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Understanding Illiberal Peace-building

An Analysis of Conflict, Peace and Reconciliation in North Maluku Province, Indonesia

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Abstract

The main research problem in this thesis is the lack of a holistic understanding of how neo-patrimonialism, colonial legacies, decentralisation, illiberal peace-building and the revitalisation of traditional reconciliation practices have affected conflict, peace and development in North Maluku Province (NMP). This is important to study, given the negative impacts inherent in the conflict-development nexus. In order to help bridge that research gap, the above stated processes have been conceptualised in a framework, which is incorporated in a qualitative case study design. In-depth interviews and the Reality Check Approach (RCA) are the main data-collection methods used to explore the research problem. The most significant findings are that the illiberal peace-building approach, coupled with a revitalisation of traditional *adat* practices, have been keys for the successful realisation of peaceful coexistence between Christians and Muslims in NMP, which suffered from a devastating communal war in 1999-2000.

Keywords: North Maluku Province, North Halmahera Regency, illiberal-peacebuilding, decentralisation, neo-patrimonialism, colonial legacies, reconciliation, communal violence, adat, Reality Check Approach, in-depth interviews

Words: 21,990

List of Abbreviations, Acronyms and Terminology

ACDP	Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership
Adat	Group of customary laws or the unwritten traditional code that can regulate social, political and economic practices.
ALPS	Action Learning and Planning System
Agas	Alias for the feared child soldiers in the Moluccas, due to their purported invincible powers.
ADB	Asian Development Bank
Bupati	Head of Regency (Regency may also translate as District)
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
Desa	Rural village-level (administratively below *kecamatan*)
DPRD	Regional Representative Council (Provincial level) / Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah
DPR	People's Consultative Assembly (National level) / Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat
EDG	Effective Development Group
FHH	Focal Household
GPM	Protestant Church of Maluku / Gereja Protestan Maluku
GIS	Geographic Information System
GoI	Government of Indonesia
HD Centre	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
HHH	Host Household
Hibualamo	Literally a traditional communal house in NHR, used as a uniting notion in Tobelo *adat* culture.
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
Ilmu gaib	Person with strong magical powers
INGO	International Non-governmental Organisation
Kabupaten	Regency (District)

Kecamatan	Sub-district
Kelurahan	Urban Village-level (administratively under *kecamatan*)
KIAT Guru	Teacher's Performance and Accountability / Kinerja dan Akuntabilitas Guru
KPK	Corruption Eradication Commission / Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi
Laskar Jihad	Muslim militia (mainly Javanese) who entered the wars to support the Muslim side in MP.
LIPI	The Indonesian Institute of Sciences / Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia
NHM	Nusa Halmahera Mineral (mining company in Malifut area)
NHR	North Halmahera Regency
Malino II	Second Malino Peace Agreement / Perjanjian Malino II
MFS	Minor Field Study
MP	Maluku Province
MSC	Most Significant Change (theory)
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NMP	North Maluku Province
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
Pasukan	Troops/fighters/militia
Pasukan Kuning	The Yellow Troops (the Sultan of Ternate's adat troops)
Pasukan Merah	The Red Troops (used by Christians in MP, and in NMP after the Tidore/Ternate Riots)
Pasukan Putih	White Troops (used my Muslims in the Moluccas)
Pasukan Siluman	'Phantom forces' were deserted security personnel siding with their ethno-religious community in the wars.
Pemekaran	Literally 'blossoming', referring to the creation of new administrative districts during the decentralisation
Provinsi	Province
RCA	Reality Check Approach

Rp.	Rupiah, the Indonesian currency
Sida	Styrelsen för internationellt utvecklingssamarbete/
	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
Tokoh	Leader
TNI	Indonesian National Army / Tentara Nasional Indonesia
UGM	Gadjah Mada University / Universitas Gadjah Mada
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
Unicef	United Nations Children's Fund
UU	Undang-Undang (Law)
VOC	Dutch East India Company /
	Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie
WB	The World Bank
Wali Kota	Mayor

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Map of the Moluccas[1]: North Maluku Province (NMP) and Maluku Province (MP)

Map 1. (Lencer 2013)

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[1] The Moluccas refers to the Moluccan archipelago that encompasses both provinces.

Map of North Halmahera Regency (NHR) in NMP

Map 2. (Tourism and Cultural Office North Halmahera Regency 2014)

1 Introduction

1.1 Contextualization of the Study

The fall of General Suharto's New Order regime (1967-1998) was violent and unrest quickly spread across six Indonesian provinces. The most intense communal violence plagued the newly established NMP, from August 1999 until June 2000 (Lawler 2008: 82, Brown, Wilson et al. 2005). *Communal violence* is 'organised violence between non-state actors' (Öberg, Strøm 2007: 3). This violent conflict has often been referred to as inter-communal wars; in plural to indicate that it involved more than one violent conflict/war, between different actors (Van Klinken 2007).

In the context of NMP, most of the violence divided the society along ethnic and religious lines, even though the roots and drivers were far more multifaceted (ibid.). This ethno-religious divide contrasted from Indonesia's (globally) more well-known secessionist conflicts in Timor Leste, Aceh and Papua (Van Klinken 2007, Greenlees, Garran 2002, Chomsky, Bourchier et al. 2006). During the inter-communal wars, 3,257 people died and 15,004 buildings were destroyed, in NMP alone (Barron, Azca et al. 2012). In 2002, more than half a million people were still categorised as IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) in NMP and neighbouring MP (Duncan 2008).

1.2 Research Design, Relevance and Research Gap(s)

Much has now been written about these initial violent episodes during Indonesia's era of *reformasi* (reformation) and democratisation. Yet, most previous research has been preoccupied with analysing macro-perspectives, often involving inter-province comparisons of conflict-trajectories (Barron, Kaiser et al. 2009, Barron, Jaffrey et al. 2009, Barron, Jaffrey et al. 2010, Van Klinken 2007, Sidel 2006).

Comparative analyses may be great for certain aims, but they may also end up being deceptive, since they occasionally neglect context-specific factors. For example, agency, motivations, triggers and escalation factors often varied locally, in different areas of NMP. Thus, few previous studies have adopted a more holistic approach, incorporating the conflicts, peace-building, development and reconciliation processes within NMP, including both an elitist (etic) perspective, as well as a bottom-up, (non-elitist) emic perspective. The research gap in previous research is particularly wide regarding reconciliation efforts in Indonesia (Bräuchler 2009). This gap is important to bridge considering Indonesia's violent history, as well as ongoing conflicts, which highlight a pressing need for successful peace, as well as reconciliation.

The rationale of a holistic design is that these above stated processes are all important parts of a complex puzzle—that is difficult to solve, if the parts are analysed in isolation. The forthcoming analysis will be structured according to the conceptual framework, which highlights notions relating to colonial legacies, neo-patrimonialism, decentralisation, illiberal peace-building and the revitalisation of local traditional *adat* [2] practices aimed at reconciliation. The data-collection methods in this qualitative case study are in-depth interviews and the Reality Check Approach (RCA), complemented by e-mail interviews, and critically assessed secondary sources. The RCA is a bottom-up approach, where researchers immerse several days and nights in a household of a family, in order to listen to, observe and experiencing their daily lives, thus over time informally exploring their voices (emic perspective), in relation to the research problem (EDG 2014: 4).

On the contrary, the interviews will focus on capturing the etic, elite/expert perspective. Since truth is often indeed the first casualty of war, it is important to include as many different sources of information as possible, as triangulation increases the reliability of the findings. Christopher Duncan stresses the need to include an emic perspective, analysing different people's subjective interpretations,

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[2] Explanations for the italicized Indonesian terms are provided among the abbreviations (above).

to understand why people made the decisions they did (2005: 54). Although there are several definitions of *development*, especially seen over time and from various disciplines, most have in common that they focus on improving and/or re-shaping the living conditions of people in various ways. Since this thesis involves an exploration, and a critical analysis, of the interrelated processes of peace/conflict, decentralisation, development and reconciliation in the context of a hybrid political order, it is thus highly relevant for political science and development studies.

1.3 Research Problem, Aims, Delimitation and Questions

The main research problem in this thesis is the lack of a holistic understanding of how the processes of neo-patrimonialism, colonial legacies, decentralisation, illiberal peace-building and the revitalisation of traditional reconciliation practices have affected conflict, peace and development in NMP. To increase the depth of the analysis, and to fit the scope of fieldwork in the province, I have made a delimitation to focus the fieldwork to three areas in NMP: Kao-Malifut and Tobelo in North Halmahera Regency (NHR) for the RCAs, and Ternate, for the majority of the in-depth interviews. Ternate was, and still is, the locus of politics in the province, and thus necessary to incorporate for capturing the etic perspective. The delimitation to focus on the NHR is motivated since it was the epicentre of the most vicious inter-communal violence in Indonesia, as it recorded nearly 75 percent of the deaths of the entire NMP, and like Ambon (capital of MP), the demography is almost evenly split between Christians and Muslims (Barron, Azca et al. 2012: 12).

More importantly, NHR has managed to dramatically reverse the circle of violence in the post-conflict era, in stark contrast to most other Indonesian districts that suffered from extended communal conflicts, such as Ambon, and Poso in Sulawesi. Therefore, it is highly relevant to explore the voices of the local people here, in relation to overcoming violent conflicts and the work done to reconcile the communities. This study thus aims to contribute to a more holistic understanding of the above mentioned processes in relation to the case of NMP, and Ternate and NHR in particular. Additionally, since the study is embedded into a number of

broader debates within political science and development studies, such as decentralisation, neo-patrimonialism, legacies of colonialism, peace-building in a hybrid political order, as well as democratisation—it can therefore be seen as a minor contribution to the contemporary debates, in the above mentioned fields, particularly regarding adoption of the RCA methodology, which has predominantly been focused on poverty in the past. Yet, given the limited time for fieldwork in NMP (1,5 months) the aim of this study cannot reach much further than trying to be a modest contribution to previous research, perhaps flagging up new topics to be explored deeper in future studies.

The above mentioned considerations are manifested in the following research questions:

- *In what ways were the communal wars and subsequent development in NMP influenced by colonial legacies and neo-patrimonialism?*

- *How has decentralisation affected the communal wars and peace-building in NMP?*

- *How did Indonesia's illiberal peace-building approach affect the conflicts, and subsequent peace and development efforts in NMP?*

- *How has the revitalisation of traditional 'adat' practices affected peace and reconciliation in NMP?*

2 Background and Overview

This chapter includes a literature review that provides a brief overview of the communal wars, the post-conflict period and a summary of the major peace, development and reconciliation efforts in NMP.

2.1 Overview of the Communal Wars

In order to understand the contexts and background to the peace, development and reconciliation efforts initiated after the communal wars, it is essential to get a basic understanding of the complexity behind the communal wars. The violent incidents are presented in chronological order and broadly grouped into MP and NMP. This is done for pedagogical reasons and not meant to be comparative, since the provincial boundaries were not of major importance regarding conflict causality, as will be explained below.

2.1.1 Overview of the Communal Wars in MP

The communal wars in the Moluccas started in the city of Ambon, on 19 January 1999. At this time NMP was still part of MP[3]. Violence erupted on the last day of Ramadhan, with riots between Muslim (migrants) and Christian youths. The violent clashes soon spread around Ambon and other parts of MP. As soon as mosques and churches were set ablaze, or just rumours of it, the religious divide became the strongest mobilising factor (Van Klinken 2001: 3-4). Many women and children also got actively involved, as they helped making homemade weapons, and sometimes fight as well (HD Centre, LIPI & Current Asia 2011: 18). The deaths and displacement significantly escalated due to the involvement of *Pasukan Siluman* (deserted security personnel) and the subsequent spread of professional modern weapons, and by the arrival of the *Laskar Jihad* militia, from Java. At this

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[3] The provinces were separated in September 1999, as NMP was created.

time, in June 2000, the central government issued the status of civil emergency and heavy military reinforcements were positioned in MP, where the special joint battalion, Yongab, contributed to a decline of the conflict, along with their extended mandate, allowing curfew etc. (Brown, Wilson et al. 2005: 15-17). The emergency status lasted until September 2003 in MP, even though the formal peace agreement, Malino II, was signed on February 11, 2002 (ibid.)

2.1.2 Overview of the Communal Wars in NMP

When the communal wars in MP had raged for months, NMP had still avoided any outbreaks of large-scale violence, as most people regarded the violence to be a local Ambonese thing. However, tensions arose in the area of Kao-Malifut, as the Government Regulation No. 42/1999 was passed. This formally established a new *kecamatan* (sub-district) of Malifut, for the Makian transmigrants, who had lived in the area for 25 years. [4] For most of that time, they had been lobbying for their own *kecamatan* (Duncan 2005). The indigenous ethnic Kaos strongly opposed this initiative, but partly since they were not well represented in the local government (unlike the Makians), the sub-district was made legit (Brown, Wilson et al. 2005: 31, Duncan 2005: 61).

Relations between the two ethnic groups had been tense from the very beginning. The Kaos' regarded the land given to the Makians, to be their ancestral land and they perceived that the Makians received privileged treatment by the (Makian-dominated) local government. According to the Makians though, '…the indigenous [Kao] people were lazy and resented the Makian for their economic and political successes'[5] (Duncan 2005: 63). The Makians further viewed the land given to them being from the national government, and did not recognise the Kaos *adat*-based ownership (Wilson 2005). In addition, Makians are Muslim, while the Kaos are

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[4] The Makians had been replaced there, against the will of many, by the Indonesian Government in 1975, due to increased volcanic activity on Makian Island.

[5] Makians have a long tradition of valuing education and employment in the bureaucracy, and their success in these areas are more related to hard work, than aristocratic connections with the sultanate in Ternate (Van Klinken (2007: 115).

majority Christian, yet, with a minority of around 10 percent being 'Kao Muslim'. The stakes were raised higher in June 1999, as mining company PT Nusa Halmahera Mineral (NHM) [6], initiated open-cut goldmining in Gosowong, southwest of Malifut, with 90 percent of the local employees hired being of Makian ethnicity (Wilson 2005). Additionally, many Kaos feared that the legal recognition of *kecamatan* Malifut would be a step towards making Malifut a capital of a possible future regency, which would entitle the Malifut community with large royalties from the mining. Another serious objection from the Kao community was the new *kecamatan's* border, which included five Kao villages that would thus be cut off from their *adat*-community in *kecamatan* Kao.

In line with the Kaos' continued opposition to the new *kecamatan*, the conflict escalated on August 18, 1999 and violence broke out in Sosol, which is one of the Kao villages that was included, against their will, in the Makian *kecamatan*. The dispute escalated as Sosol was burned to the ground by Makians, who torched both churches and schools, and the villagers fled to the capital, Kao[7] (Wilson 2005: 83). Later, the Kao village of Wangeotak faced the same trajectory. The Kaos counterattacked over the next few days, destroying infrastructure in the eastern part of Malifut, but were eventually stopped as security forces arrived from Tobelo town (Wilson 2005).

The new *bupati* (regent) of North Maluku Regency, Rusli Andiaco, along with the sultan of Ternate, Mudaffar Syah, then visited Kao, in a mediation-attempt to prevent escalation. The Kao leaders' demanded the cancellation of *kecamatan* Malifut and that the government would rebuild Sosol and Wangeotak, while some even demanded the exodus of the Makian community from the area (Wilson 2005: 85). Within the next couple of months, the Kao leaders' tried to solve the conflict using diplomacy, but received no reconstruction funds for the destroyed villages,

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[6] NHM is 75 percent owned by Australian Newcrest Mining Ltd, and 25 percent by PT Aneka Tambang (Persero) (www.nhm.co.id).

[7] *Kao* is, somewhat confusingly, the name of the capital of *kecamatan* Kao, name of the indigenous ethnic population of Kao that includes the Pagu, Modole, Tobelo Boeng, and Toliliko that includes the Kao Islam sub-ethnic group.

nor was the Makian *kecamatan* revoked. When a couple of months had passed without any action from the government, Kao leaders decided to retaliate against the Makian themselves. They used homemade weapons[8] and magical attacks[9] (Wilson 2005). On 25 October 1999, the Kao militia leader, Benny Bitjara, led about 15,000 *Pasukan* (militia) Kao and attacked Malifut. The security forces were completely outnumbered, and could not interfere. Many Makians had already fled, following the rising tensions, however, the remaining Makians in Malifut were overwhelmed and fled, leaving only three casualties (Wilson 2005: 88). The subsequent destruction was massive, as the Kaos burned and/or bombed all 16 villages in Malifut. As the Makians shared stories about the horrors of the conflict in Kao-Malifut, coupled with the ongoing inter-religious communal wars in MP, tensions quickly increased in Ternate City, as well as on the neighbouring island Tidore (ibid.).

