Maria Mäkelä

Possible minds
Constructing – and reading – another consciousness as fiction

Abstract

The “old school” and the “new school” of narratology seem to share a referential bias in their view of fictional minds. (1) Classical studies assume that via a meticulous differentiation of voices and viewpoints, we are able to extract a “reliable” representation of the fictional world. (2) Recent cognitive approaches tend to regard fictional and actual minds as being based on precisely the same cognitive schemata; we should ask ourselves, however, whether the natural parameters of thought and those of fiction actually converge. In this paper, I wish to demonstrate the challenge that fictional characters representing each other’s perceptions, thoughts and feelings issue to both classical and cognitive approaches to fictional minds. I suggest that fictional agents – not only narrators but focalizers as well – may take advantage of precisely the same techniques of constructing the minds of others as are used in omniscient narration. Furthermore, I try to demonstrate how this feature of literary representation inherently problematizes the “naturalizing” of (fictional) mental functioning. I will start with examples from homodiegetic narration (Ford Madox Ford, Richard Ford) and then widen the scope to more problematic instances in the heterodiegetic mode (Emmanuèle Bernheim, Fay Weldon). I argue that the “narrative tendency” of a character constructing other characters’ minds potentially mitigates the binarity of homodiegetic and heterodiegetic narration. Finally, such speculating and narrativizing – and perhaps fantasizing, hallucinating – fictional minds provide a parallel, not
with “normal” human consciousness relying on the parameters of everyday experience, but with specifically literary construction. Furthermore, such (doubly) embedded consciousness representation reveals the reader’s effort to construct fictional mental functioning as inherently “unnatural” – since there is no such thing as true mimesis of the mind.

1 Introduction

Lately, we have been witnessing a change in the narratological frame of mind. Narrative theory has travelled far from the classical assumption of the story having a mind or a sense of its own; instead, in the wake of the cognitive turn, we are eager to pay attention to the role of the reading mind in narrative sense making. Yet these “old school” and “new school” approaches both seem to share a referential bias in their view of fictional minds.

1) The classical studies concentrating on the differentiation of (inner) voices and viewpoints of individual subjectivities seem to adhere to the same mimetic illusion that is inscribed in realistic fiction – an illusion which is, however, already abandoned or abused by modernist narrative techniques. This ideal of referentiality, of having access to the “reliable” representation of the fictional world (“textual actual world;” cf. Ryan 1991: 112–113) goes hand in hand with locating the ultimate representative authority in the omniscient, objective narrative voice. Consequently, studies on free indirect discourse and focalization tend to focus (both methodologically and thematically) on drawing boundaries between the narrator’s indirect reports of the fictional world and the “subjective” and thus “unreliable” material which is filtered through fictional consciousnesses, (preferably) bearing the linguistic markers of direct or free indirect representation. What is ignored by this kind of approach (labeled as the “speech category approach” by Alan Palmer 2004: 1) is the fact that, subjective perception and inner worlds being its main themes, the modernist consciousness novel is not so much a representation of a particular kind of fictional storyworld as it is a spectrum of the characters’ own mental representations of the fictional reality (cf., Herman 2002: 36–46). Thus the interpretive task is not to seek
the truth about the fictional world but to reflect on the ways in which the partial, local and subjective truths are constructed.

2) The main task of cognitive narratology, the description and analysis of the cognitive mechanisms behind our reading and understanding of narratives (a perfectly profitable project as such), has led to a tendency to consider fictional and actual human minds as being based on the same cognitive schemata (cf. Margolin 2003; Palmer 2004). We should ask ourselves, however, whether the natural parameters of thought and those of fiction actually converge. Furthermore, the availability of information about minds in fiction and about actual minds differ significantly: when reading fictional minds we are often privileged with omniscience as far as the thoughts and feelings of the main character(s) are concerned, but may or may not be forced to perceive the fictional world and other characters through the limitations brought on by these “transparent minds.” Consequently, what we have is a set of possible worlds and possible minds that we cannot falsify (at least not without careful interpretation) – unlike in the real world, where we usually know a schizophrenic when we see one.

In this paper, I wish to avoid such referential biases and concentrate on the peculiarly novelistic ways of thematizing human consciousness. Methodologically, however, I try to draw on both the classical formalist approaches and the cognitive-based innovations whenever they seem to be sensitive enough to the literary phenomena in question. My particular aim is to highlight the functions of free indirect discourse (and related techniques of rendering fictional mental activity) in embedded or recursive representation of consciousness. The problem will be illustrated with four exemplary texts: novels by Ford Madox Ford (The Good Soldier, 1915) and Emmanuèle Bernheim (Sa femme/Sa Femme, Or the Other Woman, 1993/1994) and short stories by Richard Ford (‘Privacy,’ 2001) and Fay Weldon (‘Weekend,’ 1978).

In the field of cognitive science, it was Daniel Dennett who first, in 1983, discussed the levels of intentionality as a cognitive model: mental “worlds” can be represented as a recursive system that is potentially infinite as in statements like “X thinks that Y believes A to be mad at B” and so on (see, eg. Zunshine 2003: 278). Such embedded states of mind occur frequently in novels concentrating on the psychological processes of the characters – however, it is the peculiar nature
of novelistic presentation that it often avoids such overt marks of intentionality as explicit mentions of who is behind each represented thought, opinion, or discourse. This ambiguity of voices/subjectivities has been a perennial topic in classical narratology, but, as indicated above, the main cause for the concern has been the ambiguity between objective narratorial report and the subjective elements attributable to a fictional character (e.g. Pascal 1977). A far less scoured area of novelistic consciousness representation has to do with characters representing each other’s perceptions, thoughts and feelings; a glance at the brand new Routledge Encyclopedia of narrative theory attests to the absence of research on this particular area (see, eg. the entry on THOUGHT AND CONSCIOUSNESS REPRESENTATION by Palmer in Herman & Jahn & Ryan (ed.) 2005: 602–607). What I would like to suggest in this paper is that fictional agents – not only narrators but focalizers as well – may take advantage of precisely the same techniques of constructing the minds of others as are used in omniscient narration. Furthermore, I try to demonstrate how this feature of literary representation inherently problematizes the “naturalizing” of (fictional) mental functioning.

Obviously, the potential of embedded consciousness representation has not passed without any notice among narratologists. Moshe Ron provides examples from The Good Soldier (Ron 1981: 23–24) as well as from Henry Miller’s Sexus (ibid.: 31), pointing out the narrative possibilities of “focalizers focalizing each other” and the challenge this kind of representation issues to the “Mimetic Language Game.” Brian McHale (1983: 33–34) also singles out this kind of representation in Ulysses (is Bloom constructing Gerty MacDowell’s point of view within his own or does the narration offer a “real” shift to Gerty’s mind?) to prove that, unlike Banfield argues, we definitely need contextual cues – in addition to linguistic ones – in order to attribute represented thought segments to individual characters. Yet, even the cognitively inclined theorists who (briefly) touch upon cases of embedded consciousness representation (Jahn 1992: 357–358; Zunshine 2003: 278–281) consider its thematic implications only in relation to the assumed “what is really going on in this passage” instead of paying attention to the challenge such representation issues to referentiality, experientiality (cf. Fludernik 1996) – and to cognitive narratology, for that matter.

