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'The Accra Conditionality of Participation!?'
The role of Civil Society Organisations in National Aid
Effectiveness Processes
-Case Study of Tanzania

Master Thesis in: International Development and Management

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Lund 22 May 2009

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Date: June 2009

Subject Terms: Tanzania, Aid Effectiveness, Civil Society Organisations, Development Partners, Government

Abstract

Resulting from CSO critique of the Paris Declaration signatories of the Accra Agenda committed themselves to deepen CSO engagement in national aid effectiveness. Therefore the purpose herein is to increase understanding over functions, mechanisms, hindrances and opportunities facing CSO in this process in Tanzania.

The primary method for achieving this was semi-structured interviews with 21 persons from the Government of Tanzania, Development Partners and CSOs.

It was concluded that there are a multitude of functions for CSOs in aid effectiveness. Whereas Development Partners stressed the importance of advocacy Government highlighted service delivery as main function of CSOs. Regarding mechanisms, it was concluded that there already exist structures allowing CSOs participation. However, the quality of them are perceived to be low and they are more on an ad hoc basis rather than part of an ongoing participatory system. The non-conducive socio-political environment and low capacity of CSOs were identified as main hindrances whereas the increased transparency of Government was considered the main opportunity. Lastly the importance of letting CSOs determining themselves which role(s) they should play and how was stressed in order to avoid some kind of Accra conditionality of participation' driven by Development Partners and Government.

Acknowledgements

There are many people to thank for enabling me to conduct this research. First and foremost I would like to thank Sida for making the field-study in Tanzania financially feasible and LUMID for allowing me to integrate this internship in my Masters studies.

Furthermore, I would like to send my gratitude to the DPG Secretariat (especially to Yuko Suzuki and Niels Knudsen) and UNDP for accepting me as an intern. My time at the Secretariat was indeed instructive. I miss you all!

Of course, I am also very thankful towards all the people that have participated in the study. Without your contribution I would not have succeeded.

Likewise, the support, recommendations and spurring of my tutor Kristina Margård has been invaluable. Kristina: you have been of tremendous support throughout the whole process!

At last I would like to, as usually, thank my best friend Therese Näsman, not only for supporting me throughout the time in Tanzania, but also for helping me with the layout of the Thesis. Therese; you are the best!

List of Acronyms

AGCSAE	Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DP	Development Partner
GBS	General Budget Support
JAST	Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MKUKUTA	National Strategy for Growth and reduction of Poverty
MKUZA	Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
MoFEA	Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
NSA	Non-state Actor
PETS	Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys
TAS	Tanzania Assistance Strategy
UNCSAC	United Nation Civil Society Advisory Committee

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1 Introduction

It is normatively argued that Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are important stakeholders in national development processes (McIlwaine 1998). Apart from ensuring "...effective delivery of development programs and operations..." CSOs are considered as important actors in advocating and promoting participation and empowerment of citizens (AGCSAE 2007:1). Nevertheless, so far, the recognition and incorporation of CSOs in the international agenda on aid effectiveness has been limited (ibid).

The demand for greater aid effectiveness has grown stronger over the last years due to unprecedented transaction costs. Today over 60 000 aid projects are founded by different donors worldwide. For some recipient countries this means managing around 800 new projects per year, hosting 1,000 donor missions and writing 2,400 reports quarterly. Besides it is increasingly argued that the effects of development assistance, in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction, are insufficient. (Millennium Campaign News)

In light of this a number of international agendas have been developed and signed by both Development Partners (DPs) and recipient countries. In the forefront of these consensus are the Monterrey Statement (2002), Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (2003), Joint Marrakech Memorandum (2004), Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and Accra Agenda for Action (2006).¹ Even if the ratification of these agendas is considered major steps in reforming and improving international aid flow systems, they have been subject to critique and scepticism. Particularly the Paris Declaration, dealing specifically with aid effectiveness, has been criticised by civil society representatives (Rajani 2008). CSOs, national as international, have argued that, due to its technical focus, the Declaration misses out on the core point; that "[t]he purpose of aid effectiveness is not aid effectiveness, but households escaping impoverishment, and people realizing concrete changes in their life" (ibid:1). It has further been advocated that the Paris Declaration only addresses the donor-government relationship and hence fails to recognise CSOs, not only as policy stakeholders, but as development actors in their own right (Tomlinson 2008). Consequently it has been asserted that CSOs might run the risk of becoming marginalised both in terms of funding and policy influence within the aid effectiveness framework (INTRAC 2007).

To this end the role of CSOs in aid effectiveness was one of the main topics discussed at the High Level Forum in Accra 2008². It was concluded in the Accra Agenda for Action that necessary actions are to:

- Deepen the engagement with CSOs as valued partners whose contributions to development complement those of government and of the private sector, and inviting them to explore ways to maximise their value added.
- Invite CSOs to consider how the Paris principles can best be applied to CSOs as well as enriched from a CSO perspective.

¹ See Appendix 1

² The conference in Accra was the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and took place 2-4 September 2008. Over 1200 representatives from governments of aid receiving countries, parliaments, development partners, CSOs and foundations gathered in order to discuss how to improve the quality and impact of aid (EU 2008)

- Work with CSOs to better understand the enabling conditions and funding models that condition CSO performance and make necessary adjustment to ensure that CSOs are able to reach their full potential in different settings (Accra Agenda for Action 2008:3-4)

Nevertheless, several questions remain at national level in terms of procedures and structures for CSOs involvement. Accordingly:

As diverse, democratic, development actors in their own right, an important challenge for CSOs in the post Accra period will be how to conceive institutional mechanisms for CSOs to take their 'seat at the table' (Reality Check 2008:26).

1.1 Purpose and Research Questions

Evidently, there is a need and call for analytical discussions over how CSOs can become more integrated into national aid effectiveness processes. The objective of this paper is consequently to, within the Tanzanian context, identify and analyse perceptions of Government stakeholders, DPs and CSO representatives regarding CSOs and national aid effectiveness. The purpose of this is to increase the understanding regarding functions of and mechanisms for CSO involvement as well as over hindrances and opportunities facing CSOs engagement in aid effectiveness. To fulfil this purpose following research questions will be addressed in relation to aid effectiveness in Tanzania:

- Which are the perceptions of government stakeholders, development partners and CSOs representatives concerning the roles of CSOs?
- Which are the perceptions of government stakeholders, development partners and CSOs representatives regarding ways and mechanisms for CSOs to actively take part?
- What hindrances and opportunities are government stakeholders, development partners and CSOs representatives perceive there to be for CSOs in becoming valued partners?

It is anticipated that the documentation and analysis of stakeholder perceptions will contribute with an informative benchmark necessary for national discussions as urged by the Accra Agenda for Action. The reason for choosing Tanzania as case study is due to the fact that Tanzania is regarded to be in the forefront in fulfilling the Paris principles³ on aid effectiveness (OECD 2007). Moreover, in the direct aftermath of the Accra High Level Forum the attending Tanzanian representatives from both the donor and Government side acknowledged the need for initial studies on how to integrate CSOs accordingly (Personal communication with DPG Secretariat personnel). Hence, Tanzania constitutes an interesting country to study in regard to the Accra guidelines on CSO engagement in aid effectiveness.

1.2 Outline

The thesis consists of seven chapters. The forthcoming chapter outlines the methodological approach of and practical methods applied in the study. In the third chapter the concepts of CSOs and aid effectiveness will be abstractly discussed so to provide the reader with a theoretical understanding of the topic and to create a benchmark for analysis. The fourth chapter outlines the characteristics of the Tanzanian civil society and the history of aid effectiveness in the country. The fifth chapter constitutes the core of the paper as it presents the results from the interviews along with analyses of the research questions. Before summarising the Thesis there will be a discussion commenting the investigation process. Lastly a concluding section will summarise the study and highlight main findings and contributions.

³

See Theoretical Framework

2 Method

In this section the methodological approach guiding the investigation and the practical methods chosen for retrieving data will be outlined. Further the ethical considerations taken and expected limitations of the study will be discussed.

2.1 Methodological Approach

Due to the exploratory and knowledge enhancing character of the investigation the methodological approach will be guided by the Grounded Theory Approach as adopted by Glaser and Strauss (1967). According to grounded theory theoretical sampling "...is the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyses his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges" (1967:45). Hence, by allowing data collection becoming a dynamic and ongoing process, interlinked with analysis, the study contains both inductive and deductive features (Bryman 2004). Simultaneously as collecting data the researcher 'codes' it. Coding is the practise when the researcher breaks down and organise the empirical findings in categories (Charmaz 1983). Coding is however more than simply managing the data as it allows for conceptualization and categorization of the phenomenon of interest (Bryman 2004). Identified concepts and/or categories⁴ can then be used as "...building blocks of theory" (Strauss & Corbin 1998:101)

When applying this methodology data collection continues until 'theoretical saturation' is reached (Bryman 2004). 'Theoretical saturation' signifies the stage when "(a) no new or relevant data seem to be emerging regarding a category, (b) the category is well developed in terms of its properties and dimensions demonstrating variation, and (c) the relationship among categories are well established and validated" (Strauss & Corbin 1998: 212). Consequently, when applying grounded theory the researcher sample "...in terms of what is relevant to and meaningful" in regard to the purpose (ibid:306). Therefore, there is no requirement of statistical representativeness or random selection. Having reached theoretical saturation the researcher starts to structure and analyse the result to see if any 'hypothesis' or generalisable conclusions can be derived (Bryman 2004). With grounded theory the objective is not predominately to deductively test or verify a theory but rather to expand the frame of understanding of the studied phenomenon and if possible add to theory (Svenning 2003).

As stated the purpose of this study is to increase the understanding of CSOs in aid effectiveness and not to test or develop a theory per se. This is due to the limited theoretical benchmark regarding CSO engagement in domestic aid effectiveness processes within the framework of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. Nevertheless, it must be recognised that there is a multitude of theory dealing with civil society and development at large. Likewise CSO engagement in national poverty reduction strategies is well investigated. Therefore, whereas this study finds its theoretical basis in the overarching theories of civil society in development, it aims at increasing the context specific understanding of CSO engagement in aid effectiveness processes by identify trends, discrepancies, relations etc. In this aspect it is perceived that grounded theory, if leaning towards its inductive side, not only constitutes a good methodological framework, but also a useful method for handling empirical data. In forthcoming section the process of how I applied grounded theory will be summarised in line with the practical methods used.

⁴ Whereas '*concept*' explains a simple phenomenon a *category* is either an elaborated concept or a conjunction of several concepts. By this, categories are at a higher level of abstraction than a concept (Bryman 2004:403).

2.2 Methods of Research

The empirical data was gathered from both primary and secondary sources. Secondary information, retrieved through desk reviews of documents, was used in constructing the conceptual/theoretical framework and the contextual background of the study. The study was based on an internship⁵ at the Development Partners Group (DPG) Secretariat⁶. Through participatory observations within DPG and 18⁷ semi-structured interviews with representatives from the three stakeholder groups first-hand data was retrieved.

Literature Review

As a first step in the Grounded Theory Approach I engaged in literature review of relevant documentation. This was done to get familiarized with the topic and to construct the conceptual/theoretical framework and contextual background of the Thesis. Before using any of the documents they were analysed in accordance to the criteria of authenticity, credibility and representativeness to determine their quality and relevance for the study.

Participant Observations

An important part of the study was the on-going participatory observations done within the Tanzanian aid-system. Working at the aid coordinative unit of the DPG Secretariat and by regularly participate in DPG meetings, seminars and workshops⁸ allowed me to gain a deeper understanding of aid effectiveness in Tanzania by daily being exposed to its practical, administrative and technical aspects. This also enabled me to establish initial contact with presumable informants. As part of the Grounded Theory Approach any observations done during these meetings were noted down in a field-journal.

Semi-Structured Interviews

The main method for data collection was semi-structured interviews with Government stakeholders, DPs and CSO representatives. As I explained elsewhere "[a] semi-structure means that rather than having a pre-determined set of questions, the interviews are guided by a subject structure containing indirect thematic topics" (Tanghøj 2007:23). The advantage is that space is given the interviewer to adjust the interview as it proceeds. It also allows informants to speak more freely, using their own frames of reference, when discussing (May 1997). Engrafting informants with a feeling of 'liberty' is of specific importance within this kind of study where peoples' perceptions are of primary interest.

The guiding interview-structure⁹ applied herein was based around four 'thematic boxes'. Each of the four boxes were given a heading and bullet points summarising the main issues I wanted to discuss in relation to the research questions¹⁰. This allowed me to 'jump' between the thematic boxes in accordance to what the informant brought up for discussion and how the interview evolved. Hence, the topics tied to the boxes could be discussed interchangeable. The ambition was to, when completed the interview, have touched upon all four themes. Therefore, it was my

⁵ The internship was carried out in Dar es Salaam from 25 of August 2008 to 3 of March 2009.

⁶ See Appendix 2 for Glossary

⁷ In total 21 persons were interviewed.

⁸ See Appendix 3 for an overview of meetings and workshops

⁹ This guiding structure has been derived from a dialogue method designed by Hjerm and Andersson (1998) called the 'For Whom Group' method. The 'For Whom Group' method was shared with me by Benny Hjerm (Professor in Political Science and Faculty Head at Jönköping International Business School) as part of a field-study preparing course in 2007.

¹⁰ See Appendix 4 for interview structure

role as interviewer to, at the same time as impelling the informant to speak freely, make sure that the essential issues were covered during the interview. However, there were no pre-determined questions for achieving this. Rather the intention was to tentatively guide the informant through the boxes by asking open questions in response to what they narrated, described, exemplified etc. (Hjern and Andersson 1998).

As stated, apart from recording and transcribing all interviews I kept a field-journal in which I documented, coded, categorised and commented on observations made. This made it possible to determine if observed phenomena were ad hoc or reappearing and when 'theoretical saturation' had been reached.

Selection Process of Informants

As indicated there are three stakeholder groups that are represented in the study: CSOs, Government and DPs. This wider set of stakeholder representation is expected to contribute to a more dynamic analysis of the research questions. That I have chosen these three specific groups is due to them being identified by the Accra Agenda for Action as the primary actors for aid effectiveness.

Even if the paper at times refers to civil society, focus has solely been on CSOs as actors in development. The reason for limiting the scope of research to this civil society 'sector' is that, apart from their mission being explicitly and uniquely developmental in character, CSOs are primary agents of civil society with which governments and DPs interact on a regular basis (AGCSAE 2008:3). Even if my intention has not been to limiting the definition of CSOs it should be acknowledged that it predominately were CSOs with a clear development agenda that were consulted. No CBOs, research institutes, private sector associations etc. were included¹¹. However, two international NGOs were incorporated in order to broaden the CSO representation. Regarding DPs, both technical and political personnel from multilateral as well as bilateral donor-agencies have been interviewed in order to capture a broader dimension of DP representation. From Government only persons from the aid coordinating unit at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs agreed to participate in the study. In Appendix 5 the representation from the three stakeholder groups can be further studied.

