

Lund University  
Faculty of Social Science  
Master's Thesis in Development Studies  
SIMT32  
Major in Sociology  
30hp  
May 2009

## **THE ANGLOPHONE PROBLEM IN CAMEROON: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

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## ABSTRACT

Minority group conflicts and marginalisation has been a challenge to the peaceful existence and development of many African countries. This thesis is based on the topic: *The Anglophone problem: Political representation and Socio-economic development*. Cameroon is the case since its independence in 1960 till date.

The Anglophones who form the minority claim they are marginalised by the Francophones who are the majority and the ruling group. They claim that they are not politically represented both in the government and in decision making of the country, and also their regions, the Northwest and Southwest Provinces lag behind both in social and economic development. The origin of the Anglophone problem and ways in which the Anglophones are being marginalised is an important part of this thesis and is being looked at. Attention is also focused on what the Anglophone movements like the SCNC, AAC, and the SCYL have been doing to stop the marginalisation of the Anglophones and the response of the Cameroonian government to provide a solution to the problem.

Theories based on Ethnicity, Political systems and Regional development based on social and economic development will be used to analyse the empirical material. In addition analysis of course and related literature on Cameroon will be the methodology used because of the inability to undertake field research. It is hoped that this work will contribute to a framework on which peace and development organisations can rely in the fight against minority conflict and poverty in Cameroon and Africa as a whole.

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

My warm appreciation goes to my supervisor Prof. Staffan Lindberg for his consistent supervision of my work. He devotedly read through my thesis, made several corrections and provided me with constructive ideas.

My regards goes to my course instructors for their teachings and lectures, which have enriched my intellect and directed me in the writing of this thesis.

The Batch of students of development studies for the year 2007/2009 was equally helpful and friendly which gave me a warm study environment.

My regard goes to the Lund University management in general and the library staffs in particular deserve much credit due to their duty consciousness and promptness at work.

My gratitude goes to my family and friends both in Europe and in Cameroon, for their advice and constant prayers to ensure a fruitful achievement of my studies.

Above all greatest thanks go to God Almighty for providing me with the strength and knowledge to go through this work.

## **DEDICATION**

This piece of work is dedicated to the Lord God Almighty, the giver of all academic inspirations and successes, and through whose guidance, love and care, I have produced this thesis.

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AFRICAN MAP SHOWING CAMEROON



CAMEROON SHOWING NORTHWEST AND SOUTHWEST PROVINCES (Anglophone areas)

## ABBREVIATIONS

|        |  |
|--------|--|
| ACC    | All Anglophone Conference  |
| CAM    | Cameroon Anglophone Movement                                       |
| CANSA  | Cameroon Anglophone Students ' Association                         |
| CAPTAC | Confederation of Anglophone Parent Teacher Association of Cameroon |
| CDC    | Cameroon Development Corporation                                   |
| CDU    | Cameroon Democratic Union  |
| CNU    | Cameroon National Union  |
| CPDM   | Cameroon People's Democratic Movement                              |
| CRTV   | Cameroon Radio and Television                                      |
| FRSC   | Federal Republic of Southern Cameroon                              |
| FWCM   | Free West Cameroon Movement  |
| GCE    | General Certificate of Education                                   |
| IMF    | International Monetary Fund  |
| LDA    | Liberal Democratic Alliance  |
| NGO    | Non-Governmental Organisation                                      |
| OAU    | Organisation of African Unity                                      |
| SCARM  | Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement                            |
| SCNC   | Southern Cameroons National Council                                |
| SCPC   | Southern Cameroons People's Conference                             |
| SCYL   | Southern Cameroons Youth League                                    |
| SDF    | Social Democratic Front  |
| SONARA | <i>Societe' National de Raffinage</i>                              |
| SONEL  | <i>Societe' National d'Electricite</i>                             |
| TAC    | Teacher's Association of Cameroon                                  |
| UN     | United Nations   |
| UNPO   | Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation                     |
| UNC    | Union National Cameroonaise  |



# **1 INTRODUCTION**

## **1.1 Background and problem**

One of the greatest challenges of a modern nation state is the protection of political rights, social and economic interests of minority groups within their borders. The problems of minority groups are usually aggravated during an uncertain political or cultural situation, and in order to cope, these minority groups tend to nurture a high sense of group identity, longing for lost opportunities and a desire to return to a specific political circumstance which sometime becomes the main objectives of the leaders of this minority group (Lyombe 2003:2). This is the situation of the Anglophones in Cameroon today.

Cameroon is a sub-Saharan African country found basically between West and Central Africa. It was colonised by France and Britain, this explains why Cameroon is a bilingual country speaking both French and English. Those speaking French are called the Francophones and those speaking English are called Anglophones. Cameroon has a population of 18 million, the Francophones make up about 85% (majority) of the population while the Anglophone about 15% (minority) of the total population, this could also be clarified using the provinces, as there are ten provinces in Cameroon with eight belonging to the Francophones, and two provinces to the Anglophones. The latter are called Northwest and Southwest provinces. French Cameroon is found in the Eastern part of the country, so their region before reunification was first called East Cameroon while Anglophone Cameroon is found in the Western part of Cameroon and before reunification was called West Cameroon. The latter's name was later changed and today West Cameroon is known as Southern Cameroon. We can note that, the Anglophones are comparatively small as compared to the other part of the country and this small nature has affected its existence in negative directions.

Cameroon like most other African countries has its internal problems although there has been no major armed conflict since independence in 1961, there is the problem of the minority group being dominated by the majority and this majority also controls the government, thus Anglophone Cameroon has been at the forefront of ethno-regional protests and demands for rearrangement of state power. Two Scholars, Konings and Nyamnjoh, claim that "there is a widespread feeling in this region that reunification with Francophone Cameroon in 1961 has led to a growing marginalisation of the Anglophone minority in the state project controlled by the Francophone elites, endangering its political heritage and identity" (Konings and Nyamnjoh

2003: 2). They make us aware that it was during the political liberalisation period in the early 1990s that the Anglophone elites began to mobilise the regional population against their subordinated positions to demand for self-determination and autonomy, reintroducing federalism and later secession to the political agenda. Still, Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003:2) mention that there exist ethno-regional divisions and tensions within the Anglophones themselves particularly between the Northwest and the Southwest. Thus we realize that conflict exists at different levels in the country, besides the Francophones and Anglophones conflicts, the two main Anglophone provinces are also at conflict with each other and this makes their fight against Francophone marginalization a difficult one because they are not united in their action. The post-colonial state has taken advantage of these existing contradictions within the Anglophone community to play off the South-western elites against its North-western counterpart in persistent efforts to bolster the unitary state and to deconstruct the Anglophone identity.

Eko Lyombe views the Anglophone problem as a collection of political, economic, and social grievances expressed by the English-speaking minorities in the predominantly French-speaking Republic of Cameroon. These grievances are expressed in terms of discrimination, second-class citizenship and marginalization (Lyombe 2003:2). Although the marginalisation of the Anglophone minority in Cameroon has not yet reached its peak by resulting in an armed conflict, it is however very necessary for steps to be taken for a proactive prevention of a violent conflict in Cameroon.

## **1.2 Research Questions**

In this essay I will attempt to answer the following Questions.

- What is the origin of the Anglophone problem in Cameroon?
- In what ways are the Anglophones marginalized in contemporary Cameroon?
- What are the main reasons for this marginalization?
- What have the Anglophones tried to do to stop this marginalization, and what are they doing today?
- What are the prospects for a solution to the problem of marginalization?

### **1.3 Purpose of the study**

By analysing the Anglophone problem in Cameroon, I want to understand what brought about the marginalisation of the Anglophones in Cameroon and the reasons for this marginalisation. I also want to look at what the Anglophones have been doing so far to stop this discrimination and whether or not there are alternative ways of bringing a solution to this problem of marginalization. Since I believe that there is something to be done to improve the status of the Anglophones, I intend to explore strategies to remove the impediments for implementing "equal status" between the Anglophones and the Francophones by focusing on equal participation, democracy, empowerment and campaign on human rights. So the purpose of the study is to uncover obstacles and barriers to equal status of the citizens of Cameroon.

### **1.4 Scope and Limitation**

The scope will cover the origin of the Anglophone problem, the ways in which the Anglophones are marginalized and reasons for Anglophone marginalization, effects of this marginalization on socio-economic development within the Anglophone area, the measures which have been taken by the Anglophones and Francophones to solve this problem and to what extent these measures have succeeded. The research will be carried out on Cameroon from the time of independence in 1960 up to 2008. The limitation is that due to the time frame I might not be able to fully evaluate the socio-economic development trends in the Anglophone Area. Also there is a limitation on the available literature on what the Francophone authors have written about the Anglophone problem because they have written very little on it.

### **1.5 Methodology**

#### *1.5.1 Literature review*

My analysis will be based on secondary sources and existing literature on Cameroon, which consists of books, articles, reports, official documents from the Anglophone press which will be relevant for grounding my arguments. As mentioned above, there is very little reference to Francophone writers because they have simply not written much on the Anglophone problem in Cameroon. It appears that this is not a big and important problem for them.

Thus I will be concentrating mostly on the Anglophone literature which I found for my empirical material, implying that there might be possible biases in the empirical materials which

also mean a limitation of this study. What I have done to balance this, is to put the description and analysis presented by Anglophone Cameroonian writers in a wider context of relevant ethnicity and democracy theories so as to understand their significance. For example, Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003) is a very important analysis of the situation, which I use quite a lot in the thesis. It is, of course, a partial view in favour of the Anglophone cause, but the interesting thing is that it is also based on an understanding of identity as a social relation based in academic theory.

Flick indicates that almost everything you want to research will probably connect with an existing neighbouring field, thus it is rather naive to think there is still a new field to explore where nothing has been published before (Flick 2006:58). I have used available materials both published and unpublished on the topic, which contain information's, ideas, and evidence written from various standpoints to express certain views on the topic. The theoretical ideas have also been taken from the available course programme literatures; the various concepts, approaches and theories from different perspectives have been looked upon comparatively. Also some materials have been taken from existing literature in books from the Lund University and web-based literature on ethnicity and divided societies, politics and democracy, and socio-economic development in Cameroon and Africa as a whole.

### *1.5.2 Personal background and experience*

Added to the above, some personal background and experience of being an Anglophone Cameroonian will be presented here. I know as an Anglophone Cameroonian, it would not be easy to analyse the situation without being biased but I will try to be as objective as possible. I am an Anglophone from the Northwest of Cameroon but have stayed and studied too in the Southwest and in the Francophone regions. This gave me the opportunity to be exposed to discourses and issues concerning both the Francophone/Anglophone conflict as well as the Northwest/Southwest tensions, which divides their social identity and hence weakens their solidarity. As Ngoh (1996:328) notes: "There is no doubt an "Anglophone problem" exists in Cameroon but within the Anglophone community, there is a South West and Northwest problem."

After my bachelor degree, I travelled to Douala (one of the largest towns in Cameroon found in the Francophone region), to look for a job but it was really difficult getting one because all the interviews I attended were in French and though I responded too in French, once my

English accent was realized, I was automatically denied the job. Also my voice was under attack and my sense of Cameroon too because all around me French prevailed. I understood French relatively well but I could not speak it fluently. Thus with a less than perfect knowledge of French came a less than perfect sense of self. My confidence began to suffer because of fear of ridicule that easily came from Francophones who regarded Anglophones as foreigners. Each time the Francophones heard my friends and I talking in English, they would poke fun at us and call us “Biafrans” from Nigeria, a reference to the fact that the English-speaking Cameroon was once part of Nigeria. In addition, there are times when I go to the library and pick up books, bibliographies, magazines, anything on Africa to see how Cameroon was presented historically, but, to my dismay it was always presented as part of French Africa. English Africa was Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, etc. English Cameroon was lost. That is still the case to this day. One of my pastors once told me when I complained that our culture and our identity are not entirely of our making. We participate in and act upon what we are handed by history. These are a few experiences as an Anglophone Cameroonian, so it provides an additional advantage for the conduciveness of the study object. It also means that my analysis will aim at looking for possible solutions to the Anglophone problem, since I too have been a victim of marginalisation.