In the following, I try to demonstrate how fictional mental worlds embedded within each other challenge both classical and cognitive approaches to fictional minds. I will start with examples from homodiegetic narration (Ford
Madox Ford and Richard Ford) and then widen the scope to more problematic instances in the heterodiegetic mode (Bernheim, Weldon); finally, I argue that embedded consciousness representation potentially mitigates the binarity of first-person (homodiegetic) and third-person (heterodiegetic) narration (a narratological idée reçue). The “narrative tendency” of a character constructing the other characters’ minds conflicts both 1) with the (natural narratology) logic that epistemic restrictions result in narrative restrictions as well; and 2) with the idea that in a heterodiegetic narrative situation, all diegetic material should be attributed to the narrator while the role of the character is restricted to “revealing” him/herself through the mimetic glimpses the narration offers to the reader. Furthermore, novels with such speculating and narrativizing – and perhaps fantasizing, hallucinating – characters are also self-reflective in that they reflect both the novelist’s and the reader’s process of interpretation and construction of fictional worlds and consciousnesses. The analogy between embedded mental spaces and fictional world construction will also lead us – at least for a while – to the cognitive linguistic realms of Possible Worlds Theory and Text World Theory (cf. Ryan 1991; Doležel 1998; Gavins 2003).

Instead of pledging allegiance to the linguistic or otherwise strict definitions of free indirect discourse, I attempt to use this classical concept as representing the narrative “border phenomena,” not just between indirect and direct representation, but between the mental spaces (possible worlds and possible minds) evoked in narration. Consequently, the “freedom” of these narrative situations refers to the implicitness of the levels of intentionality and the “indirectness” to all the mediating agents that separate the reader from the referred subject of representation – the last mental domain at the end of the narrative food chain.
2 Character as narrator: The “I” who was not there

One of the most recent and convincing voices in the field of narratology belongs to Alan Palmer (2004; see also 2002) who, besides drawing our attention afresh\(^1\) to the problematic of consciousness representation, questions the validity of the speech category approach for illuminating the ways fictional minds can be narrated. Palmer wishes to shift our attention from mere “thoughtful characters in self-communion” (cf. Cohn 1978: v) – and consequently, from the highly verbalized component of “fictional mental functioning” – to the whole “social mind in action” (Palmer 2004: 9–12). One direction for Palmer as for many others is towards a cognitive-based analysis of stories where the apparatus of classical narratology is complemented and partly replaced by, as Palmer (2004: 14) labels them, “real-mind discourses.” According to Palmer, the classical speech category approach has neglected the “natural” component in the reader’s process of constructing fictional minds:

[j]ust as in real life the individual constructs the minds of others from their behavior and speech, so the reader infers the workings of fictional minds and sees these minds in action from observation of characters’ behavior and speech. (Palmer 2004: 11)

However, what we are dealing with in reading narrative fiction and fictional minds is, after all, *language*, and the problem of putting our own and other people’s minds in words. One way of approaching this paradox of fiction – the necessity of constructing other minds, yet being dependent on language as the

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\(^1\) One might argue that nothing much has happened on this front since Cohn’s path-breaking *Transparent Minds* (1978) and McHale’s (1983) elegant slating of Banfield’s linguistic-based approach to FID. (See, however, Lehtimäki & Tammi, forthcoming.) Both Cohn and McHale deserve credit for establishing the currently accepted view of FID, not as a mere linguistic category, but as a literary figure dependent on contextual and extra-linguistic markers. Furthermore, alongside with Stanzel (1984), they have demonstrated the fluidity of narrative situations along the scale between the authorial and the figural narrative situations and, more specifically, drawn our attention to the ambiguous and fuzzy border areas where the actual narrative situations are often situated.
only semiotic channel – is to look into it as it is thematized in narrative fiction itself.

Although Palmer is definitely right about our “natural” ways of making acquaintance with fictional characters resembling real people, it is precisely the seemingly natural relationships between fictional characters existing on the same diegetic level that may complicate such reading strategy. The history of narrative fiction teems with obsessive, paranoid or overly sentimental protagonists who misrepresent other characters through false speculation. Many of the paradigmatic cases have been discussed under the notion of “unreliable narration” – which is of little use here since unreliability defines the whole business of embedding fictional minds within each other. Furthermore, as Greta Olson (2003) has recently pointed out, unreliability is a characteristic far too easily attributed to all kinds of narrators who are also protagonists in their own narrative: “Homodiegetic narrators are subject to the epistemological uncertainty of lived experience. Yet they are not necessarily unreliable.” (Olson 2003: 101.) Condemning a narrator for unreliability requires a firm belief in the epistemological vraisemblance of the given narrative, which actually seems a paradoxical prerequisite to start with. On the other hand, we find examples from narrative fiction that deconstruct such epistemic limitations – and, consequently, upend the conventional binarity of “restricted” homodiegetic and omniscient heterodiegetic narration.

In Ford Madox Ford’s novel The Good Soldier, the narrator-protagonist John Dowell tries to give an exhaustive account of “the saddest story [he has] ever heard” (The Good Soldier: 7). Yet we are uncertain whether this saddest story is a triangle drama between Dowell himself, his wife Florence and Edward Ashburnham; or between Edward, Florence and Edward’s wife Leonora; or between Edward, Leonora and the last one of Edward’s mistresses, their young protégée Nancy. The confusion is due to Dowell’s narrative techniques which constantly seem to shift the focus from Dowell’s own experiential domain to that of others. He keeps reminding us that his narration consists of a faithful recounting of actions and other people’s personal experiences as they have been related to him by Leonora and Edward. Nevertheless, it seems typical of Dowell’s narration to drop off the parentheticals (such as “I remember Leonora told she felt” etc.) that would reveal the double-recounting that frames the individual experience, especially when he moves on to depict passionate feelings.
(1) For she [Leonora] discovered that Edward Ashburnham was paying a blackmailer of whom she had never heard something like three hundred pounds a year... *It was a devil of a blow; it was like death,* for she imagined that by that time she had really got to the bottom of her husband’s liabilities. (*The Good Soldier*: 65; emphasis added)

(2) So, you see, he [Edward] would have plenty to gurgle about to a woman [...] with his intense, optimistic belief that the woman he was making love to at the moment was the one he was destined, at last, to be eternally constant to... (*The Good Soldier*: 34; emphasis added)

