The Relationship between Migration within and from the Middle East and North-Africa and Pro-Poor Policies

A Report by the Institute of Arab & Islamic Studies, University of Exeter for the Department for International Development

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Executive Summary

The MENA region has a long history of migration, related to the growth of Islam, trade, tribal pastoralism as well as war and conflict. Due to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the region is home to the largest and oldest refugee population in the world: the Palestinians, with estimates ranging between 3 and 4 million. The region has also been associated with large labour migration flows to the oil-producing Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Since the 1960s, labour migrants from Turkey and, later also from the Maghreb, have been coming to Europe.

More recently, the migratory patterns of the region have become much more diversified and complex due to patterns of globalization, a series of wars and conflicts, changing labour markets, transit migration and emerging transnational networks.

- **Main Population flows:**

There are several labour and forced migratory sub-systems related to the MENA region:

1. Labour migration from Egypt, Jordan, Yemen & Palestine to
   a) oil-producing countries (GCC & Libya)
   b) non-oil producing countries (Jordan, Israel)

2. Forced migration of refugees and Internationally Displaced Peoples (IDPs): Iraqis, Kurds, Iranian, Sudanese and Afghans to Iran, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey

3. East and South Asian labour migration to oil-producing states

4. Labour migration from Maghreb countries & Turkey to Western Europe

5. Forced migration from Iraq, Turkey & Iran to Western Europe

The main population flows within the MENA region have been associated with labour migration from non-oil producing Mashreq countries, especially Egypt and Yemen, but also Jordan and Palestine and to a lesser degree Syria and Iraq, to the oil-producing countries within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Although official data on these flows is either unavailable or not sufficiently accurate and reliable, most analysts agree that this type of regional migration peaked in the mid-80s. Estimates of labour migrants to the Gulf in this period range between a low of 1.54 million to a high of 3.45 million (Shah, 1994, in IOM, 2002: 40).

Historically, Turkish labour migrants made up the main population flow from the MENA region to Europe, and to the present, they constitute the largest non-European immigrant group in the European Union. In recent years, the MENA region has produced large numbers of migrants and asylum seekers.

The first flow relates to labour migration from the Maghreb and Turkey to member states of the European Union. In 2002, Morocco and Turkey had the largest populations of expatriates in the EU, with 2 and 3 million of their citizens respectively residing as third country nationals (Castles & Miller, 2003: 123). These populations
have been joined by migrants from Algeria and Tunisia to make up large pools of labour migrants in Western Europe.

War and conflict in the region are responsible for the fact that MENA has the largest refugee population in the world, being home to more than 6 million refugees. Iran has the largest number of refugees living in its territory. While the Palestinian refugees are the largest and longest standing refugee population in the world, more recent wars and conflict have caused mainly Afghani, Iraqi, Kurdish and Iranian refugees to flee their places of origin.

Although most international migration from the MENA region takes place between the Maghreb (and Turkey) and Europe, the Mashreq countries may become more significant in future years due to a declining demand for foreign Arab labour by the Gulf countries and the ongoing political instability, conflict and wars in the region. Palestinian and Iraqi migrants are increasingly mobilising transnational social networks to migrate to Western Europe. Another increasing migratory pressure comes from growing numbers of transit migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa.

- **Main causes for internal and regional migration**
  1) Population pressures due to demographic characteristics
  2) War & conflict
  3) Rapid urbanization
  4) Changing labour markets
  5) High levels of unemployment
  6) Demand for labour in oil-producing and non-oil producing MENA countries
  7) Development-induced migration

- **Main causes for migration from MENA countries to Europe**

  International migration to Europe from the MENA region takes many forms (permanent, temporary & irregular) and is based on various underlying motivations:

  1) The voluntary migration of people who leave their country of origin for socio-economic reasons (mainly labour migrants from Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia.)

  2) The forced migration of people fleeing war & conflict (refugees from Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Palestine & Algeria)

  3) The forced migration of people escaping political persecution, oppressive regimes and lack of freedom of expression (asylum seekers from Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria and Turkey)

  4) Family re-unification (largest numbers from Maghreb, Iraq, Turkey & Iran)

  5) The optimising of access to resources, education, life style options etc. through transnational networks of families, religious & political groups (migrants from Palestine, Lebanon, Iran, Egypt, Yemen, Turkey)

  6) Labour market needs within Europe
In practice, the above categories are only analytical tools, as many migrants actually fall into more than one category. In particular, the distinction between economic and forced migrants is in reality blurred. This is especially true for Iraqi, Kurdish Palestinian, and Algerian migrants, who have fled countries of upheaval, conflict and economic crisis.

**Main Findings and Policy Recommendations:**

- Rapid urbanization processes and migration of economic migrants, refugees and IDPs, puts increasing pressure on resources and infrastructures of cities within the MENA region. Development agencies should focus on integrated projects to incorporate both long and short-term residents.

- War and conflict is responsible for poverty and large-scale refugee movements within and from the region. Need to tackle root causes of war & conflict and support peace-building initiatives involving grass-roots actors, NGOs and governments in the region.

- Policy-makers may make clear distinctions between economic and forced migrants but in reality many migrants have multiple motivations for moving (migration-asylum nexus). Acknowledgement of these complexities and inter-linkages needs to be made.

- Many labour and forced migrants from MENA countries are eager to get involved in economic, social, political and cultural development in their countries of origin. Rather than viewing migrants from MENA as a problem and challenge to security, migration needs to be considered as an instrument for development. Encourage creative policies and schemes to allow “development by means of migration”.

- Legal insecurity hinders migrants from transforming their desire and willingness to contribute to development into actual practices and activities. Access to legal status and legal rights in receiving countries will optimise migrants’ ability to contribute to alleviation of poverty in MENA countries.

- Cheaper and more reliable transmission of remittances needed to ensure more efficient use of remittances not only on individual family level but also in terms of local development and investments. Need to facilitate the creation of investment frameworks and technology transfer opportunities.

- There is a need to address the skill mismatch in the region in order to build up human capital in the region. Building of schools in targeted rural areas, training schemes, exchange of teachers and students etc. could help to address the skills-mismatch in the region.

- Facilitate ‘transnational’ and ‘virtual’ links between skilled and highly educated migrants and between people and development projects in their countries of origin.

- In order to avoid economic exploitation and human rights abuses amnesty schemes to be set up for undocumented migrants and apply international labour conventions to migrant labourers.
I. Introduction

I.1. Background of report

DFID needs to better understand the implications of different types of migration on pro-poor change in MENA at the regional and country level. Amongst migration research, not much emphasis has been given to demonstrating the links between migration and its impact on poverty reduction. In turn, there is little analysis of migration studies and trends set within poverty reduction policies and processes in MENA.

This report starts from the premise that we do not make a judgment as to whether migration is good or bad but that it is occurring and that to maximise its benefits and reduce risks for poverty reduction, a clearer understanding and framework for thinking about policies, migration and livelihoods is needed.

Migration is understood to include internal, regional, international, forced, voluntary, internal displacement, documented, undocumented, cyclical and seasonal movement of people. The implications of MENA countries' position as both senders and receivers of migrants within and beyond the region is also an important aspect.

I.2. Main Themes and Issues

DFID's Regional Assistance Plan for MENA includes cites its key areas of interest as:

- Links between migration and economic growth in the region. This includes changing labour markets and urbanisation as well as international labour markets, migration and remittances
- The relationships between conflict, poverty and migration
- The role of authorities in managing migration and the outcomes of migration (i.e. changes in where people live, how they make a living and their experience of poverty)
- Links between migration and human development
- Migration as a driver of change

The report is divided into the following sections:

- Sub-national Migration and Development in MENA
- Sub-regional Migration and Development in MENA
- International Migration, Remittances & Development
- Impact of War and Conflict on Regional Migration & Poverty
- Transnational Migration: Beyond the Push-Pull Model

I.3. Methodology

The research for this report has been mainly carried out through a desk-based review of the relevant literature, both academic and policy-oriented (see bibliography) as well as intensive search for relevant material on the Internet (see relevant sites cited). Moreover, the researcher consulted various key experts by means of phone or
face to face interviews in the UK, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine and the UAE (see appendix 2).

In addition, the principle researcher included observations and trends that have arisen in the context of her own research on Iraqi refugees and transnational migration as well as the research experiences of several colleagues working on issues related to the report.

I. 4. Main Population Trends Related to MENA Region

Main population flows:

There are several migratory and forced labour sub-systems related to the MENA region:

3) Labour migration from Egypt, Jordan, Yemen & Palestine to
   a) oil-producing countries (GCC & Libya)
   b) non-oil producing countries (Jordan, Israel)

2) Forced migration of refugees and IDPs (Iraqis, Kurds, Iranian, Sudanese & Afghanis) to Iran, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey

6) East and South Asian labour migration to oil-producing states

7) Labour migration from Maghreb countries & Turkey to Western Europe

8) Forced migration from Iraq, Turkey & Iran to Western Europe.

The main population flows within the MENA region have been associated with labour migration from non-oil producing Mashreq countries, especially Egypt and Yemen, but also Jordan and Palestine and to a lesser degree Syria and Iraq, to the oil-producing countries within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Although official data on these flows is either unavailable or not sufficiently accurate and reliable, most analysts agree that this type of regional migration peaked in the mid-80s. Estimates for Arab labour migrants to the Gulf in this period range between a low of 1.54 million to a high of 3.45 million Arab labour migrants in the Gulf (Shah, 1994, in IOM, 2002: 40).

Historically, Turkish labour migrants made up the main population flow from the MENA region to Europe, and to the present constitute the largest non-European immigrant group in the European Union. In recent years, the MENA region has produced both large numbers of labour migrants and asylum seekers.

The first flow relates to labour migration from the Maghreb and Turkey to member states of the European Union. In 2002, Morocco and Turkey had the largest populations of expatriates in the EU, with 2 and 3 million of their citizens respectively residing as third country nationals (Castles & Miller, 2003: 123). These populations have been joined by migrants from Algeria and Tunisia to make up large pools of labour migrants in Western Europe, most notably Belgium (Moroccans and Turks), France (Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians), Germany (Moroccans and Turks), Italy (Moroccans and Tunisians), the Netherlands (Moroccans and Turks), Spain
(Moroccans) and Sweden (Turks). According to a recent IOM study (2002: 1), about 2.7 million non-EU nationals are from Turkey, and approximately 2.3 million from the Maghreb. Together, they account for nearly half of non-EU nationals living in the European Union (ibid.) (see Table 1).

War and conflict in the region are responsible for the fact that MENA has the largest refugee population in the world, being home to more than 6 million refugees. Iran has the largest number of refugees living in its territory. While the Palestinian refugees are the largest and oldest refugee population in the world, more recent wars and conflict have caused mainly Afghani, Iraqi, Kurdish and Iranian refugees to flee their places of origin.

Although most international migration from the MENA region takes place between the Maghreb (and Turkey) and Europe, the Mashreq countries may become more significant in future years due to a declining demand for foreign Arab labour by the Gulf countries and the ongoing political instability, conflict and wars in the region. Palestinian and Iraqi migrants are increasingly mobilising transnational social networks to migrate to Western Europe. Another increasing migratory pressure comes from growing numbers of transit migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa.

Demographic Considerations:

Second only to Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA has the fastest growing population of the world. Although fertility rates have declined in recent years, it is still the second highest in the world and at double of the replacement levels (Egset, 2000: 29-30). The World Bank estimates that population growth will continue at a rate of 1.9% until 2015, estimating that the region’s total population will reach 394 million by 2015 (ibid.). Yet, it is important to point out the correlation between population growth and the increase in the region’s labour force, growing at a projected annual rate of 3.3% in the 1995-2010 period (World Bank 1998/99:195). In 2000, the labour force of the region totalled 104 million people. It is expected to reach 146 million by 2010 and 185 million by 2020 (Youssef, 2004).

In addition to the huge numbers of young people entering the labour market, two other factors have played a significant role in expanding the labour force. On the one hand, reduced opportunities for labour migration to the Gulf countries has increased the pool of those seeking employment at home. This decreased demand is linked to nationalism policies, the impact of the Gulf war in 1991 and ongoing political crises in the region as well as preference for cheaper labour from Asian countries. In the long run, perhaps more significant, however, is the fact that female labour force participation is increasing (from less than 23% in 1970 to 32% in 2000), although it is still lower than female labour force participation rates in other regions of the world (World Bank, 2004). In terms of methodological considerations, it is important to point out that women’s actual contribution to the economy and labour force participation rates often neglect women’s considerable participation in the informal sector.

