LUND UNIVERSITY
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Who Supports Anti-Immigrant Parties and Why? A Two-Step approach using the European Social Survey, 2002 – 2012

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Abstract: This thesis analyses the popularity of anti-immigrant parties and anti-immigrant opinions in Europe, which have grown rapidly in the 21st century. Diverging from the earlier research on the topic, the preference of anti-immigrant parties is the key variable of interest and it is analyzed using economic, socio-demographic, as well as sociotropic factors. The first six waves of the European Social Survey are used, together with a two-step ordinary least squares estimator, to obtain individual and country-level effects. The findings suggest that both cultural and economic concerns about immigration are driving the parties success. The former has the larger effect, while opinions on ethnicity are divided. The key findings include that preferring an anti-immigrant party is associated with a more positive attitude towards immigration of the same ethnicity, and that education is an insignificant factor when controlling for opinion on immigration.

Keywords: anti-immigrant parties, immigration, unemployment, Europe

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1   Introduction

"The current recession may slow globalization, including international migration. The key questions are how migrant-receiving governments deal with the migrants who are now inside their borders and the migration policies they adopt during recovery. A key challenge is to encourage migrant-receiving and migrant-sending governments to cooperate to protect the rights of migrants, which also protects local workers by avoiding competition based on exploitation"

- Philip Martin, University of California, Davis (2010)

The current recession has indeed affected Europe in ways that are unlikely to wane in the near future. The slightly more distant future offers its own set of challenges from population ageing to growing inequality. In the present, immigration has become not only a pressing concern for the European politicians, but also for the European public. According to the Eurobarometer survey released in 2015 immigration has topped the economic situation and unemployment, despite the on-going debt crisis in Greece, as the most serious concern currently facing Europe. It with these motivations that this thesis seeks to answer why anti-immigrant parties have gathered so much support in the recent past. The aim is to provide a better understanding of why immigration is so controversial and what this implies for the future of Europe. The first part will establish the context for the coming chapters through an overlook of migration in Europe. Some theory behind why people migrate will be covered as well. The discussion will take a turn towards the political dimension, where a brief discussion about the history of the anti-immigrant parties is provided. The second part will provide a literature review spanning two separate strains of literature from economics, political science, and sociology. The literature review will be connected with economic theory, as well as theory derived from the reviewed literature, in order to construct empirically testable hypotheses. The final part of this thesis will attempt to test the hypotheses through an econometric analysis. A two-step ordinary least squares model is used to analyze data from the six rounds of the European Social Survey. The results of the two-steps are discussed separately, followed by a thorough discussion of the empirical analysis in terms of the constructed hypotheses. A brief discussion of what the results entail for the future immigration policy is presented before the final conclusion, which will offer brief suggestions for future research, as well as policy advice that can be derived from the results.

1.1   Migration and Europe

1.1.1   Brief Overlook

European immigration, from the colonial times to the present, has gone through multiple trends: until the 20th century Europe was a net exporter of immigrants, as many Europeans would seek a better life in the colonial nations or the New World (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg 2009). In the 20th century, particularly after the Second World war, the migration patterns changed from emigrating away from Europe to internal migration within Europe. By the 1960s, Northern Europe had become a net importer of immigrants from Southern Europe, and in the late 1980s and 1990s, the fall of the Soviet Union and the later Balkan wars, led to

large migration flows from Eastern Europe to Western Europe. However, the main topic of this thesis and the most controversial type of migration is that which has happened from developing nations in Africa and Asia to Europe in the past 40 or so years. The public discourse paints a picture of this type of migration as massive in scale and fuelled by war and extreme poverty (De Haas 2008). The terrorist attacks that have occurred since 9/11, both in and out of Europe, have only fueled the controversy by creating an image of immigration from certain parts of the world as inherently dangerous. In actual terms, however, those who end up being able to migrate tend to not be the poorest within the source regions, but rather those wealthy enough to be able to afford the journey (B. Chiswick and Hatton 2003). This alone limits the immigration flows significantly and casts doubt on the fears of an overrun Europe.

In addition, immigration is sometimes presented as a solution to future challenges, such as labour shortage and population ageing. The proponents argue that since the native fertility rates have decreased below maintenance levels in many Western European nations, and as life expectancy has continued to grow, the only solution to the challenge is to bring in more immigrants to upkeep the supply-ratio. The critics counter by stating that the rate of immigration would have to massively grow in the coming decades for it to have any real effect. In this sense, perhaps the fear of massive scale immigration is potentially directed towards a potential future scenario rather than the present. Furthermore, some research has shown that the immigrant populations tend to adapt to the native population's fertility regimes and therefore the immigration populations will grow old too and with an increasing speed (Bengtsson and Scott 2011).

It is important to understand why immigration happens to begin with. The changing migration flows from emigration from Europe, to internal migration, and finally to external immigration are explained to a substantial degree by the comparative economic conditions in the target and source regions (B. Chiswick and Hatton 2003). To provide an example, the colonial times were marked with high demand for European labour in the colonial states, as it was needed to establish a significant European presence in the region (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg 2009). It is no surprise then that since it was relatively easy for Europeans to find employment outside of Europe that they would proceed to emigrate.[1]

On the other hand, the period after the Second World War witnessed a large reconstruction effort in Europe fuelled by the strong American economy. Indeed, the decades that followed are sometimes called the golden years up to the 1970s, as they were marked with an unprecedented economic growth throughout Western Europe, particularly in nations such as Germany and France. The rebuilding efforts led to such high demand for labour that labour shortages were now a reality. This would cause an obvious economic pull effect on the Southern European labour, thus leading to migration from south to north.

At the same time as Europe was prospering, the poor economic conditions and rapid population growth implied particularly tough challenges for many developing nations. In this case, the difficulty of finding work and the relatively poor living conditions created a push factor, leading people to find work outside their native regions. As Europe was prospering and the colonial ties allowed relative ease of travel for mid-income nations, it is also no surprise that migrants would often choose to relocate to Europe, the Middle East, and Northern Africa (De Haas 2008). It can then be roughly summarized that when areas in Europe needed workers and areas outside of Europe or within Europe needed work, the incentive for labour immigration was born. Of course the

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[1]Another non-European example would be the oil crises in the 1970s. The sudden increases in revenues for the Gulf states subsequently led to massive increases in demand for labour and thus mass migration from Asia in particular ensued. See (B. Chiswick and Hatton 2003) for a more illustrative discussion on this.

reasons for migration are more complicated than this, but the key macro factors are understood to have been the central driving force (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg 2009).

In the mid-20th century many of the immigrants, both from Europe and outside of it, entered on guest worker programs, highlighting the idea of immigrants at the time as temporary guests or rent workers. However, often the national legislation would ultimately allow such immigrants to remain in the area even after the initial work permit expired, provided that some relatively flexible conditions were satisfied (Bengtsson, Lundh, and Scott 2005). The more humanitarian clauses in the legislation would also allow family reunification, that is to bring their families from their native countries to Europe, for those who would decide to settle down. In consequence, not only did the guest workers remain in large numbers, as little return migration occurred, but they were able to bring their families over as well. European countries had thus largely miscalculated the nature of immigration, as the guest workers were not the temporary labour force they were thought to be, but rather new permanent residents.

To complicate the matter, it has been shown that immigrant populations tend to have higher fertility rates across generations than the native populations(Akkerman 2015). Consequently, the parts of the populations with parents or grandparents born outside of Europe have rapidly grown in size. Currently, Germany has an 11,9 percent immigrant population, United Kingdom 12,4 percent, France 11,6 percent, Spain 13,8 percent, Italy 9,4 percent, Sweden 15,9 percent, Austria 15,7 percent, and Denmark 9,9 percent[2]. As the original demand for labour, which pulled the immigrants to the country, has declined and a large number of immigrants have come under asylum seeking or family reunification, the situation for immigrants has largely deteriorated (OECD n.d.). This is rather paradoxical, as on the one hand they will benefit from the rising living standards, but on the other hand they face obstacles such as the lack of country-specific skills, language barriers, social networks, and even discrimination (B. R. Chiswick 1978).

