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State-building in Somalia

Voices from the "International community" and the "Somali diaspora"

Author: Samira Elmi
Bachelor's thesis: SOCK01, 15 hp
Spring semester 2013
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Abstract

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Somalia has been a failed state since 1991, which has made it questionable whether the country would be able to rebuild its state. This thesis aims at understanding the factors affecting the state-building process in the country based on voices from interviewees belonging to the "International community" and the "Somali diaspora". To gain an understanding of what implications the factors could have on the reconstitution of a Somali state, a Weberian inspired theoretical framework was applied. This thesis argues that three main categories i.e. political, social and economic factors can be identified as having implications on the state-building process. However, the political aspects are highlighted as the most important. Furthermore it is argued that the ideal state model, as a Eurocentric discourse, evolves to the "hegemonic powers" advantage, thus supporting their dominant position, which makes it questionable if the Somali state can adapt to such a model.

Keywords: Somalia; state-building; Weberian ideal state; social contract; power relationships; Eurocentric discourse

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List of abbreviations

EU – European Unions

EUSR – European Union Special Representative

FOI – Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut

HOA – The Horn of Africa

AMISOM – African Unions Mission in Somalia

AU – African Union

TFG – Transitional Federal Government

UI – Utrikespolitiska institutet

UICs – Union of Islamic Courts

UN – United Nations

UNOSOM – United Nations Operation in Somalia

USC – United Somali Congress

1. Introduction

"Before you can have democracy or economic development, you have to have a state".[1] But, how does a country build a state? During the 1980s and early 1990s a neoliberal[i] view dominated development policy discussions; thus, questions of state-building and state capacity were excluded. As part of the push for liberalization and a minimalistic state, the scope of the state was reduced in developing countries through privatization, subsidy cuts, deregulation etc. However, these donor-imposed programs were often counterproductive. In many African states for example, former colonial administrative systems existed alongside neopatrimonial[ii] regimes that competed for resources and often felt threatened by Weberian rational bureaucracy. Donor conditionality was therefore used as an excuse by regimes to expand and protect the scope of the neopatrimonial state, while reducing the "modern" state sectors.[2] Today, several African states are among the weakest in the world;[3] unable to preserve rule of law, guarantee territorial integrity and support development among other Weberian state functions.[4] During the 1990s, the weakness or collapse of these states resulted in human rights and humanitarian disasters in countries like Haiti, Cambodia, East Timor and Somalia.[5] Subsequently, it has been concluded that development is mostly affected by institutional and political rather than economic factors.[6]

In the case of Somalia, there was an inability to establish a central government after the downfall of the dictatorial Barre regime in 1991. In a state of anarchy, clan-based groupings (Somaliland and Puntland) and militant Islamic groupings (southern and central Somalia) gained control of different parts of the country.[7] Several internal and external actors tried and failed in reconstructing the Somali state. Due to these failures, the world community's involvement in the country was reduced to food aid.[8] However, as global problems such as terrorism, poverty, trafficking and AIDS are seen as closely related to weakness or failure of states,[9] the world once again turned its attention to Somalia during the 21st century as the

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[1] Fukuyama, Francis. *"STATENESS" FIRST.* Journal of Democracy, Vol.16, Nr.1, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005 p.84 [DOI: 10.1353/jod.2005.0006]

[2] Fukuyama, Francis. *The Imperative of State-Building.* Journal of Democracy, Vol.15, Nr.2, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004, pp.26-29 [DOI: 10.1353/jod.2004.0026]

[3] Jackson, Robert H. and Rosberg, Carl G. *Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood. World Politics*, Vol. 35, No. 1, Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp.1-24 [ISSN:0043-8871]

[4] Verhoeven, Harry. *The self-fulfilling prophecy of failed states: Somalia, state collapse and the Global War on Terror.* Journal of Eastern African Studies Vol. 3, No. 3, 2009, pp.405-425 [DOI: 10.1080/17531050903273719]

[5] Fukuyama 2004:18

[6] Ibid. pp.26-29

[7] Normark, Sture. 'Inbördeskriget'. In Lena Hagberg (ed.), *Somalier: grundinformation.* Norrköping: Statens Invandrarverk, 1993 p.25; Leonard, David K. with Samantar, Mohamed S.. *What Does the Somali Experience Teach Us about the Social Contract and the State?*. International Institute of Social Studies, Development and Change 42(2), Published by Blackwell Publishing, 2011 p.559 [DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7660.2011.01702.x]

[8] Shinn, David H. 'Somalia and the International Community: Facing Reality'. In Ulf Johansson Dahre (ed.), *Predicaments in the Horn of Africa: 10 years of SIRC Conferences in Lund on the Horn of Africa.* Lund: Media-Tryck, Lund University, 2012, p.15

[9] Fukuyama 2004:17-18

instable situation in the country affected both regional and international peace and security.[10] It is therefore questionable whether a Weberian state, that has monopolized the legitimate claim on force within a territorial jurisdiction,[11] can be established. A post-transitional government, which was established in August 2012 to assist the state building process in Somalia, is experiencing dire obstacles.[12]

This has been the basis of the research question this thesis has been built around: *What factors are important in the reconstitution of the Somali state?* This thesis aims at understanding the factors that could affect the state-building process in Somalia based on views of interviewees from both the "Somali diaspora" and the "International community". The identified factors are analyzed in relation to a theoretical framework, which is mainly based on the Weberian concept of state, since it is a guideline for defining a state. Rousseau's concept of the social contract is also consulted in this framework, as it is assumed that the state is established on the basis of such a contract. According to D.K. Leonard and M.S. Samantar "[t]hese assumptions and attendant ones about how a social contract is established implicitly guide most international efforts to deal with collapsed states."[13] These conceptual tools are complimented with other theories that expand the possibilities for analyzing the identified factors.

The study is delimited in accordance to ethnic heritage, political knowledge and residency in Sweden, when it comes to the interviewees belonging to the category "Somali diaspora". The "International community" is delimited to non-ethnic Somalis, who have worked with questions concerning Somali state-building, peacekeeping and human rights etc. Both of these communities can be seen as consisting of several different actors, therefore the interviewees opinions are not seen as representative for the whole community.

This thesis has been structured so that previous research is firstly presented to give a brief insight into the field that is followed by the theoretical framework on which this thesis is built. This section is accompanied by a short description of the limitations of a Weberian framework. After a methodological discussion, a historical background gives a contextual framework to highlight the internal and external aspects of the Somali state-building process. Thereafter, main factors identified by the interviewees shall be presented with an analysis based on the theoretical framework. This thesis will end with a critical discussion highlighting

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[10] Frisell, Eva Hagström; Lindell, Magdalena Tham and Skeppström, Emma. *Land i sikte? – EU:s samlade ansats gentemot Somalia.* Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), Report nr: FOI-R--3462--SE, 2012, p.9;14-15

[11] Weber, Max. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.* (n.d.) Trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, New York: The Free Press, 1964, p.154

[12] UNDPA (United Nations Department of Political Affairs). *Somalia.* (n.d.)
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/africa/somalia (Retrieved April 29th 2013)

[13] Leonard with Samantar p.560

the limitations of the Weberian ideal state model in its application to the Somali stat-building process.