The trigger that started large-scale violence became 'the Bloody Sosol letter' (*Sosol Berdarah*), which called for Christians to cleanse the area of Muslims, Makians in particular. Even though the letter was quickly found to be unauthentic, it had been photocopied and distributed to many Muslim communities in Ternate, and Tidore, by Makian leader Fahri Almari[10], as well as members of the district parliament (Wilson 2008: 84). On November 3, anti-Christian riots erupted with direct relation to *Sosol Berdarah,* which started with the lynching of Reverend Risakotta, head of *Gereja Protestan Maluku* (GPM) the protestant church on Tidore. He was hacked to death with machetes, and subsequently set on fire, by an angry crowd after trying to explain that the letter was false. The following riots killed 35 Christians, three churches were set on fire, and 260 homes left shattered, and all surviving Christians became IDPs and were evacuated from Tidore by the navy (Wilson 2008: 86, Duncan 2005: 67). Three days later the riots spread to Ternate, as hundreds of armed

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[8] This included: bows and arrows, spears, shields, machetes, and made their own style of the Molotov cocktail by extracting sulfur from bombs found on sunken Japanese WWII battleships.
[9] According to interviews by Christopher Duncan, the Kaos claim they killed several Makians using people with strong magical powers '*ilmu gaib*'.
[10] For a discussion of the possible origin of the false letter, see (Wilson 2008: 84).

Muslims entered the streets wearing white headbands, the colour used by the Muslim forces in the communal violence in MP. Therefore, they were called *Pasukan Putih*, the white troops, and the Sultan of Ternate's *adat*-forces were wearing yellow, thus called *Pasukan Kuning* (yellow troops). In the riots, 31 people were killed, 353 houses destroyed, along with six churches, and the Indonesian navy subsequently had to evacuate over 19,000, mostly Christians, to Sulawesi and Halmahera (Wilson 2008: 89). As *Pasukan Kuning* and the Sultan of Ternate were defeated by *Pasukan Putih*, the sultan surrendered and left North Maluku, and importantly, had to agree not to run in the upcoming gubernatorial election, revealing some of the political elites' incentives (Barron, Azca et al. 2012: 66).

After the Ternate riots, the violence spread to Halmahera again, as *Pasukan Putih,* attacked Christian villages, as revenge for the destruction of Malifut. Many IDPs fled to majority Christian areas, as Tobelo city, North Sulawesi or Bacan, and brought with them stories of the horrors of war. There were multi-faith efforts aimed at easing the rising tensions, for example to dismiss false rumours, but eventually violence erupted in Tobelo and in the neighbouring Sub-district of Galela, including several massacres in the name of religion. Soon after this the violence engulfed most areas of NMP, such as Bacan, Morotai, and Obi. In June 2000, over a hundred Christians were killed by *Pasukan Putih* and the Government of Indonesia (GoI) declared civil emergency, along with troop reinforcements (Brown, Wilson et al. 2005). However, this GoI initiative happened after the two sides already had fought to a stalemate in Tobelo/Galela, with considerable losses on both sides—leading to widespread conflict fatigue, coupled with a realisation that neither side could win, as the military now blocked any movements of militias (Barron, Azca et al. 2012: 11).

2.1.3 The Post-conflict Period

The term 'post-conflict period' may be conceptually blurred, as (minor) violent episodes continued to occur, even after the official end of the wars. Here, the term refers to the time when the wars had stopped, thus July 2000 in NMP (February

2002 in MP) and most reports stretch the post-conflict period up until 2008, since large-scale violence were almost non-existent after that, also in MP (Barron, Azca et al. 2012). GoI's major (but late) response had been the implementation of civil emergency status, which lasted until May 2003 in NMP, and September 2003 in MP. The official GoI peace initiative, the Malino II peace agreement, in 2002, mainly focused on MP. Even after this period, episodes of violence have continued to erupt in MP from time to time. In February 2012, five people were killed and several houses burned to the ground on Haruku Island in MP.[11]

Contrary to the continued violence in MP, NMP has almost completely managed to avoided new large-scale episodes of violence. When it did erupt, the violence was related to the gubernatorial election in 2007, as the voting count was disputed between Thaib Armaiyn and Abdul Gafur. No deaths occurred, however, bullets were fired and bombs were used, and around 50 people were injured, leaving 34 buildings damaged or destroyed (Barron, Azca et al. 2012: 21-22). To sum up the post-conflict period, it is important to note that the Malino II accord constituted a turning point in the GoI's response to conflict management, and entered a phase more focused on conflict recovery and peace-building. However, the Malino II was only focused on MP, which left much of the peace-building and reconciliation work in NMP to local actors and people at the grassroots level.

2.1.4 Peace, Development and Reconciliation Efforts

In NMP, the GoI's main approach was to re-inforce the security forces. The different actions of the Indonesian military (TNI) in relation to peace and reconciliation in NMP were ambiguous throughout the conflict and post-conflict period. In the latter, they did help to facilitate some of the early reconciliation efforts in NHR, called the Mamuya meetings (starting in August 2000).

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[11] At that time, I was visiting the Moluccas for the first time and was staying at the neighbouring Island of Saparua, right opposite Haruku. The following week, when visiting nearby Seram Island, I witnessed rifled-armed militia, as they passed by the village I resided on, as violence erupted again in central Maluku, within MP.

The number of participants grew with each meeting, and the third gathering was large, attended by 600 people from both communities, as well as the current Vice-president Megawati and other officials from the national and regional governments. Yet, as Duncan (2008: 223) argues, these had minor impact, sometimes even contrary effect, as some people were offended by statements from officials insisting that 'all is well' and that people should forget the past. There were also some minor new outbreaks of violence in NMP, which have been blamed on provocations by some military units, trying to extend their stay and thus profit from the unrest. This led to demands from many villages throughout NMP to get rid of the military presence (Duncan 2005: 79).

Therefore, most other peace meetings were organised locally, without military involvement, for example the *Halmahera Baku Dapa 1*, 20-31 January 2000. It was sponsored by the Christian organisation Halmahera Community Resilience Organisation, and agreement was made that reconciliation efforts should be based locally, utilising *adat* cultural traditions, to bridge the religious divide (Barron, Azca et al. 2012). Similar local interfaith initiatives, which ended with local peace agreements, happened in the town of Jailolo (western Halmahera) and in *kecamatan* Sahu (Duncan 2014: 107).

On 19 April 2001, a peace declaration was made in Tobelo, involving leaders from both religious communities. The ceremony was held in the traditional *Hibualamo*[12] field, and the language used was the local ethnic-based Tobelo language. Other similarly local peace declaration was signed in Morotai on 29 May, and in Galela on 30 June. The largest event was perhaps the declaration to work for the establishment of a new regency in North Halmahera, on 12 January 2002, which brought several leaders from the two sides together with agreements to (re)build solidarity between all groups in the future regency (Barron, Azca et al. 2012). In the light of increasingly successful peace-building locally in NMP, the GoI focused on funding reconstruction and recovery programmes, allocating large budgets to the

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[12] Traditional Tobelo community *adat*-house.

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local governments over a three-year period, beginning in 2004. Another focus for the national, and regional, governments was to resolve the many complicated problems involving IDPs. Progress has been made and in April 2004, about 75 percent of the 200,000 displaced people in NMP had returned home, or permanently settled elsewhere. Problems hindering a complete resolution involve corruption of IDP funds, reluctance of some IDPs to return to their native villages, as well as resentment among some local communities, arguing that the IDPs receive privileged treatment by the government (Brown, Wilson et al. 2005).

Humanitarian responses have also involved several non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs), where the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been a key coordinating player. Focus areas for the INGOs have been health and sanitation, education programmes, livelihoods assistance, rebuilding infrastructure, as well as mental rehabilitation. These efforts were often carried out by local NGOs, (often sponsored by INGOs), as local actors often have better impact and legitimacy with the local population. Most efforts have been regarded fruitful, yet, critique has arisen claiming that the coordination has been poor[13] between INGOs and the provincial and national governments (Brown, Wilson et al. 2005).

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[13] 'Poor coordination' in this context should be understood as the diplomatic way of highlighting corruption of INGO-sponsored IDP funds, by the provincial government elite (Smith 2009).

3 Conceptual Framework

I argue that this framework, in a broad sense, is an example of development theory as conceptualised by Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2010: 1-2) that interlinks politics, ideology and explanation, aiming to establish a critical and systematic approach to reflections regarding the research problem. Therefore, it merges various concepts and notions, as well as brings to light the legacies of colonialism, which is needed in order to fully understand the historical roots to the communal wars in the Moluccas.

3.1 European Colonialism and Neo-patrimonialism

This part first sheds light on the dark legacies of European colonialism, as some of these legacies still linger on today in the former colonies. The second part explains and discusses the conceptual underpinnings of neo-patrimonialism.

3.1.1 Legacies and Characteristics of European Colonialism

It should not be denied that the historic roots of the development field has been influenced by the ideas of Enlightenment and the European powers ventures of conquest, trade and colonialism, and the subsequent spread of capitalism (Li 2007). Thus, the ideas of evolution and progress were inherent to the view of the irrevocable development of societies in stages, where the Western world was the obvious role model (Cowen, Shenton 1996).

During the 19th century, arguments about alleged racial superiority of Europeans started to gain ground at the end of the century. In relation to the development field, these racist ideas can be exemplified by the poem from 1899: *the white man's burden* (to improve the Natives' lives) (Li 2007: 32). A common colonial tactic was division of local communities, using various strategies. Sometimes the divide was racialized and oftentimes coupled with notions of different subgroups' potential for

improvement. This had of course horrific consequences for those deemed 'unimprovable', as some people or subgroups could be annihilated, in line with the rationale of natural selection (Li 2007: 15). Thus, oppression was a strong characteristic of the Europeans' rule—a structure that was often put into practice indirectly, as the colonial powers preferred to reinforce existing local elite rulers. This enabled more efficient accumulation of wealth for the colonisers, and their companies, by scaling up the pre-established systems of appanages, forced labour, tax farms, usury, and most importantly for the colonisers—the trading monopolies (ibid.: 32).

A prevailing pattern was that the colonisers, and their elite puppets, used their increased wealth to further cement their positions of power, leaving the local population poor, and often marginalised (Jönsson, Jerneck et al. 2012: 85). Likewise, land rights and geographical borders were to a large extent manipulated and drawn by the colonial powers, which included, as Johnson (2009: 176) argues: 'the systematic erosion of customary rights to land…'.

A further tactic adopted by the colonial powers to legitimise their rule, was to reinforce the locals' indigenous traditions, as they stressed the importance of preventing the locals to become too much like their colonial masters. Thus, somewhat absurdly, as Li writes (2007: 15) 'Intervention was needed to teach (or oblige) natives to be truly themselves'. Important to note moreover, is that some institutions crystallised during colonialism and some traits, or consequences, still linger on today. Local elites were often bribed and provided weapons, in order to rule (suppress) the local population (Jönsson, Jerneck et al. 2012: 86).

Since many developing states were to a large extent shaped and influenced by colonialism, it is vital to understand this part of their history, in order to understand the present, or more recent history (Mahoney, Thelen 2009). Thus, in this thesis the colonial legacies are recognised, however, they are seen as one of many parts in a multidimensional understanding of the developments in NMP.

3.1.2 Neo-patrimonialism

Neo-patrimonialism is a child born out of a marriage between modern bureaucracy and patrimonialism (i.e. a pre-modern governance type where those with (absolute) power are governing through personal ties). Therefore, the underpinning of this governance structure involves corruption by local elites in relation to state assets, by the means of bureaucracy and industries/companies in control of the state. Atul Kohli (2004: 393) characterises the neo-patrimonial state as suffering from severe fragmentation, difficulties dealing with regional interests—this foster a national development ideology marked by inefficiency. Common implications here are that a tiny elite extract the natural resources, as well as controlling the state or domain like a family patriarch, strengthening their own position; this is often a colonial legacy, and a major obstacle to development.

3.2 The Conflict (and Peace)—Development Nexus

This nexus is of course complex and multifaceted, but put very simple: violent conflicts have several negative effects on development (World Bank 2011: 4). Violent conflict often results in a weakening of the workforce through involvement in the violence, and also indirectly by displacement, restrictions of movement, hunger and disease. Damages to social, and physical, infrastructure negatively impacts power supplies, transport networks, as well as health and education services. Econometric studies have provided evidence showing a clear connection between insecurity and poverty, as well as vice versa (Thomas, Williams 2013: 307). Therefore, many of these trends will be reversed if violence is substituted with the consolidation of peace.

3.3 Decentralisation

Decentralisation in this thesis should be understood as the process where 'central governments transfer political, fiscal and administrative powers to lower levels in an administrative and territorial hierarchy' (Duncan 2007: 713). Consequently, it is closely linked to the notion of (increased) regional autonomy. In a global

perspective, the last decades have witnessed an increasing decentralisation-trend, oftentimes backed by influential multi-lateral institutions, for example the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (Subbarao, White 2005). Proponents of decentralisation claim that there are links between good governance and decentralisation, as it creates incentives for local officials to be more responsive to local needs and aspirations (Ribot 2004: 11). It is further stressed that decentralisation is in line with a growing democratisation process, since it is supposed to transfer political control, closer the local citizens (Crook, Manor 1998, Manor, World Bank 1999).

It is hypothesised that accountability increases along with greater community participation, which in turn should foster better political policies and less corruption (Agrawal, Ribot 1999). However, the question of decreasing corruption has been heavily debated, and likely more factors/contexts need to be considered, see for example Bardhan and Mookherje (2000) and Fisman and Gatti (2002). Champions of decentralisation further stress that natural resource management will be improved, given decreased power distances to the local communities—they argue that if people have a connection to the environment, it is more likely that sustainable practices are adopted (Kaimowitz, Ribot 2002).

Furthermore, on the one hand, decentralisation is theorised to have a positive impact for minority groups within countries, since they should be better recognised and acknowledged if they gain increased control over political processes (Kaimovitz, Vallejos et al. 1998, Kälin 1999). On the other hand, others oppose that view, and claim that local elites easily get corrupted when power is suddenly decentralised in their favour, which may result in continued marginalisation and exclusion of certain minority groups (Resosudarmo 2004, Hadiz 2004). Critical analysts maintain that the regional elite sometimes only remain accountable towards majority groups, as they (their votes) are most important to secure their power in a democratic vote. Correspondingly, local minority groups risk being marginalised (Ribot 2004). This is in line with findings from a UNDP report (2006: 36), in Vietnam, which stated that the widely held prejudice that 'ethnic minorities have low capacity and a low

intellectual level has been a significant obstacle to increased minority participation'. Lastly, as Gerry van Klinken argues, if decentralisation of power also involves substantial increases of funds, coupled with vague or insufficient anti-corruption monitoring, it may create polarisation and competition among local elites, in order to gain monetary benefits from the transition (Van Klinken 2007: 112-113). To sum up, decentralisation in theory, is attached with many benefits in a democratic perspective, however, to move from theory to practice has also triggered problems in relation to rapid shifts of authority.

3.4 Illiberal Peace-building and Hybrid Political Orders

This section first introduces the concept of illiberal peace-building, where it will be defined and discussed in relation to the liberal model. The second part conceptualises and discusses hybrid political orders.

3.4.1 Illiberal Peace-building

In this thesis, illiberal peace-building should be understood as an approach where a central government uses autocratic/illiberal methods to secure peace, such as restoring neo-patrimonial networks, halting democratic elections, rolling back reforms of the bureaucracy, re-establishing heavy military presence and impunity for corrupt local elites, (if they are loyal to the central government) (Smith 2014). These methods are often considered unpalatable by the central government, yet necessary, in order to reach a negative peace (i.e., the absence of war) (Galtung 1969, Smith 2014). In order to further conceptualise illiberal models of peace-building, it is helpful to also introduce more characteristics of the liberal model, to highlight discrepancies.