The current population growth will increase the ongoing rural – urban migration, the expansion of urban centres as well as the pressure of population flows regionally and to Europe. During the past decades, the region has always been described in terms of its large proportion of young people, leading to high dependency ratios. Due to the maturing of MENA’s age structure, the growth of the economically active population (ages 15-64) will exceed that of the economically dependent population by a much greater amount than any other region (World Bank, 2004, Overview). This, in turn, will, at least in the short run, lead to a greater increase in unemployment and
potentially to greater population flows. However, in the view of Fargues, a relative young but economically active population might be an asset on the long run, and could open a ‘demographic window of opportunity’ favourable to investments and savings (2003: 4). A recent IMF study suggest that this favourable age structure should be taken advantage of by encouraging housing construction, thereby addressing the need for housing as well as absorbing a high number of labour (Dhonte, Bhattacharya and Youssef, 2000). However, as Fargues, rightly points out, one might argue that less traditional sectors would make better use of human capital, especially in light of advances in education across the region (2003: 4).

II. Sub-national Migration and Development within MENA

This section will document the main internal population and migration patterns and labour flows within MENA countries and analyse their relationship to development and pro-poor policies. It will start by outlining the characteristics of labour markets within the region.

II.1. Changing Labour Markets in the MENA region

MENA countries have been characterized by a rapid growth of their labour forces, high rates of unemployment, and a heavy reliance on the public sector for job creation. Employment structures have also been changing with a shift from agriculture to more industry and service-based labour markets. These factors shape population flows and pressures at all levels: sub-national, sub-regional and international.

II.1.a). The Labour Force & Unemployment

More than population dynamics, it is clearly employment dynamics, which have become a matter of concern. Unemployment is indeed reaching highs, in particular since IMF-inspired programmes of economic reforms have been implemented throughout MENA: this ranges from 10% (Egypt, Lebanon, Syria) to a record 30% or above in Algeria and Palestine’ (Fargues, 2003: 3). According to available official statistics, MENA’s unemployment rates are the highest in the world. Excluding the labour force working in the GCC, the average rate of unemployment in MENA countries stands at 20%. The unemployment problem is most severe in Iraq, with an estimated 50% of the workforce unemployed. In the West Bank and Gaza, estimates of unemployment in 2001 were close to 40%, but the events of recent years have without question resulted in even higher levels of unemployment. In a number of other countries in the region, such as Iran, Algeria, Libya, and Yemen, as much as a third of the potential workforce is unemployed (Keller & Nabli, World Bank, 2002).

According to Richards & Waterbury (1996 :134), four generalisations can be made about the nature of unemployment in the region, namely that it is higher 1) in cities than in rural areas, 2) among the youth, 3) among the educated and 4) among women seeking employment (with the exception of the GCC states). Despite the World Bank’s rather optimistic projections about positive labour market outcomes, job creation and economic growth if MENA follows developmental policies of integration, privatisation and diversified economies (Youssef, 2004), most commentators seem to predict that the growth of the labour force will lead to an augmentation in unemployment and may increase incentives for regional and international migration.
II. 1.b). Significance of Public Sector
The share of public enterprises in the labour market and in economic production is high. While generally below 10 percent for middle-income economies, it reaches more than 30 percent in Egypt and Tunisia and nearly 60 percent in Algeria. Combining government employment and employment in public enterprises brings the share of employment in the broader public sector among wage employees to as much as 35 percent in Egypt, 50 percent in Jordan and almost 60 percent in Algeria (ERF, 2000). Given the large size of government employment, efficient public sector downsizing requires a great number of labour redundancies. For example, in Egypt the initial estimate for labour redundancies in public enterprises was around 10 percent but in practice this figure proves to be closer to 35 percent. In Morocco, the fourteen largest public enterprises produced an annual average loss that reached more than 2 percent of GDP by 1992, with the consequent downsizing of labour (ibid). As private sector growth stagnated during the 1990s, governments were forced to become employers of last resort. Indeed, some evidence points to declines in real wages in the manufacturing sectors of Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan during the 1990s (Gardner, IMF, 2003).

II.1.c). Skills Mismatch
The weakness of productivity growth during the 1990s is particularly striking in light of the region's educational gains. Although MENA countries still lag behind developing countries in Asia and Latin America in terms of educational achievement, they have made impressive strides since 1975, particularly where women are concerned. The average number of years of education completed by those 15 years of age and older in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Pakistan, and Tunisia more than doubled between 1975 and 2000, compared with an average increase of about 50 percent in other developing countries. On average, the return on investing in education thus appears to have been low, suggesting that educational systems may not have adequately prepared students to meet the requirements of modern market economies. The large proportion of university students with degrees in human and social sciences in MENA countries may be symptomatic of a skill mismatch (Gardner, IMF, 2003).

II.2. Urbanization and Migration

II.2.a). General Patterns
Populations in the MENA region tend to be unevenly distributed on the land, both among MENA countries and within each country. While all six GCC countries together have a population of about 32 million (with Saudi Arabia alone having about 22 million inhabitants), Egypt alone has a population of about 69 million (IMF, 2003). The density per square kilometre varies sharply from three persons in Libya to as many as 1,000 in Bahrain. One reason for this is that a very large percentage of MENA is barren desert. Thus, in Egypt the non-desert areas of the Nile Valley and the Delta have a density of over 1,200 inhabitants per square kilometre, while the desert areas (over 95% of total territory) have a density of one (Hopkins & Ibrahim, 1997: 69).

This characteristic of MENA explains why, despite the vastness of territory, many villages and cities appear to be overcrowded. This pattern also implies mounting pressures on the limited non-desert areas in the region. About 70% of the poor in the MENA region live in rural areas, even though rural areas support only 43% of the total population. (World Bank, 2003). Together with several political and socio-economic factors, this situation has triggered a stream of rural-urban migration in all MENA countries, leading to rapid urbanization and, in turn, to the transformation of
urban spaces into increasingly significant clusters of communities originating from the countryside. The inflow of rural migrants in MENA has been much more rapid than the pace at which they are absorbed into the market. As a result, many cities in the region are populated with unemployed and underemployed people (Hopkins & Ibrahim, 1997: 70).

Rural-urban migration is linked to changes in the sectoral distribution of employment. Since the 1970s, the share of employment in agriculture declined rapidly until the mid-1980s and more slowly since then. However, manufacturing and other industries have not increased proportionally to the decline of the agricultural sector (Shaban et al. 2001). The development of urban areas is still closely tied to the rural economy through the exchange of labour, goods, services, information and technology. Remittances from urban areas to rural areas are an important source of income for rural populations in the MENA region as elsewhere. In Morocco, for example, urban remittances are as high as 30% of the income of the poor (World Bank, 2000).

II.2.b). Significance of Informal Sector

Internal migration data is indicative of the real and perceived employment opportunities in different regions, and differences of educational, health and other services. One important outcome of rural-urban migration has been the growth of the so-called informal sector in urban areas. Although associated with hidden unemployment, urban under-employment and poverty, informal activities have become a means for many countries to cope with population growth, rural-urban migration, economic crises and unemployment. In some countries of the MENA region, the informal sector is estimated to contribute anywhere between one-quarter and two-thirds of non-agricultural employment, with Algeria (1985) at 25.4 percent; Tunisia (1989) at 39.3 percent; Morocco (1982) at 56.9 percent; Egypt (1986) at 65.3 percent; Mauritania (1988) at 75.3 percent; Iran (1986) at 43.5 percent; and Turkey (1990) at 17.4 percent. As for their contribution to GDP, informal activities are largely under-recorded in the national income accounts of all Third World countries (ERF, 1996, Editorial).

Box 1 Case Study: Yemen

Presently, the Yemeni population is predominantly rural, but has been rapidly urbanizing at rates, which have averaged between 6-8%, or almost two to three times higher than average urban rates of increase in the MENA region. This rapid urbanization dates to the 1970s, fuelled by a combination of high rates of population growth, rural-urban migration, remittances and, more recently, return of migrants in the wake of the Gulf War in the early 1990s (see Table 2, Annex 1).

According to the statistical year book projections, 34% of the Yemeni population, or about 5.4 million people, were estimated to be living in cities in 1998. Almost two thirds of this population was concentrated in Sana’a, Aden, Taiz and Al-Hodeidah, with Sana’a alone accounting for 28% of urban residents. By the year 2025, 58% of Yemen’s population, i.e. 19.674 million people will be living in urban areas - an increase of some 13.874 million people, outpacing the existing capacity of cities to manage this growth and provide services. (World Bank, Comprehensive Development Review, Yemen, 2000).

The trend in urbanization in Yemen is comparable not so much to the countries in the Middle-East, but to those in Sub-Saharan Africa, and other low income countries characterized by relatively lower levels of urbanization and very rapid rates of growth (see Tables 3 & 4, Annex 1).

Almost one in five of Yemen’s residents lived below the poverty line in 1992. While the majority of the Yemeni poor live in rural areas, poverty rates in urban areas are disproportionately high. As of 1992, 18.6% of the urban population was below the poverty line as compared to 19.2 in rural areas in 1992. (WDI 1998).

Overall governorate poverty rates do not seem to be correlated with levels of urbanization, or services. Sana’a city is the exception as it is the most urbanized, has the highest degree of literacy and services, and lower than average poverty rates at 11.2 %. The high rates of poverty in urban areas, in the face of rapid urbanization, are cause for concern in terms of the capacity of cities to generate not only the services, but the jobs required to absorb a rapidly growing population and reduce poverty.

Urban households spend about 67% of their income on food and housing,(13%). Tobacco and qat expenses are about 11% in both urban and rural areas (ibid.).
Role of Migration in Yemen’s Urban Development

Current migration estimates indicate that Sana’a City, the historical and political capital city is the main destination of internal migrants – 107% from outside. Aden governorate with 25% of population from outside, followed by Al- Hodeidah with more than 10% of new comers, are distant seconds. Other receiving governorates are Al-Mahrah, Al- Jawf, Hadramout, Shabwah and Saadah due to the initiation of various projects (the discovery of oil and some investment projects). Out-migration is largest in the least urbanized governorates such as Al-Mahwit (about 8% of its original population has moved out) Taiz, Dhamar, Sanaa, Ibb, Lahj, Al-Baida and Abyan. Hajjah governorate seems to have changed from sending to a receiving area. This might be due to the return of the migrants from the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia (World Bank, 2000). Most receiving governorates are at least 30% urbanized. Interestingly, Hadramout in the South, being also a third urban, and with one of the highest accessibility of water from the network (after Sana’a city and Aden) does not attract that many immigrants, if compared for instance with Al-Hodeidah which is more inland (see Table 5, Appendix 1)

(Source: World Bank, Comprehensive Development Plan, Yemen, 2000)

II.3. Internal Displacement

According to the Global IDP Project, the Middle East is home to the world’s largest single refugee population – the Palestinians. Regionally, it has one of the smallest internally displaced populations. Across the region there are an estimated 1.8 million internally displaced compared to 4.8 million refugees (Global IDP Project, Middle East, 2004). This estimate should be treated with caution, however, as many IDPs in the region have never been registered. At the same time, the number includes many descendants of IDPs, reflecting the fact that internal displacement in the region has often spanned over several generations. In fact, over half the internally displaced people in the Middle East have been displaced for at least twenty years (ibid.).

Hundreds of thousands of people were internally displaced by the civil war in Lebanon from 1975 to 1990. Some 300,000 IDPs remain unable to return because of continued instability in the southern part of the country, which despite the withdrawal of the Israeli army in 2000 is still plagued by clashes between the Lebanese guerrilla group Hizbollah and Israeli forces. The wars between Israel and its neighbours after 1948 caused large-scale displacement, including the internal displacement of Arabs within Israel and of inhabitants of the Golan Heights within Syria. These IDP populations, each of whom now totals several hundred thousand, have been displaced for decades and there is little prospect for return in the near future (ibid.).

In 2003 the US-led armed intervention in Iraq, followed by the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime produced a large scale of internal displacement in the Middle East. The UN had feared that an additional one million people would become displaced within Iraq as a result of the war. While displacement did not take place on this scale, close to 80,000 people were forced from their homes during the fighting (ibid.). In the wake of the fall of Saddam Hussein, a number of international humanitarian organisations, including some assisting IDPs, established a presence in Iraq. By the end of 2003 many of these NGOs and charity groups had left Iraq due to the growing insecurity and the direct targeting of humanitarian actors. The resultant reduction of humanitarian operations has, for the near future at least, diminished the chance of finding durable solutions for the many Iraqis who were displaced by the war.

The situation for existing IDPs in the region has also not improved. The current state of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has caused the additional internal displacement of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and continuing tensions between Israel and Syria have prevented the return of IDPs displaced from the Golan Heights (ibid.). (See Section V for more detailed discussion).
II.4. Development-Induced Displacement

Over the last decade, research on population displacement by development projects has considerably expanded. However, while researchers of Asia, Africa and Latin America have produced a great deal of writings on resettlement processes and their failures, literature on the MENA region has been relatively scarce (Ben-Achour & Cernea, 2004). This is despite the fact that displacements have become more frequent in the region in recent years, especially in urban settings, due to urban regeneration and infrastructure investments, as witnessed extensively in Lebanon and Egypt, for example (ibid.). Displacement related to rural areas is often linked to water security, i.e. the Ilisu dam on the river Tigris, which threatens to displace thousands of Kurds and the Taiz Municipal and Flood Protection Project in Yemen, which affects the already marginalized Akhdam caste (ibid.). It is beyond the scope of this report to explore development-induced migration in the MENA region in any detail, but it is an issue that should be explored further, especially in the context of pro-poor policies.