2. Previous research

Several studies have been done on failed or weak African states, where focus mainly has been on factors contributing to their failure. Since 9/11 this particular phenomena has been associated with terrorism, transnational crime etc. according to Harry Verhoeven. Verhoeven challenges this "Orthodox Failed State Narrative", which parallels state failure with terrorism and anarchy, by emphasizing the development of political entities capable of providing stability and order within the Somali territory.[14] In comparison to Verhoeven's study, a critical approach to international narratives is not taken in this thesis. However, of particular importance for this study is one of Verhoeven's concluding remarks, which highlights the difficulties with reconstituting a Somali state:

> The international community would do well to enter into far more dynamic, nuanced engagements with collapsed states - instead of being (selfishly) security-obsessed, it should explore how alternative forms of legitimate political authority can help bring about the substantive freedoms people need to realise their fundamental aspirations.[15]

This is also a factor Leonard with Samantar point to, when they state that:

> […] the fixation of the international community on state governance has inhibited the development of other, more feasible, forms of governance (which, even if imperfect, would be better than the collapsed states)[16]

In contrary to Verhoeven, Leonard with Samantar tries to gain knowledge about the social contract through highlighting contemporary Somali polities, while the social contract in this study is used as an analytical tool applied on interview material.[17]

Furthermore, researchers, like Hussein Ahmed Warsame[18], Mwangi S. Kimenyi et.al.[19] and J. Peter Pham[20], have also focused on the process of reconstituting a Somali state, not least concerning the international involvement in such a transformative process. Similar to this

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[14] Verhoeven p.405-25
[15] Ibid. p.418
[16] Leonard with Samantar p.561
[17] Ibid.
[18] Warsame, Hussein Ahmed. *Role of International Aid and Open Trade Policies in Rebuilding the Somali State*. Bildhaan, An International Journal of Somali Studies. 2011, Vol. 11, pp51-72 [ISSN:15286258]
[19] Kimenyi, Mwangi S.; Mbaku, John Mukum and Moyo, Nelipher. *Reconstituting Africa's Failed States: The Case of Somali*a. Social Research, Vol. 77. Issue 4, 2010, pp.1339-1366 [ISSN:0037783X]
[20] Pham, J. Peter. *State Collapse, Insurgency, and Famine in the Horn of Africa: Legitimacy and the Ongoing Somali Crisis*. Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 2 Taylor & Francis Group, 2011, pp.153–187 [DOI: 10.1080/21520844.2011.617238]

thesis, Kimenyi et.al. include the Weberian concept of state. However, it is used as a tool to characterize state failure,[21] which is not the objective of this study.

3. Theoretical framework

The starting point of the following theoretical framework is the political sociology of Max Weber, where the main concepts of state and legitimacy are outlined. Thereafter, the basis for building a state is predominantly founded on Jean-Jacques Rousseau's concept of social contract. Rousseau was an advocator for egalitarianism; i.e. the equality of humans; equal voting rights for all men (excluding women) and participatory democracy.[22] As these concepts are similar to those of the traditional Somali kinship system (see *Pre-colonization: Traditional kinship society*) Rousseau's concept of social contract is seen as most applicable in the case of Somalia in relation to other contractual theorists. Furthermore, as Michel Foucault states that power is everywhere,[23] this concept of power is seen to enable a wide applicability in the case of the Somali state-building process. In addition, John Searle's theory on the construction of social reality is seen as a compliment to these theories.

State-building

What is a state? In the Weberian sense a state has monopolized the legitimate claim on force within a given territorial jurisdiction. Weber describes it as:

> A compulsory political association with continuous organization (*politischer Anstaltsbetrieb*) will be called a 'state' if and in so far as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the *monopoly* of the *legitimate* use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.[24]

Furthermore, characteristic for the modern state is the existence of rule of law, i.e. a legal and administrative order, which is changeable by law. The rule of law holds authority over citizens and all actions taken within its territory.[25]

There are two distinguishing aspects of the Weberian ideal state. Firstly, the definition implies a form of bureaucratic apparatus i.e. administrative staff. Secondly, the administrative authoritative rule is established on a monopoly of legitimate use of force. Thereby, legitimacy of authority must exist when enforcing order. However, "no system of authority voluntarily limits itself to the appeal to material or affectual or ideal motives on as the basis of

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[21] Kimenyi, Mbaku and Moyo pp.1339-1366

[22] Lewin, Leif. 'Inledning'. 1993. In Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Om Samhällsfördraget eller Statsrättens grunder*. 1762. Trans. Sven Åke Heed and Jan Stolpe, Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 2009 pp.9-10

[23] Hörnqvist, Magnus. *Foucaults maktanalys*. Stockholm: Carlsson Bokförlag, 1996, pp.28-9

[24] Weber p.154

[25] Ibid. pp.154-156

guaranteeing its continuance",[26] according to Weber. Moreover, variations in obedience and exercising authority for example depend on the type of legitimacy that is claimed. Weber identifies three ideal types of legitimate authority; legal, traditional and charismatic authority; each with a different basis for legitimacy. Within a system of impersonal order, legitimacy is obtained on a rational basis i.e. the belief that authority will follow the rule of law, thus legal authority is achieved, which is in accordance with the Weberian definition of a modern state. If legitimacy is, however, based on the sanctity of tradition; as in kinship systems, monarchies among others; the obligation of obedience is a matter of personal loyalty, whereby traditional authority is attained. In the case of charismatic authority, an individual's characteristic qualities are the basis for obedience.[27] By obeying authority, order can be enforced and if the states monopoly of force is seen as legitimate by the member of the state the states survival chances are improved. The monopoly of the use of force is according to Weber an essential character of the modern state.[28]

Theoretically, states can be seen as built through warfare or on the basis of a social contract. According to Charles Tilly, warfare created the European state apparatus, based on interaction between military machinery and the development of the market.[29] Through increasing control and monitoring means of violence,[30] power holders concentrated the means of coercion within a territory.[31] Additionally, an administrative state structure was created to control and extract resources from the population for sustaining the army. Thereby, power holders became involved in capital accumulation, dispute settlements, distribution of services and goods, among other things.[32] However, Tilly's theory on state-building through warfare is not applicable to post-colonial African states, which inherited administrative systems[33] and were territorially divided by former colonial powers.[34] Yet, as the African continent is currently facing several intra-and-interstate conflicts,[35] the emergence of new state formations cannot be excluded, which the division of Sudan[36] exemplifies. Therefore, state-building through warfare might still be a plausible way for establishing a state.

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[26] Weber p.325
[27] Ibid. pp.325-28
[28] Ibid. p.156
[29] Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, AD 990-1992. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., (revised paperback edition), 1992. p.94
[30] Ibid. p.68
[31] Ibid. p.20
[32] Ibid. pp.19-20
[33] Fukuyama 2004:26-29
[34] Lewis, Ioan M. *A Modern History of Somalia – Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*. London: Longman Group Ltd., 1980.p. iv
[35] Wai, Zubairu. *Neo-patrimonialism and the discourse of state failure in Africa*. Review of African Political Economy, Vol.39 Nr.131, 2012, p. 29 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2012.658719]
[36] Bereketeab, Redie. *Self-Determination and Secessionism in Somaliland and South Sudan: challenges to postcolonial state-building*. Discussion paper 75; Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala. Milton Keynes: Lightning Source UK Ltd., 2012, p.11

On the other hand, contractual theorist Rousseau asserts that when humans lack the power to overcome the obstacles of their preservation in the state of nature, the only means for survival is uniting their powers.[37] However, Rousseau states that the difficulty is:

> […] to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.[38]

The solution is the social contact, by which each individual unites himself and his power in command under the general will, and in their shared capacity each member becomes an inseparable part of the whole.[39] Moreover, the general will is based on common denominators of different interests, thus, society should be governed by the general will.[40] Ergo, this contract creates a unified moral and collective body, with a common will. The public person, formed by the unification of people, constitutes the state.[41]

