

1992

La guerre sauvage: The Seven Years' War on the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier

Matthew Charles Ward
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***La guerre sauvage: The Seven Years' War on the Virginia and
Pennsylvania frontier***

Ward, Matthew Charles, Ph.D.

The College of William and Mary, 1992

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LA GUERRE SAUVAGE
THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR ON THE VIRGINIA
AND PENNSYLVANIA FRONTIER

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Matthew C. Ward

1992

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APPROVAL SHEET

This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

The Seven Years' War on the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier was a devastating struggle. About two thousand colonists died, almost as many were captured, and tens of thousands fled for safety in the east. The British and their colonists proved unable to mount an effective military defence: colonial forces proved unfit for warfare in the frontier environment and military efforts resulted only in intense discord between civil and military authorities. As a result of the destruction of the raids both Virginia and Pennsylvania were unable to contribute to the war effort in the northern theater, on the St. Lawrence, Lake Champlain, and Acadia.

The French and their Indian allies achieved this success with few resources. The French were unable to commit over a few hundred men to the Ohio Valley, while the Indians experienced an acute shortage of arms and supplies caused by the disruption of their traditional trading network. To achieve their success the French and their Indian allies did not raid randomly, but with an intentional strategy and with specific targets.

The Indians who fought on both sides, fought, not as European pawns, but with their own specific war-aims: the Susquehanna Delawares sought independence from Iroquois overlordship; the Cherokees joined the Virginians in an attempt to break the South Carolinian control of their trade; the Ohio Indians struggled to keep European settlements out of the Ohio Valley.

Eventual success for the British in the theater was achieved not by the superiority of their forces in the theater--in each regular battle British troops were routed, at Fort Necessity, Braddock's Field, and Major Grant's defeat outside Fort Duquesne in 1758--but through attrition caused by British superiority in other theaters. In particular British naval superiority deprived the French, and in turn their Indian allies, of needed supplies.

LA GUERRE SAUVAGE:
THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR ON THE VIRGINIA AND
PENNSYLVANIA FRONTIER

Introduction

From 1754 until 1760 a bitter war between Great Britain and France devastated much of North America. This is a study of that conflict on the frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania. Unlike other works this study focuses not on the military maneuvers of the regular armies in New York and on the St. Lawrence River, where British arms eventually emerged victorious, but rather on the war of raids by the French and their Indian allies on the backcountry of the middle colonies. In this region the war was a disaster for the British and their colonists; colonial troops proved singularly inept at waging frontier warfare, while backcountry inhabitants, their civil officials, and colonial assemblies, actively hindered the war effort.

All studies of the war have relegated the struggle in what may be termed "the Ohio theater" to a distinctly secondary role. However, to the French, and more especially to the Indians who participated in the war, the struggle here was a central element of the war. In North America the French were hard-pressed to withstand the superior power of the

British.¹ British North America dwarfed French Canada, both in terms of population and economic output. British forces outnumbered the French on the seas, and in North America on the land. The French had to allocate their precious resources as wisely as possible to hold the British at bay while they brought their superiority in Europe to bear.

Using the bulk of their manpower in the north, in New York and on the St. Lawrence, the French won the support of Indian allies who participated in paralysing important British colonies. The French viewed the war in the Ohio theater as a distinctive struggle; compared with the war of regular armies in the North, *la guerre militaire*, it was a war of Indian raids and Indian diplomacy, *la guerre sauvage*. In 1756 Governor Vaudreuil wrote from Canada to Jean Baptiste Machault, Minister of the Marine and Colonies, discussing the success of his policies in waging the war. He commented that

There must no longer be any question of managing the English. Their enterprises are carried to excess, and you see, my Lord. . . that they are making new and greater efforts against this Colony; that I am making use of the reinforcements the King has granted me to oppose them, and that I neglect

¹ It is difficult to separate the terms "British" and "English" although they are significantly different. Great Britain refers to the largest island in the British Isles, England refers to only one of the kingdoms. In general I have used the term British to refer to inhabitants of the United Kingdom and also to settlers of the British North American colonies, although it is galling to so call such men as Conrad Weiser, whose ancestry and cultural heritage could scarcely be less British. However as eighteenth century writers frequently used the terms British and English indiscriminately, as do most modern writers, on occasion for clarity I have also used the term English to mean British.

nothing to enable me to carry the war into their country. . . I apply myself particularly, my Lord, to sending parties of Indians into the English Colonies. I also do my best to multiply them as much as circumstances permit. Nothing is more calculated to disgust the people of those Colonies and to make them desire the return of peace.²

The Indians who participated in these raids did so not as pawns of their European neighbors, but with their own specific goals: the willingness of the French to supply the Ohio and Susquehanna Indians with food and weapons which they could use against the British provided a rare opportunity to drive back the British onslaught and prevent future encroachment on their homelands; the willingness of the Virginians to provide the Cherokees and Catawbias with supplies offered them the possibility of freedom from the South Carolinian trade-monopoly.³

² John Romeyn Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, 15 Vols., (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons and Co., 1853-1887) 10:413.

³ For clarity and brevity I have referred to those Indians who support favored the French as "francophile," and those who favored the English as "anglophile." The men who influenced and controlled the policies of Indian groups I have referred to simply as "leaders" rather than the more culturally biased "chiefs." This terminology avoids particular confusion as contemporary accounts referred to Indian leaders by numerous different terms, shaman, chief, half-king, and king, to name but a few. The search for a term is further complicated because the Indian leaders' claims to their position varied greatly. Some of the leaders occupied "recognized" leadership positions from leading tribal families, for example Shingas and the Beaver, two leaders of the Ohio Delawares. Some were appointed to their position, and held power by the nature of their backers, such as Scarouady, whose sole claim to leadership over the Ohio Indians was his appointment by the Iroquois. Others, such as Teedyuscung, rose to prominence merely because of their own personal leadership abilities.

The French and their Indian allies conducted the war not as a series of random, uncoordinated, and brutal raids, but with a central strategy. While many raiding parties did not coordinate their individual activities, the general pattern of the raids reveals an element of planning by both the Indians and the French. On occasion the raids concentrated on cutting communications with the Cherokees, or on isolating British supply routes, at other times they focused on destroying isolated frontier posts, or even threatening peace negotiations by sowing doubts about the reliability of specific Indian groups.

For the French and their Indian allies the war in this theater was a stunning success. Pennsylvania and Virginia, two of the wealthiest and most populous colonies in North America, along with the less important colonies of North Carolina and Maryland, did not contribute to the war effort in the northern colonies. The raids were considerably more destructive than historians have recognized. The Indians and the French killed over two thousand British subjects. In addition raiders drove settlers from their homes in an area covering about twenty-thousand square miles, and returned to their homes loaded with booty. British captives filled Indian towns from the Delaware to the Wabash Rivers, and British cattle grazed in Indian meadows throughout the region.

While the Seven Years' War has traditionally been viewed as a great victory for British and American arms, in the

middle colonies it was a fiasco. The only successes came when the British had large numbers of southern Indian allies, particularly the Cherokees, or when events elsewhere precipitated French action. The reaction of the colonists only aided the success of the French and their allies. While the French and francophile Indians devastated the backcountry, frontier settlers refused to aid the war effort. Indeed, they seized every opportunity to profit from the distress of others.

In recent years historians have commenced a new struggle over the nomenclature of the conflict. This struggle indicates many of the issues ignored by historians. Called by contemporaries simply "the last great war," generations of Americans have known the conflict as "The French and Indian War." However, recent historians have, with good reason, objected to this term because it implies that blame for the conflict lay with the French and Indians, and ignores the fact that Indians fought on both sides. These historians have chosen instead to term the war "the Seven Years' War." Calling the conflict the Seven Years' War avoids much of the jingoism and ethnocentricity invoked by the French and Indian War. But this term is also misleading. It insinuates that the struggle in North America was a by-product of the greater conflict in Europe as were most of the colonial wars. But the origins of this struggle lay solely in North America and the war in Europe was in many ways instigated by the struggle in

North America.⁴ The term also disregards the involvement of a crucial participant in North America, the Indians. The Seven Years' War was a European struggle fought from 1756 to 1763 between the French and their allies the Austrians and Russians against the Prussians and their allies the British. The war in North America was a struggle fought from 1754 to 1760 between the French and their allies the Great Lakes Indians, the Delawares, the Shawnees, and supported by several lesser tribes, against the British and their allies the Cherokees, Catawbas, and, at least in name, the Iroquois.

Lawrence Henry Gipson avoided this dilemma by creating his own term "the Great War for the Empire." In many ways this is the most suitable term for the war suggestive of the conflicting imperial claims of the French and British as a cause of the war and of its world-wide nature. Stephen Auth has also coined his own term, naming the conflict in Pennsylvania "The Ten Years' War." However, as neither "The Great War for the Empire" nor "The Ten Years' War" are in common usage. For this reason this study will refer to the conflict as the Seven Years' War.⁵

⁴ It is probably more accurate to argue that the war in North America provided a catalyst for the unrelated conflict in Europe.

⁵ Stephen F. Auth, *The Ten Years' War: Indian-White Relations in Pennsylvania, 1755-1765*, (New York, NY: Garland Publishing, 1989); Lawrence Henry Gipson, *The British Empire Before The American Revolution*, 15 Vols., (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1936-1970).

The "Eurocentric" approach to the war is reflected in other aspects of the historiography of the conflict. From late-nineteenth-century historians, such as Francis Parkman, to late-twentieth-century "ethnohistorians," such as Francis Jennings, scholars have focused most of their attention on the military maneuvers in New York and Nova Scotia and on the St. Lawrence, all but ignoring the war in the Ohio Valley and in the backcountry of Virginia and Pennsylvania.

Francis Parkman's work laid the groundwork for many later historians. Parkman was the first historian to closely examine the war and Indian involvement in the conflict. However, Parkman's work has long been acknowledged as deeply flawed and outdated. The pages overflow with patriotic sentiment: Parkman generally depicts the French as scheming, corrupt fops; the Indians are savage, mindless, brutes; while the English and their colonists represent the forces of progress, civilization, and democracy. More seriously, some historians have even questioned Parkman's use of sources and accused him of inventing evidence.⁶

Francis Jennings' *Empire of Fortune* is more than a corrective to Parkman. Jennings' study is the first to pay adequate attention to the intricacies and significance of Indian diplomacy and to view the Indian actions as rational

⁶ Francis Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1890). For a discussion of Parkman's work and accuracy see Francis Jennings, "Francis Parkman, A Brahmin Among Untouchables," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Ser. 42 (1985), 305-328.

and reasoned. But Jennings' work is in a different way as flawed as Parkman's. Portraying almost every incident as part of a grand conspiracy of either the colonial administrators for personal profit, or of imperial bureaucrats to remove the colonists' power, large parts of Jennings' work are deeply flawed and distorted. Jennings directly challenges critics of his conspiratorial view of the war arguing that "critics of conspiracy theories of history deserve respect only after they attend to the evidence of conspiracy facts."⁷ Most importantly Jennings develops a complex series of conspiracies around the Walking Purchase of 1737, upon which he blames the alienation of the Susquehanna Delawares. As a result, he portrays Pennsylvania's Indian diplomacy during the war as a struggle simply between those conspiring to hide the fraud, the Penns and the Proprietary faction, and those seeking to unearth the details, the Quakers and many assemblymen.

The most balanced account of the war is Canadian Guy Frégault's *Canada: The War of the Conquest*. Frégault portrays the war as the result of the conflicting imperial ambitions of the two European powers. The colonists, British and French, were simply the unfortunate victims of the clash. Frégault's narrative has a distinctly anti-Parisian tone, reflecting the animosity still felt by many French-Canadians for the manner in which they feel the French government deserted them.

⁷ Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies & Tribes in the Seven Years' War in America*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988). The quotation appears on p.259.

However, Frégault pays almost no attention to Indian diplomacy, and all but totally ignores the war on the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier.⁸

The most encompassing account of the war is Lawrence Henry Gipson's multi-volume study *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*. Gipson shows how the struggle was a world war, and how events in North America influenced those in Europe, Africa and Asia. However, perhaps surprisingly, Gipson's coverage of the war in the Ohio Valley is shallow, and he too pays little attention to the raids on the frontier.⁹ Studies of the war in this region have been few and restricted. Hayes Baker Crothers' *Virginia and the French and Indian War* concentrates primarily on the political impact of the war and goes into little detail. As disappointing is the more recent work of James Titus' *The Old Dominion at War*, which concentrates primarily on the history of the Virginia Regiment during the war.¹⁰ Studies of Pennsylvania's involvement in the war are even fewer; the colony lacks any in-depth monographic study of the war. Work has been

⁸ Guy Frégault, *Canada: The War of the Conquest*, trans. Margaret Cameron, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969).

⁹ Lawrence Henry Gipson, *The British Empire Before The American Revolution*, 15 vols, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1958-)

¹⁰ Hayes Baker-Crothers, *Virginia and the French and Indian War*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928). James Titus, *The Old Dominion at War: Society, Politics, and Warfare in Late Colonial Virginia*, (Columbia S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1991).

restricted to articles detailing specific incidents, except for Stephen Auth's published undergraduate honors thesis *The Ten Years' War*, which is the fullest study of the war in the colony.¹¹

Several doctoral dissertations illuminate aspects of the conflict. Chester Raymond Young's "The Effects of the French and Indian War on Civilian Life in the Frontier Counties of Virginia, 1754-1763," provides a useful quantitative account of the impact of the war.¹² Michael McConnell's "The Search for Security: Indian-English Relations in the Trans-Appalachian Region, 1758-1763," while focusing primarily on the years after the fall of Fort Duquesne until Pontiac's uprising, provides an excellent survey of anglo-Indian relations in the Ohio Valley during the period of the Seven Years' War.¹³

¹¹ Stephen F. Auth, *The Ten Years' War: Indian-White Relations in Pennsylvania, 1755-1765*, (New York, NY: Garland Publishing, 1989). The most prolific author of articles has been Donald Kent, editor of *The Henry Bouquet Papers*. See especially "The French Advance into the Ohio Country," *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine*, 37 (1954), 135-141; "The French Occupy the Ohio Country," *Pennsylvania History*, 21 (1954), 301-314.

¹² Chester Raymond Young, "The Effects of the French and Indian War on Civilian Life in the Frontier Counties of Virginia, 1754-1763," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1969.

¹³ Michael N. McConnell, "The Search for Security: Indian English Relations in the Trans-Appalachian Region, 1758-1763," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The College of William and Mary, 1983.

Several other studies have investigated important aspects of the war. Several touch upon the impact of the war in creating popular dissatisfaction with government policies. Marc Egnal's *A Mighty Empire* examines the role of expansionist ideology in fueling opposition to British policy and fermenting the Revolution. In *Empire and Liberty* Alan Rogers studies many of the political disputes spawned by the war.¹⁴ Two works study the war from the "Indian perspective." Anthony Wallace's *King of the Delawares* focuses on the life of Delaware leader Teedyuscung to provide a vehicle for the study of the Susquehanna Delawares during the period.¹⁵ David Corkran's *The Cherokee Frontier*, provides a detailed history of Anglo-Cherokee relations from the early eighteenth century through to the Revolution and illustrates the fluctuating relations between the tribe and the colonial authorities which resulted in their providing substantial assistance for the British from 1756 to 1758, and then assaulting the frontier from 1759 to 1761.¹⁶

¹⁴ Alan Rogers, *Empire and Liberty: American Resistance to British Authority, 1753-1763*, (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1974); Marc Egnal. *A Mighty Empire: The Origins of the American Revolution*, (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988).

¹⁵ Anthony F.C. Wallace, *King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung, 1700-1763*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949).

¹⁶ David Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier: Conflict and Survival, 1740-1762*, (Norman Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962).

None of these studies has explored the conflict on the frontier in detail. Yet only through a full examination of the war on the frontier is it possible to provide an adequate appraisal of the struggle. Such a study as this also provides insight into the mindset of the backcountry settlers during a period of intense strife, in a region which saw considerable unrest in the following years and which has been the focus of much recent study.¹⁷

¹⁷ Slaughter, *The Whiskey Rebellion*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986); Ronald Hoffman, Thad Tate, Peter Albert, eds., *An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry During the American Revolution*, (Charlottesville, Va: University of Virginia Press, 1985).

Chapter I

The Blood of the English War Comes to the Ohio Valley

It is in the blood of Englishmen to hate Frenchmen
--Mémoire sur les Colonies françoises et angloises. . .¹

In the summer of 1748 diplomats from all over Europe gathered in the ancient city of Aix-La-Chapelle to negotiate an end to four years of blood-letting between Great Britain and France. After several months of negotiations a settlement was finally reached: Great Britain would restore to France all colonial conquests, most importantly the fortress of Louisbourg at the mouth of the St. Lawrence River, and guarantee colonial boundaries; France, in turn, would restore conquests in Europe, particularly the barrier fortresses in the Netherlands.² The Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle seemed to provide, at least for some time, an opportunity for peace in

¹ 'Mémoire sur les Colonies françoises et angloises de l'Amerique Septentrionale,' 1739, quoted in Guy Frégault, *Canada: The War of the Conquest*, trans. Margaret Cameron (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969), p.3.

² W.A. Speck, *Stability and Strife, England 1714-1760*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp.252-253; J.R. Jones, *Britain and the World 1649-1815*, (Brighton, England: Harvester Press Ltd., 1980), pp.206-207.

Europe. Over three thousand miles away, however, events were in motion which would undermine the efforts of the diplomats in Aix-La-Chapelle.

In 1748 conditions in the Ohio Valley seemed to be turning in favor of Great Britain. Many of the Indians were abandoning their traditional support of the French and adopting a more anglophile stance, seeking closer ties diplomatically and economically with the English. Yet only seven years later the Ohio Indians devastated the frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania with astonishing success. The Ohio tribes were not alienated by a secret conspiracy amongst members of the English and colonial elite, but rather by repeated political miscalculations and diplomatic blunders influenced by greedy Virginia land speculators and Pennsylvania traders.³

While the diplomats convened in Europe, in the dusty, backcountry hamlet of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, a group of rather less distinguished delegates gathered for a conference. Delegates from the colonies of Virginia and Pennsylvania joined representatives from the Iroquois Confederacy and

³ Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988) Jennings portrays the origins of the war as enmeshed in a series of conspiracies. Everywhere groups were conspiring to rob others of their rights. To deflect criticism he comments that "critics of conspiracy theories of history deserve respect only after they attend to the evidence of conspiracy facts." Unfortunately the evidence for most of Jennings' conspiracies is non-existent, and instead rather points to incompetence and blunders by the parties, particularly the British and colonial authorities. p.259.

several Ohio Valley tribes, most notably the Shawnees, Delawares and Twightwees⁴. The conference served several purposes. The English had called the Indians to Lancaster to strengthen the ties they had made with the Indians of the western Ohio Valley during the latter years of King George's War. Several of the western tribes had recently thrown out the French traders amongst them and sought to exclude French influence. The English were now faced with a great opportunity to exploit their discontent.⁵

The Ohio Indians came to the meeting with different purposes. For some the meeting was an opportunity to atone for their support of the French during King George's War, as the War of the Austrian Succession was called in North America. Claiming they had been "seduc'd" to join the French who had "promis'd us great Things," the Shawnees admitted that they had "been a foolish People & acted wrong" and promised "better behaviour for the future." In response the English

⁴ The Twightwees were a confederacy of several tribes, called the Miamis by the French. The Miamis were also the largest of the three tribes who made up the confederacy, the others being the Piankashaws and Weas. Bruce G. Trigger, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians: The North East* (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), p.597.

⁵ Lawrence Henry Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution: Zones of International Friction, North America, South of the Great Lakes Region, 1748-1754*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1939), p.175.

commissioners formally forgave them "on Condition of better behaviour for the future."⁶

For the western Indians, particularly the Twightwees, the meeting in Lancaster was an opportunity to develop a closer relationship with the English, with whom they had had little previous contact. Eager for the benefits of English trade the western Indians sought acceptance from the English and the promise that more traders would be sent to them in the future.⁷ But most important, the Ohio Indians came to Lancaster to inform the English that they would no longer abide by the decisions of the Iroquois and instead wanted the English to treat them as equals rather than subordinates of the Iroquois. Indeed, the Ohio Indians were opposing the wishes of the Iroquois by attending the conference.⁸

The desires of the Ohio Indians posed a major dilemma for the English which they proved incapable of resolving. By circumstance the Ohio Indians had tended to side with the French. Both the Ohio Indians and the French were hostile to the Iroquois who claimed the lands upon which the Ohio Indians

⁶ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania: Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania*, 16 Vols. (Harrisburg, Pa.: Theo. Fenn and Co., 1852-1853), 5:311, 316.

⁷ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:317; Stephen Cutcliffe, "Indians, Furs and Empires: The Changing Policies of New York and Pennsylvania, 1674-1768," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Lehigh University, 1976), pp.18-19.

⁸ Lois Mulkearn ed., *George Mercer Papers Relating to the Ohio Company of Virginia* (Pittsburgh Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1954), p.476; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:145-147.

lived and were historic enemies of the French and in turn close allies of the English.⁹ The English had two options: they could recognize the Ohio Indians as equals of the Iroquois and lose Iroquois support, or they could continue to recognize the Iroquois as the masters of the Ohio Valley and lose the potential support of the Ohio Indians.

This was a difficult decision. Since the late seventeenth century the English had recognized the Iroquois as the speakers for other tribes in the Northeast. The "Covenant Chain" which linked the English to the Iroquois and the Iroquois to the other tribes was the cornerstone of English Indian policy. The system had enabled the English more easily to control their relations with the Indians, and it enhanced Iroquois power and prestige. At Albany in 1722 the Shawnees had been formally placed under Iroquois direction. However, by the mid-eighteenth century the Iroquois had become dependent upon the English to enforce their power over the other Indian tribes.¹⁰

There were compelling reasons why the English should support the Iroquois. The English claim to the Ohio Valley came from the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 in which the French had recognized that the Iroquois were "under the Dominion of

⁹ Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984), pp.350-351.

¹⁰ Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, pp.148-149, 297-301, 363.

the Crown of Great Britain." In turn, the Iroquois claimed the Ohio Valley as a conquest, and thus as Iroquois territory it was English territory. To decide that the Iroquois were not masters of the Ohio put into doubt any English claim to the region.¹¹

Still more important to many, only four years earlier in Lancaster the Iroquois had sold for £400 to Virginia "the Right and Title of our Sovereign the King of Great Britain to all the lands within the said Colony, as it is now or hereafter may be peopled and bounded by his said Majesty."¹² The Iroquois later claimed that they had thought they were only ceding a strip of land along the Appalachians, most notably the Shenandoah Valley, to the English. But the English saw the cession as including all lands that could be claimed by Virginia. As Virginia's charter gave the colony a claim to most of North America from the Atlantic to the Pacific the Iroquois had unwittingly given up any claim of theirs to North America outside Iroquoia. If the Iroquois

¹¹ In the seventeenth century the Iroquois, in a series of campaigns, had driven other Indian tribes from the Ohio Valley. "Representation of the State of the Colonies in North America, 1754", British Library, Additional Mss., London, 33,029:156-163.

¹² Deed of Release of Lands in Virginia, by Six Nations, at the Treaty of Lancaster, 1744, Ralph Boehm ed., *British Public Record Office, Class 5 Files*, [from originals in the Library of Congress] (Frederick, Md., University Publications of America, Inc. 1983), Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1330) 12:168-170

were not really masters of the Ohio, the treaty of Lancaster was worthless.¹³

In return for the Lancaster grant the English had reconfirmed that they would recognize Iroquois suzerainty over the Ohio territory. This claim had once had some validity, but by 1748 it was far from true. In the early 1730s, on the prompting of the French, the Shawnees moved from the Tennessee Valley to the Ohio Valley.¹⁴ They were soon followed by other groups of Indians. The Twightwees moved east into the region between the Miami and Wabash rivers. The Wyandots moved south to the southwestern shores of Lake Erie. The Delawares, forced out of their homelands on the Delaware and Susquehanna rivers, moved west to the upper reaches of the Ohio River. Some dissident Iroquois joined them on the southeastern shores of Lake Erie, establishing their own hybrid tribal identity, the Mingoos.¹⁵

The Ohio tribes developed several substantial settlements in the region. A few miles downstream from the Forks of the

¹³ "Deed of Release of Lands in Virginia," Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1330) 12:169; Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, pp.359-362.

¹⁴ Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution, Zones of International Friction*, 4:154-155; Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent, eds., *Wilderness Chronicles of Northwestern Pennsylvania* (Harrisburg, Pa: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1941), pp.3-4, 5-6.

¹⁵ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:464; Michael N. McConnell, "The Search for Security: Indian English Relations in the Trans-Appalachian Region, 1758-1763" (Ph.D. Dissertation, College of William and Mary, 1983), pp.8-9.; Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, p. 308.

Ohio was the town of Logstown. Founded in 1743 by Kakawatcheky, who had migrated to the Ohio Valley from eastern Pennsylvania, Logstown served as a place of general rendezvous for most of the Ohio Indians and a trading center for the eastern Ohio Valley.¹⁶ Also on the Ohio River, a few miles downstream from the mouth of the Scioto River, was Old Shawnee Town. During the late 1740s and early 1750s the town, which straddled the Ohio River, was a major political center for the Ohio tribes, home to Shingas and the Beaver, two of the dominant Shawnee leaders of the region. By 1748 Lower Shawnee Town contained over 150 houses and was capable of furnishing over three hundred warriors. But in 1753 it was destroyed by a flood and many of its inhabitants moved a few miles north up the Scioto River to Lower Shawnee Town, which remained an important political center for the Shawnees throughout the 1750s.¹⁷ North of Logstown, near the confluence of Neshanock and Mahoning Creeks, was a complex of Delaware villages known as Kuskuskies Town which contained almost one hundred houses and was an important political center for the Delawares in the Ohio Valley.¹⁸ West of the region, on the branches of the

¹⁶ Mulkearn ed., *George Mercer Papers*, p.476.

¹⁷ Mulkearn ed., *George Mercer Papers*, *Journal of Christopher Gist*, p.16.; Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution, Zones of International Friction*, 4:159.

¹⁸ McConnell, "The Search for Security," p.11; Michael McConnel, "Kuskusky Towns and Early Western Pennsylvania Indian History, 1748-1778," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, (January 1992) 116:33-58.

Miami River was the Twightwee trading town of Pickawillany, one of the fastest growing centers in the Ohio Valley in the late 1740s, containing over four hundred families. Attracting traders from Pennsylvania, who were protected by a blockhouse built by George Croghan, Pickawillany served as a symbol of English penetration into the Ohio Valley.¹⁹

By 1748 the Ohio tribes were more populous and powerful than the Iroquois Confederacy which supposedly retained suzerainty over them. Both Conrad Weiser and Governor Hamilton sensed these important shifts in the traditional balance of power. In 1752 Hamilton informed Richard and Thomas Penn, the proprietors of Pennsylvania, that

The Six Nations consider the Western Indians not as Councillors but Hunters, and wou'd take it amiss to have them treated with in any other manner than as a People depending upon them; on the other hand the Western Indians Look upon it, as the truth is, that they either are, or soon will be, as numerous and powerful as the Six Nations at Onondago; & therefore will not be content to take the Law from them.²⁰

The English, nonetheless, refused to make a clear choice and continued to treat with the Iroquois on matters dealing with the Ohio Valley. Simultaneously, they consulted with the Ohio Indians to win their acceptance of their schemes. At Logstown, for instance, in 1752, even though they had invited

¹⁹ McConnell, "The Search for Security," pp. 5-18; Mulkearn ed., *George Mercer Papers*, p.18-19, 491.

²⁰ Governor Hamilton to Richard Penn and Thomas Penn, [1752], *Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs*, 2:20.

the Ohio Indians, it was the Iroquois to whom the English addressed their speeches and from whom they sought answers. As a result neither side was satisfied. The reason for this disastrous policy lay in the opposing influences upon English policy makers. Pennsylvania traders sought to draw the Ohio Indians closer to the English, while Virginia land speculators sought to acquire their lands as quickly and cheaply as possible. The Pennsylvanians sought negotiations with the Ohio tribes, the Virginians with the Iroquois.

During King George's War the English sent several diplomatic missions to the Ohio Indians. These missions were quickly followed by traders from Pennsylvania who established a substantial trading network. The preference of the Ohio Valley Indians for English goods over French hastened the growth of the Pennsylvania trade. During most of the 1740s and early 1750s French goods were scarce and expensive, owing to profiteering by the suppliers in France and the leaseholders of the western posts.²¹ In 1749 the Intendant of New France, François Bigot, complained to the government in France about the poor quality of trade goods sent to Canada. The cloth was "frightful; the red cloth is brown and unpressed; the blue of a very inferior quality to that of the English." Bigot predicted that "as long as such ventures are

²¹ W.J. Eccles, *The Canadian Frontier: 1534-1760* 2d ed., (Alburquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1983), pp.151-153.

sent, they will not become favourites with the Indians."²² As a result, the Pennsylvania trade boomed. By 1748 there were over twenty English traders in Logstown alone and a similar number at Pickawilany. George Croghan in particular had established an extensive trading network and had "accounts" with several hundred Ohio Valley Indians. By 1750 the skin and fur trade provided Pennsylvania with over one-third of its exports, while around a third of the total London trade in deerskin came from Pennsylvania.²³

The impact of European trade goods on the Ohio Valley Indians was significant. The Indians of the Ohio Valley were not primitive subsistence hunters who sold their surplus to purchase luxury items, but had become tied into a complex nexus of trade stretching back to western Europe. When Christopher Gist visited the home of Delaware Chief Windaughakah on the Scioto River, he was entertained lavishly and was waited upon by his black slave, hardly the reception to be expected several hundred miles from the nearest European settlement.²⁴ The Indians came to depend upon trade to supply them with various items which became all but essential to

²² Abstract of Despatches from Canada, 1749, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, 10:200.

²³ Cutcliffe, "Indians, Furs and Empires," p.221; Mulkearn, ed., *George Mercer Papers*, p.476; "Accounts of Ohio Traders," H.S.P., Cadwallader Collection: Trent-Croghan Papers.

²⁴ "Journal of Christopher Gist," Mulkearn, ed., *George Mercer Papers*, p.14

their existence. As a result, whoever controlled the Indian trade could exercise great influence over the Indians. In particular, the Indians sought access to European cloth, arms, and ammunition. Thomas Lee, acting governor of Virginia before Robert Dinwiddie's arrival, candidly informed the Board of Trade in 1749 that if the Indians "are not Supplied with Guns[,] Ammunition, & Cloths, by presents and trade; they must starve; soe they are Obliged to cultivate a friendship with those that will help them."²⁵

The development of the Pennsylvania fur and skin trade in the Ohio Valley had significant international repercussions. As the Ohio Indians came into contact with English traders their allegiances slowly shifted. Before King George's War the Ohio tribes had had little contact with the English. The French cultivated their ties by supplying the Ohio Valley Indians with trade goods. The arrival of a large number of Pennsylvania traders threatened to overturn French influence in the area. Indeed at Sandusky on Lake Erie in 1747, a group of Wyandots led by their "Chief Nicholas," whom some Pennsylvania traders had supplied with arms, killed and drove out the French traders there.²⁶

²⁵ Thomas Lee to Board of Trade, October 18, 1749, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1327) 11:605-607; McConnell, "The Search for Security," pp.27-38.

²⁶ Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution, Zones of International Friction*, 4:175.

If trade alone had been the only desire of the English they might have succeeded in winning the allegiance of the Ohio Indians. But in Virginia in particular, wealthy gentlemen cast their eyes upon the fertile lands of the Ohio Valley. From the early 1740s, when fur traders and trappers first crossed the Appalachians, reports, often exaggerated, of the fertility and possibilities for settlement in the region filtered eastward. Travellers such as Peter Salley, a German immigrant from Augusta County, Virginia, described the Ohio Valley in glowing terms: "well Water'd, there are plenty of Rivulets[,] clear fountains[,] and running Streams and very fertile Soil." There were even salt and lead mines in the region which could be profitably exploited.²⁷ Such reports could not fail to whet the appetites of land-hungry Virginians.

