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Book Reviews

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Book Reviews

***Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis.* By David T. Moore. Washington, D.C.; Joint Military Intelligence College Press, 2006. Maps. Figures and Tables. Notes. Sources cited.**

Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis is Occasional Paper Number Fourteen published by the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This series of Occasional Papers deals with significant issues in the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and is supported by JMIC through its Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. This work builds on earlier publications in the same series dealing with analytic methodology in the U.S. IC.

The author, David T. Moore, is a senior intelligence analyst and technical director at the National Security Agency (NSA). Serving in assignments both abroad and in the Washington, D.C. area for more than two decades, Moore has developed expertise in the areas of intelligence analysis competencies, methods, and standards, and has been an advocate for best practices in intelligence through creative insights into analytic methodology. His methods have been tested for practicality in several training and educational courses throughout the U.S. IC.

The central theme of this work is the need for analysts throughout the U.S. IC to be better trained in various critical thinking methods and to put their training to use in more effective ways. The shortfall in intelligence analysis in the U.S. IC in the last half-century, according to Moore, has been the analysts' persistent reliance upon their own (or their agencies') presuppositions, assumptions, and biases. Moore's argument is that this pattern of analysis has resulted in a number of intelligence failures and has not encouraged analysts to think "outside the box." According to Moore, for analysts in the IC to be most effective, they need an "overarching, reflective framework to add structured reasoning to sound, intuitive thinking" (1).

Moore first illustrates this point by defining three types of reasoning—inductive, deductive, and abductive—and how these three reasoning processes trace the development of analytic beliefs along different paths. While Moore argues that analysts who use these reasoning processes stand to be the most persuasive, he still warns that fallacious reasoning or mischaracterization in any of the three methods can affect reasoning using the others. Moore then defines critical thinking and its application in intelligence analysis, using the definition set forth by Richard Paul and Linda Elder of the Foundation for Critical Thinking. According to Paul

and Elder, critical thinking is "the mode of thinking in which the solitary thinker improves the quality of his or her thinking by skillfully taking charge of the structures inherent in thinking and imposing intellectual standards on them" (8).

Moore argues that when the correct questions and related alternative explanations are not fully considered, intelligence failures occur. He uses the Cuban Missile Crisis as a case study to demonstrate how preconceived notions about the presence of foreigners in Cuba in the summer of 1962 led to several missteps in the handling of the crisis by the fall of 1962. Moore effectively reasoned that the lack of critical thinking strategies used to evaluate the events leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis had a significant impact on how the U.S. responded to the incident. Analysts at that time instead relied upon preconceived notions of the value of HUMINT being reported from Cuba. Moore warns that these fallacies can also be capitalized upon by an adversary for deception purposes, and were effectively employed to some degree by the Cubans and Soviets in this situation.

Moore also cites another area in which critically thinking analysts can have a significant impact in the IC and U.S. foreign policy—with policy-makers. According to Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, who wrote *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers*, analogy is a tool commonly used by policymakers. Moore reasoned that critically thinking analysts might add substantively to the policymakers' options by "constructively challenging the tendency to rely upon analogy as a way of addressing situations" (35).

For much of the rest of the paper, Moore continues to define critical thinking strategies, their importance in the IC framework, and how the IC needs to further its efforts to incorporate critical thinking training into the development of its analysts. He outlines the poor record of implementing critical thinking training throughout the IC and provides suggestions on how to remedy that so IC analysts will have the right tools to review a broad spectrum of intelligence information in a rapidly-changing environment. According to Moore, with the proper training, IC analysts will be better able to synthesize intelligence using different strategies as opposed to relying solely on intuitive thinking, which inherently leads to biases and preconceived mindsets. He describes the critical thinking course currently utilized by NSA and touts it as a good model to follow.

Overall, this paper serves as a valuable tool for senior IC officials who will formulate and develop future training programs for IC analysts. Moore cites examples for implementation of training and at the end of the paper

provides exercises and activities for use in a classroom setting. The paper would possibly prove more useful to more inexperienced analysts in the IC if Moore would provide a further breakdown of the actual critical thinking methods, and practical examples of how to apply those principles in real-life intelligence situations, as he illustrated with the Cuban Missile Crisis case study. With that said, though, this paper likely serves as a fitting complement to the other papers in the series and should be utilized as part of JMIC training.

