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


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**Partisan Infighting among House Republicans:
Leaders, Factions, and Networks of Interests**

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Abstract

Congressional parties are commonly regarded as highly unified legislative teams, but the Tea Party Caucus has revealed factional divisions within the Republican Party. Using annual ratings from 290 interest groups, we estimate the ideological locations of Republican legislators to map their party's factional structure. We project a bipartite network of annual scores to relate interest groups by the similarity of their ratings and legislators by the similarity in which they have been rated. Cluster analysis identifies factions of moderate and extreme Republicans. Further investigation shows that Republican leaders withhold legislative rewards from both subgroups, but that moderates are denied disproportionately.

Historically high levels of partisan polarization in Congress have encouraged scholars to view each party as ideologically homogenous (see e.g., Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Poole and Rosenthal 2007; Roberts and Smith 2003; Rohde 1991). But the sudden rise of Tea Party Republicans in Congress, especially in the House, has challenged this understanding of the two legislative parties. Launched in 2010, the Tea Party Caucus adopted hardline, populist positions that many congressional Republicans opposed (Evans 2014; Mann and Ornstein 2012). When the party took control of the House in 2011, it struggled, as a result, to advance a legislative agenda that satisfied a broad majority of its members. The Republican Party was still comprised of conservatives who uniformly opposed Democratic priorities, but its members disagreed over major budgetary issues and split on the most salient floor votes. As one observer concluded, “Today’s Republican Party is an assemblage of tribes with no real leader” (Sullivan 2013).

The Tea Party’s repeated defiance of the Republican agenda has renewed scholarly interest in factions and the ideological composition of congressional parties (e.g., Gallagher and Rock 2012; Gervais and Morris 2012). But there are no established quantitative methods for identifying and measuring the size of intraparty groups in Congress. Consequently, the congressional literature has overlooked a number of important questions. How does the factional structure of the majority affect its legislative agenda? How do majority-party leaders manage and respond to conflicting factions within their caucus? Do they reward or punish members of various ideological subgroups? In this paper, we present a method for detecting multiple factions within the congressional parties, and we examine leadership strategies for maintaining unity within an ideologically divided party. We focus our analysis primarily on House Republicans because, among other factors, the Tea Party’s disobedience provides an ideal opportunity to examine the dynamics of partisan infighting.

To determine the ideological composition of congressional parties, we examine the collection of interest groups that align with each caucus. Our assumption, following the early insights of Schattschneider (1960) and Truman (1951), as well as more recent observations by Bawn et al. (2012), among others, is that the congressional parties manage a coalition of interests with intense and, at times, competing preferences. These coalitions, potentially, reveal the ideological makeup of each party. Examining the period from the 107th to the 112th Congress (2001-2012), we use annual interest-group scores from a large, diverse set of organizations to estimate the ideological locations of House members and to map the factional structure of the parties. Specifically, we create a two-mode network relating interest groups and their annual ratings of all House members. We project this two-mode network to create two separate single-mode networks: 1) where interest groups are related by the similarity in which they score House members, and 2) where legislators are related by the similarity in which they have been rated by interest groups. Then, using a hierarchical clustering algorithm on a correlation matrix of similarities between actors, we identify ideological factions within each party.

Our analysis shows that interest groups mainly cluster into two broad camps, split along liberal-conservative lines. Democratic legislators tend to be rated highly by social-justice groups, pro-choice advocates, and labor unions; Republicans tend to be rated highly by corporate interests, anti-tax groups, and pro-life organizations. Although we find clear evidence of partisan polarization, we also find strong indications of internal party divisions. Notably, within the House Republican caucus, we detect a moderately conservative, a solidly conservative, and extremely conservative faction. Each one is rated favorably by a different subset of interest groups, and each one predates the Tea Party Caucus. Based on the distribution of interest-group support across the Republican Party, we infer that the moderate faction partly reflects blue-collar

concerns, that the mainstream faction largely represents corporate preferences, and that the extreme faction readily stands for anti-immigrant and antigovernment positions.

After identifying these party factions, we see whether Republican leaders in the majority restrain or otherwise penalize legislators based on their factional affiliations. In particular, we see whether leaders block bills sponsored by members of certain factions at both the committee and floor stages. Our findings show that Republican leaders limit the legislative influence of both moderate and extreme subgroups in order to retain agenda control for themselves. But our findings also indicate that Republican leaders are most likely to deny legislative victories to members of the moderately conservative, worker-oriented faction. We surmise that, in a highly polarized chamber, majority-party leaders block bills by moderates for fear that such measures might gain support from the minority and pass against the objections of most majority members. Bills by the extreme faction do not represent this same risk and are not set aside as often. That said, we do find that Republican leaders block the extreme faction's tax, spending, and immigration bills—the very measures that represent the group's top priorities. Overall, while our study offers a new technique for identifying ideological subgroups and measuring party disunity, it also, importantly, provides insights into agenda control by majority-party leaders.

In the next two sections of this paper, we discuss competing views of the congressional parties and explain why they are best understood as networks of policy interests. We then consider how majority-party leaders work to minimize caucus rifts and subdue intraparty factions, and we offer several predictions on leadership strategies. Next, we discuss our method for detecting ideological subgroups, and we report the results of our network analysis. After detecting these subgroups, we then test and confirm our hypotheses on bill control by majority Republican leaders. To conclude, we suggest new research questions on intraparty divisions.

Conceptions of Parties and Factions

Broadly speaking, there are two competing views on the organization and behavior of congressional parties. The most prominent asserts that the two parties operate as legislative teams composed of likeminded members who consistently take policy positions that differ from their partisan rivals (e.g., Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Gerring 1998; Grynaviski 2010). Republicans are conservative and seen as the party of big business, while Democrats are liberal and considered the party of the working class. The second view holds that parties are best understood as complex political organizations that manage a coalition of interest groups with intense policy preferences (e.g., Bawn et al. 2012; Karol 2009; Noel 2013; Schattschneider 1960; Truman 1951). This view emphasizes the challenges that party leaders face in trying to satisfy coalition members who often have competing demands. For example, the Democratic Party has a long history of representing the interests of both environmentalists and labor unions, even though these groups have conflicting goals over industrial policy. At times, then, each party contains factions of legislators who represent different interests, pursue goals at odds with the rest of their caucus, and attempt to reshape their party's agenda (DiSalvo 2012; Reiter 2004).

Although seemingly contradictory, these two views of congressional parties may not be incompatible. A highly coordinated team will have members whose preference do not align on all major issues, and a factious party can advance legislative goals that most members will support in order to minimize internal policy disputes. Congressional parties can thus have ideological divisions and still project reasonably coherent electoral brands.

Despite the compatibility of the two views, the conception of parties as cohesive legislative teams has dominated congressional research. In part, the prominence of one-dimensional spatial models has encouraged scholars to focus extensively on the differences

between the parties and oversimplify the configuration of each party (Aldrich et al. 2014). The field's most widely used roll-call scaling methods—including NOMINATE and IDEAL—estimate ideological preferences of members along a single dimension.¹ These methods, as a result, are better at capturing the divisions between parties than the ideological composition of each party (Poole and Rosenthal 2007, 55-57; Noel 2013, 15).² Efforts to estimate ideal points in multidimensional settings have provided relatively complex depictions of the parties, but these investigations have examined caucus divisions on only a narrow subset of bills (Jeong 2008; Jeong et al. 2011).

Research that examines congressional factions, meanwhile, has relied on qualitative analysis to trace the fluctuating influence of key intraparty groups, such as Dixiecrats, Blue Dogs, and Progressive Republicans (DiSalvo 2012; see also Polsby 2004). Drawing upon historical records, this literature charts the development and maneuvers of intraparty factions over long periods.³ But without a consistent method for identifying members of each partisan subunit, this research has struggled to determine the size and strength of factions—and thus the level of intraparty disunity—with much precision. It has also been unable to identify the most common and effective strategies used by party leaders to quell subgroups and prevent them from overtaking the party's agenda. Qualitative examinations of parties have enabled researchers to raise and tackle questions otherwise neglected by the congressional field. However, without systematic data, their answers have provided uneven insights into parties and factions.

In sum, the methodological choices of scholars have largely determined whether they understand legislative parties as cohesive teams or factional organizations. Most likely they function in both capacities. To date, scholars have failed to develop a rigorous, quantitative

approach that captures both the polarization of the two parties and the ideological complexity of each party. A major focus of this paper is to present such a method.

Networks of Policy Interests

If we view legislative parties as coalitions of interests, we can determine the ideological composition of the two parties by examining the collection of interest groups that align with each caucus. Admittedly, some powerful interest groups, such as the financial-services lobby, provide campaign contributions to both Democratic and Republican members (McCarty et al. 2013). But the polarization of the two congressional parties has been mirrored generally by the polarization of interest groups. In particular, groups that rate legislators based on their voting records have increasingly split into two distinct partisan camps, with liberal groups largely supporting Democrats and conservative groups mostly supporting Republicans (McCarty et al. 2006, 17). This trend suggests that the two parties represent and work on behalf of opposing interests.

Although they share some important priorities, interest groups aligned with the same party may have different ideological allies within the party's ranks. Conservative interests, for example, may generally favor reductions in public programs, leading them to support the overall Republican agenda. Even so, because each group has its unique policy goals that distinguish it from the rest of the conservative coalition, each one will presumably favor Republican legislators who work hardest to advance the group's narrow policy objectives. If so, we can identify intraparty factions by tracking the level of support or approval legislators receive from different interest groups within the same partisan coalition. That is, we can see whether a subset of interest groups coalesces around a subset of party members. We expect such alignments to be rather prevalent because faction members, seeking to raise their influence within a party, often establish connections with prominent interest groups (DiSalvo 2010). Moreover, by examining ties

between legislators and special interests, we adopt a strategy that can potentially detect multiple factions within a single caucus. Differences among interest groups in the same coalition may reveal complex factional structures in the congressional parties.

In the methods section, we discuss how interest-group ratings of legislators can be used to identify intraparty factions. For now, we simply note our agreement with Koger et al. that social network analysis is “especially useful for studying political parties and interest groups since these actors are best understood as networks of co-operating allies” (2009, 634).

Leadership Responses to Factions

Emerging and established factions seek to alter the ideological identity of their party and, in doing so, work against their party’s leaders whose primary mission is to defend and enhance the party brand. Faction members often vote against the party line and propose bills intended to challenge the party platform, thereby exposing significant divisions within the caucus (DiSalvo 2012). Although leaders of both parties have incentives to bolster their party’s unity, only leaders of the House majority have the necessary resources to minimize internal disputes and subdue factions. With control over the legislative agenda, majority-party leaders bring bills to the floor that, above all, are intended to unify rank-and-file members (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).

However, they can also use the floor agenda to grant and withhold rewards in ways that encourage party discipline, advancing bills sponsored by loyal party members and blocking bills drafted and supported by disruptive members. Multiple bills are commonly introduced in Congress that cover the same issues and that effectively propose the same policy solutions. At times, majority-party leaders can pick and choose which version of a bill, if any, they decide to move forward, with the leeway to select measures from one faction over the other.