The effect can be seen in table 1, as nearly across the spectrum the foreign-born population have a significantly higher unemployment rates than than the native-born population. In many cases the rates are more than twice as high as native-born unemployment, and in every case at least a percentage-point higher. The highest foreign-born unemployment rates can be found in Finland, France, Sweden, and more recently in Italy and Austria as well. Together with the potential unrest that might follow from the lack of integration and unemployment, it follows that immigration can create a disproportionate pressure on some EU member states. This highlights why immigration is an large concern and why integration and immigration policy are so important in contemporary Europe. In this context, it is not only of interest to social scientists but also for policy makers to study this topic, as the presence of anti-immigrant parties has the potential to exert significant influence on future policy

1.1.2 The Rise of the Populist Anti-Immigrant Parties

Although Europe has had a long history with xenophobia and negative attitudes towards immigrants, largely in response to changing demographics, many anti-immigrants parties have arisen in the political field in the last 30 or 40 years. First, the Freedom Party in Austria gained serious support in the 1980s and managed to gain 26,9 percent of the parliamentary votes in 1999. The second obvious example has been Vlaam's Blok in Belgium, who managed to gain 24,15 percent of the votes in 2004. Others have enjoyed moderate to large success in

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[2]Numbers taken from national population databases, e.g. Statistics Finland

Table 1: Unemployment Rates for Foreign-born and Native-born Populations (F = Foreign-born N = Native-born

Year	2002		2004		2006		2008		2010		2012	
Place of Birth	F	N	F	N	F	N	F	N	F	N	F	N
Country												
Austria	8	4	13	5	8	4	7	3	14	7	15	7
Finland	19	10	23	10	18	9	13	6	17	8	14	8
France	20	8	14	9	14	8	12	7	15	9	16	9
Italy	9	9	10	8	8	7	8	7	11	8	14	10
Netherlands	5	2	10	4	11	4	6	2	9	4	11	5
Norway	8	4	8	4	8	3	5	2	9	3	7	3
Sweden	10	4	13	6	13	6	12	5	16	7	16	6
Switzerland	2	2	3	3	3	3	N/A	N/A	8	3	7	3
UK	8	5	7	4	8	5	7	6	9	8	9	8

[a] Data extracted on 10 Aug 2015 from OECD.Stat

the 1990s as well, such as the Progress Party in Norway, and the People's Party in Denmark and Switzerland. Although the success of the older anti-immigrant parties has come to a halt in some instances and they have endured controversies, which have damaged their status [3] a new wave has risen in the other Nordic countries, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Currently the majority of Western European nations have an active anti-immigrant party with at least 10 percent of seats in national parliament (table 2), suggesting that immigration is a topic in politics that is here to stay and will likely increase in intensity in the coming years.

Table 2 illustrates the recent developments in the political field well. The columns represent the last five national parliamentary election results for each anti-immigrant party. The first wave consisting of the Freedom Party in Austria, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, and Lega Nord were the most popular anti-immigrant parties in the 1990s and still retain significant support at 40/183 seats, 6/150 seats, and 20/630 seats respectively. In Sweden and Finland the True Finns and the Swedish Democrats have gained electoral success only in the late 21st century with the former currently holding 38/200 seats and the latter 49/349 seats. The People's Party in Denmark and the Progress Party in Norway have maintained steady presence ever since the 90s with the Danish People's Party currently holding 37/175 seats and the latter 29/169 seats. The French National Front and the United Kingdom Independence Party appears as if their voter bases are largely insignificant, however, they have enjoyed far larger support than the number of seats in the table shows: UKIP has received over 10 percent of the votes in the 2015 national elections and National Front in 2004, with the most recent percentage being 8,4. Currently both also have 24 out of 74 national seats in the European Parliament[4].

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[3]E.g. Vlaams Blok was ruled illegal under anti-racism laws. The continuation of Vlaams Blok is now known as Vlaams Belang, but it no longer enjoys similar success as the original party. Also, the Freedom Party in Austria has split into two competing parties, thus diminishing its role as well.

[4]Numbers taken from the the national election sites

Table 2: Number of Parliamentary Seats in the Last Five National Elections

Party	5th	4th	3rd	2nd	1st	Total Seats Available
True Finns (Finland)	1	3	5	39	38	200
	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014	(max 38)
Swedish Democrats (Sweden)	0	0	0	20	49	349
	2001	2005	2007	2011	2015	(max 49)
People's Party (Denmark)	22	24	25	22	37	175
	1995	1999	2004	2009	2014	(max 37)
Vlaams Belang (Belgium)	15	20	32	21	6	159
	1993	1997	2002	2007	2012	(max 32)
National Front (France)	0	1	0	0	2	577
	1999	2002	2006	2008	2013	(max 2)
Freedom Party (Austria)	52	18	21	34	40	183
	1996	2001	2006	2008	2013	(max 52)
Lega Nord (Italy)	59	30	28	60	20	630
	1996	2001	2006	2010	2012	(max 60)
Party for Freedom (Netherlands)	N/A	N/A	9	24	15	150
	1997	2001	2005	2009	2013	(max 24)
Progress Party (Norway)	25	26	38	49	29	169
	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	(max 49)
People's Party (Switzerland)	29	44	55	62	54	200
	1997	2001	2005	2010	2015	(max 62)
Indepdence Party (UK)	0	0	0	0	1	650
	1997	2001	2005	2010	2015	(max 1)

[a] Gathered from national election result databases

[b] Too much should not be drawn from these numbers as different electoral systems are not comparable

2 Literature Review and Theory

2.1 Literature Review

The previous research on the topic can be categorized into two strains of literature with either a country or cross-country focus: the first strain deals with the causes of anti-immigrant party success, while the second with the covers causes of anti-immigrant opinion. Although the literature can be categorized in this way, this is not to say that the literature within each respective strain is always connected. One reason for this is certainly that some research has come from the field of economics while the others have come from political science or sociology. Thus, unsurprisingly, different aspects are emphasized depending on the field. Despite this, important contributions have been made across the spectrum and while no consensus appears to have been born, similar findings have still been made.

Anderson (1996) differentiates between the economic, political and temporal variables in explaining the success of the progress parties in Denmark and Norway. As the support for the parties was found to be similar [5] along with the similarity of the nations themselves, the setting provides a fine opportunity to attempt see if their success is indeed driven by the same factors. The study uses data from national questionnaires, which measure potential support via hypothetical questions, such as "which party would you vote for?". Somewhat surprisingly, the results suggest that that in the Danish case economic factors measured through unemployment are significant, as is the electoral momentum, and size of the foreign-born population. That is, the party gains initial success with the growing number of immigrants and grows with the momentum gained from poor economic situations. In the Norwegian case, on the other hand, none of the variables, with the relatively weak exception of the size of the immigrant population, provide a good predictor for the success of the party. The study concludes then that even in a very similar context, the success of the parties may be driven by very different factors.

In a similar vein, Rink, Phalet, and Swyngedouw (2009) studied voting for Vlaam's Blok in Belgium between 1991 and 1999. Among the most important determinants of voting behaviour were the size of the immigrant population, which had a curvilinear effect on voting, while on the other hand, unemployment was found to have only a small effect. Individual factors such as low-skill occupations and limited education were also important predictors. The implication for the Dutch case would thus be that the economic context matters less than the socio-economic status itself.

