French and German Security Policy:
Close allies with differing views on the intervention in Libya

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Abstract

France and Germany are two closely connected countries with two very different identities. Despite of these differences, they have been cooperating for many years and have represented a driving factor behind European integration. Both have had an interest in making the European Union a global actor with a more united foreign policy. Agreements between the two countries are not an axiom though, as the intervention in Libya has shown. We are going to use this disagreement as a setting for studying the differences between the two countries from constructivist and realist perspectives. This leads to an examination of the French identity as an important, global actor in opposition to the German perception of themselves as a civilian power, with a culture of restraint from military force. To test the relevance of these identities we are applying realist assumptions about national interest and rationality as well as constructivist ideas regarding their approaches to the Libyan crisis. We find that both French and German identities have played an integral part of their decisions, but also that their actions to a differing degree have been influenced by their national interest.

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1. Introduction

Peaceful demonstrations in several cities in Libya, inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts, were violently repressed by the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, which in the spring of 2011 led to an armed rebellion, mainly in the east of the country around the city of Benghazi. The brutality of the military operations performed by troops loyal to Colonel Gaddafi against towns held by the rebels caused an outrage by the international community and made the reporting of the attacks against the civilian population major headlines around the world. In European countries, the United States, the African Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Arab League, the calls for an international intervention to protect civilians gathered strength and put pressure on the UN.

The Security Council, referring to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted Resolution 1973 on March 17th 2011. In Resolution 1973, whose goal was to protect Libyan civilians, it was decided the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya and allowed willing countries to *"take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya"*. Resolution 1973 was submitted by France, Lebanon, and the United Kingdom. The preliminary negotiations had raised the opposition of Russia and China who finally abstained from voting after intense diplomatic activity of President Nicolas Sarkozy. It was passed by South Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, the United States, France, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Five members abstained: Germany, Brazil, China, India, and Russia.

France was the most determined state for the Libya intervention. French President Nicolas Sarkozy made it his mission to organize a multilateral military intervention in Libya, and France has been the first country to recognize the legitimacy of the Benghazi-based rebels. On the other hand, Germany, France's close ally, did not support the Libyan intervention. France and Germany had worked hand in hand since the end of the Second World War, and their relationship had been crucial for the stability of Europe and the evolution of the EU. Nevertheless, the "twin engines" of the European Union had radically differing points of view concerning the Libya intervention.

This raises the question: How can we explain the fact that the close allies that are France and Germany do have opposed views on the Libya intervention, and why did they act differently?

To answer this question, we will use constructivism in order to analyze the importance of identity and history on the differing actions of the two nations and realism to counterweight

constructivism with notions of power and economy. In a first part, we will analyze France's motives to intervene in Libya through constructivism and realism. In a second part, we will explain why Germany did not want to participate to the intervention from constructivist and realist points of view.

1.1 Purpose

We will use the intervention in Libya 2011 to conduct a comparative case study, as we seek to investigate the differences between France's and Germany's security policies. We are going to use constructivist theory to analyse their different identities and the implications they have on their actions. To counterweight this, we will also look into the power politics involved and try to look at their contrasting approaches from a realist perspective. Our objective is to determine which of these theories gives the best explanation of the conduct of the two nations and how they can complement each other. Is it the identities of France and Germany or their national interest which is the most important factor for their differing policies and is it equal results for both?

During the uprising in Libya there were talks among the allied NATO forces about how to react and there was a vote in the UN on the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya which then resulted in a military intervention. France was amongst the nations who were supporting an intervention and Germany was amongst those who criticized it and chose to abstain from voting and did not participate in the operation. Our question is thus, *was it identity or national interest that caused the close allies of France and Germany to act differently with regard to the Libyan crisis?*

1.2 Theory

We have chosen to study the differing security policies of Germany and France from two contrasting perspectives, constructivism and realism. We want to study how the two theories can explain the actions of the two allies and if they are capable of finding various explanations to these differences. We think that both identity and self-interest would explain France's will to intervene and Germany's passivity regarding the intervention in Libya.

Constructivism emphasizes the social aspect of human existence, the influence of the environment and interactions on the formation of our behavior. By applying constructivist

theory we mean to analyse how large a part identity and history has played in forging the differing policies and to how big an extent it was relevant in the Libya intervention. Our hypothesis is that France's long interventionist history in Africa and Germany's reluctance to use force can influence their security policies and attitudes towards the Libya intervention. We are going to use Hanns J. Maull's concept of civilian power, by which he sees a German identity as an anti-militaristic nation who prefers multilateral cooperation and human rights over unilateral actions and self interest. Further we are also going to be criticising this concept from a realist point of view, utilising their more national interest influenced notions of power.