From 1745, requests for land grants on the frontier flooded the Virginia Council. In April 1745 the Council granted over 300,000 acres on the frontier of Augusta County to four land companies. In November the Blair-Russell Company was granted 100,000 acres in Frederick County adjacent to Lord Fairfax's land. In April 1747 the Council issued another grant of 50,000 acres on the Youghiogheny River adjacent to the Blair-Russell grant to William McMachon and Company. In

²⁷ "A Brief Account of the Travels of Peter Salley a German who Lives in the County of Augusta in Virginia," Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1327) 11:657, 659

1749 they made even larger grants: 500,000 acres on the New River, 50,000 acres on the Ohio, and 800,000 acres on the border of Virginia and North Carolina.²⁸

These grants represented an unprecedented interest in land speculation by the Virginia elite. Settlers were not driven west by a shortage of land, but rather wealthy eastern planters saw a potential to make profits by claiming the best western lands and later selling them to immigrant smallholders.²⁹ The government was willing to make these grants because many Virginia burgesses and Councilors were themselves involved in land speculation, while the process had appeared to work well in speeding the settlement of the Shenandoah Valley on the Fairfax, Beverley, and Borden Lands. The land companies did serve a useful purpose. Once they had obtained their lands, they "sell & parcel them to poor People that come from other Colonies to the North. . . who cannot bear the Expencc of coming down. . . [to Williamsburg] to make their Entries, & other Necessaries in taking up Lands." This enabled many smaller planters, particularly new immigrants, to

²⁸ H.R. McIlwaine, ed, *Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia*, 6 Vols., (Richmond Va.: Virginia State Library, 1925-1966), 5:172-173, 191-195, 231-232, 295-298; Alfred P. James, *The Ohio Company: Its Inner History*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959), p.9.

²⁹ Allan Kulikoff illustrates how small-scale speculation drove the settlement of Virginia into the piedmont, *Tobacco and Slaves: The Development of Southern Cultures in the Chesapeake, 1680-1800* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1986), pp.141-157.

gain a toehold on the way to becoming established landowners. In other circumstances these people would not have been able to bear the expense of surveying and patenting their lands.³⁰

The flood of so many and such large requests for lands caused Governor William Gooch to become apprehensive about the advisability of the grants if they "might possibly give Umbrage to the French." In November 1747 and again in the summer of 1748, he wrote to London requesting advice on making any further grants.³¹ But while Gooch's reservations increased, so did the power and influence of by far the most important and influential of all the land companies, the Ohio Company of Virginia. With members and supporters, including the Earl of Halifax the president of the Board of Trade, expounding their case at the highest levels of government, the Board of Trade proclaimed that indeed the settlement of the Virginia frontier in that manner "will be for His Majesty's Interest, and the Advantage and Security of that and the Neighbouring Provinces."³² At the same time the departure

³⁰ Gov. Dinwiddie to Board of Trade, June 16, 1753, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1327) 11:788-789; Robert D. Mitchell, *Commercialism and Frontier: Perspectives on the Early Shenandoah Valley*, (Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1977), pp.59-65, 78-84.

³¹ Gov. Gooch to Board of Trade, June 16 1748, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1327) 11:548-554; Mulkearn, ed., *George Mercer Papers*, p.1

³² Orders in Council, November 24, 1748, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1327) 11:550; Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, pp.12-13.

of Gooch from Virginia and his replacement, at first by Thomas Lee as acting governor and then by Robert Dinwiddie, aided the cause of the company. Both Lee and Dinwiddie were active members of the company and could be relied upon to further its cause. Dinwiddie himself divulged that he had "the Success and Prosperity of the Ohio Company much at Heart."³³

In January 1749 John Hanbury, a wealthy London merchant and leading member of the Ohio Company, presented the Crown with the company's petition for a land grant. Unlike the other Virginia land companies, the Ohio Company was to receive its charter directly from the crown, not from the governor and council. In February the petition received royal assent and the company acquired the right to 500,000 acres on the Ohio. The Crown granted 200,000 acres immediately, exempt of quitrents for ten years. The other 300,000 acres were to be received later, on condition of the company "seating at their proper Expence a hundred Familys upon the Lands in Seven Years" and of their "Erecting a Fort and maintaining a Garrison for the protection of the Settlement."³⁴ The Ohio Company thus acted as more than just a holder of land for sale

³³ Gov. Dinwiddie to Thomas Cressap, January 23, 1752, R.A. Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758*, 2 vols. (Richmond Va.: Virginia Historical Society Collections, 1883-1884), 1:17-18; Louis Knott Koontz, *Robert Dinwiddie: His Career in American Colonial Government and Westward Expansion*, (Glendale, Ca.: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1941), p.159.

³⁴ Orders in Council, February 9, 1749, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1327) 11:551-553; Mulkearn ed., *George Mercer Papers*, p.1-2.

to potential settlers. The company was to be actively involved in the development of their lands and envisioned settling German Protestants from the Rhineland and engaging in the lucrative Ohio fur trade.³⁵

As soon as the company heard of the grant, they ordered Hanbury to purchase the necessary goods for the Indian trade. They settled upon a location upon the Potomac at the mouth of Wills' Creek as the best location for their first company warehouse, and hired Christopher Gist to explore the Ohio Valley to ascertain the best area for settlement.³⁶ There were now only two obstacles in the way of the company: the opposition of the French and the attitude of the Ohio Indians. In the company's eyes, neither seemed insurmountable, for there seemed no reason that the Indians should strongly object to the settlement of lands they had already ceded at Lancaster, nor why the French should oppose the settlement of lands they had showed no interest in developing and which were rightly English. To the French and Ohio Indians, however, the plans of the Ohio Company did pose a major threat.

As long as the English did not physically occupy the Ohio Valley, the French had paid little attention to it. However once news of the proposed settlements reached Canada, the French perceived a challenge to the integrity of New France.

³⁵ Petition of John Hanbury, presented February 9, 1749, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (vol. 1327) 11:555-560; James, *The Ohio Company*, p.14.

³⁶ Mulkearn, ed., *George Mercer Papers*, pp.5, 7-10, 142.

Economically, the worth of the Ohio Valley to the French was questionable. In September 1748 the acting governor general in Quebec, Roland-Michel, marquis de La Galissonnière, wrote to Paris that the French settlements and lands in the interior of North America had "been praised greatly beyond their just value, scarcely a person can be found to-day who regards them as good for anything." They were "so remote," and even "the fur trade carried on there [is] one of the least advantageous in Canada."³⁷

However, while economically of little worth, the Ohio Valley was strategically vital. The Ohio was "almost the only route for the conveyance from Canada to the River Mississippi."³⁸ In addition, the French felt that if they did not secure the region the English would quickly overrun it and succeed in "intruding themselves between our two Colonies, the loss of the Mississippi and the ruin of the internal trade of Canada would be assured." Penning the English in by the Appalachians appeared the only means "to prevent their penetrating into our trading colonies and even into Mexico."³⁹ Before the plans of the Ohio Company the Ohio Valley had

³⁷ La Galissonnière to Count de Maurepas, September 1, 1748, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:134.

³⁸ La Galissonnière, Memoir on the French Colonies in North America, December 1750, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:229.

³⁹ La Galissonnière to Count de Maurepas, September 1, 1748, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:134-136.

seemed hardly worth attention: by 1749 French officials in Canada were arguing the necessity of establishing "one or more trading posts on the Belle Rivière [Ohio] or in its vicinity, and especially toward its headwaters" to secure the loyalty of the Indians and to counteract English influence.⁴⁰ This brought the interests of the Ohio Company, the Pennsylvania traders, and the French into direct conflict.

To Englishmen not involved in the fur and skin trade or in land speculation, the importance of the Ohio Valley was less tangible. The English claimed the Ohio Valley. To allow the French to settle the region was an affront to English pride and prestige. It impinged upon the abstract and overwhelming fear and hatred of France which permeated all English dealings with the French and offended the chauvinism of those in Great Britain and the colonies who saw most of North America as a future part of the British Empire.⁴¹ Moreover, the English feared that if the French gained possession of the Ohio Valley, they would restrict the English colonies to the Atlantic seaboard while they would expand unhindered into the interior. Paranoia enabled the English to believe that the French were even capable of destroying their colonies and would "soon be in a Condition, by the nature of

⁴⁰ Marquis de La Jonquière to Comte de Maurepas September 20, 1749, Stevens and Kent, eds., *Wilderness Chronicles*, pp.26-27.

⁴¹ Marc Egnal, *A Mighty Empire: The Origins of the American Revolution*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp.11-15.

their Situation, to seize upon either Pensilvania, Maryland, Virginia, or the Carolina's, or drive us from the whole."⁴² This strategic rhetoric was used in Whitehall, Philadelphia, and Williamsburg to justify English actions. However, behind it lurked baser motives of the Pennsylvania traders and Virginia land speculators who sought to exclude the French from the region. But it failed to convince everyone.

In 1748 neither Great Britain or France was prepared to go to war over the Ohio Valley. Both governments attempted to restrain the colonial authorities from starting any such conflict. But over the next seven years the dispute in the Ohio Valley steadily grew. As each new dispute broke, both sides escalated the conflict, gambling that the threat of a larger war would prevent the other from taking further action. At first the contestants seized trade goods. Then they attacked Indian allies. Finally, colonial troops clashed and the ensuing global war engulfed four continents.

Initially, the French were reluctant to use force so soon after the Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle and restricted themselves to issuing threats and strengthening their claims. The French first attempted to weaken the English alliance with the Iroquois by exciting jealousies between them. They sent parties of Caughnawaga Indians amongst the Iroquois to inform them of English plans to occupy the Ohio Valley. They

⁴² P. Collinson, "Some Thoughts upon the French Scheme and the Ohio Country," February 25, 1757, British Library, Add. Mss., 33,029:380-381.

stressed that when the French "occupied" a territory they merely sought the friendship of the Indians and established a few trading posts, but when the English occupied an area they established settlements and destroyed the Indians' hunting grounds. They tried to convince the Iroquois that since the end of King George's War the English had ignored them, pointing to the reluctance of the English to help the Iroquois gain the release of prisoners held in Canada and to the attention and gifts which the English had lavished on the Catawbas since the war as compared to their relative disregard of the Iroquois.⁴³

The English quickly moved to forestall French influence amongst the Iroquois. In 1750 the Council of Virginia sent Conrad Weiser with an invitation to the Iroquois to come to Fredericksburg, Virginia, for a conference with the Catawbas and to discuss grievances. But much to the Virginians' surprise, the Iroquois refused, claiming they feared disease so far from their homeland. Their refusal showed their disdain for their recent neglect by the English.⁴⁴

The French also consolidated their claim to the Ohio Valley. In the summer of 1749 acting governor de La Galissonière sent an expedition, headed by Pierre-Joseph

⁴³ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:470-480; *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 5:332.

⁴⁴ *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 5:332, 333, 340; Thomas Lee to Board of Trade, June 12, 1750, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1327) 11:601-604; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:477.

Céloron de Blainville, down the Ohio River to bury lead plates claiming the region for the French and to investigate the extent of Indian defections. De Blainville commanded a large detachment of 230 men including regular troops and Abenaki and Caughnawaga Indians. From the Ohio he wrote a warning letter to Governor Hamilton of Pennsylvania, complaining about the presence of Pennsylvania traders in the Ohio, "a Country to which the English never had any pretension." He demanded that Hamilton "prohibit trade in the future, as it is contrary to the treaties; and notify your traders that they will expose themselves considerably, should they return to these countries."⁴⁵ What de Blainville discovered on the Ohio disturbed the French immensely. At Logstown English traders were furnishing the Indians with goods at one-quarter of the French price. Not only had the English won over most of the Shawnees and Delawares in the Ohio, but they had "succeeded in causing a revolt among the Miamis. . . These Indians had even invited the Illinois to join them."⁴⁶

De Blainville's expedition had not been large enough to do anything more than issue threats and investigate,

⁴⁵ Celeron de Blainville to Governor Hamilton, August 6, 1749, Stevens and Kent, eds., *Wilderness Chronicles* pp.25-26;

⁴⁶ Donald H. Kent, *The French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania, 1753*, (Harrisburg Pa.: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1954), p.9; "Ministerial Minute on Despatches from Canada," September 18, 1750, Brodhead, *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:219-220; Lord Halifax to the Duke of Newcastle, August 15, 1753, British Library, Add. Mss., 33,029:96-100; Eccles, *The Canadian Frontier*, p.159.

especially as he received an unfavorable reception from many of the Ohio Valley Indians, particularly at Pickawillany.⁴⁷ La Galissonière reacted de Blainville's reports by sending messages to the Ohio Indians, informing them that he was "much displeased with the usedge his solgers received from all the Indians that was settled on the Ohio." He warned that "if they Did not unaidedly send the English Traders home from among them and charge them never to return, that he was Determined to Disown them for his Children and send a party of men" to bring them into line.⁴⁸

Neither the Ohio Indians nor the English traders took the French threats seriously. The following year, 1750, the new governor of Canada, Pierre-Jacques de Taffanel, marquis de La Jonquière, decided to send a much larger expedition of "divers detachments of Frenchmen and Indians" to back up La Galissonière's threat, punish the Ohio Indians, and throw out the English. However, La Jonquière came across unexpected opposition from Canadian fur traders and merchants who feared that the scheme would spark a general Indian war. Instead, he abandoned the project, much to the chagrin of the government in Paris, and limited himself to seizing more English traders and establishing a trading post to compete with the English,

⁴⁷ Lord Halifax to the Duke of Newcastle, August 15, 1753, British Library, Add. Mss., 33,029:96-100.

⁴⁸ George Croghan to Richard Peters, November 25, 1749, H.S.P. Cadwallader Collection: Trent-Croghan Papers, 5:18.

hoping with the combination of threats and rewards to recover Indian allegiance without the use of force.⁴⁹

La Jonquière sent a party under Philippe Thomas de Joncaire to the Ohio to establish a trading post at Logstown, or Chiningué as the French called it. There Joncaire was to arrest all the English traders he could find and seize their goods, while offering gifts and presents to the Indians. At Logstown Joncaire came across Andrew Montour and George Croghan on a mission from the Pennsylvania Assembly. Croghan and Montour were two of the most influential and popular traders amongst the Ohio Indians. Any attempt to seize them in Logstown, surrounded by anglophile Indians, would have been difficult if not impossible. Instead Joncaire merely issued the same warning, that the Ohio Valley "has always belonged to the King of France, and the English have no right to go there to trade." He warned that English traders would no longer be able "to plead ignorance" if they were found, but would be arrested. Joncaire's failure to arrest Croghan and Montour seemed to prove that the French threats were empty. Neither were the Indians impressed by his gifts, for Montour and Croghan had bought £700 in gifts from Pennsylvania and

⁴⁹ "Ministerial Minute of the Attempts of the English to settle on the Ohio," September 23, 1751, "Instructions" given to Duquesne, April 1752, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relating to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:239-240, 242; Kent, *The French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania*, pp. 9-10; Eccles, *The Canadian Frontier*, p.147.

Virginia to Logstown which overshadowed those brought by the French.⁵⁰

Farther west La Jonquière's plans had no more success. In the spring of 1750 he sent out parties of western Indians, mainly Potawatomis, Ottawas and Hurons, from Detroit to visit Indian towns and villages near Lake Erie. They had orders "to take or destroy what English Men they could meet" and were given rewards for English prisoners or scalps. In particular, the French offered a large reward for killing George Croghan. But Croghan was in Logstown where Joncaire and the francophile Indians still dared not harm him. The parties were to let the anglophile Indians know that the French were "making all the Preparations possible. . . to destroy some Nations of Indians" in the English interest.⁵¹ This direct threat concerned many of the western Ohio Valley tribes, particularly the Twightwees. But until the French actually acted it would not make them change their allegiance. By the end of 1750 it had become clear that if the French were to gain control of the Ohio Valley they would have to do more than threaten English traders and woo the Indians with gifts: military action against the Indians to force out the anglophile factions would be necessary.

⁵⁰ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:540; Eccles, *The Canadian Frontier*, pp. 159-160; Kent, *French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania*, pp.10-11.

⁵¹ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:481, 482-483.

To succeed in stemming the English tide La Jonquière should have carried out his threat of military action. But because of his mercantile connections, he was reluctant to risk promoting a general war. He did send a small expedition, led by de Blainville, in the summer of 1751 against the Twightwees. The aim of the expedition was to destroy the forces of the anglophile Twightwee leader la Demoiselle. But de Blainville's Indian allies were reluctant to press their attack, and without them the expedition was not large enough to assault the Twightwees directly.⁵² The French satisfied themselves by killing two anglophile Miami chiefs and seizing a few English traders. Rather than intimidating the Twightwees, this action only enraged them more. Reports sent to Paris simply stated that the "rebels of the Beautiful river [have] not experienced any ill treatment from the Nations that. . . La Jonquière had excited against them." More action was needed. The death of La Jonquière in May 1752 and his replacement by the more bellicose Ange de Menneville, marquis de Duquesne, made this possible.⁵³

As Duquesne mustered his forces in Quebec, the actions of the English helped his plans. The English had first begun to

⁵² M. de Longueil to M. de Rouillé, April 21, 1752, Brodhead ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:245-251

⁵³ "Ministerial Minute of the English Encroachments on the Ohio," 1752, "Instructions" given to Duquesne, April 1752, M. de Longueil to M. de Rouillé, April 21, 1742, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:240-241, 242, 247; Eccles, *The Canadian Frontier*, p.160.

win the Ohio Indians' allegiance through the Indian trade; it was also through the Indian trade that the English first began to alienate them. In the wake of the rapid expansion of the Ohio fur and skin trade, many unscrupulous traders had found that they could quickly make large profits, despite the danger from the French. Almost any frontiersman who had a few pounds to invest could enter the trade. These traders soon found a way to maximize their profits. They discovered the ease of transporting large quantities of liquor to the Ohio and the eagerness of the Indians to buy and consume it. With the Indians in a drunken stupor, the traders could purchase their skins at bargain rates: George Croghan complained in 1749 that most of the Ohio Indians "are for the English at present but if there be nott a stop put to the bringing of Liquor out amongst them. . . [they] will go to the French."⁵⁴ At almost every meeting between the colonial authorities and the Indians after 1752 the Ohio Indians complained about the Indian traders. Scarouady, an anglophile leader of the Ohio Indians, stated in 1753:

your Traders now bring scarce any thing but Rum and Flour; They bring little Powder and Lead or other valuable Goods. The Rum ruins Us. . . When these Whiskey Traders come they bring thirty or forty Caggs and put them down before Us and make Us drink, and get all the Skins that should go to pay the Debts We have contracted for Goods bought of the Fair Traders, and by this means We not only ruin Ourselves but them too. These wicked Whiskey Sellers when they have once got the Indians in

⁵⁴ George Croghan to Richard Peters, November 25, 1749, H.S.P. Cadwallader Collection: Trent-Croghan Papers 5:18.

Liquor make them sell the very Clothes from their Backs.⁵⁵

The Pennsylvania authorities made sincere attempts to halt the illegal liquor trade and to license traders. In Cumberland County Andrew Montour led efforts to halt the illegal trade. Several unlicensed Indian traders were brought before the county court and prosecuted. Yet in nearly every case the Grand Juries found them not guilty, "tho' the Facts be ever so clearly proved." This outcome was hardly surprising considering that one of the largest illegal traders, John Smith, was also one of the county's justices.⁵⁶ Conrad Weiser complained to Hamilton that he was "credibly informed that some of the Magistrates of that County sells the most." He reported that Smith had gone to Aughwick "I suppose to gather some Money for Liquor he sent--he is an old Hypocrite--told me that the Governor ought not to suffer any strong Liquor to come to Aucquick."⁵⁷

The traders also increased Indian unease in other ways. While the Pennsylvania traders and Ohio Company speculators both wished to see the French excluded from the Ohio Valley, neither Pennsylvanians nor Virginians wanted to see the other in the Ohio Valley, for their ends were mutually exclusive:

⁵⁵ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:675-676

⁵⁶ *Proceedings of Criminal Court, 1750-1759, Cumberland County Historical Society, Carlisle PA., Box 6; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:628, 749;

⁵⁷ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:149.

control of the Indian trade and settlement of the Indians' lands. The Pennsylvania traders bitterly opposed the schemes of the Ohio Company and they made no secret of their opposition, especially to the Ohio Indians whom they repeatedly warned about the dangers of the Ohio Company. They cautioned the Indians that the Virginians would take and settle their lands, destroy their hunting grounds, and drive them from the river. They warned that the fort the company intended to build was not to provide protection and a center for trade but rather "to be a bridle for them, and that the roads which the Company are to make is to let in the Catawbas upon them to destroy them."⁵⁸ Considering the influence of the Pennsylvania traders among the Indians these warnings must have carried considerable weight.

While the warnings of the Pennsylvanians and the French raised the fears of the Ohio Indians, the Ohio Company pressed for a conference with the Ohio Indians to ratify the cession of their lands made in the Lancaster Treaty of 1744, and to gain their acquiescence in the construction of a company fort on the Ohio, the very events the Indians most feared. No desire could have been more calculated to rouse their suspicions. As soon as Robert Dinwiddie arrived in Virginia in November 1751, he prepared for negotiations with the Indians the following summer in Logstown. He ordered James

⁵⁸ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:423, 424; *Journal of Council of Virginia*, 5:302-303.

Patton to purchase some "Rich Goods" to present to the Indians "in Consequence of the Treaty at Lancaster. . . as a further Consideration for the Lands they then Sold to this Government and an Inducement for them to protect and secure a peaceable Possession to the Ohio Company."⁵⁹

The conference convened at the end of May 1752. Present were representatives from the Shawnees, Delawares, wightwees, and Iroquois, and colonial delegates from Virginia and Pennsylvania. Andrew Montour, speaking for the Virginians, came straight to the point. He informed the Indians that under the terms of the Lancaster cession, the lands on the Ohio were part of Virginia. The Virginians attempted to assuage Indian fears by maintaining that the purchase at Lancaster was not with "any intention of taking them from You, but that we might live together as one People, and keep them from the French." Montour added that the Virginians now wished "to make a Settlement of British Subjects on the South East side of the Ohio." To sweeten the announcement, he stressed that "from such a Settlement, greater Advantages will arise to You, than you can at present conceive. Our People will be able to supply you with Goods much cheaper, than can at this time be afford'd." In addition, "they will be a ready Help, in case you shou'd be attack'd, & some good Men among

⁵⁹ Dinwiddie to Conrad Weiser, December 12, 1751, Dinwiddie to James Patton, December 13, 1751, Brock, ed., *Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 1:6-7, 9-10; *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 5:370-378.

them will be appointed, with Authority to punish and restrain, the many Injuries, & Abuses, too frequently committed here, by disorderly white People." Cheaper trade goods and protection from the French and unscrupulous Indian traders were the advantages that the Virginians offered to the doubting Indians. The Ohio Company even guaranteed that if the Indians wanted land, they would be able to buy it from the Ohio Company at the same rate as English settlers. This must have seemed less than a bargain to the Ohio Indians who had presumed that they had never ceded the land.⁶⁰

One of the most anglophile of the Ohio Indians, Tanaghrisson, a Seneca who had been appointed by the Iroquois to oversee their "subsidiary" tribes on the Ohio and whose authority was directly threatened by these developments, was reluctant even to confirm the Lancaster grant, let alone give consent to the actual settlement of the Ohio and to the construction of a fort there.⁶¹ The Virginians tried to by-

⁶⁰ "Account of the Treaty of Logstown," 1752, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1327) 11:752-753; "Case of the Ohio Company, 1762," Mulkearn ed., *George Mercer Papers*, p.53.

⁶¹ The Iroquois appointed several leaders for the Ohio Indians, most notably Scarouady and Tanaghrisson. They claimed the right to do this by virtue of their "conquest" of the Ohio Valley in the seventeenth century, and their suzerainty over the Delawares in Pennsylvania, (the Ohio Delawares had moved there from Pennsylvania.) The Ohio Indians, for their part, seem to have accepted the Iroquois appointees although they did not always pay great attention to their wishes. Indeed, as soon as hostilities commenced on the Ohio, both Tanaghrisson and Scarouady removed to the Pennsylvania frontier. William A. Hunter, "Tanaghrisson," (continued...)

pass him. On June 9, the commissioners showed the Ohio Indians the Lancaster deed. The Ohio Indians had never been informed of it and were horrified. They "blamed them [the Iroquois] much for keeping it private. . . they never told them they had sold further than the warriors road." Suddenly, they found that Iroquois had already granted their lands to the English. Tensions rose. The Iroquois delegates at Logstown attempted to save face, claiming that they had "never understood. . . that the Lands then sold were to extend further to the Sun Setting, than the Hill, on the other Side of the Alligany Hill," a substantially different interpretation of the treaty from the Virginian's. All the Indians agreed they would have to consult with the Iroquois Council at Onondaga "so that we can't give you any further Answer now." Instead of considering a land cession, the Ohio Indians brought up new issues of the abuses in the Indian trade and the Shawnees taken prisoner in South Carolina when returning from an expedition against the Cherokees.⁶²

The negotiations were stalled. But Virginia pressed on. The Virginians knew that the Ohio Indians wanted both protection from the French and increased trade. After

⁶¹(...continued)

Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 3:613-614; Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, pp.27-29.

⁶² "Case of the Ohio Company, 1762," Mulkearn, ed., *George Mercer Papers*, p.56; "Account of the Treaty of Logstown, 1752," Boehm, ed., *BPRO CO5 Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1327) 11:761-764.

considerable persuasion, on June 11 Tanaghrisson finally seemed to acquiesce in the construction of a fort at the Forks of the Ohio, but he still objected to any settlement there as the Virginians demanded.⁶³ The Virginians stressed that "Trade could never be carried on with them, to their Advantage, unless we had a Settlement of People near, to raise Provisions, & render them Plenty & Cheap." But the Indians only promised "we will take care that there shall be no Scarcity," while the Iroquois delegates repeated that they would have to confer with the council at Onondaga for any final decision.⁶⁴

After over two weeks of negotiation no progress had been made. The colonial commissioners finally urged Andrew Montour "to converse with his brethren the other Sachems in private on the subject to urge the necessity of such a settlement and the great advantage it would be to them as to their trade." That afternoon the Iroquois delegates "retir'd for half an Hour" with Montour.⁶⁵ In the end they were persuaded to agree to the Ohio Company's plans. Whether through open bribery, as Francis Jennings claims, or merely through persuasion and

⁶³ "Case of the Ohio Company 1762," Mulkearn, ed., *George Mercer Papers*, pp.62-63.

⁶⁴ "Account of the Treaty of Logstown, 1752," Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1327) 11:766, 770.

⁶⁵ "Account of the Treaty of Logstown, 1752," Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1327) 11:770; "Case of the Ohio Company, 1762," Mulkearn, ed., *George Mercer Papers*, p.64.

pressure, the Iroquois finally gave their "Consent and Confirmation" of the Lancaster deed "in as full and ample a Manner as if the same was here recited."⁶⁶ More important, they agreed to Ohio Company settlement on the Ohio and guaranteed that the settlement "shall be unmolested by us, and that we will as far as in our Power assist & protect the British subjects there Inhabiting."⁶⁷

The Ohio Company now had the deed they wanted, even though its validity was in doubt. Members of the Ohio Company admitted ten years later that "it was with great difficulty that the Indians were. . . brought to agree that any settlements should be made by the English upon the Ohio tho' at that very time they were under the strongest apprehensions of being attacked by the French."⁶⁸ What was of more concern in the long-term, although it did not concern the Ohio Company at the time, was that only the Iroquois delegates consented at Logstown, not any of the Ohio Indians. While the company's indifference reflected the English position that the Iroquois possessed the Ohio, the purpose of the meeting had been to get

⁶⁶ Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, pp.43-44. Jennings suggests that the Virginians and Iroquois entered into a secret conspiracy in "the back room" where the Indians were bribed. There is absolutely no evidence for this in the accounts of the Logstown Treaty.

⁶⁷ "Account of the Treaty of Logstown, 1752," "Confirmation of the Lancaster Deed," Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1327) 11:774, (Vol. 1330) 12:171-172.

⁶⁸ "Case of the Ohio Company, 1762," Mulkearn, ed., *George Mercer Papers*, p.54.

the acquiescence of the Shawnees and Delawares. In this it had failed.⁶⁹

There were even those among the English who questioned the validity of the grant. Governor James Glen of South Carolina informed the Board of Trade that "I can hardly think that a verbal promise from some of the Head Men. . . or even giving leave to build two Forts can be deemed a Cession of their Rights to these Lands." Glen assailed the claims of Virginia, pointing out that "such a permission neither conveys Dominion nor Possession of the Country, on the Contrary our desiring their permission, may be said to be a tacit acquiescence [sic] and acknowledgement that they retain that." At much cost, the treaty at Logstown had achieved little. Almost immediately Dinwiddie decided that it would be necessary to invite the Ohio Indians to another conference to reaffirm the treaty of Logstown, which in turn he had intended as a reaffirmation of the treaty of Lancaster! This time the conference would be at Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, in the spring of 1753.⁷⁰

The Ohio Company pressed on, but events in the Ohio Valley quickly made the plans of Dinwiddie and the company obsolete. Over the winter of 1751-1752 the French finally

⁶⁹ "Account of the Treaty of Logstown, 1752," Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1327) 11:778.

⁷⁰ James Glen to Holderness, June 25, 1753, Boehm ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 13) 13:434.

began their assault on the Ohio Indians. Moving south from Detroit into Twightwee territory, they killed at least thirty warriors. The Twightwees appealed to Pennsylvania for arms and ammunition with which to fight the French. This request placed Governor Hamilton in a quandary. He could hardly refuse such a request when it was the Twightwees' support of the English which had exposed them to the wrath of the French. On the other hand, he realized that the Quaker-dominated Pennsylvania Assembly would never approve sending arms directly to the Indians. Hamilton therefore instructed Croghan to tell the Twightwees that he could not supply them but he was sure the Virginians would.⁷¹

Before the Twightwees could appeal to Virginia, the situation deteriorated further. On June 21, 1752, while the English and the Ohio Indians were leaving Logstown, a party of twenty French and over two hundred Ottawa and Chippewa Indians descended on the Twightwee trading town of Pickawillany. The party had specific orders "to kill all such Indians as are in amity with the English, and to take the Persons and Effects of all such english Traders as they could meet with." They killed one English trader, captured six more, and killed many more Indians, including the Twightwee anglophile chief "la Demoiselle" or "Old Briton." Any Twightwees who survived the attack soon fled. When Thomas Burney and William Trent arrived in the town two weeks after the attack, they found it

⁷¹ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:568-569, 570, 571.

completely deserted.⁷² The attack on Pickawillany escalated the conflict. The French had openly attacked the main town of an Indian nation allied to the English. It remained to be seen how the English would react.

The Twightwees appealed frantically to Virginia for aid. Instead, Dinwiddie sent William Trent with an invitation to the planned conference in Winchester the following spring. To the Twightwees the call to discuss the Ohio Company's grant must have seemed ludicrous. Trent reported that the Twightwees were in a "miserable Condition." All the traders had either been killed, captured, or had fled the region. Those Indians who would not join the French were left to starve.⁷³ The Virginians decided to send Thomas Burney to the Twightwees with a supply of arms. But Burney took his time preparing, and by the time he had gathered the arms and ammunition it was almost winter; Dinwiddie decided simply to present the arms when the Twightwees arrived in Winchester in the spring. As a result, with the French refusing to trade with anglophile Indians and the English refusing to supply

⁷² The French troops had been ordered not to kill any of the English traders if they could avoid it. "Detail of Indian Affairs," Stevens and Kent, eds., *Wilderness Chronicles*, p. 31; "Journal of William Trent," Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, (1327) Part 1, 11:712-728; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:599-600, 674.

