Electoral Violence and the Survival of Democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: A Historical Perspective

Adesola Samson Adesote[a],*; John O. Abimbola[b]

Introduction

In every stable democratic society, election remains the essential ingredient of transitory process from one civilian administration to another. Elections have become an integral part of representative democracy that by and large prevails across the world. According to Lindberg (2003), every modern vision of representative democracy entails the notion of elections as the primary means of selection of political decision makers. Thus, it is incomprehensible in contemporary times to think of democracy without linking it to the idea and practice of elections. Ojo (2007), described election as the ‘hallmark of democracy’ while Chiroro (2005) sees it as the ‘heart of the democratic order’. In all, elections constitute a core component of democracy.

The electoral process in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular especially since the beginning of the 21st century is characterised by violence. It is important to emphasize here that though violence has been a long-standing feature of the democratisation process in the post colonial Nigeria, its recent manifestations especially since the birth of the Fourth Republic has assumed an unprecedented magnitude thus constituting a major threat to the survival democracy. Fundamentally, there is no doubt the fact that electoral violence remains a major source of political instability in a democratic society with palpable threats of deconsolidation. Scholars among which were Adigun Agbaje and Said Adejumobi have argued that violence has become infused in political processes in most new democracies in Africa especially with respect to the 21st century. For instance, according to the 2008 Amnesty International Report, ‘the violent struggle for power, even in states which do not descend into armed conflict, still remains an important component of political life in Africa.

The electoral process in Nigeria has been characterised by violence with the 1999 elections being a major turning point. The elections were marked by violence with many innocent lives lost and displaced. The paper argues that the high incidence of electoral violence (pre and post) in the Fourth Republic in particular is closely associated with neo-patrimonial character of the Nigerian state, the nature and kind of party politics being played, the weak institutionalisation of democratic architectures and inefficient electoral management body among others. It posits that these were among the factors that led to the fall or collapse of the First and Second Republics. The paper therefore submits that the survival of democracy in the Fourth Republic involves adherence to the ideals and principles of electoral process as practised in ideal democratic societies.

Key words: Electoral violence; Democracy; Nigeria

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/4593
May 29, 1999 which culminated in the birth of the Fourth Republic. The republic which started amidst great hope and expectations is yet to significantly convince the generality of the Nigerian populace its democratic success especially with respect to the conduct of free, fair and credible elections devoid of election violence (pre and post).

In fact, both at national and state levels, transition from one civilian administration to another since 2003 in particular has been very rough. This is noticeable in the various cases of electoral violence which has claimed several lives, displacement of innocent people and wanton destruction of property. The conduct of election since the birth of the fourth republic up to 2011 has been retrogressive rather than progressive. This work tends to interrogate electoral violence and the survival of democracy in Nigeria through historical approach. For the purpose of this discourse, the paper is divided into six parts. The first part is the introduction; second focuses on conceptual clarification; third deals with historical trajectory of electoral violence in Nigeria; the fourth part discusses electoral violence in the fourth republic; the fifth part examines electoral violence and the survival of democracy in the fourth republic while the sixth part is the conclusion.

1. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION OF SOME TERMINOLOGIES

In a discourse of this nature, it is very imperative to conceptualize some major key concepts. Among these concepts include, violence, electoral violence, election and democracy. First, the word violence has been viewed from different angles by different scholars from distinctive standpoints. Thus, for the purpose of this discourse, we are looking at violence in terms of both violation of human rights and social injustice. This paper therefore examined one major type of violence (electoral violence) that has greatly led to loss of lives, wanton destruction of property, massive displacement of innocent lives as well as threat to the survival of democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.

1.1 Violence

According to Gilula & Daniels (1969) as cited in Wikipedia (2010), violence is ‘destructive aggression’. This conceptualization of violence implies the use of physical force to injure persons or property; and this is the core of most definitions of violence. The World Health Organization defines violence as the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation (WHO, 2002).

