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MAHAN'S CONCEPTS OF SEA POWER

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 23 September 1963

by

Captain H. Kaminer Manship, USN

Admiral Austin, Admiral Hogle, gentlemen:

Just about a year ago, I sat out there as a student to absorb my appointed instruction in what has been derisively termed by a former Secretary of War as 'The Gospel According to St. Mahan.' I would not have you believe, however, that I am here to preach a Navy gospel—though one or two of last year's class criticized the speaker for not doing so. I will not attempt to set forth a 'Navy line' on strategy. I would submit to you that Admiral Mahan himself was only secondarily a propagandist for his views and primarily an analytical historian who derived from his studies and writings demonstrable cause and effect relationships between sea power and national greatness. From his evaluation of these relationships, he then developed and propounded his theories of sea power as an instrument—perhaps an indispensable one—for projecting and expanding United States power and influence throughout the world. Inasmuch as the time during which he formulated his ideas was a time of hiatus in the Navy—and indeed in the whole military and diplomatic posture of the United States—Mahan cast himself as an expositor of increased strength and readiness. But I come here today not to praise Mahan and his ideas, but hopefully to explain them. It is entirely true that much of Mahan's writing bears the imprint of that particular time in which he lived and must be considered in historical context. But the main purpose of my discussion with you is to summarize and highlight those basic precepts of Mahan which retain a fundamental validity and currency.

In order to do this, it may be useful that I cover briefly a few of the high points of Admiral Mahan's life and career, and that I describe the extent and scope of his writings, to the end that you may have some meaningful guidance should you desire to research his writings or seek additional light professional reading to fill the many gaps among your committee sessions, lectures, seminars, classes, and research paper sessions!

Alfred Thayer Mahan was born in 1840 at West Point. His father, Dennis Mahan, was for 41 years an instructor in engineering and military science at the Military Academy; and you gentlemen of the Army will doubtless recognize the tribute to one of West Point's founding fathers embodied in Alfred Mahan's middle name. The atmosphere attendant to the son's childhood environment doubtless molded his aptitude for matters both military and intellectual; but it is known that the elder Mahan counseled him against a service career, believing young Alfred to have better aptitude for a civil occupation. Professor Mahan acquiesced, however, when, after a year at Columbia, his son sought and obtained entry into the Naval Academy, whence he graduated just prior to the Civil War.

As a line officer, Mahan pursued for about twenty-five years a rather routine career in standard billets. It was perhaps inevitable that, in the wake of the Civil War, the country's energies and attention were directed to the settlement and development of its vast continental domain; and the Navy at this time found itself in a rather moribund state with neither motivation nor money adequately to span the transition from sail to steam and on to the other technological advances accruing to the industrial revolution. At this point in his career, Mahan described himself as 'drifting on the lines of simple respectability as aimlessly as one very well could.' In his aimless drifting, however, Mahan had managed to impress his intellectual capacity upon Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, who in the early 1880's no longer accepted with equanimity the idea of a Navy aimlessly adrift. In fact, in the words of Professor Russell of the Naval Academy, Luce was engaged in a crusade to enable the Navy to adapt doctrine and personnel to the machine age. One of Admiral Luce's accomplishments in his crusade was the establishment of the Naval War College. His summons to Mahan to lecture at this institution on the art of war and naval history signaled Mahan's emergence from obscurity to a position in the forefront of the expositors of strategic thought. It is perhaps indicative of the pace and tenor of the times that Mahan was able to devote two years of study to preparation for his War College assignment. At this point, his life-long avocation to scholarship was transformed into his professional reason for being.

It is a matter of record that, prior to his call from Admiral Luce, Mahan held views that in latter-day parlance would be termed isolationist: that the United States should avoid expansion into overseas territories; that the United States should eschew heavy naval expenditure, not only to save money but also to minimize undue military influence in the governmental processes; and