We have chosen to use a realist perspective that, to some extent, is influenced by the work of Kenneth Waltz. Indeed, in *Man, the State and War,* he explains that the causes of war can be explained from three different levels of analysis: the individual, the state and the international level. We will analyze why France intervened in Libya from two levels of analysis: the individual and the state level. We will also use Robert Gilpin's theory, which asserts that a nation is not always trying to maximize its security but is also capable of pursuing other goals such as economic strength as long as it does not jeopardizes this security (Miskimmon 402). This realist approach to examine their actions will mean we will have to seek other explanations such as power and economy. The actions of France and Germany may to a larger extent be derived from economical and security reasons rather than from their identities. From a realist perspective, they will probably be seen to act accordingly to a rational national interest instead of being influenced by a more deeply lying identity. We believe that France has a more direct national interest in Libya as they rely more on a steady supply of oil than Germany who, to a wider extent, uses other energy resources and therefore does not have as strong an incentive to participate in the intervention as France does. We believe that this creates a good foundation for a realist analysis

1.3 Method

We are going to use a qualitative method where we are going to rely on second hand sources to make our analysis. As mentioned, we will include two different perspectives in our paper to compare the French and German security policies, thereby using a comparative method. We will use scientific papers and articles, as well as news articles and official speeches to build our conclusions on.

Discussing Germany, we will use the book of Ruth Wittlinger, *German National Identity in the Twenty-First Century: a Different Republic After All?,* in which she describes

the changes in the German identity after the unification and writes about the development of German foreign policy. To get a constructivist point of view, we are using Maull's paper *Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?,* where he discusses German identity from a role concept of normative, civilian power and the development of the German foreign policy. To counterbalance Maull's ideas about civilian power and the normative value given to it we are going to apply the ideas of Regina Karp's paper *Germany: A 'normal' actor?,* with its criticism of the normative concept and get another, more varied explanation of how Germany is wielding its power. Contrasting the discussion about identity we will also use Alister Miskimmon's work: *German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crises*, making a rational cost/benefit calculation based on the German interests in Libya versus the cost of the intervention.

In order to analyze why France intervened in Libya from a constructivist point of view, we will analyze the French identity which is in large part shaped by Charles de Gaulle's views on France, which he wrote in his War Memoirs, *Mémoires de Guerre*. We will also use official websites of the French government and of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as *France Diplomatie* and *Vie Publique* to understand how France perceive its role in the international system and thus which identity she has. We will also use an article written by Franck Petiteville, *Quatre décennies de "coopération franco-africaine": usage et usure d'un clientélisme*, to analyze which role France has in Africa. In order to offset these constructivist arguments, we will use an article written by Jean-Robert Henry, *Sarkozy, the Mediterranean and the Arab Spring* in which he explains that Sarkozy had personal interests in intervening in Libya, which are due to his strong commitment in the French policy towards Mediterranean countries. Then, we will mostly use figures published by the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) which describe the source of the crude oil imported by France in 2011. We will use these figures to show the importance of the Libyan oil for France's security.

2. France's motives for an intervention in Libya through a constructivist perspective

2.1 The homeland of Human Rights: an identity

On the eve of the French Revolution, the National Constituent Assembly adopted on August 26th, 1789, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. France is proud to have created one of the first republics and to have been one of the first countries to write such

a statement of Human Rights. This text has still a constitutional value: this heritage is at the heart of France's national diplomatic ambitions: France advocates for the ratification of conventions protecting human rights at the global level (France.fr, 2009). Human rights are a priority of France's foreign policy. France sees itself as a promoter of the *Rechtsstat* and an advocate of human rights, two key elements of democratic governance. In fact, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs speaks of "development assistance and democratic governance" as a single concept, categorizing the support of Human Rights as part of its policy on democratic governance (France Diplomatie, 2009).

To demonstrate its commitment to these values abroad, France emphasizes its participation "in the formulation of many of the doctrines and international instruments in the field of Human Rights"(France Diplomatie, 2009). On the diplomatic front, France inspired the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948; it remains active in the Council of Human Rights of the United Nations and supports humanitarian programs of UN agencies and non-governmental organizations. In addition, France is using its capable military capacity to participate in many operations of peacekeeping around the world in countries such as Chad, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, and Kosovo. While France argues that democracy and human rights have "historical significance" for France and its policy, it recognizes that human rights are universal (France Diplomatie, 2009). According to a publication of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, the "promotion and protection of human rights and democratization process is an essential component of the foreign policy of France" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). France is really attached to these two priorities because during the eighteenth century, it was France itself that had to establish a democratic government and assert the rights of its own citizens. The incorporation of these principles in its foreign policy allows France to share these values, which are at the heart of its national identity, with the rest of the international community.

Charles de Gaulle is one of the most important and influential figures in the History of France and its foreign policy, and the Gaullist ideas continue to influence French politics today. Charles de Gaulle is known as a General, the "leader of the Free French" during the Second World War, Statesman and French President. Its policy is primarily associated with the concept of "greatness" of France. In 1954 he wrote in his War Memoirs, "*I, instinctively feel that Providence [created the France] for completed successes or evil practices. [...] In short, in my opinion, France cannot be France without greatness*"(De Gaulle, 1954). De Gaulle believed that France had a unique role in the world, and he has led a foreign policy that

would allow France to carry out this role. Charles de Gaulle clearly communicated the French independence and emphasized its influence on the international scene.