Consistent denial of legislative rewards can be highly punitive because, without a clear record of accomplishment, members struggle to serve constituents and win reelection (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). Majority-party leaders therefore need to exercise some restraint when they manage competing factions; otherwise, they could harm the electoral chances of their own members and help the minority gain new seats. Faction members may expose and exacerbate divisions within the majority—and undermine the party’s reputation in the process—but they are still more likely to vote for the majority’s bills than are minority legislators. Furthermore, if leaders block all proposals offered by faction members, it may encourage them to switch parties or, in extraordinary cases, establish a new party. Either way, such action would jeopardize the party’s majority status and fundamentally damage its brand (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 44).

At the same time, if majority-party leaders do not block bills by faction members, they risk bringing measures to the floor that will only exacerbate party divisions. Leaders likely recognize that they must strike a balance between blocking and advancing faction bills to encourage partisan unity. In order to achieve this balance, majority-party leaders may adopt a strategy of accommodation, in which they distribute relatively minor rewards to many or most faction members regardless of their disobedience (Sinclair 1981; Westfield 1974). This strategy may entice some faction members to demonstrate greater loyalty to the party in hope of gaining additional benefits. More important, the distribution of small rewards provides faction members with modest resources for reelection, and helps leaders defend the party’s majority status without giving undue support to the most disruptive members of the caucus.

The strategies of restraining and accommodating factions are not mutually exclusive. On one hand, majority-party leaders can withhold key rewards from most faction members to

prevent them from dividing the party and yet, on the other hand, they can provide minimal assistance to these same members for electoral reasons. Majority-party leaders, then, must maintain a difficult balance between restriction and reward, so that efforts to bolster the party's unity do not undermine the party's majority status.

Both Democratic and Republican leaders, in responding to factions, are likely to adopt this dual strategy. In the next sections, however, we develop hypotheses specific to House Republicans because of our study's timeframe and because of the special circumstances that the Tea Party Caucus has created. Currently, only the Republican Party has a faction of legislators who are supported by well-funded, ideologically driven activist groups with heavy policy demands (Grossman and Hopkins 2015).

Maintaining Party Unity

When setting the legislative agenda, majority-party leaders seek to enhance the party's electoral chances and maintain the party's unity. Except under exceptional circumstances, they only bring legislation to the floor that a "majority of the majority party" supports. Any bills that threaten to divide the caucus and damage the majority's record of accomplishment are therefore blocked. For this reason, legislative output in the House largely depends on the level of agreement over policy within the majority caucus. Leaders bring more bills to the floor as the majority becomes increasingly homogenous, and they reduce the legislative agenda as the majority becomes increasingly heterogeneous (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2002).

The factional structure of the majority party very likely affects agenda setting by leaders. Members in a factional party hold diverse preferences, represent disparate interests and constituencies, and make competing demands over legislative priorities. Leaders who manage a party comprised of multiple factions must consider not only which factions to satisfy and to what

degree, but also whether acquiescence to one faction will spark conflict with another. The easiest way to maintain party unity under such conditions is to narrow the agenda and advance only legislative items that satisfy a majority across party divisions. The more factionalized the majority is, the fewer the bills leaders will bring to the floor.

H1: During Republican majority control, an increase in the number of Republican factions will be associated with a decrease in the number of bills passed in the House.

Withholding Rewards

Not all factions pose an equal threat to majority-party cohesion, even though all factions seek to alter their party's overall ideological position. Moderate subgroups strive to pull their caucus toward the center of the policy space, whereas extreme groups seek to pull their party toward an ideological pole (DiSalvo 2012). Of the two, moderate groups pose a greater threat to the majority's agenda and unity, because they have preferences close to the minority's side of the policy space and incentives to offer bills that attract minority support. Potentially, a moderate faction could work with minority-party legislators to pass measures opposed by the rest of the majority caucus, creating even greater internal divisions and harming the majority's reputation as an effective legislative team. With an overriding need to block moderate factions and their bipartisan activities, majority-party leaders will work with "senior partners," especially committee chairs, to prevent bills from leaving committee and reaching the House floor (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 9).

While moderate subgroups pose similar strategic challenges to Democratic and Republican leaders, the asymmetric polarization of the Republican Party likely makes its leaders especially hostile to moderate legislative efforts (Grossman and Hopkins 2015; Mann and Ornstein 2012). Conservative Republican members—representing extreme, often uncompromising interests—are unlikely to support leaders who periodically allow moderate bills to reach, let alone pass, the

House floor. We thus expect Republican House leaders to use their gatekeeping powers primarily against their party's moderate subgroups.

H2a: Republican members of ideologically moderate factions will have fewer bills reported out of committee than other majority-party members.

H2b: Republican members of ideologically moderate factions will have fewer bills pass the House than other majority-party members.

Accommodating Factions

Extreme subgroups in the majority have no ideological overlap with minority legislators, and therefore have few, if any, incentives to collaborate across party lines. Bills offered by extreme faction members, however, may split the majority in some cases, if the rest of the caucus finds the legislation too ideological. For majority-party leaders, simply blocking extreme, caucus-splitting bills may not preserve party unity. Unlike moderate factions, whose bills are at odds with the majority's platform, extreme factions often propose bills that represent uncompromising versions of the majority's agenda items. To routinely kill these bills at the prefloor stage may trigger a backlash not only by members of the extreme faction, but also by activists and interest groups that demand the majority adopt ideologically pure positions. Again, because of asymmetric polarization, this concern over a backlash by ideologues is greatest within the Republican Party (Grossman and Hopkins 2015).

That means Republican House leaders must develop a strategy that accommodates the extreme faction within their party and yet prevents the faction's most ideological bills from reaching the floor. To accomplish these conflicting goals, leaders can press committee chairs to usher extreme-faction bills out of committee and, at the same time, they can prevent many of these same bills from receiving floor consideration. A bill reported out of committee represents a significant accomplishment, since most members see only a small percentage of their bills

undergo and survive panel deliberations (Volden and Wiseman 2014, 26). So Republican leaders can give their party's extreme faction legislative victories that help its members satisfy, or at least partly satisfy, their activist base. But leaders can also use their blocking power to ensure faction victories at the committee stage have little impact on the floor agenda.

H3a: Republican members of extreme conservative factions will have more bills reported out of committee than other majority-party legislators.

H3b: Republican members of extreme conservative factions will have fewer bills pass the House than other majority-party legislators.

Data and Methods

Before we can test our predictions, we need to determine whether the House Republican Party contains distinct ideological factions. In other words, we need to identify stable subsets of Republican legislators whose preferences, on an array of policy issues, differ consistently from most other members in their party. To detect intraparty factions and their members, we develop a novel approach that uses annual interest-group scores of legislators. As noted above, we focus our analysis on the Republican Party primarily for substantive reasons. But we also face some data restrictions that shape our study. Since the minority often opposes majority bills for political rather than ideological reasons, it is difficult to identify meaningful divisions within the minority party based exclusively on floor votes (Dion 1997; Lee 2009). And since Democrats had majority control for only two Congresses in our study, we lack a sufficient timeframe for determining whether observed disunity in the Democratic Party reflects stable factional groupings.⁴

To begin, we collect annual interest-group ratings of legislators from 290 organizations, compiled and made available by Project Vote Smart (2015). We gather data from so many groups because, in order to identify intraparty divisions, we need to see how legislators are

evaluated by a large, diverse set of interests, reflecting a range of ideological priorities and representing a mix of narrow and broad policy concerns. Additionally, studies that rely on ratings by only a handful of groups tend to see a bimodal distribution of legislators that simply captures the split between parties, not the differences within them (Snyder 1992, 319).

With these interest-group scores, we construct a bipartite network composed of interest groups and House members.⁵ In this network, both interest groups and legislators are treated as nodes, and every group has a tie to every legislator. The weight of a tie is determined by the mean-centered rating an interest group gives to each member between 0 and 100. With this bipartite network in place, we then project two separate networks. The first network projection relates legislators to one another based on the similarity in which they have been rated by interest groups. The second projection relates interest groups by how similarly they have rated legislators. We then apply a hierarchical clustering algorithm to examine the community structure of both networks and to detect factions (for early examples of this approach in social networks, see Burt 1976, 1978).

This approach captures actors who are structurally equivalent due to the similarity in ideological ties they maintain with different interest groups (Knoke 1994; Wasserman and Faust 1994). The conceptual importance of structural equivalence in network theory is built upon the intuition that actors in a social network with similar ties to others will tend to have similar beliefs and outlooks (for an overview, see Wasserman and Faust 1994). We use interest-group ratings of House members in place of social ties to capture the similarity of legislators across multiple issues. In essence, we use the reputations legislators have developed through their support of various policy issues over time, in order to infer underlying ideological similarities between groups of legislators.

What follows is a description of how the bipartite network relating interest groups and legislators is projected into a network relating legislators to one another. To capture the similarity of ratings for each legislator relative to all other legislators, we create an adjacency matrix containing the correlations between interest-group scores of each member. The rows and columns of the adjacency matrix are legislators. This correlation matrix is symmetric, with each cell containing the correlation coefficient of similarity for each member represented on the row and column of the matrix. By definition, the main diagonal of the matrix is one. In calculating the correlation between two members, we drop cases where an interest group has not rated both members. However, for each session of Congress in our study, the coverage across legislators is very nearly complete for 144 interest groups. To ensure consistency, we use a minimum of 80 interest-group ratings common to both legislators in order to calculate a correlation between them.⁶ Our approach for identifying clusters of similar legislators is also used to detect clusters of similar interest groups.

[Figure 1 about here]

Two stylized networks are displayed as examples. Figure 1 shows the cluster analysis applied to interest groups, in which two factions representing traditional liberal and conservative issues are clearly depicted. This finding is consistent with existing studies on the ideological positions and polarization of interest groups using different data and techniques (McKay 2010).

[Figure 2 about here]

The other network projection relates House members by the similarity of their ideological preferences. To measure ideological similarity, we calculate Spearman's correlation coefficient between each member's vector of interest-group ratings. The result is a network relating similarly rated individuals to one another. Then, as noted above, we apply a hierarchical

clustering algorithm to this correlation matrix (Dong and Horvath 2007; Ranola et al. 2013). Figure 2 show ties between ideologically similar House members for the 112th Congress. The detected clusters are highlighted, and a simplified group-level network is overlaid in blue and red (representing the Democratic and Republican parties). Again, the process of generating the interest-group projection is identical to that used for the legislator network.

Cluster Analysis Results

For each Congress in our study (the 107th to 112th), we apply the clustering analysis to determine the similarities between legislators based on the ratings they received from all interest groups. Importantly, this approach takes into account all ratings that are similar, whether similarly high or similarly low. For example, two legislators would be considered similar if both consistently received high scores from one set of groups or low scores from a different set of groups. This method does not necessarily identify institutionalized factions (such as formal party caucuses). Rather, it detects factions based on the policy preferences of legislators, revealed by their voting history on key issues as defined by each interest group.