(3) His marriage with Leonora had been arranged by his parents, and though he always admired her immensely, he had hardly ever pretended to be much more than tender to her, though he desperately needed her moral support, too... (*The Good Soldier*: 67; emphasis added)

The emphasized segments in the examples above seem to slide towards free indirect discourse. This is not the Proustian case of FID in homodiegetic narration – displaying the dual experience of both the narrating and the experiencing “I” (cf. Helkkula’s article in this volume) – but comes, instead, close to the heteroglossic doubling of voices, conventionally ascribed to the heterodiegetic narrative situation\(^2\). We could, of course, naturalize Dowell’s use of emotionally consonant narration (yet narration with a bitterly ironic undercurrent showing through) within the linguistic framework of free indirect speech. This would, however, be a solution only in individual cases, not with regard to the whole narrative situation and its thematic significance. The opaqueness that Dowell’s narration produces between the reader and the assumed fictional reality and its inhabitants is dramatized in those moments when we cannot tell a true recounting of another person’s words (possibly in example 1) from Dowell’s own generalizations of someone else’s frame of mind (possibly in example 3) or even from his own hypotheses and judgments (possibly in example 2).

Dowell’s case gets further complicated by passages constructing “third-degree” experientiality, as in the lengthy description of Nancy’s emotional tumult

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\(^2\) Yet also Genette (1980: 207–208) points out several passages in *Recherche* that show “Proust capable of transgressing the limits of his own narrative ‘system’” and adhering to “the omniscience of the classical novelist.”
at the moment Edward’s love dawns on her: the representation of Nancy’s consciousness cannot be based on her own verbal rendering of her experiences but must be derived from Leonora’s, or, more probably, from Dowell’s hypotheses (who was not there to witness any of this). When Dowell describes Nancy’s childishly hysterical state, he uses the whole scale of speech categories just as omniscient narration would, from (4) indirect to (5) free indirect and (6) direct discourse.

(4) She began thinking about love (…) She had a vague recollection that love was said to render a hopeless lover’s eyes hopeless (…) she remembered that lovers’ existences were said to be punctuated with heavy sighs. (…) she felt like a person who is burning up with an inward flame, dessicating at the soul with thirst (…) (The Good Soldier: 256–258)

(5) Unhappiness; unhappiness; unhappiness was all around her. (…) It must then be right that she should go. Edward was always right in his determinations. (…) Well, she was prepared to tell him that she was ready to witness his amours with another young girl. She would stay there – to comfort Leonora. (…) Leonora, Leonora with her hunger, with her cruelty, had driven Edward to madness. He must be sheltered by his love for her (…) (ibid.: 258–263)

(6) It seemed to her that for one short moment her spirit could say: “Domine, nunc dimittis… Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace.” (ibid.: 261)

The examples demonstrate how the speech categories are not in any natural way congruent with actual speech or thought acts and, consequently, cannot be defined as direct or indirect in terms of referentiality. However, already the firmly established list of “syntactical markers” reveals the fact that the narratological doxa concerning free indirect discourse is deeply rooted in the speech category approach: we speak of “back-shift of tenses,” “retention of deixis” and “conversion of personal pronouns,” thus privileging the mimetic utterance, the enoncè – as if the process of narration was somehow supplementary. This is what Monika Fludernik (1993: 281–282) calls “the direct discourse fallacy” in speech and thought representation; and it is precisely texts like The Good Soldier and overly
narrativizing characters like John Dowell that highlight the ultimate nature of consciousness representation as – should we say – “the direct access fallacy.”

Here, Fludernik’s *theory of schematic language representation* (1993) comes in useful; namely – and this is, I am aware, a simplifying account of Fludernik’s theory – the view that whatever the mode used in representing someone else’s discourse, we are always dealing with approximations, not verbatim reproductions. Human cognition operates with prototypical expectations, and in the case of discourse reproduction, it means that both telling and reading adhere to typical schemas of language use. (Fludernik 1993: 398–408, *passim*.) Dowell’s apparent reproduction of Nancy’s thoughts and emotions is a case of language schematization and typification *par excellence*: he claims to “know that she pictured herself as some personage with a depressed, earnest face and tightly closed lips” (*The Good Soldier*: 259), but the reader, already aware of Dowell’s biased relationship to his own story, can tell that it is precisely Dowell himself who relies heavily on the literary-cultural schemas of sentimental desire. This strategy can be seen as culminating in the pathetic prayer (example 6) Dowell claims Nancy’s “spirit could say;” as Fludernik’s theory has it, also direct discourse representation relies on prototypical (habitual, recurrent, predictable) speech acts, not the “original” utterance (see Fludernik 1993: 409–414). Consequently, Nancy and, more or less, also Edward, Leonora and Florence, end up but as characters within Dowell’s own fiction. As Paul B. Armstrong notes in his study on the “Fordian Bewilderment,” “Dowell only discovers what he thinks and what his history means by offering his experience to himself in language” (Armstrong 1987: 196). *The Good Soldier* is ultimately not, however, the narrator-protagonist’s account of his individualized experiences but a mixture of undifferentiated passions, mostly projected to other subjectivities than Dowell’s own.

In Genettean terminology, Dowell’s narration suffers from *paralepsis*: he exceeds the epistemic limitations that the logic of narrative sets to him. However, the question is not about simply knowing too much but of entering another experiential plane; in terms of Fludernik’s “Natural Narratology,” we cannot narrativize such descriptions within the cognitive frame of mere telling but must adhere to the frame of experiencing (cf. Fludernik 1996: 43–50). As Fludernik points out, “(...) reflectoral narration, for example in its reliance on the figural psyche as the evoked transmissive medium of the story, structures narration around the script of experiencing or viewing, rather than telling events” (Flud-
ernik 1993, 449). Yet narrative situations like the one described above contrast with Fludernik’s initial point – which is to consider real life experientiality and the kind provided by narratives as analogous. For, what Dowell’s narration offers us is *fake* experientiality, or *projected* experientiality. Free indirect discourse plays a major part in this process of projection since, by definition, it is a mode of thought representation that avoids parentheticals and thus obscures the source of (mental) discourse. The distancing function of FID is further enhanced by Dowell’s recurrent use of literary and artistic frames in constructing the past experiences; as Miriam Bailin demonstrates in her analysis of *The Good Soldier*, Dowell uses the aesthetic form “to control and shape the raw material of experience and neutralize threatening emotions” (1987: 74). FID, in all its freedom, allows Dowell to take part in the drama he was left out of by the time of action (“Unhappiness; unhappiness; unhappiness”) and somehow release his own suppressed desires by, especially, projecting them into his wife’s lover (see example 2; cf. also Armstrong 1987: 219–220). He transcends the fatal unawareness of his wife’s infidelities, but only to end up in deceptive paralepsis – in “knowing too much,” both in terms of epistemic limitations and of his own emotional capacity.