In line with the Grounded Theory Approach informants were selected through a combination of purposive and snow-ball sampling. Purposive sampling is when the "...researcher samples on the basis of wanting to interview people who are relevant to the research question" (Bryman 2004:334). Whereas snow-ball sampling is an approach where the researcher make "...initial contact with a small group of people who are relevant to the research topic and then uses these to establish contacts with others" (ibid:100). In practice an initial group of informants from each stakeholder group were identified in collaboration with the Aid Coordination Specialist at the DPG Secretariat and with representatives from the UN Civil Society Advisory Committee (UNCSAC)¹². The Aid Coordination Specialist sent an email to this group presenting the research and expressing her wish of their participation. Shortly thereafter I sent an email introducing myself and the research more in detail. I appended a Concept Note of the intended study with an adherent Interview Synopsis¹³. A request for an interview was also placed. Of the 11 emails that

¹¹ The reason for this is mainly due to time restraints and the limited scope of the study as well as due to the adopted selection methods.

¹² See Glossary in Appendix 2

¹³ The idea behind providing the informants with a Concept Note explaining the background and purpose of the study more in detail along with an Interview Synopsis was to enable the informants to get a better picture of the topic and to better prepare in front of the interview. These documents can be retrieved by sending a request to: tanghojerike@hotmail.com

were sent 10 informants accepted to be interviewed. Nevertheless, I perceived that I had not reached theoretical saturation after interviewing these 10 participants. Accordingly, further informants were required. I came in contact with the additional informant either through recommendation from already interviewed informants or during meetings, workshops, seminars etc. Also these people received the same introductory email with attachments. In total 21 people were consulted in 18 interviews¹⁴.

2.3 Ethical Considerations

All studies based on collecting data from people evoke ethical concerns. These include "...taking care to avoid harming people, having due regard for their privacy, respecting them as individuals and not subjecting them to unnecessary research" (Goddard & Melville 2004:49). In general terms this conveys e.g. that interviews should be voluntary and based upon informed consent, that data is handled carefully and respectfully by the researcher and that informants are given the opportunity to read through the written material before finalising and publishing it.

The major ethical consideration specific for this study regards the relationship between CSOs and the Government of Tanzania. As will become evident in forthcoming chapters there is a history of an underlying tension between civil society and Government. As the case study of HakiElimu¹⁵ below attests; CSOs, up to date, might run the risk of being banned if being too critical of or inconvenient to the Government. Even if the relationship is ameliorating (Lang et al 2000) some CSO representatives have expressed concerns over their participation in the study. Hence, it is my responsibility as a researcher to avoid adding to this tension by publishing anything that might position a CSO in a bad relation with the Government. Due to this I have taken following measurements to prevent any ethical inconveniences.

First, the research set up, outlined in a Concept Note, was run through and accepted by the DPG Secretariat, DPG Main, JAST Working Group and UNCSAC¹⁶. The Concept Note was distributed to the contemplated informants in order to give them the opportunity to take an informed decision whether to participate or not in the study. The interviews per se were voluntary and the informants choose what kind of recording devices that could be used. Lastly, I shared three drafts of the Thesis with the DPG Secretariat in order to get comments upon the material. Likewise, the final draft was sent to all informants for approval before publishing it.

To guarantee anonymity of informants no direct referencing is done in the Thesis. Instead following code system has been used:

- Development Partners (DP1-10)
- CSO representatives (CSO1-7)
- Government officials (GoTa-b)¹⁷

It should be acknowledged that there is no connection between the assigned number and the order of the interviews as presented in Appendix 6.

¹⁴ See Appendix 6 for list of interviews

¹⁵ See Box 4 for case study

¹⁶ See Glossary in Appendix 1

¹⁷ The letter 'a' and 'b' are used when two persons have participated in the interview.

2.4 Limitations

My responsibility and assignment as a researcher is to open-mindedly conduct research and in a veracious way retell what I have been told. Yet, it must be kept in mind what Kant once said: "The only thing we can observe are the perceptions of the world: **how it appears to us**" (Kant cited in Moses & Knutsen 2007:172). Hence, regardless of methodological and ethical considerations there are certain limitations with the study.

Apart from the possible subjectivity of the analysis, the scope of the investigation is too narrow to capture an outright picture of the topic or to draw any clear-cut conclusions. The study rather allows for pinpointing tendencies and bringing out issues for discussion. Further, the limited representation of informants might have influenced the validity of the primary data. Likewise, from a reliability perspective, it would have been preferable to have a broader geographical, sector and institutional representation from all three stakeholder groups. E.g. only two people from Government were interviewed of which both work for the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. It can not be ruled out that other sector specific ministries might have other views and standpoints on CSO engagement. At the same time it could be argued that since the Government has expressed an official standpoint on the issue in the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST)¹⁸, to which all ministries are supposed to align, a broader representation might not be necessary as divergences in perception is not expected between the national ministries. Still, it could have been beneficial to capture the perceptions of Local Governmental Authorities (LGAs) as they might have different experiences of CSOs participation and aid effectiveness processes.

Likewise, there has been a poor representation of rural CSOs. There are reasons to believe that CSOs outside urban metropolis like Dar es Salaam and Arusha have different experiences regarding their role in aid effectiveness. Unfortunately due to the limited time frames, resources and in some cases unwillingness by stakeholders to participate it has not been feasible to extend the stakeholder representation. However, it is expected that, in consideration of the purpose and exploratory character of the study, the data gathered is reliable to a satisfying degree and extensive enough to do initial analysis on the topic.

¹⁸

See Appendix 2 for Glossary

3 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

In this chapter a conceptual/theoretical framework will be constructed. For reasons given earlier this chapter will be based on overarching theories concerning civil society and CSOs in development. A shorter discussion regarding the concept of aid effectiveness will also be given. The ambition is not to give a fully-fledged conceptual discussion but rather to 1) show that aid effectiveness entails both technical and socio-political aspects and 2) clarify how aid effectiveness will be considered in the Thesis.

3.1 Civil Society and CSOs

As stated, the thesis will focus upon CSOs in aid effectiveness rather than civil society at large. However as the concepts are closely related, and sometimes even considered equivalent, it is difficult not to touch upon civil society in this kind of framework.

3.1.1 Civil Society

The discourse of civil society has a long academic history dating back to Age of Enlightenment but was established first in the twenty-first century within the development discourse (McIlwaine 1998). Many attempts have been done in trying to define the concept of civil society. Yet, no definition has been as widely used as Gordon White's: White considers civil society to be:

An intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by organisations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values (White 1994:379)

The broadness of this definition has made it popular amongst development actors, donors, research institutes, CSOs, Governments etc. However, as concluded by Pedersen 2001:3): "It offers little guidance in terms of how to apply the concept in the context of development aid". Overall, "critics have decried the conceptual and practical usefulness of civil society for reasons of ambiguity and empirical diffuseness" (Howell & Pearce 2001:1). In order to avoid this discussion and possible diffuseness this study focus on CSOs as they are not only clearly developmental in their nature, but also normatively perceived as organised representatives of civil society (ibid).

3.1.2 CSOs in Development

Like civil society there is no common definition capable of reflecting the variety of organisational objectives, structures, activities, resources etc. that CSOs represent (Reality Check 2008). In the broadest sense it could be argued that CSOs "...include all non-market and non-state organisations in which people organise themselves to pursue shared interests in the public domain" (AGCSAE 2007:3). Accordingly, a multitude of associations, e.g. non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community/faith-based organisations, private sector associations, co-operatives, research institutes etc., are often incorporated to the CSO concept (Ingelstam & Karlstedt 2007). Yet, what they do have in common is a normative expectation of independence from Government and DP agendas and that they are working on behalf of society *in plero* or representing a specific civic group (ibid).

Today CSOs are widely recognised amongst development practitioners as important actors in national development (McIlwaine 1998). Likewise, proponents of different theoretical perspectives support CSO participation in development. (Pedersen 2001: Howell & Pearce 2001). However, these theoretical perspectives present multiple normative understanding of CSOs in regard to their functions in society and their relation to the state (ibid).. E.g. Neo-liberals predominately consider CSOs as alternative actors to the state for provision of social services

whilst Pluralists rather think of CSOs as counter-weighting agents to the state power by acting within existing structures (ibid). Structuralists, on the other hand, promote “fundamental change of unequal power structures from below” (Pedersen 2001:4-5). However this adaptableness of the notion “also adds to the confusion when different and potentially contradictory development objectives are combined into one strategy” (ibid)

However, it could be argued to be a general consensus among development practitioners that CSOs, as organisations ‘of and by the people’, well situated to “...understand the needs and claims of ordinary people and build multiple relationships with communities who are the agents and beneficiaries of development efforts” and to “...promote people’s participation and democratic action and reflect the values of socio-economic justice and solidarity as citizens”(Reality Check 2008:39/6).

As this implies, CSOs have, in relation to poverty reduction and social development many important roles to play and functions to fulfil. Amongst them are:

- Representation of the interest of specific civic groups
- Mobilization of social actors to increase their consciousness and impact.
- Regulation and monitoring of state performance and over the actions of public officials.
- Developmental or social action to improve the well-being of their constituencies (DIIS 2004:3).

3.1.3 Concerns

Even though CSOs are normatively perceived to be *pro bono publico* it should be kept in mind that CSOs:

...are complex associational universes...they contain repression as well as democracy, conflict as well as co-operation, vice as well as virtue: they can be motivated by sectional greed as much as social interest (Robinson & White 1997:3)

In regard to this the problem of CSOs having to sacrificing their autonomy due to strong donor dependency in form of funding is often mentioned as a weakness of and threat to CSOs. Likewise the increasing international requirement and funding conditionality of CSO participation might reify CSOs as “historically inevitable components” by overlooking the past and present socio-politics dynamics in the specific countries (Howell & Pearce 2001:2). Overall, attempts by donors and domestic Governments to operationalise CSOs threaten to reduce the notion to a mere technical tool and by that “...depoliticize it in a way that paradoxically could lead to a constriction of intellectual and political space” (ibid). Hence, as advocated by several scholars, neither CSOs nor civil society should be externally manufactured but rather given space to transform in their own way (ibid. Pedersen 2001:McIlwaine 1998).

3.2 Aid Effectiveness

The demand for greater aid effectiveness has grown stronger over the last decade in light of unprecedented transaction costs and insufficient effects of aid on poverty (Reality Check 2008). The international discourse on aid effectiveness is predominately guided by the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action¹⁹ (Hauer 2006). The thoroughgoing aspiration of these agendas is to give recipient countries more influence and responsibility over their own development

¹⁹ See Appendix 2 for Glossary

strategies and the process of allocating aid (ibid). The donors are inclined to find new methods for accommodating their aid better to the national context of the partner countries (ibid). To achieve greater aid effectiveness the signatories have agreed on five respective four committing principles (See Boxes 1 and 2)

Box 1 Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness

<u>Paris Principles</u>	
Ownership:	Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption
Alignment:	Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems.
Harmonisation:	Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication.
Results:	Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and results get measured
Mutual Accountability:	Donors and partners are accountable for development results. (OECD)
<i>Source:</i> http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html	

Box 2 Accra Agenda Principles on Aid Effectiveness

<u>Accra Principles</u>	
Predictability:	Donors will provide 3-5 year forward information in their planned aid to partner countries
Country Systems:	Partner country systems will be used to deliver aid as the first option, rather than donor systems.
Conditionality:	Donors will switch from reliance on prescriptive conditions about how and when aid money is spent to conditions based on the developing country's own development objectives.
Untying:	Donors will relax restrictions that prevent developing countries from buying the goods and services they need from whomever and wherever they can get the best quality at the lowest price. (OECD)
<i>Source:</i> http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3343,en_2649_33721_41297219_1_1_1_1,00.html	

In practise these principles have transferred into institutional and technical reformation and harmonisation of DP and Government aid delivery systems (Reality Check 2007). The effectiveness of aid is hence measured in lowered transaction costs between DPs and Governments (ibid). This way of practice aid effectiveness has been subject to criticism due to its technicality and exclusion of CSOs (Tomlinson 2008). As argued by CSOs "...the true measure of aid effectiveness is a sustained reduction of poverty and inequality in the poorest countries, where aid is a key resource" (ibid:4). Or as expressed elsewhere: "the purpose of aid effectiveness is not aid effectiveness, but households escaping impoverishment, and people realizing concrete changes in their lives" (Rajani 2008). From this perspective, where aid effectiveness is about the

actual impact on the ground, the issue of incorporating CSOs as policy stakeholders becomes utterly relevant (Tomlinson 2008). Accordingly, I will not delimit the understanding of aid effectiveness herein to the mere technical aspect of it, but also to be considerate of its more socio-political dimensions. This implies that I will investigate CSO engagement in processes surrounding e.g. national development programmes, poverty reduction strategies and aid harmonisation initiatives.

3.3 Previous Research

Lastly in this chapter it should be recognised that an overarching study regarding aid effectiveness and CSOs has been done by the Advisory Groups on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness²⁰. However, this research was conducted in the pre-Accra period aimed at making the Accra High level Forum recognising CSOs as valued partners in aid effectiveness. The purpose of this study was accordingly, from a theoretical point of view, argue for the importance of letting CSOs participate in aid effectiveness. Hence, by addressing the same topic, but in the post-Accra period from a specific contextual perspective and with research questions taking the debate further, the Thesis will not only build upon this research but also add to the scope of it.

²⁰

See AGCSAE (2007) Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness at <http://web.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cs>

4 Contextual Background

In this chapter the discussion of CSOs and aid effectiveness will be taken further by contextualising it to Tanzania. First a description of the Tanzanian civil society will be given. Secondly, the history of aid effectiveness in the country will be outlined.

4.1 Civil Society in Tanzania

Herein an overview of the Tanzanian civil society will be given in order to get a better understanding of the environment CSOs are operating in. Through this it is also anticipated that the readers will become more considerate of obstacles, opportunities and possibilities facing CSOs in taking their 'seat at the table'.