The majority of the international peace-building interventions after the Cold War have followed the liberal model's logic. In essence here, is the 'triple transition': moving from war to peace through the social, political and economic spheres (Paris, Sisk 2009). The international UN intervention in Timor Leste can serve as an empirical example of liberal-sponsored peace-building, whereas Mahindra

Rajapaksa's peace-building in Sri Lanka often is depicted as a hybrid with strong illiberal traits (Höglund, Orjuela 2012). Programmes following a liberal, or neoliberal rationale, commonly promote reforms of the security and legal sectors, political and market deregulations, decentralisation and the creation/strengthening of democratic institutions. Within academia, following the dominance of liberal peace-building in practice, much attention has focused on assessing the liberal model's implementation. Here, a common critique being the failure to sponsor state-building when moving from theory to practice (Paris, Sisk 2009).

Moreover, scholars have highlighted several unintended 'illiberal effects' caused by liberal peace-building efforts, such as higher degrees of violence in post-conflict periods (Berdal, Suhrke 2013), establishment of predatory elites (Richmond 2009), discouragement of development vis-à-vis security (Duffield 2001), weaker local governance (especially welfare institutions) (Hughes 2009), exclusion of local representation and destabilising effects of democratisation (Mac Ginty 2008). Another frequent issue in the critical literature on liberal peace-building is the promotion of *Western* democratic institutions as a universal model. First, it results in a depiction of states that does not meet this criteria as automatically portrayed as 'failed/fragile' and thus, according to scholars of critical development theory, this idea can be viewed as part of Western cultural imperialism (Escobar 2011). Second, given that the modern Western-style Weberian state hardly exists outside the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), it thus exposes the narrowness of the concept (Boege, Brown et al. 2008).

Third, it largely ignores the historical contexts of many post-colonial developing countries as still being in the beginning of a state-building process, if compared to state-building processes in the Western world which took centuries (Hameiri 2007). Consequently, it falls into the pit of one-dimensional cookie-cutter recipes for development that lack an awareness of colonial legacies (Jönsson, Jerneck et al. 2012: 89, Kohli 2004). Hence, these models do not provide a suitable lens for analysing non-liberal, often state-led, peace-building efforts. Having said that, illiberal means of conflict resolution have of course also produced failed outcomes,

but that has not always been the case (Smith 2014). Sometimes states have deliberately chosen to follow a different path. Academics have revealed that illiberal means in some cases have contributed to violence reduction in conflict areas and thus have potential to be part of a stable route to peace, and not always an indication of state failure (Smith 2014: 1510). However, given the (democratic) costs related to illiberal peace-building, it is necessary to carefully examine its effect on violent conflict, sustainable peace and development.

3.4.2 Hybrid Political Orders

Many countries that have aimed to transition from autocracy to democracy, have met resistance along the way and sometimes ended up in a hybrid position, for a short or longer period of time. The term 'hybrid political order' has been discussed by several scholars in different academic disciplines, thus including a multitude of analyses, comparisons and categorisations between different regime types (Widmalm, Oskarsson 2010, Wigell 2008, Brownlee 2009, Diamond 2002). The adoption of the concept 'hybrid political order' is relevant for this study, because illiberal peace-building is a model predominantly used by states in transition to democracy, characterised by a contested political environment.

I have chosen to implement the concept as presented by Volker Boege et al. (2008: 10), they stress that places often depicted as 'fragile' are diverse in the sense that authority is highly contested and competing power-claims usually exist, overlap, and interact, such as: 'the logic of the *formal* state, of traditional *informal* societal order (e.g., *adat* laws in Indonesia), and of *globalisation* and associated *social fragmentation* (which is present in various forms: ethnic, income level, religious…)'. Claire Smith (2014) argues that the consequences of liberals, neo-liberals and illiberals unwillingness to negotiate with different models of peacebuilding, other than the model corresponding to their own worldview, often result in more deadly outcomes. Negotiated settlements between 'ideologically incompatible' enemies may be politically unpleasant. However, the alternatives, such as foreign military intervention, often turn out more disastrous for all parties

(Smith 2014). Previous research regarding some of the so-called failing states, has demonstrated successful consolidations of (negative) peace, in regard to halting violent episodes and the promotion of basic levels of economic, social and political stability, by engaging with illiberal means. Here, the theory is suggesting, as Smith (2014: 1511) conveys:

> The sustenance or creation of neo-patrimonial networks can buy in restive local elites to a central state-building project—cementing emergent or contested forms of a state and securing forms of peace.

3.6 Reconciliation

In this section I initially conceptualise reconciliation and present the definition(s) adopted in this thesis. This is followed by a section where the concept is problematized, and lastly revitalisation of traditional culture is discussed in relation to reconciliation.

3.6.1 Conceptualising Reconciliation

When episodes of violence or wars have been brought to an end, there are often lingering 'negative emotional residues', which might ignite violence again if not removed (Jeong 2009: 214). Every conflict is different, but there are very few violent conflicts that do not result in physical and emotional separations among the involved communities. The foundations of such divisions feed on continued uncertainty, anger and fear. If widespread, this presents serious challenges to building a sustainable peace in the post-conflict era. Difficulties relating to such processes have been evident in post-conflict reconciliation efforts in former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone and Cambodia. Such cases have displayed that the post-conflict process is often marked by distress as emotional injuries linger due to post-traumatic stress disorders, caused by the previous exposure to atrocities, death of family members and friends. This is often coupled with anger due to loss of employment and property, as well as internal displacement. Troubles regarding the

suppression of grief and fear may end up in desires for restorative justice and revenge (Jeong 2009). Therefore, reconciliation is necessary to put in a wider context that incorporates both psychological, as well as negative social effects of violent conflict, for example alienation and marginalisation. Since recent history of violent conflict horrors are likely to linger on in the minds of many people, reconciliation efforts need to be carefully considered and seen as a long-term process with several dimensions. These dimensions, or notions, come with various labels by scholars from different disciplines.

Most agree that *coexistence* is a vital first objective of reconciliation (Jeong 2009, Bhargava 2012, Sampson 2003). Political theorist Rajeev Bhargava describes coexistence as the thin notion of reconciliation, which could be characterised as 'reconciliation as resignation' (Bhargava 2012). This is further a common notion of reconciliation if a war has ended in a stalemate between two sides. This stems from that both sides have to adapt to the fact that no side won and thus expectations have to be adjusted in line with coexistence. However, as Ho-Won Jeong proclaims 'In order to realise coexistence, the most essential element is a change in the attitudes and behaviour of the adversaries' (Jeong 2009: 214). Elementary parts of this is to establish mutual respect for each other's different identities and thus grow a common humanity in order to encourage a new future deprived of othering, dehumanisation, fear and similar notions that may be used to justify aggression between groups.

If communities are to be able to move on after having experienced a violent conflict, there is need for social space where people can express their grief, and also confronting lingering fears and/or myths relating to the troubled past. Social bonds may be re-twined by the means of initiating processes of mourning and remembrance (Daly, Sarkin 2011). Ho-Won Jeong (2009: 214) reasons that:

> Rehumanizing the enemy may start from a commitment to take the risk of a journey for reconciliation and to accept the choice to forgive. The process of restoring justice starts with the admission of guilt by perpetrators and public apology.

Relating to the pros of decentralisation and regional autonomy (see 3.3), it has also been argued that these processes, in theory, improve conflict resolution and reconciliation, as local people can play a bigger role (Laksono 2004, Permana 2002). This argument stems from the idea that local village leaders possess unique knowledge and understanding regarding local forms of conflict resolution, for example customary law, which outside mediators often lack.

3.6.2 Problematizing Reconciliation

Recent cases of violent conflicts in different parts of the globe have often been followed by cookie cutter attempts for reconciliation, typically involving models for truth commissions, (effective) law enforcement, justice, human rights, and sometimes amnesty and forgiveness (Bräuchler 2009: 3). Proponents of such approaches have often been INGOs embedded in liberal-peacebuilding operations (Lambourne 2009, Mac Ginty 2008). There is a need to problematize such attempts to reconciliation in order to avoid approaches cloaked in universality, and particularly, approaches containing un-reflexive standardisation of comparative models (Huyse 2003: 163, Darby 2003).

Steve Sampson has highlighted a further critique, as he claims that most reconciliation approaches take for granted that the situation prior to the outbreak of violent conflict, should have been characterised by peace, friendship and understanding. However, as Sampson puts it (2002: 181) such circumstances most likely existed only as someone's nostalgia. Another potential problem relating to reconciliation is the ambiguity of the term itself; what exactly *is* reconciliation? There is a vast amount of different conceptualisations relating to various understandings of reconciliation, revealing a 'concept that defies clarity' (Weinstein 2011). This is related to the inherent multidimensionality of the concept itself. It is a process intersecting at various levels, for example, between different nations, communities, persons, as well as between the individual and community level (Bräuchler 2009: 3). In this thesis, two notions of reconciliation have been selected, to aid the subsequent analysis. The first is Bhargava's weak notion of

reconciliation—*peaceful coexistence* (described above). The second is a stronger version of the concept, characterised as 'a condition that must be realised by collective effort of two or more groups', as well as 'refers to the cancellation of enmity or estrangement, via the owning-up of responsibility for wrongdoing followed by forgiveness' (Bhargava 2012: 371). This stronger notion of reconciliation is regularly associated with accountability, apologising/forgiveness and shared truth (Duncan 2015).

3.6.3 Reconciliation by a Revitalisation of Traditional Culture

In relation to an amplified critique of the marginal achievements of top-down approaches to reconciliation, grassroots approaches have gained momentum. Many of these efforts have in common that they have focused on localised cultural, traditional and indigenous practices (Babo-Soares 2004, Bräuchler 2009, Baines 2007). Apart from being bottom-up in general, they differ from the universally-cloaked approaches since they are argued to better capture the agency of the local people and civil society actors.

Furthermore, they have a greater potential to grasp the relevant sociocultural peace-building context, being anchored from below (Bräuchler 2009, Duncan 2015). Important understandings here, (given that these approaches are based on culture, are that this concept is adaptive, as well as diverse, depending on different conceptualisations in different places and over time, as socio-political realities are dynamic (Bräuchler 2009: 888). Relating to this is a view of identity, whether it is currently most influenced by culture, or political factors, as a notion that can be rearticulated in the present, as well as constructed in the future (Hall 1996, Hall 1985: 113). Partly relating to this diverse and subjective character of traditional cultural approaches, critics have argued that approaches based on localised traditional notions, such as customary law, also involve risks, especially in heterogeneous regions comprising various ethnic groups, as well as migrant populations. This is because these groups could hold different traditional understandings in relation to peace and conflict management. Thus, a dominant

ethnic group's traditional way of reconciling the community, could be excluding migrants, or push them to assimilate to the dominant groups' customary rules, and thus face the danger of being counter-productive (as it may cause further disputes) (Acciaioli 2001).

4 Methodology

This chapter presents the methodological and philosophical considerations I have made in relation to this study. It includes discussions on reflexivity, the qualitative case study design, the data-collection methods, assessment of secondary sources, as well as qualitative data analysis.

4.1 Methodological and Philosophical Considerations

I agree with David Silverman (2013: 10) who stresses that research becomes more effective if arbitrary assumptions about the intrinsic superiority of certain methods are rejected. Indeed, within development studies, much research mirror this view, as inter-disciplinarity and mix-methods are common (Sumner, Tribe 2008). In this thesis, the methods have been chosen with consideration of the research problem and research questions. Therefore, a combination of qualitative methods (RCA and in-depth interviews) have been preferred, since my aim does not put emphasis on answering questions of 'how many?', nor to generate a usable large-n dataset etc. This design may still be labelled a mixed methods approach, since the mixing is not limited to a mix of quantitative and qualitative designs (Morse, Niehaus 2009: 20). This design reflects my preference, in this study, to explore 'how?' and 'why?' questions. This interest connects well with an ontological recognition of multiple realities.

This thesis is not theory-driven and thus mainly inductive. The theoretical framework will predominantly be adopted as a way to guide the analysis, to make sense of the findings, in contrast to a deductive cause-and-effect based design. Therefore, this study has incorporated an interpretive framework, or worldview, related to social constructivism, since the participants' subjective meanings are recognised as having been negotiated socially and historically (Creswell 2012: 24-25). Axiologically, I agree with the claim that research is value-laden and may not

be fully free from bias (Hoglund, Oberg 2011). I view the participants in this study as people with agency and voice, (and not as merely sources of data), the methods chosen reflects this epistemological view. This is evident by my aim of adopting a two-way process focusing on inclusion of the participants and positioning of the researcher as a listener (May 2011: 21). The in-depth interviews and RCAs were complemented by an analysis of relevant secondary sources. Additionally, two email interviews were conducted with prominent scholars, who have published extensively on conflict, decentralisation, peace-building, development and reconciliation efforts in North Maluku, namely, Anthropologist Christopher Duncan[14] and Political Scientist Christopher Wilson.[15] Both have experience of extensive periods of fieldwork in NMP as well.

4.1.1 Reflexivity

Research is never completely free from bias and therefore the best way of reducing it, is to be transparent about the study's design, including my own background, role, motivations and previous experiences, in relation to the research problem—this improves the validity and reliability of the study (Sumner, Tribe 2008: 187, Jönsson, Jerneck et al. 2012).

My interest in Indonesia was initially sparked through backpacking around the beautiful far-stretched and diverse archipelago, while I studied half of my undergraduate degree in Peace and Conflict Studies at Gadjah Mada University (UGM), in Yogyakarta. While there, I interned at the Center for Security and Peace Studies at UGM and gained an increased understanding of many aspects of Indonesian culture and politics, as well as an intermediate proficiency in Bahasa Indonesia, which I would argue is indispensable in order to carry out fieldwork in Indonesia in a meaningful way. Language skills are also useful for internal

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[14] His publications in relation to issues discussed in this thesis: (Duncan 2014), (Duncan 2009), (Duncan 2008), (Duncan 2007), (Duncan 2007), (Duncan 2005), (Duncan 2005), (Duncan 2003), and (Duncan 2000).

[15] His publications related to this thesis: (Wilson 2015), (Wilson 2011), (Wilson 2008), (Wilson 2006), (Wilson 2005), (Brown, Wilson et al. 2005), and (Wilson 2001).

evaluation of linguistic codes and expressions (Dulic 2011: 40). My bachelor's thesis was also focused on the Moluccas, as I conducted in-depth interviews with Moluccan youths' that had experienced the communal wars (Björkhagen 2013). My previous experience has aided the preparations for this study, and careful preparations are part of doing ethical research (Brydon 2006). Later during my current master programme, I was able to return for an internship at GRM International (now Palladium). Here, among many tasks, I had the opportunity to participate in two RCA studies—one pilot study on Java, and another in West Papua, focused on education.[16]

After the internship I also worked as a consultant in another RCA study focused on perspectives and experiences of international migrant workers from Indonesian Borneo (The RCA+ Project Team 2015). Doing fieldwork always involves a range of complex ethical issues relating to ownership, exploitation and knowledge generation (Scheyvens, Storey 2003), and participatory fieldwork can be particularly difficult to carry out (Bell, Brambilla 2001). Here, I will address some important considerations in relation to the methods used in this study, where the overarching rule is to do no harm (and hopefully to do good)[17] (Brounéus 2011: 141, Momsen 2006: 47).

This study's overarching methodology aims to counter the tendency of mainstream development discourse that tends to legitimise the voices of Western 'experts', often at the expense of marginalised local voices (Escobar 1995). Apart from that, I took several actions to improve the ethical standard of the research. First, I always made it clear to all participants in the study that participation was completely voluntary and could be cancelled at any time. Second, for the interviews, the participants were told about the study by reading and signing an informed consent form, which was always verbally translated into Bahasa Indonesia, to avoid

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[16] This RCA study was commissioned by KIAT Guru and Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership (ACDP).

[17] For example, by giving voice to people who have largely been marginalised by the regime or neglected by previous research.

misunderstandings. Additionally, my interview guide and research aims were approved by my supervisor, as well as in general by Sida, in line with fulfilling the Minor Field Study (MFS) criteria. Third, full confidentiality was also an option for all respondents in the in-depth interviews.[18] In RCA studies, the identities of the people and exact locations of the RCAs are always kept confidential. I acknowledge that this may reduce the general reliability of the methodology, yet, the ethical concerns (to protect the participants) are more important here. Storing the collected data in a secure way is also important, particularly when doing a study in a politically sensitive environment, containing confidential data[19] (Höglund, Öberg 2011: 11).

Dukono eruption seen from Tobelo.

