on. Individuals are encouraged to take responsibility, not only for their own safety but for others. This way of reorganizing the preventive work could be related to David Garland’s idea of “responsibilisation” (1996); in which non-state agencies, with references to collaboration, are encouraged to partake in the endeavor of crime prevention (in this case terror prevention).

Furthermore, solutions containing repressive elements do exist. The temporary secret coercive laws, mentioned in the previous strategy, are (although they are still temporary) perceived as necessary to an effective terror prevention (Skr. 2011/12: 21). And it is stated that SÄPO sometime is in need of assistance from the national task force of Sweden (*Nationella insatsstyrkan*, NI). NI is the ultimate police resource of society, said to deal with serious, and/or exceptional situations (Skr. 2011/12:17). Moreover, it is also stressed that the police, under certain circumstances, may request support from the Swedish military (Skr. 2011/12:18-19). In this, a risk to cloud the division between the police and the military becomes prominent. A blurring of the police and the military is ethically problematic as, the military is not to be used

⁸ A search on the term “Information” in the strategy gives 68 results, and a search on “collaboration” (samverkan) gives 58 hits.

in a repressive way against its own citizens according to democratic traditions (c.f. McCulloch and Pickering 2009:637).

Assistance from NI and the military, as well as the introduction of border controls, represent measures which ought only to be used under certain serious circumstances; and, as such, they could be termed “exceptional measures”. Calls for the need of such measures, nonetheless raises a myriad ethical questions, e.g. the danger of normalizing exceptional measures (especially if their duration are extended beyond the moment of crisis) (c.f. Zender 2009:123-126).

The idea of “lone-wolf”, that is the threat from “within”, casts suspicion on Swedish citizens and those residing in Sweden, and may, thus, endanger the notion of “us” and “them”. To assure the picture of “us” as good democrats the term “our fundamental values” (referring to democratic values) (Skr. 2011/12:3) and expressions with the same spirit, are recurrent in the strategy (Skr. 2011/12:4,7, 16). The absence of such expressions in the strategy of 2008 is noteworthy. It could, perhaps, be stressed that the idea about the threat from “within” is double-sided, as it on the one hand challenges the binary division of “us” and “them” and on the other hand serves to clarify the picture of “us”. This is done not only in relation to an external “other” but also in relation to an internal “other” (c.f. Baker-Beall 2014:232).

I wish to make a final note on the strategy of 2012. Although there are undoubtedly significant differences between the strategy of 2008 and 2012, some of the suggested solutions in the later are similar to those present in the former. For instance, aiding “particularly vulnerable regions” (Skr. 2011/12:14), dialogues and discussions (Skr. 2011/12:9, 15) and fighting social injustices, such as discrimination (Skr. 2011/12:13), are still seen as important part of the preventive work. Similarly, protecting the EU: s border, and to check “third country citizens” (Skr. 2011/12:20) remains an important concern.

The strategy of 2015 is, characterized by the vocabulary of risks, which may be understood in light of the inconsistency (possibly leading to uncertainty) reflected in the diagnostic frame. Thwarting radicalization is still perceived as the ultimate goal to counter terrorism (Skr. 2014/15:1, 5, 8-9, 12-13). As such focus remains on the domestic realm; and the major task of preventive work is to “as early as possible identify processes of radicalization, in order to stop individuals and groups from becoming further radicalized and ultimately commit acts of terror” (Skr. 2014/15:5). The safety of society is stressed as the superior value. To identify “risk-zone” individuals that already pose, or in the future may come to pose a threat to the social order is thus, deemed a necessity (Skr. 2014/15:9-10). Those at risk are to be identified at an early stage

in order to counteract a perceived likely, or *possible*, future negative development (Skr. 2014/15:9-12, 20). To preempt threats before they emerge involves a pre-crime logic, in which “better safe than sorry” is the motto. Although such a motto may seem logic (especially when it comes to preventing devastating acts of terror), it nonetheless may endanger the presumption of innocence. Thereby there is also a risk to erode the rule of law (c.f. McCulloch and Pickering 2009:632f).

As presented in the strategy, to look for different “push and pull” factors may be viewed as a way to identify those perceived to be at risk of becoming, future so called “Lone-Wolfs”. A part of the “push factors” focus on individual motivations, such as a search for meaning and excitement (Skr. 2014/15:5). From this it becomes clear that some individuals are considered especially prone to radicalization. As in the strategy of 2012, those who have already proven their deviance (by being convicted of crime) and those perceived likely to, in the future, become deviant are apprehended to be particularly prone to further deviance, such as that of radicalization (Skr. 2014/15:11, 13-14, 21). There is, however, a lack of explicit explanations as to what causes this proneness. Based on the idea of “push” factors, one may, for instance, speculate that said proneness is to do with internal “push” factors manifested due to the “weak” character of the individual. On the other hand, one may also speculate that the proneness to radicalization is caused by some sort of disease. There is, without doubt, an uncertainty pertaining to the meaning of “push” factors and, so too how these may function to identify individuals at risk. Despite this, selective measures aimed at “risk-zone” individuals are promoted. A clear-cut explanation of what actions will be implemented at those at “risk” is missing. It is, however, stressed that different measures are to be implemented for different individuals (Skr. 2014/15:12). Question as to the transparency of the law may come to mind.