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***At The Center Of The Storm: The CIA During America's Time of Crisis.* By George Tenet with Bill Harlow. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007 (first paperback edition published in 2008). ISBN: 978-0-06-114779-1 (paperback). Photographs. Glossary. Index. Pp. xxii, 561. \$16.95.**

It is difficult to specify whether this is a biography or a history. Certainly it is one person's view of actions and reactions that significantly changed America's world. George Tenet had been a U.S. Senate staffer and a part of the National Security Council (NSC) staff before being appointed as the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1995. He became the Director in 1997, and served in that position until 2004, under the William J. Clinton and then the George W. Bush administrations. A lot of world events happened during his years with the CIA that directly affected the United States and how we conduct our daily lives, and that necessitated changes in U.S. Government structure and responsibilities. His account of his days with the CIA and world events in that period provide the reader with insights as to how some decisions were and were not made, at least from the perspective of someone at the senior level of America's Intelligence Community (IC).

While one might expect that the author would try to justify things that occurred and that, retrospectively, might have been done better or differently, Tenet seems to make every effort to be fair-minded in his descriptions of actions and decisions, and indeed takes the blame for some of the things that went wrong during the period. To me, this is not an effort to provide a rationale for actions taken during this turbulent period. Rather, it is an insightful view of some of the day-to-day activities that took place. It is also an insightful view of the IC and how it operates.

In the preface of the book, Tenet makes his objectives clear: "This memoir relies on my recollection of a tumultuous period in our nation's life. No such undertaking is completely objective, but it is as honest and unvarnished as I can make it." A bit further he states that "this is the story of how we saw the threat, what we did about it, what was proposed and not done, how our thinking evolved, and why the men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency were ready with a plan of action to respond forcefully to the loss of three thousand American and foreign lives" (3).

The structure of the book follows the early days of his work at CIA, including the normal day-to-day activities, the events of September 11, 2001, the preparation for and conduct of the war in Afghanistan, and the preparation for and initiation of the war in Iraq, and concludes with a comprehensive afterword and postscript summarizing the book.

In Tenet's early days at the CIA, the Agency, as well as many other government organizations, were undergoing funding reductions and reduced hiring. He demonstrates how good leadership under these adverse conditions can modify or alleviate some of the associated stresses. He describes his focus on the value of the employees and how a leader must earn their trust, providing leadership from "the perspective of the glass being always half-full" (4). A clear indicator of his leadership attitude was the fact that on most days while he was Director he ate lunch in the main cafeteria at the CIA, not in an executive dining room.

Tenet takes an incisive look at events and situations leading up to September 2001, including those he labels as "missed opportunities" (191). In his words, he treats this view not as what could have stopped the attacks but in the context of several "what ifs" that could have delayed them or reduced the effects. He also notes some of the intelligence collected that indicated the imminence of an al-Qaida attack, but no clear indicators of the specific targets. Based on some of these indicators some actions were taken, but they were not always popular. Even shortly after September 11, when the IC assumed that this was only the first wave of a series of attacks, a program that increased intelligence collected by the National Security Agency (NSA) against foreign terrorists that were suspected of planning new attacks on the U.S. was vilified as "domestic spying."

Concerning the build-up to the Afghanistan war and the Iraq invasion Tenet cites many of the conflicts and even misunderstandings that developed among the many elements involved: the FBI, the CIA, members of Congress, the Pentagon, the Office of the Vice President, and the Office of the President. The author elaborates on the conditions surrounding areas of potential concern that might bear on the decisions to initiate attacks. For example, he provides more background to consider concerning the uproar following his use of the phrase "slam dunk" which, according to him, was not an expression to support the president's decision to remove Saddam Hussein and launch the Iraq war. Rather, Tenet maintains that the exclamation was in response to a question as to whether more information regarding Iraq could be declassified and released in order to better debate the issues at hand (362). Also significant among these concerns and misunderstandings were the facts surrounding al-Qaida associations with Iraq, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and the famous sixteen words, "The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa," which appeared in the president's State of the Union speech early in 2003 (449).

