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Critical review

A response to simplifying complexity [☆]

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7 Abstract

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10 1. Complexifying simplicity

11 In a recent issue of Geoforum, Steven Manson (2001)
12 presented a timely review of Complexity Theory in order
13 to orient the unversed reader in a framework of Com-
14 plexity Theory’s key concepts. Manson begins with an
15 overview of the evolution of research in Complexity
16 Theory, appreciating its antecedents and asking a
17 number of thought provoking questions. This is fol-
18 lowed by a discussion that pulls together much of the
19 disjointed literature in establishing a typology of ap-
20 proaches to Complexity Theory, including an examina-
21 tion of their advantages and disadvantages.

22 In meeting the aims of his review of Complexity
23 Theory, Manson has covered a substantial amount of
24 literature, much of which is difficult to commensurate
25 and sometimes even contradictory. He effectively cuts
26 through its often effusive nature, uncovering some of the
27 embedded constructs and recognizing its links to the
28 past and its future potential. However this author con-
29 siders that Manson’s presentation of complexity did not
30 make clear a number of fundamental concepts in his
31 article. These points are to be taken up here through a
32 discussion of an alternative view in the context of
33 Complexity Theory: the first is a discussion of Manson’s
34 usage of “types of complexity theory”, the second in-
35 volves a re-evaluation of the differences between these
36 “types”, and the third addresses the differences between
37 Complexity Theory and Chaos Theory.

38 The second and third points of discussion are com-
39 mon misconceptions (in general and geographic litera-
40 ture) that arise from the assimilation of ideas without

careful consideration of their context. This is a common 41
problem resulting from geography’s borrowing tenden- 42
cies (Agnew and Duncan, 1981). All of these points are 43
essential to the conceptual framework that orients and 44
directs the reader and researcher. An alternative 45
framework is then considered in Section 5. 46

2. Theories of “Complexity” versus complexity theories 47

There are many different forms of research efforts in 48
complexity over many different disciplines producing 49
many different measures and definitions of *complexity* 50
that all fall under the rather broad umbrella of Com- 51
plexity Theory (for a fairly comprehensive bibliography 52
see [http://aldebaran.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk/~bruce/com-](http://aldebaran.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk/~bruce/com-bib/) 53
Manson (2001, p. 405) states ‘that there is no one 54
identifiable complexity theory’, however that depends 55
on the conception of theory. At the basic level of theo- 56
retical construction, such as world-view (Moore, 1997), 57
complexity theorists concur that the whole is greater 58
than the sum of its parts. This aphorism appears to be 59
the glue that binds the somewhat fragmentary nature of 60
complexity research. Instead of considering algorithmic, 61
deterministic, and aggregate complexity as separate 62
types of Complexity Theory they can be thought of as 63
different measures or definitions of the complexity of a 64
system. Thus there are different theories of the definition 65
of complexity rather than different types of Complexity 66
Theory. 67

3. Complexity versus complicated 68

Manson (2001, p. 406) recognizes that ‘there are 69
separate kinds of complexity that have different and 70

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71 sometimes conflicting assumptions and conclusions'.
72 Beyond this recognition it is important to ask what are
73 the underlying constructs that make these "types", or
74 rather definitions of complexity, incommensurable. The
75 key to understanding most of the differences between the
76 varying definitions or measures of complexity is the
77 definition of the term *complexity* itself.

78 The difficulty with the term *complexity* is that it suf-
79 fers a semantic hangover from its well-accepted dictio-
80 nary definition; 'only a decade ago, "complex" simply
81 meant made of many interrelated parts' (Koch and
82 Laurent, 1999, p. 96), synonymous with complicated.
83 However, there is now much more to *complexity* than its
84 dictionary definition (Mikulecky, 1999). Many authors
85 have failed to note the difference between *complicated*
86 and the new interpretation of *complex* taken in Com-
87 plexity Theory.