### **1.6 Outline of the study**

The paper will consist of the following chapters, besides this introduction, which is also Chapter one. Chapter Two will contain the theoretical approach. “There is hardly a research without theories because in science, what are needed are relevant facts which are relative to the current state of development of that science. The relevant facts for science are the answers provided from ideal observations” (Chalmers 2004:11), I am going to use three main theoretical fields which are:

-Ethnic Relations and its History in Africa which is develop Donald Horowitz and Antoine Lema.

-Political Systems in Africa also develop by Staffan Lindberg and E. Gyimah-Boadi.

-Socio-economic development in a regional perspective developed by Amartya Sen, Jeffery Sachs, Van de Walle, Nicolas and some others.

Chapter Three will deal with a brief history of Cameroon, Its colonial inheritance and origin of the Anglophone problem. I will also look at the various ways in which the Anglophones are marginalized, that is politically, economically and socially as well as the reasons for this marginalization.

Chapter Four will present the general actions carried out so far by the Anglophones to try to stop this marginalization and what they are doing today. I will look in detail on the methods and approach that Anglophone parties like the Social Democratic Front (SDF), All Anglophone Conference (ACC), Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC), and Southern Cameroon Youth League (SCYL), have taken so far to resolve the marginalization problem.

Chapter Five will be an evaluation of the methods and approaches taken by all these parties based on practical principles. I will also look at the successes and failures of these methods.

Chapter Six will present general discussion and analysis. That is using the theories mentioned above to analyse and understand the empirical materials.

Chapter Seven will be the general conclusions and prospects for a solution to the Anglophone problem. How the obstacles to equal status between Anglophones and Francophones can be addressed.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS**

Below are the theories which I am going to use for my research:

- Ethnic Relations and its history in Africa
- Political systems in Africa
- Socio-economic development in a regional perspective

## **2.1 Ethnic relations and its history in Africa**

Ethnic conflict is a worldwide phenomenon and in country after country, political parties, pressure groups, trade unions, armed forces etc. are organised ethnically. Ethnic identity is strongly felt and behaviour based on ethnicity is normatively sanctioned, and often accompanied by hostility towards out-groups. In divided societies, ethnic conflict is at the centre of politics, and ethnic division poses challenges to the cohesion of states and sometimes to peaceful relations among states (Horowitz 1985:7-8). He goes ahead to mention that ethnic conflict strains the bonds that sustain civility and is often at the root of violence that results in deaths, homelessness and the flight of large numbers of people.

Horowitz (1985:4) traces the origin of ethnic conflicts. He mentions that ethnic conflict is a recurrent phenomenon in histories which are usually revived by war time experiences or emerge after a war, like in the First and Second World War and even with the termination of colonial control in Africa and Asia. He continues by saying that these ethnic movements that sought independence from colonial powers were not always wholly representatives of all the ethnic groups in their territories. Some groups that were not well represented attempted to slow down the march to independence or even tried to create a separate state. As some groups moved to succeed the power of the former colonialist, others claimed that self-determination was incomplete since they had not achieved their own independence (Horowitz 1985:4).

Horowitz (1985) also mentions that the Europeans drew arbitrary lines and territorial boundaries on maps to suit their interest, heedless of the effects it had on ethnic groups. This made some ethnic groups to be divided between territories, and some were included in the same territories along with others whom they had little in common. That is why around the time of African independence, there was the talk of "artificiality of territorial boundaries" imposed by the colonial powers. Ethnic conflicts have always been blamed on the colonialist because of these artificial territorial boundaries which they drew across ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985:75).

Antoine Lema 1993:22 suggests that ethnicity theories are not homogenous. He divides them into two competing and contrasting schools of thought, the Primordialists who believe that ethnic groups are based on primordial sentiments of solidarity and will continue into the modern and post modern states and the Modernists who believe that ethnic groups will disappear with modernisation because social mobilisation was conceived as an overall process of change, where people move from traditional to modern ways of life. These include changes in literacy level,

residence from rural to urban and occupation from agriculture to non-agriculture and intermarriages between different ethnic groups. Thus according to him, as times goes on ethnic groups will tend to disappear and the world will become one global place where peace and development will exist (Antoine Lema 1993:22).

Nkwi and Socpa 1997 in their article “Ethnicity and Party Politics in Cameroon” trace the roots of ethnicity in Cameroon. They state that Cameroon has a distinct regional, cultural, religious, and political traditions as well as ethnic variety. They mention that before colonization, Cameroon was a territory of diverse zones populated by a variety of peoples, after the colonial masters left, the relationship changed due to the Anglophones claiming they are being marginalized by their Francophone counterparts. In 1884, Cameroon became a German protectorate (Kamerun). The Germans were defeated by British and French forces in 1916, and the territory was divided between those nations in 1916. In 1922, the French and British zones became League of Nations mandates, with the French controlling over 80 percent of the national territory. They state that the frontier between the French and British zones cut through the territories of several ethnic groups, particularly the Bamiléké and Grassfields peoples of the western highlands. This later served as an impetus for the reunification of those zones at the time of independence. The division of the country into British and French League of Nations mandates after World War I created Anglophone and Francophone regions and this division has created what has become known today as the “Anglophone problem” because the Anglophones who are the minority are complaining of being marginalized by their Francophone counterparts (Nkwi and Socpa 1997).

Horowitz (1985:22) indicates that ethnic discrimination is more likely where regional ethnic schemes are implemented, thus an assumption may grow that, members of a particular ethnic group have no claims to work in the central government or anywhere outside their region because they are not of the same ethnic group as the leaders of their country. He gives an example from Ghana where many people expect favourable treatments at the hands of bureaucrats belonging to their own ethnic group and unfavourable treatment at the hands of bureaucrats belonging to other ethnic groups.

Horowitz (1985) also brings out the concepts superiors and subordinates in his book, stating that in study after study, it has been assumed that ethnic relations are relations between superiors and subordinates. He adds that many sociologists have developed a sort of pathos for



minority groups as “victims”, conceptualizing the relations between subordinate and dominant groups in such a way that the former are invariably oppressed and exploited. Also the competition for scarce values and material goods is exactly what propels people to see themselves as members of distinct groups (Horowitz 1985).

Antoine Lema (1993:29) uses the concept of ethnicity as an attribute that designates a people’s particular sense of identity and solidarity, just as the concept of nationality. He indicates that “a strong sense of ethnic identity is difficult to maintain without strong family ties.” These include marriage within the groups.

Horowitz (1985:559) suggests some mechanisms of conflict reduction; the four mechanisms are as follows:

- 1) “By spreading the points of power so as to take some heat off a single focal point, i.e. scattering power among institutions at the centre.
- 2) Ethnic conflicts may be reduced by policies that create incentives for inter ethnic cooperation, but certain preferential and territorial arrangements may also do this.
- 3) It may also be reduced by policies that encourage alignments based on interests other than ethnicity.
- 4) Lastly by reducing inequality between groups so that dissatisfaction declines. ”

Horowitz also mentions that “electoral systems have a role in fostering or retarding ethnic conflict. The delimitation of constituencies, the electoral principle, the number of members per constituency, and the structure of the ballot box all have a potential impact on ethnic alignment”(Horowitz 1985:601-622).

Whether and when a secessionist movement will emerge is determined mainly by the domestic politics and by the relations of groups and regions within the states. Today, some Anglophones favor secession from the Francophones of the east. They feel that their region is being dominated by the Francophones and that they are insufficiently represented in government posts. But it appears moves taken by the Anglophone Movements towards secession have been strongly resisted by the central government.

## **2.2 Political systems in Africa**

Political systems are the formal processes by which decisions are made concerning the process for electing leaders, the roles and responsibilities of the executive and legislature, the

organisation of political representation (through political parties), the accountability the state, and the use of production and distribution of resources in any given society. Most Africa leaders are authoritarian considering themselves as ultimate leaders who do not have to answer to anyone. African countries will continue to be involved in conflicts unless their leaders agree on how to govern their states and how to distribute their economic resources equitably and this can only be done when there is democracy in a country.

Staffan Lindberg (2003:1-2) brings out a modern definition of democracy as “one which includes participatory and contested elections, perceived as the legitimate procedure for the translation of rule by the people into workable executive and legislative power”. This definition, he says induces a focus on three dependent variables namely: participation, competition and legitimacy as democratic qualities of elections which facilitate the institution and deepening of civil liberties in society as a causal variable in democratization. He goes on by adding that elections fosters liberalization and have a self reinforcing power that promotes democracy in African political regimes.

Many elections in African have failed to meet the internationally accepted standards for free and fair elections (Wondwosen 2008). The indicators of successful elections include free, fair and peaceful elections in which opposition parties participate and the outcome of elections are acceptable to all parties, but most elections in Africa have not been successful because once in power, the leaders of the new nation or state become very greedy and selfish with power and since they are in control, they rig the elections to remain there rather than to give space for another leader (Wondwosen 2008).

“Variations of the semi-competitive approach to legislative elections in which the voter could choose between several candidates approved by the ruling party were later introduced in some countries. Voters continue to choose representatives based on how good they are as patrons of their respective constituencies” (Lindberg 2003:10-12). He adds that, a few African countries have learnt from failed experiments with democracy and have designed innovative electoral systems, including arrangements to include ethnic minorities, contain extremist ethno-regional political parties, and encourage election alliances and party coalitions. Some other African countries have not changed at all, the recent experiences of Kenya and Zimbabwe show that no election should be taken for granted. These countries also highlight a possible worrying trend in African elections (Lindberg 2003:10-12).

According to Taylor (1994), the principle of liberal democracy sees individuals as entitled to “govern” their own lives, within limits connected primarily with the mutual recognition and equal opportunities for all. Lindberg (2003:47) continues by suggesting that “at the core of the democratic government system is the principle that the people select representatives who govern them and are held accountable for their actions”. For the process to be legitimate these two prerequisite of equality of political participation and free political competition must be present. He mentions the electoral way as one of the options of choosing leadership and disposing of old government in a political system. As a core institution of representative democracy, elections are supposedly the only means to decide who holds legislative and executive power respectively (Lindberg (2003:47).

“The more democratic traits different parts of a political system has, the more democratic the country. And the only way of knowing how democratic a country is by thoroughly analyzing the partial regimes that constitute the entire political system” (Lindberg 2003:50). Thus by analyzing election as a central system institution of representative democracy for the realization of its core value, we may actually get to know a lot about the system as a whole. Lindberg (2003) also adds that, a necessary component of all aspiring democratic system are institutional guarantees for holding periodic and contested elections to the executive and legislative branches of the government by which the people through participation can rule indirectly over themselves. Political participation exercised through voting and equality of political participation in elections implies there is a universal suffrage guaranteed by law. Participatory elections also mean that individuals and political parties have equal rights to exist and field candidates to contest elections (Lindberg 2003:50-53). In Africa, to positively impact an electoral process and to avoid conflicts, observation and technical support must start long before Election Day and continue well after. It should support the emergence of legitimate institutions, interaction between local people and the government, and good governance (Wondwosen 2008).

Lindberg rounds up his argument by insisting that “elections do not only signify democracy, but what breeds democratic qualities are self reinforcing and self-improving quality of repetitive elections” (Lindberg 2003:179). His analysis shows that regime survival in Africa has little to do with the level or rate of economic development otherwise with more breakdowns we should witness poorer countries with negative economic development, to have only short

sequence of elections. He supports the theory that a strong and active civil society is the outcome of liberalization and electoral practice and not their cause (Lindberg 2003:179).

Gyimah-Boadi (2004:104) also brings out some key developments in democracy in Africa as well as its shortcomings. In contrast to Lindberg, he argues that civil society has contributed significantly to African democratisation and that it must overcome many internal and external obstacles and deficiencies, if it is to sustain its effectiveness as an agent of African democratic development. He mentions that some of these developmental NGOs have emerged to fill the gap in meeting the social and economic needs of marginalised groups arising from breakdowns of state and traditional social support systems. Gyimah-Boadi (2004:104) also states that African countries under military or authoritarian civilian governments, organizations in civil society provided an opportunity for ordinary citizens to express their economic and political needs. A combination of religious services, professional groups, and trade unions has become more vocal in demanding political change in many African countries. Also the combination of opposition groups in civil societies and the voices of ordinary citizens provide a powerful expression for democracy and responsive government throughout Africa (Gyimah-Boadi (2004:104).