Uri Margolin presents the cognitive task that narrative fiction imposes on the reader as follows:

(...) we are operating within the confines of a make-believe world, pretending that narrators and storyworld participants exist independently of the text which actually creates them via semiotic means, and that they are sufficiently human-like so that concepts developed in cognitive science to model the activities of actual human minds are applicable to them, even if only through analogical transfer. (Margolin 2003: 273)

The nature of the fictional universe as a hypothesis, as “make-believe,” is much the same as the nature of the other consciousness. In Possible Worlds Theory and in Text World Theory, the whole system of “make-believe” worlds comes in neat Chinese boxes: the first order hypothetical domain forms the “textual actual world,” in the subjective perceptions of fictional characters, this world is (re)shaped into second-order mental representations; and by using their capacity to create non-existent, possible worlds, these fictional minds produce their own fictions, that is, fictions within fiction (cf. Ryan 1991: 22; Gavins 2003:
130–132). Yet one problem remains: narrative fiction does not readily appear in 3D-modelled patterns, although, since the regime of cognitive narratology, one may be tempted to think it does.

The example of John Dowell demonstrates how we operate with the hypothetical when constructing other people’s thoughts and emotions. There is thus nothing unnatural in speculating about other people’s mental activities – the unnatural takes over as these hypotheses are verbalized and woven into the thread of fictional representation. If we were to approach the problem from the angle of linguistics, we would adhere to modal logic, the grammatical means to construct the hypothetical such as counterfactuals or the conditional (and this is what Possible Worlds Theory and Text World Theory tend to do). Genette pays attention to this linguistic loophole available to epistemologically restricted homodiegetic narrators: “Since Spitzer, critics have often noted the frequency of those modalizing locutions (perhaps, undoubtedly, as if, seem, appear) that allow the narrator to say hypothetically what he could not assert without stepping outside internal focalization” (Genette 1980: 203). However, precisely due to the analogy between fictional world construction and the construction of mental spaces, it is often impossible to separate the modal from the actual. If we once again return to the narration of *The Good Soldier*, we may see that Dowell shares the epistemic uncertainty with his reader.

(7) **I seemed to perceive** the swift questions chasing each other through the brain that was behind them. **I seemed to hear** the brain ask and the eyes answer with all the simpleness of a woman who (...) (*The Good Soldier*: 40; emphases added)

(8) **I seem to see** three figures, two of them clasped close in an intense embrace, and one intolerably solitary. It is in black and white, my picture of that judgment, an etching, perhaps, (...) (ibid.: 82; emphasis added)

In some of the rare cases Dowell refers to his own mental representations (example 8), he renders them with at least same amount of uncertainty as the ones he projects into other people’s minds (example 7). Example (8) highlights his tendency to escape into aesthetics – into fiction – rather than sort out his true feelings. As Armstrong puts it, Dowell’s “surprise and confusion reveal that his “reality” was an interpretive construct, a composition based on hypotheses and
presuppositions” (1987: 201) – and if we examine Dowell’s strategies for composing the inner realities of other characters, we can be rather convinced that for him the reality never ceases to be “an interpretive construct.”

One of the points of modernist fiction is to demonstrate how we are always bound to be left out from the “textual actual world.” Sometimes the theme of alienation can be taken further when a character is represented as distancing himself or being distanced from his own consciousness. As already pointed out in the case of the self-denying John Dowell, it is often the construction of one’s own experience that seems to call for modality. Richard Ford’s short story ‘Privacy’ provides a striking example of the distancing between the narrating and the experiencing “I.” The story begins with a man’s recounting of his habitual married life; soon the iterative narration breaks off and turns into an intense singulative representation of the man’s nocturnal experience as he watches a woman undress on an opposing window.

(9) I don’t know all that I thought. Undoubtedly I was aroused. Undoubtedly I was thrilled by the secrecy of watching out of the dark. Undoubtedly I loved the very illicitness of it, of my wife sleeping nearby and knowing nothing of what I was doing. It is also possible I even liked the cold as it surrounded me, as complete as the night itself, may even have felt that the sight of the woman – whom I took to be young and lacking caution or discretion – held me somehow, insulated me and made the world stop and be perfectly expressible as two poles connected by my line of vision. I am sure now that all of this had to do with my impending failures. (‘Privacy:’ 5; emphases added)

The passage is paradoxical through and through since it both constructs and deconstructs the protagonist’s experiential frame. The suspiciously vivid description of the intense coldness and secrecy of the moment questions the narrator’s insistence on not being sure about his past sensations. When the man, later on, accidentally encounters the woman he has (by now repeatedly) been peeping at, he finds out she is surprisingly old and suspects that the woman finds his attention somehow menacing.

(10) I might suddenly have felt the urge to harm her, and easily could’ve. But of course that was not my thought. (…) I didn’t want her to think my mind contained what it did and also what it did not. (ibid.: 7)
The former modality turns, at the end of the story, into a complete negation: instead of representing his former thoughts, the narrator reports what he did not think. One possible interpretation is that the narrator-protagonist projects his own violent and abusive obsessions into the woman’s unnecessary fear. The sentence “I might suddenly have felt the urge to harm her, and easily could’ve” is not, by the linguistic definition, exactly free indirect discourse but still it creates an ambivalent dual perspective; the sentence is, in a way, left lingering between the two characters, as a hypothesis not exactly originating from either of their consciousnesses³.

Alienating oneself from one’s own mind and projecting emotions and experiences into another are, as it seems, cognitive strategies that may exceed the logic of language. Next, we will move on to discuss embedded consciousness representation in heterodiegetic narrative situations to see if the third person reference will open up further possible minds.

3 Character as focalizer: Encounters with the third

When reading Emmanuèle Bernheim’s novel Sa femme (translated into English as Sa Femme, Or the Other Woman), the reader is first captivated by the frame of the conventional “adultery story“ – and so is the protagonist, Claire: the narration concentrates on Claire’s mind as it becomes more and more preoccupied with the secret encounters with her lover and, moreover, with images of his wife and children. In the course of the narrative, however, Claire’s mental activity turns out to be based on obsession and fantasy. As her obsession grows worse her fantasies about the man’s wife begin to dominate the narration as well.