Despite losing one's natural freedom through contractual consolidation, the individual gains civil liberties, moral liberty and the proprietorship of his possessions. Through moral liberty i.e. obeying laws that he himself has prescribed, the individual acquires freedom within the state.[42] Hence, the purpose of the social contract is the prosperity and preservation of its members.[43] It can be seen as regulating the relationship between the state and its citizens.[44] However, if the social contract is breached the state dissolves into anarchy.[45]

In both Weber's and Rousseau's conceptual frameworks forces of power are highlighted in different ways. The states capacity to enforce order is based on its ability to monopolize force, which is dependent on its ability to gain obedience, and ultimately through legitimacy of authority it gains power through the members of the state. For Rousseau the social contract is a consolidation of power; the unification of each members force; thus the construction of a contract is built around the concept of power. Furthermore, within the state the general will, can be seen as holding power over the single individual, however, as he is a constituent of the public body, he gains power in the form of moral liberty. Thus, power relationships are illustrated through the social contract. Similarly, power plays a role within the state-building

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[37] Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *Om Samhällsfördraget eller Statsrättens grunder*. 1762. Trans. Sven Åke Heed and Jan Stolpe, Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 2009, p.27
[38] Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *The Social Contract*. 1761. Trans. G.D.H. Cole. New York: Prometheus Books, 1988.p.23
[39] Rousseau 2009:29
[40] Ibid. p.39
[41] Ibid. p.30
[42] Ibid. p.33-34
[43] Ibid. p.99
[44] Ibid. p.47
[45] Ibid. pp.102-03

process presented by Tilly, in which power holder concentrate power over a territory, army and population.

Foucault states that power is everywhere, as it is exercised in the interaction between people or groups of people, thereby power is a relationship. It is dynamic; constantly active and changeable within relative strengths. Relative strengths of people or groups of people exist in power relationships.[46] An important aspect of Foucault's concept of power is that it is not limited to state-centric power struggles.[47] The relative strengths within interpersonal relationships are dependent on differences in for example ethnicity, knowledge, gender, and social position. However, the degree of relevance and importance of these factors are decided by deeper power structures,[48] as some power relationships can become institutionalized,[49] and power relationships and their power techniques can become intertwined and develop into bigger institutions if they find support within each other.[50] Each power relationship holds a momentary position within a continuous struggle. The existence of diverse relative strengths within power relationships, in a context, constitutes the continuous struggle that increases risk or chance for transformation of the relative strengths within each power relationship. Therefore, transformation of the power relationship is affected by other relative strengths and conditions, thus, the subordinate actor might not actively guard their interests as the dominant actor due to having a higher chance of changing their position within another power relationship.[51] Furthermore, Foucault point to the relationship between power and knowledge, and states that the utilization of knowledge increases the relative strengths within power relations and enables the exercise of power.[52] The interplay between power and knowledge signifies the constitution of power through accepted forms of knowledge, "truth" and scientific understanding. According to Foucault, each society has a regime of truth i.e. a system of truth conditions, discourses and theories, which has evolved within the local continuous struggle. When well established, this regime of truth becomes the basis for the relative strengths within power relationships in a society. Furthermore it functions as a fulcrum for the dominating actor's exercise of power.[53]

As the interplay between the concept of state, state-building (through warfare or social contract) and power have been illustrated, the remaining question is: *How are these concepts*

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[46] Hörnqvist p.28-30
[47] Ibid. p.50
[48] Ibid. p.52
[49] Ibid. p.47
[50] Ibid. p.55
[51] Ibid. p.37-8
[52] Ibid. p.153
[53] Ibid. pp.165-9

shared in social reality? According to Searle some facts, so called institutional facts, within social reality only exist on the basis of human institutions.[54] Humans assign certain functions to objects, which are assigned in relation to the users and the observers' interests. Thereby, it is assigned functions that are not possible merely based on the objects physical attributes.[55] However, human institutions, which create institutional facts, are based on collectively accepted rules.[56] These facts are created through the application of certain rules that exist within this system, whereby the status of an assigned function is collectively acknowledged.[57] Thus, a specific object (X) is identified as (Y) in a specific context (C).[58] Subsequently, the assigned status function (Y) also allots a subject with certain deontic power i.e. obligations, rights, restrictions etc.[59]

Hence, in reference to Searle's concept of institution, legitimacy of authority within a state is based on collectively identifying a specific authority (X) as having legitimacy (Y) within a given territory (C), and the basis for legitimacy i.e. the collectively accepted rules are either legal, traditional or charismatic, according to Weber. Thus, the status function of legitimacy assigns this authority with deontic power. In a similar way the social contract can be interpreted; by commonly identifying the social contract (X) as regulating the relationship between state and citizen (Y) within a society (C) deontic power is created.

Limitations of Weber's conceptual framework

Western imperialism associated with modernity, capitalism and economic development becomes ground for post-colonial critique; focusing on deterministic Eurocentric frameworks of classic sociologists like Weber, Durkheim and Marx. According to Manuela Boatcă, the means through which Weber validates his theory i.e. contrasting with non-Western societies is problematic.[60] Furthermore, Boatcă states that this later developed into a dichotomy between modern Western rationality and traditional societies, used by modernization theorists to locate societies at different development stages, "thus completing active production of non-Western as absence of modernity".[61] In the same vein, Zubairu Wai states that the conceptual framework of state rationality is:

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[54] Hörnqvist pp.15-16
[55] Searle, John R. *Konstruktionen av den sociala verkligheten.* Trans. Staffan Ahlin, Göteborg: Bokförlaget Daidalos AB, 1997, p.241
[56] Ibid. p.141
[57] Ibid. p.55
[58] Ibid. p.127
[59] Ibid pp.113-14
[60] Boatcă, Manuela., *"FROM THE STANDPOINT OF GERMANISM": A POSTCOLONIAL CRITIQUE OF WEBER'S THEORY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY,* Postcolonial Sociology - Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 24, p.56 [doi:10.1108]
[61] Boatcă p.63

> [...] a vulgar universalism that disregards specific historical experiences while subsuming them under the totalitarian grip of a Eurocentric unilinear evolutionist framework. Explicitly or implicitly, this evolutionist framework produces a particular notion of history which holds that African phenomena can only really be understood as mirroring an earlier European history.[62]

Wai also argues that discourse established by using concepts like neopatrimonialism and state failure is a function of power, and constructs a reality that supports "the hegemonic power"[iiii], thereby, normalizing power relationships.[63]

As this critique mainly points to the Eurocentric basis for Weber's theoretical framework, it is relevant to incorporate these considerations in relation to the factors identified as affecting the state-building process. However, according to the prescriptions of the world society, a state is able to gain legitimacy by conforming to a universalistic state model,[64] thereby making the Webarian conceptual framework pertinent for analyzing factors that could affect such an establishment.

4. Methodological framework

A case study

To identify factors affecting the state building process in Somalia, the methodology employed throughout the thesis is a single case study on one phenomenon; hence the study is small-scale, but thick since focus is on one particular situation i.e. the state-building process in Somalia.[65] The study aims at gaining contextual understanding of the case of Somalia, and not generating generalizing results.[66] Case studies can be over-simplified resulting in that readers draw misleading conclusions, as they presume the result is descriptive of a whole situation instead of an entity of it.[67] Therefore, this thesis stresses that focus is only put on one entity of the Somali society i.e. the process of reconstituting the state, and thus the aim is not to describe every aspect of the Somali society.

