



LUND
UNIVERSITY

Department of Political Science

STV004

Tutor: Christian Fernández

Building Peace and Democracy

Liberalization and Institutionalization in Cambodia and
Timor-Leste

Emma Svensson

Abstract

Many of the countries hosting a peacebuilding mission have resumed to violence after the international community has left. The reason for this has often been a too quick liberalization creating pathologies that might lead to renewed conflict causing peacebuilding to fail. Therefore, an alternative model, focusing on institutionalization before liberalization (*IBL*), has been suggested. If this theory is true, IBL would be a more efficient way of reaching the goal of a liberal democracy by avoiding the pathologies that a too quick liberalization creates. By comparing the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, representing the quick liberalization model, and United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, representing the IBL model, the question of institutionalization increasing the prospects of peacebuilding missions succeeding is answered. Using four parameters, the presence of violence, the elections, the human rights and the level of economy and development I find that the IBL model indeed has left Timor-Leste closer to a liberal democracy than Cambodia. The IBL model is not without problems though. There is a risk of leaving the local population outside the process of peacebuilding which might lead to renewed failures.

Key words: Peacebuilding, Institutionalization, Liberalization, Cambodia, Timor-Leste

Abbreviations

CPP	Cambodian Peoples Party
ETDF	East Timor Defense Force
ETPA	East Timor Public Administration
ETPS	East Timor Police Service
ETTA	East Timor Transitional Administration
FUNCINPEC	United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPA	Governance and Public Administration
HDI	Human Development Index
IBL	Institutionalization Before Liberalization
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IMF	International Monetary Fond
INTERFET	International Force in East Timor
NC	National Council
NCC	National Consultative Council
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PDK	Party of Democratic Kampuchea (The Khmer Rouge)
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
SNC	Supreme National Council
SOC	State of Cambodia
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
TNI	Indonesian National Military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia)
UN	United Nations
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMISSET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
WGI	Worldwide Governance Indicators

Table of contents

1	Introduction.....	1
1.1	Statement of Purpose.....	1
1.2	Definition of Peacebuilding	2
1.2.1	Peacebuilding and the Creation of a Liberal Democracy.....	3
1.3	Disposition	3
2	Theory and Methodology	4
2.1	Quick Liberalization is Causing the Failures	4
2.2	Institutionalization Before Liberalization	5
2.3	Methodology	6
2.3.1	Points of Comparison.....	7
2.3.2	Material	8
3	Introduction to the Cases	9
3.1	Cambodia	9
3.1.1	The Mandate of UNTAC.....	10
3.1.2	The Work of UNTAC	10
3.1.3	UNTAC and the Liberalization Model.....	11
3.2	Timor-Leste.....	11
3.2.1	The Mandate of UNTAET	12
3.2.2	The work of UNTAET	13
3.2.3	UNTAET and the IBL Model	14
4	Comparison of the Two Countries	16
4.1	Presence of Violence.....	16
4.1.1	Assessment of the Presence of Violence.....	17
4.2	Elections.....	18
4.2.1	Assessment of the Elections.....	19
4.3	Human Rights.....	19
4.3.1	Assessment of the Human Rights.....	20
4.4	Level of Economy and Development.....	21
4.4.1	Assessment of the Level of Economy and Development.....	22
4.5	Alternative Explanatory Factors.....	22
5	Conclusion	24
6	Final Reflection- Problems with IBL	26
7	References.....	28

1 Introduction

There is a high risk for post-conflict states to resume to violence, even if there has been some sort of peace operation present. The international community has thus not had an efficient strategy for creating a stable and lasting peace when deploying an operation. Therefore, in late 2005 the United Nations (*UN*) launched a new institution within its organization, the Peacebuilding Commission (*PBC*) which was the first organization established both by the Security Council and the General Assembly (A/RES/60/180, S/RES/1645). One of its tasks was to “advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery” (S/RES/1645 Para. 2a). While attending the meetings of the PBC, specifically its country specific meetings concerning Sierra Leone, during the fall of 2006 I came to realize that there seemed to be no consensus about what exactly it was that the PBC should do. What were the strategies and what should the PBC involve itself in? What was necessary for creating a stable and lasting peace? This, along with the notion that many of the previous peacebuilding operations had been failures, made me become interested in what approach is necessary for a peacebuilding mission to succeed.

1.1 Statement of Purpose

Peacekeeping operations have always been a part of the UN system. The operations have over the time, especially since the end of the Cold War, increased and changed their scope. Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced in 1992, in his report *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, the notion of peacebuilding which since the 1990s has been the focus for many UN operations. It is also within this area that this thesis takes its starting-point. More specifically the focus will be on how peacebuilding can become more successful. As I have mentioned, the presence of a stable peace and democracy can be questioned in many of the states where a peacebuilding mission has taken place. Why are there so many failures and is there a strategy that would increase the possibility for the operations succeeding?

Roland Paris argues that a greater focus on institutionalization would be a more appropriate way of conducting peacebuilding to increase the prospects for success (2004). If he is right, an operation focusing on institutionalization before liberalization would be a greater success than one who does not. Since this is an approach that distinguishes itself from how most peacebuilding operations have been pursued in reality it would be of interest to investigate how well institutionalization actually works. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to test Paris’ Insti-

tutionalization Before Liberalization (*IBL*) theory. More specifically the question to be answered is:

Does a focus on institutionalization increase the prospects of peacebuilding missions succeeding?

Before going into the theory and methodology in depth peacebuilding will be defined and the disposition of this thesis will be presented.

1.2 Definition of Peacebuilding

The first step in identifying peacebuilding is to distinguish it from other types of peace operations. I will here clarify that the focus is on third party peacebuilding efforts (many times in cooperation with the host state) as opposed to efforts undertaken by the state of concern itself.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali divides conflict management into four categories: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is identified as “rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war” (1992). This can be compared to the definition of the more traditional peacekeeping operation which is defined as “to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers” (Ibid.). Also Tom Keating and Andy Knight mean that peacebuilding is “a means by which the outside world can contribute to the resolution of intrastate (or societal) conflict and to the reconstruction, or construction, of a culture of peace in postconflict situations.” (2004 p.xxxi). Paris uses the same categories as Boutros-Ghali but his definition is an “action undertaken at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of fighting.” (2002 p.38). It should be mentioned here that some uses peacekeeping with the prefix second generation or multi-dimensional instead of peacebuilding to distinguish it from the more traditional peacekeeping operations (see i.e. Doyle and Sambanis 2000, Mason and Quinn 2006).

Some common themes are possible to distinguish here. Peacebuilding takes place at the end of an intrastate conflict and it aims at creating a stable peace and rebuilding a society. Peace and reconstruction are thus the keywords and the definition that will be used here. The reconstruction of a society can mean many things though, depending on what it is that should be reconstructed. This is of course ultimately defined by the over all goal of the peacebuilding mission. As will be shown, this goal has mainly been the same: to create a liberal democracy.

1.2.1 Peacebuilding and the Creation of a Liberal Democracy

In the research done on peacebuilding there are some common reappearing themes when it comes to rebuilding the society. There is for example a focus on democratization through the preparation and monitoring of elections (Boutros-Ghali 1992, Keating and Knight 2004 p.xxxiii, Mason and Quinn p.26). The promotion of the rule of law and the protection of the human rights are also important aspects (see i.e. Boutros-Ghali 1992, Keating and Knight 2004 p.xxxiii, Mullenbach 2006 p.57, Rotberg 2002 p.33). Economy is a third area that can be distinguished. Robert Rotberg writes for example about the importance of “jump-starting battered economies” (2002 p.33, compare Mullenbach 2006 p.57). As Michael Barnett puts it: “The explicit goal of many of these operations is to create a state defined by the rule of law, markets, and democracy.” (2006 p.88). Elections, rule of law, human rights and a working economy are, together with a stable peace, all features of the modern western liberal democracy. Thus peacebuilding defined as creating a stable peace and rebuilding the society, in the long run means the creation of a liberal democracy. This is, according to Oliver Richmond, the common peacebuilding consensus (2004 pp.131-132). Therefore, the ultimate goal of peacebuilding can be defined as the liberal democracy. The reason for this is the liberal peace thesis: “the notion that democratic forms of government are more peaceful- both in their internal politics and in their international relations- than other forms of government.” (Paris 2004 p.41). The liberal peace thesis is well accepted today and important to understand what peacebuilding in practice actually strives for.

