https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20200001639 2020-03-28T19:12:48+00:00Z



#### Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project

ACAS-Xu Run 5 HITL (June 2019) SC-228 WG 1.3 Results Outbrief

Human Systems Integration March 11, 2020

UAS INTEGRATION IN THE NAS

Kevin J. Monk (presenter) Jillian Keeler Conrad Rorie Casey Smith Garrett Sadler



- <u>Goal</u>: assess ACAS Xu Run 5 in a human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulation in order to measure pilot and system performance in real-time
  - An emphasis on pilots' ability to comply with:
    - Remain Well Clear (RWC) alerting and guidance
    - Resolution Advisory (RA) alerting and guidance
      - Vertical, Horizontal and 'Blended' (vertical + horizontal) RAs
- Where appropriate, we will compare ACAS Xu Run 5 results to previous SC-228 Phase 1 DAA work
  - The Phase 1 V&V HITL was conducted in 2016 using NASA's DAIDALUS algorithm to provide DAA alerting and guidance
  - The design of the present scenarios were kept as similar as possible to the Phase 1 sim to allow for comparisons, *however*:
    - Sensor noise was <u>not</u> modeled in the Phase 1 study & the simulated RADAR detection range was <u>8nm</u>
- Note: Run 5.1 (FRAC) was released shortly after this HITL; at the end of this brief we will show a few charts on tests we performed with the updated logic




- Independent Variables:
  - Display Configuration (2 levels, within-subjects)
    - Integrated DAA information presented within TSD
    - <u>Standalone</u> DAA information shown in separate, dedicated display
  - Threat Type at First Alert (2 levels, within-trial)
    - <u>Corrective DAA Alert</u>: encounter scripted to provide the *maximum allowable* Corrective DAA (RWC) alerting time
    - <u>Resolution Advisory</u>: encounter scripted to "force" RAs without a preceding DAA alert (i.e., pop-up or blundering intruders)
  - Intruder Equipage (2 levels, within-trial)
    - <u>Cooperative</u> (ADS-B)
      - Detection Range: 20 nm, 360° field of regard
      - Vertical Range: +/- 10000 ft MSL
    - <u>Non-Cooperative</u> (RADAR-only)
      - Detection Range: 6.7 nm
      - Field of regard: 110° azimuth & 15° elevation



**Experiment** Design

#### **STANDALONE CONFIGURATION**




 DAA & CA information presented separately from navigation and vehicle control interfaces



**Experiment** Design

#### **INTEGRATED CONFIGURATION**



DAA & CA information co-located with navigation and vehicle control interfaces

### Test Setup



- 16 active-duty UAS pilots
  - Situated at AFRL's Vigilant Spirit Control Station (VSCS)
    - Simulated Oakland Center, Class E airspace
    - Pilot booth isolated from rest of simulation environment
    - Honeywell Sensor Model provided representative ADS-B and RADAR sensor noise (*not present in PT6*)



- ATC confederates and 'pseudo' pilots managed simulated airspace
  - Provided realistic comms & background traffic
  - Used retired Oakland Center controllers and general aviation pilots as confederates






#### Test Setup

- 4 experimental trials per pilot (~45min per trial)
  - 2 mission routes x 2 display configurations
- Pilot task
  - Maintain safety of aircraft along pre-filed flight path
    - Manually respond to DAA and RA guidance from Xu
  - Coordinate with center controller as appropriate
  - Respond to scripted chat messages and system failure events
- Ownship configuration
  - Generic MQ-9 model
  - Cruise speed: 160 KIAS
  - Climb/descent rate: 1,000 fpm
  - Turn rate: 3° per second





- Data from an engineering analysis showed pilots (with the GCS under test) could not meet the desired response times for initial (5 sec) and subsequent RAs (2.5 sec)
  - Particularly slow to respond to horizontal & blended RAs
  - Pilots were no quicker in responding to subsequent RAs
- As a result, for this study an RA 'auto-fill' feature was used to reduce RA response times
  - RA target heading/default vert. speed was automatically entered into the GCS; pilot had to click "Send" button to confirm and upload the maneuver