that the Navy's wartime functions properly should be limited to commerce raiding and coastal defense. However, in the course of his studies, he discovered that 'control of the sea was an historic factor which had never been systematically appreciated and expounded.' Concurrently, his own analysis of the factors pertaining to sea power as an instrument of national power resulted in the transformation of his own thinking. He therefore proposed in a letter to Admiral Luce that his lectures would 'begin with a general consideration of the sea, its uses to mankind and to nations, the effect which the control of it or the reverse has upon their peaceful development and their military strength. This will naturally lead to and probably embrace in the same lecture a consideration of the sources of sea power, whether commercial or military; depending upon the position of the particular country, the character of its coasts, its harbors, the character and pursuits of its people, its possession of military ports in various parts of the world, its colonies, etc., its resources in the length and breadth of the world.' These words of Mahan constitute as good a summary as I can derive of the scope and purpose of his War College lecture teachings, which evolved in 1890 into his first monumental work, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. This great work initiated an eventual output of 21 books and more than a hundred essays; more than two thirds of the essays were republished in book form. Such republication inevitably resulted in duplication and renders somewhat difficult the separation of individual thoughts and ideas into a clear, concise pattern. However, it is in the works sometimes referred to as the 'influence' series that Mahan developed his main themes concerning sea power. In addition to *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, this series includes *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812*, which was a two-volume work published in 1892 and which Mahan himself rated his best; and *Sea Power in Relation to the War of 1812*, also a two-volume set appearing in 1905. In addition to these, much of his definitive thought is contained in a collection of his lectures published in book form in 1911 and entitled *Naval Strategy, Compared and Contrasted with the Principles of Military Operations on Land*—a title usually shortened to the simple form, *Naval Strategy*. There is general agreement that the collection of essays in the book entitled *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future* contains interesting and worthwhile reading. It should be emphasized, however, that most of his later works serve to amplify, fortify, and update the basic rationale and conclusions of the introduction and first chapter of *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, which passage is included in your recommended reading for this study.

And now, having very briefly acquainted you with Mahan, his career, and his works, I must press on to a brief examination of what Mahan said—and I do so with a bit of the feeling expressed by the incurable optimist who jumped from the Empire State Building, and as he passed the second floor descending said, ‘So far, so good!’

The first and most obvious light in which the sea presents itself from the political and social point of view is that of a great highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide common, over which men may pass in all directions but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather than others. These lines of travel are called trade routes; and the reasons which have determined them are to be sought in the *history of the world*.

Notwithstanding all the familiar and unfamiliar dangers of the sea, both travel and traffic by water have always been easier and cheaper than by land.

*The Influence of Sea Power
Upon History, 1660-1783*

From the point of departure stated by the words before you, Mahan reached back into the history of mankind's struggles to develop his thesis concerning sea power. In Mahan's day, Britain was at the zenith of her ascendancy as the seat of a world empire; and Mahan's historical analysis extracted from the story of Britain's rise the factors which had enabled her to achieve wealth and dominion in the face of opposition from various foes in many ways superior to her except in the medium of the sea. But before he began his detailed historical narrative, he provided us with a nutshell preview of his thesis in the form of an analysis of Rome's ascendancy in the Mediterranean from the days of the Punic Wars. He explains the Roman capability to use the waters of the Mediterranean—albeit in a primitive way—as a medium through which she increased the strategic mobility of her forces. Rome controlled the Mediterranean and, despite Hannibal's monumental attempts to outflank her overland, Rome eventually succeeded in destroying Carthage, for Carthage had no effective reciprocal means to strike at Rome's heart. Much later, and on a much broader stage, Britain, too, exploited the mobility afforded her by her command of the sea in order to project and concentrate her strength and influence at key points around the globe which both fed the

economic coffers of the Empire and assured retention of the factors which perpetuated British control.

In analyzing the historical factors that formed the basis of British power, Mahan detected and propounded parallels to the strategic position of the United States as this nation reached the limits of its continental expansion. As stated previously, Mahan had moved in the 1880's from an isolationist viewpoint to one in 1890 whereby, with the unmatched zeal of any convert, he could see no future for the United States except that she should expand her influence and power outward beyond her sea frontiers in order to achieve political greatness and economic wealth. In essence, Mahan's doctrine stated that:

- (1) The United States should be a world power;
- (2) Control of the seas is necessary for world power status;
- (3) The way to maintain such control is by a powerful Navy.

But let us here be very careful not to exclude the nonnaval elements of sea power which are so vital a part of Mahan's overall concept. In speaking of United States outward expansion, he stated:

. . . home trade is but a part of the business of a country bordering on the sea. Foreign necessities or luxuries must be brought to its ports, either in its own or foreign ships . . . (and parenthetically return with products of the country).