The pull factors have to do with the individual’s social context. If s/he moves in a social context that promotes, e.g. ideological violence, the likelihood of radicalization increases (Skr. 2014/15:5). “Risk-zone” individuals may thus be discerned based on the social context in which they operate, i.e. who they associate with. Although no social context is identified (which might not be disable either); it is, however, mentioned that the breeding ground for “anti-democratic” behaviors and violent extremism could, amongst other things, be found within religious communities and amongst youths (Skr. 2014/15:10). As always when it comes to an identification of so-called “potential risk groups” (2014/15:12), there may be a risk of stigmatizing certain groups, or even individuals associated with alleged groups (c.f. Guilt by association, Pantazi and Pemberton 2009:652).

Christina Pantazi and Simon Pemberton (2009) have, in a British counter-terrorism context, highlighted the construction of Muslims as the “enemy within” (c.f. Fekete 2004). In Pantazi and Pemberton’s study the stigmatization of a Muslim population may function as a mean to preserve the status quo. In another other case, stigmatization may be an unanticipated and unwanted consequence of morally substantiated attempts to change people. The term “antidemocratic behavior” (Skr. 2014/15:10) is constructed as the binary to a “honorable” way of living” (Skr. 2014/15:23) and through this binary construction a moral division between desirable and undesirable behaviors/lifestyles is revealed (c.f. Loseke 2003:90). Although an “antidemocratic behavior” is undesirable, people are nonetheless believed to be changeable, and hence correctable. All in all, the “push and pull” factors operate on the individual level, and they are vaguely defined. Like in the previous strategy, the prevention of “early initiatives” focuses on a selective secondary prevention (c.f. Sahlin 2000:36).

Those individuals who have traveled to and subsequently returned from “conflict-zones” are seen to be at risk. These, so-called “returnees” are suspected to have trained for and taken part in armed combat (Skr. 2014/15: 4, 31). “Returners” may thus be subjected to both secondary and tertiary prevention (c.f. Sahlin 2000:36-38). Another population which may be exposed to tertiary prevention is that of convicts (2014/15:13, 14, 21). The formal object of the Swedish prison is partly to rehabilitate its clients. This object is reflected in its Swedish name “Kriminalvården” freely translated into “The Unit For the Care of Criminals”(their official English name: The Swedish Prison and Probation Service). The prison staff is, in the strategy of 2015, encourage to search for “sign of radicalization” (Skr. 2014/15:13-14); and when reading this, I came to think of the potentiality of there being an unspoken tension between the pursuit for control, and the goal of rehabilitation.

SÄPO is still assigned the overall responsibility for the terror preventive work. SÄPO’s role as an intelligence service is emphasized (Skr. 2014/15:14, 16, 18, 21, 23-24, 41), and there is a silence as to SÄPO’s ability to initiate discussions and dialogues. SÄPO’s main preventive task is thus to collect information about those residing in Sweden, and to detect and analyze “risk-zone” individuals (Skr. 2014/15:9-10, 23-24). The increased focus on identifying individuals at risks seemingly have led to an omission of SÄPOS “softer” assets. To work against social forces such as discrimination is no longer mentioned as possible solutions. The temporary secret cohesive measures mentioned in the previous strategies, have now become permanent, as they, on the behalf of SÄPO, are viewed as needed (Skr. 2014/15:16). Although it is said that “personal integrity should be protected when the cohesive measures are used” (Skr. 2014/15:17)

the normalization of special powers, as in this case, ought to be recognized as problematic (c.f. Zender 2009:123f).

Like SÄPO, the regular police role as an intelligence service is accentuated. Problem-oriented policing shall be the *modus operandi* of the regular police and; accordingly, the police shall collect and analyze data based on local problem scenarios (Skr. 2014/15:12). Sahlin (2000:97f) stresses that the transition to a problem-oriented policing is another expression of the pursuit for control via collection information. Ericson and Haggerty (1997:17f) have also made remarks on said transition. They hold that (1997:18) “[i]n risk society the traditional police focus on deviance, control and order is displaced in favor of focus on risk, surveillance and security”.

Furthermore, to “counteract radicalization and to affect people’s will to commit crime” (Skr. 2014/15:9) is stressed as an important part of the preventive work. One may wonder what solution that – within a democratic society – may be suggested in order to affect the will of people? The police primary task is, after all, to protect democratic values and norms, not to define them (c.f. Sahlin 2000:136). SÄPO’s mission to prevent terrorism is, by no means, easy. It is surely not facilitated by the fact that there, in all strategies, is a lack of both the definition of that which causes terrorism (radicalization) and the phenomena itself.