1.3 Disposition

The disposition of this thesis will be as follows. Chapter two is the theory and methodology chapter. Here why peacebuilding missions so many times have been failures is presented. Thereafter the IBL model is explained. There is also a short introduction to the cases and the parameters that are used to make the comparison. In Chapter three the two cases, Cambodia and Timor-Leste are presented. This is done by giving a short introduction to the conflicts and the look at the mandate and the work of the two UN operations as to justify why they represent the two different models of peacebuilding. In chapter four the two countries are compared to decide which one come closest to the ideal of a liberal democracy. This is done by using four different parameters; the presence of violence, the elections, the human rights and the level of economy and development. Thus this chapter aims at showing if institutionalization increases the prospect for success. In the fifth and final chapter problems with the IBL are discussed.

2 Theory and Methodology

Several studies have been done to evaluate previous peacebuilding missions. Mark Mullenbach for example compares states that have had a mission with those who have not. In his study he finds that out of the 15 cases that have had a peacebuilding mission 20% did resume to violence after five years. Of the 15 cases that did not have a mission the number was 46.6% (2006 p.65). Michael Doyle's and Nicholas Sambani's study, which according to them is based on all civil wars since 1944 where a peacebuilding mission was present, shows that after two years 57.26% of the peacebuilding missions have failed and thus only 42.74% were successes when it comes to ending the hostilities (2000 p.783). When also requiring a minimum level of democratization, Doyle's and Sambani's research gives a 65.32% failure rate and a 34.68% success rate (Ibid.). George Downs' and Stephen Stedman's success rate is somewhat higher. Out of sixteen cases six were successful, four were partially successful, and four were failures (2002 p.59). Paris on the other hand studies eleven cases during the 1990s and finds that only two of them were clear successes (2004 p.154). By combining these findings the result shows that the presence of a peacebuilding operation more often results in a success than when a mission is not present. Nevertheless, the failure rate for peacebuilding is quite high and this is a problem.

The over all assessment of peacebuilding operations does not give a positive view. If one assumes that the liberal peace thesis is correct, the goal of a liberal democracy as to create stable peace and democracy is the right one. Therefore, the high failure rate should be connected to the method used to reach that goal rather than to the goal itself. What that method is and how it causes failures will now be presented.

2.1 Quick Liberalization is Causing the Failures

As mentioned before the main goal for peacebuilding has been to create a liberal democracy. Several researchers argue that the liberalization is done too quickly and therefore might be harmful rather than good (see i.e. Barnett 2006, Paris 2004). The reason for this is that post-conflict states often do not have the necessary institutions to handle the processes of liberalization (Barnett 2006 p.89, Paris 2004 p. 152).

The central question for Paris is whether liberalization, which is done through democratization and marketization, "fostered conditions for a stable and lasting peace in the states that hosted peacebuilding missions." (2004 p.59). By examining eleven countries where a peacebuilding mission was present during the 1990s,

Paris finds that the process of political and economical liberalization, together or separately, in most cases “produced destabilizing side effects that worked against the consolidation of peace.” (2004 p.151). This might cause violence to resume. He continues his argument by saying that the low success rate is a result of a too quick liberalization creating pathologies that threatens the process of liberalization altogether and thus also the peace. Elections can for example be a focal point for harmful competition. It might cause polarization which then affects the process of democratization in a negative way. Ultimately it might lead to renewed violence as was the case in for example Angola and Rwanda. There might also be a problem with saboteurs and a failed transition. This occurs when newly elected leaders use the system that got them elected to halt the democratization. Examples of this are Liberia and Cambodia. There is also a risk of widening the gap between the rich and the poor by a too fast economic liberalization, which seems to have happened in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. Liberalization might also give space to civil society organizations that rejects the principle of toleration, an obvious example being Rwanda. Finally there is a risk for ethnic entrepreneurs who use the distrust between different groups in the society to build a political platform, for example former Yugoslavia (Ibid. pp.159-166). All this might be the result of trying to transform a country into a liberal market democracy during a period when the state is very fragile. What is needed to be able to deal with these pathologies are well functioning institutions (Ibid. p.174).

Paris’ findings show that the method used to reach the goal of a stable peace through a liberal democracy has failed by focusing too much on a quick liberalization. After all, it took several decades for the Western states to become liberal democracies. Nevertheless, the international community often has conducted peacebuilding operations in a short amount of time focusing on democratization through elections and economic reforms. Thus my assumption will be that Paris’ findings are correct and by accepting that also implying that there is a need for a new strategy.

2.2 Institutionalization Before Liberalization

As an alternative to the quick liberalization model Paris introduces a new technique for conducting peacebuilding: Institutionalization Before Liberalization. This technique involves “constructing the foundations of effective political and economic institutions *before* the introduction of electoral democracy and market-oriented adjustment policies” (Paris 2004 p.179). This is done because what is needed, according to Paris, in the immediate post-conflict period is “political stability and the establishment of effective administration over the territory” (Paris 2004 p.187).

The IBL peacebuilding strategy includes several different elements. First of all the conditions have to be ripe for holding elections. This includes political parties not contesting the elections and that governmental institutions that can resolve election disputes and enforce its outcome are in place (Ibid. p.189). Secondly the

electoral system should be designed as to reward moderation, which has to be decided within the specific context of each country (Ibid. p.194). Thirdly, a civil society that is conducive to peaceful democratic politics should be promoted at the same time as civil society organizations that does not have these values should be restrained (Ibid.). Fourthly, hate speech needs to be controlled. Finally, adoptions of conflict-reducing economic policies are necessary. This could be done by delaying the economic reforms until the political conditions have stabilized or by implementing the reforms over a longer period of time (Ibid. p.200). The common denominator for all these features is to rebuild effective state institutions. To clarify what Paris means by institutions it might be useful to quote him at some length:

“These [institutional] elements include a constitutional court to resolve disputes surrounding elections and to uphold the articles of the constitution against challenges; a reliable police force to maintain domestic order and enforce the rulings of the constitutional court and any other court legally constituted under the constitution: a procedure for regulating hate speech in the media; a system of overseeing the conduct of political parties and civil-society organizations; electoral rules specifically designed to reward moderation; a legal framework capable of regulating the market economy; and a redistributive mechanism to protect the welfare of the most vulnerable sectors of the population.” (Ibid. p.205)

The goal is still the liberal democracy but the method to reach that goal has changed to avoid the pathologies of too quick liberalization. A peacebuilding mission adopting the techniques of IBL should, if Paris theory is correct, thus be more successful at reaching and maintaining the goal of a liberal democracy than the ones who does not.

2.3 Methodology

As mentioned earlier this thesis aims at testing Paris’ idea of Institutionalization Before Liberalization. If Paris’ theory works a mission that adopts IBL, or at least some of its elements, would be more successful than a mission that does not. Two cases, one for each model needs to be compared to answer the question of institutionalization increasing the prospect of peacebuilding missions succeeding. The two cases that will be used here are the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (*UNTAC*), which will represent the liberalization model, and the UN

Transitional Administration in East Timor (*UNTAET*)¹, which will represent the IBL model. If Paris' theory is true then Timor- Leste should be closer to the ideal of a liberal democracy than Cambodia. A problem occurring when using these cases is the time difference. Cambodia has had a longer post-conflict period than Timor-Leste and this must be taken into account when looking at the present situation.

UNTAC was the first operation where the UN launched its "first full-scale post-Cold War nation-building operation." (Dobbins et al 2005 p.70). In reality, as we shall see, the focus became the elections. Both the Paris Agreement and the Security Council resolution that gave UNTAC its mandate explicitly talked about the organization of elections. The Security Council resolution even gave a final date for when the elections were to be hold (S/RES/745). Thus the quick fix liberalization method was used. UNTAET was also a first of its kind. It was the first operation where the UN actually took over a country and became the government (Economist 2001). To be able to administer the state UNTAET had to build all the institutions necessary to govern a country. This was done by building up the civil administration, a police force and an army among other things. Thus it exemplifies the institutionalization model. The operations will be presented and discussed in further detail in the next coming chapter.