Boomgarden and Vliegenhard (2012) note that previous research has largely focused on macro-level data and variables such as unemployment, immigrant demographics, and the electoral system. As such, they tap on a largely neglected yet important aspect of the debate, that is the role of mass media and perception rather than the actual status of the society. They analyse the content of five most-read Dutch newspapers, where articles relating to immigration, unemployment, and party support are chosen and subsequently evaluated against a visibility factor. The findings include that immigration-related news contents are significant and more important than economic news contents. The authors discuss the implication and argue that it is not the economic challenges but the perception of a cultural challenge that is the key variable. Similar results are found in earlier research as well, with a less technical analysis (see for exmaple, WWalgrave and de Swert 2004, Dearing and Rogers 1996).

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[5]7.4 ad 6.3 percent respectively

Van Klingeren et al. (2014) continue on the analysis of media content by comparing the situation in Netherlands to Denmark. They seek to find out to which extent the media is more important than the reality, such as the actual size of the immigrant population or the actual state of the economy. Contrary to other research on the subject, the study takes into account the role of positive and negative news rather than aggregating it all into one as Boomgarden and Vliegehard did. Again, it is shown that country level-factors are important, as the role of media content has a smaller effect in Denmark than in Netherlands. The authors speculate that the this is because in Denmark the media tone is more polarized to begin with. Thus whereas the discourse in Netherlands may have an effect on a "critical mass", in Denmark the opinions are made up to begin with and thus smaller effect is observed.

Although much can be learned from research on individual countries, due to the heterogeneity of the results it is difficult to make generalizations. For this reason there is also a substantial body of work on the topic addressing the overall popularity of anti-immigrant parties in Europe in the 20th century.

Van Der Brug et al have performed much work on this topic. In their first study on the subject (2000) a macro perspective is chosen to assess the that voting for anti-immigrant parties is a protest against the mainstream parties rather than that they are attractive to the voter on their own right. The data is cross-sectional and taken from the European Elections Study (1994) to determine why some anti-immigrant parties fail and others succeed. They perform an OLS regression analysis using Austria, Denmark, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Germany. Their focus is on the supply-side of the debate and thus party differences are being measured. They find little evidence that supports the protest vote hypothesis. Instead the electoral institutions, such as other parties and their contemporary situations, are significant explanations.

Van Der Brug et al (2003) use the same method and set of hypothesis again on the data from a latter European Elections Study (1999). The results suggest that the story is dynamic rather than static, as protest votes appear to have become more common than they previously were. However, not too much has changed, for the ideological match between the voter and the anti-immigrant party is still the dominant explanation. In the cases where it is no longer the dominant factor, as in the case of the Belgian National Front, the German Republicans, and the Dutch Centre Democrats, these parties have also turned out to be relatively unsuccessful. The paper's conclusion is then that anti-immigrant parties present an alternative to the mainstream parties, and as long as they provide an ideologically sound alternative rather than a gimmick, they are likely to survive past the short-run.

The other strain of literature engages the topic by looking into what determines public attitudes towards immigrants. The general findings have been somewhat surprising, as the public opinion has changed surprisingly little.

David Card (2002) analyses the first European Social Survey from 2002 to break down the compositional effect of immigration. The study provides a robust technical analysis using rotational questions found only in the first ESS. Card finds that economic factors are important, but most of the variation on whether immigration is considered good or bad is determined by the composition of the immigrant population. In other words, it does not only matter if the immigrants are skilled or non-skilled but it also matters who they are and where they do come from. The respondents to the ESS seem to then distinguish between the fiscal effect of immigration and the composition of the immigration population, and indeed the latter is determined to be more important for immigration policy.

Hatton (2014) contributes on the same line of research as Card. His analysis consists of 20 countries, for

which there is data before and after the year 2008, to answer if recession has changed minds in regards to immigration. The method used consists of a two-step model with country, time, and individual factors being analysed. In the first step, the questions on immigration are regressed on the country, time and individual factors, with the aim of generating the country-level time effects. The second step regresses the country-level time effects on macroeconomic five macroeconomic variables. On the individual-level, the respondent's age, birth in the country, labour force participation, and low education are found to have a negative effect on the opinion on immigration. On the country-level there is large variance in the results between countries and the country-level time factors are found to have a very small effect, which indicates that the opinion on immigration is rigid and not easily affected by economic shocks. The variable most affected is the question if immigration negatively affects the economy. Hatton also tests six additional questions relating to human values, such as safety in surroundings, trusting other people, and importance of traditions, as well as political orientation, such as trust in politicians, satisfaction in government, and where the respondent places on the left-right scale. Of these questions, only safety in surroundings and importance of tradition are uncorrelated over time with opinions on immigration. Interestingly, mistrust in politicians and lack of satisfaction with the government are both correlated with the share of social benefits and unemployment. However, when controlling for macroeconomic factors only the effects of trust in people and trust in politicians remain significant. This suggests that the state of the economy is more important than the government, whereas distrust in people overall and in politicians drives anti-immigrant opinions. There is country-level variation with North, such as Finland and Norway, having a more positive opinion on immigration, while South, such as Italy and Greece, having a more negative effect, possibly due to being hit harder by the recession. However, the results suggest that cross-sectional socio-demographic factors are more important. The study also finds little evidence of a shift in the political spectrum from left to right. The key finding of the study is that overall, the recession has had a surprisingly small effect on the anti-immigrant opinion.

Elise Rustenbach (2010) uses the European Social Survey together with regional data from Eurostat much in the same vein as Hatton. The analysis is broader, however, and in total eight theories are tested: cultural marginality, human capital, political affiliation, societal integration, neighbourhood safety, contact, foreign investment and economic competition. A two-step approach is adopted to factor in for individual, regional and national variance. The results speak the same story for the most part as the majority of previous research. Educational attainment, left-right political leaning, interpersonal trust, as well as unemployment, are major predictors of anti-immigrant opinion. However, contrary to economic logic, unemployment is associated with lower degrees of anti-immigrant opinion, both at a regional and national-level. Importantly, the number of immigrants is not found to be significant either.

Finseraas, Pedersen, and Bay have also studied anti-immigrant attitudes using the ESS and its first five rounds. Their analysis consists of testing the relative importance of economic and socio-tropic variables, and in particular, the importance of unemployment within different demographic segments in those European countries, which are part of the OECD. The apriori expectation is that unemployment only affects economic concerns related to immigration and not cultural concerns. Thus the dependent variables are based on the same questions as in Hatton's study, except only two of them are used. The main independent variables are the respondents' level of education, unemployment rate, the size of the foreign population, and the interaction between the two. They also use a two-step model, however, with a different method. In the first step, they regress the individual-level control variables for each country-level time period. In the second step, the intercept and slope

coefficients are used as independent variables together with the macro-level variables, as well as country and time fixed effects. The focus is on the second-step, where the results suggest that the negative relationship between immigrants and education becomes steeper with higher unemployment, larger size of the foreign population, and the interaction of the two variables. Moreover, for those with low education, an increase in unemployment is found to be more important than then the size of the foreign population.

Anna Maria Mayda (2006) provides similar analysis on a different sample. The analysis makes use of the International Social Survey Programme and the World Value Survey. This analysis is broader than what has been discussed so far, as many non-European countries are discussed as well. The results emphasize the importance of economic variables, as well as the labour market, and the author rejects the claim that immigration attitudes are shaped entirely by non-economic variables. However, the study also finds that non-economic variables as a whole appear to be explain more of the variance in the sample. In addition, the study finds that the higher the per-capita GDP the country has, the less open they are to immigration.

The only obvious conclusion to be drawn based on the three strains of literature appears to be that the success of the anti-immigrant parties are not driven by any single factor. The role of media, the economic context, the individual socio-economic status, as well as the structure of the political system have been found to be significant factors. Furthermore, their importance appears to vary depending on the region that is being measured. The anti-immigrant sentiments, on the other hand, are largely driven by the individual's socio-economic status, the composition of the immigrant population, and the lack of interpersonal trust. Perhaps the most important determinant on the individual level is the socio-economic status, and in particular the individuals level of education, where those with higher education are on average significantly more tolerant, regardless of the region.

