

A long relationship, no membership: Turkey and the European Union.

- An investigation of cultures and identities standing in the way of accession.



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Abstract

The aim of this study is to investigate and establish culture and identity issues potentially standing in the way of Turkey becoming a member of the European Union.

It has been more than 50 years since Turkey first showed intents to become member of the collaboration, which today is called the European Union. In 1999, Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate for full membership. Since then the accession process has moved in slow motion or reached a complete stalemate. The research, analysis and discussions in this thesis try to provide answers to why this is.

Through theories of ethno-symbolism and Constructivism, identities and social discourse are examined in Turkey and in the European Union.

Whether or not a common European identity exists is, as this thesis will explain, not a question easily answered. This thesis is written on the basis that identities are founded in common history, culture and political understanding.

The analysis and discussion in the paper outline arguments that indicate specific differences between European and Turkish identity such as ethnic traditions and cultures. Furthermore, different views on democracy in Turkey and in the EU are also discussed. It is the conclusion of this thesis that these differences arguably create obstacles for a future Turkish membership and possibly will continue to do so for a long time.

Key words: The European Union, Turkey, Culture, Identity, Ethno-symbolism, Constructivism

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1. Introduction

Why do we study social interaction? This study is in my opinion essential because social interaction can create some of the most dangerous tension in our immediate surroundings. The world and our surroundings seem to be decreasing in size as humans evolve and succeed in making the world smaller through online options and easier transportation like never before. Because of this, different cultures and identities are crossing paths everyday. The importance of maintaining peace despite difference is increasing accordingly.

In 1987, Turkey applied for membership of the European Community, which six years later would be known as the European Union (the EU). This was not in any way the first time Turkey expressed a wish to enter the European collaboration. The country first applied for associate membership in the European Economic Community in 1959. In 1963, the European Community and Turkey signed an Association Agreement, which would be known as the Ankara Agreement. In Turkey, politicians are referring to this as waiting on the doorstep of the EU for more than 50 years¹. As the foreign minister of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoğlu, said at the 51st meeting of the Turkey-European Union Association Council on 27 May 2013:

*“It has been 50 years since the Ankara Agreement was signed in 1963. The EU membership has been our strategic goal since then”.*²

At the time of writing, Turkey has still not achieved membership.

The reason for the focus of this thesis is a personal interest in Turkey's potential membership of the EU.

In 2012, a “positive agenda” was launched to bring fresh dynamics to the negotiations between the European Union and Turkey. From an economical perspective Turkey is arguably becoming a more lucrative partner for the EU. The economy in Turkey has increased steadily the last couple of years and the country had the highest growth rate in the world in 2010 and 2011, only exceeded by China in 2010.³

The development of international relations and globalisation are issues arguably making it increasingly difficult for the European Union to disregard the question of Turkish EU membership.

¹ Zaman, Today's. *Today's Zaman*. 04. February 2013, accessed 14, December 2013,

² Affairs, Republic of Turkey: Ministry of Foreign. 27. May 2013, accessed 17. December 2013, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/foreign-minister-davutoglu-eu-membership-has-been-our-strategic-goal-for-almost-50-years-and-will-continue-to-be.en.mfa>

³ Udenrigsministeriet. *Danmark i Tyrkiet, Udenrigsministeriet*. 10. January 2013, accessed 5, December 2013, <http://tyrkiet.um.dk/da/om-tyrkiet/tyrkiets-historie-og-politiske-situation/oekonomisk-situation/>

Since Turkey was accepted as a candidate country for membership of the EU in 1999, many changes have been made in the Turkish society.⁴ The changes have not yet led to any finalizing negotiations. At the same time, Turkey's political leaders have begun criticizing the EU for stalling the accession process. Among many things, Turkish leaders are criticizing the EU for having double standards towards candidate countries and their abilities to fulfil the asked criteria for accession. Furthermore there has also been speculation and critique against the EU for not admitting that the accession process is being stalled because the EU is hesitating to grant membership to a country that has a majority of Muslim citizens.⁵

By making a comparative analysis of culture and identity in Turkey and the EU, and a critical discourse analysis of political texts from both Turkey and the EU, I aim to describe the difficulties and reasons for disagreement between Turkey and the EU. With the results from the analysis the scope of the thesis is to seek validation for my hypothesis: The European Union's hesitation or reluctance to accept Turkey as a full member is not only due to political and economical demands not being met, but also has to do with differences in culture and identities.

The debate on globalisation has a tendency to focus on economical advantages, cheaper employment and other trade and industrial benefits. This is not to disregard, but as much as the above mentioned describes some important aspects of globalisation, it is also very much about how populations interact despite differences.

1.2 Research questions

1. What characterises European identity?
2. What characterises Turkish national identity?
3. In which ways might expressing this Turkish national identity influence EU's political leader's attitude toward Turkey's accession to the EU?
4. What characterises the way the EU's political leaders are identifying Turkey in talking about future EU enlargement?
5. In which ways might these differences influence Turkey's accession to the EU?

⁴ Heron, Tomas. *Folketinget, EU-oplysningen*. 07. November, 2011, accessed 15, December 2013, <http://www.eu-oplysningen.dk/spsv/off/alle/tyrkiet/>

⁵ Harding, Luke. *The Guardian*. 07. June 2013, accessed 15, December 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/07/erdogan-accuses-eu-hypocrisy-turkey-protests>

1.3 Literature review

With this literature review I want to show you, the reader, where I have found inspiration from and interest in the topic, but more importantly this literature review is a mean to emphasise areas in the discourse where I believe to see important aspects that could be developed.

Many have studied the enormous topic the European Union and found the intricate relationship between Turkey and the EU interesting. This have led to numerous discussions, articles, papers, books etc. all trying to enlighten the reader and bring attention to the many aspects of the EU, not to mention the tensions and outcomes of the potentially historic relationship between what many would describe as a predominant Islamic culture and a predominant Christian culture.

I will in the chapter on theory explain the theories in this thesis further, but as it was a great part of finding my focus, I want to mention Anthony D. Smith's "Nationalism"⁶ and Steven J. Mock's work "Symbols of defeat"⁷ which both focus on the ethnic, the past. Both authors are handling a difficult field of research, a field that will never cease to raise questions, and a field that deals with how formation and building of nations and identities come to be. The importance of why we as individuals seek to form groups, in order to find meaning and purpose, a way to organise and find others willing to submit to the same culture of rules and laws. Both authors define theories of nationalism, nation and identity.

The scope of this thesis is to contribute to the current discourse on Turkey and EU relations. In the book "Europe: An Unfinished Adventure" Zygmunt Bauman⁸ very eloquently describes the core values of the European Union that according to him are the cornerstones of a collaboration across borders. According to Zygmunt Bauman "Rationality", "Justice" and "democracy" are three important values forming the mind of the European citizens. The constant pursuit of these values establishes a European identity. He emphasizes that despite the many different forms of democracy through out Europe one can argue that they originate from the same train of thought, which is why we can find similar core values that helped shape the democracies in Europe.⁹ Arguably the EU has moved into an era of economic instability, raising nationalism and internal power struggles. I agree with Zygmunt Bauman in his analysis and thoughts on the matters of the European Union being in a difficult situation, seeing how the world is developing. He expresses the need for the EU to once

⁶ Smith, D. Anthony. *Nationalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001.

⁷ Mock, J, Stevens. *Symbols of defeat in the Contrucktion of National Identity*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

⁸ Bauman, Zygmunt. *Europe: An Unfinised Adventure* . Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004.

⁹ "Europe: An Unfinised Adventure ." Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004, p. 126 - 129

more strive to attain the same hunger for adventure, the same passion for creating politics together, that will help our common task of coping with still growing problems, European as well as global. He strongly believes that the answer lies within an ever-closer union; he even speaks of a budding European federation.¹⁰ As an important note Bauman writes in 2004, before the severity of the economic crises struck. In terms of a European federation I do not find reason to believe that that will ever become a reality. I do however find reasons to agree with Zygmunt Bauman on his perspectives on the foundations for a common European identity.

The potential membership of Turkey is not mentioned in Bauman's book, which is why I want to research further on this subject and look into the matter of how Turkey would adapt to an European identity as described by Zygmunt Bauman.

The Danish professor Uffe Østergård also focuses on EU/Turkey relations in writing about the above mentioned and debated common European identity in his book "Europa: Identitet og Identitetspolitik".¹¹ He discusses the difficult question of whether or not a common European identity exists. He identifies the old heritage of Turkey, the cruelties of the Ottoman Empire as a reason for why some Europeans still associate Turkey with the "other" and a threat to the Christian Europe.¹² According to Uffe Østergård it is wrong to identify Europe with a Christian character. I concur with his point that there have been other directions of religion or political ideologies alongside Christianity in much of Europe's history.¹³ My question is whether or not it is wrong to argue that Christianity is a common character when talking about European identity. How much does this Christian heritage in Europe have to do with the fact that Turkey is still being held at "safe distance" from the EU? It is my personal opinion that religion should be of little matter, Christianity or Islam. We should be able to co-exist peacefully as have been made possible between the members of the European Union since the Second World War. At the time of writing, I do unfortunately not believe this to be possible between the EU and Turkey. Uffe Østergård wrote his book in 1998 before the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and before the EU was faced with the economical crisis. He argues that Islam potentially could be a positive contribution to European civilisation. The quote below is translated from Danish into English. He writes on the third to last page of the book:

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 131.

¹¹ Østergård, Uffe. *Europa: Identitet og Identitetspolitik*. Viborg: Munksgaard/Rosinante, 1998.

¹² "Europa: Identitet og Identitetspolitik." Viborg: Munksgaard/Rosinante, 1998. p. 146.

¹³ Ibid., p. 381

“In the next century it will be impossible to overlook the role of Islam in Europe as well as outside.”¹⁴

Can Islam become a well-integrated part of the Europe Union? Following what has happened in the world since Uffe Østergård wrote his book, I see this as one of the biggest challenges facing not only the European Union.

My thoughts on this thesis have been formed by the above questions relating to cultures and identity when talking about why Turkey is not yet a member of the EU. In *“Trials of Europeanization”*¹⁵ the aim of the book is to give the reader an overview of what Turkey’s decision to pursue membership of the EU has meant to the political culture of the country. In the book, the author speaks of a concept called the spill-over process. In the context of the book, the spill-over effect is either political or functional,¹⁶ but put in the context of this thesis one could ask: What if the concept were to deal with culture, religion and identities? What have this spill-over effect then been given EU and Turkey through the years of the accession process?

The work of Jesper Møller Sørensen and Erik Boel *“Tyrkiet – på vej gennem EU’s nåleøje”*¹⁷ is in my opinion a well written publication that provides the reader with a good understanding of Turkey as a country and also an overview of the long and difficult accession process and difficulties that have existed and still exist between the European Union and Turkey. It is important to note that the above-mentioned publication, like this thesis, is written without the insight that a native might have, but based on knowledge from interviews, translated text and documents.

What especially caught my eye and interest were the authors describing the battle of culture in Turkey. It is an introduction to an internal battle of cultures in Turkey, an effect of the building of the Turkish nation and its identity following Kemal Atatürk.¹⁸ Kemal Atatürk is to this day still called the father of the Turkish nation, but can accordingly also be defined as the man who started the current battle of cultures in Turkey, seeing as he was the ruler who banned religion from public space.¹⁹ With time comes change and for Turkey and the Turkish people the time following Kemal

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 387.

¹⁵ Grigoriadis, N. Ioannis. *Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and The European Union*. New York : Palgrave Macmillian, 2009.

¹⁶ *“Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and The European Union.”* New York : Palgrave Macmillian, 2009. p. 7.

¹⁷ Sørensen, møller Jesper, and Erik Boel. *Tyrkiet - på vej gennem EU's nåleøje*. Viborg: Gyldendal, 2005.

¹⁸ *“Tyrkiet - på vej gennem EU's nåleøje.”* Viborg: Gyldendal, 2005. p. 85.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 88.

Atatürk have been a roller coaster of change, cultural and politically. I want to build upon this and focus on the battle of cultures not only in Turkey, but also between Turkey and the EU.

1.4 Context

1.4.1 The European Union (the EU) and the ongoing enlargement

Many in The EU view integration and enlargement as way to promote peace, stability, democracy and prosperity.²⁰ In 1993, the Copenhagen European Council defined requirements candidate countries need to fulfil in order to join the EU. The council also concluded that accession could take place as soon as candidate countries are capable of fulfilling these requirements.

The criteria for membership require candidates to adopt political and economic EU-values by achieving “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union.”²¹

Accession talks begin with a process to determine if the country meets the EU’s rules and regulations. The rules and regulations – also known as the “acquis communautaire” – have 35 chapters. The European Commission proposes common negotiating positions for the EU on each chapter, which must be approved unanimously by the Council of Ministers. Chapters of the acquis can only be opened and closed with the approval of all member states. Each year, the Commission publish reports, assessing the progress made by a candidate country. Once the Commission concludes negotiations on all 35 chapters, with an applicant a draft accession treaty is submitted to the council for approval and to the European Parliament for assent. After approval by the Council and Parliament each EU member state and the candidate country must ratify the accession treaty.²² In 2004, the largest expansion of the union happened when the EU accepted 10 new member states. In January 2007, Romania and Bulgaria joined as well. With the accession of Croatia on 1 July 2013 (after eight years of negotiations), the Union now has 28 member states.

²⁰ European Commission. *Understanding Enlargement - The European Union’s enlargement policy*. Bruxelles: European Commission, 2011.

²¹ European Commission, The Copenhagen criteria 1993, accessed 14. December 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/enlargement/criteria/index_en.htm

²² Archick, Kristin. *European Union Enlargement*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2013. p. 1

Currently, there are four candidate countries besides Turkey. Montenegro was given candidate status in December 2010 and opened accession negotiations with the EU on June 19, 2012. Serbia was granted candidate status in March 2012 and could begin actual negotiations by January 2014. Macedonia has a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, but Greece and Bulgaria have blocked the Macedonian negotiation.²³ Iceland began the accession process in July 2010, but in 2013, the Icelandic government announced that it is suspending the accession process.²⁴

1.4.2 Political situation between the EU and Turkey

Turkey started accession talks in October 2005, but at the time of writing, only 14 chapters out of 35 has been opened in eight years and only one has been closed²⁵. Croatia began membership talks on the same day as Turkey, but has already finished the whole process – the country became the 28th member on July 1 2013.

Looking back at the eight years since Turkey started the accession talks, one could argue that negotiation talks and the debate climate between Turkey and the EU now is at an all-time low. Both the political negotiations and the public opinions in Turkey and in the EU about Turkey's accession are characterised as being in a worse shape than in any previous time during the years that have gone by.

Scholars²⁶ point to the spring of 2012 as the beginning of a process that might have led to the stalemate of today.

In May 2012, the EU Commission launched an agenda on Turkey, which EU labelled as “positive”. The intent was to kick-start EU-Turkey relations, the EU said.

In the years that followed, the EU published four reports which all expressed disappointment with Turkey's progress: In October 2012, the European Commission published its annual assessment of the progress of the candidate countries, including Turkey. In December 2012, the European Council's published its “conclusions” on enlargement. In April 2013, the European Parliament's published its Progress Report on Turkey. And in October 2013, the European Commission again published its annual progress rapport.

²³ Barber, Tony. *Financial Times*. 12. September, 2013, accessed 17. December 2013, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5d4d383a-13bd-11e3-9289-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qXrHcJSP>

²⁴ Pop, Valentina. *Euobserver*. 13. September, 2013, accessed 17. December 2013, <http://euobserver.com/enlargement/121419>

²⁵ Commission, European. *www.europe.eu*. 05. November, 2013, accessed 14. December 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-958_en.htm

²⁶ Morelli, Vincent L. *European Union Enlargement, A Status*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2013.

The criticism in these rapports included, among other things, lack of freedom of expression and lack of media freedom. There was also criticism of Turkey's refusal to recognise Cyprus and the EU presidency, which at that point in time was Cypriote.