III. Sub-regional Migration and Development in MENA

III. 1. Major Regional Labour Flows

The main population flows within the MENA region have been associated with labour migration from non-oil producing Mashreq countries, especially Egypt and Yemen, but also Jordan and Palestine and to a lesser degree Syria and Iraq, to the oil-producing countries within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Although official data on these flows is either unavailable or not sufficiently accurate and reliable, most analysts agree that this type of regional migration peaked in the mid-80s (see Table 6, Annex 1). Employment estimates of Arab labour migrants to the Gulf during this period range between a low of 1.54 million to a high of 3.45 million (Shah, 1994, in IOM, 2002: 40).

III. 2. Replacement of Arab Migrants

Long before the Gulf crisis in 1990 and the subsequent war in 1991, GCC states started to recruit workers from Asia. The economic argument posed for this change in employment patterns was that Asian workers worked for less money and were more productive. Yet, in order to understand the recruitment policy drives of the GCC states in this period non-economic considerations also need to be given weight. In the context of political instability, especially in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, GCC governments were wary of radical social and political ideas. In addition to the upsurge of Islamist ideologies in the 1980s, leftist and pan-Arab ideologies were widespread and threatened the conservative monarchies in the Gulf. Moreover, the sheer presence and dependence on foreign labour was felt to pose a threat and measures were taken to make this migration phenomenon temporary rather than permanent. As Arab migrants had often tried to bring over their families, Asian workers appeared to be the safer choice in terms of both their politics and their status as temporary migrants.

The preference for non-Arab foreign nationals became even more pertinent in the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait and Yemen, Jordan and Palestine’s support for Iraq. About 1.5 million people were displaced in the wake of the Gulf crisis in
1990/1991: about 800,000 Yemenis were expelled from Saudi Arabia, alongside 200,000 Jordanians and 350,000 Palestinians who were mainly expelled from Kuwait (IOM, 2000). No in-depth research has been carried out to study the impact of this situation on the economies and poverty levels of the sending countries. But obviously the lack of remittances, as well as pressures on local labour markets, have been a huge burden, especially in Yemen, Egypt and Jordan where unemployment and recession rose significantly (Abdel-Latif, 1992).

Box 2: The Impact of Mass Return on Yemen

Among the poorest countries in the region, Yemen suffered greatly from the forced return of an estimated 800,000 migrant workers within a very short period of time in 1990 (Van Hear, 1997). In addition to supporting large numbers of dependants within Yemen, remittances of Yemeni workers in GCC countries accounted for a large proportion of Yemen’s official foreign receipts. Due to the large one-time influx of capital, equivalent to several years’ receipt of remittances and a considerable amount of goods and equipment brought back, the return of migrants did present opportunities for investment. However, only limited efforts were made by the Yemeni government, as well as international and non-governmental organisations to provide development assistance to returnees. One exception was the Emergency Recovery Project (ERP) to assist returnees, overseen by the Ministry of Construction and Reconstruction, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The ERP proposed programmes for the construction of roads, improving education and vocational training for returnees, selling agricultural inputs to returnee farmers at subsidized prices, and the provision of returnee housing and infrastructure. However, the project was extremely slow in implementation and failed to substantially increase the investment opportunities for return migrants. A high proportion of returnees have remained unemployed and only very limited investment was made in the agricultural sector.

(Source: Nick van Hear, 1997, Reintegrating Returnees: Opportunities and Constraints)

Under normal conditions, returning migrants bring to their countries of origin accumulated savings that help their return and often allow for better economic prospects at home. This was not possible during the Gulf crisis and many migrants even had to leave their personal belongings behind. Aside from the economic setback, migrants have also suffered psychologically, similar to refugees during war and conflict. In Egypt, the outcome has been more mixed as Egyptian nationals replaced many of the former Palestinian, Jordanian and Yemeni migrants in the GCC countries (Richards & Waterbury 1996:370-1).

In the mid 1990s, Asian labour migrants from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Korea and Bangladesh outnumbered Arab migrants by about one million (Girgis, 2002: 10). However, a more in-depth study of Kuwait from 1989-2000 reveals that despite a decrease in numbers, Arab migrant workers have dominated the upper echelons of skill categories (technical, managerial and clerical), while Asian workers have dominated services, agriculture and production-related jobs. Jobs in sales have also been dominated by Arab workers. It is interesting to note that the overall foreign Arab population outnumbered the Asian population as many Arab workers tend to migrate with their families while Asian workers (both men and women) migrate on their own. This is partly related to the conditions (salaries, housing etc) related to high and low skilled jobs (ibid. 13) as well as the particular migration culture of Arab and Asian workers. According to Evans and Papps (1999: 213), about one third of Arab adult migrants (other than Jordanian and Palestinian migrants for whom no data was available) is living with at least a part of their families in the country of settlement. This is despite the fact that GCC states have severely curtailed family reunion, except for foreign workers of high-income levels (mainly western expatriate communities). Aside from the need to provide visas and bank guarantees, migrant workers are obliged to pay a considerable fee before family members are allowed temporary residency.
III. 3. Nationalization of the Labour Force

Since the 1990s, there has been a new trend influencing recruitment strategies and, potentially, future populations flows. As a result of persistently weak oil prices, financial contributions, depleted foreign assets and loss due to two Gulf wars (1980-1988, 1991), the GCC countries have started to experience recessions, and for the first time have recorded unemployment figures for nationals. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the Manpower Council estimated the unemployment rate among Saudi nationals at 14% in 2000, and at 15% in 2001 (EIU, 2002). In addition to an economic crisis, GCC countries face a large pool of young first time job seekers (including women), who benefited from the expanded and improved education system. About half a million GCC nationals are unemployed in a region that employs 7.5 million expatriate workers (Girgis, 2000, in IOM, 2002: 44). Based on population growth projections and the maturing of the large proportion of the 0-14 years age group, Girgis estimates that the share of the labour force within the overall population will increase from 58% (1975) to 63% in 2005, thereby considerably increasing the number of people in search for waged employment.

All GCC states have introduced policies to reduce rising unemployment among their nationals, and to maintain or increase birth rates in order to curtail their dependence on foreign labour (IOM, 2000). Despite ongoing attempts by GCC governments to nationalize their labour forces, “nationalization” or “localization policies” – i.e. the attempt to replace foreign with national labour - seem to have been only partially successful (see Table 6, Annex 1). This is largely due to the preference for better-paid and prestigious public sector jobs at a time that government expansion has come to a halt. The public sector can not be sufficiently enlarged to absorb the large numbers of first time job seekers. Despite obvious improvements in the education systems, there also seems to exist a skills-mismatch between national graduates and private sector needs (Girgis, 2002:38).

The increased participation of women in the labour force poses another challenge as the educational profile of women is higher than those of men. While still low in comparison to other MENA countries and regions, female participation in the Gulf is expected to rise due to a) economic recession and negative per capita income growth which will force young families to rely on two salaries rather than one; b) the rise in education levels, particularly higher education; c) women’s ongoing demands for greater recognition and rights, particularly pertaining to freedom of movement, education, political participation and contribution to the economy and d) reliance on expatriate maids and nannies, which will push well-educated women to seek careers outside the confines of their homes (Girgis, 2002: 21).

Whatever obstacles exist in the present time to speed up the process of the nationalization of the labour force, there is no doubt that, in the long run, national workers will replace a large number of expatriate workers. As GCC nationals will seek well paid skilled jobs, this trend will affect Arab migrants much more than Asian migrants who are predominately found in low skilled jobs. Jobs currently held by Arab labour migrants include teachers, engineers, lawyers, physicians, researchers etc., which will eventually be sought more intensely by the national labour force. Girgis (2002) predicts “slow Arab out-migration” over the next decades. According to his estimates, the current out-migration in Arab countries will amount to a loss of remittances worth $1.55 billion over the period of 2003-2007 alone (p.39). In addition, there will be an increase in return migration which, in turn, will lead to greater pressures on local labour markets and may lead to greater unemployment rates.
III. 3. Migration to non-GCC countries within the MENA region

Other less significant regional population flows have been associated with migration to Libya (mainly from Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Palestine), to Jordan (mainly from Iraq and Palestine) and to Iraq (mainly from Egypt and Palestine). The migration flow to Libya has increased since the establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989 and the Treaty of Marrakech, which was supposed to facilitate labour movements within the Union. Rapprochement with Egypt has also increased the number of Egyptian migrant labourers. Moreover, restrictions on migration imposed by European countries is cited as a reason for the increase in migration to Libya (Nassar, 2004).

However, several analysts and academics have challenged the effectiveness of the Union of Arab Maghreb to produce regional integration (Safir, 1999: 89). Libya has enjoyed the highest per capita income in Africa, estimated at $5410 in 1990 (Farrag, 1999: 81, in Castles & Mills, 2003: 128). In this same period the Libyan government began to shift its political focus away from the Arab world towards Africa, increasing its influence on African politics and diplomacy. In this context, the government tolerated the flow of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa who largely became involved in a project to green the desert. Yet, despite Gaddafi’s pan-African policies, a high number of Libyans resented the presence of African labour migrants. A mixture of economic crisis due to the imposition of sanctions and racist attitudes led to violent outbursts against African migrants, with the killing of hundreds of Africans in 2000 (Bensaâd, 2002: 19, in Castles & Mills, 2003: 129). Although the killings were followed by a massive exodus of African migrants, these days the migration flow continues as many are hoping to either find economic betterment in Libya or a chance to transit to Western Europe (ibid).

In the past, Jordan and Iraq have both sent and received migrants. The Iraqi state under Saddam Hussein tried to mobilize its own human resources rather than foreign labour (as was the case in the GCC countries). Nevertheless, in the context of the economic boom (late 70s and up to mid 1980s) as well as loss of labour due to war (1980-1988), the Iraqi state needed to import labour from outside. Based on Arab nationalist principles, the Iraqi government rejected the idea of labour migrants from non-Arab countries and allowed in several million mainly unskilled Egyptian workers into Iraq. Despite several violent clashes and incidents during the late 1980s, many Egyptian workers remained in Iraq until the Gulf War in 1991. In the past decade, due to the severe economic and humanitarian crises brought about the comprehensive economic sanctions (1990-2003), as well as continued political instability and violence, Iraq became mainly a country of immigration.

Jordan, on the other hand, has continued to be both a country witnessing out-migration and replacement migration. Yet, the most recent impact of migration needs to be analyzed in the context of return migration of Jordanians and Palestinians from the Gulf countries, mainly Kuwait, in 1991/1992 as well as the large flow of Iraqi refugees since 1990.

III. 4. Economic & social outcomes of regional labour migration

III. 4. a) Economic outcomes
According to Egset, labour migration and remittances ‘redistribute oil wealth throughout the region more effectively than direct aid from oil exporters’. The latter has been estimated at around $50 billion between 1973 – 1990 (2000: 24). However, at the same time as aid given to the main oil exporting countries to poorer countries in the region decreased in the 1990s, the level of remittances also dropped due to
the aforementioned factors. One reason that the effect of foreign aid on regional development has only been limited is due to the fact that a large proportion was channelled into defence budgets, while the rest has been poorly managed (El-Ghonemy 1998:63; Richards & Waterbury 1996: 368 in Egset, 2000:25).


The economic benefits of these remittances for the sending countries have been felt most predominantly on the personal and household level, but have largely failed to contribute to larger economic growth, capital accommodation and processes of innovation (Fergany, 2001). As comparative studies of labour migration and remittances have shown, it is not the poorest of the poor who find the initial resources to migrate. However, the majority of migrants from Mashreq countries to the GCC have been young, adult males from rural areas. These migrants have helped to reduce poverty and local unemployment in rural areas, and have possibly contributed to driving up wages for those who stayed behind (Richards & Waterbury 1937: 371, in Egset, 2000:27-28). It has not only been the rural poor, but also governments that became dependent on remittances as an easy source of hard currency: According to Fergany (2001) remittances grew to represent significant amounts relative to other macro-economic quantities, such as GDP, foreign exchange earnings and the import bill (p. 9). In contrast to the policy and institutional frameworks of countries, such as South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, which effectively mobilized remittances for saving and investment purposes, Arab countries have, by and large, failed to do likewise. As a matter of fact, the policy and institutional frameworks of Arab countries have worked to exacerbate economic repercussions, such as inflation, speculation in hard currency, and exaggerated dependence on imports (ibid.)

Out-migration has also represented costs to sending countries by creating labour supply shortages in some sectors, a brain drain, especially with the most highly skilled migrants, inflated wages for these groups and loss of public investment in training of skilled labour (Egset, 2000: 27). In Jordan, one of the outcomes has been shortages of key personnel, especially medical specialists (Egset & Hammad, 1999: 28).

