Random Oracle Reducibility

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






Introduction

Two Cryptographic Schemes...



- Possible comparison criteria
 - which scheme is more efficient?
 - how do $\mathbb A$ and $\mathbb B$ relate?
 - purpose-specific properties (e.g. ciphertext size)?
- rather easy to compare in the standard model


Two Cryptographic Schemes #2



Secure under $\mathbb A$

Secure under $\mathbb B$


Two Cryptographic Schemes #2



• Comparison "biased" by random oracle dependency

Comparing The Schemes

- Comparison "biased" by random oracle dependency
- e.g. $\mathbb{A} \subsetneq \mathbb{B}$, but H more demanding than G
 - RO G: provide randomness
 - RO *H*: POWHF, CR, ...
- perhaps H even uninstantiable!



The Reduction Approach

- Formalizing exact requirements is tedious
- instead, use the cryptographer's approach: reduction
 - A^H secure $\Rightarrow B^{T^H}$ secure
 - any hash function which makes A secure also makes B secure
 - uninstantiability of B implies uninstantiability of A

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 - A^H secure $\Rightarrow B^{T^H}$ secure
 - any hash function which makes A secure also makes B secure
 - uninstantiability of B implies uninstantiability of A
- may require a non-trivial transformation T (stateless, deterministic, efficient)
 - guarantee "structural compatibilty"
- i.e., relative security amongst two schemes

Random Oracle Reducibility

Semi-formal Definition

Scheme A {strictly, strongly, weakly} reduces to scheme B if for every H there exists a transformation T such that

• strictly:

A is G_A^H -secure under $\mathbb{A} \Rightarrow B$ is $G_B^{T^H}$ -secure under \mathbb{B}

where $G_S^{\mathcal{O}}$ defines a security game (think IND-CCA for example) for scheme S

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• strongly:

$$A \text{ is } G_A^H\text{-secure under } \mathbb{A} \Rightarrow \begin{cases} B \text{ is } G_B^{T^H}\text{-secure under } & \mathbb{A} \cup \mathbb{B} \text{ and} \\ B \text{ is } G_B^{T^{H'}}\text{-secure under } & \mathbb{B} \text{ for some } H' \\ \text{relying on } \mathbb{H}' \end{cases}$$

• weakly:

A is G_A^H -secure under $\mathbb{A} \Rightarrow B$ is $G_B^{T^H}$ -secure under $\mathbb{A} \cup \mathbb{B}$

where $G_S^{\mathcal{O}}$ defines a security game (think IND-CCA for example) for scheme *S*

Example

Example: Hashed ElGamal

- Twin hashed ElGamal (THEG) encryption scheme [CKS09]
- extends hashed ElGamal (HEG) encryption scheme, but milder assumption
 - DH assumption as opposed to strong DH assumption
 - IND-CCA secure given an IND-CCA symmetric scheme
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- our result: THEG* is strongly reducible to HEG

Proof of Reducibility

- THEG* is strongly reducible to HEG
- Proof strategy
 - 1. show weak reducibility from THEG^* to HEG
 - 2. prove THEG* secure on its own (in the ROM)
- strong reducibility then follows

Scheme Details

HEG (scheme A)

 $\begin{array}{l} \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathcal{A}}(m):\\ y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{q}\\ k \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(g^{y}, X^{y})\\ c \leftarrow \mathsf{E}_{k}(m)\\ \mathsf{return} \ (g^{y}, c) \end{array}$

THEG* (scheme B)

 $\begin{aligned} & \mathsf{Enc}_{B}(m): \\ & _{\mathcal{Y}} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{q} \\ & k_{0} || k_{1} \leftarrow G(g^{\mathcal{Y}}, X_{0}^{\mathcal{Y}}, X_{1}^{\mathcal{Y}}) \\ & c \leftarrow \mathsf{E}_{k_{0}}(m) \\ & \text{return } (g^{\mathcal{Y}}, c, k_{1}) \end{aligned}$

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HEG (scheme A)


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
THEG^{*} (scheme B)

- Oracles H and G: need transformation function
- $T^{H}(a, b, c) = H(a, b) || H(a, c)$


- Handling hash oracle queries
- alleged adversary ${\mathcal B}$ against THEG^*
- algorithm \mathcal{A} performs $T^{H}(a, b, c) = H(a, b)||H(a, c)$



- Handling decryption queries
- algorithm ${\mathcal A}$ simulates second key half



- Handling the encryption challenge query
- algorithm ${\mathcal A}$ simulates second key half



- Algorithm ${\mathcal A}$ outputs whatever ${\mathcal B}$ outputs
- all queries are simulated perfectly
- thus, ${\mathcal A}$ is successful whenever ${\mathcal B}$ is
- THEG* is secure in the ROM (rather technical, see paper)
- hence strongly reducible

Further Results/Applications

More examples of (strict) random oracle reductions

- probabilistic RSA FDH signatures reducible to Guillou-Quisquarter signatures
- probabilistic RSA FDH signatures reducible to PSS signatures
- Schnorr signatures reducible to BLS signatures

recall: reducibility allows to argue about instantiability

The End

Thank you!

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References



David Cash, Eike Kiltz, and Victor Shoup. The twin DiffieHellman problem and applications. Journal of Cryptology, 22(4):470–504, October 2009.