2.3.1 Points of Comparison

Since both model's ultimate goal is to create a stable peace through a liberal democracy the success of the missions will be judged by comparing how well the operations have created favorable conditions for this in the respective countries. The state that comes closest to the ideal of a liberal democracy is the state with the type of operation that works the best. To evaluate this there will be several points of comparison. First of all I will look at the presence of violence since this is a sign of peace and also to some extent the rule of law. The higher level of violence the further away the state is from a liberal democracy. The second parameter will be the elections, freer and fairer elections signify a more democratic state. Thirdly in a liberal democracy the citizens have certain rights and freedoms. How the countries comply with the human rights will therefore be compared. More breaches means less democratic. This too will give implications for the rule of law. A part of the liberal democracy is also often the market economy and thus the level of economy and development will be the fourth and final point of comparison.

It can off course be questioned if these points of comparison are justifiable for looking at the success of a specific peacebuilding operation since they are very broad goals while a mission might have a very restricted mandate. Here it is not how well the operations have carried out there mandates that is of interest though.

¹ East Timor's official name since the independence is Timor-Leste and this name will thus be used from now on, the exception being if East Timor is used in a mission's name.

The mandates are different since they represent the different models. Instead it is the present situation in the countries respectively that will tell us something about how well the different operations and models actually are working. Another criticism could be that these are all Western measures of success. Measures that are more adjusted to the local setting might be useful. However, success is here defined as reaching the goal of a liberal democracy and therefore what constitutes this goal has to be the points of comparison. Nevertheless, there is an obvious problem with these parameters since they do not include how the populations of the countries respectively apprehend the operations and the present situation. The practical problem of not being able to interview the citizens circumscribes this possibility.

2.3.2 Material

The comparison will be done by mainly looking at statistics and reports from Amnesty International, Freedom House, the UN, the United Nations Development Program (*UNDP*) and the World Bank. There is a methodological problem with this because these are all second hand sources. There will be no first hand material which of course might affect the result. There might also be a problem with achieving reliable statistics from Cambodia and Timor-Leste. Using the UN and the World Bank might also cause a problem because they are sometimes evaluating their own work. It is a possibility that the presentation of their work done in Cambodia and Timor-Leste is described in a too positive way. On the other hand the information I will use comes from well known and well recognized organizations and their material is widely used to make comparisons. Thus the material should be credible enough to make conclusions.

3 Introduction to the Cases

Before comparing Cambodia and Timor-Leste with each other the background to the conflicts will be presented. To show how UNTAC and UNTAET represent the different models the mandates and the work of the missions also are important.

3.1 Cambodia

Cambodia became a French protectorate in 1863. When the French were weakened during the World War II King Sihanouk started the independence negotiations and by 1953 Cambodia became independent (Brown and Zasloff 1998 p.2). In 1970, due to the U.S. – Vietnam War, Sihanouk was voted out of office by the National Assembly and replaced by a pro-American regime (Chandler 1996 p.191). The new regime, lead by general Lon Nol, launched two failed offensives against the Vietnamese but managed, mostly because of military assistance from the U.S., to stay in power for four years. By 1975 the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian communist guerilla, managed to take the power and imposed a totalitarian regime (Brown and Zasloff 1998 p.vii). During their ruling between 1975 and 1978, before ousted by Vietnam forces, over one million, maybe as many as up to two million, people died (Chandler 1996 p.212, UD 2007 p.4). This was a direct result of the Khmer Rouge ruling which included overworking the people, not treating the sick in an appropriate way, giving too little food to the population and executions of people identified as enemies to the regime (Chandler 1996 p.212). When the Khmer Rouge was put out of office they waged a guerilla war against the government set up by Vietnam. The situation was further complicated by the Russian support to the Vietnamese forces and the Chinese support to the Khmer Rouge.

By the end of the Cold War the five permanent members of the Security Council finally convened peace negotiations with the factions of the Cambodian conflict (Dobbins et al 2005 p.69). On 23 October 1991 the Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, the Paris Agreement, was signed in Paris. There were four major factions that were supposed to live up to the agreement: the State of Cambodia (*SOC*) and the Cambodian Peoples Party (*CPP*), which was the governing party, the United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (*FUNCINPEC*), the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (*PDK*), or the Khmer Rouge, and the Khmer People's Liberation Front (Ibid. p.74). The four factions arose during the transitional period the Supreme National Council (*SNC*) (Ibid. p.77).

3.1.1 The Mandate of UNTAC

The Security Council Resolution 745 of 1992 established UNTAC on 28 February 1992 to ensure the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The agreement gave UNTAC a mandate to deal with human rights, elections, military and police functions, civil administration, rehabilitation and the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons (Paris Agreement). More specifically UNTAC was to organize free and fair elections (Paris Agreement Annex 1) which were to be held no later than May 1993 (S/RES/745). The civil administration component was meant to supervise and control foreign affairs, national defense, public security, finance and information, which were agencies that could affect the outcome of the elections (Paris Agreement Annex 1). As part of the military and police functions UNTAC had to ensure law and order, supervise, monitor and verify the withdrawal of foreign forces and the ceasefire. UNTAC was also supposed to conduct 70% demobilization of the national factions (Paris Agreement Annex 1). At the same time the SNC was the “unique legitimate body and source of authority in Cambodia in which, throughout the transitional period, national sovereignty and unity are enshrined, and which represents Cambodia externally” (Paris Agreement para. 7). In March 1992 UNTAC was in place in Cambodia and could start its work.

3.1.2 The Work of UNTAC

UNTAC started its work in several areas at the same time. It established a training program in human rights and cleared 4 million square meters of mines. An electoral law was also submitted to the SNC. The PDK at first did not want to comply but after pressure from the Special Representative of the Secretary General (*SRSG*), the highest ranking UN staff, the law was finally adopted (UNTAC). The cooperation of the factions of SNC was a reappearing problem and UNTAC was caught up in a situation where it was to exercise control over an already existing sovereign bureaucracy. This got more complicated due to the resistance of the oversight from the government. For example the Cambodian officials created parallel structures for communication to avoid being monitored by UNTAC (Dobbins et al 2005 p.83).

When it came to the cantonment, disarming and demobilization UNTAC failed because they could not get the PDK to cooperate. According to the Khmer Rouge foreign military personnel were still present in the country and they would thus not comply with the demobilization and the process had to be suspended (UNTAC). However, the Security Council decided that elections should be held no later than May 1993 (S/RES/783) and thus the focus became to be even more on the realization of the elections.

Despite all the problems UNTAC managed to organize the elections in seven months. But, during the run-up to the election the security situation deteriorated. In some areas polling could not be conducted. 176 deaths, 316 injuries and 67 abductions were reported, something that both the CPP regime and the Khmer

Rouge were responsible for (Paris 2004 p.85). Nevertheless, 89.56% of the population participated in the general elections in May 1993 (UNTAC). A Constituent Assembly was also elected with a 3-month mandate to create the constitution and thereafter transform itself into the parliament.

When the election result was released the CPP would at first not accept it since they had lost the power to FUNCINPEC. A compromise was reached resulting in two Prime Ministers, one from FUNCINPEC and one from CPP. Nevertheless, in practice the leader of the CPP, Hun Sen, had the power since he had control over the civil administration and the armed forces (Paris 2004 p.86). UNTAC was however declared a success and was withdrawn (S/RES/880). The democracy in Cambodia was short lived though. The situation deteriorated after UNTAC had left and in 1997 Hun Sen took the power through a bloody coup (Dobbins et al 2005 p.86).

3.1.3 UNTAC and the Liberalization Model

As shown UNTAC was not, especially not in practice, the bureaucracy itself but was rather to monitor somewhat already existing structures. Thus it did not participate in institution building to any extent. When UNTAC failed with both the monitoring process and the demobilization the main focus became to conduct free and fair elections as to create a liberal democracy. This was done in only seven months. The emphasis on elections, no institution building, human rights and the short amount of time that UNTAC was deployed are together thus a good example of the quick liberalization model. Another example is that the elections were held before a constitution was in place.