(11) Does his wife sometimes make him up a lunchbox? In the morning she fills it up with yesterday’s leftovers and seals it. She smiles. It reminds her of the early days of their marriage, when Thomas was still a fore-

³ Yet one more ambiguity arises and enables us to construct a “triple perspective:” does the sentence reproduce the past sensation of the experiencing I in free indirect discourse or does the possibility of violence cross the narrator-protagonist’s mind only at the moment of recounting?
man. The children look on enviously – they’d like a lunch-box to take to school. They’d make a wood fire to heat it up, and they wouldn’t have to go to the dining hall. (Sa Femme, Or the Other Woman: 49; emphases added)

Sa femme lui prépare-t-elle parfois une gamelle? Le matin, elle la remplit avec le reste du plat de la veille et elle la ferme hermétiquement. Elle sourit. Cela lui rappelle les premiers temps de leur mariage, quand Thomas était encore chef de chantier. Les enfants regardent avec envie. Ils aimerait bien, eux aussi, une gamelle qu’ils emporteraient à l’école. Ils feraient un feu de bois pour la réchauffer. Et ils n’iraient pas à la cantine. (Sa femme: 51–52; emphases added)

The point at which Claire’s own mental representations deviate most from the assumed actual states of the story-world is when Thomas reveals that he has no wife and no children after all, and even after this revelation Claire keeps to her own position as “another woman” and has a hard time letting go of her carefully constructed images of the man’s domestic happiness. Finally, it seems that for Claire, the only way to adjust is to transfer the obsession to one of her patients, Monsieur Corey and to sa femme – and to fill her mind with images of their everyday life.

(12) She thought about M. Corey. With a fever like that, his body would heat up the bed so much in the night that his wife would probably throw the big eiderdown aside. (Sa Femme, Or the Other Woman: 104; emphasis added)

Elle pensa à Monsieur Corey. Avec la fièvre, son corps chaufferait tellement le lit qu’au cours de la nuit, sa femme rejetterait sans doute le gros édredon. (Sa femme: 102; emphasis added)

(13) M. Corey would still be very tired, and it would, in all probability, take him ten minutes. Now, he’s putting on his fur-lined jacket, knotting his scarf and leaving his flat. He gets into the lift. His wife stops him, she hands him his gloves. He thanks her and kisses her. What would he do without her? (Sa Femme, Or the Other Woman: 116; emphasis added)

Monsieur Corey devait être encore très fatigué, il prévoirait sûrement dix minutes de trajet. Là, il met sa canadienne, noue son écharpe et sort de son appartement. Il entre dans l’ascenseur. Sa femme le rattrape, elle
The examples above are a bit misleading since the third person reference to Claire shows only at the beginning of example (12); yet the whole narrative situation is framed by the heterodiegetic mode. As the examples demonstrate, however, Claire is a focalizer in the very sense of the word: what we can infer from the narration is hardly anything but “an individual perspectival projection of part of a shared phenomenal world” (cf. Margolin 2003: 282). It is almost impossible – or at least contrived – to try to distinguish from the narration “any individualized cognitive mental functioning” (cf. Margolin 2003: 278) that would be attributable to a narrative personage other than Claire; there are no markers of privileged, heterodiegetic-extradiegetic knowledge or commentary that would establish a narrative level above Claire’s “cognitive mental functioning.” The case is further complicated by the fact that, embedded in Claire’s focalization, we actually have a kind of second-order system of third-person reference (in example 11, to Thomas’s non-existent wife and children; and in example 12, to M. and Mme Corey) – and, moreover, a kind of second-order system of focalization and representation of consciousness.

How does Claire’s habit of constructing possible worlds (an idyllic morning in his lover’s family, M. Corey leaving his apartment for a medical examination chez Claire) differ from John Dowell’s tendency to “narrate too much?” In (Fludernik’s) terms of naturalizing and narrativizing, in Claire’s case, we cannot adhere to the frame of telling – at least not as “naturally” as when reading Dowell’s account; as already mentioned above, in Fludernik’s model, focalization is evoked by the cognitive frames of experiencing and viewing. Consequently, in a heterodiegetic narrative situation, we must frame the representation(s) of mental spaces with yet another Chinese box. In examples (12) and (13), we are led to Claire’s internal focalization through a passage of FID (indicated by the modality of devait être, chaufferait, rejeterait, prévorait); in example (11), focalization is evoked by a hypothesis in direct discourse (“Does his wife sometimes make him up a lunchbox?”). After this opening up of a story-internal possible world, we are led to yet others, to the mental worlds of the characters inhabiting this possible world. In examples (11) and (13), Claire goes even so far in her mental representations as to project verbalized thought acts into the minds of Thomas’s
children (“They’d make a wood fire to heat it up, and they wouldn’t have to go to the dining hall”) and M. Corey (“What would he do without her?”). A character processing another character’s mental activity into free indirect discourse is something we encountered already in homodiegetic narration; in the heterodiegetic mode, this may result in double or embedded FID: in example (13), Monsieur Corey’s mentally constructed hypothesis (“What would he do without her?”) is nested in Claire’s mentally constructed hypothesis (“M. Corey would still be very tired, and it would, in all probability, take him ten minutes”). Consequently, what we have is the narration’s representation of a mental representation of a mental representation – in other words, a projection of a projection of a projection. Ron comments on this kind of passages which force MR [Mimetic Reader] to construe utterances as FID embedded or framed within a higher instance of FID. Here the limits of the mimetic powers of language coincide with what can be plausibly rescued from an infinite regress where none of the stations is explicitly noted. (Ron 1981: 35)

If human cognition is able to understand and organize the levels of intentional-ity – at least to a point – then why does embedded consciousness representation issue a threat to the “Mimetic Language Game?” We already encountered the “limits of the mimetic powers of language” when analyzing Dowell’s tendency to drop off parentheticals and represent the multiply recounted or completely imagined versions of other people’s experiences as a straightforward rendering of their mental activity. In cases of embedded FID, we are twice as exposed to the same confusions concerning the boundaries between the actual and the hypothetical.

The much discussed ambiguity of FID is partly caused by its similarity with “pure” objective narration since it usually lacks the linguistic signs of quotation or embedding; as a narrative technique, it thus creates loopholes for the focalizers to convey their own perspective as if it were an objective report on the actual state of the storyworld (cf. Mäkelä 2003: 64–66). In the recurrent narrative situations of Sa femme, Claire’s fantasies begin with the indirect report of the narrator sliding towards FID with Claire guessing what the object of her obsession is peut-être, sûrement or sans doute doing. The tense may remain imparfait
or it may just as well shift into present, and the hypothesis that has started in the conditional shifts to the indicative form. From these shifts it follows that the subjective fantasy somehow takes over and gains representational authority: the present tense gives a strong illusion of the character’s visions as actually perceived. The following example shows how Claire wants her boyfriend to be suspicious and imagines him perceiving some traces of another man.