The ships . . . must have secure ports to which to return, and must be followed by the protection of their country throughout the voyage.

This protection in time of war must be extended by armed shipping.

In another passage Mahan gives this succinct definition of sea power:

. . . sea power in the broad sense . . . includes not only the military strength afloat that rules the sea or any part of it by force of arms, but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests.

It is most important to note in the foregoing passages the interplay he envisages between the naval and nonnaval portions of a nation's overall maritime posture: the merchant shipping requires the protection of naval forces; on the other hand, the fundamental requirements of a Navy are realized in the existence of an adequate merchant marine base. It must be acknowledged that certain knowledgeable later writers fault Mahan for his attempt to present an oversimplified equation of maritime and naval dominance. It is true that certain countries such as Norway and Greece have developed sizeable merchant fleets without proportionate naval protection; likewise, Mahan himself recognized that certain political circumstances might lead a nation to the development of naval strength in the absence of proportionate mercantile interests. The question posed here is: Does Mahan's thesis concerning the mutual dependence between merchant and naval fleets no longer apply because of the exceptions mentioned—or does the existence of a general atmosphere of law and order at sea, underwritten by British power in the immediate past and by the United States and allied navies today, permit small nations to develop maritime strength without naval protection? These are interesting speculations, but I attempt here to be an impartial interpreter. Therefore, I leave you with this capsule summation of Mahan's thesis which was provided for him several hundred years earlier by Sir Walter Raleigh:

He who rules the sea controls the commerce of the world
and thus the riches of the world and finally the world
itself.

Having stated the strategic necessity for outward United States expansion, Mahan then set forth to define the principal conditions affecting a nation's ability and will to project its influence across the sea; these conditions are enumerated here:

THE PRINCIPAL CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE SEA POWER OF NATIONS

Geographical Position
Physical Conformation
Extent of Territory
Number of Population
Character of the People
Character of the Government

*The Influence of Sea Power
Upon History, 1660-1783*

As to the first of these, Mahan perceived that Britain's ascendancy on the seas had in part stemmed from her relative immunity from attack by rival land powers. Moreover, her position athwart the most important Atlantic trade routes enabled her to dominate the commercial flow between Europe and the resource areas in America, Africa, and Asia; and in time of war, to sever her enemies' access to vital materials. As to the United States, Mahan saw even greater potential for maritime dominance in this country's freedom from the burden of land defense against strong neighbors and in the dominant position of this country relative to the new vital trade routes soon to be established through the Panama Canal.

Proceeding on down the list, Mahan evaluated the many deep, defensible harbors along the United States seaboard as an indispensable element in the establishment of both commercial and naval maritime strength. Moreover, the fortuitous linking of many of our harbors with the continental interior, by the natural means of an unsurpassed navigable river system as well as by the rapidly developing man-made links of railroads and canals, provided access for raw export materials and manufactured goods to their points of export.

The next two elements must, to some extent, be considered together, in that Mahan implied that, whereas national capacity and strength depended upon the nature and extent of its territory, too much territory in proportion to population was a source of weakness as far as sea power is concerned. He felt that a nation's expansion beyond her sea frontiers was dependent upon an overflow of people, so to speak, who might man the ocean-going fleets and execute national commercial and political pursuits overseas. Crowded Britain, of course, is an extreme example of such a balance; Mahan pointed to the Confederate States, on the other hand, as an illustration of the other end of the scale, because the Confederacy was sparsely populated and had too much coastline to defend. Also, he points to The Netherlands as an example of an inadequate home base which eventually undercut the success of the Dutch in exploiting the other basic elements of sea power.

Mahan goes on to point out that the national character and aptitudes of the people condition the development of sea power. As a point of fact, he accords this element primacy with the statement:

The tendency to trade, involving of necessity the production of something to trade with, is the national

characteristic most important to the development of sea power.

Elsewhere, he amplifies this thought with the words:

. . . production, with the necessity of exchanging products, shipping whereby the exchange is carried on, and colonies, facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping and tend to protect it by multiplying points of safety. . . .

In passing, it is interesting to note the effect of substituting the words 'allies and foreign investments' wherever Mahan used the word 'colonies,' particularly if your interest is in achieving a valid updating of Mahan's basic thesis.