Historically the relationship between civil society and the Government of Tanzania has been characterised by the "...state's constant efforts to create political hegemony" (Lange *et al* 2000:18). Little space has been given civil society to grow and develop as a sphere that is separate and relatively independent from the state (*ibid*). E.g. during the Presidency of Nyerere organisations engaging in political opposition were forbidden (Hydén 1999). Nevertheless, as the state realised the importance of having a civil society that at least was perceived by external parties as functioning, they tried to establish a state controlled civil society (Kasfir 2004:Hydén 2005). Hence there has been a tradition of looking upon civil society as an 'extended arm' of government and CSOs have been expected to engage directly in service delivery. Therefore there is an inherited 'culture of silence' limiting civil society in criticising government (*ibid*). Beside, the sprawled population and poor infrastructure connecting communities have contributed to a weak tradition of social mobilisation and assembly, especially in rural areas (Kasfir 2004). Generally, there is a poorly developed rural civil society as the majority of the CSOs are based in the bigger cities. Overall, the Tanzanian civil society lacks *áááness* and does not have the urge or incentive to engage in collective assemblies and co-operations (Lang *et al* 2000: Hydén 1999)

Since the time of Nyerere there has however been an intensified democratisation and decentralisation process causing Government control over civil society to weaken. Simultaneously there has been a remarkable growth in CSOs in Tanzania (Lange *et al* 2000). Through the development of a 'NGO policy' in 2001 and with current aid reformation processes civil society has formally become recognised as an important actor in national development and democratization (*ibid*). Regardless, there are still tendencies of a hegemonic approach by Government vis á vis civil society, which is exemplified by the case study in box 3, and several control mechanisms are practiced (Lange *et al* 2000). E.g. all organisations in Tanzania must be registered and approved by a counsel which is nominated by Government. As this process is quite complicated and expensive it tends to marginalise smaller and financially-weak organisations (Utrikesdepartementet 2007). Furthermore, no private media is allowed national coverage (*ibid*). Another aspect limiting CSOs is their high dependency on funding. "[I]n Tanzania, organisations tend to be formed by resource persons, who reach out to the grass-roots, not the other way around" (Lange *et al* 2000:15). Moreover, as popular participation is generally very low in Tanzania many CSOs struggle with low memberships.

Case Study □ HakiElimu

HakiElimu is a non-governmental organisation that was established in 2001 with the vision to "see that every child in Tanzania is able to enjoy her or his right to basic quality education" (HakiElimu 2009). In 2001 the Government of Tanzania initiated a Primary Education Development Project and in 2004 the Government decided to undertake a national Public Expenditure Tracking Survey on it (U4 2007). The responsibility of conducting the Tracking was given to the research institute REPOA. The result presented by REPOA indicated a number of drawbacks with the Project. However, "the Ministry of Finance quickly issued a rebuttal questioning the methodological authenticity of the REPOA study" (U4 2007:3). Based on this report HakiElimu published a 'review of the reviews' in August 2005 criticising the Tanzanian school system and the Primary Education Development Project (Jensen 2006:1) Further, as outlined in U4:

The report was combined with a series of popular and widely watched television and radio adverts illustrating the problems of corruption and mismanagement in the education sector. This strongly irritated the Minister of Education and the then President, Benjamin Mkapa (U4 2007:4)

The Minister of Education advocated that the report was biased and too critical, missing out on the actual ameliorations that had been done in the education system. The popular adverts were perceived to ridicule the Government and being an election year in 2005 the Government took action against HakiElimu (Tanzanian Affairs 2006:1). The Government banned the organisation in October the same year and prohibited them hence to publish any more articles or reports regarding the school system. This act was condemned by many domestic CSOs and non-domestic actors. However, this did not stop the Government from threatening to punish media, schools, organisations etc. that operated with HakiElimu (Legal Human Right Centre 2006)."It was only significant public and possibly high level diplomatic pressure that stopped the Government from banning the organisation altogether" (U4 2007:3).

As to CSO participation in national development there is very little documentation about actual CSO involvement and contribution. Overall it seems like CSOs engagement in aid effectiveness processes and in national development in general, has been very limited and ad hoc (Field Notes). Nonetheless, there are a few instances in which CSOs have been given the possibility to participate. E.g. during the drafting of the Poverty Reduction Strategy consultations between CSOs and Government took place (Curran 2005). However:

The general feeling CSOs have about the first PRPS is that they did not really have any impact on the policy content of the strategy and that the document does not reflect civil society's perspective or inputs in a meaningful way (ibid:10)

Likewise, whereas the importance of CSO representation in various policy-making fora has 'formally' been recognised by the Government several CSOs claim that such invitations rather is a cabotage by Government in order to 'tick the civil participation box' (Personal Communication with UNCSAC members).

4.2 Aid Effectiveness in Tanzania

Tanzania is commonly regarded as a star-pupil in aid effectiveness (DPG 2006). Not only does Tanzania have records of innovations in aid management reforms for over a decade, but the 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration concluded that Tanzania already in 2007 was in the forefront of achieving the aid effectiveness goals set by the agenda (OECD 2007).

The requisite of enhancing aid effectiveness in Tanzania was initially driven by a crisis in the relationship between DPs and Government in mid 1990s. In response to this a group of independent advisers was commissioned to give recommendations on how to improve overall development cooperation in Tanzania (JAST 2006). Part of the recommendations, adopted by both parties in 1997, urged Government to articulate medium- and long-term national development priorities and to reform the financial management system. DPs were encouraged to "...better coordinate and harmonise their development assistance...as well as to increase the predictability of aid flows" (ibid:3). The parties also agreed to, in joint actions, "...strive for greater transparency, improved accountability and promote increased involvement for civil society" (DPG 2006:21). The initiative of improving aid effectiveness was taken further with independent assessments of Tanzania's development partnership in 1997, 1999 and 2000 and the formalization of an Independent Monitoring Group in 2002 (JAST 2006).

In 2002 the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS), a medium-term framework for development co-operation, was launched. TAS, aimed at "...strengthening aid coordination, harmonisation and alignment as well as national ownership and Government leadership of the development process" (ibid:3). The implementation of it led to considerable improvements in national aid harmonization, predictability and management (DPG 2006). Due to the demand for better donor harmonization and clearer Division of Labour (DoL) between donors, DPs formalised a coordinating body called the Development Partners Group (DPG)²¹ in 2004. The ambition of this was to incline DPs to "...speak with one voice on key development issues" (DPG 2006:22).

Regardless of progress made under TAS parallel systems for managing, monitoring, delivering and evaluate development assistance were still in place causing high transaction costs. Therefore a Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) was developed in 2006. Compared to TAS, JAST intends to be more encompassing by considering "...all aspects of the development partnership between the Government and the Development Partners as well as the role of non-state actors therein". Accordingly, JAST was aligned to the domestic Poverty Reduction Strategies²² and to the international aid effectiveness frameworks²³. (JAST 2006:4).

JAST aims at establishing an effective development partnership by:

- Strengthening national ownership and Government leadership of the development process,
- Aligning Development Partner support to Government priorities, systems, structures and procedures,
- Harmonising Government and Development Partners process,
- Managing resources for achieving development result,
- Ensuring mutual accountability of the Government and Development Partners; and
- Strengthening accountability of the Government to the citizens of Tanzania". (JAST 2006:5)

What distinguish JAST from previous initiatives is that it not only recognises CSOs as important actors in aid effectiveness but that it also specifies expected roles of CSOs:

²¹ See Appendix 2 for Glossary

²² The MKUKUTA and the MUKUZA

²³ I.e. the Monterrey Consensus, Rome, declaration, Marrakech Memorandum and Paris Declaration

Local and international CSOs mobilise and enhance community participation and resource contribution in development activities and act as partners to the Government and Development Partners in delivering community services. CSOs also participate in local government planning and in reviewing development strategies including the MKUKUTA/MKUZA, programmes and projects, the national budget process, and JAST implementation, and disseminate relevant information with attention to its creditability and user-friendliness to the public. They thus facilitate mutual accountability of the Government and Development Partners as well as domestic accountability of the Government...In addition, they engage in dialogue with the Government and Development Partners and consolidate and present community views to the Government and Development Partners. They also serve as domestic and international advocates for development and aid effectiveness, stimulate public debate and raise understanding on these issues (ibid:7)

Further, a Dialogue Structure²⁴ and a rationalised DoL, dividing DP contributions in regard to key development areas²⁵ were presented in JAST as main mechanisms for aid effectiveness. However, as national and sector dialogues still took place with overlapping agendas and with unclear linkages, the government proposed in 2008 a new Dialogue Structure and DoL²⁶ (Government of Tanzania 2008). Apart from being more straightforward and homogeneous, the new structure acknowledges the importance of, apart from Government and DPs, "other domestic stakeholders (non-state actors)" in all dialogue fora (ibid:1). At the time of writing the new structure was not fully operational since the proposed DoL had raised some concerns amongst DPs as to upon whose criteria is it to be determined which DP that is to operate in what sector dialogue²⁷.

²⁴ See 'old Dialogue Structure' in Appendix 7

²⁵ See Appendix 8 for a schedule over the Clusters, Sectors and Thematic Areas identified by the Poverty reduction Strategy as key development areas for Tanzania. The DoL is also built around these working groups.

²⁶ See 'new Dialogue Structure' in Appendix 7

²⁷ For updates on this process please consult The DPG Secretariat at the DPG web-page: <http://www.tzdp.org.tz>

5 CSOs in aid effectiveness – stakeholders’ perceptions

In this chapter the results from the interviews will be presented and analysed in course with the research questions. Apart from the question specific analyses given in direct connection to the presentation of the result of each research question, an end-analysis will round off the chapter.

5.1 Roles of CSOs

It came forward in the interviews that CSO engagement in national aid effectiveness is important, necessary and welcomed. The interviewed stakeholders widely expected and encouraged CSOs to contribute more to the agenda. The Government officials and most interviewed DPs referred to JAST when discussing perceived roles of CSOs in aid effectiveness (GoTab:DP1-5:DP8-10). Even though none of the CSO representatives specifically made reference to JAST they identified the same roles. According to JAST (see above) CSOs are to:

- Deliver community services;
- Support government in planning, implementing and evaluating governmental lead development programmes;
- Represent the ‘voice’ of the people;
- Disseminate information;
- Act as policy advocators for development and aid effectiveness.

Due to this consensus I will let the roles identified by JAST structure the presentation below.

Service Delivery/Implementation

There seems to be a contention within Government that CSOs predominately are to engage in service delivery. As expressed by the officials:

CSOs role is to implement and complement Government in providing communities with services (GoTb).

CSOs should in collaboration with Local Government Authorities mobilise resources at community level to support local development projects. CSOs can provide communities with hospitals and schools, but letting government have control of the instances in order to guarantee sustainability in and quality of the delivery. (GoTa)

The contention that CSOs should engage in service delivery has also been expressed by most CSO representatives. As one participant expressed:

The whole idea with civil society is to complement Government's efforts to implement policies and directions given for development (CSO1).

Yet, it should be noted that many CSOs informants perceived service delivery to be one of many functions and not necessarily as the most important one (CSO2:CSO4-5). One CSO representative explained that:

The basic responsibility of delivering aid is Government's, but Government structures must sometimes be supported, complemented and informed by civil society structures (CSO2).

DPs on the other hand were more reluctant towards seeing service delivery as a primary function of CSOs in aid effectiveness:

CSOs are not supposed to cover up for Government where they have failed to deliver; it is not up to CSOs to supply Tanzania with e.g. education and health care systems. That is the role of Government. CSOs should rather demand and pressure Government to deliver these services (DP6a).

As will become evident later on in the chapter, DPs are rather pushing CSOs to play a more adversarial role.

Evaluation and monitoring

Predominately, DPs and CSO representatives stressed that CSOs have an important function to fulfil in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of aid effectiveness processes - especially in light of increased General Budget Support²⁸ (CSO1:DP9). CSO led M&E presents a civic tool for controlling Government delivery (DP9-10:CSO1:CSO4):

It is crucial that CSOs evaluate if the central system actually delivers the required services and that the aid money trickles down society now when the money are pooled to Government. (DP5)

Or as a CSO representative expressed it:

We are to make sure that Government is not repeating any mistakes and we do that by actively scrutinizing them. (CSO6)

Interesting to point out is that the majority of CSOs argued that M&E should be undertaken in close collaboration with Government (CSO1:CSO3-6). The DPs on the other hand stressed that CSOs, apart from M&E, should actively challenge the accountability of implementation and demanding performance of Government (DP9). Whilst the M&E function of CSOs is identified by JAST the interviewed Government officials did not bring it up.

Information dissemination

The necessity of CSOs to be continuously engaged throughout aid effectiveness processes have been emphasised in the interviews. Hence, CSO contribution in planning and decision-making of aid effectiveness strategies, especially in the role of informants and civic spokesmen, is perceived vital. Several CSO representatives argued that information dissemination, both up- and down-stream, to be the most crucial CSO contribution to aid effectiveness. (CSO2:CSO4-6)

Information dissemination is not only important for having an informed national debate on aid effectiveness but also to raise public awareness concerning national development processes. (CSO4)

This informative link provided by CSOs was also recognised by Government and DPs as important since it allows CSOs to represent civic groups and make the 'voice' of marginalised people heard (GoTab:DP1:DP5:DP9). Further, it was widely argued that through grass-root dialogues CSOs can give feedback to Government regarding development initiatives, policies and priorities (DP2:DP10:CSO3:GoTa). By pushing for certain civic groups or causes and informing about the actual poverty picture, CSOs play an important role in problematising national aid effectiveness priorities and programmes (CSO4:DP9). Furthermore with local knowledge:

CSOs should play a challenging function, an accountability function and an advocacy function on account of their constituents (DP9).

²⁸

See Appendix 2 Glossary

Policy advocates

With increased usage of governmental system for aid donation there is according to DPs a clear need for CSOs to accompany government with an advocacy function rather than a service delivery function (DP1):

CSOs should not function as the extended arm of Government. There must be a move towards adversarial CSOs that focus much more on political difficult issues such as accountability, human rights, governance, corruption etc. CSOs need to be the critical voice against Government so to hold them accountable outside the democratic processes. Today we see that CSOs are not as critical towards Government as we would like to see. (DP4)

The CSO representatives also argued that a policy-advocating function is of importance (CSO1-5). Through advocacy CSOs can increase awareness of Government and DPs regarding specific matters and social situations and by that contribute to informed decision-making (CSO1:CSO3-4). Likewise, by acting as watch-dogs CSOs can critically scrutinize and hold Government and DPs accountable for their actions (CSO1:CSO3-5). The Government official also pinpointed the value of having a scrutinizing and adversarial civil society as it contributes to more dynamic national dialogues (GoTa). Yet they stressed that Tanzanian CSOs are not capable of fulfilling these functions due to lacking capacity and experience in the area (GoTab):

CSOs today are not advocating or constructively scrutinizing. They are only criticising us. (GoTa)

5.1.1 Analysis

Initially the seemingly general positive stance towards CSO engagement in aid effectiveness should be highlighted. An initial recognition of the importance of CSO engagement is the first and most important step toward seeing CSOs as valued partners in aid effectiveness.

Out of above outline three main analytical conclusions to draw in regard to the first research question. Firstly, there are several different roles ascribed to CSOs by the stakeholders of which no one really has been given priority by the stakeholders. One explanation to this could be the "multiple normative understandings" of CSOs as mentioned in the theoretical framework. Further it could be difficult to identify one predominant role or function due to the dynamic nature of CSOs. Yet, there is nothing that says that CSOs are to play one role or fulfil one function in aid effectiveness. As argued by Howell and Pearce (2001) the strength of CSOs lies within their diversity. Secondly, it seems that the identified roles are 'traditional' ones in the sense that they are ascribed CSOs in overall development frameworks. Accordingly, there seems not to be any aid effectiveness or country specific roles. This can be due to the fact that aid effectiveness, if recognising its socio-political aspects, is closely interlinked with general national development frameworks. Thirdly, even if the stakeholders seem to generally agree in the multiplicity of functions CSOs could play a possible perceptual discrepancy could be the tendency of DPs to push for a more adversarial and challenging role of CSOs whereas Government is clinging on to the notion of CSOs as service delivers. This suggests that the Government are more aligned to the neo-liberal perspective on CSOs whereas DPs tend to be more Pluralistic. The CSOs themselves seems more torn between the two extremes.