(14) She went into the bathroom, leaving the door half-open, and listened. (…) He discovers the fruit juices. That surprises him, because Claire never drinks them. Now he sees the bottle of champagne. But Claire doesn’t like it – someone must have brought it for her. The fridge door closes again. (…) He has understood. (Sa Femme, Or the Other Woman: 36–37)

Elle se rendit dans la salle de bains, laissa la porte entrouverte. Et écouta. (…) Il découvre les jus de fruits. Cela l’étonne car Claire n’en boit jamais. Maintenant, il voit la bouteille de champagne. Pourtant Claire n’aime pas ça. On la lui a sans doute apportée. La porte du frigidaire se referme. (…) Il a compris. (Sa femme: 40–41)

It is through minor hints in narration that we recognize a kind of transition from the actual events to Claire’s mind and again back to the reality. The only change in the narrative mode is from passé simple to present; otherwise Michel’s visit to the kitchen is represented as if actually perceived by, not Claire because she is in the bathroom, but an omniscient narrator who, furthermore, is able to penetrate into Michel’s mind and report his thoughts in FID (“Pourtant Claire n’aime pas ça. On la lui a sans doute apportée”). When the narration returns to the actual situation with the narrator reporting that “Claire emerged from the bathroom” and “Michel didn’t ask her any questions” we don’t get any information that would actually prove us that Michel “has understood” anything. Ultimately, in the context of the whole novel, we are able to conclude that Claire is a kind of a narrator in her own right and extends her discursive power all the way to other people’s inner worlds.⁴

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⁴ I am indebted to my shrewd commentator Dr. Mikko Keskinen for his clairvoyance in suggesting to me the connection – which, for me, now seems obvious – between the character’s name “Claire” and her ostensible ability to construct parallel universes: Claire who sees, Claire voyant, is deceivingly clairvoyant. If we should continue
The difference between Dowell’s and Claire’s strategies of projection is that, whereas Dowell operates within the frame of telling, Claire’s mental activities as a focalizer must be naturalized within the frame experiencing. Yet these two exemplary cases highlight the fact that some serious overlapping may occur. Dowell is not merely telling his “saddest story” – the true sadness lurks in his sentimental recounting, in the fact that he experiences the tragedy of his life only retrospectively. Claire, on the contrary, does not recount her story – and yet her mental representations, when rendered in narrative discourse, create story-worlds. Paradoxically, Claire becomes the focalizer of her own mental representations: if we consider the possible worlds created in Claire’s mind as separate from their narrative context, as such they are likely to evoke the frame of viewing as in example (13): “Now, he’s putting on his fur-lined jacket, knotting his scarf and leaving his flat. He gets into the lift. His wife stops him, she hands him his gloves. He thanks her and kisses her.” In Claire’s mind, the cognitive processes of telling, experiencing and viewing are symptomatically entwined, and that is likely to happen in the reader’s mind as well.\(^5\)

In fact, one way to get hold of the story would be to read it as free indirect discourse all through since we never actually seem to exit Claire’s experiential field. Consequently, the notion of FID – or the representation of fictional consciousness in general – as embedded discourse (see, eg, Ron 1981; Ryan 1991; Palmer 2004: 183–193) becomes problematic: how to construct the outer frame in the same vein, we could actually reduce all such modalizing expressions as sans doute, probablement and sûrement to one – clairement. Clarity is also le mot juste in describing the spare style of the novel’s narration and its insistency on material details. The wordplay would thus reinforce our interpretation of the narration as being completely filtered through and organized in Claire’s consciousness.

\(^5\) Manfred Jahn (2003) draws our attention to the dynamics between the ”internal” stories that exist only in the individual mind (dreams, fantasies etc.) and the “external” stories that are intersubjective. According to Jahn, narratives are recycled over and over again in the processes of internalization and externalization as we recount and receive them. The problematic at hand is situated at the very threshold of internalization and externalization: whereas Dowell seeks to cope with his internal anxieties by offering an external account to an imaginary audience, Claire constructs internal representations whose externalization rests on the narratorial voice. Yet the ambiguity between “internal” and “external” not only remains but is thematized in these stories as an ambiguity that characterizes all consciousness representation: aren’t we all telling stories mostly to ourselves?
that would be free of the character’s subjectivity, in which this subjectivity would be neatly nested? Again, in examples (11–14) as in earlier ones from *The Good Soldier*, pure modal logic proves insufficient. As interpreters of the novel – as the ultimate cognitive processors – we are made to reach beyond referentiality and textual markers of discourse attribution and to consider the multiple narrative and experiential levels of the story at the same time. Again, there is no recursive system of representation where the outer frame could falsify the inner frame. The transfer from actual to mental does not inevitably show in the textual surface, and therefore it is the transitional states in the creation of narrative domains – representational thresholds of sorts – that are of crucial importance for our reading. The example of *Sa femme* highlights one of the functions of FID as a transitional mode between the textual actual world and embedded mental and hypothetical domains.

To take another example of a “narrativizing focalizer,” we may have a look into the mind of the burn-out wife and mother Martha in Fay Weldon’s short story ‘Weekend.’ For Weldon’s protagonist, the construction of other minds, especially that of her husband Martin, is based on pathologic insecurity; we are told that Martin “seldom spoke a harsh word, but Martha, after the fashion of wives, could detect his mood from what he did not say rather than what he did” (‘Weekend:’ 310). Fludernik (1996: 188–191) offers the story as an example of “reflectorized narration,” yet not as a paradigmatic case with the protagonist as the fixed center of focalization and the source of idiomatic expressions. As Fludernik points out, Martha’s mind is constantly penetrated and patronized by the demanding voice of her husband as well as the more general, socio-cultural doxa defining the right kind of motherhood, wifehood and womanhood.

(15) Martha paid her [the cleaning woman] out of her own wages: well, the running of the house was Martha’s concern. If Martha chose to go out to work, as was her perfect right, Martin allowed, even though it wasn’t the best thing for the children, but that must be Martha’s moral responsibility – Martha must surely pay her domestic stand-in. An evident truth, heard loud and clear and frequent in Martin’s mouth and Martha’s heart. (‘Weekend:’ 310)

(16) People, children, houses, conversations, food, drink, theatres – even, now, a career. Martin standing between her and the hostility of the
Also in this case, the whole story could be interpreted as FID all the way (sliding towards stream of consciousness and occasionally to first-person reference) – but not just as an intermediary discourse or mental domain between the extradiegetic narrator and the diegetic consciousness, but as a constant ambiguity between mental domains within the fictional storyworld. However, in spite of the apparent multitude of voices at work in the story, we actually never leave Martha’s consciousness – a rather obvious interpretation, yet Fludernik remains reticent on this point. On the one hand, we find Martin’s discouraging comments scattered, often in parentheses, among Martha’s flow of stressful thoughts: “Martin liked his potatoes carefully peeled. He couldn’t bear to find little cores of black in the mouthful. (‘Well, it isn’t very nice, is it?’: Martin)” (ibid.: 321). On the other hand, her mind is penetrated by the self-help type of pep talk and mottos, often rendered in the generic second person, that establish her script for creating a perfect bourgeois bliss: “Gaze into the eyes. Love. It must be love. You married him. You. Surely you deserve true love?” (ibid.: 313.) As Fludernik rightly states, “[b]y refusing definite attributions of the discourse, the text iconically represents the pervasiveness of societal pressures on Martha” (Fludernik 1996: 191). In other words, the levels of intentionality are again only implied since the narration avoids parentheticals. One of the functions of FID in this story is, obviously, to demonstrate how Martha adopts Martin’s views uncritically as part of her own rationalizing (“well, the running of the house was Martha’s concern”). Yet one might feel that this – Martha being victimized to other voices – is not the whole story, although the narration rather convincingly demonstrates the discursive power of the patriarchal establishment.