And last on this list, but certainly not least, Mahan perceived that governmental attitudes and processes inevitably conditioned a nation's outlook on overseas commerce and concomitant naval strength. He reasoned that if the advocates of maritime commercial expansion and those of naval preparedness held a preponderant voice in the councils of government, a nation would inevitably support and expand its maritime posture. He perceived the handicaps faced by a popular government in maintaining a consistently favorable attitude towards maritime and naval pursuits; and it was largely his purpose to attempt to condition our people, but more particularly our government, to an appreciation of the opportunities and the challenges offered by the favorable stance of the United States in the essentials of sea power.

It is interesting to note that Mahan himself acknowledged the inexactness of the very term 'sea power' as a label and a catch-word for his cause—and it may be that this imprecision itself has led to some of the misunderstanding and misapplication of Mahan's thesis that has characterized some persons and nations who have superficially called up Mahan in support of a purely naval argument. Tirpitz in Germany, for example, was dazzled by Mahan's case for sea power as an instrument of national power; but Tirpitz didn't read Mahan carefully—or he ignored what he read—for he made the mistake of equating sea power with naval strength in ships of the line, and he failed to appreciate Germany's deficiencies in several of Mahan's elements such as position, conformation, and so on. It should be recognized that the incisive thesis that we've thus far discussed was truly a concept of national strategy, as conceived in today's acceptance of that term. With his

Army origins, Mahan would have been shortsighted indeed had he not recognized the interrelationships of the ground and sea forces of his day. In this regard Mahan developed a brilliant hypothetical analysis which involved the trans-Pacific projection of an army to engage a mythical East Asian enemy. In this hypothesis, Mahan exhibited clear prophecy of amphibious and logistic concepts that received definition and development much later in World War II. And in last year's Cuban confrontation and quarantine, it is possible to see a classic example of Mahan's conception of applied control of the sea, which is, in a pragmatic context, a matter of ships and not of abstract dominance of routes drawn on a chart. Here also was an extension—beyond Mahan's imagination—of the exercise of sea power not only by naval elements, but also through concurrent action of our sister services, particularly in the search and reconnaissance phases. The naval power of this nation in the Cuban affair was applied and projected with great restraint and finesse—but surely Mr. Khrushchev, in his contemplation of the portent of that situation, must have realized, whether or not he has read Mahan, the lasting truth of these words:

It is not the taking of individual ships or convoys, be they few or many, that strikes down the money power of a nation; it is the possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as the fugitive; and by controlling the great common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the enemy's shores. This overbearing power can only be exercised by great navies. . . .

*The Influence of Sea Power
Upon History, 1660-1783*

Now though, as we have seen, Mahan's primary object and transcendental theme was the political and strategic importance of sea power, he evaluated historical naval events with a secondary object of determining, in his words, 'leading principles—always a few—around which considerations of detail group themselves, [tending] to reduce confusion of impression to simplicity and directness of thought. . . .' To this end he devoted many thousands of words of discussion and analysis. Taken in total, his words boil down to a four-pillared foundation of naval strategy, with these elements as the pillars:

- | | |
|------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Concentration | 3. Offense |
| 2. Objective | 4. Communications |

In his book, *Naval Strategy*, Mahan stated:

The fundamental object in all military combinations is to gain local superiority by concentration.

Over and over, in other passages, he repeats this basic idea; for example:

Never attempt to straddle, to do things at the same time, unless your force is evidently so supreme that you have clearly more than enough for each.

or this :

Not by rambling operations, or naval duels, are wars decided, but by force massed, and handled in skillful combinations.

Mahan detected in his historical studies a direct relationship between British successes in utilizing their naval mobility to achieve concentration of force at a critical point, as opposed to the French tendency to disperse their efforts to nuisance raiding and harassment of commerce. This led him to the rejection of *guerre de course*, or commerce destruction, as the primary role of a Navy and led him to this broad conclusion:

. . . concentration of effort will as a rule be a sounder policy than dissemination.