In spite of the criticism, EU member states agreed in early 2013 to support a proposal from France about opening a new chapter of the *acquis*, namely chapter 22, Regional Policy. Up until now only 13 out of 35 chapters had been opened.

Negotiations were set to begin in June 2013. In the end of May though, events in Turkey started to induce new problems. Public protests erupted in Turkey over the future of a park, but then turned into protests demanding basic rights and freedoms in reaction to violence committed by the police against the protesters spread across Turkey. According to assessment made by the Turkish Medical Association (TMA) on 15 July 2013, 8163 people were injured in demonstrations across Turkey. 5 people lost their lives. According to declarations made by the Ministry of Interior on June 22th, protest occurred all around Turkey except in Bayburt and Bingöl. 2,5 million people attended the protests.²⁷

After Turkish authorities cracked down on the protestors, renewed criticism from the EU was raised. A resolution from the European Parliament expressed its *“deep concern at the disproportionate and excessive use of force by the Turkish police.”*²⁸ Turkish government officials replied with harsh words about the EU.

Several EU member states warned that they would postpone accession talks. In the end the EU agreed to open the new chapter, but to postpone the accession negotiations until October.

On November 5, Turkey and the EU opened the 14th chapter, Chapter 22 on regional policy. Even though the EU as well as Turkey expressed hope that more chapters would open soon, France has conveyed the message to Turkey that it will not lift its veto on four chapters until after the European Parliament elections that will be held in June 2014.

1.4.3 Public opinion in Turkey and in the EU

EU membership seems to have lost its appeal for many Turks. In 2004, 62 percent of Turks asked said that a Turkish membership of the EU would be a good thing, and only 12 percent said it would

²⁷ The economist. »The economist.« *The economist*. 8. June, 2013, accessed 12. December 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21579004-recep-tayyip-erdogan-should-heed-turkeys-street-protesters-not-dismiss-them-democrat-or-sultan>

²⁸ European Parliament. *www.europarl.europa.eu*. 13. June, 2013, accessed 09. December 2013, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=P7-RC-2013-0305&language=EN>

be a bad thing. In 2012, 36 percent said that Turkish membership would be a good thing, while 33 percent said a bad thing, the Eurobarometer polls show. In 2013 alone, the Turkish public opinion about the EU took a rollercoaster ride. In a Eurobarometer poll published in September, only 43 percent of the Turkish citizens viewed the EU positively, as compared with 60 percent six months earlier.²⁹

Turkey's economy continues to thrive. Many Turkish citizens or Turks seem to feel that a membership in the EU is no longer needed in order to secure Turkey's status. In 2005, only 16 percent of Turks said that Turkey's economy was doing better than the average of the European Union countries. In 2013 that percentage had increased to 56 percent a large shift in opinion observed through Eurobarometer polls.³⁰

European support for Turkey's accession among citizens of EU member states has been lukewarm at best, and now it seems even more ambivalent than before. This opinion may be due to internal crisis of upholding democratic standards with newly accepted membership countries, which arguably affect the attitude towards the acceptance of more countries such as Turkey. These internal events or crises are for example the Hungarian crisis that started at the end of 2011; where democratic and human rights written into the European treaties, were disregarded. Another crisis that arguably can have affected opinion among EU citizens is the Romanian rule of law crisis in the summer of 2012.³¹ The latest Eurobarometer poll concerning opinion among EU citizens about Turkey is from 2008, the poll shows that 36 percent of the European citizens are in favour, where as 44 percent are not in favour of the membership.³²

2. Method

In the following chapter I describe the methods and the collection of data gathered and examined in order for this thesis to have been written.

I have chosen to work with a deductive approach. By using this approach my analysis has been conducted as a mean to research the validity of my hypothesis and use of theory. Had I chosen to

²⁹ Eurobarometer. [hec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm). xxx. xxx, 2014, accessed 03. January 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm

³⁰ Eurobarometer. [hec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm). xxx. xxx, 2014, accessed 03. January 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm

³¹ Buckley, Neil, James Fontanella-Khan, og Kester Eddy. 11. July, 2013, accessed 13. January 2014, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3901b64c-ea12-11e2-913c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qIuVw18B>

³² Eurobarometer. [hec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm). xxx. xxx, 2014, accessed 03. January 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm

work inductively, it would have meant initiating the work process without a hypothesis as a starting point, but instead letting observations and empirical data form the structure.

By working deductively results from the analysis will then either confirm the theories and hypothesis or indicate other possible theories than the ones initially thought out.³³ Both the deductive and inductive approach have their limitations or weaknesses. The inductive approach can be overwhelming in the amount of empirical data where important points have a possibility of being overlooked. The deductive method on the other hand has a danger of becoming too narrow, where subjective opinions can create blind spots.

It is important to be aware of these risks and limitations. I knowingly focused on a deductive path; working as objectively as possible, as I believe this to be most fruitful for the findings and arguments of this thesis.

2.1 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

Historically speaking, CDA is a rather new discipline. Nothing develops more, or provides better insight than when knowledge is shared and discussed. A group of scholars decided to get together to discuss the many ideas and different perspectives on CDA. This formed a CDA network of distinguished scholars such as Gunter Kress, Theo van Leeuwen, Teun Van Dijk, Norman Fairclough and Rut Wodak, following a small symposium in Amsterdam in 1991.³⁴

The method of CDA is said to be an offspring of Critical Linguistics (CL), which emerged in the 1970s. CL and CDA are related. Whereas CL often uses the perspective of those who suffer, CDA has another use and understanding of the concept “critical” as CDA wants to uncover and clarify the political ideologies and influences in the language of those *in power*, the people who actually are responsible for the existence of inequalities - and who has the power to change it.³⁵ The high emphasis on the ability to be “critical” indicates inspiration from the Frankfurt School or Jürgen Habermas as “critical linguistics”.³⁶ A further interpretation of taking a critical approach is in the opportunity to distance one self from the text, to see the interconnectedness of things and go beyond the actual words to also examine meaning and context.

³³ Olsen, Henning. *Kvalitative kvaler: Kvalitative metoder og danske kvalitative interviewundersøgelers kvalitet*. Danmark: Akademisk, 2002. p. 110-115

³⁴ Wodak, Ruth, Michael Meyer, Siegfried Jäger, van, A. Teun Dijk, Norman Fairclough, og Ron Scollon. *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage Publications, 2001. p. 4

³⁵ ”*Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage Publications.” 2001. p. 10-11

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2

CDA is not a locked method but a method developed and examined by many scholars, some of them mentioned above, contributing their take on how CDA works to its best abilities in retrieving results in analysis. A general explanation or features required in the different variations is that it is a useful method when ones aim is to examine social dilemmas.

CDA is oftentimes used in analysing political speeches. One of many examples is Ruth Wodak's use of CDA in analysing speeches of ministers and heads of government as part of what she calls the field of control.³⁷

For my thesis this method is very suitable since I have chosen political texts from the president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso³⁸ and the president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan³⁹, as part of my investigation and validation of my hypothesis.

CDA requires descriptions and analysis of social processes and structures in all levels (personal, groups and society) and includes the concepts of power, the concept of history, as well as the concept of ideology.⁴⁰ There are several different CDA approaches, no one is considered the “right one”, but diversity is important. As mentioned CDA is said to critically defend any inequality or point out power abuse practised through discourse. The method is used to show how the privileged use linguistic means to stabilize or intensify their power and the inequalities of society.

Teun A. van Dijk, professor of Discourse Studies at the University of Amsterdam, contributed to the learning's of CDA with several publications, starting back in 1984 where he wrote his first book on racism “*Prejudice in Discourse*”. He has lectured widely in Europe and America and has very strong opinions about CDA as being discourse analysis focusing on social problems with a political attitude, as Van Dijk expresses it, “CDA is biased – and proud of it”.⁴¹ I structure my analysis according to the principals of Van Dijks multidisciplinary CDA method. The multidisciplinary CDA is focused on diversity and the importance of combining both discourse and social structures in an analysis of specific social relations. This diversity is explained in Van Dijk's discourse-cognition-society triangle. The triangle indicates how different aspects are equally important and useful for a critical analysis, especially in defining the context for the “communicative event” to be analysed.⁴²

³⁷ Ibid., p. 68

³⁸ Commission, The European. *www.ec.europa.eu*. xxx. xxx, 2014, accessed 03. January 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/about/cv/index_en.htm

³⁹ Sørensen, møller Jesper, and Erik Boel. *Tyrkiet - på vej gennem EU's nåleøje*. Viborg: Gyldendal, 2005. p. 192

⁴⁰ Wodak, Ruth, Michael Meyer, Siegfried Jäger, van, A. Teun Dijk, Norman Fairclough, og Ron Scollon. *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage Publications, 2001. p. 3

⁴¹ ”*Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*.” London: Sage Publications, 2001. p. 96

⁴² Ibid., p. 97-98

The analysis of the two texts is initially structured through findings of the “semantic macrostructure”. Finding the macrostructure is done by location of general topics; topics that can help define and establish what discourses exist within the text and what it is about on a global level. Van Dijk distinguishes between local and global. The global meaning of the texts is emerging and understood through the micro or local meaning of the texts.⁴³

To ensure a proper understanding and analysis of the texts, the local meanings of the texts, as Van Dijk calls them, are investigated. The local meanings in the texts are studied, such as the meanings of words, the structure of propositions, and relations between propositions. Local meanings are the result of the selection made by speakers or writers in their mental models of events. It can also be their general socially shared beliefs. This is the type of information that influences the mental models the most, meaning that they also are the ones, which influence the opinions of the recipients.⁴⁴

2.2 Data collection

2.2.1 Speeches

The scope of this thesis is to research and analyse culture and identity aspects in the EU and in Turkey, in trying to find out if these are playing a role in the obstruction of the chances of Turkey becoming a full member of the EU. The empirical data or texts are in this case political speeches addressed to European and Turkish politicians and citizens. In the analysis I discuss and interpret the written texts from speeches given by as mentioned José Manuel Barroso, the current president of the European Commission, and the current prime minister of the Turkish republic, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The speech given by Barroso is the annual state of the union speech, held on the 13th of September 2013 at the European parliament plenary session in Strasbourg.⁴⁵ Erdogan originally held his speech at a group meeting with his political party, AK.⁴⁶ I have chosen these speeches because they represent leaders from the two instances in focus; furthermore the target groups of the speeches are citizens, the heart of the nations, and political leaders who are in the position of actively affecting change. The citizens might not be participating at the physical place where the

⁴³ Ibid., p. 102

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 103-106

⁴⁵ Barroso, Manuel, José. 11. September, 2013, accessed 02. November 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-684_en.htm

⁴⁶ Erdogan, Tayyip, Recep. *Justice and Development Party*. 25. June, 2013, accessed 03. November 2013 <http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/haberler/ak-party-group-meeting-june-25-2013/50464>

speeches were given, but in this assignment the online accessibility of both speeches is argued as ground for the citizens in the EU and Turkey also being viewed as targets for the substance of speeches.

2.2.2 Interviews

In the introduction I explain the problems and topic of research. Getting to the right topic and deciding on a structure and method has been a long road with many doubts and difficult decisions. As a result the topic has been corrected, limited in scope and improved along the way.

In the process of finding the right research design I very early decided that I would incorporate expert interviews as an addition to the gathered empirical data. As explained the topic changed a bit along the way, which happened accordingly with the knowledge gained from the empirical data. This is important to note in terms of the interviews conducted. A couple of the questions asked are related to the earlier design and line of research questions. I will defend that these interviews are still valuable as expert knowledge and as empirical support. In the following I outline whom I interviewed, why they are relevant and the design of the interviews.

In the art of interviewing there are elements difficult to predict, you are dealing with people that might be situated elsewhere or have busy schedules. Equal to working with a research project, you cannot always foresee how it will develop or what obstacles you might come across. What I had initially planned were qualitative semi-structured face-to-face expert interviews with open-ended questions.⁴⁷ This type of interview would have allowed the interviewees to elaborate on issues of particular interest and for the interviewer to possibly go beyond the structured questions and contribute further meaning and understanding to the research.

I found two experts, to whom I am grateful, willing to contribute to this project. Searching for interviewees I came across the first of the two experts at a lecture on “Liberalism and Democracy in a Turkish Model” held by professor Omer Taspinar at University of Copenhagen, School of Law on the 4th of October 2013. I participated in the lecture out of interest, but I had done a little research before hand and learned that Mr Omer Taspinar was an expert on EU and Turkey relations. After the lecture I approached the professor with the request of a possible interview. As a director of the Turkey project at Brookings institute in Washington, professor at the National War College and

⁴⁷ Olsen, Henning. *Kvalitative kvaler: Kvalitative metoder og danske kvalitative interviewundersøgelers kvalitet*. Danmark: Akademisk, 2002. p. 74-75

adjunct professor at John Hopkins University in the United States,⁴⁸ circumstances would have that Mr Omer Taspinar was only in Denmark for the abovementioned lecture. In our conversation after the lecture he kindly agreed to a written interview, I mentioned an interview on Skype as a possibility, so that it would still be face-to-face, but due to a busy schedule and travels he preferred correspondence through e-mail.

In a face-to-face interview it is essential before beginning the actual interview to create confidentiality between the interviewer and interviewee, especially important in the respect of the interviewee's willingness to answer honestly. This can be achieved by clearly explaining the design of the interview, topic and field of research in an interview guide. Furthermore it is important to explain the context of the interview and how it afterwards will be implemented; in this case what importance it would have in this thesis. Without the opportunity to do the interview in person, the confidentiality process and outlining of the interview was instead presented in an introduction letter to the interview questions send by e-mail. The interview being in writing created a more structured interview, where as the face-to-face interview would have allowed for questions to be asked in a less structured order or left out in total according to what direction the interviewee wanted to go. The open-ended questions send by mail still provided the experts with opportunity to elaborate and go beyond the questions if they wanted to. The lecture given by professor Omer Taspinar, which I actively participated in, will also be an addition to the interview.

Daniella Kruzmanovic is a professor at Copenhagen University belonging to the Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies.⁴⁹ She is introduced as the second expert interviewee. Searching for experts in my field of research, I wanted to locate an expert able to meet personally, which would mean it would have to be an expert situated in Denmark or willing to conduct an interview via Skype. I came across Daniella Kruzmanovic on the Internet; she has authored several publications on matters of the EU and Turkey, which indicated that she had expert knowledge and a good understanding of the subject. In our initial mail correspondence, in which I asked if she would be willing to participate in an interview, she wrote that had timing been differently she would have been more than willing. Unfortunately she was just about to leave the country for a longer period of time at the time of our correspondence. Because I myself had a limited amount of time, and her

⁴⁸ Institute, Brookings. www.brookings.edu. xxx. xxx 2013, accessed 02. October 2013, <https://brookings.edu/experts/taspinaro?view=bio>

⁴⁹ Copenhagen, University of. xxx. xxx, 2013, accessed 07. October 2013 <https://ccrs.ku.dk/staff/profile/?id=122121>

profile so perfectly fitted the scope of this thesis, it was agreed, like the previous, to conduct the interview in writing.

Unlike Mr Omer Taspinar, Professor Daniella Kruzmanovic because of her travels, only had a few days to reply. I had my interview guide or letter of introduction from the earlier interview, which I send her by e-mail, along with her request of the questions being restructured and deducted to three important questions. In the limited time she thought it best to give more time to a few answers with depth and careful thought, than short hurried answers to many questions. The answers I received were well thought through, descriptive and of great use to further process of this thesis.

All questions and answers can be found in the appendix.

3. Theory

In this chapter, I explain the theories I have chosen to support and help enlighten and argue the focus of dilemma between the EU and Turkey and validity of my hypothesis. I operationalize the theories chosen in the later analysis chapter.

3.1 Theoretical delimitation

In this section, I define the theoretical choices that limit the scope and define the boundaries of this thesis by describing alternative theoretical perspectives that could have been adopted.