Return migration of skilled workers might potentially pose opportunities in terms of investment and contribution to the economy. In practice lack of adequate return programmes by MENA governments and international organizations have so far largely failed to create any positive developmental impact of return migration within the region.

III.4.b) Social Outcomes
On a social level, labour migration to the Gulf has had wide-ranging impacts on sending societies, from life style and consumption patterns, household structures, gender relations to ideological outlooks and worldviews. Due to the fact that the vast majority of Arab labour migrants to the Gulf have been male, there has been an increase in female-headed households in sending countries. As revealed in the Egyptian context, the effects have been multi-fold, and contradictory (Hijjab, 1988;
Hoodfar, 1996). On the one hand, labour migration has increased the hardship and stress on women trying to function in a society where women tend to gain respect and protection through their male kin. Young wives especially have often been left under the control of their in-laws, particularly their mother-in-laws, a situation that frequently leads to tension and conflict. There have also been reports of women despairing as their absent husbands did not send the expected sum of money home and women were forced to borrow further from other relatives and neighbours. In some instances, the extra cash tempted male migrants to engage in polygamous marriages, thereby seriously undermining the economic and social position of the first wife (Ibid.).

These negative side effects aside, women have been able to benefit from labour migration: from personal gains related to reduced poverty and increased living standards, to participation in the labour force. It created the need on the state level to mobilize women as part of the labour force as a replacement of male migrants (Hijab, 1988: 78). While women were initially mainly pushed into unskilled jobs in factories and the agricultural sector, they have increasingly entered skilled wage labour. Highly skilled women, particularly teachers and medical doctors, have also increasingly started to migrate to GCC countries, often alongside their husbands.

Those sceptical of the positive impact of migration on Arab societies, stress the fact that it has increased conspicuous consumption amongst its populations, not only creating a class of *nouveau riche*, but also increasing inflation (ibid.) Another social side affect frequently cited is the increase in social conservatism and religiosity on the lines of Saudi *Wahabi* Islam rather than local traditions and cultures. Many migrants have adopted the more orthodox and strict interpretations of Islam, prevailing in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf societies. This manifests itself in dress codes, level of religious observance, social attitudes and morals, particularly where women and gender relations are concerned, as well as in political outlooks.

### IV. International Migration, Remittances & Development

This section will address the context and trends of the main population flows from the MENA region to Europe. It will analyse the developmental impacts of these flows to their countries of origin as well as to the receiving countries. While providing an overview of all migration flows from MENA to Europe, the main focus in this section is on economic labour migration (skilled, unskilled, regular and undocumented).

#### IV. 1. Globalization and ‘the new migration’ to Europe?

In the 1990s, a plethora of academic writings on migration trends and patterns in Europe identified a ‘new migration’, which has often been traced to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Changes related to economic conditions as well as war and conflict, such as in former Yugoslavia, produced in millions of refugees, outnumbering any other migration in Europe since the end of the Second World War (Koser & Lutz, 1998: 2). Another factor used to characterize the ‘new migration’ in Europe is the fact that boundaries between sending and receiving countries have become blurred within Europe (ibid.). Especially noteworthy in this context are southern European countries, like Italy, Spain and Greece that have historically been associated with labour migration to northern European countries such as Germany, for example. However, countries within southern as well as central Europe have been receiving increasing numbers of migrants from the MENA region, seeking asylum and/or labour.
Some commentators argue that the profile of migrants has been changing in the sense of a greater variety of ‘migrant types’: highly skilled workers, unskilled workers, students, clandestine migrants and asylum seekers. The diversification of ‘migrant types’ has also been evident amongst migrants from MENA and can partly be related to wider processes linked to economic and cultural globalization.

**Box 3: ‘Bourgeois Migration’**

Parallel to the growing trend of seasonal and irregular migration of people with low levels of literacy and education more generally, and no resources other than income from work, there also has been a growing flow of educated and skilled labour as well as entrepreneurial investors. In France, this latter phenomenon is called the ‘bourgeois migration’, and refers to groups of predominantly Moroccan migrants whose economic activity is not based exclusively on selling their labour but also on investing in various sectors, such as industry, commerce and construction (Khachani, 1998). This group of migrants has not received much attention in academic writings and policy considerations, but initial findings render them progressively more important, especially where development in both receiving and sending countries is concerned.


The rise of political and economic global networks have had a profound effect on structures and relationships within the European Union (EU). Some authors have argued that a new flexible and cheap labour force in Europe is reflecting a dynamic relationship between global and local realities (Psimmenos, 2000: 83.). The dynamic and contradictory characteristics of global economic formations are reflected through the presence of both harmonization and liberalization principles of socio-economic activity in the EU (ibid.)

**IV.2. Feminization of Migration**

The growing participation of women has also been increasingly noted within more recent academic writings on global migration trends in general and European migration patterns in particular. Women migrants from the MENA region, particularly Turkey, the Maghreb and Iraq, have often entered Europe as part of family re-unification schemes, but today more and more women migrate by themselves in search of work outside their home countries. Female migrants can be found in sectors of the economy, which exhibit employment growth, and especially in the service sector (Koser & Lutz, 1998: 3).

According to Kofman et al (2000):

> The primary shift in labour demand through most of the industrialized world has been from industrial to service sector. These service sector jobs occur in gendered niches, where labour recruitment is influenced by the sexual division of labour. Women dominate some of these shortage sectors where local populations are unable to meet labour requirements such as domestic work, nursing and teaching. Thus, there has been an increase in women migrants in particular sectors of the labour market (p. 7).

The role of migrant women as domestic workers constitutes one of the main forms and characteristics of the feminization of migration flows from MENA to Europe. In Spain and Greece domestic work is the largest area of employment for migrant women, while nearly a third of the work permits issues in Italy in 1995, were issued to domestic workers (Anderson and Phizacklea, 1997). The problem might not necessarily be the need for domestic work per se, but the legal and social circumstances in which this need arises. Many women migrants remain totally at the mercy of their employers if they do not have immigration status.
IV. 3. Southern Europe

Traditionally an area associated with ‘out-migration’, southern Europe has more recently witnessed a major reversal of historical patterns: Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus have become receivers of relatively large numbers of labour and forced migrants. Italy, for example, has around one million migrants from diverse origins, including a large percentage from the Maghreb. Greece has an estimated half million migrants, half from Albania and the rest a mix from Eastern Europe, but also Iraqi and Kurdish migrants. It is particularly important to note here that only about 70,000 migrants in Greece have legal status (Anthias & Lazaridis, 2000: 2). This raises a crucial issue for all those concerned with migration studies and migration policies: a large number of undocumented migrants are not included in official statistics. Attempts by Spain and Italy to regularize the status of foreign workers have largely been unsuccessful, partly due to a continual demand for undocumented labour (ibid. 3).

The reversal of historical patterns in southern Europe (formerly an area of out-migration) has been explained in terms of its geographical location, the residual effects of African colonial influences and the inadequacies of methods of surveillance and migration control (Lazaridis, 2000: 49). Throughout southern Europe policies aimed at reducing labour market rigidities and enhancing competetiveness have been introduced. This increases the eagerness of employers to hire undocumented workers (ibid.).

The migratory flows of migrants into southern Europe consist of people fleeing their country of origin (such as Kurds and Iraqis), and Third World migrants. Increasingly, southern European countries have also witnessed the immigration of migrant workers from Maghreb countries, predominately Morocco, but also Tunisia and Algeria. There are, however, huge differences between northern and southern European countries in terms of the percentage of the migrant population within the overall populations. Germany alone hosts 2/3 of the Turkish migrant community as well as over 80,000 Moroccans, making up 8.9 % of the overall population. In Belgium foreigners make up approximately 9% and in France 6% of the overall population, with migrants from Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco accounting for a large percentage of these numbers (IOM, 2002: 13). In Italy and Spain, on the other hand, foreigners only make up about 2% of the overall population (ibid.)

Some migrants enter on short- term work contracts in order to be reunified with family members (ibid. 4). For undocumented migrants, the only possibility of work is within the informal economy, which is relatively large in southern European countries. The informal sector refers to economic activities outside the legally registered formal production methods and money flows. It can take many forms ranging from underground activities to unpaid labour within a family. Clientelism facilitates the informal sector and makes labour migrants highly dependent and vulnerable to those pulling the strings. Women maybe further exploited and abused, working in this sector as cleaners, entertainers, nurses and sex workers.

IV. 4. Undocumented Migration

In 1991 estimates put the number of illegal immigrants who entered the EU at 2 million. By 1999 this figure had risen to 3 million (EUROSTAT, 2002: 46, in IOM, 2002: 24). Although no concrete figures for undocumented migrants from the MENA
region are available, one can infer the magnitude of the problem by the sheer number of Maghreb immigrants who are enrolled in such programmes (ibid.).

There are currently three legal categories, which allow labour migrants to enter Europe: 1) annual quotas, 2) family reunion, and 3) seasonal migration contracts. According to Dr Ibrahim Awad, Director of the IOM Area Office in Cairo, more and more migrants from the region enter Europe as undocumented workers. Small businesses being part of informal labour markets, agricultural sectors and the tourist industry mainly attract undocumented workers and even, to some extent, documented workers. “It is not by coincidence that Italy and Spain are attracting most of the migrants”...the “texture of enterprises, the structure of enterprises, are more attractive to labour migration in some countries than others” (Ibrahim Awad, Interview, Cairo, April 2004).

Due to the lack of their legal status, many undocumented migrants have been subjected to economic exploitation and human rights abuses. Re-admission agreements between European countries and Maghreb countries have been designed to prevent illegal immigration and economic exploitation of migrants by encouraging cooperation between countries of origin and receiving countries. The first agreement was concluded between Spain and Morocco in 1992, followed by Italy in 1998. Algeria and Tunisia followed, while negotiations are underway with Egypt (Awad, 2004).

New migrants are attracted by jobs made vacant by workers who have been regularized. Thus, employers are replacing immigrants who are seeking regularization with new clandestine workers. Moreover, as soon as immigrants succeed in stabilizing their situation, they look for better paid and less degrading employment, leaving their former jobs open to new candidates. This trend shows that all the various factors such as the employment situation, the workers’ aspirations and the political choices of governments encourage upward mobility in workers at the lowest levels, and their replacement by new immigrants (for a general historical approach to this issue, see Böhning, in Böhning and Zegers de Beijl, 1996). This phenomenon would, however, disappear if new flows were not ensured (Giubilaro, ILO, 1998).

An illustration of this phenomenon can be found in the Italian situation. The immigrants who were regularized under the two laws of 1987-88 and 1990-91 promptly left the low-paid precarious jobs they were engaged in in the South of the country to move to the industrial North. Today, vast communities of legal immigrants are settled in the principal towns of Northern Italy, where they have been able to take advantage of a favourable economic situation and a demand for cheap unskilled labour in small and medium-sized enterprises (metallurgy, ceramics, tanning, footwear, garment industry etc.). New immigrants were attracted by the employment vacancies in the South. However, due to the suspension of regularization laws just prior to their arrival in the South of Italy, they found they had no legal status to work. At present they work illegally as peddlers, seasonal agricultural workers, fishermen or wage-earners in clandestine workshops or in construction (ibid.).

The MENA region itself has increasingly become a site for irregular migration, with migrants coming mainly from sub-Saharan Africa en route to Europe, transiting mainly through Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia (Barros & al, 2002). Transit migrants in the MENA region include undocumented labour migrants, refugees and trafficked migrants. Migrants from Niger and Mali travel through Libya, hoping to transit through Algeria and Morocco to Europe (Castles & Mills, 2003: 123). These new population flows bypass immigration control when entering through the Sahara, as well as when
leaving by sea or by land route via Ceuta or Melilla. As many of these undocumented migrants stay indefinitely, Maghreb countries are faced with an inflow of refugees whose entry and exist is increasingly difficult to monitor. Mashreq countries, on the other hand, have increasingly become a transit point for refugees from other MENA countries and Central Asia. Lebanon, in particular, has emerged as a launching point for the traffic of Kurds smuggled to Europe on cargo ships from Syria and Iraq (Fargues, 2003: 6-7).

A study on smuggling and trafficking in the Middle East (IOM, Içduygu & Toktas, 2002) argues that rather than the involvement of hierarchical mafia-type organized crime groups, the Middle East smuggling networks of locally operating individuals and groups are far more complex. These networks are often based on family, kinship, ethnic and national networks, spanning countries of origin, transit and destination worldwide. The main sea routes used to transport irregular migrants from MENA include 1) the journey form the Maghreb countries directly to the southern coast of Spain, or via Melilla and Ceuta; 2) from Turkey to Greece, Sicily, or mainland Italy and 3) from Egypt and the Maghreb, via Tunisia or via Malta to Sicily and mainland Italy. Besides these maritime routes, many migrants are being smuggled and trafficked from MENA to Europe via air and land routes crossing through Turkey, Jordan and Iran (ibid.).