The cluster analysis shows that the parties are polarized and comprised of multiple factions. We find that the House Republican Party contains three major subgroups in most, but not all, Congresses in our period of study. Because of electoral turnover and exogenous events that affect the policy agenda, majority-party unity—and thus the number of detected factions—varies over time. This variation is in keeping with other research that has sought to identify network communities within and between congressional parties (Waugh et al. 2012).

Although our analysis identifies ideological differences between intraparty groups, it does not reveal what these ideological differences are. For this reason, we look for a significant trend in average first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores among the detected subgroups in

every Congress under investigation (Poole and Rosenthal 2007). Using a non-parametric test of trends across ordered groups, based on the Wilcoxon rank sum test (Cuzick 1985), we find that the mean NOMINATE score for each faction differs and follows a trend from moderate Republicans to increasingly conservative Republicans. Based on these scores, we conclude that the Republican Party contains a moderate conservative faction, a mainstream conservative faction, and an extreme conservative faction.

[Figure 3 about here]

Figure 3 shows an alluvial plot, or flow diagram, that tracks the changes in the number and composition of detected factions over time (Rosvall and Bergstrom 2007). The rectangles in the plot represent detected factions while the smoothed lines represent how members in detected factions have flowed between these clusters. The plot shows factions ordered according to the average NOMINATE score, with the more moderate Republican factions aligned higher on the vertical axis and the more extreme conservative factions lower on the vertical axis. Note that the plot, as currently displayed, does not provide the absolute position of the clusters according to NOMINATE. Instead, each column is ordered according to each faction's average NOMINATE score.

Defining Party Subgroups

Simply arranging factions in ideological order provides limited insight into each subgroup's composition. To note the presence of an extreme Republican faction does not tell us in what way, or on what policy dimensions, the group is extreme—especially compared with the rest of its party. We therefore examine, qualitatively, the interests that underlie the different factions between and within the parties. Here we have space to provide only a brief summary of

our method and findings. The online appendix includes an extensive discussion and supporting evidence.

The logic of our analysis is straightforward. By identifying key interests that favor each faction, we infer what each party subgroup represents in broad policy terms. As a first step, we examine the fifteen interest groups in each Congress that provide the highest ratings to members within a given cluster. These lists indicate which interest groups have rated factions within parties similarly or differently across years. Differences between the parties are clearly evident. Democrats are generally rated highly by social-justice groups, pro-choice advocates, and labor unions, while Republicans are generally rated highly by corporate interests, anti-tax lobbies, and conservative religious organizations.

Within a party, the differences are more difficult to discern using this approach. As one might expect, multiple interest groups often provide high scores to the majority of legislators in the same party. That said, we do see that the mainstream conservative faction receives high ratings from many more business groups than other Republican factions. Across the years of our study, for example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of Independent Business provide favorable scores. A diverse set of corporate interests—including the tech sector, construction associations, and service- and retail-industry groups—also provide high ratings. Because of this support, we consider the core conservative subgroup to be the *mainstream, business faction* of the party.

To discern differences between the other Republican factions, we take the mean of the ratings given by all interest groups and subtract it from the mean within each detected faction. This mean-difference approach effectively removes the interest groups that rate factions

similarly across the party. Interest groups that differ between factions thus stand out, giving us a sense of how the intraparty groups are ideologically distinct.

At first glance, the mean-difference reports indicate important ideological overlap between the business faction and the extreme faction. Groups representing pro-gun, pro-life, and low-tax policies appear in both reports. However, a closer examination reveals that the extreme faction receives favorable scores from two types of organizations that set it apart from the mainstream, corporate faction: Tea Party affiliates and radical right-wing groups. The groups aligned with the Tea Party include Americans for Prosperity and FreedomWorks (Skocpol and Williamson 2012); the radical right-wing groups include the John Birch Society and the Gun Owners of America. Many of these groups have advocated policies that are hostile to minorities, especially immigrants (Parker and Barreto 2013). Additionally, while the anti-tax lobby supports both the pro-business and extreme Republican factions, we find that a higher number of these organizations rate the extreme subgroup favorably. We also find that, by the 112th Congress, anti-tax groups like the Club for Growth and the National Taxpayers Union are overwhelmingly supportive of the extreme Republican faction. Consistent support from this collection of interests suggests that, among party subgroups, the extreme faction holds positions that most accord with reactionary views and “starve the beast” fiscal conservatism. We therefore call this Republican group the *intolerant, antigovernment faction*.

As for the moderate conservative cluster, we find that it has comparatively little overlap with the other two Republican factions. Few business groups score it favorably, and no Tea Party or anti-immigrant groups give it high ratings. Looking at the mean-difference reports, we do find two types of organizations that differentiate this faction from the rest of the party: labor unions and pro-immigration groups. Among these interests, the two most prominent are the American

Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees and the National Council of La Raza. The presence of labor and Latino groups on the mean-difference reports is by no means contradictory; they not only hold similar views on immigration and labor issues, but they also work together to promote their common policy agenda (Lazo 1991). That these interests favor the moderate conservative faction suggestions that, among Republican subgroups, it best reflects the priorities of the working class and blue-collar workers. For this reason, we borrow an old term for worker-friending conservatives and dub this subgroup the *lunch pail Republican faction*.

To summarize, our analysis reveals that House Republican subgroups not only sit on different points of the conservative spectrum, but that they also represent distinct and competing conservative priorities. The moderate faction appears to be worker oriented; the mainstream faction appears to reflect corporate interests; and the extreme faction appears to represent a mix of nativist and antigovernment preferences.

Regression Models and Results

Having now identified the main Republican subgroups, we turn our attention to leadership strategies and develop models for testing our hypotheses. We want to determine whether membership in moderate and extreme subgroups diminishes the likelihood of Republican legislators seeing their bills reported out of committee and passing the House. Using data from the Congressional Bills Project (Adler and Wilkerson 2015), we construct two count dependent variables. The first is the number of bills a member sponsors that are reported out of committee; the second is the number of bills a member sponsors that pass the House.⁷ Commemorative bills are excluded from the analysis because they have negligible impact on a party's agenda (Cox and Terry 2008).

We derive several variables of interest from our cluster analysis to examine the effects of factional structure and affiliation on legislative success. Because we expect intraparty divisions to decrease the size of the majority's agenda, we construct the variable *Number of Factions* to indicate the number of ideological subgroups within the Republican Party for each Congress. We construct the dummy variable *Moderate Republican Faction* to denote whether a legislator belongs to the party's most moderate subgroup (with the lowest average NOMINATE score). And we create the dummy variable *Extreme Republican Faction* to indicate whether a legislator belongs to the most conservative subgroup (with the highest average NOMINATE score).⁸

Additionally, we include several control variables in our models. Using the number of bills that a legislator has sponsored in past years, we construct the variable *Previous Bills* to account for a member's legislative experience.⁹ Presumably, productive members will enjoy relatively high levels of bill success regardless of factional membership. We also include a *Leadership* variable to indicate whether a member holds a senior position, including speaker, leader, and whip, in either party. Because of their agenda-setting powers, majority-party leaders typically see their bills pass the House (Volden and Wiseman 2014).¹⁰ But membership in the majority accords legislative advantages even to the rank and file. For this reason, we follow Cox and Terry (2008) and create a *Majority Party* variable that indicates whether a member has majority or minority status; we then interact this dummy with all independent variables to determine the effect of majority status on a Republican member's bill success.¹¹ Although Congress dummies are commonly added to models to account for time, we do not include them here because they are highly correlated with our variables of interest. Instead, we add a time trend to the model to alleviate concerns of a systematic process affecting our results. Correlations among variables and summary statistics are reported in the appendix.

Because our dependent variables are counts of bills, we opt to use a negative binomial model to deal with overdispersed data (Cox and Terry 2008). Before conducting regression analyses, we check whether our two outcomes are highly correlated. A bill reported successfully out of committee has an increased likelihood of reaching and passing the House floor. Not surprisingly, we find a strong correlation between bills reported and bills passed ($r = 0.85$), suggesting that majority-party leaders often make joint decisions on a bill's success at the committee and floor stages. If so, conducting separate regressions for each dependent outcome might produce correlated errors and inefficient estimates. We therefore use a seemingly unrelated negative binomial regression model to generate parameter estimates.¹²

Table 1 displays the findings of the regression analysis. Column 1 shows the negative binomial output for the number of bills by members that are reported out of committee; column 2 presents results for the number of bills by members that pass the House. We expect that the number of factions in the Republican majority will be negatively associated with the number of bills passed in the House. We assume that Republican leaders decrease legislative output as subgroups increase in order to minimize policy disagreements among their party's rank and file. The coefficient for the interaction term between *Majority Party* and *Number of Factions* is negative and significant in the bill-passage model, confirming our first hypothesis. Indeed, the Republican majority passes fewer bills at the floor stage as it becomes increasingly divided.

[Table 1 about here]

We also expect that members of the moderate faction—the so-called lunch pail Republicans—will have fewer bills reported out of committee and fewer bills pass the House than their partisan colleagues. Majority Republican leaders, we argue, will frequently block legislation by moderates to prevent Democrats from providing decisive support to faction bills

and hijacking the agenda. In both equations, estimates for the interaction term between *Majority Party* and *Moderate Republican Faction* are negative and significant, clearly verifying our second set of hypotheses. Of note, estimates for the same variable are positive and significant when it is not interacted with the majority-party term. While moderate, lunch pail Republicans face legislative obstacles in times of majority Republican control, they appear to enjoy a relatively high degree of legislative success in periods of Democratic majority control. This increased success under Democrats indicates that these moderate lawmakers, given the opportunity, do make bipartisan deals. Their relatively high ratings from Latino and labor groups suggest that they likely have overlapping preferences with Democrats on wage and working-class issues. But this overlap also reinforces why Republican majority-party leaders restrict these members' legislative opportunities.

As for the extreme subgroup, we predict that members of the intolerant, antigovernment faction will often see their bills reported out of committee, but will not see their bills pass the House. This strategy, we posit, enables majority Republican leaders to assuage the most intensely conservative members in their caucus, without handing over the legislative agenda to them. In the reported-bills model, we find significant and positive results for the interaction term between *Majority Party* and *Extreme Republican Faction*. In other words, we find that members of the most conservative Republican subgroup are much more likely to see their bills leave committee than other Republican legislators. Conversely, in the bill-passage model, we find negative and significant results for this same interaction term, suggesting that extreme faction members are unlikely to see their bills reach the floor. Our third set of hypotheses is confirmed.