Photo: Martin Björkhagen

A risk assessment that identifies potential hazards and considers possible solutions if they occur, are also required before entering the field (Binns 2006: 16). This included a desk research of potential hazards (e.g., possible new outbreaks of violence, malaria, location of health facilities etc.). The malaria precautions proved necessary, as one member in my host household (HHH) in the Kao area unfortunately was infected during my stay, yet she was cured as treatment was provided quickly. I was caught in an ashfall from the active Dukono volcano in NHR. Fortunately for the study, this was in the very end of the fieldwork. However, I learned the hard way that volcanic ash may quickly spread hundreds of miles given strong wind, and inhaling even small parts of it can be hazardous[20], as it contains tiny abrasive particles of rock and natural glass (Horwell, Baxter 2006). In a development perspective, volcanic activity is not only a threat to humans, but to livestock, (jet-driven) aircrafts, it may damage machines and electronics, as well as

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[18] Yet, nobody chose that option among the interviewees.

[19] I encrypted all files using the open source software Axantum AxCrypt.

[20] Subsequently, I developed respiratory pain and dizziness, and in Sweden I was diagnosed with possible pneumonia. This left me bedridden for some months and delayed the hand-in of this thesis.

interrupting power generations (Horwell, Baxter 2006). In Indonesia, 69 million people live inside the risk area of 30 km distance to one of the 142 volcanoes (Preventionweb 2015). Another thing that is important to reflect about is the identity of the researcher, as the various perceptions of certain traits (e.g., gender, personality, age, class, ethnicity, nationality, religion, dress code etc.) may influence the actions and information shared by participants (Höglund 2011: 124). Further, in order to thwart hierarchical tendencies between the participants and myself, I followed the advice of Janet Henshall Momsen (2006: 47) who contends that constant reflexivity, along with continuous reassessments of one's positionality and assumptions are required. During my fieldwork in NMP, I volunteered to teach English to local children in Ternate, which I found to be both fun and a chance to connect and give back to the community.

4.2 A Qualitative Case Study

In contrast to most previous studies regarding NMP, this study adopted a qualitative case study design, a methodology that is receptive to inter-disciplinary strategies (Wallensteen 2011: 17, Denscombe 2009: 43). This design acknowledges the complexity of conflicts and peace-building, paying attention to the contextual factors that are unique for each case, as opposed to the aim of finding commonalities to be compared between different cases. This design further permits different forms of data-collection that are useful for finding themes, patterns and for triangulating information, relating to the same case (Creswell 2012: 98).

Another data-collection method I tried during the fieldwork was focus groups, which are conducive to exploring people's experiences and opinions (Söderström 2011: 147). This method was adopted once during the fieldwork, in relation to a Muslim youth organisation, but it turned out difficult to facilitate a meaningful discussion among the group, and instead it became more of a group interview. This was likely due to several reasons, partly due to my translator who was new to this method, and also due to cultural barriers, where some group members perhaps were hesitant to discuss potentially sensitive questions in the company of many people,

or with me, an outsider. Hence, the focus group data will not be included in the study, but it was nonetheless an experience to learn from. Other approaches could also have been interesting, for example using grounded theory. That approach aims to 'move beyond description and to generate or discover a theory, a unified theoretical explanation for interactions, actions and social processes of people' (Creswell 2012: 84). However, given the time-consuming inductive design required for grounded theory, the feasible choice was to combine the qualitative methods highlighted in the beginning of this section.

4.3 RCA

This section discusses the RCA methodology, including a contextual overview and the characteristics of the method. The end of the section highlights the RCAs in this study.[21]

4.3.1 Contextual Overview

Sida, on the initiative of the Swedish Embassy in Bangladesh, pioneered this experimental qualitative approach in Bangladesh, from 2007 to 2011 (Arvidson 2013: 280). The RCA, and various other participatory approaches, for example *Most Significant Change* (MSC) (Davies, Dart 2005), *Action Learning and Planning System* (ALPS) (Aid 2006) and *appreciative inquiry* (Ludema, Cooperrider et al. 2006), have gained momentum over the last decades. This development can be viewed in the light of an increased conceptual objection towards the assumption that people living in poverty are powerless and lacking in initiative (Arvidson 2013: 280, Hulme 2004). Correspondingly, 'bottom-up' approaches have been increasingly promoted by donors and viewed as important in development planning (Momsen 2006: 49). These approaches focus on the agency of the beneficiaries and the importance (for practitioners and policy-makers) in development, to be in touch and up-to-date with the realities, contexts and

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[21] The RCA in Kao area was conducted 01.03.15-04.03.15 and the RCA in Tobelo area was conducted 05.03.15-08.03.15.

aspirations of people living in poverty, as these realities are dynamic and may change rapidly (EDG 2014: 4). However, the RCA is in general adopted as a tool within interdisciplinary and multi-methods approaches, in order to better respond to the great complexities that are intrinsic in processes of development and change over time; an example of this is the 'Koshi Hills Study' in Nepal, which used RCA, secondary data review, econometrics and Geographic Information System (GIS) (Koleros, Jupp et al. 2015). The preference of using the RCA as a component of a mixed methods approach hints at existing limitations of the method itself; if the aim is monitoring and evaluation, the RCA may lack sufficient breadth and will not generate findings that are generalizable (EDG 2014: 7). Yet, as this is well-known, the method is rarely adopted as a standalone evaluation method.

4.3.2 Methodological Characteristics of the RCA

In general, a researcher spends four consecutive days and nights in a HHH, where one interacts and explores the research theme, which also includes neighbouring households. An RCA study usually involves around 18 HHH and about 72 focal households (FHH) (neighbours) all together, as they are conducted by a team of researchers, as opposed to the RCAs in this study. Purposive sampling is used, in line with the aim of the particular study, to choose locations. In RCA, entering the community is done without gatekeepers and preferably by walking into the village (EDG 2014). This aims to promote independence and being unobtrusive, as well as to avoid 'manipulation' from different actors in a village (e.g., in selecting a HHH), and to reduce associations relating to outside interests.

It is also important to be clear about that no resource mobilisation is involved, though the researchers are encouraged to discretely leave behind a bag of basic foodstuffs (e.g., rice, cooking oil etc.), in order to compensate for the food eaten while staying with the family (EDG 2014). There are a number of essential principles in RCA methodology that researchers and practitioners should follow both to improve the study and also to adhere to ethical standards (EDG 2014, Arvidson 2013). First, *Living with* instead of visiting, aiming at experiencing the

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ordinary life of members in a household in an informal manner, trying to avoid a guest status. Thus, attention need to be directed at building rapport and maintaining good relationships involving sharing, self-disclosure and self-examination (Dickson-Swift, James et al. 2006: 856). Second, to have *informal conversations,* instead of formal interviews, to create a more relaxed atmosphere and to decrease power-distances—aiming to prevent polite but limited answers. Hence, RCA is sometimes linked to 'listening studies' and the notion of giving voice (Narayan, Patel et al. 1999). Yet, a thematic conversation guide including the themes of the study is often used discretely[22], to aid practitioners (see Appendix E for the guide used in this study). Third, *learning rather than finding out*, aiming at suspending judgement and thereby giving agency to the people in the study, though, RCA is not action research.

Fourth, *being experiential* in that practitioners actively immerse themselves in daily activities and accompany family members to, for example: school, the health clinic, work, market etc. This facilitates interaction and observation of different service providers and others, in the context of ordinary daily life routines. Fifth, *embracing multiple realities* as opposed to merely public consensus views and thus accepting a diversity and complexity of voices. Further, a cross-sectoral view is encouraged, rather than only focusing on one aspect of people's lives.

Sixth, *flexibility* of intra-method techniques are encouraged (e.g., observations, drama, drawing pictures and mapping, participatory video etc. Seventh, in general, RCA aims to be *longitudinal* in order to better understand and explore change over time. If the design is longitudinal, researchers will return to the same households, yearly, for five years. Eighth, *awareness of power* involves an aim to avoid displaying or using things that may widen pre-existing power gaps between the researcher and the people involved in the RCA (e.g., jewellery, expensive mobile phones/cameras/clothes/sunglasses/watches, using an umbrella to protect from the

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[22] I use to consult the guide when I am not engaged in conversations, e.g., before going to bed.

sun[23], jokes between researcher-interpreter (as it excludes others) including talk in another language, as well as very formal language, dictating food preferences etc. Lastly, an important aspect is the *triangulation opportunities* inherent in RCA (e.g., between people, places and in time if longitudinal).

4.3.3 The RCAs in This Study

Two RCAs in this study were conducted in the Kao and Tobelo areas, in NHR (see Map 2). The motivations behind the choice of locations were presented in the introduction. This study has taken advantage of the experiential character in RCA's methodology and therefore adapted the RCAs to fit the scope and aim of this thesis. Consequently, the RCAs in this study cannot be longitudinal, nor will they be centred around poverty (even though the HHHs were indeed poor). Instead, these RCAs explored ordinary people's voices in regard to peace, development and reconciliation efforts, after the communal wars. The HHH I stayed with for this study fulfilled the broad criteria of being ordinary people who had experienced the conflicts and subsequent peace and reconciliation in the post-conflict era. I avoided to stay with the head of the village or other people with a power position. The HHHs in this study remain anonymous, as always within the RCA methodology. Single RCAs have occurred in the past, often labelled as 'pulse-takers' (i.e. an update on context and development impacts etc.) (EDG 2014).

An obvious limitation of the RCAs in this study is the lack of triangulation possibilities, compared to a 'normal' RCA study, where several researchers may triangulate findings from several HHH, in different locations. Nevertheless, the findings in this study will be triangulated with the data from the interviews and secondary sources, thus enabling inter-method triangulation. The time frame for both RCAs followed the 'RCA standard' of four days and nights in a row in each location, which were followed by a day of debriefing together with my interpreter. As Apentiik et al. stress, interpreters and research assistants can 'make or break' a

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[23] For example, in Indonesia, many people from the upper class use umbrellas for this purpose, to avoid getting tanned/darker, since being dark is associated with the lower class (manual workers), revealing a direct link between skin color and perception of class.

study (2006: 35). Accordingly, I was very privileged to have Siti Alifah Ahyar, an experienced and skilled interpreter who has conducted several RCAs, both as a researcher and as an interpreter. Since we had worked together before, we already had good rapport, which is important during the process of fieldwork.

4.4 In-depth Interviews

Nine in-depth interviews (see Appendix A) were conducted with members of the NMP elite and with respondents that can be categorised as 'experts', in relation to the research problem (sampling criteria are presented below). This method was adopted since it is a great tool to get a deeper understanding of complex processes in a post-conflict society (Brounéus 2011: 130). It can add insights to the case that would be hard to gain through quantitative methods. When using in-depth interviews, it is important to be consistent. For example, to explore the same general theme with all respondents, this improves the quality of the subsequent analysis. Having said that, it does not mean that every interview is the same; when using open-ended, semi-structured, questions, the respondent is given the choice of deciding the extent of each answer (Brounéus 2011: 130).

This is part of the strength of this method, since it will contribute to a greater depth in the forthcoming analysis, where the respondents' multiple views will be scrutinised (Esaiasson, Gilljam et al. 2007: 258). A limitation of this method can be said to be a lack of external validity, as the number of interviews are few, compared to questionnaires.

4.4.1 Sampling, Validity and Reliability

Purposeful sampling, or selective sampling, is a common and relevant sampling technique for qualitative case studies. Here, as Imelda Coyne suggests—the aims of the research should guide the sampling process (1997: 624). The process of choosing respondents (sampling) for in-depth interviews can be directed by the principle of *credibility*: 'what sources will maximize the reliability and validity of the results'? (Rubin, Rubin 2005: 64). Since the number of respondents are few

(compared to a quantitative sample), it becomes increasingly important to find relevant persons. Since the RCA method is bottom-up (emic), (focused on societal motivations and the experiences of ordinary people), the in-depth interviews complement that perspective, as they capture the etic perspective. Previous research has concluded that many efforts (e.g., conflicts, peace-building and reconciliation) have been coordinated and organised by people from the local elite, at various levels in NMP: provincial, district or village (Van Klinken 2007).

As the sample criteria was directed by the credibility principle, persons who were regarded as very knowledgeable and experienced in relation to the research problem, were also included in the in-depth interview sample, for example people from academia[24], NGOs, CSOs and from the local media. I used gatekeepers to locate relevant people, according to the criteria discussed above and thus a couple of respondents were also located using snowball sampling. Nonetheless, they fulfilled the same criteria. Given their diversity, they did provide a great platform for exploring different voices of the etic perspective, as well as provided triangulation opportunities, in relation to the research problem.

Validity and reliability are improved by being transparent about the different parts of the research process, as well as a reflection upon the researcher's own position (see 4.4.1). Furthermore, a limitation of this design can be the lack of external validity (generalisations to other contexts). Nevertheless, qualitative methods do permit analytic generalisations (i.e., contribute/compare to new theory based on empirical findings, or through systematic analysis of the empirical data by utilising existing theories. Consequently, theory may render it possible to transfer understandings of qualitative knowledge from even a minor study, to other contexts (Bryman 2012: 191, Jönsson, Jerneck et al. 2012). Nonetheless, this method also has weaknesses relating to bias and reliability. For example, the researcher needs to

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[24] People within academia in Indonesia have often been reported to cooperate with elite politicians (e.g., encouraging their students to demonstrate in favour of certain politicians etc.) and they sometimes swap academia for formal political positions. Therefore, they can be included in the informal elite category (Barron, Azca et al. 2012).

critically assess if there are underlying reasons at play that guide the motivations of some respondents. Are there expectations of financial gains, or other reasons, stemming from the participation in an interview with a foreigner? The question of compensation is heavily debated within academia, and there is no easy answer (Brounéus 2011: 135). However, given the limited budget for this field study, the answer was easy due to practical reasons. I did also state that no compensation will be entitled to all interviewees verbally upon first contact, as well as written in the informed consent document, to avoid any misunderstandings.

4.4.2 Gatekeepers

A gatekeeper(s) is another essential ingredient when doing in-depth interviews, especially when conducting research in politically sensitive environments. Without a gatekeeper, it may be impossible to get interviews with certain people/communities because a post-conflict period is usually characterised by issues such as power struggles within the political elite, corruption, sensitivities to outsiders based on historical events etc.

In addition, gatekeepers can provide a smooth way of grounding the field research in the local community, as it may help establishing good rapport and trust with the local people, and he or she may also make sure that the research questions make sense in that particular local context (Brounéus 2011: 134), however, an informal method as RCA does not use gatekeepers (see 4.3). I can confirm the importance of working with gatekeepers, as I did for the in-depth interviews during my fieldwork in NMP. My main gatekeeper is a native of North Maluku and has experience of working with humanitarian assistance after the conflicts for UNDP, and now works as a civil servant in the provincial government. This background provides him with an in-depth understanding of the issues relating to this thesis, as well as an extensive contact network. Therefore, it would have been very difficult, or impossible, to

know who to interview and to actually get in contact with all those local elite interviewees, without the cooperation and knowledge of the gatekeeper.[25]

4.4.3 Conducting In-depth Interviews

The schedule for the in-depth interviews in this thesis can be found in Appendix A. The majority of the interviews were conducted in Ternate and the rest in Tobelo. Ternate is the locus of politics in NMP, and Tobelo is the capital of NHR, which experienced the most intense communal conflict. Therefore, these towns are home to most influential people in relation to my research problem, in the etic perspective. There are several things to consider when conducting in-depth interviews. First, the place and atmosphere must ensure that the interviewees' feel comfortable and safe. If not, the information gained will suffer and the ethical standards of the research as well. Second, it is pivotal that the researcher has reflective listening skills, which lead to a better understanding of the respondent; this shows that you are an emphatic listener, which further entails an ethical judgement of knowing when to stop asking about potential traumatic issues etc. (Brounéus 2011: 137). In the light of this, I made a habit of always talking with the respondents beforehand, to let them influence the place and setting of the subsequent interview, as well as letting them have a look at the interview guide and/or ask any questions about the aim of the research. As a result, the interviews were conducted in a variety of venues, but having in common that they were places chosen by the respondents. The same interview guide (see Appendix B) was used, however, the length of the interviews varied considerably, which displays that each interview is still different in many ways. Lastly, I incorporated some lessons from interactional sociolinguistics that include a focus stretching beyond spoken words (e.g. eye rolls, body language, pauses and hesitations). This facilitates an interpretation of what the respondent *intended* to say and perhaps how sensitive the issue was, rather than simply what he/she said (Holmes 2008: 372).