In addition, Gyimah-Boadi (2004:125-278) brings out the concept of corruption as an impediment to development. He says that the effect of corruption has translated into political instability, frequent regime changes and unstable economic investment environment. These factors results in slowing the consolidation of participatory governance in the region. Therefore controlling corruption is one of the greatest challenges to the establishment and consolidation of a democratic system in African countries. The inability of marginalised groups to genuinely participate and make governance decisions in their communities has been a major cause of entrenched corruption and abject poverty in most rural areas. Also the failure to develop a participative approach to the design and implementation of anti-corruption strategies is part of a general breakdown in accountability. He notices that only about two out of five African governments are accountable to their people through the most minimal instrument of free and fair elections and proposes that Africa needs a new bargain including debt relief for democracy and development for good governance. Under such new deal for African development, then African governments would not merely hold each other accountable, they would be monitored,

evaluated and held accountable by the international community and by their own people working closely in coordination with donor agencies (Gyimah-Boadi 2004:125-278).

Hyden (1992:12) identifies four properties of effective governance as important to good politics. Trust which refers to a normative consensus on the limits of action present in a political community; Reciprocity which is the quality of the social interaction among members of a political community; Accountability refers to the effectiveness in which government can exercise influence over their governors; and lastly Authority which stresses the significance of effective leadership. The more these properties characterise the system, the stronger the probability of effective governance.

Chazan et al (1992:217) indicates that "Political changes in Africa have come in a violent as well as in a peaceful wrapping. The military "coup d'état" has been the most prevalent way of inducing change against the will of those in office. It is important to point out reasons why coups have not taken place to analyze the elements conducive to their occurrence." Some military regimes have been more efficient but others have been more corrupt thus violence may be a central catalyst for political transformation. Some countries that have undergone civil wars emerge from these confrontations intact and well defined political centres but this is not the same in all cases (Chazan et al 1992:217).

### **2.3 Socio-economic development in a regional perspective**

Development is defined as a "process which enables human beings to realize their potentials, build self confidence and lead lives of dignity and fulfilment", it frees people from the fear of want and exploitation and aims at enlarging peoples choices which include access to income, employment opportunities, education, health and a clean and safe environment. Each individual should have the opportunity to participate fully in his community by participating in decision making and implementing of these decisions (Rist 2006: 9).

Development interventions are intended to move societies from a situation in which they are believed to be worse off, to situations in which they are assumed to be better off. The driving idea here is that human beings are most happy and productive when they enjoy freedom of mind and body and this can only be achieved in the atmosphere of peace and stability, guaranteed by a stable and good government through genuine performance (*Human development report 2004*). In addition, this report argues that human development is first and foremost about allowing people

to lead the kind of lives they choose and providing them with tools and opportunities to make those choices. Thus it sees human development as both a question of politics as well as socio-economics. Therefore, economic, social and political development all depends on human development to complete the process of national development. The idea is that unless the poor and marginalized can influence political action at local and national level, they are unlikely to get equitable access to jobs, education, health, justice and other basic services and I believe regional development is an easy means to achieve national development.

Efforts at regional development started with the independence era in Africa specifically with the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1964. Together with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), these two organisations sustained regional efforts throughout the continent, with the collaboration of bilateral aid especially from former colonial powers in the different regions. Concerning the socio-economic development, neither the regionalization efforts nor other structural adjustment programs undertaken from the 1980s did improve the African economies, which “at the dawn of the twenty-first century, most of sub-Saharan Africa remained mired in economic crisis despite two decades of donor-sponsored reform efforts. Most economies in the region still have not overcome the fiscal and balance of payments deficits that have undermined economic stability since the first oil crisis in the mid-1970s” (Van de Walle, Nicolas (2001:3).

Regional development within Cameroon can be achieved by expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. This requires the removal of major source of unfreedoms like poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity of repressive states (Sen 1999:3). Also in page 8-10 of the same book, he defines socio-economic development in its broader sense as “An integrated process of expansion of substantive freedoms interconnecting with one another.” Those freedoms can be identified as political freedom, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security.

He gives two reasons why freedom is central to development.

-“The evaluative reason meaning, assessment of progress has to be done primarily in terms of whether the freedoms that the people have are enhanced

-The effectiveness reason meaning achievement of development is dependent on the free agency of people.” In essence greater freedom enhances the ability of people to help and influence the

world which is central to the process of development. Sen sees the strength a democratic system as an essential component of the process of development. He says the use of democratic institutions is conditioned by our values and priorities and what we make of the necessary opportunities of participation (Sen 1999:158). Thus if regions which are less economically developed are provided with political and socio-economic freedom of speech, facilities and opportunities then these areas will gain regional development as well as national development.

Van de Walle, (2001:6) presents some obstacles to socio-economic development as: The state's limited capacity to implement development policies, endemic corruption, inadequate public infrastructure, the quality of physical and human capital, and the deterioration of security. During the twenty years of structural adjustments supported by the IMF and the World Bank, the most criticized causes were high government expenditures, high levels of inflation and protectionist trade policies. While other developing countries in Asia and Latin America experienced impressive development levels after their independences, through advantages of foreign direct investment and the spread of liberalization, Africa's poor performance has instead reinforced its progressive marginalization from the global economy, where its share, according to the World Bank's report 1998, amounted only at 1.1 percent of the world's GDP. From this scenario, the general view is that appropriate policies, especially policies capturing African characteristics, are still needed for the socioeconomic development of the continent. Besides the economic factors, Van de Walle 2001:11 points out that "variables such as the level of corruption, the extent of ethnic fragmentation, the level of political violence, or the quality of government services help explain the growth differential between Africa and other regions". Since African governments' incapacity in implementing policy changes is identified as part of the problem, a plausible way around such a situation is of implementing the required policy changes through regional organizations.

Sachs (2005:56) insists that the most common explanation for why countries fail to achieve economic growth often focuses on the faults of the poor and poverty is a result of corrupt leadership and retrograde culture that impede modern development. He also outlines failure of government as a good reason for persistent poverty. Growth may enrich households linked to good market opportunities, but it may bypass the poorest even within the same community. This may be because they are part of a particular ethnic or religious minority (Sachs 2005:56). "The western world has part answers concerning Africa's prolonged crises. Everything comes back,

again and again to corruption and misrule. Western officials, including the countless missions of the IMF and the World Bank to African countries argue that, Africa simply needs to behave itself better, to allow market forces to operate without interference by corrupt rulers”(Sachs 2005:191). The Millennium Development Goal recognise that extreme poverty has many dimensions, not only low income, but also vulnerability to disease, exclusion from education, chronic hunger and under nutrition, lack of access to basic amenities such as clean water and sanitation, environmental degradation such as deforestation and land erosion that threatens lives and livelihoods. Sachs mentions (2005:213) that to reduce poverty by half by 2015 as the Millennium Development Goal states, each country should adopt a Poverty Reduction Strategy by major policy shifts at national and international levels, to boost growth and development in the region.

Kholi looks at the role of the state in fostering different rates of economic development especially through rapid industrialization. This is because the state takes and implements decisions on how a country’s resources and its labour force should be positioned for its industries to grow (Kholi 2004:4).

The theory of patron-client relationship brought out by Törnquist (1999: 57) and Hyden et al (1970:32-33) is also very important in this study. They mention that many scholars in public administration, have agreed that the relations between politics and development is characterized by the use of clientelism and patrimonialism by dominant groups to capture for themselves a large part of society’s resources, and to subjugate and exclude the masses. These relations are based on mutual personal exchange of goods and services between unequal actors. Reciprocation comes in the form of loyalty, votes and rendering of various services from the client to the patron, and the patron provides the client with material support, protection, appointments and promotion. This phenomenon hinders the early growth of a professional ethic in the civil service (Törnquist 1999: 57 and Hyden et al 1970:32-33).

These theories above will be used to analyze the later part of this essay and they will help give a better understanding the Anglophone problem and possible solution to this problem in Cameroon. The country is composed of several ethnic groups spread over the ten provinces of the country, but just two of these provinces compose of the Anglophone who feels because of their minority status, they are marginalized and not politically represented. They also complain



that their own provinces are neglected in terms of social and economic development. This has led to some conflicts in the past making the Anglophones to threaten secession. However, Horowitz has given some important mechanisms in his book to avoid and reduce a conflict situation. In addition, Lindberg has proposed democracy as an essential tool of government to rule its people. This is because it guarantees periodic and contested elections and people through participation can rule indirectly over them. This is also supported by other authors mentioned above. Lastly, Sen, Van de Walle looks at freedom and regional socio-economic development as a better means to improve economic growth in all parts of the country and reduce marginalization.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **3. HISTORY OF CAMEROON AND ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM**

#### **3.1 A Brief history of Cameroon**

The history of Cameroon is very important in this study because the Anglophone problem in Cameroon today originated as far back as during the post Colonial period, thus providing a brief history will give us a clear understanding of how this problem started.

DeLancey and Mbella (2000) give a brief history of Cameroon from the “Historical dictionary of the Republic of Cameroon”. They mention that, the Portuguese were the first non Africans on Cameroon’s coast in the 1500s, but malaria prevented significant European settlements and conquest of the interior until the late 1870s, when large supplies of the malaria suppressant, quinine became available. The Portuguese activities in Cameroon were devoted to coastal trade and acquisition of slaves but slave trade was largely suppressed by the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century when the Christian missionaries established their presence and continued their religious activities in Cameroon (DeLancey and Mbella 2000).

As mentioned in the theoretical part above by Nkwi and Sopca (1997), during the scramble for Africa in 1884, Cameroon became a German colony and the imperial German government made substantial investments in the infrastructure of Cameroon, including extensive railways, hospitals, schools and plantations. However since the indigenous people proved reluctant to work on these projects, the Germans instigated harsh and forced labour. They also mention that, during the World War 1, in 1914, France and Britain invaded and defeated the Germans in Cameroon making the league of Nations to hand over Cameroon to France and Britain as trusteeship territories. Cameroon was later split into two parts with France gaining a

larger portion while Britain received a stripe bordering Nigeria from the sea to Lake Chad. This division has laid a base for the creation of two identities and the population of each identity sees themselves as a distinct community, because of their differences in language and inherited colonial tradition (Nkwi and Sopca 1997). This is also a consequence of colonial rule in Africa as Horowitz (1985) mentions above that the colonial masters drew territorial boundaries on maps to suit their interests, heedless of the effects it had on ethnic groups.

According to Awasom (2000), while the Francophone elite received strong support from the French during the constitutional negotiations in the 1950s before independence, the Anglophone elites were virtually abandoned by the British because the British were not in full support of the Anglophone reunification with Francophone Cameroon. They preferred them joining Nigeria because it will be easier for them to rule both territories since Nigeria was also their colony. By the end of colonial rule in Cameroon, French Cameroon was more developed than British Cameroon because much capital was invested in Cameroon by the French making them to have a higher per capita income, higher educational levels, better health care as well as infrastructure than British Cameroon. Hence by the time Cameroon got independence in 1961, French Cameroon was more developed and better off than British Cameroon.