A realistic approach would be an obvious choice, were my aim to analyze possible political power struggles in the accession process itself, in which member states might have economic or political reasons for stalling the process. Instead, I focus on other possible reasons, namely the possibility that differences in culture and identities could be reasons for the stalemate in the negotiations.

When researching matters of Turkey and the EU, one quickly realizes that the struggle over power is a frequent topic of discussion. In the realm of international politics, a fine line exists between cooperation, protecting self-interest and maintaining peace. For a realist, the approach taken is often referred to as a pessimistic approach. Realists tend to take the position of worst case-scenario.⁵⁰

In the theory of realism, each individual state is the main actor in the international system. The theory argues that it is impossible for states, thinking states will always protect self-interest, to co-

⁵⁰ Swisa, Maja. »Future Stability in The European Union: Realism, Constructivism and institutionalism.« *Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on The European Union: Vol. 2011, Article 11*, xxx. xxx 2011: (125-134) p. 127-128

operate on a supra-national level. It is through this power struggle and the knowledge of military equality between distributors of power that realists see the only way of insuring peace.⁵¹

A valid point and threat to the EU's constellation is the belief among realists such as John J. Mearsheimer that extreme nationalism will once more gain substantial influence. In realism, as explained, states and nations are acting on their own accord. This is also an argument, which is used when discussing the possibility of extreme nationalism growing in force. The argument is that nations or nation states within the EU will find other nations threatening and will have to act upon that threat. The fear being that this act will be of a violent nature to protect national interest.⁵²

Critics of realism would say that the EU is in it self a great power on the international political scene, and that states have found a way to collaborate on a supra-national level, and have done so successfully since the II World War.⁵³ This is also why I have chosen not to use realism as a theoretical approach in this thesis, since it fails to provide solid arguments of the still continuing integration of the European Union. Furthermore I have not chosen to implement realistic approaches because it does not reflect the scope of this thesis. I do not as mentioned focus on specific power political technicalities in the possible accession of Turkey. In stead I focus on the soft power elements, because I believe this to be essential in the field of research behind EU and Turkey relations. That members of the EU willingly are letting go of sovereignty are arguably a puzzle for most realists. This might help explain why few, other than Mearsheimer, have tried to make use of the theory when trying to explain EU matters.

Steven J. Mock argues for a theoretical model in "Symbols of defeat in the Construction of National Identity" where he via empirical data demonstrates how "*the nation state can fill the function in the modern world that religion did in pre-modern times.*"⁵⁴ Thus remembering that there are countries and nations where religion or a "transcendent father figure" ensures order in society.⁵⁵ Mock is as mentioned also concerned with the formation of nations. With his model we are to understand how violence, despite being something we wish to expel from our society, becomes essential for the social order and establishment of nations.⁵⁶ Mock wants to show how nations have gathered after

⁵¹ Mearsheimer, J. John. »Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War.« *International Security*, vol. 15, No. 1, xxx. xxx 1990: (5-56) p. 11-19

⁵² »Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War.« *International Security*, vol. 15, No. 1, xxx. xxx 1990: (5-56) p. 20-21

⁵³ Swisa, Maja. »Future Stability in The European Union: Realism, Constructivism and institutionalism.« *Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on The European Union: Vol. 2011, Article 11*, xxx. xxx 2011: (125-134) p. 128

⁵⁴ Mock, J, Stevens. *Symbols of defeat in the Contracktion of National Identity*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. p. 51

⁵⁵ "*Symbols of defeat in the Contracktion of National Identity.*" New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. p. 71

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 62

religion or an all-ruling father figure is no longer present. He argues then that we through our shared memories of generative sacrifices can channel violence so that it will benefit society, thus the nation will function as a moral compass and be the law and justice of society.⁵⁷

I think it is an interesting theory, and I do arguably find his theory applicable on a more specific number of countries where it can be shown that religion through generations have played a consistently smaller part in the public sphere. In this thesis we are dealing with the entire European Union where religion is still very visible in the debate and public sphere, and we are also dealing with Turkey where it is arguably even more so.

3.2 Ethno-symbolism

The theory, I have chosen as a main support in the analysis, is Ethno-symbolism. In the scope of this thesis it will be used as described by Anthony D. Smith.⁵⁸ The theory was written as a critical response to the theory of modernism, which focuses on the elite and how nations and collective identities are a creation of more present times. It was quite the distinguished academics Anthony D. Smith differed with; he was himself a former student of scholar Ernest Gellner and in the line of other great academics such as Elie Kedourie and Kenneth Minogue.⁵⁹ The modernists as Anthony D. Smith refers to, see the time of the French revolution in 1789 and the elites from revolutions such as the French, as founders of nations and nationalism.⁶⁰

Ethno-symbolism explains contrary to modernism the importance of cultural elements over time. For Anthony D. Smith it is essential that national and collective identities be related to past ethnic ties.⁶¹ Only through observation of how these elements evolve and continue to play a role over a long *longue durée* are we able to analyze social structures.⁶² Ethno-symbolism is first and foremost a theory of nation building and collective identity formation. It is not a static process but one where generations and nations change and develop through time. Thus an identity is a complex matter of past values, symbols and memories, that generation after generation will add to and contribute with own cultural elements.

John A. Armstrong introduced Smith to the idea of studying nations and nationalism over a long *longue durée*, which led to a further quest in researching how and why nations and identities form. A

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 70 - 73

⁵⁸ Özkirimli, Umut. *Theories of nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. p. 149

⁵⁹ "Theories of nationalism: A Critical Introduction." London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. p. 148

⁶⁰ Smith, D. Anthony. *Nationalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001. p. 45-47

⁶¹ "Nationalism." Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001. p. 58-59

⁶² Smith, D. Anthony. *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach*. New York: Routledge, 2009.

highly important matter for Smith was to discover the origins of nations, and through this to better understand nations and collective identities today.⁶³

As mentioned earlier identity formation is key to this thesis, in finding out why Turkey and the EU are struggling with finding enough common ground to make the membership a reality.

Smith gives us two types of patterns that can help outline the formation of nations, the “lateral” and the “vertical”.⁶⁴ The lateral being ethnic communities counting for the elites, explaining that a community was tied to their status as a superior class. The other being vertical, and the one I’m focusing on, forms nations through historical culture that unite despite classes, and where the elements of traditions and heritage plays a decisive role. Building and sustaining a nation, Smith explains, is very much linked to the persistence of the ethnic characters,⁶⁵ when set out from a vertical ethnic community and the route Smith calls “Vernacular mobilization” organized religion, myths, sacred texts and documents insured that the traditions of the community survived.⁶⁶ Smith defines a nation as follows:

*“A nation is named human population sharing a historic territory common myth and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members”*⁶⁷

In the following analysis chapter, I am using this approach to define the common ethnic characteristics of the EU on the one side and of Turkey on the other. This way, my aim is to examine whether EU and Turkey have a mutual ground or if they have differences that can help explain some of the difficulties in the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU.

Ethno-symbolism have like most other theories been presented with areas of critic. In “Symbols of defeat in the Construction of National Identity” by Steven J. Mock he criticizes Smith’s theory of Ethno-symbolism for being inaccurate. Smith argues for the persistence and authenticity in symbols, myths and values from the past. Mock on the other hand argues that it is difficult to find any such authenticity in the existing nations or ethnic communities becoming nations. He argues that new groups or generations always will find themselves in contrast to the past generations, trying to win over the ethnic identity.⁶⁸ Mock does agree with the importance of a community’s perception of authenticity specifically in symbols. In his opinion especially symbols of defeat are

⁶³ Özkirimli, Umut. *Theories of nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2010. p. 150

⁶⁴ “*Theories of nationalism: A Critical Introduction*.” London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2010 p. 151 - 152

⁶⁵ Smith, D. Anthony. *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach*. New York: Routledge, 2009. p. 21

⁶⁶ Özkirimli, Umut. *Theories of nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2010. p. 152 - 153

⁶⁷ “*Theories of nationalism: A Critical Introduction*.” London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2010. p. 148

⁶⁸ Mock, J, Stevens. *Symbols of defeat in the Contrucktion of National Identity*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. p. 28

easily accepted as authentic national signifiers.⁶⁹

3.3 Constructivism

According to realism, anarchy and power between states enables war, but more importantly maintains peace. Looking at another theory in the field of international relations, we find Constructivism. The idea of Constructivism and the theory's main purpose to demonstrate how elements of international relations are socially constructed was being noticed in the beginning of the 1990's. Alexander Wendt is recognised as the author behind the writings that put Constructivism and the sociological characters of this theory on the map.⁷⁰

In the analysis Constructivism is used primarily to examine the effects and constructs of social discourse and interaction, and to investigate the effects that social discourse and interaction can have on how identities develop. In the theory of Constructivism it is explained that collective identities can be build when power relations between countries are approached in a "non-egotistic" manner, without having aggressive national intentions at heart, but the ideal of peaceful collaboration.⁷¹

A main trait of Constructivism is explained, like realism, by how we in society always strive to maintain peace. In the Constructivist theory peace is ensured through social interaction, human's will to change, and not in the force or capacity of military power. These changes of norms and social practises occur as a result of history and how humans learn through social interaction and past events. Changes in societies are often a very slow process. In the European Union the social world, norms and values changed after the world wars because it was crucial for security.⁷²

4. Analysis and discussion

4.1 European Identity

The idea of a common European identity might for some seem unlikely, knowing the number of membership countries to be 28, some of them already dealing with several nations and identities trying to get along with one another. Nation is in this thesis understood as explained by Anthony D.

⁶⁹ "Symbols of defeat in the Contruction of National Identity." New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012 p. 50 - 51

⁷⁰ Copeland, c. Dale. »The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay .« *International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2*, xxx. xxx 2000: (pp. 187-212) p. 187

⁷¹ "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay ." *International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2*, xxx. xxx 2000: (pp. 187-212) p. 193

⁷² "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay ." p. 189-191

Smith, quoted in the theoretical chapter. In the following, I discuss the possibility of a shared European identity, especially when this identity is seen in the light of another identity in this case (the investigation of) a Turkish identity.

Whether or not a European identity exists has been argued many times. Some say it is a work in progress, whilst others are sceptic or simply disagree. Though I believe it important to always remain sceptic, put in other words: to be open to new arguments and theories, and to the idea that there is no absolute truth, I find that there are strong arguments pointing towards it being possible to speak of a common European identity.

Joining the discussion on identity, I find it important to initiate with a personal note, being that I believe identity is a matter of choice, context and culture. Individuals or groups do not necessarily only possess one identity, but are arguably able to have different identities alongside each other. It is a matter of choice in different settings and contexts: It can be argued that a specific group or individual might identify more with local culture, in the event or context of he or she finding themselves faced with new and different local traditions and values. Or if a European citizen were outside of Europe, the sense of belonging to a European identity might intensify.

In the literature review, I mention Zygmunt Bauman who shares his thoughts on European identity as reality, because of the willingness in the EU to pursue or always try to obtain the same basic values.⁷³ Scholars, who discuss and argue for a European identity, often mention values. As Smith writes, "*A nation is sharing of historical memories, public and mass culture*". This combined with Zygmunt Bauman's argument of the "essences" or "spirit" of Europe, explained as our European consciousness developed through time by our shared memories and events,⁷⁴ I see many reasons behind a European identity.

There is a definite sharing of public and mass culture in the EU. An example of this is the freedom of movement and services. Because of these freedoms, culture is exchanged and shared on a regular basis. Furthermore, all member countries have common legal rights and duties because of the EU's achievement of the joint democratic collaboration. Being willing to make sacrifices for the community or nation is a feature often mentioned in terms of describing how identities are formed. Loyalty and trust is argued as a key to create a strong bond and preservation of the feeling of kinship.

⁷³ Bauman, Zygmunt. *Europe: An Unfinished Adventure*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004. p. 125

⁷⁴ "Europe: An Unfinished Adventure." Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004. p. 6

The EU membership countries and European citizens have common memories, myths, symbols and future goals that arguably are a key to the formation or feeling of a common identity. Here, I want to emphasise common memories such as past catastrophic wars, especially World War II, which with its destructive and devastating result, led to the fellowship of war “never again” in Europe.⁷⁵ Symbols such as the European flag, a “national” anthem (“The European Anthem”), and arguably the Euro have still not proven as effective or unifying as some pro-European integrationist had hoped for, but the effect of especially the Euro have arguably created a closer bond or feeling of cohesion between the European citizens.⁷⁶

This development or creation of European identity can be seen as a result of Anthony D. Smith’s theory of ethno-symbolism and the constant development and changes in nations and identities through time with generation after generation having contributed and fought against competing identities. Keeping in mind that there are still many different cultures, values and norms within the EU, the development through time has arguably united through values, which the majority in Europe share and believe in, such as individual freedom, human rights and democracy.⁷⁷

Who are we? Who are we against? How is identity defined? As the second of the three questions imply, it is often defined through comparing one self or the group to “the other”, not much else can gather a human population like a common enemy can. The interesting question is if this image of a potential enemy or threat to the nation is sometimes exaggerated, or if it stems from prejudice build over a long period of time.

A lot of dispute exists over the issue of religion in the discourse concerning a common European identity. For those who believe that the unifying aspects of the EU lie in the secular and democratic values, religion has little importance. Others believe that religion, in particular Christianity, is a corner stone of the EU and an important value, as they see religion as a source of traditions and values in many European societies. The question of religion has been and is still creating heated debates. The discussion of secular vs. Christian as a foundation for the EU is sensitive and full of conflicts. In the light of Ethno-symbolism and the theory’s core of ethnicities persisting and developing through time if important enough for the particular nation, it is argued in this thesis that Christianity is one of the ethnic myths and traditions that has prevailed. The meaning and argued importance has changed as generations have contributed their thoughts and ideas on the matter, and the religion has adapted to the secular principals of European society. The values of secularization

⁷⁵ Gurria, Angel. *OECD*. 10. December, 2012, accessed 05. November 2013, <http://www.oecd.org/eu/nobelpeaceprizeceremonyattheoecd.htm>

⁷⁶ European Union. *European Union*. accessed 04. January 2014, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/index_en.htm

⁷⁷ Bauman, Zygmunt. *Europe: An Unfinished Adventure*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004. p. 126-129

are for many the corner stones of the European Union, and because of Europe's brutal history caused by religious meddling in political matters, secularization was a path of reason, tolerance and individuality.

4.2 Turkish Identity

With this section, my aim is to outline and explain the development of national identity in Turkey, using Anthony D. Smith's theory of identity formation. My purpose is to indicate whether or not the current identity is building on ethnic features such as symbols, myth, culture and values. This is provided with the same intentions as the above-mentioned section on European identity to ensure the reader with a substantial contextual understanding and to support the following analysis.

The Ottoman Empire officially came to an end when the Lausanne-treaty was signed in July 1923. The signing of this treaty marked the end of a Turkish sultanate leading a multi-national empire and the beginning of an independent Turkish nation and republic.⁷⁸ During World War I the Ottoman Empire was defeated and enemies succeeded in conquering large areas of the Empire, but the geographical land we know, as Turkey today was successfully kept safe by General Kemal Atatürk, who more than anything wanted to create a homogeneous Turkish nation. The methods and ways of achieving this nation of Turks led to violent and aggressive repressions of minorities.⁷⁹ Despite the majority of the Turkish people being religious with Islam as the main religion, Atatürk firmly believed that religion was to blame for the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and, inspired by the French revolution, that a modern nation and society had to be build on secular principals. Because his inspiration especially came from the French revolution, Atatürk's idea of a secular state was total separation of state and church.⁸⁰ He closed the Caliphate in 1924, and in 1928 he eliminated all influence Islam had on any state business. This very though secular ideology, known as the Kemalist ideology, was written into the Turkish constitution a year before his death in 1937.⁸¹ The ideology still creates heated debate among Turkish citizens, especially among the secular Turkish elite, constantly debating how strict the separation of church and state has to be in present day Turkey.