The coup shows that this model, at least in this particular case, did not work. Instead liberalization lead to some of the pathologies mentioned before. The elections became a harmful competition between CPP and FUNCINPEC when one of the parties at first did not accept the result of the election. Also, Hun Sen can be seen as a saboteur of the Cambodian transition to democracy. He and his party participated in the elections but, when the result did not turn out as he expected he performed a coup.

Before comparing this, somewhat poor result, with the situation in Timor-Leste after an IBL operation, a briefing of Timor-Leste and UNTAET is necessary.

3.2 Timor-Leste

The eastern part of the island of Timor was colonized by Portugal in 1701 and remained in its power until 1975. During the independence process political parties were established and Fretilin, a socialistic party that advocated independence rather than incorporation with Indonesia, gained the most popularity (Säkerhetspolitik). Following the independence Indonesia invaded the country

(Dobbins et al 2005 p.151). The first years of the occupation were brutal, the Indonesian military committed many atrocities and Falintil, the military wing of Fretilin, was practically defeated. By the 1980s between 100 000 and 200 000 people had died due to the occupation (UD 2006 p.2). The international community finally started to show its interest in the conflict during the 1990s. In consultations between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN it was decided that the Timor-Leste should hold a referendum to decide its future. The popular consultation was conducted by United Nations Mission in East Timor (*UNAMET*) which was given a mandate from 11 June to 30 September 1999 (see S/RES/1246, S/RES/1257). On 30 August 1999 78.5% of a 98% turnout voted in favor of independence (Chopra 2002 p. 982). Within two hours after the result had been announced the brutal response from the Indonesian National Military (*TNI*) and supportive militia groups came. Around 1500 people were killed (*Säkerhetspolitik*). 250 000 people were deported to West Timor while another 200 000 fled to the mountains (Dunn 2003 p.358). To put these number into context it has to be remembered that the total population of Timor-Leste is around one million (UI 2006b p.43). Also, 74% of the buildings and houses all over Timor-Leste were destroyed (Dunn 2003 p.354). After negotiations with the UN Indonesia accepted the presence of a multinational force, INTERFET, which was given its mandate by the Security Council (see S/RES/1264). Finally on 19 October Indonesia accepted the result of the referendum which made it possible for UNTAET to take over the responsibility of Timor-Leste. This also included the security responsibility formerly performed by INTERFET (*Säkerhetspolitik*).

3.2.1 The Mandate of UNTAET

UNTAET was established through Security Council resolution 1272 of 1999. The resolution gave UNTAET “overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice” (S/RES/1272). More specifically UNTAET was supposed to:

- Provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor
- Establish an effective administration
- Assist in the development of civil and social services
- Ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance
- Support capacity-building for self-government
- Assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development (Ibid.).

UNTAET was also given authorization to take all necessary measures to fulfill the mandate. As Jarat Chopra puts it, ”This project assumed a state-centric *terra nullius* and an open season on institutional invention.” (Chopra 2002 p.981). The

first regulation showed proof of this. It gave all legislative and executive power, including the judiciary administration, to UNTAET and the Transitional Administrator, SRSR Sergio Vieira de Mello (Regulation 1999/1).

3.2.2 The work of UNTAET

UNTAET “actually *was* the government through May 20 2002” (Dobbins et al 2005 p.158). This was done by organizing UNTAET under three pillars: military, humanitarian assistance and governance and public administration (*GPA*) (Smith 2003 pp.62-63). To keep a close connection to the Timorese people one of the first things UNTAET did was to establish an advisory body, the National Consultative Council (*NCC*), composed by both UNTAET staff and Timorese (Regulation 1999/2). After the UNTAET was criticized for not sharing power the *NCC* was transformed into the National Council (*NC*) with a somewhat more extensive mandate (Smith 2004 p.149). The *GPA* was also transformed into The East Timor Transitional Administration (*ETTA*) to increase the “timorization” and to reach a “fully functional civil service managed entirely by East Timorese.” (UNTAET Fact sheets No.12).

In 2001 UNTAET organized the elections of a Constituent Assembly. Parties that had not been in favor of the independence were not allowed to participate (Smith 2004 p.150). UNTAET also established a Constitutional Commission that held hearings with the citizens to ask their view on the constitution (Ibid. p.149). The Constituent Assembly was elected on 30 August 2001 and on March 22 the task of creating a constitution was completed. According to the constitution the Assembly was to become the country’s parliament upon independence (UNTAET Fact Sheets No. 4). Following the elections of the Constituent Assembly the East Timor Public Administration (*ETPA*) consisting of ten ministries and four secretariats under the control of the Transitional Administrator was created. By the end of its presence UNTAET had recruited almost 11 000 domestic civil servants (Dobbins et al 2005 p.169).

Continuing along the line of institution building an East Timor Police Service (*ETPS*) and as a part of that a Police Election Unit was established (UNTAET Fact Sheets No.6). Also, the East Timor Defense Force (*ETDF*) was built from scratch with the first battalion existing of previous Falintil members (Smith 2003 pp.79-82). A Public Prosecution Service was also created (UNTAET Fact Sheets No.7). Moreover a nationwide radio channel, a TV channel and a newspaper were set up (UNTAET Fact Sheets No.19).

Another step that was taken to meet the criticism of not letting the Timorese participate in the rebuilding process was to prepare for elections (Dobbins et al 2005 pp168-169). Presidential elections were held on 14 April 2002. The elections were free and fair and no one contested the result of the Independent Electoral Commission (*IEC*), another body created by the UNTAET. By 20 May 2002 Timor-Leste gained its independence and UNTAET withdrew only to be replaced by United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (*UNMISSET*) that

would continue to support the new state until 20 May 2005 (see S/RES/1410, S/RES/1480, S/RES/1543).

3.2.3 UNTAET and the IBL Model

UNTAET with its focus on institution building is a good representative for the IBL model even though not completely following Paris' theory. It created a civil administration, a police force, a defense force, a public prosecution service, an independent electoral commission to oversee the elections and contributed to the origination of the constitution. Good civil society was promoted through the participation of civil society groups in the NCC and the hearings of the citizens before drafting the constitution. This might also have been done by not letting groups/parties that were opposing the independence (bad civil society) participate in the elections to the Constituent Assembly. The establishment and control over media gave UNTAET a possibility to control hate speech.

Since the independence no parliamentary election has been held- the Constituent Assembly has taken that role until the elections in 2007. It is therefore hard to say anything about the electoral system. Paris argues that the importance when it comes to the electoral system is “rules that compel serious candidates to secure significant political support across different communal groups.” (2004 p.194). The election to the Constituent Assembly was based on both regional representation and a nation wide proportional representation system which made it possible for different communal groups to be represented. Thus there were some moderating elements. The presidential election was based on a majority vote and there were no specific moderating elements. The major faction opposing the independence, Indonesia, was not present by the time of elections though and thus the need for moderating elements might therefore not have been that strong.

When it comes to ripe conditions for elections it seems like the criteria of political parties not contesting the elections was fulfilled since this did not happen. Instead there was a major consensus among most parties that Xanana Gusmão should become the president (Smith 2004 p.154). Also, the absence of Indonesia and TNI might have played its part. As for the other criteria for ripe conditions, governmental institutions that can resolve election disputes and enforce its outcome, the IEC was established. Also, the ETPS had a special election unit. On the other hand the judicial system was not fully developed. There was for example no Supreme Court. But, the UN has continued its support to Timor-Leste since the independence, and thus it seems to recognize that the holding of elections is not the quick fix that will leave the state completely functioning.

The economic reforms have mostly been implemented by others than the UNTAET, such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fond (*IMF*) (Dobbins et al 2005 pp. 172-175). There was of course a close cooperation between the different agencies but the main responsibility was not with UNTAET. It is therefore difficult to say something about UNTAET's work when it comes to conflict-reducing economic policies. Some-

thing worth mentioning is that the World Bank in its Transitional Support Strategy wanted to prioritize institution building and avoid complex projects until these institutions were in place (World Bank 2000 p. 13). This is thus a way to delay economic reforms until the political conditions have stabilized.