⁷³ Dinwiddie to the Board of Trade, December 10, 1752, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1327) 11:702-704.

arms for the Indians' protection, many of the Twightwees began to change their allegiance to support the French.⁷⁴

In the spring of 1753 Duquesne expanded French activities. He sent another large expedition to Lake Erie which established forts at Presqu'Isle on Lake Erie, and Rivière au Boeuf and Fort Machault on tributaries of the Allegheny.⁷⁵ Duquesne reported that the Indians were shocked to see the French using such force in the Ohio country. Many of the Ohio Indians, some of whom had moved south only a few years earlier to have greater access to English goods and to obtain greater English protection, began to conclude that the English were now incapable of protecting them and returned north. Some of the Indians even turned against the English and rejected wampum belts sent to encourage them to oppose the entry of the French into the Ohio country.⁷⁶

From their new strongholds on Lake Erie and the upper branches of the Ohio, the French sent a clear message to any traders still in the Ohio Valley: French Indians, particularly Ottawas, killed traders and confiscated the goods of others. By May William Trent reported that "There is not one [anglophile] Indian or whiteman anywhere below the Shawnese or

⁷⁴ Gov. Dinwiddie to Captains Cressap and Trent, February 10, 1753, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 1:22-24.

⁷⁵ Fort Machault was called Venango by the English.

⁷⁶ Duquesne to M. de Rouillé, August 20, 1753, Brodhead ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:255-257

Logstown" who was not packing up and leaving.⁷⁷ The French sent a final warning to the English traders which now carried weight.

If the English Traders would imediately Quit the River (on their own commanding them to go off) they would let them go unmolleted, but if they or their Indians should make any resistance, they sho'd take them all Prisoners and perhaps Kill some of them; and that the Govr of Canada would not suffer any further Trade to be carried on by the English on the Waters of the Ohio's [sic]⁷⁸

The French threat worked. Dinwiddie reported that "All the English Traders have left the Ohio in a great Panick, being affraid of being cut off." With English traders gone, the Indians had no choice but to trade with the French or starve, and by trading with the French they bound themselves increasingly to French influence.⁷⁹

The Ohio Indians did not arrive in Winchester in May 1753 as the Virginians had hoped. It was not until mid-September that several parties left their homes to meet Dinwiddie and to discuss what aid he would give them, as it was Dinwiddie, they maintained, "on whom they cheifly [sic] depend for immediate Assistance." Dinwiddie, however, decided that business in

⁷⁷ "Case of the Ohio Company, 1762," Mulkearn, ed., *George Mercer Papers*, p.71.

⁷⁸ William West to Gov Hamilton, May 7 1753, *British Library, Add. Mss.* 14,034:178-180

⁷⁹ Dinwiddie to Board of Trade, 16 June 1753, Boehm, ed., *BPRO CO5 Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1327) 11:793

Williamsburg was too pressing for him to meet them that fall. Instead, he sent a group of commissioners from the Council to arrange another meeting in Winchester the following summer.⁸⁰

Offended by the failure of Dinwiddie to attend the conference, Scarouady, speaking for the Ohio Indians, told the Virginians outright that "We now request you may not build that Strong-House, for we intend to keep Our County clear of Settlements during these Troublesome times." He did, however, promise in private that when the French were driven from the Ohio, "We will consider what to say to you about the Lands."⁸¹

If the Twightwees expected arms, they were again sorely disappointed. In July the Virginia Council had approved sending two barrels of powder, four-hundred weight of lead, and five small arms to the Twightwees. Almost immediately William Fairfax informed them that Montour had counselled against arms being sent because of the danger of capture by the French. As a result, the Twightwees received nothing. They went on to Carlisle to meet with Governor Hamilton hoping for more success there.⁸²

The Pennsylvania Council, however, decided that since Dinwiddie had not bothered to meet the Indians in person

⁸⁰ *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 5:439-440.

⁸¹ "Narrative of Negotiations with Indians at Winchester," September 1753, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1328) 11:903, 915-916.

⁸² *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 5:438-439; "Case of the Ohio Company, 1762," Mulkearn, ed., *George Mercer Papers*, p.79.

"there was no Necessity for the Governor's indulging the Indians with his Presence."⁸³ Instead, they sent commissioners Benjamin Franklin, Richard Peters, and Isaac Norris, who brought the good news that the Pennsylvania Council had finally approved aid. Again the Indians were disappointed. A group of traders present at the conference persuaded the commissioners not to give the Indians any arms for fear of capture by the French. The commissioners only promised that George Croghan would bring them to the Ohio when it was safer.⁸⁴

The Ohio Indians, concerned at the advance of Pennsylvania settlers and annoyed by the refusal of the colony to provide arms, bluntly informed the Pennsylvanians that "we desire that Pennsylvania. . . would at present forbear settling on our lands over the Allegheny Hills. . . Let none of your People settle beyond where they are now."⁸⁵ If Virginians could not settle on the Ohio, Pennsylvanians could not settle on the upper reaches of the Susquehanna.

The only "success" for the Pennsylvanians came in persuading Scarouady not to go to South Carolina himself to seek the release of the Shawnee prisoners. But these efforts also served to enrage the Ohio Indians further. The Shawnee

⁸³ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:657

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 5:682

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 5:675

chiefs in particular expressed "Dissatisfaction at this Endeavour of the Commissioners to stop Scarrooyady."⁸⁶

The Winchester and Carlisle conferences had been disasters. The Ohio Indians had gone with the hope of talking to governors Dinwiddie and Hamilton, but neither had attended. The Indians had hoped that they would be supplied with arms with which they could resist the French, but they returned home with nothing. They did, however, leave with the impression that the English had agreed not to build a fort at the Forks of the Ohio. This impression would not last long. For any of the Twightwees who had remained loyal to the English, the refusal to supply them with arms was a bitter blow and convinced them that the English were unworthy allies. Within a few weeks they defected to the French. Meanwhile, the French were attacking the anglophile Shawnees and Delawares further up the Ohio.⁸⁷

Dinwiddie was disturbed at the failure of the Winchester conference. He received more bad news when Governor Hamilton reported that the Iroquois had also decided that no fort should be built on the Ohio, for it was "an hunting country. . . and we would have it reserved for this use only, and desire that no Settlements may be made there, tho' you may

⁸⁶ Ibid., 5:683

⁸⁷ Mulkearn, ed., *George Mercer Papers*. pp.69-71; James Glen to the Earl of Holderness, June 25, 1753, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 13) 1:431-432.

trade there as much as you please."⁸⁸ Still worse, the Iroquois objected to the English treating directly with the Ohio Indians. They complained to Montour that the Ohio Indians were just "Hunters, and young and giddy Men and Children; that they were their Fathers, and if the English wanted any thing from these childish People they must first speak to their Fathers." Driven by the desire to ensure the security of the Ohio Company's grant, the English had attempted to negotiate both with the Iroquois and the Ohio Indians, now they were losing the support of both.⁸⁹

The anglophile Indians remaining on the Ohio now looked to the English for protection and action. Tanaghrisson called upon the English to send arms and ammunition, claiming "if you don't send immediately, we shall surely be cut off by our Enemy the French."⁹⁰ Dinwiddie's first reaction was to send a young Virginia militia commander, George Washington, to the new French forts on the Allegheny to demand removal of French forces from English soil. Washington's mission was a complete failure. The French laughed at the governor's audacity. To the Ohio Indians Washington's journey proved yet another insult, for "Col. Washington whom we conveyed to the French Fort, left us there, came through the Woods, and never thought

⁸⁸ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:637.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 5:635

⁹⁰ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:691; "Journal of George Croghan," January 1754, H.S.P., Penn Mss.:Indian Affairs, 2:1.

it worth his while to come to Logs Town" to discuss the results of his mission.⁹¹

Washington returned to Williamsburg with another message from the French that the English must evacuate the region. Dinwiddie had to take action. He determined to build a fort on the Ohio, despite the requests of the Ohio Indians and Iroquois to the contrary. He resolved to send William Trent to the Forks of the Ohio to construct a small fort, for even if the fort was unable to halt the French advance, he wrote to Hamilton, "if we can only erect a Fort or Two as a mark of our Possession, it will be doing something."⁹² But Dinwiddie's plan went further than constructing a fort. To encourage volunteers to serve against the French, the Virginia Council agreed to grant 200,000 acres on the Ohio to those who would volunteer.⁹³ To many of the Ohio Indians this action only proved the perfidy of their so-called allies.⁹⁴

Trent, accompanied by a small party of volunteers, mainly former fur traders, began construction of the fort in January 1754. The Ohio Company had already chosen an easily

⁹¹ "Treaty with Indians at Fort Cumberland, October 18-November 5, 1754," Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 15) 2:158, 165

⁹² "Narrative of What Happened on the River Ohio," British Library, Add. Mss., 15,874:208-211; *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 5:458-459; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:5-7

⁹³ 100,000 acres was to be contiguous to the fort, and was to be free of quitrents for fifteen years.

⁹⁴ *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 5:461-462

defensible site on the Ohio a few miles downstream from the Forks. Dinwiddie had originally planned to send more militia in the early spring to reinforce Trent. However, he soon discovered that he "c'd not compell them to march to the Ohio; and if forc'd, [they] w'd have been of little Service." He decided instead to draft three hundred men from the militia and to form them into the Virginia Regiment. He ordered Washington, appointed second in command of the regiment, to march a detachment to Wills' Creek, while Colonel Joshua Fry, the commander, assembled the remainder in Northern Virginia and awaited the arrival of three Independent Companies which Whitehall had agreed to send to assist Virginia in holding the Ohio.⁹⁵

Fry and Washington were beset with many problems. There was a shortage of skilled officers and a surplus of disputes over respective authorities, particularly between officers of the Independent Companies with royal commissions and of the Virginia Regiment, with commissions from Dinwiddie. The troops were slow to assemble for there were few volunteers and several of the county justices refused to draft men from the militia into the regiment. In addition the Independent

⁹⁵ One Independent company was from South Carolina and two were from New York. *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 5:464; Gov. Dinwiddie to Lord Fairfax, [January 1754,] Dinwiddie to the Earl of Holderness, April 27, 1754, Gov. Dinwiddie to Earl of Halifax, Brock, ed., *Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 1:48-50, 133-134, 134-135. The Independent companies were companies of colonial troops, who were part of the British Army but were not attached to any regiment, hence they were "independent."

Companies took much longer than expected to arrive in Virginia. Finally, a shortage of horses and wagons slowed the expedition's progress.⁹⁶

Trent wrote to Washington at the beginning of March pleading for reinforcements before the French arrived. Since there was no way Fry could be ready in time, Washington took the initiative to march his detachment to the Forks to reinforce Trent.⁹⁷ But before Washington could arrive, the shortage of supplies forced Trent to return to Will's Creek, leaving behind only a small detachment of forty-one men under the command of Ensign Edward Ward to hold the fort against the French.⁹⁸ On April 17, French forces under the command of François Le Mercier appeared outside the uncompleted fort. Ward was greatly outnumbered. He later claimed that there were almost 1,000 French. He had little choice but to

⁹⁶ Gov. Dinwiddie to Lord Fairfax, February 23, 1754, Dinwiddie to Col. Innes, July 20, [1754], Brock, ed., *Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 1:82, 232; George Washington to Thomas Cressap, April 18, 1754, George Washington to Governor Dinwiddie, May 9, 1754, W.W. Abbot, ed., and Dorothy Twohig, assoc. ed., *The Papers of George Washington*, Colonial Series (Charlottesville Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1983-), 1:82, 93-95; Gov. Dinwiddie to Board of Trade, March 12, 1754, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 14) 1:540-542.

⁹⁷ Gov. Dinwiddie to Joshua Fry, March 18, 1754, Brock, ed., *Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 1:109-110; Douglas Southall Freeman, *George Washington*, New York, Charles Scribener's Sons, 1948, p.355.

⁹⁸ Edward Ward was a half-brother of George Croghan. Of the men with him only thirty-three were troopers.

surrender the fort and march his men back to Wills's Creek.⁹⁹ The French proceeded to utilize the supplies of lumber the English had already amassed to construct their own fort at the Forks, which they named Fort Duquesne in honor of their governor.¹⁰⁰

The surrender of the fort horrified the anglophile Indians. The English seemed to have done nothing to hold the Ohio. The day after the fall of the fort, Tanaghrisson, still at Logstown, sent a plea to the English. "We have been waiting this long Time for the French to strike Us, now we see what they design to do with Us, we are ready to strike them now and wait for your Assistance; be strong and come as soon as possible you can." He warned "if you do not come to our Relief, we are gone entirely."¹⁰¹

In light of the Indians' appeals, Washington, who was now in command of the expedition following the death of Fry, determined to proceed towards the fort to see if there was any

⁹⁹ "Deposition of Ensign Ward," [May 1754], Gov. Dinwiddie to Board of Trade, May 10, 1754, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 14) 1:693-697, (Col. 1328) 11:985-990; Washington to Dinwiddie, April 25, 1754, George Washington to Hamilton, April [24], 1754, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *Papers of George Washington*, 1:83-85, 89-90.

¹⁰⁰ Lawrence Henry Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, 6:31-32

¹⁰¹ Speech of Scruniyatha [Tanaghrisson], April 18, 1754, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:2.

chance of taking it by surprise.¹⁰² But the French had scouting parties out. For several days Tanaghrisson and Scarouady, scouting for Washington, reported French parties in the vicinity. Finally, on the evening of May 27, they informed him there was a party shadowing him. Washington sent out a detachment in ambush. In the ensuing skirmish his troops killed the French commander, Joseph Coulon de Villiers, sieur de Jumonville, and ten other French troops, taking another twenty-one prisoner.¹⁰³

The skirmish marked the first direct conflict between troops of the two powers and the French were bound to react quickly. News of the skirmish and deaths angered the French forces at Fort Duquesne. It was an escalation of the conflict from encouraging Indian tribes to destroy one another to Europeans themselves killing one another. Almost immediately the French sent out a much larger party, under the command of de Jumonville's brother, Louis Coulon de Villiers, to intercept Washington.¹⁰⁴

Surely aware that the French would react but unaware that the French had sent out a much larger party, Washington

¹⁰² Fry died at the beginning of June after falling from his horse. Gov. Dinwiddie to Washington, June 4, 1754, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 1:126-127.

¹⁰³ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, May 18, May 29, 1754, Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington June 4, 1754, George Washington to John Augustine Washington, May 31, 1754, Abbot & Twohig eds., *Papers of George Washington*, 1:96, 110-111, 118, 126-127;

¹⁰⁴ Frégault, *Canada: The War of the Conquest*, p.69.

continued his advance towards Fort Duquesne. Dinwiddie sent Washington a message warning him not to be too rash or to "make any hazardous Attempts agst a too numerous Enemy."¹⁰⁵ On June 28 Washington halted at Gist's "plantation" on the Monongahela a few miles south of Fort Duquesne. At a Council of War with Washington and his officers, Scarouady revealed that the French had been reinforced and resupplied and had sent a much larger force out.¹⁰⁶ Washington had around 400 men with him, many of them ill and unfit for duty. Instead of continuing, he chose to retreat hastily towards Wills' Creek. However, his troops were weary from their tough march over the rough terrain and made slow progress. Informed that the French were quickly closing on him, Washington determined to halt his retreat at a spot already prepared for defense, Fort Necessity. The Indians who were with Washington were disgusted at his temerity and his refusal to accept any advice from them, despite their knowledge of the terrain. Even worse was Washington's general contempt for the Indians; they later complained that "he took upon him to command the Indians as his Slaves." As a result, shortly after Washington arrived at Fort Necessity, the Indians abandoned him.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Twohig and Abbot, eds., *Papers of George Washington*, 1:119.

¹⁰⁶ "Minutes of Council of War, June 28, 1754," Abbot & Twohig eds., *Papers of George Washington*, 1:155-156.

¹⁰⁷ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:151

On the morning of July 3 the French arrived at his camp with about 700 men, 600 French and 100 Indians. The battle continued from eleven in the morning until the evening. But the fight was unequal. The earthworks were of little utility; while they prevented the French from storming the camp, they offered little protection from the fire of the French snipers. The French took cover behind the trees surrounding the camp and sniped at the exposed English troops. One by one, they picked off Washington's forces. By dusk Washington had lost one hundred men killed and wounded.¹⁰⁸ With his force surrounded and demoralized, abandoned by his Indian allies, and with a fierce storm raging, Washington asked for terms. The document he signed admitted responsibility for the "murder" of Jumonville, acknowledged that the Ohio was "les Terres du Domain du Roy," and agreed that the English would evacuate the region. Washington, of course, repudiated the agreement as soon as he was back in Virginia, claiming that he had been unable to read the surrender document clearly in the flickering candle light of the sodden evening. The French hoped that the defeat of Washington's force would mark the end of the dispute in North America and that the English would now

¹⁰⁸ Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, July 24, 1754, Boehm, ed., *BPRO CO5, Part 1 Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 14) 1:712-714; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:50-52; Varin to Bigot, July 24, 1754, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:260-261.

lose interest in the Ohio Valley, but it merely encouraged the English to do more to recover the region.¹⁰⁹

By the summer of 1754 the English had alienated most of the Ohio Indians. By constructing a fort and planning settlements, they had proven that they were untrustworthy; by surrendering at Fort Necessity they had shown that they were powerless to protect their allies and to punish their enemies. In the wake of Fort Necessity, the English did little to recover their position, while the French took great pains to point out to the Indians that the English had all but abandoned the Ohio Valley. The French promised the Ohio Indians that if they would support them, they would allow them to live in peace and would supply them with the goods they needed; if they continued to support the English, they would drive them away and kill them.¹¹⁰ In May Andrew Montour warned Governor Hamilton that the French would soon harass any anglophile Indians in the Ohio Valley to "prevent their planting, and thereby render them incapable of supporting their Families." He added that before they began, force must be used "to preserve our Indian allies."¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Varin to Bigot, July 24, 1754, Stevens and Kent, eds., *Wilderness Chronicles*, p.81; "Narrative of What Happened upon the River Ohio," British Library, Add. Mss., 15,874:208-211.

¹¹⁰ "Treaty with Indians at Ft. Cumberland, October 18-November 5, 1754," Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 15) 2:157-158; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:691;

¹¹¹ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:46.

French pressure prompted many Shawnees and Delawares on the Ohio, now isolated from the English by Fort Duquesne, to reconsider their allegiance. The majority joined the French. But a few, like Tanaghrisson and Scarouady, whose outspoken support for the English meant that they could not possibly change sides, had little choice but to evacuate their families. When Tanaghrisson arrived at Washington's camp in June, he brought with him over eighty Indians. The numbers increased dramatically after Fort Necessity. By the end of 1754 over three hundred Indians from the Ohio Valley were living on the branches of the Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania and another two hundred on the upper branches of the Conococheague in Cumberland County. Many of the Indians went to Aughwick, George Croghan's plantation on the Juniata River on the frontiers of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. There they were maintained at colonial expense until the end of the war. For the remainder of 1754 any remaining anglophile Shawnees and Delawares desperately strove to discover what English policy entailed.¹¹²

Indians who remained loyal to the English assembled in October at Fort Cumberland to discover what the English planned. The Indians were uneasy at the inactivity of the English and were concerned that "what the French tell them of their Brethren is too true, that is that the English are

¹¹² *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:130, 140, 149, 159, 257; Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, [June 1754,] Brock, ed., *Official Records of Governor Dinwiddie*, 1:229-230;

afraid of the French."¹¹³ From the start of the conference there was bad news. En route to the conference, Tanaghrisson had died at Harris's Ferry. One of the purposes of the conference had been to get the Indians to declare war against the French, but the Indians made use of the occasion instead to voice their complaints about English actions. Scarouady complained that "we expected you would have told us more of your minds. . . what was spoke in public, was only to prevent some of our People from knowing what we were about." He also protested the actions of Washington that summer, particularly during the Fort Necessity campaign. Scarouady added that the French had warned the Ohio Indians that the English would drive them away or kill them. Scarouady concluded that "you have given us some reason to suspect you." That even the staunchest of English allies accused the English of duplicity was a sorry commentary on English policy.¹¹⁴

With the collapse of Indian support for the English in the Ohio Valley, Governor Dinwiddie in Virginia, and Governor Hamilton and his successor Robert Morris in Pennsylvania sought support from the colonial assemblies. Shortly after his arrival in Pennsylvania, Morris informed the Assembly that the Indians who remained loyal to England "dare not be active for

¹¹³ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:140.

¹¹⁴ "Treaty with the Indians at Fort Cumberland, October 18 to November 5, 1754," Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 15) 2:156-169; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:184.

us till they see a Force in the Field superior to that of the French, and if that be not soon they will certainly give up our Cause and embrace the tempting Offers made them by the French."¹¹⁵ But the governors' appeals fell on deaf ears.

Dinwiddie had summoned the House of Burgesses as early as November 1753 to grant aid for the construction and protection of a fort on the Ohio and to strengthen his authority over the militia. He informed the burgesses that the crown had instructed him to call them "immediately" and "to lay before them the Necessity of a mutual Assistance." But instead of granting a supply, the House demanded to see Dinwiddie's instructions from the crown and accounts of the treaties of Lancaster and Logstown. The House refused to give Dinwiddie additional authority over the militia, maintaining that only "if any Invasion should Happen, and the Power given to the Governor, by those Laws, should then be found insufficient" would they reconsider their decision.¹¹⁶

The burgesses' recalcitrance stemmed from two unrelated disputes which soured relations between Dinwiddie and the House. Some members saw the conflict as one caused by the Ohio Company. Many burgesses were members of competing land

¹¹⁵ Address of Gov. Morris to Pennsylvania Assembly, December 3, 1754, Edward Reed, ed., *Pennsylvania Archives, Papers of the Governors, 1747-1759* (Harrisburg Pa.: State of Pennsylvania, 1900), 2:302-303.

¹¹⁶ H.R. McIlwaine, *Journals of the House of Burgesses: 1752-1755, 1756-1758*, (Richmond, VA, Virginia State Library, 1909), pp. 103-104, 110, 115-116.

companies and opposed the activities of the Ohio Company. They even directly attacked the company, suggesting that Dinwiddie should make many land grants over the Appalachians "in small parcels," which would have destroyed the value of the Ohio Company's grant.¹¹⁷ Others were alienated by Dinwiddie's continuing attempts to collect a fee of a pistole for the registering of land patents. Until 1755 the "Pistole Fee Controversy" generated "factious Disputes and violent Heats" which undermined meetings of the House.¹¹⁸ On December 19, in disgust, Dinwiddie dissolved the Assembly. He warned them that

His Majesty's Royal Command for a mutual supply recommended to you at the beginning of this Session, to preserve the Friendship of the Indians. . . should have been the fix'd Object of your Attention; but to disregard the Designs of the French, to despise the Friendship of the Indians, and to dispute the rights of the Crown in the Disposal of their own Lands, may be of bad Consequence.¹¹⁹

With Washington's initial return from the French forts, Dinwiddie recalled the House on February 4, 1754. He presented the details of Washington's expedition and painted a bloody picture of what would happen if they did not act.

¹¹⁷ H.R. McIlwaine, *Journals of the House of Burgesses: 1752-1755, 1756-1758*, p.116. Egnal, *A Mighty Empire*, pp.96-97.

¹¹⁸ Gov. Dinwiddie to Capel Hanbury, May 10, 1754, Brock, ed., *Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 1:153; For a full discussion of the pistole fee controversy see John Alden, *Robert Dinwiddie, Servant of the Crown*, (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1973), pp.26-37.

¹¹⁹ McIlwaine, *Journal of the House of Burgesses, 1752-1755, 1756-1758*, p.171.

The House agreed to authorize £10,000 for defense but the governor felt that they "clogg'd" the bill "with unreasonable Regulations, & Incroachments." Distrustful of allowing Dinwiddie control of any funds, they appointed a committee to oversee their disbursement. At first Dinwiddie would not consent to the bill, complaining that "the People here are too much on a republican Spirit. The Ho. of B. making resolves in dispos'g of the King's Money without the Concurrence of the other Branches of the Legislature, is without Precedent." However, he was forced to agree to the Assembly's terms in order to obtain funds for the fort at the Forks of the Ohio.¹²⁰

After Washington's defeat at Fort Necessity, Dinwiddie recalled the House. They met "with good Dispositions," and on August 29 agreed to raise £20,000. Opposition was slow to form, but eventually a group of burgesses, led by the speaker, John Robinson, organized themselves into "something like a Party that were not for Laying anything." They tacked a rider onto the bill to pay £2,500 to Peyton Randolph who was in London arguing the Assembly's case in the Pistole Fee

¹²⁰ Dinwiddie to Board of Trade, March 12, 1754, May 10, 1754, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1328) 11:981, (Vol. 1328) 11:985-987; Dinwiddie to William Fairfax, March 15, 1754, Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, July 24, [1754], Brock, ed., *Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 1:108, 236; William Waller Henning, *Statutes at Large*, Richmond, Franklin Press, 1819, 6:420-422.

Controversy.¹²¹ Dinwiddie was mortified. He rejected the bill and promptly prorogued the Assembly. William Fairfax commented to Washington "The news of your engagement & rout at the Meadows did not give the public more affecting concern than the unhappy conclusion of our present meeting."¹²² It was clear that Virginia would not be able to drive the French from the Ohio unaided.

Governor Hamilton had even less success in persuading the Pennsylvania Assembly to grant supplies. Hamilton wrote despairingly to Dinwiddie in March 1754, "I never expected they would appropriate Money for the Purpose of War or Warlike Preparations, but thought they might have been brought to make a handsome Gift to the King's Use, and have left the Disposition of it to me." But the Assembly had stuck rigidly to its Quaker principles, intensified by a religious revival which swept the sect in the 1750s.¹²³

It was not, however, the Quaker beliefs of the majority of the Assembly that finally kept them from granting money for

¹²¹ Gov. Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, September 1, 1754, Brock, ed., *Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 1:298-300; Jack Greene ed., *The Diary of Colonel Landon Carter of Sabine Hall 1752-1778*, (Charlottesville, Va,: University Press of Virginia, 1965), 1:111-114.

¹²² William Fairfax to George Washington, September 5, 1754, Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, September 11, 1754, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *Papers of George Washington*, 1:201, 206-207.

¹²³ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:1-3; Joseph E. Illick, *Colonial Pennsylvania: A History*, (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), pp.218-225.

defense but rather a series of disputes with the governor. After Washington's defeat, the Assembly received petitions from the inhabitants of Cumberland and Lancaster Counties expressing fears that they would soon be attacked by the French. This warning was enough to stir some Assemblymen to consider providing for the colony's defense. The Assembly ran into the first of several conflicts with the governor which would last for several years and paralyse Pennsylvania's war effort.¹²⁴

The Assembly agreed to raise funds by issuing £30,000 in paper money, £10,000 of which was "for the King's use," but the governor and the Assembly could not agree on the period in which the bills were to be retired. The Assembly refused to listen to any of Hamilton's complaints maintaining that "the Representatives of the People have an Undoubted Right to judge, and determine, not only of the Sum to be raised for the Use of the Crown but of the Manner of raising it." Neither side would give ground, and Pennsylvania had raised no money at all.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ Petition of the Inhabitants of Cumberland County, July 15, 1754, H.S.P., Conarroe Collection 10:60; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:130-132.

¹²⁵ Hamilton had previously refused to give his assent to paper money bills claiming that they were contrary to his instructions from the proprietors and the crown. This time, fearing the results if nothing was provided for defense, Hamilton gave way. Then came the question of the life of the bills and the method for retiring them. Hamilton wanted the bills retired in four years, the Assembly in ten. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:729-730, 6:39-45, 244-246; Gov. (continued...)

Governor Morris arrived in the fall of 1754. Many hoped the succession of a new governor would prompt the Assembly to be more receptive. Morris exhorted the members to "exert yourselves at this critical Juncture in Defence of your Country." But once more the Assembly attempted to issue paper money, and again the governor and Assembly ran into deadlock over the period of retirement. Morris's only solution was to "suspend" the bill until it could be approved by the Crown an action which would take several months. The Assembly had again failed to raise any money for actions on the Ohio.¹²⁶

The French were in possession of the Ohio Valley, Washington's force had been routed, yet the colonial

¹²⁵(...continued)

Morris to Sir Thomas Robinson, January 30, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 15) 2:39-41; Gertrude MacKinney, ed., *Votes of the Assembly, Pennsylvania Archives*, 8th Ser. (Harrisburg Pa.: State of Pennsylvania, 1931), 5:3705-3706; Theodore Thayer, *Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 1740-1776*, Harrisburg, PA., Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1953, pp. 28-29.

¹²⁶ The Assembly agreed to raise £40,000, £20,000 for "the King's Use," but again in paper money. Regardless of the explicit orders from the Privy Council which Morris laid before them forbidding issues of paper, the Assembly pressed on. However, Morris was prepared to compromise. He claimed that Whitehall had previously allowed the colonies to issue paper money in emergencies and the situation on the frontier was definitely an emergency. He offered to approve an emission of paper retired in four years. But the Assembly would not abandon their schemes and demanded that the paper be retired in twelve years. Gov. Morris to Sir Thomas Robinson, December 24, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 15) 2:6-12; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 5:3742, 3764, 3771, 3786; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:206; Thayer, *Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy*, pp.37-38.

assemblies and governors were squabbling over privilege. There was only one way the French could be driven out and that was through intervention by Great Britain. In Whitehall the Newcastle administration sought to avoid the expense of conflict with the French in the Ohio and pursued "the most effectual Measure for preserving The Peace."¹²⁷ The French ambassador in London, Charles-Pierre-Gaston-François de Lévis, duc de Mirepoix, proposed the evacuation of the Ohio with the Alleghenies as the English boundary and the French boundary running Southwest from the southern shore of Lake Erie. But the two sides could not agree on exact boundaries, and both demanded the demolition of the other's forts in the region. Each could have compromised, but neither was willing.¹²⁸

Even after negotiations stalled, the Newcastle administration hoped that they could recover the Ohio Valley without a war. In 1753 they hoped that the colonial authorities would be able to deal with the situation without help from Great Britain. After Fort Necessity, with the colonial assemblies squabbling, it became clear that this was impossible. Newcastle still hesitated. He was concerned about lack of support in Great Britain for a war in North America, for "Ignorant People say what is the Ohio to us, what

¹²⁷ Duke of Newcastle to Dayrolle, November 16 1753, British Library, Add. Mss., 15,874:217

¹²⁸ "Demandes de La Grande Bretagne et de La France, 1755," Holderness to Keith, March 11 1755, British Library, Add. Mss., 6,865:97-104, 15,874:286 .

expense is there like to be about it, shall we bring on a War for the sake of a River."¹²⁹

Newcastle, however, was not a "dove." He had opposed the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle because it was not sufficiently advantageous for Great Britain. By the fall of 1754 he was convinced that in order to recover the situation, regular troops would have to be sent to North America.¹³⁰ On September 24, Edward Braddock received his instructions. He was to take two companies of infantry from Cork, Ireland, to Virginia. The colonial governors were instructed to assist him and to insure that his regiments were recruited up to full strength. With these troops, numbering over three thousand, he would drive the French from the Ohio.¹³¹

¹²⁹ P. Collinson "Some Thoughts on the French Scheme and the Ohio Country", February 25 1757, British Library, Add. Mss., 33,029:380-381;

¹³⁰ Speck, *Stability and Strife*, p.252.

¹³¹ "Instructions to General Braddock," November 28, 1754, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 3, *The French and Indian War*, (Vol. 6) 1:16-26; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:200-201; "Report of the Board of Trade on the Plan for a General Concert," August 9, 1754, British Library, Add. Mss., 35,909:194-201.

Chapter II

The Defeat

It is taken for granted that this Summer's Campaign will make Major General Braddock Master of the Ohio. . . It is not to be doubted he will soon make himself Master of all Canada¹

Braddock's plan was beautifully simple. The English forces would advance to the Forks of the Ohio and seize Fort Duquesne. Then in a single, swift move they would advance upon Fort Niagara and seize that French stronghold. There was no possibility of failure. The English had massed over three thousand troops. The French, on the other hand, had fewer than three hundred soldiers and militia and six hundred Indians protecting Fort Duquesne. Governor Vaudreuil wrote despairingly to Paris informing the government of the straits he was in. He informed the government that Fort Duquesne could not possibly withstand a siege because the post had not been properly reinforced and supplied. He added, "I dread, with reason. . . the first intelligence from that fort."²

¹ "Project for Next Year's Campaign in N. America" August 11, 1755, British Library, Additional Mss., 35,909:208-210.