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[25] He remains anonymous for ethical reasons. I got in touch with him through contacts obtained during my internship at GRM.

4.5 E-mail Interviews

The in-depth interviews were complemented with two email interviews with two experienced researchers (see 4.1.1) in relation to my research area. On the one hand, compared to in-depth interviews, this method lacks the possibilities of incorporating the interactional sociolinguistic elements (mentioned above), and thus it may be harder to establish rapport etc. On the other hand, others stress that email interviews may stimulate a more egalitarian form of interview, since it is absent of visual cues and thus might reduce some prejudice. They also provide greater flexibility, and privacy, where a respondent may answer in their own time (Desai, Potter 2006).

4.6 Assessment of Secondary Sources

Secondary sources have been used as a complement to the primary sources. The secondary sources include previous research in relation to the research problem and relevant historical, political and background information. That may be from academic journals, books, reports by INGOs, CSOs, NGOs etc. I have used these sources for several purposes, for example to identify actors/organisations relevant for the study, identifying research gap(s), learn relevant theory, understanding conflict trajectories, and as a way to triangulate the findings from this study. Secondary sources, just like primary sources, are in need of critical assessment, sometimes referred to as an external evaluation. I followed the suggestions provided by Tomislav Dulic (2011: 38-39), when I evaluated the sources for this study.

4.7 Analysing Qualitative Data

I have chosen a thematic analysis in relation to the qualitative data in this study, which should be seen as part of a holistic design that stresses the importance of not isolating parts of social realities. Thus, social realities are best understood if examined contextually (Lincoln, Guba 1985: 39). Initial steps in the analytical process included transcriptions of all interviews and discussing and writing down themes and findings of the RCAs while debriefing with my interpreter. Further steps

include identifying commonalities and differences, as well as reoccurring themes or trends throughout and across the data. Here, the guiding principle was to identify themes of importance in relation to the aim and objectives of the study (Guest, MacQueen et al. 2011: 67). The last part of the analysis was to also look for more abstract themes and thus to analyse the findings using the conceptual framework in the study. Final interpretations and discussions of this analysis will be presented in Chapter 5. The analytical process is aided by triangulation with secondary sources to facilitate a meaningful discussion and validation of the results (Creswell, Clark 2007: 129).

5 Results and Analysis

In this chapter, the findings from the primary and secondary sources will be systematically analysed in relation to the stated research questions, where the conceptual framework will provide the lens needed to make sense of the findings.

5.1 The Influence of Colonial Legacies and Neo-patrimonialism

The initial question to be discussed is in what ways the communal wars were influenced by colonial legacies, and subsequently follows a discussion regarding neo-patrimonial impacts in NMP.

5.1.1 Colonial Legacies

In a European perspective, the Moluccas was arguably more famous in the past, where it was known as the Spice Islands. This eastern part of the vast Indonesian archipelago has lured traders for more than 700 years, mainly in search of nutmeg, mace and clove, which were endemic to the Moluccas and highly valued as preservatives before the age of refrigerators (Bräuchler 2015). Prior to the arrival of the European colonial powers, the region was caught up by the rivalries between the main political centres: the Sultanates of Tidore and Ternate. [26]

When the European colonial powers arrived, they entered the domain of hegemonic Islam, as gradual conversions had been occurring ever since the establishment of the first Arab trading colonies in the China Sea, as early as the seventh century (Wolf, Eriksen 2010, Taylor 2003). Yet, by the end of the 17th Century, the Dutch became the most powerful force, ousting the rival Portuguese, Spanish and British colonisers. The most powerful company was by far the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, (VOC). They made so much profit from

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[26] The two other sultanates are Bacan and Jailolo, all in today's NMP, however, they have remained much less influential, compared to Ternate and Tidore.

the monopolisation of spices, mainly in the Moluccas, that they paid their stockholder an average of 18 percent per year between (1602-1800), however, it eventually ended in bankruptcy and a subsequent hand-over of authority of the Indies to the Dutch crown in 1800 (Li 2007: 32-33).[27] In the Moluccas, divisions of the local populations along religious lines was a direct consequence of colonial rule, as Catholic and Protestant missionaries often followed the colonial ventures and dividing the local population was a common trait of colonial rule (Brown, Wilson et al. 2005: 10). Christian converts were treated superior, compared to followers of local animist religions, or local converts to Islam.

For example, the Dutch colonisers only deemed the Christians converts worthy of *the white man's burden* to be 'improved'. Consequently, the Dutch administration allowed these converts to receive education, which was denied to Muslims and followers of local animist cosmologies. Although Muslims and Christians have for the most part lived in peaceful co-existence, colonial rule had created an evident social stratification along religious, commercial and factional lines; a process initiated already in the 1650s (Bertrand 2004). However, as elaborated on in the conceptual framework, the Dutch still carefully maintained the notion of the natives' 'otherness' even to converts, in order to legitimise their rule, which is evident by the adherence of separate legal systems (Li 2007: 32).

Furthermore, as conceptualised in Chapter 3, a common colonial tactic was also to reinforce local elite rulers, in order to control populations indirectly. In NMP, various colonial powers used this tactic and thus took sides in the long-standing rivalry between different sultans in the regions, which shows that the Islamic elite were not treated as the general population. Yet, this was only because the colonisers considered these alliances and indirect rule advantageous for extracting the natural resources, where the overarching aim always was to monopolise the spice trade (Li 2007). The colonial powers also manipulated geographical borders to serve their interests, as was mentioned as a common colonial trait in Chapter 3. In NMP, this

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[27] For a visual map displaying the Dutch East India expansion, see;
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dutch_East_Indies_Expansion.gif

manipulation is still dividing the island of Ternate into one 'traditional' area loyal to the Sultan of Ternate, and the rest as a more cosmopolitan and Islamic part, where several different ethnic groups and newcomers to the area often reside; since the Dutch had always only allowed newcomers to settle in that area (Van Klinken 2007: 114). Accordingly, the communal war in Ternate between the Sultan of Ternate's *Pasukan Kuning* and the Muslim *Pasukan Putih*, has clear connections to the artificial geographical boundaries created by the Dutch and Spanish colonisers, as they had formed competing alliances with the local elites.

Inter-group horizontal inequalities are often sources of tensions that may cause violence, especially if changes occur rapidly—and this also include changes that even out pre-existing inequalities (Brown, Wilson et al. 2005). This is exactly what happened in the Moluccas prior to the communal wars. In a period of six years (1991-1997), the local Christian economic and socio-political domination in the Moluccas was eroding, in line with General Suharto's 'Islamic turn', as can be exemplified by the following tables (which also reveal effects relating to transmigration).

Table 1

Proportion of Population in Maluku employed in High-rank jobs by Religion and Migration Status, 1990

	Non-Migrant	Migrant	Combined
• Islam	2.5%	**7.4%**	3.1%
• Catholic	4.2%	**16.7%**	4.4%
• Protestant	**7.4%**	**12.7%**	7.6%
• All Religions	4.4%	**8.8%**	4.8%

Calculated from sample of Census 1990. The numbers cover what is today's MP and NMP, as it was prior to the split. Figures in bold are above province average (Brown, Wilson, et al. 2005: 27).

Table 2

Protestant-Muslim Socio-economic Disparities, 1991-1997									
	1991			1994			1997		
Social Indicator	P	M	R	P	M	R	P	M	R
• Reads Easily	82.3	69.0	1.2	86.1	73.2	1.2	92.8	84.3	1.1
• Education rate (Female)	48.3	18.4	2.6	48.2	33.7	1.4	55.1	37.7	1.5
• Education rate (Male)	56.5	34.3	1.6	55.0	47.0	1.2	63.6	53.0	1.2
• Easy source of drinking water	31.4	13.9	1.2	31.8	19.3	1.6	26.7	22.2	1.2
• Housing has electricity	54.8	41.4	1.3	53.2	60.2	0.9	65.7	66.2	1.0
• Housing has solid floor	71.0	58.6	2.3	67.2	66.8	1.0	72.2	65.1	1.1

Notes: P = Percent of Protestants; M = Percent of Muslims; R = Ratio of P to M.
Source: Calculated from the Demographic Health Surveys (http://www.measuredhs.com)

Calculated from the Demographic Health Surveys
(Brown, Wilson, et al. 2005: 27).

Religion is important for the vast majority of the population and thus has a great influence for the social networks of many people. This is further confirmed by the empirical data from my fieldwork, where the majority of the respondents usually identified themselves first and foremost based on religious identity, and often ethnicity and other factors as secondary. Yet, some people in Tobelo and even more in Kao, emphasised ethnicity before religious identity, as exemplified by the Kao Muslims, who pointed out that one should say 'Kao Muslim, and not Muslim Kao' (RCA in Kao, 2015).

Another observation I made, however, was the almost complete segregation of the religious communities still today. Often people of different religions live in separate villages, or as segregated neighborhoods within a town.[28] The segregation is further evident within the educational system, where the majority of the private schools are religiously segregated, from kindergarten to universities, yet, public schools are often mixed. Nevertheless, some policy changes are going on in Ternate, as students from different faiths are being accepted to schools of another religion now more

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[28] An exception being the few returning Christian IDPs in Ternate, who are mixed throughout the city (Interview Theis Hoke, 2015).

often than in the past (interviews with Theis Hoke and Kasman Hi Ahmad, 2015). Yet, students are always only taught religion based on their own religion, thus not learning about other faiths at all in school. The Moluccas has often been mentioned as a place of harmony between religions, and religious violent conflicts have indeed been rare. However, as Birgit Bräuchler (2015: 59) argues: '…interreligious relationships were based on passive tolerance, and interreligious dialogue was missing'. This is part of why religion later became one of the mobilising forces in the communal wars, sometimes labelled an 'enabling environment', referring to the segregation and horizontal inequalities along religious (and ethnic lines). To conclude this section, I argue that the above analysis has exposed that several of the general traits of colonial rule have indeed influenced the Moluccan society and created divisions of the local population along factional (Ternate-Tidore) and religious lines in general, where the evident social stratification between local Christians and Muslims is heavily influenced by colonial legacies.

5.1.2 Neo-patrimonial Impacts

The general characteristics and common consequences of neo-patrimonialism have been conceptualised in Chapter 3.1.2. Some of these concerns are intertwined with the decentralisation process and will thus be further analysed below, others will be dealt with here. The communal war between the ethnic Makians and Kaos, was to a large extent driven by an increased Kao frustration over a corrupt district government.

First, the government had refused to take their voices into account regarding the establishment of the Sub-district of Malifut, which boundaries included two traditional Kao villages, as well as the Gosowong gold mine. The straw that broke the camel's back was when the Makian-dominated provincial government later refused to compensate the Kaos' for the destruction of these two villages by the Makians, which made it clear that the government was far from impartial. Rather, it was suffering from a classic symptom of neo-patrimonialism: a governance structure permeated by corruption by local elites in relation to state assets, by the

means of bureaucracy and companies in control of the state. Here, the gold mine, although not state-controlled, raised the stakes, as it would still generate significant taxes to the local regency government[29], and provide plenty of employment opportunities. To be fair, these concerns were also coupled with emotional factors, as the Makians' did feel that they had legitimate land-rights, since they had been re-located there by the national government. Nonetheless, the neo-patrimonial traits of the Makian-elite paved way for the macro foundations directly related to the subsequent outbreak of violence, as their main focus was to reinforce their own position, which evidently became a great obstacle to a peaceful resolution to the Kao-Makian conflict, as well as development in general, in the whole Kao-Malifut area. Neo-patrimonialism and its related power and patronage opportunities, are in theory often contributing to an inefficient development ideology as well as communal ethno-religious tensions (Wilson 2008: 70, Wilson 2015: 3, Bertrand 2002: 58).

That would be an understatement in this case, where it is better understood as having contributed to the chaos and destruction of ethnicity-based communal war, which subsequently sparked religious war in almost every corner of NMP. After the communal wars, the government's response did contain more pragmatism, as building material for the reconstruction of the burned Kao villages were provided, however, the material was often not sufficient (RCA Kao area, 2015). Thus, many Kaos are still disappointed about the provincial government's (in)actions, which is further exacerbated by the fact that Malifut Sub-district never was revoked. Yet, the disappointments are unlikely to erupt in new clashes with the Makians, as people realised that violence did not contribute to a sustainable solution, rather it caused severe destruction and trauma. Relations with the Makians have gradually improved as well (ibid.). The profits of NHM's gold mine is still largely benefitting the Australian majority owner company Newcrest. Yet, the taxes and employment have not only benefitted the Makians, as the Kao previously feared. Instead the Regency

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[29] The Kaos feared that Malifut could later become the capital of the forthcoming North Halmahera Regency, which involve significant rent-making opportunities for neo-patrimonial elites.

of North Halmahera is at the receiving end of tax revenues and permit deals. This has led to mixed feelings amongst the Kao (and Malifut groups). On the one hand, there are people from both ethnic groups that have been able to work in the NHM goldmine, which give high salaries and pensions. Some have even got positions in the NHM's corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee, which are in command of distributing money to the NHM community development programme, aimed to reach the five sub-districts in closest proximity of the mine.

Yet, during my fieldwork, tensions were apparent in both Kao and Tobelo (where the regency government offices are), as demonstrators took to the streets, demanding transparency and results regarding the promise of the one percent of the company's yearly revenues (approximately 100 billion Rp.) that have been earmarked for community development in the five sub-districts. Demonstrators claim that the only results so far are a village gate and a number of scholarships. The local press reports that only 15 billion rupiah (Rp.) have benefitted the local communities, which leaves 85 percent stolen on a yearly basis (Seputar Malut 2015). It is further reported that the police investigation focuses on people within the regency government and the CSR committee, but no arrests have ever been made (ibid.). The CSR committee itself and NHM, have refused to comment on the case (RCA Kao area, 2015).

The official I interviewed in the regency government blamed the entire problem on the NHM, for lacking in transparency towards the local people (Interview with M Roke Saway, Tobelo 2015). Many local demonstrators have placed their hopes for a thorough investigation by the national corruption eradication commission (KPK), but so far waiting in vain. Locals, together with environmental and indigenous rights NGOs, have previously demonstrated in the thousands against NHM's destruction of 52 hectares of protected forest in connection to their second mine site, in the Toguraci area, which put spokes in the wheels for the livelihoods of indigenous people in both Kao and Malifut. NHM's operations is said to violate the Law No. 41/2003 on mining in protected areas, yet a court decision has later allowed the company to operate (Jakarta Post 2003). The company has hired

soldiers and police for security, who intimidates and denies entry for the local people (Jakarta Post 2003). To sum up, it can be said that the developments after the communal wars in Kao-Malifut have largely normalised relations between the former conflicting groups. Yet, it seems likely that the corruption of the community development money can partly be connected to neo-patrimonial features of the elite in the regency government (Kabupaten Halmahera Utara), as well as by locals connected to the CSR committee—and this is indeed creating new frictions in the affected societies today.

5.2 Impacts of Decentralisation in NMP

This section will shed light on the various outcomes related to the decentralisation processes initiated soon after the fall of the Suharto regime. The analysis will first briefly present how these policies came about on a national level, and later follows an analysis regarding the impacts on the communal wars in NMP. The last part will look at how the peace-building process was affected by these policies.

5.2.1 Decentralisation and the Communal Wars

After the fall of Suharto, among the first priorities in the political transition from autocracy to democracy, was to initiate decentralisation and regional autonomy processes. B.J. Habibie, Suharto's successor, started the democratisation and decentralisation processes by reducing the military's power in politics and establishing freedom of the press (HD Centre, LIPI & Current Asia 2011: 10). He also announced the first democratic elections after Suharto, which ended his own presidency. Thus, in 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly known as 'Gus Dur', became the first democratically elected president after the long autocratic rule.[30] The democratisation and decentralisation processes continued with the passing of several new laws in 1999—UU No. 22/1999 on the devolution of political authority

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[30] He was removed by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and replaced by Vice-president Megawati Sukarnoputri, who then acted as president 2001-2004. She was succeeded by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), who got re-elected a second term and was succeeded by the current President Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo in the 2014 election.

and UU No. 25/1999 on fiscal decentralisation (Bräuchler 2015: 41). Nonetheless, it was not until 2001 that the government launched the full programme of decentralisation, often referred to as 'big bang' decentralisation (Smith 2009). The name indicates that the reforms were quite radical changes of the governance structure, as it involved a rapid transformation of economic and political policy linked to the former long authoritarian centralised governance structure (Hofman 2003). Decentralisation efforts were undertaken in many Southeast Asian countries, often enthusiastically supported by multi-lateral institutions such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank (WB), yet, Indonesia's development was one of the most extreme regarding its pace and extent (Duncan 2007: 713).