Collaboration is apprehended as a prerequisite for a successful work (Skr. 2014/15:3, 6, 10-12, 15, 24-25, 41).⁹ On page 42, below the heading “collaboration a common responsibility”, it is stated that “all who might have a role to play must take their responsibility and contribute whichever way they can”. “The whole society” (Skr. 2014/15:6), including non-governmental actors and individuals, *must* partake in the preventive work. As such, they are no longer merely encouraged to partake (Skr. 2014/15: 5-6, 32, 42). An exchange of information between international national and local authorities (e.g. municipalities), other social agencies (e.g. religious communities) and even individuals, it apprehended as necessary in order to achieve a desirable control of individuals; but also to streamline the efficacy of institutions. The need of information is further expressed through the following quote: “access to information is a prerequisite for authorities’ possibilities to avert acts of terror” (Skr. 2014/15:15).¹⁰ In 2014 a national coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism (*Nationell Samordnare mot Våldbejakande Extremism*) was appointed in order to improve the collaboration, including

⁹ A search on term collaboration “samverkan” gives 71 results in the strategy of 2015.

¹⁰ A search on the term information “information” in the strategy of 2015 gives 86 results.

the exchange of information, between national authorities and local municipalities and organization (Skr. 2014/15:9-10).

The fact that even social actors whose main mission does not address countering terrorism must take part in the preventive work raises several, in the strategy, unspoken complications. The Swedish migration agency (Migrationsverket), that is to consider applications from people who want to live in Sweden and also to help people who seeks shelter and asylum, is assigned the task of helping SÄPO identify, what is referred to as “security threats” (Skr. 2014/15:21). People who seek asylum in Sweden, from for instance Syria, may be understood as either a potential threat to national security or a human in need. If the perspective in which people primarily are seen as a potential threat to national security is accentuated, there is a risk that the human rights of people in dire need of help and shelter are neglected. Another conundrum concerns the possibility that the people who arrive to Sweden may have been pursued by the security service of their respective native countries. Therefore, SÄPO’s involvement in the affairs of other agencies may be problematic. This also brings up the issue of responsibilities and power balances between different agencies.

It is furthermore stated that “The Swedish Security Service is also in the need of the knowledge and information that is locally situated in order to be able to efficiently execute their mission” (Skr. 2014/15:16). As such, local authorities (municipalities) are encouraged to provide information to SÄPO (Skr. 2014/15:12,14, 16). The goals of local agencies, e.g. social services, are usually to provide social care, whilst SÄPO seeks to control. The former does not use repressive measures, whilst the latter is repressive force with monopoly of violence. When social policy actors and their practices are subordinated the logic of security and social control, there is a potential for the blurring of the functions of care and control. Such a possible meshing is ethically problematic and it may also hamper social policy actors’ ability to live up to their stated goals and, in that sense collaboration could be counterproductive. Additionally, a “securitization” of social policy poses questions pertaining to confidentiality and trust (c.f. Ragazzi 2017:170f). Finally, private actors must do one’s bit. Private actors shall, together with official agencies, develop risk and vulnerability analysis; and if they encounter something suspicious they have, in accordance with their report obligation, to notify authorities (Skr. 2014/15:17,18, 25). Taken as a whole, these example of collaboration shed light on some of the potential perils of collaboration: discrepancies pertaining to the goal of the different actors, issues regarding confidentiality, responsibilities and power balances; and, last but not least, the risk of counterproductively. Other barriers to a successful collaboration may be lack of inter-

organizational trust (unwillingness to share information), lack of expertise, different economic resources, and perhaps even diverse political agendas (Crawford and Evans 2017:815).

I would like to make some final comments on the strategy of 2015. Like the previous strategy, the strategy of 2015 is similar to its predecessor in several aspects. Border controls, international collaboration and secret cohesive measures (made permanent in 2015) is still part of the counter terrorism package. Despite these similarities, I would argue that there is a significant difference between the strategy of 2015 and its predecessor, namely the pursuit of security, sustained by the vocabulary of risks. Although signs of this future development could be identified already in strategy of 2012, its terminological toolkit is far more evolved in 2015. The terms “individuals at risk”, “risk assessment”, “risk manuals”, “risk groups” and “problem-oriented policing” all belong to a prevention that follows the rationale of security first (c.f. Beck 1992). The mentality of risk is also apparent when it comes to notion of collaboration. Faith in the tradition criminal justice establishment seems insufficient, and under the umbrella of collaboration, the task of preventing crime (terrorism) is distributed in all directions from the national state; upwards to international organizations (e.g. the EU), downwards to regional or local authorities, and sideways to civil society, non-government organizations, and even to citizen. This new way of governing crime, also referred to as “the preventive turn”, not only re-structures responsibilities for crime control and security. It also re-articulate the relations between the state, market and civil society (c.f Crawford and Evans 2017:798f).