1.2 Election

Webster’s Encyclopaedic Dictionary (2006) defines election as: “the act or process of organizing systematic (s) election (permitting mass participation and method of choosing) a person or persons by vote for a public office position in which state authority is exercised”. Roberts and Edwards (1991) cited in Omotola (2007) define election as: “A method for the selection of persons to fill certain offices through choices made by an electorate; those (citizens who are qualified to vote under the rules and procedures of the electoral system”

1.3 Electoral Violence

Fischer (2002) defines electoral violence (conflict) as any random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced “protection,” blackmail, destruction of property, or assassination. Fischer’s definition has been modified by Megan Reif (2010) as cited in Majekodunmi, R & Adejuwon, K. D (2012) where electoral violence is defined thus:

any spontaneous or organized act by candidates, party supporters, election authorities, voters, or any other actor that occurs during an electoral process, from the date of voter registration to the date of inauguration of a new government, that uses physical harm, intimidation, blackmail, verbal abuse, violent demonstrations, psychological manipulation, or other coercive tactics aimed at exploiting, disrupting, determining, hardening, delaying, reversing, or otherwise influencing an electoral process and its outcome.

Also, Igbuzor (2010) sees electoral violence as:

any act of violence perpetrated in the course of political activities, including pre, during and post election periods, and may include any of the following acts: thuggery, use of force to disrupt political meetings or voting at polling stations, or the use of dangerous weapons to intimidate voters and other electoral process or to cause bodily harm or injury to any person connected with electoral processes.

International Foundation for Election Systems (2011) defines electoral violence as “any violence (harm) or threat of violence (harm) that is aimed at any person or property involved in the election process, or at disrupting any part of the electoral or political process during the election period.”

According to Albert (2007) electoral violence has to do with all forms of organized acts or threats – physical, psychological, and structural – aimed at intimidating, harming, blackmailing a political stakeholder before, during and after an election with a view to determining, delaying, or otherwise influencing an electoral process.

These above definitions of electoral violence typically captured the deeper nature and stages of electoral violence in Nigeria especially since the birth of the Fourth Republic in 1999.

1.4 Democracy

Democracy which started in Ancient Greek city state Anthen was derived from the Greek words “Demos”
meaning “people” and “Kratos” implying “rule”. Thus when put together, democracy in Ancient Greek means “rule by the people (Cambridge Encyclopaedia 1990). More importantly, while there is no universally accepted definition of democracy, Dahl et al (2003) cited in Abimbola & Adesote (2012) argued that equality and freedom remain the most important characteristics of democracy since ancient times. They however defined democracy as an egalitarian form of government in which all the citizens of a nation together determine public policy, the laws and the actions of their state, requiring that all citizens (meeting certain qualifications) have an equal opportunity to express their opinion (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012).

2. HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

The history of political violence (electoral violence inclusive) in Nigeria could be traced to the colonial period. This means that thorough understanding of the problem of electoral violence in Nigeria requires situating it within its political history. Scholars have argued that colonial settings laid the foundation of future political conflict in Nigeria. This argument was hinged on a number of British political experiments in West Africa in general and Nigeria in particular among which were, the introduction of the elective principle in 1922 and on the emergence of the 1946 Richards constitution. For instance, the elective principle, though to a very large extent was non-violent, was too limited with income and residential qualifications, could be a potential basis for violence (Omotola, 2007).

This argument could be corroborated with what happened when elections were held into the regional Houses of Assembly in 1951 across the country. The elections which were held based on the then electoral system introduced by the 1951 constitution led to widespread dissatisfaction among majority of Nigerians in 1952. Thus, in 1953, there was increase in the intensity of political agitation (Falola, et al, 1991). The 1946 constitution paved the way for the division of the country into three regions in which each region was dominated by a major ethnic group. For example, the Hausa-Fulani dominated the Northern region, while the Yoruba and the Igbo dominated the Western and Eastern regions respectively. Thus, within each region, there were numerous other so-called minorities which were at a considerable disadvantage as far as political power was concerned. The emergence of political development in 1950s marked the genesis of electoral violence in Nigeria. In 1951 for instance, elections were held into the regional Houses of Assembly based on the introduced electoral system of the 1951 Constitution. This electoral system created a widespread dissatisfaction among the Nigerians (Falola et al, 1991).

The first and immediate post independence electoral violence in Nigeria occurred during the 1964 general elections, the first election to be conducted after independence. The Northern People’s Congress needed the elections to consolidate its power at the centre. The Action Group (AG) also needed it in order to dislodge Chief S.L Akintola from power in the West. The NCNC on its own also wanted to improve its bargaining strength in the East. It became obvious that all the major political parties were adequately anxious to participate in the elections (Falola et al, 1991). By the middle of 1964, two major political alliances had emerged from all the manoeuvres. The NPC and the NNDP founded the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). The AG and the NCNC constituted themselves into the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). The 1964 federal election was contested between these major alliances (Ige, 1995). Two main coalitions contested these elections: the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) made up of the NPC and some other minor parties; the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) comprising the NCNC, AG, NEPU and UMBC (Falola, et al, 1991).