² "Account of the Battle of the Monongahela," July 9, 1755, Vaudreuil to Machault, July 24, 1755, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the History of New York*, 10:303-304, 307.

Braddock had arrived in Virginia on February 24, 1755. The transports carrying his troops arrived three weeks later. Preparations had been underway for several weeks before he arrived. Sir John St. Clair, who had arrived in Virginia ahead of Braddock, had already begun reviewing the colonial forces, amassing provisions, and searching for a good route to the Ohio. All along the frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania officials scoured plantations for provisions, wagons, and horses. Braddock's expedition was a major undertaking that would strain the resources of the colonies.³

In many ways Braddock and St. Clair were unfortunate choices to lead the expedition. Both were irritable and haughty and regarded the colonists with a disregard equalled only by their disdain for their Indian allies, which they made no effort to hide.⁴ Almost immediately upon his arrival Braddock began to complain about his reception, commenting to Newcastle "I cannot say as yet they have shown the

³ Gen. Braddock to Thomas Robinson, March 18, 1755, British Library, Additional Mss., 32,853:346-354, London; Gov. Dinwiddie to Board of Trade, March 17, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1763*, (1328) 11:1021; Gov. Dinwiddie to Adam Stephen, February 18, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Earl of Halifax, February 24, 1755, *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 1:504, 512; James Burd to Edward Shippen, February 21, 1755, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Shippen Papers, Vol 1. [the volume I inspected was unpaginated] Philadelphia, PA.; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:297, 300-301.

⁴ St. Clair would become an even greater burden in 1758 during Forbes' Campaign. Forbes himself commented of St. Clair "He is a very odd Man, and I am sorry it had been my fate to have any Concerns with him." Forbes to Bouquet, September 4, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet*, 2:477

Regard. . . that might have been expected."⁵ He berated Morris and Dinwiddie on their failure to provide him with all the necessaries he demanded for the expedition.⁶

In the middle of April Braddock summoned Governors DeLancey of New York, Sharpe of Maryland, and Dinwiddie and Morris to his camp at Alexandria. There he informed them of his demands. He expected that they would create a general fund of money from all the colonies on which he could draw for his expenses without having first to gain the approval of the colonial assemblies. The governors replied that they were sure that the assemblies would never approve the creation of such a fund. They angered Braddock more when they informed him that they would be unable to provide him with any funds at all. To avoid failure, they advised Braddock that he should instead "make use of his Credit upon the Government at home to defray the Expence of all the Operations under his Direction."⁷ Braddock was aghast. Not only had the governors refused to create the general fund he felt he needed, but they had the audacity to suggest that he should pay all the costs.

⁵ Gen. Braddock to the Duke of Newcastle, March 20, 1755, British Library, Additional Mss., 32,853:388-391.

⁶ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:332-333, 335-338.

⁷ Gov. Dinwiddie to John Hanbury, April, 1755, "Minutes of a Council of War held at Alexandria," April 14, 1755, British Library, Additional Mss., 32,854:378, 33,029:174-177; "Minutes of a Council at Alexandria," April 14, 1755, BPRO CO5, Boehm, ed., *Westward Expansion, 1700-1763*, (15) Part 1, 2:263-268.

He had been expecting a hero's welcome and the colonists to heed his every whim. He made no secret of his displeasure.

While Braddock was fuming at the colonial governors in Alexandria, Sir John St. Clair was alienating the colonial authorities and frontier inhabitants of Pennsylvania and Virginia. Braddock had sent St. Clair to Wills' Creek on the Potomac to reconnoitre a route to the Ohio and to gather wagons and supplies. St. Clair found, however, that it was much more difficult than he had expected to engage road cutters, obtain wagons, and purchase provisions. Repeatedly rebuffed by the frontier inhabitants, he "stormed like a Lyon Rampant" at the provincial commissioners Pennsylvania had appointed to help him. He threatened the frontier inhabitants that "instead of marching to the Ohio he would. . . march his Army into Cumberland County" and would "by Fire and Sword oblige the Inhabitants" to follow his instructions, and if they would still not cooperate he would order his troops to "kill all kind of Cattle and carry away the Horses, burn the Houses, &ca." He further suggested to the commissioners that to speed the cooperation of the frontier inhabitants, they should "hang an arse (as he phrased it.)" St. Clair's activities left a bitter legacy of distrust on the frontier which remained throughout the war.⁸

⁸ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:368; Gen. Braddock to Sir Thomas Robinson, April 19, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 3, *The French and Indian War*, (6) 1:47-56; Robert Orme, "Journal of General Braddock's Expedition," British Library, Kings' Mss., 212:13, 23.

Braddock's demands meant that both Dinwiddie and Morris again had to call their assemblies in an attempt to gain more supplies. Six weeks before Braddock's arrival, the Pennsylvania Assembly, disgusted with the failure to make progress in 1754, had proposed adjourning until May. This threat appalled Morris. He managed to persuade the Assembly to continue in session, but they still refused to provide supply.⁹ Eventually, thanks largely to the efforts of Benjamin Franklin, the Assembly agreed to provide fourteen thousand bushels of wheat for the expedition, but no more. The Quaker members of the Assembly, who refused to provide direct war material such as arms and ammunition, did not balk at providing supplies. They combined with the frontier representatives, who demanded aid, to override the resistance of those who sought to use the opportunity to press for greater Assembly power. An attempt to provide aid beyond the wheat became enmeshed in disputes with the governor, although the Assembly, despite Morris's opposition, did agree to raise £5,000 in paper money on their own credit to pay for Indian gifts and other expenses of the commissioners.¹⁰

By the middle of March the intransigence of Pennsylvania had exasperated Braddock. He complained to Morris that the province, although "by far the most Opulent of any upon the

⁹ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th ser. 2:235; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:295-296.

¹⁰ Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Morris, March 10, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 1:522, 523.

Continent, as well as most nearly interested in the Event of the Expedition," was taking "advantage of the Common Danger in order to encroach upon His Majesty's Prerogative in the Administration of his Government." Braddock sent a veiled warning to the Assembly. "In what light such Behaviour must Appear to His Majesty, may be easily conceiv'd. . . It may be worth their while. . . to consider, whether it may not be presum'd that the Government at Home will take some Method to oblige 'em to act for the future."¹¹

But rather than being intimidated, the Assembly embarked on a new dispute with Morris over the publication of the Assembly's minutes. The Assembly refused to show Morris their minutes before publication. Worse for Morris, the published version included some letters from the Secretary of State, which Morris had lain before the Assembly to support his request for supply. Morris maintained that the letters were private: the Assembly defended their need to explain their actions. The dispute made any prospect of the Assembly granting supply still fainter.¹²

Eventually, with the threat of royal action hanging over them and in view of Braddock's expedition, the Assembly reconsidered their reluctance to grant funds. In March they

¹¹ Braddock to Gov. Morris, March 9, 1755, Boehm ed., BPRO C05, Part 3, *The French and Indian War*, (6) 1:41-42.

¹² Gov. Morris to Sir Thomas Robinson, April 9, 1755, Boehm ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (15) 1:43; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:387; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 8th Ser., 5:3865.

agreed to raise £25,000 for "the King's Use."¹³ However, again the Assembly insisted on a paper issue to be retired in ten years. Still smarting from the dispute with Morris, the Assembly was reluctant to give him control over the expenditure of the money. The bill assigned only £5,000 directly to Braddock and left the other £20,000 under the control of a committee of the House. Morris again refused his assent, informing the Assembly that he felt that such a restriction was "trifling with the King's Commands, and amounts to a Refusal to give at all, and I am satisfied will be seen in this Light by my Superiors."¹⁴ The Assembly replied that they were confident the people would see that "we did everything in our Power" and that "the Danger to which this Country stood exposed, and his Majesty's repeated and affectionate Calls, had great Weight with us, whatever they had with the Governor." The House then adjourned until the beginning of September, having failed once more to grant major support for Braddock's expedition.¹⁵

¹³ £5,000 was set aside for Braddock to use as he saw fit, £5,000 was given to the commissioners to pay off other debts Pennsylvania had encumbered in building roads and getting supplies to the expedition and providing gifts to the Indians, £10,000 was given for providing supplies, and the final £5,000 was set aside to pay debts Pennsylvania had previously incurred. *Pennsylvania Archives*, 8th Ser., 5:3870

¹⁴ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 8th Ser., 5:3874-3875, 3894; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:386-388.

¹⁵ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 8th Ser., 5:3896-3897, 3903.

In Virginia the disputes over the "Pistole Fee Controversy" had subsided. Peyton Randolph had returned from London, apologized to Dinwiddie about his behavior, and made a "Promise to conduct himself more regularly." Dinwiddie in turn had restored him to his post of Attorney-General, and both sides were prepared to overlook their past disputes.¹⁶ But the subsiding of the Pistole Fee Controversy did not mean that the House of Burgesses would automatically provide additional funds for Braddock's expedition. The House, and Dinwiddie himself, felt aggrieved at the failure of the other colonies to provide any funding for Braddock, and the House pointedly refused to pay for the subsistence of troops from other colonies stationed in Virginia. The House believed that they had already provided sufficient aid and would grant no more until needs on the Ohio were clearer. Thus, as Braddock assembled his forces at Fort Cumberland, the assemblies of the two provinces most intimately involved with the success or failure of the expedition were refusing to supply aid.¹⁷

Braddock's expedition was beset with many handicaps before it even got underway. Indeed, there were some who

¹⁶ Gov. Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, February 18, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 1:506-507.

¹⁷ Gov. Dinwiddie to Board of Trade, March 17, 1755, Boehm ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (1328) 11:1021-1022; Gov. Dinwiddie to Lord Halifax, February 24, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Gen. Braddock, May 9, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 1:512-517, 2:34;

doubted that the expedition could ever succeed. Braddock's secretary, son of Governor Shirley of Maryland, after touring the camp at Fort Cumberland wrote to Morris that he was "greatly disgusted at seeing an Expedition (as it is called) so ill concerted originally in England and so ill appointed, so improperly conducted since in America, and so much Fatigue and Expence incurred for a Purpose which if attended with success might better have been let alone." The delays were so long that the expedition was "in Danger of ending in little or nothing."¹⁸

The delays were excessive. The troops were to rendezvous at Wills' Creek, or Fort Cumberland as the newly constructed defenses were called. Newcastle had ordered Braddock to complete his regiment to full strength when he reached North America but recruiting was painfully slow. In addition, Braddock was determined to conduct the expedition in European style and to march to the Ohio with a large baggage train and heavy artillery for conducting a siege. The difficulties in obtaining horses and wagons greatly delayed the advance. Braddock also had to hire hundreds of workers to build the very road along which he intended to march.¹⁹ Progress was

¹⁸ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:404-406.

¹⁹ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:378-379; George Washington to John Augustine Washington, May 14, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *Papers of George Washington* 1:277-278; Richard Peters to Gov. Morris, May 18, 1755, HSP Gratz Papers, Case 8, Box 24; Robert Orme, "Journal of General Braddock's Expedition," *British Library, Kings' Mss.*, 212:37, 56;
(continued...)

further delayed by the scores of camp-followers who swarmed around the expedition: sutlers and victuallers, whores and washerwomen, wives and mistresses. The presence of such non-combatants was a constant problem, despite several attempts Braddock was unable to reduce their numbers significantly.²⁰

Braddock also delayed to await the arrival of the Indian auxiliaries he expected. Dinwiddie had invited the Ohio Indians to meet in May in Winchester, but after his snub the previous year and with the French firmly controlling the Ohio Valley, none came. In addition, Dinwiddie had opened negotiations with the southern Indians, the Catawbas and Cherokees, in the Carolinas, hoping that they would send support. But Governor Glenn of South Carolina objected to Dinwiddie's interference in what he viewed as South Carolina's exclusive preserve. Because of French pressure and the failure of the English to provide a sufficient number of gifts, (due to the inability of Morris and the Pennsylvania Assembly to agree upon a supply,) the Iroquois were also reluctant to send men.²¹ At the end of March Scarouady

¹⁹(...continued)

"Instructions to General Braddock," November 28, 1754, Gen. Braddock to Sir Thomas Robinson, April 19, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5, Part 3, *The French and Indian War*, (6) 1:16-26, 47-56.

²⁰ Robert Orme, "Journal," pp.66, 69; Gov. Morris to Gen. Braddock, June 16, 1755, *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:413; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:426.

²¹ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:358-360, 370-372; Robert Orme, "Journal," pp. 11, 39-40; Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir
(continued...)

bluntly informed the Pennsylvania Council, "You think You perfectly well understand the Management of Indian Affairs, but I must tell You that it is not so, and that the French are more politick than You. They never employ an Indian on any Business but they give him fine Cloathes, besides other Presents, and this makes the Indians their hearty Friends." He warned the Council that unless they had gifts ready for the Iroquois, any Indians who would come to help them "will be laughed at and made ashamed."²²

About one hundred Indians assembled at Fort Cumberland on May 10, mainly from George Croghan's plantation at Aughwick. The Indians brought with them their wives and families, fearing that if they were left behind the French and their Indian allies would attack them.²³ Instead of welcoming the Indians who had struggled to reach his army, Braddock complained at their small number and asked them to send their families home.²⁴ Braddock's lack of consideration disturbed the Indians. Several months after the expedition Kanuksusy, one of the Indians who had removed to Aughwick, informed the

²¹(...continued)

Thomas Robinson, June 23, 1755, Brock, ed., *Official Records of Governor Dinwiddie*, 2:70.

²² *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:343-344.

²³ *Virginia Gazette*, May 23, 1755; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 29, 1755; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:398-399.

²⁴ "Speech of General Braddock to the Indians at Fort Cumberland," May 10, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1763*, (15) 2:247-249.

Pennsylvania Council bluntly that the French had defeated the English because of

the pride and ignorance of that great General that came from England. He is now dead; but he was a bad man when he was alive; he looked upon us as dogs, and would never hear anything what was said to him. We often endeavoured to advise him and to tell him of the danger he was in with his Soldiers; but he never appeared pleased with us, & that was the reason that a great many of our Warriors left him & would not be under his Command.²⁵

Braddock's lack of consideration was not all that disturbed the Indians; his intentions also concerned them. According to a later account, the Delaware leader Shingas had asked Braddock what he intended to do when he had driven the French from the Ohio. Braddock replied that "the English Shoud Inhabit & Inherit the Land." Shingas then asked if the Indians who supported the English "might not be Permitted to Live and Trade Among the English and have Hunting Ground sufficient To Support themselves and Familys as they had no where to Flee Too But into the Hands of the French." Braddock replied abruptly that "No Savage Shoud Inherit the Land." This amazed the Ohio Indians who repeated the question. But Braddock merely reaffirmed his reply. Shingas and the other Indians then informed Braddock that "if they might not have Liberty To Live on the Land they woud not Fight for it[.] To wch Genl Braddock answered that he did not need their Help and had No

²⁵ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:588-589.

doubt of driveing the French and their Indians away."²⁶ It is possible that even Scarouady himself thought about defecting to the French. On June 19 he was "captured" by the French, although he later managed a miraculous escape.²⁷

Braddock's haughty treatment and blunt assertions that the English alone would occupy the Ohio Valley, combined with Washington's earlier misuse of the Indians in the Fort Necessity campaign, convinced many of the Indians who were still wavering in their support of the English to abandon them and join the French or at least to assume a neutral stance. Indeed, Shingas, one of the principal leaders of the raids on the frontier, maintained that this was his primary reason for deserting the English. Even the Indians who had come from Aughwick left in disgust, claiming they wanted to protect their wives and children whom Braddock had ordered to return to their homes. As a result, at one point, Braddock was left with only eight Indians for the expedition, a woefully insufficient number.²⁸

Braddock finally left Fort Cumberland on June 10. His party made a strange sight, "the Knight [St. Clair] swearing

²⁶ Beverly W. Bond, Jr., ed., "The Captivity of Charles Stuart, 1755-1757," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, June 1926, 13:63.

²⁷ Gov. Sharpe to Sir Thomas Robinson, June 28, 1755, Boehm ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1763*, (16) 2:361; Robert Orme, "Journal," p.77; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:456.

²⁸ Robert Orme, "Journal," p.40.

in the Van, the Genl curseing & bullying in the Center, and their Whores bringing up the Rear."²⁹ The advance was painfully slow because Braddock took with him some of the heavy guns from the warship *Norwich* moored in Alexandria. But with the shortage of horses the guns were more of a liability than an asset. It took seven of "the most able Horses" to pull one howitzer and five for each twelve-pounder. When the expedition came to steep hills it was necessary to send horses from the rear of the column to help those in the front pull the guns up the slope. With such obstacles the expedition advanced at a snail's pace, averaging only five or six miles a day, and on some days no more than two miles. With a column extending for five miles, they offered an inviting target for French and Indian attacks.³⁰

Lacking Indian auxiliaries, Braddock's expedition advanced blindly towards the French. The French took full advantage of this to send out scouting parties to keep track of his slow advance. The French-allied Indians quickly captured any of Braddock's men who wandered too far from the camp and left their mutilated bodies along the line of march for their fellow soldiers to find. Several times Braddock

²⁹ John Rutherford to Richard Peters, August, 1755, HSP, Peters Papers, 4:441.

³⁰ Guy Frégault, *Canada, The War of the Conquest*, p.95; Robert Orme, "Journal," pp. 23, 52, 57, 67, 69, 90; Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Dobbs, June 13, 1755, Brock, ed., *Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:60; Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, June 23, 1755, Boehm ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1763*, (16) 2:314.

came across abandoned Indian camps, the fires still burning, with "many Threats and Bravados with all Kinds of Scurillous Language" carved into the bark of the trees warning the men of what would happen to his men if they continued their advance.³¹ Not surprisingly, Braddock's men became nervous. Rumors careered through the expedition; morale plummeted. At times the flanking troops fired timorously into the woods, believing they had spied the French. Generally, the sightings were imaginary, but occasionally they did see Indians, often their own scouts rather than francophile Indians. On July 6 such wild shooting killed Scarouady's son who was scouting on the flanks.³²

The possibility of an ambush preoccupied Braddock. He had flankers posted during his march to prevent a surprise attack on the column. The most dangerous point was the crossing of Turtle Creek, only a few miles from Fort Duquesne, where the column would be split and the French could attack with a great advantage. On July 7 Braddock's expedition arrived at the creek. The banks were precipitous and a crossing was extremely perilous. Braddock spent two days preparing for the crossing. On the morning of July 9 his troops began to cross the creek. By noon the whole party had

³¹ Robert Orme, "Journal," pp.84-85, 87-88, 97; George Washington to John Augustine Washington, June 28-July 2, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *Papers of George Washington*, 1:322.

³² Robert Orme, "Journal," pp. 79, 98

crossed. Fort Duquesne was only ten miles away. It seemed that nothing could prevent Braddock's success now.³³

The plight of Fort Duquesne was critical. Contrecoeur decided that it was pointless to attempt to resist a siege and sent Beaujeu with 123 soldiers, one hundred militia and six hundred Indians, mainly Onondagas, Ohio Delawares and Ottawas, to try to halt Braddock's advance. Beaujeu had intended to surprise and surround Braddock's troops, but "his ambush. . . failed," his troops were sighted and the fighting began, just after two o'clock in the afternoon of July 9.³⁴

Braddock imagined a heavy attack and sent the colonial troops forward to reinforce the regulars in the vanguard. He ordered his artillery to open fire. The volley wreaked havoc on the French who reeled back from heavy losses. English firing killed the French commander, Beaujeu. The Indians were on the verge of fleeing, leaving the English to destroy the remaining two hundred French troops. But Dumas, the second in command of the French forces, managed to rally his men and sent Indians to flank Braddock's column. "The whoop of the Indians, which echoed through the forest, struck terror into the hearts" of Braddock's troops. They remembered what had happened to their comrades whom the Indians had captured. The

³³ Ibid., pp. 100, 102-103.

³⁴ "Account of the Battle on the Monongahela," July 9, 1755, *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:303-304; Charles Swaine to Richard Peters, August 5, 1755, HSP, Peters Papers, 4:38.

regulars gave ground, only to find to their horror that they were trapped between the French and the advancing colonials.³⁵

There was complete confusion. Braddock attempted to order his men but he was unable to form them into their regular ranks in the woods and ravines. The casualties were horrific. Three-quarters of the officers were killed, Braddock himself was mortally wounded. Two-thirds of the English casualties were shot by their own men. Not surprisingly, the regulars exposed to this endless fire soon gave way.³⁶

The rout was complete. The surviving troops fled in total panic, abandoning their artillery which they had dragged with such great effort across the Appalachians. The French even discovered Braddock's secret instructions from the Privy Council, and his war chest containing £25,000 (some of which the colonial assemblies had appropriated for the expedition,) thrown aside to hasten the flight. Braddock himself was hastily buried in the field. It had taken the British twelve days to reach Fort Duquesne from Gist's Plantation, it took

³⁵ "Account of the Battle on the Monongahela," July 9, 1755, *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:303-304; Robert Orme, "Journal," pp. 104-105.

³⁶ Robert Orme, "Journal" pp.104-105; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, July 18, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5, Part 3, *The French and Indian War*, (46) 1:99-101; Charles Swaine to Richard Peters, August 5, 1755, HSP Peters Papers, 4:38; "A list of Officers who were present and of those killed and wounded in the action on the Banks of the Monongahila the 9th July 1755," British Library, Additional Mss., 33,046:330-335

them only thirty hours to retreat. Colonel Dunbar was several miles in the rear, near Gist's, with the supply train advancing slowly. He had as many troops as Braddock and still outnumbered the French. Dunbar's forces by themselves were capable of attacking Fort Duquesne. But the panic spread quickly, and soon Dunbar's troops were also in flight. Dunbar abandoned his supplies, and in a month retreated the three hundred miles to Philadelphia.³⁷

Braddock's defeat was a terrible disaster for the English. Not only had a major field army been completely destroyed, their equipment lost, and hundreds killed, but the defeat had major political ramifications and influenced Indian relations. In Virginia and even more in Pennsylvania, the expedition had strained relations between the governor and Assembly. The pressure to gather supplies on the frontier had created great discontent among the frontier inhabitants. The expedition had also proven to the Ohio Indians that the English were incapable of providing any protection against the French and their Indian allies. The defeat shattered Indian fears about European invincibility because a force composed mainly of Indians, outnumbered three-to-one, had destroyed Braddock. Several of the Ohio Indians, such as Shingas and the Beaver, actively joined the French in the wake of

³⁷ Robert Orme, "Journal" p. 107; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:593, 595; Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, August 20, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (16) 2:449; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:514.

Braddock's defeat. Shingas maintained that the Indians had nothing to fear in going to war against the English for the English were nothing but "a Parcel of Old Women." "They could not travel without loaded Horses and Waggons full of Provisions and a great deal of Baggage." Since the British could not find their way to the Indian towns without Indian guides, if the Indians refused to help them their towns would be safe.³⁸

Braddock's defeat need not have spelled the end for British offensive measures. Dunbar still had sufficient troops with him to threaten Fort Duquesne. Dinwiddie in particular was in favor of another attempt on the fort. However, the troops were badly demoralized, and their uncontrolled flight meant that they had lost most of their equipment. Dunbar decided to withdraw into winter quarters so that his men could recoup. To protect the frontier he left only a few forces. At Fort Cumberland he posted five hundred sick and wounded troops at the field hospital Braddock had built and a company of Virginia troops to guard them. Not surprisingly the troops felt they had been left as "a Prey for

³⁸ Both Shingas and the Beaver, if not loyal to the English, had at least kept a neutral stance. Shingas, according to his own account, came to talk to Braddock during the expedition, while the Beaver was used by Scarouady as a messenger. During the war Shingas and the Beaver were probably the two most feared Ohio Indians in Pennsylvania and a special bounty of £350 was offered for their killing or capture. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, January 1, 1756; Deposition of John Craig, March 30, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:78.

the Enemy" and deserted in hundreds. By the middle of August the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier was almost completely unguarded, an easy target for the French and their Indian allies. Only one protection remained for the English: the Susquehanna Indians.³⁹

The presence of the Susquehanna Indians formed a barrier which it would have been difficult for the French and their allies to cross as long as the natives were at peace with the English. Braddock's defeat, however, released the Susquehanna Indians. Previously the Susquehanna Indians had maintained peaceful relations with the English. Enclosed by the English to the south and east and the Iroquois to the north, they were exceptionally vulnerable to reprisals from the English or their Iroquois allies and thus had felt powerless to act. But now English power had collapsed, the French had established themselves in the Ohio Valley and on Lake Erie, and the Iroquois seemed determined to maintain a neutrality in the conflict. The time was ripe for the Susquehanna Indians to express their grievances.

³⁹ Col. Innes to Col. Dunbar, August 6, 1755, Col. Dunbar to Col. Innes, August 7, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, August 20, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Board of Trade, September 6, 1755, Boehm ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion 1700-1783*, (16) 2:468, (16) 2:469, (16) 449-451 (1328) 11:1027; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:550, 602-603; Gov. Dinwiddie to Col. Dunbar, July 26, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, August 7, 1755, August 20, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Henry Fox, August 20, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:118-120, 139-140, 162-163, 164; *Virginia Gazette*, August 8, 1755.

In the mid-eighteenth century the Susquehanna Valley was home to a mixture of many different Indian groups. On the Susquehanna River, in the township of Paxton in Lancaster County, lived the Conestoga Indians. The Pennsylvania remnant of the much larger Susquehannock tribe, the Conestogas were the most assimilated to English ways of the Susquehanna tribes. Farther north, in the Juniata Valley, lived a band of Nanticokes and Conoys who had moved north from Virginia and Maryland in the early eighteenth century. East of them, at the Forks of the Delaware, lived the Tutelos, also originally from Virginia. The Tutelos were the Susquehanna group most under the influence of the Iroquois, and many of the tribe moved north after 1753 to join the Cayugas. On the eastern or northern branch of the Susquehanna, and on the upper reaches of the Delaware River lived the Minisinks, a sub-group of the Delawares, driven from their homeland in New Jersey. All the Indians of the Susquehanna region were dominated by the largest tribe in Pennsylvania, the Delawares.⁴⁰

The Susquehanna Delawares lived principally along the east branch of the Susquehanna River, with major settlements in the Wyoming Valley at Diahoga and Nescoping, with smaller settlements along the West Branch, most notably at Great Island. Other smaller groups lived on the upper reaches of

⁴⁰ Bruce G. Trigger, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians*, Vol. 15, *Northeast*, pp.221, 246, 366-367, 501.

the Delaware River, and in the northern parts of Northampton and Berks counties in Pennsylvania.⁴¹

The Susquehanna Delawares were perhaps the Indian group with the most reason to fight the English. From the arrival of the first Pennsylvania settlers, the Delawares had been steadily pushed from their homes on the Delaware and Susquehanna Rivers. The Iroquois, supported by the English, had relegated the Delawares to the status of "women," a tributary people with no power to make war or to negotiate directly with the English. The English and the Iroquois used this designation as an excuse to deprive the Delawares of their lands.⁴²

From the earliest settlement of Pennsylvania, many of the Pennsylvanians had attempted to maintain good and trusting relations with the Indians. Under William Penn, the Indians had, with good reason, trusted the English not to defraud them. Unfortunately in the early eighteenth-century relations with the Indians came increasingly under the influence of less

⁴¹ Bruce G. Trigger, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians*, Vol. 15, *Northeast*, pp.213-224.

⁴² Richard Aquila, *The Iroquois Restoration: Iroquois Diplomacy on the Colonial Frontier, 1701-1754*, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983), pp.184-186; Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with the English Colonies from its beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984), pp. 301-302; C.A. Weslager, *The Delaware Indians: A History*, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1972,) pp.196-218; C.A. Weslager, *The Delaware Indian Westward Migration*, (Wallingford, PA.: Middle Atlantic Press, 1978), pp.12-19.

scrupulous men such as James Logan. Logan schemed to acquire lands from the Delawares for the colony beyond the original purchase line. By the early 1730s the Delawares had been driven out of their original homelands on the lower reaches of the Delaware River and had moved farther north and west into the Susquehanna Valley into territory which the Iroquois claimed though did not occupy.⁴³

The Delawares' settlement on Iroquois-claimed land gave Logan and the Penns an opportunity they could not resist. The Penns were desperately short of funds; their "fortune" lay in their grant of Pennsylvania, but only a small part had been made available for settlement. The remainder of the land the Indians claimed and occupied, and it was necessary to get a quitclaim before the Penns could sell it. The Penns and their representatives in Pennsylvania connived with the Iroquois to define the Delawares as guests of the Iroquois on their land. The Iroquois were only too prepared to participate in this scheme since declaring the Delawares their guests could not fail to bolster their power and prestige.⁴⁴

In 1735 the Penns produced notes of an old Delaware land cession, made in the seventeenth century.⁴⁵ A day and a

⁴³ Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, pp.238-316 *passim*.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 316-324.

⁴⁵ Francis Jennings details how the piece of paper the Penns produced was not a "deed." In particular it bore no signatures or marks, and did not even contain all the details,
(continued...)

half's walk would determine the boundary of the grant. At the time the Indians had understood that the walk would be done at a normal pace, the walkers stopping "to eat their dinner, [and] after that smook a pipe." But the walk had never been completed and the Delawares had long ceded the lands it covered to the Pennsylvanians. In 1735 the Penns claimed the right to conduct the walk.⁴⁶

In 1737, under intense Iroquois pressure, the Delawares agreed to allow the "Walking Purchase." With horror they discovered that the Penns intended to use trained runners to cover as much ground as possible. The land thus acquired included a large area along the Delaware River, the heart of Delaware territory. The Delawares protested, but the Iroquois quickly moved to silence them. In 1742 the Iroquois pointedly declared that the Delawares were "women" who had settled on Iroquois land and thus now had no power to treat directly with the Pennsylvanians but should only negotiate through the Iroquois. The Iroquois had designated the Delawares as women before. But previously the designation had born no opprobrium but rather represented their status as one of the most important of their "tributary tribes." Now the Iroquois

⁴⁵(...continued)
but had blank spaces which were to be filled in. Ibid., p. 332.

⁴⁶ Ibid. pp.330-332. Jennings points out that the "notes" which were produced to support the claims for the "Walking Purchase" were only scribblings, and despite the claims of the Penns could in no way be called a grant or a deed.

sought to rob them of their independence. Faced with the combined power of the Iroquois and the English, the Delawares had little choice but to bide their time.⁴⁷

The Iroquois ordered the Delawares to move to the East Branch of the Susquehanna between Wyoming and Diahoga. At least there the Delawares could feel secure from English encroachment under the protection of the Iroquois. Indeed, the Pennsylvania authorities in the late 1740s and early 1750s made several efforts to restrict the spread of settlements into areas not yet purchased from the Iroquois. In 1748 and again in 1750 Richard Peters and Conrad Weiser led expeditions of magistrates to evict settlers from their lands. This move caused great discontent amongst the frontier settlers, although there was little actual resistance. However, the authorities were probably motivated more by a desire to preserve the profits of future land sales than a desire to protect the lands of the Delawares.⁴⁸

Concern for the Delawares did not prevent the Pennsylvanians from pressuring the Iroquois for still further cessions of their lands. In April 1754 Governor Hamilton sent Conrad Weiser to visit the Iroquois-appointed leader on the Susquehanna, Shickalamy, at Shamokin to make inquiries into the possibility of further purchases. Shickalamy was

⁴⁷ Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, p.344; Richard Aquila, *The Iroquois Restoration*, pp. 185-187.