In light of Timor Leste's secession from Indonesia (largely seen as an aberration in Indonesia), the new laws were also carefully drafted in order to prevent further provinces to follow the path of seeking independence from Indonesia (Smith 2009). The anti-secession aim became a common denominator for both the hardliners (aiming for increased central government control and a strong military in conflict areas) and reformers (aiming for greater regional/local government autonomy) (Smith 2009a). Key issues for both parties were to manage conflicts and continue democratisation, meanwhile retaining the current national boundaries of the Republic of Indonesia.

Secession-risks were thought to be lower if minority groups, or other marginalised groups, could get increased participation and be included into politics. For example by bringing control of resources, public service delivery and other government bureaucracy tasks, closer to the local populations and thus hopefully increase support for the central government at the same time. Therefore, greater autonomy and resources were focused on the lower administrative divisions of *kabupaten* (regencies), *kota* (cities), and *desa* (villages), instead of directly to higher level *provinsi* (province) (Bräuchler 2015). Correspondingly, direct democratic elections were introduced to elect heads for local governments, i.e. *gubernor* (governor of a province), *bupati* (regency head), and *walikota* (mayor), for the first time in

Indonesia (HD Centre, LIPI & Current Asia 2011: 11). On the one hand, these decentralisation policies can be considered as democratic progressions in the reform era. As was highlighted in Chapter 3, in theory, decentralisation is supposed to foster good governance, as it creates incentives for local officials to be more responsive to local aspirations, as community participation should increase (Ribot 2004). On the other hand, critics have stressed that, decentralisation also involves great challenges, such as risks of increased competition and corruption among local elites, as power is swiftly decentralised in their favor, without a fine print for monitoring all sufficient regulations and anti-corruption measures (Van Klinken 2007).

The latter is a more valid description in relation to NMP. Initially, many aspects of the decentralisation process provoked a lack of clarity within the governance structure, as the new divisions of power between local, district and provincial government was still relatively ambiguous. Thus, this strongly affected the co-ordination between these governments in a time of erupting tensions (HD Centre, LIPI & Current Asia 2011). In the case of NMP, the critics concerns were often justified. One of the main conflicting points between the Makians and the Kaos, was the ethnic Makians' successful lobby for a new sub-district in Malifut, incorporating the Gosowong gold mine, and two traditional Kao villages (Brown, Wilson et al. 2005: 30-31).

Here, it would be naïve to exclude the decentralisation process as a factor contributing to the rising tensions between these ethnic groups, especially since the argument literally involved a dispute about boundaries of the newly established *kecamatan* Malifut. The findings from the RCA (2015) in the Kao-area, are also interesting. The majority did not mention the decentralisation process as having had a significant influence for the communal wars and the gold mine was not mentioned as a reason that increased competition. The opinion that the conflict was not about religion was also wide-spread in the Kao area. Nonetheless, the demonstrations (in 2015) against the alleged corruption regarding the revenues for community development from the gold mine, reveals that resources do matter, yet, as one of

many factors. It is also likely that people are reluctant to highlight monetary gains as a motive, since it can make you 'lose face' if you appear driven by financial greed. In Ternate, the competition among different factions amongst the provincial elite was even more evident. Perhaps unsurprisingly, only one of the interviewees, Roswita Mubin Abow (interview Ternate, 2015), argued that the decentralisation process was a contributing factor for the outbreak of the communal wars, as it 'was a very uncertain time that became a hard process for some people, separating some people from others'.

Here, it should be noted that she uses very diplomatic terms (i.e. *separating* and *hard process*), when in fact she is talking about groups clashing in a communal war, where people eventually killed their former neighbours in the streets, often using spears and machetes. As was discussed in Chapter 4 regarding the adoption of interactional sociolinguistics, Abow's words, in my interpretation, illustrate a lingering taboo, in relation to discussing the brutality, and culpability, in relation to the brutal communal war. That the violence was in general considered taboo, particularly to discuss its details, was a general impression throughout the fieldwork. The exceptions being a few victims, for example a woman who had been widowed and lost a son in the wars, who voluntarily accounted for how a massacre had happened in her village (RCA Tobelo area, 2015).

The fact that no other interviewee within the elite wanted to acknowledge the intense competition between the Ternate elite factions, is perhaps also quite telling, since it likely involves a degree of collective guilt, judging of the consequences it was part of creating. In the e-mail interview with scholar Chris Wilson (07.06.15), he argues that it is hard to judge how decentralisation has affected the peacebuilding, 'but it certainly affected the chances of war initially'. To conclude, the above analysis has found that in the case of NMP, the rapid decentralisation, did not unfold in line with good governance, as the proponents of decentralisation argue (see 3.3). Instead, the sudden changes, lead to intense competition among different elite factions, most evidently in Ternate, were a communal clash between the Sultan of Ternate's allies, and his Tidore/Makian opponents, ended up with the defeat of

the Sultan's *Pasukan Kuning*. Ethnic, and later religious, identities had been gradually politicised, in order to mobilise people. Yet, importantly, these factors have to be considered in relation to other structural transitions or reforms occurring simultaneously, such as the transition from autocracy to democracy, as well as fundamental reforms of the security forces, the judiciary and corporate governance (Brown, Wilson et al. 2005). A contributing factor is also the legacy of Suharto's long regime, where the important, but difficult, process of institutional-building was not high on the agenda.

5.2.2 Decentralisation and Peace-building

The decentralisation process was not altogether negative for NMP. After the communal wars, the decentralisation process, and especially the making of new administrative districts *pemekaran*, did have a positive impact in the post-conflict period, as was also confirmed above (interview Chris Wilson, 07.06.15). Scholar Christopher Duncan agrees as well:

> I would argue at the most basic level that the amount of money that the local governments can make from various initiatives due to decentralization has played a role in maintaining the peace. There is simply too much money to be made these days to let the violence happen again (e-mail interview, 10.06.15).

The respondents' views were mixed in relation to this topic. A few maintained that there were no major connections between decentralisation and peace-building. Still, most stressed that it had had positive impacts. During the interviews, the conversations on this topic at times also involved reconciliation, as this was brought up by many respondents here. For example by Ishak Naser (24.02.05):

> Decentralisation might have some influence in terms of speeding up the peace-building process because it gave a number of authorities to the local government to carry out their programs in a more flexible way, but again I think there were no direct relation between the decentralisation and reconciliation. It only worked in terms of increasing the efficiency in tackling down the conflict issue.

Roswita Mubin Abow (28.02.15) was the respondent most in favour of decentralisation, as she contended that it had a positive impact on the society, as it transferred authority towards the local people that can empower communities. This

is thus in line with the arguments for decentralisation, as presented in Chapter 3. Abow, who had worked for UNDP in the immediate post-conflict period, also stressed the importance of INGOs in supporting this process. In the interview with Husen Alting (28.02.15), he also used reconciliation synonymously with peace-building, and further agreed that it had been good for the reconciliation process. Kasman Hi Ahmad (21.02.15) also made that connection, arguing that the decentralisation was used as a tool for different ways of reconciliation, in different levels of authority, such as provincial, regency and sub-district levels. Zadrak Tongo-Tongo (09.03.15) provided the most interesting insight perhaps, capturing the elite perception of *pemekaran*, in relation to the decentralisation process, which was controlled from national level. He contended that since the year 2000, they [Tobelo elite] were introduced to the central government's plans to introduce *pemekaran* as soon as possible in relation to NMP, which aimed to create a more autonomous regency [NHR], to make the conflict issues be solved faster.

According to Tongo-Tongo, this policy was very well received, in his opinion, and people united and worked together to convince the central government to speed up the process. The positive receptions of most respondents have to be viewed in light of how the communal wars ended, with a stalemate between the two major sides: The Muslim forces could not defeat the Christians in Kao and Tobelo, and vice versa regarding the Muslim strongholds in Ternate/Tidore. This was coupled with widespread conflict fatigue given the immense cost it had inflicted and a general eroding of people's support for the involved political elite factions (Barron, Azca et al. 2012). The opinion that people was tired of fighting, and particularly weary of manipulation from political elite and/or provocateurs (often directed at rogue elements in the military or outside elite) was part of the findings in both RCA locations. Therefore, the incentives and possibilities to use violence as a means for elite agendas faded away. The process of *pemekaran*, which in NMP involved (apart from the initial creation of NMP) the creation of four additional regencies, with Ternate and Tidore in addition, as self-ruling cities with mayors (*walikota*). Furthermore, each regency was at this time also divided into plenty more *kecamatan*

(sub-districts). Today NMP consists of 45 *kecamatan* that are further divided into 730 *kelurahan/desa* (villege-level). Important here was that funds from the central government would now in many cases surpass the provincial level, under the law UU. 1/2003 (Barron, Azca et al. 2012: 75). This meant that resources were abundant and widespread, and not as concentrated at the provincial level as in 1999. Furthermore, *pemekaran* ensured that this development was steady (e.g., resources were not limited to temporary post-conflict recovery allocations) and there were lots of new civil servant positions to be filled, which are in general the most popular employments in the Moluccas, as it generates comparatively high salaries (and status), coupled with pensions, which is a rarity in Indonesia.

With the acceptance of NHR as a regency with Tobelo as its capital, the Christian elites had been separated from the Muslim elites in Ternate/Tidore, and thus the incentives for elite competition diminished. Taking NHR as an example, the regency received 1,66 trillion Rp. (US$ 170 million) from 2005-2009. A significant amount considering the regency population (171,000 in 2003) and a huge difference from the amounts received in the past, at the local administrative level (Barron, Azca et al. 2012: 75).

Among the respondents, Zadrac Tongo-Tongo and Mahmud Adi, were both actively involved in the violence. The former as a conflict leader within *Pasukan Merah,* the latter as *agas* fighter in *Pasukan Putih*. In relation to the discussion above, they exemplify that most fighters in the conflict, were successfully de-radicalised in the post-conflict period, partly thanks to the new opportunities created regarding employment and civil servant positions, in relation to decentralisation and *pemekaran.* Tongo-Tongo became a member of the provincial parliament in 2004, and Adi is a lecturer at Khairun University. The prime example though, is Abdul Gani Kasuba, the current Governor of NMP, previously a Muslim preacher who organised the recruitment and transportation of jihadists to fight in Tobelo, as well as Wahdah Zainal Imam (organiser of the anti-Christian riots in Ternate) who became part of the legislature in Ternate 2004 (Barron, Azca et al. 2012). The empirical findings from both RCA locations, in general, support the view that

pemekaran did have a positive influence for the peace-building, as it 'made the sub-districts grow up' so they could help solve the problems quickly. Some persons mentioned the visit by former President Megawati, as a positive sign that demonstrated that also the central government cared about a solution to the wars (RCA Tobelo area, 2015). Yet, others remained critical towards most of the central governments' actions, as they argued that they had not cared about the people in the Moluccas, until in the very end. The same persons often highlighted that, despite decentralisation and *pemekaran*, the central government still deployed military personnel from outside the province, which often did more bad than good for the local communities. A theme that united almost everyone in both RCA locations, was that the efforts from the various governments, were less influential compared to the grassroots initiatives throughout NMP, in relation to the building peace (an argument further developed in Chapter 5.4).

Lastly, the Kaos' demonstrations against alleged corruption of community development funds (see 5.1.2), were partly directed against their regency government in Tobelo, which is dominated by the ethnic Tobelos (the Kaos allies in the communal wars) (RCAs Kao and Tobelo areas, 2015). The problems here regarding corruption and continued political marginalisation of the Kaos, can be interpreted in line with the arguments presented by Resosudarmo (2004) and Hadiz (2004), (see 3.3), that regional and local elites have a tendency to easily get corrupted, when power dynamics change rapidly in their favour, which can result in (continued) marginalisation and exclusion of certain minority groups. Furthermore, the empirical evidence from the RCA studies indicate that Ribot's (2004) argument that regional elites sometimes only remain accountable towards majority groups, as they are the important group to nurture to win the next democratic election, and thus care less for the minorities, like the Kaos.

5.3 The Effects of Illiberal Peace-building

Indonesia, after the fall of the New Order regime, can be argued to have ended up in a contested political environment, somewhere in between autocracy and

democracy, hence in a hybrid political order, as the Indonesian central government quickly introduced ambitious reforms of most sectors (as discussed in previous parts of the thesis). At the same time as this difficult transition commenced, Indonesia faced several uprisings and communal conflicts, which made 'experts' to predict an imminent Balkanisation of Indonesia (Smith 2009). In order to circumvent such a disastrous development (in the perspective of the Indonesian state), the central government adopted a number of illiberal means to prevent this, as it realised it was suffering from the 'dual dilemma' of democratisation (i.e., increased pressures among powerful actors over positions/resources, while not yet having built sustainable democratic institutions to manage such disputes) (Mansfield, Snyder 1995, Smith 2009).

In the case of NMP, the ambitious reforms, and particularly decentralisation, had contributed to the communal violence, instead of decreasing it (see 5.2.1). Furthermore, as Smith (2014: 1514) contends, all actors within the GoI wanted to avoid any further secession, as was happening with Timor Leste. It is in this light we must consider the actions of the GoI to issue the status of civil emergency (see Chapter 2) that (temporarily) gave back significant powers to the security forces in NMP. This can thus be one example of an illiberal/autocratic mean to solve conflicts, which had been the (only) way the Suharto regime approached conflicts (Bertrand 2004). Then, how was this move received by the local elites' vis-à-vis at grassroots level? One of the Christian elite leaders, Zedrak Tongo-Tongo, argued that the military approach in NMP, involved both positive and negative impacts. An example of the former was that the military had helped facilitate the early peace-meetings (see Chapter 2.1.4), Tongo-Tongo stressed (09.03.15):

> The Muslim people had taken the initiative to ask the military to be a facilitator [for peace-meetings]. The Muslim leaders had demanded to meet the Christian leaders and talk about the conflict. We [the Christian leaders] needed to discuss their demand first, we had a bit of negative thinking about it because they had involved the military to facilitate the meeting. We were worried it was a trap. Especially as the meeting was on the border between Galela and Tobelo, in the Mamuya village [border between Christians and Muslims after the stalemate]. But we agreed to think positively and we agreed to meet them in Mamuya village.

TNI had also helped escort the first visit by Muslim leaders to the (Christian) City of Tobelo, which Tongo-Tongo (09.03.15) described as having a positive impact in the community, as Tongo-Tongo and other Christian leaders escorted the Muslim leaders, and thus demonstrated cooperation and trust between the two former enemy sides in NHR. Such actions by the military were well received by most locals, also at the grassroots (RCA Tobelo area, 2015).

A finding from the RCA in Kao area, (2015), was that people there, in general, highlighted that the military units consisting of soldiers from outside the Moluccas had been 'good', while local units had, sometimes, made situations worse. When asked what had been positive with the work of the TNI, most people mentioned evacuation of IDPs (RCA Kao area, 2015). The reinforced military deployments meant that the TNI now could effectively separate the two conflicting sides, which they did using blockades that restricted movements in NHR for over a year, which prevented further clashes (Smith 2014). Yet, during both the interviews with the elite, as well as the RCAs, most people still have a negative view of the security forces overall. Here, Tongo-Tongo, exemplifies a commonly held frustration towards the security forces:

> I have asked Kapolres [police unit in *kecamatan*] as the conflict just happened from a point in the village which was not far from their office, just like 100 meters away approximately, and the police should have power because they had 72 troops and TNI had a company. Why did they not do anything and instead let the conflict break out? (09.03.15).

Kasman Hi Ahmad (21.02.15) answered the question 'what factors he considered important for ending the communal wars' with: 'Several factors, first of all the people realised that the conflict was useless. So it is all because of that and that Jakarta gave increased power to TNI'. Faisal Djajaluddin answered the same question with: 'Well, I think [it ended] because of the awareness in the society of the suffering they had gone through, along with the support from the government and community leaders, they all wanted the war to end' (18.02.15). In the interview with Ishak Naser (24.02.15), he stressed that the most important factors for ending the conflict were:

> The government in this case provided maximal support that was the most important—the phases of handling the conflict were done by the government to involve all stakeholders. The government's first role was to alleviate the conflict by setting up police and military units…

Yet, as Tongo-Tongo and others highlighted above, the response from the GoI and the security forces came late. Indeed, the security forces had failed to stop most of the violent episodes before the positions had become more or less locked in Muslim/Christian strongholds. However, TNI's initial failures in NMP must partly be blamed on late implementation of civil emergency. Here, the concept of Indonesia as a hybrid political order brings lucidity on the case: First, as was outlined in the conceptual framework (3.4.2), illiberal peace-building is often adopted by states being in a hybrid political order, where a key feature is a highly *contested political environment*. In the case of NMP, this was true both within, and outside NMP.