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As interesting and fact-filled as the twenty-five chapters of the main text are, the last two sections are even more fascinating. The afterword sums up much of the content and the rationale that Tenet has expressed, and the postscript, written in February 2008, a year after the first publication, includes his perspective as influenced by later events. In the afterword, he notes that "first and foremost, it must be said that intelligence is not the sole answer to any complicated problem. Often, at best, only sixty percent of the facts regarding any national security issue are knowable" (490). Further in that chapter he discusses the practicality of a surge in military forces in Iraq—at the time of the writing the surge had not taken place—and he is not especially optimistic about its outcome. Consistent with the rest of the book, in the afterword he enforces the need for commitment to fighting "the global challenge of terrorism" as a worldwide problem, not focused exclusively on Afghanistan, Iraq, or specific terrorist groups (496).

A significant theme in the postscript is the potential for nuclear attack: "The intelligence is clear and compelling that al-Qaida has the intent to attack our homeland with a yield-producing nuclear bomb" (509). Regarding this he expresses his hope that the book will "spark discussion leading to strategic and tactical plans to address the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists" (513).

This book will certainly be of real interest to those who are in or familiar with the intelligence business, as it is filled with behind-the-scenes activities as seen by the Director of the CIA. In addition, all of us who lived through September 11 and have concerns about America's future and safety will find this a worthwhile read.

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***Female Suicide Bombers.* By Rosemarie Skaine. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2006. ISBN: 978-0-7846-2615-7 (paperback). Photographs. Glossary. Notes. Sources cited. Index. Pp. vii, 172. \$35.00.**

Until I read *Female Suicide Bombers*, I had no idea how many deaths have been attributed to suicide attackers. Even more amazing was the percentage of female suicide attackers. *Female Suicide Bombers* investigates how women have become combatants in armed conflicts throughout the world. Its pages are filled with very useful and interesting statistics. Rosemarie Skaine does a wonderful job of categorizing and detailing female suicide bombers in our society.

The book starts out by discussing the history of suicide bombing. Skaine provides a chronological analysis dating back to the first century when Jewish Sicaris used suicide bombers, up through and including bin Laden's September 11 attacks in New York City. Subsequent chapters cover relevant information including why women are used as bombers, the effects of terror on society, and the tactics used by female suicide bombers. Skaine also cites numerous conflicts throughout the world where females have been used as suicide bombers. For example, in 1991, Dhanu, a Sri Lankan Tamil, became the first Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) female suicide bomber. On May 21, 1991, Dhanu detonated an explosive vest that killed India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Other conflicts brought out in this book include the Chechen-Russian and the Palestinian-Israeli conflicts.

Female Suicide Bombers also discusses United States domestic security and foreign policies regarding terrorism. Skaine examines several congressional initiatives that enable this country to defend itself from terrorism. The first is the Patriot Act, which enhances law enforcement investigatory tools and strengthens the United States' measures to prevent and detect money laundering. A second initiative is the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. In November 2002, the Department of Homeland Security was established, which protects the country from attacks on U.S. soil. It strengthens computer security as well as Internet surveillance.

Included in the same chapter that covers domestic security and foreign policies is a discussion on new strategies and approaches taken by the United States against terrorism. I found this chapter to be most informative. The author quotes retired General Wesley K. Clark, former Supreme

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Allied commander of NATO, as saying: "To win this war, we must defeat the ideology of terrorism, depriving angry young people of their ability to justify their hateful actions in the name of Allah" (159).

In addition to the United States providing leadership, diplomacy, and military intervention to combat terrorism, Skaine writes that we must also cut off terrorist activities by drying up their financial support. Terrorists do not write a check for items needed to carry out their mission. Terrorist organizations deal with large sums of money, which originate out of criminal activity. In order for the United States to make a dent in the War on Terror, we must stop the flow of money to these organizations.