#### Engineering Analysis RA Response Times



- Subjective feedback from the engineering analysis indicated pilots had a particular preference for the order in which blended RAs should be issued aurally:
  - Ex. with initial <u>horizontal</u> RA followed X seconds later by a <u>vertical</u> RA:
    - First aural alert: "Turn Right" x2
    - Second aural alert:
      - If target heading *not* yet achieved: "Turn Right and Climb" x2
      - If target heading already achieved: "Climb and Maintain Heading" x2
  - Ex. with initial <u>vertical</u> RA followed X seconds later by a <u>horizontal</u> RA:
    - First aural alert: "Descend" x2
    - Second aural alert:
      - If vertical speed not yet achieved: "Descend and Turn Left" x2
      - If vertical speed already achieved: "Turn Left and Maintain Vertical Speed" x2
- Subjective feedback also indicated that pilots did not find a text box containing RA information necessary
  - Did not include a text box in this study also made redundant by the auto-fill behavior



- In the process of integrating Run 5 for this study, we determined it was necessary to make a few display-side modifications:
- Early testing showed that the target headings during horizontal RAs could change as frequently as 1 Hz
  - For pilot acceptability purposes, we capped the target heading update rate to 5 sec
  - Due to frequency of updates even with this display mod, we did not aurally annunciate new target headings
    - FAA has made clear, however, that these updates **will need to be annunciated aurally**
- The GCS converted Xu's native DAA vertical speed guidance to discrete DAA altitude bands using a very simple formula
  - SC-228 requires RWC/DAA vertical guidance to be shown in altitudes if the GCS cannot upload vertical rates
  - The conversion **did not** take ownship's vertical rate performance into account




# ACAS Xu Alerting Logic

| Symbol | Name                        | Pilot Action   | Aural Alert<br>Verbiage  |
|--------|-----------------------------|--|--|
| A      | Resolution<br>Advisory (RA) | <ul> <li><i>Immediate action required to comply</i></li> <li>Must upload maneuver within 5 seconds</li> <li>Notify ATC after maneuver</li> </ul> | "Climb/Descend" x2<br>"Turn Left/Right" x2<br>or as shown on earlier slide |
|        | Corrective<br>DAA Alert     | <ul> <li>Action required to remain 'DAA well clear'</li> <li>Coordinate with ATC prior to maneuvering</li> </ul>                                 | "Traffic, Avoid"   |
|        | Preventive<br>DAA Alert     | <ul> <li>No action required</li> <li>Generating peripheral guidance bands</li> <li>Monitor for potential increase in severity</li> </ul>         | "Traffic, Monitor"   |
|        | Guidance<br>Traffic         | <ul> <li>No action required</li> <li>Ownship maneuvers against traffic might generate increase in threat level</li> </ul>                        | N/A  |
| ۵      | "Other"                     | <ul> <li>No action required</li> <li>No coordination required</li> </ul>   | N/A  |



#### Non-Coop Encounter Example

Pilot coordinates during Corrective DAA Alert for 16 sec, then complies with 6 horizontal RAs.





• 6 scripted encounters per scenario:

| Scripted Threat Type     | Non-Cooperative<br>(RADAR Only) | Cooperative<br>(ADS-B & RADAR) |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Corrective DAA Alert     | 1                               | 3                              |
| Resolution Advisory (RA) | 1                               | 1                              |


- "Forced" RAs were executed differently depending on intruder equipage:
  - <u>Cooperative</u> forced RAs were triggered by a late intruder climb/descent into ownship (i.e., a 'blunder')
  - <u>Non-cooperative</u> forced RAs were triggered by the intruder popping-up on the scope
    - Could not consistently force immediate non-coop RAs through blunders due to sensor noise
- NOTE: non-cooperative Corrective DAA encounter was head-on intruder at 140kts; resulted in high closure rate



# **REMAIN WELL CLEAR (RWC) RESULTS**




- Display Configuration Variable
  - No difference in aircraft response times between Standalone and Integrated display conditions
  - Overall aircraft response times nearly identical to the **Phase 1** V&V HITL




#### Aircraft response time – elapsed time from alert to first maneuver upload



- Intruder Equipage Variable
  - Aircraft response times to non-cooperative intruders in this study were ~5 seconds faster than:
    - Cooperatives intruders in this study
    - Both coop & non-coop intruders in the Phase 1 sim
  - Limited RADAR range (6.7nm) resulted in shortened Corrective alert durations (avg. 16 seconds) for non-cooperatives
    - 37 of 65 (57%) non-coops progressed to RA before pilot could maneuver



Non-Coop RWC Encounter Outcomes




No RWC maneuver made before RA
 RWC maneuver, followed by RA
 RWC maneuver, no RA