Interview selection

Different forms of literature (factsheets, articles and books) were read to get an insight into the situation in Somalia. This clarified the limitations (time, access to the field etc.) the study would have before "casting a net", which means calling and e-mailing relevant interviewees.[68]

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[62] Wai p.33
[63] Ibid. p.41
[64] Meyer, Ohn W. ; Boli, John; Thomas, George M. and Ramirez, Francisco O., *World Society and the Nation-State*, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 103., No. 1., 1997, p.148
[65] Merriam, Sharan B. *Fallstudien som forskningsmetod*. Trans. Björn Nilsson. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1994, p.24-28
[66] Ibid. p.45, 184
[67] Merriam p.45-48
[68] Crang, Mike and Cook, Ian. *Doing ethnographies*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2011, pp.14-19

Since the situation in Somalia has been turbulent the possibilities to do an ethnographic study were nonexistent. Through such a method the process of reconstituting the Somali state could have been understood as it is experienced by people who live in the country.[69] That this is not included could be seen as a limiting factor, as the study lacks firsthand observers to the effects of the state-building process within the country. Instead the study is based on interviews with so called "outside observers", that can be seen as belonging to either the "Somali diaspora" or the "International community". Since Somalia has a history of both internal and external involvement in the state-building process it was considered relevant to reflect voices from both of these communities. The categorization had a target-oriented basis, that is, interviewee selection was based on criteria identified as important for each group,[70] which also served as the delimitations for this study. According to Chein target-oriented selections are conducted so that as much knowledge as possible is attained.[71] Therefore, the criteria for the "Somali diaspora" was Somali ethnicity, knowledge of current Somali politics and residency in Sweden, whiles the group called the "International community" was delimited to non-ethnic Somalis, who have worked with issues concerning Somali state-building, peacekeeping, human rights and equivalent issues. However, none of the interviewees' opinions are seen as representative for a larger community. Instead, the main objective is to accentuate their views. The aim was to comprehend what factors the interviewees, as outside observers perceived as affecting the reestablishment of the Somali state. As the interviewees have different relationships to Somalia they were able to give different perspectives to the situation. However, as the focus of this study is to identify factors that could affect the state-building process, the interview answers are not divided into two different groups, because they are not seen as two opposing groups in this matter.

The research question – *What factors are important in the reconstitution of the Somali state?* – became the foundation for the interview guides. To try to achieve a balance between what Katarina Sjöberg calls the researchers "inside understanding"[iv] and "outside understanding",[72] and thus limit the influence of bias the interview questions were based on knowledge gained from literature. Since, the interview guides were not followed rigorously the interviews became semi-structured.[73]

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[69] Crang and Cook p.1
[70] Merriam pp.61-2
[71] Chein 1981:440 in Merriam p.61
[72] Sjöberg, Katarina. 'Forskaren och fältet'. In Katarina Sjöberg and David Wästerfors (ed.). *Uppdrag: forskning*. 1st ed. Malmö: Liber AB, 2008, p.23
[73] Bryman, Alan. *Samhällsvetenskapliga metoder*. 2nd ed. Trans. Björn Nilsson. Malmö: Liber AB, 2011, pp.412-16

Awareness of clan identity and suspicion between clans is a reality, and this could have become problematic when contacting interviewees with a Somali background. However, the first Somali interviewee opened doors, like a "gate-keeper",[74] to other interviewees with different genealogies. Thereby, these were so called snowball selections,[75] but in accordance with characteristics composing the group "Somali diaspora". E-mails were sent and phone calls were made to different governmental and international institutions, such as UN's Swedish office, UI, EUSR for the Horn of Africa (HOA), FOI, to come in contact with interviewees that could constitute the group "International community". However, only two interviewees were reached using this method; a researcher focused on the HOA and a diplomat. Through my supervisor I came into contact with a third interviewee; a lieutenant commander.

The majority of the interviews took place in Malmö. However, three interviews were conducted in Stockholm, Uppsala and Karlskrona. Only one of the nine interviews was carried out over the phone and all interviews besides the telephone interview was tape recorded. As the telephone interview was done in the end phase of this study the possibilities to travel to interviewee's hometown were nonexistent. According to Bryman, a telephone interview does not have to be limiting if the interviewee is open and gives detailed answers,[76] which I feel was the case here. The remaining interviews took place where the interviewee proposed, which was mostly in offices, some at cafés and one took place at the home of an interviewee. The interviews lasted between 30 minutes (only 2) up to 120 minutes (only 2). Three of the interviews were conducted in Somali, one in English and the rest in Swedish. Translations can be problematic when doing interviews in a different language because of erroneous language translations.[77] To prevent this, when difficulties occurred, the interviewees were asked to specify words and concepts during the interview or afterwards. After the material was transcribed it was categorized according to the main subjects that the interviewees identified as affecting the state-building process. The variety composing each category of interviewees enabled a nuanced identification of factors that could affect the reconstitution the Somali state. Their voices will serve as the basis for the analysis.

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[74] Eklund, Lisa. 'Cadres as Gatekeppers: the art of opening the right doors?'. In Gregory S. Szarycz (ed.), Research *Realities in Social Science: negotiating fieldwork dilemmas*. Amherst: Cambia Press, 2010, pp.129-130
[75] Bryman pp.196-7
[76] Ibid. p.432-33
[77] Crang and Cook pp.22-26

Ethical considerations

Different research areas have established codes for ethical research,[78] however, Alan Bryman states that the fundamental aspects of ethics is confidentiality, voluntariness, anonymity and integrity.[79] Therefore, this study takes a starting point in these aspects in the discussion of research ethics.

In accordance with the information and consent criteria of ethical behavior within social science,[80] all involved in this study were informed of the purpose of the study, the voluntariness of participation and their role in the study before the interviews took place.

According to Mike Crang and Ian Cook, the researcher cannot remember all that is said verbatim and constantly taking notes could be disturbing during the interview.[81] Hence, this felt like the optimal reason for recording the interviews. Consent was given before the interviews were tape recorded, and the reason for recording was also stated. However, three of the interviewees wanted to be anonymous. Therefore, all personal information that could be traced back to the individual, such as names, hometown and specific workplaces are excluded in this study and in the transcribed material, in accordance with the definition of anonymity[v] made by the Swedish Research Councils ethical expert group.[82]

Furthermore, the criteria of confidentiality were considered in relation to all interviews, in accordance with article 23 in the *Declaration of Helsinki* 2008 that states:

> Every precaution must be taken to protect the privacy of research subjects and the confidentiality of their personal information and to minimize the impact of the study on their physical, mental and social integrity.[83]

Thus, all recorded material was deleted after transcription and the transcribed material is stored safely.

5. Brief historical background

The following chapter intends to present a brief historical overview to highlight internal and external aspects of the state-building process in Somalia. Hence focus is on Somalia's relationship to external actors, and the societal, political and economic transformation.

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[78] Gustafsson, Bengt; Hermerén, Göran and Petterson, Bo. *God forskningssed*. Vetenskapsrådet, Bromma: CM-Gruppen AB, Vetenskapsrådets rapportserie 1:2011, pp.1-130 [ISSN 1651-7350] p.18

[79] Bryman p.131

[80] Ibid pp.131-2

[81] Crang and Cook pp.60-89

[82] Gustafsson, Hermerén and Petterson p.67

[83] WMA (World Medical Association). *WMA Declaration of Helsinki - Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects*. 2008 http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/ (Retrieved May 3rd 2013)