The last topic that Skaine covers in her book is preparedness and training. It goes beyond saying that the world needs to be more prepared for the next terrorist attack. This is especially true in responding to the threat from female suicide bombers.

The book was well researched and easy to read. It would be very useful for anyone interested in intelligence, counterterrorism studies, and strategic security. In my opinion, Rosemarie Skaine's book, *Female Suicide Bombers* is a must for your library.

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***Information Operations: Doctrine and Practice.* By Christopher Paul, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008. ISBN: 978-0-275-99591-1. Acronyms/Abbreviations. Charts. Diagrams. Photographs. Glossary. Notes. Sources cited. Appendix. Pp. ix, 175. \$55.00.**

Information Operations (IO) is probably the most misunderstood operational capability in the Department of Defense (DoD). Each of the military services, the various offices working IO at the joint level, and DoD have their own conceptual understanding of how IO should operate on the battlefield. For at least ten years, these entities have battled over how to define the discipline, what to include in the doctrine, and how to conduct IO on the battlefield. Too many times leaders overlook IO as a formal operational capability, but then may unwittingly include it in battle without knowing they are conducting IO. *Information Operations: Doctrine and Practice*, by Christopher Paul is a move in the right direction for helping provide clarity within the IO discipline and shedding light on how all the IO components can work together, as well as what IO's role should be in peacetime as well as wartime.

Paul states that his intention in writing the book was primarily for its use as a reference tool, which is exactly what anyone involved in military operations, specifically IO, currently needs. This book is an excellent resource for anyone currently working in, or who may be assigned to, any one of the IO capabilities in the future. Paul is an academician in his training and education, a social scientist to be precise, with a Ph.D. in Sociology from UCLA. He works in Philadelphia's RAND office with current research interests in military influence operations, integration of air and naval forces, simulation training, press-military relations, counterterrorism, and military operation on urban terrain.

In his book, Paul consistently states that IO should be part of a coordinated and synchronized effort between multiple government agencies, of which the Department of Defense is only one facet. The book outlines three core IO themes: (1) the need to integrate and coordinate IO with higher-level U.S. Government information efforts; (2) the tension between capabilities concerned with information content [PSYOP, OPSEC, and MILDEC] and those concerned with information systems [EW and CNO]; and (3) the tension between capabilities employing "black" content and those that employ only "white" information. Black content includes those capabilities that are used that do not tell the entire truth or purposefully tell a lie to hide true intentions. White content can be thought of as what public-affairs personnel are responsible for: telling the truth. Paul states: "There are many ways that 'mixing the liars and the

truth tellers in one pot' brings grief" (118), which is one of the arguments that public affairs personnel have with IO when it comes to writing doctrine: they do not want to be associated with the deceptive aspects of IO.

Information Operations casts a large shadow that many on the operational side of the Department of Defense either like to ignore, or like to claim they do not have the technical knowledge to understand the concepts associated with IO. Too many times leaders responsible for one of the many facets of IO state that they are sure glad their subordinates understand this stuff because *they* sure don't! Paul points out this problem and quotes Christopher Lamb's observation of lessons learned during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation Iraqi Freedom 2 (OIF 2), stating that "a major problem documented in OEF, OIF, and OIF 2 lessons learned is that IO planners did not adequately understand PSYOP and thus failed to appreciate its capabilities sufficiently or employ them appropriately and effectively" (52). One could replace the word PSYOP in this sentence with any of the other IO core capabilities, supported capabilities, or related capabilities and still suffer from the same outcome. A major problem with IO military assignments is assigning personnel to IO positions without the person having an understanding of IO concepts, leading to the compounded problem that even IO personnel do not understand IO. Paul's book helps those without a degree or technical background in any of the IO areas understand how to integrate the IO capabilities into operational military strategies.

One problem area noted in the book is that in chapter one, Paul does an excellent job of explaining how the executive level of government needs to dictate the strategic information objectives, but then the rest of the book lays out IO in the military environment and deals with the execution of IO in the IO cell at the joint level of the military. Since he stated there is a need for the executive level to coordinate IO efforts, it would have been nice to read more on how those at the federal level should carry out that endeavor. Of course, maybe that could be a follow-on book intended for those in the federal level of government who work on shaping perceptions of society.