A problem with the existing literature is that the focus tends to be either on explaining why anti-immigrant parties rise to success or what determines public anti-immigrant attitudes. The two topics are thus treated as separate topics. No study so far, that I know of, has attempted to connect the analysis of the two strains of literature by using the European Social Survey to analyse individual and country factors, where the key dependent variable is part preference. It is not clear to which extent anti-immigrant attitudes are driving the rise of the anti-immigrant parties. Certainly there appears to be a disconnection there, as the recession has not substantially changed minds. Why then have the anti-immigrant parties consolidated their status? Furthermore, none of the previous studies discussed here have looked into the financial crisis and the potential momentum it has given to the anti-immigrant parties. It can be argued that even if the public opinion of immigration is rigid, it is the political field which can have the bigger impact on immigrant lives and immigration itself. Since immigration is highly likely to persist in the foreseeable future as a major issue in European politics, a study that focuses on the anti-immigrant parties could provide clarity to understand the contemporary immigration debate.

With this in mind the research question this thesis attempts to answer is who identifies with anti-immigrant parties and why. The aim of this thesis is then to provide insight into a pressing and relevant contemporary topic and to contribute to the academic discussion by connecting the reviewed literature on anti-immigrant opinion and anti-immigrant parties. The next section will discuss the relevant theory, which has largely been used in the previous research as well, and to establish empirically testable hypotheses. Finally, an empirical analysis is performed using the six waves of the European Social Survey with anti-immigrant party preference as the dependent variable.

2.2 Theory

2.2.1 Economics of Immigration

The basic economic theory provides the foundation which can be used to analyse attitudes towards immigration both on an individual and party level. The standard neoclassical theory on labour markets predicts that if immigrants are substitutes to the native workforce, it will then increase the labour force and thus lead the supply curve to shift to the right. In practical terms this implies a downward pressure on wages as competition increases, which in turn pushes employment levels to increase due to labour becoming cheaper. On the other hand, it can be expected that the native workforce will resist working at a lower wage, at least in a inflexible labour market, thus increasing unemployment among the native workforce, implying that the labour benefits of immigration are largely reaped by the immigrants themselves. In the alternative case, if the immigrants are not substitutes, but rather complements to the native workforce, then the results are completely different than in the earlier case. In this case the demand curve will move left due to new skills that the economy can utilize. The supply curve does not move in this instance, which implies that there is no clear competition among the native and immigrant workforces, thus new job opportunities are created due to the new skills. The resulting scenario would generate potentially higher wages and higher employment rate for both the native and immigrant workforce.

Figure 1: Immigrants as Substitutes

Figure 2

The basic model cannot be applied so easily on reality, and immigrants are, even in the simplest case, at least partially supplementary and partially complementary. An easy way to illustrate this, and also to help think about immigration, is to consider the following scenario: Assume that the source nation has lower general education and skill level than the target nation, it can then be reasoned that on average, most of the immigrants are substitutes to the low-skilled native workers and complements to the high-skilled native workers. Again, if the opposite is true than the skills and education are higher, then the immigrants are complementary to the low-skilled native workers and substitutes to the high-skilled native workers. Depending on what type of immigration a country receives, it can then be expected that either low-skilled or high-skilled will react

Figure 2: Immigrants as Complements

negatively to immigrants due to the increased labour market competition.

Although economic theory provides the labour market competition as a way to understand anti-immigrant sentiments, there are further reasons to believe that the public would be against immigration. Paradoxically, George Borjas (1994)has shown that immigration has a positive effect on the economy only on the condition that it actually does affect the native wages. When the wages remain the same despite immigration, immigrants reap the entire benefit of migration due to their increased wage [6].Furthermore, if there is no effect on wages and thus no labour market gain from immigration, it is reasonable to infer that the increased costs from factors such as social security, integration efforts, and other public spending, will lead to a fiscal impact. It follows then that immigration must affect the labour market equilibrium for there to be an economic benefit.

Another aspect to consider, is that for there to be an effect on wages, it is a necessary condition that the immigrants and the native workforce have a distinct set of skills Borjas 1994. When this is not the case, the only effect immigration has on the labour market is enlargement. What this means is that highly skilled societies tend to benefit more from low skilled immigrants and low skilled societies tend to benefit more from high skilled immigrants, due to the complement effect that will otherwise be missing.

In order to suggest that immigration has a positive consequence on the society, as long as the aforementioned conditions of substitution and complementation are satisfied, the distributional properties of immigrants must also be discussed. Considering the case where immigration affects wages negatively, it is unlikely that the benefits will be shared equally across the economy. Instead, the benefits tend to fall disproportionally to those employers who are able to make use of the immigrant work force. The conclusion is then that although on utilitarian terms immigrant can be beneficial, it is not necessary so for different groups in the economy. This highlights the importance of analysing which groups tend to be more anti-immigrant and whether this translates to party support.

The economic theory discussed so far provides a theoretical framework through which to analyse anti-

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[6]It has been suggested in alternative research that immigrants tend to adapt their frame-of-reference to the local setting. That is, an immigrant who moves from a poor region to a rich region will perhaps win in the short-run, but they will soon assess their relative position in the society from the standpoint of the target nation, thus not having gained as much, assuming that the immigrant is a low-skill worker.

immigrant sentiments. The lower the socio-economic status of the native worker, the more likely they are to be against immigration, as they are less likely to reap the societal benefits. Also, they are more likely to face a steeper competition in the labour market, if the immigration inflows consists mainly of low-skilled immigrants. On the other hand, the higher the socio-economic status, the more positive their attitude is likely to be, as they are more likely to be complementary to immigrants, and they are also more likely to be able to reap the aggregate benefits.

It seems plausible also to suggest that it is not economic competition alone, but also the fiscal effect which could be driving the anti-immigrant attitudes. Importantly, some other research suggests that so far immigration has encumbered a net cost on the target nations, somewhere in the realm of 0.5 to 2 percent of the annual GDP (OECD2014). Consequently, if immigrants are a burden to the state, this would imply that indeed immigrants are reaping at least some benefits, even if no competition effect is happening. Therefore, two hypotheses that will be tested on the country level are:

2.2.2 Other Considerations and the Hypotheses

Although economic theory and literature provides a solid foundation from which to begin the analysis, there are many reasons to believe that non-economic factors play important roles as well, as was found in the literature: These other factors are sometimes called socio-tropic threat (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014) and they deal with issues that relate to cultural, societal or even psychological issues.

Firstly, some anti-immigrant parties emphasize the threat of non-Western religion. The proponents of this idea tend to put forward an implicit claim that European nations are culturally similar, whereas immigrants from developing nations are dissimilar, and therefore unable to integrate to the target country society. It is argued that the cultural distance leads to a level of unrest, not only between the native and immigration populations, but also within the immigrant populations. The latter follows because immigrant populations are not a homogeneous group, but normally very heterogeneous instead. It is also commonly found that immigrants from different areas tend to have different crime rates than one another. The importance of composition of the immigrant population is therefore central and anti-immigrant attitudes can stem from lack of integration due to cultural distance.

- The 1st hypothesis is that individuals who prefer anti-immigrant parties are more negative towards immigration that is culturally distant. In addition, such individuals are also more likely to be concerned about the cultural effect of immigration rather than the economic effect.

Secondly, as has been argued in some of the earlier research, the role of media can be integral (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007 and Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden, and Van Spanje 2012). It is here that the role of political parties can become particularly crucial, regardless of what factual factors can affect anti-immigrant opinions, if media publishes content that sensationalist, then potentially the actual situation can be secondary. To illustrate, if unemployment affects voting for an anti-immigrant party, but the unemployment rates are not particularly high, the effect might be insignificant. However, if the media content pushes the idea of unemployment as being much higher than it actually is, then the public opinion might shift regardless of the actual situation.