Pre-colonization: Traditional kinship society

Before colonization Somalis lived in a stateless society, where the individual could only rely on kinship solidarity for help and security.[84] Therefore, loyalty was offered first to those with common ancestry, this was a major obligation uniting a single clan. Clan, based on patrilineal principles[vi], was the essential political entity, where agnatic[vii] origin determined political alliances. However, these alliances were always fluid[85] and the extent of the political community was defined through informal political-legal contracts (*xeer*[viii]), which were used to settle political and legal disputes, thus, reinforcing political loyalties.[86] Moreover, within the community political authority was shared and political control was not centralized. Therefore, clan leaders, lacking executive powers and right to rule presided over the assembly of elders[ix] (*shir*), and where responsible for inter-clan relationships and all other clan affairs. Furthermore, the societal concept of egalitarianism was fundamental. Thereby, all adult males were allowed to have a say in the institutionalized *shir* and were empowered to direct the policies of the lineage through a contractual treaty. A so called pastoral democracy existed, where all had the right to participate and decisions[x] were based on consensus.[87] Consequently, the traditional Somali autonomic pastoral-or agro-nomadic lifestyle, was related to the nomadic people's autonomic relationship to the state.[88] However, the construct of clan as a shared identity became a power tool used by colonialists, whereby clan came to be the only legal identity the Somalis could have by which they could gain access to the state.[89]

1969-1995: From dictatorial rule to anarchy

After a *coup d'état* in 1969 Gen. Mohamed Siyaad Barres military junta seizes power in Somalia and implements an ideology of "Scientific socialism".[90] Thus, a process of nationalizing crucial economic sectors[xi] began, and different national development projects were introduced.[91] By early 1970s the regime organized a repressive statewide control apparatus[xii]. Gradually, power became more centralized around the president, as the regime appointed people to political posts based on clan[xiii]. However, because of successful national development projects, and an ambition to reunite the Somali territory; including parts of

[84] Schackt, Jon. 'Folk och historia'. Trans. Lena Hagberg. In Lena Hagberg (ed.), *Somalier: grundinformation*. Norrköping: Statens Invandrarverk, 1993 pp.6-7

[85] Issa-Salwe, Abdisalam M. *The collapse of the Somali state – The impact of the colonial legacy*. London: HAAN Associates, 1994, p.72

[86] Ibid. pp.3-4

[87] Ibid.

[88] Schackt pp.6-7

[89] Mahmood Mamdani in Lidwien Kapteijns, *Clan cleansing in Somalia – the Ruinous Legacy of 1991*, University Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2013 p.75

[90] Ofcansky, Thomas. 'Somalia – Recent History'. In Katharine Murison (ed.), *Africa South of the Sahara 2003*, 32nd ed. London: Europa Publications Ltd., 2002 pp.936-963.

[91] Falk, Maria (ed.). *Somalia, Djibouti*. Länder i fickformat nr.214. Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska institutet (UI) [The Swedish Institute of International Affairs], (Revised with Anders Hellner) 1991 p.19

Kenya (Northern Frontier District) and Ethiopia (Ogaden) with a Somali populations; the dictator gained popular support.[92] Yet, Somali nationalistic strife for territorial reunification, created strained relationships to both Ethiopia and Kenya.[93] Thus, in 1977 the Ethiopian-Somalia War broke out. The Barre regime's defeat against Ethiopia in 1978[xiv] was followed by a shift of ideology and alliances.[94] With the inflow of refugees to the country, the loss from the war and the downward spiraling economy, the antagonism against the regime was accentuated.[95] Subsequently, the Barre regime's exercise of power changed character such that corruption and nepotism became rampant and people started fleeing the country on political grounds.[96] To suppress political opponents and the public's dissatisfaction, the regime implemented divide-and-rule policies, where feelings of clan affiliation were used to trigger and escalate competition, dissatisfaction and conflict among Somalis,[97] thereby increasing people's awareness of clan identity.[98]

In early 1980s US support – weapons, financial aid and generous loans – was offered to the Barre regime, because of their interest in the strategically located[xv] naval base in Berbera. The American interest in the country also attracted other western supporters,[99] and the support continued in spite of offences against human rights and deep rooted corruption.[100] Thus, Somalia became dependent on western aid,[101] as it was a major part of the economy.[102] Yet, neither did this aid noticeably fuel industrial development nor improve living standards for the population. The only road to prosperity for the "common man" during the 1980s was through relatives who had access to development agency funds,[103] and for the majority of Somalis, "the State" was an abstract entity that they were not a part of.[104] Somalia's strategic importance reduced with the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, the Barre regimes lost donated, financial capacity to uphold the state through patronage and coercion.[105]

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[92] Helander, Bernhard. 'Från kolonialism till kaos'. In Lena Hagberg (ed.), *Somalier: grundinformation*. Norrköping: Statens Invandrarverk, 1993, pp.14-17

[93] Samatar, Said S. *Somalia: a Nation in Turmoil*. A Minority Rights Group Report, London: The Minority Rights Group (MRG), 1991, p.16 [ISBN: 0 946690 80 4]

[94] Ofcansky, pp.937-938

[95] Helander pp.16-18; Falk p.13

[96] Ibid. pp.16-17

[97] Kapteijns p.2

[98] Issa-Salwe p.60

[99] Helander pp.16-18

[100] Samatar, Abdi Ismail. 'The production of Somali conflict and the role of internal and external actors'. In Redie Bereketeab (ed.), *The Horn of Africa: intra-state and inter-state conflicts and security*. London: Pluto Press, 2013, pp.166

[101] Helander p.17

[102] Kapteijns pp.75-81

[103] Helander pp.16-18

[104] Ibid. p.18

[105] Menkhaus, Ken. *World Development Report 2011: background case study - Somalia and the Horn of Africa*. 2011, pp.2-3 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/07/13/000333038_20110713031744/Rendered/PDF/632040WP00WDR0009B0Somalia00PUBLIC0.pdf (Retrieved May 10th 2013)

In 1991 the dictatorial regime was overthrown by oppositional groupings,[106] leaving a power vacuum making it possible for the United Somali Congress (USC), led by Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid, to seize power,[107] which resulted in a power struggle between opponent clans.[108] Food became a weapon, as militias enforced a man-made famine[109] by looting food convoys and threatening relief workers among other things.[110] The oppositional groupings "became another way to further clan interests with arms"[111] by employing the same political tactics as Barre regime.[112] According to Kapteijns, a "key shift" occurred, when political violence became communal violence. Through rationalized clan cleansing campaigns based on clan identity, people were turned against each other.[113] And in 1992 the situation deteriorated, as clan antagonism deepened and the famine reached horrendous proportions, whereby the United Nations (UN) implemented the peacekeeping[xvi] operation UNOSOM[xvii][114] to help restore the countries nation state status. However, insecurity and continuous fighting hampered the relief efforts.[115] Consequently, the US government approved Operation Restore Hope,[116] a massive military intervention with humanitarian overtones,[117] with the UN Security Councils authorization to use "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief".[118] In 1993 a ceasefire was agreed upon between the Somali political movements, but it was not preserved and conflicts occurred between militiamen and UNOSOM. Subsequently, several countries withdrew in 1994 followed by an entire withdrawal of the UN operation in 1995.[119] Simultaneously, as the country fell apart due to the intra-state conflict, the clans claimed different regions in the country.[120] Somalis formed proto-state systems in Somaliland, Puntland and alternative forms of order exist in other parts of the country today, which lack juridical status in the international community.[121]

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[106] Ofcansky p.938
[107] Issa-Salwe p.78
[108] United Nations Commission of Inquiry. *Report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them.* New York, 1994, p.10 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SOMALIA%20S%201994%20653.pdf (Retrieved May 2nd 2013)
[109] Samatar 2013:167
[110] Issa-Salwe p.96
[111] Ibid. p.75
[112] Ibid.
[113] Kapteijns p.75-81
[114] UN (United Nations). *Somalia – UNOSOM I: Background.* (n.d.A) http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html (Retrieved April 29th 2013)
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ofcansky p.939
[117] Normark p.27-28
[118] UN (n.d:A)
[119] UN. *Somalia – UNOSOM II: Background II.* (n.d.B) http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2backgr2.html (Retrieved April 29th 2013)
[120] Normark p.25
[121] Leonard with Samantar, p.559

1995-2008: Humanitarian and military interventions

The international community showed reticence in their involvement in the country after the failed UN intervention.[122] Meanwhile, the agenda of peace conferences, organized by international and regional actors, became dominated by warlords.[123] However, in recent years the international and particularly American interest in Somalia was revitalized, as the country became a haven for al-Qaeda affiliated terrorism.[124] Simultaneously, some elements of the Somali society were becoming radicalized; among them was the al-Qaeda linked al-Shabaab.