According to constructivism, state behavior is shaped by beliefs, identities and social norms, which are formed through ideas and practices. States and national interests are the result of social identities (Mingst 2010, p.84). Thus, from a constructivist point of view, France's identity is shaped by its history and perception of itself as protector of Human Rights. During the Arab Spring, Human Rights have been violated in Libya. In regards to these violations, Sarkozy stated that these revolutions have generated great hope in the heart of all of those who share the values of democracy and human rights. According to President Sarkozy, the Arab people needed France's help and support, and France had to do it because it is its duty, and thereby, France would assume its historic role as protector of Human Rights (Libération, 2011). By intervening in Libya, France did act in the name of the universal conscience which could not tolerate Gaddafi's crimes.

Resolution 1973 decided the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya and allowed willing countries to "take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya"(Resolution 1973). Thus, Resolution 1973, which permitted the Libya intervention, aimed at protecting Libyan civilians, which is entirely consistent with the French identity.

2.2 Françafrique: the trace of a colonial heritage

For over fifty years, Franco-African relations have been characterized by an undeniable desire of power from the French side. France makes its official African policy an influence policy, conceived as an essential footboard to its audience in the world (Petiteville 1996, p.572). This data has been well summarized by the French Africanist Jean-François Bayart: « *Paris has never stopped thinking its African policy as a simple instrument of its political power. From an Imperial dream in the late nineteenth century to a retreat in good order, from decolonization to conservation management cooperation, continuity was evident*» (Bayart 1992, p.141). This use of the African scene for the purpose of global influence, which is well reflected by the expressions «preserve» or «turf», is indeed one of the major features of the French specificity on the international scene. Charles de Gaulle acknowledged the importance of France's power in Africa to prop up French power on the world stage (Charbonneau 2008,

p.279-295). According to de Gaulle, France is synonymous with grandeur, influence and power, for which colonies were paramount. The fact remains that the geopolitical obsession of maintaining French influence in Africa is characterized by its intangibility through time, to the point that it deeply structured the history of Franco-African relations and created an identity of connectedness that still influences the cooperation.

Indeed, after the Second World War, de Gaulle outlined France's desired relational goals in regard to its colonies. This would not only survive decolonization, but would remain intact through his presidential mandate under the fifth Republic. As noted by Albert Mabileau and Patrick Quantin, the African dimension of de Gaulle's conception of politics puts "*France as the subject of reflection and African countries as means to promote its goals*" (Quantin and Mabileau 1980, p. 54). The authors add: "*For its permanence and ambivalence, the Gaullist representation of Africa (...) conveyed the myths of the colonial consciousness beyond time*" (Ibid., p. 61.) In fact, General de Gaulle's successors had little innovation to do concerning African policy. Despite the significant shifts in the international environment, the French policy towards Africa did not change, and was as a continuation of the rigid Gaullist conception French-African relations.

The term "Françafrique" was used to describe this situation. It was used as a political symbol and as an ideology to authorize, among other things, projects favoring the development of African natural and human resources to the benefit of France. France doesn't hesitate to use military force to protect this development. Indeed, no Western government has, since the 1960s, been engaged in Africa as much as France has and no other former European colonial power has maintained, in the post-colonial era, a relationship with Africa in the way France has. Since the 1960s, the French army intervened to nearly forty times on African soil (Fourt, 2010). This makes the Libya intervention a part of a long tradition of France as an intervener, which constitutes a part of the French identity as a powerful actor in Africa.

Because of its colonial past, its long tradition of interventionism and its influence in Africa, France sees itself as being the country that has the most legitimacy to intervene in African countries. This identity is deeply rooted in French minds. Indeed, 70% of the French population saw the French participation in the Libya intervention as legitimate which is in stark opposition to how the majority of the Germans thought (Political Overview 2011, p.29). On the other hand, It would be wrong to represent the policy of French influence as a unilateral decision imposed by the former colonial power. While France is undoubtedly the western country that intervened the most in Africa, it does not systematically act according to its national interests. In some cases, France intervened following requests by African leaders,

although French national interests were not at stake, thus showing that the French identity as a leader and protector of Africa is still relevant.

An example of this can be found in the case of Chad: African Heads of State called moderate, who were worried about Colonel Qaddafi's intentions in Chad, have regularly relied on a French intervention in this country, and when they believed a withdrawal of France was imminent, they did not hesitate to pressure on the French government (Petiteville 1996, p.577). The French identity as protector of the stability in Africa is shared by the communities of both Africa and France, which reinforces itself. Thus, the Libya intervention is seen as legitimate both from the French and the African point of view.

3. France's motives for an intervention in Libya from a realist point of view

According to realism, all military intervention justified on humanitarian grounds have been, are and will be driven by national interests, for the simple reason that states are not and should not be altruist because their main purpose is to defend the interests of their citizens and to ensure their own survival. Thus, the arguments advanced by the constructivists concerning the reasons why France intervened in Libya are greatly opposed to those of the realists. In *Man, the State and War, a theoretical analysis*, Kenneth N. Waltz uses three levels of analysis to explain the causes of war. This categorization gives three different sources of explanation: the individual, the state and the international system. In this second part, we will use two of these three levels to explain the reasons why France led the Libya intervention. We will begin with the individual level and define Sarkozy's interests in intervening in Libya. Then we will analyze the French national interests that could be achieved by waging the Libya intervention.