## DAA WELL CLEAR PERFORMANCE



- Higher proportions of LoDWC for non-cooperatives
  - Similar to separation performance against Phase 1's blunder encounters
  - Pilots were typically unable to begin their RWC/DAA maneuver before RA was issued
    - Short-duration Corrective alerts (~16 sec duration)
  - On average, non-cooperative RAs were issued closer to CPA compared to cooperatives
- LoDWC severity (SLoWC) was extremely low against both equipages
  - Lower than SLoWC values observed in Phase 1
  - Aided by auto-filled directive guidance before LoDWC



**DWC Criteria:** HorzSep = 4000ft, VertSep = 450ft, modTau = 35sec



- 9 total LoDWC against <u>cooperative</u> Corrective DAA threats
  - 6/9 were cases where the altitude guidance showed a climb/descent was safe when that was not the case
    - Issue: simply converting vertical speeds to altitude bands made it appear that larger altitude displacements were safe, when the guidance was really saying a higher climb/descent rate was safe
      - The display should have saturated the altitude bands with Corrective guidance as soon as the vertical rate guidance exceeded ±1000fpm (the simulated default vertical rate)
  - 1/9 return to course too soon
  - 1/9 ineffective pilot maneuver
  - 1/9 long ATC coordination time (frequency congestion)





### **RA RESULTS**




#### **RA Results Summary**

- 207 Total RA Encounters
  - 61% were the scripted, "Forced" RAs
    - 1 coop & 1 non-coop per trial
  - Remaining 39% were "Unscripted" RAs
    - i.e., intruder first appeared as Corrective DAA alert and progressed to an RA
    - Twice as many Unscripted RAs observed for non-cooperative encounters






- 26% included both a horizontal and vertical sense
- Remaining 7% were exclusively vertical
  - All "Unscripted" RAs against cooperatives
    - Typically following a DAA maneuver






- Initial RA
  - Avg. RT = 2.89sec
  - 97% of times under the 5 second response time requirement
- Subsequent RAs
  - Avg. RT = 2.68sec
  - 70% of times under the 2.5 second response time requirement




RA Response Time by Sequence and Display Config



#### **RA Response Time Cumulative Distribution**




- Multiple RA target heading updates were common for each given RA encounter
  - Avg. of 4-5 target headings per horizontal RA
    - This is with the target heading update rate capped at 5 sec
  - Simultaneous horizontal and vertical updates were rare
  - Vertical RAs were often appended to the end of a horizontal RA sequence (e.g., the 4<sup>th</sup> or 5<sup>th</sup> update), creating a blended RA





- Pilots complied less often with target heading updates
  - Initial RA compliance = 88-98%
  - Subsequent RA compliance = 51%
  - NOTE: pilots were still in their turn when receiving the updated target heading, so they were still complying with the general directive to turn right/left
- Reminder: we did not issue aural alert for each target heading update
  - Feedback regarding 'non-compliance': "Already headed that direction"
- Similar compliance trends between "Forced" & "Unscripted" RAs



Horizontal RA Compliance Rate by Encounter Type



- Pilots complied with vertical RAs at a consistently high rate
  - 94% (64/68) overall compliance
    - 85% compliance rate when it was *vertical-only* 
      - Occasionally recommended initial climb/descent that was already in progress
    - 96% compliance with vertical RAs added to an existing horizontal RA
      - i.e., creating a blended offset RA
    - 95% compliance when vertical and horizontal were issued simultaneously



## SUBJECTIVE FEEDBACK

- Integrated configuration was heavily preferred
  - Standalone was manageable but not ideal
- Horizontal RA updates were considered excessive
  - #1 reason for non-compliance
    - Rated as manageable, but undesirable
- Alerting and guidance rated as intuitive
  - Positive feedback on visual and aural RA presentation
  - Pilots did not desire an aural for every new target heading this would be mitigated if the logic were updated to included fewer updates
- Did not think the addition of a text box would have been helpful
  - Likely influence by the auto-fill behavior, which provided the target RA value
- Auto-fill functionality was deemed necessary



### Notes on ATC

- Did not have a structured interview/questionnaire with our 2 confederate ATC in this study
  - Controllers had participated in prior UAS HITL research and were very familiar with these types of operations
  - <u>Informally</u>, the confederate controllers indicated that the UAS operations were acceptable
  - This is consistent with past confederate ATC feedback on UAS DAA maneuvering
    - DAA warnings like RAs require UAS pilots to maneuver horizontally and/or vertically *without coordinating* with ATC prior to their maneuver
    - Controllers have indicated that this is acceptable, especially against noncooperative intruders, since the priority is the safety of the aircraft at these distances