After a reconciliation conference in Kenya 2002-04, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was created, where the Ethiopian affiliated warlord triumphed. But, because political representation was built on genealogical formula (4.5[xviii]), as the basis of power-sharing, it was endorsed by the international community.[125] Yet, the TFG had difficulties gaining control over the Somali territory,[126] while several parts of the country fell under the control of Union of Islamic Courts (UICs).[127] Hostile statements made by leaders of the rising UICs,[128] and their seizure of the capital Mogadishu lead to a TFG supported Ethiopian intervention.[129] According to Brett Morash "the fall of Mogadishu to UIC was a serious issue in Washington and Addis Ababa as it meant to them that Somalia was preparing to become the next Taliban like state, coupled with the risk of making a play for Ogaden as well."[130] Even though the Ethiopian troops succeeded in retrieving the capital, groups like al-Shabaab still posed a threat to TFG.[131] Therefore, the African Union (AU) launched the UN supported regional peacekeeping operation AMISOM in 2007, which aimed at stabilizing the situation in the country.[132] However, terrorism was not the only problem facing the region that the international community had to contend with. Piracy had escalated in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, which has affected the vital international trading passing through the region.[133] Thus, in 2008 the European Union's (EU's) engagement in the HOA extended to security with the launch of the naval Operation Atalanta, which later has become a part of the EU's comprehensive approach[xix] in the country.[134]

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[122] Shinn p.15
[123] Samatar 2013:168-70
[124] Shinn p.15
[125] Samatar 2013:.168-70
[126] Frisell, Lindell and Skeppström p.9
[127] Samatar 2013:168-72
[128] Shinn p.16
[129] Samatar 2013:168-72
[130] Morash, Brett. *"Union of Islamic Courts… An opportunity lost for stability in Somalia"*, Conference Paper. Northeastern Political Science Association, 2011, pp. 15
[131] Shinn p.16
[132] AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia).*AMISOM Background*. 2013 http://amisom-au.org/about/amisom-background/ (Retrieved April 29th 2013)
[133] Frisell, Lindell and Skeppström pp.20-22
[134] Ibid.

6. The road to reconstituting the Somali state?

After schematizing the interview material, three main factors were identified as affecting the reconstitution of the Somali state; political, social and economic. As these are intertwined, the factors will be interlinked in this following section to give an understanding of what implications they may have for the reconstitution of the Somali state. The aim of this section is to give an analysis of the interview material through a theoretical lens. Therefore this section is structured so that the main identified factors are presented and highlighted through the voices of the interviewees. Each of the presented factors is followed by an analysis based on the theoretical framework, thus, this section has combined the empirical material with a theoretical analysis. While presenting empirical findings, three people will remain anonymous, therefore they will be called: Somali A[xx], Somali B and the diplomat. Besides the diplomat, two other people are categorized as belonging to the "International community", lieutenant commander Kjell Augustzen and researcher Redie Bereketeab. In the presentation of empirical findings, their work titles will be used in front of their names, so that the voices of each group i.e. the "International Community" and the "Somali diaspora" are more noticeable. This section of the thesis will end with a short summary of the identified factors.

The case of Somalia – a theoretical analysis

There was unanimity between the interviewees in considering the political climate in Somalia today as complex. Furthermore, they distinguished similar reasons for this complexity. The following statement by Redie Bereketeab, a researcher of conflict and state-building in the HOA, highlights one of these reasons:

> *Now the issue is; which are the constituting units of the federal state? It's not clear how they are going to be shaped, and reshaped. We have a government in central Somalia, which is in Mogadishu. We have the case of Puntland, which has declared its autonomy for more than ten years, even though they are not claiming to secede from Somalia. At the end there is the issue of Somaliland, they have declared their independence and are claiming for complete separation. And on the south we have Jubaland, were at least recently, there has been what is now known as the Jubaland initiative, whereby the southern regions could constitute a federal entity within the Somali federation. And the issue within the ongoing*

> *debate is who is going to have the upper hand; is it the central government in Mogadishu or the federal states?[135]*

Researcher Bereketeab expresses the challenges with power balance between the federal entities and the central government. Also problems of state legitimacy are indirectly expressed, as Somaliland has declared their independence. How the relationship between the self-declared independent region Somaliland and the central government will evolve seems problematic, as this region has been self-governing since 1991. Hence, the Somaliland government has gained the monopoly of legitimate use of force within this territory, which enables the regional government to uphold its order, according to the Weberian state model. With reference to Rousseau, the populations within these clan-based entities i.e. the regional territories have been able to establish a social contract as they were not able to survive in the state of nature that the Somali society returned to in conjunction with the outbreak of the civil war. Thereby the consolidation represents the populations general will, thus the question is: Why would the population break a social contract that has led to their prosperity and survival to consolidate a new contract? A new social contract, uniting the power of the whole Somali population might imply that the individual's proprietorship of his possessions i.e. land and natural resources could change. Therefore it is questionable whether the central state will gain legitimacy within this region. The problem with legitimacy is also questioned by Warsame Yassin Osman, uttering that:

> *Right now, the government is built on clan and not knowledge. It is important that you can count on the government, that it is transparent etc. They are merely symbolic.[136]*

From a Weberian perspective, the lack of legitimacy which Yassin Osman emphasizes indicates that the post-transitional government is not seen as an authority. Thereby its enforcement of order will not become successful until it gains obedience from the people. However, gaining legitimacy through obedience in the central governments order might take time in lieu of Somalia's history of corrupt and nepotistic governments. Furthermore, the state lacks ability to enforce its order within its jurisdiction, as proto-state systems are established. According to the Weberian state model the central government has to establish some sort of

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[135] Redie Bereketeab, Interview 23 April 2013
[136] Warsame Yassin Osman, Interview 7 April 2013

authoritative rule within the regional areas to be able to include them in its territorial jurisdiction.

The challenge that the state it facing is also interlinked with the issue of rule of law, as Somali A expresses:

> *It is worrying, how the state will handle this* (federal entities) *[...] the regions have the right of self-determination according to the constitution, whiles it seems that the state does ad hoc attempts at going in and governing these parts.*[137]

Several interviewees have stressed the importance of rule of law, and how the population perceives the central government which is illustrated by the previous statement. This indicates that the central government tries to move beyond the authority it is granted by the constitution, from a Weberian standpoint. What is then its basis for legitimacy? According to Yassin Osman the government is based on clan and not merits, this signifies that the central government's authority is based on kinship. As the central government is composed by all clans (4.5) the sanctity of tradition is the basis for legitimacy.