Relatively early in the story, we learn that “Martha’s mother had, towards the end, thought that people were plotting against her” (‘Weekend:’ 311). Towards the end of the story, it becomes more and more obvious that Martha’s destiny is to follow her mother’s footsteps (a matrilinear destiny already prefigured in the phonetic form of the protagonist’s name). In the narration, Martha’s paranoia is rendered through embedded consciousness representation; again, the absence
of parentheticals enhances the impression that Martha really believes her own hypotheses to be the truth.

(17) Dishes were boring, Katie implied by her manner, and domesticity was boring, and anyone who bothered with that kind of thing was a fool. Like Martha. (ibid.: 315)

(18) She is running around in her nightie. Now if that had been Katie – but there’s something so practical about Martha. Reassuring, mind; but the skimpy nightie and the broad rump and the thirty-eight years are all rather embarrassing. Martha can see it in Colin and Katie’s eyes. Martin’s too. Martha wishes she did not see so much in other people’s eyes. Her mother did, too. Dear, dear mother. Did I misjudge you? (ibid.: 316)

The only way to really get inside Martha’s consciousness, behind the neurotically cheerful discourse of women’s magazines and self-help manuals, is through other minds. The only means for Martha to deal with her fears is to transform them into other people’s feelings of disappointment and scorn. Some of the FID passages render Martha’s projected subjectivity as a multiply framed perception or judgment, revealing the kind of mental states she would be unable to verbalize directly, with herself as the subject.

(19) The children noticed nothing: it was just funny lively laughing Daddy being witty about Mummy’s car. Mummy, done for drunken driving. Mummy, with the roots of melancholy somewhere deep beneath the bustling, busy, everyday self. (ibid.: 311)

Here, Martha first constructs the experience of her children (of ignoring the sharp edge in Martin’s comments to Martha), but then continues to use their experiential and discursive frame – by referring to herself as “Mummy” – to approach her own “melancholy” – a state of affairs that definitely passes the rest of the family without a notice.

One of the narrative tricks of the story lies in the alteration between iterative and singulative recounting of the “typical weekend” of Martha and Martin’s family and furthermore, of Martin’s critical remarks. Something Martin has perhaps once casually uttered is amplified in Martha’s mind as she tries to pen-
etrater her husband’s mind in order to better please him. Consequently, Martin’s utterances, rendered in direct discourse, cease to be direct in any respect other than linguistic; none of the speech and thought of other characters exist independently of Martha’s consciousness, and therefore they must be interpreted as subordinate to her mental functioning. Iterative representation of a character’s consciousness (of one’s habitual thoughts, feelings, opinions) is usually seen as a pronouncedly narratorial function since it requires temporal distancing (cf. Fludernik 1996: 184); in ‘Weekend,’ Martha is able to use such narrative authority due to her ambivalent temporal status: at times, she is the focalizer of one single event (a weekend at their cottage with their friends Colin and Katie) – and at times, the narration seems to depict her habitual experience of the exhausting family weekends. The story ends in Martha’s hysterical breakdown as her daughter starts her first period – definitely a singulative episode. The piling up of pressure and its discharging into tears is accompanied by the story’s temporal structure; this kind of temporality is not straightforwardly related to “natural” experientiality of “catching a moment” – rather, the multi-level structure enables the narrative to represent both the cause and the effect of Martha’s mental functioning at the same time.

There is no getting round the fact that Martin casts the shadows of his “disguised marital tyranny” (Fludernik 1996: 190) and “patriarchal values inimical to female self-realization” (ibid.: 191) over his wife. But then again, if we – instead of catching the easy bait – should foreground the “second-order representation” at work in Martha’s consciousness, there would also seem to be a “second-order feminist interpretation” available. All in all, Martha’s construction of the family weekend – as it seems, both the material and the mental side of it – relies on the discursive schemas surrounding the myth of modern happiness rather than real time experientiality. Consequently, the high and contradictory expectations Martha thinks people have of her are her expectations of expectations (embedded expectations?). She uses the schematic language representation (cf. above the discussion on Fludernik’s theory) in creating predictable representations of herself and imagining them to issue from the minds of others (cf. example 19 using the schema of the “aging woman”) – and, furthermore, turns Martin’s singular speech acts as universals through schematization and typification. Yet one cultural schema (one that has caused fervent reactions within feminist theory for decades) remains beyond the reach of Martha herself, one that is, however,
likely to be activated both among the members of Martha’s family and in the mind of the Weldon reader: that of the madwoman.

Both in Bernheim’s novel and in Weldon’s short story, the third-person reference to the protagonist serves not so much to construct a narratorial presence as to highlight *distancing* and *projecting* as the main cognitive strategies of the protagonists. In fact, when we read seemingly indirect reporting of Claire’s obsessive focalization (“Elle pensa à Monsieur Corey”) – or, moreover, look at the way Martha is referred to in the third person (“the little earnest Martha”; “Mummy, done for drunken driving”), we can actually imagine the protagonists *themselves* using these narrative techniques that usually indicate indirectness brought on by the mediating narrative agent. As Ron (1981: 35) notes in his discussion of FID, markers of indirect representation such as verbs referring to mental functioning (*think*, *feel*, *remember*) may just as well belong to the character’s own discourse and thus point to her self-awareness in regard to her own cognitive processes. In a sense, Claire is the “other woman” also in relation and in reference to herself since she foregrounds the experience of Thomas’s wife, whereas Martha is not even able to see herself as an independent individual and thus fails to construct herself as a full subject. Paradoxically, the minds of Claire and Martha come close both to the homodiegetic and to the heterodiegetic narratorial status: homodiegetic in their dominance (resulting in the lack of extradiegetic manoeuvring) and heterodiegetic in their ostensible omniscience in recounting other people’s views and experiences.