The campaigns by these coalitions generated much bitterness, acrimony and violence, especially in the west. The elections which were said to have been massively rigged through different means lead to widespread violence/conflicts in the west following the announcement of results by the Chairman of Federal Electoral Commission in person of Mr. Esua. This argument could be corroborated with the address of president Azikiwe and the then Inspector General Police, Mr. Louis Edet. Azikiwe in his Dawn broadcast to the nation, expressed the head of state condemned the way and manner the electioneering was conducted and his disappointment. The politicians in power have no right to employ instruments of power in order to perpetuate their stay in office. The president cited instances where Nigerian citizen had been deprived of their constitutional right to freedom of association. He warned the politicians that: “If they have decided to destroy our national unity, they should summon a round table conference to decide how our national asserts should be divided for it is better that we should disintegrate in peace and not in pieces” (Anifowose, 1972). In a similar view, the inspector general of police, Louis Edet made a nation-wide broadcast reporting that incidents involving violence had reached alarming proportions. He appealed to the politicians to protect Nigeria’s enviable reputation as a bastion of democracy in Africa (Anifowose, 1972).

The attendant violence, including arson, looting, killing, wanton destruction of properties and the total collapse of public order especially in the western region, was unprecedented. For example, at Ishokun, Ilesha, twenty school children were murdered on the ground that they were in town to combat an impending riot. Also, at Isho, a village few miles from Owo, sixteen people were killed. As it was in the west, so also it went on in the
Middle Belt. A good example was the second Tiv riot of 1964 (Anifowose, 1972).

The last straw that broke the camel’s back was the elections into regional assembly in the west in October 1965. The announcement of the election results by the Federal Electoral Commission, which led to the victory of Chief S.L Akintola of the Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP) as against the wishes of many people who expected that Chief Adegbenro of the UPGA led to large-scale widespread violence in the whole of western region on the ground that there were irregularities in the election results. The decision of the federal government to recognize the election thus gave Chief Akintola the power to form a new government. This however made UPGA to embark on a spontaneous and violent demonstration known as “operation wet e” – an operation which required the spraying of houses, cars and persons with petrol and then setting fire to them (Ige, 1995). There were series of protests and demonstrations carried out by angry students, market women, farmers and other groups in most towns and villages throughout the western region, and these were accompanied by looting, arson, killing on an unprecedented scale and burning of houses, vehicles and shops. Anti-governmental placards were displayed, party slogan- Awo! Awo! UPGA! UPGA! -as well as war songs were advanced. In some cases, the demonstration ended in clashes with anti-riot police squad, who did not hesitate to shoot. A typical song by the angry demonstrators was “Ejeki a mura ogun, eleyi l on je iya (let us prepare for war, this is an insulting behaviours) (Anifowose, 1972). The high rate of electoral violence (pre and post) following the 1964 and 1965 elections were said to have contributed in no small measure to the collapse of the first Republic (Osaghae 1998; Akinwumi 2004).

The electoral process of the second republic (1979–1983) was equally led to various cases of electoral violence across the whole of Nigeria. The most important one was the second election that was conducted after the first administration in 1983. The structure of politics, despite the alteration in the structure of the federation from three (and later four) regions of the first republic, to nineteen states, was still largely driven by ethno-religious forces, where each party maintained its stronghold in a given regional/ethnic domain (Omotola, ). For example, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) dominated the Northern region, the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) dominated the Western region while the National Council of Nigeria Citizen (NCNC) dominated the Eastern region (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012). The National Party of Nigeria (NPN), obviously NPC’s successor, controlled the federal government between 1979 and 1983. In the 1983 elections, it wanted to extend its reach to other regions, either by hook or by crook. The attempt to achieve this underscored the massive rigging of the 1983 elections, which resulted in an unprecedented outbreak of violence in the Western region, where the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), AG’S successor, held sway (Omotola, 2007). In the then Oyo and Ondo States, the two UPN states were declared for the NPN. This announcement led to unprecedented violence, in which a writer simply described it as ‘the house of war’ (Barbarinsa 2002). Although Ondo state was later returned to UPN at the Election Tribunal, series of violence that accompanied the disputed election results following various cases of alleged irregularities in the conduct of the election led to the collapse of the second republic; thus giving the military the opportunity to seize power on 31 December 1983.