*The Influence of Sea Power
Upon the French Revolution and
Empire, 1793-1812*

In this age of widespread mutual security arrangements, it is interesting to note some of the pitfalls prophesied by Mahan when he said:

The proverbial weaknesses of alliances are due to inferior power of concentration. Granting the same aggregate of force, it is never as great in two hands as in one, because it is not perfectly concentrated. Each party to an alliance has its particular aim, which divides action.

In brief summary of this point, Mahan envisioned the essence of naval strategy to embody the exploitation of the mobility of ships to achieve concentration of power at a decisive point, while at the same time holding firm at other potential points of action. From this concept stemmed his capsule definition of strategy as the decision 'where to act.'

Proceeding from this first great principle, Mahan stressed the determination of a proper objective as an essential element of where to act. Broadly and comprehensively stated, these words contain the germ of this idea:

. . . the proper objective is . . . the organized military force of the enemy.

Naval Strategy

In a narrower vein, he also stated that 'in war, the proper objective of the Navy is the enemy's navy'; but I submit to you that one must ever interpret Mahan in broad context in order to derive maximum guidance from the wisdom of his thoughts. Surely, if Admiral Spruance harked to Mahan when the Japanese Fleet approached the first battle of the Philippine Sea, he applied a broad appreciation of Mahan's concepts of mission and objective to reach the eminently sound decision not to advance the Fifth Fleet out of covering range of the beachhead at Saipan until he was assured that the Japanese could not outflank him and fall upon the Marines and soldiers then so desperately engaged. In a more negative sense, Admiral Halsey has been criticized for misapplication of the principle of concentration in the incident of 'Bull's Run' because he misdefined his objective. Perhaps my most valuable contribution in this regard would be the admonition that, to understand Mahan, you must read him in full context; and that in the application of Mahan's, or any other, maxims, only a judicious interpretation of the extant conditions and circumstances can make a principle a true aid to proper action instead of an inhibition or misdirection.

Mahan's third great principle of strategy involved his concept of the offensive, a principle that overlies almost all statements of the maxims of warfare. Mahan stated it thus:

. . . the assumption of a simple defense in war is ruin. War, once declared, must be waged offensively aggressively. The enemy must not be fended off, but smitten down. You may then spare him every exaction, relinquish every

gain; but till down, he must be struck incessantly and remorselessly.

The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future

This is not to say that Mahan did not recognize the necessity for defense under certain circumstances; but he cautions that 'even though the leading object of the war be defense, defense is best made by offensive action.' Mahan credits the 'go-get-'em' attitude of British commanders such as Rodney and Nelson as a determining factor in overcoming often superior material odds accruing to French commanders who too often adopted defensive, no-risk courses of action. Mahan also warns that successful offensive actions require at least local superiority of force; but he points to holding actions, hit and run raids, and suicide attacks as strategically useful employments of temporarily inferior forces. It is interesting to view in retrospect the long-term strategic value of such actions in the early days of World War II in the Pacific by our temporarily inferior forces.

Such a view in retrospect leads us to the examination, finally, of the fourth of Mahan's points of strategic principle.

. . . communications, in the full meaning of the term, dominate war. As an element of strategy they devour all other elements.

Naval Strategy

In his book *Naval Strategy*, Mahan discusses at some length the concept of positions and lines. He particularly emphasized the importance of central position and interior lines, and considered a nation with firm control of the sea to possess strong interior lines on a global basis. He points out an army's great dependence on its supplies and the relative ease with which a navy can support itself and an expeditionary army far from home. He explains that, on land, an army lacks the self-sufficiency that a naval force has at sea. An army must have its supplies frequently renewed and delivery of these supplies can only be briefly interrupted without consequences.

So long as the fleet is able to face the enemy at sea communications mean, essentially, not geographical lines . . . but . . . supplies of which the ships cannot carry in their own hulls beyond a limited amount.

He goes on,

Nevertheless, all military organizations, land or sea, are ultimately dependent upon open communications with the basis of the national power.

In the book, *The Problem of Asia*, Mahan again says,

Communications dominate war . . . ;

and he goes on,

Broadly considered, they are the most important single element in strategy, political or military. In its control over them has lain the pre-eminence of sea power - as an influence upon the history of the past; and in this it will continue . . .

The power, therefore, to insure these communications to one's self, and to interrupt them for an adversary, affects the very root of a nation's vigor . . .

