The In-group and Out-groups of
the British National Party and UK Independence Party

A corpus-based Critical Discourse Analysis

Robin Engström

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to determine to what degree there are textual and conceptual similarities between the British National Party's (BNP) and UK Independence Party's (UKIP) construction of in-groups and out-groups. The focus is on the two discursive strategies nomination (attribution of word form) and predication (attribution of quality).

For the present study I adopt the Discourse-Historical Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis, which offers a broad sociologic understanding of linguistic phenomena through historical contextualization. The data consist of a corpus containing news articles and policy documents from official BNP and UKIP outputs.

The in-group analysis shows that both parties have gained in confidence between the 2005 and 2010 general elections, which is mirrored in their choice of party name as preferred form of self-representation. When claiming uniqueness, both parties mix ideological themes with concrete policies, but UKIP claims ownership of more banal policies. While the BNP and UKIP criticize each other, the main recipients of their criticism are the establishment parties. Both parties feel the need to distance themselves from accusations of racism; the BNP in particular.

The out-group analysis shows that both parties frequently discuss immigration and refer to immigrants using the same word forms, although UKIP's use is more consistent with internationally agreed definitions. Both parties construct immigration as unstoppable forces, e.g. by using water metaphors. References to country of origin are also frequent; UKIP emphasizes Eastern European immigration while the BNP highlights immigration from the Third World.

Overall, the analysis shows that both parties use language extensively to distinguish between in-groups and out-groups, but that UKIP's parameters are more fine-tuned.

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1   Introduction

Right-wing nationalism has gained momentum after years of financial instability, and in most European countries extreme-right parties are now represented in either local, regional or national assemblies. Hungarian Jobbik in the East, French Front National in the West, Italian Lega Nord in the South and Danish Dansk Folkeparti in the North; all over Europe, right-wing and nationalist parties are cashing in on people's worries about the future by offering an ideology that entails considerably more than just increased national pride. Even in Germany, where fascism was thought never to be able to root again, the Nazi Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands is now represented in a couple of regional parliaments. Despite this growth in nationalist sentiment in Europe, research on the topic has been carried out almost exclusively in the fields of sociology and political science, with few linguistic forays.

In Britain, far-right organizations have been operating since the 1920s. Despite this, no such organization would enjoy electoral success until the beginning of the 21st century. This paper is concerned with the language produced by the British National Party (BNP) and the UK Independence Party (UKIP). The BNP is to this date the most successful far-right extremist party in the history of British politics, and has also managed to win representation in the European Parliament. UKIP, which has been dubbed "the BNP in blazers" (Hinsliff, 2004, 30 May), has experienced success in the European elections and has benefited from a number of high-profile defections from established parties.

Until recently, few linguists have taken an interest in the discourse of the BNP, and academic interest in UKIP is still at a level where researchers are primarily concerned with the party's demographics and electoral profile. Despite the absence of research on UKIP discourse, academics have compared UKIP to the BNP. My reason to compare the language of these two parties stems from a paradox present in much of the literature on the British far-right regarding the link between the parties' political classification and their discourse. John and Margetts (2009), for example, manage to balance two seemingly contradictory claims. They say that, on the one hand, the BNP and UKIP have used the same discourse when discussing immigration and national identity. On the other hand, this does not really make UKIP extreme (p. 501). Their subsequent statement that "UKIP draws upon the same source of social and political attitudes among the public as the BNP" (p. 508) makes me question their previous language-related conclusion, and also highlights the need for further comparative discourse studies before making statements on discursive similarity. A comparison of the BNP and UKIP is also motivated by the current electoral situation; while UKIP is gaining momentum the BNP has seemingly ceased to be an electoral force. It is plausible to assume that when BNP support decreases, UKIP will attract further support from the far-right.

The purpose of this paper is to determine to what degree there are textual and conceptual similarities between the BNP's and UKIP's construction of in-groups and out-groups. Papers dealing with this phenomenon are typically concerned either with an in-group or an out-group. In this paper, however, I use the

Discourse-Historical Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis (Wodak, 2001, 2009; Reisigl and Wodak. 2001, 2009) and corpus analysis to investigate how the parties use the discursive strategies *nomination* (attribution of identifying word form) and *predication* (attribution of quality) to construct both their in-group and out-groups. For this paper I have compiled a corpus containing news articles and policy documents published on the BNP's and UKIP's websites between 2005 and 2012. The application of corpus methodologies to discourse analysis is particularly suited for this kind of lexical inquiries as it allows me to discover lexical patterns and explain them through the lens of social and historical contextualization.

The in-group analysis is concerned with the parties' representation and perception of themselves and each other. I investigate the distribution of word forms of self-representation in party-voter interaction and how the parties' preference of party name over the pronoun *we* can be seen as an indicator of increased self-confidence and as an attempt to distance themselves from the mainstream parties. In the analysis of self-image I identify the areas in which the parties claim to have unique competence, what attributes they do not want to be associated with and how they perceive each other's existence. An image emerges of two parties that make similar claims to competence, but which diverge in terms of types of policies. The analysis also shows that the parties are aware of external critique, and that this has had an impact on the parties' self-projection.

The out-group analysis is concerned with the parties' construction of their immigration discourses, and the focus is on immigration nomenclature, quantification and origin. I investigate how the word forms *asylum seeker*, *immigrant* and *refugee* are used in order to create a negative image of immigration, but I also discover that *refugee* is used as a technical term in UKIP discourse. I find that immigrants are frequently quantified, but that general, vague collocates and water metaphors are preferred over exact specifications. Finally, I set out to triangulate where the parties claim that "immigrant waves" come from, and find that both parties frequently discuss immigration in relation to country of origin, but that the BNP and UKIP emphasize Third World and Eastern European descent respectively. The out-group analysis shows that there are many similarities between the parties' conceptualizations of immigration and that the differences are formal rather than functional.

I start by providing the ideological and political background of the BNP and UKIP, followed by a discussion of previous relevant literature. My aim and research questions are presented in 1.3. Chapter 2 contains a description of my theoretical framework and methodological approach. 2.1 is concerned with discourse theory. In 2.1.1 I summarize cognitive approaches to discourse analysis. 2.1.2 contains an outline of my conceptual framework, the Discourse-Historical Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis. The analytical dichotomy in-group and out-group is discussed in 2.2. Corpus analytical methods used in this thesis are described in 2.3. Chapter 3 contains a description of my corpus and a motivation of my choice of reference corpus. In chapter 4 I analyze the construction of the parties' in-group. Aspects covered in this chapter are forms of self-reference (4.1), claims of unique competence (4.2.1), negation of attributes (4.2.2) and mutual

perceptions (4.2.3). In chapter 5 I analyze the construction of out-groups. The analysis focuses on immigration terminology (5.2), quantification (5.3) and origin (5.4). Chapter 6 contains a summary of the analysis, conclusions and suggestion for further studies.

1.1 The political and ideological contexts of the BNP and UKIP

The BNP and UKIP are two relatively young nationalist parties located on the right of the political spectrum. By comparing the parties' own descriptions of themselves, their basic motivation appears to be the same. In its party constitution, UKIP describes itself as a

> [p]arty [that] believes that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland […] should only be governed by her own citizens and that its governance shall at all times be conducted first and foremost in the interests of the United Kingdom and its peoples[…].
>
> (UKIP 1)

The feeling that national independence has been lost and that it has to be retaken is central also in BNP texts, although here, ethnicity is an important variable.

> Our party is a party of **British Nationalism**, both ethnic and civic, and we are committed to the principle of national sovereignty in all our British Homeland affairs and of self determination and sovereignty in all Indigenous British affairs.
>
> (BNP, 2010, p. 7, original emphasis)

In the political and sociological literature, scholars use various terms to brand the parties ideologically and politically; anthropologist Holmes (2000) even struggles to fix British fascism on the left-right spectrum. This is so because of the extreme right's increased interest in welfare questions (albeit only for a designated part of the population) and the general decline of the left. This has seemingly resulted in a political reality in which parties like the BNP are able to claim legitimacy and to hold multiple political positions simultaneously (p. 114). Political scientists typically assign the BNP various ideological-political compound labels such as *extreme right* (e.g. Copsey, 2008, 2011; Linehan, 2005) or *far-right* (e.g. Gottlieb, 2004; Copsey, 2011; Linehan, 2005; Rhodes, 2009; Goodwin, 2011). *Fascist* has also been frequently used (e.g. Copsey, 2004, 2011; Goodwin, 2011; Holmes, 2000; Richardson, 2011). Labels describing UKIP include *populist* and *anti-establishment* (e.g. Evans and Goodwin, 2012; Cutts et al., 2012; Loomes et al., 2011). Evans and Goodwin (2012) brand both parties *xenophobic* and *Eurosceptic*. Based on questionnaire data provided by UKIP candidates for the 2009 European Parliament election and the 2009 general election, Loomes et al. (2011) suggest that UKIP's political position on the left-right spectrum is relative and best understood as somewhere between the centre-

right Conservatives and the more extreme BNP, which they position right next to UKIP (pp. 744-746). Evans and Goodwin (2012) agree with this view and conclude that there are several similarities between the two parties, but that the BNP is "associated more strongly with ideological extremism, criminality and violence" while UKIP "advocate similar policies in many areas but would strongly reject any association with extremism and violence" (p. 6). Others, such as Abedi and Lundberg (2009) do not consider UKIP to be extreme and rather opt for the term *anti-political establishment*. UKIP is not listed as a racist party by the anti-fascist organization Unite Against Fascism or the anti-fascist campaign Hope not Hate. Bjurwald (2011), however, includes UKIP on her list of extreme-right and xenophobic parties in Europe with the motivation that individual members exhibit xenophobic behaviour (p. 308).

It is possible to connect the current BNP to an older namesake, but also to fascist organizations operating in interwar Britain; a span of almost a hundred years. Historian Cross (1961) was one of the first scholars to give an academic account of the acts of right-wing politicians John Bean, founder of the National Labour Party, and Colin Jordan, founder of the White Defence League (p. 199), both in 1957. In 1960, these two parties would merge and form the British National Party, which eventually dissolved in 1967 (Walker, 1977, p. 67). Both men were closely linked to Arnold Leese, the founder of the Imperial Fascist League in 1929, and to John Tyndall, who would go on to form the current BNP in 1982. Under Tyndall's leadership the party had a more anti-Semitic character. Scholars such as Richardson (2011) claim that anti-Semitism is still a vital element of the party's ideology, but that such discussions now take place internally or on Internet fora (pp. 39ff). The incumbent chairman, Nick Griffin, was elected in 1999 and soon set out to modernize the party in order to gain legitimacy. The anti-Semitic elements have been downplayed, though the party remains anti-Zionist (e.g. BNP, 2005, pp. 51f). Instead, Muslim immigrants in Britain and Europe have been made the new targets of nationalist disapproval. The BNP advocates a complete halt to immigration in order to take back the land from "Third World colonizers" and to give it back to the "indigenous Britons". Discussions of what constitutes "indigenous" or British are common (see Richardson, 2011). Up until 2009 the party had a whites-only policy.

UKIP was founded by Alan Sked, Professor in International History at the London School of Economics, in 1993. UKIP's history can be traced back to the *Anti-Federalist League*, a group formed to campaign against the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. In its constitution, the party describes itself as civic nationalist and distances itself from ethnic nationalism (UKIP 2). Besides the EU, perceived threats include Marxism, multiculturalism and Islamification. Unlike the BNP, UKIP has had a number of leaders over the years. The incumbent, Nigel Farage, also a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) for South East England, led the party from 2006 to 2009 and was re-elected in 2010. Just like the

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BNP, UKIP members see themselves as victims of political correctness and media bias[1].

The BNP and UKIP are small parties and have not won any seats in the House of Commons, and are unlikely to do so unless the current first-past-the-post system is replaced by proportional representation. However, UKIP holds three seats in the House of Lords due to defections. UKIP won its first three seats in the European Parliament in 1999, and quadrupled the number of seats in 2004. The BNP had its first two MEPs elected in 2009 (Party Chairman Nick Griffin and Andrew Brons, now leader of the British Democratic Party) while UKIP made its best election so far, pulling 16.5% of the British votes, which translates into thirteen seats (since then, one MEP has been expelled, another has defected to the Conservatives). In the 2010 general election, neither party managed to win any seats in the Commons. Psephologically, however, both the BNP and UKIP had their strongest showings so far, pulling 1.9 and 3.1% of the votes cast respectively. The BNP is thus the fifth biggest party in Britain, UKIP the fourth. Although a plethora of fascist organizations have operated in Britain since the First World War, they have had little electoral success. Oswald Mosley, the face of interwar British fascism, never pulled more than 0.2% in the 1931 general election with his New Party (Linehan, p. 88). His British Union of Fascists, founded in 1932, never stood in a general election at all. Before the 2010 election, the biggest electoral success enjoyed by an extreme-right party was in 1979 when the National Front won 1.3% of the votes in the general election (Copsey, 2008, p. 20).

The BNP has had some success in local elections over the last decade but lost many of its councillors in the 2010, 2011 and 2012 elections and does now only have two seats, as compared to UKIP's 32. These massive electoral losses have resulted in political scientists taking a more relaxed approach to the BNP (e.g. Copsey, 2011, pp. 6-8) or even declaring the party dead as an electoral force (e.g. Evans and Goodwin, 2012). Bear in mind that not long ago, Copsey (2004) claimed that the party was close to attaining legitimacy (p. 167). John and Margetts (2009) warn that that the latent support for the BNP is constantly big, while others, such as Messina (2011) see such claims as overestimations of the support for the far-right (p. 186).

1.2   Review of academic responses to the far-right

The first major academic responses to the BNP came only a decade ago, and understandably, most research on the far-right in general has been carried out by historians, political scientists and sociologists. Historian Nigel Copsey published his pivotal *British Fascism: The British National Party and the quest for legitimacy*, in which he gives an account of the party's history, in 2004. A new edition was published in 2008 amid the fear that the BNP would make its way into

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[1] This is particularly true of the BNP, which considers almost all broadsheets and tabloids (not to mention the BBC and its flagship Panorama) to be anti-BNP. The decline in circulation of British newspapers is often reported on the BNP website as a sign of increase in BNP support.

the European Parliament. It would take another few years before there were any academic responses to UKIP or comparisons between the two parties.

Linguistic approaches to the contemporary far-right in Britain have been sparse but generally of high quality. Unfortunately, little attention has been paid to UKIP. This is, however, not an issue endemic to linguistics. Cutts et al. (2012) note that, while some research has been carried out on voter pattern and party organization, systematic research on UKIP has not been prioritized (p. 204f). Discourse analyses of the far-right often focus on the discursive creation and maintenance of contrast, masking and moderation of racist language and use of metaphor. An attempt to define racist discourse has been undertaken by van Dijk (1987), who provides an attitude schema containing four "topic classes", which can be said to be the centrality factors or essential components of racist discourse (p. 58).

1. They are different
2. They do not adapt
3. They are involved in negative acts
4. They threaten our socioeconomic interests

It is hard to prove that these are the only essential components of racist discourse, and there is bound to be some overlapping with definitions of other isms. These classes are just the essential abstractions of a greater number of characteristics, or more precisely, prejudices, which makes van Dijk's definition an example of a check-list approach rather than an essentialist approach to racism (see 2.1.1 for a discussion of essentialist and check-list approaches). As my analysis will show, all four of van Dijk's classes are frequently expressed in BNP and UKIP discourse. What is interesting to note here is van Dijk's use of pronouns; prejudice is essentially defined as the differentiation between *us* and *them*.

The distinction between in-groups and out-groups is discussed in Richardson (2011), who distinguishes between discursive surface and depth. He contends that "discourse of fascist parties seeking mass electoral support is inherently duplicitous, claiming one thing while the party is committed to something else" (p. 38). Richardson warns us that if we only focus on manifestos and other texts aimed at potential voters, an extreme party like the BNP might actually come across as operating within established and acceptable limits of right-wing politics (p. 42f). This echoes the methodological credo in Duverger's (1964) seminal *Political Parties*, namely that "[c]onstitutions and rules never give more than a partial idea of what happens, if indeed they describe reality at all" (xvi). Another recent reiteration of this claim has been made by Goodwin (2008), who is strongly in favour of an actor-driven approach to the far-right. Richardson's (2011) conclusions that the BNP is still intrinsically anti-Semitic, but that this manifests itself differently at surface and depth level, is the result of a comparison of BNP texts written at different points in time (p. 39). That some form of comparison is needed in order to understand how fascist discourse is reproduced is clear. Edwards (2012) does this by comparing the BNP's 2005 and 2010 general

election manifestos. By comparing frequency of party name and pronouns, he paints a picture of a party that is becoming increasingly confident. Edwards sees the increase of references to the British nation on behalf of references to the British people as an attempt to "adopt a more statesmanlike approach by invoking the authority of nationhood" (p. 251).

Political scientists Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou (2010) explain the mollification of BNP discourse as a result of emulation of UKIP discourse. The BNP has borrowed copiously from UKIP, particularly the concept of freedom (p. 589). The conception of the BNP as a parasite party, siphoning political energy from others, is an eye-opening one. The party's "borrowing" of discursive matter has been highlighted by Richardson and Wodak (2009), who describe how the BNP has claimed the phrase "British jobs for British workers" as its own following a speech delivered by Gordon Brown. In the hands of the BNP, *British* has come to be used as a formal realization of an in-group with racist overtones, referring exclusively to whites[2] (p. 262). They argue that the BNP's use of the phrase is a recontextualization of formally and functionally similar phrases, e.g. the British Fascists' "Britain for the British", used in prewar British far-right politics to construct Jews as an alien life form. Richardson and Wodak argue that instead of excluding Jews from the concept of Britishness, the phrase has now taken on anti-Muslim and anti-Black meaning (p. 256).

While Richardson and Wodak (2009) have identified an important and interesting shift, their analysis oversimplifies interwar fascist organizations' construction of non-British out-groups. Early fascist groups, such as the British Fascists or the British Empire Union, were at least initially mainly concerned with the maintenance of the Empire and the fight against Bolsheviks, which would entail that the phrase "Britain for the British" also sought to exclude anti-imperial elements as well as Jews (for an overview of the anti-Bolshevism of the interwar far-right, see Linehan, 2000). The slowly changing meaning of *British* in the hands of the far-right and the reconfiguration of the out-group is illustrated by Richardson's (2013) analysis of the conceptualization of Britishness in the newspaper COMBAT, published by the 1960's BNP and its progenitor the National Labour Party (NLP). The 1960's conceptualization can be seen as an intermediate stage between the prewar and contemporary meaning of *British*. In the 1960s, *white* was used interchangeably with *British*, but it was still the Jews rather than the Muslims who were the chosen targets of disapproval. Disappointment with the declining status of the Empire had been replaced with disappointment with the Commonwealth, which the NLP wanted to replace with a "new Union of the white dominions" (Richardson, 2013, pp. 186f).