Even though UNTAET does not fulfill all the criteria of the IBL model its institutionalization focus is strong enough to make it a representative case. Especially compared to UNTAC this is true. Therefore it is valid to use UNTAET and UNTAC to make this comparison.

4 Comparison of the Two Countries

I have in the previous chapter shown how UNTAC and UNTAET distinguish themselves and how they represent the two different types of models. If Paris' theory about institutionalization is true, Timor-Leste would be a greater success story by managing the post operation period better than Cambodia. This comparison is a very difficult one to make because depending on what parameters are used the result might turn out differently. As mentioned earlier the ultimate goal for both models has been to create a liberal democracy and how well they have accomplished this must therefore be the common point of comparison. The parameters listed in the methodology passage, the presence of violence, the elections, the human rights, and the level of economy and development, will here be used to determine this.

4.1 Presence of Violence

As mentioned earlier, the CPP at first did not recognize the result of the 1993 elections in Cambodia. FUNCINPEC was later convinced by the CPP to include them in a coalition government. This was done by using the influence that Hun Sen and the CPP still had over security forces, the army and the civil administration. The harassments continued and escalated in a bloody coup in 1997 where Hun Sen took the power (Dobbins et al 2005 p.86, Freedom House 2002). 41 political killings followed the coup (Freedom House 2002). Since then the violence has continued. There were for example 22 political murders reported during the two months prior to the 1998 election (McCargo 2005 p. 100, Freedom House 2002). Also, before the local polls in 2002, a "violent campaign that included several election-related killings, threats, vandalism, and other acts of intimidation against the opposition" took place (Freedom House 2003).

In Timor-Leste armed attacks, have occurred since the departure of UNTAET. There were for example riots in Dili on 4 December 2002 where several buildings were destroyed. An attack on the town of Atsabe where five people were killed was reported and there were also indications that new bases for the former militia and other armed groups were set up (S/2003/243). During the spring of 2006 the security situation in Timor-Leste deteriorated. Around 600 soldiers, almost half of the army, were fired because they went on strike due to low salaries and discrimination. Parts of the police force took the side of the fired soldiers and gangs of unemployed youth also joined in. The escalation of violence resulted in tens of thousands people fleeing and buildings set on fire. The riots were put down, in a brutally manner, by forces loyal to the Prime Minister (Economist 2006, Hellberg

2006). In May 2006 21 people were killed and at this point 150 000 people were estimated to be found in temporary camps due to the disturbances. This led to the deployment of a 3200 strong international peacekeeping force (TT 2006). Also, the run-up to the first round of presidential elections in 2007 has been somewhat violent and in February peacekeepers killed two men in a camp for displaced people (Economist 2007).

According to the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (*WGI*) covering the years from 2002-2005 Cambodia has a slightly better ranking when it comes to political stability and no violence which is defined as "the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism" (World Bank 2006). This statistic does not cover the coup in Cambodia or the violence that erupted in 2006 in Timor-Leste.

As part of the presence of violence it is also possible to look at the rule of law since this might show the willingness of the population to live by the law and also the possibility to deal with eruptions of violence. Timor-Leste ranks twice as well as Cambodia in 2004 and 2005, meanwhile during 2000, 2002 and 2003 Cambodia's ranking is slightly better (World Bank 2006).

4.1.1 Assessment of the Presence of Violence

In Cambodia there has been and is a presence of violence, especially around election times. The coup in 1997 is of course the most serious event. On the other hand the civil war has not resumed. In Timor-Leste there have been several incidents, especially during the last year, where violence has been used. This has severely destabilized the country. None of these cases have come near a coup though. Another difference is that in Cambodia most of the violence is related to the state and the governing party while in Timor-Leste most attacks have come from different armed groups, with the state sometimes using violence as a response. The state being the main perpetrator is a serious threat to the liberal democracy since it is supposed to be the ultimate representative of these values. By using violence against its people it contradicts liberal democracy. On the other hand, citizens resorting to violence is of course also a sign of a not too well functioning democracy since this might be an evidence of a growing frustration among the population that can not be channeled in any other way.

The state being the perpetrator might also explain why Cambodia has a higher *WGI* ranking when it comes to political stability than Timor-Leste. When the state itself stands for a lot of the violence it might not destabilize itself but rather be strengthened. On the other hand, if IBL in the form of UNTAET had been working in the expected way, a stable state, through stable institutions, should have been the result.

In both countries violence is present and it is difficult to decide where the situation is better or worse. During one period of time the level of violence is higher in one country and then it shifts. Looking at the most recent time period there seems to have been more violence in Timor-Leste. Comparing different incidents

though, no matter when they have occurred, the bloody coup in Cambodia is the most serious violent incident. Also, the rule of law is much higher in Timor-Leste than in Cambodia during the last years which shows that this is more deeply rooted among the population in Timor-Leste. The possibility to deal with violence also becomes much higher. The over all assessment must therefore be that Timor-Leste over the time is somewhat better off when it comes to the presence of violence, even though the newest major incident seems to have occurred there. A thing that has to be kept in mind though is the support that the Timor-Leste still gets from the current UN operation which probably works as a stabilizing factor. How well Timor-Leste would be doing without that presence is impossible to say.

4.2 Elections

According to several sources the 1998 elections in Cambodia was neither free nor fair since there were restrictions on media and campaigning and, as mentioned before, a lot of political violence. Also, the CPP manipulated the rules on how to allocate the seats in the parliament (Dobbins et al 2005 p.86, Freedom House 2002). The restricted access to media and violence as intimidation was also present in the 2003 parliamentary elections (Freedom House 2004). Duncan McCargo writes that “Elections in Hun Sen’s Cambodia have become an exercise in political theater that the CPP uses to legitimize its power.” (2005 p.100). The 2002 presidential election in Timor-Leste on the other hand was conducted under free and fair conditions (Smith 2004 p.155). The first round of the presidential elections held on 9 April 2007 was also conducted in a peaceful and open manner according to the preliminary report of the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM 1 p.1). The conditions improved during the second round even though there were some reports of intimidation and vote buying (EU EOM 2 pp.6-7).

Freedom House categorizes the world’s states as electoral democracies or not. An electoral democracy is a state that has a competitive multi-party political system, universal suffrage for all adult citizens, regularly contested elections with ballot secrecy and no massive voter fraud, and media access and campaigning possibilities for the major political parties to reach the electorate (Freedom House 2007a p.3). Timor-Leste qualifies as an electoral democracy while Cambodia does not (Freedom House 2007b). Also, the WGI gives Timor-Leste almost twice as high a ranking than Cambodia between 2000 and 2005 when it comes to voice and accountability which includes the possibility to select a government, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media (World Bank 2006). This is thus a mix of the elections and freedoms and rights components.

4.2.1 Assessment of the Elections

The evidence of Timor-Leste being more successful than Cambodia is much clearer when it comes to elections than the presence of violence. The elections and the period around the elections have run much more smoothly. Put simply, the elections in Timor-Leste have been freer and fairer. Also here the comparison between the countries is somewhat difficult though since the starting positions for the countries were different. Both Cambodia and Timor-Leste were weak or failed states but in Cambodia there was a regime in place. This regime has had time since the Vietnamese intervention to gain control over the civil administration and security forces and thus had the incentives to take the power when it did not win the elections in 1993. In Timor-Leste on the other hand there was no existing regime after Indonesia withdrew. And, the biggest independence faction, Fretilin, won most of the seats in the election to the Constituent Assembly, which since the independence has acted as the parliament. Also, In Timor-Leste the UN has continued its presence and support after the holding of the first presidential election through new missions and is heavily involved in the 2007 elections, something that can affect the conduct. The latest operation, The United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (*UNMIT*) is, with a current mandate until 26 February 2008, giving support to the ongoing presidential and parliamentary electoral processes among other things. (S/RES/1704, S/RES/1745). Even though there might have been international observers during the elections in Cambodia, there was no mission with the explicit mandate to support them. Nevertheless, dealing with tensions prior, during and after the elections and make sure that the pre-conditions are the best possible when leaving should be a part of the plan for a peacebuilding mission, no matter the liberalization or IBL model. Especially when the main focus is the elections. Thus the differences between the countries before the missions were deployed might explain why the elections have gone better in Timor-Leste but it is not a reason strong enough to diminish the result of the work of UNTAET compared to UNTAC. A continued long time support should also not diminish UNTAET's work since a long time presence, if it is necessary, is part of the IBL model. Thus a continued UN presence should only be seen as a part of the IBL strategy.