⁴⁸ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 5:431, 440-449.

reluctant to act but was finally persuaded to go to Onondaga to open negotiations with the Iroquois.⁴⁹

Negotiations got underway during the Albany Conference in June 1754. The Pennsylvania commissioners at the conference, John Penn, Richard Peters, Isaac Norris, and Benjamin Franklin, approached the Iroquois for a cession of land. The Iroquois initially agreed to cede all lands "to the south of the Western Branch [of the Susquehanna] as far as the Alleghenny Hills." The commissioners made clear their displeasure at such a small grant and insinuated that the Iroquois must be "under a Contract with the French for the Ohio Lands, and desired they would explain themselves on this Head." Instead, they demanded "a Deed for all the Lands that have been settled by White People, or are now wanted for Settlements, on the west Side of the River Susquehanna, as far Westward as the Province extends."⁵⁰

The Iroquois were very reluctant to make such a large grant, and were deeply divided. Eventually, however, they agreed to cede lands west of the Susquehanna, south of Shamokin to the boundary of the Province. The grant very specifically exempted the East Branch of the Susquehanna and Shamokin in as much as the Iroquois bluntly informed the

⁴⁹ Conrad Weiser to Richard Peters, May 2, 1754, HSP, Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:9; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:24.

⁵⁰ "Report of Richard Peters on Proceedings at Albany," August 5, 1754, HSP, Penn Mss., 2:4-7.

Pennsylvanians "we will never part with the Land at Shamokin and Wyoming."⁵¹

It seemed that the Susquehanna Delawares were safe for a while. But almost immediately the lands on which they had settled became the focus of another group. In 1753 a group of Connecticut speculators had formed themselves into the Susquehannah Company. They intended to acquire lands on the East Branch of the Susquehanna River, which they regarded as part of the colony of Connecticut by virtue of its original charter. Soon the company had over eight hundred members, all eager for a share of the new lands.⁵²

The Susquehannah Company was even less scrupulous than the Penns in obtaining grants and was prepared to recognize any deed as long as it came from an Indian, no matter what his origin or status. At the Albany Conference in the summer of

⁵¹ The actual boundary as determined by the deed was "all the Lands lying within the said Province of Pennsylvania bounded and limited as follows, namely Beginning at the Kittochtinny or Blue Hills on the West Bank of Sasquehannah River, and thence by the said River to a mile above the mouth of a certain Creek called Kayarondinagh, thence North West and by West as far as the said Province of Pennsylvania extends to its Western Line or Boundary, thence along the said Western Line to the South Line or Boundary of the said Province, thence by the said South Line or Boundary to the South side of the said Kittochtinny Hills, thence by the South side of the said Hills along the said Hills to the place of Beginning." "Report of Richard Peters on Proceedings at Albany," August 5, 1754, HSP, Penn MSS: Indian Affairs, 2:4-7.

⁵² "Minutes of a Meeting of the Susquehannah Company," September 6, 1753, Julian P. Boyd, ed., *The Susquehannah Company Papers*, 10 Vols., (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962), 1:40-41; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:259.

1754, Martin Lydius, acting for the company, managed to acquire a deed to the East Branch of the Susquehanna from several Iroquois of dubious repute for £2,000.⁵³ The company soon set about surveying and selling their lands. They quickly won the support of many Pennsylvania inhabitants by offering land for sale at prices considerably lower than those set by the proprietors. Most important, they won over the local magistrates, who refused to act against them. In November 1754 Richard Peters received a report from Northampton County that there was "not one Magistrate. . . but what joins them." John Shickalamy complained bitterly to Morris about the settlers moving onto lands reserved for the Indians and "coming like Birds to disturb me." Conrad Weiser added his voice to the clamor, warning that if the government continued to allow settlement, "there will certainly be Bloodshed, for the Indians always said they would never suffer any white People to settle Wyomink or higher up."⁵⁴

The Susquehanna Delawares knew they were in a dangerous predicament. They had been forced from their heartland by the Pennsylvanians in the Walking Purchase. Then the Iroquois had schemed to keep them silent while granting away still more of

⁵³ "Deed from Indians of the Six Nations to the Susquehannah Company," *Susquehannah Company Papers*, 1:101-102; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:248, 259.

⁵⁴ "Report of Richard Peters on the Proceedings at Albany," August 5, 1754, HSP, Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:4-7; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:341-342; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:248-249, 250, 253-254, 267.

their lands. Now the final vestiges of their homeland were the focus of a group whom both the Iroquois and Pennsylvanians seemed reluctant to halt. The Delawares faced the possibility of losing all their lands in Pennsylvania. Yet they felt powerless to act. They could not dare risk the wrath of the English and the Iroquois. The defeat of General Braddock gave them their opportunity. With the English unable to mount an offensive and the Iroquois carefully walking a path of neutrality, the Delawares felt they could finally risk breaking with the English and seeking their independence from Iroquois domination. They also knew that they could gain succor from the French.

Braddock's defeat had also provided the French with an unparalleled opportunity. By committing regular troops, the British had in effect declared war on France. But Newcastle believed that the war could remain limited to North America, for "in North America, the Disputes are; And there They shall remain for us; And there the War may be kept."⁵⁵

Newcastle's hopes were not unreasonable. The French had no wish to start a general war over North America. They had been deeply disturbed that de Villier's expedition had caused so much "ferment" in England and were aware that in any struggle limited to North America the Royal Navy would be able to

⁵⁵ Duke of Newcastle to Sir Benjamin Keene, April 28 1755, *Disposition of Dunbar's Regiment* [undated] BL Additional Mss., 32,854:299-302, 35,909:196-199; Machault to Duquesne, February 17, 1755, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:275-278.

strangle French trade and supplies, while the English colonies so decisively outnumbered the French colonies that their weight of numbers must quickly tell. In April 1755 Governor Vaudreuil had received instructions from Paris that he must be careful that "he might not appear the aggressor." The French intention was to continue on "a strict defensive, so long as the English will not make any attack, which is to be regarded as a rupture on their part."⁵⁶

However, Braddock's defeat meant both that the British had started the war and that the French had dominance, if only temporarily, in North America, and the risk of a full-scale war seemed more attractive. In Europe, French forces had an overwhelming superiority over the English. In addition, the French had managed to break apart Britain's alliance with Austria and Russia and left Britain with Prussia as her only ally. If the war could be fought quickly in Europe before too many losses were sustained in North America, they would be able to force some major concessions from Great Britain.⁵⁷

The French took the war to Europe by attacking the English-held island of Minorca in the Mediterranean. Suddenly, hostilities which had begun in the Ohio Valley had become a world war. In Canada French regular troops were to

⁵⁶ "Private Instructions to Vaudreuil," April 1, 1755, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:292.

⁵⁷ Jones, *Britain and the World*, pp. 209-210; Speck, *Stability and Strife*, pp. 262-263.

hold colonial forces at bay while parties of Indians commanded by French officers were to harass the colonial frontier. On land the French army was to invade and plunder George II's electorate of Hanover. If the colonies could be dissuaded from their support of the war, the crown terrified of the destruction of his hereditary homeland, and the administration convinced that the costs of the war were becoming too great, it might be possible to obtain an advantageous peace from Great Britain. By 1756 a full-scale war had broken out.⁵⁸

Braddock's defeat was the final essential element in the collapse of British policy. It was his defeat which precipitated the descent of the French and Indians on the frontier. If the British had been able to maintain a substantial force on the frontier, it is doubtful that either the French or Indians would have felt sufficiently secure to attack. His defeat also provided the French with the motivation to recommence the war they had ended at Aix-La-Chapelle in 1748, and was to spark a world-wide conflict.

⁵⁸ Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution, The Great War for the Empire: The Years of Defeat*, 6:398-417.

Chapter III

In Search of A Policy

The Delawares and Shawanese [are] falling upon your Bretheren of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia in the most cruel and treacherous Manner. . . Unless you, the Six Nations, who have always maintained a Superiority over them Indians will now exert yourselves in this Case, you will not only loose that Authority which they hitherto acknowledged, but will have them your Enemies.

--Sir William Johnson to the Iroquois, February, 1756¹

Braddock's defeat opened the frontiers to the assaults of the French and their Indian allies. For the next four years, until 1759, the French and the francophile Indians subjected the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontiers to almost continual raids. There were two types of raids. The first the French initiated and planned. They were generally larger raids, originating primarily from Fort Duquesne, and to a lesser extent, Fort Niagara. Usually a French officer commanded these raids, sometimes accompanied by Canadian ensigns, often former *coureurs de bois*. The Indians who participated were generally western Indians, Ottawas, Potawatomis, and sometimes Ohio Indians, Twightwees, Shawnees, and Delawares. Normally

¹ Council between Sir William Johnson & Iroquois, February 20, 1756, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Penn MSS: Indian Affairs, 2:68.

the Indians determined the actual targets, while the French determined the regions to be raided. However, on occasions the French decided the targets, such as frontier forts like Fort Granville in Pennsylvania and Fort Vause in Virginia.

The second category of raids the Indians themselves initiated, with no French prompting. The Ohio Shawnees and Delawares raided Augusta, Frederick, and Hampshire counties in Virginia and Cumberland County in Pennsylvania, while the Susquehanna Delawares raided the Susquehanna Valley and Lancaster, Berks, and Northampton counties in Pennsylvania. These raids rarely attacked military targets and had no French involvement.

In many of the raids the Indians crossed the Appalachians in large parties and then split into smaller groups, after determining a rendezvous to regroup for the return. The smaller groups were able to pass through frontier defenses, penetrate deep into the settled parts of the provinces, and quickly retreat before colonial parties could be raised against them. This tactic made the groups extremely difficult to intercept and defeat. They travelled light and lived "off the land," particularly after the early raids had pushed the frontier back many miles, and the raiders were able to supply themselves with provisions from the fields of the abandoned plantations.²

² In April 1756, for instance, the Indian raiders rendezvoused on the back of Warm Spring Mountain near Winchester. George Mercer to John Fenton Mercer, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:354-355.
(continued...)

In the opening months of the war both Virginia and Pennsylvania attempted to develop a policy to deal with the emergency. The raids forced both colonies to change their traditional military and Indian policies. Virginia had long relied upon the militia to defend the colony. The raids soon proved that the militia was all but useless, and Virginia was forced to develop a professional military establishment in the form of the Virginia Regiment. Pennsylvania, on the other hand, had relied on Indian alliances to protect the colony. The collapse of Indian support forced the colony to develop a military policy for the first time. Simultaneously, the strength of the pacifist Quakers compelled the government to pursue a negotiated settlement.

The first raids had begun even before Braddock had marched. In July 1754 and again in the early spring of 1755, there were sporadic attacks on the Holston River in Augusta County. Although few Indians were involved in the raids and they killed few settlers, they created disproportionate alarm on the frontier because these were the first direct Indian attacks on the Virginia frontier for many years. The French organized these early raids out of Fort Duquesne, and the main Indian participants were Shawnees. The raids aimed to hinder and break communications between Virginia and the Cherokees in

²(...continued)

"Abstract of Dispatches received from Canada," June 4, 1756, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:408.

the Carolinas.³ In the latter months of 1754 Ohio Shawnees and Delawares also launched a few isolated raids on Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Again, few Indians were involved. The raids concentrated mainly on taking plunder and driving off, rather than killing, the frontier settlers.⁴ These early raids were small in scale compared with the raids which followed Braddock's defeat. But they were a foretaste of what was to come. Without an organized system of defense the frontiers lay exposed and hundreds of frontier settlers abandoned their homes.

As Braddock advanced towards Fort Duquesne, the first large-scale raids descended upon the frontiers. At the end of June 1755 a heavy raid, composed of about 130 Indians, mainly Ohio Delawares and Shawnees, struck in the rear of Braddock's march at the settlement at Patterson's Creek, Virginia, twelve miles east of Fort Cumberland. The Indians killed eleven settlers and captured eleven more. From Patterson's Creek they spread out into the rest of Frederick and Hampshire

³ Dinwiddie to Richard Pearis, August 2, [1754], Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 1:266-268; Duquesne to Antoine Louis Rouille, Count de Jouy May 31, 1755, Sylvester K. Stevens & Donald H. Kent eds., *Wilderness Chronicles of Northwestern Pennsylvania* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1941) pp.89-90.

⁴ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:133-136, 402-409;

counties and into Cumberland County in Pennsylvania, killing almost fifty settlers and capturing about thirty.⁵

Dinwiddie again discovered the limitations of the militia. Despite the raids, William Fairfax, the commander of the Frederick County militia, refused to march outside the county's boundaries. Other men refused to serve and remained to defend their own families or fled from the frontier. Even when the men could be persuaded to muster, they lacked adequate weapons to pose a serious deterrent to the raiders. Although by law all men were supposed to have their own arms, many did not or had unreliable weapons. In addition, the arms were of different calibers, making the provision of ammunition difficult.⁶

From the French perspective, the raids had the desired effect. The inhabitants deserted large areas of the backcountry behind Braddock, rendering the acquisition of supplies for the expedition increasingly difficult. The backcountry settlers who had not fled, or who lived in areas still free from raids, refused to bring provisions to the army

⁵ *Maryland Gazette*, July 3, 1755; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 3, 1755; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:455-456, 457-458 463; Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, July 4, 1755, Boehm ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (16) 2:344-346; Edward Shippen to William Allen, July 4, 1755, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 1; Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Sharpe, July 5, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:85.

⁶ Gov. Dinwiddie to Gen. Braddock, July 4, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Thomas Bryan Martin, July 4, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Sharpe, July 5, 1755, Brock ed., *Maryland Gazette*, July 24, 1755; Henning, *Statutes At Large*, 5:112-118.

without an escort. This demand forced Braddock to divert some of his forces to provide a guard. Fleeing settlers clogged the roads with wagons heading east, hindering communications between Braddock and his rear.⁷

At the end of June, another party of Indians raided Holston's River in southwestern Augusta County. They soon advanced east into the New River Valley. The raid was small, but the Augusta County militia was in such disarray that it could not repulse the attack.⁸ Dinwiddie complained to the county commanders that "if the Militia w'd only in small Numb's appear with proper Spirit, the Banditti of Ind's w'd not face them; but it appears to me that the inhabit'ts of Augusta have been siez'd with a Pannick in allowing a few Ind's to bully all that Co'ty."⁹

Eventually enough militia assembled to oppose the raiders. But the defenders proved a sorry lot. In two engagements, the Indians killed several Virginians, including the commander of one party and one of the most respected Augusta gentlemen, James Patton, while suffering no

⁷ Gov. Morris to Thomas Penn, July 8, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (16) 2:442-443; Edward Shippen to James Burd, July 8, 1755, H.S.P. Shippen Family Papers, Vol 1; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:641-642.

⁸ Gov. Dinwiddie to David Stewart, July 16, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Col. Patton, July 16, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to John Buchanan, August 11, Brock ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:100-101, 101, 154-155.

⁹ Gov. Dinwiddie to William Byrd, July 22, 1755, Brock ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:110.

casualties. By the end of July, the raiders had penetrated as far as Smith's Mountain in Halifax County, deep into the settled parts of Virginia, and had killed at least twenty-seven settlers in Augusta County alone.¹⁰ The raids of June and July were still small in scale compared with later forays, though they did more damage than in the winter of 1754-1755 and the French reported that the Miami and Potawatomi Indians alone had killed or captured 120 English settlers.¹¹

The complete failure of the militia disgusted Dinwiddie as he received repeated complaints from frontier settlers who found themselves unprotected and were forced to flee. He wrote despairingly to an officer of the Augusta militia, "if Y'r People will dastardly give up their Families and Interest to a barbarous Enemy, with't endeavour'g to resist them, they cannot expect to be protected." He added ominously "If they will run away from themselves and desert their Int[eres]ts[,]

¹⁰ "A Register of Persons who have been either Killed, Wounded or taken Prisoners by the Enemy in Augusta County, as also of such as have made their Escape," Gov. Dinwiddie to James Buchanan, August 11, 1755, Draper Mss.: William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83, 86.

¹¹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 4, 11, October 9, 1755; *Maryland Gazette*, September 11, 25, October 2, 1755; Gov. Dinwiddie to Andrew Lewis, September 15, 1755, Brock ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:198-199; "Journal of Occurrences in Canada from October, 1755, to June, 1756," Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:401.




Figure 1: physical Features of the Virginia and Pennsylvania Frontier

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those that y[e]t rema. to defend the Co[un]ty may hereafter be tho[ugh]t worthy of enjoying their Platat[ion]s."¹²

Dinwiddie summoned the House of Burgesses to meet on August 5. He urged them to grant money to raise troops and to pass a new militia law to increase its efficiency in defending the frontier. He implored them to "oblige every Subject, that is able to bear Arms, to be ready and obedient on all Occasions, to acquire such military Knowledge, and submit to such military Discipline as can alone make them act with Safety and Hon'r to themselves, and Utility to their Co'try." Fearful of the impact of the raids, the House quickly obliged. They agreed to grant £40,000 for 1,200 men to be formed into the Virginia Regiment.¹³ They also passed new regulations to

¹² *Virginia Gazette*, August 8, 1755; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 21, 1755. Gov. Dinwiddie to John Buchanan, August 11, 1755, Brock ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:155.

¹³ The Assembly sought to make Washington Commander-in-Chief. He had resigned his previous commission, disgusted at the independent companies' officers' refusal to regard the Governor's commission as equivalent to a royal commission. He served Braddock as a volunteer, as aid-de-camp. When the Assembly suggested his appointment he made known that his disgust at the conditions under which he had previously served and demanded the power "of having the Officers in some measure appointed with my advice, and with my concurrence." Unfortunately, Dinwiddie had already promised many of the commissions. The two entered into negotiations and eventually compromised. Washington was able to select most of the field officers, while other officers who had already received their commissions from Dinwiddie, retained them. Philip Ludwell to George Washington, August 8, 1755, Warner Lewis to George Washington, [August 9, 1755,] George Washington to Warner Lewis, August 14, 1755, George Washington to Andrew Lewis, September 6, 1755, George Washington to Charles Dick, September 6, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of* (continued...)

improve attendance at musters, and hence training, and to provide stiffer penalties for insubordination, including the death penalty. Yet again, however, hopes that such stiff penalties would be enough for the militia to function as an effective local defense force proved false.¹⁴

Dinwiddie immediately set about raising six ranger companies of fifty men each. The rangers were to be based in small forts constructed along the frontier and to operate independently of the Virginia Regiment. Their role was to detect incoming parties before they could reach inhabited parts of the colony and to intercept them or alert other detachments to their presence. Meanwhile, Dinwiddie ordered the recruitment of sixteen companies of sixty men each to form the Virginia Regiment. In return for their commissions, the officers had to recruit a specific number of men for their own companies. If the system of voluntary recruiting failed, the

¹³(...continued)

George Washington, 1:356-357, 358-359, 360-361, 2:1, 19-20, 21-22; Address of Gov. Dinwiddie to House of Burgesses, August [5], 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to the Earl of Halifax, August 7, 1755, Instructions to Washington," [August 14, 1755], Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:134-135, 141-143; Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, August 7, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5 Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (16) 2:375-380; "Extracts of Letters from Gov. Dinwiddie," August 7, 20, September 6, 1755, British Library, Additional Mss., 33,029:210; Henning, *Statutes At Large* 6:521-530; McIlwaine, *Journal of the House of Burgesses, 1752-1755, 1756-1758*, 297-298.

¹⁴ Henning, *Statutes at Large*, 6:530-544.

House empowered Dinwiddie to draft unmarried men from the militia to complete the numbers required.¹⁵

As the Virginian military effort had proved less than expected, Dinwiddie hoped that the Cherokees and Catawbas would send warriors to protect the Virginia frontier. In August he sent Daniel Carroll with a message to them. In September several Cherokee warriors came to Williamsburg and held a conference with Dinwiddie. Dinwiddie requested that they should station some of their men on the New and Holston's Rivers to protect their communications with Virginia. Another deputation who arrived in Williamsburg at the beginning of October agreed to protect southwestern Virginia. However, it would be some time before they could send men. Virginia was still without Indian allies and an effective military force as the winter drew near.¹⁶

¹⁵ The dependence of a commission on the recruitment of a specific number of men was standard procedure in the mid-eighteenth century. Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Dobbs, August 29, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie's Instructions to George Washington, [August 14, 1755] *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:182, 184-186; General Instructions for Recruiting, September 1-3, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *Papers of George Washington*, 2:13-14; Henning, *Statutes at Large*, 6:521-530. A condition of accepting a commission in the Virginia Regiment was that the officer had to recruit a certain number of men. Failure to do so was considered equivalent to resigning one's commission. Each captain was to raise thirty men, each lieutenant eighteen, and each ensign twelve.

¹⁶ "Message from Gov. Dinwiddie to the Catawbas and Cherokee Indians," August 22, 1755, "Minutes of a Council with the Cherokee Indians," September 5, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to John Smith, September 6, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:168-169, 187-188, 190; "Negotiations of Governor Dinwiddie with the Cherokees,"
(continued...)

At the end of September, scattered reports arrived of parties of Ohio Indians skulking around Fort Cumberland. Adam Stephen, the commander at the fort, reported that about 150 Indians had crossed the Appalachians and then "divided into small parties." One party descended on the Greenbriar River in Augusta County killing twelve and capturing eight. Another party descended on Patterson's Creek east of Fort Cumberland. They attacked on October 1, killing forty-two settlers. The party then pressed on down the Potomac to Town Creek, Maryland, wreaking havoc en route. A third party of Delawares, commanded by Shingas, descended on the South Branch of the Potomac. This raid so terrified the detachment of the Virginia Regiment stationed there that they abandoned their positions and retreated towards Edwards Fort on the Cacapon.¹⁷

The Virginia frontier was in chaos. Hundreds of families fled, abandoning their belongings. Washington, who had been supervising recruitment in Fredericksburg, hurried back to Winchester. There he "found everything in the greatest hurry and confusion by the back Inhabitants flocking in, and those

¹⁶(...continued)

October 1, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (16) 2:493-498.

¹⁷ Adam Stephen to George Washington, October 4, 1755, George Washington to William Vance, October 10, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:72-73, 93; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11/12, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:236-242; "Register," Draper Mss.: William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:641-643; *Maryland Gazette*, October 16, 1755.




Figure 2: Towns and Counties of the Virginia and Pennsylvania Frontier in the 1750s.

of the Town removing out." He encouraged the frontiersmen to remove to the many blockhouses which the Virginia Regiment and the frontiersmen themselves had built along the frontier rather than completely abandon the region. A few did, but most were intent on fleeing as far as possible and warned Washington that if he attempted to stop them, they would "blow out [his] brains."¹⁸

Many of the troops Washington had recruited were still in Fredericksburg for rudimentary training. Washington attempted to speed their march to Winchester, but the newly appointed officers were slow to act. Their own safety concerned them as much as the safety of the province. When Washington called out the militia from the counties of Augusta, Frederick, Hampshire, Prince William and Fairfax, they refused to muster. One captain claimed that "his Wife, Family and Corn was at Stake, so were those of his Soldiers, therefore it was not possible for him to come." Those soldiers and militia who were in Winchester, or who arrived from Fredericksburg, deserted in droves upon the first warning of an attack.¹⁹

¹⁸ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 8, 1755, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:83-84, 101-102.

¹⁹ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11/12, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:239; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, Abbot and Twohig eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:103, 106; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 30, 1755.

With the militia failing to provide protection, the frontier settlers feared an Indian onslaught. Fear soon turned to panic, which in turn hampered the defense efforts, breeding yet greater fear and panic. Settlers fleeing their plantations blocked the roads, making it all but impossible to send detachments to intercept the raiding parties. When Washington attempted to speed reinforcements from Winchester to the South Branch and Fort Cumberland, they were unable to move owing to "the Crowds of People who were flying" down the roads.²⁰

Panic also bred wild rumors. There were even reports that Winchester had fallen. The rumors made it exceedingly difficult for Washington and his commanders to judge the most effective disposition for the few troops they had at their disposal, and resulted in much time and effort being wasted. On October 11 an alarm was raised that a large party of Indians had attacked a plantation twelve miles from Winchester. The next report purported that the raiders had penetrated to within four miles of Winchester. The townspeople were "flying in the most promiscuous manner." In desperation, Washington sent out a company to intercept the raiders. What the company found, however, was not a large Indian raiding party but "a Mulattoo and negro seen hunting,"

²⁰ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, Abbot and Twohig eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:105.

and three drunken soldiers "carousing, firing their Pistols, and uttering the most unheard of Imprecations."²¹

The October attacks revealed many critical weaknesses in Virginia's military system. The military regulations the House had approved were completely inadequate. The provisions for conducting courts martial were insufficient, and there were no provisions at all for prosecuting civilians who aided deserters and hampered the defense efforts. Washington found it all but impossible to organize an adequate defense, for civilians refused to cooperate with military authorities. He complained that "no orders are obey'd but what my a Party of Soldiers, or own drawn Sword Enforces; without this a Single horse, for the most urgent occasion, cannot be had, to such a pitch has the insolence of these People arriv'd."²²

Washington pressed Dinwiddie to persuade the Assembly to pass a new mutiny law which would enable him to keep order. Under the "Act for making Provision against Invasions and Insurrections" of 1748, the only punishments which could be inflicted on mutinous troops were fines. In the face of a determined enemy, fines were unlikely to be much deterrent to

²¹ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11-12, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:238-239; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, "Memorandum and Advertisement," [October 13, 1755,] Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:102-104, 109-110.

²² George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11/12, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:237.

mutiny and desertion. Washington pressed for the provision of the death penalty for such offenses and urged the House to make civilians "liable to certain heavy Fines, or Corporal Punishments for Entertaining of Deserters." He was aware, however, of the deep opposition of some in the House to such harsh measures, even in time of war. He commented to Dinwiddie that he had "some surprise, that we alone shou'd be so tenacious of Liberty as not to invest a Power where Interest and Politics so unanswerably demand it; and from whence so much good must consequently ensue." He threatened, publicly, that if the House would not pass new military regulations, he would resign his commission and leave the colony to its fate.²³

Dinwiddie summoned the House to meet on October 27. At its opening, Dinwiddie urged the Burgesses to pass measures promoting discipline and improving recruitment. He warned them that the defensive measures of the Virginia Regiment would "prove abortive, unless the commanding Officer be enabled to keep them under strict Discipline, and in a proper Submission to their Officers." He then informed them of Washington's difficulties in recruiting. Most distressing were the "repeated complaints. . . of the great Obstructions given to the Service, by many of the Magistrates and other

²³ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11/12, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:237-238; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:103; Henning, *Statutes at Large*, 5:112-118.

civil Officers, some of whom have even given Protection to those who have shamefully deserted." Some officers "with an unparalleled [sic] and most criminal Undutifulness to their Country, have discouraged, and prevented the enlisting of Men."²⁴

Impressed by Washington's pleas and threats, the House quickly passed a new mutiny act. The act approved the death penalty for desertion and disobedience. But the act still did not stem the flow of deserters because Washington had to apply to Dinwiddie for writs to hold courts martial, and before Washington could carry out a sentence he had to supply Dinwiddie with full transcripts of the trial for the governor's approval. As a result the whole process was tediously slow and proved little deterrent to deserters and mutineers.²⁵

Moreover, the House was not in session long enough to begin to consider other penalties for civilians. Dinwiddie prorogued it after several of the members "began to be factious and enter'g into Cabals very incosist't with their Duty at this Period." Several burgesses attempted to use the emergency to press for the establishment of a loan office to emit £200,000 in paper money. The exchange rate on Virginia

²⁴ H.R. McIlwaine, *Journal of the House of Burgesses, 1752-1755, 1756-1758*, pp.319-320.

²⁵ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, January 13, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:316; Henning, *Statutes*, 6:559-564.

currency had already fallen from a 25% discount in 1754, to a 32½% discount in the fall of 1755. Dinwiddie thus felt that he could not in good conscience allow the issuing of paper money. When several burgesses pressed their cause, Dinwiddie dissolved the House and issued writs for a new election.²⁶

Fortunately for Virginia, following the October 1755 Potomac raids, the French and the Ohio Indians did not subject the frontier to another major raid until the following April. Washington used the lull to attempt to rationalize the frontier defenses. He began the construction of a series of forts from which scouts could range the frontier to detect raiding parties and raise the alarm. He determined that Winchester should be the base of operations for the Virginia Regiment and began construction of a large fort there, named Fort Dinwiddie in honor of the governor. He also abandoned any dependence upon the militia and used it solely as an auxiliary force, to garrison forts when the regular troops were needed elsewhere, and when he believed there was little chance of attack.²⁷

²⁶ Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, October 18, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Morris, November 12, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Dobbs, November 13, Gov. Dinwiddie to the Earl of Granville, November 15, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:247-248, 264-265, 265-266, 275; William Fairfax to George Washington, October 20, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:132.

²⁷ Adam Stephen to Washington, November 7, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:158-159.

Washington's attempts to organize the colony's defense were hindered by the slow pace of recruiting for the Virginia Regiment. By the end of December 1755, instead of the one thousand men the Assembly had authorized for the regiment, Washington's officers had recruited only five hundred. It was not until the middle of January that Washington was finally able to divide the regiment into the sixteen companies which Dinwiddie had authorized. Even then, many units were still incomplete, leaving the command structure inefficient and cumbersome and lessening the impact of training.²⁸

Recognizing the weaknesses of the regiment and eager for their own share of glory, several groups of Virginia gentlemen organized their own volunteer forces. The gentry in Hanover county formed a company of volunteers which ranged the frontier in October. In the spring of 1756 a larger volunteer group of "Associators," commanded by Peyton Randolph, assembled in Fredericksburg. The volunteer companies, however, were all but useless. They were top-heavy in officers, thin in ranks, and rarely courageous enough to engage in combat.²⁹

²⁸ Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:307. "Order," January 9, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:259-263.

²⁹ *Virginia Gazette*, November 7, 1755; John Robinson to George Washington, May 3, 1756, Landon Carter to George Washington, May, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:87, 186; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 20, June 3, 1756; *Maryland Gazette*, May 20, 1756.

Washington also sought to strengthen Virginia's defenses by withdrawing the forces garrisoned at Fort Cumberland to blockhouses and forts near still-inhabited areas to the east. While Fort Cumberland was located on the outer limits of settlement in 1754, and although important as a supply depot for assaults on the Ohio, it was a great liability in defensive terms. Garrisoning it drew men from other areas without protecting the settlers, for raiders could easily bypass the fort. Supplying the fort was also difficult. Moreover, because the fort was in Maryland, there were constant disputes over command between Washington, his officers, and Colonel Dagworthy of the Maryland forces. However, pressure from Dinwiddie and from General Shirley forced Washington to maintain the fort for a future attack on the Ohio.³⁰

In Pennsylvania, news of Braddock's defeat threw the frontier into chaos. The news caused settlers to quit their plantations, leaving crops rotting in the fields. A report from Carlisle confirmed that the settlers were "in general in great Trouble and Confusion" and the "Back Settlers are in general fled, and are likely to be ruined for the Loss of their Crops and Summer's Labour."³¹ In Philadelphia initial

³⁰ Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 270-271n; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, January 14, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:317.

³¹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 31, 1755.

reaction to the news suggested that governor and Assembly could reconcile their differences. The Assembly agreed to provide £50,000 to raise troops for the frontier. Even Quaker assemblymen acquiesced to funding volunteer units, while other members abandoned their quest for paper money, proposing instead to raise funds by a tax "upon all Estates, Real and Personall, and Taxables, within this Province."³²

However, old disputes soon resurfaced. On August 5, Morris rejected the bill because it violated his instructions in other ways: it taxed proprietary lands and the Assembly appointed assessors to determine the rates. Most Pennsylvanians imagined the Penns as fabulously wealthy aristocrats, and the Assembly would not exempt the colony's largest landowner from taxation. But while the Penns were great landowners, most of their lands were undeveloped and they were relatively impoverished. Instead of defending his actions in terms of the chimera of the Penns' wealth, Morris instead informed the Assembly that "all Governors. . . are from the Nature of their Office exempt from the Payment of Taxes," and, in the same manner that the House of Commons could not tax the Crown, the Assembly could not tax the Proprietors. But the Assembly would not concede and merely

³² *Pennsylvania Archives*, 8th Ser., 5:3933.

replied that "the Proprietary. . . does not govern us. The Province supports a Lieutenant to do that Duty for him."³³

Morris attempted to break the stalemate by offering Ohio lands to all who would serve on the frontier. But the Assembly rejected his proposal. It pointed to the contradiction in his position: while claiming he was "bound not to encumber proprietary lands," he was "proposing to give away 6 or 700,000 acres of it as bounties." Assemblymen maintained that they must merely "endeavour patiently to wait for that Relief which Providence may in due Time think fit to favour us with." Others, however, were increasingly concerned at the deadlock. Several leading Pennsylvanians were so distressed by the disputes that they offered to pay the Proprietors' tax if defense measures were passed.³⁴ But the Assembly refused to consider any measures as long as deep divisions still existed with the governor over taxation.