DeLancey and Mbella (2000), mention that in 1955, the Union of the People of Cameroon (UPC) party began an armed struggle for independence in French Cameroon. They later achieved independence in 1960 as Republic of Cameroon. The following year, on October 1<sup>st</sup> 1961, the Muslims of Northern part of British Cameroon voted to join Nigeria, while the Christians of Southern Cameroon voted to join the Republic of Cameroon to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon. The former French and British regions each maintained substantial autonomy. They also add that Ahmadou Ahidjo, a French speaking Muslim from the North of Cameroon was chosen president of the country in 1961. He was given an advantage because he was from French Cameroon which had a larger population. He relied on a pervasive internal security apparatus and outlawed all political parties but his own in 1966. In 1972, a new constitution replaced the federation with a unitary state called the United Republic of Cameroon. Ahidjo resigned as president in 1982 and was constitutionally succeeded by his prime minister, Paul Biya, a career official from the Beti ethnic group in the south province. Ahidjo later regretted his choice as successor but his supporters failed to overthrow Biya in a 1984 coup. Biya won single-candidate elections in 1984 when the country was again renamed the Republic of

Cameroon. Biya has remained in power, winning multiparty elections in 1992, 1997, and 2004. His Cameroon people's Democratic Movement (CPDM) party holds a sizeable majority in the legislature (DeLancey and Mbella 2000). Many observers claim that the results were rigged.

### **3.2 Colonial inheritance of Cameroon**

Tongkeh (2009) highlights the colonial inheritance of Cameroon. He mentions that during the Berlin Conference of 1884, it was agreed that the "scramble for Africa" would proceed peacefully but Germany acquired Cameroon by outwitting Britain in the "scramble for Cameroon." This was due to Britain's reluctance to annex the territory despite several appeals by the coastal chiefs of this territory. Germany used this reluctance to its advantage and signed the Germano-Duala treaty of 1884 which gave her easy access into the interior of Cameroon then called Kamerun. He adds that during World War I, Germany was defeated thus losing all its African territories to the victorious powers. The Versailles Treaty, which settled the terms of peace between Germany and its victorious adversaries, stripped Germany of all its colonies including Kamerun. These territories were allocated to the victorious powers and their allies under a system of League of Nations "mandates" whereby the victorious powers would administer the former German colonies as mandates on behalf of the League of Nations (Tongkeh 2009). He continues by stating that German Kamerun territory was handed over to France and Great Britain who split it into two "Cameroons." Each country attached its part of "Cameroon" to its existing colonial empire. French and British entry into Cameroon implied the institutionalisation of two new European colonial cultures and these two cultures were to determine the bi-cultural nature of the society in its various aspects, sectors and policies when it became independent. In the French portion, the colonial policy of "assimilation" was used to rule the Francophone regions while the British used "indirect rule" (Tongkeh 2009).

#### *3.2.1 Consequences*

Konde (2009) mentions some of the consequences of colonial rule in Cameroon. He states that the outcome of more than 75 years (1884-1961) of European colonial domination in Cameroon has given rise to alienation of indigenous cultural norms, the permanence of colonial institutions, and the inability to revise the outdated colonial inheritance to reflect the social, political, and

economic realities of contemporary Cameroon. The example he gives is the fact that since independence in 1960, Cameroon has been characterized on the political front by authoritarianism, a legacy of French colonialism. He adds that for decades after attaining independence, colonial influence in Cameroon is still pervasive to the point that the tendency is to perpetually look outward for models of political organization. The Francophones look to France, while the Anglophones look to Britain. He also mentions that, it would be no exaggeration to infer that Cameroon's outstanding national problems stem from her dual colonial legacy which, in effect, is acting as a hindrance to national integration. The colonial masters, through the agency of colonialism, have utilized the weapon of "cultural alienation" in Cameroon to maintain their interests and foster divisions among Cameroonians; the partition Treaty gave Britain one quarter and France three quarters of the territory and inhabitants, including the important towns of Douala, Kribi, Garoua and Yaoundé. This fact, from the start, made French influence preponderant in Cameroon (Konde 2009).

### **3.3 Origin of the Anglophone problem in Cameroon**

The Anglophone problem today originated after the reunification of the two Cameroons. By reuniting with the former French Cameroon, the Anglophone political elite had hoped to enter a loose federal union as a way of protecting their territory's minority status and cultural heritage; little did they know what awaited them. The 1961 reunification of British Southern Cameroon and Former French Cameroon was an extraordinary event as people of different colonial backgrounds decided to form a single state (Awasom 2000:1). He adds that the two leaders Ahmadou Ahidjo president of Eastern Cameroon and the Prime Minister John Ngu Foncha of Southern Cameroon and their counterparts planned a date to meet at a conference in Foumban on the 17<sup>th</sup> of July 1961, to draw up the constitution of the country. The Constitution of Cameroon is the supreme law of the Republic of Cameroon which outlines the rights guaranteed to Cameroonian citizens, the symbols and official institutions of the country, the structure and functions of government, the procedure by which the Constitution may be amended, and the process by which the provisions of the Constitution are to be implemented. The two Cameroons now reunified had to sit and implement laws which were to govern them. Foumban is one of the largest native towns in Cameroon found at the border of Anglophone and Francophone

Cameroon. Its inhabitants compose of Muslims, Francophones and Anglophones so the town had no territorial advantage on any side, that's why the constitution meeting was held there. The marginalisation of Cameroon's Anglophones began after the Foumban Constitutional Conference of 17 July 1961 which produced the Federal constitution and went operational on the 1<sup>st</sup> of October 1961 (Ngoh 1996). This is because most of the laws of the constitution were not respected but later changed by the former president Ahmadou Ahidjo in favour of him and his Francophone counterparts.

### **3.4 Terms of the Foumban Constitutional conference which were not respected**

Konings and Nyamnjoh in their book "Negotiating an Anglophone Identity" (2003:44-48) present some of the terms which were not respected and which are seen as the beginning of the Anglophone marginalization.

Cameroon was made a Federation, with East Cameroon and West Cameroon as its constituent states. In East Cameroon, the legislature was unicameral, but in West Cameroon, the House of Chiefs was added. This clause was changed in May 1972, a new constitution was drafted by Ahidjo where he abolished the Federal system and replaced it with a highly Centralised Unitary state with broad political power vested in the position of the president. The previous legislative system was replaced by a unicameral National Assembly of 120 seats. During the negotiations at the Foumban conference, the bargaining strength of Francophone delegation reflected the fact that the size of population of the Anglophone region was small comprising of about one quarter of the entire population, thus by their joining the Republic of Cameroon, President Ahmadou Ahidjo was able to dictate the terms of Federation by capitalising on his territory's senior status.

The official languages of the former Federal Republic was to be French and English but to the consternation of the Anglophones, the final version of the constitution in the unitary state appeared to deny the equal status of both languages, stipulating in article 59 that the revised constitution shall be published in French and English, but with the French text being authentic.

Equal citizenship, as proposed by the Southern Cameroonian delegation was rejected by Ahidjo but he eventually agreed to insert a clause into the constitution, affirming the Federal adherence

to the fundamental freedoms set in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the (UN article 1)

The Constitution created a presidential regime at the unitary level, in contrast to the Anglophone proposal; Instead Ahidjo indicated in the new constitution that the president of the Republic was to be an active and powerful chief rather than a figure head. He was to be head of state, armed forces and was not accountable to the legislature for his actions. He appointed ministers, governors, judges and high level civil servants who were entirely dependent on his favour to remain in office.

Ahidjo persuaded the Southern Cameroonians to join his party the *Union Nationale Cameroonaise* (UNC), the single party formed in September 1966, and was able to penalise any Anglophone leader who remained committed to Federalism. On May 6<sup>th</sup> 1972 he announced in the National Assembly that he intended to transform the Federal Republic into a unitary state on the 20<sup>th</sup> of May, thereby abrogating clause 1 article 47 of the Fouban Constitution which impairs the unity and integrity of the Federation shall be inadmissible. Even if the constitution were to be amended it should not be done by a Referendum, because clause 3 article 47 stipulated that “proposals for revision shall be adopted by simple majority vote of the members of the federal assembly, provided such majority includes a majority of representatives of each of the federated states” (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003:46).

The new constitution laid down a system significantly different to the one Foncha had promised Southern Cameroonians. What made them more annoyed was the fact that Ahidjo never submitted the constitution for final approval to a constituent assembly composed of Francophones and Anglophones representatives. Ahidjo used his power to control the negotiations, accepting only those suggestions and amendments of the Anglophone delegation that posed no threats to his well prepared draft constitution. Horowitz sees the relation between subordinate and dominant groups as a common phenomenon in divided societies and criticizes it because the subordinates are invariably oppressed and exploited.

Contrary to Anglophone expectations, the new terms of the constitution did not create an equal partnership between the two parties which could preserve the cultural heritage and identity

of the Anglophone minority. It proved a mere transitory phase in the total integration of the Anglophone region into a strongly centralised, unitary state. The final version of the Constitution left no room for legal secession from the federation, although some southern Cameroonians had wanted a provision into the constitution sanctioning peaceful withdrawals from the federation (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:48).

The Anglophones started to resent their regional loss of autonomy and their subordinated position in the unitary state because they claim that the marginalization did not end after the Fouban constitutional conference but has continued till today. Below are some points showing how the Anglophones have been marginalized. Their numerous grievances are mainly of political, economic and social factors which shall be analyze below.

### **3.5 Ways in which the Anglophones are being marginalized**

#### *3.5.1 Political Representation*

An important factor in the development of the Anglophone problem was the nation-state project after reunification which has extended up till this moment. According to the Anglophone population, nation building has been motivated by the determination of the Francophone political elite to dominate the Anglophone minority and to erase the cultural and institutional foundation of Anglophone identity (Kofele-Kale 1986; Takougang & Krieger 1998). Anglophones have been downgraded to inferior positions in the national decision making process and have been underrepresented in ministerial as well as senior and middle-ranking positions in the administration, the military and parastatals (Kofele-Kale 1986; Takougang & Krieger 1998). According to Bouddih (2006), prominent positions in the country are always reserved for the Francophone and for more than 32 years since reunification, ministries such as those in charge of Territorial Administration, the Armed Forces, Education, Finance, Foreign affairs, Commercial and Industrial Development etc. have never been headed by Anglophones. In the Foreign Service, Anglophones rarely get appointed as Cameroon's Ambassador to London, Washington, New York, Lagos or Paris. These key diplomatic posts are reserved for Francophone (Bouddih 2006). In the theoretical part above ethnic discrimination in divided societies is mentioned by Horowitz (1985), where members of a particular ethnic group have no claims to work in the central government or anywhere outside their region because they are not of the same ethnic group as the leaders of their country.

The Anglophones are being assaulted from time to time when they hold their party meetings. The first opposition party in the country the Social Democratic Front (S.D.F) during a rally to launch the party, had its members assaulted leading to the death of six young Anglophones (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997:214). They continue by adding that members of the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), which today is the main Anglophone movement in Cameroon, were detained when they attempted to hold a press conference led by the group's vice chairman, Nfor Ngala Nfor. The authorities arrested them under the pretext that they weren't authorized to hold meetings. In the past years arrests of this kind have been common place and the situation has not improved (IRIN NEWS 2007). In October 2001, following demonstrations in English-speaking provinces for greater political rights in which three people were killed, nine injured and over 100 arrested, Amnesty International called on the Cameroon government to "respect rights of freedom of association and expression" (Amnesty international Oct 2001). Taylor (1994) encourages the principle of liberal democracy where individuals as entitled to "govern" their own lives, within limits connected primarily with the mutual recognition and equal opportunities for all.

Although the Republic of Cameroon is officially bilingual, without the knowledge of French it is impossible to pursue a good career in state administration because all administrative works are carried out in French (Mbembe 2001). Anglophone identity and consciousness are raised by almost daily confrontations with Francophone government officials posted in Anglophone Cameroon who often do not speak a word of English and behave like masters of the area thus relegating the Anglophone population to the position of subjects rather than Citizens (Mbembe 2001).

### *3.5.2 Economic Discrimination*

An important aspect of this discrimination is the relative underdevelopment of the Anglophone region which explains that, it has not been benefited accordingly from their rich resources, particularly oil discovered in 1973 off the coast of Western Cameroon (Konings 1993). He continues by mentioning that, the oil public corporation SONARA is predominantly staffed by Francophones, even though the oil exploitation, production and transformation take place in Anglophone Cameroon. Also oil-derived revenues and taxes are paid to the state directly in Yaounde in the Francophone area (Konings 1993). This in particular created a consciousness



among the Anglophone population who now feel they are been recolonised and marginalised and thus looked at as second class citizens of their own country Bayart (1993).