- The 2nd hypothesis is then that media has a significant effect on the probability of preferring an anti-immigrant party

Thirdly, a key finding in some of the studies was the role, or lack thereof, of interpersonal trust. Relating to the role of education, if the public has not come in contact with immigrants, particularly those who are culturally distant, they might hold preconceived notions about them, which will in turn affect their preferences. However, rather than discussing only the social contact theory, it is important to note that many anti-immigrant parties are not identified solely as anti-immigrant, but also as euro-skeptics in opposition to the mainstream politicians. It can then be expected that their popularity is driven by distrust not only towards other people, but also towards institutions.

- The 3rd hypothesis is that interpersonal trust has at least two components in regards to preferring anti-immigrant parties: distrust towards other people and distrust towards political institutions

Fourthly, one common factor across the previous literature seems to be the role of education in countering anti-immigrant attitudes. There are different mechanisms through which this could happen. One relates to economic competition as the skills and specialization gained through education make them less likely to be substitutes to immigrants. On the other hand, education could also provide a better knowledge of the effects of immigration on society, so it can be evaluated on a more neutral basis. It could also be that education is a good route through which to become acquainted with immigrants and foreigners in general, thus creating exposure and contact, which will reduce pre-conceived opinions.

- The 4th hypothesis is then that the higher the individual's education the less likely an individual is to prefer an anti-immigrant party.

As for the country-level factors, if anti-immigrant parties are not only a consequence, but also a cause of attitudes towards immigration. It could be that the small role for unemployment in determining attitudes towards immigration that was found by Hatton (2014) is masked by the choice of the dependent variable. That is to say that unemployment may not affect anti-immigrant attitudes too much, but it may be a key factor in determining the success of an anti-immigrant party. Potentially, this could also lead to a circular mechanism, where unemployment affects anti-immigrant party preference, which affects attitudes towards immigration and again leads to an increasing support for anti-immigrant parties.

There are at least three ways in which way the original effect could occur. Firstly, unemployment in a region may affect the behaviour of other people within the region and their behaviour in turn can affect the behaviour of the individual in question. Secondly, unemployment in the region can affect economic opportunities in the region, thus creating a fear-factor, as well as support for a political alternative, due to a perceived failure of the reigning government. Thirdly, high unemployment could also potentially induce a greater media visibility for anti-immigrant parties, thus giving them more opportunities to gain support.

- The fifth hypothesis is then that unemployment is a key country-level factor in determining anti-immigrant party success.

Overall, the hypotheses are contrived with the aim of confirming previous results and to explicitly link anti-immigrant opinions to anti-immigrant parties. As the variable of interest will be the probability of preferring an anti-immigrant party, the empirical analysis will be able to also test the sensitivity of the results with composition adjustments. For example, it is of interest whether those who prefer anti-immigrant parties are mostly affected by the effect of immigrants on the economy, culture, or the country as a whole. Alternatively,

it can be tested if the economic status or the cultural distance of the immigrant matters more. Furthermore, the approach allows the assessment of the relative importance of institutional distrust versus anti-immigrant opinions. It is difficult to find guidance from theory or even the earlier research on the relative weightings of these considerations, and for this reason they are not tested with explicit hypotheses. It is expected, however, that they will be significant factors.

3 Data and Methods

3.1 European Social Survey

The data used in the empirical analysis section is taken from the European Social Survey. The ESS is a repeated cross-sectional survey collected every other year since the year 2002. However, the latest survey from 2014 has not yet been released, so the analysis is limited to first the six waves from 2002 to 2012. The respondents to the survey are a random sample and their answers are collected through one hour long face-to-face interviews. The topics in the survey cover politics, values, cultures, as well as socio-demographic backgrounds. Some questions relating to these topics are covered only in one or two rounds, and for this reason, only those questions which are collected in each survey are included.

The analysis will also not cover all European countries present in the survey, as not all of them have an explicit anti-immigrant party with a significant following. In addition, it is probable that the rise of anti-immigrant parties in Eastern Europe are driven by different mechanisms than the Western European countries, as their electoral systems and voting systems are very different. For this reason, it is risky to fit them under one model even with controlling for unobserved country effects, which is why only the following 11 Western European countries are included: Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, France, UK, Italy, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Additionally, some countries are omitted from different rounds, such as Austria from the 3rd to 6th rounds, as their results still remain unpublished, so the analysis will be incomplete in some cases.

Applying these limitations, the dataset has altogether 111,115 observations, with each country having roughly between 800 and 1500 observations per round, depending on the size of the population. In general, the smaller the nation the fewer respondents there are and vice versa. The number of observations can be balanced according to post-stratification weights, which can reduce sampling bias and potential non-response bias, in the event that there is some linear dependency between the variable or response of interest and the variables used for post-stratification (*ESS Round 6: European Social Survey (2014): ESS-6 2012 Documentation Report. Edition 2.1. Bergen, European Social Survey Data Archive, Norwegian Social Science Data Services.* N.d.). These weights are provided by the ESS itself and therefore no construction is required.

There are some further issues in the data that warrant discussion, such as the large number of missing variables or refusals to answer particular questions. This provides a serious challenge as it is likely that such answers are not missing randomly, and since the dependent variable is binary, and many of the explanatory variables are continuous, the missing variables cannot be coded differently for analysis. For this reason, any refusals to answer and any missing observations are dropped from the analysis. This unfortunately will limit the scope of the final interpretation as the sample will suffer from self-selection bias and thus the results cannot and should not be generalized too far. At best, the results can be used to extrapolate to that part of the population, which feels strong enough about politics to openly declare feeling closest to a particular party.

Table 3 provides summary statistics of the final data-set. Roughly half of the sample has been cut and 54650 observations are left. However, the number of observations vary a little according to the number of missing responses in some of the explanatory variables. Those variables which have value from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 2 are binary, and the rest are continuous, with the exception of education, which is categorical. Preferring an anti-immigrant party has been coded so that 1 means the respondent prefers an anti-immigrant party and 0

means the respondent prefers a non-anti-immigrant party. The responses to explanatory variables have been coded so that a higher value means a negative response for the variables immigrants are bad for the economy, immigrants are bad for the culture, immigrants are bad for the country, allow immigrants of the same ethnicity, allow immigrants of a different ethnicity, as well as allow poor immigrants. In addition, the values of the first three variables have been transformed from 0 to 10 to 1 to 4, so that comparison is easier [7]. Therefore, a higher value for immigrants are bad for the economy means the respondent thinks immigrants are not good for the economy. As for the other variables, the interpretation can be somewhat confusing in comparison, because a higher value means a positive response for variables trust people, trust politicians, trust EU, satisfied with the state of the economy. Therefore, a high value for trust in EU means that the respondent has a complete trust for EU and vice versa.

The numbers show the mean values for the variables across the sample and it can be seen that the vast majority do not prefer an anti-immigrant party. People on average trust other people more, whereas politicians and EU are less trusted, suggesting that institutions in general are seen as untrustworthy. The opinion on the state of the economy is slightly more positive than negative, whereas all the immigrant variables are above two indicating that on average people are slightly negative towards immigration. Upon further inspection, some other points stand out as well: the overall opinion that immigrants are bad for the culture is lower than for the other two options. This means that overall immigrants are thought to be better for the culture than for the economy or country as a whole. The same applies for allowing immigrants of the same ethnicity, which has a somewhat higher mean value. This indicates that the polarization on the whole sample, appears to be between whether immigrants are good for the economy or good for the culture.