So far, only the Ohio Indians and western Indians had raided Virginia and Cumberland County. Most Pennsylvanians believed that the French and their allies could not attack deep into Pennsylvania, certainly not east of the Susquehanna,

³³ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:454-456, 8th Ser., 5:3937, 3939; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:525-527; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 14, 1755.

³⁴ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:517-519, 525-528, 530, 563-564, 585, 586; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 8th Ser., 5:3932; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 14, 1755; Address of Gov. Morris to the Assembly, August 9, 1755, Address of Gov. Morris to the Assembly, August 21, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (16) 2:432, (17) 2:740-741.

unless the Susquehanna Indians were "drawn off." In October rumors began to circulate of their defection. Scarouady, supported by George Croghan, warned that the Susquehanna Delawares were close to abandoning their allegiance to the English and might even take up arms because the French were making great efforts to lure them away.³⁵

By the fall of 1755 virtually all the former anglophile Indians on the Susquehanna had deserted Pennsylvania. The few who remained were in no position to offer support for the colony. The Council thus decided that the only hope to protect the frontier, without raising troops and beginning a war, was to engage the Iroquois to stop their tributary Indians from assaulting the frontier. The belief was still widespread in Pennsylvania that the Delawares remained at the bidding of the Iroquois. In mid-October they sent Scarouady and Andrew Montour to inform the Iroquois of the "treachery" of the Ohio Indians and to encourage them to intervene to prevent the defection of the Susquehanna Indians.³⁶

While the Pennsylvanians threatened the Delawares with the wrath of the Iroquois, the French also sent a clear message. The governor of New France informed the Indians who were reluctant to fight the Pennsylvanians to "go where I

³⁵ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 6th ser., 2:475-576; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:551-554, 588-590, 615-616, 642-643.

³⁶ Richard Peters to Conrad Weiser, October 18, 1755, HSP Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:58; Scarouady and Montour did not leave for Iroquois until late January 1756. See Chapter IV for more details of their mission.

cannot hurt you. You are in my way. You must not stay any longer." They should move to the Ohio Valley or at least farther up the East Branch. Alarmed by the French threats, the Susquehanna Delawares offered no resistance and either moved away or allowed the French and their Indian allies to move through their territory unmolested to reach the unprotected Pennsylvania frontier. Many even joined their Ohio compatriots and prepared for war.³⁷

In the middle of October the Susquehanna Delawares called Andrew Montour to the "Great Island" near the forks of the Susquehanna to inform him that the French had given them a hatchet "to be used against the English if they proved saucy." John Harris, who visited the "Great Island" at the end of October, reported that he found the Indians all painted in black and ready for war. It was apparent that the Susquehanna Delawares were joining the French. Weiser warned William Allen, "I think all our Indians are gone off with the French, or rather joined them because they could not stand their Ground." Within a few days this realignment became apparent as news of raids by the Susquehanna Delawares arrived in Philadelphia.³⁸

On October 16 a party of Susquehanna Indians from the West Branch descended upon the settlement of Penn's Creek on the west side of the Susquehanna, a few miles south of

³⁷ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:683.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 6:659-660, 672-673.

Shamokin. The raiders killed or captured twenty-five settlers. A party that set out from Harris' Ferry to bury the dead was itself attacked on October 24, losing eight more. At the end of October the raiders crossed the Susquehanna and attacked into Lancaster County, coming within five miles of Harris' Ferry and leaving a trail of destruction along the Susquehanna.³⁹

This was the first attack east of the Susquehanna. The final realization that the Susquehanna Delawares had deserted their former allies and that the province no longer had protection from raids caused great terror amongst the inhabitants. Pennsylvania had no militia, no regular forces, and a substantial proportion of the population who opposed any form of violence, even self-defense. Some of the frontiersmen attempted to organize themselves to make a stand, but they lacked arms, experience, and authority. Weiser informed Morris from Reading that "We are all in uproar, all in Disorder. . . We have no authority, no commissions, no officers practised in War, and without the commisseration of our Friends in Philadelphia, who think themselves vastly safer than they are." He warned Morris, "if we are not immediately

³⁹ "Petition of the Inhabitants of Penn's Creek," October 20, 1755, HSP, Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:32; William Buchanan and John Armstrong to James Burd, October 27, 1755, HSP, Shippen Family Papers, Vol.2; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:645, 647, 650-652, 654, 654-655; Gov. Morris to Governors of Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey and New York, October 29, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (17) 2:813-814.

supported we must not be sacrificed, and therefore are determined to go down with all that will follow us to Philadelphia, & Quarter ourselves on its Inhabitants and wait our Fate with them."⁴⁰

Morris informed the frontier inhabitants that if they would organize themselves into groups, he would do all he could to provide them with supplies and weapons. In Cumberland County the local gentry formed a general committee to defend the county. They appointed James Burd, a leading member of the county's elite, to command the men who had volunteered to defend the county and resolved to build five forts at the county's expense, to which they could evacuate all the women and children.⁴¹ Other settlers, rather than form themselves into military units, built their own blockhouses. However, the ad hoc defense units and frontier blockhouses were insufficient to protect the frontier. The blockhouses were small and often offered an inviting target to the raiders. The men were volunteers and received no pay.

⁴⁰ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:667.

⁴¹ "Meeting of the General Council of Cumberland County," October 30, 1755, HSP: Lamberton Scotch-Irish Collection, 1:23; John Armstrong, William Smith, and William Buchanan, to James Burd, November 2, 1755, Pennsylvania State Archives, Edward Shippen Thompson Papers, 1:3; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:680.

They quickly disbanded if they perceived it was more in their interest to flee or protect their families.⁴²

Meanwhile, the raiders pressed west into Paxton Township, Lancaster County, and on into Berks County. Conrad Weiser attempted to organize defense efforts in the area and to halt the flow of refugees. But the inhabitants lacked arms and "did not care to fight if they could avoid it." The inhabitants' anger soon turned against the Quakers living in Reading. A report from the town declared that "The people exclaim against the Quakers, & some are scarce restrained from burning the Houses of those few who are in This Town." The raiders soon divided into smaller parties and harassed much of northern Lancaster and Berks counties, leaving a trail of devastation and terror.⁴³

On November 1 Shingas' party, consisting of about one hundred Ohio Indians who had been raiding the South Branch in Frederick and Hampshire counties in Virginia, crossed into Pennsylvania and descended upon the Great Cove in Cumberland

⁴² In the spring of 1756 the blockhouses and forts themselves became the targets of the raids. For details see below. Gov. Morris to George Washington, October 31-November 1, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *Papers of George Washington*, 2:151; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:680; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, November 6, 1755.

⁴³ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:705; Conrad Weiser to Gov. Morris, November 18, 1755, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:60; Conrad Weiser to Gov. Morris, November 19, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:49.

County. They killed over forty settlers.⁴⁴ Following the descent on the Great Cove, Shingas's party divided into smaller parties to ravage the Little Cove and Conolways.⁴⁵ John Potter, sheriff of Cumberland County, attempted to form the local inhabitants into a band to pursue the Indians to prevent them from raiding farther. But the inhabitants decided to vote on the suggestion and decisively rejected his proposal. On the night of November 2, over one hundred terrified settlers sought protection from Potter's only slightly less terrified volunteers.⁴⁶

On November 16 the East Branch Susquehanna Delawares launched their first raid into the heart of Pennsylvania. A party attacked the settlements at Tulpehocken and Bethlehem in Berks County, killing thirteen. The party then divided into two groups. One group advanced southwest into Berks County, attacking several defense parties who were guarding key passes through the mountains. The other party attacked southeast towards the Delaware River. On November 21 the second group

⁴⁴ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:668-669, 675, 676, 704, 707; Conrad Weiser to Gov. Morris, November, 1755, HSP, Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:63; "Meeting of Residents of Cumberland County," November 3, 1755, HSP, Lamberton Scotch-Irish Collection, 1:23.

⁴⁵ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:676.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 6:673-674.

descended upon the Moravian settlement at Gnadenhütten, killing all but two of the settlers.⁴⁷

The raids on Berks and Northampton counties continued through December. Numerous small parties raided isolated targets and picked off settlers as they ventured back to their homes to recover their possessions. Weiser reported to Morris that "the Country is in a dismal Condition: Believe me kind Sir, that it cannot hold out long. Consternation, Poverty, Confusion, Parties is everywhere." William Parsons warned that even the inhabitants of the town of Easton on the Delaware River were preparing to evacuate. The raiders killed seventy-eight in Northampton County alone.⁴⁸

A report from Northampton County painted a gruesome picture: There may be seen horror and desolation, populous Settlements deserted, Villages laid in Ashes, Men, Women and Children cruelly mangled and Massacred, some found in the Woods very nauseous for want of interment, some just seeking after the hands of the Savage Slaughterers, and some haggled and covered all over with Wounds, which look like so many Mouths crying for Vengeance against their Murderers, and yelling at the negligence & insensibility of the Administration, to

⁴⁷ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:703-704, 704-705, 736-737, 737; Conrad Weiser to Gov. Morris, November 18, 1755, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:60; Timothy Horsfield to William Parsons, November 25, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (17) 2:736-737; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, November 27, December 4, 1755.

⁴⁸ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:756-761; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, December 11, 18, 25, 1755, January 8, 1756; "List of Inhabitants Killed in Northampton County," December 19, 1755, HSP., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:52.

whose inactivity there are so many
Sacrifices.⁴⁹

Meanwhile, a new Assembly met in Philadelphia. Although many Quakers had decided not to seek office and others made few efforts to campaign, many were returned, "so strongly were the Publick disposed to have Friends for their Representatives." Many Pennsylvanians distrusted Morris fearing that he intended to create compulsory militia service. Conrad Weiser reported to Richard Peters that one of his neighbors, Jonas Seely, had been running for sheriff of Berks County. It had seemed at first that he had much popular support. But then his opponents went around "to all most every man and reported that Jonas Seely was a Governors Man. . . and that he would Certainly bring things about that they must all take up a Musket and Exercise, which our foolish Germans did belief." As a result Seely was decisively defeated. A similar pattern was repeated over much of the colony. The strength of the Quakers meant that the Assembly was reluctant to enact any measure which might suggest the creation of compulsory military service.⁵⁰

When Morris received news of the raids, he informed the Assembly and attempted to cajole them into providing funds for

⁴⁹ List of Inhabitants Killed in Northampton Co., December 19, 1755, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:52.

⁵⁰ Christopher Wilson and John Hunt letter, November 4, 1755, British Library, Additional Mss., 33029:355; Conrad Weiser to Richard Peters, October 2, 1755, HSP, Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:56.

a defense force. The Assembly acquiesced in the creation of a strictly volunteer defense force, but again attempted to tax proprietary lands. Although Morris was prepared to compromise and assent to the bill, including the taxation of proprietary estates, he demanded in return that the rates for the proprietary estates should be set by commissioners jointly appointed by the governor and Assembly, not elected as the bill required. He also demanded that the bill include a suspending clause permitting the Privy Council to suspend the taxation of proprietary estates if they deemed it unconstitutional.⁵¹

The Assembly refused the amendments, claiming that "one of the most valuable Rights of British Subjects, [is] to have their Bills granting money to the Crown accepted without Amendments." To put pressure on Morris, they declined to pay his salary or any other expenses of government. Thomas Penn applied more pressure by informing him of the considerable concern in London over the refusal "on our part to assist the publick at such a time as this." Many influential Pennsylvanians, including Richard Peters and several other members of the Council, expressed deep concern that "the lives of the people are not to [be] plaid with nor thrown away

⁵¹ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 8th Ser., 5:4101, 4102-4103.

because the two parts of the Legislature differ," and pressed Morris to come to a compromise.⁵²

Morris would not compromise over the supply bill. Nor would the Assembly compromise over efforts to create and regulate a volunteer military service. Mindful of the opposition to any military service amongst the Quakers, the Assembly was reluctant to act. Despite a flood of petitions from every quarter of the frontier "praying that the House would either enact a Militia Law, or grant a sufficient Sum of regular Troops as may be thought necessary to defend our Frontiers," the Assembly sought a different course of action.⁵³

At the beginning of the session, Morris informed the Assembly that "the French had gained the Delawares and Shawnese to their Interest, under the ensnaring Pretence of Restoring them to their Country." Morris intended only to report that the Indians sought to drive the Pennsylvanians from the frontier. But to many in the Assembly, Morris' words suggested that the Indians still considered the frontier to be their land, whereas the Pennsylvanians believed that the Indians had sold these lands. The implication was that for some reason the Indians regarded the sale of their lands as

⁵² *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:695, 731; Richard Peters to Conrad Weiser, October 14, 1755, HSP Conrad Weiser, 1:57.

⁵³ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 8th Ser., 5:4096, 4100-4101, 4103, 4104, 4109; Marc Egnal, *A Mighty Empire*, pp. 73, 79-85.

invalid. The Assembly, led by the Quakers, demanded negotiations with the Delawares to discover the causes of their alienation, rather than preparations to fight.⁵⁴

While the Assembly was correct to believe that there were genuine reasons for the alienation of their former allies, they could not guess how deep the animosity of the Susquehanna Indians ran. The Assembly established a commission to inquire into the alienation of the Indians, but it could find no definitive reason for the Delawares' alienation, even though the Assembly suspected that some of the proprietors' dealings may have lurked behind it.⁵⁵

Many Pennsylvanians expressed dissatisfaction at the Assembly's determination to end the conflict by negotiation. The flood of petitions from the frontier meant that the Assembly was well aware of the dissatisfaction on the frontier. Soon it became apparent that dissatisfaction was not limited to the frontier. The mayor and aldermen of Philadelphia came before the Assembly to demand action to provide "legal protection to your bleeding Country, which ought to be the chief object of all Government." They warned that it would "not be possible to preserve the peace and quiet of this City, nor of the Province itself much longer, if some

⁵⁴ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:684-685; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, November 13, 1755.

⁵⁵ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:710, 724-728;

effectual Methods are not speedily taken for their general Defence and Security."⁵⁶

Almost as if on cue, a mob of seven hundred frontiersmen descended on Philadelphia demanding protection and denouncing the Assembly's refusal to compromise with Morris. The Assembly defended its actions by claiming that "We have the most Sensible concern for the poor distressed Inhabitants on the Frontiers. . . [but] Those who would give up essential Liberty to purchase a Little temporary safety deserves neither Liberty nor Safety." The frontiersmen, fuming at the Assembly's recalcitrance, replied that "they did not know that their Liberties were invaded, but they were sure their Lives & Estates were."⁵⁷

With a mob hammering on their doors and faced with the threat of widespread unrest, the Assembly finally agreed to provide for the creation of a military force of "such people as are desirous to be united for military purposes." Morris disliked the bill because it did not mandate compulsory military service. But in a province such as Pennsylvania, where a substantial proportion of the inhabitants were pacifists, any compulsory military service would have been unthinkable. Morris also disliked the "democratic" elements

⁵⁶ "Remonstrance by the Mayor, Aldermen, etc. to the Assembly of Pennsylvania," November 25, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion*, (17) 2:714-717.

⁵⁷ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:552; Gov. Morris to Thomas Penn, November 28, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion*, 1700-1783, (17) 2:794-800.

of the bill, for the companies were to elect their own officers, who in turn were to chose the regiment's colonel, lieutenant-colonel, and major. However, Morris did have the power to reject an officer, in which case the companies were to present him with a choice of two candidates and he was to pick one.⁵⁸

Considering the nature of the province, the restrictions were reasonable. However, the greatest weakness of the law was that the commander could not maintain troops on garrison duty for over three weeks without the men agreeing beforehand. This restriction would cause great problems because one of the main duties of the Pennsylvania forces was the garrisoning of frontier forts. Compared to the militia laws in other colonies, let alone the army regulations in Great Britain, the Pennsylvania law was extremely lenient. Indeed, Governor Dinwiddie regarded the law as "a Joke on all military Affairs." But for a colony which had a strong pacifist tradition, it was a major development. Despite his

⁵⁸ Morris has been bitterly attacked for his reluctance to approve such a just measure. However Morris also had to consider the reaction of the government in Whitehall. Indeed his reservations about the Assembly's acts were justified for in June 1756 the Privy Council disallowed the militia act as it was so much in discordance with British tradition, and because of the election of officers. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:275-277; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, November 27, December 18, 1755; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 8th Ser., 5:4130.

misgivings, Morris approved the bill, which laid the basis for the future defense of the colony.⁵⁹

The Assembly went even further and provided £50,000 for the defense of the province and, in exchange for a voluntary contribution of £5,000 from the Penns, agreed to exempt proprietary estates from taxation. Although Morris still had reservations, because the bill suggested the Assembly could have taxed proprietary estates if it had wished, he nevertheless gave his assent. Pennsylvania finally had a law regulating military units and money to pay for them.⁶⁰

By the end of 1755 both Virginia and Pennsylvania had created rudimentary military establishments. Whether these forces were capable of defending the colonies remained to be seen. Neither colony had developed a suitable strategy for winning the war and colonies had to struggle with the results over the following months. During the early months of 1756 both Virginia and Pennsylvania strove to discover a policy which could halt the raids. Virginia attempted to woo the southern Indians, the Cherokees and Catawbas in particular, to aid in offensive measures, while Pennsylvania continued to pursue a combined military and diplomatic solution.

⁵⁹ Gov. Dinwiddie to William Allen, January 2, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:313.

⁶⁰ Gov. Morris to Thomas Penn, November 28, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (17) 2:794-800.

In Pennsylvania the commissioners appointed by the Assembly to oversee the colony's conduct of the war were convinced that the best means to fight the war was "to carry the warr into the Enemy's Country and hunt them in all their Fishing, Hunting, Planting, & dwelling places." George Croghan and others, however, argued that Pennsylvania should build a chain of forts to defend the backcountry before embarking on offensive operations. As a result of the influence of Croghan and his supporters with Morris, during the winter of 1755-1756 the colony followed a defensive policy. The newly raised provincial troops garrisoned an extensive network of fortifications to protect the province, while simultaneously the government continued to seek a negotiated settlement with the Indians.⁶¹

The forts extended in a continuous line along the frontier from the Maryland border to the Delaware River. Chief among them was Fort Augusta at Shamokin at the forks of the Susquehanna River. Dominating the forks, the fort controlled an important route into Pennsylvania for raiding parties coming from the Ohio and West Branch of the Susquehanna. It also served as an important base from which the Pennsylvanians exerted influence over the Susquehanna Delawares. However, like Fort Cumberland, it was many miles beyond the farthest settlements, and was difficult to reinforce and keep supplied. Some of the Council proposed the

⁶¹ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:153.

construction of a fort at Adjouay, twelve miles above Wyoming, but it would have been completely impracticable and could not have been supplied.⁶² Although most of the forts were small, only having garrisons of twenty to fifty men each, many Pennsylvanians believed that they would "prove a sufficient Protection to the Inhabitants against such Parties as have hitherto appeared." The construction of the forts took considerably longer than had been expected, preventing Pennsylvania from taking the offensive against the Indians through the summer of 1756.⁶³

Meanwhile, the Pennsylvanians sought to negotiate a settlement with the Indians and to conclude a peace without fighting. Morris had received information from the missionary David Zeisburger that many East Branch Indians had still not deserted the English, but were afraid to come to negotiate

⁶² The fort at Adjouay was supposed to protect any "friendly" Delawares, and deter the French from interfering with the East Branch Susquehanna Delawares. Minutes of Council, February 26, 1756, H.S.P. Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:75; William Clapham to James Burd, June 7, 1756, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol 2; Richard Peters to Conrad Weiser, June 15, 1756, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:75; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:622-624; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:158-160.

⁶³ The construction of the forts was not completed until the summer of 1756. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:10-11, 153-154; Gov. Morris to George Washington, February 2, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:316-317; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:577-578, 580-582; William Hunter, *Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1753-1758*, (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1960,) pp.168-193.

because the Pennsylvanians "would suspect them for Enemies."⁶⁴ Morris countered by inviting the Delawares to a conference at Harris's Ferry in January. The governor sent Scarouady to Wyoming to ask the Delawares to attend and to promise protection for the Indians and their families. Although "Hitherto we have not been a Warlike People," the governor observed, "we have seen our Error, and are determined to act with Vigour. . . and afford. . . our Friends & Allies the Protection they have a right to demand of us."⁶⁵

Scarouady returned with bad news. He reported that the Susquehanna Delawares were completely in the French interest and that "they are determined to fight the English as long as there is a Man left; and that when they have conquered the English, they will turn their Arms against those Indians who will not join with them now."⁶⁶ Not surprisingly, few Indians came in January. Those few were led by the most anglophile of the Susquehanna and Ohio Indians, "the Belt," Aroas (or as the English called him "Silver Heels,") Jagrea, and Newcastle, hardly an indication of a strong peace party amongst the Susquehanna Indians. They informed Morris too, that they

⁶⁴ Deposition of David Zeisburger, November 22, 1755, Boehm ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (17) 2:718-719.

⁶⁵ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:562-563, 564-565; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:753-754; "Minutes of Conference held at Carlisle," Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (17) 2:826-829.

⁶⁶ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:12; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:578-580.

believed most Susquehanna Delawares were firmly in the French interest. More to mollify the Quakers than with any real hope of peace, Morris persuaded Aroas and Scarouady to go to Nescooping to an old ally of the English, the Susquehanna Delaware John Shickalamy, to ascertain the disposition of the Delawares more precisely.⁶⁷

While Morris awaited their return, "fifteen or twenty" East Branch Susquehanna Delawares attacked settlements near Gnadenhütten in Northampton County. The local inhabitants were so terrified that, although they could easily have driven off the attackers, they fled in terror. Throughout early January the party of raiders continued to harass Northampton County. On January 18 they ambushed a party on the Delaware River twelve miles above Easton. On January 27 a much larger raid of West Branch Susquehanna Delawares on the Juniata River in northern Cumberland County killed fifteen. The next day a smaller party of Ohio Indians fell on the Conolaway in southern Cumberland County. These raiders pressed on towards McDowell's Mill near the Susquehanna River, capturing several settlers there. In early February another small raiding party attacked Northampton County, near the Blue Mountain, killing two settlers and capturing four.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:574-576. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:773-774, 7:1-3, 3-4, 33-35, 46-50.

⁶⁸ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, January 8, 15, 29, February 5, 12, 19, 1756; Robert Morris to James Burd, February 7, 1756, Hugh Mercer to James Burd, February 17, 1756, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

In Virginia over the winter of 1755-1756, Governor Dinwiddie similarly sought to win the Cherokees. Dinwiddie believed that "with[ou]t some of the Ind[ian]s to join our Forces we may have the like Misfortune as at [the] Monongahela."⁶⁹ Dinwiddie and the Cherokees had long been courting each other. The Cherokees sought to end their dependence upon South Carolina for trade goods. The mounting tension between Britain and France had aggravated the internal divisions among the Cherokees between those settled around Chota and those around Tellico. The divisions, which had long existed, developed into anglophile and francophile factions. Sensing the shifts amongst the Cherokees but misunderstanding the full implications, the Carolinians had threatened a trade boycott of the tribe if any of them supported the French. It was at this point that the Virginians offered to negotiate, much to South Carolina's Governor Glen's horror, but to the delight of the Cherokees.⁷⁰

In October 1755, Dinwiddie sent Richard Pearis to the Cherokees to encourage them to send some of their men to defend the Virginia frontier. In November he appointed William Byrd and Edmund Randolph to treat with them and authorized them to offer payment for any warriors the

⁶⁹ Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, November 15, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:267.

⁷⁰ David H. Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier: Conflict and Survival 1740-1762*, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962), pp.38-74, passim.

Cherokees might send to Virginia. The negotiations were successful and 130 Cherokees spent the winter of 1755-1756 guarding the New River Valley.⁷¹

With this victory Dinwiddie began to consider offensive operations against the Ohio Indians. In the fall of 1755 Obadiah Woodson, one of the more experienced Virginia "woodsmen," had suggested an expedition against the Shawnees. But at the time Washington was still attempting to bring the Virginia Regiment to full strength. Because they disliked roaming the frontier defensively, many of the Cherokees supported Woodson and advocated a more honorable assault upon the Shawnees.⁷²

Planning for an expedition in December 1755, Dinwiddie ordered William Preston and John Smith to draft about 350 men from the Augusta militia to form an expedition with Indian auxiliaries. In January 1756 he appointed Andrew Lewis to the command. In the same month he conferred with several Cherokee leaders who visited Williamsburg to confirm and

⁷¹ Negotiations with the Cherokees, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (16) 2:493-498; Corkran, *The Cherokees Frontier*, pp. 63-64; Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Dobbs, December 13, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:290.

⁷² Gov. Dinwiddie to Obadiah Woodson, November 20, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, December 14, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Capt. Hogg, December 15, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:278-279, 292, 294-295.

coordinate their participation.⁷³ Preparations were complete by the beginning of February and the expedition set off on February 19 from Fort Frederick to travel up Stony Creek to the Ohio River to attack the Ohio Indians' towns.⁷⁴

The Stony Creek expedition was beset with problems from the outset. The officers of the expedition were deeply divided. John Smith was under the impression that he was to be in command, as was Obadiah Wilson. When Dinwiddie appointed Andrew Lewis, the others became intensely jealous of his authority. In addition, all the Virginia officers took an immediate dislike to the Indian trader Richard Pearis, to whom Dinwiddie gave a commission in recognition of his services in persuading the Cherokees to aid the Virginians.⁷⁵

The expedition had been badly planned. The strategy, urged by the Cherokees, had been to attack the Shawnee bases on the Scioto. The Cherokees expected the Virginia forces to travel light and live off the land as they did. However, the

⁷³ Gov. Dinwiddie to Capts. Preston & Smith, December 15, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Sharpe, January 2, 1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to Andrew Lewis, January 15, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:230-232, 295-296, 308-310; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, January 13, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:278-280; Gov. Dinwiddie to William Preston, December 15, 1755, Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:90.

⁷⁴ William Preston's Diary of the Sandy Creek Expedition, Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:96-97.

⁷⁵ Gov. Dinwiddie to John Smith, January 15, 1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to Obadiah Wilson, January 15, 1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to Richard Pearis, January 15, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:322-323, 323, 324-325.

Virginia troops were incapable of marching such a distance over the rough terrain. Heavy rains made fording streams difficult. The expedition "had no tents, nor indeed hardly any other Necessaries for such a Journey." The February and March weather was cold and wet and, exposed to the bitter weather, many of the men fell ill. The expedition had an insufficient number of packhorses, and with no fodder en route many of the horses died. The expedition carried insufficient supplies for the men as well. The commissaries had provided only fifteen days' provisions for the three hundred mile march, expecting the men to hunt and provide much of their own food. Despite the myth of the frontier hunter, the men proved singularly inept at locating and killing game and on March 2 Lewis put the men on reduced rations.⁷⁶

The expedition moved slowly. Not surprisingly there was soon unrest among the forces. William Preston reported "the Men Murmured very much for want of Provisions & numbers Threatened to Return home." Lewis was able to persuade the troops to stay, but they were "faint & weak with hunger and could not Travel the Mountains nor wade the Rivers."⁷⁷ By the middle of March there was open mutiny among the men. Large numbers deserted and sought their own way home. "Hunger & Want was so much Increased that any man in the Camp would have

⁷⁶ William Preston Diary of the Sandy Creek Expedition, Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:105, 108-110, 117.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 1QQ:105, 110-111, 112.

Ventured his Life for a Supper." On March 13 Lewis called the men together. He told them that he believed they would soon find good hunting grounds. He reminded them of the importance of the expedition and asked "all that was willing to share his Fate to go with him[.] All the Officers & some private men not above 20 or 30 Join'd him." The rest returned home. With only thirty men remaining Lewis was forced also to return to Virginia.⁷⁸

The Stony Creek expedition had been a complete fiasco. Peter Hog blamed the failure on "the Disobedience of Men[,] Undisciplined, & Subject to no Military law, a too Smal [sic] Store of provisions; & the most Impassable Route that Ever was Attempted." The House of Burgesses established a committee to investigate the disaster. The committee largely agreed with Hog's assessment, with the exception that they also blamed the "refractory and mutinous Behaviour" of Captain Obediah Wilson, John Smith and John Montgomery."⁷⁹

The failure had major repercussions which affected the frontier throughout the rest of the war. In Augusta County a legacy of unrest and dissatisfaction remained between the men and the officers who had commanded the expedition. It particularly distressed the Cherokees. In the same manner

⁷⁸ Ibid., 1QQ:118-122.

⁷⁹ McIlwaine, *Journal of the House of Burgesses, 1752-1755, 1756-1758*, pp. 368, 385; Peter Hog to George Washington, April 3, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:330; *Maryland Gazette*, May 6, 1756.

that Braddock's reliance on a heavy wagon train had disgusted the Ohio Indians, the Cherokees now observed first-hand the inability of the English to march beyond the frontier without vast quantities of supplies. Nonetheless, the concept of carrying the attack to the Indians to prevent the assaults on the frontier, rather than cowering in ineffectual forts and blockhouses, remained valid.

In April 1756 a Maryland party under the command of frontiersman Thomas Cresap made another attempt to attack the Ohio Indians. The party set out on April 23 from Fort Cumberland and had even less success than the Stony Creek expedition. Without Indian auxiliaries, the expedition was unable to detect enemy parties. At the start of their journey, Cresap was killed in a skirmish. Lacking a strong leader, many members of the party mutinied and drifted back to Fort Cumberland. The expedition had only marched as far as Bear Camp twenty-one miles beyond the fort before it turned back.⁸⁰

In Pennsylvania the negotiations with the Indians and the influence of the Iroquois failed to halt the raids. At the end of February Shingas again raided the Little Cove and Path Valley in Cumberland County, killing seven and capturing four. Shingas' men soon pressed on farther near McDowell's Mill, a

⁸⁰ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 6, 13, 27, 1756; *Maryland Gazette*, April 29, May 6, 1756; Adam Stephen to George Washington, May 29, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:182-183.

region which had already suffered extensive losses. Meanwhile, other small parties raided the entire frontier. Small parties skulking around the forts made supply difficult. The raiders burned deserted plantations, leaving a trail of destruction behind them. Although few were killed, the raids heightened the panic and left settlers more discontented with the government's failure to protect them. On March 24 the Susquehanna Delawares launched a major raid into Berks County, reaching to within fourteen miles of Reading killing thirteen and capturing several more.⁸¹

For the first time these raiders encountered military opposition in Pennsylvania. As a consequence of the Militia Act, several counties had established their own militia units. Unlike the Virginia militia, some of the Pennsylvania militia units proved surprisingly effective. In Peters Township, Cumberland County, a militia company pursued a raiding party for several miles, forcing them to abandon some of their booty and one of their captives. However, there were not enough militia units, and they were insufficiently trained to offer much sustained protection from raids.⁸²

⁸¹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, March 11, 18, April 1, 1756; Benjamin McGill to James Burd, March 5, 1756, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol.2; Deposition of John Craig, March 30, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:78; Jacob Arndt to Timothy Horsfield, March 7, 1756, H.S.P., Northampton County Records: Miscellaneous Papers, 1:183.

⁸² *Pennsylvania Gazette*, March 18, 1756; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:61-63.

In Virginia the winter of 1755-1756 had seen relatively few raids. Dinwiddie attributed the decline in numbers to the success of the ranger companies. In reality, it was probably due more to the availability of tempting targets in Pennsylvania and Maryland, and the fact that winter snows made crossing the Appalachians difficult. During the winter the French concentrated on using "Upper Country Indians," Hurons, Ottawas and Potawatomis, to keep the frontier forces occupied.⁸³

In the spring, larger-scale raids commenced again. Dumas, the commander of Fort Duquesne, sent out several parties with orders "to observe the enemy's movements back of Fort Cumberland," "to harass their convoys," and where possible to attack stores and destroy forts.⁸⁴ The parties consisted of western Indians and Ohio Shawnees and Delawares, typically with a French commander. The French sensed a weakness in the English strategy of constructing small and isolated fortresses as a barrier: when they proved too strong for a raiding party, they could easily by-pass them; when their garrisons were too weak to resist, they could surround and destroy them. From mid-March until the end of July, the

⁸³ Gov. Dinwiddie to the Board of Trade, March 20, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:373-375; Montcalm to Count d'Argenson, June 12, 1756, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:414.