The current cultural, social and political situation is quite different from when Atatürk was in power. The form of government is now a parliamentary democracy, lead by Recep Tayip Erdogan

⁷⁸ Sørensen, møller Jesper, and Erik Boel. *Tyrkiet - på vej gennem EU's nåleøje*. Viborg: Gyldendal, 2005. p. 26

⁷⁹ "Tyrkiet - på vej gennem EU's nåleøje." Viborg: Gyldendal, 2005. p. 33

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 28-29

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 32

and his Party, AKP, which has Islamic roots, though the party deny being Islamic-oriented.⁸² Erdogan has been prime minister in Turkey since AKP's big win general elections in 2002, and it is argued that visibility of religion has been growing in the Turkish public sphere under his leadership. This has been welcomed by the majority of the Turkish population, who despite continuing to treasure Atatürk, arguably identify themselves with their cultural heritage such as religious myths and traditions. The more secularly orientated part of Turks is more concerned with this development since some believe that religion is a threat to the nation, and that straying away from the strict separation of religion and state could lead to Turkey once more becoming a multi-cultural nation, such as in the time of the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkish military have more than once forcefully removed democratically elected governments that threatened the principals of Atatürk's vision for the nation. They are seen and see them selves as the protectors of the Kemalist ideology.⁸³ In order to meet the criteria for membership asked by the EU, the power of the military has been diminished. The cultural and historical development of the Turkish nation have arguably contributed to the formation of a Turkish collective identity with democratic norms as foundation, as well as an identity with strong ties to its history of cultural and ethnic roots such as religious traditions, myths and values. The latter development continuing to establish it self and become more and more visible in Turkish society.

Omer Taspinar argued at the lecture he held in Copenhagen that there was a need for change among the Turkish citizens, one of the reasons being that Kemalists are unable to provide stability and visibility in society.

The reforms and changes made in Turkey were truly kicked off in the hope of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria; this process arguably affected the political as well as the cultural world in Turkey.⁸⁴ I mentioned the spill-over effect in the literature review, and I argue that from the time Turkey received status as candidate country, a politically and cultural spill-over process was also initiated. It is my personal opinion that this process has been rewarding to both the EU and Turkey, in terms of a closer relation both politically and culturally. An example of the democratic improvements in Turkey is the enhanced protection or focus on minorities.⁸⁵ The main reason the EU was established in the first place, was to insure close ties between countries and nations in order to avoid war.

⁸² Ibid., p. 312-313

⁸³ Grigoriadis, N. Ioannis. *Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and The European Union*. New York : Palgrave Macmillian, 2009. p. 70-75

⁸⁴ "Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and The European Union." New York : Palgrave Macmillian, 2009. p. 155-156

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 137-138

Through this investigation of the Turkish identity I want to find or examine any differences when compared to the proposed collective European identity in the analysis.

4.3 Discussion of the identities

Looking at Turkish identity today, I would argue that the development or formation can be explained or at least has to do with the country's history and of the way secularism, liberalism and democracy were enforced on the Turkish population. The large Islamic population in Turkey eventually had to oppose the centralizing policies and created an identity around protecting their right to practice their religion alongside the political republic. The European identity also builds on secular and democratic values, but compared to Turkey these were enforced from the bottom up through revolutions instead of top-down like in Turkey. Despite this difference the European identity is still associated with and arguably has a strong bond to the Christian traditions and historical memories. The need for or unwillingness to give up on the Islamic or Christian cultural identity could indicate that nations, looking at it from the ethno-symbolisms prospective, are bound and closely connected to their important historical, cultural and ethnical roots.

In the interview questions I asked Daniella Kuzmanovic for her opinion on main issues behind EU's hesitation to accept Turkey into the EU. I would like to pay attention to the following quote:

“One (issue), as has particularly been the case with France under Sarkozy but which is a current in most EU member states particularly among right-wing, nationalist parties, has to do with a notion of Turkey as not European or not European enough for cultural as well as religious reasons. This is what I would call the value argument.”⁸⁶

The difficulties or differences in the ethnic and historical past of Turkey and the EU arguably are an issue when it comes to the possible accession. As Daniella Kuzmanovic says, there is a doubt if Turkey is “European enough”.

I have mentioned that an important aspect of identity formation is common historical memories. In “Identitet og identitetspolitik” Uffe Østergård argues that Turkey and the EU do have a common history and common memories, but compared to the memories shared in Europe that brought togetherness, the memories shared between Turkey and the EU have arguably become more of a symbol of the “other”.⁸⁷ This heritage or past, looking at the discussion so far, is still to this day affecting opinion among Europeans.

⁸⁶ Kuzmanovic, Daniella, interviewer Maria Romme. *Expert interview*. 13. November 2013.

⁸⁷ Østergård, Uffe. *Europa: Identitet og Identitetspolitik*. Viborg: Munksgaard/Rosinante, 1998. p. 144-145

I would like to focus on another quote from Daniella Kuzmanovic, because she also touches upon the differences that affect the opinion of Turkey in the EU. Besides the historical past, she emphasise that the possible and important bridge between the two will be difficult to achieve because of the religious and cultural differences being used as a hindrance.

“The muslimness of Turkey is here used to create one kind of unbridgeable difference between Turkey and Europe, just as the lack of democracy, rights, and rule of law is highlighted as a sign of Turkey’s inability to develop what these actors perceive as inherent European values. In the eyes of proponents of such argument should Turkey become member it would challenge the whole notion of a European common community.”⁸⁸

4.4 Analysis of the speeches

4.4.1 State of the Union 2013

Topics: Semantic macrostructures

I begin the Critical Discourse Analysis by summarizing the text; this is accomplished by listing important topics from the text. The aim for this is to find the semantic macrostructures, which are derived from the local structures of meaning. As explained in the chapter concerning method the topics embody the most important information of a discourse and represent what the discourse is about. They define what speakers, organizations and groups orient towards. They are often expressed in titles, headlines, summaries, abstracts, thematic sentences and conclusions.

In Barroso’s “State of the Union address 2013” on September 11, 2013, the title does not express any topics, but it does express the self-categorization of the text genre: It is an address about the state that the EU is currently in.

I have chosen the following topics summarizing the macropropositions:

- M1 The upcoming European Parliament elections give EU-politicians a responsibility to defend and explain the actions of the EU to the citizens.
- M2 The financial crisis erupted in spite of the EU collaboration, not because of it.
- M3 At this point in time after the crisis, EU is doing better than expected
- M4 Because the member states stood together, the crisis strengthened the collaboration

⁸⁸ Kuzmanovic, Daniella, interviewer Maria Romme. *Expert interview*. 13. November 2013.

- M5 Citizens of the EU member states do not know the facts about the EU's positive role in solving the problems, because EU politicians do not allow themselves to be proud of it, and because the public debate is polluted by myths, populism, and extremism.
- M6 The biggest risk is if politicians show lack of commitment to stability and reforms
- M7 The idea of Europe needs to go far beyond the economy. It is about values and standards which only the EU level can protect to promote citizens individual rights such as consumer protection, labour rights, women's rights, respect for minorities among many others.
- M8 The enlargement has been a success in healing history's deep scars and establishing democracies.
- M9 EU cannot turn its back on countries like Ukraine (countries in the Eastern Partnership) which are seeking closer ties to the European Union, no matter the attempts to limit these countries of their sovereign choices.
- M10 It is only because they were offered the possibility of EU membership that Serbia and Kosovo have come to an agreement.
- M11 The EU was made to safeguard its values such as the rule of law, from the inception to the latest chapters in enlargement.

In a further reduction I summarize these macropropositions to an overall macroproposition (topic): In upcoming EU elections, EU politicians must clarify to the unknowing voters that the EU is not causing the economical problems, but solving them, and that the ongoing EU enlargement is about ensuring peace by establishing democracy and safeguarding democratic values like rule of law.

Local meanings

In this section I analyze local meanings with focus on the meaning of the words in the text. Knowing the limitation of pages and in order to probably investigate the scope of this thesis, a more specific analysis of a few carefully selected local meanings is in focus.

At this local semantic level, I examine the use of the words "*Europe*" and "*European*" which has implications that express the ideological perspective of the author/speaker, Barroso. From the beginning of the text, it becomes clear that Barroso is not only using "*Europe*" as a name for the continent and not only using "*European*" about citizens of the ethnic groups in Europe.

In the very first sentence after the initial greetings, "*Europe*" is used in a way, which can be seen as a synonym of the EU. Hence talking about the upcoming elections for the European Parliament,

Barroso says that “...voters across Europe will...”.⁸⁹ In the following sentences, he talks about “Europe” as something that has been present in the lives of citizens and discussed in talk shows.

In the following paragraph, he presents a theme for the address: His “*main ideas for a truly European political debate ahead of next year’s elections*”.⁹⁰ The fact that he talks about a “truly European” debate implies that “European” might be an ideological concept to him.

This is emphasized even more when he says: “...our European model strengthens the trust of the citizens...”⁹¹

In the speech, Barroso quickly starts associating “Europe” with the words “we” and “together”. This further implies that he is using “Europe” as a synonym for the EU or the EU member states. It becomes even more evident when he says “together, as the European Union, we can...”⁹²

Later he says: “Now is the time for all of those who care about Europe, whatever their political or ideological position, (...) to speak up for Europe”.⁹³ This implies that he is not only talking about Europe as a synonym for the EU, but as something you can care for and speak up for.

That “Europe” and “European” is also established as an ideological concept in the mental model is argued through two paragraphs in which Barroso talks about “our idea of Europe” and “The European ideal”.⁹⁴ He explicitly outlines this in the following sentences in which he underlines that it “is about values” and that it is about believing in “political, social and economic standards” which are grounding in “our social market economy”.

“Europe and “European” is throughout the speech associated with positive words which shows a form of positive self-presentation. As an example, it is mentioned that Serbia and Kosovo have come to an agreement “only because they were offered a European perspective”.⁹⁵ In the following sentence a Nobel Prize winner is quoted saying that “Europe is a project of peace”. And later,

⁸⁹ Barroso, Manuel, José. 11. September, 2013, accessed 02. November 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-684_en.htm p. 2

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 2

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 5

⁹² Ibid., p. 3

⁹³ Ibid., p. 3

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 8

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 8

“European” is associated with “*responsibility*” and “*solidarity*” – both of which are concepts related to prevailing ideologies in most European countries.

Using “*Europe*” and “*European*” instead of “*EU*” might influence the mental model of the recipients being constructed here. It is implied that the ideological concept which it is associated with, is not only a product of compromises between politicians, but values which is firmly anchored in a common culture shared among the nations of the continent. And that the EU therefore can speak with one voice on behalf of a united people: “*In Europe, we believe...*”.⁹⁶

Another expression that emphasizes the ideological or common heritage of “*Europe*” is indicated when Barroso says “*Surely you all know Justus Lipsius*”.⁹⁷ Referring to him because he was an influential scholar and has given name to the Council building in Brussels, it indicates a symbol of our shared history and common values such as rationality and reason.

The choice of the concept of “*Europe*” and “*European*” influences other local meanings in the rest of the text. This is emphasized by the lexical selection of words when referring to opponents of the ideological concept of Europe presented in this speech. “*Let me say this to all those who rejoice in Europe's difficulties and who want to roll back our integration and go back to isolation: the pre-integrated Europe of the divisions, the war, the trenches, is not what people desire and deserve.*”⁹⁸

The first part implies the ideological presupposition that difficulties of some (Europe, meaning the EU) are the cause for rejoicing among its opponents. In other words, whilst Europe is a project for common good – a premise outlined in the previous paragraphs – opponents are finding joy in other people’s misery. This polarization of the mental model is further enforced when Barroso associates rolling back the EU integration with negative words like “*isolation*” and “*war*”. This way he defines the aim of opponents of EU integration in negative terms, and at the same time implies the ideological presupposition that the only alternative to the EU is going back to the time of war in Europe.

The local meaning thus implies a contrast between the moral of the proponents and of the opponents of the EU, which indicate a form of negative other presentation. Arguably this polarizes the mental model of the recipients in the sense that while the intentions of the EU and of its proponents are for the common good, the intentions of its opponents are bad.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 9

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 7

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 9

Throughout the text many expressions also have the ideological presupposition that national interests are standing in the way of common success for Europe. As an example, it is outlined that “*real progress for Europe*” can only be achieved if countries “*rise above purely national issues*”.⁹⁹ Finally, among many other local meanings of this text, I mention the importance of what is being left out in the text. In talking about the enlargement and positive consequences of it, Barroso only mentions some countries – namely Serbia and “*countries like Ukraine*”.¹⁰⁰

The expression “*countries like Ukraine*” is in the same paragraph associated with the “*Eastern Partnership*” which is a partnership between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and the EU.

This means that candidate countries like Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey are omitted in the text. Talking about omission is only relevant in a discourse when it can be shown that the omitted information is part of the mental model. One could argue that it is striking that an explicit reference to Turkey is left out in the text, because several topics of the speech seem to relate directly to developments in the Turkish accession process, some of which was happening just prior to the address.

Issues, which particularly could imply an implicit relation to the Turkish accession process are Barroso’s descriptions of the values which EU is protecting by requiring a country to “*establish democracies*” if it wants to be taken in to consideration as a possible EU member. Furthermore when he says, “*Safeguarding its values, such as the rule of law, is what the European Union was made to do, from its inception to the latest chapters in enlargement.*”¹⁰¹ The emphasis of the specific value “rule of law” can also be referred to problems in member states like the Roma crisis in France in the summer of 2010, the Hungarian crisis that started at the end of 2011; or the Romanian rule of law crisis in the summer of 2012. But in this case, Barroso is emphasizing rule of law in the context of enlargement, and considering the date of the speech it seems strikingly relevant to the events in Turkey. Two months prior to Barroso’s address, the EU strongly criticized problems concerning rule of law in Turkey in relation to the Turkish government’s crackdown on protesters in Gezi Park in Istanbul. Just one month after the address, the EU published a progress report about Turkey’s accession in which the government’s reaction to the protests and the lack of judicial response to claimed police brutality are mentioned as a crucial problem in the first chapter: “*Democracy and the rule of law*”.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 3

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 8

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 10

4.4.2 AKP group meeting

Topics: Semantic macrostructures

Like the previous analysis of Barroso's speech, I begin by summarizing the text, listing important topics to find the semantic macrostructures, derived from local structures of meaning.

In Erdogan's "AK Party Group Meeting" speech on June 25, 2013, the title does not express topics or categorization of the text genre. It does though express the setting or context, namely the party group meeting.

I have chosen following topics summarizing the macropropositions:

M1 The politics of the AKP are helping Turkey by providing better education and enhancing Turkey's international reputation.

M2 The organizers behind recent protests have been searching for outside support because they knew that the Turkish people, who are now showing support for the AKP government at its rallies, wouldn't fall for their disinformation about the AKP

M3 Some protesters are sincere in their aim to protect trees, but others are insincere because they demand that the AKP government must step down which is against the will of the nation.

M4 The AKP government has always listened to all groups in society and all 76 million citizens of Turkey, but it will fight those who go against the will of the nation.

M5 Protests are attempts to weaken the new, powerful Turkey that has been created by 10.5 years of AKP government, because the opposition parties can't win by using democratic means and want to disguise their responsibility for wrongdoings against groups of its own electorate.

M6 Like protests in Brazil, the current protests in Turkey have been started by the foreign interest rate lobby which is unhappy that the new economic stability has caused the Turkish interest rate to drop.

M7 The AKP government is solving all problems within the boundaries of democracy and rule of law, while the protesters have illegally tried a military coup.

M8 By being part of the conspiracy against the AKP government and thereby Turkey, international media have contributed in making violent protesters look peaceful and make the police look like it was using excessive force against them.