There are a number of issues that could be pondered about in relation to this suggested discrepancy. Firstly it must become clear what is meant with service delivery and advocacy as well as whose and what the expectations are. Service delivery as such can be carried out in different arrangements and objectives for each function. If a CSO is forced to, either due to the direct demand of Government or indirectly due to Government's failure in delivering public goods, do service delivery it could hamper the autonomy of the organisation since it is not given the possibility to chose if to, and in such case, what to deliver. Nevertheless, being the 'extended arm'

of Government does not have to be counter-productive if built upon a consensus building partnership where CSOs are engaged to set the agenda. Advocacy, being a western derived concept, is in its most straightforward notion the pursuit of influencing outcomes (QPPD). If being considerate of the facts that 1) there is not a strong tradition of public movements in Tanzania and 2) CSOs have a long history as service deliverers, a paradigm shift towards a more adversarial and scrutinizing function of CSOs might not be as easy as DPs might perceive. CSOs are simply not used to question or oppose Government in a critical manner and the Government is not used to be criticised. As the HakiElimu case testifies such behavioural change of CSOs might cause tensions and confusions between CSOs and Government - leading to non-conductive and oppressing behaviour of the Government.

Considering this it might be desirable to allow a different kind of advocacy develop, that is considerate of the socio-dynamic history of civil society and its relation to Government in order to achieve a conducive environment for CSOs to influence decision-making without colliding with Government. Maybe advocacy in the form of negotiation and consensus building would be more conducive in Tanzania. As stated, in its most straightforward notion advocacy is the pursuit of influencing outcomes, which could be achieved equally well through negotiation and consensus building.

5.2 Participatory Mechanisms

It stands clear from the study that there already exist mechanisms formally allowing CSO participation. Accordingly, most informants argued that there is no need to develop new participatory mechanisms per se but that the quality of those already in place must be enhanced. E.g. the existing mechanisms are more on an ad hoc basis rather than parts of an on-going and systematic participatory-dialogue process (CSO3:CSO6). Further, present fora of stakeholder dialogue is more tailored to meet DPs' needs and requirements rather than CSOs (DP7:CSO3-4). Nonetheless, following participatory mechanisms were identified by the interviewees.

Dialogue Forum

Regular and informed stakeholder dialogues were concluded by the informants to be the most important participatory mechanism for CSOs in regard to aid effectiveness. This as such on-going dialogues contribute with a framework allowing CSOs to disseminate information, represent peoples' views and to engage in policy advocacy (DP2:DP5-8:CSO1:CSO3-4). Particularly, since 2008 when Government started to invite CSOs to the annual Poverty Policy Week and General Budget Support reviews²⁹, these consultative meetings were frequently mentioned as good frameworks for CSOs to contribute to policy-making and priority setting (GoTa:CSO3-5:DP2-5:DP8-9). However, as pinpointed by several informants; whilst the structure of the fora is conducive in a generic sense, the quality of the stakeholder dialogues taking place within these meetings is often very low (CSO1-4:DP1-8:GoTb). Moreover, as explained by one DP, when the policy dialogue has reached the level of Poverty Policy Week and General Budget Support reviews it:

...is more or less a done deal and there is little room for negotiation. Hence for a fruitful participation CSOs must be involved in the pre-cooking stage of the policies as well. There need to be an ongoing policy dialogue throughout the year between all stakeholders. There must likewise be some kind of system of dialogues that ideally brings the voices of the grass-roots to structured sector and stakeholder as well as national dialogue forums that are lean enough to undertake a meaningful information exchange (DP9).

²⁹

See Appendix 2 for glossary

The Government officials and three DPs (DP8:DP4:DP10) mentioned the new Dialogue Structure as the primary system for achieving this. Other informants suggested, without referring to the Structure, that a 'tripartite system' where effected DPs, Government ministries and CSOs in a certain sector can come together to discuss and work out policies in order to get an informed benchmark for funding allocation, programming, monitoring etc. should be established (CSO1:DP2).

Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys

As to the M&E role of CSOs it was suggested that whereas DPs and Government engage in Public Expenditure Review dialogues concerning challenges in cash flows from central to local level, CSOs could be engaged by conducting Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) (See Box 3) at local level (DP5:DP3b:CSO5). Originally PETS have been conducted by DPs but it is becoming more common that CSOs adapt the methodology in order to monitor cash flows of aid money (Graaf 2005).

Box 4 Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys

What are Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys?

A Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) tracks the flow of public funds and material resources from the central government level, through the administrative hierarchy, and out to the frontline service providers. The aim is to improve the quality of service delivery at the local level, and the key question that a PETS sets out to answer is: *Do public funds and material resources end up where they are supposed to?* If they don't, the survey may go further and ask: *Why are those funds being diverted?* Such surveys are typically implemented at the sector level, usually in health or education. (U4 2007:1)

"PETS ultimately intend to provide local communities with information about the level of resources allocates in particular services in their area; perhaps to the local school or health clinic" Most commonly PETS are carried out "mainly by donor agencies to trail their funds". However, more recently "the methodology is copied by civil society organizations to increase accountability and responsiveness of local governments. The rational is that with demonstrating how money is transferred or spent at different bureaucratic levels, the local decision makers can be held accountable to those civil society organizations" (Graaf 2005:1)

Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys in Tanzania

In Tanzania three national PETS have been conducted: 1999 (PWC), 2001 (REPOA/ESRF) and 2003 (World Bank) (U4 2007). Apart form these there have been a number of other PETS carried out at the district level by Non-State Actors (PWC, REPOA, ESRF, HakiKazi, TEN/MET, TCDD, KCSPR Forum and ActionAid) (Graaf 2005). However the result of these PETS "are not shared widely, little is known about the impact the studies have had and collected data is not compared" (Graaf 2005:2)

Further information: <http://www.u4.no/themes/pets/main.cfm>

According to some DPs, the development, adaptation and extension of PETS could be a good mechanism for CSOs to monitor how aid money flows through society and to evaluate the result of Government's investments at local level (DP5). By this CSOs complement PER measurements taken at central level (DP5:CSO6). Further:

By conducting PETS CSOs can move away form being service delivers and move towards becoming monitors of Government delivery (DP5).

If used and communicated in the right way CSO led PETS could also increase the understanding and awareness of the situation of ordinary citizens at community level - which per se would strengthen the information disseminating function of CSOs (CSO6).

One of the DPs informed that their agency provides training in PETS for CSOs (D3b). However, as explained:

The PETS we do is not only one survey, but what we had in mind was more of building an information system so that communities are trained to do PETS on a more continuing basis. (DP3b)

Likewise a CSO representative informed that they were developing simple sector surveys in Swahili aimed for the usage of ordinary people at local level:

We must be enabled to go e.g. to a school and ask how many teachers it got, how many of them are professional, when was the last time they got a capacitation grant and how was that money spent etc. And then communicate this information to the local and central authorities. However, so far there has been little interest of these surveys from the government authorities. (CSO5)

Local Government Authorities

A further way for CSOs to become integrated in aid effectiveness processes, identified by the CSOs themselves, is to initiate closer collaborations with LGAs. A closer collaboration could help CSOs to strengthening their relationship with the central Government since LGAs function as 'gateways' to core dialogues and processes (CSO5). Besides, several CSOs experienced it to be easier to collaborate with LGAs than with the central Government since it is possible to establish a more 'personal' cooperation with LGAs (CSO2:CSO5-6):

At the regional or district level, where government officials work more directly with CSOs there is no longer an abstract misconception since the collaboration is individually based. (CSO5).

Umbrellas and Networks

The formation of umbrella organisations and networks were frequently mentioned by CSO representatives as a predominant way to strengthen their influence in aid effectiveness. Particularly they argued that umbrella organisations help CSOs to, like DPs, 'speak with one voice' and by that strengthening them as counterparts (CSO2:CSO4-5): Likewise it was stressed that local community based networks are necessary for effective communication flows within civil society (CSO5). Moreover, it was recognised that for CSOs to become stronger in national sector dialogues, it might be beneficial to establish and strengthen sector networks (CSO5).

Not all CSO representatives were however convinced that umbrellas add value. One CSO representative argued that umbrella organisations in Tanzania have never worked as they "simply are useless" (CSO4). An alternative, suggested by a CSO informant, was to rather create space for CSOs to dialogue with each other around specific matters:

I think that dialogue forums work better in regard to networking and partnership than initiating formal structures for membership based organisations (CSO1)

Similarly most DPs argued that umbrellas do not have any comparative advantage in sector or national dialogues (DP1:DP3-5:DP7). The rationale is that umbrellas tend to become too general and broad in their mission so that they loose expertise, and by that bargain power (DP5). DPs rather expressed a general preference to collaborate with sector specialised CSOs due to their "front edged competence" (DP5). It was commonly argued amongst DPs that since Government and DPs are organised around sectors CSOs should, in terms of policy dialogue, organise

themselves according to the same system (DP2). The Government on the other hand stressed the importance of keeping a dialogue with umbrellas in higher levels of dialogue but acknowledged that:

It is important not to only dialogue with umbrella organisations as it is not always the case that umbrella organisations understand the things discussed during sector reviews since they have not been involved throughout the year in the sector working groups. That is why participation of specialised CSOs in sector working groups are important as well (GoTa)

Media

Regarding mechanisms for CSOs to become more adversarial the role of media was raised. A few CSO representatives stressed the importance of recognising the usefulness of media in mobilising people, changing perceptions and increasing popular awareness (CSO1-2). Hence it was stressed that CSOs should make more use of media in conveying messages so to pressure Government into listen to them (CSO1-2:DP7).

5.2.1 Analysis

Considering the focus given dialogue and information sharing it is interesting to highlight that, apart from the Government officials, only three of the interviewed DPs (DP8:DP4:DP10), and none of the CSOs representatives, mentioned the new Dialogue Structure. As explained above the Structure is supposed to be *the* dialogue system in Tanzania by guaranteeing participation of all stakeholders, at all levels and sectors throughout the year.

Why then has the recognition of the new Dialogue Structure been so low? The most straightforward explanation is that the awareness of the new Dialogue Structure is low. Whilst this might be true for CSOs, if considering the fact that they have not so far participated in drafting or implementing the structure, DPs have been given the document are involved in the current implementation process (Personal Communication DPG Personnel). The low recognition by DPs could possibly be explained by their non-compliance to the Government suggested DoL. Overall the low awareness suggest the need to actually communicate the new Dialogue Structure to a wider set of stakeholders. If CSOs are expected to participate in and contribute to the process they must at least be made aware of the structure's existence and its intended implications. Furthermore, if CSOs are to, as urged by the Accra Agenda, to be regarded as valued parties, it seems straightforward to include CSOs in the implementation process of the new Dialogue Structure right away.

It should however be acknowledged that, whilst the implementation of the Dialogue Structure could help CSOs to become integrated in aid effectiveness dialogues and policy-making processes, the structure is limited to the national level. I.e. it does not automatically guarantee up- and down-stream information flows and dialogues. As concluded in the theoretical framework the strength and value added of CSOs in many aspects is their representation of the people and their knowledge of the local poverty situation. Thereof, a strong foundation for CSO contribution in aid effectiveness depends on the local level being connected with the national level. Accordingly, for the Dialogue Structure to function as expected and for CSOs to add value, there need to be similar consultations at district, regional and local level supporting the national processes in terms of information dissemination. E.g. the development of CSO led PETS could be one way of supporting the national dialogue structure from below. Likewise, initiating closer collaboration with LGAs could be a way for CSOs to become closer connected both to national and local processes.

5.3 Hindrances and Opportunities

In following sections identified hindrances and opportunities facing CSOs will be outlined. For structural reasons most of the issues have been clustered together into more overarching challenges and opportunities.

5.3.1 Hindrances

A non-conducive environment

If CSOs are to contribute substantially and constructively they must be given the possibility, space, time and blessing to do so. Otherwise their efforts will become ad hoc, un-coordinated and random. However, an overarching hindrance for CSO engagement highlighted by most informants was the '*non-conducive environment for CSO engagement*' - impeding stakeholder dialogue, information sharing, participatory decision-making and CSO action. (CSO3:CSO5-6:DP1-4:DP8)

A contributing factor to this, as argued by all parties, is the tendency of counter-fading *attitudes* of the stakeholders. CSO representatives perceived Government to sometimes have a repugnant attitude towards CSO contribution (CSO1:CSO3-5):

There is sometimes a problem with the attitude of Government, I would not say that their attitude is bad, but they lack understanding of the importance of CSOs and sometimes you feel like they are just ignoring us. They do not see the value of our contributions (CSO3).

Further:

Unless we are aligning with Government they are regarding us as useless. If an organisation questions Government it runs the risk of getting in trouble. Whenever an organisation makes things public that might be uncomfortable for Government it is instantly regarded as opposition and regarded as nothing else than troublemakers. Trying to operate when being afraid of getting banned is not conducive. Government must be willing to accept criticism and take it as a challenge when CSOs dialogue and advocate for change. We are not necessarily criticising. It is about looking at gaps and challenges and informing Government; look here, something is wrong and something must be done. (CSO5)

The problem of insecurity for CSOs was also acknowledged among DPs:

I remember a statement made by the former minister of finance that really frightened me. She said that: 'we as Government allows the opposition to exist, we allow the multi-party system to exist and we allow Civil Society to have a voice' (DP9). For me, this is a threat since it indirectly implies that Government also can take this away if these stakeholders are becoming 'inconvenient' (DP9).

From the Government's point of view constant opposition by CSOs was interpreted as non-constructive and retrogressive (GoTa):

CSOs are always negative and go against Government. CSOs should not only try to criticise us, they should try to collaborate with us. Sometimes CSOs could have a better solution to a problem, but in conveying that they only attack us. They should be more cooperative [...] To deliberately go against Government no matter what distorts the possibility to a fruitful dialogue. The Government has made a lot of good achievements, but do CSOs understand and see these achievements? (GoTa).

CSOs on the other hand considered their attitude to be too non-proactive:

We are not here to beg for our rights, we are here to demand them. Somehow it is a pressure from donors that pressures government to listen to us and to invite us to the dialogue, but it should be us that press for and demand it (CSO4).

Likewise the perceived tendency of DPs to "knowing best" and by that "crowding out" CSOs in dialogue was understood as a major challenge (CSO1: CSO4-5).

Donors presume that they know what is needed and how it is to be done, but what do they know about the real poverty situation? They have experts in policy advocacy in e.g. health that dialogue with the ministry of education without ever having been outside Dar es Salaam (CSO4).