3.1 The Libya intervention or "Sarkozy's War"

By focusing on the individual level, the personality, perceptions, choices and activities of individual decision makers and participants provide the explanation a state's actions (Mingst 2010, p.68). According to classical realist Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws which are rooted in the nature of 'Man'. With respect to the individual level of analysis, the central actor in France concerning the Libya intervention is then-President Nicolas Sarkozy. In fact, Sarkozy committed himself to the Libyan "adventure in a way that has rarely been seen by a western leader during a post-Cold War international crisis" (Bagehot, 2011). What are the reasons of this strong commitment? According to classical realists, who have a very

pessimistic view on human nature, individuals are power seeking, selfish and antagonistic (Mingst 2010, p.74). Indeed, Saint Augustine believed that men are egoistic and selfish, and that these characteristics were the causes of war. Thus, according to the realist view of men, Sarkozy's motives to intervene in Libya are nothing but the fruit of his personal interests. Sarkozy has been criticized on his decision to intervene in Libya because aside from the official justification that was to "leave the Libyan people choose its own destiny" (Libération, 2011), former president Sarkozy used this intervention to serve his personal interests that are described as a combination between a wish to restore his presidential image as well as Sarkozy's desire to see his prestige project, a Mediterranean union further developed (Bagehot, 2011).

In 2011, Nicolas Sarkozy was at his lowest in the polls for the 2012 presidential elections. Indeed, on March 3rd 2011, only a few days before the adoption of the UN resolution 1973, only 21% of the French intended to vote for Sarkozy at the first round of the 2012 presidential elections (Le Parisien, 2012). Since the beginning of his five-year mandate, and especially during the two first years, Nicolas Sarkozy made mistakes that deteriorated his reputation and popularity. As a response to these mistakes, Sarkozy said that it took him "a few months" to "make president." "It took me some time to find the balance between proximity and solemnity," he said (Le Monde, 2012). Therefore, Sarkozy staked everything on the last year of his mandate to reestablish his presidential image and in this way win the 2012 presidential elections. By making the choice of intervening in Libya, Sarkozy attempted to please the 70% of French people who supported the intervention in Libya (Political Overview 2011, p.29).

The relationship between France and the Mediterranean has been such a major diplomatic and personal concern for Nicolas Sarkozy that we can legitimately speak of "Sarkozy's Mediterranean policy" (Henry 2012, p.405). On February 7th 2007, in Toulon, during his presidential campaign, Nicolas Sarkozy presented his Mediterranean Union project. He stated that it would become the major purpose of the French foreign policy for his five years mandate. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was launched on the 13th July 2008 at the Paris Summit. The UfM's aim was to constitute a framework for political, economic and social relations between the European Union and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (History, Union for the Mediterranean). Therefore, Libya has been invited to participate to the UfM. However, the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was the only leader who rejected Paris' invitation to attend the UfM's first session in 2008. According to Gaddafi, the UfM takes economic projects that have already failed in the earlier attempt to create a

union for Mediterranean, the "Barcelona Process", launched in 1995 by the EU and the Mediterranean countries. Gaddafi was not satisfied by this Union for the Mediterranean and responded that Libya did not belong to the European Union but to the Arab League, and that Libya would not deign to accept this offer. Moreover, he has accused the EU of wanting to dominate the North African countries, once under European colonial rule (EU Observer, 2008). Nicolas Sarkozy's dear project was therefore halted largely because of Gaddafi. Thus, Nicolas Sarkozy had clear interest in getting rid of Gaddafi of the circle of the leaders concerned by his project.

3.2 France's interest for the Libyan "Black Gold"

By analyzing a phenomenon from the state level analysis, we find the explanation in characteristics of the state: the type of government, the type of economic system, interest groups and national interests (Mingst 2010, p.68). On an official website of the French government, it is written that "France intends to retain the ability to act alone if its national interests and bilateral commitments require it to do so" (Vie Publique, 2011). By this statement, we understand that France does not hesitate to intervene in a country if its national interests are at stake and according to realism, states are driven by their national interests. Thus from a realist point of view France intervened in Libya because of national interests. But what are these interests that were at stake due to the Libyan civil war? France is far from being self-sufficient in oil. In 2010, only 1% of needs were met by the France's production, according to statistics from the French Union of Petroleum Industries (Hamza, 2012). This need to import energy creates a great interdependence which makes France willing to utilise all necessary means to secure these interests.

According to the French National Institute for Statistics and Economics Studies (INSEE), the French branch of Eurostat, the oil consumed in France is imported from four large regions: Africa, ex-USSR, the Middle East, and the North Sea (Insee, 2012). As we have seen, the import of oil is crucial for the French economy and thereby, their security. The region that has seen its oil exports to France increased the most since the last thirty years is Africa. In fact, the share of oil consumed in France imported from Africa accounted for 16.3% in 1979, whereas it represented 32.1% in 2010. In 2010, half of the oil imported from Africa was actually extracted in Libya. The rate of Libyan oil importation increased steadily from 2003 to 2010, evolving from 4.2% in 2003 to 15.9% in 2010 which made Libya a major oil supplier and thereby a key actor for French security. Before the Revolution, France was

Libya's second client for oil. Economic relations between Libya and France were essentially based on the import of Libyan oil to France. Indeed, French imports from Libya were composed more than 99% of hydrocarbons (France diplomatie, 2012).

