Mount Etna, Italy Landsat 8 / OLI (bands 4-3-2) & TIRS 01/29/2019 ttps://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20190033479 2020-03-11T16:18:58+00:00Z

# Landsat 9 Micrometeoroid Orbital Debris (MMOD) Mission Success Approach

Thermal infrared signature

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# Agenda

- Problem Definition Why assess against Mission Success?
- Solution Process
- Environment Assessment
- Characterize Threat
- Generate Design Curves
- Exceptions
- Lessons Learned
- > Summary

# **The Problem**

- NASA-STD 8719.14B addresses only reentry critical hardware and generation of new orbital debris
- Mission success requires 2-3 times as much hardware on robotic missions to meet Level 1 science requirements
  - Additional hardware required for assessment includes radiators, instruments, data storage, communication, Attitude Control System (ACS) hardware
- Why not assess these items and protect billion dollar missions against the risk from MMOD?

## **The Solution Process**



- Use the latest version of ORDEM for Orbital Debris and MEMR for micrometeorites
- Calculate spacecraft cross-sectional areas, known orientations, and planned mission durations in each orientation (Nominal, Safehold, Reboost, etc.)
   Vast majority of time spent in Nominal orientation
- Assuming the probability of a single impact for the mission, find the projected particle size for the given flux curve
  - □Based on acceptable risk of a penetration
  - When looking at protection designs, the longest duration orientation will most likely drive design

#### **Particle Selection from Flux Curve**



Figure 1. Omnidirectional Orbital Debris Flux Curve for the Landsat 9 Orbit

# Characterize Threat Directionality, Speed, & Density

- Landsat 9 OD environment (705 km, 98.2 deg) was examined in order to determine the relative threat from each direction.
- ORDEM 3 predicted flux values were examined for 1 mm and 3.16 mm fiducial points, medium density and high density particles
  - □ Principle spacecraft directions were assessed (Nadir was essentially nil)
  - □ Ram dominates the directionality of the particles
- Medium density (2.8 g/cm3) particles dominate the flux predictions
  - High density (7.9 g/cm3) particles constituting only about 10% of the total flux
     Other particles types predicted by ORDEM 3 had negligible flux

#### > The ORDEM 3 also provides average velocity.

	1 mm Fiducial			3.16 mm Fiducial		
↓Direction	Total Flux $[\#/(m^2 * yr)]$	% Flux	Avg. Vel. ( <i>km/s</i> )	Total Flux $[\#/(m^2 * yr)]$	% Flux	Avg. Vel. ( <i>km/s</i> )
Port	1.34E-02	2.3%	7.89	3.23E-05	3.8%	7.99
Ram	5.53E-01	95.4%	14.69	7.77E-04	92.3%	14.70
Starboard	1.34E-02	2.3%	7.89	3.23E-05	3.8%	7.99
Wake	2.24E-07	0.0%	0.80	6.49E-09	0.0%	0.58
Zenith	3.02E-07	0.0%	0.50	1.82E-09	0.0%	0.50
Total	5.80E-01			8.42E-04		

#### Table 1 - Directional Orbital Debris Flux and Velocity for the Landsat 9 Orbit

- Manned missions designs have relatively thick shield, typically used to protect thick pressure walls
- Robotic spacecraft designs employ thinner shields to protect thin walled electronic boxes
- The bumper thickness, wall thickness, and separation between MLI and structure were analyzed iteratively until a protection threshold was achieved for the given particle size.
  - □ Reimerdes Ballistic Limit Equation (BLE) was used for initial designs
  - Other parameters were held constant throughout the assessment: Al particles (2.8 g/cm<sup>3</sup>) at 14.7 km/s and 0° impact angle, and Aluminum 7075-T6 wall material
- The design curves indicate the minimum set of conditions to prevent penetration by a 2 mm medium density particle
- There is a minimum effective component wall thickness, below which enhancing the blanket density is no longer an effective strategy (the blanket/bumper becomes the dominant shield)

# Design Curves for Protection against Penetration of 2 mm, 14.7 km/s, Medium Density Particles



Figure 2. Design Curves for Protection against Penetration of 2 mm 14.7 km/s particles

#### > Exempted items:

- Antennas
- Optical Apertures
- □ Thermal (radiator) Apertures
- □ Solar Array

- □ Thruster Apertures
- □ Mechanisms
- Redundant Harnesses (physically separated)
- When the protection is for unique hardware (see list above), then it is more difficult to provide generic design guidelines.
  - These items require point solution and involve heavy analysis and/or testing (especially for unique materials).
  - □ Often, additional analysis was performed to quantify the risk.
- While there was no overall probability of success target, the analysis provided a quantitative assessment when assessing risk from penetration versus protection implementation complexity

#### **Lessons Learned**

- Engage the Subject Matter Experts at the HyperVelocity Technology Team (HVIT) early for help with modeling and analysis
- Model all Spacecraft components (both Reentry Critical and Mission Success) in Bumper to improve protection results and to provide a quantitative risk assessment
- Assess MMOD risk early enough that there is still time to incorporate changes based on analysis results
  - □ Overall layout of components on the SC
  - □ Physical construction of components (box-wall thickness, radiator surface, etc.)
- Plan for a test program
- There are multiple ways to apply redundancy to lower risks
- Assess for all orientations in mission timelines. Some short durations operations can still be a design driver.
- > Verify material data sheets from vendors

# Summary

- The overall Landsat 9 assessment of including Mission Success MMOD requirements for the mission was positive.
- Given that the instruments are located in the ram direction and facing the brunt of the MMOD flux, added shielding should yield a better return on investment with a greater probability of meeting Level 1 science goals.
- There is always room for improvement and the future areas of focus will be on the items that were exempted previously listed.
- Given the increased knowledge of the mission systems team, the next Landsat mission will have a better understanding of MMOD design mitigations that can be incorporated into the observatory layout earlier in the design phase.
- Shielding in the primary MMOD flux direction will have a higher priority when considering placing critical science instruments in harm's way.