9 Framing Terrorism

In this section I will present a summary of how terrorism is framed as a severe, constantly evolving threat within the three Swedish strategies (c.f. Baker-Beall 2014). I intend to take all three strategies into account, as I believe that they, together, could be viewed as representing a narrative (social problem formula story) on terrorism.

Although there is a lack of definition in the Swedish strategies, terrorism is portrayed as an act perpetrated by non-state-actors, or non-parliamentary groups and individuals (e.g. “lone-wolfs” and “returners”). This construction of the terrorist as a non-state actor serves to obscure the potential of state terrorism. Although there are three types of terrorism in the strategies: left wing, right wing, and “the new terrorism” (drawing inspiration from Al- and its offspring Isis), the policy authors construct the problem of terrorism as mainly consisting of the threat posed by the, so called “new”, terrorism. The comprehension of terrorism is mainly sustained by a silence pertaining to the other two types of terrorism. By presenting the “new” terrorism as another facet and/or branch of already established problems, e.g. the “old” terrorism, traditional crime and the risk associated with globalization, it appears somewhat familiar. The “new” terrorism is, furthermore, portrayed as a religiously inspired international form of terrorism, and its adherent’s modus operandi suicide attacks, is portrayed as a means to yield as high a number of civilian casualties as possible. Such an indiscriminate violence, naturally, evokes fear. By appeals to emotion and logics, the “new” terrorism is perceived as threatening to violate the cultural theme of “right to life”, democracy and the symbolic entity “our fundamental values”, a threat that might also incite fear. Overall, fear is the most prominent emotion, and within the social problems game it may be seen as a favorable emotion, in the sense that, it may function to encourage audience member to care, and to evaluate terrorism as an intolerable condition.

To illustrate the physical harm done, examples of implemented attacks and their casualties in recent years in Europe are given (in the strategy of 2015). This may contribute to the perception of terrorism as a widespread problem. The parameters of the “new” terrorism changes, and as a consequence new and somewhat modified features are emphasized, such as the international dimension in 2008: “lone wolfs” in 2012 and “returners” (and once again, “lone-wolfs”) in 2015. These changes may underpin the idea of the liquid nature of the “new” terrorism.

The construction of terrorism as a social problem also entails the construction of identities. The construction of “us”, as an opposite to an external “other”, is present on different occasions: in

the case of border controls: in the division between “fragile” states in need of help and those states assigned the task of helping. However, the construction of “us” is not merely strengthened in relation to an external “other”, but also in relation to an internal “other” via the idea of the “lone-wolf”. These binary constructions do not merely illustrate one way in which meaning is created through categorization; but they do also reflect larger (geo)political power relations. Although categorizations are a natural part of people’s ways of making sense of the world, the power relations reflected in the binary constructions may help us to understand ways in which we are governed (c.f. Bacchi 2009:9). An elucidating example is the binary construction of “democratic” and “anti-democratic” behaviors, in which the morale of desirable and undesirable ways of living shine through. Herein, people are encouraged to “chose” a democratic way of living and if they do so they may make sense of themselves as “good”, democratic citizens.

The construction of terrorism as a social problem builds on three key concept: terrorism (that which ought to be prevented), democracy (that which ought to be protected) and radicalization (that which causes terrorism). Throughout the strategies there is a silence pertaining to possible explanations of the key-concepts. Such silence naturally results in a certain degree of vagueness as to their meaning. Their meanings have to be assumed or inferred, an audience may hence, freely “fill in the blanks”. When doing so people may turn to typifications, and or even stereotypes (Loseke 2003:54f). In the current political climate in Europe, Muslims are at risk of being apprehended as the enemy (c.f. Fekete 2004; Pantazi and Pemberton 2009). Vagueness may, however, not always be viewed as something undesirable. Gunnar Fredriksson (1992:92ff) holds that vagueness is a necessary component of the political language as, political concepts, have to be arbitrary, paradoxical and its meaning changeable. This applies not least in the case of terrorism. A crystal clear definition of terrorism, including the terrorist, ought not to be desirable as the definition of the terrorist is a highly varied. Vagueness may hence – in the context of terrorism – be seen as an asset as it makes the meaning of key-concepts contestable, and hence changeable. Unspecified key-concepts may not only contribute to a desirable vagueness, but it this vagueness may also reflects the complexity inherited in the problem of terrorism.

Although Loseke’s perspective has proven fruitful when analyzing terrorism as a social problem, I nevertheless think that she fails to acknowledge that the study of social problems may also, in and of itself, be viewed as a social practice. By studying the social construction of social problems, one also, in a sense, contributes to the human activity of constructing social

problems. What's more, I have encountered some difficulties in utilizing her analytical tools. The first is to do with Loseke's separation of social structures (e.g. the welfare system) and social forces (e.g. discrimination). To me, it was a bit complicated to tell them apart, although the shortcomings of the former may, possibly, be viewed to cause the latter.