- M9 Gezi Park had to be cleared of protesters because the park belongs to our people.
- M10 The protesters have insulted the AKP electorate with accusations of voting fraud and also insulted sacred Islamic values.
- M11 Unnatural connections between the CHP and European countries show that they are collaborating in starting conflicts in Turkey.
- M12 Investments leaving Turkey only do so because of global tendencies, not because of the protests or the government.

I make a further reduction by summarizing the above-mentioned macropropositions with the following overall macroproposition (topic):

Recent protests against the AKP government do not have the support of the Turkish people, but are organized by an international conspiracy to destroy the progress Turkey has made in the last 10 years. This is done by luring the world into believing that the AKP government is using undemocratic means against peaceful protesters when it is in fact enforcing the will of the nation upon violent protesters.

Local meanings

I begin by examining the use of the expressions “*will of nation*” and “*the nation’s will*” which have implications that express the ideological perspective of the author/speaker, Erdogan.

The first time these expressions are used in the text, is in mentioning that the AKP is organizing rallies called “*Respect for Will of Nation*”.¹⁰²

The use of this expression as part of a rally title and maybe even as a party slogan strongly implies a form of positive self-presentation – understood as the AKP respecting what the nation wants.

Furthermore this also implies the proposition that people who criticize the AKP do not have respect for the nation’s will – here seen in the form of negative other presentation. The use of the expression as part of a title or slogan implies an effort to create a mental model of the recipients, which far exceeds this speech.

From here on, Erdogan uses the expression “*will of the nation*” not as a title or a slogan, but as a concept, which he constantly associates with the actions of the AKP. The actions of his government are hereby defined in positive terms, implying a form of legal and moral right.

¹⁰² Erdogan, Tayyip, Recep. *Justice and Development Party*. 25. June, 2013, accessed 03. November 2013 <http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/haberler/ak-party-group-meeting-june-25-2013/50464> p. 2

“Among the protestors there are some who aim to attack the government and the will of nation rather than using their democratic rights for innocent and righteous demands.”¹⁰³

This sentence also expresses the ideological presupposition that attacking the government and thereby the will of nation is the opposite of using democratic rights for righteous demands.

It is also worth noting that some of the lexical choices here create polarization between the government and the protestors. Among many examples are the use of the word “*attack*” which associates the protestors with brutality and lack of democratic legitimacy.

This is also emphasized two paragraphs prior to this, when Erdogan associates the protestors with violence and his own government with democracy and law.

“Violence, tension, and conflict would definitely not help in solving the problems. We will solve our problems by talking and within the confines of democracy and law.”¹⁰⁴

Erdogan is omitting the fact that both the EU and human rights organizations like Amnesty International strongly criticized his government for using violent force against what started as peaceful protest.

Later in the same paragraph, Erdogan continues associating AKP with the will of the nation:

“As long as we have our people’s support, we would never back down from serving our people and representing the will of nation.”¹⁰⁵

This sentence expresses the presupposition that the AKP has the people’s support – a premise that is explicitly established in the beginning of the text when Erdogan states that, “*last week we received the intense affection of the people*”.¹⁰⁶

By expressing a promise to never back down from representing the will of nation, the sentence also has a presupposition that the AKP is in fact representing the will of nation now.

Relevant to the analysis of “*will of nation*” is the repeated use of the phrase “*our people*” throughout the speech. Talking about the “*Respect for will of nation*”-rallies, uses the expression “*our people*” about citizens who are supporting the AKP:

“All these rallies have reflected very clearly how our people react to the recent protests and acts of violence in Turkey. Our people patiently watched those protests but that same wisdom also enabled them to see the big picture.”¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 3

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 3

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 3

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 1

At this point it is unclear if “*our people*” refers to the Turkish nation as a whole or only to Erdogan’s own supporters. One could easily come to the conclusion that he is referring to the nation as a whole, but that would be a mistake due to the fact that Erdogan is omitting to mention that millions of Turkish citizens participated in the protests and many more expressed agreement with their criticism.

This omission is further clarified looking at the first part of the speech where Erdogan notes that the People’s Republican Party, the CHP, has been organizing and provoking the protests. The CHP received 26 percent of the votes at the 2011 general election, thereby representing more than 11 million Turkish voters.¹⁰⁸ Therefore, when Erdogan is talking about “*our people*” in these sentences, and omits to mention that this is his supporters and not the nation as a whole, he is constructing a mental model for the recipients in which it seems as if he is acting on behalf of almost every Turkish citizen against a small group of evildoers.

Further on in the speech, Erdogan associates both “*our people*” and “*the will of nation*” with the government and specific values.

*“They (the protesters) insulted our sacred values such as headscarf, mosques, and flag. We cannot tolerate such behavior. So when the election time comes our people will reveal their judgment on these vandals and looters for what they tried to do to the will of nation”*¹⁰⁹

In these sentences, Erdogan explicitly refers to headscarf, mosques, and flag as “our sacred values”. The lexical choice of the word “*sacred*” implies that these values are part of a domain, which must not be questioned or criticized. In labeling these values as “*sacred*”, it is implied that they are anchored in a common culture. This is one of many examples implying that Erdogan has adopted an ideology that does not allow even large minority groups in society to express, to criticize or demonstrate against values or opinions of the majority.

When Erdogan talks of judgment for what the protesters tried to do to the will of the nation, it shows that he is setting up the specific mental model in this speech based on this general ideology. Using hyperboles like “*vandals*” and “*looters*” about the protesters, Erdogan further implements the conceptual polarization between legitimate government and illegitimate protesters mentioned earlier.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 2

¹⁰⁸ osce. »osce.« www.osce.org/odihr/84588. 31. October, 2011, accessed 10. January 2014, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/84588>

¹⁰⁹ Erdogan, Tayyip, Recep. *Justice and Development Party*. 25. June, 2013, accessed 03. November 2013 <http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/haberler/ak-party-group-meeting-june-25-2013/50464> p. 4

At the end of the speech, it is emphasized that Erdogan is creating a mental model based on the before mentioned general ideology that minorities must not criticize the will of the majority. In the beginning of the paragraph below he expresses support for a version of democracy, which is the prevailing ideal of modern, Western European countries:

*“We have always been the Government of our entire 76 million citizens even though we have only received 50 percent of the votes (...) It is important to note that we are building a Turkey where our differences make us richer and stronger and everyone’s lifestyle is well respected. We have never discriminated among our citizens..”*¹¹⁰

But in the end of that same paragraph another sentence is important to mention because it can be seen as a firm contradiction of this ideal:

“We will face those who attacked our nation’s will, democracy, and economy in the next elections.”

On one hand, Erdogan reassures the recipients that his government is respecting the other 50 percent of the voters who do not vote for his party. Immediately thereafter he says that his party will “face those who attacked our nation’s will” – meaning the millions of protesters who is most likely among the 50 percent not voting for AKP.

Finally, I examine the local meanings and their effects in the parts of the speech where Erdogan implies or explicitly say that an international conspiracy is behind the protest. The first time he implies this is when mentioning protests in Brazil:

*“I think the protests in Brazil have also been started by foreign perpetrators since Brazil has just paid off its debt to IMF just like we did. We said it was the interest rate lobby from the beginning that was unhappy for the headway we have made in economy.”*¹¹¹

By using the expression “also” in the first sentence, he expresses the ideological presupposition that a foreign interest rate lobby started the protests in Turkey. This notion, that an international conspiracy is at play, becomes explicit later in the speech when Erdogan addresses the role of European countries, exchanging letters with the chairman of the Turkish opposition party CHP:

*“They are collaborating for starting a sectarian conflict in Turkey and this exchange of letters could not be a coincidence”,*¹¹² Erdogan says and continues by talking about “unnatural connections”.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 5

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 5

¹¹² Ibid., p. 4

The lexical selection of expressions in these past three quotes, like “*perpetuators*” implies the formation of a biased model of events where the actors who are opponents of “*our people*” and “*will of nation*” is not only bad, but also portrayed as criminals. The use of expressions like “*not a coincidence*”, and “*unnatural connections*” emphasizes the overall polarization of the conceptual structure of the text where the actions of his opponents are described as covert and dishonest.

At the same time it implies that forces outside of Turkey – European countries, international media, and a foreign interest rate lobby all explicitly mentioned – is secretly and dishonestly seeking to go against the will of the Turkish nation by manipulating with facts and trying to provoke people to protest.

Erdogan then mentions that a Turkish representative of an international media company tweeted and asked people to stop consuming to make the Turkish economy suffer in order to force the Government to listen them. To this Erdogan rhetorically asks:

*“How could someone betray his own country like this?”*¹¹³

This sentence has the ideological presupposition that it is downright treason if a Turkish person encourages his fellow countrymen to try to force the government to listen. This shows not only the ideological proposition that minorities should not criticize the majority, but also implies that Erdogan might see it as an un-Turkish action to criticize the majority or to encourage acts such as the mentioned consumer protests. An action that might even go against his ideological model of Turkish values.

4.5 Discussion

In the following I discuss the results from the analysis of the two speeches. This discussion is furthermore arguments for or against the scope of this thesis based on earlier findings and the theory of Constructivism, as mentioned in the theoretical chapter.

In the two speeches both speakers are constructing mental models for the recipients, though available to the public, in both cases the main recipients are politicians. This is important to note because both speeches are held in front of publicly elected politicians, all capable of directly affective change. The results of the analysis show that both texts emphasise and connect common or shared values to positive notions, in a positive self-presentation being part of the mental models constructed for the recipients. They are arguably thereby able to affect opinion and attitudes.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 5

Barroso constructs an image of the other by mentioning opponents of the EU. Based on the constructivist theory, this construction of the other through social discourse is important in forming a collective identity. As mentioned, Constructivism imply that collective identity is build around those who have a non-egotistic approach, and are arguably set aside from those with aggressive self-interest in terms of international relations.¹¹⁴ Then looking at the analysis of Erdogans speech there is clear indication that he is expressing a quite aggressive national self and arguably an unwillingness to look beyond “*the will of the nation*”. There are several occasions in the speech, as shown, where Erdogan positively enhances Turkeys situation and show little or no understanding for the protestors. “*everything was going great in Turkey. So what is there to protest really?*”¹¹⁵ This indicates an unwillingness to look beyond the wants of the Turkish nation as Erdogan and his Party AKP have constructed it.

The omission of positive expressions about Turkey in Barroso’ speech or about the EU in Erdogan’s speech could be seen as an indication of difficulties in the accession process. In Erdogan’s speech there is no indication or effort in a reconciliation following the events and protests. This could suggest a shift in attitude and that the wish to join the EU is steadily decreasing for the current government with Erdogan in charge. This is also emphasised in the fact Erdogan is omitting to mention or comment on the international criticism, concerning the acts and comments against the protests and protestors.

The omission of Turkey in the State of the Union speech could suggest implicit distinction between “us” being the EU and Turkey not being a part of this “us”. This could indicate that Barroso in a very implicit way is communicating that Turkey is not yet ready to become part of the European identity. Here we can once more focus on the construction of collective identity, suggesting that the EU still sees Turkey as having an aggressive self-interest approach to international relations. Put into other words by Daniella Kuzmanovic in the following quote:

*“A bigger EU could more easily disintegrate and it will be more difficult to create unity among its members on the various issues pertaining to the EU – this is difficult enough as it is now!”*¹¹⁶

The fact that Erdogan very proudly speaks of the “intense support of his people” - understood in this thesis as the people who voted for him, and arguably excluding those who did not - is a clear difference between the EU and Turkey. Where the EU, through its social discourse, emphasizes the

¹¹⁴ Copeland, c. Dale. »The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay .« *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 2, xxx. xxx 2000: (pp. 187-212) p. 193

¹¹⁵ Erdogan, Tayyip, Recep. *Justice and Development Party*. 25. June, 2013, accessed 03. November 2013 <http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/haberler/ak-party-group-meeting-june-25-2013/50464> p. 4

¹¹⁶ Kuzmanovic, Daniella, interviewer Maria Romme. *Expert interview*. 13. November 2013.

protection of each individual through the rule of law, Erdogan is arguably using the analyzed discourse to protect the will of the nation, which as we have shown in the analysis means the will of his own government and the people who support it.

In the previous discussion on identities it is suggested that the Turkish and the European identity, analysed through ethno-symbolism, have anchored connections to different cultural roots and histories. Following this line of thought I want to discuss other differences found in the analysis of the speeches. In the theory of Constructivism the role of shared ideas is an ideational structure constraining and shaping behaviour in a society.¹¹⁷ In the analysis of the two speeches I have found results that indicate a social discourse containing different expressions of socially shared ideas. An example of this difference is the way Erdogan uses the word democracy, and the way he continues to do so in the speech. With the results of the CDA analysis this use of democracy can be criticized as a “tyranny of the majority”. This is actually an accusation that has been made in several articles relating to how Erdogan is exercising his power as Prime Minister.¹¹⁸ So even though there have been improvements in the protection of minorities in Turkey, these results are suggested to be in stark contrast to the view on democracy that is prevailing in the EU, including individual rights and consideration for minorities which are main ideas and shared values portrayed in Barroso’s speech. I asked Professor Omer Taspinar what he believed to be reasons behind EU prolonging the accession process with Turkey. The following answer is inline with the above-mentioned suggestions that there is a significant difference in culture and identity between Turkey and the EU. *“For the European right the main problem is Turkey's Islamic character. For the centrists it is Turkey's size and the fear of immigration and unemployment in Europe. For the left it is the fact that Turkey is not democratic and liberal enough.”*¹¹⁹

To further the discussion on found differences between Turkey and the EU in the speeches and to emphasize the first line of Omer Taspinar’s quote, I argue that there is a difference shown in the texts in terms of religious traditions.

Even though I earlier argued that some common traditions and myths in Europe stem from a Christian heritage, this religious heritage take up little space in political discourse. Barroso does not

¹¹⁷ Copeland, c. Dale. »The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay.« *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 2, xxx. xxx 2000: (pp. 187-212) p. 189

¹¹⁸ The economist. »The economist.« *The economist*. 8. June, 2013, accessed 12. December 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21579004-recep-tayyip-erdogan-should-heed-turkeys-street-protesters-not-dismiss-them-democrat-or-sultan>

¹¹⁹ Taspinar, Omer, interviewer Maria Romme. *Expert interview*. 11. November 2013.

express any religious words or comments; he does on the other hand mention a symbol of the democratic cultural heritage of the EU. The mentioned “Justus Lipsius”, now the name of the council building in Brussels, the capital of political affairs in the EU, and an influential humanist from the 16th century. This symbol indicates close ties to the historical development of democracy and the rule of law in the EU. With this I argue that there is an issue in how Erdogan uses traditional and “*sacred*” values such as the headscarf and mosques, as part of a political speech on democracy. Furthermore it is arguably a problematic difference because there is a separation of religion and state in the EU, and even though the current Turkish society is also build on secular principals, I have suggested that there are signs of a different perspective on how much religion is a part of the agenda.

Omer Taspinar develops this in following quote: “*Islamophobia, the backlash against multiculturalism, the gender equality question are all relevant in the eyes of many Europeans.*”¹²⁰

It is neither a personal opinion nor do I find it positive or productive for our societies, but the results are arguably indicating that these differences prevent the integration of Turkey into the EU.

5. Conclusion

The collective memories of aggressive national interest that led to the World Wars, created important and prevailing values in Europe. It has been proved that by surrendering parts of ones national sovereignty in exchange for a “friendly” political and supranational collaboration peace can be a gathering goal and preserved.

This thesis has investigated why the EU has yet to recognize Turkey as a nation-state also willing to put aside self-interest in order to assure peace despite of differences.

It is argued through the analysis and discussion of identities and culture that specific obstacles are still to overcome if Turkey is to become part of the EU. Zygmunt Bauman argues that the collective identity in Europe is built on the constant pursuit of shared basic values, such as democracy, rationality and justice. The findings of this analysis indicate that Turkey, still after all these years, will have difficulties adapting to this identity, suggesting that Turkey and the EU are in pursuit of different values.