Another challenge contributing to the non-conducive environment is the limited operational *space* for CSOs (DP1:DP4:DP7-8:CSO1-4:CSO6). Apart from a limited economic space, i.e. in terms of funding, many CSOs experienced that they have a narrow and regulated political and public space to act within (ibid). E.g. difficulties in getting national media coverage for policy advocacy and information dissemination was mentioned as one issue, apart from the general attitude of Government, limiting the action space of CSOs (CSO1-2:DP7). The case of HakiElimu was frequently referred to as an example of the limited and controlled operational space. Furthermore, national policy formulations and laws regulating the CSO sector were criticised of being too restrictive (CSO3-4). DPs also stressed the necessity of giving CSOs enough operational space:

CSOs must be allowed to meet and without external influence think together and come up with their own strategies and agendas. That is what creates pro-activeness and creativeness (DP8).

Further it was argued that *time* frames for CSO engagement in aid effectiveness processes are not conducive. A concern amongst CSOs and DPs was that invitations, information, instructions etc. from Government often are released too late:

Sometimes you can get an invitation to a sector or consultation meeting the same day and you get relevant documents at the meeting. How are we to contribute in these meetings when we do not have the time to prepare? (CSO4).

Accordingly:

The supply side of the consultative processes need to take into consideration that CSOs need enough time and space to organise themselves if they are to participate effectively (DP8).

Moreover, the actual time slots designated CSOs during consultative meetings were perceived too short for CSOs to convey their messages (DP3a:CSO1)

Another discussed aspect was the non-functional upstream and downstream *information flows* between and within stakeholder groups - leading to low information exchange and a broken chain of communication (CSO5). From the CSO perspective a feeling of there being unwillingness, both at local and central level, to share information have been expressed (CSO2:CSO4-6). This, as accordingly argued, only contributes to an uninformed and biased dialogue and policy-making (ibid). In some aspects LGAs have been perceived by CSOs as "bottlenecks" of information, hindering the outcomes of local and national dialogues to trickle down- as well as upwards the Governmental and social systems (CSO5).

Lack of information per se was also identified as a major problem for CSOs. There is simply not enough empirical information regarding the overall poverty situation, specific needs of people, effects of Government led programmes etc. (CSO1-4:DP3:DP5:DP8:GoTb):

Sometimes even the simplest information you require, e.g. how many people suffers from HIV/AIDS, is not existing or is scattered everywhere. How is civil society supposed to monitoring and evaluate something we do not know anything about? When there is not enough information we can not function as a watchdog nor as a support to government and donors, so what should we do then? (CSO5).

Vague identity of CSOs

Another perceived obstacle is the 'vague identity' of CSOs (CSO1:CSO6:DP8-9). As argued by one CSO representative:

Most of the CSOs do not only lack capacity, they also lack a vision. They are not well settled to understand what they really want and what they want to achieve and this vagueness weakens them. This vagueness will ultimately frustrate Government and donors, making it difficult for CSOs to gain influence and respect (CSO1).

Several informants argued during the interviews that most CSOs have too broad visions as they tend to be involved in different sectors simultaneously or change focus of their work repetitively - causing an impoverishment of expertise (CSO1-5:DP2-4:DP6-9:GoTab). One CSO representative argued that "CSOs engaging in everything will end up doing nothing" (CSO4). Connected to this is the tendency of 'brief-case NGOs' (GoTa). As argued by the Government officials: "These NGOs are only instruments for earning money and they are not good partners to collaborate with" (GoTa).

Moreover it was emphasised, particularly by the Government officials and DPs, that there is no clear Division of Labour between CSOs in Tanzania (DP1-3:DP6-8:GoTab). This was perceived to aggravate CSOs influence in policy dialogue as they loose expertise and front-edged competence (DP1:DP3-5:DP7:GoTa). Accordingly, as argued, "CSOs simply need to find their comparative advantage and stick to it" (DP5). The Government representatives also pointed out the problem with CSOs not being sector orientated:

Since Government and donors are already working according to the sector and thematic areas division given by the New Dialogue Structure and CSOs should adopt the same structure as well so to facilitate a qualified dialogue (GoTb).

However, as identified by the officials, there are specific cross-cutting issues in which CSOs seem not to be willing to engage:

Most CSOs want to engage in traditional service delivery sectors, such as health and education, whilst they avoid thematic areas such as governance, corruption, employment etc. How can we have CSO participation in these cross-cutting issues when there are no CSOs working with these questions? (GoTb).

Further, the Government officials and DPs expressed confusion over whether CSOs are doing advocacy or if they are trying to provide services on behalf of Government, or both. As one DP put it:

Are they challenging or are they trying to implement - if we do not know, how are we to relate and support? (DP9).

Likewise the Government officials pointed out that it is very difficult for Government to know what the CSOs really are doing and whether they "are with us or if they just want to challenge us" (GoTa). Hence, what is called for is a clearer CSO agenda (DP8):

CSOs have to identify areas in which they strongly feel that they want and can make contributions and then prioritise these areas by organising and allocating their resources (DP7).

A final factor contributing to vague CSOs identified was the issue of 'fund driven' organisations. (DP2:DP6-8:CSO1:CSO3). The problem is that in whichever sector organisations feel there is funding they will try to operate in (CSO1). This cause CSOs to engage in particular areas based on the funding possibility rather than on the organisation's competence and comparative advantage in that sector. In regard to this the problem of conditioned funding was raised. Many CSO stakeholders expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that DP funding often comes with an agenda since it undermines CSOs development and independence (CSO2:CSO4-6). As acknowledged:

DPs are part of this problem, we are throwing money at them and saying 'do this, do that' and then expecting miracles in that specific sector (DP9).

Likewise DPs admitted that DPs have 'created' many CSOs and that is not sufficient instruments for financing CSOs in a way that keep donors at distance (DP4). Consequently it was concluded that a major challenge for CSOs is to become less dependent upon external funding that comes with an agenda.

Insufficient Capacity

An overarching theme in most interviews was the perceived low capacity, in terms of financing, human resources, technical expertise and organisation, of CSOs. Lacking financial capacity was predominately identified by CSOs as a major hindrance. Especially it was pin pointed that with increased General Budget Support there is a risk that less funding is given CSOs (CSO1-6):

With direct project funding there was always room for CSOs, but now with basket funding it is difficult for us to get money (CSO6).

Most DPs and the Government officials however did not perceive there to be insufficient funding. One DP explained that the direct CSO funding of the cooperation had not decreased as a consequence of the aid effectiveness agenda (DP6).

Regarding human capacity and resources it was argued by CSOs representatives that the lack of full time employees is a major capacity issue for CSO effectiveness. Full-time employees are necessary for qualitative participation and CSO contribution as it allows organisations to have people specifically focusing on policy-dialogue, negotiation and to follow domestic development processes (CSO1:CSO3-5). Today most people in CSOs work on a voluntary basis on their spare time (CSO1). As to the technical expertise it was highlighted by the Government officials and DPs that most CSOs do not have enough capacity in terms of data gathering and analysis, presenting cases and in conveying their messages in a coordinated way (DP3a).

Another dimension of lacking capacity brought up during the interviews was the tendency of current interactions between CSOs, DPs and Government only to take place at national level with a small and centralised CSO elite in Dar es Salaam. Whereas there are a handful strong CSOs operating at the national level there are very few organisations at community level (DP8). Moreover:

Whereas CSOs in Dar es Salaam are strong, they are in a sense far away from 'reality'. Hence it is questionable whether they are good and legitimated representatives of the people (DP3b).

Accordingly, this poor organisational capacity of community based organisations causes it to be a poor civic representation from local to national level - also impinging centralised CSOs' possibility to represent the 'voice' of the people.

5.3.2 Opportunities

Even if the hindrances facing CSOs seem daunting a few opportunities have also been identified. Overall it has been argued that the relation between CSOs, Government and DPs has ameliorated. That Government officially invited CSOs to participate in the annual General Budget Support review and the Poverty Policy Week 2008 suggests that Government not only is becoming more transparent but also more open-minded towards civil society (ibid). This official recognition CSOs as valued parties was considered to be the main opportunity (CSO2-5:DP4-6:DP8-9:GoTa). There to it was argued that the already existing participatory frameworks and mechanisms have become more civil society 'friendly' (CSO2-5:DP4:DP6-9:GoTa). E.g. CSOs are regularly involved in some of the sector working groups, both on DP and Government side (GoTab:CSO5:DP8). Moreover, especially in the education and mining sector, there are examples, such as HakiElimu, when CSOs have engaged successfully in policy advocacy (CSO1:CSO4-5:DP6:DP8).

Regarding funding and donor dependency it was highlighted that there already exist mechanisms for independent funding that could be developed. E.g. Foundation for Civil Society and Rapid Funding Envelopes³⁰ were mentioned as good basket funding mechanisms helping CSOs to become less dependent upon DP agendas (DP4). Nevertheless, the capacity of and knowledge about these funds is limited.

5.3.3 Analysis

There are many hindrances facing the Tanzanian CSOs in becoming more engaged in aid effectiveness. The greatest problem seems to be the limited ability of CSOs to operate independently from the state and DPs. Nevertheless, the fact that Government has opened up the doors to policy dialogue by inviting CSOs to participate in the new Dialogue Structure is definitely one step in the right direction of seeing CSOs as valued partners.

However it is not enough with only a formal acceptance. There need to be substance and practise as well to it. Otherwise the sentence will be a cabotage for pleasing international agendas and directions. To avoid this the establishment of a conducive and proactive practise - by all parties - is vital. There must not only be a genuine will to include CSOs but also a willingness to understand the nature, problems and issues facing them. There are no 'quick-fix' solutions to this. It must be understood that obtaining mutual respect and appreciation is a learning and accustoming process. Since the inherent tension between CSOs and Government might obstruct the process of genuinely accepting CSOs as valuable partners in practice it must be accepted that time and patience will be required.

Whereas the vague identity of CSOs in terms of lacking vision and focus is perceived to be a problem it could on the other hand be argued that the unconformity of civil society in Tanzania rather is an asset. As discussed by Howell and Pearce (2001) the strength and value added of CSOs lies to some extent in the multiplicity of organisational types and in their varied work. Hence, it might not be desirable to try to homogenise CSOs into a sector structured DoL determined by the Government. Furthermore, the tendency of them avoiding certain sectors could possibly be explained by the funding pattern of DPs. As pinpointed, many CSOs are 'fund driven' and their practise depends on funds donated by DPs. When looking at the funding pattern by DPs in Tanzania it can be concluded that in the health and education sector there is a lot of funding for CSOs compared to e.g. good governance (DP4). Further, if considering the history of the relationship between Government and civil society, it is easy to understand that

traditional and service delivery oriented sectors like education and health might be easier for CSOs to engage in as they are not as adversarial like corruption and good governance. With little experience and capacity of engaging in policy-advocacy in combination with a protective Government it becomes a true challenge or CSO to operate in these political sensitive areas. However, herein lies the opportunity of exploring already existing channels to independent funding of CSOs.

5.4 End Analysis

So far it can be concluded that the result of the study is not unexpected or remarkable. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it has not provided valuable insights or that there are no interesting points to draw upon further. In this section a more focused analysis regarding the new Dialogue Structure will be done from a CSO perspective and in line with the retrieved result. The reason for this is to evoke and deepen the national discourse on how CSOs can enrich the aid effectiveness agenda. Even if focus herein is on the operationalisation of the new Dialogue Structure it is not to say that there is no need for CSOs to contribute to aid effectiveness outside this framework. Rather it might be beneficial for CSOs to develop independent mechanisms for advocacy and monitoring of Government by e.g. making use of media and other channels for communication and social mobilisation. However, due to the limited space of writing and the on-going implementation process of the Dialogue Structure, I have chosen not to elaborate further on that.

New Dialogue Structure

It stands clear that structured stakeholder dialogue is a central factor not only for aid effectiveness per se but also as a participatory mechanism for CSO contribution. As pinpointed, regarding this credence in dialogue, it is remarkable that so few informants referred to the new Dialogue Structure. The implementation of the Dialogue Structure *is* supposed to convey a national consultative framework for on-going policy-dialogues between Government, DPs and CSOs³¹ at various levels and in several sectors (GoT 2008). Accordingly the practical appliance of it should, at least abstractly speaking, give CSOs the possibility to take a more active stand in aid effectiveness. However, from a CSO perspective there are several issues that need to be addressed as how to practically make it operational and CSO inclusive.

The first issue to consider is which CSOs are to be included in the various sector/thematic/cluster working groups³² and national dialogue fora³³. It goes without saying that it is impossible to have a complete representation of CSOs due to logistical and efficiency reasons. Accordingly it must be discussed which CSOs are to participate in which forum. It should also be discussed upon whose demand and criteria specific organisations are to or not to get involved. Likewise it should be contemplated who the CSOs are to represent: civil society at large? Specific marginalised groups? Or their own organisational interest?

The most straightforward organisation of CSOs representation according to the interviewed Government officials would be to have specialised CSOs or sector networks showing comparative advantage participating in sector/thematic/cluster working groups whereas umbrella organisations could take part in the higher national dialogue fora³⁴. In this way a technical and

31 The new Dialogue Structure however refers to Non-state Actors rather than to CSOs.

32 See Appendix 8

33 See Appendix 7

34 Higher and/or national dialogue fora refers to the Joint Coordination Group and the MKUKUTA-PER main. See Appendix 7

sector specific competence could be guaranteed at lower levels of dialogue whereas a broader and more united CSO representation could be achieved in the higher level of dialogues. However, with this approach it must somehow be guaranteed that information generated and decisions taken at lower levels of dialogue are channelled up through the structure and shared between the CSO representatives. Otherwise umbrella organisations might not be aware of what has been discussed throughout the year in the sector/thematic/cluster working groups, which could dilute their respective representation and contribution in annual consultations and policy dialogues with Government and DPs. Furthermore, considering the perceived low value added of umbrella organisations in Tanzania, for them to successfully become the main civil society interlocutors in national dialogues there is a clear need for them to, not only become more representative of their constituencies, but also more qualified for the purpose. This is likewise true for sector specific CSOs. There is also the issue of non-representativeness of CSOs in certain cross-cutting and more political difficult sectors/themes such as corruption and good governance. How is CSO representation to be initiated within these areas of dialogue? What if there are no CSOs that are willing to get engaged?

Secondly, it is not only a question of what kind of organisation that is to participate in which forum, but also which specific CSOs that are to take their 'seat around the table' and upon whose request these organisation are nominated, selected and included. As to the request, it was explained by the interviewed Government officials that it is up to the Government to formally invite CSOs. This should be done by them sending a general invitation to the major umbrella organisations. Then it will be up to them to internally agree which organisations are to represent civil society in which fora. There are two distinct risks with this. Firstly, there is a risk that Government only invites to 'old goodies' - i.e. organisations that Government perceives to be cooperative. Umbrella organisations that are perceived awkward or too adversarial might consequently run the risk of not being incorporated. Secondly, there is a risk that the invitation stays at the desk of the Director of the umbrella organisation rather than turning into an internal discussion and evaluation over suitable candidates. Furthermore, even if this should be regraded as an opening up by Government vis á vis CSOs, the request and initiative of inclusion is not directly taken or driven by the CSOs themselves. This, in combination with the fact that no CSOs have been engaged in drafting the new Dialogue Structure limits the CSOs' ownership over their own possibility to participation. They have not been part of determining the set up, identifying priority sectors/thematic/cluster areas, suggesting how they can contribute or what kind of functions they would want to fulfil within the structure etc. Accordingly, the framework of CSO engagement in the structure could be perceived as directed by Government. Crassly argued CSOs have been provided a finalised structure with the demand of aligning to it but without any directions of how to practically do so.