Another concern regards the notion of domain expansion. The focus on the "lone-wolf" in the strategy of 2012 resulted in an enhanced emphasis on the domestic realm, and a lesser concern about an international dimension. According to Loseke domain expansion is at hand when the contents of an already established problem are expanded. In this case, however, the idea newly introduced idea of the "lone-wolf" serve not to expand the domains of terrorism, rather to change its focus toward the domestic realm. I think that Loseke's domain expansion fails to recognize that, what may appear to be an expansion, may actually lead to a change of focus. In the social problems game, a constant adding of new content may create complexity; hence a change of focus may be favorable as it may contribute to the preservation of the simplicity of a social problem. My last concern has to do with "piggybacking". To understand how familiarity is constructed by examining how one social problem feeds on the achieved level of acceptance of other already established problems is, indeed, an inspiring analytical thought. However, Loseke, in my opinion, fails to answer the question: how many times may a condition "ride" on the back ("piggybacking") of other, already established problems before its becomes its own?

9.1 Counter-terrorism in the United Kingdom

In this section I will provide a very brief overview of how the United Kingdom's strategy for countering terrorism (CONTEST) came about. I then intend to account for some of the controversies which have been at hand in relation to the British framework of counter-terrorism. Thereafter, I will discuss how the Swedish responses to terrorism may be understood in light of the aforesaid.

Great Britain has a long history of responding to and coping with violent acts, referred to as acts of terrorism, in particular the "The Troubles" in Northern Ireland. Approximately a year before the events of 9/11 UK adopted the Terrorism Act (2000). In this act a changed focus from the Irish separatists to the Islamist terror could be noted (a focus that has remained even until present day). As of 9/11, to deal with the threat posed by Al-Qaeda and its associates became a matter of urgency. This resulted in an embracement of a whole array of counter-terror legislation in Britain in ensuing years. The United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategy

(CONTEST) were first published in 2003, and revised and published in 2006 and 2009, 2011 (the same year as endorsement of The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act (TPIM)).

The aim of the CONTEST is to “reduce the risk to the UK and our interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence” (Home office 2011:6). The strategy consists of four working streams, known as the “four P’s”: Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. Out of these, the first P, that is the prevent section, has received a considerable amount of attention (Brandy 2016; Pantazi and Pemberton 2009:652). Within a scholarly context, concerns have been raised that Great Britain’s responses to the so-called “new terrorism” are, indeed, problematic. Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2013), is critical of the discourse of “radicalization”, central to the prevent section. She holds that the concept makes terrorism knowable and governable through the concept of risk. And that the deployment of “radicalization” reflects a pre-emptive form of risk governance, in which risk is anticipated as the driving principle (c.f. O’Malley 2004). In this climate of risk some parts of the population, that is Muslims, are perceived to be both “at risk” and risky (Heath-Kelly 2013:174ff). Similarly, other scholar have noted that counter-terrorism measures serve to identify Muslims as “the enemy within” (Fekete 2004; Bonino 2012; Pantazi and Pemberton 2009, see also Suspect community Hillyard 1993) and; that we, to an increasing extent, are governed through risk (and fear), leading to an intensification of a wider culture of surveillance and control (Walklate and Mythen 2006, c.f Culture of fear, Furedi 2002).¹¹ These deployments reflect a wider preventive development in which preempting threats before they emerge is the guiding principle (McCulloch and Pickering 2009; Ericson 2008). This pre-crime logic has, by McCulloch and Pickering (2009:640) been described as a new preventive paradigm (c.f. Zender 2007), characterized by a mentality of risks, and a pursuit for security.

Within this risk-based paradigm situational crime prevention (e.g. CCTV), rather than social is encouraged. The success of the situational crime prevention has, since the late 1980s, been observed in the UK, as well as in the US and Australia (c.f. O’Malley 1992:262). The pre-crime climate also entails a deployment of new and/or modified laws (usually with repressive elements), e.g. the discretionary powers of stop and search (Terrorism Act 2000, section 44), Prevention of Terrorism Act (control orders, 2005), and the introduction of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act (2011). Additionally, even if the legislation

¹¹ In March 2011, the guardian found, that there were a total number of 1.85 million CCTV: s across UK; this corresponding to one camera for every 32 people in UK.