Paul's chapter "Contemporary Information Operations" provides an excellent overview of IO at the joint level of the military, from highlights of the relevant IO doctrine to diagrams and charts depicting an IO cell and IO cell chief functions. If readers are not familiar with how IO is organized in the U.S. military before reading the book, they will have a clear understanding of the environment, at least at the joint level, after reading the book.

The heart of the book, though, lies in chapters three through five, where Paul breaks IO down into three areas: information content (psychological operations, military deception, and operations security), information systems (electronic warfare and computer network operations), and related military capabilities (public affairs, civil-military operations, and military support to public diplomacy). In each chapter, Paul describes the capability in general terms, then specifically describes it as it relates to IO with the tools and capabilities listed. Finally, he identifies the challenges each capability faces. These three chapters are probably the most valuable portion of the book since the reader who has a limited understanding of one IO area can refer to the appropriate section and begin to comprehend how the capability can be used for effect in a comprehensive operational IO campaign.

In the final chapter, Paul looks toward the future of IO and provides suggestions on how to reorganize IO to minimize the tensions between information content and information systems, and black content from white content. An important concept stressed is that *everyone* in the U.S. Government contributes to shaping the perceptions of the adversary. The actions of an E-1 Army private may have a tremendous influence in shaping an adversary's perception since the private may have face-to-face contact with an adversarial population.

Paul also makes realistic suggestions for reorganizing IO to separate the content-based capabilities from the systems-based capabilities. He suggests that both EW and CNO be in a systems organization and PSYOP, MILDEC, PA and CMO be in a content organization. Of course, this would create the problem with mixing the black and white contents together so he suggests separating the white and black parts of PSYOP and marrying the white part with PA and the black part with MILDEC. He further suggests changing the names so there are no residual associations with former capabilities. Paul concludes that there are further challenges to IO that may present future problems, but separating content from systems and black from white is a good start to solving some of the current issues facing the discipline.

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***The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency.* By Matthew M. Aid. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009. ISBN: 978-1-59691-515-2. Photographs. Notes. Sources cited. Index. Pp. 424. \$30.00**

The National Security Agency (NSA) wears many hats, but its primary role is two-fold: first, it breaks the cryptologic codes of foreign governments and their militaries and feeds this information to policymakers responsible for guiding the foreign relations of the United States; second, NSA develops specialized technology that ensures foreigners cannot break into coded U.S. communications, either government or military. Matthew M. Aid provides extensive coverage of the politics and necessity leading to the creation of the NSA. He starts with U.S. cryptologic efforts during the Second World War and traces NSA's successes as well as failures up to the present day.

Although there are intelligence disappointments mercilessly revealed throughout the book, in the end one cannot help but believe that even this skeptical author has gained respect for NSA's contributions. During the Eisenhower administration, NSA learned that the Russians were preparing to move troops into Poland, and that Israel, with British and French support, was planning to attack Egypt. Prior to the invasion of Hungary, NSA detected Soviet troop movements. During the Kennedy administration, NSA confirmed North Vietnam was controlling Viet Cong activities in the south. In another part of the world, NSA tapped into the Cuban national telephone system and developed intelligence uncovering Soviet activities there that played a crucial role in resolving the Cuban Missile crisis.

By the time of the Johnson Administration in 1964, NSA was intercepting and reporting regularly on North Vietnamese naval communications. The author describes in detail the role of intelligence during the Gulf of Tonkin affair, and the self-serving "cherry picking" of available intelligence by policymakers. Much intelligence during the war came from NSA reading of diplomatic traffic from other countries, instead of from intercepted Vietnamese communications, which remained secure, except for low-level cipher systems. In response, NSA refined the art of "traffic analysis," the derivation of intelligence from monitoring communications patterns without being able to read the content of the messages. Warning of the Tet Offensive came this way.

By 1972, NSA had broken the communications codes of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and helped deter planned terrorist attacks against Israelis in New York City. It played a crucial role in providing intelligence to President Ford during the Panama Canal negotiations.