Table 3: Summary Statistics for Micro-level Variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Vote right-wing	54650	.091473	.2882832	0	1
Trust people	54574	6.009089	2.1965	0	10
Trust politicians	54329	4.684607	2.123648	0	10
Trust EU	50531	4.748333	2.235451	0	10
Satisfied with state of the economy	53943	5.556958	2.30024	0	10
Gender	54629	1.493236	.4999588	1	2
Age	54565	49.84488	18.0765	14	102
Education	54650	2.297694	.7902474	1	3
Immigrants bad for the economy	53613	2.472591	.9119132	1	4
Immigrants bad for the culture	53913	2.126129	.9724686	1	4
Immigrants bad for the country	53864	2.537632	.8838546	1	4
Allow immigrants of the same ethnicity	53779	2.072482	.7541703	1	4
Allow immigrants of a different ethnicity	53805	2.341046	.8172527	1	4
Allow poor immigrants	53728	2.403626	.8388382	1	4

[a] Data extracted on 10 Aug 2015 from OECD.Stat

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[7]The same was done by hatton2014public

3.2   Empirical Strategy and Model

A large obstacle that has been a problem for much of the earlier research, and which also haunts this analysis, is that the type of available data is cross-sectional rather than panel data. This implies that many of the novel control techniques that could be more appropriate and reliable cannot be used without making strong assumptions (Angrist and Pischke 2008). Moreover, identifying a quasi-experimental design, such as an instrumental variable or difference-in-differences approach has so far proved to be insurmountable, meaning that causal interpretations have not been drawn. In order to provide robust results it is necessary to discuss those methods which can be applied to this research. Firstly, the model of choice is limited by hierarchical features of the data. Some models such as pooled OLS with clustered standard errors can be used, but no information on the parameters of the distribution of unobserved factors are obtained (Bryan and Jenkins 2013).

Another option is to run either fixed-effects or a random-effects models, which allow for proper control of the country effects. However, specific limitations apply to these methods too, which is why an alternative method is suggested by Mark and Jenkins (2014): a two-step pooled OLS model, where first the individual effects are estimated with country-level dummies and then the country-level effects are estimated using the country coefficients as the dependent variable. The MCMC simulations by Bryan and Jenkins suggest that it is the most efficient and least biased estimator when the number of countries is below 25. However, even then the results of the second-step are likely to be biased and inaccurate to a degree, but weaknesses are still minimized with the chosen method. As the number of countries in the dataset increases then the use of other models becomes more attractive. For example, logit and probit models are efficient when the number of countries is above 30. Same applies to using clustered standard errors, which are too high in the presence of few countries. As the number of countries is in this analysis is only 11, it is appropriate to use a two-step linear probability model.

The model can then be written as

$$\mathbf{Y_{ict}} = \mathbf{X_{ict}}\beta + \mathbf{V_{ct}} + \epsilon_{\mathbf{ict}} \quad \text{with} \quad _\mathbf{i}, ..., \mathbf{N_c}; = \mathbf{1}, ..., \mathbf{C_t}, ..., \mathbf{T}$$

where $\mathbf{y_{ict}}$ is the linear probability of feeling closest to an anti-immigrant party, $\mathbf{X_{ict}}\beta$ is a vector of individual level covariates, $\mathbf{V_{ct}}$ are the country and time fixed effects, and $\epsilon_{\mathbf{ict}}$ is the error term. The country and time fixed effects are included as dummies to model some of the variation that occurs because of them. The covariates are chosen based on the earlier theoretical discussion, where age, sex, and education are the standard socio-demographic variates. The other covariates can be split into four categories: 1) interpersonal distrust, 2) media and perception, 3) effect of immigration, 4) type of immigration. The first includes questions relating to trust in people, politicians, parliament, and the EU. The second includes the time spent following political news on TV and the perception of the state of the economy. The third includes the variables which deal with the variables measuring the perceived impact of immigration, while the fourth deals with the preference for different types of immigration. The purpose of this categorization is to test the hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4 and to allow for a clearer discussion of their relative importance by choosing to exclude them in different specifications. The sensitivity analysis then means that it can be seen which of the four categories are the most interconnected. For this reason, although the estimator used does not allow for a causal interpretation of the coefficients, it does allow for a speculation of the causal channels.

The second step of the regression analysis entails taking the coefficients for each country to obtain the country-effect. The model is then written as

$$\hat{\mathbf{V}}_{\mathbf{ct}} = \alpha + \mathbf{Z}_{\mathbf{ct}}\gamma + \eta_{\mathbf{c}} \quad \text{with} \quad _{\mathbf{c}}; = \mathbf{1}, ..., \mathbf{C_t}, ..., \mathbf{T}$$

Where $\mathbf{V}_{\mathbf{ct}}$ is the regression coefficient from the first-step, α is the constant, $+\mathbf{Z}_{\mathbf{ct}}\gamma$ is the country and time level covariates, and $\eta_{\mathbf{c}}$ is the error term. The first-step controls for variation on the individual level, so the second-step will provide an estimate of the components of the country effects. Due to the low number of observations it is crucial to save as many degrees of freedom as possible. For this reason only two covariates are chosen. National unemployment to test the fifth hypothesis and immigrant inflows. The data for the second-step is taken from the Eurostat database, where unemployment and the immigrant inflows are used from the relevant years.

4 Results

4.1 First-step results

The first-step results are found on table 4. The first model includes all the covariates, the second excludes the Distrust covariates, the third the Effects of Immigration covariates, the fourth the Type of Immigration covariates, and the last excludes both the Effect and Type of Immigration covariates.

The first striking feature is that in the main model trust in politicians has the wrong sign as expected although the coefficient is insignificant. Secondly, the amount of politics seen on the TV on a daily basis is insignificant. This is probably explained by the measure being very crude to begin with, as it ignores for example news from the printed media or the internet. Furthermore, it contains all news and not only immigration related news. Thirdly, education, whether secondary or tertiary, is insignificant and tertiary education has the wrong sign as well. This is very surprising, as according to the reviewed literature, education was a significant factor across the spectrum. Satisfaction with the economy, as well as all the variables relating to immigration directly are significant and they all have the correct sign. One exception remains, which is the curious case, that not allowing immigrants of the same ethnicity as the majority, is negatively associated with anti-immigrant party preference. This suggests that anti-immigrant parties are not against immigration per se, but against immigrants of different ethnicity.

The other models reveal more. Removing Distrust variables in the second model changes the sign for secondary education but it continues to remain insignificant. The distrust also affects satisfaction with the current state of the economy as the variable becomes insignificant, although the coefficient changes little. The immigration variables are largely unchanged with small variations in the coefficients. The third model removes the Effects of Immigration and this also has little effect across the board, beside the sign change for the tertiary education variable. The fourth model eliminates Type of Immigration variables and this appears not to change the results greatly either. The largest effect is that the sign for tertiary education switches back to being positively associated with anti-immigrant party preference, but the coefficient remains insignificant.

The most interesting results are obtained by removing all variables relating to immigration. Trust in people, EU and the parliament remain significant and trust in politicians insignificant. The time spent watching politics

on TV is also insignificant. Importantly, both secondary and tertiary education obtain the correct sign and they also become significant at 10 percent and 5 percent level respectively in this model [8]

Overall the results indicate that the effect from schooling may run through knowledge about immigration, as the removal of Effects of Immigration appears to have a relatively large effect. On the other hand, this is not enough by itself, as also the Type of Immigration variables must be removed for the education coefficients to turn significant. As for the immigration variables themselves, they appear robust to the model specification, and remain largely unaffected by it. Interestingly, culture seems to have the largest coefficient in the main model at a 1,65 percent increase in the probability of preferring an anti-immigrant party for each unit increase on the scale of opposition. For the economy and country variables the coefficient values suggest a 0.98 and a 0.87 percent increases respectively for each unit increase. For the compositional aspects there is a negligible difference between allowing different ethnicities and poor immigrants, with both being associated with roughly 0,2 percent increase in probability per unit increase. The coefficient for allowing same ethnicity immigrants has a slightly weaker effect at 0.13 percent decrease in the probability, for one unit increase in not allowing more of the same ethnicity immigrants.