IV. 5. Developmental Impacts of Labour Migration to Europe

Labour market developments in the MENA region outlined in section II, namely expansion of labour forces due to relative high population growth, the maturation of the under-14 age group, wider access to education and the increased participation of women, have clearly influenced migration patterns in the Maghreb. Most decisive here are the high unemployment figures for young diploma holders and graduates. According to some estimates, the economies of the Maghreb region require strong and sustainable growth to provide at least 1 million jobs annually in order to absorb both underemployment and unemployment (Khachani, 2002). Maghrebi migrants are perceived as potentially playing an important role in contributing to this growth, both as investors and providers of funds and by allowing an increased transfer of foreign currency (ibid.).

It is virtually impossible to determine the actual size of remittances due to their diverse forms and the difficulty of monitoring the various formal and informal channels being used. Remittances to Morocco, for example, are estimated at about $2 billion a year, of which approximately half is transferred from France. Between 1975 and 1998, remittances accounted for 6.5% of the Moroccan GDP. (Sørensen, 2004: 1). However, available statistics only refer to formal channels, which appear in balance reports under the heading of “uncompensated remittances” or “simple transfers” (Khachani, 1998, 2002). Aside from commercial bank transfers, some of these more visible transfers take the form of pensions, family allowances, medical costs etc. and might be channelled through employers’ organizations on behalf of the migrants.

Invisible transfers take various forms (Khachani, 2002; Sorensen, 2004):

1) Cash that the migrant takes home to his or her family during a visit or sends through a third party, often based on family or village networks. This is often the preferred option, especially for migrants from conflict-ridden countries (Iraq, Iran, Algeria, Palestine) or countries with poor infrastructures
2) An exchange mechanism between compatriots involving the payment of bills or buying of goods for compatriots, who in turn credit the bank account of the family in the country of origin in the national currency. This mechanism is increasingly widespread because of the non-convertibility of Maghrebi currencies and because of foreign exchange controls (Khachani, 2002: 13)

3) The purchase of goods in the host country, which are brought back to the country of origin, including cars, household goods, clothes etc. Although these goods are generally meant for private use, they are frequently sold in the informal economy of the country of origin. This channel is enhanced through geographical proximity and is more developed in Algeria where the “suitcase trade” represents a considerable portion of transfers (ibid.)

Remittances represent a major source of hard currency in Maghreb countries and have become increasingly important for external balance of payments. This becomes particularly evident when they are compared to macroeconomic indicators, such as GDP, exports and imports. According to data from the IMF's "Balance of Payments Yearbook", Morocco is the fourth largest recipient of official remittances, totalling $3.3 billions in 2002 (Sorensen, 2004: 4). In 2003, an estimated 2.5 million Moroccans were residing abroad, representing almost 8% of Morocco’s total population of 31,689, 265 (July 2003 estimate), and affecting maybe half of all Moroccan families (ibid.). The contribution from remittances means that only 19% of the population lives below the poverty line. In other words, about 1.2 million Moroccans escape poverty thanks to migrant remittances (ibid.) (see Table 7, Annex 1).

Sceptics have pointed out that: remittances may lead to increased consumption rather than productive investment; the skills of returning migrants do not match local market needs and out-migration leads to a serious ‘brain drain’. (Collinson, 1996 in Sørensen, 2004: 6). However, Sorensen (2004) and Khachani (2002) argue that while many returning migrants cannot match their skills to market needs, others have transformed the existing market to fit their skills. As the economic base of MENA countries has expanded, money from remittances is being invested in both traditional and non-traditional sectors including: agriculture, construction, tourism etc.

Governments in the Maghreb have tended to regard the phenomenon of emigration as necessary and profitable. It is generally perceived to a) reduce unemployment rates, b) to procure foreign currency in order to finance development and c) to enable migrants to obtain vocational training that will be useful on their return. In Morocco, for example, earlier budgetary plans proposed emigration as a means of solving under- and unemployment (Sorensen, 2004) However, while government policies are based on the assumption that these population flows would be temporary, regulated and occurring in the context of a “migration chain”, the reality of recent years has shown that most migration is either permanent or seasonal, as well as increasingly clandestine and hard to monitor.

Recognizing the importance of remittances for individual families as well as local and national economies, the Moroccan government expanded the national banking system, the Moroccan Banque Populaire, which was created in 1970. It has currently about 40 branches throughout France, Germany, the UK, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden (Sorensen, 2004: 6). Since 2001, the government has launched a more coherent and integrated policy trying to optimise the positive development effects of migration on Moroccan economy and society.
V. Impact of War and Conflict on Poverty & Development

This section will outline the impacts of war and conflict on migration within and from the MENA region. While one has to distinguish between various patterns of displacement: 1) induced by large development projects, such as dams, agrarian projects etc., and 2) induced by war and conflict, this report will focus on the latter.

V. 1. Introduction

Political instability and repression of opposition groups, discrimination of ethnic and religious minorities, war & conflict, but also, development agendas and projects account for the large flows of involuntary migration within MENA. Sudanese, Nubians, Kurds, Lebanese, Yemenis, Iraqis, and Iranians are among the main populations, which have experienced large scale forced migration and displacement in the region. In addition, there have been great numbers of forced migrants from Afghanistan to Iran. However, with the exception of the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, and more recently the refugee flows related to the Gulf War in 1991, the issue of refugees and Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) within MENA has not received much attention. It has not only been largely absent from academic writings on the region, but has also not been a priority topic for regional policy makers. Only very recently, have some governments started to think more carefully about legal and administrative issues, the provision of services and co-operation with UNHCR in relation to refugee and IDP populations.14

Several commentators have argued that the specific situation of the Palestinians has shaped the way regional governments and policy-makers have perceived refugees and IDPs in more general terms. In principle, Palestinians living in Arab League states should benefit from the 1965 Casablanca Protocol (The Protocol), which asked signatories to uphold the Palestinians' right to work, to enjoy full residency rights, and freedom of movement within and among Arab countries. The Protocol did not require the signatories to grant formal citizenship to the Palestinians because of the importance that Arab states attached to maintaining Palestinian identity and to their claim to a sovereign homeland. However, at least it was expected that Arab countries would grant Palestinians permission to continue to reside in other Arab countries until the Palestinian right of return was clarified. The extent to which the Protocol and its recommendations were implemented by the Arab states, in both laws and administrative practices, varied over time depending on a range of political circumstances and decisions. Eventually, the absence of clear and well-defined legislation regulating the status of the Palestinians in the Arab countries has meant their basic civil rights have been sacrificed (Abbas Shiblak: 1995:4).

Due to the political and ideological difficulty of naturalizing Palestinians, the notion of naturalization and citizenship rights for any foreigners has not been an integral concept amongst MENA states. The situation is even further complicated by patriarchal and patrilineal notions of identity, which account for the fact that women from MENA who are married to non-national refugees are not able to pass on their citizenship to their partners and children. This, of course, has serious implications in terms of pro-poor policies and processes of development as non-citizens are often not eligible for national poverty reduction projects.

In the wake of the creation of Israel, the initial response from MENA countries was
that the displacement of Palestinians was a temporary phenomenon. Focus was given to ‘the right of return’. The nature of the Palestinian refugee issue has defined how regional policy makers have dealt with other refugee groups. Rather than basing policies and structures on international conventions and legal treatises, most governments have taken an off-hand approach and left the welfare and survival of refugees to the principles of Islamic charity and Arab hospitality. The outcomes have been contradictory: on the one hand, it has allowed a large number of refugees to evade refugee camps, have a relative high level of freedom and mobility and to take advantage of local solidarity networks based on family, kinship, ethnic and religious ties. This has been the case with Iraqi refugees in Iran, for example, who were able to become relatively self-sufficient. On the other hand, refugees and IDPs in MENA have been extremely vulnerable to poverty, discrimination, repression and the threat of deportation. In Egypt, for example, many Palestinian, Sudanese, Somali, Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees often suffer great hardship and economic deprivation due to the non-existence of national laws on refugees and the current un-written non-integration policy of the Egyptian government (Harrel-Bond, 2003b).

V. 2. Main refugee flows within MENA (IDPs, regional)

The vast majority of refugees in the region are Palestinians making up about 2,975,000 of the total 5,367,400 refugees. Other major populations of refugees are Afghans, mostly located in Iran; Iraqis in Jordan, Turkey and Iran; Somalis in Egypt and Yemen, and Sudanese in Egypt (although Sudan also has a strong labour migration tradition to several ME countries). The most recent flows of forced migration and displacement relate to the war, occupation and ongoing violence in Iraq, which accounts for displacement inside the country (i.e. thousands of people left Falluja and went to Baghdad), as well as to neighbouring countries, such as Jordan, Iran and Turkey.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is known to host the largest refugee population in the world. In 1999, Iranian officials reported that there were over 1.8 million refugees in Iran: Afghans make up the largest group (about 1.3 million) and there are about half a million Kurdish Iraqis (USCR, 2000, in Harrell-Bond et al, 2003). The most recent war and conflict in Iraq has failed to produce the large scale flow of refugees to Iran as was widely predicted and as occurred in 1991. However, mainly Iraqi Shi’a from the south as well as Iraqi Kurds continue to escape to Iran. Most Iraqi refugees have settled close to the Iran-Iraq border. Because of the freedom of movement that refugees enjoy in Iran, under five percent of the total refugee population live in camps (UNHCR, 2000, in Harrell-Bond et al, 2003)

As an outcome of the wars and instability in Iraq, a large number of Iraqis sought refuge in bordering Jordan. In the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, about one million forced migrants arrived in Jordan, fleeing from Iraq and Kuwait (Chatelard, 2002). After the 1991 uprising of Iraqi Shi’a in the south and its brutal repression by the previous regime, thousands of Iraqi Shi’a fled to Jordan. In 1996, UNHCR reported that about 1 – 2 million Iraqis had entered Jordan since the Gulf War (ibid.). In the wake of the last war of 2003, thousands of more Iraqis left for Jordan. While many of them returned last year, a large number have remained in Jordan and there has been a small yet continuous trickle of Iraqis entering Jordan over the past months.
V. 3. Refugees & Asylum seekers from MENA

Despite common assumptions based on media reports and political debates, the number of people seeking political asylum in all developed countries fell by around 20% between 2002 and 2003. In the EU, the number of asylum seekers dropped by 22 percent, down from 370,000 in 2002 to 288,000 in 2003. Despite a fall in applications of 41 per cent, the UK remained the most popular destination among EU host countries with 61,050 applications, followed by France (51,400) and Germany (50,450). Based on a comparable ratio of their existent populations Austria and Sweden have the highest rate of asylum applications in the EU (see Table 8, Annex 1).


In the 1990s, Iraq and Iran produced the highest numbers of asylum seekers in the MENA region. In 2000, for instance, there were more than 90,000 asylum seekers coming to Europe from Iran, Iraq and Turkey, accounting for more than one fifth of the total asylum seekers to the EU (İçduygu, 2001). Iraq produced more asylum seekers in Europe than any other origin country in 2002, but only half as many in 2003. Iraqis were the third main refugee group in the world in 2001 (Chatelard, 2002). Kurds from Turkey, and also Iraq and Iran, constitute another large group of asylum seekers. Common ‘push factors’, such as ethnic or religious discrimination, human rights abuses, war and a large proportion of internally displaced people relative to the total population, account for the large number of refugees and asylum seekers from MENA countries to Europe.

However, many refugees and asylum seekers from MENA, as well as other regions in the world, illustrate the fact that the analytical distinction between forced and voluntary migrants is not as clear-cut as policy-makers would like us to believe. Iraq is a case in point. In 1996, 4 million Iraqis were reported to live abroad (USCR, 1996, in Chatelard, 2002). Although a large number of Iraqi refugees have fled for clear political reasons related to oppression by the previous regime (mainly Kurds and Shi’a), a large number of Iraqis left the country during the 1990s due to a combination of factors, including political repression, ongoing conflict (especially in the North and South) as well as a severe economic crisis due to the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions put in place between 1990 and 2003. For those parts of the population, like Kurds, Shia, and to some extent Christians, who have been collectively denied access to scarce resources, emigration becomes clearly motivated by a mixture of both economic and political factors (ibid.).

Despite attempts to repatriate Kurdish and Iraqi asylum-seekers by some EU governments, it is obvious that both groups are extremely reluctant to return under the present circumstances. Additionally, one can safely predict that as soon as the security situation allows for travel to Jordan and Turkey, a considerable number of Iraqis will join the existent ranks of Iraqi asylum seekers. Based on informal interviews with Iraqis outside and inside Iraq, there is a growing concern that the security and humanitarian situation will not stabilize any time soon. In the first months after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, there was a strong trend of return migration. Now, however, Iraqis have increasingly losing faith in both the occupying forces and the process of political transition.