In light of this it could be reflected over the possibility that CSOs might not want to become incorporated in the Dialogue Structure as they might perceive it as non- conducive. Is it then to be no CSO representation or are CSOs to be forced to participate in the various dialogue fora? Even if this may be an unlikely scenario *in pleno* it is not impossible in part. E.g. as already discussed there are certain sectors which CSOs already now are reluctant and hesitant to engage in. Since the result from this study indicates, the awareness amongst CSOs regarding the new Dialogue Structure is low - if they at all know about it. Accordingly, we can not know the reaction of CSOs as they become exposed to the new Dialogue Structure.

It can be understood from the set up of the Dialogue Structure³⁵ and from the interviews that the most straightforward and 'rational' way for CSOs to get involved would be to adopt a sector wise

approach like DPs. Such an alignment would require quite an internal reorganisation and development of the Tanzanian civil society. Yet, to judge from the interviews it seems to predominately be DPs and the Government inquiring a more distinguishable sector division of CSOs in relation to stakeholder cooperation in aid effectiveness. Such a development takes time and the implementation of the new Dialogue Structure is approaching. Further, normatively speaking any kind of evolution of civil society should be internally evoked and progressed naturally if the result not is to become a civil society with a 'weak identity' (Howell & Pearce 2001). Hence, changes in civil society should not be driven by external parties (ibid). Accordingly the request of inclusion and will of sector reorganisation should come from the civil society actors themselves. If CSOs do not see the benefit of being part of the dialogue or if there is no genuine will to participate 'forced' or impelled inclusion into the Dialogue Structure might only lead to unsustainable and non-constructive CSOs contribution.

Conditionality of participation!?

Taking this into consideration in combination with identified hindrances, is it realistic, if even desirable, to demand of CSOs to adopt a sector structure in order to become considered as valued partners in aid effectiveness? Should focus not rather be upon what is feasible and what the CSOs themselves believe to be appropriate ways forward? Further, as acknowledged in the Accra Agenda, we need to "Invite CSOs to consider how the Paris principles can best be applied to CSOs as well as enriched from a CSO perspective" (Accra Agenda for Action 2008:3). Accordingly, CSOs should be given the opportunity to influence the nature of the stakeholder cooperation with in aid effectiveness - which, to deem of the result, they are not enabled to do today. Besides, if taking into consideration the negative effects of an 'external manufactured' civil society should it not then be up to the CSOs to, not only define their role(s) within the aid effectiveness framework, but also to demand their inclusiveness? Likewise, should it be up to CSOs to find their own ways and mechanisms for contribution? Of course, for them to do so, they need support. The responsibility of DPs and Government should be to enable CSOs to participate in the national structures by unbiased means. This demands that all parties must strive towards achieving a conducive environment in which possibility is given CSOs to contribute in alternative ways, outside the national systems, if so desired. In the end what must be avoided is some kind of 'Accra conditionality of participation' driven by DPs and Governments!

6 Discussion

A lot of issues have been raised, problematised and discussed throughout this paper. What possible remains is to suggest how concerned stakeholders could proceed in enabling CSO engagement in aid effectiveness processes and how to take the research further. Unfortunately due to the limited space of writing there is no possibility to do so in the main text. Nevertheless, in Appendix 9 a summary of the recommendations given both to DPG Secretariat and the participating informants is provided. This chapter will rather serve as a commentary on the study per se with reflections over the investigation, field-methods and result.

Reflections

It has truly been a privilege conducting this study. Being able to do research about CSOs in aid effectiveness in this multifaceted manner has enriched, not only me as a researcher, but presumably also the overall initiative to deepen the engagement of CSOs in the Tanzanian aid effectiveness processes.

The study aimed at providing initial information regarding relations, tendencies, trends etc. so to increase the understanding of the topic. Even if the paper is not capturing the complete picture of the situation or contributing with a solution to genuine CSO engagement in aid effectiveness, there are a lot that could be learnt from it and built on. Overall, the thesis is perceived to have contributed with:

- Knowledge transfer and information sharing on stakeholders' perceptions regarding possible role(s) of CSOs in aid effectiveness.
- Facilitating a common understanding of mechanisms and procedures through which CSO can engage.
- Acknowledging and assessing the hindrances and opportunities facing CSOs in Tanzania in becoming valued partners in aid effectiveness.

Also it is anticipated that the documentation of stakeholders' perception and the analysis of it has contributed with an information benchmark for continued discussions regarding CSOs and aid effectiveness in Tanzania. E.g. identifying main hindrances and opportunities open up for the possibility to, in an informed manner, develop strategies and set priorities for strengthening CSO performance.

Considering this it must be concluded that the thesis has not only fulfilled its purpose, but also been able to take an important first step in contextualising and applying the goals set up by the Accra Agenda for Action regarding CSOs. Accordingly, I believe that the methodological approach taken and the practical methods used have served the objectives of the study well. I perceive that theoretical saturation was achieved and that elements for theory building and for further research have been provided. Overall, few major methodological and practical hindrances have occurred throughout the investigation. What could however be highlighted again is the overall limited geographical, sector and institutional representation of the stakeholders, which might have affected the representativeness and generalisability of the result.

Nevertheless, it stands clear that there is a lot to be done before the Accra principles on aid effectiveness and CSOs are put in practice in Tanzania. Further studies enriching the principles from a CSO perspective is indeed needed and practical reformations of on-going dialogue practices and structures are necessary. To contribute to and intrigue this process I will suggest a number of questions that I believe important to investigate, analyse and discuss.

Questions for further discussion

A lot of questions have risen throughout the study which unfortunately, due to time and space restraints, have not been dealt with in this paper. Hence they are left to other researchers to take on:

- What is the role and contribution of Parliament, UN and Media in aid effectiveness processes and in supporting CSOs?
- What is the role and contribution of international NGOs in domestic aid effectiveness and in supporting local CSOs? Are they in a better position to support capacity building of domestic CSOs in a less conditioned manner?
- How is increased General Budget Support influencing direct and indirect funding of CSOs?
- Which sources of independent funding is available for CSOs in Tanzania and how can these sources become improved and more accessible?

End Note

Reaching genuine CSO participation in Tanzania's aid effectiveness processes is a challenge. Nevertheless, this is a process that just have started and considering the existing opportunities and procedures it is just a matter of time and continued open-mindedness of all parties before CSOs are considered and acting as valuable parties in the many processes of aid effectiveness in Tanzania.

7 Conclusion

With the Accra Agenda for Action there is a call to deepen the engagement of CSOs national in aid effectiveness and to enable them to reach their full potential as valued partners. This study has been an attempt to, in the aftermath of the High Level Forum in Accra, contextualise the issue of CSO engagement and contribution in aid effectiveness. The purpose of this has been to increase the understanding of conceivable role(s) and mechanisms for CSO involvement as well as what hindrances and opportunities are facing CSOs in becoming further engaged in aid effectiveness processes in Tanzania.

The guiding methodology for fulfilling the purpose was the Grounded Theory Approach as adopted. The methods for data collection have been participatory observations and semi-structured interviews with representatives from the Government of Tanzania, Development Partners and CSOs. The informants were selected through purposive and snow-ball sampling. In total 21 people were interviewed. Regardless of methodological and ethical considerations the investigation experienced some limitations. E.g. the limited representation of informants might have influenced the validity of the primary data. Also from a reliability perspective it would have been preferable to have a broader geographical, sector and institutional representation from all three stakeholder groups. Nevertheless, in-line with the purpose, the gathered data was deemed to be reliable to a satisfying degree in order to do initial analysis on the topic

The result of the study indicates that all three stakeholder groups perceive CSOs engagement to be important, necessary and welcomed in aid effectiveness. A handful functions of CSOs in aid effectiveness have been. Whereas DPs stressed the importance of advocacy Government highlighted service delivery as main function of CSOs. CSOs on the other hand did not prioritise one role over an other but argued that different roles fulfil diverse functions in aid effectiveness. It was concluded that several mechanisms already exist allowing for CSOs participation. However, the quality of them are low and they are more on an ad hoc basis rather than part of an ongoing participatory system. Amongst the identified mechanisms participatory and on-going policy-dialogues were stressed as utterly important by all stakeholders. However considering this focus on dialogue it was highlighted and discussed that, apart from the Government officials, only three of the interviewed DPs and none of the CSOs representatives, mentioned the new Dialogue Structure. The on-going implementation process of the new Dialogue Structure was specifically discussed from a CSO perspective.

The non-conducive socio-political environment, hindering CSOs to operate independently from the state and DPs, along with the wanting capacity of the CSOs was identified as main hindrances. However, the fact that Government has opened up the doors to policy dialogue by inviting CSOs to participate in the new Dialogue Structure is definitely one step in the right direction of seeing CSOs as valued partners. Yet. it has been stressed that it is not enough with only a formal invitation. There need to be substance, practise and a genuine will as well to it. Otherwise the sentence will only be a cabotage for pleasing international agendas.

In the end it was conclude that it should be up to CSOs themselves to demand their participation and determine which role they should play, and how. DPs and Government should accordingly by unbiased and unconditioned means support and enable CSOs. Likewise, all parties should strive towards achieving a conducive environment allowing CSOs to contribute in alternative ways, outside the national systems, if so desired. All of this is of primary concern in order to avoid some kind of 'Accra conditionality of participation' driven by DPs and governments!

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Appendices

Appendix 1 - Summary of International Agendas on Aid Effectiveness and Harmonisation

Monterrey Statement (2002)

In 2002 the Monterrey Statement was endorsed by Heads of State and Government. The statement as an outcome of the Monterrey Conference and the United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development. Apart from the jointly agreed financing principles USA and EU committed themselves to new development objectives. The participants also reached agreement regarding relief, corruption, and policy coherence. (The United States President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief)

The Monterrey Statement embraces six areas of Financing for Development:

- Mobilizing domestic financial resources for development.
- Mobilizing international resources for development: foreign direct investment and other private flows.
- International Trade as an engine for development.
- Increasing international financial and technical cooperation for development.
- External Debt.
- Addressing systemic issues: enhancing the coherence and consistency of the international monetary, financial and trading systems in support of development (ibid)

Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (2003)

In early 2003 the bigger multilateral development banks, international organisations, donors, governments meet in Rome for a High-Level Forum on aid Harmonisation. By signing the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation the participants agreed to take action in order to improve the management and effectiveness of aid. They further committed to take "stock of concrete progress" and the meet up in 2005 to evaluate the initiative. (Aid Harmonization and Alignment 2008)

The Rome Declaration on Harmonization sets out to:

- Ensure that harmonization efforts are adapted to the country context, and that donor assistance is aligned with the development recipient's priorities.
- Expand country-led efforts to streamline donor procedures and practices.
- Review and identify ways to adapt institutions' and countries' policies, procedures, and practices to facilitate harmonization.
- Implement the good practices principles and standards formulated by the development community as the foundation for harmonization (ibid)

Joint Marrakech Memorandum (2004)

The second roundtable discussion took place 2004 in Marrakech. Over 50 country representatives and 20 international development organisations signed a joint memorandum

setting out principles and action plans for how to managing for development result (EBRD 2004). The discussions were centred around how "...countries and development agencies can work more effectively, individually and collectively, to help countries achieve their development goals (ibid:1). Five core principles for managing for development results were set by the Memorandum:

- At all phases from strategic planning through implementation to completion and beyond focus the dialogue on results for partner countries, development agencies, and other stakeholders.
- Align actual programming, monitoring, and evaluation activities with the agreed expected results.
- Keep the results reporting system as simple, cost-effective, and user-friendly as possible.
- Manage for, not by, results.
- Use results information for management learning and decision-making, as well as for reporting and accountability (Joint Marrakech Memorandum 2004:2)

Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005)

The Paris Declaration was the result of the Paris HLF on aid effectiveness taking place 28 February-2 March in 2005. Envoys and heads of government from 90 donor and recipient countries as well as 26 representatives of international organisations and multilateral donors participated in the meeting (OECD 2005). A few civil society and public sector representatives attended the meeting as observers. The reason behind the Paris Declaration was the recognition that too much focus had been put on the quantity of aid rather than on the quality of it. Fragmentation and conditionality of aid caused high transaction costs and unnecessary administrative pressure on recipient countries. Moreover, the system resulted in low national ownership of recipient countries and little contextual orientated aid. The objective with the meeting was to discuss and agree upon how to make aid more effective and harmonized. (Hauer 2006)

The signatories of the agenda committed themselves to:

- Lower transaction costs by increased donor harmonisation
- Tailor large-scale development aid to specific requirements of recipient countries, and
- Strengthen recipient countries ownership over their national development strategies (Paris Declaration 2005).

Accra Agenda for Action (2008)

In September 2008 around 1200 development stakeholders, including Governments, donor institutions, foundations, parliaments, and civil society organisations, gathered in Accra for the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. The intention with the conference was to follow up on the Paris Principles and to speed up the implementation of them. In the Accra Agenda for Action recipient countries and donors agreed on steps to take in order to further reform and make aid more effective. (EU 2008)

Following principles were agreed upon:

- **Predictability:** Donors will provide 3-5 year forward information in their planned aid to partner countries

- **Country Systems:** Partner country systems will be used to deliver aid as the first option, rather than donor systems.
- **Conditionality:** Donors will switch from reliance on prescriptive conditions about how and when aid money is spent to conditions based on the developing country's own development objectives.
- **Untying:** Donors will relax restrictions that prevent developing countries from buying the goods and services they need from whomever and wherever they can get the best quality at the lowest price. (OECD)

Appendix 2 -Glossary

Basket Fund: "A basket fund is a funding modality under which more than one Development Partner collectively funds a country's development programme or sector as a whole with harmonisation procedures, processes, etc". (JAST 2006:34)

Development Partner: "Development Partners are members of the Development Partners Group (DPG) and other bilateral and multilateral agencies that provide official development assistance to Tanzania". (JAST 2006:35)

Development Partners Group: "The DPG is the coordinating body of the DPs in Tanzania. It was formalized in 2004 on basis of Rome Declaration and TAS but was revised in 2006 in response to Paris Declaration and JAST. The members of DPG are all bilateral and multilateral donors that provide development assistance to Tanzania. Currently DPG consist of 17 bilateral DPs³⁶ and 5 multilateral agencies (including the UN system)³⁷. The purpose of DPG is to, under lead of GoT, "...promote the implementation of the Paris principles on Aid Effectiveness in Tanzania in order to support national efforts to achieve Tanzania's growth and poverty reduction goals" (DPG 2007:1). More specifically the objectives of the DPG is to 1) improve the effectiveness of dialogue and 2) to coordinate DP harmonization and alignment efforts" (DPG 2007:2).