The internal battles on culture both in Turkey and the EU have not contributed in furthering the accession process. The demonstrations in Turkey, of which Erdogan spoke in the speech analysed in the above, showed evidence of many differences, one of them argued in this paper as a possible

¹²⁰ Taspinar, Omer, interviewer Maria Romme. *Expert interview*. 11. November 2013.

different view on the meaning of democracy. The EU has been faced with internal discussions on the principals of the rule of law in the mentioned events where membership countries have been accused of disregarding some of the basic values constituting the collaboration. At the time of writing this conclusion, these conflicts are yet to be fully resolved, but one can hope that they are resolved with agreement and that this affects future conflicts of difference, maybe even the potential membership of Turkey.

The conclusion, now knowing how persisting ethnic features, collective memories, historical and cultural developments influence identities, is that the EU arguably still signifies Turkey as “the other”, as a nation with a different and competing culture. Turkey as a nation is still in development following Atatürk. The cultural roots and religious majority are arguably claiming their place in the Turkish society. It is seemingly not a first priority among many Turkish citizens to become a member of the EU, whether it is due to differences in culture or the dismissive behaviour of the EU. The findings in this thesis suggest that these are the reasons for Turkey’s long accession process. The implication of this is that no membership is currently in sight.

5.1 Prospects

It does look as if there is still a long wait before Turkey and the EU can open the last chapters in the accession process to membership. I want to stress that the mere process or the on-going accession talks, the efforts to achieve agreements through discussions and politics in a democratic atmosphere, is enabling or creating a rational and productive way for the two parties to preserve peace and insure growth. I would not want to see the accession process being put to a stop with the above-mentioned or other differences being at fault.

Traditions, values and memories are important in our lives, but they can also be the cause of prejudice. It is important to learn from the past and there are certainly values worth treasuring, but it should not prevent an open mind to those who appear different. It is apparel to be aware of how we portray the “other”. We must ensure that these images of the “other” are not only negative or even dangerous.

An obvious further study or future research on these findings, which could be interesting, is how we potentially solve the problems that come from the differences in our cultures and identities.

The hope is that the conversations, social interaction and the accession negotiations will continue between Turkey and the EU. This would arguably make the risk of dangerous disagreements less

likely to occur. And this would once again prove the mission set out by the EU from the very beginning.

"World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it."¹²¹

¹²¹ Union, European. *European Union*. xxx. xxx, 2014, accessed 10. January 2014, <http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/>

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7. Appendix

7.1 Appendix 1

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

José Manuel Durão Barroso

President of the European Commission

State of the Union address 2013

Check Against Delivery
Seul le texte prononcé fait foi
Es gilt das gesprochene Wort

European Parliament plenary session/Strasbourg
11 September 2013

Mr. President,
Presidency of the Council,
Honourable Members,
Ladies and gentlemen,

In 8 months' time, voters across Europe will judge what we have achieved together in the last 5 years.

In these 5 years, Europe has been more present in the lives of citizens than ever before. Europe has been discussed in the coffee houses and popular talk shows all over our continent.

Today, I want to look at what we have done together. At what we have yet to do. And I want to present what I believe are the main ideas for a truly European political debate ahead of next year's elections.

Honourable Members,

As we speak, exactly 5 years ago, the United States government took over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, bailed out AIG, and Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection.

These events triggered the global financial crisis. It evolved into an unprecedented economic crisis. And it became a social crisis with dramatic consequences for many of our citizens. These events have aggravated the debt problem that still distresses our governments. They have led to an alarming increase in unemployment, especially amongst young people. And they are still holding back our households and our companies.

But Europe has fought back. In those 5 years, we have given a determined response. We suffered the crisis together. We realised we had to fight it together. And we did, and we are doing it.

If we look back and think about what we have done together to unite Europe throughout the crisis, I think it is fair to say that we would never have thought all of this possible 5 years ago.

We are fundamentally reforming the financial sector so that people's savings are safe.

We have improved the way governments work together, how they return to sound public finances and modernise their economies.

We have mobilised over 700 billion euro to pull crisis-struck countries back from the brink, the biggest effort ever in stabilisation between countries.

I still vividly remember my meeting last year with chief economists of many of our leading banks. Most of them were expecting Greece to leave the euro. All of them feared the disintegration of the euro area. Now, we can give a clear reply to those fears: no one has left or has been forced to leave the euro. This year, the European Union enlarged from 27 to 28 member states. Next year the euro area will grow from 17 to 18.

What matters now is what we make of this progress. *Do we talk it up, or talk it down? Do we draw confidence from it to pursue what we have started, or do we belittle the results of our efforts?*

Honourable members,

I just came back from the G20 in Saint Petersburg. I can tell you: this year, contrary to recent years, we Europeans did not receive any lessons from other parts of the world on how to address the crisis. We received appreciation and encouragement.

Not because the crisis is over, because it is not over. The resilience of our Union will continue to be tested. But what we are doing creates the confidence that we are overcoming the crisis – provided we are not complacent.

We are tackling our challenges together.

We have to tackle them together.

In our world of geo-economic and geopolitical tectonic changes, I believe that only together, as the European Union, we can give our citizens what they aspire: that our values, our interests, our prosperity are protected and promoted in the age of globalisation.

So now is the time to rise above purely national issues and parochial interests and to have real progress for Europe. To bring a truly European perspective to the debate with national constituencies.

Now is the time for all those who care about Europe, whatever their political or ideological position, wherever they come from, to speak up for Europe.

If we ourselves don't do it, we cannot expect others to do it either.

Honourable Members,

We have come a long way since the start of the crisis.

In last year's State of the Union speech, I stated that *'despite all [our] efforts, our responses have not yet convinced citizens, markets or our international partners'*.

One year on, the facts tell us that our efforts have started to convince. Overall spreads are coming down. The most vulnerable countries are paying less to borrow. Industrial output is increasing. Market trust is returning. Stock markets are performing well. The business outlook is steadily improving. Consumer confidence is sharply rising.

We see that the countries who are most vulnerable to the crisis and are now doing most to reform their economies, are starting to note positive results.

In Spain, as a signal of the very important reforms and increased competitiveness, exports of goods and services now make up 33% of GDP, more than ever since the introduction of the euro. Ireland has been able to draw money from capital markets since the summer of 2012, the economy is expected to grow for a third consecutive year in 2013 and Irish manufacturing companies are re-hiring staff.

In Portugal, the external current account, which was structurally negative, is now expected to be broadly balanced, and growth is picking up after many quarters in the red. Greece has completed, just in 3 years, a truly remarkable fiscal adjustment, is regaining competitiveness and is nearing for the first time in decades a primary surplus. And Cyprus, that has started the programme later, is also implementing it as scheduled, which is the pre-condition for a return to growth.

For Europe, recovery is within sight.

Of course, we need to be vigilant. *'One swallow does not make a summer, nor one fine day'*. Let us be realistic in the analysis. Let us not overestimate, but let's also not underestimate what has been done. Even one fine quarter doesn't mean we are out of the economic heavy

weather. But it does prove we are on the right track. On the basis of the figures and evolutions as we now see them, we have good reason to be confident.

This should push us to keep up our efforts. We owe it to those for whom the recovery is not yet within reach, to those who do not yet profit from positive developments. We owe it to our 26 million unemployed. Especially to the young people who are looking to us to give them hope. Hope and confidence are also part of the economic equation.

Honourable members,

If we are where we are today, it is because we have shown the resolve to adapt both our politics and our policies to the lessons drawn from the crisis.

And when I say 'we', I really mean: 'we': it has really been a joint effort.

At each and every step, you, the European Parliament, you have played a decisive role through one of the most impressive records of legislative work ever. I personally believe this is not sufficiently known by the citizens of Europe, and you deserve more credit and recognition for this.

So let us continue to work together to reform our economies, for growth and jobs, and to adapt our institutional architecture. Only if we do so, we will leave this phase of the crisis behind us as well.

There is a lot we can still deliver together, in this Parliament's and this Commission's mandate.

What we can and must do, first and foremost, let's be concrete is delivering the banking union. It is the first and most urgent phase on the way to deepen our economic and monetary union, as mapped out in the Commission's Blueprint presented last autumn.

The legislative process on the Single Supervisory Mechanism is almost completed. The next step is the ECB's independent valuation of banks assets, before it takes up its supervisory role.

Our attention now must urgently turn to the Single Resolution Mechanism. The Commission's proposal is on the table since July and, together, we must do the necessary to have it adopted still during this term.

It is the way to ensure that taxpayers are no longer the ones in the front line for paying the price of bank failure. It is the way to make progress in decoupling bank from sovereign risk.

It is the way to remedy one of the most alarming and unacceptable results of the crisis: increased fragmentation of Europe's financial sector and credit markets - even an implicit re-nationalisation.

And it is also the way to help restoring normal lending to the economy, notably to SMEs. Because in spite of the accommodating monetary policy, credit is not yet sufficiently flowing to the economy across the euro area. This needs to be addressed resolutely.

Ultimately, this is about one thing: growth, which is necessary to remedy today's most pressing problem: unemployment. The current level of unemployment is economically unsustainable, politically untenable, socially unacceptable. So all of us here in the Commission – and I'm happy to have all my Commissioners today here with me – all of us want to work intensively with you, and with the member states, to deliver as much of our growth agenda as we possibly can, we are mobilizing all instruments, but of course we have to be honest, not all are at European level, some are at national level. I want to focus on implementation of the decisions on youth employment and financing of the real economy. We need to avoid a jobless recovery.

Europe therefore must speed up the pace of structural reforms. Our Country Specific Recommendations set out what the member states must do in this respect.

At EU level – because there is what can be done at national level and what can be done at European level –, the focus should be on what matters most for the real economy: exploiting the full potential of the single market comes first.

We have a well-functioning single market for goods, and we see the economic benefits of that. We need to extend the same formula to other areas: mobility, communications, energy, finance and e-commerce, to name but a few. We have to remove the obstacles that hold back dynamic companies and people. We have to complete connecting Europe.

I'd like to announce that, today, we will formally adopt a proposal that gives a push towards a single market for telecoms. Citizens know that Europe has dramatically brought down their costs for roaming. Our proposal will strengthen guarantees and lower prices for consumers, and present new opportunities for companies. We know that in the future, trade will be more and more digital. Isn't it a paradox that we have an internal market for goods but when it comes to digital market we have 28 national markets? How can we grab all the opportunities of the future that are opened by the digital economy if we don't conclude this internal market?

The same logic applies to the broader digital agenda: it solves real problems and improves daily life for citizens. The strength of Europe's future industrial base depends on how well people and businesses are interconnected. And by properly combining the digital agenda with data protection and the defence of privacy, our European model strengthens the trust of the citizens. Both with respect to internal and external developments, adopting the proposed legislation on data protection is of utmost importance to the European Commission.

The single market is a key lever for competitiveness and employment. Adopting all remaining proposals under the Single Market Act I and II, and implementing the Connecting Europe Facility in the next few months, we lay the foundations for prosperity in the years to come.

We are also adapting to a dynamic transformation on a global scale, so we must encourage this innovative dynamism at a European scale. That is why we must also invest more in innovation, in technology and the role of science. I have great faith in science, in the capacity of the human mind and a creative society to solve its problems. The world is changing dramatically. And I believe many of the solutions are going to come, in Europe and outside Europe, from new science studies, from new technologies. And I would like Europe to be leading that effort globally. This is why we – Parliament and Commission – have made such a priority of Horizon 2020 in the discussions on the EU budget.

That is why we use the EU budget to invest in skills, education and vocational training, dynamising and supporting talent. That is why we have pushed for Erasmus Plus.

And that is why, later this autumn, we will make further proposals for an industrial policy fit for the 21st century. Why we mobilize support for SMEs because we believe a strong dynamic industrial base is indispensable for a strong European economy.

And whilst fighting climate change, our 20-20-20 goals have set our economy on the path to green growth and resource efficiency, reducing costs and creating jobs.

By the end of this year, we will come out with concrete proposals for our energy and climate framework up to 2030. And we will continue to shape the international agenda by fleshing out a comprehensive, legally binding global climate agreement by 2015, with our partners. Europe alone cannot do all the fight for climate change. Frankly, we need the others also on board. At the same time, we will pursue our work on the impact of energy prices on competitiveness and on social cohesion.

All these drivers for growth are part of our 'Europe 2020' agenda, and fully and swiftly implementing it is more urgent than ever. In certain cases, we need to go beyond the 2020 agenda.

This means we must also pursue our active and assertive trade agenda. It is about linking us closer to growing third markets and guaranteeing our place in the global supply chain. Contrary to perception, where most of our citizens think we are losing in global trade, we have a significant and increasing trade surplus of more than 300 billion euro a year, goods, services, and agriculture. We need to build on that. This too will demand our full attention in the months to come, notably with the *Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership* with the US and the negotiations with Canada and Japan.

And last but not least, we need to step up our game in implementing the Multiannual Financial Framework, the European budget. The EU budget is the most concrete lever we have at hand to boost investments. In some of our regions, the European Union budget is the only way to get public investment because they don't have the sources at national level.

Both the European Parliament and the Commission wanted more resources. We have been in that fight together. But even so, one single year's EU budget represents more money - in today's prices - than the whole Marshall plan in its time! Let us now make sure that the programmes can start on the 1st of January 2014. That the results are being felt on the ground. And that we use the possibilities of innovative financing, from instruments that have already started, to EIB money, to project bonds.

We have to make good on the commitment we have made in July. From the Commission's side, we will deliver. We will, for example, present the second amending budget for 2013 still this month. There is no time to waste, so I warn against holding it up. In particular, I urge member states not to delay.

I cannot emphasise this enough: citizens will not be convinced with rhetoric and promises only, but only with a concrete set of common achievements. We have to show the many areas where Europe has solved problems for citizens. Europe is not the cause of problems, Europe is part of the solution.

I address what we have to do still more extensively in today's letter to the President of the European Parliament, which you will also have received. I will not go now in detail regarding the programme for next year.

My point today is clear: together, there is a lot still to achieve before the elections. It is not the time to throw in the towel, it is time to roll up our sleeves.

Honourable Members,

None of this is easy. These are challenging times, a real stress test for the EU. The path of permanent and profound reform is as demanding as it is unavoidable. Let's make no mistake: there is no way back to business as usual. Some people believe that after this everything will come back as it was before. They are wrong, This crisis is different. This is not a cyclical crisis, but a structural one. We will not come back to the old normal. We have to shape a new normal. We are in a transformative period of history. We have to understand that, and not just say it. But we have to draw all the consequences from that, including in our state of mind, and how we react to the problems.

We see from the first results that it is possible.

And we all know from experience that it is necessary.

At this point in time, with a fragile recovery, the biggest downside risk I see is political: lack of stability and lack of determination. Over the last years we have seen that anything that casts doubt on governments' commitment to reform is instantly punished. On the positive side, strong and convincing decisions have an important and immediate impact.

In this phase of the crisis, governments' job is to provide the certainty and predictability that markets still lack.

Surely, you all know Justus Lipsius. Justus Lipsius is the name of the Council building in Brussels. Justus Lipsius was a very influential 16th century humanist scholar, who wrote a very important book called *De Constantia*.

He wrote, 'Constancy is a right and immovable strength of the mind, neither lifted up nor pressed down with external or casual accidents.' Only a '*strength of the mind*', he argued, based on '*judgment and sound reason*', can help you through confusing and alarming times.

I hope that in these times, these difficult times, all of us, including the governments' representatives that meet at the Justus Lipsius building, show that determination, that perseverance, when it comes to the implementation of the decisions taken. Because one of the issues that we have is to be coherent, not just take decisions, but afterwards be able to implement them on the ground.

Honourable members,

It is only natural that, over the last few years, our efforts to overcome the economic crisis have overshadowed everything else.