In reference to Foucault, how the power relationship will form between the central government and the federal entities also illuminates momentary relative strengths within a continuous struggle, which might be seen as decided by a deeper power structure within the Somali society i.e. clan. The clan structure has been institutionalized, as it is incorporated in both the private and the public sphere within the society. According to all Somali interviewees the clans has always had an important role for the individual, and also in the transformation of the Somali society, which was in agreement with the opinions of the "International community" as well. The following statement by Somali B clarifies this:

> *With the civil war in Somalia, a void occurred when the state function disappeared. The individual thus sought affiliation and the clan filled the void of the state. [...]His feeling of identity or self is coupled with the clan and not the nation.*[138]

Not only did the function of the clan change, but it replaced the functions of the state, which Asho Omar Geesdiir, former gender adviser and child protection coordinator for the TFG (2009) and chairlady of Somali National Woman Organization, highlights:

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[137] Interview 10 April 2013
[138] Interview 20 Mars 2013

Before, they defended the culture, but now they are engaged in politics. Their
social function is nonexistent; they used to solve disputes, defend women's rights
for example. Clan leaders protected people through dialogue, but after the war
the warlord took, by arms, the role of the clan leaders.[139]

Moreover, Omar Geesdiir asks: *If you base a state on a clan system – How can I have the*
right to live were ever I want, buy a house, and engage in the politics in that area? How can I
do that?[140]

   In asking that question, Omar Geesdiir is referring to the different federal entities that are
predominantly clan based, and the limitations people have with mobility within the country.
The previous statements indicate both the relationship the individual has to his clan and the
structural change of the clan function in which governments find support for their structure
through the incorporation of clan, which has also been illustrated in the historical overview.
According to Foucault's concept of power, the continuous struggle within relative strengths
i.e. the power relationship between central government and regional entities and their relative
strengths can increase the chance for transformation of these relationships. This could mean
that the dominant actor i.e. the central government that has gained international
acknowledgement loses its dominant position. However, interpreting Weber, if the central
government does not have authority within its territorial jurisdiction, and cannot uphold the
monopoly of legitimate force to obtain order, then it cannot be seen as the dominant actor
within the power relationship. As both regional governments and the central government find
support in the clan structure, the clan structure can be seen as the regime of truth which they
use to support their power exercise. By accepting the clan structure as truth, knowledge is
utilized by both the regional governments and the central government to improve their
position within the relative strengths. On the other hand, by identifying a certain union of
people i.e. a government (X) as representative of a clan (Y), thus the representative
government gains deontic power, which is rights and obligations, however, this requires that
this institutional fact is collectively accepted. If the central government or the regional
governments are not collectively accepted as representative of the clan, then they lack deontic
power. Thereby, their authority i.e. their deontic power is nonexistent within a territorial
jurisdiction. Then according to Weber, the citizens do not see the state as legitimate, and it
will therefore not survive.

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[139] Asho Omar Geesdiir, Interview 5 April 2013
[140] Ibid.

Another recurring factor that was mentioned during the interviews was the role of different international actors in their involvement in the Somali state-building process. Lieutenant commander Kjell Augustzen states that: *Then, there is the image now that there are many stakeholders when there are natural resources that can be extracted.*[141] Further lieutenant commander Augustzen point to the importance of dialogue: *You have to have an open dialogue with all nations who have an interest in Africa; an open dialogue in which the UN is involved.*[142] However, researcher Bereketeab emphasizes an important question when it comes to nations implicit motives for intervening:

> *How do you weigh your motives, are your motives helping the Somali people or is your motives your own national interests? Now, these are the crucial questions that have to be asked whenever someone intervenes, what is the motive, what is the driving reason pushing that actor to intervene.*[143]

In retrospect Somalia's geopolitical importance during the Cold War and in the War against terror, these questions are relevant, as they indicate what the implicit reasons for foreign interventions can be. Some of the Somali interviewees mentioned that international actors have their own interests for involving themselves in the process of state-building, and that these interests do not coincide with what is best for the population. Interpreting Foucault, this might indicate a power relationship between the intervening actors and the intervened party. Intervening actors find support from certain regimes of truth i.e. humanitarian, military etc. that enables them to motivate their exercise of power, thus legitimizing their actions to enforce a certain order in a country. As the dominating actor, they actively guard their interests, since a transformation in the relative strengths might imply that their dominant position shifts. Thereby, the regime of truth that supports their actions might change character, and thus shifting the hegemony towards the subordinate actor. But, it has to be emphasized that several actors have different agendas for involvement in a country, thus, several relative strengths exist simultaneously both inside and outside a country, within continues struggle, all trying to gain the position as the dominant actor.

The distrust between Somalis, caused by divide-and-rule policies and the clan war, was another factor that was frequently mentioned during the interviews. According to the interviewed diplomat, the question of land ownership has been unsolved since the beginning

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[141] Kjell Augustzen, Interview 16 April 2013
[142] Ibid.
[143] Redie Bereketeab, Interview 23 April 2013

of the civil war. Therefore *the challenge is of trying to find a common idea about what kind of society they want, where everyone has the same rights and obligations.*[144] How will such a common idea be accomplished? With reference to Searle it might be possible if the Somali people collectively assign their society with certain values, a common idea. However, according to Rousseau, to create a common idea of what kind of society the entire Somalia will be, a new social contract might have to be established between the central government and the people, which could result in a change in proprietorship. Land ownership has been a contested question, Somali B stated that: *Property has to be returned. It is important for the peace process between the clans.*[145] As the safeguarding of peoples proprietorship of their possessions is one of the reasons for establishing a social contract the proto-state might have to break its social contract with people within its territory to resolve the question of land ownership. By not solving the question of land ownership a social contract between the central government and the Somali people might not be established.

The diplomat states that *the state should not be equivalent with Mogadishu.*[146] During the Barre regime everything i.e. universities, governmental offices etc. was located in the capital, which is something that has also been emphasized by the Somali interviewees, If people worry that the government will limit its focus to the central part of the country, this might strengthen the power the proto-states hold, thereby making it difficult for the central government to establish a social contract with its population, a social contract based on people believing that their union will lead to survival and prosperity.

The minimal involvement of women in public affairs, the lack of education and infrastructure were also factors brought up during the interviews. Several interviewees stated that these are challenges facing the process of rebuilding the country, which are interlinked with the economy. The state's ability to insure security, basic needs etc. is based on economy, which several of the interviewees brought up. Researcher Bereketeab states that:

> *The challenge, for the emerging federal government is; how do you build a military force, the security intelligence and police force, which are professional, which are accountable to the civilian government in Mogadishu? Now, as we know, there are many international agencies training the Somali army. But, at the end the Somali government has to be able to train its one army, it has to take the*

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[144] Diplomat, Interview 22 April 2013
[145] Interview 20 Mars 2013
[146] Diplomat, Interview 22 April 2013

responsibility of training, organizing its own military, own security forces, its own
intelligence forces.

To be able to endow its people with security as well as basic needs, a state must possess a capacious economic base. *Because in order to get legitimacy from its own people then the government has to be able to give those services*, according to researcher Bereketeab. The central government therefore needs to uphold monopoly of the legitimate use of force, from a Weberian standpoint. Moreover, the population will not feel personal loyalty; which is the basis for obedience in states with traditional authority; if the central government does not achieve this. But, the chaotic situation in the country might be beneficial to some actors, which is highlighted by Somali B's statement:

These people who enriched themselves in the chaos, oligarchs, these rich, rich people; smuggle, money launder, loot, sell drugs, confiscate arable land from the little people, the farmers. They are corrupt. These people who profited during this anarchic time they do not want peace. They have money.[147]

Hereby the question is: what kind of livelihood options are there for the people, if war economy is the only economy that exists? How will the government be able to give basic services to the people and thereby gain legitimacy? According to Tilly no means of coercion has been concentrated by the central government, as it is unable to stabilize order within the country, furthermore it lacks the economic resources to enable such an order. But, Yassin Osman questions the reason for there not being any other economy, as he states:

Why is a country aid dependent, when their country has everything; ocean, arable land etc. But we don't use it. Somalis have to start using it. From donors the country may for example get cheap rice, thus the rice grower in the country stops producing rice, as he doesn't earn a living on it anymore.[148]

This statement also highlights a power relationship between a donor country and the receiving country, where the receiving country becomes subordinate in such a relationship as it is dependent on donations for its survival. Therefore, to ensure the survival of the citizens, which is an aspect of the social contract, the government has to generate internal growth. Otherwise the social contract can be seen as breached. Moreover, Yassin Osman points out

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[147] Interview 20 Mars 2013
[148] Warsame Yassin Osman, Interview 7 April 2013

that the Somali people themselves have to change the relative strengths by using their natural and human resources. The power of the people was an aspect highlighted by all the interviewees, as they stated that unless the Somali people are determinate to reconstitute the state, then the external support might not help in achieving this goal. Within all of the theories employed the people are the actors who for example, establish a social contract, collectively assign certain functions with status, constitute both the state and power relationships.