In addition to Iraqi, Kurdish and Iranian refugees and dissidents, the last decade also witnessed an increase in Palestinian migration from the occupied territories, Lebanon
and Jordan to Western Europe. Many of these migrants have been part of transnational social and family networks (see section V.), which, in light of stricter asylum policies and border controls, often facilitate the migration process.

V. 4. Impact of Internal and Regional Forced Migration on Poverty

Generally speaking, forced migration increases poverty and hinders development. This is particularly true in the context of MENA countries where states have failed to integrate refugees into state structures and institutions in which pro-poor programmes are administered. At the same time, non-state providers, like NGOs, charity organizations, religious associations and international organizations are often at odds with the state. In many MENA countries, but most notably in Egypt, it is predominately non-Egyptian nationals who work with refugees, while Egyptians themselves are more involved in poverty alleviation amongst their own nationals.

The urban setting is crucial to the understanding of the relationship between forced migration, poverty and development in the MENA region. A large number of refugees in the region are settled in urban spaces, where they interact with IDPs and recent migrants from rural areas, as well as with long-term residents. There is a well-developed literature on the urbanization processes in MENA countries (see, for example, Tekçe B, on the processes of urbanization in Cairo stimulated by rural-urban migration), which has made a number of contributions to our understanding of poverty and underdevelopment in the region. Recent patterns of forced migration, which bring increasing numbers of refugees to cities, adds a new dimension to pressures of urbanization.

Compared to other recent urban migrants, urban refugees in MENA are vulnerable both in terms of their access to protection and to resources, both of which impact on poverty alleviation and development. Kagan (forthcoming) identifies a procedural difference in determining refugee status that differentiates between rural refugees, generally granted protection as a group, and urban refugees who access protection through an individual status determination process. Unlike in Western countries where recognition is a means of granting asylum, status determination in MENA and other states in the developing world “has often been a means of separating refugees from their host societies and transferring responsibility for their care onto the international community.” (Kagan forthcoming, p. 2).

Problems arising from the lack of domestic protection for undocumented refugees in cities is matched by the lack of access to resources. Both local governments and international aid/policy organisations differentiate between citizens with rights to access resources (e.g. government sponsored health care or inter-governmental agency programmes in poverty reduction) and refugees. In Egypt, for example, there are free health clinics for impoverished Egyptians, while refugees are not allowed to use these facilities. Refugees are also often excluded from the distribution of subsidized foods and goods and the allocation of ration cards. According to Fabos (2004), there is evidence that:

[…]livelihoods pursued on the margins of urban society in developing countries present the risk of exploitation and injury, as well as increased informal employment opportunities, that large numbers of refugee children remain without access to education, despite possibilities for creative self-help schooling projects, and that thousands of ‘closed file’ refugees remain hidden and vulnerable, regardless of increased access to resettlement programmes.

The strain on urban resources is particularly problematic in a situation of war and
conflict, as can be witnessed by the hardships facing IDPs in Baghdad and Kirkuk, for example. Kurds deported from Kirkuk and other Kurd-majority cities by Saddam’s Arabization campaigns throughout the 1990s were forced to live in make-shift camps on the edge of war-torn cities in Iraqi Kurdistan (Zanger 2002).

V. 5. Developmental Impacts of Forced Migration to Europe

While there exists an increased recognition about the potential relationship between labour migration and development, only very recently have scholars started to pay attention to the developmental impacts of forced migrants on their countries of origin. A study on Eritrean and Bosnian refugees (Al-Ali & Koser, 2001) reveals the desire of refugee communities to contribute to reconstruction and development without necessarily returning home. Aside from sending regular financial remittances, even if on income support, refugees were often involved in political activities related to their country of origin; they raised consciousness and funds amongst the population in the receiving country about the humanitarian crisis in Eritrea and Bosnia, and Eritreans paid reconstruction taxes to their local embassies. Moreover, refugees also transmitted ‘social remittances’, i.e. ideas, knowledge, values and cultural artefacts. However, remittances and taxes sent by refugees to their countries of origin as well as the political influence of the diaspora could also be used to prolong war as has been the case in Eritrea.

The significance of refugee communities for reconstruction and development in MENA has been clearly illustrated in the case of Lebanon. The rapid reconstruction plan, which was sponsored by Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, failed to meet expectations in part because it was based on the realization of regional peace. Yet, spending continued. Hundreds of millions of dollars were poured into new, loosely regulated independent government bodies, such as the politically affiliated Councils for the South and the Displaced. In addition, massive funding went into the military, while authorities failed to collect taxes and utilities. It is only the continuous flow of remittances from the Lebanese diaspora as well as new Arab investments that have kept the country afloat. (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/)

Lebanon is a predominantly importing country and its national economy is therefore characterised by large trade deficits; however, net foreign income earnings, remittances and earnings from tourism, banking, insurance, and other services have helped to offset these trade deficits. Even during the conflict, the balance of payments was generally in surplus. It showed minor deficits in 1979, 1983, 1984 and 1986, but larger deficits occurred in 1989 and 1990. In all other years in the period 1975-1997, there were surpluses in the balance of payments. (http://www.finance.gov.lb/)

The Iraqi diaspora have similarly played an important role in addressing poverty issues in Iraq. Ever since the severe economic crisis that developed as a fallout of the Gulf War in 1991, Iraqis living abroad increasingly took to supporting their families and friends within Iraq. Remittances, aid and donations sent by Iraqi refugees helped a large part of the Iraqi population to survive during the sanctions regime. During the previous regime, Iraq’s private banks controlled less than 8% of total banking assets and offered very limited services. Under the new Banking Law, 10 of Iraq’s 17 private banks have a remit to make international payments and transfer remittances, and issuing letters of credit. International payments and remittances into Iraq are now roughly estimated at more than $5 million per day (Coalition Provision Authority, February 2004).
V. 6. Policies & Programmes of Governments & International Organizations

With the exception of a few states (Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Israel and Yemen), most countries in the region have not ratified the UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Even those states, which have signed the Convention of Rights have done so with numerous reservations and often apply very loose interpretations to refugee rights (Morvaridi, 2004: 9). In Egypt, for example, refugees do not have the right to access state education, free health services or housing benefits. In Jordan, refugees are discouraged from settling and integrating and their residency is limited to a 6 months period after which they are either forced to move to a third country or risk being fined for every day beyond the 6 month grace period they overstay (UNHCR, 2003). In Iran, distinctions have been made between Afghani and Iraqi refugees where the latter have not been subject to repatriation programmes and have benefited from greater access to resources, including work, education and health care (Harrel-Bond, 2003).

It is only since the massive displacement of people caused by the Gulf conflict and war (1990-91) that regional governments have become more attentive to the issue of non-Palestinian refugees (Zaiotti, 2004). However, MENA countries still have no specific visions or policies for refugees. This even holds true for countries like Egypt, which signed the 1951 Convention (ibid). The strategy of many countries in the region has been to recognize the presence and authority of UNHCR and to create institutional links between local authorities and the UN organization. However, as Zaiotti points out, countries in the region have maintained a cautious attitude towards asylum:

As a rationale for their stance, local authorities pointed to the close connection between the plight of refugees and the politically sensitive and still unresolved Palestinian question. They raised other concerns as well, stressing both domestic and regional constraints such as limited resources available and the economic burden newcomers would be to the host country, the need to maintain good relations with neighbouring countries and the fear of becoming a “dumping ground” of rejected refugees from other countries in the area (2004: 13).

Although, by and large, local authorities have accepted UNHCR’s authority and decisions, they have not provided formal guarantees for refugees and refugees therefore have continued to fall under the legislation applicable to foreigners in general (ibid.) In other words, no specific measures have been taken to guarantee and promote the economic, social and political conditions of refugees, although it has to be said that they have, in the main, been tolerated within other MENA countries. At the same time, political expediency, coupled with shortage of funding and more generally the weakening of the refugee regime at the global level, has meant that UNHCR neither has the willingness nor capacity to push for radical change (ibid. 15).

UN and NGO humanitarian assistance concentrates on vulnerable populations in Iraq and in the Palestinian Territories, including internally displaced people. Humanitarian assistance to IDPs in both areas has, however, been severely restricted. In Iraq, current insecurity prevents humanitarian agencies from assessing the needs of IDPs and responding to them. According to several UN reports, Israeli authorities have been blocking delivery of basic food items, medicines and fuel to the Gaza Strip, and UN humanitarian access to the West Bank has been impeded by bureaucratic procedures. UN agencies and NGOs active in the Palestinian Territories are increasingly reorienting resources from development to relief to meet growing
humanitarian needs. In the rest of the region, long-term IDPs are generally neglected (World Project IDPs, Middle East, 2004).

As is recognized in much of the literature on refugee relief, the split between development aid and humanitarian assistance works against the large number of refugees in the MENA region. In the context of war, conflict and widespread poverty, humanitarian aid oriented towards refugees and IDPs is a cause for resentment amongst the wider population. On the other hand, long-term development projects may exclude refugees and IDPs. The fact that one either has to be a refugee or a citizen to receive a specific kind of aid, undermines any attempt to produce integrated programmes.

**Box 4: The Case of Iraq**

Prior to the last war in Iraq, there were roughly 800,000 IDPs in northern Iraq (mostly Kurds) and 100,000 IDPs in central Iraq (mostly Shites, but some Kurds as well) (Romano, 2004). Of the 800,000 in northern Iraq, around 100,000 were fairly recent IDPs from the Arabization campaigns of the 1990s around Kirkuk and Mosul. There were also approximately 800,000 Iraqi refugees in neighbouring and third countries – particularly Iran (202,000 registered by the UNHCR), Jordan (around 300,000, mostly unregistered), Saudi Arabia (5,100 in the Rafha camp near the Iraqi border), and Syria (40,000, unregistered).15

Additionally, some 13,000 Turkish Kurdish refugees who fled the conflict between the PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) and the government of Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s resided in camps in Iraqi Kurdistan and just south of the Green Line, especially in Makhmour. Approximately 24,000 Iranian refugees resided in Iraq, including Iranian Kurdish dissidents from Komala and the KDPI (Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran) in the part of the Autonomous Zone controlled by the PUK, as well as Mujahadeen al-Khalq dissidents previously armed by Saddam and residing south of the Green Line. (Romano, 2004)

Roughly 90,000 Palestinians were residing primarily around Baghdad and Mosul, as well as a few hundred Eritrean, Somali, Sudanese and Syrian refugees who were also primarily living in and around Baghdad (ibid.). Particularly with regards to IDPs, however, exact figures remain difficult to ascertain, due to varying survey techniques and common difficulties with differentiating many unregistered IDPs and refugees from the general population.

In 2004, the vast majority of these IDPs and refugees have yet to be satisfactorily resettled in their places of origin or repatriated. Although the 2003 war did not produce the vast numbers of displaced persons and the humanitarian catastrophe that many analysts had predicted, little has transpired to rectify the IDP and refugee problem that existed before the war (Romano, 2004). Although thousands of IDPs have returned to their general areas of origin, most of these “returnees” are living in tents under difficult conditions, in places such as the former international sports stadium of Kirkuk. So far they have not been able to benefit from any comprehensive and organized return programme. At the same time, the situation of Palestinian refugees in Iraq has worsened after most of them were evicted from their regime-subsidized homes (Romano, 2004). Around 10,000 new IDPs were created when many ethnic Arabs were expelled from or fled the formerly Kurdish areas they were inhabiting just south of the Green Line (particularly in Kirkuk). Some of these new Arab IDPs have returned to the south, where they reside in tent camps or with relatives, since they sold their homes when they moved north under Saddam’s Arabization programmes. Others remain in similar temporary housing near Mosul, Makhmour, and other parts of northern Iraq, awaiting some kind of determination of their status and afraid to confront the Kurdish returnees they fled in April 2003 (ibid.).

Around an estimated 50,000 Iraqi refugees have returned to Iraq out of their own accord (Romano, 2004). These refugees mainly returned during the initial 6 month period after the downfall of the Saddam Hussein regime, when the security and humanitarian situation was slightly better and the predictions for a sustained peace more optimistic than they have been in recent months. In addition to these numbers, UNHCR and IOM have assisted the return of 2,800 refugees who were previously based in Saudi Arabia and a similar number from Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. However, due to the dire security situation, the lack of assistance & adequate housing as well as insufficient finances, many of these returning refugees have now become new IDPs (ibid).

The legacy of the previous regime, 13 years of comprehensive sanctions, ongoing political instability, lack of security, violent insurgencies, unemployment and deteriorated infrastructure are all factors that account for widespread poverty within Iraq. Poverty ratings rank the majority of Iraqis as living well...
below sustenance levels. Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to predict that the flow of forced migrants inside Iraq as well as to its neighboring countries will gather speed in the near future. Once the security situation on the roads to Iraq’s border countries has improved, the likelihood of being caught under sniper fire or stepping on live mines has diminished, it is expected that we will see a large scale movement of people. This will be particularly the case once the security situation on the roads to Iraq’s borders has improved. Many people are held back these days by the fear of road side bombs and sniper attacks.