4 The diegetic consciousness, mind-doubles, and the art of embedding

It is an entrenched desire of the reading mind to project other minds onto the narrative; as Margolin puts it,

> even if the story is behavioristic in its manner of portrayal and provides no information about the cognitive functioning of storyworld participants, readers need to formulate hypotheses about the minds of agents and ascribe to them mental functioning in order to make sense of their doings in terms of human actions and interactions. (...) Not only the
working of the individual mind in isolation, but also its working as influenced by its internal image of the working of other minds appear to be necessary to make human sense of a narrative. (Margolin 2003: 284)

Consequently, Claire’s twisted mental functioning may not be that twisted after all. To be honest, when we first read about Thomas having a family, didn’t our minds start ticking, trying to construct the non-existent wife and kids – by asking appropriate (rhetorical) questions such as “what would his wife think if she knew…?” Claire’s hypotheses stand in parallel to the reader’s process of fictional (mental) world construction also in a deeper ontological sense since the little information Thomas gives her in the first place is nothing but pure fiction. Yet the interpretive question remains, with Claire and, more or less, with the other protagonists we have discussed, whether they are conscious fiction makers, know-alls who are after the “truth,” or merely delusive. In *Sa Femme*, there is one striking passage that compels us to ponder whether Claire is, in fact, consciously trying to fit her reality into the cultural schemas of adultery and the “other woman.”

(20) She wondered if Thomas talked about her: ‘I have a mistress.’ She nearly burst out laughing. She repeated the words ‘a mistress’ several times, beneath her breath. A couple seated opposite her looked at her, so she stopped. But for the rest of the journey she couldn’t help smiling. (Sa Femme, Or the Other Woman: 80–81)

Elle se demanda soudain si Thomas parlait d’elle. ”J’ai une maîtresse.” Elle faillit éclater de rire. Elle répéta plusieurs fois ”maîtresse” à mi-voix. Un couple assis en face d’elle la regardait, alors elle se tut. Mais pendant tout le reste du trajet, elle ne put s’empêcher de sourire. (Sa femme: 82)

Thomas’s hypothetical speech act echoes Emma Bovary’s famous silent exclamation “J’ai un amant!”; characteristically, Emma’s illusion of the sublime is turned into Claire’s twisted habit of experiencing feelings by projecting them into other people’s emotions, in this case into Thomas’s thrill of having a maîtresse. Does Claire experience herself as a truly Emma-like heroine in the middle of an exciting drama? Or is she victimized by those frames like Flaubert’s Emma? Or is it
just the reader who draws the parallels? Ultimately, it depends on our interpretation how many passages we may find from represented worlds to others.

Ford’s Dowell and Bernheim’s Claire share the tendency to over-organize their experience, and in all their self-sufficiency, their mental representations, as such, come very close to resembling narrative fiction. However, just as some fictions are more skillful and innovative than others, Dowell’s constructions show much more artistic ambition than Claire’s idyllic visions of her lover’s domestic happiness. When exploring this type of narrativizing characters, we can imagine a scale ranging from highly sophisticated narrators or focalizers who are masters of fabulation just as their flesh-and-blood authors (Nabokov’s Humbert, Mann’s Aschenbach, Ford’s Dowell) to the more brutally twisted minds of Claire and Martha. Artistic or less so, these characters are there to play the “Mimetic Language Game” on us. Fludernik defines realism in terms of narratology as “a mimetic representation of individual experience that cognitively and epistemically relies on real-world knowledge” (Fludernik 1996: 38); instead of being mimetic in this way, these minds are diegetic in their eagerness to press their own version of the fictional world upon the reader. This is not, by any means, striking when we consider characters who are narrators of their own story; it is when focalizing characters in heterodiegetic narrative situations “use” narrative techniques for the benefit of their own perspective that we may especially need to readjust our reading strategies – as well as our narratological categories, for that matter. Furthermore, through verbalization and narrative organization, the narrator, and again, more remarkably, the focalizer can be regarded as narrating their own minds. As Margolin (2003: 281) notes, “[i]t is only in the narrated domain that the full range of human cognitive activities can be portrayed or represented.”

Thematically, constructing other people’s thoughts and emotions and narrativizing them may, in many cases, be linked to emotional defense and self-deception on the part of the protagonist. In all the exemplary stories discussed above, none of the protagonists seem exactly to be “there.” Dowell settling for a role of a mere bystander in a story where he actually is the bitterly deceived one; Ford’s Peeping Tom recounting what he did not think or feel; Claire constructing herself as the maîtresse; and Martha reflecting her own image as the “little earnest Martha” or practical but asexual housekeeper in other people’s eyes. As Margolin (2003: 287) points out, fiction often provides us with repre-
sentations of non-standard mental functioning (see also Semino 2002); Claire is, undoubtedly, a case in point, but part of the strangeness of her perceptions and hypotheses originates in the very “unnaturalness” of consciousness representation as such, of rendering mentally constructed worlds in language. This feeling of strangeness, one might think, is an argument against the cognitive-narratologist tendency to consider all construction as narration: narrativizing one’s own experiences, and especially those of other people, may also indicate non-standard, deviant mental functioning. What I am trying to suggest here, against the cognitive grain, is that it is the overly narrativizing, obsessive, artistic, paranoid mind that stands in parallel to the techniques of modernist narration, not the “ordinary” human mind relying on the parameters of everyday experience. By verbalizing all kinds of mental activity, by forcing the complex and multiple cognitive representations through the single semiotic channel of language, literary fiction distorts the human mind and often makes it difficult to tell the sane from the insane.

In the present discussion, free indirect discourse has been understood, above all, as a discursive path from mental domains to others. Furthermore, it is peculiarly this mode that seems to create confusion and overlapping between the cognitive frames of telling and experiencing as Fludernik defines them. According to Margolin, focalization can also be understood in terms of actual cognitive processes, that is, as “deictic anchoring, intentionality, attention and perception, cognitive processing and resultant mental representation of a domain” (Margolin 2003: 283). The examples discussed above – and we may find any number of others – demonstrate, however, that diegesis always doubles the deixis, the attention, the resultant presentation – and, most importantly, the intention in representing the fictional storyworld. The task of postclassical (cognitive or otherwise) narratology could and should be to reach beyond the classical dual voice hypothesis and explore the full potential of the double entendre evoked by the implicitness of the levels of intentionality: we should not only speak of double-voiced discourse, but, in many cases, about double deixis or perhaps – dual cognition. Free indirect discourse – in all its ambiguity and heterogeneity – is at the core of this issue, displaying the inherently unnatural relationship between story and discourse (cf. Ginsburg 1982: 140, 145), of the diegetic leap between actual experience and its mediating through other minds, fictional and real.
There is no true mimesis of the mind; some fictions, such as *The Good Soldier* and *Sa femme*, thematize the essence of the other mind as a fictional construction. Consequently, modes of thought representation such as FID should not be seen as merely serving the cognitive vraisemblance since they bear in themselves also the potential to undermine such mimetic effects. The fictional mind is, if anything, a *reading* mind. A pronouncedly literary mode of narration such as FID is likely to focus our attention to the nature of experientiality in fiction as *projection* – as the doubling of the mind through language.

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