This discourse would be incomplete without having a look at the aborted Third Republic. Prior to the Presidential election in 1993, the local government and gubernatorial elections had already been conducted in preparation for the birth of the third republic. It is known fact that Nigeria since independence has never had any peaceful election devoid of violence and other electoral vices. Thus, the 1992/1993 elections were no exception. Meanwhile, the circumstances that led to the aborted Third republic revealed that Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, a dictator, in spite of his long transition programme, had no intention of handing over power to the civilian. This became known when he annulled the June 12, 1993 presidential election which was internationally acclaimed as free and fair; and as well described by local observers as the fairest election in the post colonial Nigeria. The annulment of the election caused series of crises especially in the Western part of Nigeria championed by some groups such as NDAECO among others. The post electoral violence which followed the annulment of the June 12, 1993 election was what forced Gen. Ibrahim Babangida to form an Interim National Government (ING) headed by Ernest Shonekan, who was later overthrown in what was regarded as peaceful coup on November 17 1993 by General Sani Abacha. This development made the Third Republic an aborted republic (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012).

The above historical analysis of the electoral violence in the post colonial Nigeria in particular contributed immensely to reasons why democracy in the first two major republics (first and second) could not only be consolidated but also be sustained. It could also be argued that the electoral processes as well as the kind of party politics (popularly known as zero sum game, winner takes all syndrome) played in the two republics were parts of the reasons why democratic rule could not be sustained.

3. ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC, 1999-2011

Before we begin to examine various cases of electoral violence that have plagued the fourth republic since 1999, it is important to briefly have a glimpse of the birth of the republic. The process that eventually culminated in
the birth of the Fourth Republic began as a result of the sudden death of Late Gen. Sanni Abacha on June 8, 1998, thus paving for the emergence of General Abdulsalam Abubakar as the new Head of State of Nigeria. Subsequent upon his emergence, Gen Abdulsalam announced that he would hand over power to the democratically elected president on May 29, 1999. In the pursuance of the transition programme, General Abubakar, dissolved the initial five political parties registered by the Abacha’s regime, cancelled all the elections that were conducted and thus, set up another electoral body known as Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). The electoral body was set up initially to grant provisional registration to nine political parties, with the condition that after the local government elections of that year, those that had 10% votes and above in at least 24 states of the Federation would qualify to contest the subsequent State and Federal elections. Eventually, only three political parties that is, the Alliance for Democracy (AD), All Peoples Party (APP) and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) that were registered (Dode, 2010 ; Abimbola & Adesote, 2012).

Within nine months of inception, the regime of Gen. Abdulsalam successfully completed a transition to civilian administration by conducting several elections including the presidential election of April 1999 and thus handing over power to Chief Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP on May 29, 1999. The emergence of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as the third executive president of Nigeria marked the genesis of the fourth republic. The need therefore to nurture the nascent democracy to maturity such that it could no longer be reversed or eroded like what happened during second republic became a major challenge to the new government.

The conduct of free, fair and credible periodic elections by unbiased electoral body including its umpire as well as other electoral officials and the adherence to democratic principles of governance remain major factors responsible for the avoidance of electoral violence in any democratic society. These two major factors were the challenges which the fourth republic had been contending with since its birth in 1999 up till 2011 general elections. It is against this backdrop that we shall examine various electoral violence vis-à-vis elections that were conducted in Nigeria since the birth of the fourth republic with major emphasis on the 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections.

Since the birth of the fourth republic in 1999, three general elections were said to have been conducted under a civilian administration in the country in which one can say that democracy was actually consolidated. In other words, the years between 2003 and 2011 witnessed the successful transition of one civilian administration to another. For instance, in 2003, a presidential election was conducted and the incumbent president, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP was declared the winner by INEC. In 2007, Late Alhaji Umaru Yar’Adua of the same PDP was also declared by INEC as the President elect. In April 2011, another presidential election was conducted by INEC in which Dr. Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP, who was initially sworn in first as, Acting President following the critical condition of Late president Umaru Yar’Adua, and later as a substantive President after its death also contested and was declared winner of the election by INEC.

Though democracy was consolidated in the period between 2003 and 2011 because, there was no military welcome back, various elections conducted during the period were not devoid of different kinds of electoral malpractices which led to a number of electoral violence culminating in the killings and displacement of many innocent lives and destruction of property which worth billions of naira. Effort would be made to cite various cases of electoral violence that took place in Nigeria between 2003 and 2011.