Development Partner Group Secretariat: "UNDP is providing a permanent secretariat to DPG (the DPG secretariat). The main objective of the Secretariat is to maintain the records of DPG and provide necessary support". (DPG 2007:5)

Foundation for Civil Society: "The Foundation for Civil Society is a Tanzanian non-profit company, designed and funded by a group of like-minded development partners, and governed by an independent Board...The Foundation aims to establish an intermediary support mechanism for civil society organisations in Tanzania which will enable effective engagement in poverty reduction efforts as set out in the Government of Tanzania policies: Vision 2025, the Tanzania Assistance Strategy, and the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP). The Foundation is one of the largest support mechanisms for civil society in Tanzania, and is committed to delivering grant aid and supporting capacity-building initiatives as a means of strengthening effective engagement in poverty reduction". (The Foundation of Civil Society Tanzania 2009:1)

General Budget Support: "GBS is an aid delivery modality which provides financial assistance to the overall national budget. It is allocated by the Government according to its legal and budgetary process and hence subjected to the same degree of contestability as domestic resources". (JAST 2006:35)

GBS annual Review: "The General Budget Support (GBS) Annual Review is the most significant meeting of the year between the Government of Tanzania (GoT) and the fourteen Development Partners who provide aid in the form of general budget support (GBS)...The review looks at the progress that has been made by the GoT in meeting the targets set out in the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty...In so doing the review takes a detailed look at all development issues outlined in the MKUKUTA clusters including, health, transport,

³⁶ Belgium (Embassy and BTC), Canada (CIDA), Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (GTZ, Embassy and KfW), Ireland (DCI), Italy, Japan (Embassy, JICA;JBIS), Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden (SIDA), Switzerland (SDC), UK (DIFD) US (USAID and MCC).

³⁷ EC, AfDB, IMF, World Bank, UN (UNESCO, UNFPA, UNAIDS, UNIDO, UNICEF, ILO, IFAD, FAO, UNDP, WFP, UNHCR, WHO, UN-Habitat, UNCDF).

education, agriculture as well as governance and government reform and map out objectives for subsequent year. The Annual Review is an important part of the process by which Development Partners decide how much money to provide to the GoT in general budget support" (DPG Secretariat 2009:1)

JAST Working Group: The JAST Working Group is a DP-lead group aimed at supporting the Government in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the JAST (JAST 2006)

National Strategy for Growth and reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA): "The MKUKUTA is Tanzania's second-generation PRS. It is the central coordinating framework for growth and poverty reduction initiatives in the country. It is set out for five years and adopts an outcome-based rather than a sector-oriented approach, based on three broad clusters: (1) Growth and reduction of income poverty; (2) improvement of the quality of life and social well-being; and (3) governance and accountability". (JAST 2006:36)

Non-state Actors: "Non-state actors are local communities; CSOs including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based and faith-based organisations; academic and research institutes; the private sector and the media" (JAST 2006:36)

Paris Declaration 2005: "The Paris Declaration was adopted at the Second High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris in March 2005. It commits donors and developing countries to take far-reaching and monitorable actions to reform the ways in which aid is delivered and managed for greater aid effectiveness. The Partnership Commitments of the Declaration focus on national ownership, harmonisation, alignment, managing for results, and mutual accountability". (JAST 2006:37)

Poverty Policy Week: "Poverty Policy Week is a three-day forum popularly known as PPW to discuss the country's development progress...The overall objective of the forum is to assess and discuss progress in the implementation of MKUKUTA and the Public Expenditure Review (PER). In contrast the previous PPW fora, the 2008 consultations had the additional value of allowing stakeholders to discuss in the wider context the PER. Approximately, a total number of 400 participants managed to participate in the 2008 PPW" (Policy Forum 2008:1).

Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys: "A Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) tracks the flow of public funds and material resources from the central government level, through the administrative hierarchy, and out to the front-line service providers". (U4 2007:1)

Rapid Funding Envelopes: "Rapid Funding Envelope (RFE) for HIV/AIDS is an innovative partnership among the Tanzanian Commission for AIDS, the Zanzibar AIDS commission, nine bilateral donors, and one private international foundation. Developed and launched in 2002, the RFE provides grants (up to \$200,000) for short-term projects to civil society organizations (CSOs) in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar" (Rapid Funding Envelope 2006:1)

United Nations Civil Society Advisory Committee (UNCSAC): "The United Nations Country Team in Tanzania has set up a Civil Society Advisory Committee to strengthen the contributions of the United Nations and civil society to the country's development... Its eleven members represent a broad diversity of issues and constituencies, including faith-based organizations, trade unions, the private sector, women's organisations, youth organizations, people living with HIV/AIDS, people living with disabilities, policy networks and NGO umbrella associations. The committee will provide strategic and substantive input to the humanitarian and development policies and programmes of the UNCT in Tanzania...The committee will also guide the work of the UN with civil society and help to develop and implement joint CS-UN activities and programmes, such as partnerships and programming in the

context of the UNDAF, capacity development, and initiatives to promote domestic accountability'. (UNDP 2007b:1)

Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUZA): "The MKUZA is the second generation of the Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan (ZPRP), aiming at enhancing economic growth and reducing poverty. It is a result-based strategy, emphasising cross-sectoral linkages and focusing on attaining outcomes in three broad clusters, namely (1) growth and reduction of income poverty, (2) social services and well being, and (3) good governance and national unity". (JAST 2006:39)

Appendix 3 - Overview of Meetings and Workshops

MEETING	SUBJECT	PARTICIPANTS	DATE and PLACE
DPG Meeting	Accra High Level Forum	Heads of Cooperations and Heads of Agencies	9 th September. Finish Embassy
DPG Induction Course	Introducing newly arrived Heads of Cooperation to the work of the Development Partners Group. Workshops and presentations.	New Heads of Cooperation, DPG Secretariat and Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs	24-25 September 2008. Coral Beach
DPG Meeting	Household Budget Survey	Heads of Cooperations and Heads of Agencies. Special guests: Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs and National Statistic Bureau	7 th October. Finish Embassy
DPG Meeting	Poverty Policy Week	Heads of Cooperations and Heads of Agencies	4 th November. Finish Embassy
Poverty Policy Week	Sector Dialogues and Reviews	Government and ministry officials, development partners, civil society representatives and media.	19-21 st November. Blue Pearl Hotel
DPG Meeting	Division of Labour and Development Cooperation Fund	Heads of Cooperations and Heads of Agencies	2 nd December. Finish Embassy
UNCSAC Meeting	Civil society forum. Research presentation by Erike Tanghoj	UNDP representatives and CSOs.	4 th December. UNDP
DPG Meeting	Division of Labour and New Dialogue Structure	Heads of Cooperations and Heads of Agencies	20 th January. Finish Embassy
DPG Meeting	MKUKUTA/MUKUZA Review and evaluation	Heads of Cooperations and Heads of Agencies	10 th February. Finish Embassy
DPG Meeting	Division of Labour and New Dialogue Structure	Heads of Cooperations and Heads of Agencies	3 rd March. Finish Embassy

Appendix 4 - Interview Guide

Phase one - *Presentation*

1. Relate to the informant by a presentation of the interviewer (and the interpreter)
2. Ask if I can use the name
3. Let the informant presents himself/herself.
4. Describe the overall study and its purpose
5. Explain why the participation of the informant is important for the study
6. Describe what the expectations are and ask if the informant has any expectations of the interview
7. Emphasis that the interview is voluntary
8. Ask if the informant has any questions so far

Phase two - *Description*

- a) Describe the overall structure and themes of the interview
- b) Ask for permission to take notes and account for the intended methods for it (e.g. recording, interpreters, note-taking, etc.).
- c) Ask for permission to contact people who might be mentioned in the dialog

Phase three - *Introduction*

- (1) Ask the informant to generally describe his/her work.
- (2) Ask what the informant knows about the Paris Declaration and the national aid effectiveness process.
- (3) When appropriate, move in to any of the boxes.

Box 1 - *Perceived role(s)/function(s) of CSOs in relation to the national aid effectiveness process*

- Identify if, and in such case when in the process, the informants perceive CSOs to be important for national aid effectiveness
- Identify if the informant perceives that CSOs, as a whole or some specific parts, should be incorporated in the process
- Identify which role(s) the informant considers CSOs should have/play in general or in specific areas/sectors
- Identify why the informant perceive CSOs should play this/these role(s)/function(s)

Box 2 - *Perceived ways and mechanisms for CSOs to fulfill the perceived role in regard to the national aid effectiveness process (only relevant if the informant perceive that CSOs should have a role to play)*

- Identify which ways and mechanisms the informant perceives necessary and/or preferable in order for CSOs to fulfill the perceived role(s)

Box 3 - *Realization of previous attempts of engaging the CSOs.*

- Identify if the informant knows about or have been taking part of any previous attempt of incorporating CSOs in the national aid effectiveness process
- Identify who participated in that attempt
- Identify what the informant thinks the outcomes of that attempt were

Box 4 - *Perceived hindrances and opportunities facing CSOs to fulfill the perceived role/functions*

- Identify what hindrances and opportunities the informant considers there to be for CSOs to fulfill its perceived role(s)/function(s)
- Identify what solutions the informant perceives there to be to the hindrances

Phase four - *General evaluation*

- Round off and conclude
- Retell the interview in short terms and ask if the summary is in line with the perception of the informant
- Once again, ask for permission to contact person who might have been mentioned during the dialog
- Thank the informant

Source: Adapted from Hjern and Andersson (1998).

Appendix 5 - Informant Information

Name of Informant	Organisation/Ministry/Cooperation	Position
DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS		
Enrico Strampelli	European Commission http://www.deltza.ec.europa.eu/	Head of Cooperation
Heikki Haili	Finish Embassy http://www.finland.or.tz	Head of Cooperation
Jesper Kammarsgaard	Danish Embassy http://www.ambdaressalaam.um.dk/en Poverty Reduction Budget Support Working Group http://www.tzdpdg.or.tz	Head of Cooperation / Chair of PRBS working group
Axel Doerken Frank Holtmeier	GTZ (Germany) http://www.gtz.de/en/599.htm	Head of Cooperation Priority Area Coordinator (Local Governance)
Svein Baera Joan Mungereza	Norwegian Embassy http://www.norway.go.tz/info/embassy.htm	Minister Counsellor Programme Officer, Gender and Civil Society
Pieter Dorst	Embassy of Netherlands http://tanzania.nlembassy.org/ JAST Working Group	Head of Cooperation and chair of the JAST WG
Zabdiel Kimambo	DFID http://www.dfid.gov.uk	Governance Advisor
Yuko Suzuki	UNDP/DPG Secretariat http://www.tzdpdg.or.tz/	Aid Coordination Specialist
Reid Sirrs	CIDA http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/tanzania DPG Main http://www.tzdpdg.or.tz	Head of Cooperation / Co-Chair of DPG Main
Balandya Elikana	Poverty Reduction Budget Support Secretariat	Chair of PRBS Secretariat
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS		
Maalima Khalfan	Organisation of people with disabilities in Zanzibar: "is a national cross-disability organization established in 1985 with a purpose of mobilizing people with various disabilities to bring about lasting changes for the benefit of all persons with disabilities" (UWZ 2008:1) http://www.uwz.or.tz/	Executive Director
Fatma Alloo	Tanzania Media Women Association: "The Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA) is a non-governmental Organisation (NGO) formed in 1987 by 12 women journalists and broadcaster who strongly opposed the way media portrayed women and determined to join hands to remedy the situation" (TAMWA 2003:1) http://www.tamwa.org/ UN Civil Society Advisory Committee	Media and Development Consultant for TAMWA and Chairlady for UNCSAC
Oddvar Bjorknas	Norwegian Peoples Aid: NPA is an international NGO. "NPA Tanzania works in close cooperation with local organisations, primarily centred in the Coast/Central Zone and the Kagera Region. The thematic focus of the country programme is Land and Resource Rights, Democratic Rights, Indigenous People's Rights and Youth Rights" (NPA 2003) http://www.npaid.org/	Executive Director
Hebron Timothy Mawakagenda	The Leadership Forum: "The Leadership Forum was established in 2000 and formally registered on 15 th December 2000 as a trust by the Administrator General under the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional affairs (CAP 375). It strives to see individuals; men and women release their leadership potentials in creating opportunities for the well being of all humanity in society. Their mission is to realize and encourage people in the society with the ability, capacity and commitment to lead others by and through influence and responsibility" (The Leadership Forum 2008) http://www.tlftz.org/index.php? Policy Forum: "Policy Forum is a network of NGOs incorporated as a non-profit company under the Companies Act of 2002... including over 50 non-governmental organizations registered in Tanzania... with specific interest in influencing policy processes to enhance poverty reduction, equity and democratization" (Policy Forum). http://www.policyforum-tz.org/	Executive Director of The Leadership Forum and Board member of Policy Forum
Elizabeth Missokia	HakiElimu: "HakiElimu is a non-profit civil society organization. HakiElimu works to realize equity and justice in basic education and society by promoting the democratization of governance at all levels of society. Our approach focuses on creating space for concerned citizens to make a difference in education and democracy. Throughout, we seek to bridge persistent gaps between policy and practice by making current policies work for the people, and we also ensure that the Government serves the public and provides practical justice to all concerned" (HakiElimu 2009). http://www.hakielimu.org/index.php	Executive Director
Francis Kiwanga	Legal Human Right Centre: "The LHRC is registered under the Companies Ordinance Chapter 212 of the Laws of Tanzania as a Company without shares limited by guarantee. The organization was founded from a human rights project of another organisation; the Tanzania Legal Education Trust (TANLET). The LHRC has a mandate to operate throughout Tanzania. the LHRC envisages a just and equitable society which can be contributed to, through the planned mission as a non-profit making, non-partisan non-governmental organization striving to empower the public, promote, reinforce and safeguard human rights and good governance in Tanzania" (Legal Human Rights Centre 2007) http://www.humanrights.or.tz/	Executive Director
Cathy Doran	DanChurchAid Tanzania: "Established in 1922, DanChurchAid (DCA) is today one of the major Danish humanitarian non governmental organisations (NGO), working with local partner, international networks, churches and non-religious civil organisations to assist the poorest of the poor. DanChurchAid began its activities in Tanzania in 1963 with support to refugee work. Since then DanChurchAid has supported programmes in Tanzania through the Lutheran World Federation and Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS)" (DanChurch Aid Tanzania) http://www.danchurchaid.org	Programme Manager
GOVERNMENT		
Mukajungu Kamuzora Neema Mkwizu	Aid Coordination Section External Finance Department (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs) http://www.mof.go.tz/	Economist Economist