Out-groups are complex in the sense that they are not homogenous. The current BNP's complex conceptualization of out-groups can be seen in Figure 1, where the interwar notion of the Bolshevik conspiracy is combined with the more contemporary paranoia concerning an Islamic invasion of Europe.

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[2] It should be pointed out that approaches to the BNP emphasizing the homogeneity of the electorate have been criticized, for example by Rhodes (2011) who concludes that there is no "shared position or universal understanding of whiteness and white identity" among BNP voters (p. 114).

Figure 1. BNP distortions of the BBC logo.

Figure 1 is a prime example of the paranoia that is so typical of the BNP's out-group construction. In this image, downloaded from the official BNP website, the out-group has an ethnic and a politico-cultural anatomy, just like in the prewar and 1960's conceptualizations. Just like Richardson and Wodak (2009) pointed out, there has been a shift in ethnic focus from Jews to Muslims, but the fear of the left, signalled by the hammer and sickle in the fake BBC logo shown in Figure 1, is still present.

Charteris-Black (2006) takes an interest in the rhetorical function of metaphor in right-wing discourse. Using a corpus compiled from BNP and Conservative sources as well as right-wing news paper texts, he finds that both parties, as well as the media, persistently use metaphor in relation to immigration, particularly container metaphors and metaphors of natural disasters. He also discovers that, while the media make use of both, the centre-right tends to favour container metaphors while the far-right uses metaphors of natural disasters. The underlying function of these metaphors, according to Chartis-Black, is to "discourage sympathy with immigrants by treating them as objects rather than as the subjects of life stories" (p. 569). Of the natural disaster metaphors, water movement is of particular importance for the present study and will be discussed in 5.3. An increase in water stands for an increase in immigration, but Chartis-Black asserts that tidal metaphors are also inextricably linked to repatriation, with the withdrawal of water serving to naturalize the sending home of immigrants (p. 571). Regarding the magnitude of the metaphorical disaster, Chartis-Black sums it up with the axiom "the greater the disaster the further to the right" (p. 569).

1.3 Aim and research questions

The aim of this thesis is to determine to what extent there are textual and conceptual similarities between the BNP's and UKIP's construction of in-groups and out-groups. It is my hope that this approach can be applied also to critical

studies of political organizations operating in other national and ideological contexts. I seek to answer this overarching question:

- To what extent are there formal and functional similarities between the discourses of the BNP and UKIP?[3]

I operationalize this rather wide aim by focusing on how the BNP and UKIP construct in-groups and out-groups through the use of the discursive strategies *nomination* (attribution of form of identification) and *predication* (attribution of characteristics, qualities and features). Four questions are central to this thesis.

In-group	• What word forms do the parties use in order to express themselves?
	• What unique self-image do the parties convey?
Out-group	• What word forms do the parties use in order to represent and describe immigration?
	• What aspects do the parties foreground in their description of immigration?

The two in-groups with which this study is concerned are the BNP and UKIP themselves[4]. I have chosen to focus on immigration as the out-group partly because of the fact that the BNP and UKIP are anti-immigration parties, but also because of the applicability of the word. Immigration as an umbrella term is heterogeneous and fuzzy and in this context therefore in need of clarification.

The first question in each pair is concerned with the attribution of word form to actors or organizations. In the analysis of the in-group I investigate the parties' choice of word form of self-reference. In the analysis of the out-groups the question is rather what word forms the parties use when referring to immigrants. The second question in each pair is concerned with the attribution of characteristics, qualities and features to actors or organizations. When the parties use this discursive strategy they seek either to project a positive image of themselves (the in-group), e.g. by claiming unique competence in policy areas, or to project a negative image of their opponents (the out-group) e.g. by attributing negative characteristics to them.

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[3] The dichotomy formal-functional is further elaborated in 2.1.2.
[4] The BNP and UKIP are of course each other's out-group, and so is every other political party.

2   Discourse theory and corpus methodology

In this study I carry out a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) aided by corpus linguistics methods. In terms of methodology, this thesis is a marriage of quantitative and qualitative approaches. Baker et al. (2008) have referred to this marriage as a "useful methodological synergy" (p. 273f). The relation between corpus linguistics and CDA works in two directions. Corpus software can be used in order to retrieve instances of phenomena typically discussed in CDA, and then provide frequencies and other statistical data. The other way is to search for phenomena not typically associated with CDA, and then apply a CDA framework (p. 285). The methodological synthesis proposed by Baker et al. (2008) is particularly suited for this investigation as it allows lexical patterns to be the point of departure for a social study. Moreover, the combination of corpus linguistics and CDA bridges the gap between quantitative and qualitative approaches, and it can also be argued that the incorporation of quantitative methods reduce researcher bias.

In this chapter I introduce the discourse-theoretical framework and corpus linguistic methodology underpinning the analysis. In 2.1 I discuss my theoretical framework. The chapter is divided into a section 2.1.1 which is concerned with discourse as an unarticulated system of concepts and a section 2.1.2 in which the Discourse-Historical Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis, which is the framework adopted for this study, is presented. In 2.2 I discuss the analytical perspectives *in-group* and *out-group* and state what linguistic features I will investigate. Finally, 2.3 contains a description of the corpus analytical tools used in the analysis.

2.1   Discourse theory

This chapter starts with an account of cognitive approaches to discourse, particularly theories of semantic storage. The discussion of the unarticulated systematization of conceptual and encyclopaedic knowledge in 2.1.1 draws upon the works by Fillmore (1982), Lakoff (2008) and Langacker (1987). In 2.1.2 I outline the theoretical framework used for this study, the Discourse-Historical Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis, which draws upon the work by Wodak (2001; 2009) and Reisigl and Wodak (2001; 2009).

2.1.1   *Cognitive approaches to discourse*

Discourses never exist in isolation but are intertwined in complex networks, known as interdiscursivity. Similarly, concepts do not exist in isolation. There have been many attempts to explain exactly how we store and retrieve conceptual information. Fillmore (1982) uses the term *frame* to refer to a comprehensive system of knowledge that we use in order to make sense of the world. More precisely, a frame is "any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which

it fits" (p. 111). Some of Fillmore's exemplifications of topics discussed in lexical semantics can be extrapolated to discourse analysis, where they are highly relevant. One of these topics concerns reframing of lexical sets. Fillmore notes that in the case of the word pairings *boy-man* and *girl-woman*, there is lag in the lexical transition from *girl* to *woman*, while *boys* tend to be identified as *men* at an earlier age. As Fillmore points out, this asymmetry points at negative attitudes towards women (p. 126). An implicit application of frames in this manner is carried out in a longitudinal corpus study by Baker (2010b), who studies the distribution of *Mrs*, *Miss* and *Ms* in British corpora. He concludes that there is an increase in the use of the word forms *boy* and *girl* as lexical representations of adults, but that the number is considerably higher for women than for men (p. 139).

Lakoff (2008) has adapted frame semantics for studies of political discourse. Discourse (Lakoff calls it *narrative*) is structured by smaller entities, frames, which are neural circuits capable of structuring thought (p. 22). While frames are simple in nature, they can be combined into more complex, perhaps even contradictory structures. Lakoff exemplifies this with the compound *field hospital*; a patient and a doctor may both be soldiers, but while one tries to save lives, the other is paid to end them (p. 23). The relation between neurobiology and political language is further investigated by Lakoff and Wehling (2012). They argue that an understanding of the complex neural networks of the brain, and the knowledge that the activation of one concept triggers a larger set of related concepts, are necessary in order to understand politics (p. 29). All political frames are moral, and it is the politicians' task to connect mundane issues to these larger, moral frames (pp. 9, 13). Swing voting can be explained by the presence of a complex circuitry, whose different frames are triggered by politically coloured language (p. 14). Political conceptualization is hierarchical, and discursive success hinges on the ability to activate a moral frame through mentioning of specific issues, something which Lakoff and Wehling insist that conservatives do better than liberals (pp. 29, 35).

On a lexical level, the activation of frames can be compared to the notion of discourse prosody and semantic preference. Stubbs (2001) defines semantic prosody as a relationship between a lemma and a set of semantically related words, easily labelled according to quality or function (p. 65). When this relation can be identified as attitudinal rather than strictly semantic, Stubbs uses the term *discourse prosody*. Discourses can thus be labelled *positive*, *negative* or any other evaluative label. For example, Baker and McEnery (2005) argue that persistent linking of the word *asylum seeker* to a set of negatively charged concepts will lead to the activation of those negative concepts every time we hear or read the word *asylum seeker* (p. 218).

In Langacker's (1987) terminology, frames are known as *domains*, and the exact content of such domains varies depending on level of complexity (pp. 147ff). Langacker uses the term *centrality* and *centrality factors* to discuss the degree to which encyclopaedic knowledge can be said to have an impact on meaning, or perhaps rather to what degree we should pay attention to encyclopaedic aspects of meaning (pp. 158-161). A concept may be associated

with an infinite set of pieces of information, some of which may be highly ideographic or contingent, to use Langacker's wording, while other pieces of information are essential to a concept's meaning. Langacker argues that for encyclopaedic knowledge to be considered an essential component of a concept, it has to be conventional, generic, intrinsic and characteristic (p. 159). The notion of centrality factors, which is closely related to what is known in ontology as essentialism, is incompatible with most post-modern forms of discourse analysis. Discourse analysts tend to take the ideographic, or text-specific, into consideration just as much as the nomothetic, or what is universal and potentially suitable for generalizations. Langacker argues for his essentialist approach to conceptualization using the word *banana*. Langacker says that his sister has slices of banana for breakfast (ideographic knowledge), but that this knowledge is not important enough to be a part of a wider conceptual frame, according to which the fruit is classified based on other properties such as shape or colour (which are apparently considered objective enough for generalizations). In discourse analysis, on the other hand, the existence of the knowledge of the sister and her nutritional habits could hypothetically be of enormous importance (the decision not to eat banana could, for example, be interpreted as a stance against globalization or unfair working conditions). One of the objects of discourse analysis is to foreground, or demystify[5], what actors choose to background, and to question what is foregrounded. It is up to the analyst to decide which aspects should be lifted.

The essentialist influence on the study of fascist discourse is too reductive. In his historiography of fascism, historian Linehan (2000) says that contemporary research on fascism is dominated by a generic approach which seeks to explain fascism in terms of core features (pp. 4f). A definition of fascism suggested by Griffin (1991), according to whom fascism can be summed up as a "palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism"[6], has had a large impact on the study of fascism (p. 26). Similarly, Payne (1995) sees a generic working definition of fascism as a prerequisite for comparative studies, even if the definition turns out to be an ideal type that does not necessarily crystallize itself in the real world (p. 4). The purpose of such a synthesis is to replace what Griffin (1998) describes as a checklist approach (pp. 9f). As Griffin (1991) points out, this type of definition is a heuristic tool (p. 11), but if used as a truly rigid minimal law, which is easy to do when you have simple tools at hand, this might lead to an insufficient amount of attention being directed to aspects that are not explicitly accounted for in the minimalist definition. It is indeed a problem if scholars' fixation on certain

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[5] As this is a lexical study, emphasis is on foregrounding rather than demystification, which is a term used by Fairclough (1992) to refer to the process of clarifying agency, for example by studying passive sentences and nominalization.

[6] Griffin's (1991) definition of fascism foregrounds the belief in a "political myth" which emphasizes national rebirth and regeneration (*palingenesis*). This palingenetic myth is the party's mobilizing force (p. 27). *Populist* is a term applied to a cadre whose power is given and legitimized by the people (pp. 36f). The difference between *nationalism* and *ultranationalism* partly corresponds to the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism. Nationalists have a rational and functional conception of the nation based on citizenship. Ultranationalists share an organic conception of the nation and inclusion is based on ethnicity rather than citizenship (Griffin, 2006, pp. 451f).

aspects allows contemporary (far-right) organizations to revive other old (fascist) ideas without being noticed. However, as we will see in the next chapter, broad contextualization is a vital part of my approach, and generic definitions can be used in order to grasp certain forms of socio-historical embeddings.

2.1.2   *The Discourse-Historical Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis*

The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) is a tradition within the wider movement of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA is an interdisciplinary approach which combines social theory with linguistic methods, described by Fairclough (1992) as an attempt to "marry a method of linguistic text analysis with a social theory of the functioning of language in political and ideological processes" (p. 26). Elaborating more on the central pillars, Baker et al. (2008) describe CDA as "a way of doing discourse analysis from a critical perspective, which often focuses on theoretical concepts such as power, ideology and domination" (p. 273). CDA is theoretically and methodologically flexible, or as van Dijk (2001) puts it, "it does not have a unitary theoretical framework" (p. 353). In my view, the absence of a predetermined modus operandi is the strength of CDA as it allows, or perhaps forces, the researcher to rely on her or his knowledge of the field in order to structure the study.

The Discourse-Historical Approach is a way of applying CDA to the study of political discourse, having been described by Wodak (2009) as a "vehicle for looking at latent power dynamics and the range of potential agents" (p. 38). The relationship between language and power is at the centre, and language is seen as the means by which power relations are established and maintained (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009, p. 88). Just like CDA, DHA is flexible and allows the analyst to use her or his knowledge in order to explain phenomena through contextualization. The name, the Discourse-*Historical* Approach, is a little misleading, however, as research within this framework is to a large extent (text) linguistic and social and not history per se. What makes DHA unique is its emphasis on interdisciplinary contextualization of language. The purpose of DHA is not to offer a linguistic and historical description of language (e.g. syntax + etymology), but to use history as a means of contextualizing language in time and space, yielding a greater understanding of both language and society. Later in this chapter I will introduce the term *historization* as a contextualizing mechanism.

Key sociologic and political concepts in DHA are *critique*, *ideology* and *power*. These are accompanied by the linguistic concepts *discourse*, *text*, *intertextuality*, *interdiscursivity* and *recontextualization*. My use of DHA follows Reisigl and Wodak's (2001; 2009) and Wodak's (2001) outline, but diverges particularly in terms of quantitative methodology, textual unit of study and heuristic levels. The incorporation of corpus linguistics entails a stronger focus on lexical items as the main objects of investigation, and my interest in neurocognitive aspects of language has resulted in the addition of a neurocognitive level to Wodak's (2001) model of theories and linguistic analysis (p. 69).

Reisigl and Wodak (2009) define discourse by using a set of abstracted, organizational criteria (p. 89). Functionally, discourse is normative arguments; formally it is a "cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices" that can be assigned a macro-topic. Ontologically, discourse is socially constituted but also socially constitutive. In this respect, DHA differs from traditional Marxist approaches which see discourse as the manifestation of underlying economic function, or post-structuralist approaches such as Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) Discourse Theory, where "every object is constituted as an object of discourse" (p. 107). Discourse is contrasted with text, which is simply a "specific and unique realization of a discourse" (Wodak, 2009, p. 40).

Critique is a pivotal concept in DHA. Reisigl and Wodak (2001) identify three aspects (pp. 32ff).

1. *Text or discourse-immanent critique*;
2. *Socio-diagnostic critique*;
3. *Prospective critique*[7]

First, a researcher should find potential self-contradictions and inconsistencies in the texts and discourses. Such inconsistencies are relatively apolitical and include logical fallacies. Second, a researcher should expose the persuasive, populist and manipulative nature of discursive practices, and identify what she or he sees as problematic consequences, should the discourse crystallize as implemented policies. This level is not entirely text-internal but involves the use of social theories, chosen based on the researcher's background and contextual knowledge. The third step is not concerned with the actual text under investigation but rather with the improvement of future communication, e.g. in the form of seminars after the research product has been published.

Context is a pivotal concept in DHA and can be approached from an interdiscursive or intertextual angle. Interdiscursivity concerns the embedding of discourse topics. For example, discourse on climate change is rarely ever strictly meteorological but intertwined with discourses on finance and health (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009, p. 90). Intertextuality concerns the linkage of texts to other texts, and is a concept central to my study. Blommaert (2005) says that the purpose of DHA is to "[trace] the (intertextual) history of phrases and arguments" (p. 28). *Intertextual* should be highlighted rather than put in brackets, as Blommaert does, otherwise it would result in rather one-dimensional investigations; it is in fact impossible to study conceptual history by looking at one text alone. Recontextualization is a more abstract form of intertextuality that is not only concerned with explicit references to discourse topics, names or specific events but with the history of the relationship between discourse function and form. I choose to define recontextualization as formal or functional modification of referencing. Formal referencing concerns the implantation of a semiotic form in a new context where it is given a new function. This is the type of recontextualization process that van Ginderachter (2005) comes across in his

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[7] Corresponds to *prognostic critique* in Wodak (2001, p. 65).

investigation of the interwar, fascist Flemish organization *Katholieke Vlaamsche Meisjesbeweging*'s motto *Ik dien* ('I serve'). van Ginderachter argues that men would assume the implicit recipient of women's services to be either the husband or God, while women in fact considered themselves to serve their country (pp. 274f). Functional referencing occurs when a function or concept is used with a different or modified word form(s), e.g. the choice to talk about *them* rather the *out-group* or *the others*. This phenomenon is further discussed in 2.2.

Figure 2 is a visual representation of my adaptation of DHA. My model is largely based on Wodak's (2001, p. 69), however, there are a few differences. My approach consists of five heuristic levels rather than four: texts, discourse, specific frame, social embeddedness and brain structures and functions. The five levels are different ontological sizes, ranging from micro to macro level. The first two levels are mediated by intertextuality and interdiscursivity and are purely descriptive. The remaining levels are attempts to functionally explain the forms of the first two levels using various theories and framing and restriction mechanisms. This is in line with received CDA methodology as a "CDA study engages in two major aspects of analysis: a *descriptive* analysis which analyses the *texts* and accounts for linguistic characteristics of the data, and an *explanatory* level where the findings of the first level are contextualized and *explained*, drawing on linguistic and social theories" (KhosraviNik, 2010a, p. 55).

Figure 2. Levels of theories and context, abstraction of methodology and reality levels.

Note. Based on Wodak's model of context (2001, p. 69).