It has always been argued that one of the fundamental problems facing majority of post-colonial African states is that of how to sustain and consolidate their democracy through credible elections (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1989). Evidences have shown that in the whole of African continent, only few states could lay claim to have genuinely conducted free and fair elections that were universally perceived. Thus, election administration that will achieve governmental legitimacy and as well prevent electoral violence after polls has always been a major serious concern to not only electoral scholars (Kolawole, 2007), but also many lovers of democracy. It is on this submission that the three general elections that were conducted in Nigeria stands.

The first major general election to be conducted by a civilian administration in Nigeria’s fourth republic was in 2003 under the administration of President Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. The 2003 general election was not only said to have been one of the most corrupt and fraudulent elections to be conducted in the post colonial Nigeria (Kurfi, 2005). The election was also characterised by different types of electoral frauds which range from ballot stuffing, intimidation, killing, and assassination among others. The election was a triumph of violence. A number of people have argued that there were no elections in 2003 but merely the intimidation of voters and the selection of already decided winners by elites and caucuses (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012). Both internal and external observers were unanimous on the unfairness of the competition in the electoral process which was said to have been manipulated by the so-called ruling party, Peoples’ Democratic Party. For example, according to the Human Right Watch’s report, between April and May 2003, about one hundred people were said to have been killed and many more injured during federal and state elections in Nigeria and that most of the violence was perpetrated by the ruling PDP and its supporters (Human Rights Watch, 2004). The subsequent local government
election which was conducted across the country in the following year also witnessed electoral violence. USIP noted that violence during the 2003 election cycle was more blatant and widespread and marked the unchecked proliferation of another worrisome development; the hiring and arming of militias to serve narrow political ends.

Also, the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), a coalition of over ninety civil society groups, in its report on the 2003 general elections, gave a vote of no confidence in the elections. The group declared in its report that “...Twenty-nine of the registered political parties that either contested or did not contest the elections have variously rejected the results as announced by the INEC declaring the results as fraudulent. Both Domestic and International Election Observers documented massive irregularities that characterised the elections and refused to endorse the elections as free and fair. Some political parties and their candidates decided to challenge some of the results before the various Election Petition tribunals and have gone ahead to do so while others declared “mass action” to pressure a government without popular mandate to abdicate power” (TMG, 2003). This could be corroborated with the submission of Agbaje and Adejumobi (2006), who argued that the electoral fraud that was staged in 2003 general elections was more sophisticated than that of 1983 general elections.

In 2007, the second election under the fourth republic was conducted. Rather than getting better, in spite of series of negative reports by both internal and external observers against the 2003 general elections, the 2007 general elections turned out to be the worst election to have been conducted in the post colonial Nigeria. In the run-up to the elections, there were several incidence of pre-electoral violence leading to political killings, bombings and armed clashes between supporters of rival political parties. Evidences showed that between June and August 2006, about three gubernatorial candidates were assassinated (Omotosho, 2007) among which Dr. Ayo Daramola, PDP gubernatorial candidate of Ekiti State was among. The outcome of the general elections of 2007 was said to be flawed elections. In fact, election was worse than the 1999 and 2003. The scale of electoral violence (pre and post) was unprecedented. Good examples of cases of pre-electoral violence in the 2007 election are captured by IFES-Nigeria and the Human Right Watch. For instance, the IFES-Nigeria collected, documented and reported different incidences of electoral violence in Nigeria, and thus put the total at 967, which included 18 deaths from January 13 – April 30 2007 (IFES-Nigeria, 2007). The Human Rights Watch also highlighted incidence of pre-electoral violence in the run-up to Nigeria’s April 2007 elections which was beset by political killings, bombings and armed clashes between supporters of rival political factions (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Instances of irregularities in the conduct of the election which invariably engendered electoral violence were noticeable in the recourse to courts by aggrieved parties as well as the reports of various local and foreign observers, electoral scholars and even in the speech of elected president.

Animashaun (2008), argued that there was massive irregularities in the 2007 general elections and it was characterised by inflation of voting figures, declaration of result where elections were never held or not conclusive, intimidation of voters as well as manipulation of the security services. According to former governor of Anambra State, Dr Chukwuemeka Ezeife, while commenting generally on the status of democracy in Nigeria as cited in Adeyemo (2009) opined that:

...democracy is associated with elections. How have the elections gone since 1999 till date? The 1999 elections were disputed but it was vastly better than the 2003 elections. People shouted foul about the 2003 election but that was infinitely better than the non election of 2007. Each election has been worse, more flawed than the one before it. We cannot be getting a democracy by running further away from it.