In addition to the above, Anglophone Cameroonians felt the effects of the county's withdrawal from the Common Wealth when they lost the Common Wealth preferences for certain export products from their area. Banana producers who had been allowed to export their products to Britain were greatly affected (Konings1993). Also Konings 1993 adds that, the opening of road and rail links and removal of customs barriers between East and West has meant in effect the rapid decline of the West Cameroon's two main ports, Victoria and Tiko, and the growth of Douala port in the Francophone East.

(Konings 1996), explains that, the Cameroon Development Corporation (C.D.C) is the largest and one of the oldest agro-industrial enterprises in the country found in the Southwest. It is the second largest employer of labour after the government and specialises in variety of crops. Four of its crops include rubber, palm oil, tea and bananas. It is of great importance to regional development and is largely credited with whatever socioeconomic development has occurred in Anglophone Cameroon. It has created employment, supplied water, build school and hospitals, constructed roads. As such it has been called the economic life-line of Anglophone Cameroon (Konings 1996). Kholi (2004) looks at the role of the state in fostering different rates of economic development especially through rapid industrialization. This is because the state takes and implements decisions on how a country's resources and its labour force should be positioned for its industries. Thus with the growing success of this enterprise in West Cameroon, the government was suppose to put in more resources so that it expands wider and improve the development of the area, but it was the reverse. The government announcement of the privatisation of this important agro-industrial enterprise in 1994 was shocking news to the Anglophone population and promoted vehement protests actions among the Anglophone Cameroonians, who saw this as a major form of marginalisation, considering the fact that the enterprise has been doing quite well despite the economic crises and was offering them so much (Konings 1996:206-212).

All the existing parties, associations and pressure groups formed a united front to resist the government's decision. Thus there were strong protests marches organised by Anglophone movements condemning privatisation of C.D.C making the Biya regime to withdraw its decision on the C.D.C privatisation (Konings 1996:206-212). The privatisation protest movement is one

of the recent developments in Anglophone Cameroon which have made the Biya regime painfully aware of the growing unity and determination among the Anglophones in their struggle for redress of the marginalization and subordination of their region within the francophone dominated state (Konings 1996:215-216).

### *3.5.3. Discrimination in Education and training*

According to Bouddih Adams (2006), the Anglophones are systematically discriminated against in the admission of students into professional schools and other institutions of higher learning, notably the National School of Administration and Magistracy (ENAM) where the Anglophone sections have been abolished, and the Higher Teachers' Training College (ENS). He mentions that there is little or no continuity between the education the Anglophone children are given at the primary and secondary levels and the French-oriented education dispensed in the national institutions of higher learning. Thus he adds that Anglophone youths are forced to travel abroad at great financial costs to themselves and to their families in search of higher education, which is of good quality and consistent with their basic education Bouddih (2006).

In September 1983, the minister of National Education promulgated an order modifying the Anglophone General Certificate of Education (GCE) examination by making it similar to the *Baccalaureate*, a French examination in Cameroon (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:117). They continue by stating that the order was apparently intended to facilitate the entry of Anglophone students into professional and technical institute in Cameroon, which was exclusively based on the French system. They state that the Anglophones students insisted that this problem of exclusion of Anglophone students from professional and technical institute could be solved only by the creation of institutes based on the English system (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:117).

According to Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003), television films and programs originally made in English are shown in Cameroon only after they have been dubbed into French, and only in their French version. They mention that broadcast time on Radio and Television is unevenly divided between English and French programs. So the Anglophones have concluded that from the content and language of the program, the Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) is meant for the Francophones only (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:128)

These points presented above and many others have made most of the Anglophones to favor Federalism and later secession from the Francophone of the East. They feel that the Western Region is being dominated by the East and they are insufficiently represented in government positions. They consider themselves victims of the majority and think they are being discriminated upon in all spheres of life especially socially, economically and politically. They think the government has not protected their right. One of the mechanisms of conflict reduction proposed by Horowitz is to reduce inequality within ethnic groups so that dissatisfaction may decline.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **4. ACTIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE ANGLOPHONES TO SOLVE THE MARGINALIZATION PROBLEM**

Nyamnjoh (1996) mentions that under considerable internal and external pressures, the Cameroon government introduced a greater measure of political liberalization, and in December 1990, it announced the advent of multiparty system as well as certain degree of freedom of mass communication and associations, including the holding of public meetings and demonstrations. As a result, several political parties, pressure groups, and private newspapers were established in Cameroon which began to express and represent Anglophone interest (Nyamnjoh 1996:38). He continues by saying that the Anglophones used this opportunity of liberalization of political space to create and reactivate several organizations for the representation and defence of their interest. Promoting political liberalization is an important step to democracy and good governance (Törnquist1999:97). “In the pursuit for self autonomy and self determination, they engaged in sensitization campaigns to inform the Anglophone population about their objectives and strategies and to mobilize it for action against the Francophone dominated unitary state” (Koning and Nyamnjoh 2003:76). This was done by the creation of several political parties and pressure groups like the SDF, ACC, SCNC and the SCYL, whose activities has been analyzed below.

#### *4.1 Social Democratic Front (SDF)*

According to Takougang and Krieger (1998), given the Anglophone frustration with the Francophone dominated state, it is not surprising that the first opposition party appeared in

Anglophone Cameroon in 1990 known as the Social Democratic Front (S.D.F). It was formed in Bamenda the capital of the Northwest province and the members were demanding for liberalization of political space and capitalizing on popular frustration among Anglophones following three decades of marginalization. They continue by stating that the S.D.F chair man was John Fru Ndi who achieved great popularity among the urban masses because of his courage and popular style of leadership (Takougang and Krieger 1998:105). As mentioned above, the launching of the SDF party, ended up in the death of six young Anglophones but the state-controlled media tried to deny government responsibility for this bloody event and this led to both domestic and international condemnation (Nyamnjoh 1996:26-27). In the past years scholars have attempted to examine how opposition parties function in Africa, they realized that being an opposition party is a dangerous pursuit due to harassments, imprisonments, press censorship and even murder of opposing politicians (Wondwosen 2009:2). Wondwosen observed that even after the introduction of multipartism in the 1990s, opposition parties are forced to function under severe political constraints imposed by the elected but authoritarian government.

Also Wondwosen (2008) states the indicators of a successful election as free, fair and peaceful in which the opposition parties participate and the outcome of elections are acceptable to all parties, but according to him, most elections in Africa have not been successful because once in power, the leaders of the new nation state become very greedy and selfish with power and since they are in control, they rig the elections to remain there rather than to give space for another leader.

The SDF appears to have adopted a rather ambivalent attitude towards calls from new pressure groups for a return to a federal state because it increasingly presented itself as a national party rather than an Anglophone party, thus the party started losing its initial appeal for English-speaking Cameroonians because of its half hearted stand as regards the Anglophone problem” (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003: 79). They continue to mention that the SDF party continued to drop and loose its popularity from this point and chose to boycott the October 1997 presidential election, along with the other opposition parties such as National Union for Democracy and Progress (UNDP) and the Cameroon Democratic Union (UDC). These parties have denounced past electoral fraud and called for an independent electoral commission (IRIN NEWS 1997). In the presidential election held on 11 October 2004, Fru Ndi stood again as the SDF candidate and won 17.4% of the votes according to official results, far behind Biya Tetchiada (2004). The 2004

elections showed clearly the loss of popularity by Fru Ndi and his party SDF. The SDF strongly opposed the constitutional amendment allowing Biya to run for President again in 2011, they condemned the fact that he has been president of Cameroon for 26 years and wants to remain head of state for another term of office (Tetchiada 2004). The SDF parliamentarians boycotted the April 2008 parliamentary vote in which the amendment was approved (BBC NEWS 2008).

#### *4.2 All Anglophone Conference (AAC)*

According to Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003), Following political liberalization, several associations and pressure groups by Anglophones elites were formed to represent and defend their interests. They mention that some pressure groups were the Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM), and the All Anglophone Conference (AAC), Teachers Association of Cameroon (TAC), the Confederation of Anglophone Parents-Teacher Association (CAPTAC) and the Cameroon Students Association (CANSA). In 1993 they forced the government to create a General Certificate of Education Board (GCE) in the Anglophone area and succeeded to achieve it (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997:217). This signified an important victory for the Anglophones in their ten years of struggle. These pressure groups and associations have promoted demonstrations, strikes and boycotts in their fight against the Francophone dominated unitary state. (Ibid: 217).

The All Anglophone Conference which was formed and in March 1993, held its first meeting in Buea, capital of the South West province for the purpose of adopting a common Anglophone stand on constitutional reforms and of examining several other matters related to the their welfare and prosperity (Mbaku and Takougang, 2004). They continue to mention that the Buea declaration listed many grievances about Francophone domination and called for a return to a federal state (Mbaku and Takougang, 2004:206). The shift from federalism to secession was adopted during the second All Anglophone Congress held in Bamenda from the 29<sup>th</sup> to the 2<sup>nd</sup> of May 1994 and the delegates in that same congress voted to replace the (AAC) with Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997:219).

#### *4.3 Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC)*

According to Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003:95), renewed attempts to enter into negotiations with the Biya government failed because he simply ignored the list of resolutions of the Southern Cameroons delegates mandated by the SCNC in November 1994. They mention that on October 7, 1995, the SCNC executive unanimously adopted the independence program for the Southern Cameroons.

The Anglophone leadership has made strenuous efforts to gain international support for their territory's autonomy by dispatching missions to selected countries in Africa, Europe and North America; they entered into correspondence with the UN secretariat and the Commonwealth office, and applied for membership to the Unrepresented Nations and People Organization (UNPO) in The Hague (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:94). (The UNPO works closely with the UN and has been active in the process that led to the independence of East Timor), (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:94) Most of the SCNC leaders believed that it could play a similar role in the case of the Southern Cameroons. The UN leaders had become increasingly concerned about the possibility of an outbreak of an ethno-regional conflict in West Africa and during his visit to Cameroon in May 2000, the UN secretary-general, Kofi Anan, in a press conference pleaded for dialogue between Francophones and Anglophones leaders. The SCNC were ready for dialogue but Biya turned a deaf ear to them (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:96).

According to Konings and Nyamnjoh (2000), the Anglophone leadership sensitization campaign was quite successful during 1992-1995, but from 1995 onwards the Anglophone sensitization campaign came to a standstill. They continue to mention that one of the most important reasons for this is the resignation of the founding fathers from the SCNC leadership, after which the party lacked competent and committed leadership. This made a conflict developed within the Anglophone movements between those who continued to adhere to a negotiated separation from French Cameroon and those who had come to the conclusion that the independence of Southern Cameroons would only be achieved through armed struggle (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2000:16).

#### *4.4 Southern Cameroon Youth League (SCYL)*

Many Cameroonians started losing confidence in the new SCNC leadership and the youths especially began to create and execute their own agendas for reclaiming self determination, thus

they formed the Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) operating under the umbrella of the SCNC (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:103). They continue to mention the SCYL was dissatisfied with the SCNC leadership who continued to cling to a strategy of peaceful dialogue with the francophone-dominated state thus they broke off relations with the SCNC in 1996 and placed itself under the umbrella of Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement (SCARM). It now aimed to create an independent Southern Cameroon state through rebellion In the process of preparing for action in both Anglophone provinces, the SCYL was unexpectedly faced with imprisonment of its chairman and many of its members (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:104).

#### *4.5 Federal Republic of Southern Cameroon (FRSC)*

Division within the SCNC became a frequent source of internal conflict and proved harmful to the Anglophones cause and it was in these circumstances that justice Frederick Ebong an SCNC activist with close ties to the SCYL took over the Cameroon Radio Television Station in Buea in 1999 and proclaimed the restoration of the independence of the Federal Republic of Southern Cameroons (FRSC) (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:105).