(Source: Romano, 2004)

VI. Transnational Migration: Beyond the Push-Pull Model

This section explores the increasing significance of transnational networks and activities amongst migrants from the MENA region, involving economic social, political and cultural links and activities spanning two or more countries.

VI. 1. Transnational Perspectives on International Migration

A focus on ‘transnational communities’ has been widely heralded as an important new approach to international migration. More traditional approaches have tended to conceive international migrants as exceptions from the norm. Population flows were often explained in terms of a simple push-pull model. In contrast, the transnational communities approach conceives of international migrants not as anomalies, but rather as representative of an increasingly globalised world. This model has refocused attention on the utilisation by international migrants of modes of telecommunication and transport; the pooling of resources and successful exploitation of global markets, and the association with new social forms, political challenges and cultural resources generated by linkages across several geographical locations (Al-Ali & Koser, 2002: 3).

‘Transnational migrant networks’ refer to multi-stranded social relations, social fields and activities of immigrants, linking together societies of origin and settlement as well as links between migrant/refugee communities across different nation-states. Vertovec argues that although ‘transnationalism (as long as distance networks) certainly preceded the nation…today these networks function intensively and in real time while being spread around the world’ (1999: 447). Globalisation, technological changes, time-space compression (Harvey, 1989), and processes of decolonisation have accelerated the intense exchanges, modes of transactions and activities across borders. As transport and electronic communications have grown, migrants have found it possible to have multiple localities and arguably also, multiple identities. As a result, family and kinship ties have moved from a largely local to a global scale. In turn, the volume of migrant remittances has grown enormously, and the use to which remittances are put, as was discussed earlier, has changed (Al-Ali & Koser, 2002: 3).

One characteristic of transnational communities is that they maintain economic, political and social networks that span several societies. What defines membership of these networks is a common country of origin or a shared identity. Members of transnational communities often have a common ethnicity; often retain a collective memory of ‘home’, and often also aspire to return to a ‘homeland’. Just as the formation of transnational communities has accelerated in recent years, so too has the unmaking of these communities, through the re-grouping or in-gathering of migrant communities or dispersed ethnic groups, as a result of movements of people back to their country of origin, or through their integration in host countries.

V.2. Transnational Networks in Context of MENA
Several commentators describe the Middle East as currently being at the crossroads of various new migration trends and changes in migration orders. Moving away from a migration system mainly based on labour market demands (GCC oil-producing countries) and economic needs on the one hand, and war and conflict on the other hand (Palestine, Iraq, Turkey), the Middle East is increasingly becoming part of a complex and globalized migratory system. Transnational networks based on family, friendship, religious, ethnic, village or political ties have come to play a major role in shaping current migration flows and patterns. Despite, and sometimes even as a reaction to the tightening of migration control policies throughout the EU, these networks facilitate movement from the MENA region to the EU.

Whether Palestinian networks based on family and village ties (Dorai, 2003), Lebanese networks based on ethnic and religious affiliation (Pedersen, 2003), networks of Kurdish migrants or Iraqi Shi'a religious affiliation (Chatelard, 2002), these networks often defy border controls and economic logic. However, in most cases, transnational social networks represent solidarity networks that shape the development and organization of migratory processes in both the country of origin and the destination country. Dorai, who has carried out an in-depth study of Palestinian migrant networks between refugee camps in Lebanon and European countries (initially Germany, Denmark and Sweden, but more recently United Kingdom and Belgium) argues that these solidarity networks have many functions: 1) they permit the mobilization of funds necessary for the journey to the intended host country; 2) they provide information on the country of destination circulated through the network and spread to potential migrants; 3) they facilitate the adaptation of newcomers in the host country; 4) they also help to select the actual migrant from the departure country to fit the special needs of the host country; 5) they help to circumvent the legal constraints in the host countries, and 6) they influence the destination location of the migrants (Dorai, 2003:25).

It is interesting to note that resources, such as social capital, solidarity networks and information flows often develop locally first before they take on a transnational dimension. This has been true for Palestinian refugees in camps in Lebanon as much as for Iraqi Shi'a in Baghdad or in the south of Iraq. A number of factors contribute to the emergence of these transnational networks. In both the Palestinian and Iraqi case for example, there has historically been an existing migration order of people migrating to Europe, many of whom have settled permanently, obtained residency or even citizenship rights and soundly established themselves. The worsening of both economic and political situations in the MENA region particularly Iraq, Palestine and, in the case of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon increased discrimination and the severe curtailing of civic rights has augmented the migration pressure, especially among young men. The closing of European borders to asylum seekers in the 1980s created a situation where legal migration became more and more difficult. Slowly, solidarity networks emerged in the 1990s, which have facilitated the illegal immigration of migrants to the EU.

In the context of Palestinian migrants, Dorai describes the following factors as the main reasons for increased migration pressures: 1) the end of the civil war in Lebanon increased the discrimination against the Palestinian community at political and economic levels; 2) the Oslo agreement did not give any solution, nor perspective, those made refugees in 1948; 3) the economic situation in Lebanon had seriously deteriorated by 1993; and 4) Palestinians were competing with Syrian and Egyptian workers in the labour market. Due to the various forms of immigration control, such as stricter visa requirements, carriers' liability, readmission treaties with Central and Eastern European States and electronically fortified borders, many migrants resorted to illegal means (Chatelard, 2002). It is in this context that
transnational solidarity networks have gained the significance they now hold.

V.3. Transnational Communities, Reconstruction & Development

It might be useful to draw a distinction between transnational activities - which can be observed and measured - and transnational capabilities, which encompass the willingness and ability of migrant groups to engage in activities that transcend national borders. Transnational activities can be classified in a variety of ways. They may include activities that are political (e.g. lobbying), economic (e.g. remittances and investment), social (e.g. promotion of the human and other rights of the transnational group within different societies) and cultural (e.g. articles in newspapers). They may take place at the individual level (e.g. through family networks), or via institutional channels (e.g. through community or international organisations). Taking the case of refugee or exile groups, while directly transnational activities may focus on the home country, indirectly transnational activities may also include the application of pressure on the host government or international organisations for change in the home country, or indeed the promotion of the rights of the exile community itself (Al-Ali, Koser et al, 2001: 581).

At the same time, however, it is important to focus on the capabilities of migrant or exile groups to participate in activities that transcend national borders. A definition of capabilities includes the extent to which individuals and communities identify with the social, economic or political processes in their home countries, which is a prerequisite for them to engage in transnational activities (ibid. 581-2). At a more practical level, the capability of individuals, families and communities to become involved in such activities may depend on the skills and resources available to them, which in turn is influenced by factors such as the length of time they have spent in their host countries and the opportunities that have become open to them. Capabilities also centre upon the internal organisation of migrant or exile communities, and the level of motivation to maintain group solidarity. A specific area of interest is the extent to which communities in different host countries collaborate and mobilise for a common purpose, or even identify with that purpose (ibid).

A crucial structural framework within which migrants' transnational strategies are forged and within which they should be analytically contextualised relates to the politics of "integration" in the country where migrants reside, notably in the form of respect for cultural difference, rights to citizenship and to resource redistribution. For example, there is evidence to suggest that states are developing new multicultural agendas which aim to encourage and foster, among first and second generation migrants, affiliations and identification with their country of origin. Migrants, as a matter of fact, are seen as viable tools in the reorganisation of capital and are crucial means of reaching out to new markets. (see Glick-Schiller, 1999). The ways in which migrant women and men are perceived and the ways in which such perception is constructed, as well as the legal, socio-economic and political tools which the state employs to deal with their presence at the national and local levels should be highlighted in order to bring out the qualitative differences between the transnationalism of different social groups.

A careful analysis of transnational practices should also interrogate the gendered ways in which national norms construct migrants as temporary, seasonal or undocumented and unsteady workers, and, more broadly, the ways in which migrants and refugees are incorporated or excluded within their society of settlement and unfold the ways in which these conditions limit or forge transnational practices and mobility. For instance, whereas some migrants from the MENA region might develop transnational practices by virtue of their double citizenship which allows
them a degree of mobility and political participation between and within two countries, other migrants, particularly refugees, are either limited or impeded from maintaining relations with their country of origin. Recently in Italy, with the coming into power of the right-wing coalition led by Berlusconi, changes to immigration laws have been proposed aiming to transform even long-term settled migrants into flexible, undocumented and cash in hand workers, whose resident permit could be withdrawn in case of unemployment.

States of origin seem also to be more and more interested in pursuing "diasporic" policies (Smith, 1999) to foster the sense of belonging among their nationals abroad and are therefore increasingly allowing dual nationality or dual citizenship. The crucial role of ‘sending states’ in forging and creating transnational political and economic fields often reflects their increasing dependency on migrants' remittances. In a world characterised by global economic restructuring, migrants' investments are essential for the viability of the sending countries' economies (Guarnizo and M.P.Smith, 1998). This is certainly the case for a country such as Morocco, overwhelmed by IMF structural adjustment policies, where, in the national balance of payments, the remittances of Moroccan emigrants are higher than before the phosphate and tourist industries (Ben Ali, 1991; Bencherifa et al, 1992).

Box 5: The case of Moroccan transnational networks

In Morocco, migrants' remittances today constitute a very dynamic market for both state and non-state agents. Transnational practices such as transferring money, buying land and houses or investing in their country of origin have been a constant character of Moroccan international migrants. In the last few years, the possibilities offered by technological advances have enabled migrants to simultaneously participate economically in two or more countries (Salih, 2003). For example, in the past, the transfer of money, especially to rural areas in Morocco, took place mainly through ‘postiers’. These were usually former migrants who, travelling once or twice a year to various countries in Europe, acted as mediators, or even sometimes administrators, between families left behind in Morocco and workers abroad, providing indeed a transnational field of relations which escaped official apparatus (Charef 1983). However, in the 1990s the introduction of new technologies insured that money could be speedily and safely transferred. Through branches and offices of Moroccan banks in Europe, migrants can operate in Morocco by instantly sending money to their kin back home at the same time as they can open a Moroccan dirham current account or even take part in a globalised financial market by buying shares in Casablanca, while living in Europe (Salih, 2003).

Different sets of instruments and services are provided not only by governmental actors but also by private banks and companies who offer services to attract migrants' remittances, which are competitive with those of governmental economic bodies. Moreover, several other aspects related to the transnational lives of migrants, from the problems they might encounter in the long car journey back to Morocco, to the accidental death of kin in Europe or in Morocco nowadays constitutes a substantial business for private insurance companies; these are beginning to replace the traditional solidarity chain of fellows emigrants commonly activated in emergencies. The direct benefit of private insurance aside, it also, and importantly, institutionalises transnationalism (ibid.).

As mentioned earlier, remittances have become more and more crucial to the equilibrium of the national trade balance. The crucial economic role played by migrants' remittances renders the permanence of Moroccans abroad essential not only for the survival of individual households but also for the viability of the national economy. Moroccans living abroad today have the right to vote in Moroccan elections and to hold dual citizenship. Fearing the loss of remittances due to whole families emigrating, the government and the market have recently created new organisations such as the Foundation Hassan II pour les Marocains résident à l'Etranger and the Ministère pour la communauté des Marocains à l'Etranger. These organisations aim to maintain and reinforce links with second and third generation Moroccans abroad and to defend their rights. (Salih, 2003).

(Source: Salih, 2003)

V.4. The position of Women and Gender within Transnational Migration

Transnational approaches to the study of contemporary migration often fails to see
how transnationalism itself is not a neutral space. The ways in which gender intervenes in differentiating and shaping projects, practices and possibilities of movements has been generally overlooked. Indeed, migrant women and men enjoy qualitatively distinct experiences of membership in the country of immigration, as well as embodying different experiences of citizenship in their countries of origin, particularly when it comes to the MENA region (see Kandiyoti, 1991; Charrad, 1990). However, it is important to highlight the gendered dimension of the simultaneous living in two (or more) countries emphasised by transnational approaches, by analysing discourses and practices, which define and attempt to control the terms and possibilities of women’s movements across nation-states.

An analysis of transnationalism should be able to identify how host states perceive women as citizens; emblematic of equal citizenship status is the freedom with which they are allowed to cross borders. The conditions for moving transnationally are not always available to women, or are limited or framed within a set of normative and cultural gendered rules. For example, referring to the MENA region, Joseph has argued that women ‘are recognised and addressed as citizens in the context of their positions within patriarchal structures, as subordinate mothers, wives, children or siblings’ (1996:7). Women’s activities are also conditioned by a set of normative and cultural regulations based upon hegemonic interpretations of gender roles within both their country of settlement and that of origin. These regulations condition their activities, their identities and their likelihood of either moving across countries or staying put. For example, women are assigned duties and responsibilities in the reproductive spheres, which they are expected to carry out transnationally. Yet the obstacles posed by social customs and normative rules might prevent them from keeping up links with what is perceived to be “back home”.