Figure 2 contains three vertical axes: methodology, ontology and epistemology. At the centre of Figure 2 we find the ontological dimensions, or heuristic levels as they will be referred to here. These heuristic levels illustrate the different components of the analysis. It should be stressed that Figure 2 is a model, i.e. it contains the aspects that I investigate, but the actual analysis does not necessarily run in a strictly linear fashion. As pointed out by Wodak (2001), constant movement between the levels is needed (p. 70). I am now going to describe these five heuristic levels more in detail.

The first heuristic level is a pre-discourse level, concerned with texts in isolation rather than as a discursive aggregate. The first heuristic level is purely descriptive, and Reisigl and Wodak (2009) suggest five "discursive strategies" that can be used on this level to analyze group formation (pp. 93f).

- Nomination: what word forms are used in order to represent persons, objects, phenomena, processes and actions?
- Predication: what qualities are attributed to the above forms?
- Argumentation: how are nomination and predication justified?
- Perspectivization: how are actors or organizations involved in the use of these strategies?
- Intensification/mitigation: how strong or weak are the linguistic realizations of the preceding strategies?

Perspectivization is the red thread throughout this study and here I would like to stress its primacy. I claim that we need to make a distinction between perspectivization as merely one discursive strategy among many and perspectivization as the deep function underpinning discourse. Reisigl and Wodak (2009) list a number of linguistic devices affected by this strategy, e.g. deictic forms, quotation marks, direct or indirect speech and metaphor (p. 94). However, I argue that all the discursive strategies listed above fall within the scope of perspectivization. I have created the following example to illustrate how a stereotypical construction of Jewish identity can look like.

Nomination: *Jews* (membership category)
Predication: *Greedy* (stereotypical attribute)
Argument: "They control the economy"
Perspectivization: *A conspiracy* (the speaker excludes her/himself)
Intensification: "They're everywhere" (hyperbole)

These strategies serve the purpose of constructing an out-group that is different from the in-group, or at the very least to distinguish between a group of people and the speaker. What is clear is that all constitutive elements are based on perspective. This claim is supported by KhosraviNik (2010a) who describes perspectivization as an "omnipresent feature of any linguistic realization" since "all linguistic products are *perspectivized* as they are essentially *choices* and can extend from choosing (or not) a certain word to a macro-topic" (p. 58).

Nomination and predication correspond to the research questions posed in 1.3 and will be the main focal points of the analysis. It is, however, impossible to treat these two dimensions in isolation from the other three, which I will only touch upon peripherally throughout the analysis. I investigate nomination in the in-group by comparing the BNP's and UKIP's choice of form of self-reference. In the out-group analysis I look at the parties' "immigration nomenclature", i.e. the word forms referring to immigrants. Predication is operationalized by looking at what qualities the parties claim as unique and what qualities they attribute to immigrants.

I do not intend to analyze intensification/mitigation here, so this strategy is only discussed when corpus searches result in findings that need to be addressed from that particular perspective.

Finally, arguments can only be counted if they exist, which is not always the case. For example, the parties' use of party name over pronoun is never accompanied by an explanation, while other word forms such as *immigration* or *the Third World* are often discussed in relation to topoi[8] such as disease, economy or repatriation. Moreover, there are clear limitations to corpus linguistics when it comes to identifying arguments, metaphor, discourse topics, et cetera as they cannot be identified using simple search words or automatic annotation. Hopefully, progress in the field of semantic and pragmatic tagging will change this.

The second heuristic level, the discourse level, is concerned with the formation of discourses through intertextuality and embedding of discourse topics through interdiscursivity. A study of intertextuality and interdiscursivity involves a body of texts produced by one actor alone[9], which could be a person or an organization. The inductive reconstruction of a discourse or discourse topic (a macro-variety) from smaller elements is a prerequisite for a comparative analysis. It can of course be difficult to relate a macro topic to a discourse, which is one of Reisigl and Wodak's (2009) definitions of discourse (p. 89). This problem is related to the question of interdiscursivity and whether a discourse topic can exist in isolation or whether embedding is unavoidable. As Baker (2006) explains, "[w]here I see a discourse, you may see a different discourse, or no discourse" (p. 4). In chapter 5 I reconstruct the discourse topic of immigration. It is of course not unproblematic to reconstruct a discourse topic, but by using a corpus-based approach and by using relevant search terms, it is easier to reconstruct a discourse topic such as *economic discourse*, *environmental discourse* or *immigration discourse* than it is to conclude that a discourse is *racist*, *sexist* or *unfair*. In order to make such claims

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[8] My use of *topos* (pl. *topoi*) diverges somewhat from how it is typically used in DHA (see Baker et al., 2008, p. 299). In this study, a *topic* is a macro label given to discourses (e.g. economic discourse, immigration discourse) while a *topos* refers to the subject matter discussed within a discourse. When I discuss meta-aspects of topoi, e.g. the reason d'être of a metaphor, I use the term *function*.

[9] The reason for this is quite obvious; it is not possible to compare the language of two actors if the corpus contains texts produced by many actors. However, interdiscursivity and intertextuality can be studied as more general, multi-actor phenomena, for example by studying what texts or slogans are frequently cited and used by right-wing organizations (intertextuality) or what discourse topics these organizations often discuss (interdiscursivity). These are wider, contextualizing approaches and therefore part of the fourth heuristic level.

(which I will not make here) you need a priori definitions of what constitutes *racist*, *sexist* or *unfair* discourse, similar to van Dijk's (1987) prejudice schema used in his investigation of racist discourse (see 1.2).

The third heuristic level, the specific frame, corresponds to Wodak's (2001, pp. 67, 69) 'middle range theories'. *Social* should not be understood as strictly sociological, but may as well incorporate linguistic elements. The choice of theory depends on the form that needs explaining, but what the theories have in common is that they are specific and operational, i.e. they focus on a particular actor/organization and offer explanations to that actor's or organization's acts. Aspects that can be investigated include amongst other things the structure of an organization, the people associated with that organization and the history of the organization. The choice of theory, as has already been pointed out, is completely dependent on the act that needs investigating. For example, in a study of party behaviour, theories deployed can be concerned with ideology, electoral gains or branding.

The fourth heuristic level, here called *social embeddedness*, contains broader theories and corresponds to Wodak's 'grand theories'. This level, described by Richardson (2013) as "'history' as it is conventionally understood – the broad and complex interactions of people, organizations, institutions and ideas" (p. 183), is less operational than the middle range theories found on the third heuristic level. Rather than being operational, they constitute a framing foundation. The fourth heuristic level can also be understood as similar to conceptual history or conceptual semantics. Embeddedness is achieved through a process that I call *historization*. The idea is that a discursive event is not insular but embedded politically and socially, and that history is the best way of understanding this embeddedness. *Historization* is a contextualizing process whereby a semiotic target feature and its associated actors and organizations are connected to other features and actors. The purpose is to identify instances of recontextualization, which, if they are cases of functional recontextualization, are found using an onomasiological approach. In lexical semantics, onomasiology is the branch which seeks to answer the question *"How can X be expressed?"* (Geeraerts. 2010, p. 23). Once a discursive function is discovered, e.g. the desire to associate the word form *asylum seeker* with the concept of criminality, the task is to identify similar functions in other synchronic or diachronic actors' discourses. Since this is a comparative study, this sort of identification is achieved by comparing the BNP and UKIP, but at this stage it is also important to view the two parties within a wider frame, e.g. by comparing with the conceptualizations of immigration found in newspaper texts or in the discourses of diachronic actors and organizations.

The fifth heuristic level is not explicitly dealt with in the analysis. The function of a form cannot be explained by social theories alone. It is important to remember that there are neural and cognitive constraints on language. Therefore, neurocognitive theories are just as important when it comes to explaining the use of specific word forms. For example, the intertwining of the word forms *asylum seeker* and *refugee*, which is discussed in 5.2, cannot only be explained by theories about the purpose of intricate bureaucratic terminology, but requires amongst other things theories about lexical storage, retrieval and priming (see

previous subsection). I therefore find it sound to bear in mind that discourse can be explained also by neurocognitive theory. In the present study, frame theory is adopted for this purpose, however, neural aspects will not be considered here. It should be stressed that the heuristic levels in Figure 2 are merely components of this study and not watertight bulkheads. Cognitive aspects are considered at all levels, and might arguably be difficult to treat as a demarcated level. The brain structure/function level simply serves to point out that there are extra-social circumstances affecting language production and consequently discourse, e.g. mental illness or damage to the brain caused by a stroke.

Figure 2 contains a methodological and epistemological axis as well. Methodological tools will be further discussed in 2.3. The levels of reality, originally developed by Lundquist (2007) as a part of a wider definition of ontology encompassing size, actor position and reality levels, is used here to illustrate the limited range of objectivity and to illustrate which levels different methods and contexts seek to describe. The *statement level*, which contains an actor's contended motivation, can be objectively described. The *information level* contains an actor's perceived motivation, and how exactly to reach that information is a difficult question to answer. One way would be to deductively infer discursive implications from a hypothetical motivation and then ascertain whether these implications occur on the statement level. Identification of self-contradictions on the text level would be another indication that there is a discrepancy between what an actor says and thinks. The *reality level* is more difficult to reach and is therefore not dealt with here. It should, however, be stressed that any inference drawn from corpus material is concerned with the statement level rather than the reality level, i.e. any discussion of "true motives" or "real identity" are impossible. This might be particularly true in the case of the BNP; Richardson (2011) asserts that there is always a difference between what parties such as the BNP say, and what they really believe (p. 38). An analyst could for example decide to investigate the validity of all statements in a corpus; to ascertain to what degree politicians lie or tell the truth. However, I find this unnecessary. The occurrence of a discourse says a lot, whether the facts are correct or wrong.

2.2   Analytical perspectives

The parties' use of language is approached from two different perspectives: the creation of the in-group, i.e. the parties themselves, and the creation of the out-group, i.e. immigrants. *In-group* and *out-group* are an analytical dichotomy with a long and theoretically rich history, originating in the fields of sociology and psychology. Writing in 1921, sociologists Burgess and Park defined this dichotomy, which is used interchangeably with the terms *we-group* and *others-group*, in the following manner.

> Thus a differentiation arises between ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the others-groups, out-groups. The insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry, to each other. Their relation

to all outsiders, or others-groups, is one of war and plunder, except so far as agreements have modified it. If a group is exogamic, the women in it were born abroad somewhere. Other foreigners who might be found in it are adopted persons, guest-friends, and slaves.

<div align="right">(Burgess and Park, 1921, p. 294)</div>

The notion of conflict as a deterministic phenomenon and the emphasis on race that was common in pre-Holocaust social science have, hopefully, disappeared by now. Instead, other aspects of group formation have been emphasized, e.g. the concept of sameness (Cillia et al., 2009, pp. 11ff). In their analysis of an Austrian informant's view of national identity, Cillia et al. highlight aspects such as a common culture, a common history, a common (small) territory and a common language as the glue that holds an in-group together (p. 119).

Eighty-four years after the publication of Burgess and Park's *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, the following statement was made in the BNP Languages & Concepts Discipline Manual, underlining the fact that there can be no mixing of in-groups and out-groups.

> BNP activists and writers should never refer to 'black Britons' or 'Asian Britons' etc, for the simple reason that such persons do not exist. These people are 'black residents' of the UK etc, and are no more British than an Englishman living in Hong Kong is Chinese. Collectively, foreign residents of other races should be referred to as 'racial foreigners', a non-pejorative term that makes clear the distinction needing to be drawn. The key in such matters is above all to maintain necessary distinctions while avoiding provocation and insult. (Original emphasis)

Formally different from Burgess and Park's definition but functionally the same, Spencer (1892) distinguished between a *code of amity* and a *code of enmity* (p. 136); a dichotomy that anthropologist Keith (1948) would use even after the Second World War to describe racial characteristics of Jews[10] (pp. 390f). For political theorist Mouffe (2000), polarity is a necessity in a truly democratic society. More conflicting discourses prevent the blurring of traditional political distinctions (p. 96), without which there will be an increase in nationalist sentiment and support for the extreme right and other sectarian forms of collective self-identification (pp. 80, 114). Thus the presence of a 'them' to counterbalance 'us', is an absolute prerequisite for a sustainable democratic climate, but a distinction has to be made between *antagonism* and *agonism*. The purpose of that distinction is to "provid[e] channels through which collective passions will be given ways to express themselves over issues which, while allowing enough possibility for identification, will not construct the opponent as an enemy but as an adversary" (p. 103).

I employ the in-group-out-group dichotomy for practical reasons. The in-groups in this investigation are the BNP and UKIP respectively, and the out-groups are all those who are explicitly identified by either party as not being a member of the in-group. Given the esoteric nature of the parties, the list of out-

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[10] Keith uses the term *circle* rather than *group*.

groups is potentially infinite. It is interesting to note the dual applicability of the dichotomy. In the hands of a nationalist party, in-groups and out-groups correspond to *us vs. them*. In the hands of a researcher, it is rather supposed to be a distinction between two different *they*. DHA is not an objective approach, however, but seeks to deliver critique emanating from the researcher, and if possible, to offer prospective critique. UKIP, which in many ways resembles the BNP but also diverges in several aspects, is currently gaining momentum while the BNP is slowly pushed into the shadows again. The reader may therefore want to see this thesis as an attempt to identify the similarities between the two parties, and then decide for her or himself whether these similarities are of importance.

Silverman (2006) discusses the ethical questions which arise when researchers interact or study groups of people with which we would perhaps not otherwise interact, or "fraternizing with groups we dislike", to use Silverman's words (p. 321). It is, for example, suggested that interaction with such groups is a way of transcending the us-them dichotomy; a dichotomy that perhaps does more damage than good in social research, and which might halt social change (pp. 321f). In *The Fascists in Britain*, one of the earliest comprehensive accounts of British fascism, historian Cross (1961) states his own political position: "My approach to the subject has been in a spirit of pure inquiry and I have tried to ignore my personal views, which are anti-Fascist and unsympathetic to anti-Semitism or racialism" (p. 7). Richardson and Wodak (2013) note that David Renton and Roger Griffin, two of the contemporary historians who have had the most influence on the study of fascism, hold disparate positions when it comes to the issue of neutrality, with Renton dispensing with the notion altogether and Griffin arguing that fascism should be treated just like any other ideology (p. 6).

Contemporary studies of the British or Swedish context of far-right extremism cannot be said to be objective, signalled by the use of the term *fascist* by scholars such as Copsey (2008) or Goodwin (2011). Even more subjective stances are taken by journalists. In his account of the National Front, the forerunner of the BNP, Walker (1977) writes that he "oppose[s] the National Front, the ideology they stand for, the policies they present and the poison they inject". Another example of a subjective stance can be found in Blomquist and Bjurwald's (2009) investigation of women in the Swedish far-right, women whom they refer to as 'Nazi chicks' (Swe. *nassebrudar*) (p. 21).

I share Cross' views on fascism, anti-Semitism and racism, however, I am not sure that he can speak for both of us when it comes to the question of objectivity. It is an inevitable fact that all research is subjective in one way or another. The best way of compensating for researcher bias is to do what I do here; to let the material, in my case a corpus, talk for itself. As Baker (2006) argues, the consultation of a corpus makes it possible to "place a number of restrictions on our cognitive biases", i.e. with a large data set at your disposal it is difficult to justify why you should use only a small selected body of texts (cherry-picking) (p. 12). This is not an unproblematic approach either, though. As already stated, DHA (and CDA) is not an objective approach; Baker (2012) goes as far as to conclude that for CDA analysts, the "explicit position" is a "strength rather than a problem" (p. 255). However, he also concludes that it is important to apply scientific

methodology, e.g. data-driven and statistical approaches, and to avoid polemics. In a self-critical evaluation of his own previous study of representations of Islam in British newspapers (Baker, 2010a), Baker (2012) reaches the conclusion that any statement a discourse analyst makes about language use can be construed and criticized in a great many ways even if the argument is backed up by corpus data and is not the result of cherry-picking. His statement that British media is biased against Muslims can be supported by corpus findings that show that the words *Muslim*(*s*) are linked to extremist words in so-and-so many instances, but then the question arises how many percentages are required in order to justify such a statement. To complicate the matter even further, there are undoubtedly people who believe that Muslims should not be assigned extremist labels at all and for whom one single instance of such attribution would suffice to make statements about media bias. Conversely, some people would claim that there are not enough negative descriptions of Muslims, and would thus reject the notion of media bias (pp. 252-255).

2.2.1 The in-group perspective

This is a description of how I will investigate how the BNP and UKIP use the discursive strategies nomination and predication to create an in-group. The investigation of nomination focuses on the word forms used by the parties to communicate with potential voters. I will use the following search terms:

- *We*
- *BNP*, *British National Party*, *UKIP*, *UK Independence Party*, *United Kingdom Independence Party*

The search terms constitute a dichotomy consisting of pronoun and party name. Naturally, the parties also use other features and constructions when addressing readers. My choice of search terms is motivated by a study by Edwards (2012) in which he focuses on the choice between *we* and party name as preferred form of self-reference in the BNP's 2005 and 2010 general election manifestos. Not only do I have the possibility to test his findings on a much bigger data set, but I can also make a cross-party comparison.

The aim of the investigation of the predicational strategy is to ascertain what qualities the parties believe they possess or do not possess and in what political areas the parties claim to have unique competence, i.e. what image they project. I operationalize this by searching for instances in which the adverb *only* occurs within 50 spaces to the left and right of a party name, and then clean the concordance lines. An example can be seen in (1).

(1) Only UKIP are committed to restoring weekly bin collections.

Again, there are other ways to express uniqueness and to attribute qualities. The semantics of *only* is one reason for selecting it, however, the choice was ultimately based on a smaller pilot study carried out manually on an arbitrarily

selected BNP construction file (i.e. the files in which the texts were stored before they were compiled and eventually tagged) consisting of around 35,000 words. Other ways of expressing uniqueness were found, e.g.

(2) No other party stands up for those who cannot speak for themselves.
(3) [W]e know how to restore order and respect to our society but no one in the political establishment has the balls to do it! We do.

These constructions were, however, few in comparison to the use of the *only*-construction. Moreover, constructions such as (2) and (3) are difficult to search for, in comparison with the more easily searchable *only*. Finally, as negation of possessing certain qualities is as important as claiming to have them, I also use the search string /[party name] is|are not/ to find sentences such as (4).

(4) UKIP is not antiimmigrant, racist or xenophobic.