These were the major trend of action taken by the Anglophones to fight the marginalization problem in Cameroon, from 1990 to 2001. 2002 till present day has been characterised by government arrests, brutality and detainment of SCNC members whenever they hold their meeting, and try to demonstrate in public. They have correspondents in U.S and Europe who also carry on demonstrations and protests in favour of an independent Southern Cameroon. The most prominent is the SCNC-NA, meaning Southern Cameroons National Council in North America. They even run a news-letter known as the “The Southern Cameroon Voice” where they analyse and promote the goals and struggles of the movement (SCNC official webpage). It can be noted that, there was leadership problems and growing disagreement within the Anglophone movements on the strategy to be employed in the achievement of independence for Southern Cameroons and that is why it has been difficult for them to achieve success.

Philosophers have begun to turn their attention towards secession because there has been a great increase not only in the number of attempted secessions, but also in successful secessions. Some theories of secession emphasize a general right of secession for any reason (“Choice Theory”) while others emphasize that secession should be considered only to rectify grave injustices (“Just Cause Theory”), the latter theory explicitly say that no secession is legitimate,

except in response to oppression or injustice, thus the members of a political minority have the right to self-government if and only if they have good reasons not to agree with the existing laws and if the majority refuses to change these laws. Good reasons to reject existing laws are the facts that members of the minority have restricted freedoms (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 2003). Horowitz believes that groups demanding secession have the strongest sense of grievance and that the strength of a secessionist movement and the heterogeneity of the society are inversely related and since most secessionist regions are ethnically heterogeneous, their movements end up divided (Horowitz 1985:267). This is true for the Anglophone secession, which have not been able to achieve their goal because their movements have been divided. In my view, though the Anglophone have faced a lot of injustice and oppression, secession is definitely not the solution to the numerous problems that weighed down Anglophone minorities, rather they should keep fighting for peaceful dialogue and I believe the government will heed to their demands with time. But for as long as Africa's leaders continue with their deliberate policies of marginalization and exclusion of minorities from governance in their own countries, so long will secession remain in the forefront of African politics.

With this high political tension in the Anglophone provinces of North West and South West, the Biya government developed fears over the possibility of Anglophones to unitarily declare autonomy. Thus there was a need to develop strategies to contain the Anglophone threats and it is strongly believed by Nyamnjuh (1999) that one of the tactics Biya used was the politics of indirect rule. The Biya government has used variety of strategies to neutralize the Anglophone bond; the strategies used are as follows

#### **4.6 Strategies used by the Cameroon government to neutralize the Anglophone identity**

4.6.1 *Divide and Rule*; the government has attempted to divide the Anglophones capitalizing on existing contradictions between the Southwest and the Northwest elite. One of Biya's diverse tactic is to appoint South Westerners to key positions in response to their frequent complaints about North Westerner's domination over their province (Konings and Nyamnjuh 2003:111).

.Biya sought to use his allies among the Anglophone elite for the defence of the unitary state in exchange for rewards in the form of appointments, thus to those who sought protection as



minorities, the price to pay would be vote for Cameroon's People Democratic Movement (CPDM) which is Biya's party and the ruling party (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:111).

To better understand the point of divide and rule above, it is wise to look at the theory of patron-client relations as explained by Törnquist (1999: 57) above. He explains that patron-client relations are based on mutual personal exchange of goods and services between unequal actors. This relation arises when the powerless clients need to relate to the world outside its family and require material support and protection from influential persons who are the patrons. Reciprocation comes in the form of loyalty, votes and rendering of various services from the client to the patron.

Nyamnjoh (1999:117) highlights the idea of Cameroon as a country united by ethnic ambition and difference. He argues that the government instead of pursuing and capitalizing on what Cameroonians have in common has opted for the deceitful approach, which he uses to manipulate the Cameroonians. He goes ahead to analyze the situation by mentioning that, a civil servant appointed to a high office is made to understand that the head of state is to be thanked for such an appointment, while those from other ethnic group or region are to be blamed for the lack of any appointment or for the loss of one. Individuals must give the president total support if they wish to maintain or climb to a high office (Nyamnjoh 1999:106).

Hyden et al (1970:32-33) claim that, as a form of political intrusion into the civil service, patronage tends to be chronic if and when it forms the basis of appointment and promotion, usually resting on political zeal rather than the merits and achievements in appointments and promotion. This phenomenon hinders the early growth of a professional ethic in the civil service.

Ironically, the Anglophone problem has increased the chances of Biya's loyal followers among the Anglophone elites to be appointed to government post which used to be reserved for the Francophones (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:114). Such highly placed Anglophones tend to be members of the Anglophone delegation sent regularly by Biya from Yaoundé the capital to the Anglophone provinces to contest the claims of the leadership of the Anglophone movements and to defend the unitary system (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:114).

*4.6.2 Trivialization of the Anglophone problem:* the government has often tried to minimize the Anglophone-Francophone divide by highlighting the existence of a common identity under the German colonial rule and official recognition in all the post-colonial constitutions of the bilingual and multicultural nature of the Cameroonian nation (Konings and Nyamnjoh

2003:110). Also in order to convince his national and international opponents that Cameroon's policy of bilingualism has been successful, Biya claimed in 1999 that secessionist tendencies were being manifested only by a tiny Anglophone minority and that he was ready to call for a referendum if it became necessary (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:110).

*4.6.3 The establishment of direct and indirect control over the mass media;* By seeking total ownership and control of the broadcast and media, the state has over the years weakened solidarity and freedom among the Anglophones (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:121).

Many decisions are taken to frustrate the Anglophone journalist and also to minimize and discredit their efforts. CRTV has seldom been reported the truth about any Anglophone movement, initiative or program of action (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:121).

*4.6.4 Repression:* Most of the strategies employed by the government to deconstruct the Anglophone identity tended to be accompanied by cruel repression of the Anglophone population and their activities. Opposition parties like the SDF and LDA continued to be exposed to state intimidation and violence (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:133-135). There were also many other cases of violence and intimidations faced by the Anglophones because many of their demonstrations and strikes organized by the various Anglophones associations and pressure groups were quelled by government troops. These points above have been an obstacle to the struggles of the Anglophones for equal status.

In conclusion, the Anglophones have taken several actions to stop their marginalization by the Francophones, they have even attempted to proclaim their independence several times when the government refused a peaceful dialogue about their return to federalism, but in all these, they have not succeeded because the government too has been very clever in neutralizing their actions and have used several strategies to split them. The Anglophone struggle has been weakened by the fact that they lacked committed and competent leaders, and because the two Anglophones regions Northwest and Southwest have always had conflicting ideas about each other. The Anglophones have not fought as one but have been divided in their actions, making it possible for the government to use it as an advantage against them. We can note that in two occasions in which they fought as one, they succeeded in their struggles. These includes; the campaign for the creation of a General Certificate of Education Board in Anglophone Cameroon, which forced the government to create one in 1993 and when the government attempted to privatize the biggest agro-industrial enterprise in Anglophone Cameroon, (The Cameroon

Development Corporation, CDC) it prompted vehement protests actions among the Anglophone Cameroonians, and the government had to stop their actions of privatization of this company. Thus I believe they could have learnt a lesson from these examples that “united they stand and divided they fall”. The next chapters will evaluate these actions and reasons for their failure.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **5. An evaluation of the actions taken by Anglophone movements to solve the marginalisation problem in Cameroon**

In the quest for self autonomy and self determination, the Anglophone movements (ACC, SCNC, SCYL and FRSC) engaged in various actions ranging from sensitization campaigns, demonstrations, strikes and boycotts in their fight against the Francophone dominated unitary state. These movements listed many grievances about Francophone domination. Kofele-Kale and Takougang mentions some of their grievances which includes; the abolishment of the federal system in replaced by a highly Centralised Unitary; the denial of equal status of both languages by the constitution in the unitary state, the relative underdevelopment of the Anglophones region shows that it has not benefited sufficiently from its rich economic resources, particularly oil (Kofele-Kale 1986; Takougang 1993). These are just a few problems among many others. The issue of rich natural resources as a cause of conflict has been further analysed by Paul Collier et al who in their extensive study of civil wars identifies the failures of economic development as the key roots cause of conflict (Collier et al 2005). They mention that, scarcity of resources has been the prime trigger of disagreements between tribes and nations making him to conclude that these conflicts are an overwhelming phenomenon for low income countries.

The Anglophone movements had a trend of action as analysed in the previous chapter. They began by calling for negotiations through dialogue, when their call was ignored, they asked for a return to a federal state, which still yielded no response; finally the call for secession came in, still with no reaction from the government. This means that all their cries fell on deaf ears. Lyombe (2003) mentions that the authorities instead answered the Anglophones by imposing even tighter control over the monopoly of government media and used them to stress national unity among the Anglophones and denounced the leaders of the Anglophone movements who questioned the status quo of the Francophone government (Lyombe 2003:12).

The Anglophone leaders even made efforts to gain international support for their territory's autonomy, they sent some of their leaders to selected countries in Africa, Europe and North America, and applied for membership to the Unrepresented Nations and People Organization (UNPO) in The Hague. Mills and Stemplau (1999: 2), in their article *The privatization of security in Africa* presents the Kofi Anan report to the UN Security Council which suggest that "finding better ways to deal with the incident of conflict would not only benefit Africa but could contribute to the development of a new order, so the UN and other international bodies have been doing their best to resolve these conflicts which has brought disastrous consequences in most African countries." That is why when Kofi Anan visited Cameroon in 2000 he insisted on dialogue between the Anglophones and Francophones as the best solution to the problem but Biya and his government did nothing of this. What the SCNC did lastly was to take over the Cameroon Radio Television Station in Buea and proclaimed the restoration of the independence of the Federal Republic of Southern Cameroons (FRSC). These were the sequences of actions they took. The English-language newspapers state that "the drive toward secession is the result of government refusal to discuss Anglophone proposals for solving the Anglophone problem" (Lyombe 2003:15). These various actions carried out by the Anglophone movements made very little progress because their calls have fallen on the deaf ears of Biya and his Francophone government. Though they have made a few gains, the overall results of their actions have been far below expectations. I will analyse their success first and the failures right after it.

## **5.1 Successes**

Konings and Nyamnjoh mention that these movements were successful only on the basis that they have made significant contribution to raising Anglophone consciousness and have been able to put the Anglophone problem on the national and international political agenda showing that the Anglophones are being marginalized in their own country. Most Anglophones became conscious of Francophone domination, assimilation and exploitation on the basis not only of their own personal experiences but also their frequent exposure to the sensitisation activities of the Anglophone leaders, journalists and artists. (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:197).

According to Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003), one of their major successes was the organisation of the All Anglophone Conference (AAC) attended by large number of Anglophone elites who put federalism and later secession on the constitutional reform agenda. Some important victories were booked in this period, in particular the creation of the GCE board and the postponement of the CDC privatisation. On these occasions the leadership was capable of mobilising Anglophones against government encroachment on their educational and economic legacies. (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:198).

## **5.2 Failures**

The government proved increasingly capable of neutralising the opposition parties and the Anglophone movements to a large extent by employing a number of long standing tactics like divide and rule, appointing ethno-regional leaders in the regime and severe repression. Its major strategy was to divide the Anglophone elites by capitalising on existing rivalries between the Northwest and Southwest elites (Eyoh 1998; Mbile 2000).

The Anglophones movements have been inclined to lay all the blames of their marginalisation on the Francophone-dominated state but they have failed to realise that they themselves are also to be blamed for their failure. This can be seen where the Anglophone elites failed to form a united front in the pre and post reunification period for the representative and defence of the Anglophone interests because they were preoccupied with their own internal power struggles (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:196-199).

There was also the problem of regular disunity among the various Anglophone organisations and uncertainty in their objectives. While some wanted independence, others do not even want a federal state. This created confusion among the Anglophones and in June 2001, the Anglophone movements decided to merge and formed an alliance to achieve independence (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:199)

Lyombe (2003) mentions that the youths, frustrated with the various strategies of suppression of the Anglophones aspirations for recognition and representation, have turned to alternative channels for mobilisation. Increasingly they are using the Internet as a vehicle to air their views on various aspects of their predicaments. The Internet has been one of the main catalysts for the development of an "Anglophone identity" among English-speaking Cameroonians around the world. Camnet, name of the Cameroonian e-mail discussion group

based in Italy, United States, the United Kingdom and Canada has continued to be dominated by English-speaking Cameroonians in these countries have proved to be a form for the discussion of identity issues as well as methods of getting out of the problematic situation created by the Anglophone problem (Lyombe 2003:16).