[Table 2 about here]

To explore this faction's treatment further, we consider whether bills most central to the extreme group are blocked from floor consideration. As noted earlier, we determine from interest-group ratings that the extreme faction represents intolerant, antigovernment positions. If our analysis is correct, this faction's members are most likely to hold extremely conservative positions on issues that deal with immigration, minority rights, taxes, and budgets. Allowing this subgroup to pass bills on these key issues would risk painting the rest of the Republican Party as equally intolerant and fiscally regressive, and would very likely damage the party's electoral brand. A strong, second test of our hypothesis, then, is that Republican leaders will obstruct extreme-faction bills that involve civil rights, minority rights, immigration, social-welfare policy, taxes, and government funding. We identify appropriate measures from the Policy Agendas Project and then conduct a count-model regression using this subsample of bills. Table 2 reports the coefficients for this equation, and shows a negative and significant result for the extreme conservative faction. Simply put, members of the intolerant, antigovernment subgroup see their core bills routinely blocked by majority Republican leaders. Combined, the results from Tables 1 and 2 confirm our third set of predictions that the Republican leadership uses a dual legislative strategy for extreme members, providing them with important but ultimately limited rewards.

Confirmation of our hypotheses suggests that Republican leaders employ relatively sophisticated strategies for managing factions, maintaining party unity, and controlling the floor agenda. Although they consistently penalize moderate, lunch pail Republicans by killing their bills in committee and denying their bills floor consideration, leaders accommodate extreme faction members to some degree, allowing their measures to move out of committee. This inconsistent treatment of subgroups suggests that majority-party leaders are not simply interested in controlling the agenda; they are also interested in keeping the peace. They repress moderate-

faction bills readily, without fear of pushback from the rest of the party, because this group's bills could gain unwanted Democratic support. By contrast, they allow the extreme faction victories at the prefloor stage to placate their most fervent caucus members, but they prevent these members' bills from reaching the floor and saddling the party with untenable positions.

Conclusions

At the outset, we noted that ongoing dissension within the Republican Party appears to challenge the conception of congressional parties as unified legislative teams. We thus posited, in contrast with much of the congressional literature, that the two parties can be polarized and internally divided. To explore this possibility, we developed a new method for identifying ideological factions within the parties, using annual ratings of legislators from nearly 300 interest groups. Our analysis showed that the two congressional parties are indeed highly polarized. More important, it revealed major ideological divisions within the parties, and it identified the interests that unite and divide party factions. We focused our investigation mostly on House Republicans, in part because of recent Tea Party activity, and we found that Republican legislators have been ideologically divided well before the formation of the Tea Party Caucus. Finally, we considered how Republican leaders manage and respond to different intraparty factions, and we determined that while they block bills by both moderate and extreme subgroups, they restrict moderates to a greater extent.

In all, our results suggest that the ideological structure of legislative parties is complex and that the parties, consequently, require skilled, strategic leaders to hold them together. The conventional view that the majority, in a polarized environment, works eagerly to steamroll the minority is only half the story. The other half is that majority-party leaders—or at least, majority Republican leaders—employ different strategies to keep different factions in line. Notably, they

both accommodate and restrict their party's extreme members, allowing their bills out of committee but blocking their bills from the floor—including ones tied to their anti-tax, antigovernment, and anti-immigrant priorities. In biblical terms, the leaders giveth and they taketh away. We observe this treatment of the extreme subgroup across all years of our study and not simply during the Tea Party period, indicating that internal Republican politics have posed a challenge to leaders even when the party appeared highly committed to a legislative agenda.

Not only does this paper complicate our understanding of the congressional parties, but it also raises several new avenues of research. Does the Republican Party in the Senate have the same factional structure as the Republican Party in the House? If so, do Republican leaders in both chambers manage factions similarly to maintain party unity, or do the different rules and procedures of the two chambers force leaders to adopt different strategies? Do Democratic leaders in the majority use the same mix of carrots and sticks that Republicans use, or do they develop unique solutions for intraparty divisions? What strategies do factions in the majority party adopt to advance their legislative goals? To what extent are they successful in shaping the majority's priorities? Do moderate factions behave differently than extreme factions in trying to achieve their policies? Or do all factions, regardless of ideological preferences, use the same basic approaches to push and fulfill their agenda? Many of these questions warrant separate investigations, suggesting that much work remains in trying to understand internal party dynamics.

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
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
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Figure 1. Interest-group clusters in the 112th Congress




Note: Nodes are groups; ties are the similarity between each group in its rating of House members. This general pattern of two largely unconnected clusters holds across our sample. Colors represent different detected clusters, with blue being the liberal, Democratic-leaning cluster and red being the conservative, Republican-leaning cluster.

Figure 2. Intraparty factions in the U.S. House (112th Congress)



Note: Red and blue overlays are detected clusters. The network beneath the overlays shows nodes as House members. Different colors are different factions, with Democratic Party factions in the top left and Republican Party factions in the lower right.

Figure 3. Alluvial plot showing change in detected Republican factions (107th-112th Congress)



Note: Rectangles represent the factions detected using cluster analysis. The horizontal axis is the Congress, and the vertical axis is the average NOMINATE score of each faction. More moderate members are listed higher and more extreme members are listed lower. The curved lines represent flow between each detected faction over time. Average NOMINATE scores are listed above each faction.

Table 1. Seemingly unrelated negative binomial regression analysis of bills reported out of committee and passed in the House

	SUR	
	Report b/se	Passed b/se
Constant	5.124 (22.667)	48.411* (22.742)
Time trend	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.025* (0.011)
Previous Bills	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Leadership	-1.240 ⁺ (0.638)	-1.648 ⁺ (0.967)
Extreme Republican Faction	-0.693*** (0.198)	0.129 (0.164)
Moderate Republican Faction	0.535*** (0.161)	0.705*** (0.139)
No. Factions	0.019 (0.021)	0.047* (0.018)
<i>Majority interactions^a</i>		
Majority party	1.221*** (0.102)	1.385*** (0.103)
M * Previous Bills	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
M * Leadership	1.049 (0.820)	2.110* (0.911)
M * Extreme Republican Faction	0.453* (0.222)	-0.358 ⁺ (0.188)
M * Moderate Republican Faction	-0.680*** (0.185)	-0.781*** (0.171)
M * No. Factions	-0.007 (0.031)	-0.099*** (0.027)
Observations	2512	

^a The numbers below this point are based on the interaction of majority party and the variable

Table 2. Negative binomial regression analysis of immigration, civil rights, tax, and spending bills passed in the House

	(1)	(2)
	PA	FE
	b/se	b/se
Constant	21.614 (56.510)	-70.368 (110.098)
Time trend	-0.012 (0.028)	0.035 (0.055)
Previous Bills	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.038 (0.032)
Leadership	-5.002 (29.693)	-2.217 (4270.841)
Extreme Republican Faction	1.330 ⁺ (0.706)	2.511 ^{**} (0.935)
Moderate Republican Faction	0.637 (0.820)	1.538 (1.048)
No. Factions	-0.186 (0.148)	0.008 (0.180)
<i>Majority interactions^a</i>		
Majority party	1.320 ^{***} (0.298)	1.263 ^{**} (0.413)
M * Previous Bills	0.036 ⁺ (0.019)	0.035 (0.022)
M * Leadership	5.070 (29.662)	13.868 (4158.077)
M * Extreme Republican Faction	-1.509 [*] (0.744)	-1.941 [*] (0.906)
M * Moderate Republican Faction	-0.725 (0.856)	-1.301 (1.068)
M * No. Factions	0.167 (0.159)	0.349 (0.224)
χ^2	95.964	40.391
DF	12	12
N	1339	354

⁺ $p < 0.10$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$

Model based on the following minor categories from the Policy Agendas Project:

Tax bills (107, 2009), Migrant and Seasonal workers (529),

Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties (200, 201, 202, 206),

Social Welfare (1300, 1301, 1302), Government Operations (2000, 2002, 2004)

The population average estimator implements Huber-White standard errors.

The fixed effects regression omits legislators that appear just once.

^a The numbers below this point are based on the interaction of the majority party and the variable.

Notes

¹ However, Carroll and colleagues note that “both NOMINATE and IDEAL can be and often are used to estimate multidimensional issue spaces” (2009, 556).

² For a number of reasons, roll-call scaling methods may even overstate the level of partisan polarization in Congress. See Roberts and Smith 2003; Snyder 1992.

³ For example, DiSalvo (2012) uses newspaper articles, scholarly accounts, and party records to identify factions and to compile lists of key faction members.

⁴ We assume a higher degree of sincere voting among majority-party members, regardless of factional affiliation, because the majority sets the floor agenda. In all likelihood, majority members only vote against a majority bill when they truly oppose the measure.

⁵ A full list of interest groups is found in the online appendix.

⁶ As a robustness check, we conduct separate analyses that include the 144 interest groups that provide complete ratings in three or more Congresses. As we report in the appendix, the results are substantively the same as the results that include all interest groups in the analysis.

⁷ Alternatively, to test our hypotheses, we could use the number of bills sponsored by a member that simply reach the House floor. But using this variable would not meaningfully change the results of our analysis because, except for one or two measures each Congress, all bills that reach the House floor also pass the House floor (Cox and McCubbins 2005).

⁸ In years when House Republicans are the minority, we only count members as being in the most extreme faction if they were also in the most extreme faction during the previous period of majority Republican rule. Again, because minority-party members have incentives to vote against majority bills regardless of their preferences, they may develop artificially extreme floor records as opposition members.

⁹ We substituted the *Previous Bills* variable with a *Tenure* variable, which was constructed using the number of years a member had served in the House. The results were the same.

¹⁰ We also included committee leadership variable as a control; our findings were unchanged.

¹¹ Initially, following Cox and Terry (2008), we included a quadratic term to capture non-linear effects, but we dropped the term from our model due to concerns over multicollinearity. The coefficients did not change substantively with its removal.

¹² As a robustness check, we conduct separate negative binomial regressions for each dependent variable, using three different model specifications—population average, fixed effects, and random effects—to ensure our findings are consistent. The results are reported in the appendix and support our predictions.