Late President Umaru Yar’Adua also at his inaugural speech admitted that the 2007 general elections were flawed (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012). The evidence of this was seen in the various steps he took subsequently after its assumption. First, he inaugurated twenty-one members of Electoral Reform Committee, headed by justice Uwais to see to the problem of electoral process in the country. Second, he ensured the Independence of Judiciary which was noticeable in the various judgements dispensed at both Tribunal and Appeal courts over electoral irregularities. Examples of this were the loss of Edo, Ekiti, Osun and Ondo States to Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and Labour Party respectively (LP), which were initially declared to have been won by PDP according to INEC (Aniekwe, et al, 2011)).

Though the 2011 general elections were generally acceptable by both local and foreign observers to be partially fair when compared with the 2003 and 2007 general elections which conducted under the fourth republic, the election witnessed two major stages of electoral violence, the pre-election period (that is, period of registration, campaign, election day) and the post election period (that is, after the announcement of results). At the state level, there were several cases of pre-electoral violence which led to the brutal murder of some people. A good example of this was the case of pre-electoral violence in Akwa Ibom state in March 22, 2011 which led to the setting up of Presidential Investigation Panel to investigate the remote and immediate causes of the violence and proffer solutions to nip future occurrence in the bud and the way forward. According to a report, some parts of the Akwa Ibom state, particularly in Ikot Ekpene and Uyo were engulfed by a reign of violence which was unprecedented. Thus, by the time the dust of the mayhem
settled, according to officially confirmed Police report two supporters of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Etop Nicholas Idiong, a trader and Daniel Udo Akpan, a commercial motorcyclist were brutally murdered in Ikot Ekpene while several people sustained various degrees of injuries. Also, Nsemo Ita Ekong, an Akwa Ibom Transport Company bus driver was recovered shot dead in his vehicle on Abak road and several persons were injured in Uyo. Other loses suffered included property worth billions of Naira which were destroyed during the politically motivated rampage. The property included: 200 brand new Peugeot 307 cars; 500 brand new tricycles; the Goodluck/Sambo Campaign office which was burnt down by the rampaging mob; Fortune International High School owned by Senator Aloysius Etok which was razed down with school children in session and over 20 Toyota Hiace buses belonging to the PDP and Godswill 2011 Campaign Organization, nine Hilux jeeps belonging to the Government of Akwa Ibom State which were either completely destroyed or vandalized (Official Gazette of Government of Akwa Ibom State, 2012).

At the national level, the announcement of the April 2011 Presidential election result by INEC in which President Dr. Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP was declared the winner led to violence (post electoral violence) especially in some parts of Northern Nigeria, such as Bauchi, Yobe, Maiduguri, Kaduna among others. The post electoral violence that accompanied the 2011 general election resulted in the killing of about ten corps members in Bauchi state (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012). Beside this, there were other cases of electoral violence over the 2011 election. It was a result of the magnitude of the pre-election violence in Akwa Ibom State and the mayhem that had rocked several parts of the country before and after the April 2011 general elections that compelled President Goodluck Jonathan to set up a 22-man panel under the chairmanship of Sheikh Ahmed Lemu to look into the various crises. Specifically, the Panel was mandated to identify those responsible for the pre-election violence in Akwa Ibom State as well as the other electoral violence that greeted the election especially in some Northern states in the country.

4. ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND THE SURVIVAL OF DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA’S FOURTH REPUBLIC: LESSONS FROM OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES

The place of free, fair and credible election in the sustenance of democracy most importantly in a democratic society cannot be overemphasized. This is because, it not only offers a government a unique opportunity for legitimacy, but, also serves as a transitory process in stable democracies. This is why electoral scholars like Adigun Agbaje, 2006, Shola Omotola, 2007 among others often argued that the significance of fair and fair elections as a critical element of democracy cannot be overstated. Besides, in a liberal democracy, electoral process always gives room for the formation of groups popularly called political parties which are expected to possess some basic characteristics like political ideology, sincere political manifestoes, party discipline, strong internal democracy among others (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012). Thus, competition among these political parties is seen as part and parcel of democracy because it helps to strengthen the quality and level of their service to the people. It is when politics is not being played according to the acceptable democratic principles that it generates into unprecedented violence.