- No effect of Integrated vs Standalone on pilot performance
  - Strong subjective preference for Integrated display
  - Consistent with Phase 1 findings
- Remain Well Clear / DAA
  - Comparable response times to the Phase 1 DAA study
  - Pilots maintained DWC at a high rate against cooperative intruders
    - Would have been better with appropriate conversion of RWC vertical speed guidance to altitude guidance - i.e., saturate altitude bands if vertical rate bands exceed default vertical rate
  - LoDWC rates went up considerably against non-cooperatives
    - Result of shorter RDR relative to Phase 1 (6.7nm vs 8nm) and only including high closure rate non-coop encounter type in this study
- Resolution Advisories
  - Effective at limiting severity of DWC violations (lower SLoWC than Phase 1)
  - Auto-fill function enabled pilots to largely meet the desired RA response times while remaining in the loop
  - High compliance rates to vertical RAs and <u>initial</u> horizontal RAs (~95%)
    - Pilots failed to keep up with target heading updates (often intentionally) because they were in their turn while the heading target fluctuated



 In late 2019 we integrated Run 5.1 into our lab and ran each of the two Xu HITL traffic scenarios twice with a researcher inthe-loop

= 8 total "scripted" RAs (4 coop & 4 non-coop)

= 4 total "unscripted" RAs (all non-coop)

 Researcher waited ~15sec to respond to Corrective alerts & ~3 sec to respond to RAs

No background traffic/ATC in the loop


- Provided a quick-and-dirty look at differences between Run 5.1 vs Run 5 logic
  - Also allowed us to dig into new data that we did not prioritize for the full HITL



- Focused on the 2 primary, display-related effects of the Xu logic:
- 1. <u>Frequency of RA target heading updates</u> pilots in the HITL found the rate of updates frustrating/unnecessary
  - Run 5.1 implemented logic similar to the display-side logic that was implemented in the HITL:
    - New logic restricts updates to no more than every 5 sec and requires the current heading to be within 23deg of target heading
- 2. <u>Horizontal-vertical DAA band alignment</u> observed during HITL that Corrective vertical bands would intercept ownship altitude earlier and remain longer than horizontal bands
  - Were not able to extract that data from the HITL but did collect it here for reference
  - NOTE: we did not see evidence that this impacted pilot performance in the HITL, and subjectively, pilots did not indicate that it was a problem
    - Regardless there should be some DAG input on this behavior




- Fewer target heading updates in Run 5.1 compared to Run 5
  - 3-4 headings per RA vs. 4-5
  - More time spent in initial RA stage (next slide)
- Vertical/blended RAs were still relatively rare overall and happened later in the RA sequence



#### Run 5.1 RA Frequency




- ~11 seconds elapsed between the initial RA and first target heading update
  - Substantial improvement over Run 5 which typically updated every 5 sec
- ~4-5 seconds elapsed between subsequent RAs
  - Similar to Run 5
  - Note: 5-second update rate applied to weakening horizontal RAs only



#### Duration Between RA Updates (sec)




 Logic appears to use the first target heading update to increase the heading magnitude and then reduces the size with the second update





- <u>Early vertical DAA banding</u> = how long did vertical DAA corrective banding intersect ownship's altitude prior to the horizontal banding doing the same (thus generating an alert)
  - Most prevalent during cooperative encounters
  - Exceeded 5 sec in 11/24 cases
  - Avg. duration of 5 sec
- <u>Late vertical DAA banding</u> = how long did vertical DAA corrective banding persist after the horizontal banding had disappeared (i.e., Clear of Conflict)
  - Longest duration during cooperative encounters
    - Exceeded 5 sec in all cases; considerable variability
  - Avg. duration of 20 sec





- Pilots performed very well with ACAS Xu Run 5
  - High favorability ratings regarding how the DAA & RA alerting and guidance was presented
  - Responses to DAA guidance & rates of LoDWC consistent with Phase 1 work
  - Pilots' quick responses to RAs led to very low severities of LoDWC
- Potential quality of life improvements remain mainly around the issue of target heading updates and horizontal-vertical DAA band alignment:
- A larger initial target heading for horizontal RAs could reduce the need to issue updates and would add stability from the pilots' perspective
  - Even with Run 5.1, the 2<sup>nd</sup> & 3<sup>rd</sup> updates came in quick succession (~5 sec)
- Run 5.1 still had an issue with holding on to vertical DAA bands long after a DAA corrective alert had been removed



# **HITL QUESTIONS?**

kevin.j.monk@nasa.gov

conrad.rorie@nasa.gov