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **6. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THEORY WITH EMPIRICAL MATERIALS**

#### **6.1 The Anglophone problem from the perspective of Ethnicity theory**

Ethnicity can be seen as belonging to a group that shares the same characteristics, such as language, religion, ancestry and culture. Horowitz (1985:7-8), mentions that, ethnic conflict is at the centre of politics in divided societies and poses challenges to the cohesion of states and sometimes to peaceful relation among states. Though ethnic divisions in Cameroon has never gone up to the stage of a civil war, demonstrations in English-speaking provinces for greater political rights went to the stage where some people were killed, some injured and others arrested showing that there exist a regional and ethnic conflict between the Anglophones and the Francophones.

Ethnic divisions can be traced as far back as the colonial days, when Europeans drew arbitrary lines and territorial boundaries on maps to suit their interests, heedless of the effects it had on ethnic groups. This made some ethnic groups to be divided between territories, and some were included in the same territories along with others whom they had little in common. (Horowitz1985:75). Cameroon was taken over by Britain and France after defeating Germany the First World War. This territory was later split into two parts with France gaining a larger portion while Britain received a stripe bordering Nigeria from the sea to Lake Chad. The division of the Cameroon territory led to some consequences for future political developments and this has also affected the economic and social developments of the country. This division has also laid a base for the creation of two identities and the population of each identity sees themselves as a distinct community, this is because of their differences in language and inherited colonial tradition of education, law, public administration and worldview.

Most African leaders take advantage of ethnic conflicts and divisions to achieve their personal goals and remain in power. A governing elite that perceives pressure groups as a threat

might use different strategies to undermine its potential power (Bousard 2003:112). In Cameroon these techniques range from divide and rule, neo-patrimonialism, patronage, clientelism (Mbuagbo and Robert 2004). The Cameroon government has attempted to divide the Anglophones capitalizing on existing contradictions between the Southwest and the Northwest elite. One of Biya's diverse tactic is to appoint South Westerners to key positions in response to their frequent complaints about North Westerner's domination over their province. Törnquist (1999: 57) explains that patron-client relations are based on mutual personal exchange of goods and services between unequal actors and reciprocation comes in the form of loyalty, votes and rendering of various services from the client to the patron. Biya and his Francophone government are the patrons while the Anglophones who need appointments, promotion and protection are the clients. In order to gain these things, they need to be loyal and always vote for Biya as president so that he will include them in his government. Regional differences in wealth also exist; the South West and North West areas have less access to wealth and infrastructure considering the fact that they are the minority and are being marginalized (Nkwi and Sopca 1997). Antoine Lema (1993), states that the Modernist theory believes that ethnic groups will disappear with modernisation. I support her argument because despite the fact that there are so many ethnic groups in Cameroon, there also are a lot of inter-marriages, so with time, there will be a generation where these ethnic groups will disappear and there will be nothing like ethnic divisions and discrimination.

Looking at Horowitz mechanisms of conflict reduction presented in the theories above, one can say that a country like Cameroon would benefit from such mechanisms if put in practise. This is because the country has many ethnic groups and for equality to exist, power must be shared amongst various ethnic groups so that they will be politically represented both in the political and socio-economic decision making of the country, thus discrimination and inequality will be reduced. Also he mentions that interethnic group cooperation's should be encouraged, so that disparity between groups will be reduced.

He also brings out a structural technique used to reduce ethnic conflict and promote accommodation which might be useful in solving the Anglophone Problem in Cameroon. Accommodation refers to ways in which ethnic groups can tolerate, understand and consider each other in their differences. The structural technique includes Federalism or regional autonomy as a means of conflict reduction. (Horowitz 1985: 601)

Federalism is a system of government in which the individual state of the country has control over their own affairs but is controlled by a central government for national decisions. He presents the Nigerian example showing that federalism can either aggravate or alleviate ethnic conflicts depending on the number of member state in a federation, their boundaries and ethnic composition. The Nigerian experiment shows the importance of political context in shaping the manifestations of ethnic conflict and territorial design may prove a useful instrument of conflict reduction (Horowitz 1985:613). The Anglophones in Cameroon have always been fighting for a federal state where they can control their own affairs and Horowitz highlights ways in which federalism can reduce ethnic conflicts as well as a way in which federalism might breed conflicts, so if the Anglophones were to be granted their wish today there is no very strong evidence that the Anglophone problem will be resolved. The three ways he mentions are as follow;

- 1) Federalism can create political components in which ethnically and sub ethnically parties can flourish. An example is the fact that a group that is the minority at the centre might be a majority in one or more states and may be in a position to rule this states thereby overcoming its reduced influence or even exclusion at the centre.
- 2) State governments provide opportunities for the development of interethnic elite relations that sometimes soften ethnic hostility among politicians.
- 3) The creation of ethnically heterogeneous states may help scale down to the state level some divisive issues that might otherwise engulf the entire country.

He mentions that federalism is not for every one. It might be safe to say that federalism has some conflict reducing possibilities for some countries than others (Horowitz 1985:618).

On the other end federalism might instead aggravate conflict and he mentions that, one of the ways in which federalism can instead breed conflict is the fact that, government offices in lower-level units will be composed differently from central bureaucracies. Ethnic discrimination may occur, affecting particularly the fortunes of well educated groups willing to migrate in search of opportunities outside their own state (Horowitz 1985: 622). Despite the fact that Horowitz presents more advantages in which federalism can alleviate conflict, it does not mean is the best solution for the Anglophone problem in Cameroon, it is just an option which can be considered.



## **6.2 The Anglophone problem from the perspective of political systems (Democratisation theory)**

O'Donnell and Schmitter (1993) argues that a process of political transition consist of three phases; "liberalization, democracy and consolidation".

### *6.2.1 On Liberalization*

Liberalization refers to a relaxation of previous government restrictions in areas of political, social and economic policies. The liberalisation process in Cameroon was characterised by the emergence of pressure groups, opposition parties and civil societies in the 1990s. It also involved urban violence, "Ghost town," arrests of opposition leaders as in most authoritarian regimes. After considerable pressure on the regime the government in December 1990 broadcasted into law the following liberalisation decrees no 90/055 and no 90/056 of December 1990 (Nghoh 1994). Lindberg argues that "elections foster liberalization and have a self reinforcing power that promotes democracy in African political regimes." Participatory elections also mean that individuals and political parties have equal rights to exist and field candidates to contest elections. (Lindberg 2003:50-53). Cameroon has successfully entered the first phase, but has difficulty with phase two which is democratization. Cameroon is manifestly not a country in transition for the time being because it is stagnant in the first stage of transition.

### *6.2.2 On Democracy*

As a matter of fact democracy in Cameroon since 1990 went only as far as the political ritual of holding elections, all of which has been marred by gross irregularities and blatant disregards of fundamental principles of democratic elections (Nyamnjoh 2000, Mbuagbo and Robert 2004). Though there have not been any change of regime, there was a movement from one party state to a multiparty one which moved the democratisation process to another level, but because of the dominating role of the elites there was a possibility to craft the transition process in their favour. This is what Huntington (1991) calls transition through transaction. Lindberg (2003) emphasizes on the fact that periodic holding of elections breeds' democracy. He insists that elections have a significant positive effect on democracy as measured by improvements in civil liberties. To support his arguments, he brings out six ways to prove how elections can lead to improvements in democratic indicators such as civil liberties. They are as follows; "Citizens become voters,

democratic “lock-in” mechanisms, self-fulfilling prophecies, civic organisations, new roles for state institutions, and the role of the media.” (Lindberg 2006:145-147). He mentions that the key to these linkages lies in the logic of elections as a struggle for political power. It is during election campaign and their immediate aftermath that most individuals and organisations engage in activism. Being the largest peacetime mobilisation of political activism, elections provide opportunities for political challenges and change.

The elements of competition inherent in elections provide voters and organisations with a means to pressure incumbents and demands concessions from politicians. The promise to improve democratic liberties provides a rallying cry for opposition parties. Combined, these factors can lead to a competition over who can improve civil liberties and other democratic freedoms (Lindberg 2006:148). Thus even if regimes remain largely authoritarian for an extended period, if they allow for the holding of periodic elections, this will tend to advance democratisation with time as measured by civil liberties rating.

Cameroon is an authoritarian state which holds presidential elections once in 7 years. The current president has won all the past elections and political powers remain concentrated on his hands since 1982, making the opposition party to boycott the recent elections because they claim these elections have been marred of serious frauds. Following Lindberg’s argument, if elections could be held like once in 5 or 4 years, then democracy might improve after a number of elections because with time civil liberties which includes participation (freedom of assembly, open public debates, right to join civic organisations) competition (personal autonomy, economic rights, educational and professional opportunities), and legitimacy (peaceful coexistence of various social organisations, free public discourse, ability to control violence and provide physical security to peaceful citizens), will also improve and give way to new leaders to bring about changes in the country. Despite this aspect of fraud and corruption in Cameroon, when compared to most neighbouring countries, Cameroon is a political success story. Nigeria and Chad had civil wars and several “coups d’états”, but both presidents that Cameroon has had so far Ahmadou Ahidjo (1960-82) and Paul Biya (1982-present), have been skilful at keeping an ethnically diverse country from joining the ranks of failing states. Despite this success, if the Anglophone problem is not well handled, it might result to a civil war making it to join its neighbours in the trend.

One important contrast in ideas and opinions is noted above between Lindberg and Gyimah. While Lindberg (2003:179) supports the theory that a strong and active civil society is the outcome of liberalization and electoral practice and not their cause, Gyimah (2004:104) argues that civil society has contributed significantly to African democratisation and it must overcome many internal and external obstacles and deficiencies, if it is to sustain its effectiveness as an agent of African democratic development. Gyimah's opinion is more applicable to the Cameroonian context considering the fact that it has an authoritarian state, civil societies will provide an opportunity for ordinary citizens to express their political and economic needs. Just like the case where the Anglophones wanted their own board of General Certificate of Education to be created, civil societies including the Teachers Association of Cameroon (TAC), the Confederation of Anglophone Parents-Teacher Association (CAPTAC) and the Cameroon Students Association (CANSA), in 1993 forced the government to create a General Certificate of Education Board (GCE) in the Anglophone area and succeeded to achieve it (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997:217). This signified an important victory for the Anglophones in their ten years of struggle.

### *6.2.3 On Consolidation*

Consolidation can be looked as an adaptation process in which politicians and citizens learn to act according to democratic rules, norms and procedures. It emphasises on the gradual change of values such as trust, moderation and tolerance i.e. on the development of democratic culture (Plaster, Ulram and Waldrauch 1998:12-16). The Cameroonian society may learn democratic principles at the local levels and may be exposed to democratic norms reflected in their behaviours, but since Cameroon has not yet reached the stage of democracy, it is difficult for it to reach the consolidation stage. Interestingly, the school system offers a constructive meeting place for a peaceful dialogue. The Anglophone schools offer a good education and some Francophone students enter these and thus learn to live together with Anglophone students.

### **The Anglophone problem from the perspective of Regional development (Socio-economic development)**

The idea here is that socio-economic development at a national level can be achieved through regional development, and regional development can be viewed as the provision of aid and

assistance to regions which are less economically developed. Most writers in development studies emphasize the fact that humans beings are most happy and productive when they enjoy freedom of mind and body and this can only be achieved in an atmosphere of peace and stability, guaranteed by a stable and good government. Thus in essence people should be allowed to lead the kind of lives they choose and be provided with tools and opportunities to make their choices (*Human Development Report 2004*). Sen (1999:158) defines socio-economic development in its broader sense as “An integrated process of expansion of substantive freedoms interconnecting with one another.” Those freedoms can be identified as political freedom, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security. The Freedom House 2005 classifies Cameroon as not free. The Anglophones complain that they are economically marginalised because their regions are less developed. Even though they have rich natural resources like oil, they have not been benefited from it because revenues obtained from this company is spent on development projects in the Francophone regions and the company is mostly staffed by Francophones while the Anglophones remain unemployed.