2.2.2   The out-group perspective

Just like the analysis of in-groups, the out-group analysis is concerned with the use of nominational and predicational strategies. The choice of analytical starting point is not an obvious one though. While the application of the term in-group is limited to the BNP and UKIP themselves, the out-group is potentially infinite, and far from homogenous in any way.

I have chosen to focus on how the parties construct their immigration discourses, particularly the aspects of immigration terminology, quantification and origin. Immigration is a vague concept, which is precisely why it makes such an excellent topic for investigation. Unlike discourses on more demarcated groups, e.g. Muslims or Europeans, which might seem the most obvious starting points given the BNP's and UKIP's strong focus on Islam and the EU respectively, an "immigration discourse" can encompass so many more aspects. A European must come from or live in Europe by definition, and a Muslim must, also by definition, adhere to the teachings of Islam. There are no such restrictions on the construction of immigration and immigrants.

In order to make a comparison between the two parties I inductively reconstruct the immigration discourse topic using corpus linguistic tools. The word pairing below serves as a springboard for the analysis and helps me identify the qualities that the BNP and UKIP attribute to immigrants:

- *Immigration*
- *Immigrant*(*s*)

For the investigation of nomination, or immigration terminology, I use the search words listed below:

- *Asylum seeker*(*s*)
- *Immigrant*(*s*)

- *Refugee*(*s*)

Obviously, there are other ways in which you can refer to immigrants. These search terms have been used in corpus studies carried out on British newspaper texts (Baker and McEnery, 2005; Baker et al., 2008; KhosraviNik, 2010b), and it is therefore my hope that this study will make it possible to compare the construction of immigrants as an out-group in far-right discourse with the same process in the media.

During my investigation of quantification I found that water metaphors occur quite frequently with *immigrants*. The water metaphor *wave of* (*immigrants*) has been the topic of several studies, e.g. Refaie, 2001; Baker and McEnery (2005) and Charteris Black (2006). However, while Charteris-Black (2006) carried out an analysis of water metaphors in the BNP's 2005 general election manifesto, Baker and McEnery used two larger corpora consisting of newspaper and United Nations texts. Thus neither has carried out a similar investigation on a large BNP or UKIP data set. With the aid of a larger corpus, I can undertake a more quantitative investigation of these political phenomena.

Origin is another aspect frequently discussed by both parties. In order to ascertain whether the parties' emphasis on the EU and Islam respectively entails frequent attribution of national origin to immigrants, I undertake a qualitative and a quantitative analysis. For the qualitative analysis I identify references to geographical words (countries, continents, parts of continents) occurring with the words *immigration* and *immigrant*(*s*). The quantitative analysis is a large-scale frequency analysis and the search terms are the names of countries and national adjectives. This method and the other corpus methods I use are described in the next section.

2.3   Analytical tools

Here I describe the general use of frequency, dispersion plots, collocational analysis and concordance. I also state universal parameters of data collection and presentation. The software used for this study is Anthony Laurence's Antconc, which contains all the traditional corpus linguistic tools described here, and more.[11]

In order to bridge the gap between qualitative and quantitative methodology in the social sciences, I do corpus analyses. Baker et al. (2008) have highlighted the fuzziness of the boundaries between quantitative and qualitative approaches, and points out that by using simple quantitative methods, "'qualitative' findings can be quantified, and that 'quantitative' findings need to be interpreted in the light of existing theories, and lead to their adaptation, or the formulation of new ones" (p. 296).

Tognini-Bonelli (2001) has suggested a distinction between *corpus-based* and *corpus-driven* analyses (pp. 65, 74). In a corpus-based study, the corpus serves to

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[11] The software is freely available at Anthony Laurence's website http://www.antlab.sci.waseda. ac.jp/index.html.

provide evidence for pre-corpus hypotheses. In a corpus-driven study on the other hand the corpus should be approached without any preconceptions, typically by using word lists or keyword lists rather than search terms as analytical starting points. In reality, corpus methodology is not as polarized as Tognini-Bonelli suggests; it is rather more like a continuum. My approach is found somewhere in the middle of this continuum. It is partly corpus-based since I use subjectively generated search terms (e.g. *immigrant*, *refugee)* as analytical starting points rather than using objective word lists (keyness), and it is partly corpus-driven in the sense that my findings, whatever they may be, are the motivation for further analysis. The continuum view is shared by McEnery and Gabrielatos (2006, p. 36).

> As far as the role of theory in corpus linguistic research is concerned, it is more helpful to regard different approaches as falling between two end-points of a continuum, rather than belonging to one of two polar extremes. At one end, the corpus is used to find evidence for or against a given theory, or one or more theoretical frameworks are taken for granted; at the other, the observed patterns in the corpus data are used as a basis from which to derive insights about language, independent of pre-existing theories and frameworks, with a view to developing a purely empirical theory.

What is important to underline is that this is a usage-based approach, meaning that the corpus is the empirical data in which habitual linguistic patterns can be found. In practice, this means that the investigation of one feature might require the investigation of another feature, i.e. the analysis of one search term generates a new search term. In accordance with DHA methodology, I move recursively between theory and empirical material in the analysis. This also means that not every tool is used for every search word. As pointed out by Reisigl and Wodak (2009), "[c]ategories and tools are not fixed once and for all. They must be elaborated for each analysis according to the specific problem under investigation" (p. 95).

2.3.1   *Frequency and dispersion analysis*
Frequency is the most basic method used in this thesis. If a corpus query is motivated and well thought-out, a frequency list can be used in order to identify a discourse, because, as pointed out by Baker (2006), "if people […] make one linguistic choice over another, more obvious one, then that reveals something about their intentions, whether conscious or not" (p. 48). Frequency analysis is mainly used in order to identify common forms of nomination, as in 4.1 where it is used in order to compare the most prevalent linguistic forms of self-representation. In 5.2 it is used in order to calculate the distribution of the nominational forms *asylum seeker*(*s*), *immigrant*(*s*) and *refugee*(*s*).

Frequency analysis is also carried out on a large-scale level. Large-scale frequency analysis is different from my other methods in that it, unlike a concordance or collocational analysis, does not generate new search terms. In this

study, I use large-scale frequency analysis in 5.4, where I use a regular expression accounting for all country names and national adjectives in the world[12] in order to ascertain where the parties claim that immigrants come from.

Since the texts in the corpus are chronologically ordered, dispersion plots can reveal whether a feature occurs consistently throughout the corpus, which would suggest that it is a salient feature, or just in a few clusters, which would suggest that it is either used in a particular context, by a particular writer or in relation to a particular event. Consider the two dispersion plots from the BNP subcorpus in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Dispersion plots of the words *halal* and *violence* in the BNP subcorpus.

Dispersion of *halal* in the BNP subcorpus.

Dispersion of *violence* in the BNP subcorpus.

In the BNP subcorpus, *halal* is a quite frequent word (55 occurrences) but the level of dispersion is low. Another word, *violence*, occurs 63 times, but has a much higher level of dispersion. The inference we can draw here is that, yes, *halal* is an important word for the BNP, but its spread is low, which might hint that the word is only used in certain contexts (which it is; a concordance analysis shows that the word usually occurs in news stories promoting the party's anti-halal campaign). Dispersion plots are for example employed in chapter 5 in order to determine whether the search terms *immigration* and *immigrant*(*-s*) are truly occurring consistently in the parties' language and therefore can be said to be salient parts of discourse.

2.3.2   Collocational analysis

Lenci et al. (2005) define collocation as a sequence of at least two words signified by a mutually strong associative bond, but admit that it is difficult to separate a collocate from the rest of the linguistic structure (pp.196f). In Baker's (2006) definition, statistical significance is a constituent part (p. 95f), but the motivation clearly springs from an interest in social issues: "An association between two words, occurring repetitively in naturally occurring language, is much better evidence for an underlying hegemonic discourse which is made explicit through the word pairing than a single case" (p. 13).

Unless otherwise specified, I search for collocates that occur within a span of five spaces to the left and right of the search term. Numbers in parentheses alongside collocates are, unless otherwise stated, raw frequencies. The lists of collocates will only contain lexical items (nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs). I have also chosen to omit modal verbs, as the top 10 otherwise would have been crammed with various verb forms that, on the one hand could tell us a lot about

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[12] Countries, i.e. members of the United Nations (http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml).

stance and normativity,[13] but which do not say much about how the parties construct different groups. In chapter 5 I search for collocates of *immigration* to get a first image of how the immigration discourse can be framed. The structure of the chapter is a direct result of these collocates. Generally in chapter 5, collocational analysis is used in order to investigate forms of predication.

2.3.3 Concordance analysis

Concordance, a list of the many micro-contexts of a search term, is the most important tool I use in this paper. A simple search term generates a number of concordance lines in which the search term is located at the centre. Lexical and discursive patterns are identified by browsing through and sorting concordance lines.