4.2   Second-step results

The results for the second-step of the model are presented on table 5. It is worth discussing the actual interpretation of the coefficients, which can be somewhat tricky. The first-step estimates the fixed country effects, which is now the dependent variable. Therefore, the second-step estimates the effects of unemployment and immigrant inflows on the country fixed effects, when the individual preference is already controlled for. Therefore, a negative value means that a variable reduces the the country effect of increasing the probability of preferring an anti-immigrant party. As such, it is surprising to see that both of the coefficients are negative. A percentage-point increase in unemployment, for example, leads to a 0.02 unit decrease in the country fixed effects. An increase of thousand immigrants per year will lead to a 0.0003 unit decrease in the country fixed effects. The high R-squared suggests that almost 40 percent of the variation is explained by the two variables. However, it is pivotal to stress, that these results are not robust and that the country levels should be taken at best as pointers. (Bryan and Jenkins 2013).

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[8]To test if any particularly variable is more responsible than the other, a step by step removal of the variables has been conducted as well, but it does not make a difference. All immigration variables must be uncontrolled for, for the coefficient to remain significant.

Table 4: First-step models

VARIABLES	(1) Anti-immigrant	(2) Anti-immigrant	(3) Anti-immigrant	(4) Anti-immigrant	(5) Anti-immigrant
Trust people	-0.00177**		-0.00302***	-0.00236***	-0.00580***
	(0.000853)		(0.000837)	(0.000845)	(0.000824)
Trust EU	-0.00580***		-0.00708***	-0.00588***	-0.00840***
	(0.000944)		(0.000934)	(0.000935)	(0.000930)
Trust parliament	-0.00277***		-0.00361***	-0.00289***	-0.00488***
	(0.00105)		(0.00103)	(0.00104)	(0.00102)
Trust politicians	0.000602		0.000451	0.000745	0.000600
	(0.00115)		(0.00113)	(0.00114)	(0.00112)
TV politics 1 - 2,5 h	0.00471	0.00339	0.00310	0.00419	0.000969
	(0.00348)	(0.00337)	(0.00344)	(0.00345)	(0.00342)
TV politicas 2,5+ h	0.0142	0.0135	0.0123	0.0184	0.0164
	(0.0137)	(0.0131)	(0.0136)	(0.0138)	(0.0136)
Secondary education	-0.00245	0.000781	-0.00557	-0.00310	-0.00969**
	(0.00477)	(0.00461)	(0.00471)	(0.00473)	(0.00470)
Tertiary education	0.00360	0.00260	-0.00454	0.00126	-0.0181***
	(0.00458)	(0.00442)	(0.00450)	(0.00455)	(0.00447)
Satisfied with economy	0.00292***	0.000252	0.00251***	0.00337***	0.00252***
	(0.000825)	(0.000736)	(0.000812)	(0.000818)	(0.000809)
Good for economy	0.00977***	0.0115***		0.0152***	
	(0.00220)	(0.00213)		(0.00214)	
Good for culture	0.0165***	0.0181***		0.0226***	
	(0.00232)	(0.00222)		(0.00226)	
Good for country	0.00867***	0.00982***		0.0144***	
	(0.00231)	(0.00225)		(0.00226)	
Allow same immigrants	-0.0138***	-0.0136***	-0.0112***		
	(0.00334)	(0.00324)	(0.00330)		
Allow diff. immigrants	0.0210***	0.0233***	0.0309***		
	(0.00382)	(0.00372)	(0.00372)		
allow poor immigrants	0.0220***	0.0216***	0.0283***		
	(0.00316)	(0.00306)	(0.00312)		
Constant	-0.0268**	-0.0769***	0.0384***	0.000372	0.182***
	(0.0128)	(0.0113)	(0.0119)	(0.0125)	(0.0109)
Observations	42,800	45,865	43,674	43,476	44,499
R-squared	0.105	0.102	0.101	0.100	0.086

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: Second-step model

VARIABLES	(1) Estimate
Unemployment	-0.0197***
	(0.00326)
Immigrant	-0.000338***
	(7.33e-05)
Constant	0.188***
	(0.0209)
Observations	104
R-squared	0.437

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[a] Immigrant inflows measured in units of 1000s.

5 Discussions

5.1 Is it culture, the economy, media, or education that ultimately matters?

The research question that this thesis sought to answer is who supports anti-immigrant parties and why. The results largely support previous research although some of the results come as surprises. The first hypothesis to be tested was that individuals who prefer anti-immigrant parties would be more negative towards immigration that is culturally distant, and more concerned about the cultural effect of immigration, rather than the economic effect. The results largely support the hypothesis as each model suggest that allowing ethnically different immigrants is less desirable than ethnically similar immigrants. However, what is noteworthy is that anti-immigrant party supporters are more likely to support same ethnicity immigration as non-anti immigrant party supporters. Therefore, to classify anti-immigrant parties as anti-immigrant might be a mistaken label. The result could be understood to suggest a degree of xenophobia within the supporter base as well. However, an alternative explanation is that different ethnicity is associated with a different culture, which renders immigrants from distant cultures less desirable. Indeed, immigrants in general are seen as more of a threat to the native culture rather than to the native economy or to the country itself.

The second hypothesis was that media would have a significant effect on the probability of preferring an anti-immigrant party. Indeed, the role of media has been emphasized by some scholars, but little evidence to support its role is found in the analysis. A likely reason for this is that the unit of measurement "time spent watching political news on TV daily" is a very crude variable. It is unclear whether watching more political news should increase or decrease support for anti-immigrant parties. A better control variable is required, so that the actual content of the media and its effect is being measured, and not the amount of time spent following the media. It could also be that any effect of the media is caught by the other control variables. However, no specification produced significant coefficients in this instance. Worthy of nothing, however, that any study that could control for media content will likely require a different approach and an experimental design should be favored.

The third hypothesis stated that interpersonal trust has two or more components in regards to preferring anti-immigrant parties. One of them being distrust towards other people and the other distrust towards political institutions. The results indicate that euroskepticism is associated with a higher probability of preferring an anti-immigrant party. However, the coefficient is smaller than for the anti-immigrant variables, meaning that while important, EU is of lesser concern on average. As for the composition of the distrust, it appears that distrust of the national government is more important than distrust of politicians, perhaps capturing the effect that at least an anti-immigrant party, which are often in the opposition of the parliament, are trustworthy. Distrust towards people is a significant variable as well, but noticeably lower so than distrust towards EU and the parliament. This sheds some light towards earlier research, which paints a picture of an anti-immigrant individual as distrustful in general. Although it may be true to an extent, these results show that the difference is smaller than anticipated, when controlling for other factors. The distrust factors is potentially driven by the distrust towards political institutions.

The fourth hypothesis was that the higher the individual's education, the less likely they are to prefer an anti-immigrant party. However, the important finding, that education is only significant when anti-immigrant attitudes are not controlled for, indicates that the component in education that prevents support for anti-

immigrant parties, may be knowledge about immigration. An alternative explanation could also be exposure to immigrants from opportunities in school, or even new perspectives as schooling tends to break preconceived notions. Regardless of the correct interpretation, it must be stressed that it is difficult to find an interpretation that supports the labour market competition hypothesis. If the hypothesis were to hold, a significant result could have been expected, when not controlling for which type of immigration to allow. As this did not change the results, it could also be argued that education is simply a poor proxy for labour market skills.

The fifth hypothesis which stated that unemployment is a key country-level factor in determining anti-immigrant party success is difficult to assess. On the one hand, the results were significant, but on the other hand the coefficient was negative. The interpretation would mean that that country fixed effects diminish with higher level of unemployment. This suggests that something happens during periods of unemployment, which lowers preference towards anti-immigrant parties. Same can be said about immigration inflows, which also turned out to have a negative impact. Potentially larger immigrant inflows, when all other things are held constant, could create more contacts and exposure, through which the cultural fears are being overcome.