regulating the maximum length of pre-charge detention of terrorism suspects has, in turns, been modified from 28 (between 2006-2011) till 14 days, it is still the longest within the EU.¹² Alongside these measures there has been an extension of the powers of the police. Several of the modified or newly implemented measures risk to undermine due legal process for the suspect, as well as the presumption of innocence; and thereby also erode the rule of law (Pantazi and Pemberton 2009). Since its formation, the Terrorism Act (2000) has expanded its realm to include new offences. UK's definition of terrorism has been accused of being far too broad, as it may comprise politically motivated actions aimed at influencing a government or international organization. Such a definition is highly problematic, since it may sustain violations of the freedom of speech (*Amnesty International* 2017). Law enforcement authorities, e.g. the police have, due to the extension of powers, been ascribed an increased discretion; and due to the vagueness of what and who constitute terrorism and terrorist, there is a danger of assumptions of "guilt by association" (McCulloch and Pickering 2009:630; Pantazi and Pemberton 2009:652). Amnesty International (2017) has called attention to the fact that several of the longstanding laws, and counter-terrorism measures introduced in the UK, are akin to those in a regime of emergency. As these are adopted outside a formally declared state of emergency, a tendency toward a normalization of exceptional powers may be identified (Zender 2009:123ff).

Like "the war on drugs", the terror preventive work involves an international dimension, which allows the national security to extend beyond its sovereign territory. In light of this, another disquieting development, namely the blurring of international and national security, may be observed (McCulloch and Pickering 2009:637f). Moreover, the preventive work encourages an engagement and collaboration between government agencies, and non-governmental actors both on national and local levels. Local communities are particularly encouraged to engage on several grounds. One rationale is that they may detect warning signs at an early stage. Another is that communities also may, in collaboration with other local authorities, such as the police, work in a preventive manner in order to prevent young people from becoming radicalized. These thoughts could be related to the trend, noted by David Garland (1996), in which central government restructures responsibilities of crime control; individuals are – to an increasing extent – made responsible for their own security. In a similar fashion, Katja Franko Aas (2007:140ff) argue that the state has "outsourced" its responsibility to cater for security. The

¹² The-charge detention period in the United Kingdom have ranged from 90-days, to 45, 42, 28 days and today the period is 14 days (*Amnesty International* 2017:47).

responsibility to provide for security is given to international organizations, as well private actors. The commodification of security to the private sector is particularly problematic, as it may lead to an enhancement of punitive and repressive actions. The commodification of security also contributes to an uneven allocation of security, on the basis of the individual's resources; as it follows the play rules of the free market (Zender 2009:49ff, 90f).

Furthermore, community participation also strives to improve "communication with Muslim communities, marginalising extremists and promoting social integration" (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011:157). To do so, a mutual relationship of trust and confidence, primarily between the police and Muslim communities, is underlined. This targeting of Muslims communities has been recognized to contribute to a sense of otherness, and even the creation of a "suspect community" (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011:175f; Pantazis and Pemberton 2009).

All in all, it nonetheless seems as if counter-terrorism measures risk to erode, or at least endanger a lot of liberal ideals (e.g. the rule of law and the equal value of every person) which, in a democratic society such as that of the United Kingdom ought to be highly valued (Miller 2009, c.f. Findlay 2007).

9.1.1 A temporal comparison of the Swedish strategies and a reflection of some potential pitfalls based on the British literature

In this last section I intend to, with a special focus on preventive ideas, to shed light some salient similarities and differences between the three Swedish strategies. Thereafter, I want to make some comments on how the Swedish line of thought on counter-terrorism may be understood, using British literature on counter-terrorism as a backdrop.

In the strategy of 2008, terrorism is constructed as problem external to Sweden. The root causes of terrorism are, in the diagnostic frame, seen to emanate from conflicts and wars occurring in fragile states and "conflict zones". The audience is, mainly, encouraged to care by ways of appeals to people's capacity to care about others (humanitarian themes). As the preventive work takes aim at fighting the root causes of terrorism overseas, there may be a blurring of the lines between national and international security (c.f McCulloch and Pickering 2009:637f). Similar

tendencies have been brought to light in a British context. Within the domestic realm a social prevention, including general efforts (primary prevention) aimed at socialization is promoted.

In the strategy of 2012, the idea of the “lone wolf” turns the gaze toward the threat from “within”, and the international dimension is, hence emphasized to a lesser extent. As the threat is brought closer to home, the threat scenario is escalated. The encouragement to care is now sustained by appeals to fear, as it is now the most salient emotion. The preventive work has (compared to the prevention in the previous strategy) – through the notion of radicalization – become more selective orientated. To obtain control of individuals in order to detect “signs of radicalization” is perceived as the overarching objective. Control is achieved via information, and information ought to be collected through collaboration. Collaboration does not only refer to a collaboration between authorities, but between authorities, non-governmental agencies and even individuals. As individuals are expected to partake in the preventive work e.g. by providing information to, SÄPO, it could be argued that individuals – to a greater extent – are made responsible for their own safety. Such a reallocation of crime (terror prevention) control clearly bear resemblance to the development in the UK (c.f. Garland 1996). Furthermore, it is also stated that, the Swedish police may request assistance from the National task force of Sweden and even the military. The eventuality that the Swedish military may be used as a repressive force against Swedish citizen risks to obscure the division between the police and the military (or even war and crime) (c.f Aas 2013:107f).