Aid's coverage of NSA history continues to more current events, but gradually with fewer facts and more speculation. Considerably less information is available concerning events such as the Persian Gulf wars, the invasion of Iraq, and the situation in Afghanistan.

Aid also points out that not all intelligence was used properly. There is ample coverage of NSA warnings being ignored. For example, CIA intelligence analysts rejected its warnings that Egypt and Syria were preparing to attack Israel in 1973. NSA had also picked up advanced warning of the Soviet military move against Czechoslovakia in 1968, even though the CIA continued to insist no invasion would take place. There are many such examples in the book.

The author also reviews what we know about several major disasters suffered by NSA, such as the unprovoked Israeli attack on NSA's ship *Liberty* in which thirty-four crew members were killed, including twenty-five NSA civilian cryptologists. Israel claimed the attack was an accident, but intercepts of radio traffic confirm the attack was intentional. The author notes that the NSA will not release the intercepts, presumably to cover up for the Israelis.

The Secret Sentry is a serious history of NSA. By reviewing the voluminous footnotes at the end of the manuscript, one can get a sense of the remarkable amount of research behind this work. A great amount of material is taken from the National Archives but there are hundreds of references to original documents never published, but reviewed by the author. In addition, there is a large amount of information obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and from numerous recordings from the NSA Oral History project in the Center for Cryptologic History.

Another notable aspect of the book is how the author covers the extreme sensitivity of NSA's work, and the terrible consequences when its secrets are revealed. For example, in 1971, Jack Anderson reported that NSA could listen to Politburo telephone calls. As a result of his arrogant and stupid act, the U.S. embassy was given a bath in high-energy microwave bombardments, and this vital source of intelligence dried up completely. Most readers will recall how irresponsible reporting by the *New York*

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Times revealed that Usama bin Ladin's cell phone was being tapped. He never used a phone again. Aid provides many such examples, and they should serve as a warning to everyone.

Anyone who studies *The Secret Sentry* will come away with awe and appreciation for the amazing accomplishments of the NSA. It truly is one of the most remarkable institutions in the U.S. Government or anywhere. The people who work there sign up for a life of obscurity, never to be publicly appreciated. What it does require is incredible ingenuity and brain-power, yet by the time its deeds are recognized, the persons involved are either dead or long retired.

In covering this important institution, Matthew M. Aid is very much distinguished from other writers. This reviewer has read more or less all of the published books (in English) about the NSA. *The Secret Sentry* is among the very best.

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***The Blood of Lambs: A Former Terrorist's Memoir of Death and Redemption.* By Kamal Saleem with Lynn Vincent, New York, NY: Howard Books, 2009. ISBN: 978-1-4165-7780-5. Appendixes. Notes. Pp.xi, 340. \$23.99.**

Kamal Saleem, the son of a Lebanese blacksmith, learned at his mother's table that the most sinful Muslim man can redeem himself with one drop of an infidel's blood. This lesson and others from Saleem's accounts of his violent and hate-filled life as a terrorist are the foundation of an excellent book. As the title of *The Blood of Lambs* suggests, the book exposes the violence of the young and impoverished who are recruited by radical Islam.

Saleem was forced to leave school and begin work at the age of six. But despite his abbreviated formal education, and with the able assistance of Lynn Vincent, his co-author, Saleem delivers a fascinating life story that is full of lessons to complacent and too-trusting Americans.

The chief lesson is that America has an enemy within her walls—radical Islam—and does nothing about it. Saleem is qualified to make this assessment because at one time he was such an enemy. A corollary lesson is the frequent use of *al toquiah*—lying to enemies for the sake of Islam—that is frequently illustrated by the behavior of Saleem and his fellow Islamic radicals. The deception formerly practiced by Saleem is now turned against him by "moderate" Muslims in the United States who claim that Saleem is a liar and seeking to provoke prejudice against a peaceful people and their religion.