⁸⁴ Instructions to Ensign Douville, March 23, 1756, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:396.

French encouraged their Indian allies to launch repeated attacks against the newly constructed Pennsylvania and Virginia forts. In four months they attacked nine forts and destroyed five. The decision to attack the forts reflected a major and highly successful shift in the strategy of the raids. Meanwhile, other raiding parties not initiated by the French raided more vulnerable targets along the frontier.

In the middle of February two large raiding parties rendezvoused near Fort Cumberland. They killed or captured several stragglers from the garrison. One of the parties pressed southward into Virginia and attacked and destroyed a blockhouse known as William's Fort, killing thirty-three out of the thirty-five men in the fort. At the beginning of April the raiders attacked Ashby's Fort on Patterson's Creek and surrounded Coxe's Fort at the mouth of the Little Cacapon River in Frederick County. The other raiding party pressed northeast into Pennsylvania. At McCord's Fort in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, it destroyed the fort and killed or captured thirty people. All these forts were to the rear of Fort Cumberland and protected the vulnerable supply routes.⁸⁵

At the beginning of April Washington reported to Dinwiddie that all communications with Fort Cumberland had been cut off and that "the roads between [Winchester] and Fort

⁸⁵ Edward Shippen to James Burd, March 24, 1756, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.; *Maryland Gazette*, March 11, April 8, 1756; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 8, 15, 29, May 6, 1756




Figure 3: Selected Forts on the Virginia and Pennsylvania Frontier in the 1750s.

Cumberland, are much infested." Not until early May could he restore reliable communications. The raids frustrated Washington. It had become clear that the frontier forts were ineffective and that rangers could not intercept the raiders because they moved off too quickly. Washington admitted that "the advantageous way they have of fighting in the Woods, their cunning and craft are not to be equalled; neither their activity and indefatigable Sufferings." Unlike the English troops who had to take large quantities of supplies with them, the Indians "depend upon their dexterity in hunting, and upon the Cattle of the Inhabitants for provisions."⁸⁶

On April 7 a party of the Virginia Regiment with some Cherokee auxiliaries fell in with a raiding party. In the skirmish the Cherokees killed the French commander, Ensign Douville, and discovered his orders from Fort Duquesne detailing the attacks on Fort Cumberland's supply routes. Despite this information, Washington was unable to strengthen his position. He attempted to enlist local inhabitants to foray routes that Indian raiders were expected to use. Only fifteen men appeared for service. In mid-April the impotence of the Virginia forces became clear when several small parties of Indians were seen near Edward's Fort on the Cacapon River. A party of the Virginia Regiment setting out to intercept the raiders was attacked as it left the fort. In a fierce

⁸⁶ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 7, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:332-335; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 20, 1756.

skirmish the Indians killed seventeen Virginians, including their commander Captain Mercer, while suffering no casualties. A few days later, the same party attacked Fort Hopewell on the South Branch.⁸⁷

By the end of April, the inhabitants had abandoned all of Hampshire County and most of Frederick County. There were no settlers west of the Shenandoah except for isolated pockets upon the South Branch and near Edward's Fort on the Cacapon. Most who remained cowered in forts with little food or ammunition.⁸⁸

As raiders descended upon Frederick County and pushed towards the Shenandoah Valley, Washington had only forty regimental troops at his disposal. The rest were posted to garrison the frontier forts while Washington awaited the arrival of new recruits. Upon receiving Washington's first reports of the raids, Dinwiddie hastily ordered out half the militia of the northern Virginia counties, but no militia mustered in time to aid the frontier settlers.⁸⁹ The militia

⁸⁷ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 16, 1756, William Stark to George Washington, April 18, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 24, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:1-3, 17-18, 44-46. *Maryland Gazette*, May 6, 1756; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 6, 1756.

⁸⁸ George Washington to John Robinson, April 24, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 27, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:48-51, 58-61.

⁸⁹ The militia were ordered out in Albermarle, Caroline, Culpeper, Fairfax, Frederick, King George, Louisa, Orange, Prince William, Spotsylvania and Stafford Counties. It was estimated that should provide between three and four thousand

in Frederick County refused to muster at all. On the frontier, dissatisfaction with the failure of Washington to defend the inhabitants mounted. At the end of April Washington reported that some even talked about "capitulating and coming upon terms with the French and Indians; rather than lose their lives and Fortunes through obstinancy [sic]."⁹⁰

Towards mid-May, over a month after the raiders had first descended on the frontier, the militia finally began to arrive in large numbers in Winchester. Washington posted them to reinforce smaller garrisons or man civilian-constructed blockhouses in order to encourage the populace to remain on their plantations and to help with the construction of fortifications at Winchester.⁹¹ This tactic also allowed Washington to send out several parties of the Regiment to act as rangers and scouts along the frontiers.⁹² Sensing the arrival of reinforcements, the raiders moved to other parts of the frontier, to Pennsylvania and western Augusta County. On June 25 they set fire to and captured Fort Vause in Augusta

men. *Maryland Gazette*, May 13, 1756.

⁹⁰ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 24, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:46.

⁹¹ "Memorandum respecting the Militia," May 14, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:127-128.

⁹² George Washington to Henry Woodward, May 4, 1756, George Washington to John Dalton, May 4, 1756, George Washington to James Hamilton, May 4, 1756, George Washington to Nicholas Minor, May 4, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:90, 91, 91-92, 92.

County. The fort was crowded with settlers seeking protection, and three were killed and another twenty captured.⁹³

As the raids moved away from Frederick County, military strategy began to conflict with political necessity. Washington wanted to recall the militia to save money and because it had set a poor example for the regular forces: the men in the militia had deserted in droves and refused to serve and their arrival on the frontier had encouraged many of the Virginia Regiment to follow their example. Washington also sought to concentrate the Virginia Regiment in a few strong locations to rationalize communication and supply routes. Posting the forces in small forts along the frontier had failed to prevent raids and merely offered new targets. Now Dinwiddie had other thoughts. He was concerned about encouraging the inhabitants to return to their plantations, rather than military strategy, and ordered Washington to continue the militia in service and to keep his men in the frontier forts.⁹⁴

⁹³ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83; Gov. Dinwiddie to Henry Fox, July 24, 1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, July 24, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:461-463, 466-469; *Maryland Gazette*, July 29, 1756.

⁹⁴ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, May 3, 1756, "Memorandum respecting the Militia," May 7, 11, 12, 13, 16, 1756, William Fairfax to George Washington, May 13-14, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, May 23, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:82-83 97, 117, 119, 123, 124-126, 137-138, 171-173; Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, May 8, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official*

Hearing of renewed destruction on the frontier, Dinwiddie convened the House of Burgesses to review funding for the Virginia Regiment and various provisions for the militia.⁹⁵ Again the House was unwilling to act. The "slowness" of the House in dealing with the requests to augment the Virginia Regiment distressed many. William Fairfax informed Washington that when news of raids arrived in Williamsburg, the House was deeply alarmed, yet after studying the reports "a few Hours lull their Fears and all's well again."⁹⁶

The House was reluctant to commit itself to funding the Regiment because of rumors rife in Williamsburg about the troops' misbehavior, particularly of the officers'. They had heard that the officers were guilty "of all inordinate vices; but more especially of drunkenness and profanity." Until they knew more, the House declined to increase the Regiment's numbers, fearing the corruption of Virginia's youth.⁹⁷ The

Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 2:407;

⁹⁵ In particular Dinwiddie pressed for a law providing the militia with arms of the same caliber, as previously the men had provided their own weapons which were frequently of different bores which made providing them with ammunition very difficult indeed. McIlwaine, *Journal of the House of Burgesses 1752-1755, 1756-1758*, 6:335-337.

⁹⁶ Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, April 28, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:392; William Fairfax to George Washington, April 26, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:56.

⁹⁷ George Washington to John Robinson, April 16, c. April 18, 1756, John Robinson to George Washington, April 17, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:6-8, 12, 15-17.

House's reluctance prompted a speedy reply from the officers who deluged the House with letters illustrating the virtues of the Regiment.⁹⁸

The House finally agreed to raise £25,000 through a poll tax to pay for defense, but only through the summer. They also approved measures strengthening the existing provisions for a draft from the militia. The act ordered the county lieutenants first to ask for volunteers from among all able-bodied single men in the county. Then they were to draft by lot, until one-in-twenty of these eligible men were in the Regiment. To ensure compliance the House authorized fines of up to £500 for refractory officials. They also closed a loophole by instructing officials to exempt as "overseers" of slaves only men who were registered as such on March 25. The House also increased and facilitated the powers of Regimental officers to impress needed supplies and equipment. When Dinwiddie finally prorogued the House on May 5, it had greatly strengthened the Regiment to deal with French and Indian incursions.⁹⁹

There still remained problems enforcing the draft. When the Council of war met in Augusta County, as the act

⁹⁸ Landon Carter to George Washington, May 1756, Abbot and Twhig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:185-187.

⁹⁹ "Overseers" were exempt from militia duty because of the fear of slave rebellion. Since many of the Virginia freeholders owned slaves, this was one way to avoid unpopular duty. Henning, *Statutes*, 7:9, 14-18; McIlwaine, *Journal of the House of Burgesses*, 6:397.

prescribed, the Council declared, "as the greatest Part of the able Bodied single Men of this County is now on Duty on our Frontiers and there must continue. . . which renders a draft of our militia at this time Impracticable. . . We are therefore unanimously of Opinion to Postpone the Draughting of the sd Militia."¹⁰⁰ The protest was repeated in many counties. Local justices refused to force men into the regiment, and those they drafted were generally vagrants and other undesirables who had no link to the county.¹⁰¹ By the beginning of June the Virginia Regiment was still not complete after seven months of recruiting.¹⁰²

Washington believed there were only two ways to protect the frontier. Virginia needed many more Indian allies for "Indians are [the] only match for Indians; and without these, we shall ever fight upon unequal Terms. . . five hundred Indians have it more in their power to annoy and disturb our Inhabitants than ten times as many Regulars." The second solution was to remove the frontier inhabitants "to live in Townships" in the interior and protect groups "working at each others Farms by turn; and to drive their Cattle into the thick settled parts of the Country." This action would both protect

¹⁰⁰ Council of War of the Officers of the Militia of Augusta County, May 20, 1756, Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:130.

¹⁰¹ For more details see chapter VII.

¹⁰² Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, June 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:431-432.

the settlers' cattle and deprive the raiders of a substantial source of food. The second solution was impracticable given the mentality of the frontier settlers, and the first had long been an aim of Virginia's policy but had so far yielded little success.¹⁰³

In Pennsylvania, Governor Morris abandoned hopes for a negotiated settlement. Morris had sent Scarouady and Andrew Montour to increase the pressure on the Delawares to come to the peace table by encouraging the Iroquois to intervene with the "tributary" tribes to halt the raids. Scarouady and Montour were to inform the Iroquois that as "the Delawares are your Cousins & under your Direction" the Iroquois should attempt to "correct your Cousins & stop their proceedings."¹⁰⁴

Morris also sent Aroas to inform the Susquehanna Delawares of Scarouady's mission and to gauge their disposition. When Aroas returned, at the end of February, John Shickalamy accompanied him and reported that Scarouady had tried to talk some of the Delawares out of attacking, but "they would not so much as touch the Belts he laid before him. They threwed them on one side with their Pipes, and gave him ill Language." Shickalamy himself had wanted to come down to visit the English much earlier, "but the Delaware Indians

¹⁰³ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 7, 1756, George Washington to John Robinson, April 7, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:333-334, 338.

¹⁰⁴ Instructions of Gov. Morris to Andrew Montour and Scarouady, December 1755, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:54.

would not let us go. . . [they] told us in plain Terms that if we offered to go down the River they wou'd look upon us as Brethren to the English and their Enemies" and kill them.¹⁰⁵

The Susquehanna Delawares were so set against the English that some had even attempted to kill Scarouady during the negotiations. Shickalamy reported that the Delawares of the East Branch gave as the reason for this defection "that from Time to Time the English, from their first settling Pennsylvania, had murdered above one hundred of their People without making Satisfaction for them. That the English had cheated them out of a great deal of Land, and cheated them in Commerce continually."¹⁰⁶ Those amongst the English who supported the commencement of negotiations had further encouragement when Shickalamy informed them that despite all the raids there were still a few among the Delawares who remained loyal to the English, in particular the Delaware leader Paxinosa.¹⁰⁷

Morris knew that commencing military operations against the Susquehanna Delawares would incense many Pennsylvanians. Already he faced sufficient opposition within the Assembly. He consequently delayed until Scarouady and Montour returned from their mission and predicted that the Iroquois would

¹⁰⁵ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:49, 51; Memorandum of Conrad Weiser, February 22, 1756, Minutes of Council, February 24, 1756, H.S.P. Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs 2:73, 74.

¹⁰⁶ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:53.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 7:53-54.

"inflict proper punishments on them [the Delawares], as they are in Subjection to them."¹⁰⁸

When Scarouady and Montour returned at the end of March, their news was bleak. As late as the fall of 1755 the Iroquois had branded as "a false Report" the accounts that the Susquehanna Delawares had joined the French and had urged the British "to draw your Troops from the Frontiers." Sir William Johnson warned them "that I plainly foresee, unless you, the Six Nations, who have always maintained a Superiority over them Indians will now exert yourselves in this Case, you will not only loose [sic] that Authority which they hitherto acknowledged, but will have them your Enemies." Finally, the Iroquois had agreed to discipline the Delawares and halt the raids. However, when Scarouady and Montour arrived amongst the Delawares, it was clear that Iroquois influence was non-existent.¹⁰⁹ Scarouady and Montour reported that the Delaware towns they had travelled through were "all violently against the English," and nearly all the Delawares "were bent upon striking the English." They had met the new self-proclaimed Delaware King, Teedyuscung, who had made clear his opposition to the English, and seemed ill-disposed to making any peace,

¹⁰⁸ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 2:56; Minutes of the Council, March 4, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:76.

¹⁰⁹ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:64-67, 67-69; Affairs, 2:77; Speech of Sir William Johnson to the Iroquois, December 7, 1755, "Indian Treaty at Fort Johnson," February, 1756, Minutes of the Council, March 27, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:65 66-68, 77.

and had even sent a message to the Iroquois asking for help against the English.¹¹⁰

On April 8 Morris informed the Council that "it appears to us that the Delawares have sold themselves to the French, and are determined to take this Opportunity to throw off their Subjection and Dependency upon the Six Nations, imagining that they shall be supported in it by their New Masters." Morris asked the Council to support a declaration of war and the creation of a generous scalp bounty. The Council agreed.¹¹¹

News that the Council was considering a declaration of war alarmed "Several of the Strict and reputable Quakers" in the Assembly. They presented a petition expressing their opposition. They denounced a declaration of war as "hasty" and asked "that full Time may be allowed for those Indians who still remain well affected towards us, to use and report the Effect of their Endeavours to reconcile our Enemies." They further urged that a "full Enquiry may be made whether some Apprehensions these Indians have conceived of a Deviation from the Integrity of Conduct towards them. . . may not unhappily have contributed. . . to the Alteration of their Conduct towards us." The Quakers argued that there had to be an

¹¹⁰ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:64-67.

¹¹¹ \$150 was offered for every Indian over twelve years old, delivered alive to a provincial fort, \$130 for every female prisoner and children under twelve years old, \$130 per scalp of an Indian male over 12, and \$50 for a woman's scalp. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:74-75; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:590-593.

explanation for the Delawares' alienation for although the Indians "are savage, and inexpressibly cruel to their Enemies, they are not void of a large share of natural Understanding, [and] have in many Cases, clear Sentiments of Justice and Equity." ¹¹²

The petition expressed the basic opposition of the Quakers to the war in Pennsylvania, which led to the establishment of the "Friendly Association" to seek a peaceful resolution. Unlike most of their contemporaries the Quakers appreciated that the Indians acted rationally and that their alienation could be logically explained. If the reasons for their discontent could be found and remedied, it should be possible to avoid fighting. What the Quakers failed to appreciate, however, was that much of the Delawares' dissatisfaction lay in the internal politics of the eastern tribes, particularly their subjection to the Iroquois. A solution to that problem could not be as easily negotiated as the Quakers imagined.¹¹³

The Quakers' pleas were drowned out by the clamor for action from the frontier. Complaints, pleas, and threats flooded into Philadelphia from the backcounty. The protestors were not only the poor and destitute but included "a

¹¹² *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:83, 84-86, *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 22, 1756.

¹¹³ For a discussion of the establishment of the Friendly Association see Theodore Thayer, *Israel Pemberton: King of the Quakers*, (Philadelphia: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1943), pp.97-102.

considerable number of the principal Inhabitants of the Counties of York and Cumberland," many of whom were reduced to living in squalor in barns and stables in Lancaster. "Men, Women and Children, who had lately lived in great Affluence and Pleanty reduced to the most extreme Poverty and Distress. . . in want of the Common Necessaries of Life." The protestors planned to meet in Lancaster on April 16 for a march on Philadelphia to force the Assembly to take military action. Immediately on hearing of their plans, Morris issued a proclamation to ban their meeting. He also sent out commissioners to meet them and attempt to appease them. With renewed threats of unrest in the backcountry, Morris formally issued the declaration of war on April 14. News of the declaration pacified the protestors and they disbanded.¹¹⁴

When the Quakers heard of the government's declaration of war they sent one of their most prominent members, Israel Pemberton, with a final plea to the Council to at least send a message to the Delawares. Pemberton maintained that if they could inform the Delawares that the Pennsylvanians were prepared to investigate their complaints, the Delawares would surely sue for peace. The Council reacted with some surprise and maintained, quite correctly, that private individuals should not intervene in Indian policy, but inconsistently suggested that if the Quakers wanted to open negotiations with

¹¹⁴ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 15, 1756; Report of Chew, Stedman, West and Shippen, April 21, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:80.

the Indians they could do so under their own auspices rather than under the colony's.¹¹⁵

The Quakers' intervention, however, did force Morris to make another attempt to communicate with the Susquehanna Delawares. At the end of April, he sent another message that the Pennsylvanians had asked the Iroquois to intervene. He also declared that the Pennsylvanians were prepared to offer "just and honourable Terms" if the Delawares would negotiate. But first, they must release all the prisoners they had taken on the frontier. He went on to inform them that the Indians who lived among the English "have not had any Mischief done to them" by the English and that he would ensure their safety if they came to negotiate.¹¹⁶

Sir William Johnson further smoothed the path to negotiations. At the beginning of May, the Council received a copy of a letter from Johnson to Governor Shirley of Maryland in which Johnson suggested that some of the Susquehanna Delawares were prepared to seek peace.¹¹⁷ The failure of the threats of the Iroquois to bring the Delawares back into line had humiliated Johnson. He informed Morris haughtily that he refused to take responsibility for the Susquehanna Delawares because he found "great difficulties in

¹¹⁵ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:103-105.

¹¹⁶ Message of Morris to Susquehanna Indians, April 26, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.:Indian Affairs, 2:81.

¹¹⁷ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:116-117.

Governing and Supplying the wants of the Six Nations in Connection with me; 'tis therefore Impossible I should also take Charge of those seated at a Distance on the waters of Susquehanna." In this manner Johnson laid the path open for the Pennsylvanians to take matters into their own hands.¹¹⁸

The Council pressed Morris to suspend hostilities against the Delawares until the results of further negotiations were known. Reluctant to suspend the hostilities so soon after declaring war, Morris decided first to tour the frontier to gather news on the state of the province's defenses. He found that many Pennsylvanians desired a suspension of hostilities against the Indians. Receiving intelligence that the Diahoga Indians desired peace, or at least wished to open negotiations, Morris issued a proclamation on June 3 announcing a twenty-day suspension of hostilities east of the Susquehanna River.¹¹⁹ The Council sent Newcastle and Jagrea to Diahoga to invite the Delawares to meet at Easton. They also sent James Logan to try to encourage some New Jersey Delawares to accompany Newcastle and Jagrea as interpreters and allies.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:157; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:622-624.

¹¹⁹ "Governor Morris's Proclamation for a Cessation of Hostilities against the Indians," June 3, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:89; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:117-118; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:614, 616.

¹²⁰ Report of Capt. Newcastle, Jagrea, & William Lacquis, May 31, 1756, "Minutes of Council," June 3, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:87, 90. *Colonial Records of*

As Morris and the Council pondered negotiations, the raids had continued upon the Pennsylvania frontier. In late May and early June a raiding party of Ohio Indians terrorized Cumberland County, attacking in Peters Township and in the Tuscarora Valley. The raiders continued their policy of targeting provincial forts.¹²¹ On June 11 another party of Ohio Indians destroyed Bigham's Fort at the junction of the Juniata and Tuscarora Rivers. The fort was crowded with settlers from the surrounding district who had sought protection there. Three were killed, fourteen were presumed dead, and six were captured.¹²²

On July 30 the Ohio Indians took their greatest prize, Fort Granville. Unlike the other forts the Indians took in the spring and early summer of 1756, which had been constructed mainly by the settlers themselves and had small, if any, garrisons, Fort Granville was a provincial fort. Most of the defenders were several miles away guarding reapers when the Indians attacked. The Indians captured twenty-two soldiers, three women, and six children and burned the large quantity of supplies which the provincial commissioners had

Pennsylvania, 7:144, 152; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:617.

¹²¹ See p.154.

¹²² *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 10, 17, 24, 1756.

amassed to distribute to other forts on the west side of the Susquehanna.¹²³

While the large French-initiated raids attacked the forts along the frontier, smaller Indian-initiated raids harassed the frontier throughout late June and early July. These raids particularly targeted the supply routes to Fort Cumberland and frontier settlers gathering their harvests.¹²⁴ Most of the raids conducted by the Ohio Indians occurred in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, Frederick County, Maryland, and Frederick County, Virginia. On July 20, Ohio Shawnees and Delawares attacked soldiers guarding reapers near McDowell's Mill in Cumberland County while another party attacked the Conococheague. A third party raided down the Potomac towards Maidstone and into Frederick County, Virginia.¹²⁵ A series of smaller raids, conducted by Susquehanna Indians who opposed any peace negotiations, occurred to the east of the Susquehanna in Bethel Township Lancaster County and in upper Berks County.¹²⁶

¹²³ Ibid., August 19, 1756.

¹²⁴ Robert Stewart to George Washington, July 30, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:302-303; "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 29, 1756.

¹²⁵ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 29, August 12, 1756; Robert Stewart to George Washington, July 31, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:303-305; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:120.

¹²⁶ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 17, 24, 1756; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:164.

By the summer of 1756 the French and their Indian allies had subjected the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier to over a year of continuous raids. While Virginia and Pennsylvania had both slowly developed military policies to deal with the assault, those policies had proved notably unsuccessful. Both colonies had also made tentative attempts to negotiate with Indians living near their borders, Virginia with the Cherokees and Catawbas, Pennsylvania with the Susquehanna Delawares. By the summer of 1756 that policy had failed to bring any benefits but would bear fruit during the following year.

Chapter IV

The Military Failure: The War in Virginia 1756-1757

In the fall of 1756 George Washington reported that "the ruinous state of the frontiers, and the vast extent of land we have lost since this time twelve-month[s ago], must appear incredible to those who are not eye-witnesses of the desolation. Upwards of fifty miles of a rich and (once) thick-settled country is now quite deserted & abandoned."¹ The French and their Indian allies had ravaged the frontier region and penetrated deep into the backcountry. In North America the British reeled from disaster and defeat. In August 1756 the French seized the important fort of Oswego driving the British from the Great Lakes making meaningful diplomacy between the British and the Great Lakes Indians all but impossible. Britain fared no better in Europe. The Austrians defeated Britain's allies, the Prussians, at the battle of Kolin in June 1757 and the French defeated the combined Hanoverian and British forces under the command of the Duke of Cumberland at Hastenbeck in July. In September the French forced Cumberland to sign the Convention of

¹ George Washington to John Robinson, November 9 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:16-17.

Klosterseven, removing his army from the field. Meanwhile France's other allies the Russians, occupied Berlin and the French much of the Netherlands.²

However, on the Virginia frontier the war was nearly an impasse. The Ohio Indians, lacking supplies and fearing British and Cherokee raids on their homes, were unwilling to follow up on their victories. They had begun to encounter supply shortages even while they devastated Virginia. In 1755, before an official declaration of war, the Royal Navy had seized French merchantmen around the world and threatened French supply lines. By 1757, despite a string of military victories, the condition of Canada was desperate. In Quebec the French were unable to feed the seminary students and closed the school. On the Ohio and Susquehanna Rivers circumstances were even more dire.³ Besides arms and ammunition, the Indians lacked food and clothing. John Cox, who escaped from the Susquehanna Delawares in August 1756, reported that they were "in a starving Condition" and were "reduced to the necessity of living upon Dog Flesh and the few Roots and Berrys they could collect in the Woods."⁴

The Virginians were unable to capitalize on this weakness because they lacked the necessary diplomatic acumen and

² W.A. Speck, *Stability and Strife*, p.267.

³ Guy Frégault, *Canada: The War of the Conquest*, pp.113, 137; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 16, 1757.

⁴ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 9, 1756; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:243, 357.

military might to bring the Ohio Indians to the peace table. Washington struggled to organize the Virginia Regiment which never reached full strength. At the beginning of August 1756, when there should have been 1080 men in the regiment, a muster showed only 926, and that number decreased. By the following May only six hundred men remained on duty.⁵

Men abandoned their posts in "great and scandalous desertions," although often waiting until after they had received their pay and clothing. The problem worsened in the summer of 1757 after the House of Burgesses authorized a draft from the county militia. Intended to recompense for the shortfall in the regiment's recruits, the draft merely heightened the problem of desertion. Of four hundred men selected, 114 deserted within one week.⁶ The draftees spread the practice to the men who were already serving.

Washington warned that if something were not done quickly the regiment would be imperiled. He attempted to use fear to stem the tide of desertion. A court martial at the end of July 1757 sentenced fourteen deserters to death and others to

⁵ Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Lyttleton, May 26, 1757, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:632-633.

⁶ George Washington to Adam Stephen, August 5, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, August 14, 1756, George Washington to John Robinson, July 10, 1757, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, July 11, 1757, George Washington to John Stanwix, July 15, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:337, 350 4:287-290, 295, 306; Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Sharpe, July 30, 1757, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:676-677.

severe sentences, such as 1,500 lashes.⁷ Washington himself ordered the construction of a forty foot high gallows at the entrance to the camp at Winchester "to hang two or three on it, as an example to others," "which has terrified the rest exceedingly."⁸ The threats did not work.

The attempt by the House of Burgesses to encourage men to remain in the regiment by raising their pay also did not work. Its failure lay mainly in the reluctance of the House to grant greater power to the military authorities, particularly the power of execution. When the Mutiny Act of 1755 expired in September 1756 they refused to renew it until April 1757.⁹ For seven months Washington was unable to inflict serious punishment on mutineers and deserters. Instead he could only send out detachments in the hope of rounding up deserters before they reached towns in which they could find cover.

⁷ Only two men were actually hanged, the other twelve were pardoned. But even some of the men who had been sentenced to death but then pardoned, deserted as soon as they received their pardon! "General Court Martial," July 25-26, 1757, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, September 17, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:329-334, 405-409.

⁸ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, July 10, 1757, George Washington to John Stanwix, July 15, 1757, John Robinson to George Washington, July 18, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:291-292, 306-307, 315-316.

⁹ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, September 8, 1756, January 12, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:396, 4:93; Henning, *Statutes at Large*, 6:544-550, 7:87-92; McIlwaine, *Journal of the House of Burgesses, 1752/1755-1756/1758*, 401-410.

Deserters grew increasingly adept at concealing themselves and fleeing. Some deserters from Fort Cumberland even managed to make their way to Fort Duquesne, providing the French with invaluable intelligence. Civilians aided their flight, developing sophisticated ways of concealing fugitives in what amounted to an eighteenth-century underground railroad.¹⁰

Several circumstances encouraged desertion. The strict discipline and structure of the regiment appealed to few men. A soldier's life in the eighteenth century was hard and unrewarding. Because of disputes between Dinwiddie and the House of Burgesses over the emission of paper money, the colony often did not have the funds to pay the troops. In January 1757, for example, Washington was unable to pay the regiment for several weeks. There was no guarantee of financial support for men maimed in battle, or for the families of those killed. Not surprisingly many attracted to the regiment by thoughts of the glamour and pay found their illusions dashed and sought escape.¹¹

¹⁰ *Maryland Gazette*, August 12, 1756; Vaudreuil to Machault, August 8, 1756, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:434; William Fairfax to George Washington, August 13-16, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:346-348.

¹¹ Gov. Dinwiddie to the Board of Trade, January 4, 1757, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1329) 12:28-30; George Washington to the earl of Loudoun, January 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:85.

The House of Burgesses was also reluctant to provide funds for new equipment and supplies, dismayed at the waste that occurred. Waste and mismanagement drained supplies, and officers refused to restrain consumption. Washington complained to Loudoun that "the waste of Provisions is very inaccountable, following no method in serving a certain quota to each Man. Speak of an allowance (never so plentiful) and you offer an affront."¹² The regiment was chronically short of basic supplies, from food to tents. Poor conditions turned regimental camps into breeding grounds for disease, to which the poor diet added scurvy. Troops starved, froze, and became sick. Dysentery ran rampant, almost killing Washington in the winter of 1757-1758.¹³

Morale also suffered as the regiment received no recognition for its services. In 1757 Washington complained bitterly to Loudoun about the crown's refusal to grant commissions to the regiment's officers. He commented that "no Body of regular Troops ever before served 3 Bloody Campaigns without attracting Royal Notice. . . we want nothing but

¹² Even though sums were deducted from the men's pay to provide for their clothing and food the amounts raised nowhere near covered the actual costs. George Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:87.

¹³ Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, December 15, 1756, January 26, 1757, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:563-564, 584-585; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, January 12, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:93-94.

Commissions from His Majesty to make us as regular a Corps as any upon the Continent."¹⁴

On the contrary, the soldiers endured bitter attacks for their failure to protect the frontier. The regiment came under a barrage of criticism from what Washington derided as "Chimney Corner Politicians" in Williamsburg.¹⁵ In the late summer of 1756 the *Virginia Gazette* carried an editorial venomously attacking the regiment.

While they lie skulking in Forts, and there dissolving in Pleasure, till alarmed by the Approach of the Enemy, who could expect to find them no where else; when instead of searching out the Enemy. . . and preventing their Incursions, they tempt them by their Security and Laziness, to come in Quest of them, and attack them in their Fortifications.--When this is the Case, how wretchedly helpless must a Nation be? What useless Lumber, what an Incumbrance, is the Soldiery. . . But when Nothing brave is so much as attempted. . . when Men, whose Profession it is to endure Hardships, and encounter Dangers, cautiously shun them, and suffer their Country to be ravaged. . . then certainly, Censure cannot be silent, nor can the Public receive much Advantage from a Regiment of such dastardly Debauchees.¹⁶

With lack of pay, poor conditions, and low status, volunteers and draftees alike sought freedom from the regiment.

¹⁴ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie March 10, 1757, "Memorial the Earl of Loudoun," March 23, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:113, 120-121.

¹⁵ George Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:83.

¹⁶ There is no extant copy of the *Virginia Gazette* for this date. The editorial was reprinted in the *Maryland Gazette*, November 25, 1756.

The potential pool of recruits shrank as rumors of the horrors of military life spread throughout Virginia. As men deserted they took with them stories of "their Sufferings and want of Pay (which Rags and Poverty sufficiently testified.)" Their tales "fixd in the Populace such horrid Impressions of the hardships they had Encountered, that no Arguments could remove their prejudices, or Facilitate the Recruiting Service."¹⁷

The creation of the Royal Americans in the spring of 1756, the first regiment of the regular British Army recruited solely in North America, made recruiting activities for the provincial regiments more difficult. In March 1756 the House of Burgesses had approved £8,000 to pay the expenses of recruiting for the Royal Americans and, not surprisingly, those with a military bent enlisted in the Royal Americans rather than the provincial forces.¹⁸

Recruiting for the Royal Americans generated other tensions as well. Denis McCarty, who had previously gained infamy for his recruiting activities for the Virginia Regiment, secured a commission in the Royal Americans. He proved no more suitable in his new regiment. In January 1757

¹⁷ George Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:80-81.