This is the prerogative of the sea powers; and this chiefly . . . they have to set off against the disadvantage of position and of numbers in which, with reference to land power, they labor. . . .

In these passages on the importance of communications are to be found two different meanings to the word 'communications.' The idea is sometimes advanced that the word 'logistics' may be substituted for the word 'communications' whenever Mahan uses the latter, but this substitution cannot be made without regard to context. Mahan often clearly means 'logistics' when he says 'communications.' At other times, he is using the word in another sense. For instance, the word 'logistics' is out of place in his sentence, '. . . all military organizations, land or sea, are ultimately dependent upon open communications with the basis of national power. . . .'

However, it may also be partly Mahan's fault that, upon occasion, strategists have become overly concerned with protecting something so abstract as a 'line of communication.'

Professor E.B. Potter of the Naval Academy identified this error and made the point quite clearly when he wrote,

Unfortunately, Mahan, having to invent a terminology to carry his meaning, had borrowed from land warfare such phrases as 'lines of communications,' 'communication routes,' and 'sea lanes.' These expressions quickly became catch phrases to naval strategists. Since it is easier to quote Mahan than it is to read him, his disciples employed his terminology without noting the careful qualifications he had employed. As long as great circle lines connecting ports could be drawn on a chart, they became 'sea lines of communication' and by 1914 navies conceived it their duty to protect these 'lines.' Actually their business was, and is, to protect ships. Sea lines of communications carry nothing; ships carry the trade of the world.

In brief summary, Mahan believed that adequate control of the sea both depended upon and assured the necessary communications in the broad sense, that enabled a nation to project its power and influence into the uttermost parts of the earth, into the very teeth of those forces which might challenge that nation's security or prosperity. We remember the Marshall Plan as the catalyst for a remarkable political, economic, and psychological reconstruction of free Europe; but I would suggest to you that its effects—both material and moral—were made possible by European realization that continued United States military presence was assured by the United States and Allied dominance of the maritime regions and logistic support routes of the North Atlantic. It is the application of sea power, in its most comprehensive sense, that has enabled this nation and its allies in the free world to knit together and maintain a concert of strength around the periphery of the continental communist powers. By this chain, the projection of communist power and influence has been contained, with certain exceptions of political sufferance, within a tightly defined continental ring. One author has described this process as an updating of Mahan's ideas, to which he applies the term 'peripheral strategy.'

But in this line of discussion, I can see that I am spilling over into the scope of later lectures by Captain Hayes on the subject 'Sea Power and National Greatness' and by Captain Hurst on the subject 'The Influence of Sea Power on the Current World Crisis.' Therefore, in closing, I would like to believe that my necessarily cursory coverage of the vast scope of Mahan's concepts will serve chiefly to pique your curiosity and lead you to the study and evaluation of his works, to the end that his basic

factors and principles may aid you in your consideration and formulation of current strategic concepts. In this context I would submit to your consideration the avowal of Bernard Brodie when he said, in effect, that until a ton of goods can move as cheaply by air as by sea, we must continue to control the sea.

In this era of ultimate force, when the very feasibility of war is often brought into question, I think it appropriate that I leave you with a Mahan quotation stemming from his consideration of the moral aspects of war:

Power, force, is a faculty of national life; one of the talents committed to nations by God. Like every other endowment of a complex organization, it must be held under control of the enlightened intellect and of the upright heart; but no more than any other can it be carelessly or lightly abjured, without incurring the responsibility of one who buries in the earth that which was entrusted to him for use . . . Until it is demonstrable that no evil exists, or threatens the world, which cannot be obviated without recourse to force, the obligation to readiness must remain; and where evil is mighty and defiant, the obligation to use force - that is, war - arises . . .

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

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Naval War College, Command and Staff Course, 1955
Naval War College, Naval Warfare Course, 1963
George Washington University, graduate study in International
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NavWarCol	Staff	1963-
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Hv Attack Squadron ELEVEN	CO	1961-1962
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2nd and 308th Bombard- ment Wings, SAC, USAF	Senior Combat Crew Commander; Squadron Commander	1957-1960
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Fighting Sq 81/13A/131	Ops Off; Material Off	1946-1948
Flight Training, various stations	Student aviator	1944-1946
USS Wichita (CA-45)	Jr Fire Con Div Off	1943-1944