Supporting Information

**Partisan Infighting among House Republicans:
Leaders, Factions, and Networks of Interests**

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Organizations and Annual Scores

Table A1. Complete List of Interest Groups						
Name	Congresses for which ratings were provided (1) or not (0)					
	107	108	109	110	111	112
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation	0	1	1	1	0	0
Citizens Against Government Waste	1	1	1	1	1	1
American Forest and Paper Association	0	1	1	1	0	0
National Tax Limitation Committee	1	1	1	1	1	0
American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists	1	1	0	0	0	1
Workplace Fairness	0	1	0	0	0	0
National Association for College Admission Counseling	0	0	1	1	1	1
Born Free USA	1	1	0	0	0	0
English First	1	0	1	1	0	0
Secular Coalition for America	0	0	1	1	0	1
Communications Workers of America	1	1	0	0	1	0
Republican Liberty Caucus	1	1	1	1	1	0
Council for a Livable World	1	0	0	1	1	0
American Shareholders Association	1	1	0	0	0	0
Defenders of Wildlife Action Fund	0	1	1	1	1	1
Americans for Better Immigration	0	1	1	0	0	1
Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence	1	1	0	0	0	0
United States Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation	0	1	1	1	1	1
The Population Institute	0	1	1	0	0	0
Concerned Women for America	1	1	1	1	1	1
National Association of Government Contractors	0	1	0	0	0	0
Business and Professional Women USA	1	1	1	0	0	0
Service Employees International Union (SEIU)	1	1	1	1	1	1
American Association of University Women	1	1	1	1	1	1
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights	1	1	1	1	1	1
American Foreign Service Association	1	0	0	0	0	0
National Parent Teacher Association	1	1	0	0	0	0
Radical Middle	1	1	0	0	0	0
Military Officers Association of America	0	0	0	0	1	0
American Muslims for Jerusalem	1	1	0	0	0	0
State PIRGs Working Together	0	1	1	0	0	0
National Electrical Contractors Association	1	1	1	0	0	1

Table A1 (cont'd). Complete List of Interest Groups

Organization Name	Congresses for which ratings were provided (1) or not (0)					
	107	108	109	110	111	112
National Association of Counties	1	0	1	1	0	0
Population Connection	1	1	1	1	1	0
National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare	1	0	0	0	0	0
Citizens for Health	0	1	0	0	0	0
Federation for American Immigration Reform	1	1	1	1	1	0
National Association of Social Workers	1	0	1	1	1	0
Americans for Prosperity	0	0	1	1	1	1
United States Women's Chamber of Commerce	0	1	1	0	0	0
American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals	1	1	0	0	0	0
Citizens for Global Solutions	1	0	1	1	1	1
National Hispanic Leadership Agenda	1	1	0	0	0	0
National Ready Mixed Concrete Association	0	0	0	0	0	0
United States Public Interest Research Group	1	1	1	0	0	0
Leading Age	0	1	0	0	0	0
American College of Emergency Physicians	1	1	0	0	0	0
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers	1	1	1	1	1	1
The Retired Enlisted Association	0	1	1	0	0	0
National Breast Cancer Coalition	1	1	1	1	1	0
Population Action International	0	1	1	1	0	0
Global AIDS Alliance	0	1	0	0	0	0
Taxpayers for Common Sense	1	1	1	0	0	0
Friends Committee on National Legislation	1	1	1	1	1	1
National Active and Retired Federal Employees Association	1	1	1	0	0	0
United Food & Commercial Workers	1	0	0	1	0	1
National Retail Federation	0	1	1	1	1	1
Associated General Contractors of America	1	1	1	1	1	0
National Association of Manufacturers	1	1	1	1	1	1
Parkinsons Action Network	0	0	1	0	0	0
American Bar Association	1	0	0	0	0	0
The Cato Institute	1	1	0	1	0	0
United States Border Control	0	1	1	0	0	1
The American Legion	0	1	0	0	0	0
Retire Safe	0	1	0	0	0	0

Table A1 (cont'd). Complete List of Interest Groups

Organization Name	Congresses for which ratings were provided (1) or not (0)					
	107	108	109	110	111	112
American Farm Bureau Federation	0	0	1	1	1	1
National Right to Life Committee	1	1	1	1	1	1
National Youth Advocacy Coalition	1	0	0	0	0	0
National Association of Counties	1	0	1	1	0	0
Population Connection	1	1	1	1	1	0
National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare	1	0	0	0	0	0
Citizens for Health	0	1	0	0	0	0
Federation for American Immigration Reform	1	1	1	1	1	0
National Association of Social Workers	1	0	1	1	1	0
Americans for Prosperity	0	0	1	1	1	1
United States Women's Chamber of Commerce	0	1	1	0	0	0
American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals	1	1	0	0	0	0
Citizens for Global Solutions	1	0	1	1	1	1
National Hispanic Leadership Agenda	1	1	0	0	0	0
National Ready Mixed Concrete Association	0	0	0	0	0	0
United States Public Interest Research Group	1	1	1	0	0	0
Leading Age	0	1	0	0	0	0
American College of Emergency Physicians	1	1	0	0	0	0
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers	1	1	1	1	1	1
The Retired Enlisted Association	0	1	1	0	0	0
National Breast Cancer Coalition	1	1	1	1	1	0
Population Action International	0	1	1	1	0	0
Global AIDS Alliance	0	1	0	0	0	0
Taxpayers for Common Sense	1	1	1	0	0	0
Friends Committee on National Legislation	1	1	1	1	1	1
National Active and Retired Federal Employees Association	1	1	1	0	0	0
United Food & Commercial Workers	1	0	0	1	0	1
National Retail Federation	0	1	1	1	1	1
Associated General Contractors of America	1	1	1	1	1	0
National Association of Manufacturers	1	1	1	1	1	1
Parkinsons Action Network	0	0	1	0	0	0
American Bar Association	1	0	0	0	0	0
The Cato Institute	1	1	0	1	0	0

Table A1 (cont'd). Complete List of Interest Groups

Organization Name	Congresses for which ratings were provided (1) or not (0)					
	107	108	109	110	111	112
Retire Safe	0	1	0	0	0	0
United States Border Control	0	1	1	0	0	1
The American Legion	0	1	0	0	0	0
American Farm Bureau Federation	0	0	1	1	1	1
National Youth Advocacy Coalition	1	0	0	0	0	0
Doris Day Animal League	1	1	0	0	0	0
Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology	0	1	1	0	0	0
Sierra Club	0	1	0	0	0	1
ConservAmerica	0	0	1	1	1	0
American Security Council Foundation	1	1	0	1	1	1
The Humane Society of the United States	1	1	1	1	0	0
National Association for the Self-Employed	1	1	0	0	1	0
National Association of Wheat Growers	0	0	1	1	0	0
PeacePAC	0	1	1	0	1	1
Family Research Council	1	1	1	1	1	1
Center for Security Policy	0	0	1	1	1	1
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers	1	1	1	1	1	0
Americans for Tax Reform	1	1	1	1	0	0
Business-Industry Political Action Committee	1	1	1	1	0	0
Drum Major Institute for Public Policy/TheMiddleClass.org	0	1	1	1	1	1
United States Chamber of Commerce	1	1	1	1	1	1
American Society of Anesthesiologists	0	1	0	0	0	0
American Library Association	0	1	0	1	1	1
Americans United for the Separation of Church and State	1	1	1	0	0	1
Plumbing-Heating-Cooling Contractors-National Association	1	1	1	1	0	1
The Leukemia & Lymphoma Society	1	0	0	1	0	0
Concord Coalition	1	0	0	0	0	0
Peace Action West	0	0	1	1	1	1
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics	0	1	0	0	0	0
Associated Builders & Contractors	1	1	0	1	0	0
People for the American Way	1	0	0	0	0	0
Transportation Communications Union	1	1	1	0	0	0

Table A1 (cont'd). Complete List of Interest Groups

Organization Name	Congresses for which ratings were provided (1) or not (0)					
	107	108	109	110	111	112
United Seniors Association	0	0	0	0	0	0
American Postal Workers Union	1	1	0	0	0	0
National Taxpayers Union	1	1	1	1	1	1
American Public Health Association	1	1	1	1	1	0
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Christian Action Network	0	1	0	0	0	0
Vietnam Veterans of America	1	1	0	0	0	1
Maryland Business for Responsive Government	0	1	1	0	0	0
American Land Rights Association (formerly League of Private Property Voters)	1	1	1	1	0	0
National Parks Conservation Association	1	1	0	0	1	1
Bread for the World	1	1	0	0	0	1
National Federation of Independent Business	1	1	1	1	1	1
American Lands Alliance	0	1	1	0	0	0
National Council of La Raza	0	1	1	1	0	0
Alliance for Retired Americans	1	1	1	1	1	1
USA Engage	1	1	0	1	1	1
Americans for Democratic Action	1	1	1	1	1	1
Californians for Population Stabilization	1	0	0	0	0	0
National Stone	1	1	1	1	1	1
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs	1	1	1	1	1	0
American Benefits Council	1	0	0	0	0	0
The Humane Society Legislative Fund	1	1	1	1	1	1
International Brotherhood of Teamsters	0	0	0	0	1	0
League of Conservation Voters	1	1	1	1	1	1
National Education Association	1	1	1	1	1	1
NARAL Pro-Choice America	1	1	1	1	1	1
National Rifle Association	1	1	1	1	1	1
Center for Reclaiming America	0	1	0	0	0	0
Citizens United for Rehabilitation of Errants	0	1	1	0	0	0
International Association of Fire Fighters	0	0	0	0	0	0
League of United Latin American Citizens	1	1	0	0	0	0
Latin America Working Group	0	1	1	1	1	0
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers	1	1	1	1	0	0
American Wilderness Coalition	1	1	1	0	0	0

Table A1 (cont'd). Complete List of Interest Groups

Organization Name	Congresses for which ratings were provided (1) or not (0)					
	107	108	109	110	111	112
NETWORK	1	1	1	1	1	1
Campaign for Working Families	1	1	1	1	1	1
Peace Action	1	1	1	0	1	1
American Family Voices	1	0	0	0	0	0
American Academy of Emergency Medicine	0	1	1	0	0	0
National Farmers Union	1	1	1	1	1	0
Children's Defense Fund	1	1	1	1	1	1
Non Commissioned Officers Association	1	1	0	0	0	0
Information Technology Industry Council	1	1	1	1	0	0
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mennonite Central Committee	0	0	1	0	0	0
Women's Action for New Directions (WAND) and-WILL	1	1	1	0	0	1
American Coalition for Ethanol	1	0	0	0	0	0
United States Business and Industry Council	0	1	0	0	0	0
Sportsmen and Animal Owner's Voting Alliance	1	1	1	1	1	1
Gun Owners of America	0	1	1	1	1	1
Citizens for Health - Whole Person Health Rating	0	1	0	0	0	0
Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America	0	0	0	1	1	0
American Federation of State	1	1	1	1	1	1
Human Rights Campaign	1	1	1	1	1	1
American Humane Association	1	1	0	0	0	0
United Auto Workers	1	1	1	1	1	0
Protect Patients Now!	0	0	1	0	0	0
United To End Genocide	0	0	1	1	0	0
Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council	1	1	1	0	1	1
Consumer Federation of America	0	0	0	0	0	0
Disabled American Veterans	1	1	1	0	1	0
National Restaurant Association	0	1	1	1	0	0
Federally Employed Women	0	1	1	1	1	1
Bakery	0	1	0	1	0	0
Campaign for America's Future	0	0	1	0	0	0
Council on American-Islamic Relations	0	0	1	0	0	0
American Civil Liberties Union	1	1	1	1	1	1
AIDS United	1	0	1	0	0	0