Saleem started down the path of radical Islam at a young age. Going to work at a job across town, Saleem, a Sunni Muslim, was beaten by three different groups of bullies—Armenians, Kurds, and Shiites—the last of which literally chased him into the arms of the Muslim Brotherhood. It was a life-changing event. Saleem instantly was granted not just care for his wounds and reassurance, but more importantly, protection. It was not the kind of protection that involved calling the police or the bully's parents. Saleem witnessed the fear and awe that the Muslim Brotherhood inspired among its neighbors as its members visited each group responsible for terrorizing the six-year-old now under the protective wing of the Brotherhood. Later in life, Saleem came to see the Muslim Brotherhood as the lifeblood of Islamic terrorism and a "Muslim imitation of European fascism" (69).

Soon Saleem was a member of Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which sent him on his first mission at age seven

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smuggling weapons into Israel. The description of the training for that mission and its execution, and other missions he carried out as a youth and teenager, fill much of the first third of the book and provide insight into the ease with which an unending supply of Islamic fighters are recruited and used.

Pages turn quickly while reading accounts of Saleem's growing up as an Islamic fighter that are interspersed with chapters of his current life as a former terrorist speaking about the dangers of radical Muslims both alone and as a member of "The Three Ex-Terrorists" (Walid Shoebat and Zakariah Anani are the other two former Muslim terrorists). The life of a former Muslim speaking out against radical Islam (Saleem converted to Christianity following a severe accident) is not without danger. The constant threats and protective measures take their toll, as evidenced by a panic attack of his teenage daughter and the anxiety he and his wife experience when threatened.

One account that will interest intelligence and counterterrorism professionals is Saleem's recruitment by an American for duty in Saudi Arabia. Seeking to escape the Lebanese Civil War, Saleem was hired by an American company that seemed to go to extraordinary lengths to employ him. Saleem became the manager of a recreational village in Saudi Arabia at a large salary, and in relatively short order became the operator of a "honey trap" operation as the American company brought in women under the guise of nurses, clerks, and technicians who were really dancers, escorts, and sex workers. Saleem's employer sought to supply pleasures to the Saudis to gain a business advantage and to influence Saudi-American relations. Saleem outfitted the rooms with cameras and extorted funds for the PLO. Saleem glosses over his connection with the American company and we are left to wonder if he was a recruited intelligence agent without realizing who his true employer was.

In 1980, Saleem led a group that transported SA-7 surface to air missiles to Afghanistan. After managing narrow mountain trails, Saleem was shocked to find an American Special Forces team assisting the mujahideen to whom Saleem had brought the SA-7s. The account of Saleem's time in Afghanistan is instructive, especially the American attempt to recruit Saleem and his fear that his cohorts would suspect he had been pitched.

Saleem had no desire to work for Americans, however. Instead he entered the United States on a temporary visa in 1981, planning to do as much harm as possible. He was financed by the same Saudi prince who had sent him to Afghanistan. America's poor and criminal groups proved to be

fertile ground for recruiting. One of the most revealing accounts of the book is not a battle scene, of which there are several, but Saleem's secret to recruiting Americans to Islam: he fed them. "You would not believe how many people in these Bible belt neighborhoods simply wanted something to eat" (245). It gives one pause to ponder if the same tactics are more effective now than in the 1980s. In another case, a local thug he tried to recruit was left without his posse after being convicted. But Saleem visited him in jail before he was transferred to prison. Playing on the new convict's fear, Saleem provided a contact—a Muslim Brotherhood contact—who arranged for his safety in prison. Upon his release, the former neighborhood tough was a dedicated Muslim who promptly traveled to a Pakistani terror camp.

Just as Saleem had been easily recruited by the Muslim Brotherhood, he was able to recruit with the same inducements—personal safety and freedom from starvation. This is a powerful lesson and illustrates how *The Blood of Lambs* operates on two levels. It is an interesting primer for the uninitiated or poorly informed, but it is also excellent reading for intelligence and counterterrorism professionals who can take away lessons about recruitment, tradecraft, and the power of the Muslim Brotherhood, which remains very active recruiting in all Muslim countries and feeding its recruits to several radical organizations. Perhaps Saleem's lesson to the professionals is this: know your opponent because he is already here.