Appendix 6 - List of Informants


Name	Organisation	Position	Stakeholder	Date	Place	Email
Enrico Strampelli	European Commission	Head of Cooperation	Multilateral DP	04-dec	EC, Mirambo House	Enrico.Strampelli@ec.europa.eu
Maalima Khalfan	Organisation of people with disabilities in Zanzibar	Executive Director	CSO	05-dec	Sleep Inn, Dar es Salaam	
Fatma Alloo	Tanzania Media Women Association / UN Civil Society Advisory Committee	Media/Development Consultant / Chairlady	CSO	05-dec	Alliance Francais, Dar es Salaam	falloo@zitec.org
Heikki Haili	Finish Embassy	Head of Cooperation	Bilateral DP	10-dec	Finish Embassy	heikki.haili@forin.fi
Jesper Kammarsgaard	Danish Embassy + Poverty Reduction Budget Support Working Group	Head of Cooperation / Chair of PRBS working group	Bilateral DP	11-dec	Danish Embassy	jeskam@um.dk
Axel Doerken Frank Holtmeier	GtZ	Head of Cooperation Priority Area Coordinator (Local Governance)	Bilateral DP	12-dec	GtZ	Axel.Doerken@gtz.de frank.holtmeier@gtz.de
Svein Baera Joan Mungereza	Norwegian Embassy	Minister Counsellor Programme Officer, Gender and Civil Society	Bilateral DP	12-dec	Norwegian Embassy	svb@mfa.no jom@mfa.no
Pieter Dorst	Embassy of Netherlands	Head of Cooperation	Bilateral DP	12-dec	Umoja House, Dar es Salaam	pieter.dorst@minbuza.nl
Oddvar Bjorknas	Norwegian Peoples Aid (International NGO working with land properties)	Executive Director	CSO	14-dec	Norwegian Peoples Aid	oddvarb@npatz.or.tz
Hebron Timothy Mawakagenda	The Leadership Forum and Policy Forum (NGO Networks)	Executive Director of The Leadership Forum and Board member of Policy Forum	CSO	22-dec	Leadership Forum	mwakagenda@yahoo.com
Zabdiel Kimambo	DfID	Governance Advisor	Bilateral DP	21-jan	Umoja House	Z-Kimambo@dfid.gov.uk
Elizabeth Missokia	HakiElimu (Education)	Executive Director	CSO	26-jan	HakiElimu	ed@hakielimu.org
Yuko Suzuki	UNDP/DPG Secretariat	Aid Coordination Specialist	Multilateral DP	27-jan	UNDP	yuko.suzuki@undp.org
Francis Kiwanga	Legal Human Right Centre	Executive Director	CSO	27-jan	Legal Human Right Centre	kiwanga@humanrights.or.tz
Reid Sirrs	CIDA / DPG	Head of Cooperation / Co-Chair of DPG	Bilateral DP	28-jan	CIDA	reid.sirrs@international.gc.ca
Cathy Doran	DanChurchAid Tanzania (Faithbased International NGO)	Programme Manager	CSO	28-jan	UNDP	cdoran@elct.or.tz
Mukajungu Kamuzora Neema Mkwizu	Aid Coordination Section External Finance Department (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs)	Economist Economist	Government	30-jan	Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs	neemark@yahoo.co.uk mukajungu@yahoo.co.uk
Balandya Elikana	Poverty Reduction Budget Support Secretariat	Chair of PRBS Secretariat (former civil servant at Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs)	Multi/Bilateral Dps	05-feb	CIDA	elikana.balandya@prbstanzania.org

Appendix 7 – Proposed new Dialogue Structure (Attachment 1)

Proposed new dialogue structure

Effective, high quality and regular dialogue between the Government, Development Partners and domestic stakeholders is crucial for our successful co-operation towards achieving national development, growth and poverty reduction goals. Currently, sector and national dialogue takes place around different processes (PER, MKUKUTA, GBS etc.), with often overlapping agendas, schedules and memberships without clear selection criteria as well as weak or unclear interlinkages. This has led to high transaction costs as well as insufficient quality and ineffective dialogue arrangements and their expected outputs. For example, MDAs engage in sector dialogue with DPs and at the same time are direct members in PER CWGs, representing their own Ministries rather than the sector at cluster level. Structures for national dialogue throughout the year are in place for the PER process, but are missing for the MKUKUTA process in terms of policy dialogue on MKUKUTA implementation. The only multi-stakeholder forum for this purpose is the MKUKUTA Annual Review/Poverty Policy Week.

Figure 1. Current dialogue structure




In view of these shortcomings in the existing dialogue structure, a new structure is proposed with the following features:

- (4) Dialogue structure integrates to the greatest extent possible all existing processes (MKUKUTA, PER, JAST and GBS), thus combining dialogue on policy and budgetary/expenditure issues, in order to reduce overlaps and transaction costs.
- (5) Dialogue structure has three levels:
 - d) Sectors/thematic areas where MDAs (and active DPs) are direct members, whereby a distinction is made between internal Government dialogue and dialogue between the Government, DPs and non-state actors

- e) 3 Cluster Working Groups (CWGs) corresponding to the three MKUKUTA clusters: (1) Growth and Income Poverty Reduction; (2) Improvement of Quality of Life and Social Well-Being; and (3) Governance and Accountability, where sectors/thematic areas are represented, as well as a MKUKUTA-PER Macro Group
 - f) MKUKUTA-PER Main Working Group where CWGs and the MKUKUTA-PER Macro Group are represented. The change of name from the previous PER Main Working Group to MKUKUTA-PER Main Working Group reflects the broadening of the dialogue agenda to include MKUKUTA and related policy issues
- (3) Sectors/thematic areas and CWGs have a lead and deputy lead MDA (and lead DP), which represent other members in dialogue at the next higher level:
- a) The sector/thematic area lead and deputy lead MDA – together with lead DP – represent the sector/thematic area at cluster level, but can still be accompanied by sector experts if the need arises
 - b) The CWG lead and deputy lead MDA – together with the cluster lead DP – represent the CWG in the MKUKUTA-PER Main Working Group, but may be accompanied by technical experts from sectors/clusters if the need arises.
- (4) Annual Review consultative meetings will take place at sector/thematic area and national (MKUKUTA-PER) levels.

Figure 2. Proposed new dialogue structure



Source: Government of Tanzania (2008 Attachment 1)

Appendix 8 - Sector and Cluster Working Groups and Thematic Area Working Groups

Sector Working Groups	Clusters	DPG Sector Working Groups
	Sector Working Groups	1. Growth and Income Poverty
Industry and Trade (PS)		
Energy & Minerals		
Natural Resources and Tourism		
Land and Human Settlement		
Infrastructure		
2. Quality of Life and Social Well-Being		Education
		Water
		Health
3. Governance and Accountability	Legal Sector	
	Legal Sector/Refugee Sub-group	
Thematic Area Working Groups	1. Growth and Income Poverty	Employment
	2. Quality of Life and Social Well-Being	HIV/AIDS
		Social Protection
		Culture
	3. Governance and Accountability	Governance
		Accountable Governance
		Governance/Local Government Reform
		Governance/Domestic Accountability
		Governance/Public Service Reform Program
		Governance/Anti-corruption Reform
	Other Thematic Working Groups	Gender
		Environment
		Forestry
		Fisheries
		Wildlife
MKUKUTA Monitoring System (PMG)		
Macro Economic Management		
Public Financial Management		
Innovation and Technology		
Other	Zanzibar Core Group	
	PRBS/PRSC Donor Group	
	PRBS Coordinating Group/Secretariat	
	JAST Working Group	

Appendix 9 - Summary of Recommendations to DPG Main, Government and CSOs

There will be a true challenge for all stakeholders in obtaining genuine CSO engagement in Tanzania's aid effectiveness processes. Not only will it be about finding new ways of collaborations, working-methods and dialogue structures - it will also be about establishing new roles and change attitudes. As argued, this is a process in which CSOs must be given the space and time to transform in their own way and develop without being pushed or stressed by various interests or agendas. Otherwise sustainable and constructive CSO contribution might not be achieved. Even though it must be accepted that this transformation must come naturally there are things that could be done in order to enable and facilitate for CSOs as well as accommodate them with opportunities to become better involved in aid effectiveness.

If CSOs are to become seen and treated as valued partners in aid effectiveness it is of outermost importance that the expectations of them are put in relation to the socio-political dynamics of the environment they are operating in rather than in relation to normative and generic expectations stated in international frameworks and in academic theories. This is important in order to avoid abstract misconceptions and to create an understanding of the national situation. Hence further studies are definitely required. Considering the outdated information on the Tanzanian civil society domestic research institutes, such as the REPOA, should engage in research. Further there is a direct opportunity to make use of this study. Even though this paper is not capturing the whole situation or contributing with a formula for genuine CSO engagement there are a lot that could be learnt from it. It is hence recommended that the study and its outcomes are critically assessed and discussed both within and between stakeholder groups. Overall, it is utterly important that the results from any study is communicate to and discussed amongst concerned stakeholders. In accordance to this study participating stakeholders are inclined to ask following questions:

- What is the result indicating?
- What could be learnt from it?
- Is it giving any 'new' information or confirming previous perceptions?
- Which questions have been raised that needs to be taken further?
- Are any of the issues raised in need of further clarifications?
- Is anything missing in the research?

Whereas the internal stakeholder dialogue over these question might be easier to practically initiate, cross-stakeholder discussions might be a logistic challenge. Nevertheless, as indicated in the main text, there are already structures in place which could be made use of. E.g. it is possible to:

- Arrange for a result and analysis presentation and discussion of the study during a DPG main meeting.
- UNCSAC could arrange for a separate workshop in which CSOs and other interested stakeholders could critically discuss the outcome. Or UNCSAC could make use of one of the monthly breakfast meetings at Unicef to bring up the study for discussion.
- The DPG Secretariat could arrange for a voluntary workshop/presentation in which representatives from the three stakeholder groups are invited.

Regardless of how it is done and through which fora, the most important thing is to continue the discussion about how CSOs can become deeper engaged and regarded as valued partners in aid effectiveness.

Secondly, considering the suggested importance of on-going stakeholder dialogues for CSO participation in aid effectiveness, the operationalisation of the new Dialogue Structure should be placed high on the agenda. Yet, as discussed the implementation of the structure might not be as straightforward. From a CSO perspective the process however starts by actually being informed about the structure and the possibilities of CSOs to be integrated into it. Taking into account that none of the CSO representatives in this study mentioned the new Dialogue Structure in the interviews it could be questioned whether CSOs understand it or if they at all are aware of its existence. Without adequate information and guidance to understand it it will become extremely difficult for any CSO to make a claim for participation or for that make any constructive contribution. Accordingly it is highly recommended that the structure is first and foremost 'communicated' to CSOs. This is of primary importance especially since CSOs have not been integrated in the planning and drafting of the structure.

There are many ways by which the new Dialogue Structure can be communicated and instructed. The most straightforward way is to make sure that at least all umbrella organisation, major networks and the UNCSAC have received a copy of it - preferable in Kiswahili. Additionally, there are CSO fora which could be made use of in order to convey these messages. E.g. the monthly Unicef breakfast meetings and the yearly civil society forum are opportunities during which the Government can inform about the new Dialogue Structure and allow CSOs to pose questions. Furthermore separate workshops initiated either by Government or DPG where CSOs could be informed about the structure but also be enabled to comment on it would be a good way to start integrating CSOs in the implementation process. This last point is of great importance. If CSOs are to be regarded as value added partners they must start to practically be treated that way. The new Dialogue Structure is currently being implemented and the Division of Labour of DPs between sectors and thematic areas is being established. nevertheless, so far no CSOs are engaged in these procedures. From a CSO and Accra perspective it is recommended that, even if it might be perceived that CSOs are lacking the capacity, CSOs become integrated in the current implementation initiatives and discussion.

However, as identified in the end-analysis of the main text there are several questions remaining regarding CSO inclusion in the new Dialogue Structure. Even so, it seems quite straightforward to initiate discussions with CSOs regarding these issues. Even if the structure as such has been determined by the Government there might still be room for discussion and consensus building around the actual character and objectives of the various sector and thematic area dialogues. As CSOs are to be present in these dialogues they should be integrated in establishing the nature of the stakeholder dialogue.

Thirdly, it should not be forgotten that there already are cases where there are good collaborations and dialogues within sector/thematic working groups between CSOs and DPs or CSOs and Government. These cases should accordingly be acknowledge and studied. Several questions could be posed in regard to this in order to increase the understanding of how CSOs can become further incorporated in the new Dialogue Structure:

- In which sectors and thematic areas are there already active CSOs and where are there no participating CSOs? What are the reasons behind it?
- On whose initiative have the CSOs become engaged in the working groups?
- What kind of CSOs are participating?

- What kind of contribution do they do and what kind of dialogue is taking place in the working group?
- How is the contribution perceived by the parties?

Answering these questions requires both a mapping over the CSO engagement in the various working groups as well as a structured qualitative study. This would not only open up for a better understanding of what is going on, but also contribute with a framework for experience exchange between the various working groups. It has been indicated by one of the participants that an initiative of such a mapping has been previously taken by the PRBS secretariat. Hence, it should be followed up how far that mapping has come and what the scope of it is and if it needs to be extended.

Fourthly, as could be understood from the main text the issue of independent funding is regarded as a major hindrance for CSOs to become independent, strong and valued partners in aid effectiveness. Accordingly, there is a challenge for CSOs to become less dependent upon conditioned, direct as well as indirect, funding. In consideration of this it is advisable to look into the possibilities of extended core funding. Like General Budget Support to Governments, CSOs should be supplied a similar funding mechanism. This could of course be achieved by developing the already existing mechanisms for independent funding. E.g. it should be questioned, investigated and analysed if and how Rapid Funding Envelopes and the Foundation of Civil Society could become stronger and more useful for CSOs. This has however not only to do with the actual amount of money made available. It also regards the actual awareness of these mechanisms and the understanding of how CSOs can apply for these funds. Therefore initiatives to inform CSOs about these funding mechanisms should be undertaken as well as studies aimed at providing recommendations on how to develop overall core funding in Tanzania should be a priority of e.g. REPOA and DPs.

Further, it was perceived by most CSO representatives that the actual amount of money donated to CSOs is decreasing due to an increased General Budget Support direct to Governments. However, as indicated by one DP the direct funding to CSOs had not decreased. Accordingly there is a need for studies on how increased General Budget Support actually influence the funding of CSOs and their ability to find non-conditioned funding.

Lastly the opportunity of developing and strengthening CSO lead PETS should be investigated. As concluded in the analysis PETS could be a very practical tool for CSOs not only to evaluate aid effectiveness initiatives but also to contribute with information about the situation of ordinary people at community level. As indicated in some interviews there are already CSOs developing and conducting PETS and DPs providing training in PETS. However, as the overall awareness over the result of these PETS and training there is a need to find ways and methods for communicating the outcomes of these initiatives. There might be already conducted PETS at local or regional level of which the central Government, DPs and Capital based CSOs know about. Accordingly, not only are studies concerning the PETS methodology as such needed but also inventories of what already exists in form PETS methodologies, conducted and on-going surveys, trainings etc.