Table A1 (cont'd). Complete List of Interest Groups

Organization Name	Congresses for which ratings were provided (1) or not (0)					
	107	108	109	110	111	112
Americans for Immigration Control	0	0	1	0	0	0
Drug Policy Alliance Network	0	0	1	1	0	0
National School Boards Association	0	1	0	0	0	0
Center for International Policy	0	1	0	0	0	0
Armenian National Committee of America	0	0	0	1	0	1
Americans for the Arts Action Fund	1	1	1	1	0	1
American Veterans	0	1	0	0	0	0
Public Citizen's Congress Watch	1	1	1	0	0	0
National Council of Senior Citizens	0	0	0	0	0	0
Christian Coalition of America	1	1	0	1	1	1
National Organization for Women	0	0	1	1	0	0
American Conservative Union	1	1	1	1	1	1
National Family Planning & Reproductive Health Association	0	0	1	1	1	0
Legion for the Survival of Freedom	0	0	0	0	0	0
American Family Association	0	1	1	1	1	0
American Medical Association	1	0	0	0	0	0
National Small Business Association	0	1	1	1	0	1
Arab American Institute	1	1	1	1	1	1
Eagle Forum	1	1	1	1	1	1
School Nutrition Association	0	1	0	0	1	0
American Immigration Lawyers Association	1	0	1	0	1	0
American Road and Transportation Builders Association	0	1	1	0	0	0
Democrats for Life of America	0	1	0	0	0	0
Animal Welfare Institute	1	1	1	1	1	0
Planned Parenthood Action Fund	1	0	1	1	1	1
American Federation of Government Employees	1	1	1	1	1	1
Coalition to Stop Gun Violence	1	1	0	0	0	0
The John Birch Society	1	1	1	1	1	1
Freedom Democrats	0	0	1	0	0	0
FreedomWorks	1	1	1	1	1	1
United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers	1	1	1	1	0	0
Consumer Action	0	0	1	0	0	0
National Association of Elementary School Principals	0	0	1	1	0	0

Table A1 (cont'd). Complete List of Interest Groups

Organization Name	Congresses for which ratings were provided (1) or not (0)					
	107	108	109	110	111	112
Traditional Values Coalition	0	0	1	1	0	0
Citizens for Tax Justice	0	0	1	0	0	0
Association of Community Organization for Reform Now (ACORN)	0	0	1	0	0	0
National Criminal Justice Association	0	0	1	0	0	0
The Arc	0	0	1	1	0	0
National Rural Health Association	0	1	1	0	0	0
International Warehouse Logistics Association	0	0	1	1	1	0
National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors	0	0	1	0	0	0
Fleet Reserve Association	0	0	0	1	1	1
American Wind Energy Association	0	0	1	0	0	0
National Association for Addiction Professionals	0	0	1	1	0	0
Big Cat Rescue	0	0	1	1	1	0
National Council of Agricultural Employers	0	0	1	1	0	0
St. Joseph Health System	0	0	1	1	1	0
Academy of General Dentistry	0	0	0	1	0	0
Iranian American Political Action Committee	0	0	1	0	0	0
Partnership for America	0	0	1	0	0	0
Computer & Communications Industry Association	0	0	1	1	0	0
The Club for Growth	0	0	1	1	1	1
American Nurses Association	0	0	1	0	1	1
The American College of Physicians	0	0	1	0	0	0
National Animal Interest Alliance Trust	0	0	1	0	0	0
Hope for Peace and Justice	0	0	1	0	0	0
RESULTS	0	0	1	1	0	1
Church World Service	0	0	1	0	0	0
Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages	0	0	1	1	1	0
United Fresh Produce Association	0	0	0	1	0	0
PFLAG	0	0	0	1	0	0
Utility Workers Union of America	0	0	0	1	0	0
International Foodservice Distributors Association	0	0	0	1	1	1
Alliance For Headache Disorders Advocacy	0	0	0	1	0	0
American Academy of Family Physicians	0	0	0	1	0	0
TechAmerica	0	0	0	1	0	0

Table A1 (cont'd). Complete List of Interest Groups

Organization Name	Congresses for which ratings were provided (1) or not (0)					
	107	108	109	110	111	112
Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law	0	0	0	1	1	1
United States English	0	0	0	1	1	0
The National Lumber and Building Material Dealers Association	0	0	0	1	1	1
Associated Equipment Distributors	0	0	0	1	0	0
GOPUSA	0	0	0	1	0	0
The Children's Health Fund	0	0	0	1	1	1
Association of University Centers on Disabilities	0	0	0	1	1	1
Association For Supervision and Curriculum Development	0	0	0	1	0	0
Grassroots Netroots Alliance	0	0	0	1	0	0
Depression and Bipolar Support Alliance	0	0	0	1	0	0
National Employment Lawyers Association	0	0	0	1	0	0
Environment America	0	0	0	1	1	1
American Society for Radiation Oncology	0	0	0	1	1	0
League of Women Voters	0	0	0	1	0	0
Irregular Times/Progressive Patriots/That's My Congress	0	0	1	1	1	1
ACT! for America	0	1	1	1	1	1
Progressive Democrats of America	0	0	0	1	0	0
The American Geriatrics Society	0	0	0	1	0	0
The American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association	0	0	0	1	1	1
The Poker Players Alliance	0	0	0	0	1	0
The Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans	0	0	0	0	0	1
Center for Worker Freedom	0	0	0	1	0	0
Women Employed	0	0	0	0	1	0
Americans for Fair Taxation	0	0	0	1	0	1
The National Mining Association	0	0	0	1	0	0
Alliance to Stop the War on the Poor	0	0	0	1	0	0
Consumer Alliance for Energy Security	0	0	0	1	0	0
Southern Alliance for Clean Energy Action Fund	0	0	0	1	1	1
Resolve Uganda	0	0	0	1	1	0
CNET News	0	0	1	1	0	0
American Hospital Association	0	0	1	1	1	0
NewPolicy.org	0	0	0	0	1	0

Table A1 (cont'd). Complete List of Interest Groups

Organization Name	Congresses for which ratings were provided (1) or not (0)					
	107	108	109	110	111	112
AIDS Drug Assistance Program (ADAP)	0	0	0	0	1	1
Home School Legal Defense Association	0	0	0	0	0	0
National Latino Congreso	0	0	0	1	0	0
Voices for Creative Nonviolence	1	0	0	1	0	0
Emergency Committee for American Trade	1	0	0	0	0	0
Clean Water Action	0	0	0	0	0	1
Susan B. Anthony List	0	0	0	0	0	1
Liberty Central	0	0	0	0	1	0
Vote Kids	0	0	0	0	1	0
Keep America Safe	1	0	0	0	0	0
NumbersUSA [Americans for Better Immigration]	0	0	0	0	1	1
Open Doors USA	0	0	0	0	0	1
Independent Electrical Contractors	0	0	0	0	1	1
The New American	0	0	0	1	0	1
Alzheimer's Impact Movement	0	0	0	0	1	0
American Veterinary Medical Association	0	0	0	0	0	1
National Organization for Marriage	0	0	0	0	0	1
Western Organization of Resource Councils	0	0	0	1	0	0
Heritage Action for America	0	0	0	0	0	1
American Council of Engineering Companies	0	0	0	1	1	1
Catholic Advocate	0	0	0	0	0	1
National Foreign Trade Council	1	1	1	1	0	0
ProEnglish	0	0	0	0	0	1
Global Exchange	0	0	1	1	0	0
TechCrunch/CrunchGov	0	0	0	0	0	1
Food Policy Action	0	0	0	0	0	1
The Center for Education Reform	0	0	0	0	0	1
Financial Executives International	0	1	0	0	0	1
National Committee for an Effective Congress	1	1	1	0	0	0

Qualitative Analysis: Characterizing Intraparty Factions

The cluster analysis identifies three major factions within the House Republican Party across the years of our study. Based on their average NOMINATE scores, these three subgroups appear to occupy distinct ideological positions on the conservative spectrum: moderate, mainstream, and extreme. As we note in the manuscript, these labels provide only limited insight into the ideological composition of the House Republican caucus. The mean NOMINATE scores may tell us where the factions sit roughly in comparison with each other, but they do not tell us what makes each faction ideologically distinct. We therefore seek to determine which types of organizations prefer and oppose each party subgroup, in an effort to identify each faction's ideological priorities. In other words, we can infer what each party subgroup represents in broad policy terms if we isolate the key interests that favor each one. This approach allows us to move beyond one-dimensional designations of relative conservatism and provide, instead, a rich ideological description of each subgroup.

We use two strategies to determine which organizations are most closely aligned with a given faction. First, for every Congress, we compile a list of the fifteen interest groups that provide the highest ratings for each detected faction. This method allows us to see whether, and to what extent, the same interests provide positive scores to all three factions. Second, for every Congress, we calculate the mean of each interest group that rated members in a given faction and subtract it from the mean rating of all interest groups for the House Republican caucus. By generating these mean-difference reports, we remove the interests that provide similar ratings for factions across the party and identify the interests that score factions differently. We then use these remaining interest groups to determine the ideological makeup of the factions.

To form these judgments, we look for consistent patterns in the collection of interests that favor each party subgroup. Typically, a complex set of organizations supports any given faction, but we find that, over time, certain types of groups repeatedly score one faction higher than the others. Because of this relatively stable support, we are able to develop a basic characterization of what each Republican faction stands for. We also name or label each faction to highlight its overriding priorities and to distinguish it from the rest of the party. What follows is a detailed, qualitative analysis of interest groups and the corresponding factions.

Mainstream Republicans: The Business Faction

To start, we examine the lists of fifteen interest groups that score each Republican faction highest. As we acknowledge in the manuscript, these lists provide a rough sense of the ideological differences between factions, because many organizations—such as socially conservative groups—rate all Republican subgroups quite favorably. However, we do find one important pattern in these lists across the years of our study: the mainstream conservative faction receives consistently high ratings from business interests. Examples (not an exhaustive list) are included in Table A1. The list includes a diverse collection of business groups, including construction associations, service-industry lobbies, and major corporate PACs, among many others. Based on these findings, we dub this Republican cluster *the mainstream, business faction*. In most Congresses, it is the largest conservative subgroup and, as such, likely functions as the core of the House Republican Party.

Table A2. Business Interests that Support the Mainstream Republican Faction

107th Congress

American Coalition for Ethanol
 American Land Rights Association
 Associated Builders & Contractors
 Information Technology Industry Council
 National Federation of Independent Business
 National Stone, Sand & Gravel Association
 Plumbing-Heating-Cooling Contractors-Nat'l Assoc.
 Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council
 United States Chamber of Commerce

108th Congress

Associated Builders & Contractors
 BIPAC
 National Federation of Independent Business
 National Retail Federation
 United States Chamber of Commerce

110th Congress

Associated Builders & Contractors
 BIPAC
 International Foodservice Distributors Association
 National Council of Agricultural Employers
 Alliance for Worker Freedom

112th Congress

International Foodservice Distributors Association
 National Electrical Contractors Association
 National Federation of Independent Business
 Nat'l Lumber and Building Material Dealers Assoc.
 National Stone, Sand & Gravel Association
 Plumbing-Heating-Cooling Contractors-Nat'l Assoc.
 Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council

Extreme Republicans: The Intolerant, Antigovernment Faction

The mainstream, business faction and the extreme conservative subgroup receive relatively similar ratings from a collection of conservative interests—such as anti-tax, anti-gay, pro-life, and pro-gun organizations. In short, we find important ideological overlap between the mainstream and extreme conservative factions. Given the Republican Party’s longstanding opposition to abortion and its wide support for expansive gun rights, it is hardly surprising that organizations focused on these priorities make few distinctions among the party’s subgroups. For this reason, we turn to the mean-difference reports to identify key ideological differences. Even here, however, we see important overlap. Several major groups appear on the mean-difference reports for both, including the socially conservative Eagle Forum and the National Rifle

Association (NRA). However, as we make clear in the manuscript, the mean-difference reports do reveal that the extreme Republican faction is uniquely favored by Tea Party affiliates and radical right-wing groups. In some cases, as we note below, these two types of organizations are one and the same.