4.3 Human Rights

Freedom House identifies Cambodia as a not free country since 1994. Meanwhile, Timor-Leste since 1999 has been ranked as partly free (Freedom House 2007c). To be able to compare this, the definitions of partly free and not free are necessary. A partial free state is

“one in which there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties. Partly Free states frequently suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife, and

often a setting in which a single political party enjoys dominance despite the façade of limited pluralism. A Not Free country is one where basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied.” (Freedom House 2007a p.2).

Thus according to this Timor-Leste is providing the basic freedoms and rights better than Cambodia even though both countries have serious problems. A similar assumption can be made by reading Amnesty International’s yearly reports. During 2005 there were restrictions on freedom of assembly, threats against the opposition and human rights defenders, curtailing of criticism of the government, forcible returns of Vietnamese refugees and a corrupt and weak legal system among other things in Cambodia (Amnesty 2006a). In Timor-Leste during the same period the justice system was weak, which lead to unlawful arrests and detentions, and there were some allegations of police abuses. The main focus though was on the impunity of the abuses connected to the 1999 referendum (Amnesty 2006b). Looking at previous years the weak and corrupt legal system, the threats (sometimes assassinations) against the opposition and the treatment of the refugees as well as the political violence linked to the elections were reappearing themes in Cambodia (see Amnesty 2005a, Amnesty 2004a, Amnesty 2003a). Also, in Timor-Leste the same breaches of the human rights, the weak legal system and police abuses, reappear in previous reports (see Amnesty 2005b, Amnesty 2004b, Amnesty 2003b).

4.3.1 Assessment of the Human Rights

In both countries breaches against the human rights are present and serious. Even though it might be somewhat strange to compare violations with one another, the violations in Cambodia seem to be somewhat worse. There are for example several more types of breaches in Cambodia than in Timor-Leste. Political killings or assassinations have been reported from Cambodia several times while in Timor-Leste there are no such reports during the period covered here. Especially around election time the breaches of the human rights are very serious in Cambodia while there are very few incidents reported so far from Timor-Leste. Timor-Leste’s main problem seems to be with a not too well functioning justice system and police force, something that of course is very serious and needs to be dealt with. This also cast some shadow on UNTAET’s work since they did create institutions but maybe not as well functioning as one could hope for.

Also the difference in the human rights performance might be explained by the presence of the international community. In Cambodia there has not been another mission since UNTAC left and thus there has not been any strong verification mechanism there to monitor how the regime is behaving. In Timor-Leste on the other hand the UN presence leaves less space for conducting breaches. How Timor-Leste would have done all by itself is impossible to say, maybe they too will have a worse human rights record when the international support leaves.

On the other hand the continued support to the institutions might give Timor-Leste enough time to implement the human rights in all areas and make them the self-evident way of conduct. In that way the human rights becomes consolidated. UNTAET's mode of operation has therefore worked better than UNTAC's when it comes to the promotion of the human rights.

4.4 Level of Economy and Development

The Human Development Index (*HDI*) is a combined index for measuring development. The parameters used are life expectancy, adult literacy and school enrolment, and the Gross Domestic Product (*GDP*) per capita calculated in purchasing power parity (*PPP*) income (UNDP 2006). According to the HDI Timor-Leste is ranked as 142nd in the world while Cambodia has a ranking of 129 (Ibid.). Looking at each specific parameter the life expectancy in Timor-Leste is 56 years, while it is 56.5 in Cambodia. The adult literacy rate reaches 58.6 % in Timor-Leste and 73.6% in Cambodia while the school enrolment ratio is 71.7% in Timor-Leste and 60.2% in Cambodia. The GDP per capita in Cambodia is 2 423 U.S. dollars. Since there are no numbers on the GDP per capita in Timor-Leste a national estimate of 1 033 U.S. dollars had to be used to calculate the HDI (Ibid.). The number from the Swedish Institute of International Affairs gives a somewhat different picture. According to them the GDP/capita in Cambodia was 317 U.S. dollars in 2005 (UI 2006a p.21). In Timor-Leste the GDP was 352 U.S. dollars per capita (UI 2006b p.51). Thus here the Timorese economy is slightly better, but these numbers does not seem to be PPP adjusted. Moreover, the sources showing that the Cambodian GDP/capita is higher are several (CIA, UD 2006 p.1, UD 2007 p.2).

Other measures of the level of economy and development than the HDI can be used, especially when it comes to the economy. An effective economy can for example be measured by looking at the level of corruption. The control of corruption is higher in Timor-Leste than in Cambodia according to the World Bank (World Bank 2006). Since it almost always is a market economy that is promoted how well the government issues policies and regulations to promote the development of the private sector is also relevant. When it comes to this Cambodia has around twice as good ranking as Timor-Leste (Ibid.). Gender equality and employment rate are other relevant measures. I have found no statistics on gender equality. The World Bank estimates that the unemployment rate is around 20% in Timor-Leste reaching 43% among the youth in the urban areas (World Bank). I have found no statistics that can be compared here though. CIA estimates the unemployment rate to be 2.5% in Cambodia in the year 2000 and 50% in Timor-Leste in 2001 (CIA). These numbers are hard to compare since they are estimates and for different years. Since the difference is so big though it seems pretty safe to say that the unemployment is higher in Timor-Leste than in Cambodia.

4.4.1 Assessment of the Level of Economy and Development

There is hardly any difference in the life expectancy age between the countries so this as a measure of how well the health system works shows no difference. The literacy rate is much higher in Cambodia than in Timor-Leste. On the other hand the school enrollment is higher in Timor-Leste which implies that the present school system is better in Timor-Leste. This might lead to a higher educational level in the long run. The big difference lies in the income per capita and unemployment. This shows that Cambodia has a better economy than Timor-Leste when it comes to these areas, while corruption seems to be lower in Timor-Leste. The high unemployment rate in Timor-Leste has to be taken into certain consideration since many people without work is a destabilizing factor that might lead to renewed violence.

There is thus no uniform trend when it comes to the level of economy and development which makes it difficult to make a judgment of the result. Also, the statistics of development and economy are probably the least reliable ones of the parameters since they depend more heavily on the information from each government than the other ones. More indicators would have been preferable. This is also the most difficult parameter to connect to the work of UNTAC and UNTAET since the work in the field of economy and development often is done through other agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF. Nevertheless, with an overall evaluation, the economy in Cambodia seems to be somewhat stronger while the development in other aspects is more or less the same.

Here the time aspect has to be taken into account. A longer time has passed after the conflict in Cambodia than in Timor-Leste and thus they have had a greater opportunity to develop the economy. Cambodia has also become popular for tourism which of course brings in revenue. Another difference that might affect the economic development is the size of the population. In Timor-Leste the population is just above one million (UD 2006 p.1) while it is over 13 million in Cambodia (UD 2007 p.1). This means that the labor force is much bigger in Cambodia than in Timor-Leste which might make Cambodia more attractive for foreign investors. The textile industry has for example been developed in Cambodia. Timor-Leste might be seen as a too small economy to be worth investing in.

4.5 Alternative Explanatory Factors

I have already mentioned that other circumstances than the operations themselves might have affected the outcome. For example the continued international presence in Timor-Leste might explain the different results. On the other hand the good effects of the international presence only speak in favor of the IBL model since this means that the international community has shown interest for a long term commitment and not a quick fix model. The time difference and the political situation before the missions were deployed might also have had an effect on the

present situation. The time difference would have spoken in favor of Cambodia though.