However, the import of Libyan oil in France fell by 68.9% between 2010 and 2011: the Libyan oil accounted for only 4.9% of imports in 2011. According to INSEE, this is a result of the Libyan conflict and has led France to change its map of oil suppliers. Libyan exports were offset by contributions from Algeria, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Ghana and Kazakhstan (INSEE, 2012). Nevertheless, these "substitute" countries do not replace the precious and promising oil importer that Libya was. In February 2001, given the continuing deterioration of the situation in Libya, the French oil group Total started to suspend its oil production on some of its facilities. "We started to suspend some of our production capacity" in Libya, told a spokesman for the group (La Tribune, 2011) . This created problems to the French supply of oil which in turn threatened France's economy.

According to realism, oil is a strategic goods that is fundamental for states' survival which is their primary goal. From a realist point of view, states desire stability in the availability of supplier countries and commodities (Mingst 2010, p.123). Thus, the revolution in Libya, which, as we have seen, has destabilized the oil market in Libya, could be seen as a risk to the security of the French state. As a result, France engaged in a military intervention in Libya to try to restore order in Libya as soon as possible, and thereby revive the oil industry in Libya.

A rumor released by the French daily *Libération* on September 1st, 2011 indicates that a secret agreement on oil was passed between France and the new Libyan authorities, the National Transitional Council. *Libération* was based on a letter, dated from April 3rd 2011, 17 days after the adoption of the UN resolution 1973, in which it was stipulated that "with regard to the oil agreement passed with France in exchange for the recognition of our Council, we have delegated brother Mahmoud at the London summit as the legitimate representative of Libya to sign this agreement assigning 35% of total crude oil to the French in exchange of full and ongoing support to our Council" (Libération 2011). This letter was addressed to the office of the Emir of Qatar because this country is from the beginning of the uprising the intermediate between France and the NTC.

Even though the authenticity of this letter has not been verified and has been denied by the French government and the NTC, the NTC did not hide that the priority for reconstruction and the allocation of oil contracts would be given to countries that have supported the revolt. Given the high costs of the Libya intervention (The Ministry of Defence refers to 1 million

Euros per day), the French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppé reassured the French people by stating that "the intervention of France in Libya is an investment for the future" (Le Point, 2011). Therefore, by this statement, Juppé declares that there are economic interests in Libya and that these interests will be met through the intervention in Libya. It can therefore be assumed that agreements on oil had already been signed before the start of the intervention in Libya, which motivated France to intervene in Libya in order to satisfy these economic interests, which, as we have seen, are almost entirely related to oil.

4. A constructivist analysis of Germany's refusal of the Libya intervention

4.1 A troubled History and civilian power

There are some major differences between France and Germany in their history and identity that plays an important part in how they behave on the international stage. France has a long and unbroken history of being a major power and Germany has risen from the ashes of World War II (Lehne, 2012). After the War Germany was divided and had a completely changed perception of itself. From having had imperial aspirations, it was now a country seeking multilateral solutions to global problems, who created a policy of avoiding power politics and the use of military force (Lehne, 2012). Germany had become a nation, that according to Maull, was "*built on cooperation instead of competition, on the pursuit of wealth rather than power, on a quest for integration through transfer of sovereignty instead of a vain search for autonomy, dominance and status*", something he defines as a civilian power (Maull, 2004, p. 3). This was partly a result of the WWII victors' desire to keep Germany pacified but also because of the new, strong culture of 'never again' among the German elites and population. The meaning of the 'never again' policy was that Germany would not engage in any aggressive wars and instead build a nation as a ´civilian power´, which would use civilised methods such as the rule of international law and willingness to sacrifices sovereignty to supranational organisations (Maull, 2004, p. 4).

This view of Germany´s role on the international stage kept its dominating influence until after the unification. As Germany grew bigger and stronger, other nations started to expect more and there were talks about Germany playing a bigger role in the international community. After a few years, the pressure from its allies started to build. Especially the US was pushing for a sharing of the burden and led an active attempt to make Germany contribute more as part of military and peacemaking operations (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 118). It

still was very hard for the Germans to perceive themselves as a military power, which has been proved through their reticence every time military measures have been brought up as means to solve international problems. (Maull, 2004, p 9).

The mounting pressure eventually pushed Germany into a rapid development of the policies from the former Bonn republic, which resented the use of force. As there were talks about Germany taking on greater responsibility in the international community again, the questions about using military force in multilateral operations started to intensify. In 1993 the UN secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali said that the international community would not have any objections if Germany participated militarily in multilateral operations. This view though, was not shared among the majority of the German public who did not want to see their troops deployed around the world and Germany kept a quite neutral policy which fitted with their identity as a civilian power (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 118).