The highlighted factors

Looking at the quotes above, several factors are seen as affecting the state-building process in Somalia. Politically, the power relationship between the central and the regional entities is highlighted, where questions of legitimacy is raised. The mistrust between clans and the influence of clan is also problematized; how much influence should clan have in politics? The question of international actors and their role in the state-building process is also emphasized; what are the motives behind their involvement in the country?

Socially, the function of the clan has transformed, and the clan based geographical areas limit people's mobility. The poor infrastructure, lack of education and limited involvement of women in the transformative process are all social dimensions that affect the state-building process. Additionally, security is also an emphasized problem facing the post-transitional government in its establishment and the population, which is interlinked with economy.

Finally, the country has economic obstacles to overcome; the establishment of a non-war economy that is not based on criminality and simultaneously, utilizing the natural and human resources that exist to become donor independent.

7. The Eurocentric discourse

Is African phenomena only understood as mirroring an earlier European history, where modern Western states are a dichotomy to traditional societies? Looking at the highlighted factors they can be interpreted as concepts that mirror the conceptual framework of state rationality, as they relate to concepts of legitimacy, state-building, social contract among others that are based on so called Eurocentric theories. Simultaneously, as these concepts are used as a frame of reference defining countries, they have become universalistic models, all other countries try to adapt to. However, the evolution of the state-building process can be seen as contextual, since the concept of state, as an institutional fact, is based on collectively accepted rules. Thus, the reconstitution of a Somali state, and the shape it will take, depends on how the Somali people collectively assign certain functions to the state, thereby giving it a

specific status, with reference to Searle. But, the state also needs international acknowledgment, thus, it has to transform itself according to the universalistic models so that the "hegemonic powers" do not find this establishment illegitimate, thereby, the state might disregard its historical experiences, according to Wai. So it is questionable whether traditional societies will ever gain the equivalent status as so called modern Western states within the world community. As "modern states" are still evolving they are outgrowing the definition of the Weberian ideal state; the gap to modernity will grow farther in relation to "traditional societies". Thus, the concept of the modern state can also be seen as evolving; adopting to the benefit of "hegemonic powers" in the global economy. So as we live in a world consisting of power relationships that are relative strengths within a continuous struggle, according to Foucault, the dominant actors' exercise of power is supported by regimes of truth, such as the concept of the modern state. However, without our collective acceptance of these regimes, thus, assigning them with a certain status function, they would not exist. Therefore the question of what factors are seen as important for the reconstitution of the Somali state might depend on how the country will adopt to the transforming standards of universalistic state models.

8. References

List of interviewees

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Asho Omar Geesdiir, interviewed on April 5th 2013

Warsame Yassin Osman, interviewed on April 7th 2013

Anonymous, interviewed on April 10th 2013

Kjell Augustzen, interviewed on April 16th 2013

Abdalla Jama, interviewed on April 19th 2013

Diplomat, interviewed on April 22nd 2013

Redie Bereketeab, interviewed on April 23rd 2013

Liban Wehlie, phone interview on April 26th 2013

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Appendix: Map of Somalia

Source: **United Nations Cartographic Section Department of Field Support**, *General Maps: Somalia*. 2011. http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/somalia.pdf (Retrieved May 15th 2013)

Endnotes

[i] Neo-liberalism refers to advocacy of the minimalistic state, and the rights of the individual against those of the state (see neo-liberalist as Robert Notzick, Friedrich Hayek). The view is influenced by classical liberalism (Scott, John and Marshall Gordon (ed.). *Oxford dictionary of Sociology*. 3[ed] ed. revised, New York: Oxford University press, 2009 p.509)

[ii] Neopatrimonialism: patron-client relationships, where support (e.g. investments, votes) is given to a particular political party (or equivalent) and the supporters gain security and/or access to different benefits etc.

[iii] Hegemony refers to "the production of ways of thinking and seeing, and excluding alternative visions and discourses" (Scott, John and Marshall Gordon (ed.). *Oxford dictionary of Sociology*. 3[ed] ed. revised, New York: Oxford University press, 2009 p.306)

[iv] "Inside understanding" and "Outside understanding "– my own translation from Swedish; originally called: *inifrånförståelse* and *utifrånförståelse*.

[v] "Anonymization or anonymous assumes that the coupling between samples or answers to a questionnaire and a specific individual has been eliminated so that either unauthorized or research group can restore it. No one can thus combine e.g. a specific task with a specific individual's identity. The code list is destroyed. Anonymity can also be achieved by making the collection of materials without a specific individual's identity is recorded." (Gustafsson, Hermerén and Petterson p.67: my own translation)

[vi] The clan-name is based on a common male ancestor. The traditional clan structure and genealogy of the Somali society is traced to two brothers; Soomaal and Sab. The clan-families traced to Soomaal led mostly a pastoral-nomadic life, whilst clans traced to Sab led an agro-nomadic life. Descendants of Sab are Raxanweyn and Digil, whilst the clan-families Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye and Daarood can be traced back to Soomaal. The Somali society mainly constitutes of these six clan groups (see Issa-Salwe p.2).

[vii] Agnatic means to be related on one's fathers side

[viii] *Xeer* (sometimes spelled *Heer*) is customary law

[ix] All adult males are elders.

[x] After lengthy discussions decisions were based on consensus.

[xi] During 1975 a system of renewable land-leasing was introduced, which was tarnished by corruption and manipulation. After 1991, the issue of land (and blood debt) became an important and contentious part of the intra-state conflict, which has not yet been resolved.

[xii] State-control apparatus i.e. in the form of a dreaded counterintelligence; National Security Service; "special" secret prisons among other things

[xiii] MOD – three clans; Ogaden, Marehan and Dhulbahante; constituted President Barres most important support

[xiv] The Ogaden War (1977-1978): a war between the Ethiopian and the Somali government, where Somalia losses Soviet patronage to Ethiopia, which led to the Somali break with USSR and a strengthening of relationship with the USA (see Ofcansky p.937).

[xv] The port city has an inflow the Red Sea and Suez Canal

[xvi] According to the principles of UN peacekeeping, no operation can be deployed without the consent of the main parties of a conflict

[xvii] UNOSOM mandate was for the political aspects and for humanitarian assistance in Somalia

[xviii] 4.5 formula means that 1 quota of the seats in Parliament is given to each of the four majority clans, whiles a quota of 0.5 seats are appointed to a coalition of minority clans.

[xix] EU:s comprehensive approach in the HOA – The thought behind is that the cooperation and coordination of security and development in a country will lead to more efficiency (Frisell, Lindell and Skeppström, p.11)

[xx] To anonymize the Somali interviewees they are called A, B. These are letters chosen because they are the first two in the alphabet. Since the occupation of the interviewees belonging to the "International community" is relevant for this study, as it aims to reflect their voices, the anonymized interviewees' profession is mentioned. However, all other information is excluded so that the specific identity of the person is concealed.

No reference after the endnote implies that the endnote has the same reference as the sentence where you can find it.