But our idea of Europe needs to go far beyond the economy. We are much more than a market. The European ideal touches the very foundations of European society. It is about values, and I underline this word: values. It is based on a firm belief in political, social and economic standards, grounded in our social market economy.

In today's world, the EU level is indispensable to protect these values and standards and promote citizens' rights: from consumer protection to labour rights, from women's rights to respect for minorities, from environmental standards to data protection and privacy.

Whether defending our interests in international trade, securing our energy provision, or restoring people's sense of fairness by fighting tax fraud and tax evasion: only by acting as a Union do we pull our weight at the world stage.

Whether seeking impact for the development and humanitarian aid we give to developing countries, managing our common external borders or seeking to develop in Europe a strong security and defense policy: only by integrating more can we really reach our objectives.

There is no doubt about it. Our internal coherence and international relevance are inextricably linked. Our economic attraction and political traction are fundamentally entwined.

Does anyone seriously believe that, if the euro had collapsed, we or our Member States would still have any credibility left internationally?

Does everyone still realise how enlargement has been a success in terms of healing history's deep scars, establishing democracies where no one had thought it possible? How neighbourhood policy was and still is the best way to provide security and prosperity in regions of vital importance for Europe? Where would we be without all of this?

Today, countries like Ukraine are more than ever seeking closer ties to the European Union, attracted by our economic and social model. We cannot turn our back on them. We cannot accept any attempts to limit these countries own sovereign choices. Free will and free consent need to be respected. These are also the principles that lie at the basis of our Eastern Partnership, which we want to take forward at our summit in Vilnius.

And does everyone still remember just how much Europe has suffered from its wars during the last century, and how European integration was the valid answer?

Next year, it will be one century after the start of the First World War. A war that tore Europe apart, from Sarajevo to the Somme. We must never take peace for granted. We need to recall that it is because of Europe that former enemies now sit around the same table and work together. It is only because they were offered a European perspective that now even Serbia and Kosovo come to an agreement, under mediation of the EU.

Last year's Nobel Peace Prize reminded us of that historic achievement: that Europe is a project of peace.

We should be more aware of it ourselves. Sometimes I think we should not be ashamed to be proud. Not arrogant. But more proud. We should look towards the future, but with a wisdom we gained from the past.

Let me say this to all those who rejoice in Europe's difficulties and who want to roll back our integration and go back to isolation: the pre-integrated Europe of the divisions, the war, the trenches, is not what people desire and deserve. The European continent has never in its history known such a long period of peace as since the creation of the European Community. It is our duty to preserve it and deepen it.

Honourable members,

It is precisely with our values that we address the unbearable situation in Syria, which has tested, over the last months, the world's conscience so severely. The European Union has led the international aid response by mobilising close to 1.5 billion euros, of which €850 million comes directly from the EU budget. The Commission will do its utmost to help the Syrian people and refugees in neighbouring countries.

We have recently witnessed events we thought had long been eradicated. The use of chemical weapons is a horrendous act that deserves a clear condemnation and a strong answer. The international community, with the UN at its centre, carries a collective responsibility to sanction these acts and to put an end to this conflict. The proposal to put Syria's chemical weapons beyond use is potentially a positive development. The Syrian regime must now demonstrate that it will implement this without any delay. In Europe, we believe that, ultimately, only a political solution stands a chance of delivering the lasting peace that the Syrian people deserve.

Honourable members,

There are those who claim that a weaker Europe would make their country stronger, that Europe is a burden; that they would be better off without it.

My reply is clear: we all need a Europe that is united, strong and open.

In the debate that is ongoing all across Europe, the bottom-line question is: *Do we want to improve Europe, or give it up?*

My answer is clear: let's engage!

If you don't like Europe as it is: improve it!

Find ways to make it stronger, internally and internationally, and you will have in me the firmest of supporters. Find ways that allow for diversity without creating discriminations, and I will be with you all the way.

But don't turn away from it.

I recognize: as any human endeavor, the EU is not perfect.

For example, controversies about the division of labour between the national and European levels will never be conclusively ended.

I value subsidiarity highly. For me, subsidiarity is not a technical concept. It is a fundamental democratic principle. An ever closer union among the citizens of Europe demands that decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely to the people as possible.

Not everything needs a solution at European level. Europe must focus on where it can add most value. Where this is not the case, it should not meddle. The EU needs to be *big on big things and smaller on smaller things* - something we may occasionally have neglected in the past. The EU needs to show it has the capacity to set both positive and negative priorities. As all governments, we need to take extra care of the quality and quantity of our regulation knowing that, as Montesquieu said, '*les lois inutiles affaiblissent les lois nécessaires*'. [*Useless laws weaken the necessary ones*.]

But there are, honourable members, areas of major importance where Europe must have more integration, more unity. Where only a strong Europe can deliver results.

I believe a political union needs to be our political horizon, as I stressed in last year's State of the Union. This is not just the demand of a passionate European. This is the indispensable way forward to consolidate our progress and ensure the future.

Ultimately, the solidity of our policies, namely of the economic and monetary union, depend on the credibility of the political and institutional construct that supports it.

So we have mapped out, in the Commission *Blueprint for a deep and genuine Economic and Monetary Union*, not only the economic and monetary features, but also the necessities, possibilities and limits of deepening our institutional set-up in the medium and long term. The Commission will continue to work for the implementation of its Blueprint, step by step, one phase after the other.

And I confirm, as announced last year, the intention to present, before the European elections, further ideas on the future of our Union and how best to consolidate and deepen the community method and community approach in the longer term. That way, they can be subject to a real European debate. They will set out the principles and orientations that are necessary for a true political union.

Honourable Members,

We can only meet the challenges of our time if we strengthen the consensus on fundamental objectives.

Politically, we must not be divided by differences between the euro area and those outside it, between the centre and the periphery, between the North and the South, between East and West. The European Union must remain a project for all members, a community of equals.

Economically, Europe has always been a way to close gaps between countries, regions and people. And that must remain so. We cannot do member states' work for them. The responsibility remains theirs. But we can and must complement it with European responsibility and European solidarity.

For that reason, strengthening the social dimension is a priority for the months to come, together with our social partners. The Commission will come with its communication on the social dimension of the economic and monetary union on the 2nd of October. Solidarity is a key element of what being part of Europe is all about, and something to take pride in.

Safeguarding its values, such as the rule of law, is what the European Union was made to do, from its inception to the latest chapters in enlargement.

In last year's State of the Union speech, at a moment of challenges to the rule of law in our own member states, I addressed the need to make a bridge between political persuasion and targeted infringement procedures on the one hand, and what I call the nuclear option of Article 7 of the Treaty, namely suspension of a member states' rights.

Experience has confirmed the usefulness of the Commission role as an independent and objective referee. We should consolidate this experience through a more general framework. It should be based on the principle of equality between member states, activated only in situations where there is a serious, systemic risk to the rule of law, and triggered by pre-defined benchmarks.

The Commission will come forward with a communication on this. I believe it is a debate that is key to our idea of Europe.

This does not mean that national sovereignty or democracy are constrained. But we do need a robust European mechanism to influence the equation when basic common principles are at stake.

There are certain non-negotiable values that the EU and its member states must and shall always defend.

Honourable Members,

The polarisation that resulted from the crisis poses a risk to us all, to the project, to the European project.

We, legitimate political representatives of the European Union, can turn the tide. You, the democratic representatives of Europe, directly elected, will be at the forefront of the political debate. The question I want to pose is: which picture of Europe will voters be presented with? The candid version, or the cartoon version? The myths or the facts? The honest, reasonable version, or the extremist, populist version? It's an important difference.

I know some people out there will say Europe is to blame for the crisis and the hardship.

But we can remind people that Europe was not at the origin of this crisis. It resulted from mismanagement of public finances by national governments and irresponsible behaviour in financial markets.

We can explain how Europe has worked to fix the crisis. What we would have lost if we hadn't succeeded in upholding the single market, because it was under threat, and the common currency, because some people predicted the end of the euro. If we hadn't coordinated recovery efforts and employment initiatives.

Some people will say that Europe is forcing governments to cut spending.

But we can remind voters that government debt got way out of hand even before the crisis, not *because of* but *despite* Europe. We can add that the most vulnerable in our societies, and our children, would end up paying the price if we don't persevere now. And the truth is that countries inside the euro or outside the euro, in Europe or outside Europe, they are making efforts to curb their very burdened public finances.

Some will campaign saying that we have given too much money to vulnerable countries. Others will say we have given too little money to vulnerable countries.

But every one of us can explain what we did and why: there is a direct link between one country's loans and another country's banks, between one country's investments and another country's businesses, between one country's workers and another country's companies. This kind of interdependence means only European solutions work.

What I tell people is: when you are in the same boat, one cannot say: '*your end of the boat is sinking.*' We were in the same boat when things went well, and we are in it together when things are difficult.

Some people might campaign saying: Europe has grabbed too much power. Others will claim Europe always does *too little, too late*. The interesting thing is that sometimes we have the same people saying that Europe is not doing enough and at the same time that's not giving more means to Europe to do what Europe has to do.

But we can explain that member states have entrusted Europe with tasks and competences. The European Union is not a foreign power. It is the result of democratic decisions by the European institutions and by member states.

At the same time we must acknowledge that, in some areas, Europe still lacks the power to do what is asked of it. A fact that is all too easily forgotten by those, and there are many out there, who always like to nationalise success and Europeanise failure. Ultimately, what we have, and what we don't have, is the result of democratic decision-making. And I think we should remind people of that.

Ladies and gentlemen,
Mr President,
Honourable members,

I hope the European Parliament will take up this challenge with all the idealism it holds, with as much realism and determination as the times demand of us.

The arguments are there.

The facts are there.

The agenda has been set out.

In 8 months' time, voters will decide.

Now, it's up to us to make the case for Europe.

We can do so by using the next 8 months to conclude as much as we can. We have a lot to do still.

Adopt and implement the European budget, the MFF. This is critical for investment in our regions all over Europe. This is indispensable for the first priority we have: to fight against unemployment, notably youth unemployment.

Advance and implement the banking union. This is critical to address the problem of financing for businesses and SMEs.

These are our clear priorities: employment and growth.

Our job is not finished. It is in its decisive phase.

Because, Honourable Members, the elections will not only be about the European Parliament, nor will they be about the European Commission or about the Council or about this or that personality.

They will be about Europe.

We will be judged together.

So let us work together - for Europe.

With passion and with determination.

Let us not forget: one hundred years ago –Europe was sleepwalking into the catastrophe of the war of 1914.

Next year, in 2014, I hope Europe will be walking out of the crisis towards a Europe that is more united, stronger and open.

Thank you for your attention.

7. 2 Appendix 2

AK Party Group Meeting June 25-2013

Very distinguished guests,

My very distinguished deputy friends,

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I salute you all with love and regards and I wish from Allah that our Group Meeting would be good for our country and nation. I welcome all our guests and thank them from the bottom of my heart for their excitement. At the beginning of our meeting I want to share some good news. As part of FATİH Project we have taken the first step for distributing free tablet computers to our 10.6 million students. The winner of the bid would have to found an R&D center and invest in Turkey within next three years. I wish this revolutionary development would be good for our teachers, students, and their families.

Last February I announced that our handicapped citizens would also be appointed to teaching positions and the Ministry of Family and Social Policies has quickly made the necessary arrangements with the contributions of the Ministry of National Education. So starting today we are taking the online applications until July 1st for appointing 600 teachers in 46 different subjects for the next school year.

My distinguished deputy friends,

We are making another important arrangement that paves the way for contract-based state employees to obtain permanent state tenure. This arrangement would enable 96,500 personnel to obtain the permanent tenure and we hope to pass this law before the parliament goes to summer break.

My very distinguished deputy friends,

Distinguished guests,

Last week we have received the intense affection of our people just like we are witnessing now in this room. On June 9th we attended the opening ceremony of the Mediterranean Games in Mersin for which we invested 800 million TL. Greece was supposed to host these games but due to the financial difficulties they are having we were asked to take over. Within only 17 months we have finished all the preparation work and hosted these games and 6,000 athletes from 24 countries. Our citizens in Mersin have showed a great interest to these games and the attendance is very impressive. So far Turkey has won 16 bronze, 21 silver, and 19 gold medals and ranks second in total only trailing Italy. This will very likely be the most successful Mediterranean Games of our history and for that I want to thank all our athletes. I also wish the best to the athletes of all our fellow Mediterranean countries. I hope they will leave with great memories. I also wish speedy recovery to our national athlete Binnaz Uslu.

My distinguished deputy friends,

Our next stop was Kayseri where I attended the opening ceremony of the FIFA U-20 World Cup and to our Respect to Will of Nation rally. Istanbul, Bursa, Antalya, Trabzon, Gaziantep, Rize, and Kayseri are hosting the tournament and I watched the first half of the opening match between Cuba and South Korea. I wish all the success to our national team in this tournament. Prior to the match we had our rally with the enthusiastic participation of 200,000 citizens. I want to thank all our citizens in Kayseri for their support and I want to thank our organization in Kayseri for their success. The level of enthusiasm and excitement is growing in our every rally.

We had another Respect for Will of Nation rally on Saturday in Samsun and it was the greatest rally I have ever had in Samsun. The next day we had our rally in Erzurum again with the participation of an excited crowd. The day before Nationalistic Movement Party had a rally in Erzurum and the attendance was not anywhere near to ours. All these rallies have reflected very clearly how our people react to the recent protests and acts of violence in Turkey. Our people patiently watched those protests but that same wisdom also enabled them to see the big picture. There was an intentional disinformation campaign since the beginning of the protests and yet thousands of people did not believe in any of it. They came to our rallies to show their support for us. We have been telling everyone if they want to use their democratic rights they should be arranging rallies in squares and not engage in any violent behavior. Those who use violence are destined to lose. Democratic rights can only be exercised in legal rallies and elections. Those who organized and provoked these protests knew they would not be able to influence our people. They actually wanted to reach out to the international circles from the beginning, as they knew our people would not believe them. That is why they have been writing and talking in English. They have been searching for outside support.

My distinguished friends,

The protestors come from very different segments of society and they were out there for different reasons. We have never turned our back to our people for the past 10.5 years. We have always listened the demands of every different group without discriminating against any race, language, and belief. There were some among the protestors who were genuinely concerned for the trees and the environment and we have listened their arguments, as we believed in their sincerity. There were, however, some that had no sincerity or honesty in their cause and intentions. They cannot tell the AK Party Government that the governor and some other people need to be fired. They have no right to tell us what to do. Our people give us this authority and responsibility.

I want to remind everyone that prior to the AK Party Governments we had coalition governments in our country that on average lasted for 16 months. These short-lived governments led to instability and the GDP per capita fell as low as \$2,600. AK Party has come and changed everything. An era of stability and consistency has started. Turkey has made a big leap forward in every field. Turkey has become a country that is widely respected in all over the world. So they wanted to weaken this powerful Turkey with this organized scheme but our people have sided with the AK Party Government and did not fall for this vicious scheme.

It is not like the protests in Brazil where people argue against a 20-cent raise or lack of healthcare implementations. However, I think the protests in Brazil have also been started by foreign perpetrators since Brazil has just paid off its debt to IMF just like we did. We said it was the interest rate lobby from the beginning that was unhappy for the headway we have made in economy.

I said this in our group meeting last week: CHP's impotence in providing strong and effective opposition has made its electorate hopeless. This hopeless mass went out to the streets and CHP has viciously provoked this mass by calling for violence. Unfortunately we have also witnessed that our Alevi citizens participated these protests as a group. We understand their feelings and demands. As you know we had an Alevi initiative and met with their representatives many times. This process will resume but we need to solve these issues on the negotiation table. Past mistakes should not be repeated. When Dersim Massacre took place CHP was the ruling party in Turkey and they have never showed a reaction to this massacre. I, as the Prime Minister of this era, apologized for that incident. Chairman of CHP has not apologized yet and still has not acknowledged that CHP was responsible for it. Our Government has worked hard to solve the problems of our Alevi citizens just like we would do for any religious belief. The problems have not been fully addressed yet but no one can claim that we are not sincerely working for a solution.

