

# Expectations

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## The 'Fallacy of Division'

In Aristotle's (350 BC) list of common human logical errors:

*Attributing characteristics of the whole to the parts*

Google search for examples yields:

- America is rich
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Clearly a fallacy!

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Before 2008, “Representative Agent” models dominant:

Argument:

- Debt is *owed* to someone
- One person's debt is another person's asset
- All that matters is *aggregate* net worth

Advantage: Representative Agent models are *simple*

Of course, as always, some annoying dissenters from the gospel

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
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## Prelude

With Apologies to L. Frank Baum  
The Role of Expectations  
What Have We Learned?  
Conclusions  
References

# Don't Worry, Be Happy?





## Countries, States, Households: Debt Runup Mattered

If  $i$  had greater debt runup than  $j$  before crisis, then (in the crisis)  $i$  suffered worse decline than  $j$ , where  $i, j$ :

- Countries (International Monetary Fund (2012))
- States/Localities in U.S. (Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2011))
- Households (Dynan (2012))

*Prima facie* evidence that balance sheet conditions matter (?).

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
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# IMF World Economic Outlook 2012, Chapter 3

The Great Recession was particularly severe in economies that experienced a larger run-up in household debt prior to the crisis.



## Minimal Requirements of a Useful Story

- Imperfect Foresight
  - Simplest Model: Imperfect Unemployment Insurance
- People Differ in *Something* Other Than Employment
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## Ingredients

Standard elements: Time-separable CRRA utility, optimization, etc

Elements to highlight:

- $\beta$  - Time Discount Factor
- $\mu$  - Expected Unemployment Risk
- $G$  - Expected Income Growth Rate
- $\kappa$  - Expected Credit Availability



## There are Two Kinds of People ...

... Debtors and Creditors

Heterogeneity in targets is matchable in various ways:

- Young vs Old
- Optimist vs Pessimist
- Risk-Averse vs Risk-Tolerant

Assertion: Doesn't Matter (much)!

My Choice: Time preference rate (patient vs impatient)

Crucial point: It *does* matter (for spending) *who* has the wealth

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## Setup

- Equal % of Aggregate Income to Patient and to Impatient
- All debt  $d$  belongs to one type,  $d^{\text{poor}}$ 
  - Cynamon and Fazzari (2013)  
• Debt has concentrated in bottom 20%
- Aggregate net worth is  $a = 0.5(a^{\text{rich}} - d^{\text{poor}})$

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In 2001

- Aggregate wealth-to-income ratio
- Aggregate debt-to-income ratio  $d$

Requires difference in “patience” of about 8 percent a year

Other parameter values taken from Carroll and Toche (2009)

To match: Rise from  $d_{2001} \approx 1$  to  $d_{2007} = 1.3$

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Construct three experiments all of which satisfy:

- $d$  went from  $d_{2001} \approx 1$  to  $d_{2007} \approx 1.3$ 
  - So,  $d^{poor}$  increased from 2 to 2.6
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## Three Experiments

- 1 Belief in a Credit Boom
- 2 Belief that Unemployment Risk Has Declined
- 3 Belief in Faster Growth

In my experiments, none of these beliefs is *true*:

- Unemployment Remains Constant
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
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
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
# Belief in Gradual Expansion of Credit Availability




# Believed Unemployment Risk Declines in 2001




# Beliefs About Aggregate Growth Improve in 2001



# Aggregate Saving in the Three Expectations Cycles



## Actual Saving Path



# Expectations Drive Outcomes

In all three experiments:

- In Short Run, Agg Dynamics Are Driven by Changes in  $\mathbb{E}$
- Big diffs Across Groups in *response* to expectations changes



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## For Data Collection

- Balance Sheet Surveys:
  - Ask Questions About Expectations!
- We Really Need to Measure Saving Rates By Group!

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► Experiment Overview

Write the consumption function contingent on the parameter values prevailing in year  $t$  as, for example,  $c_t^{\text{poor}}(m_t^{\text{poor}})$ ,  $c_t^{\text{rich}}(m_t^{\text{rich}})$ , and so on.

We want to assume a smooth change in the  $\varsigma$  parameter over time:  $\varsigma$  parameter of  $\varsigma_{2002} = \varsigma_{2001} + \eta$ ,  $\varsigma_{2003} = \varsigma_{2001} + 2\eta$  and so on through 2007.

Given this path of  $\varsigma$  we have the sequence of consumption functions  $c_{2002}^{\text{poor}}$ ,  $c_{2003}^{\text{poor}}$ , and so on.

Then, for example, starting from the steady-state  $a^{\text{poor}} = -d_{2001}^{\text{poor}}$  values found in the calibration exercise above, we have a path of values of  $a_{2002}$ ,  $a_{2003}$  and so on from the dynamic budget constraint and from the series of  $c^{\text{poor}}$  functions.

The idea, then, is just to find the  $\eta$  such that  $a_{2007}^{\text{poor}} = -2.6$ .

Unless otherwise indicated, parameter values match those used in Carroll and Toche (2009)

Given these calibrations, we find the combination of assumptions about  $\beta^{\text{poor}}$  and  $\beta^{\text{rich}}$  such that the steady state of the model predicts that  $a = a_{2001}$  and  $a^{\text{poor}} = -2$  (which is the same as  $d = 1$  and  $d^{\text{poor}} = 2$ ).

so

$$a^{\text{rich}} = 2a + d^{\text{poor}} \quad (1)$$


Baseline calibration to 2001:

$$\begin{aligned} a_{2001} &\approx 5 \\ d_{2001} &\approx 1 \\ \Rightarrow d_{2001}^{\text{poor}} &\approx 2 \end{aligned}$$

▶ Back

$$\Rightarrow a_{2001}^{\text{rich}} = 12$$

## Including Post-2007 Data



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