Historically, the use of violence (pre and post) in elections is not peculiar to recent and emerging democracies in developing world in general and Africa in particular. For example, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries England and America, there were documented cases of electoral violence where force and intimidation were used as a tactical means of winning elections (Seymour C, et al, 1918). One basic fact remains that violence in elections has always been a major threat to the sustenance or stability of a democracy. With respect to African continent, new democracies in this continent especially since the 1990s which was termed as the third wave of democracy have been confronted with series of electoral violence that had resulted in the killing/death and displacement of many innocent lives. Examples of this are noticeable in the cases of Zimbabwe, 2000, 2005, 2008; Zanzibar 2005, 2010; Kenya, 2007, among others (Chaturvedi, 2005, Khadiagala 2008, Waki Report 2008, and USIP, 2010). For example, the 1998 elections in Lesotho led to a post—election conflict nearly brought the country to a civil war situation. This situation was only contained through the diplomatic and military interventions of South Africa and Botswana. In 2007, the elections were similarly accompanied by violence (Matlosa, 2007). Also, the disputed presidential elections in 2007 in Kenya threw her into a post—election violence which, in only two months, claimed more than 1200 lives and displaced an estimated 350,000 people (USIP, 2010).

More importantly, high degrees of conflict or continuous electoral violence are capable of creating political unrest and as result instability; and slow the sustenance and consolidation of democracy as well as development. This could be seen in what happened in some of the countries in African mentioned above. For instance, an analysis by Afrobarometer of Africans’ view of democracy suggests that poor elections are to blame for dissatisfaction with elections as means to attain political representation. Thus, among the eighteen countries surveyed by Afrobarometer, the three countries
CONCLUSION

The foregoing discourse has critically examined electoral violence and the survival of democracy in Nigeria’s fourth republic from the historical perspective. The paper argues that one of the major factors that was responsible for the fall and collapse of the first and second republics in the post-colonial Nigeria was massive electoral irregularities which led to unprecedented electoral violence. It discusses several cases of electoral violence since 1960 up till the birth of the fourth republic. The discourse posits through the historical perspective that the Nigerian politics since independence have been characterised by pervasive struggle for political control irrespective of their negative consequences.

Despite the fact that the most recent electoral exercise in the country, the April/May 2011 general elections and the 2012 gubernatorial elections in Edo and Ondo States showed elements of improvement and possibly restoration of hope in the democratization process which was though applauded by foreign observers, the elections especially the April 2011 presidential election led to post-election violence. The paper submits that, for democracy to survive in Nigeria there is need for building the institutional capacity of the electoral commission, comprehensive and broad based electoral framework, constant and frequent political education and enlightenment. Electoral competition should not be seen as a do or die affair as championed by former President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo during the run-up to the 2007 general election. A good lesson should be learnt from the just concluded presidential election in Ghana, a neighbouring West African country where though the competition was keen, it was devoid of ethnic chauvinism and religious sentiment.

It concludes that the survival of democracy as well as its consolidation involves adherence to the ideals and principles of electoral process as practised in ideal democratic societies (Schedler, 1998). Also, moving a step further towards completing and deepening democracy is measured by high expectations of regime continuity (Schedler, 1998). Thus, the attainment of these objectives involves three core elements of structural, behavioural and attitudinal foundations of democratisation (Schedler, 2001). While the structural elements emphasise issues of socio-economic prosperity where poverty is kept to the barest minimum and institutional parameters such as periodic, competitive, free and fair elections, a multiparty system and the rule of law, the behavioural foundations relate to the proven capacity of ‘democrats’ to roll back anti-democratic challenges. This demands that no major political actors violate basic democratic rules anymore (Schedler, 2001), by having recourse to electoral violence, the rejection of elections or the transgression of authority, thereby putting the survival of democracy at great risk. The third element is the attitudinal foundations that encompass what Andreas Schedler called the basic normative, strategic and cognitive elements required to sustain democracy. The normative elements include democratic legitimacy, defined as the genuine, non-instrumental, intrinsic support for democracy by political elites as well as citizens. The strategic elements entail the ability to mediate in and transform the usual conflicting relationship between democrats and anti-democrats in a consensual way, so that all can work in the interests of the democracy project (Schedler, 2001).

REFERENCES