This policy of restraint continued thus after the unification but combined, the pressure from its allies and the national discourse were starting to change Germany. This had the effect that Germany reluctantly began to 'normalizing its policies. From being held back by the division and their history, it was to some degree, beginning to act more as a ´normal´ western power. Germany was starting to fulfill the expectations of its allies, while at the same time trying to stay out of power politics (Bickerton, 2011, p. 39). The first major changes came along with a change of government, when the Red and Green coalition came into power 1998. They were able to legitimately distance themselves from Nazi-Germany which gave them a bigger freedom to maneuver. They used two different approaches to build the new German identity: they focused on their big historical responsibilities from the horrors of the Second World War, while at the same time started to see Germany and German identity as something positive (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 44).

This gave Germany a new issue to deal with as their dedication to multilateral cooperation was now going to make it difficult to maintain the antimilitarism that had dominated since the Second World War. The military participation in the Balkans was a sign that Germany was ready to use some military force even if it did not perceive itself as a ´normal´ power (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 121). The lengthy discussions before Germany agreed to deploy troops in the Operation Allied Force against Serbia 1999, showed that it still was not easy for Germany to see itself use military force as a tool even when there was a genocide taking place in Europe (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 394). The result of these discussions was nonetheless very important, as Germany took its first big steps by deploying troops in a major

conflict and as Wittlinger writes, Germany was starting to evolve *"from a security consumer to a security exporter even if this involved military means"* (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 121).

Even though Germany was starting to use force as a political tool, it was still very clear on only deploying force when it was the last solution and for defensive or humanitarian reasons as well. Germany was also very careful so that their actions would not be seen as a return to power politics. It insisted on acting through multilateral cooperation and on using military measures only in cases regarding international peace and protecting human rights (Maull, 2004, p. 8). These premises made it clear that Germany might not take part in all of their allies' international operations, which could be seen both as a continuation of their civilian power policy but also as a break with their aspirations to be a part of the international community and a dependable partner (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 401).

4.2 Rising confidence and new assertiveness

The mission in the Balkans made it clear that ethical reasons were very important for Germany to use military force. It was also a way for the Germans to show that they were now a reliable international partner who was ready to participate even when it involved the use of force (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 127). This, combined with Germany's expanding role in the EU, gave it a growing confidence and a rising sense of importance and an awareness of its political weight (Lehne, 2012)(Miskimmon, 2012, p. 394). After the 9/11 terror attacks, Germany showed great support for the US and their efforts in Afghanistan, that they also supported militarily. The support for the US policy was not an axiom though, as it appeared when president Bush started talking about an axis of evil, pre-emptive strikes and an invasion of Iraq. At that point, Germany´s limitations were met and they refused to have any part of the invasion and even voted against a UN resolution on the matter (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 132).

The chancellor at the time, Gerhard Schröder, took a very clear on stance against the war in Iraq and was determined on a German policy that was not build on war but was based on peace and democracy instead, something he saw as contrasting the American policy. He emphasised that German policy were made in Berlin and nowhere else and made it clear he did not support the US views and disagreed on some dimensions of the war on terror (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 129). This demonstrated two things: that Germany still was not ready to deploy military force if was not the last resort and also that Germany had a changed perception of itself and the obligations it had to fulfill in their multinational partnerships, since it no longer felt obliged to follow its allies on important international issues. This forced

the US to see Germany more as an equal whose support could no longer be taken for granted and Germany made it clear that it would not follow a US policy if it did not conform with the German approach (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 131).

As Germany started to build their own sovereign identity, it begged the question of which international operations Germany should participate in and how they would contribute to them. The discussions in Germany remained in part on how it was supposed to deal with its history. Should it share a larger part of the burden of multilateral military missions or should their historical actions compel them to advocate a more non-military and pacifist approach to international issues (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 394)? With Merkel coming into power in 2005, the new regime was quick to underline that the German policies would remain in the same mold as before: Germany would remain an actor who follows international law and defends human rights, while gradually taking a more active role on the global stage (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 132). Merkel soon criticised the US over Guantanamo, Russia for breaking human rights and China over Tibet, thereby underlining that Germany had an independent policy and would not shy away from taking their own path (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 134-135).

Germany´s quest to get a permanent place on the UN security council (at least until the EU gets one) is a good expression of how Germany is now identifying itself as an important actor on the global stage but as their attempt to give the EU a place on the UNSC as well, also proves that Germany puts a big value on the multilateral cooperation between states (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 135). Its preference for multilateral cooperation along with its independent identity, create some challenges for the German security policy concerning when to follow their allies or not, since they also stands for anti-militarism. This becomes increasingly difficult as Germany does not have a coherent national security policy which makes every new situation something that must be discussed in debt in the Bundestag before Germany can act (Maull, 2004, p. 18)(Lehne, 2012).

As the case of Libya shows, Germany was not ready to lead an offensive mission in another country as long as there were factors they saw as big uncertainties. Foreign minister Westerwelle described the situation as *"unpredictable"* and when asked about Germany´s stand, he said *"Your own instinct is to say 'We have to do something.' But military intervention is to take part in a civil war that could go on for a long time"*. He then went on to say that *"Germany has a strong friendship with our European partners. But we won't take part in any military operation and I will not send German troops to Libya."* Instead Germany would focus on targeted sanctions and political pressure which he explained with *"Considering alternatives to military engagement is not the same as doing nothing"* (Harding,

2011) something that from a constructivist perspective can be seen as Germany holding on to its identity of anti-militarism even when their allies do not agree, as Westerwelle was expressing these views at the same time that most of Germany's closest allies were pushing for a UN resolution to intervene in the conflict.