In the hitherto latest strategy, that of 2015, the notions of the “lone-wolf” and “returners” retain the focus on the domestic realm. Fear is still the most prominent emotion, and as in the previous strategy, counteracting radicalization remains the primary objective. A mentality of risk is prevalent, and on the basis of the perspective of “push and pull” selective measures ought, at an early stage, to be implemented toward those perceived to be at risk (prone to radicalization), is encouraged. General preventive measures, e.g. discussions and dialogues, are, hence, no longer viewed as part of the preventive work. The temporal cohesive measures mentioned in the previous strategies have, since the beginning of 2015, been made permanent. The tendency to normalize exceptional measures, and thereby to extend the powers of the police, is akin to that observed in the UK. A multi-actor collaboration is still viewed as a key component to a successful terror prevention. The national coordinator to safeguard democracy against extremism’s (appointed in 2014) is to initiate collaboration projects with the broader society, ranging from collaborative arrangements with government authorities, local authorities and even with civilians. As several social actors, e.g. social services, whose main mission does not

include crime prevention (and hence not counter-terrorism), are to adopt a mentality of risks, a myriad of, in the strategy, unspoken tension may arise. Fredrik, chief of security of a Swedish municipality is critical of function of the coordinator. He stresses that the national coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism is the state's way of withdrawing tasks once bestowed to the municipalities. Fredrik also express a practical problem, namely the tension that is created between the available means and goals of his business, and the demands and goals of the national coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism. Per, another chief of security of another Swedish municipality, also expresses a critical opinion on the development of local policies and recommendations, produced by the municipalities in collaboration with the national coordinator. Per hold that the local policies sometimes contain, or at least risk to contain recommendations as to registration of onions which are, in fact, unlawful. Simon, on the other hand, brings forth another perspective. At the time when the local policies took form and were implemented, Simon worked alongside the national coordinator (as does he even today). Simon considered the local policies to be needed, as the municipalities and its staff had set up a framework for countering extremism. As the local policies took form, the employees of each municipality received useful information about extremism. Simon argue that, when they had information sessions with staff and representatives from the municipalities it was clear that they overlooked left wing and right wing extremism, as they mainly thought about one form of extremism; the religious "Islamic extremism".

Some of the Swedish counter-terrorism measures may, doubtlessly, based on British literature on the subject, be considered as problematic. The normalization of the exceptional and the increasingly blurred terrain between internal and external security, the police and military (crime and warfare) and the functions of care and control, ought to be reflected upon.

The crime prevention Sweden has in some respects, embarked upon a similar path as Great Britain. As displayed in the strategies, a prevention that build on socialization is pushed aside by a prevention that; through the notion of radicalization (and the perspective of "push and pull", is aimed at a selective part of the population (secondary and tertiary prevention). As the preventive work in Sweden stresses the need of an introduction of preventive measures at an early stage, a positive development of individuals is – increasingly – subordinated the safety of society. The focus on confronting threats before they emerge, simultaneously, fits within the wide preventive development observed in the UK (see, McCulloch and Pickering 2009; Ericson 2008). This development is characterized by a mentality of risk, and a desire to preempt threats before they emerge (c.f. McCulloch and Pickering 2009; Zender 2007).

The prevention of “early initiatives” may raise several ethical questions, which ought to be taken into consideration. To begin with, to implement counter-terrorism measures against individuals based on the perception of them being at risk may undermine the presumption of innocence; likewise, one may wonder what measures that may be implemented against those who have not committed any crime. The idea of preempting threats before they emerge, may, also, be put to question. To take action against e.g. small children based on the believe that they, in the future, most likely (or possibly?) will turn to deviance, may appear difficult to justify ethically. By the same token, it may be problematic to cast suspicion on certain individuals, as this may result in stigmatization and in worst case-scenario, contribute to a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy (c.f. Merton 1968:477f). Additionally, selective measures, justified on the basis of utilitarianism may, in a terror context, adhere to the logic: “to trade off the liberties of a few against the security of the majority” (Zender 2009:136); and they may hence risk to effect some parts of the population more than other parts (c.f. Sahlin 2000:138ff).

Collaboration is, in the Swedish material, seen as a task involving multiple actors, governmental as well as non-governmental. In the Swedish material, as well as in the British literature on counter-terrorism, a trend, in which individuals – increasingly – are made responsible for their own safety, is discernible (c.f. Garland 1996). Non-governmental actors are also, under the umbrella of collaboration, encouraged to cooperate with the Swedish Security Service and to deploy a mentality of risk. It seems as if risk has become the organizing principle for the preventive work; or perhaps even for the whole society (c.f. Beck 1992). The preventive work of coping with risk, has led to a seemingly increased focus on (control of) individuals, and a marginalization of proposal pertaining to changes in social fabric. Hence, in this climate of risk wherein security is seen as the superior value, it nonetheless seems as if national security has taken precedence over social security. Furthermore, Sahlin holds that a society which prizes control, risks to do so at the expense of individual integrity. Along the same lines, Zedner (2009:45f) stresses that, if the security of society is seen as the superior value, other values such as social equality, may be placed in a backseat position, or even be endangered.