Figure 4. A screenshot of the concordance function in AntConc.


```
Concordance Hits  17
Hit  KWIC
1    References & APPENDIX 1: UKIP Policy on banning the burqa UKIP' proposed policy
2    be celebrated Tackle extremist Islam by banning the burqa or veiled niqab in pu
3    ns of the French population and voted to ban the burka from being worn in public
4    h Council of the Muslim Faith insist the ban does not violate Islamic law as bur
5    ish political party advocating a similar ban. UKIP's face coverings policy outli
6    rope when it said that it would oppose a ban on burkas.  "It is frankly nothing
7    P's Paul Nuttall.  "If the UK decides to ban the burka in public places it is so
8    oad here. Belgium leads the way on burka ban  Friday, 30th April 2010  A burka b
9     only serious party advocating a similar ban on wearing the burka – which is not
10   Commission." Belgian politicians move to ban the burka  Wednesday, 31st March 20
11    Pearson has welcomed Belgium's moves to ban the burka from streets, parks, scho
12   ozy is right to push ahead with plans to ban the burka being worn in public. In
13   ractised and enjoyed privately and would ban people from wearing the burka or ni
14   jority of Britons back UKIP's call for a  ban on the burka by an emphatic 70%.  A
15   rticle (Jan 16) warned that our proposed ban on wearing the burka in public buil
16   e penalty for leaving it can be death. A  ban on the burka would be for freedom,
17    January 2010  UKIP's proposed policy on banning the burka in public buildings a
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Note. This example contains instances of the lexeme BAN occurring within 50 spaces of *burka/burqa* in the UKIP subcorpus.

Before a concordance is analyzed and presented in table form, I clean the list by removing repetitions (which might occur since the parties re-use certain phrasings) and irrelevant lines (which might occur due to e.g. homonymy).[14] The concordance software is concerned with the number of characters rather than words preceding and succeeding the search term, which means that some of the lines might contain words that are incomplete in terms of spelling. Unless I can

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[13] For example, my own tentative comparisons between the BNP-UKIP corpus and the big reference corpora the BNC and COCA (see 3.2) suggest a significant discrepancy in the use of weak and strong modal verbs. For example, the modal *shall* is highly frequent in BNP and UKIP texts, even in passive constructions.

[14] Not more than a handful of lines had to be removed.

identify a word with complete confidence, i.e. when no other derivation or inflection is possible, I restore the word; otherwise, it is removed from the line.

In chapter 4.2, I use concordance in order to identify the political areas in which the BNP and UKIP claim unique competence. In 5.2 I use concordance to look closer at the parties' use of *refugee*, in 5.3 it is used in order to identify water metaphors and in 5.4 to identify topoi in relation to the Third World.

3   Material

In this chapter I provide an overview of the design and structure of my corpus. I also explain my choice and use of reference corpus.

3.1   The BNP-UKIP corpus

In order to carry out quantitative research I have compiled a corpus consisting of articles and policy documents freely available from official BNP and UKIP outputs[15]. Unlike the British National Corpus (BNC) or the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), which provide samples of general British and American English respectively, the purpose of my corpus is to provide a standard sample of BNP and UKIP language. However, as politics is dynamic and political organizations evolve, the corpus is only representative of the time in which it was compiled. This also explains the relatively small size of the corpus. With 912,329 words, it belongs to the same size category as the Brown Corpus, a corpus of American prose published in 1961 and compiled by Francis and Kučera with the aim of offering a standard sample of Present-Day American English (Francis and Kučera, 1964). The size of the corpus is completely contingent on what amount of text is available to the public, and in this respect the BNP is ahead of UKIP with nearly four times as much text available online (my own approximation). The number of words in the news articles and policy documents sections are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Size of the BNP and UKIP subcorpora and sections.

	Number of words in articles	Number of words in policy documents	Total number of words
BNP	349,996 (76.57%)	107,112 (23.43%)	457,108
UKIP	350,029 (76.89%)	105,192 (23.11%)	455,221
		Corpus (total): 912,329	

Note. Section ratios in parentheses.

The data collection is governed by external criteria, according to which the corpus is divided into a BNP and a UKIP subcorpus, which account for 50.1 and 49.9% respectively of the total word count. The subcorpora are in turn divided into one section for articles and one for policy documents. These categories roughly correspond to the spatial notions of macro and micro varieties, although

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[15] All samples are authentic BNP and UKIP texts, freely available at www.bnp.org.uk and www.ukip.org respectively. *The British National Party Language and Concepts Manual* is the only text included in the BNP subcorpus that has not been downloaded from the official BNP website. This document was leaked by WikiLeaks in 2009 but has since then been publically defended by party chairman Nick Griffin (BBC 2009, April 23).

they should be viewed as imprecise delimitations rather than a precise pint of language. There are indeed articles so short that they could pass as tweets and articles so long that they could be placed in another size category. The articles and policy sections can also be seen from a temporal perspective, i.e. in terms of the degree of preparation that precedes publication. Since most articles in this corpus are news stories, it is assumed that they are a less planned form of communication than policy documents. The number of texts in each subcorpus and section is shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Number of texts and words per text.

		Number of texts	**Words per text**[16]
Articles	**BNP**	641	more than 100, less than 3,000
	UKIP	1322	more than 50, less than 2,000
Policy documents	**BNP**	5	more than 1,900 less than 33,600
	UKIP	12	more than 6,300 less than 16,200

The articles sections contain 700,025 words and thus constitute the bulk of the corpus, accounting for 76.73% of the total number of words. "Articles" are the short-to-medium length texts published under the news banner on the parties' respective websites. UKIP articles and policy documents are typically shorter than BNP texts. The BNP subcorpus contains 641 articles published between May 2010[17] and 29 February 2012. The UKIP subcorpus contains 1,322 articles published between 7 March 2007 and 28 June 2012. The obvious discrepancy[18] between the subcorpora in terms of number of articles is explained by the textual nature of UKIP articles. A typical UKIP article is brief, often only a paragraph, while a typical BNP article is considerably longer, and rarely, if ever, shorter than a paragraph. Besides the spatial aspect, this entails that the UKIP publication span is three years longer than that of the BNP. The BNP is extraordinary in this respect; no other political party to the right of the centre-right produces even nearly as much material, a fact that unfortunately renders similar quantitative

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[16] Articles and policy documents are only stored according to party belonging and genre, i.e. they are not stored individually, which is why I can only give approximate lengths for the articles. The number of policy documents is much lower and quicker to process, hence the more precise numbers.

[17] It is difficult to pinpoint the exact starting point of the time span due to a lack of dating in older BNP articles. However, by tracing individual events reported in the articles, it can be placed shortly after the general election on 6 May, 2010.

[18] This corpus is clearly *isolexical*, i.e. the purpose is to allow comparisons to be made across subcorpora containing a similar amount of words. This is contrasted with *isotextual corpora*, which contain a similar number of texts (Oakey, 2009, p. 141).

linguistic research on parties and groups such as the English Democrats or the English Defence League impossible (the same is true of many other small parties).

As seen in Table 3, the articles belong to different "genres", typically news stories, opinion, open letters, obituaries et cetera. The texts thus cover the main party strata, both the top layers and the rank and file.

Table 3. Types of genres and policy documents.

Articles	**BNP and UKIP**	News stories, opinion, obituaries, open letters, seasonal greetings, recommendations of video clips, announcements (of meetings et cetera), membership offers.
Documents	**BNP**	2005 GE manifesto, 2010 GE manifesto, constitution, activists' guide, language manual.
	UKIP	2010 GE manifesto, constitution, 2011 England LE manifesto, policy area manifestos (agriculture; Britishness; constitution; defence; education; government; immigration; justice; welfare and economy).

Note. GE = general election, LE = local election

The policy section constitutes 23.27% of the corpus and consists mainly of manifestos, published between 2005 and 2011. The BNP section includes the 2005 and 2010 general election manifestos, an activists' guide and a language manual. The UKIP section also contains the 2010 general election manifesto, as well as the England 2011 local election manifesto. The bulk of the UKIP section, however, consists of policy documents emphasizing specific questions. Both sections contain respective party's constitution. The low policy ratio is due to a shortage of material of this kind. This goes for both parties; news reports are published almost on a daily basis on both party websites (although, as the availability of material shows, a little less frequently on UKIP's) while more extensive manifestos are only published before general elections. In contrast, local election manifestos are typically much shorter; e.g. the parties' 2012 London election manifestos (not included here), which only cover a single page. Moreover, certain local manifestos could not be included since they are written in Welsh or Scottish Gaelic.

The articles sections constitute nearly 80% of the total number of words, a ratio which reflects the parties' text production quite well. Articles also appear to be more representative of a party's linguistic outflow than policy documents as one can assume that they are realizations of a larger number of contributors. Policies can be either static (general election manifestos) or progressive (topic-specific manifestos that are updated rather than replaced), but whatever shape they take, they fix the corpus in time to a higher degree than articles do.

Any inclusion of material raises the question as to what extent it actually mirrors the actors' true motives, and to what extent they are representative of the parties as a whole. There is no obvious way of determining whether my choice of

samples is representative of the parties I set out to study, simply because so little is known about their internal structure. It is not known who publishes articles on their websites since few articles are signed, and in the BNP's case not always dated. I have, however, contacted both parties in order to provide a sufficient genealogy of the texts included in my corpus and in order to ask party officials questions about their view of their party's language use. It has been difficult to arrange interviews since the BNP has a non-student policy. Also UKIP seems hesitant to talk to students. The little that I know about the text sources comes from personal conversations with the registrant and owner of UKIP's website, former MEP Dr. John Whittaker. Whittaker paints an image of a party that has little control over its own organization. He does not know who the current editor-in-chief is, and adds that "it's always been such a mess and probably is in most organizations". When I explain to him that I am interested in knowing who writes the texts, he simply states that "the party has published the texts. Beyond that, I am not sure if you are going to get anywhere. And I am not sure that it is in my interest or the party's interest to help you get any further." He also says that he could contact people and ask them to help me, but then declares that he is not going to do that (J. Whittaker, personal communication, 7 November, 2012). I have made numerous attempts to obtain demographic data from the BNP, but to no avail.

Because it is possible to comment on articles published on the BNP's website, it might seem suitable to include some of those comments in order for the corpus to be representative of more membership strata. Since the UKIP website does not provide a commenting service any more and since there are no means of verifying that the commentators are even members of the parties, I have chosen not to include this micro variety. Micro blogs such as Twitter were considered, but the availability of material would have led to an overemphasis on key people such as party leaders, councillors and MEPs. It would undoubtedly have been interesting to include such material, but doing so would have raised the question as to what extent users are speaking as private citizens or as representatives of their party. I intended this investigation to be organization-oriented rather than actor-oriented, which is in part a forced approach since BNP and UKIP representatives do not seem to be using social media to the extent that a quantitative investigation can be undertaken.

The decision was made to include texts in their entirety. To decide upon a standard size of sample was never a plausible option as the final data set would prove too small. After the data had been captured, the texts were converted from their original formats into plain text, thus stripping them of non-textual elements. All structural and automatic features such as headers, page numbers and tables of contents have been omitted. Moreover, I have taken care to clean up the texts by deleting links, email addresses and contact information where these features have been clearly separated from the main body of text. Dates of publication and pen names (where available) have been left untouched in order to ease identification of individual texts. As with any genre, certain wordings and even paragraphs are more pervasive than others and may therefore occur in more than one document.

In order to perform more specific queries, the corpus has been syntactically annotated using Treetagger, a stochastic part-of-speech-tagger using the English parameter file trained on the PENN Tree Bank. Like with any POS-tagger (software which assigns parts of speech to each word in the corpus), it is hard to estimate its accuracy. Rossini Favretti et al. (2002) estimate an error rate of 9.24%, but it should be pointed out that the training was performed on an Italian pilot corpus (p. 36).

3.2   Reference corpus

In order to establish the importance of lexical frequency in the BNP-UKIP corpus, I use the *Corpus of Contemporary American English* (COCA) as a reference corpus. It contains 450 million words, of which 20 million are replaced annually with newer material (Davies, 2010, p. 448). American political vocabulary is arguably different from European, however, neither the British National Corpus (BNC) nor any other British corpora were considered simply because they are all too old.[19] COCA, in contrast, is one of the largest contemporary corpora of the English language currently available. Also, given the BNP's and UKIP's interest in Muslim affairs, any unmonitored corpus made available before 2002 would generate obsolete frequencies.

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[19] The BNC, which was completed in 1994, contains material produced in the later part of the 1900s (BNC).

4   The in-group analysis: the parties

This chapter is concerned with two aspects of in-group construction: self-reference and image. In 4.1 I investigate the BNP's and UKIP's choice of form of self-reference and compare these to the parties represented in the House of Commons. In 4.2 I study party image. I identify what qualities the parties claim as unique (4.2.1), what qualities they do not want to be associated with (4.2.2) and finally how the BNP and UKIP perceive each other (4.2.3).

4.1   Self-reference

There are currently two[20] nationalist parties in the House of Commons with non-unionist names: the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru ('The Party of Wales') but no party with a name containing the elements *Britain*/*British* or *UK*. The BNP and UKIP are not the only nationalist parties operating in England with a holistic approach to the UK electorate mirrored in their party name, however. Diachronically, a large number of political organizations using *Britain* or *British* as part of their name can be classified either as fascist or fascist avant la lettre, e.g. *the British Empire Union*, *the British Commonwealth Party*, *the British Fascisti* (later: *the British Fascists)*, *the British Union*, *the British Union of Fascists*, *the British United Fascists*, *the British People's Party* (for an overview, see Linehan, 2000), *the Greater Britain Movement* and *the British Democratic Party* (see Copsey, 2004). Other contemporary parties include *Britain First* (founded in 2011), *the British Democratic Party* (founded by former BNP MEP Andrew Brons in 2013) and *the British Freedom Party* (founded in 2010 and previously led by Paul Weston, a former UKIP politician).

The BNP is not the first party to use this name. As we saw in 1.1, the first far-right British National Party was the result of the merging of the White Defence League and the National Labour Party in the early 1960s (see Richardson, 2013 for a historical outline). Also as seen in 1.1, UKIP developed out of the cross-party organization the Anti-Federalist League (AFL) in 1993. Several political forces, both on the left and the right, have adopted the form *league* as part of their name, however, those on the right have been given the most attention recently, mainly because of the emergence of the violent English Defence League. Other far-right organizations that have adopted *league* as part of their name include the British Workers League (BWL), the Economic League (EL), the Imperial Fascist League (IFL) and the League of Empire Loyalists (LEL). Of the organizations mentioned in the preceding enumeration, IFL, founded in 1929 by former British Fascisti member Arnold Leese, is the only organization that was also a political party. The remaining organizations were ginger groups, connected to fascist or nationalist parties; BWL to the nationalist National Democratic and Labour Party, EL to the anti-Bolshevik British Empire Union and LEL to the Conservatives (see

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[20] Perhaps the abstentionist Sinn Féin, whose Irish name means 'we ourselves', could be added to this list.

Linehan, 2000, 44f for a brief description of BWL and EL; see Walker, 1977 for a history of LEL).

There are clear parallels between LEL and UKIP; they both started out as "leagues" with Britain as the in-group and those who were perceived as threats to Britain's power as the out-group. In LEL's case, the objective was to prevent the Empire from falling apart; UKIP on the other hand is fighting against what it sees as the imminent danger of devolution and federalism. LEL would merge with a handful of other parties to form the National Front, the forerunner of the BNP, in 1967, while the Anti-Federalist League would go from being anti-Maastricht to anti-EU. However, the suggestion that UKIP is, or was, a pressure group, is strongly denied by former MEP John Whittaker, who says that the objective even from the start was to challenge the establishment. As he explains, there have been many pressure groups in British history, but they have little to show for their efforts. "The only way to make progress is to challenge the other major political parties", he explains (J. Whittaker, personal communication, 30 November, 2012).

Party names are important, naturally, since they are supposed to say something about the party and its representatives. A party name should invoke a feeling of moral affinity, i.e. in the same way as a specific issue should activate a moral frame (see 2.1.1). Consequently, it should be possible to study the state of a party by investigating party name distribution. Edwards (2012) compares the distribution of the abbreviation *BNP* in the BNP 2005 and 2010 general election manifestos, and contrasts the numbers with the frequency of self-reference pronouns. He finds that the BNP's use of party name has increased dramatically in those five years, from a mere 33 instances (or 0.13%) in 2005 to 372 (or 1.25%) in 2010. Conversely, the number of instances in which *we* functions as self-reference has decreased from 329 to 236 (p. 248). Edwards does not explain this change merely in stylistic terms, but rather argues that the party has undergone a profound transformation and that the increase in the use of the abbreviation *BNP* on behalf of *we* is indicative of growing self-confidence (p. 249).

The low frequency of party name in the 2005 manifesto is interpreted by Edwards as a tactic to legitimize ideas, but legitimization does not necessarily entail emulating mainstream political parties. Although Edwards' comparison yields interesting results, it seems a good idea to view both the BNP and UKIP within an even bigger frame. Figure 5 contains the ratio of *we* to party name as form of self-reference in the 2010 general election manifestos of all ten parties represented in the House of Commons, plus the BNP and UKIP.

Figure 5. Ratio of the pronoun *we* to party name in the 2010 general election manifestos of the ten parties represented in the House of Commons, plus the BNP and UKIP.

Notes. 0 indicates balanced use of party name and pronoun. Negative numbers indicate more pronoun than party name, and positive numbers indicate more party name than pronoun. Parties from left to right: Labour, Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Scottish National Party, Green Party, Social Democratic and Labour Party, Plaid Cymru, Democratic Unionist Party, Sinn Féin, British National Party, Alliance and UKIP.

Figure 5 contains a scale stretching from -3 to +1. On this scale, zero indicates a balanced use of pronoun and party name. Negative numbers are indicative of a predominant use of the pronoun *we* as word form of self-reference while positive numbers indicate that the parties' preferred choice of word form is their own party name. The numbers show that the BNP clearly belongs to the party name "cluster", although its linguistic choices are somewhat more balanced than those of UKIP, which relatively speaking is the most self-boosting party on the British political scene. In the UKIP manifesto, *UKIP* is three times more frequent than *we*. It seems then that Edwards' explanation is valid for UKIP as well; like the BNP, UKIP is a small right-wing party struggling to gain legitimacy and remain in clear opposition to all other parties. UKIP's use of party name, just like the BNP's, has increased since 2005. 1.01% of the word forms in the 2005 manifesto were instances of party name while 0.68% was instances of pronoun, which would position UKIP further to the left in the diagram.

Rather surprisingly, we find the miniscule Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, a liberal party which stands in stark contrast to the BNP and UKIP, on the right-hand side. Most parties, among them many regional ones, balance their use of pronoun and party name. However, the three largest traditional parties are located on the far-left side. The question whether this, extrapolating from Edwards' reasoning, is a sign of low self-confidence or an indication that the boundaries between traditional parties have been blurred, is open for discussion. It is of course possible to argue that repetitive self-referencing is in fact a sign of low self-confidence and that the bigger, traditional parties do not need to tell the voters who they are. Such claims, however, would rather indicate an unfortunate state of self-assurance rather than genuine self-confidence. Moreover, it would be negative from a marketing point of view not to tell your potential voters who you are.

Regardless of what a change in the frequency of a linguistic feature indexes, it is clear that both the BNP and UKIP have adopted the same tactic of addressing the electorate. As seen in Table 4, this tactic is uncommon. The major trend observed in the 2010 general election manifestos of the parties represented in the House of Commons is a general decline in the use of party name and an increase in the use of *we*. Besides the BNP and UKIP, the only party with a noteworthy increase in use of party names is Plaid Cymru; another nationalist party. This does not seem to be endemic to nationalist parties, however, as the change in Sinn Féin use of party name is marginal while the SNP follows the trend with increased *we* and decreased use of party name.