In NMP, the local political elites' manipulated longstanding ethno-religious divides to gain power. At the same time, outside NMP, challenges to the authority of the GoI were even more pressing (see 1.1), which contributed to a slow GoI reaction in NMP. Furthermore, following the characteristics of a hybrid political order, the Kao-Malifut conflict certainly involved the notion of *overlapping power-claims* relating to the logic of a *traditional informal societal order* versus the *formal state*, since the Kao had disputed the establishment of *kecamatan Malifut*, based on traditional *adat* ownership. Thus, to sum up the influence of GoI's illiberal adoption of more power to the security forces, I conclude that it was effective, once it was introduced. Yet, as pointed out by interviewees and people at the grassroots level (RCA Tobelo area, 2015), this measure came late and elements within the security forces had also been provoking the local population at times. In an economic development perspective, the military blockades meant that people could not work in the fields/gardens and trading networks were cut off. In addition, the infrastructure was damaged and the workforce was depleted as a result of the high death toll and displacement. On an abstract level, this can be viewed in light of the 'conflict-development nexus' (see 3.2) and shows that even when violence has ended, negative impacts still linger.

Besides, restoring authoritarian-style powers to TNI in NMP were the first, but not the last, of the illiberal peace-building tools used by the GoI at this time. The next move involved halting some of the newly introduced democratic reforms, for example, (re)establishing central control of the regional autonomy processes, such as *pemekaran* (Smith 2014). Accordingly, as Claire Smith (2009: 175) revealed in her dissertation, the GoI withdrew the power from the local governments by implementing 'caretaker administrators', directly under the power of GoI's 'temporary' proxy governors in both MP and NMP. This freezing of the newly introduced regional autonomy reform extended even beyond the civil emergency status, up until the first direct local elections in 2005; this was clearly a highly illiberal way of consolidating security.

Neo-patrimonialism is a further feature of illiberal peace-building, and in the case of NMP, the GoI established neo-patrimonial networks with their hand-picked governor, Thaib Armaiyn, giving him control of the huge recovery budget, which meant marginalising the other factions who had violently competed for this position in 1999-2000 (Smith 2014). These illiberal policies worked, if judged by the consolidation, (and almost 15 years of durability), of a negative peace. However, as briefly outlined above, they also had several costs. First, large portions of the aid budget were corrupted by Thaib Armaiyn and his patronage network. Second, the illiberal approach meant not prosecuting local elites for their role in the wars. Third, it seriously damaged the democratic reform processes, as institutional building was postponed, this also involved ignoring corruption within the judiciary (Smith 2014). Thus, the illiberal approach did involve serious costs, as outlined above. However, a prolonged communal war would most likely have been worse, given the loss of life, displacement and negative impact on development in general. Still, all acknowledgements for the successful consolidation of peace in NMP must not go to the GoI, which will be further explained below, as the focus turns to peace and reconciliation efforts anchored from below.

5.4 *Adat's* Effect on Peace and Reconciliation

As discussed earlier, peace-building in general and reconciliation efforts in particular, were anchored from below in NMP. However, as was presented in the conceptual framework (see 3.6.1) most violent conflicts result in physical and emotional separations, which feed on continued *uncertainty*, *anger* and *fear*—that need to be reduced in order to build a sustainable peace. Here, the GoI must receive some credit, as their illiberal security approach (even if implemented very late) did remove much of the *uncertainty* and *fear* between the two communities. Some of the violence had (in the end) been triggered by a security dilemma, which resulted in 'pre-emptive' attacks by both sides, as they were convinced of imminent attacks from their opponents (Wilson 2008). Furthermore, the GoI's statement (delivered through the provincial government) to the local elites in North Halmahera, which said that Tobelo will not become the capital of the future NHR, unless the situation is calmed and they can help facilitate safe returns of the IDPs (Duncan 2014: 113). This incentive greatly contributed to convincing the elite (see also prior discussion in this chapter), particularly in Tobelo and Galela, to work hard to reconcile their communities, as put by one of the elite leaders, Tongo-Tongo (09.03.15):

> When the conflict was over and we started the reconciliation process, I functioned as an *adat* leader [conflict leader during violence]. We hoped that the *adat* approach could work to solve the conflict, considering that we derive from the same ancestors, we have strong bonds to each other.

Elite leaders like Tongo-Tongo and Hein Namotemo pointed also to the success of the strong *adat* culture among the different sub-groups constituting the Kaos. This had involved an *adat* oath for unity in 1999, which indeed kept them united throughout the whole communal war, because according to the local cosmology, the one breaking an *adat* oath will suffer illness and death (Duncan 2014: 113). *Adat* ties had also prevented religious conflict on Kakara Island, as the majority Christian community protected their Muslim neighbours, until they could be safely evacuated to a nearby island (Duncan 2009: 1088). Thus, even though *adat* had actually failed to prevent much of the violence, it was still considered as the peace

approach with best potential to bridge the religious divide. The efforts were initiated from the local elite', however, it gradually received more and more support at grassroots level, in light of widespread conflict fatigue and a realisation among people in general that the wars had chiefly brought death and destruction to them (RCAs in Kao and Tobelo areas, 2015) and the same theme was evident among all elite/expert respondents as well.

It seems thus that the theoretical arguments in favour of localised designs (see 3.6) best fit with the process in NMP, as local leaders took a leading role based on notions of *adat*, as opposed to cookie cutter approaches, instigated from a central government or INGOs, where emphasis rather is on improving law enforcement, human rights and truth commissions (Bräuchler 2009a). Interesting to note regarding the use of *adat* within NMP, is that it was articulated in different ways, depending on area, yet sharing features of an open space—mainly aiming to bridge the religious divide, which had subsequently become the strongest dividing factor in the wars. For example, in Tobelo, *Hibualamo* (the traditional long house) has been revitalised. Faisal Djajaluddin explained (18.02.15):

> Hibualamo exists as a result of our ancient local wisdom found in North and West Halmahera. In West Halmahera it is called 'sasadu' even though it has a similar house shape like *Hibualamo*. Physically it is a house, but philosophically, it means a meeting place for diverse people and communities. The immigrants can also visit *Hibualamo*.

Husen Alting (28.02.15) had a similar understanding of the use of *adat*:

> Adat is a very powerful instrument for peace in North Maluku. Actually it is not only Hibualamo, but adat from all areas of North Maluku are being applied to the reconciliation process… the immigrants who live here have to take part in the local wisdom of North Maluku.

Zadrak Tongo-Tongo (09.03.15) agreed as well:

> We hope that the *adat* approach can work to solve the conflict. Considering that we have derived from the same ancestors, the *adat* approach is a bit like a family approach. Even though we have many newcomers here from different areas in Indonesia, with different ethnicities, we decided that we must try to gather all different groups under *Hibualamo* [in Tobelo], yet these groups should still keep their diversity.

Tongo-Tongo was also one of few respondents who reflected upon the fact that the notions of *adat* used to reconcile the communities after the wars, were not very conservative:

> On special occasions [in the past] where many ethnic groups from around Indonesia were gathered, it was a bit ironic, because it was only the Tobelos that did not have special traditional clothes… we just have a traditional hat. But now we have got inspiration from outside and we modernised our tradition. Now, on every Thursday, all students and civil servants wear 'traditional Tobelo batik'…

Another dimension, or motivating factor, was articulated by one of the older respondents (working in the regency government), M Roke Saway (10.03.15) stressed:

> Civil society, but especially the people, had the biggest role compared to the government. You can see up until today, we do not have conflict, because the peace came from the people, and it started with self-awareness… People also realised that they would like to die in the places where they come from.

These accounts reveal some important aspects regarding the notion of *adat* that I believe are integral to the successful consolidation of peace in NMP. They are anchored first in the particular culture of each area within NMP[31], yet sharing the important aspect of being a meeting place that are inclusive also to newcomers, and different ethnic and/or minority groups. Further, as it has been evident that the revitalisation of *adat* has been pragmatic, where most communities seems to have managed to downplay their religious identities, by rearticulating an *adat* rhetoric, or discourse, focused on their common ethnicity and/or culture(s).

Even if a common ethnicity often was a part of the focus, that notion was not exclusive, as all people were encouraged to be part of this community-based traditional reconciliation, aiming at countering religious-based provocation in the future. It seems thus to be avoiding one of the pitfalls of cultural approaches, which is a too exclusive character that are not open for other ethnic or minority groups (Acciaioli 2001). There were also people arguing that more actors deserve credit

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[31] An example of the vast (cultural) diversity within the Moluccas, is the fact that these provinces encompass 130 language communities (Duncan 2009).

for contributing to the absence of new conflicts, since the introduction of the *adat* approach. Examples of this include religious leaders, which were mentioned to have, in general, supported and actively promoted the notion of *adat*. Since religious leaders often possess considerable informal authority within their community in NMP, their cooperation with *adat* leaders must be considered one of the keys to the consolidation of peace. Their pragmatic amenability in this case is significant, because historically, there have been a lot of frictions between religion and *adat,* where some religious leaders have argued that certain *adat* traditions are incompatible with (strict) Islam or Christianity (Hefner 2011). Furthermore, both during the RCA studies (2015), as well as in many elite interviews, people mentioned positive impacts in their communities relating to programmes implemented by local NGOs or INGOs, as Roswita Mubin Abow (28.02.15) explained:

> We [the UNDP] used to involve important leaders like, religious leaders, *tokoh pemuda* [youth leaders] and *adat* leaders in our programmes since they could help bring people together. We had programmes with football, sports and arts, to bring the communities together… and my team [UNDP] involved both Christians and Muslims [from the Moluccas], and we were a very solid team.

These mixed-faith working teams served as an example of inter-faith collaboration for peace and many people at the grassroots have given credit to UNDP, World Vision, Unicef, Red Cross, Save the Children, Mercy Corps as well as several local NGOs like Dormala, PML and Forum Studi Halmahera, for having had positive impacts in their communities, covering issues from re-construction to mental rehabilitation and many others.

In addition, during the RCA in the Tobelo area (2015), several locals' highlighted a philanthropic initiative that they regarded very successful; a man called 'Pak David', who had emigrated to Germany before the communal wars, returned in 2003 and wanted to contribute to reconciling his former home village. Apart from donating construction material for houses, he purchased a relatively big fishing boat and created a fishing cooperative with the requirement that the workers must be inter-religiously mixed. Villagers said this was great for reconciliation, as well as

helping the suffering economy. Another finding from the RCA in this area was the 'provocateur narrative' advocated by a few people. Although this narrative is more or less a conspiracy theory[32], it works as a unifying factor, as it suggests that much of the violence had been driven by 'outsiders' (e.g., (national) political elites, military units, or sometimes also including people from other areas in NMP (RCA Tobelo area, 2015).

This tendency is common in post-conflict scenarios, as it is a strategy reducing the in-groups' feelings of collective guilt. One the one hand, this may hamper admissions of guilt by perpetrators. Yet, on the other hand, it can promote reconciliation efforts, as it bridges the division of the local communities. This has contributed to reducing incentives for post-conflict violence in parts of the Moluccas (Björkhagen 2013). Moving back to the conceptual framework, I would argue that the above discussed efforts, in line with the *adat* approach, have contributed to a peace and reconciliation process that fulfils the first important objective of reconciliation, which is *peaceful coexistence* (Sampson 2003), or 'reconciliation as resignation' (Bhargava 2012). The empirical findings indicate that both sides have shared a desire to reconcile in line with a pragmatic approach, based on what they have in common. Since the wars in NMP ended in a stalemate in NHR, both sides realised that they had to adapt and working towards mutual respect for each other's different identities and grow a common humanity, deprived of dehumanisations of the 'religious other' (RCA Tobelo area, 2015).

Since the vast majority of the local people had suffered significantly from the violence, they wanted to end hostilities and reconcile, as has been suggested by the empirical findings (and secondary sources). *Attitudes* and *behaviour* did change, as was essential according to the framework. However, I would not argue that the strongest notion of reconciliation, as theorised by Bhargava (see 3.6.2), has been fully accomplished in NHR or Ternate. In the latter location, many Christian IDPs never returned for various reasons, thus the communities did never really have the

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[32] Yet, when related to elements within the security forces, there is evidence of provocateurs (Wilson 2008: 188).

chance to reconcile there. The Christian respondent in Ternate, Theis Hoke, stressed that relations were 'back to normal', yet he also mentioned discrimination towards Christians (e.g., difficult to get permits to build a church). In addition, in relation to the requirements for 'strong' reconciliation, I argue that NMP and NHR have not reached such a condition, for example 'owning-up of responsibility for wrongdoing followed by forgiveness' (Bhargava 2012: 371).

In NMP, the issue of culpability, has been largely absent from the peace and reconciliation process. Especially the local elite have stressed the importance of moving on and forgetting the violence. This was manifested in the local peace agreement, and government officials maintained that assigning blame to individuals or groups, risked sparking new violence, as the Christian and Muslim narratives seldom were identical, coupled with a justice system incapable of prosecuting the large number of people involved in the communal conflicts (Duncan 2014: 114). The next chapter will discuss some of these results, in relation to the previous findings and discuss their possible implications in a wider perspective.

6 Concluding Reflections

In relation to the first research question, the analysis found that several legacies from the era of European colonialism, have lingered on in the Moluccas. The conceptual framework revealed several strategies used by the colonial powers to enforce their rule, for example dividing the local population. A common tactic of division was to reinforce existing local elite rulers, as this enabled more efficient accumulation of wealth for the colonisers (Li 2007: 32).

The legacies of that practice are still evident in today's NMP as some local elite actors (e.g., the sultanates of Ternate and Tidore), cemented their power because they were allies of opposing colonial powers. In addition, the analysis found that colonialism also had brought Christian missionaries with them to the Moluccas. As the Dutch colonial administration treated the Christian converts preferential, compared to locals who adhered to Islam or animist religions, this quickly divided the Moluccan society along religious lines. As discussed in the analysis, this led to significant horizontal inequalities between Muslims and Christians that must be considered one of the factors contributing to the communal wars. Religious segregation is still the norm throughout NMP and most private educational institutions are still segregated depending on religion. Furthermore, students only learn about their own religion in school. In addition, Indonesians still have to choose from one of the six officially recognised religions, for example on the national identification cards. In the light of this and the lingering religious segregation in NMP, it could be fruitful for future research to explore the role of Indonesian institutions, in relation to religious segregation.

Furthermore, the framework gave account of neo-patrimonialism, which affects the governance structure negatively, as a common characteristic was corruption of state assets by local elite, which are most interested in strengthening their own position, and thus govern like a family patriarch (Kohli 2004: 393). The analysis

demonstrated that neo-patrimonial patterns were recognised in NMP, especially in relation to the Kao-Malifut conflict. Here, the Makian-dominated local government was shown to have been a major contributing factor to the communal conflict, as their main concern had been to reinforce their own position of power, relating to the promotion of *kecamatan* Malifut, an area including a profitable gold mine. The resulting ethno-religious conflict with the Kaos was the start of large-scale communal war in NMP. The Makians' role further highlights the great importance of paying attention to local context and its complexities, as the dominance of the Makians goes against the general colonial legacy of Muslim marginalisation in the Moluccas—in the Makian-Kao conflict, it was indeed the majority Christian Kao group being the most marginalised. The analysis further provided evidence that problematise the view often found in comparative studies—that the conflicts in the Moluccas was only about religion.

In relation to neo-patrimonial legacies, the findings from the RCA in Kao area (2015) were very interesting; today both Makians and Kaos share an anger towards the neo-patrimonial governance of NHR, as both groups claim the political elite in the regency government are partly responsible for the large corruption of funds from the gold mine, which are supposed to contribute to community development (RCA Kao area, 2015). Since my fieldwork was indeed limited in time and space, further explorations of this new tension in NHR could provide the basis for profitable future research. Could corruption by neo-patrimonial elites be a threat to sustainable peace in NMP?