Also the government announcement of the privatisation of the Cameroon Development corporation, an important agro-industrial enterprise found in the Anglophone region, was a shocking news to the Anglophone population and prompted vehement protests actions in Anglophone Cameroonians who saw this as a major form of marginalisation, considering the fact that the enterprise is second largest employer of labour after the government and is of great importance to regional development and is largely credited with whatever socioeconomic development has occurred in Anglophone Cameroon (Konings 1996 :206-212). This shows that that the Anglophone region is discriminated when it comes to development. To improve this situation, the Anglophones should be given a chance to make decisions about the development of their region and be provided with facilities and opportunities to carry on development projects since they best know what is good for them. By doing this, the region will gain regional development as well as national development. On the other hand Jauch (2002) argues that privatisation was introduced in the 1980s and 1990s in Africa, as part of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), since it was believed that it will lead to greater efficiency, higher productivity, and better service delivery. He mentions that, in return for loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, African countries were forced to implement neo-liberal economic policies, which included privitisation. It was also during this

period that the Cameroon government made attempts to privatise the Cameroon Development Corporation. Might be they were being forced to do this by the IMF and World Bank to do this, but the Anglophones did not see it in this way instead, they looked at this as a major form of marginalization for attempting to privatise a successful industry in their region.

One way of empowering the local people to develop their regions is through capacity building which refers to investment in people and institutions through practices that will together enable regions in the countries to achieve their development objectives (World Bank: 1997). It is a process by which individuals, groups, organisations, institutions and societies increase their abilities to perform core functions and solve problems to achieve their objectives. By building local governments capacity, development performance and democratic values would be simultaneously improved thereby engaging people and social organisations in the development processes. Local Government Units have broader autonomy and bigger power in arranging household affairs, exploring financial resources, and imposing people's participation. By giving trust and power to both lower organizational units and social groups, it will keep local authorities democratic and empower local organizations to actively participate in the decision-making process of decentralized governance (World Bank 1997). From this perspective, capacity building constitutes a prerequisite, by which local government would be able to strengthen their administrative infrastructure in order to realize an effective governance system and regional development.

Ndongko (1974:154-56) presents a survey of the Cameroonian experience in development planning with emphasis on the regional dimension. He mentions that economic development planning in Cameroon has been regionalised in the sense that it has paid attention to problems unique to certain regions. It should be noted that regionalization of development planning means integrated development with a view to achieving balanced growth of the national economy. Considering the Cameroonian policy of maintaining equilibrium between regions, the planning process is expected to give adequate attention to the spatial dimension of economic development of the nation. There exist provincial development councils which propose regional action programmes and determine the order of priority of the operation to be adopted. This important feature of planning is reflected by the nature of the decisions taken by the planning ministry with respect to the allocation of public and private resources between the various regions.

In the regional allocation and distribution of resources, Cameroon adopted a five year economic and social development plan with the largest share of the investments going first to the Littoral province, secondly the south centre region, the North province was the third. It should be noted that these were all Francophone regions and west Cameroon which is the Anglophone region received its own share of planned investments after these regions, which was considered an aspect of marginalisation. Despite this aspect, Ndongko's evaluation of the Cameroon regional development planning proved an encouraging results though he could not prove if there have been improvement in the developments of the regions because of insufficient data (Ndongko1974:159)

As a matter of fact, most western writers have blamed the underdevelopment and poverty state on African leaders due to their corrupt nature. Van de Walle, (2001:6-11) presents some obstacles to socio-economic development as: endemic corruption and the state's limited capacity to implement development policies. He points out that "variables such as the level of corruption, the extent of ethnic fragmentation, the level of political violence, and the quality of government services help explain the growth differential between Africa and other regions." Sachs (2005:56) insists that African countries fail to achieve economic growth because of their corrupt leadership and retrograde culture that impede modern development. In addition, Gyimah (2004:125-278) brings out the concept of corruption as an impediment to development. He says that the effect of corruption has translated into political instability, frequent regime changes and unstable economic investment environment. Corruption is a major obstacle to development in Cameroon. Transparency International (TI) declared Cameroon as the world corruption champion in 2000 and 2001; this affected not only the image of the country, but also its development, thus dropping the living standard of the Cameroonians. Efforts have been made at all levels to combat corruption because of its huge economic costs. The World Bank estimates that, corruption costs developing countries 5% of their GDP and undermines the confidence of the international community and investors, who would want to come and increase the potential wealth of the country. Though the corruption index for Cameroon has gone up to the 40<sup>th</sup> position, there still exists a high level of corrupt practices in the country which is actually affecting the socio-economic development of the country.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **7. CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE ANGLOPHONE PROBLEM**

#### **7.1 Conclusion**

Minority conflicts are common phenomena in Africa, and these conflicts arise due to several reasons. The Anglophone problem in Cameroon was as a result of the Anglophone minority group being marginalised by the majority who are the Francophones. I have explained above both the origin and ways in which the Anglophones are being marginalised. Also the actions carried out by the Anglophone movements and tactics used by the government to neutralise the Anglophone identity have been explained in details. Theories like ethnicity, political systems and regional development have been used to analyse the empirical material. I know the work presented here is somewhat cumbersome in all their details, but I gave detailed descriptions in chapters three, four and five, in order for us to have a clear understanding of the Anglophone problem. We can realise that the problem is a difficult one, which has not had a solution till date because each of the conflicting zones have refused to agree with the other. Even though the UN and the Anglophones have been pleading for dialogue, the Francophone government is still adamant to give in, instead they are using their own tactics to neutralise the Anglophones.

#### **7.2 Possible solutions to the Anglophone problem**

A possible solution to the Anglophone problem is to hold future negotiations between the Anglophones and the Francophone elites like the 1961 constitutional Fouban Conference since increasing numbers of Anglophones and Francophones are beginning to support a negotiated solution (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:202). It has become evident that Biya and his government form the major barrier to the call for negotiation. He appears not yet to realise that his present strategies of appointing a few Anglophones leaders in top positions are more likely to radicalise Anglophone demands than offer a lasting solution to the problem. Actions like the emergence of the SCYL with its advocacy of armed struggle and the election of a new and apparently bolder SCNC leadership show that the conflict still has a long way ahead. That is why the Anglophone leadership strongly believes that no meaningful dialogue is possible without the involvement of the United Nations. The UN secretary General Kofi Annan pleaded for dialogue between the

Anglophone and Francophone leaders during his visit to Cameroon in May 2000. He made the Anglophones understand that dialogue and reconciliation rather than separation were instrumental in solving the Anglophone problem. Therefore, to prevent any further bloodshed or an escalation of the conflict between the Anglophone movements and the Francophone dominated state. “It will be best for the UN to bring more pressure to bear upon Biya to accept dialogue and help organise constitutional talks under the auspices of the United Nations” (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003: 203).

Also Konings and Nyamnjoh advise that, if any future negotiations are to take place, the Anglophones and the Francophones have to be actively involved in the constitutional process, and discuss freely and frankly about the future form of state. The Anglophone call for an independent state has a long tradition. It was the most popular option in the years preceding reunification but the local population was not given the chance by the UN to vote for it during the 1961 plebiscite. The Anglophone movements renewed this call during political liberalisation in the early 1990s. Also it will be wise for the UN to organise a referendum to see if there is sufficient support for the Anglophone movement’s call for the creation of an independent southern Cameroon state so as to get a more reliable source of information about the Anglophone’s aspirations (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003:203-204).

Some scholars regard secession as the best solution in cases where there are no prospects for any peaceful coexistence of territorial units within dysfunctional and divided nation-states. Eritrea’s peaceful separation from Ethiopia in 1994 is used as an example for successful secession, but I think the example is not very good because there is now a violent conflict with Ethiopia. In addition, the Anglophones and the opposition need to remain united and exercise patience with the government rather than turn to conflict and bloodshed.

In situations of conflicting political interests, there are always discourses and counter-discourses. Denial of a problematic situation occurs when an individual or group denies that a problem exists, or denies wrong-doing or incompetence. For example, when Anglophones complain of marginalization, most French-speaking politicians, as well as some high-ranking English-speaking politicians in the Cameroon government, deny that there is such a thing as an Anglophone problem (Lyombe 2003:15).

Lastly, regional development should be carried out in all the regions of the Cameroon equally. There should be no discrimination in some regions because they are Anglophones or the



minority group. This can be done through empowering the local people through capacity building to actively participate in the development projects by defining, and solving social and economic problems to achieve their development objectives.

### **7.3 Peace building the way forward**

Peace-building encompasses activities carried out either by the primary parties to the conflict, the civil society, the government, international organizations, independent states or donor organizations to ensure a long lasting peaceful situation in the post conflict period and also prevent the recurrence of conflict. These activities may include: reconciliation, restoration of judicial system, protection of human rights, good governance, state institutions building and security sector reform. Methods of carrying out some of the peace-building activities such as reconciliation through dialogue could be an effective mechanism and should be emphasized when handling African conflicts especially at the local levels rather than armed conflict. Reconciliation through dialogue is one of the best solutions to the Anglophone problem. As we have seen above, the former UN secretary general Kofi Anan pleaded for this before he left Cameroon so the Biya Government should be made to understand this, so that the problem can be solved so as to prevent any further future conflicts.

Rothschild and Lake (1997: 291) identified four main options to national leaders for conflict management

- “1) Demonstration of respect for all groups and cultures
- 2) Formal and informal power sharing
- 3) Election according to rule that ensures either power sharing or minimal representation of all ethnic groups in national politics
- 4) Federalism or regional autonomy”

They suggest that no matter the strategy chosen, success depends greatly upon the commitment of leadership. If leaders are not prone to compromise and to operate transparently, ethnic tensions are bound to re-emerge and in some cases the resulting tensions will turn into conflicts, and once this occur, preventive diplomacy must give way to peace making. In such cases mediation on the part of the third party who is neutral to the conflict will be needed. External intervention would be most effective if it were indirect and represented in the material and

logistical support of UN or regional efforts. The further challenge is to develop political strategies for peace keeping (Rothschild and Lake 1997; 291). Just as Rothschild and Lake suggest, the leaders of African countries and Cameroon especially need to know that they owe a responsibility to their citizens. If the government believes and accepts that the country belongs to all its citizens, whatever their social categories, then the government should treat everybody equally and not marginalize a particular group because they are a minority. They should avoid favouritism and create opportunities where every region of the country can participate and be represented. On the part of the citizens, they need to exercise patience with the government and not see violence as the best solution to the problems they have.

#### **7.4 Contribution of this study to development studies**

In many African countries, violent conflicts have slowed down economic and social development. This study reveals that in order to manage conflicts in a non-violent manner, governance methods adapted to the development process are needed. Effective conflict prevention demands thorough understanding of the origins and dynamics of these conflicts. This study has tried to trace and understand the origin of the Anglophone problem, and has suggested the best solutions possible for the problem to be solved.

At a national level the study has encouraged peaceful negotiations through dialogue rather than violent conflict to promote social, political and economic development. It also encourages good governance through democracy, to accommodate different groups and interests in society. Internationally, we realise that the external community has provided means by which the conflicting groups in Cameroon can negotiate their own solutions to tensions rather than imposing externally devised solutions, which is a good step in development. One of the feasible external interventions came from the former UN Secretary General encouraging negotiations through dialogue. The study also reveals a stubborn government who does not want to solve a problem by negotiation despite all the pressures put on it to accept negotiations through dialogue. It will be good if more external pressure is put on Biya and his government because the Anglophones might run out of patience and turn to armed conflict which will be disastrous for the all people in Cameroon.

This study of Cameroon has revealed a democratisation process where its transition phase did not go beyond multiparty elections, where the pre-transition regime maintains itself in the

post-transition era. We can therefore imagine the dominant role of the elite against the grassroots, which does not encourage development since the grassroots are not empowered nor have a say in projects that concern them.

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