These points put together show that the German identity of anti-militarism and multilateralism is still a dominant force in Germany, but also that they are willing to break some of their preferences for civilian means, if a situation arises in which the only solution is a military one. This shows from a constructivist point of view that the German identity of multilateral cooperation is valued but that the culture of restraint is strong and that Germany still has difficulties with deploying troops unless it is done as a last resort and purely for humanitarian reasons. This goes well with Germany´s preference, since the Second World War, which is to use diplomatic and economical means instead of force to wield their influence. In Germany, there is a strong opinion that military force is normatively worse than any other form of power and that it should be avoided as far as possible. Maull argues that Germany is a security-policy ´paradox´ because they have continued the policies from the time before the unification and has not tried to pursue power in the ´normal´ way, which he explains as the underlying identity of the Germans (Karp, 2009, p. 17).

5. A realist analysis of Germany's refusal of the Libya intervention

5.1 Germany´s way to secure power

Even if you assume that Germany has an identity where they prefer to use civilian power, it does not prove that they do not use their civilian strength to influence others and impose their way even without the use of military force. It is only if you presume that the use of civilian power to achieve influence is normatively more benign than the use of military force, that a so called civilian power is something that cannot be analysed from a realist perspective (Karp 2009, p. 17). This civilian power could be seen as Germany making use of their size and powerful economy to influence other nations, as it is seen in the EU (Karp, 2009, 14) and they can thereby be perceived as a state in a realist sense, with self-interest as the driving factor (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 394). The difference between Germany and France is that Germany prefer not to use military force unless it is utterly necessary and instead utilises other means to reach their goals. As Karp puts it *"a civilian power is not a military power but*

it can, and usually does, pursue long-term strategic economic interest with clearly instrumental strategies" (Karp, 2009, p. 17).

As Germany has been militarily involved in several conflicts it is now questionable if Germany is a civilian power any more. If you take the participation in the interventions against Serbia and Afghanistan versus the nonparticipation in Libya, you can see some differences that explain why they chose to act as they did. The war in former Yugoslavia and the genocide by Serbia was taking place in Europe and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were partially planned in Germany (BBC News, 2005). Therefore both of these interventions can be seen as ways for Germany to neutralise threats against their security and to prove their credentials as an international actor to cement their place in the international community (Wittlinger, 2010 , p.126-127) while the Libyan situation was not perceived as a threat and thus was not an intervention deemed necessary.

5.2 A Cost/Benefit analysis and room for maneuver

To analyse Germany from a realist perspective, you obviously have to consider security reasons but if you also count in economical factors the explanatory "power" is rising significantly. In the case of Libya, there are several factors that made Germany abstain from voting and participating in the intervention. As foreign minister Westerwelle put it when he explained the German decision:*"We calculated the risk"* and *"it is also clear that we cannot threaten military action against every country in north Africa where there is injustice"* (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 397). When you think of this against a backdrop where Germany had participated in some recent military operations, it could be seen as if Germany did not have any interest in participating in Libya, since it was not in their national interest and therefore made a decision based on their relative gains.

Maybe more important than anything else when you study Germany´s decision not to join in the intervention, is to make a cost/benefit analysis of Germany´s losses and gains from participating. Apart from normative factors, there are several other indications on why Germany would not be interested in getting involved in the conflict. First of all there was the possibility of being tied down in a lengthy and costly conflict, something Germany would prefer to avoid, as they were deeply occupied with the euro-zone crisis and thereby already under some economic pressure (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 402). Moreover, Germany was, according to Miskimmon, not satisfied with the planning of the mission and thought of the

intervention plan as rash, which did not help to ease their fears of a long and economically demanding involvement (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 397).

If you take a look at Libya´s importance to German economy, it is clear that Libya was not a crucial trading partner and that Germany did not stand to lose a lot if they did not participate in the intervention (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 402). Germany was not dependant of Libyan crude oil, who exported about 14 percent of their oil to Germany and thereby did not represent any security threat (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 402). Instead, Germany's most important trading partner in energy was Russia, where a large part of their energy imports originated from (U.S. Energy Information Administration). This makes German relations with Russia very important and even though a realist approach might suggest that countries such as Germany would be bandwagoning to the powerful US, the relations with such a crucial energy supplier should not be underestimated. So although Germany appreciate their strong ties with the US, they do not mind occasionally being on the same side as Russia, who they also perceive as an integral part of their security (Karp, 2009, p. 28).

This could explain why Germany did not find it important or critical enough to participate in the intervention in Libya, even though it could hurt their long term collaboration with their closest allies. By choosing not to participate, it could also be argued that Germany is trying not to be tied down by multilateral commitment and to keep their options open, as they balance the relations with its allies in the west and Russia to the east (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 402). Germany did not see the Libya crisis as an acute risk and did not perceive it as a particular threat to their security. This might have tipped the weight to focus on economic factors and the relations with Russia in a quest for relative gains (Lehne, 2012).