First, many groups aligned with the Tea Party score the extreme faction highest across the years of our study. These groups, many of them backed by billionaires, include Americans for Prosperity, FreedomWorks, and Heritage Action (Skocpol and Williamson 2012, ch. 3). Second, a collection of radical right-wing groups, such as the John Birch Society and the Gun Owners of America, consistently support the extreme Republican faction. For decades, the John Birch Society has opposed the United Nations, the Federal Reserve, and regulatory agencies, and has espoused conspiracy theories derived from biblical prophecies (Hardisty 2000). Similarly, the Gun Owners of America opposes the United Nations and claims that the Barack Obama administration has plans to imprison gun owners and confiscate firearms (McMurry 2014). Calling the NRA too moderate, it also disapproves of nearly all gun regulations—including, for example, restrictions on private weapon sales to criminals and mentally ill individuals (Steinhauer 2013).

Additionally, while anti-tax and anti-immigrant groups support both the mainstream and extreme Republican factions, we find that a higher number of these organizations rate the extreme subgroup favorably. We also find that, by the 112th Congress, the anti-tax groups are overwhelmingly supportive of the most extreme Republican faction. Besides the many Tea Party affiliates, the Club for Growth, the American Conservative Union, and the National Taxpayers Union are all identified in the mean-difference reports for this faction. Table 2 illustrates the consistency of the mean-difference reports from Congress to Congress.

Table A3. Groups Identified in Mean-Difference Reports for Extreme Republican Faction

107th Congress

American Conservative Union
English First
Federation for American Immigration Reform
John Birch Society, The

108th Congress

Americans for Better Immigration
Citizens Against Government Waste
Federation for American Immigration Reform
FreedomWorks
Gun Owners of America
National Tax Limitation Committee
Taxpayers for Common Sense
United States Border Control

109th Congress

The Club for Growth
English First
John Birch Society, The

110th Congress

American Conservative Union
Americans for Prosperity
Citizens Against Government Waste
Club for Growth, The
FreedomWorks

111th Congress

Citizens Against Government Waste
Club for Growth, The
National Taxpayers Union

112th Congress

American Conservative Union
Americans for Better Immigration
Americans for Prosperity
Citizens Against Government Waste
Club for Growth, The
FreedomWorks
Heritage Action for America
John Birch Society, The
National Taxpayers Union

Beyond sitting on the extreme of the conservative spectrum, what distinguishes this subgroup from the rest of the Republican caucus? As already noted, several important organizations that favor this Republican subgroup have strong Tea Party connections. Even the John Birch Society has identified with the Tea Party, at times supporting and participating in the movement's events (Skocpol and Williamson 2012, 33). Furthermore, while the Club for Growth

has never established ties with the Tea Party, its anti-tax positions certainly match the priorities of Tea Party organizations like Americans for Prosperity and FreedomWorks.

Still, to label the extreme Republican subgroup as the Tea Party faction is problematic for at least two reasons. First, even based on our limited data set, this faction predates the Tea Party uprising by at least eight years. Given the consistency of our findings across time, we strongly suspect that this faction has been present in the Republican Party since the 1990s, if not earlier. Second, membership in the formal Tea Party Caucus may not necessarily correspond with membership in the extreme Republican faction (although it is reasonable to assume significant overlap between them). That being said, this faction's apparent support from Tea Party organizations provides important insight into its ideological composition.

Efforts to characterize the broad Tea Party movement have sparked much controversy (Continetti 2010). On the one hand, conservative pundits have argued that it simply reflects enduring concerns over burdensome regulations, the size of government, and the cost of social-welfare programs. On the other hand, critics have called the Tea Party a collection of reactionary groups, driven by bigotry and conspiracy theories—the latest iteration of the “paranoid style in American politics.” Most likely, the movement encompasses both aspects of extreme conservatism. Groups such as FreedomWorks advocate for drastically lower taxes and severe austerity programs in order to starve the government beast, so to speak, while organizations with hardline positions on immigration and social policy reflect common prejudices among ultraconservatives (Parker and Barreto 2013; Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Since both types of organizations score extreme Republicans highly, we call this party subgroup the *intolerant, antigovernment faction*.

Moderate Republicans: The Lunch Pail Faction

Looking at both interest-group scores and mean-difference reports, we find that the moderate Republican subgroup receives relatively favorable support from a diverse mix of organizations. Industry associations, women's groups, labor unions, conservative religious interests, and animal-rights activists, among many others, appear on this faction's list of supporters across the years of our study. Compared with the other two Republican subgroups, this faction does not appear to have a high degree of ideological coherence. What does stand out is that it receives relatively low ratings from Tea Party and anti-immigrant groups, and that it receives relatively little support from corporate interests. From an initial analysis, the moderate faction is easier to define by what it does not represent than what it does.

However, as we explain in the manuscript, the presence of labor organizations, antipoverty groups, and Hispanic interests in the mean-difference reports for this faction does suggest a distinct factional identity. Looking at Table A3, we see major union groups listed, including the American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees (AFSCME). We also see pro-immigrant groups like the National Council of La Raza, American Immigration Lawyers Association, and the Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages. Admittedly, these organizations do not have as heavy a presence on the mean-difference reports for the moderate faction as the Tea Party groups do for the extreme faction. But the dual presence of labor and immigration groups indicates that the moderate faction is receiving relatively high support from interests with overlapping concerns. Indeed, Hispanic interests have long been focused on workers' rights and have formally worked with labor unions for decades on immigration and workers issues (Lazo 1991; Pérez and Muñoz 2001).

We surmise that the moderate Republican subgroup appears to reflect, at least in part, the interests of the working class and blue-collar workers. For this reason, we borrow an old term for worker-friending conservatives and call this subgroup the *lunch pail Republican faction*.¹ It is hardly surprising that we find majority Republican leaders consistently blocking this subgroup’s bills, given that its concerns appear to be at odds with the pro-corporate, low-tax direction of the other two factions.

Table A4. Groups Identified in Mean-Difference Reports for the Moderate Republican Faction

108th Congress	110th Congress
Nat'l Active & Retired Federal Employees Assoc.	Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers, & Millers
National Council of La Raza	Drum Major Institute
Transportation Communications Union	National Association of Social Workers
	Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages
111th Congress	
AFSCME	
American Immigration Lawyers Association	

¹ In recent years, a union-funded super PAC has adopted the name Lunch Pail Republicans (Knafo and Jamieson 2012). The term, however, predates this group.

Mean-Difference Reports: Extreme Republican Faction

----- **107th Congress** -----

-44.426799 : National Right to Life Committee (252)
-41.297412 : English First (74)
-38.812655 : National Rifle Association (1034)
-35.549628 : American Land Rights Association (formerly League of Private Property Voters) (916)
-29.872740 : American Conservative Union (1481)
-28.921659 : Christian Coalition of America (1467)
-27.927153 : Family Research Council (718)
-26.680787 : Campaign for Working Families (1086)
-25.498050 : Concerned Women for America (134)
-24.161999 : Federation for American Immigration Reform (300)
-22.542893 : Eagle Forum (1513)
-18.577100 : Keep America Safe (1974)
-15.420064 : American Coalition for Ethanol (1211)
-12.004608 : The John Birch Society (1627)
-10.039171 : Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council (1294)

----- **108th Congress** -----

-44.707842 : Federation for American Immigration Reform (300)
-14.601902 : United States Border Control (544)
-14.187694 : Sportsmen and Animal Owner's Voting Alliance (1221)
-10.869177 : Gun Owners of America (1226)
-10.077756 : Eagle Forum (1513)
-8.041421 : Americans for Better Immigration (118)
-6.551592 : FreedomWorks (1658)
-6.185054 : Citizens Against Government Waste (13)
-5.946040 : Taxpayers for Common Sense (430)
-5.611685 : National Tax Limitation Committee (23)
-5.213393 : Christian Action Network (902)

----- **109th Congress** -----

-40.517241 : National Animal Interest Alliance Trust (1742)
-27.353786 : Sportsmen and Animal Owner's Voting Alliance (1221)
-7.010649 : English First (74)
-6.387424 : American Farm Bureau Federation (611)
-5.847617 : The John Birch Society (1627)
-5.499070 : The Club for Growth (1734)

110th Congress

- 41.106443 : National Council of Agricultural Employers (1705)
- 31.074930 : FreedomWorks (1658)
- 27.257703 : The Club for Growth (1734)
- 27.065126 : Progressive Democrats of America (1837)
- 26.397059 : Alliance for Worker Freedom (1856)
- 25.093838 : Citizens Against Government Waste (13)
- 22.146359 : Sportsmen and Animal Owner's Voting Alliance (1221)
- 20.285714 : Americans for Prosperity (310)
- 18.549020 : American Conservative Union (1481)
- 17.408263 : Republican Liberty Caucus (88)
- 17.191877 : Consumer Alliance for Energy Security (1867)
- 16.017507 : National Tax Limitation Committee (23)
- 15.401961 : The New American (2027)
- 15.196078 : American Family Association (1497)
- 14.876050 : American Land Rights Association (916)

111th Congress

- 14.270784 : Sportsmen and Animal Owner's Voting Alliance (1221)
- 11.478500 : Citizens Against Government Waste (13)
- 6.773411 : The Club for Growth (1734)
- 5.556617 : National Taxpayers Union (872)
- 5.155996 : Irregular Times/Progressive Patriots/That's My Congress (1834)

112th Congress

- 25.157869 : Sportsmen and Animal Owner's Voting Alliance (1221)
- 16.737690 : The Club for Growth (1734)
- 16.037392 : Citizens Against Government Waste (13)
- 14.544984 : Heritage Action for America (2061)
- 11.929828 : FreedomWorks (1658)
- 11.834185 : Americans for Prosperity (310)
- 11.810274 : American Conservative Union (1481)
- 9.049950 : Independent Electrical Contractors (2026)
- 8.216901 : The New American (2027)
- 7.165602 : National Rifle Association (1034)
- 6.830495 : The John Birch Society (1627)
- 6.794522 : Irregular Times/Progressive Patriots/That's My Congress (1834)
- 6.705194 : Family Research Council (718)
- 6.638712 : National Taxpayers Union (872)
- 6.113027 : Americans for Better Immigration (118)