88 A system is *complicated* if it can be given a complete
89 and accurate description in terms of its individual con-
90 stituents, no matter how many, such as a computer or
91 the process of programming a VCR (Cilliers, 1998);
92 'complication is a quantitative escalation of that which
93 is theoretically reducible' (Chapman, 1985, p. 370). A
94 system is said to be *complex* when the whole cannot be
95 fully understood by analyzing its components (Cilliers,
96 1998). Many techniques under the banner of Complexity
97 Theory have little or nothing to do with complexity as
98 such, where the word *complexity* is used to describe
99 complicated or difficult systems, typically with many
100 parts (Edmonds, 1999). Chapman (1985, p. 370) asserts
101 that if the world can be explained in a reductionist
102 manner 'then "complexity" is not qualitatively different
103 from "simplicity" but merely quantitatively different'.

104 Manson (2001, p. 406) states that 'all three kinds of
105 complexity are concerned with how the nature of a
106 system may be characterized with reference to its con-
107 stituent parts in a non-reductionist manner'. However,
108 neither algorithmic nor deterministic complexity, as
109 Manson defines them, are complex in the sense de-
110 scribed above. Manson discusses two forms of algo-
111 rithmic complexity: the first is more commonly
112 described as computational complexity and the second
113 as algorithmic information theory. Neither formulation
114 of complexity is concerned with how the system may be
115 characterized by its parts in a non-reductionist manner.
116 Both translate complexity as complicated.

117 Manson's unfortunate usage of *deterministic com-*
118 *plexity* as a classification of a group of types adds to the
119 confusion. Within the literature deterministic complex-
120 ity typically refers to those Manson has placed under the
121 rubric *algorithmic complexity*. What are commonly re-
122 ferred to as deterministic measures of complexity, are
123 those that require the accounting of every bit in an ob-
124 ject (Gell-Mann and Crutchfield, 2001).

125 What Manson terms *aggregate complexity* comes
126 nearer the mark of complexity that both Manson and

this author consider apposite in terms of Complexity Theory. However, Manson's discussion of aggregate complexity is a description of the structure and behavior of complex systems rather than a *type* of complexity. Manson's explanation of change and evolution in Sub-section 4.1.6 is also somewhat confusing. The *dissipative* form of transition is a form of self-organized response by the system to perturbation. Self-organized criticality, rather than 'the ability of complex systems to balance between randomness and stasis' (Manson, 2001, p. 410), is that balance (commonly termed the edge of chaos) between chaos, which is not equivalent to randomness, and order. Furthermore, self-organized criticality is not a "type of transition" but a type of system organization.

4. Chaos Theory versus Complexity Theory

Because there is no framework or definition for Complexity Theory, or for that matter Chaos Theory, confusion between Complexity Theory and Chaos Theory or the concepts of complexity and chaos is another key difficulty overlooked by many authors. Because Chaos Theory is in some respects a precursor of Complexity Theory, much of the terminology has remained unchanged despite changes in meaning. Manson recognizes that 'deterministic complexity is [a]... marred concept' (2001, p. 408), but does not expand as to why it is problematic. The differences between Chaos Theory and Complexity Theory are not discussed.

Chaos Theory deals with simple, deterministic, non-linear, dynamic, *closed* systems. They are extremely sensitive to initial conditions resulting in an unpredictable chaotic response to any minute initial difference or perturbation. Complexity Theory focuses on complex, non-linear, *open* systems. Complex systems respond to perturbation by self-organizing into emergent forms that cannot be predicted from an understanding of its parts.

Mikulecky (1995) notes that the evidence for the validity of chaotic dynamics for biological processes involve simple *isolated* systems. Chaos is found in the idealizations or models of real systems, but it is not evident in the systems themselves. Lorenz's renowned weather system was an open but isolated system, a product of abstract computation that lies outside of the embedded nature of real world systems, incorporating a set of rules that did not change; 'global weather is not a simple chaotic system' (Bak, 1997, p. 159). Manson references Zimmer (1999) to state that 'fewer systems than anticipated are in fact deterministically chaotic' (2001, p. 408). However on closer reading of Zimmer (1999), and with the difference between Complexity Theory and Chaos Theory in mind, it is evident that chaos has only been found in models, not *natural* systems. In Chaos Theory disorder arises from simple or-

179 dered states, in Complexity Theory large scale order
180 arises from complex apparent disorder at the local scale.