6. Conclusion

By using constructivism in order to explain the reasons why France intervened in Libya, we found the explanation in the French identity. The two aspects of the French identity that we have used to explain France's participation in the intervention in Libya are: its wish to promote Human Rights around the world and its deep tradition of intervener in Africa. As we have seen, France is proud of being the "homeland of Human Rights", a heritage that dates back to the French Revolution. When Gaddafi's son promised that "rivers of blood will run through Libya" if the protesters didn't accept the reform offers, the international community mobilized itself. In the name of Human Rights, France saw itself obliged to fulfill its historic

role, and thus to protect the Libyans from Gaddafi's crimes. France launched the Libya intervention because it wants to maintain its tradition of Human Rights promoter. France wants to keep its reputation of "homeland of Human Rights" in order to stay important and influent. As we have seen, France looks after the promotion of Human Rights around the world, but is particularly attentive for the African continent and does not hesitate to intervene in Africa. France's old and strong links with Africa, which constitute a part of the French identity, have played a role in France's participation in the Libya intervention as well. These cultural, military and economic relations make France to think it has a great influence in Africa. As we have seen, France perceives itself as a legitimate intervener when conflicts erupt in Africa. Thus, through the constructivist perspective, this dimension of the French identity also explains why France intervened in Libya. However, France did not intervene in every conflict around the world, not in all the African conflicts, where Human Rights were violated. Constructivism cannot explain why France did not intervene in all the other conflicts. We know that the decision of intervening in military interventions is not made randomly. Thus, there must be other reasons for France to intervene in Libya, but constructivism is not able to grasp them.

By applying the realist theory to the case of the French participation to the Libya intervention, we had to think in terms of interests. We have used two level of analysis: the individual and the state level. Analyzing which of Sarkozy's personal interests could be achieved by making France intervene in Libya was interesting because Sarkozy had a leader role in the Libya intervention. Indeed, he was the one who convinced President Obama who was hesitating about intervening or not, and he also persuaded China and Russia not to block the negotiations by their veto. From a realist point of view, Sarkozy decided to intervene in Libya to try to restore his presidential image and to revive his project, the Union for the Mediterranean, which was partially blocked because of Gaddafi. From the state level analysis and from a realist point of view, France intervened in Libya in order to restore the stability which put at stake its Libyan oil imports. Thus, France had to intervene in Libya as soon as possible in order to protect its own security. Realism gives arguments that constructivism cannot grasp. Realism clearly shows that France had interests in Libya, especially oil. Indeed, oil is a very important resource for France's security, and as we have seen, the Libyan oil represents an important share of the French imports of oil. Thus, France had an urgent need to restore stability in Libya. In the case of the intervention in Libya, France used its identity of intervener as its official arguments for the intervention. Indeed, the official justification of this intervention was the protection of the Libyans. However it is clear that France had major

national interests in Libya, and these interests are quite obvious. Neither constructivism nor realism can grasp all the reasons why France intervened in Libya. These two theories complement each other in this case.

By using constructivist theory, it becomes very clear that France and Germany has completely different perceptions of themselves and two almost opposite identities when it comes to security policy and the use of military means. We think that constructivist theory has a strong explanatory power when it comes to Germany's resistance to utilise military force as a political tool. They have only used military means on few occasions and only intervened in conflicts when they perceived themselves as having a just cause. This reluctance of using military means to further ensure their security is hard to explain for realist. Even though Miskimmon tries to make a case for the prioritisation of economic factors, its difficult from a realist point of view, when Germany goes against a state as powerful as the US when they might would have expected a policy of bandwagoning.

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The German preference for multilateralism and willingness to participate in supranational cooperation is also somewhere that constructivism has an advantage over realism, which with its focus on the sovereign nation state can find that difficult to explain. The perception of Germany as having a culture of restraint when it comes to using military measures and an insistence on multilateral coalitions is more easily explained by the German identity and influence from their history than of pure German national interest. The German identity as a civilian power is deeply rooted in the population as well as strong anti-militaristic sentiments. Though, as we have seen in our analysis, it is also combined with a sense of responsibility towards protecting universal humans rights, something that has led to some difficult decisions for the Germans after which they have participated in some militarily

operations. Their choice not join the intervention in Libya can therefore be seen as a bit of a paradox when you consider the rate at which Gaddafi was killing civilians.

This is where realism might have an advantage on constructivism: Germany's view of itself as having a historical responsibility to protect human rights arguably should have persuaded them to join in the intervention. We think that the realist explanation of how an economically pressed Germany, who thought it more important to save the euro-zone and their own economy than getting committed in a costly engagement, decided not to participate in a Libyan intervention. It could be seen as a continuation of the German anti militarism, but that would create problems with how to explain their earlier interventions in Serbia and Afghanistan. The problem with this advantage in explanatory power is that it is not as durable if you, as mentioned above, take into account the strong resistance of using force if it is not as a last resort, something the Germans expressed concern about in the build up to the intervention. If Germany had not taken such a public stance against the operation they might have been able to avoid spending substantial resources while at the same time keeping their partners in the NATO satisfied. When Germany insisted on abstaining on the vote, they arguably did so because of their normative believe in civilian solutions and thereby giving preference to the constructivist theory.

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