Mean-Difference Reports: Moderate Republican Faction

----- **107th Congress** -----

-17.733073 : Americans for the Arts Action Fund (1425)
-15.232187 : AIDS United (1380)
-12.475097 : National Education Association (1015)
-11.756026 : American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (38)
-10.377260 : Planned Parenthood Action Fund (1578)
-9.825860 : NARAL Pro-Choice America (1016)
-9.771978 : Human Rights Campaign (1256)
-9.646402 : Emergency Committee for American Trade (1937)
-9.512318 : Population Connection (265)
-9.485023 : Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence (122)
-7.354484 : International Brotherhood of Boilermakers (374)
-7.151631 : Citizens for Global Solutions (329)
-6.988657 : American Wilderness Coalition (1081)
-6.354484 : United States Public Interest Research Group (361)
-5.987239 : National Breast Cancer Coalition (401)

----- **108th Congress** -----

-80.392857 : National Rural Health Association (1693)
-44.857143 : American Academy of Emergency Medicine (1117)
-43.584821 : American Society of Anesthesiologists (762)
-31.763393 : Bread for the World (926)
-29.071429 : National Council of La Raza (956)
-22.023214 : Americans for the Arts Action Fund (1425)
-21.714286 : American College of Emergency Physicians (373)
-20.466071 : National Active and Retired Federal Employees Association (447)
-11.607143 : The Population Institute (131)
-11.260000 : National Parks Conservation Association (922)
-10.937500 : Population Action International (412)
-10.638393 : Population Connection (265)
-9.766786 : Transportation Communications Union (847)
-9.008929 : American Road and Transportation Builders Association (1558)
-8.716607 : PeacePAC (693)

109th Congress

- 39.445727 : Animal Welfare Institute (1574)
- 20.055285 : The Humane Society of the United States (674)
- 13.295990 : The Humane Society Legislative Fund (1001)
- 10.175337 : ConservAmerica (664)
- 9.257721 : Big Cat Rescue (1704)
- 8.332084 : The Population Institute (131)
- 8.134070 : American Wilderness Coalition (1081)
- 7.045765 : Americans for the Arts Action Fund (1425)
- 6.390555 : Parkinsons Action Network (517)
- 6.311169 : League of Conservation Voters (1012)
- 6.247826 : American Hospital Association (1922)
- 6.047639 : American Lands Alliance (934)
- 6.011057 : National Breast Cancer Coalition (401)
- 5.944303 : Population Connection (265)
- 5.686469 : Planned Parenthood Action Fund (1578)

110th Congress

- 31.214963 : National Association of Social Workers (309)
- 27.059386 : Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers and Grain Millers (1347)
- 27.001125 : National Association of Elementary School Principals (1669)
- 25.000000 : Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages (TESOL) (1757)
- 23.529412 : Academy of General Dentistry (1714)
- 23.385567 : American Association of University Women (164)
- 23.286966 : Association For Supervision and Curriculum Development (1810)
- 23.277162 : National Association for Addiction Professionals (1703)
- 22.058824 : American Academy of Family Physicians (1778)
- 21.936275 : The Children's Health Fund (1791)
- 21.711508 : Americans for the Arts Action Fund (1425)
- 20.779090 : AeA (1780)
- 20.735133 : National Association for College Admission Counseling (54)
- 19.338476 : Drum Major Institute for Public Policy/TheMiddleClass.org (750)
- 18.308181 : The Humane Society of the United States (674)

111th Congress

- 26.133700 : Big Cat Rescue (1704)
- 23.580586 : National Association for the Self-Employed (679)
- 18.219780 : Fleet Reserve Association (1699)
- 18.067766 : ConservAmerica (664)
- 13.469780 : The Humane Society Legislative Fund (1001)
- 13.457875 : Association of University Centers on Disabilities (1793)
- 13.415751 : American Immigration Lawyers Association (1542)
- 12.957875 : American Council of Engineering Companies (2074)
- 12.479853 : Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law (1781)
- 12.411172 : Children's Defense Fund (1144)
- 12.082418 : American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees (AFSCME) (1254)
- 11.908425 : Defenders of Wildlife Action Fund (109)
- 10.976190 : Vote Kids (1970)
- 10.565934 : Environment America (1826)
- 9.869048 : League of Conservation Voters (1012)

112th Congress

- 71.604938 : Vietnam Veterans of America (908)
- 18.018360 : Americans for the Arts Action Fund (1425)
- 11.404495 : AIDS Drug Assistance Program (ADAP) Advocacy Association (1932)
- 8.952390 : American Council of Engineering Companies (2074)
- 8.879962 : Financial Executives International (233)
- 8.174992 : American Veterinary Medical Association (2031)
- 7.861918 : USA Engage (970)
- 7.650332 : Food Policy Action (2171)
- 6.944413 : The Humane Society Legislative Fund (1001)
- 6.848686 : National Education Association (1015)
- 6.691611 : United States Chamber of Commerce (755)
- 5.813802 : Citizens for Global Solutions (329)
- 5.481165 : Bread for the World (926)
- 5.204685 : National Parks Conservation Association (922)

Summary Statistics and Robustness Checks

Table A5. Summary Statistics

	Count	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.
Previous Bills	2512	48.55	85.31	0.00	771.00
Leadership	2512	0.01	0.11	0.00	1.00
Extreme Republican Faction	2512	0.16	0.36	0.00	1.00
Moderate Republican Faction	2512	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00
No. Factions	2512	2.25	2.60	0.00	8.00
Majority party	2512	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00

Table A6. Correlations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(1) Previous Bills	1					
(2) Leadership	0.00319	1				
(3) Extreme Republican Faction	-0.0865	0.0459	1			
(4) Moderate Republican Faction	-0.0167	-0.0288	-0.194	1		
(5) No. Factions	-0.0906	0.00697	0.327	0.295	1	
(6) Majority party	-0.0629	0.0154	0.0827	0.130	0.135	1

Table A7. Negative binomial regression analysis of bills reported out of committee (1-3) and bills passed in the House (4-6)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	PA	FE	RE	PA	FE	RE
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Constant	5.145 (23.148)	-37.657 (29.565)	13.244 (20.585)	47.117* (22.146)	-14.510 (28.445)	67.120*** (20.353)
Time trend	-0.003 (0.012)	0.019 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.024* (0.011)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.034*** (0.010)
Previous Bills	0.001 (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Leadership	-1.241+ (0.644)	-0.264 (1.087)	-0.881 (1.030)	-1.655+ (0.986)	-1.444 (1.044)	-1.498 (1.016)
Extreme Republican Faction	-0.693*** (0.197)	-0.620* (0.243)	-0.523* (0.234)	0.129 (0.168)	0.274 (0.183)	0.297+ (0.174)
Moderate Republican Faction	0.534*** (0.162)	0.506** (0.181)	0.592*** (0.166)	0.703*** (0.142)	0.797*** (0.164)	0.849*** (0.150)
No. Factions	0.019 (0.021)	-0.007 (0.026)	0.016 (0.022)	0.048* (0.019)	0.029 (0.022)	0.042* (0.019)
<i>Majority interactions^a</i>						
Majority party	1.219*** (0.101)	1.284*** (0.107)	1.299*** (0.099)	1.377*** (0.103)	1.407*** (0.103)	1.511*** (0.095)
M * Previous Bills	0.004*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
M * Leadership	1.055 (0.820)	0.891 (1.067)	0.930 (1.051)	2.125* (0.930)	2.343* (1.042)	2.068* (1.031)
M * Extreme Republican Faction	0.455* (0.222)	0.338 (0.253)	0.297 (0.247)	-0.355+ (0.191)	-0.474* (0.197)	-0.520** (0.191)
M * Moderate Republican Faction	-0.680*** (0.184)	-0.747*** (0.189)	-0.758*** (0.181)	-0.777*** (0.172)	-0.995*** (0.173)	-0.992*** (0.165)
M * No. Factions	-0.007 (0.031)	-0.033 (0.036)	-0.022 (0.029)	-0.099*** (0.027)	-0.101** (0.034)	-0.115*** (0.027)
χ^2	714.804	445.069	560.915	695.022	479.308	638.638
DF	12	12	12	12	12	12
N	2512	2005	2512	2512	2111	2512

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The population average estimator implements Huber-White standard errors. The fixed effects regression omits legislators that appear just once over the course of the panel.

^a The numbers below this point are based on the interaction of majority party and the variable

Table A8. Negative binomial regression analysis of bills reported out of committee (1-3) and bills passed in the House (4-6). Model results use interest groups that rated members across at least three Congresses (144 interest groups).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	PA	FE	RE	PA	FE	RE
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Constant	18.869 (22.425)	-17.516 (28.555)	29.484 (19.913)	55.757* (21.874)	-11.216 (27.497)	75.099*** (19.528)
Time trend	-0.010 (0.011)	0.009 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.028** (0.011)	0.006 (0.014)	-0.038*** (0.010)
Previous Bills	0.001 (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Leadership	-1.288+ (0.664)	-0.443 (1.083)	-0.948 (1.028)	-1.601 (0.998)	-1.414 (1.044)	-1.434 (1.016)
Extreme Republican Faction	-0.767** (0.252)	-0.546* (0.239)	-0.634** (0.228)	-0.389* (0.175)	-0.207 (0.185)	-0.335+ (0.173)
Moderate Republican Faction	0.139 (0.235)	0.252 (0.238)	0.273 (0.226)	0.251 (0.186)	0.420* (0.205)	0.319+ (0.192)
No. Factions	0.082* (0.037)	-0.001 (0.043)	0.074* (0.032)	0.156*** (0.030)	0.142*** (0.038)	0.172*** (0.028)
<i>Majority interactions^a</i>						
Majority party	1.260*** (0.103)	1.315*** (0.107)	1.345*** (0.100)	1.425*** (0.107)	1.443*** (0.104)	1.572*** (0.097)
M * Previous Bills	0.004*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
M * Leadership	1.078 (0.842)	1.027 (1.064)	0.974 (1.050)	2.043* (0.948)	2.315* (1.041)	1.984+ (1.030)
M * Extreme Republican Faction	0.653* (0.264)	0.505* (0.255)	0.561* (0.241)	0.241 (0.195)	0.177 (0.202)	0.175 (0.189)
M * Moderate Republican Faction	-0.211 (0.258)	-0.612* (0.261)	-0.426+ (0.240)	-0.328 (0.210)	-0.665** (0.229)	-0.507* (0.208)
M * No. Factions	-0.096* (0.040)	-0.096* (0.038)	-0.108** (0.036)	-0.213*** (0.034)	-0.208*** (0.034)	-0.246*** (0.032)
χ^2	698.126	452.131	556.916	708.015	479.790	640.694
DF	12	12	12	12	12	12
N	2512	2005	2512	2512	2111	2512

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The population average estimator implements Huber-White standard errors. The fixed effects regression omits legislators that appear just once over the course of the panel.

^a The numbers below this point are based on the interaction of majority party and the variable

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