181 5. The importance of structure

182 Thus, much misunderstanding arises from the con-
183 fusion or inappropriate use of the terms of Complexity
184 Theory and Chaos Theory. This may sound like mere
185 semantics, but the importance of using appropriate
186 terms cannot be emphasized enough, as they form the
187 basis of communication. A well-defined set of terms
188 provides a framework within which research can be
189 placed and discussed.

190 Beyond confusion with complication and Chaos
191 Theory, this authors other comments have been directed
192 at the organization of the concepts of complexity in
193 Manson's paper. The appropriate frameworks are very
194 important to developing a correct interpretation of
195 Complexity Theory. Frameworks form the next level of
196 theoretical construction (Moore, 1997) above the world-
197 view at which Complexity Theory seems to be stalling.

198 An alternative categorization of the varying types of
199 complexity found across numerous disciplines rallying
200 under Complexity's banner involves a careful analysis of
201 their underlying definitions or measures of *complexity*
202 per se. This author considers that the types of com-
203 plexity may be divided into seven (not mutually exclu-
204 sive) groups, covering most of the main variations found
205 in the literature and which are briefly considered here.

1. *Deterministic complexity*. This type of complexity is based on information theory and is measured as the algorithmic content of a string of bits, defined as 'the length of the shortest program that will cause a standard universal computer to print out the string of bits and then halt' (Gell-Mann, 1995, p. 16). This category also includes computational complexity, a measure based on processing time. Thus complexity is equated with randomness.
2. *Statistical complexity*. Statistical measures of complexity attempt to measure the degree of structure or pattern present in a complex system, circumventing the problem of statistical complexity where randomness equals maximal complexity. The boundary conditions of extreme order and disorder are satisfied by vanishing at these limits (Feldman and Crutchfield, 1997).
3. *Phase transition*. Maximal complexity is defined as the mid-point between order and chaos, the edge of chaos (Kauffman, 1995).
4. *Chaos derivatives*. The measures of complexity developed under Chaos Theory are typically based upon the Lyapunov exponent or the Fractal dimension. The former 'defines in precise mathematical terms a system's sensitivity to initial conditions' (Jensen,

1987, p. 177); the latter defines complexity through a measure of the irregularity of an object.

5. *Connectivity*. Complexity is measured by the degree of connectivity within the system, where the greater the number of connections or interactions the higher the complexity (Kauffman, 1995).
6. *System variability*. Complexity is defined whereby an increase in system variability (e.g., spatial variability or between scale variability) results in an increase in the complexity of the system.
7. *Relative and subjective complexity*. These types of complexity hold that it is a consequence of human perception and is therefore relative to the observer; 'the complexity of an object is in the eyes of the observer' (Klir and Folger, 1988, p. 193).

Manson's foray into describing the structure and behavior of complex systems can also be reformulated. The classification applied here is specifically oriented to geographic applications. As with the earlier framework, the divisions imposed are not mutually exclusive, they are used as a heuristic device to enhance understanding. Mapping complexity produces four classes: complex system structure, landscape, behavior, and organization. Complex system structure defines the complex system as composed of *elements* and relations or *connections*. Complex system landscape defines the *state space* of the complex system within which *attractors* are found and the importance of *scale* is recognized. Complex system behavior is defined by self-organization and can be divided into *elemental behavior*, or element ↔ element interaction, *system ↔ environment* behavior, and the *complex whole behavior* that emerges from the two former types of behavior. Complex system organization is described as a continuum, the opposing extremes of which are defined as *order* and *chaos*. Between these two end points lies the *edge of chaos*.

6. Concluding comments

If a repetition of geography's history of misapplied or poorly understood concepts mined from other fields is to be avoided and the potential of complexity to be clearly understood, it is imperative that these concepts or theories are critically defined in the terms of their origins. The dangers of accepting a single account of Complexity Theory without a thorough understanding of its original other disciplinary context will result in an inability to communicate effectively to those applying "complexity theory" in other disciplines and may well lead to spurious research.

This returns the discussion to Manson's insightful, yet unanswered, question: 'What value does Complexity Theory hold for geographic research?' (2001, p. 405), a question that supports the call for research from the US National Research Council (1997). To effectively eval-

284 uate Complexity Theory's value for geographic research,
285 and as a basis for future research and development, re-
286 quires appropriate frameworks.

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