The analysis also dealt with the question of how the swift decentralisation process affected the communal wars and peace-building in NMP. The framework (see Van Klinken 2007) suggested that even though this process in theory involves democratic benefits, there are looming dangers of corruption and competition among local elites, if this process comes with substantial resources (and poor anti-corruption monitoring). The analysis clearly showed that the latter scenario unfortunately was the case in NMP, as many of the conflicts involved mobilisation along ethno-religious lines, by local elites struggling to gain control of the (soon-

to-be) lucrative positions within provincial and local governments. The interview with Roswita Mubin Abow confirmed this view, whereas other interviewees' did not highlight the decentralisation process as significant. Yet, this denial must of course be considered in relation to the fact that some respondents are part of the indicted group. In the e-mail interview with Christopher Duncan, he argued that the decentralisation process, after the communal wars, also had contributed to the peace-building process. He stressed that, given the fact that a lot of resources were allocated to various regencies and sub-districts, 'there are simply too much money to be made these days to let the violence happen again' (10.06.15).

However, the findings from the emic perspective also highlighted voices arguing that the decentralisation had only been good for majority groups, while minority groups who were less represented in politics, face continued marginalisation (RCA Kao area, 2015). Yet, my study cannot make any wide generalisations regarding this matter. Thus, it could be useful if future research investigated the situation of other minority groups within NMP, in relation to the effects of decentralisation, preferably by adopting a longitudinal research design.

The next research question focused on exploring how GoI's illiberal peace-building approach had affected the conflicts, and the subsequent peace and development. The analysis, aided by the framework, found that the illiberal efforts were effective in order to consolidate a negative peace and regain peaceful co-existence. However, the illiberal means also contributed to a lack of 'deeper' reconciliation, as many victims still feel anger over the fact that not even the leaders of communal massacres have been prosecuted (RCA Tobelo area, 2015). Further research could benefit from a deeper scrutinizing of the illiberal measures sustainability, in a longer perspective. In relation to other similarly affected areas, the consolidation of peace in NMP is a rare success so far in my view, which is in line with conclusions found in some previous research (Barron, Azca et al. 2012). Thus, the adoption of the illiberal peace-building model must be considered in relation to a very difficult transition period, where Indonesia was in a hybrid political order, in the very beginning of a democratisation and state-building process. In relation to the

research question dealing with reconciliation, the analysis suggests that the reasons behind the success of the *adat* approach are indeed multifaceted; widespread conflict fatigue, a history that includes peaceful coexistence, and kinship ties sometimes crossing religion (hence the label family approach by some respondents) and the outsider 'provocateur' narrative, are all factors that have contributed to today's peaceful coexistence, which constitutes the thin notion of reconciliation. Thus, the people were not reconciled just because of *adat,* but the notion of *adat* was successfully revitalised and rearticulated because people wanted peace and reconciliation.

Adat thus became the strongest unifying factor, which provided a framework for reconciliation that indeed unified the society at different levels. Synergy effects were created as the process involved actors from the grassroots and the local government. Besides, where *adat* could not help, such as certain development issues (e.g., re-building infrastructure) support was provided by local CSOs/NGOs, often supported by INGOs, which in general managed to avoid sponsoring cookie cutter approaches (which were highlighted as pitfalls in the framework). However, during the RCA (Tobelo area, 2015), there were local people who expressed, in private, feelings of anger towards the fact that people (from the other religious community) responsible for killing their family members, had not faced any legal consequences.

However, the same people had themselves chosen to return to this mixed-faith village (where some of the perpetrators still live) after the wars, which also reveals a desire to move on, in my view. Nonetheless, the weak rule of law, security forces inaction and the fact that some of the leaders of the violence now enjoy high positions in the local and provincial governments, are potentially dangerous, as it sends out a message that the use of violence can pay off, coupled with a general lack of trust in democratic institutions (Wilson 2015). Therefore, it is positive that the current President of Indonesia, Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo, has already enforced stronger anti-corruption measures, which recently has put the former governor of North Maluku, Thaib Armaiyn behind bars for his involvement in corruption of the

IDP funds in NMP (e-mail interview Chris Wilson). Thus, Indonesia seems to move in the right direction, as anti-corruption and governance are slowly improving. In some cases in this thesis, we have seen that the etic and emic perspectives differed, as the drivers and motivations associated with the elite, were not the same as described by many of the local people, who had indeed been more physically involved in the wars and peace-building. This should not be seen as a weakness in the study. Instead, it can be said to demonstrate the importance of embracing multiple realities and triangulating different perspectives, when trying to solve a complex puzzle.

The inclusion of the emic perspective also served the purpose of bridging the identified research gap, as most previous research has indeed trivialised the important grassroots perspective.[33] To conclude, I hope this study has fulfilled its aim of being a modest contribution to existing research, implementing the RCA methodology in a new research context, as well as flagging up some interesting issues for future research. Lastly, I agree with Chris Wilson (2015: 1331) and Birgit Bräuchler (2015), who stress the importance for future research to further explore peace and reconciliation in contemporary Indonesia.

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[33] However, Chris Wilson and particularly Christopher Duncan, are exceptions to the elitist bias in previous research.

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Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Schedule

In-depth Interviews

Interview Date	Name	Sex	Age	Ethnicity	Religion	Occupation	Location
18.02.15	Faisal Djajaluddin	M	34	N/A	Islam	Editor Malut Pos (Newspaper)	Ternate
21.02.15	Kasman Hi Ahmad	M	N/A	N/A	Islam	Rector Muhammadiyah and PDI-P's candidate for Regency election (2015-2020)	Ternate
24.02.15	Ishak Naser	M	47	N/A	Islam	Vice-chairman DPRD, National Democratic Party (NasDem)	Ternate
25.02.15	Mahmud Adi	M	27	Makian	Islam	Lecturer Khairun University, (and previously a child soldier during the wars).	Ternate
28.02.15	Husen Alting	M	N/A	N/A	Islam	Rector Khairun University, former member the local NGO 'LML'	Ternate
28.02.15	Roswita Mubin Abow	F	38	Ternate	Islam	Lecturer Khairun University, (UNDP local staff)	Ternate
09.03.15	Zadrak Tongo-Tongo	M	68	Tobelo	Christian	Former civil servant in DPRD, (conflict leader during the wars)	Tobelo
10.03.15	M Roke Saway	M	53	N/A	Islam	1st Assistent to the Regent of North Halmahera	Tobelo
29.03.15	Theis Hoke	M	30	Ternate	Christian	IT Entrepreneur Ternate City (one of the few Christian IDPs that moved back to Ternate	Ternate

E-mail Interviews

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Appendix B – Interview Guide

1. Did you live in North Maluku at the time of the communal wars and later during the post-conflict period up until today? Did you have to move because of the conflicts?

2. What factors do you consider were important for ending the communal wars, so the peace-process could start?

3. What effect do you consider the Malino II peace agreement had for the peace-process?

4. In September 2003, former President Megawati signed the Presidential Instruction No. 6 (Inpres) that gave instructions to coordinating ministries to prioritise recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation activities. How did initiatives, such as this, from the central government effect the peace and reconciliation process, in your opinion?

5. Both the provincial and local governments have made efforts to re-integrate the large number of internally displaced peoples (IDPs). How has this worked out in practice, in your view?

6. How has the decentralisation process influenced the peace-building?

7. What roles have been played by the civil society, in your view?

8. Following the declaration of civil emergency on 27 June 2000, the military took part in many of the early reconciliation efforts, especially in North Halmahera. What is you view of the role the military has played for the peace and reconciliation process?

9. What roles have been played by religious leaders for reconciliation of communities that were often divided along religious lines during the communal wars?

10. During the conflict, some media operators were also divided along religious lines. Has that situation changed today?

11. What influence has the media reports had for the consolidation of peace, in your view?

12. North Maluku has a long history of peaceful co-existence and cooperation between different religious, and ethnic, communities. What is your view of the integration and reconciliation situation today?

13. Some communities have tried to reconcile their communities by revitalise different *adat* traditions, for example by the Tobelo that focused to emphasise

common *adat* traditions and a common ethnicity. Has this had a positive impact on reconciliation in communities with this focus? How has the effect been for non-indigenous people?

14. Large recovery funds have been distributed to North Maluku for recovery/peace-building work. In what ways have this materialised?

15. Has the socio-economic inequalities between different groups decreased after the end of the conflict, in your view?

16. Has the end of the conflict involved increased economic development for the majority of the population of North Maluku, in your view?

17. How has the integration of former combatants been facilitated by the provincial, or local, government?

18. Very few people have been convicted for crimes during the communal wars, for example massacres involving women and children. Some maintain this to be good for the maintenance of peace, since incarceration of some (and not others), may spur new conflicts. Others argue that this is tells that war-crimes are tolerated in times of violence. What is your view?

19. In many parts of Indonesia, criminal *preman* groups are still being used by some politicians to mobilise support. Is this a problem also in North Maluku in your view? What influence for reconciliation?

20. There have been some recovery/peace-building programmes implemented by international development organisations, for example by UNDP, Save the Children etc. What is your view of the effect of these efforts for consolidating peace in the province?

21. UNDP's own evaluation stated that their recovery and peace-building programmes often failed to pay attention to gender questions, i.e. the social and economic empowerment of women and their involvement in peace-building. What do you think about the role given to women in this process and how has that effected the reconciliation?

22. There have also been many efforts by local NGOs regarding peace-building and reconciliation. What influence have these efforts had?

23. What role, if any, has the sultan of Tidore, and his followers, had for the peace and reconciliation process, in your view?

24. What role, if any, has the sultan of Ternate, and his followers, had for the peace and reconciliation process, in your view?

25. What roles, if any, have the sultan of Bacan and Jailolo, and their followers, have for the peace and reconciliation process, in your view?

26. What do you think is important to improve further regarding the peace and reconciliation process in the future?

27. Is there some question you think I have missed to ask, or anything you would like to add?

INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR STUDY PARTICIPANTS

Prospective research participant: Please read this form carefully and do not hesitate to ask any questions that may arise, before you decide whether you want to participate in this research study. Participants are free to ask questions at any time before, during, or after participation.

Project Information

Project Title: After the Communal Wars: Peace, Development and Reconciliation in North Maluku

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1. Purpose of the Study

My name is Martin Björkhagen, and I am a master student in Development Studies, majoring in Political Science at Lund University. This study is being carried out with an overall aim of gaining deeper understanding of the different factors that have contributed to the consolidation of peace in North Maluku Province, after the communal conflicts. This further involves studying the reconciliation and development processes connected to this. I am inviting you to participate in this interview because your experience with, or knowledge of, the peace, development

or reconciliation processes. This research thus seeks to make a modest contribution to previous research regarding the post-conflict scenario in North Maluku by adopting a qualitative approach, which former studies rarely have done.

2. Participation

If you are willing to participate, you will take part in an in-depth interview. There is no fixed time frame for the interview, as different questions may generate various answers from different participants. I will ask questions about your general opinion in relation to the topic of the study, and also how you have experienced different processes of peace, development and reconciliation etcetera. The interview can take place at a location of your personal choice, where you feel most comfortable. With your permission, I seek the permission to audio record the interview, which increases the validity of the study. Yet, the recording is optional and you may also decline to answer certain question if you wish.

3. Confidentiality

With your consent, I would like to use the information you provide in the interview for the study, which involves your name. Please consider the possible implications of your identity being known to people outside the study. If you consider that your name and identity could result in any risk for you, it is best to remain anonymous in the study and I will thus replace your name. If your title would reveal your identity, I would also not include it in the published study.

4. Benefits

There are no financial benefits for participating in this study. However, your participation is very much appreciated and important, in order to increase the understanding of the consolidation of peace in North Maluku, and can contribute to a wider discussions of successful peace-building and development, after communal conflict.

5. Your Rights

You are entirely free to choose whether or not you want to participate and you may terminate your participation at any time of the study, by notifying me, or any of my supervisors. If this choice is made after an interview, I will delete all information

obtained during the interview. You are always free to contact me or my supervisors for any questions regarding the study. Your consent does not take away any legal rights in the case of negligence or other legal fault of anyone involved in this study. This consent form does not replace any applicable laws. Your signature below indicates that you voluntarily consent to participate and that you have received a copy of this consent form for your own records.

I do____ /Do not____ agree to my interview being recorded.

Participant Name:_____ Age: _____Occupation: _____

Optional information; Ethnicity: _____Religion: _____ Place of birth:_____

Place of residence during the communal wars: _____Place after the wars:_____

Participant Signature: _____ Date:

Researcher Signature: _____ Date:

Appendix D – Pictures from the RCAs

Demonstration (about to begin) against corruption of the community development
funds, from the '1%' of the revenues from the Gosowong goldmine, Kao RCA, 2015.

Anti-corruption demonstration in Tobelo City, March 2015.

The newly-built *Hibualamo* in Tobelo City, finished in 2007, on the initiative of Hein Namotemo's regency administration, in NHR.

The accompanying text at the *Hibualamo* site, revealing some of the discourse relating to the revitalised *adat*.

Graffiti at a youth hangout place in Kao. Israeli-motifs are often seen in Christian areas, and pro-Palestine motifs more frequently in Muslim areas.

Mass grave for Muslims who were killed in this village during the communal wars.

Soya-soya dance in Gurabunga, Tidore. It is a war dance, but is also used for special occasions (e.g. welcoming important guests or celebrating Tidore-day). The white flags represent Tidore, as opposed to yellow, which is Ternate's colour.

Many churches and mosques are newly re-built (after having been destroyed during the wars), some are even still under construction in NMP. Above from Malifut area, down left from Sosol (Malifut), and down right—a new church in Tobelo.

The *rumah adat* (traditional adat houses) come in various shapes, some are old, some new. Popon village (up-left), Kiematubu (up-right), Kakara Island (middle) and the newly-built *Hibualamo* in Tobelo (below). The latter is connected to the bigger *Hibualamo,* displayed at the cover page.

RCA photos: My interpreter and I are about to accompany women in the village to the gardens to collect vegetables (above). Below I am having an informal conversation with a neighbour and her daughter, while doing laundry—both during the Tobelo RCA.

To the right is my HHH during the Kao RCA. The house to the left belongs to their neighbour, who suddenly improved his house and bought an expensive SUV, after becoming a member of NHM's CSR committee.

The status of NMP's waste management leaves room for improvements, as a lot of trash are put into the rivers (left). To the right is one of many houses displaying football motifs, a sport that is immensely popular in the Moluccas—and was used to bring youths together after the conflicts.

One of the adat-influenced regency government buildings in NHR (above). Below is the volcanic Makian Island.

Above is the Kiematubu volcano on Tidore. Below is a photo from the funeral of the (48th) Sultan of Ternate, Mudaffar Sjah, who passed away during my fieldwork.

Appendix E – RCA Conversation Guide

Efforts in peace/reconciliation and development

Influence/roles of:

- Traditional (adat) leader(s)
- Religious leader(s)

What kind of efforts? Experienced level of community participation in these efforts? Perceived impact/value of these efforts?

About the village/community/Surrounding

- Geographical location/access/nearby villages/towns
- No of HH, social organisation?
- Economic range of livelihoods, who are rich/poor; why? Changed after conflict?
- Existing religions/ethnicities—represented by church-mosque and/or cultural buildings?
- Migrant population? Integration of different groups?

Efforts in peace/reconciliation, rehabiliatation and development

Influence/roles of:

- INGOs
- Local/national NGOs

What efforts? Experienced level of community participation in these efforts? Perceived impact/value of recovery/development efforts? Mental rehabilitation efforts/PTSD?

Leadership & efforts in peace/reconciliation/development

Influence/roles of:

- Kepala Desa/Pak RW/RT
- District/sub-district government leaders
- National/Regional/Provincial leaders
- Security forces/legal system

Experienced level of community participation in these efforts? Perceived impact/value of these efforts? Experienced level of insight/trust in these efforts? Preman groups/criminality?

Consolidation of Peace

Perceived causes for ending the war(s)

- What did people experience was the main reason(s) the conflict ended?

Local people's outlook on the future

- What, if any, could disrupt the consolidation of peace in the future their view? How are provocations handled?
- Current view of the integration/relations with the other community?

IDPs/land rights and the media

- How many were displaced during the conflict?
- Which places did they go?
- Most returned? When and how? Integrated?
- Land rights issues?
- What media are available? View of the media's coverage?

What is the experience of IDPs, and non-IDPs regarding their situation in the post-conflict scenario? Experience of different actors involved in the process of resettlement?