Table 4. Percentages of *we* and party name in the 2005 and 2010 general election manifestos of the ten Westminster parties and the BNP and UKIP.

Parties	*we*		party name	
	2005	2010	2005	2010
Alliance	0,54	0,58	1,42	1,4
British National Party	1,28	0,78	0,13	1,3
Conservatives	2,12	2,45	0,45	0,25
Democratic Unionist Party	1,08	0,9	1,22	0,84
Green	1,21	1,05	0,96	0,5
Labour	2,38	2,28	0,19	0,08
Liberal Democrats	5,12	1,31	2,18	0,4
Plaid Cymru	1,87	1,98	0,68	1,43
SDLP	0,88	1,76	0,82	0,84
Sinn Fein	0,43	0,75	0,8	0,87
Scottish National Party	1,74	2,07	1,0	0,58
UKIP	1,01	0,38	0,68	1,13

Party names are frequent forms of self-reference in the BNP-UKIP corpus as a whole. Table 5 shows the frequency of party name and pronoun for each corpus section.

Table 5. Forms of self-reference in the articles and policy sections of the BNP and UKIP subcorpora.

	BNP		UKIP	
	Articles	**Policies**	**Articles**	**Policies**
party name	1116 (0.32%)	547 (0.51%)	3155 (0.9%)	759 (0.72%)
we	2062 (0.59%)	733 (0.68%)	2074 (0.59%)	403 (0.38%)

Notes. The numbers are raw frequencies from the corpus sections with section percentages in parentheses, which allow for cross-section and cross-party comparison.

As seen in Table 5, *we* is the BNP's preferred form of self-reference both in policy documents and in articles, where it is almost twice as common as the party name. What is particularly striking about these numbers is that *UKIP* is the preferred form in both UKIP articles (0.9%) and policy documents (0.72%). A party name self-reference is almost three times more likely to occur in an article published on the UKIP website than on the BNP equivalent. This can be interpreted as an attempt from UKIP's side to establish a rapport with the people who visit its website. Depending on whether the visitor is a potential voter or a member, such a strategy seeks either to include the visitor in the in-group or re-affirm that person's membership of the group. The BNP's numbers might seem low in comparison with those of UKIP, but in comparison with most political parties the BNP's self-referencing is quite frequent. UKIP's numbers are merely a little more frequent in this respect. The frequent occurrence of party name in BNP and UKIP texts can be explained by the same underpinning logic. Party names serve partly to inform voters about ideology but also to communicate how the parties are different from all other parties, which is a claim I will elaborate in the next section.

It should be stressed that party names, despite being important in the sense that they inform the voter about a party's ideology, also can be used in order to project a partly or wholly false image. For example, there is nothing that suggests that the English Democrats are more democratic, or for that sake more English, than any other political party operating in England. This scepticism concerning form and function is well-rooted in British society, but has perhaps mainly been directed towards non-Brits. In the classical *Instructions to British Servicemen in Germany 1944*, a booklet-size crash course in German society given to British troops before D-Day, the authors warn the reader that once Hitler is removed new parties will pop up, but "[e]ven if they have names similar to our parties they will have different problems and different aims" (Bodleian Library, 2008, p. 46).

Finally, it should be pointed out that the names *BNP* and *UKIP* are not accurate descriptions of the present electoral landscape. Despite their holistic image, BNP and UKIP are primarily English phenomena with limited influence in the rest of Britain. British identity is nonetheless an important concept to both parties. Richardson and Wodak (2009) have discussed the BNP's use of the slogan "British jobs for British workers" (see 1.2). Interestingly, this slogan occurs 16 times in the UKIP subcorpus, as opposed to only 4 in the BNP subcorpus. However, while the BNP claims ownership to the slogan (see Richardson and Wodak, 2009, p. 252) UKIP seems less possessive. Former MEP John Whittaker, who has publicly stated that the party supports "British jobs for British workers", claims not to be aware that the slogan has been used by any

other politician or political party, especially not Gordon Brown. "I'm quite sure that if Gordon Brown used that phrase it wasn't his original phrase either. It's been around since the last war and before", he explains. He goes on to say that UKIP would not claim ownership to the slogan, and even suggests Labour as a potential source for it (J. Whittaker, personal communication, 7 November, 2012). In the next chapter, however, we will take a look at what UKIP and the BNP actually do claim as unique.

4.2   Party image

In this section the focus is on predication; a discursive strategy concerned with actors' attributions of qualities. Here, I approach party image by investigating in what areas the BNP and UKIP claim unique competence, what qualities they do not want to be associated with and what qualities they attribute to each other.

4.2.1   Unique competence

Political survival can be said to be contingent on having or at least claiming to have unique competence; to have the only solution to a problem. The BNP, with its focus on Islam, often comes across as more extreme than UKIP, which focuses more on the EU and the consequences of supranational power structures. This might be due to the parties' deployment of "uniqueness structures". In this section I investigate how the parties claim uniqueness by using the adverb *only* ("BNP/UKIP is the only party to…"). This is a powerful, discriminating construction that stands out in the text, and which therefore is likely to catch the reader's attention. Figure 6 illustrates the areas in which the BNP and UKIP claim unique competence.

Figure 6. Ideological themes and policies with which the BNP and UKIP want to be associated.

What is clear from the long lists of issues and areas in Figure 6 is that both parties mix abstract, ideological themes with more concrete policies. UKIP's policies are, in comparison with the BNP, more concrete or perhaps banal[21]. For example, UKIP claims to be the only party that wants to ban the burqa, abolish tuition fees and restore weekly bin collections; all concrete policies that the party wants to be associated with. UKIP also makes statements that are impossible to prove, e.g. that it is the only party advocating sustainable fishing policies, the only party that voters can trust and the only party that really makes sense when you think about it. UKIP's self-proclaimed competence is also quite extensive, encompassing areas such as education, constitutional structure, defence, agriculture, fiscal policy and culture.

The BNP seems to ground its uniqueness in more abstract, ideological themes. Several ideological categories can be identified, e.g. an ultranationalist and a traditional left-wing one. The ultranationalist claims to uniqueness are concerned with the preservation of a British identity, the discontinuation of foreign aid and the abolishment of the Human Rights Act (and some would perhaps argue the deportation of criminals). Interesting to note are the claims which perhaps historically have been more associated with the left, e.g. claims to be the only green party in Britain, the re-nationalization of industries and the claim to be the only party for hard-working people. Several claims contain no meaning unless the voter is already familiar with the BNP's ideology and policies. To uninitiated voters, such statements provide no information at all. A parallel discourse can also be found; the BNP claims to be the only British party to stand up for human rights, but also to be the only party that wants to abolish the Human Rights Act, suggesting difficulties to accept humankind in terms of sameness.

There are a number of areas in which the parties overlap; immigration and EU are two such areas. One belief that the two parties share, and which is typical of parties trying to cash in on voters' discontent, is that all other parties waste money. The BNP and UKIP do also have similar opinions about the environment; they claim to be the only parties to realize that climate change, to the extent there is such a thing, is not man-made.

> The BNP is the only party to oppose the global warming theory and to argue in
> favour of a reasonable, calm and rational approach to environmental care.
> (BNP subcorpus, policy documents section)

> UKIP are the only party that believe man-made climate change does not exist, and
> our view has been vindicated by today's ruling.
> (UKIP subcorpus, articles subsection)

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[21] I use *banal* to distinguish between policies concerned with mundane issues (e.g. bin collection) and more structural or complex policies and ideologies (e.g. design of tax systems, foreign policy). *Banal nationalism* is a term coined by Billig (1995) and refers to the everyday means of reproducing the nation (p. 6). Billig explains the difference between the conceptualizations of nationalism as a peripheral (e.g. BNP) or intermittent (winning a competition) phenomenon and as an "endemic condition" by using a flag metaphor. Banal nationalism does not refer to attention-seeking waving of flags (as employed by nationalist groups), but rather to less conspicuous uses, (e.g. the hanging of a flag outside a government building) (pp. 39ff).

There are in fact other areas in which the two parties overlap, but they are harder to find using corpus methods. As I suggested earlier in this section, the reason why UKIP might be perceived as more Eurosceptic than the BNP or the BNP as more Islamophobic than UKIP might be due to their wording. The *only*-construction is, as has been pointed out, used in order to foreground a certain quality, but the fact that a certain quality is not foregrounded in a party discourse does not entail that it is not there. One example of this concerns the Human Rights Act. The BNP claims to be the only party in Britain wanting to repeal it, however, there are plenty of instances in which UKIP makes similar demands, although never using the *only*-construction.

4.2.2   Negation

Now that we know what political image the parties project, it is time to investigate what image they do not wish to have. The process is the reverse, i.e. I search for instances in which the party names co-occur with a negation. The presence of negation in relation to party name is interesting mainly for two reasons. First, to *negate* in the sense 'to disapprove of a policy' sends virtually the same signals and functions much in the same way as a positive declaration. That is, the BNP and UKIP have not made a name for themselves as champions for new policies or new legislation; they are meeting places for naysayers. Second, negation suggests that the responsible layers of the parties are aware of the less flattering descriptions of them circulating in the media and that there are voters who have a negative perception of them. The difference in how the parties perceive their critics can be seen by comparing the example sentences in Table 6 and Table 7.

Table 6. Concordance showing what the BNP claims not to be.

1	BNP is not just a party; it is a providential movement. We have a destiny, so things happen to us
2	BNP is NOT a "normal political party." In fact, in reality, we are much more than a political party
3	BNP is not a 'racist' or 'racial' or 'racialist' or 'race-conscious' or 'white' or 'whitepeople's' party
4	BNP is not a 'fascist' or 'fascistic,' let alone a 'Nazi' or 'neo-Nazi' or 'national socialist' party.
5	BNP is not an 'extreme' or 'extremist' party. It must never be referred to as such, and anyone who
6	BNP is not 'anti-Europe.' We are 'anti-EU' or 'anti-European Union' or 'anti-Brussels.' Europe,
7	BNP is not an antisemitic party: we do not believe that Jews per se are bad, though we do, of course
8	BNP is not a 'hate group' and does not 'hate' anybody, with the possible exception of members

Table 6 contains several concordance lines which sum up the kind of image problem from which the BNP suffers. The BNP is often classified as fascist by scholars (see e.g. Copsey, 2004, 2011; Goodwin, 2011; Holmes, 2000; Richardson, 2011), and the members are aware of this. Table 6 contains forms of self-identification that the BNP will not have collocate with the party name, such as *racist*, *white*, *fascist*, *Nazi*, *neo-Nazi*, *extreme*, *anti-EU*, *anti-Semitic* and *hate group*. This is completely understandable since the BNP is not the sort of racist party that wants to appear racist. This might sound perfectly obvious, even stupid to point out. However, historically, extremism has been seen as a positive quality by leading actors in the British far-right. For example, in 1962, original BNP co-founder Colin Jordan, who had begun to express more and more support for

Nazism, left the original BNP to form the National Socialist Movement (Thurlow, 1987, p. 264). Members of the present-day BNP are of course aware of how they are perceived and have gone to some lengths to deny accusations of racism. There have, however, been attempts to justify racism, as seen in the extract from an article below.

> What the English language does not provide, is a word to define an understanding of the circumstances where belief in superiority of a superior race, is appropriate or acceptable, or what definition or use of superior is or can be meant.
>
> (BNP subcorpus, articles section)

This type of meta-pragmatic statement gives us an opportunity to get inside the lexicon of a BNP member. This is only a small part of a bigger plan to redefine *racism* as 'anti-white', which can be seen in the leaflet *Racism Cuts Both Ways*, in which anti-white racism is connected to, amongst other things, grooming, and in which the BNP describes its members as victims by using a Shylock quote from Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice* (p. 1). Perhaps the nature of the BNP really can be summed up using its own words. While we may agree that the BNP is not a "normal political party", as expressed in line 2 in Table 6, it is more questionable whether its members really are working towards a pre-determined (divine) goal, as suggested in line 1.[22]

Table 7. Concordance showing what UKIP claims not to be.

1	UKIP is not antiimmigrant, racist or xenophobic. UKIP has members who were themselves once i
2	UKIP is not anti-immigration. We propose a five-year freeze to sort out the current system then
3	UKIP is not just about the EU. I am passionate about this country which has been failed by the
4	UKIP is not for lemmings; it is not for sheep. UKIP is for independent thinkers who share a
5	UKIP is not opposed to some limited and controlled immigration but it must be solely in the interest
6	UKIP is not difficult to discern. It's all down to the unpalatable policy of quitting the EU.UKIP goes
7	UKIP is not fashionable. My own personal opinion of the party and Europe is irrelevant - until the

Table 7 shows that UKIP also has to deny accusations of being racist, but racial aspects do not seem to bother UKIP. Instead, accusations of being a single-issue party are denied (EU, immigration). Line 4 and 7 are particularly interesting as they are in fact examples of non-populist statements. This is perhaps the strongest reason why neither party deserves the fascist epithet, at least if we apply Griffin's (1991) definition of fascism as "palingenetic populist ultra-nationalism" (p. 26). Many of the parties' policies are simply too extreme and uncomfortable to appeal to the greater masses.

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[22] *Providence* is a theological concept with a rich theoretical history, so the exact meaning here is open for debate. Judging by the context, however, it seems to be used interchangeably with *destiny*. The BNP's use of *providential*, just like Hitler's, could be said to be an example of what is called *calculated ambivalence* (see Richardson and Wodak, 2009), i.e. a discursive strategy which purposely allows several interpretations of an utterance. *Providential* would thus have the meaning 'destiny' to non-Christians, while a Christian conceptualization could emphasize the divine nature of the predeterminism.

4.2.3 Mutual perceptions

Media has sometimes suggested that the BNP and UKIP are part of the same phenomenon, a claim that has been met with protests from both parties. Not surprisingly, you will not find any instances in the corpus in which the parties explicitly admit that they agree with each other. Perhaps more surprising is the lack of aggressive tones when one party discusses the other. The BNP makes 61 references to UKIP while UKIP makes 45 references to the BNP, of which almost all are found in news articles. To begin, we can establish that neither party spends much time denigrating the other, as seen in the plots in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Dispersion plots of the parties' references to each other.

The BNP's references to UKIP: 58 in news articles, 3 in policy documents (not shown here).

UKIP's references to the BNP: 44 in news articles, 1 in policy documents (not shown here).

These plots indicate that the instances of references are unevenly distributed, which suggest that the parties refer to each other at special times, e.g. during elections. Compare this to the distribution of references to the two major parties, the Conservatives and Labour, seen in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Dispersion plots of the BNP's and UKIP's references to the Conservatives and Labour.

The BNP's references to the Conservatives in news articles: 354.

UKIP's references to the Conservatives in news articles: 726.

The BNP's references to Labour in news articles: 269.

UKIP's references to Labour in news articles: 357.

Rather than attacking each other, the BNP and UKIP take on a shared opposition role vis-à-vis Labour and the Conservatives. References to the two establishment parties are frequent and evenly distributed, making criticism of the

establishment a more salient feature than criticism of other nationalist organizations.

A closer look at the micro contexts in which the party references occur shows that an overwhelming majority of the references serve a purely informative purpose, e.g. to report election results, to announce appearances in media, et cetera. The BNP's references to UKIP that are not strictly informative are seen below.

> Do not condemn the entire membership of UKIP when some of they may join the BNP one day. [sic!]

> Naive UKIP-type 'anti-Europeans' who think that Greece and Italy are now under EU rule are missing the point.

> Well-known people like Neil Hamilton are only too aware that UKIP is simply a safety valve […]

> To the Daily Express and the plastic patriots of UKIP, the answer is summed up in one word: Brussels.

> [W]e understand more and more just why UKIP and similar small-c conservative Euro-sceptic outfits shy away from this area.

> UKIP is slavishly pro-bank, sickeningly internationalist and blatantly under the thumb of a small but noisy pro-Zionist lobby.

The tone is far from aggressive; in fact, the first excerpt suggests that the BNP and UKIP are not dissimilar. It seems that rather than treating UKIP as an enemy to be destroyed, the BNP perceives UKIP as a naïve constellation manipulated by other, bigger forces, e.g. the political establishment, the EU, the Conservatives and a Jewish conspiracy. The tactic seems to be to simply dismiss UKIP as inadequate. Instances of non-informative references to the BNP by UKIP are even sparser, but completely different in nature.

> […] there's a revulsion at both the professional political class and the racists and fascists of the BNP, which is why the UKIP vote is rising so strongly.

> The BNP are a racist party. Article 2 of their Constitution bans black and Asian candidates standing for them. UKIP is proud of having five multi-ethnic candidates standing for us on merit.

> Any attempts to address immigration issues in this country by the BNP are always tainted by xenophobia and racism.

The tone is more aggressive and UKIP makes strong claims about the BNP's ideological nature. UKIP describes the BNP as fascist, racist and xenophobic, i.e.

the very same labels that the BNP has tried to distance itself from. UKIP also seems to define itself by juxtaposing its own party demographics with that of the BNP. When the BNP still had a whites-only policy, as is discussed in one of the above excerpts, UKIP expressed its pride in its "multi-ethnic" candidates". Five black or Asian candidates, if that is indeed what UKIP wants to convey with "multi-ethnic", is a low number, but so little is needed in order to beat the BNP in terms of diversity.

5 The out-group analysis: immigration

This chapter is concerned with the BNP's and UKIP's construction of immigration. In 5.1 the salience of immigration is established, and the main aspects of immigration in the BNP and UKIP discourses are identified. The aspects that are identified and discussed concern immigration nomenclature (5.2), quantification (5.3) and origin (5.4).

5.1 Reconstructing the immigration discourses

Immigration, and particularly the limitation or discontinuation of it, is without doubt one of the most important issues for the BNP and UKIP. As seen in 4.2, immigration is also one of the policy areas in which both parties claim to have unique competence. Based on a 2004 European elections poll, John and Margetts (2009) identify immigration as the policy area in which there is considerable overlap in voter sympathy between BNP and UKIP; immigration is the most important issue for 77% of the BNP voters, as compared to 53% for UKIP voters (p. 498).

Charteris-Black (2006) sees the increase in the lexical frequency of *immigration* and *asylum* in the Conservatives' 2005 general election manifesto as the starting point of the party's adoption of new immigration policies. He notes that between 1945 and 2005, *immigration* had been used so sparsely that it had almost not been used at all. *Asylum* did in fact never appear in any Conservative manifesto before the 2001 general election (p. 564).

Judging by the BNP-UKIP corpus data, *immigration* and *immigrant*(*-s*) are clearly salient features of both BNP and UKIP language, and far from taboo. The numbers and the dispersion of the features in the BNP-UKIP corpus are seen in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Dispersion plots of *immigration* and *immigrant*(*-s*) in the BNP and UKIP subcorpora.


BNP: *immigration*. Articles: 380. Policies: 125. Total: 505.

UKIP: *immigration*. Articles: 334. Policies: 246. Total: 580.

BNP: *immigrant*(*-s*). Articles: 336. Policies: 50. Total: 386.

UKIP: *immigrant*(*-s*). Articles: 74. Policies: 71. Total: 145.

Figure 9 shows that both *immigration* and *immigrant*(*-s*) are salient features in BNP and UKIP language, although *immigration* is more frequent. One possible explanation could be that it is much easier to blame problems on something that is vague and abstract, such as *immigration*, than on something concrete, such as individual *immigrants*, which would require specification. *Immigrant*(*-s*) are much more frequent in articles, which are "everyday texts", than in policy documents, which are more offical texts supposed to focus on bigger issues and structures. It is also interesting to note that *immigration* is UKIP's first choice of word form, to the extent that UKIP actually outperforms the BNP. On the other hand, the concrete forms *immigrant*(*-s)* are more frequent in the BNP subcorpus.

By comparing lexical frequencies in the BNP and Conservative 2005 general election manifestos, Charteris-Black (2006) finds that centre-right parties tend to talk about *immigration*, while far-right parties talk about *immigrants* (p. 568). The numbers presented in Figure 9 show that this conclusion does not apply unproblematically to the BNP and UKIP. A wide discrepancy is found between the parties' references to individual immigrants; BNP is far more likely to refer to *immigrants* than UKIP. The two parties' preference of the abstract *immigration* in public policy documents and the mixing of word forms in articles could suggest the existence of parallel discourses, or what Richardson (2011) calls surface and depth, i.e. discourses aiming at insiders and outsiders respectively (pp. 38f). Although all article texts are publicly available on the parties' websites, it is plausible to assume that the texts are written for an in-group; people already familiar with the party jargon. Richardson notes that, unlike in mass-distributed BNP leaflets, racist discourses are more easily discernable in more closed rooms, e.g. on the website (p. 46).

To get a first impression of how the BNP and UKIP construct their immigration discourses, and to state which aspects will be highlighted, a list of collocates may be of help. Table 8 contains the ten words which collocate with *immigration* most frequently.

Table 8. Collocates of *immigration* in the BNP and UKIP subcorpora using ranked frequency.

BNP		UKIP	
Collocate	**Frequency**	**Collocate**	**Frequency**
mass	110	action	76
Britain	49	overdue	72
British	30	mass	72
policies	26	policy	57
policy	21	UKIP	52
illegal	19	Britain	39
world	18	control	26