Other explanatory factors, not mentioned before, are the scope of the conflict and the presence of violent factions. The Khmer Rouge regime is counted for as very brutal and an estimated two million people might have died during their ruling. In Timor-Leste that number was no more than 200 000, which of course also is a high number. This must nevertheless be compared to the size of the population. In Cambodia almost a fourth of the population died (UD 2007 p.4). In Timor-Leste the number is lower, around a fifth of the population died. On the other hand over 70% of the infrastructure in Timor-Leste was destroyed. Thus these differences might not be as big as it first seems. A difference that is more evident though is the presence of violent factions. In Timor-Leste, the most violent faction, the TNI, withdrew when UNTAET deployed, leaving some minor militia groups behind. In Cambodia on the other hand the Khmer Rouge continued its presence. But, it was not the Khmer Rouge that put a halt to the democratic process. Instead it was the party who acted as a government during a large part of the conflict, the CPP, which was responsible for the coup. The Hun Sen regime also seems to be responsible for a lot of the human rights violations.

These other explanatory factors have of course affected the present situation in the respective countries. However, they do not seem to be strong enough to falsify the findings that the UNTAET's work has affected the present situation in Timor-Leste in a more positive way than UNTAC has in Cambodia in three out of the four points of comparison.

5 Conclusion

To decide which of the two countries that come closest to a liberal democracy it is necessary to combine the four parameters. When it comes to the presence of violence the result is not obvious. Both countries have had eruptions of violence after the peacebuilding missions left. Even though the most recent violence seems to have erupted in Timor-Leste the most serious events have occurred in Cambodia. Therefore, taking into consideration the bloody coup in Cambodia and the serious violence around elections time, Timor-Leste is somewhat closer to the ideal goal of a functioning liberal democracy. This is also true when it comes to the elections and the human rights. There has been very little political violence and frauds in Timor-Leste whereas intimidations of different kinds frequently have occurred in Cambodia around election time. The elections have therefore been freer and fairer in Timor-Leste. When it comes to the human rights the breaches have been fewer and less severe in Timor-Leste. On the other hand, the economy seems to be working better in Cambodia. Thus in three out of the four parameters Timor-Leste has come closer to the goal of a liberal democracy during a shorter amount of time. Even if one does not give the parameters the same weight, the economy can not be said to be more important than the other three combined.

Other circumstances such as the time difference, a continued international presence in Timor-Leste, the scope of the conflict and the presence of hostile factions have affected the present situation. However, when looking at these differences they do not seem to be big enough to falsify the findings of Timor-Leste being closer to a liberal democracy than Cambodia. Thus the over all assessment must be that Timor-Leste is closer to the goal of a working liberal democracy even though there still seems to be severe problems there.

The question to be answered in this thesis was whether the focus on institutionalization increases the prospects of peacebuilding missions succeeding. In three out of the four parameters used in this thesis Timor-Leste comes closer to the ideal goal of a liberal democracy. Therefore, institutionalization seems to increase the prospects of success for the peacebuilding missions since success throughout this thesis has been defined as how well the operations have created favorable conditions for a liberal democracy.

By using the operations in Cambodia and Timor-Leste, the IBL model shows to be more effective when it comes to creating a liberal democracy. Comparing two cases is of course a too narrow study to make any general assumptions about peacebuilding. More operations using the IBL strategy are necessary. Also, the findings are limited since there has been no possibility to conduct any field studies. Furthermore, using other parameters as points of comparison might have given a different result. As will be shown in the final chapter, there are also some

problems with the IBL model itself since one can hardly claim that Timor- Leste is a fully working liberal democracy. Nevertheless, in the setting that this thesis has been written the question of institutionalization increasing the prospects of peace-building missions succeeding seems to be true when comparing it to the liberalization model.

6 Final Reflection- Problems with IBL

If the result from previous chapter is accepted, the IBL model would be preferable to the quick liberalization model. Accepting the IBL is not that easy though. It is obvious that Timor-Leste still has a lot of problems and has a long way to go before becoming a working liberal democracy. There are human rights violations, eruptions of violence and the economy does not seem to work. The eruptions of violence might in one way be the most serious one since this shows that a large part of the population is unsatisfied with their possibility to affect their own lives. The reason for this might actually be the two other problem areas; the bad economy which leaves many people unemployed and the violations of the human rights which shows that the rule of law is not consolidated. Also the weaknesses in both the justice system and the police force affect the situation. All this shows that the IBL model might also have some problems when it comes to creating a stable peace through a liberal democracy.

The supporter of the IBL model could explain the recent situation in Timor-Leste by claiming that UNTAET did not follow the IBL model closely enough. UNTAET did create institutions before elections but maybe not as good as were necessary. The quality of the institutions has to be taken into account. As mentioned before, both the police force and the justice system are still not working smoothly. The courts are weak and the election process is dependent on the UN. Another sign of this is high unemployment rate which shows that the economic policies have not worked that well. They have created a fragile situation rather than stability so far. The institutionalization might thus have been rushed too much, leaving UNTAET closer to the liberalization model than it was supposed to. After all, it only operated for two and a half years. This leads us to the problem with IBL though. Rushing the institutionalization and the election process seems to have been a result of increasing the timorization of the operation. After all, UNTAET was criticized for not sharing power. As Jarat Chopra puts it “there is never a vacuum as long as there is a population. There is a profound difference between anarchy defined as the absence of a national executive, legislature and judiciary, and the actual breakdown of indigenous social structures.” (Chopra 2002 p.981). The participation of the population² is therefore fundamental but something that seems to be difficult to implement in the IBL model.

One of the strengths of the IBL model is that it dares to put off democratization in a first phase. But, this is also one of its weaknesses. The way that IBL was conducted in Timor-Leste gave the Transitional Administrator and

² For a discussion about participatory intervention see Chopra 2002.

Administration a very extensive power thus leaving very little room for opposition to their ideas and decisions. Therefore, put into practice the IBL seems to show too little consideration to the local settings and the incorporation of the local population. There is a risk for a top down approach, which might be seen as too interventionalistic. The West ones more arrives with a prefixed model and ideas without thinking about how this will work in a different cultural and historical setting. The whole process of building and democratizing a country might then be rejected and actually create more tensions leading to renewed conflict. Thus when criticizing the quick liberalization model for creating pathologies Paris forgot the participatory element of the local population (or the absence of it) being one thing affecting the success of peacebuilding. This meant that he did not include this in the IBL model with the risk of also making this model fail.

Institutionalization in itself might not be the wrong way to go when it comes to peacebuilding but the risk of leaving the local population on the side has to be dealt with. The starting point for all peacebuilding missions, no matter what model one finally decides to use, should therefore be to consult the population already from the start not only on the question of independence but also on how they want their country to be run. In that way the whole process would be deeper rooted in the country and the risk of renewed tensions might decrease. How to increase the participation of the local population in the IBL model is thus something that is necessary to discuss and develop if this model is to increase the prospects of peacebuilding mission success.

7 References

- Amnesty 2003a = *Amnesty International Report 2003: Cambodia*.
<http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/Khm-summary-eng>, 13 April 2007.
- Amnesty 2003b = *Amnesty International Report 2003: Timor-Leste*.
<http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/Tmp-summary-eng>, 13 April 2007.
- Amnesty 2004a = *Amnesty International Report 2004: Cambodia*.
<http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/khm-summary-eng>, 13 April 2007.
- Amnesty 2004b = *Amnesty International Report 2004: Timor-Leste*.
<http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/tmp-summary-eng>, 13 April 2007.
- Amnesty 2005a = *Amnesty International Report 2005: Cambodia*.
<http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/khm-summary-eng>, 13 April 2007.
- Amnesty 2005b = *Amnesty International Report 2005: Timor-Leste*.
<http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/tmp-summary-eng>, 13 April 2007.
- Amnesty 2006a = *Amnesty International Report 2006, Asia-Pacific: Cambodia*.
<http://web.amnesty.org/report2006/khm-summary-eng>, 13 April 2007.
- Amnesty 2006b = *Amnesty International Report 2006, Asia-Pacific: Timor-Leste*.
<http://web.amnesty.org/report2006/tmp-summary-eng>, 13 April 2007.
- A/RES/60/180 = *Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly: 60/180. The Peacebuilding Commission*, 2005. <http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/498/40/pdf/N0549840.pdf?OpenElement>, 7 May 2007.
- Barnett, Michael, 2006. "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War", *International Security* Vol. 30, No. 4, pp.87-112.
- Brown, MacAlister- Zasloff, Joseph, 1998. *Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers 1979-1998*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 1992. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*. <http://www.un.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html>, 14 March 2007.
- CIA = *The World Factbook*, 2007. <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>, 17 April 2007.
- Chandler, David, 1996. *A History of Cambodia*. Second Edition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Chopra, Jarat, 2002. "Building State Failure in East Timor", *Development and Change* Vol. 33, No. 5, pp.979-1000.
- Dobbins, James- Jones, Seth G- Crane, Keith- Rathmell, Andrew- Steele, Brett- Teltschik, Richard- Timilsina, Anga, 2005. *The UN's Role in Nation-Building from the Congo to Iraq*. Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation.
- Downs, George- Stedman, Stephen 2002. "Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation" pp.43-69 in Stedman, Stephen John- Rotchild, Donald-