Having interpreted the results, it is important to state that the results, particularly those of the second-step, are not necessarily robust. Firstly, the issue of missing variables limits the interpretation, as well as generalization from sample to population. Secondly, the model is unlikely to have provided causal estimates and therefore a degree inaccuracy should be expected. Thirdly, many studies have used the European Social Survey data-set, so it is important that future research will attempt to replicate the results on a different sample ([9]). On the other hand, the results appear robust to various specifications but any future research should still attempt a different method on the same questions.

5.1.1 Immigration Policy and What Can We Expect from the Future?

The results suggest that anti-immigrant parties are here to stay. The fact that cultural and economic concerns appear to be driving the anti-immigrant parties suggests that their support is relative rigid as well. However, even without anti-immigrant parties Europe has already earned a reputation as "Fortress Europe" at least since the 1980s, due to the noticeably stricter stance on external immigrationDinan 2004. Yet many holes in the European immigration policy remain and immigration, especially in the form of asylum seekers from culturally distant locations, has continued to increase substantially. Due to the increased inflows of culturally distant immigrants and the prolonged debt crisis, it can be expected that anti-immigrant parties are likely to continue enjoying at least moderate success. Since it appears that reducing or even stopping immigration inflows is main political agenda for these parties, it is reasonable to suggest that harsher attitudes can be expected if the parties are able to enter the national governments.

The freedom of travel within the European Union is well connected to the issue. The increased movement rate within the union enables immigrants to enter in one country and move relatively freely to another. Although the natives do benefit from barriers to entry in the labour market, such as languages, social circles, cultural know-how and so on, the single European market nevertheless can motivate a type of race to the bottom. The country with the most hospitable labour market can be expected to see a larger number of immigrants, due to the demographic pull factor. A potential consequence may be political pressure for Europe to coordinate its immigration policy even further. Therefore, it is possible that anti-immigrant parties will find allies in other

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[9]Of course, this too provides practical obstacles, as few surveys on the scale of the ESS exist.

parties, as the non anti-immigrant parties will become more anti-immigrant. In support of this, it has been argued that so far the driving force behind the transformation from Europe to "Fortress Europe" has been the mainstream right-wing parties (Mudde 2013).

5.2 Concluding remarks

This thesis sought to provide insight into why anti-immigrant parties have become so popular and what this could mean for Europe. The general findings in the empirical analysis section support the notion that it is less the economic factors and more so the cultural factors which drive anti-immigrant parties. What this means for future immigration policy is that education of the general public is likely a key to generate more neutral or positive attitudes towards different cultures and ethnicities It could be a resourceful topic for further research to look into further. On the other hand, as cultural concerns were more important than economic concerns, the implication is, as has been noted by others, that integration policy, which promotes cultural and societal cooperation, could be effective in disarming anti-immigrant sentiments. Although economic concerns had a lesser impact, they are still an issue. Furthermore, they are potentially harder to deal with. It can be speculated that economic concerns are largely driven by the high unemployment rates within the foreign-born populations. Therefore, integration policy is again a key, as placing the focus on finding ways to lower the unemployment rates within the foreign-born population, could lead to results that disperse both economic and cultural concerns. To measure what the role is of foreign-born unemployment rates in the rise of the anti-immigrant parties and how it can affect it, is a topic that future research on this topic should focus. Indeed, as it seems that anti-immigrant parties are here to stay and immigration policy does not seem to be the appropriate tool to disperse anti-immigrant opinions, coming research and policy should place the emphasis on integration policy over immigration policy.

Appendix

Table 6: Summary Statics for Country and Time variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Belgium	54650	.0963403	.2950601	0	1
Switzerland	54650	.0893321	.2852251	0	1
Denmark	54650	.1152608	.3193393	0	1
Finland	54650	.1154437	.3195596	0	1
France	54650	.0819579	.2743031	0	1
UK	54650	.0959927	.2945839	0	1
Italy	54650	.0255078	.1576629	0	1
Netherlands	54650	.1028728	.3037955	0	1
Norway	54650	.115828	.3200215	0	1
Sweden	54650	.1094236	.3121728	0	1
ESS round 2	54650	.1966514	.3974702	0	1
ESS round 3	54650	.1708692	.376398	0	1
ESS round 4	54650	.172516	.3778318	0	1
ESS round 5	54650	.1587557	.3654515	0	1
ESS round 6	54650	.1043184	.3056759	0	1

[a] Data extracted on 10 Aug 2015 from OECD.Stat

Table 7: Country and Time results for the first-step models

VARIABLES	(1) Anti-immigrant	(2) Anti-immigrant	(3) Anti-immigrant	(4) Anti-immigrant	(5) Anti-immigrant
Belgium	0.0168**	0.0102	0.0190***	0.0133*	0.0140**
	(0.00712)	(0.00696)	(0.00689)	(0.00697)	(0.00687)
Switzerland	0.227***	0.224***	0.225***	0.226***	0.216***
	(0.0103)	(0.00979)	(0.0102)	(0.0101)	(0.0102)
Denmark	0.0359***	0.0309***	0.0372***	0.0395***	0.0419***
	(0.00756)	(0.00724)	(0.00730)	(0.00740)	(0.00729)
Finland	0.0115*	0.00443	-0.00150	0.0220***	0.00824
	(0.00662)	(0.00644)	(0.00636)	(0.00639)	(0.00628)
France	-0.0123*	-0.0177**	-0.00928	-0.0159**	-0.0154**
	(0.00727)	(0.00714)	(0.00722)	(0.00707)	(0.00718)
UK	-0.0764***	-0.0770***	-0.0724***	-0.0779***	-0.0726***
	(0.00623)	(0.00600)	(0.00600)	(0.00602)	(0.00588)
Italy	0.0131	0.00760	0.0206**	0.00336	0.00499
	(0.00995)	(0.00988)	(0.00972)	(0.00965)	(0.00944)
Netherlands	0.144***	0.135***	0.145***	0.141***	0.141***
	(0.00888)	(0.00852)	(0.00870)	(0.00871)	(0.00863)
Norway	0.109***	0.102***	0.112***	0.104***	0.106***
	(0.00808)	(0.00768)	(0.00792)	(0.00793)	(0.00787)
Sweden	-0.00127	-0.00459	-0.00376	-0.0165***	-0.0380***
	(0.00623)	(0.00600)	(0.00591)	(0.00596)	(0.00577)
2 ESSround	0.00474	0.00582	0.00648	0.00649	0.00961**
	(0.00458)	(0.00441)	(0.00451)	(0.00453)	(0.00448)
3 ESSround	0.00170	0.00444	0.00355	0.00506	0.00863*
	(0.00490)	(0.00473)	(0.00483)	(0.00486)	(0.00481)
4 ESSround	0.0140***	0.0121***	0.0162***	0.0156***	0.0177***
	(0.00484)	(0.00466)	(0.00480)	(0.00480)	(0.00478)
5 ESSround	0.0383***	0.0428***	0.0382***	0.0403***	0.0407***
	(0.00539)	(0.00523)	(0.00531)	(0.00534)	(0.00527)
6 ESSround	0.0446***	0.0468***	0.0458***	0.0460***	0.0460***
	(0.00579)	(0.00572)	(0.00575)	(0.00573)	(0.00571)
Female	-0.0316***	-0.0337***	-0.0308***	-0.0332***	-0.0338***
	(0.00299)	(0.00291)	(0.00294)	(0.00297)	(0.00294)
Age	-0.000910***	-0.000850***	-0.000945***	-0.000720***	-0.000615***
	(0.000103)	(9.86e-05)	(0.000102)	(0.000101)	(9.91e-05)
Observations	42,800	45,865	43,674	43,476	44,499
R-squared	0.105	0.102	0.101	0.100	0.086

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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