Despite the aforesaid similarities as to the preventive idea of “early initiatives”, including the multi-actor collaborative stance, the Swedish counter-terrorism framework seem to differ from that of the UK in several respects. Unlike the UK, Sweden does not promote situational crime prevention. Situational measures such as, CCTV primarily aimed at controlling peoples’ behaviors trough surveillance, are not part emphasized in the Swedish strategies. Although I am not able to answer why is the case, one speculation is that the political climate in Sweden

not (yet) welcome an implementation of such measures. It would not be wise to make inferences as to a possible emergence of a private security market in Sweden based on the strategies. It could, however, be noted that there are no references to private companies, which citizens could turn to for security, in the Swedish strategies.

Another distinct difference between the counter-terrorism framework in Sweden and Britain, has to do with the portrayal, or rather, understanding of the enemy. As observed in the British literature, Muslims are framed as the “enemy within”. Although I have not studied how the enemy is constructed within a British counter-terrorism context, I hold that the enemy is not clearly defined within the Swedish material. As noted in the previous section, I think this may have to do with the element of vagueness.

By adding a temporal dimension, I have, like like, Strandh and Eklund, been able to demonstrate how the understanding of terrorism has changed in between the strategies. Even though I have not studied the impact of focusing events on these changes, my study also points toward the importance of the notion of “lone-wolfs” and collaboration. Strand and Eklund uses the notion of mitigation to make sense of the identified changes; whilst I have chosen to draw on Sahlin’s perspective on crime prevention. Using Sahlin’s thoughts on crime prevention has enabled to problematize identified changes; and the British literature on counter-terrorism has, furthermore, enabled me to situate identified changes within a broader preventive societal development.

10. Concluding remarks

In this essay, I have examined the ways in which claim-makers, in this case, the authors of the policies conduct the social problems work of persuading audience members that their claims about terrorism are believable and important. In doing so, the claim makers make use of strategies that are common to successful claims. I have shed light on how they produce a package of claims about terrorism which entail: making appeals to logic and emotion, setting the parameters of the condition, creating meaning (diagnostic frame) and constructing the solutions (prognostic frame). By constructing terrorism as another branch or facet of an already established problem (piggybacking), it appears a both a familiar and troublesome condition. Through appeals to fear, terrorism is framed as a severe and constantly evolving threat (c.f. Baker-Beall 2014). Fear encourages us to evaluate the condition as intolerable, and that which we fear, we usually take seriously and deem important. What's more, the narrative of terrorism (social problems formula story) is a moral one, as it conveys desirable and undesirable ways of living. It also presents us with the possibility of making sense of ourselves in relation to the social world, via the constructions of identities. One example of this is the positing of the identity of "us", both in relation to the external and internal other. Scrutinizing the construction of terrorism as a social problem, has not only contributed to an understanding of how it is framed; it also tells us something about larger societal and cultural trends and worries.

A salient characteristic of the discourse of terrorism is its vagueness. This vagueness may be viewed as an asset, since the former is a necessary component of political language. Even though Loseke (2003:16f) holds that social problems tend to be reduced to simplified conditions, I, nonetheless, hold that elements of vagueness in the narrative of terrorism also reflects its complexity. Terrorism threatens not only life and limb, but it also poses a threat toward something "bigger", namely the symbolic entity of "our values". As this claim is symbolic, and hence more far-reaching than it appears on the surface, terrorism may be viewed as a condition which reflects larger, more diffuse, cultural worries pertaining to the possible rise of anti-democratic values and behaviors. The ways terrorism is framed may not only illuminate cultural worries, but it may also perpetuate them.

As I have discerned in the prognostic frame, one way of preventing and controlling crime is through collaborative arrangements. This collaborative multi-actor approach is underpinned a mentality of risk, and it is linked to the prevention of "early initiatives". The focus on "early initiatives" to preventing possible future harm reflects a sort of pessimism toward the possible

troublesome development of (some) individuals. This pessimism may be related to the mantra “nothing works”, and the collapse of the rehabilitative ideal. As the belief in rehabilitation has waned, corrective ideals have gained the upper hand. Prevention is seemingly not primarily about favoring a positive development, but rather, thwarting negative ones (Sahlin 2000:24f): this too reflects a sort of pessimism as to terror prevention. The urge for collaborative arrangements signifies an extensive institutional reorganization (c.f. Strandh and Eklund 2015:276). This development may be reflected upon in three ways, it may;(1) be apprehended as a way of “empowering” citizens, and it may also;(2) be a part of the state’s ambition to control and police people from a distance, or;(3) it may be viewed as a way of centralizing tasks to the state.

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