people	18	illegal	24
country	17	year	23
party	15	labour	21

The co-occurence of the features *British*, *party* and *UKIP* is indexical of the strong bond between the two parties and the immigration issue. The collocates listed in Table 8 are used in order to structure the chapter and to identify the lexical cornerstones of BNP and UKIP discourse. To begin with we can

triangulate the geographic context; both parties are primarily concerned with immigration in Britain, signalled by the high frequency of *Britain* in both subcorpora. *World* (18) in the BNP subcorpus refers mostly to immigration from Third World countries, however, the BNP discusses immigration in other parts of the world too in order to find deterrent examples. On the topic of multiculturalism (or *multiracialism*, as the BNP prefers to call it), the party concludes that:

> From Bosnia to Rwanda, Indonesia to Northern Ireland, one only has to scratch most of the conflicts in the world -- ranging from low-level loathing to outright genocide -- to find that at the root of the problem is the juxtaposition by past migration or strategic decision by a ruling class of two or more different peoples in the same piece of territory.

Another frequent collocate seen in Table 8 is *illegal*; a word pertaining to immigrants' status, and which will be discussed in 5.2. The quantifier *mass* occurs 110 and 72 times in the BNP and UKIP subcorpora respectively, making it the most and third most frequent collocate of *immigration*. Quantification of immigrants will be discussed in 5.3. An aspect typical of immigration discourse is reference to country of origin, which I discuss in 5.4.

5.2   "Who are 'they'?"

If you migrate you are not necessarily an immigrant. There is a complicated vocabulary applicable for situations in which people cross national borders, just like there are plenty of metaphors used for the actual crossing. The dispersion plots in Figure 9 highlighted the saliency of *immigrant*(*-s*) in both subcorpora, but now we are going to include two other words pertaining to the legal status of immigrants, namely *asylum seeker* and *refugee*. The frequency of the three labels is compared in Table 9.

Table 9. Raw frequency of *asylum seeker*(*-s*), *immigrant*(*-s*) and *refugee*(*-s*).

	BNP		UKIP	
	Articles	**Policies**	**Articles**	**Policies**
asylum seeker(*-s*)	103	10	11	19
immigrant(*-s*)	336	50	77	80
refugee(*-s*)	29	14	5	19

The features seen in Table 9 are the ones that I will focus on here. On a morphological level, all three features are considerably more frequent in the plural, although this does not seem to have any semantic significance, hence my decision not to present singular and plural forms separately. It is worth noting, however, that while the frequency is still low, there are more instances of the singular *asylum seeker* in the BNP subcorpus, and as a consequence, more references to individuals. *Asylum seeker*(*-s*) is the second most frequent form used by both parties but is almost four times more frequent in the BNP subcorpus,

particularly in the articles section. *Immigrant*(-*s*) is, as shown earlier, a popular choice, unlike *refugee* which is rare regardless of party and text type.

Before looking closer at these features it seems suitable to return to the notion of discourse prosody and a concern raised by Baker and McEnery (2005), namely that "if the term *asylum seeker* is perpetually paired with a range of concepts that express falsity, then eventually people may be primed to think of this concept whenever they encounter the term *asylum seeker*" (p. 218). There is nothing conspicuous about politicians speaking in favour of their own ideas while dismissing their opponents, but the discourse prosody of *asylum seeker*, *immigrant* and *refugee* is particularly negative in the hands of the BNP and UKIP.

Asylum seeker(-*s*) are preceded by attributes in 17 instances in the BNP subcorpus: *Afghan* (1), *alleged* (1), *bogus* (10), *failed* (1), *Indonesian* (1), *Iranian* (1), *Islamic* (1) and *legal* (1). The corresponding number for UKIP is 8: *bogus* (5), *existing* (1), *failed* (1) and *many* (1). There are a number of national adjectives in the BNP subcorpus, and they are mainly used in order to identify individual asylum seekers rather than an undistinguishable mass. *Bogus* is the most frequent attribute used by both parties, and this word sums up their immigration discourses quite well, i.e. that there cannot possibly be any "real" asylum seekers in Britain because of the country's geographical location. This line of argument, which is based on the Dublin Regulation (a law determining which EU member state is responsible for handling asylum claims), is elaborated in the text excerpts below.

> Only the British National Party will bring an end to the invasion of our country. The British National Party argues that asylum seekers have the right of refuge in the first safe country bordering the one they flee, and do not have the right to cross any safe countries to reach Britain.
>
> (BNP subcorpus, articles section)

> The terms of the 1951 Convention of Refugees should be strictly enforced so that asylum seekers should seek refuge in the first designated safe country they come to, until such time as Britain withdraws from the *Convention* and replaces it with our own laws for the application and granting of asylum. We should repeal the Human Rights Act 1998 and withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights. These have prevented the courts from expelling terrorists, extremists, criminals, bogus asylum seekers and undesirable aliens.
>
> (UKIP subcorpus, articles section)

It is not surprising that *immigrant* is the label most widely adopted by both parties since its definition, unlike that of *refugee*(-*s*) and *asylum seeker*(-*s*), is not internationally regulated. *Immigration* is the most frequent term used to refer to people who migrate to Britain, and the word's discourse prosody is clearly negative. Table 10 contains the attributive pre-modifiers of the search terms *immigrant*(-*s*), minus national adjectives (which will be discussed in 5.4).

Table 10. Pre-modifying collocates of *immigrant*(-*s*) in the BNP and UKIP subcorpora.

BNP	*illegal* (65), *Muslim* (6), *many* (5), *new* (5), *cheap* (3), *second* (3), *permanent* (2), *Christian* (1), *criminal* (1), *economic* (1), *fellow* (1), *few* (1), *foreign* (1), *historical* (1), *Islamic* (1), *large* (1), *other* (1), *past* (1), *previous* (1), *single* (1), *skilled* (1), *ungrateful* (1), *unskilled* (1), *wealthy* (1)
UKIP	*illegal* (31), *aspiring* (1), *foreign* (1), *new* (1), *unemployed* (1), *unskilled* (1), *unwanted* (1)

Note. Collocates occur one space to the left of the search term (L1, R-).

Table 10 shows that the adjective that most frequently collocates with *immigrant*(-*s*) in both subcorpora is *illegal*, amounting to 61 and 84% respectively of all attributive collocates of *immigrant*(-*s*). It is not surprising that two anti-immigration parties adopt this tactic, but it is still interesting to note how feelings of disapproval permeate every aspect of the framing of this policy area. Collocates such as *skilled*, *unskilled* and *unemployed* indicate concern for immigrants' ability to adapt to the labour market.

Baker and McEnery (2005) conclude that, while still negative, the discourse prosody of *refugee* in newspaper texts is not nearly as negative as that of *asylum seeker* (p. 222). My findings show that the word does carry negative connotations, but the parties' disapproval is not primarily directed against the refugees, but rather the judicial structures which allow people to claim the status of refugee. The word forms *refugee*(-*s*) are considerably less frequent than *immigrant*(-*s*) and *asylum seeker*(-*s*), which is likely due to the confusion concerning the exact meaning of the word and other words semantically contiguous to migration. This can be seen in Table 11.

Table 11. Concordance of *refugee*(-*s*) in the BNP subcorpus.

1	can stop genocide. Real safe areas or	refugee	escape corridors should be established with
2	will be prepared to contribute funds to	refugee	relief programmes which respect these.
3	existence of legitimate international	refugees	from persecution and war, but point to the fact
4	represent a movement of truly needy	refugees	but rather 'another phase in the deliberate and
5	the immigrants from Tunisia were	refugees	and the bulk were economic migrants. Wim
6	4,000 people judged to be "genuine	refugees	". Australia has gullibly gifted Malaysia with £5
7	no to cashlessness', which focuses on	refugees	who have been refused entry to the UK. It was
8	enforcement of the UK so that, with respect to	refugees	and illegal immigrants, there are no blind eyes
9	`equality', postMarxist fixation on turning	refugees	and immigrants into a surrogate proletariat, or
10	coming to Britain and claming asylum or	refugee	status, then it clearly benefits us to support
11	the nearest safe country. So, unless a flood of	refugees	from a civil war in France or Denmark shows up
12	peoples of European descent, who arrived as	refugees	or economic immigrants centuries or decades

The first two lines in Table 11 entail an increase in spending on non-British people. It is, however, an official BNP policy to offer financial incentives to people of "foreign descent […] who wish to leave permanently" (BNP Immigration). The discursive strategy applied here is likely to aim at turning *refugee* into a word accompanied by suspicion by making it co-occur with words or other elements seeking to negate its validity, as in line 6 where quotation marks are used to suggest that 4,000 refugees are impostors. The juxtaposition of truly needy and unworthy refugees is also seen in line 4. *Refugee*(-*s*) collocate with *economic migrants* (line 5 and 8), *illegal immigrants* (line 8) *immigrants* (line 9)

and *asylum [seeker]* (line 10); all are attempts to give *refugee* a negative discourse prosody. The suggestion in line 7, that refugees would be denied entry, is anti-semantic, i.e. it is contesting the core semantics of the word. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 1951), an asylum seeker is a person who claims to be a refugee, but whose claim has not yet been evaluated, i.e. once a country has given you refugee status, that country cannot deny you entrance. This is regulated in the 1951 *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, which is a document that the BNP is familiar with.

> Under present circumstances we would abide by our obligations under the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees. We recognise the existence of legitimate international refugees from persecution and war, but point to the fact that international law provides that such persons must be given -- and must seek -- refuge in the nearest safe country. So, unless a flood of refugees from a civil war in France or Denmark shows up on our shores, these refugees are simply not Britain's responsibility and have no right to refuge here.
>
> (BNP subcorpus, policy section)

The BNP seeks to obfuscate the regulated meaning of *refugee* by using it interchangeably with other terms whereas UKIP makes a clear distinction between *asylum seeker* (the negative stage) and *refugee* (the neutral stage), e.g. by referring to the UN Convention on Refugees.

Table 12. Concordance of *refugee*(*-s*) in the UKIP subcorpus.

1	refusal of their application, is pending. '	Refugee	means an asylum seeker whose application has
2	a binding definition of who qualifies as a	refugee	. It had been adopted by the British Government
3	citizen or permanent resident, may sponsor a	refugee	or humanitarian applicant provided that they
4	asylum system. They also have a commendable	refugee	and humanitarian entrant system whereby an
5	to assist individual asylum applicants seeking	refugee	status. Immigration: Action Overdue! 7 14.
6	rise in illegal immigrants. At the Traiskirchen	refugee	camp in Austria, numbers have more than,
7	Britain if they met United Nations criteria for	refugee	status, Mr Bloom pointed out. They would have
8	is in part implemented in the UK by the	Refugee	or Person in Need of International Protection
9	of 450,000 asylum cases of migrants refused	refugee	status (plus their dependants) but who had not
10	numbers being accepted. There should be a	Refugee	Sponsorship Scheme' that allows British citizens
11	has been successful. In its broader context '	refugee	' is someone fleeing civil war or natural disaster
12	a set of criteria for qualifying either for	refugee	or subsidiary protection status and also dictates
13	1951 Convention. Britain has always accepted	refugees	fleeing actual physical persecution, or who had
14	to work at all. 6.7 There is a perception that	refugees	and asylum seekers are given priority in the
15	amnesty. The terms of the 1951 Convention of	Refugees	should be strictly enforced so that asylum seeker
16	existing terms of the 1951 UN Convention on	Refugees	until Britain replaces it with an Asylum Act. To
17	be able to set quotas for the number of	refugees	accepted each year. Say they set a quota of 10,00
18	third countries, including stateless persons or	refugees	. "The EU has just voted itself the use and abuse
19	the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of	Refugees	and replace it with an Act of Parliament
20	existing terms of the 1951 UN Convention on	Refugees	regarding the application for political asylum
21	the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of	Refugees	on the grounds that if he or she is returned to
22	1948. Sizable groups of displaced persons and	refugees	came to Britain after World War II;

As becomes clear from an investigation of the concordance lines in Table 12, UKIP's use of *refugee* is in line with UNHCR's definition. UKIP's goal is ultimately the same as the BNP's, i.e. considerably reduced immigration. While the BNP seeks to associate the researched word forms (*immigrant*, *asylum seeker* and *refugee*) with negative connotations until they are part of one big frame of suspicion, UKIP reinforces and interpret internationally agreed criteria used for

confirming the legitimacy of a person's refugee claim. This, of course, entails that everyone judged not to be refugees are illegal immigrants.

5.3   "How many are there?"

This chapter is concerned with quantification of immigrants, and I should start by saying that the term *quantification* is used quite liberally here. Rather than imposing a semantic-syntactic set of criteria, I choose to define quantification as an instance whose primary discursive function is to convey information or opinion about number or mass.

The BNP and UKIP are two anti-immigration parties, so naturally quantification of immigrants is an important aspect of their communication. This can hardly be seen as a shocking discovery; however, quantification can take different guises and varies in terms of offensiveness and explicitness. If we by explicitness intend instances in which the target words *asylum seeker*(-*s*), *immigrant*(-*s*) and *refugee*(-*s*) are accompanied by exact numerical specifications, (e.g. "From 1997 to 2008 over 6 million immigrants entered the UK"), then the corpus contains a number of such explicit constructions. Consider Table 13, which sums up all instances of the target words occurring within a distance of 50 spaces to the left and right of numerical quantifications.

Table 13. Instances of *asylum seeker*(-*s*), *immigrant*(-*s*) and *refugee*(-*s*) accompanied by numerical quantifications in the BNP and UKIP subcorpora.

	BNP	UKIP
asylum seeker(-*s*)	7	0
immigrant(-*s*)	21	18
refugee(-*s*)	1	1

These numbers are very low. Rather than adopting a fact-driven approach and provide numbers, which would be the most effective way if you genuinely believe the numbers are on your side, both parties construct their immigration discourses by using less specified quantifications. As we saw in Table 8, *mass* is the most frequent collocate of *immigration* in the BNP subcorpus and the third commonest in the UKIP subcorpus. A search for attributive collocates occurring to the left of *immigration*, listed in Table 14, reveals that quantification is an important part of the BNP's and UKIP's immigration discourses, despite not being frequently expressed by numbers.[23]

---

[23] Since exact specifications are unlikely to show up as collocates, I searched specifically for all occurrences of numbers in the corpus. The investigation showed that specification such as *218000 immigrants* are indeed rare, and I therefore chose to focus more on less precise expressions.

Table 14. Raw frequency of attributive collocates of *immigration* in the BNP and UKIP subcorpora.

BNP	*mass* (86), *illegal* (16), *net* (15), *current* (4), *actual* (3), *uncontrolled* (3), *high* (2), *huge* (2), *Islamic* (2), *Muslim* (2), *altered* (1), *chief* (1), *disastrous* (1), *insane* (1), *irregular* (1), *permanent* (1), *strong* (1), *suicidal* (1), *Tory* (1), *unabated* (1), *unfettered* (1), *unlimited* (1)
UKIP	*mass* (35), *illegal* (16), *net* (13), *uncontrolled* (9), *future* (7), *controlled* (4), *current* (4), *unlimited* (4), *common* (3), *new* (3), *huge* (2), *lax* (2), *legitimate* (2), *permanent* (2), *coloured* (1), *deceitful* (1), *discredited* (1), *discriminatory* (1), *effective* (1), *foreign* (1), *full* (1), *inward* (1), *legal* (1), *limited* (1), *planned* (1), *radical* (1), *residential* (1), *serious* (1), *Tory* (1), *unending* (1), *unprecedented* (1), *workable* (1)

Note. Collocates occur one space to the left of the search term (L1, R-).

Besides *mass*, which is the most frequent quantifying collocate in both subcorpora, there are a number of other words used to quantify immigrants: *net*, *huge*, *high*, *unlimited*. Negatively charged adjectives, such as *illegal*, are used by both parties, but also adjectives invoking stronger emotions, e.g. *suicidal* (BNP) and *deceitful* (UKIP).

So, how many immigrants are there? A simple answer would be "a lot". However, as pointed out by Baker and McEnery (2005) and Charteris-Black (2006) just to name a few, immigration is typically measured in metaphors of natural disasters. Charteris-Black finds that conceptualizations of immigration as uncontrollable bodies of water are prevalent in BNP manifestos, and links these metaphors to a wider right-wing frame (p. 570). This type of metaphor exists in the BNP and UKIP subcorpora as well, as seen in Table 15 and Table 16.

Table 15. Examples of water metaphors in relation to *immigration* in the BNP subcorpus.

governments had expressed concern about the **floods of asylum seekers** from North Africa early this year
on Government for more money to support the **flood of immigrants** the town and surrounding area has to put
The ridiculous lie that **floods of immigrants** from alien countries 'enrich' Britain has been
people suffering from this seemingly endless **flow of immigrants**. Lampedusa residents feel that the Italian
they had already been replaced by the latest **wave of immigrants**? Just as the Lib/Lab/Cons were prepared to
and private relief groups for the inevitable **tide of refugees** to come. Stage 7: EXTERMINATION begins,
in the nearest safe country. So, unless a **flood of refugees** from a civil war in France or Denmark shows up on

Immigration is conceptualized as uncontrollable and uncountable natural forces, something that is perhaps better expressed by a word like *mass* than by precise numbers. Incidentally, as seen in Table 14, *uncontrolled* is one of the attributes that collocates with *immigration* in both subcorpora. Water metaphors can also be found in the UKIP subcorpus.

Table 16. Examples of water metaphors in relation to *immigration* in the UKIP subcorpus.

the EU even if it did nothing to stem the **flow of immigrants** from EU member states. Ministers predicted the
and did not touch on any ways to stem the **tide of immigrants** coming from the EU. And in a separate
And it is not just the threat of a **wave of immigrants** from Turkey. In recent weeks three EU member
to accommodate the current and intended **waves of immigrants**. Government concern for the environment
immigrants to pay pensions of the preceding **waves of immigrants**. It has been calculated that to maintain the
into account future illegal immigration and the possible **influx of migrants** from new entry countries to the
the cap would be, and did not touch on any ways to stem the tide of immigrants coming from the EU. And in

While these findings establish that there are similarities between the two parties' immigration discourses, it does not, however, prove that their use of water metaphors is intended to dehumanize immigrants or that such metaphors are negatively charged per se. After all, the metaphors seen in Table 15 and Table 16 also occur in newspaper texts. For example, Baker and McEnery (2005) find several instances of water metaphors in both newspaper articles and texts published by the UNHCR (pp. 204, 211), and Charteris-Black (2006) finds similar constructions on the website of broadsheet *The Telegraph*. Refaie (2001) claims that the conceptualization of immigrants as large, uncontrollable bodies of water has been naturalized, and that this not only has a bearing on the way we talk about immigration, but on how we can justify shielding us from it (p. 366). It seems like it is morally acceptable to talk about human beings as inanimate objects.

The instances of these metaphors help us understand party discourse if contrasted with a reference corpus. The metaphor *wave of* has been investigated by the aforementioned scholars, and is also frequent in the BNP-UKIP corpus. Table 17 contains the 20 most frequent right-hand collocates following the metaphor *wave of* in the Corpus of Contemporary American English.

Table 17. Right-hand collocates of *wave of* in COCA.

nausea (91)	relief (38)	fear (26)
violence (81)	popularity (35)	suicide (23)
immigrants (69)	interest (33)	protests (21)
immigration (65)	pain (29)	refugees (21)
attacks (42)	mergers (28)	terrorism (21)
panic (41)	democratization (27)	anger (21)
dizziness (38)	heat (27)	

**Note.** Collocates occur one space to the right of the search terms (L-, R1).

Many of the collocates in Table 17 carry negative connotations (*nausea*, *violence*, *attacks*, *panic*, *dizziness*, *pain*, *fear*, *suicide*, *terrorism* and *anger*) and it is therefore reasonable to assume that they mainly occur in negative contexts. But some of the words are clearly positive (*relief*, *popularity*, *interest*, *democratization*), even if there of course are people who might argue that popularity does more harm than good and that democracy is not the optimal form of government. Others are neutral (*mergers*, *heat*). *Protests* is perhaps more context-dependent than any other word on the list and might be perceived either way. What the reference corpus tells us is that this particular water metaphor may be naturalized, but the discourse prosody is far from neutral. It also shows a more nuanced picture, as opposed to the BNP's and UKIP's noir use. *Wave of* occurs 54 times in the BNP-UKIP corpus. The largest variation is in the BNP subcorpus, where it occurs with noun phrases such as *attacks*, *barbarity*, *black mob violence*, *budget cuts*, *colonisation*, *domestic budget cuts*, *fake e-mails*, *heterosexual AIDS*, *petty crime*, *redundancies* and *smears*. There are eighteen instances of *wave(-s) of* in the UKIP subcorpus, of which eleven co-occur with *immigration* or *immigrants* (there are only three such instances in the BNP subcorpus). Other uses of *wave(-s) of* in the UKIP subcorpus include *terrorist attacks*, *Marxist sympathisers* and *new EU legislation*. In conclusion, the discourse prosody of *wave(-s) of* is

overwhelmingly negative in both party discourses. In fact, the only positive use occurs in a UKIP article.

> Mr Reeve, recently re-elected to Huntingdon council on a wave of grass-roots support, continued: "And anyway, if the council cares so much about the way its residents put out their bins it should be checking up itself, not getting its taxpayers to do its dirty work."

Other water metaphors are also quite frequent. The construction *influx of* occurs sixteen times in the BNP subcorpus and four times in the UKIP subcorpus, and they all refer to immigrants, particularly labour migration. *Tide of* occurs five times in the BNP subcorpus and collocates with *immigration* (four instances) and *refugees* (1 instance). UKIP's use of this particular metaphor is more varied. In Figure 10, which contains a picture published on the UKIP website in February 2013 (not a part of the corpus), *tide* is used in relation to the EU.

Figure 10. A picture used by UKIP to argue that David Cameron cannot renegotiate Britain's relationship with the EU.

However, not all instances serve to identify an out-group as detrimental to Britain. In fact, I have managed to find two instances in which the tide metaphor is used in order to spread the picture of UKIP as an up-and-coming electoral force.

> We go into the Euro elections next year full of confidence and riding on a incoming tide of growing Euroscepticism across the continent.

> You should not underestimate the tide of feeling that is growing against the stupidity and greed of the EU machine.

No corresponding instances have been found in the BNP subcorpus.