Transnational movements are also highly linked to and conditioned by laws and regulations. Although some Moroccan women stress the possibility of flying “back home” in “only three hours” as central to their motivation for settling in Italy, the importance of the legal status they are accorded is crucial to their decision making. Women who travel to Italy by themselves in search of work must find employment which provides them with in regola status; this allows them to travel freely. On the other hand, women whose permits are linked to that of their husbands are able to work cash in hand, since they do not need to have a regular job to renew their permits. This flexibility, however, allows them to accomplish their reproductive and care roles transnationally.

In Europe, reproduction levels have long been in decline, thus putting the stability of the national economy and the welfare system at risk. Migrants alleviate this risk as they are often productive and reproductive resources for states (Salih, 203). Despite populist campaigns advocating migration control, both politicians and demographers are keenly aware of the important role migrants play and can play in sustaining and nurturing states.

At one level Moroccan women contribute to creating a cultural and social “Mediterranean space” where identities and cultural practices become creative terrains of subversion of fixed boundaries and separation. Yet, at another level, borders and boundaries of various kinds are powerfully imposed. A gendered approach reveals how, together with imaginative and real trans-border social spaces and movements, Moroccan women's possibilities to migrate to Europe as single migrants are being jeopardised (Kofman and Sales 1998; Lutz 1997) or bounded to the performance of women’s roles as carers.
VII. Conclusions & Policy Recommendation

- Rapid urbanization processes and migration of economic migrants, refugees and IDPs put increasing pressures on resources and infrastructures of cities within the MENA region. Development agencies should focus on integrated projects to incorporate both long and short-term residents.

- Policy-makers may aspire to make clear distinctions between economic and forced migrants but in reality many migrants have multiple motivations for moving (migration-asylum nexus). Acknowledgement of these complexities and inter-linkages will help to optimise the potential of migrants.

- War and conflict are responsible for poverty and large-scale refugee movements within and from the region. Need to tackle the root causes of war & conflict and support peace-building initiatives involving grass-roots actors, NGOs and governments in the region.

- Many labour and forced migrants from MENA countries are eager to get involved in economic, social, political and cultural development in their countries of origin. Rather than viewing migrants from MENA as a problem and challenge to security, we need to consider ways of making migration an instrument for development. Encourage creative policies and schemes to allow “development by means of migration”.

- Legal insecurity hinders migrants from transforming their desire and willingness to contribute to development into actual practices and activities. Access to legal status and legal rights in host countries will optimise migrants’ ability to contribute to the alleviation of poverty in MENA countries.

- Cheaper and more reliable transmission of remittances is needed to ensure more efficient use of remittances not only on the individual family level but also in terms of local development and investments. Need to facilitate the creation of investment frameworks and technology transfer opportunities.

- In order to fully utilise the region’s human capital issues around the mismatch of skills should be addressed. Building of schools in targeted rural areas, training schemes, exchange of teachers and students etc. could help to address this mismatch.

- Facilitate ‘transnational’ and ‘virtual’ links between skilled and highly educated migrants and countries of origin.

- Amnesty schemes for undocumented migrants to be established to avoid economic exploitation and human rights abuses.
Prior to 1990, Iraq was also a major recipient of Arab migrant labour, especially from Egypt.

Estimates in the 1990s indicated a 3% growth rate, or even 3.5% for Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. With about 2%, Bahrain, Morocco, Lebanon and Tunisia had lower rates of population growth (IMF, 1996). However, most recent figures indicate that the MENA population is growing at a rate of 2% in the current decade (Youssef, 2004).

Nationalization or ‘localization policies’ refer to the attempt to replace foreign migrant workers with national workers. These policies have been adopted in the 1990s by all GCC countries.

Despite progress over the past years with respect to life expectancy, health and education, many gender indicators in the region, such as illiteracy rates and participation in the economy are amongst the worst in the world. The average literacy rate for women in MENA rose from 16.6 percent in 1970 to 52.5 percent in 2000, when nine girls for every 10 boys were enrolled in primary schools across the region. In some countries, as much as 63 percent of university students are female. MENA women are also healthier: their life expectancy has increased by 10 years since 1980 and maternal mortality has fallen (World Bank, 2004).

Research on women in developing countries since the 1970s has uncovered a vast number of “invisible women” whose work may either not be reflected in national statistics or not compensated in monetary terms, yet who work, on average, longer hours than men. Most of these “invisible women” work in agriculture, family-run businesses, the domestic economy and elsewhere in the so-called informal sector. Of all the regions on the world, women in the Middle East and North Africa perhaps suffer from the worst case of invisibility. Even as recently as 1990, figures of women’s recorded participation were below 10% of the total labour force in seven Arab countries. However, as in other parts of the world, statistics do not always reflect reality. In India, for example, when the revised International Labour Organization definition of economic activity was applied, initial estimates that only 13% of all women were economically active had to be revised upwards to 88%. (The ILO redefined the economically active population to include “all persons of either sex who provide labour for the production of economic goods and services. All work for pay or in anticipation of profit is included. In addition, the standard specifies that the production of economic goods and services includes all production and processing of primary products, whether for the market, for exchange or for home consumption”).

Unlike World Bank reports and IMF predictions, Nader Fergany, one of the leading political economists in the region, views increasing unemployment and deepening poverty in the context of unfettered markets brought about by structural adjustment and increasing globalization (2001: 1). Moreover, he argues that unemployment can

Endnotes

1 Prior to 1990, Iraq was also a major recipient of Arab migrant labour, especially from Egypt.

2 Estimates in the 1990s indicated a 3% growth rate, or even 3.5% for Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. With about 2%, Bahrain, Morocco, Lebanon and Tunisia had lower rates of population growth (IMF, 1996). However, most recent figures indicate that the MENA population is growing at a rate of 2% in the current decade (Youssef, 2004).

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5 Research on women in developing countries since the 1970s has uncovered a vast number of “invisible women” whose work may either not be reflected in national statistics or not compensated in monetary terms, yet who work, on average, longer hours than men. Most of these “invisible women” work in agriculture, family-run business, the domestic economy and elsewhere in the so-called informal sector. Of all the regions on the world, women in the Middle East and North Africa perhaps suffer from the worst case of invisibility. Even as recently as 1990, figures of women’s recorded participation were below 10% of the total labour force in seven Arab countries. However, as in other parts of the world, statistics do not always reflect reality. In India, for example, when the revised International Labour Organization definition of economic activity was applied, initial estimates that only 13% of all women were economically active had to be revised upwards to 88%. (The ILO redefined the economically active population to include “all persons of either sex who provide labour for the production of economic goods and services. All work for pay or in anticipation of profit is included. In addition, the standard specifies that the production of economic goods and services includes all production and processing of primary products, whether for the market, for exchange or for home consumption”).

6 Fargues provides the following figures for general unemployment: 9% in Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, 13% in Morocco, 14% in Jordan, 16% in Tunisia and 30% in Algeria and Palestine (2003a). According to the World Bank (1993), unemployment among youth is considerably higher ranging from 37% in Morocco to 73% in Syria, with an average of 53% for all countries for which a data are available. Women’s unemployment rates are 50 % higher than for men in the whole region (World Bank, 2004, Overview).

7 Unlike World Bank reports and IMF predictions, Nader Fergany, one of the leading political economists in the region, views increasing unemployment and deepening poverty in the context of unfettered markets brought about by structural adjustment and increasing globalization (2001: 1). Moreover, he argues that unemployment can
not be treated in reductionist terms, but needs to include visible underemployment and visible overemployment (a reflection of invisible underemployment).

9 Prior to 1990, Iraq was also a major recipient of Arab migrant labour, especially from Egypt.

Islamism refers to a social and political movement that aims at the establishment of an Islamic state. In many contexts, Islamists constitute an opposition to their own governments. The majority of Islamists reject violence and attempt to obtain their goals through political and social means.

10 Girgis (2000) calculates that in 1999 the number of expatriate workers in the GCC states were about 7.8 million, of whom 3.5 million were of Arab origin (about 45%) and 4.3 million of Asian origin.

11 There are conflicting estimates about the relative level of skills amongst Asian and Arab workers. While the most recent and comprehensive study by Girgis (2002) stresses that Arab migrants are generally found in higher skilled jobs, Egset (2000) states that ‘while Asians are generally paid less than Arabs, they are also considered more skilled in some areas[...] (p.27)

12 For a detailed analysis and statistical evidence see, for example, King & Black (eds.) (1997) Southern Europe and New Immigrations, and Anthias & Lazaridis (eds.) (1999) Into the Margins: Migration and Exclusion in Southern Europe.

13 In Greece, for example, the informal sector accounts for about 35% of the gross domestic product (GDP) and about 25% in Italy (Iosefides 1997: 82).

14 Japan and Denmark, for example, have proposed that developmental assistance as part of the Convention Plus Initiative be rethought, with the aim of achieving durable solutions for refugees in the developing world.


16 To have a legal job which also provides a resident permit.

17 See the OCSE report 1998 on 'Trends on International Migration'.

Annex 1 (list of tables)
Table 1: Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian and Turkish Nationals in the European Union*


Table 2: Urban Population Trends in Republic of Yemen (millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population (millions)</th>
<th>Annual Growth Rate</th>
<th>Urban Population (millions)</th>
<th>Annual Growth Rate (%)</th>
<th>% of Urban Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>6.492</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>9.274</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>14.588</td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>9.21</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>15.915</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>14.25</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998*</td>
<td>17.071</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>10.87</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3: Urban population as % of total population in Yemen and other countries 1990-1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Income Countries</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan African</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>83.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Development Indicators 1998

Table 4: Growth rates of some cities between 1985-1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Growth Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ataq</td>
<td>29.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marib</td>
<td>12.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hajja</td>
<td>10.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sana’a</td>
<td>8.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadeedah</td>
<td>8.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibb</td>
<td>7.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sada</td>
<td>1.47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Share of urban dwelling units in total .%</th>
<th>Current Migration Rate</th>
<th>Life Time Migration Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sana’a City</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>107.4</td>
<td>119.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanaa</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiz</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al_Hodeidah</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahj</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibb</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abyan</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhamar</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabwah</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hajjah</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Baida</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadramout</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saadah</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Mahwit</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Mahrah</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mareb</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Jawf</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6 - Percentage of nationals and expatriates in the population of GCC countries, 1995-2000

Sources: a) Girgis, 2002; b) ESCWA, 2001 (Data for 2000); c) PACI, 2002 (Data for 2002)

d) Sources: for Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE: The 2001 annual report by the GCC secretariat, released July 27, 2002 as well as The Economist Country Reports from mid-2002; for Saudi Arabia reports by different Saudi ministries were used as well; for Kuwait: Ministry of Planning data.

Table 7: Remittances to Morocco and balance of trade deficits in million Moroccan Dirhams, 1991-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total remittances</th>
<th>Trade balance deficit</th>
<th>As % of trade balance deficit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>18873.8</td>
<td>-24599.5</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>21033.4</td>
<td>-23655.5</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>19310.9</td>
<td>-30068.0</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>19001.5</td>
<td>-32314.0</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>22961.6</td>
<td>-43310.0</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>36162.8</td>
<td>-43420.0</td>
<td>83.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>35513.0</td>
<td>-43693.2</td>
<td>81.3</td>
</tr>
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</table>


Table 8: Asylum Applications by Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian and Turkish Nationals in the European Union, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>

Source: UNHCR 2002.
### Annex 2 (list of people & organizations consulted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manolo Abella</td>
<td>ILO-Intern. Migration Branch</td>
<td>Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Ibrahim Awad</td>
<td>ILO, Cairo</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashraf Azer</td>
<td>UNHCR, Cairo</td>
<td>Community Services Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Fateh Azzam</td>
<td>Forced Migration and Refugee Studies</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUC, Cairo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Richard Black</td>
<td>Sussex Centre of Migration Research</td>
<td>Co-Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University of Sussex</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Barbara Harrell-Bond</td>
<td>Forced Migration and Refugee Studies</td>
<td>DVP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>AUC, Cairo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jane Hobson</td>
<td>DFID London</td>
<td>Urban &amp; Rural Change Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Dawn Chatty</td>
<td>Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Mohamed Kamel-Dorai</td>
<td>University of Poitiers</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Anita Fabos</td>
<td>University of East London</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Nader Fergany</td>
<td>Al-Mishkat Centre for Research</td>
<td>Director</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Foster</td>
<td>DFID London</td>
<td>Migration Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>Role</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Sari Hanafi</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Palestinian Diaspora &amp; Refugee Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Marwan Khawaja</td>
<td>Centre for Population &amp; Health</td>
<td>Director</td>
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<td></td>
<td>American University in Beirut</td>
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<td>Dr Khalid Koser</td>
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<td>Lecturer</td>
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<td>Frank Lazko</td>
<td>IOM, Research &amp; Publication Division</td>
<td>Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Kamil Mahdi</td>
<td>Institute of Arab &amp; Islamic Studies</td>
<td>Political Economist</td>
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