For decades CHP had supposedly represented our Alevi citizens yet CHP is responsible for the Dersim Massacre. What did CHP do for our Alevi citizen and their problems when it was part of the coalition governments of the past? CHP was part of the coalition government in charge when the incidents took place in Kahramanmaraş, Sivas, and Gazi Mahallesi. CHP could not stop these incidents from happening and also did not do anything to bring those who were responsible for them to the justice. I know very well that in recent years CHP has been part of dirty plans such as the bombing in Reyhanlı and the recent Gezi Park protests and to provoke our Alevi citizens. I want our Alevi brothers and sisters to be aware this dirty and dangerous game. We should move forward by increasing our hopes of a better future instead of living in the sorrows of the past. God willing we will solve any problem we have in our country, as we have done in the past. Violence, tension, and conflict would definitely not help in solving the problems. We will solve our problems by talking and within the confines of democracy and law. We will move forward by tackling the problems of our entire 76 million citizens. Once again I want everyone, especially our Alevi citizens, to be very careful against the irresponsible and dangerous provocations of CHP deputies. CHP deputies and chairman keep blaming me for being a dictator but they need to look at the history of CHP and pictures of "national chief", who is responsible for the Dersim Massacre, hanging on the walls of their headquarters if they want to see a dictator. If they want to see a fascist dictator they should look at al-Assad whom they are so fond of.

My very distinguished deputy friends,

Dear guests,

Among the protestors there are some who aim to attack the government and the will of nation rather than using their democratic rights for innocent and righteous demands. Those who saw the dirty scenario and the violence and vandalism distanced themselves from those people who had a different agenda. Unfortunately many young people were used as part of this scenario. We have been stern against those with ill intentions. We have fought against military coup scenarios to take us away from our duty. There have been many scenarios and plots that aimed to unlawfully take us away from the governing role that was given to us by democratic elections. However, we would never back down from our duty to our people. As long as we have our people's support, we would never back down from serving our people and representing the will of nation.

Since the beginning of the protests there have been an organized effort to portray as if the police is using excessive force against innocent, peaceful, and right protestors. Social media and certain media companies have been used to this end. International media has become part of this and those

who realized that they would not be able to come back to power by democratic means have orchestrated this scheme. However, my citizens did not believe in any of these and they came to our rallies to show their support.

CHP is acting with illegal organizations and that is why they will never be rewarded with the support of our people. They call themselves a political party and yet police have found numerous weapons in their party building. Also Divan Hotel was sheltering those who attacked the police so the police had to go in and arrest those people. Protestors invaded Atatürk Cultural Center and hanged posters of illegal organizations and signs that insulted the Prime Ministers. When I came back from my trip to North Africa, they were still there so I instructed that they all should be taken out within 24 hours. I wanted the Gezi Park to be cleared from the invaders within 24 hours because Gezi Park belongs to our people. Laws require us to prevent any form of invasion of public areas. I told everyone who came to visit me that we need to wait for the court to reach a verdict on the proposed plan. No one can do anything until the court says the final word. I also said even if the court rules in favor of the plan we would still take it to public vote. However, this whole Gezi Park thing is just an excuse to cause unrest in Turkey. Turkey was going great in May. We had the \$49 billion bid for the third airport in Istanbul, \$22 billion bid for the nuclear power plant, and \$2.5 billion bid for the third bridge on Bosphorus. From healthcare to education, everything was going great in Turkey. So what is there to protest really? Our young people are falling for the schemes of certain circles and they are being used. If they really want to make a difference they should be part of NGOs and our Government lowered the age requirement to be a member of parliament so they can run for parliament. We are even working on taking this age limit further down to 18 while the opposition parties oppose it even though there are many examples of such low age limits in many European countries. We already have deputies at the Assembly under the age of 30. So our youngsters should know which political party is looking for them and for their rights. We want to move forward with the contributions of our young people.

Some media companies only promote how the protestors respected the religious sensitivities but they are not telling people how the protestors entered the mosques with their shoes on and drank alcohol in mosques. Fortunately our people did not fall for these provocations. Otherwise very dangerous developments could have taken place. Some police officers might have done wrong things and the Ministry is already investigating these incidents. However, in general our police have been the side that suffered from violence. They threw hundreds of stones to our police and they drew graffiti using very foul language. They want us to overlook all these. They made loud noises late at night and disturbed everyone. They claimed to be environmentalists and yet they damaged trees on the streets. We cannot ignore all these and we will continue to stand tall against all these. They insulted our electorate and blamed them for selling their votes in exchange for money and food. They insulted our sacred values such as headscarf, mosques, and flag. We cannot tolerate such behavior. So when the election time comes our people will reveal their judgment on these vandals and looters for what they tried to do the will of nation. However, if we remain silent then they will question us as well.

My distinguished brothers and sisters,

As you know the Chairman of People's Republican Party and the leaders of European countries are exchanging letters. They are collaborating for starting a sectarian conflict in Turkey and this exchange of letters could not be a coincidence. There are dozens of unnatural connections. Curiously a Turkish representative of an international media company tweeted and asked people to stop consuming for 6 months so that the Turkish economy would suffer and the Government would

have to listen them. For the love of Allah what sort of a mentality is this? How could someone betray his own country like this? Could this be called journalism or freedom of press? How could a Turkish citizen make such a call? This is not about Gezi Park as they said. They just want to prevent democracy and economy from working in Turkey. They want to weaken our economy so that AK Party would weaken. They do not care about what would happen to Turkey. We would never tolerate such a mentality and vandalism. The protestors are used as part of a plan to damage Turkey's international reputation and influence. These protests were used as part of the plot that aimed to damage Turkey's economy and tourism. In coordination with their European counterparts, they have reported false and exaggerated news to foreign sources in order to cloud the investment climate in Turkey. They tried to create an artificial unrest and an air of instability. Some tried to derive benefits by the way of manipulation. I am very pleased to say that these plans did not work. The reforms we made in the past 10.5 years prevented this plot from reaching its target. Investors still have high confidence in our country, economy, democracy, and future. They keep on investing in our country. Recently some portfolio investments exited but that is due to the global financial tendencies. Rest assured that a greater amount of portfolio investments would come to Turkey in near future. We have helped as much as we can to all the investors in Turkey and we know investment brings employment and economic growth. We will keep welcoming any form of investment to our country as long as they believe in Turkey.

Very distinguished guests,

My very distinguished deputy friends,

These protestors also targeted the solution process, which progresses with great success. I am happy to report that my Kurdish brothers and sisters have realized that these protests targeted our fellowship and thus they did not fall for this plot just as almost all our citizens did not. These protests aimed to weaken our unity and fellowship but they end up strengthening our fellowship and unity.

Tomorrow we will have the final meeting of the advisory board and they will turn in their report. We will discuss and evaluate their findings. After receiving this final input, we will announce our road map and move forward decisively. We are going through historic times, as we end the problem of terror that has existed for the past 30 years. Our fellowship is growing and strengthening by the day. Once we solve the issue of terrorism, the other problems such as the issues of our Alevi brothers and sisters will be solved quickly as well. Our economy and democracy will soar to new heights. Turkey will move up to a whole different level.

We have always been the Government of our entire 76 million citizens even though we have only received 50 percent of the votes. One can clearly see this by the investments we made. We made more investments in the East and South East than we did in the West. It is important to note that we are building a Turkey where our differences make us richer and stronger and everyone's lifestyle is well respected. We have never discriminated among our citizens. We will live in a Turkey where we bravely tackle our problems instead of postponing them. We will thrive on our common values and fellowship. We will face those who attacked our nation's will, democracy, and economy in the next elections.

My very distinguished deputy friends,

Next Tuesday we will elect the new Speaker of Parliament and I wish from Allah that this new

Speaker of Parliament would be good for our Assembly and country. May Allah clear your path and be on your side. I salute you all with love and regards. God bless.

7.3 Appendix 3: Interview questions and answers

7.3.1 Interview with Omer Taspinar

Interview guide

Dear Omer Taspinar

First and foremost I want to thank you for the inspiring lecture you gave at the Faculty of Law at University of Copenhagen on the 4th October, on liberalism and democracy in the Turkish model.

After the lecture I approached you with a wish that you might be willing to answer a few questions. My earnest intent is that these questions and answers will serve the purpose of empirical support and take part in my thesis as an expert interview.

I am currently writing my thesis, to finish my master of arts in European studies at Lund University; my main area of interest is the potential membership of Turkey in the EU.

The research focus or current hypothesis of this paper is; *The European Union's hesitation to accept Turkey as a full member is due to cultural and religious reasons.*

With this hypothesis as a starting point I want to research the Copenhagen Criteria – and the double standards I believe to be surrounding these criteria of accession, mainly depending on which country or culture is applying, and not how successfully they have implemented the asked measures.

Arguments for or against Turkey becoming a member of the EU will be based on theories of identity and nationalism, primary sources being Anthony D. Smith and Steven J. Mock.

Furthermore my thesis will be supported by the theory of soft power by Joseph E. Nye.

I plan to make a comparative analysis of Hungary and Turkey and how well the two countries are currently complying with the Copenhagen criteria, and from this find arguments that support my hypothesis of culture and religion being a main obstacle for Turkey becoming a full member of the EU.

I hope that you, after having read this short description on my thoughts behind the thesis, have found interest and would like to answer some questions.

I imagine that you do not have much time to spare; any help would be greatly appreciated.

The following is a short series of questions. My intention with this kind of questionnaire is to ask open questions that will leave room for you to elaborate and give you the opportunity to be more specific in any area of particular interest.

Questions

Would you say a Turkish membership is as attractive today for the EU, as it was 10, 20 or 50 years ago? - What potential benefits or disadvantages could a Turkish membership bring to the European Union?

The main benefits for the EU will be strategic. Since Turkey is already in the customs unions there is no trade or financial benefits. But I don't think the EU is taken seriously in foreign policy, partly because it is not an actor in the Middle East. With Turkey in the union it will have to have a more serious foreign policy towards the region.

Turkey have since the Ankara agreement in 1963 been given prospects of accession into the European Union. This process has now lasted more than 50 years. What effect has this process had on democracy in Turkey?

Overall very positive, Especially the AKP's democratization of Turkey between 2003 and 2005 was thanks to the harmonization efforts with EU legislation. In the absence of EU prospects and vision, Turkey's democracy risks sliding backwards, as we are currently witnessing.

In your lecture you said that you believe liberal democracies can live along side Sharia - One could argue that religious law such as Sharia is one of the major reasons why many Europeans are against Turkey becoming a member of the EU. In your opinion, how could this fear of religion or of different cultures be dealt with?

The backlash against multiculturalism in Europe is a big problem that can only be solved with a balance between integration and multiculturalism. The two should not be seen as mutually exclusive. I don't think Sharia is the reason why Europeans are against Turkey. Turkey is the most secular and democratic country in the Islamic world. I also don't think it's useful to talk about the compatibility of sharia and democracy since there is no consensus on what these concepts mean in the Islamic world and in the West.

New reform changes in Hungary indicate a step back for democracy. In your opinion, what might be done within the EU to ensure that member countries keep their promise to the signed treaties and their promise to implement and uphold the Copenhagen Criteria?

There should be a new law that enables the EU to expel a country that no longer respects democracy and liberalism.

Turkey is still trying to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria. Looking at Hungary, the EU have difficulties ensuring that membership countries respect basic principals after becoming members. Would you argue that this is as an advantage or disadvantage in terms of Turkey's chances of accession and why?

Some people may fear that Turkey could become like Hungary if it is allowed to become an EU member. This could work against Turkey's membership. But there are many other reasons to say no to Turkey in the eyes of skeptics.

What do you think are the main reason(s) for the EU hesitating to accept Turkey as a full member?

For the European right the main problem is Turkey's Islamic character. For the centrists it is Turkey's size and the fear of immigration and unemployment in Europe. For the left it is the fact that Turkey is not democratic and liberal enough.

If you see cultural and/or religious reasons, please describe these.

Islamophobia, the backlash against multiculturalism, the gender equality question are all relevant in the eyes of many Europeans.

7.3.2 Interview with Daniella Kuzmanovic

Questions:

What do you think are the main reason(s) for the EU hesitating to accept Turkey as a full member?

If you see cultural and/or religious reasons, please describe these.

First, one has to be aware that it is difficult to talk about the EU as one voice with regard to the issue of Turkish membership. Thus the main reasons behind the skepticism towards Turkish EU membership vary according to the political actors you look at. If one look at the official stance of the EU (i.e. the Commission) they treat the Turkish membership negotiations as an on-going and partly technical issue of implementation of chapters consisting of rules and regulations. Here the evaluation is performed in the yearly progress report according to how the process has run, how many chapters are completed/open/blocked, and the Copenhagen criteria, where the economic part is fulfilled whereas the political part of the criteria are as of yet not according to the Commission. However, the Commission at the same time reflects the internal disagreements about Turkey among the membership countries, for example with regard to the chapters that have been blocked among other due to the Cyprus issue. It is this disagreement that is crucial with regard to the hesitancy towards Turkey. Again this hesitancy then has different reasons. One, as has particularly been the case with France under Sarkozy but which is a current in most EU member states particularly among right-wing, nationalist parties, has to do with a notion of Turkey as not European or not European enough for cultural as well as religious reasons. This is what I would call the value argument. The muslimness of Turkey is here used to create one kind of unbridgeable difference between Turkey and Europe, just as the lack of democracy, rights, and rule of law is highlighted as a sign of Turkey's inability to develop what these actors perceive as inherent European values. IN the eyes of proponents of such argument should Turkey become member it would challenge the whole notion of a European common community. But a second and other kind of hesitancy has more to do with the size of Turkey. Should Turkey become member it would be the second largest

country in the EU, which would completely shift the internal power balance within the union. This is a concern raised for example by several leading politicians in Germany (the biggest country). These concerns have little to do with culture and religion and a lot to do with power politics, and I suspect that this is actually a concern which has a much broader resonance among the political actors in the EU system.

Would you say a Turkish membership is as attractive today for the EU, as it was 10, 20 or 50 years ago? - What potential benefits or disadvantages could a Turkish membership bring to the European Union?

The geo-political circumstances have completely changes so I think the first part of the question is difficult to answer. But I guess I would say that Turkish membership has become more attractive for the EU since Turkey has undergone change from an economically weak state with little regional leverage to a state which experiences economic growth and has a stronger role to play in the region in which it is located. Turkey has in that sense become a more attractive partner. However, economically speaking integration is already in place with the customs union signed in 1996, and EU is still by far the most important trading partner for Turkey and foreign direct investor. Politically speaking there would be several advantages to Turkish EU membership, first the EU would become even bigger and thus more powerful. It would also secure a strategic partner in the Middle East, Caucasus, and Central Asian regions. But such advantages are also weaknesses. A bigger EU could more easily disintegrate and it will be more difficult to create unity among its members on the various issues pertaining to the EU – this is difficult enough as it is now! Turkey is situated in a volatile region, and unless its various disputes with other power holders in the region is solved the EU could easily face security concerns. A common foreign policy will also be increasingly difficult should Turkey join since Turkey and the EU differ for example in relation to Middle East policy.

The energy question is important here, since Turkey is attempting to become the main hub for oil and natural gas transportation from the region to among other the European markets. EU depends on Russia right now, but would no doubt prefer to have a stable, accommodating supplier (Turkey), however this would increase Turkish influence within the union vis-à-vis traditional countries like Germany and France.

Turkey is still trying to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria. Looking at the current debate about Hungary, the EU arguably have difficulties ensuring that membership countries respect democratic principals after becoming members.

In your opinion, what might be done within the EU to ensure that member countries keep their promise to the signed treaties and their promise to implement and uphold the Copenhagen Criteria?

I would prefer not to answer this question since I am not a scholar on the EU but on Turkey.