- Cousens, Elisabeth M. (Eds.). *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
- Doyle, Michael W.- Sambanis, Nicholas, 2000. "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis", *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 94, No. 4, pp.779-801.
- Dunn, James 2003. *East Timor: a rough passage to independence*. 3rd Edition. Double Bay, Australia: Longueville Books.
- Economist 2001 = "Any Lessons for Others?", *The Economist* Vol. 361, No. 8243, p.44.
- Economist 2006 = "Asia: Problem child; East Timor", *The Economist* Vol. 379, No. 8480, p.66.
- Economist 2007 = "Asia: Mutinous crew; Timor-Leste", *The Economist* Vol. 382 No. 8518, p.65.
- EU EOM 1 = *Preliminary Statement 11 April, 2007*. European Union Election Observation Mission Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. <http://www.euomtimorleste.org/xxdefault.asp?id=1&show=59&m=0>, 14 May 2007.
- EU EOM 2 = *Preliminary Statement 11 May, 2007*. European Union Election Observation Mission Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. <http://www.euomtimorleste.org/xxdefault.asp?id=1&show=59&m=0>, 14 May 2007.
- Freedom House 2002 = *Freedom in the world 2002: Country Report Cambodia*. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2002&country=922>, 13 April 2007.
- Freedom House 2003 = *Freedom in the world 2003: Country Report Cambodia* <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2003&country=358>, 13 April 2007.
- Freedom House 2004 = *Freedom in the world 2004: Country Report Cambodia* <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2004&country=2903>, 16 April 2007.
- Freedom House 2007a = *Freedom in the World 2007: Freedom Stagnation amid Pushback against Democracy*. http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/fiw07_overview_final.pdf, 30 March 2007.
- Freedom House 2007b = *Freedom in the World 2007: Selected Data from Freedom House's Annual Global Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties*. http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/fiw07_charts.pdf, 30 March 2007.
- Freedom House 2007c = *Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972-2006*. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls>, March 30 2007.
- Hellberg, Anders, 2006. "Fredspristagare ny premiärminister i Östtimor", *Dagens Nyheter* 9 July 2006. <http://www.presstext.se>, 31 March 2007.
- Keating, Tom- Knight, Andy W, 2004. "Introduction: Recent Developments in Postconflict Studies- Peacebuilding and Governance" pp.xxxi-lxii in Keating, Thomas F- Knight, Andy W (Eds.). *Building Sustainable Peace*. New York:

- United Nations University Press. <http://www.lub.lu.se/cgi-bin/ipchk/http://www.netLibrary.com/urlapi.asp?action=summary&v=1&bookid=131093>, 26 March 2007.
- Mason, David T- Quinn, Jason 2006. "Sustaining the peace: stopping the recurrence of civil wars" pp.13-30 in Mason, David T- Meernik, James D (Eds.) *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies: Sustaining the Peace*. London: Routledge.
- McCargo, Duncan, 2005. "Cambodia: Getting Away with Authoritarianism?", *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 98-112.
- Mullenbach, Mark J, 2006. "Reconstructing strife-torn societies: third party peacebuilding in intrastate disputes" pp.53-80 in Mason, David T- Meernik, James D (Eds.) *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies: Sustaining the Peace*. London: Routledge.
- Paris Agreement = *Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict*, 1991. <http://peacemaker.unlb.org/index1.php>, 20 April 2007.
- Paris, Roland, 2004. *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Regulation 1999/1 = *Regulation No. 1999/1 on the Authority of the Transitional Administrator in East Timor*, 1999. <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/etreg1.htm>, 3 April 2007.
- Regulation 1999/2 = *Regulation No. 1999/2 on the Establishment of a National Consultative Council*, 1999. <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/etreg2.htm> 3 April 2007.
- Richmond, Oliver P., 2004. "The Globalization of Responses to Conflict and the Peacebuilding Consensus", *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 129-150.
- Rotberg, Robert I, 2004. "The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention and Repair" pp.1-45 in Rotberg, Robert I. (Eds.). *When States Fall: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Smith, Michael G., 2003. *Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Smith, Anthony L., 2004. "East Timor: Elections in the World's Newest Nation", *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 145-159.
- S/2003/243 = *Special report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission of support in East Timor*, 2003. <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/262/56/IMG/N0326256.pdf?OpenElement>, 16 April 2007.
- S/RES/745 = *Security Council Resolution 745*, 1992. <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>, 7 May 2007.
- S/RES/783 = *Security Council Resolution 783*, 1992. <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>, 7 May 2007.
- S/RES/880 = *Security Council Resolution 880*, 1993. <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>, 7 May 2007.
- S/RES/1246 = *Security Council Resolution 1246*, 1999. <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>, 7 May 2007.

- S/RES/1257 = *Security Council Resolution 1257*, 1999. <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>, 7 May 2007.
- S/RES/1264 = *Security Council Resolution 745*, 1999. <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>, 7 May 2007.
- S/RES/1272 = *Security Council Resolution 1272*, 1999. <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>, 7 May 2007.
- S/RES/1410 = *Security Council Resolution 1410*, 2002. <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>, 7 May 2007.
- S/RES/1480 = *Security Council Resolution 1480*, 2003. <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>, 7 May 2007.
- S/RES/1543 = *Security Council Resolution 1543*, 2004. <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>, 7 May 2007.
- S/RES/1645 = *Security Council Resolution 1645*, 2005. <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>, 7 May 2007.
- S/RES/1704 = *Security Council Resolution 1704*, 2006. <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>, 7 May 2007.
- S/RES/1745 = *Security Council Resolution 1745*, 2007. <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>, 7 May 2007.
- Säkerhetspolitik = *Östtimor: Fördjupning*, 2006. <http://www.sakerhetspolitik.se/templates/Level2Page.aspx?id=523>, 31 March 2007.
- TT 2006 = Ny FN-styrka till Östtimor, *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå* August 12 2006. <http://www.presstext.se>, 31 March 2007.
- UD 2006 = *Landrapport- Östtimor*, 2006. <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/01/45/11/46b344f3.pdf>, 12 April 2007.
- UD 2007 = *Landfakta: Kambodja*, 2007. <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/01/39/75/91bf2041.pdf>, 14 April 2007.
- UI 2006a = *Länder i fickformat 808 Kambodja*, 2006. Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska institutet.
- UI 2006b = *Länder i fickformat 805 Indonesien/Östtimor*, 2006. Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska institutet.
- UNDP 2006 = *Human Development Report 2006*. <http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006>, 17 April 2007.
- UNTAC = *Background*. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacbackgr2.html, 2 April 2007.
- UNTAET Fact Sheets. <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/fact/FS.htm>, 2 April 2007.
- World Bank = *Timor-Leste Country Brief*. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/TIMORLESTEEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20174826~menuPK:294027~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:294022,00.html>, 2 May 2007.
- World Bank 2000 = *Transitional Support Strategy*, 2000. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTIMORLESTE/Resources/Chapter1to8.pdf>, 2 May 2007.
- World Bank 2006 = *Worldwide Governance Indicators 2006*. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/index.htm> 30 March 2007.