5.4 "Where do 'they' come from?"

Baker and McEnery (2005) note how in newspaper texts, reports about refugees are frequently accompanied by information about country of origin (p. 202). The BNP-UKIP corpus shows that, besides accentuating Britain's recipient position, the parties also speculate where immigrants come from. Many of the concordance lines of *immigration* and *immigrant(-s)* contain specifications of origin. The findings are presented in Figure 11.

Figure 11. References to country of origin and nationality in the BNP and UKIP subcorpora.

BNP		UKIP
Afghanistan (1)	Africa (1)	Cyprus (1)
Bulgaria (2)	Colombia (1)	Eastern Europe (6)
Commonwealth (1)	Congo (1)	EU (8)
Cuba (2)	Eastern Europe (4)	Hong Kong (1)
EU (1)	Iran (1)	India (2)
Iraq (1)	Jamaica (1)	Ireland (2)
Latvia (1)	Libya (1)	Malta (1)
Middle East (1)	Nigeria (1)	Outside EU (2)
Northern Africa (3)	Outside EU (1)	Poor countries (1)
Poland (1)	Portugal (1)	Romania (1)
Romania (3)	Third World (14)	Turkey (2)
Tunisia (3)	Turkey (2)	
Uganda (2)	West India (1)	
Vietnam (1)	Yemen (1)	
Zimbabwe (1)		

It might be difficult to discern a specific country in Figure 11, but the visual representations only serve to illustrate the variety of countries or regions referred to by the parties. Although the total frequency of *immigration* and *immigrant(-s)* is much higher in the corpus, BNP and UKIP mention country of origin or nationality in relation to these words explicitly 55 and 27 times respectively. In addition to making more references to country of origin than UKIP, the BNP also uses more than twice as many country names. There is, however, a great deal of overlapping between the forms used, with both parties talking about immigration from the EU whilst also referring to individual EU member states. UKIP's Eurosceptic nature is corroborated; according to UKIP, immigrants come mainly from the EU (8) or from Eastern Europe (6). With most Eastern European countries already members of the EU, the question is whether transfer of power to

Brussels is the only fear underpinning UKIP's Euroscepticism – there are, for example, no references to Scandinavian immigrants. References to Cyprus, Hong Kong, Ireland and Malta are not concerned with contemporary immigration; rather, these countries are given as examples of historical immigration that has not had any negative or major impact on Britain. Needless to say, these are all places that have experienced British influence to varying degrees.

The BNP also makes reference to former Soviet vassal states, but unlike UKIP it lists several Asian, Middle Eastern and African countries. Wider geographical terms such as *Eastern Europe* (4), *Middle East* (1), *Northern Africa* (3) and *Third World* (14) are also used. Generally speaking, it is a cleaver tactic to use broad geographical names since you do not actually need to know from where people come, and you avoid the risk of being corrected by someone who actually does. UKIP provides us with an extreme example in the form of the truly unspecific *poor countries*. There is only one occurrence of *Third World* in the UKIP subcorpus, while the BNP subcorpus contains 150 instances, and 131 of them are in the articles section. Most of those occurrences touch upon the notion that Britain is slowly, or stealthily, being invaded by alien species. The topoi that can be identified by studying the concordance of the search term *Third World* are summarized in Table 18.

Table 18. Topoi discussed in relation to the *Third World* in the BNP subcorpus.

	Topoi	Frequency
1	Britain will become a Third World country	33
2	Too many Third World immigrants	24
3	Increased criminality	16
4	Third World immigrants steal jobs	11
5	Third World cultures are inferior or incompatible with British law	9
6	Britain is colonized	8
7	Immigration costs too much	8
8	High birth rates	7
9	Increased corruption	7
10	Generally decreased standards (especially in the NHS)	7
11	Third World immigrants have been imported in order to vote for Labour	3
12	The BNP will rebuild Third World economies	3
13	Bad behaviour	2
14	Low border security	2
15	More diseases	2
16	Increased criminality, more diseases and higher living costs	1
17	Third World immigration is bad for the British gene bank	1
18	Third World elections are laughable	1
19	Britain is being ghettoized	1
20	Third World languages are a threat to the status of English	1
21	People should emigrate to the Third World instead	1
22	Britain steal professionals from the Third World	1
23	Less trade with the Third World	1

Lakoff and Wehling (2012) claim that specific issues activate wider ideological frames. The specific issue here, the Third World, is connected to almost every political area, e.g. economy (line 23), law (lines 3 and 5), healthcare (lines 10 and 15), government/governance (line 9), security (line 14), labour (lines 4 and 22), constitution questions (line 18). It seems then, that by knowing what the BNP has to say about the Third World, you also understand much of its political values, at least those exoterically available. Despite the focus on the

Third World and immigration, it is not fair to say that the BNP are focusing exclusively on these issues. Rather, I support the claim made by Richardson (2011), who chooses to view it as a single-explanation rather than single-issue party (p. 43).

The BNP compares increased immigration to colonialism, which sets them apart from other parties on the British political scene. The BNP is not, however, alone in adopting and adapting the concept of colonialism. In the UKIP subcorpus, there are two instances of the adjectival form *colonial* as a description of EU trade policies, and global warming is described as a new form of *colonialism*. Alliance, a non-sectarian Northern Irish party with one seat in the House of Commons, is, as far as I know, the only other British political party to discuss the matter of colonialism in its 2010 general election manifesto, although implicitly. Immigration is described as a "reversal of the historic trend whereby Ireland exported its people to other parts of the British Isles, North America and Australia" (Alliance, 2010, p. 30). The way Alliance conceptualizes emigration is interesting; *export* implies dehumanization by treating people as goods, but it is a question about dehumanization of an in-group; the Irish. BNP and UKIP do not use *export* in this sense, however, both parties use *import* in reference to out-groups. Table 19 contains all occurrences of *import* in the BNP subcorpus.

Table 19. Concordance of the lexeme IMPORT in the BNP subcorpus.

1	Jefferson - Britain's fastest growing	import	a horrific crime wave from the third world
2	to the British people, which is that if you	import	vast numbers of people from the Third World
3	British National Party has warned, if you	import	the Third World into Britain, the end result
4	of people has created the need to	import	yet more immigrants to help provide those
5	National Party has warned, if you	import	the Third World into Britain, the end result
6	of mass immigration brought about to	import	Labour voters from the Third World, these
7	Vince Cable actively seeks to	import	more foreign labour when we have millions
8	in benefits, the Lib/Lab/Cons need to	import	migrant workers from across the globe to
9	problem is to pay £191 million to	import	yet more refugees. The so-called Malaysia
10	take on the native culture, and instead	import	their originating culture as part of a
11	the globe to do these jobs. That these	imported	workers also cannot survive in Britain on
12	crime wave, the costs of imprisoning the	imported	criminals and their defence and Human
13	are not of indigenous origin but those	imported	to create the Marxist multi-cultural fantasy
14	caused by the sheer numbers of people	imported	to enable these Ponzi schemes to appear

The lines in Table 19 are examples of how IMPORT refers to human beings rather than goods, although there are naturally instances in which the search word refers to "normal trade". It is not just a case of "British jobs for British workers", but a serious concern that immigration will lead to various forms of criminal acts (see line 12 and 14) and a fear that immigration is a means of left-wing forces to cling on to power (see line 13). This sort of dehumanizing construction is present also in the UKIP subcorpus, although, as seen in Table 20, it is less frequent.

Table 20. Concordance of the lexeme IMPORT in the UKIP subcorpus.

1	At the simplistic level we are now seeing	imported	electricians and the like coming in
2	EU Commission President, Mr Barroso, talks of	importing	50 million Africans over the coming
3	provide training for British workers rather than	import	skills from overseas. Work permits

Line 2 resembles the type of quantitative description frequent in the BNP subcorpus. Line 1 and 3 concern "import" of labour; line 3 in particular is just a more elegant paraphrasing of the slogan "British jobs for British people" (see chapter 1.2).

Nationalists are, despite what one might think, pathologically fixated on other countries than their own. This obsession has been identified by Billig (1995), who claims that the jumping between a general and a specific scale is endemic to nationalist discourse; "'[w]e' claim to look beyond 'our' boundaries, even when seeking to close those boundaries" (p. 82). In fact, the BNP and UKIP make 2,082 and 2,033 references to 109 and 96 other nation-states and nationalities respectively in their articles. When these references are grouped according to a narrower geographical nomenclature, UKIP's emphasis on the EU is once again corroborated.

Figure 12. Distribution of nationality words in the BNP and UKIP subcorpora.

References to Britain itself are not included here. References to countries within the EU are almost twice as frequent in the UKIP subcorpus, and combined with references to other non-EU countries in Europe amount to 77% of all references. BNP on the other hand makes numerous references to Asian (19%), Middle Eastern (15%) and African (10%) countries. The large number of references to Asian and African countries does not necessarily entail an extension of the core out-group, but rather supports the large body of statistical work on BNP membership and voting behaviour which emphasize the Muslim aspect. The Muslim effect on BNP support is well-known and seen as the main component of out-group construction. John et al. (2006) found a positive correlation between support for the BNP and the presence of Bangladeshi or Pakistani groups (pp. 16f). Similarly, Ford and Goodwin (2010) find that Muslim presence (particularly in the North of England) is associated with a higher level of BNP support, but that

this applies to Pakistani populations rather than Bangladeshi. However, they find no correlation between support for the BNP and the presence of non-Muslim Asians. Moreover, support for the BNP seems to be lower in areas with bigger black populations (pp. 16, 23). Biggs and Knauss' (2012) multilevel analysis of white membership showed that the number of white BNP members is statistically higher in areas with highly segregated South Asian groups than in black neighbourhoods (p. 641).

Ford and Goodwin (2010) suggest that their findings are indicative of a modern BNP with a more subtle appeal. While the out-group of the progenitor, the National Front, included all non-whites, Ford and Goodwin suggest that the BNP shows increased acceptance for Indian and Caribbean populations but increased intolerance for Muslim minorities in (pp. 16, 18). While it seems naïve to assume that the BNP would ever change its view of non-white communities, one of Ford and Goodwin's conclusions seems more plausible, namely that the BNP has "shift[ed] its programmatic emphasis […] towards white anxieties over the more socially and geographically segregated Muslim minorities who can more easily be stigmatized as hostile to British values and supportive of terrorism" (p. 18). This can be corroborated by looking more closely at the number of references the party makes to other nations. The Middle East accounts for only 15% of all references in the corpus; however, 72% of the references to African nations are in fact references to North African, mainly Muslim countries. Similarly, the Asian countries that are most frequently discussed in BNP texts are Turkey, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh; all countries with significant Muslim populations. The shear number of national attributes found in the corpus could suggest that the BNP's out-groups are fuzzy and that this fuzziness is a sign that the party has become more acceptant of non-white communities. On the other hand, a less specified out-group does not entail a less demarcated in-group. Increased awareness of the outside world and references to it can in this case be used as means of self-identification, i.e. "we are what they are not".

6 Conclusions and future studies

The aim of this paper was to compare to what degree the BNP and UKIP use language in order to construct in-groups and out-groups. Using a corpus containing authentic BNP and UKIP articles and policy documents, I have studied on lexical items and their relation with the discursive strategies nomination (attribution of identifying word form) and predication (attribution of quality). In the analysis of the in-group, the focus was on the parties themselves. I investigated what word form of self-reference the parties prefer when addressing potential voters, what competence they claim as unique, what qualities they do not want to be associated with and what qualities they attribute to each other. The analysis of out-groups focused on immigration and how this group is nominated and predicated in terms of legal status, quantity and origin.

The in-group analysis was concerned with the parties themselves. The BNP and UKIP stand out from other parties on the British political scene in that their names mirror a holistic approach to the UK electorate, although both parties are primarily English rather than British phenomena. A quantitative analysis showed that both parties have increased their use of party name on behalf of the more inclusive but less specific pronoun *we*, which goes against the general trend. This can be interpreted as a sign of growing self-confidence and as an attempt to distance oneself from the established parties (which prefer *we* as form of self-reference) by creating a distinct linguistic profile.

The investigation of party image showed that both parties mix ideological and concrete political statements when claiming uniqueness. Both parties claim to be alone in wanting to leave the EU and solve the immigration issue, and both parties make use of value statements that are hard to measure. Two ideological types of themes can be linked to the BNP; an ultranationalist and a traditional left-wing one. UKIP seems to focus on the more banal and concrete issues in society, such as garbage collection or closing of pubs.

A lot can be understood about the parties' self-perception by looking at negation. There is a clear difference in how the parties perceive their own critics; the BNP has to defend itself from accusations of being racist, fascist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic while simultaneously arguing for the necessity of racism. The accusations that UKIP has to meet are much milder.

The BNP and UKIP refer to each other in news articles, but to a limited degree. Despite being lumped together by the media, there are few instances in which the parties distance themselves from each other. Moreover, the tone is not as aggressive as might be expected. Both parties make frequent reference to the traditional big parties and seem to take on the opposition role vis-à-vis the establishment. UKIP does, however, distance itself from the BNP by attacking the party's ideology, while the BNP's tactic seems to be to simply dismiss UKIP as a weak, manipulated constellation.

The out-group analysis was concerned with immigration. The corpus analysis showed that *immigration* and *immigrant*(*-s*) are salient items in both party subcorpora and in both news articles and policy documents, thus motivating

further enquiry. The distribution of these two terms shows that the abstract *immigration* is preferred in policy documents by both parties, while the concrete *immigrant(-s)* dominates in news articles. This could suggest that both parties make an effort to use a more abstract and conventional language in policy documents, which are texts mainly produced for non-members. Articles are mainly aimed at the in-group, i.e. members who regularly visit the party websites in order to keep à jour, which could explain the inconsistency in referencing. Moreover, the collocational analysis of *immigration* showed that the parties' names or constituent parts are among the ten most frequent collocations, thus underlying the salience of the immigration issue in BNP and UKIP discourse.

The collocational analysis generated results that suggested that legal status, quantity and origin were among the most important components of the parties' immigration discourses. An investigation of the distribution of *asylum seeker(-s)*, *immigrant(-s)* and *refugee(-s)* showed that the BNP makes frequent use of all three, although mostly in news articles and mostly in order to create negative discourse prosody. *Asylum seeker(-s)* and *immigrant(-s)* were evenly distributed in UKIP articles and policy documents, although the frequency was lower as compared to the BNP.

Both parties foreground the (il)legal status of immigrants; *illegal* is one of the strongest attributive collocate of *immigrant(-s)*, and the adjective that most frequently collocates with *asylum seeker* is *bogus*. *Refugee* is the least frequent of the word forms researched but perhaps the one that reveals the most about the two parties' view on immigration and how the question should be linguistically approached. While UKIP adopts a technical definition of *refugee*, for example by citing the UN Refugee Convention, the BNP uses this term interchangeably and even together with *asylum seeker, immigrant* and various negative attributes.

A search for numerical quantifications in relation to the target words *asylum seeker(-s)*, *immigrants(-s)* and *refugee(-s)* shows that exact specifications are rare, although marginally more frequent in BNP discourse. However, a collocational analysis shows that both parties use quantifying attributes such as *mass*, *huge*, *high* and *unlimited* frequently to describe immigration. Both parties conceptualize immigrants as uncontrollable natural forces, e.g. as waves. Claims have been made that this is a naturalized metaphor, but it is far from neutral; a cross-corpus investigation shows that this type of metaphor has mainly negative discourse prosody.

One of the more tangible differences between the parties' construction of immigration concerns their attribution of national origin. The BNP's focus on Islam and the Third World as well as UKIP's focus on Europe are mirrored in their immigration discourses. To the BNP, immigrants arrive from all over the world, but primarily from the Third World and other non-European countries. To UKIP, an immigrant is an Eastern European. UKIP is also the only party to talk about positive waves of immigration, although constructing it as a historic anomaly.

The in-group analysis showed that there are functional and formal similarities between the strategies used by the parties to present themselves, e.g. the choice to use party name on behalf of pronoun. It also showed that there is ideological

overlapping (immigration, EU) but that they champion slightly different policies (more concrete/less concrete). The out-group analysis showed that designation of out-groups is a vital part of BNP and UKIP discourse. While the function, the creation of *the Other*, is the same, different "core out-groups" are identifiable (people from Eastern Europe and the Third World respectively). Based on data presented and discussed in the in-group and out-group analyses, I conclude that both the BNP and UKIP speak the same language of differentiation. The principles of said language are the same, namely to separate *us* from *them*; what sets the BNP and UKIP apart are nothing but fine adjustments of parameters. As far as classification is concerned, the BNP's ethnic nationalist label has once again been corroborated, and while UKIP does not belong to the same nationalist sphere, it is obvious that it is not fully a civic nationalist party either, e.g. signalled by the singling out of people (Eastern Europeans).

Over the last few years, terrorist attacks committed by Islamists and Islamophobes have brought the issue of us vs. them to the fore. More research on perspectivization is needed, not only in the study of nationalist groups but in analyses of the establishment as well. The hope is that politicians will not be able to sell simple solutions if they are forced to clarify who will be negatively affected. For the last decade, much scholarship has focused on the BNP. From an academic point of view, each analysis of the BNP seems to have been a battle, a battle in which the pen proved mightier than the sword, or so it seems at the moment[24]. As the public is becoming increasingly aware of the existence of UKIP, it is my hope that the party will undergo the same scrutiny as the BNP. The Discourse-Historical Approach is a suitable framework as it allows for comparison through time and space.

As nationalist groups have learnt to work across borders, so must scholars. Increased interdisciplinarity and less ostrich-like behaviour are needed if all facets of such a complicated organism as a political party are to be understood. Linguists need to interact with politicians; talking to politicians is not the prerogative of political scientists. Similarly, spoken data are not the exclusive property of phoneticians. I conducted a pair of interviews for this paper in order to ascertain more information about text production circumstances, however, I have realized that interviews can and need to be incorporated into the data set to a larger degree than they are today (for an excellent argumentation in favour of including interviews with politicians in studies of the extreme right, see Goodwin, 2008).

Two chapters had to be dropped from the analysis due to space restrictions. The final section of the immigration chapter would have asked the mock question "how do we get rid of 'them'?" The other was supposed to investigate the parties' conceptualization of Islam. The BNP and UKIP are anti-immigration parties, which entails that they advocate policies that will either halt immigration or have immigrants deported. It is not important which party makes the most use of the word form *deport*; what is interesting is how the parties motivate such ideas. Ideas concerning deportation, immigration and international aid typically rest on an us-them foundation where decisions to help or not to help people are based on how

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[24] A battle is but a meronym of war.

they are perspectivized vis-à-vis the parties themselves. In the case of Islam, initial corpus searches showed that UKIP has more in common with the BNP than has been manifested in literature so far, which motivates further comparisons not only between the BNP and UKIP, but between UKIP and other extremist organizations.

BNP and UKIP are often labelled as either single-issue or single-explanation parties, but it is difficult to assess the validity of such claims because of researcher bias or simply because it is difficult to delineate one question from another. Advancements in semantic tagging has, however, offered a way of developing easily reproducible research methods applicable to many parties in order to get a snapshot picture of "where the parties stand now". With a semantically tagged corpus, a researcher can use the same search words that have been used in this thesis, e.g. *immigration*, but instead of "counting collocates", investigate with what semantic groups the search words co-occur.

Whoever said politics is boring is bound to change their mind in the years to come as we are living in exciting times, given that you find the thought of a fast-changing electoral landscape exciting, that is. In January 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron announced that there will be an in-out referendum on the EU if the Conservatives win the elections in May 2015. UKIP was founded as an anti-EU organization, and as the analysis has shown, the prospect of leaving the European Union is the party's main driving force. If the British people indeed chose to leave the EU, as suggested by polls, UKIP can either dissolve or re-adapt its policies in order to survive. If Britain remains a member of the EU, the anti-EU movement is bound to lose momentum, which would also be detrimental to UKIP. That might, however, result in renewed interest in more extreme organizations seeking to leave the EU using non-democratic means. Regardless of the outcome, it is my hope that this paper will be used as a point of departure in future longitudinal and cross-sectional studies of the BNP and UKIP. Group divisions are not eternal, and the prospect of an upcoming referendum might have an impact on the parties' construction of their in-groups and out-groups.

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