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***Attaché Extraordinaire: Vernon A. Walters in Brazil.* By Frank Márcio De Oliveira. Washington D.C.: National Defense Intelligence College Press, March 2009. ISBN: 978-1-932946-22-2. Photographs. Bibliographic References. Footnotes. English and Portuguese. Pp. 196. Free download available at <http://www.ndic.edu/press/13120.htm>.**

Within the known annals of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), few individuals loom as large (figuratively and literally) as Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters. Although he is not well known outside of the defense IC in particular, Vernon Walters' career spanned decades of service both in and out of uniform, crossing many continents, often in *Silent Missions* (the title of his own 1978 autobiography), unbeknownst to the American public until well after the events unfolded.

In *Attaché Extraordinaire*, Frank Márcio De Oliveira, a retired Brazilian military police officer, and current research fellow at the National Defense Intelligence College, focuses on those segments of Walters' life and career that involved his service in Brazil. De Oliveira traces Walters' early military career, where as a first lieutenant during World War II, he was assigned as a liaison officer to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy due to his extraordinary ability to learn languages. Walters not only learned to speak Portuguese, he also gained the respect and admiration of those Brazilian officers that he came to know and befriend, including General (and future President) Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco. It was during Walters's duties as U.S. Defense Attaché in Brazil in 1964 that a military junta, led by Castello Branco, came to power. There were speculations in the Brazilian press that the U.S. Government was behind the coup, noting Walters' access to the coup leader, but Walters maintained throughout his lifetime that neither he nor the U.S. Government played a role in encouraging the Brazilian military action.

Walters went on to a successful military career, serving in various diplomatic and intelligence positions with significant strategic security implications. De Oliveira makes a case that Walters, as a true "wordsmith," embodied the tools of argumentation and persuasion that allowed him to be a "connector" between hard and soft powers, a rare synergy of soldier-statesman. In the book's main shortcoming, De Oliveira attempts to stretch the analogy by attempting to show parallels between the careers of Walters and former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, who also was in military intelligence during World War II. Whereas Kissinger was to make his name known in academic circles that parleyed into a high-profile diplomatic career, Walters was content to be a soldier who maintained a much lower profile.

The strength of De Oliveira's text is the rich insight it provides on Walters' influence in Brazil and his continuing legacy in that country. Quoting General Alexander Haig's eulogy at Walters' internment at Arlington National Cemetery in 2002, De Oliveira notes the strategic intelligence implications of Walters' influence in Brazil as "both an observer and someone who shaped history." Walters' ability to understand Brazil—not just its language, history, and culture but its strategic significance and importance the nation would come to play in the Western Hemisphere as a rising power—and cultivate relationships with key leaders, garnered him high respect and public honors from the Brazilian people.

As a former U.S. Army Latin American Foreign Area Officer (FAO), myself, I always admired General Walters as someone who embodied the spirit of the true strategic scout, the epitome of a successful FAO, who embodied the ability to empathize with his host country's counterparts and gain their respect and trust, yet without going native and forgetting for whom he worked. He also took seriously the responsibility to mentor the next generation of FAOs, as noted by one of his young charges, then Major Clarke Brintnall, who commented accurately (still to this day): "Young captain Foreign Area Officers had no status in the Embassy, but he [Walters] made sure that we were all brought into the full activities of the Army Attaché Office, soon thereafter the Defense Attaché Officer, and that all of us received the benefit of his experience."

Attaché Extraordinaire offers readers an important look into the life of one of the nation's best strategic thinkers from a foreign perspective. De Oliveira is clearly a product of Brazilian military heritage, where Walters' legacy looms large, yet he is still able to assess the broader strategic implications of Walters' role in Brazil and does not shy away from the more controversial aspects of Walters' influence. At one point in the text, he admits that we may never know the true extent of Walters' personal involvement in the events leading up to the military coup of 1964, and that there are two very different views ("protective angel of the coup" or "devoted friend of Brazil"). Yet, given Walters' strong Catholic faith and "missionary" zeal in service to his nation, he would likely see the two as non-exclusive.

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