¹⁸ Henning, *Statutes at Large*, 7:61-63; *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 6:23-25; Gov. Dinwiddie to the Earl of Loudoun, January 14, 1757, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:583-584.

McCarty and another officer, Thomas Campbell, arrived in Alexandria from Philadelphia and began recruiting. They discovered that the townspeople did not welcome them and resorted to "forcing open Doors in the Night Time, taking Men out of their Beds and carrying them to their Guardho."¹⁹

To increase the pool of potential recruits the House of Burgesses authorized the impressment of vagrants. But that action only increased the regiment's problems. "For compelling these abandon'd Miscreants into the Service, who only waited time and opportunity to effect their escape, gave loose to all their vicious Principles, and invented the most unheard of stories to palliate Desertion and gain Compassion," wrote Washington.²⁰ The House also authorized the recruiting of indentured servants with compensation for their masters, and appropriated £2000 for that purpose. The proposal failed because Dinwiddie insisted on no more compensation than £8 per servant, a figure that proved unacceptable to most masters. So desperate was the demand for men that in August 1756 Dinwiddie even considered drafting convicts.²¹

¹⁹ William Fairfax to George Washington, January 22, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:100.

²⁰ George Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:81.

²¹ Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, August 19, 1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to Capt. John McNeil, December 25, 1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, December 27, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:478-480, 571-572, 572-573; Henning, *Statutes at Large*, 7:61-63.

The demands placed upon the Virginia Regiment heightened the strain. In the spring of 1756 the House of Burgesses approved the construction of frontier forts to protect the colony, and Dinwiddie decided that the regiment should garrison them. At the same time, the governor expected the regiment to send out rangers to detect incoming raids before they reached the frontier. Events of the spring of 1756 had shown that the two roles were incompatible, given the size of the Regiment: if the men were sent ranging, the garrisons were not large enough to resist attack; if the men remained in garrison, the raiders would simply bypass the forts. At the end of June a party of over one hundred Indians attacked Ephraim Vause's fort on the headwaters of the Roanoke River in Augusta County. The fort was vulnerable precisely because many of the garrison were on ranging duty.²² Adam Stephen, commander at Fort Cumberland, complained that the Indians "show themselves by way of Bravado at the Small garrisons as they pass & repass to destroy the Inhabitants, and as this insulting Behaviour escapes with impunity, it increases their insolence and demonstrates that Forts without a Sufficient number of men to defend them & Scour the Country about, are a useless Burthen to the province."²³

²² Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, July 12, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:260; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 29, 1756.

²³ Adam Stephen to George Washington, August 1, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:310.

The regiment was also expected to work to complete the defenses of the forts. Dinwiddie had intended the militia for that purpose. However, the militia refused to lower themselves to manual labor, despite offers of higher pay. Dinwiddie's order that Washington should use the regiment to construct the defenses disturbed Washington and he bluntly asked the governor whether he was "to neglect the Inhabitants and build the Forts, or neglect the Forts, and mind the Inhabitants."²⁴

Many Virginians hoped that British regulars would reinforce the provincial troops. When Loudoun called the southern governors, along with Governor Denny, to meet in Philadelphia to discuss plans for the forthcoming campaign many believed their hopes would be realized. But Loudoun's plans only increased the demands on the regiment, for he intended to all but ignore the Ohio Valley and use "the greatest part of the Troops this Campaign to the Northward" and asked that two hundred men of the Virginia Regiment be sent to protect South Carolina from an expected attack by the French.²⁵

²⁴ George Washington to Governor Dinwiddie, August 14, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:349.

²⁵ Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Lyttleton, January 29, 1757, Gov. Dinwiddie to the Earl of Halifax, May 16, 1757, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:588, 625-626; *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 6:26; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, March 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:112. *Colonial*
(continued...)

As a result of the handicaps faced by the Virginia Regiment it could offer little opposition to the continuing raids on the frontier. During July, along the entire frontier, a multitude of small, Indian-initiated raiding parties attacked settlers harvesting their crops.²⁶ At the same time two larger French-initiated and -led parties attacked the rear of Fort Cumberland, attempting to isolate the garrison. One party crossed into the Cacapon Valley and attacked around Maidstone killing several settlers. Another party pressed down the Potomac to the Conococheague, plundering and burning as they went and causing the settlers to abandon the Conococheague Valley. The raids on the Conococheague continued for several weeks. By the end of July all the settlers in the Conococheague and the Maryland frontier had been pushed back almost to Frederick.²⁷

The French attacks left Fort Cumberland's supply routes perilously exposed. French intelligence maintained that

²⁵(...continued)

Records of Pennsylvania, 7:470-472; McIlwaine, ed., *Journal of the House of Burgesses 1752-1755, 1756-1758*, p.447.

²⁶ "Memorandum," July 13, 1756, George Washington to Robert Stewart, July 22, 1756, Robert Stewart to George Washington, July 23, 1756, Abbot & Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:276, 283, 289-291; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 29, 1756; *Maryland Gazette.*, August 5, 1756.

²⁷ Robert Stewart to George Washington, July 31, 1756, George Washington to John McNeil, August 12, 1756, George Washington to Thomas, Lord Fairfax, August 29, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:304, 343, 380; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 5, 12, 19, September 2, 1756; *Maryland Gazette*, August 5, 26, 1756.

"grass was growing in the roads communicating with [Fort] Cumberland [and] Expresses no longer came any farther than Winchester." Indeed, some reports suggested that it had been over three months since a wagon had passed to the fort.²⁸ The raids forced Washington to employ many of his troops to keep the supply lines open. He pressed for the fort's abandonment so that he could ease the burden on the regiment. But Dinwiddie refused to allow the evacuation since it was a royal, not a provincial fort and could be abandoned only on strict orders from London, or from Lord Loudoun, commander-in-chief of the forces in North America.²⁹

Washington continued to press the point on Dinwiddie. In October he even gave the garrison commander permission to abandon the post. Fortunately for Washington, a Council of War at the fort recommended instead that they should retain the fort to encourage the settlers on the South Branch to remain on their plantations. They recommended, however, removing the supplies to Winchester to reduce the post's importance.³⁰

²⁸ Gov. Vaudreuil to Machault, August 8, 1756, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:437.

²⁹ George Washington to John Robinson, August 5, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:323-326; Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, August 19, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:481.

³⁰ George Washington to Adam Stephen, October 23, 1756, "Council of War," October 30, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:440-442, 447-453.

On November 15 the Council considered Washington's request. To his complete horror, the Council "were unanimously of Opinion by no means to abandon that Fort, as it would be giving up a large Extent of Country, but to reinforce it with a hundred Men from Winchester" and to keep it as the main supply depot.³¹ The Council's decision had the opposite effect from what they had intended. Since Washington had only eighty-one effective troops at Winchester, reinforcing Fort Cumberland as the Council wanted would mean abandoning Winchester. When word of the Council's orders reached Winchester, it "caused the utmost terror & consternation in the people." Washington sent a hurried note to the Council pointing out the implications of their decision, but the Council refused to abandon their plan and ordered Washington to reinforce Fort Cumberland from other frontier garrisons instead.³²

To execute these orders Washington had to abandon most of the small forts on the South Branch and consolidate the remaining forces at Pearsall's Fort. When the troops heard that the Council had posted them at the vulnerable and isolated Fort Cumberland many deserted en masse in what

³¹ *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 6:20-21.

³² George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, December 2, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:34-37; *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 6:21-22; Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, December 10, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:559-562.

amounted to a "Mutiny."³³ Washington protested, "Surely His Honour and the Council are not fully acquainted with the situation and circumstances of the unhappy Frontiers, to expose so valuable a tract of land as the Branch." He grew increasingly bitter that many Burgesses, who knew nothing about the military situation, repeatedly regarded his plans "as idle & frivolous; my propositions and measures, as partial & selfish; and all my sincerest endeavours for the service of my Country, [as] perverted to the worst purposes."³⁴

The French, meanwhile, shifted their attention to attacks on southwestern Virginia in an attempt to disrupt Virginia's ongoing negotiations with the Cherokees. In September several large French-led Indian parties descended on Augusta and Bedford counties, killing or capturing over fifty people. The raiders surrounded another frontier post, Fort Dinwiddie, but the garrison was strong enough to hold out until a relief force could arrive.³⁵ Smaller groups struck up and down the frontier. Throughout October parties harassed the South Branch of the Potomac, Stony Run in Frederick County, the

³³ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, December 17, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:62-63; Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, January 26, 1757, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:584.

³⁴ George Washington to John Robinson, December 19, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:67-68.

³⁵ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 7, 1756; *Maryland Gazette*, October 7, 1756.

Catawba River in Augusta County, and the Conococheague Valley in Maryland.³⁶

Over the winter the raids subsided. Partly this was because heavy snows made crossing the Appalachians difficult. One French officer reported that it had been "the most severe winter, during which the snow has been as much as ten or twelve feet deep."³⁷ But following the thaw in the spring the raids still were not renewed with the same vigor. From the fall of 1756 until the summer of 1757 there were only two small raids on the Virginia frontier. At the end of February a small party attacked the South Branch. In May another small party attacked the exposed settlement at Cow Pasture in western Augusta County, killing three people and capturing several others. It was not until the end of June that another large assault materialized on the frontier.³⁸

The reason for the decline in the raids lay in Pennsylvania, Cherokee, and Catawba sorties around Fort Duquesne, and a shortage of supplies on the Ohio, which increased the Ohio Indians' reluctance to leave their homes. The Cherokee raids on the Ohio Indians were the fruit of

³⁶ *Maryland Gazette*, October 7, 1756; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 10, 1756, George Washington to Adam Stephen, October 23, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:431.

³⁷ Montcalm to d'Argenson, April 24, 1757, M. Doreil to d'Argenson, May 5, 1757, Brodhead ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:547-550, 563-564.

³⁸ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, March 10, June 2, 1757; *Maryland Gazette*, June 2, 1757.

Virginia's efforts to gain Cherokee support. In the spring of 1756 Dinwiddie sent Andrew Lewis to build a fort at Chota, one of the Cherokees' main towns on the Cherokee River. He hoped that this would secure an alliance with the Cherokees and encourage them to send more warriors to aid Virginia. The governor did not intend to garrison the fort with a large number of men; rather he intended it to serve as a place of retreat for the warriors' families while they were away. The Cherokees welcomed the fort because they believed trade with Virginia would soon follow, lessening their dependence upon South Carolina.³⁹

For the next eighteen months Virginia's relations with the Cherokees fluctuated rapidly. Virginia continued to send many diplomatic missions to the Cherokees, and several Cherokee deputations visited Williamsburg. But when Virginian traders did not flock to Fort Loudoun, as the English called the fort at Chota, many Cherokees grew restless at the existence of an English outpost in their midst. Others were suspicious of the settlement of settlers who had fled the Virginia frontier on Cherokee hunting grounds in the Lower Cane Valley. The activities of Carolinian traders heightened Cherokee misgivings. Jealous that the gifts of Indian diplomacy lessened the demand for their trade goods, the

³⁹ Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, pp.77-78.

traders spread rumors of Virginian plots and encouraged the Cherokees to break their relations with the colony.⁴⁰

The French also made efforts to undermine the Cherokees' relations with Virginia. By the summer of 1756 the French had won the support of many of the neighboring Creeks, and through them sent envoys to the Cherokees. French influence was particularly strong in the westernmost of the Cherokee towns, Great Tellico. During the summer of 1756 a substantial number of the Cherokees threatened to join the French. Attempting to strengthen francophile support in the tribe, Governor Vaudreuil invited a party of Cherokees to Detroit to negotiate.⁴¹

The greatest threat to the Virginia alliance came from warriors returning from service on the frontier with tales of the colony's shameful behavior. The Cherokees were adroit at judging the strengths and weaknesses of their supporters and foes, and at manipulating the colonial governments and their agents. In initially entering the conflict they were not motivated by an altruistic desire to protect the English from the French, although their traditional enmity toward many of the Northern Indians may have been an incentive, but were

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 72, 87.

⁴¹ The visit actually served to weaken rather than strengthen the Cherokees' attachment to the French for they witnessed firsthand the Canadians' shortage of supplies. Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, pp. 71, 85-101, 107; Vaudreuil to Machault, April 19, 1757, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:539-540.

lured by English promises of payment. They were well aware that they were indispensable to the English and expected compensation commensurate with their worth. Indeed Washington argued that "it is quite manifest to every person who had had an opportunity of experiencing the advantage of indian services, that the friendship and assistance of the Cherokees are well worth cultivating." He added "For my own part, I think they are indispensably necessary in our present circumstances."⁴²

The Cherokees expected substantial recompense for their services, particularly "Cloaths, Arms, and Ammunition." Funds soon ran short and the House of Burgesses found it more and more difficult to reward the Cherokees as the Indians expected. Even the allies of the English grew restless. The anglophile leader "the Swallow" protested that "it was his Promise of great Rewards from the Governour that engaged his young Men to come in, and that the Govr had now made him a Liar amongst his own Warriours." The Cherokees fought as mercenaries not as allies as the Virginians viewed them. The Virginians thought that they could satisfy the Cherokees with the normal gifts which accompanied diplomacy, but having decided to wage war for economic reasons, the Cherokees wanted, and needed, more.⁴³

⁴² George Washington to John Stanwix, June 28, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:270.

⁴³ *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 6:25-26; Gov. (continued...)

Fighting on the Virginia frontier prevented the Cherokees from hunting for skins to trade. In addition, the uncertain conditions on the southern frontier kept many traders from venturing to Cherokee towns. As a result the prices the Cherokees had to pay for their goods rose. The Cherokees were caught in a trap: they were unable to hunt while the prices for the goods they needed increased. It should be no surprise that when the Virginians failed to reward them as they expected the Cherokees were outraged.⁴⁴

The failure of the colony to provide the warriors, particularly those who had served on the Sandy Creek Expedition, with adequate gifts, when Dinwiddie had assured them that they would be rewarded handsomely for their services, caused deep dissatisfaction. Some even attacked and looted frontier settlements in Bedford and Halifax counties when Dinwiddie announced that the trade goods had not arrived from London. Not until the end of September did the Cherokees receive any of the goods they had been promised the previous spring.⁴⁵

⁴³(...continued)

Dinwiddie to Gov. Lyttleton, January 29, 1757, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:588; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 2, 1757, George Mercer to George Washington, April 24, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:126-127, 139-141; Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, p.129.

⁴⁴ Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, p.133.

⁴⁵ Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Dobbs, July 22, 1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to Andrew Lewis, August 23, August 30, 1756, Brock, (continued...)

The reports of growing Cherokee dissatisfaction disturbed the House of Burgesses. In the fall of 1756 the House agreed to provide £2,000 of goods for the Cherokees, and allowed Dinwiddie to draw on sums previously allocated to support his Indian diplomacy.⁴⁶ When the House of Burgesses reconvened in April 1757 they again attempted to strengthen the Cherokee alliance. Realizing the importance of trade to winning the goodwill and allegiance of the Indians, the House passed an act providing for the establishment of a Virginia Indian trade "in order to supply them with the goods and other necessaries for their support upon reasonable terms." To ensure that the trade did not fall into the hand of corrupt traders, the act established five directors to supervise it and set aside £5,000 to pay their expenses. The Burgesses empowered the directors to contract directly with factors on the frontier to sell goods to the Indians, and to hire interpreters at the colony's expense.⁴⁷

The actions of the House sufficed to maintain the allegiance of the Cherokees temporarily. As a result of the funds and the arrival of the promised trade goods from London,

⁴⁵(...continued)

ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:458-459, 486-488, 492-493; George Mason to George Washington, September 13, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:406-407.

⁴⁶ Henning, ed., *Statutes at Large*, 7:61-63; McIlwaine, ed., *Journal of the House of Burgesses, 1752-1755, 1756-1758*, 401-403; *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 6:28-33.

⁴⁷ Henning, ed., *Statutes at Large*, 7:116-118.

several hundred Cherokee, Catawba, Nottaway and Tuscarora Indians spent the winter and spring of 1757 on the Virginia frontier.⁴⁸ The presence of Cherokee scouts, guides and warriors enabled the Virginia Regiment to launch offensives of its own. Several combined parties of Indians and provincial troops set out from Winchester to patrol the frontier and intercept incoming raiding parties. Some parties even launched raids around Fort Duquesne, harassing French supply routes, killing several French soldiers, and most importantly distracting the Ohio Indians from their raids on the Virginia frontier.⁴⁹

The success of the Virginians in wooing so many parties to the frontier, however, sowed the seeds of future disaster. The number of Cherokee warriors surpassed the Virginians' expectations' and there were insufficient goods on the frontier for them. Not only were goods in short supply, but

⁴⁸ *Maryland Gazette*, March 15, 1757; Clement Read to George Washington, March 15, 1757, William Fairfax to George Washington, March 31, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:117-118, 124-125; Gov. Dinwiddie to Henry Fox, January 4, 1757, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 18) 3:173-174; Montcalm to d'Argenson, April 24, 1757, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, 10:548.

⁴⁹ One such party, under the command of Lieutenant James Baker, followed the tracks of a raiding party and ambushed it killing two French officers and taking two prisoners including the commander of the party. *Maryland Gazette*, July 14, 1757; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 10, 1757, George Washington to John Stanwix, June 15, 1757, George Washington to John Robinson, July 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:194, 200, 215-217, 287-288.

direction of Indian affairs was in chaos. Whitehall had appointed Edmund Atkin as the southern superintendent for Indian Affairs, Sir William Johnson's equivalent in the southern colonies. He had arrived in Williamsburg from South Carolina in April. The Council immediately entrusted him with the supervision of Indian affairs on the frontier and provided him with gifts for the Cherokees. Atkin, however, delayed in Williamsburg on personal business and did not arrive in Winchester until June 2. For two crucial months Indian affairs in Winchester were in turmoil, lacking direction and crucial gifts.⁵⁰

Circumstances improved only slightly when Atkin arrived. By the time of his arrival, many disappointed Cherokees had sought support from Pennsylvania and Maryland. Several groups marching north met George Croghan in early June. They protested "that they did not think themselves sufficiently rewarded for their Services," and complained that "after promising us a great deal of Goods. . . [the Virginians] have not given us Cloths for Ourselves, tho' we have been five Months in their Country."⁵¹ Croghan's talks with the Cherokees infuriated Atkin who was "very tenacious of his Power." He forbade Croghan from talking further to the

⁵⁰ *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 6:44-46; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, May 29, May 30, 1757, George Washington to Andrew Lewis, June 3, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:170, 171-173, 179.

⁵¹ George Croghan's Journal, May-June, 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:11-13.

Cherokees, and ordered Pennsylvania not to present any gifts to the Cherokees.⁵² Atkin attempted to dissuade more Cherokees from going north, but merely increased their hostility and suspicion. Problems worsened when Atkin, who lacked an adequate interpreter, suspected French spies among the Cherokees and threw several warriors into the Winchester jail.⁵³

The largest Cherokee group to arrive on the frontier in the spring of 1757 was led by Wawhatchee from the eastern Lower Cherokee settlements around Estatoe. From the outset there were problems. Wawhatchee's party came by a more easterly route than the Virginians had expected, through Lunenburg and Halifax counties, where they found no gifts awaiting them because Dinwiddie had assembled the gifts at Bedford Court House. Angered, Wawhatchee and his party soon began ransacking local farms and plantations, placing Dinwiddie in a quandary. Although reluctant to punish the Cherokees too severely for fear of discouraging them from intervening against the French, he needed to mollify Halifax

⁵² Atkin claimed that the Cherokees were under his authority, the Southern Department, while Pennsylvania was in Johnson's authority, the Northern Department. George Washington to John Stanwix, May 28, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:168-169; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:631.

⁵³ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:600, 630-632; George Washington to John Stanwix, July 15, 1757, John Stanwix to George Washington, July 18, 1757, Edmund Atkin to George Washington July 20, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:306-307, 317, 321-322; Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, p.127.

and Lunenburg inhabitants. He ordered Clement Read, a Halifax justice, to round up the Cherokees "in a mild Method," meanwhile instructing the county lieutenants to have the militia ready if needed. Read hurried Wawhatchee's group on to Winchester where he promised presents awaited them.⁵⁴

When the gifts were not ready for them in Winchester they again took insult and stormed off. Their discontent soon spread to other groups. George Mercer warned Washington that the Indians were "all wavering." They had told him that "the Govr knew not how to treat Indians; that the French treated them always like Children, and gave them what Goods they wanted." Wawhatchee himself had warned that if he was not given sufficient reward he "would come & fight, and if he did not get it. . . he would turn back and take every thing from the Inhabitants as they went along, and maybe. . . scalp some of them too."⁵⁵

By the beginning of August most of the warriors had quit Virginia's service and returned south, leaving the frontier dangerously exposed.⁵⁶ When the House of Burgesses had met in

⁵⁴ *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 6:39-40, 45; Gov. Dinwiddie to Clement Read, April 12, 1757, April 15, 1757, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:609-610, 612-613; Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, pp.115-117.

⁵⁵ George Mercer to George Washington, April 24, 1757, April 26, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:139-141, 142.

⁵⁶ Edmund Atkin to George Washington, July 20, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:321-322; Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, p.127.

May they had attempted to strengthen the colony's defenses by approving £80,000 to increase the strength of the Virginia Regiment to 1,200 men. As Washington had been unable to recruit over six hundred men, despite repeated efforts, increasing the number of men whom he could enlist was unlikely to improve the colony's defense. The French and their Indian allies tested those defenses at the end of June.⁵⁷

As the French received reports of the growing disaffection of the Cherokees they encouraged the Ohio Indians to renew their attacks upon the frontier. At the beginning of June over two hundred Ohio Indians gathered at Fort Duquesne. Their intention was to attack and isolate Fort Cumberland.⁵⁸ Washington received advance intelligence of the raid from a scouting party. As he had stripped the garrison at the fort to a skeleton, Washington and his commanders agreed that the fort "must inevitably fall into their hands." Not only was the fort in danger, but as Washington had only 384 men fit for duty in the entire regiment and some of those were over two hundred miles away on the Augusta County frontier, the entire

⁵⁷ The money to pay for the Regiment was to come from a tax of two shillings per hogshead on tobacco, two shillings per hundred acres on land, and a four shillings poll tax. Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, June 1, 1757, Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Sharpe, June 14, 1757, Gov. Dinwiddie to the Earl of Halifax, June 20, 1757, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:635-636, 638-639, 648-650; Richard Bland to George Washington, June 7, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:187-188.

⁵⁸ Montcalm to M. de Paulmy, July 11, 1757, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:580-581.

frontier was imperiled.⁵⁹ Washington and his officers felt certain that if Fort Cumberland and the magazine it held fell Winchester would soon follow.⁶⁰

Washington called the officers to a council of war. They agreed that it was hopeless to defend the fort and that they should make a stand at Winchester. To facilitate the defense of the town it was imperative to recall the men stationed on the South Branch, Paterson's Creek, and the Cacapon.⁶¹ Without the protection offered by the troops, the civilians in those regions would be exposed to French and Indian raids. Washington thus ordered Andrew Lewis to evacuate them "before it may be too late," even though the evacuation meant abandoning the only remaining inhabited parts of Hampshire County and much of Frederick County.⁶²

Fortunately for Washington the French commander, Montisambert, fell ill and was forced to quit the expedition. Without a commander the Indians split into small groups which, instead of massing to attack Fort Cumberland, raided up and

⁵⁹ 200 men were en route to South Carolina at the time. George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 16, 1757, "Council of War," June 16, 1757, "Memorandum," June 16, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:217-218, 219-220, 220-221.

⁶⁰ Gov. Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 16, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:217-218.

⁶¹ "Council of War," June 16, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:219-220.

⁶² George Washington to Andrew Lewis, June 16, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:221-22.

down the frontier, killing and capturing several settlers near Winchester, and on the South Branch, the Potomac, and the Conococheague. With the frontier spared a concerted assault, at least for the time being, Washington was able to cancel the evacuation of the forts and the civilians.⁶³

The French encouraged other parties of Ohio Indians to attack the lines of communication between Virginia and the Cherokees, hoping to make it difficult for the Virginians to provide the Cherokees with gifts and keep Fort Loudoun supplied. In mid-July a raiding party attacked southern Augusta County, penetrating deep into Bedford, Halifax, and even Lunenburg counties. The attacks caused chaos and sent settlers over a large area hurrying east for protection. The terror was heightened by the actions of some of the local militia commanders, in particular Colonel David Stewart, who at the first sign of raiders panicked and began "raising false Alarms, terrifying the People, and refusing to act as becomes an Officer."⁶⁴

⁶³ Discovering that only small raiding parties were approaching the frontier Washington believed that the reports of a large attack had been false. John Dagworthy to Washington, June 17, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:226.

⁶⁴ George Washington to John Stanwix, July 30, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:354; *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 6:59-60; Gov. Dinwiddie to Clement Read, August 3, 1757, William Withers to Andrew Lewis, August 15, 1757, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:677, 686; Clement Read to William Preston, August 9, 1757, University of Wisconsin, Draper Mss.: William Preston Papers, 1QQ:154-157.

In mid-August another small raiding party attacked the South Branch, killing four and capturing two. The raiders pressed on to the Cacapon and then to Cedar Creek and Stony Creek, tributaries of the Shenandoah River, killing or capturing thirty four settlers. A month later another large party, numbering over one hundred, attacked along the Potomac River and temporarily severed communications between Winchester and Carlisle. Raids continued until the end of November, causing many settlers to abandon a large part of the northern Shenandoah Valley.⁶⁵

The renewal of raids in the summer revealed that Virginia's release from the wrath of the French and their Indian allies had only been temporary. To offer permanent protection to the frontier Virginia would either have to conclude a more permanent and lasting agreement with the Cherokees and other southern Indians, or launch a major military offensive to take Fort Duquesne and pacify the Ohio Indians. The former was difficult considering Virginia's lack of comprehension of Indian needs and diplomacy; the latter was impossible without considerable support from Britain. 1758,

⁶⁵ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, August 27, 1757, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 4:385; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, September 17, 1757, Lewis Stephens to George Washington, September 20, 1757, George Washington to John Stanwix, October 8, 1757, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 24, 1757, Robert Rutherford to George Washington, November 22, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:408, 416-417, 5:9, 25, 57; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 6, 1757; *Maryland Gazette*, October 13, 1757.

however, would finally see the commitment of a large number of British regulars and substantial resources in an effort to take the Ohio.

Chapter V

Fighting for Peace: The War in Pennsylvania 1756-1757

For the Susquehanna Delawares the winter of 1755-1756 had been one of fear for the future, rather than jubilation at their past success. Having attacked the Pennsylvania frontier, they now lived in dread of reprisals. In addition, provisions were running desperately low. Their fear was sharpened by pangs of hunger. Many of the Delawares began to relocate on the upper reaches of the west branch of the Susquehanna closer to the French, or even on the Ohio. In the heady days of November 1755, when the Delawares had first descended on the frontier, there had been rumors of the French building a fort at the Forks of the Susquehanna, at Shamokin, to protect them. Now in the reality of the late spring of 1756, the Pennsylvanians instead had occupied Shamokin and were building their own formidable fortress, Fort Augusta. In the spring the Iroquois sent demands that the Delawares lay down their arms. The Susquehanna Delawares felt isolated and vulnerable, but as long as the French were prepared to offer support they were prepared to oppose the English. However, in

case French support should suddenly evaporate, the Delawares prepared to open negotiations with the English.¹

Newcastle and Jagrea arrived in Delaware country in late April. They found Wyoming deserted because all the Indians had removed north to Diahoga. They followed them. At Diahoga Newcastle informed the Delawares of Pennsylvania's wish for peace and invited them to talk.² Before they would open negotiations, however, the Diahoga Indians went to Niagara to talk to the French and to attempt to acquire provisions. They found the French welcoming, but much to their horror they discovered that the French garrison at Niagara was almost as short of provisions as they were. There could be little hope of obtaining future supplies from the French.³

At daybreak on June 21, braving the threat from French raiding parties and the even greater threat from the parties of settlers who had set out to intercept the raiders, two bedraggled Indians, Nicodemus and his son Christian, forerunners for Teedyuscung, arrived in Bethlehem from Diahoga. They had come to inform the Pennsylvanians that the

¹ Wallace, *King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung*, pp.87-93; Letter to Thomas Penn, April 29, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs 2:83.

² Wallace, *King of the Delawares*, pp.94-95; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:190-191; "Report of Capt. Newcastle, Jagrea, & William Lacquis," May 31, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:87.

³ Wallace, *King of the Delawares*, pp. 96-97; "Minutes of Council in Easton," July 25, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:97.

Diahoga Indians, having heard of the desire of the Pennsylvanians for peace, wished to open negotiations.⁴ On July 15, Teedyuscung, having been assured by Nicodemus and Christian that he was safe, arrived at Fort Allen.⁵

Newcastle informed Morris and the Council of Teedyuscung's arrival. He begged them to act before it was too late. He told them "the times are Dangerous; the swords drawn and Glittering all Around you; Numbers of Enemy's [are] in your Borders. I beseech you, therefore, not to give any delay to this Important Affair."⁶ The time had come for Pennsylvania to negotiate with the Delawares.

At the end of June, Teedyuscung and his followers arrived at Bethlehem. The local inhabitants were uncertain how to treat his deputation and were concerned by Morris's guarantee that the Indians would be unharmed. Timothy Horsefield wrote to the governor that the local people "are not sure whether they are Friends or Enemy's. . . [and] hope that your Honour will not expose them like Sheep to the Mouths of the Wolves."⁷ Morris himself was not quite sure of the Indians' intentions

⁴ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:164, 169.

⁵ William Parsons to Gov. Morris, H.S.P., Northampton County Records: Miscellaneous Papers; "Minutes of Council in Philadelphia," H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:96; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:198-201; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser. 2:638-639.

⁶ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:199.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 7:190-191.

and invited them to Easton where he could post a better guard "in case they should not be so friendly as they Pretend."⁸

Easton was an unfortunate location in many ways. The local inhabitants were suspicious of their former enemies and were "very ignorant & indiscreet" in their comments around the Indians, many of whom understood English. The local magistrates, charged with keeping order in the town during the conference, informed Morris that they were "apprehensive that the whole Body of the Country People will come and with some of the Town, force the Indians away." The magistrates feared that the inhabitants' "Curiosity, especially when in Liquor, will lead them to go & see the Indians with whom they will either quarrel [or] if it is possible they will give them Liquor and make them drunk." The conference thus opened in an environment of hostility and mistrust.⁹

Sensing the vital importance of the negotiations the Council sent their most prominent members to treat with the Delawares: James Logan, Richard Peters, Benjamin Chew and Thomas Mifflin. However, it was not the eminent Councilors, or even Governor Morris, who were the linchpin to the

⁸ Ibid., 7:191, 192.

⁹ William Parsons to Gov. Morris, H.S.P., Northampton County Records: Miscellaneous Records, 1:209; "Minutes of the Council at Easton," July 26, 1756, H.S.P. Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:97.

negotiations, but rather Teedyuscung, the self-proclaimed "King of the Delawares."¹⁰

Born in New Jersey on the Delaware River, Teedyuscung was well versed in the ways of the English. Contemporaries described him as "near fifty years old, a lusty rawboned Man, haughty and very desirous of Respect and Command." Weiser described him as "well inclined, he talked in high terms of his own Merit, but expressed himself a Friend" to Pennsylvania. He was quick to anger and desperately jealous of any threat to his authority. When he heard that the Pennsylvanians were meeting with a few of the Indians in private session, he stormed in upon them, accusing them of negotiating behind his back, only to be informed that they were merely trying to secure enough wampum for his gift.¹¹

Teedyuscung had come to Easton to see what the Pennsylvanians could offer the Delawares in return for peace. He sensed, correctly, that the French could not sustain the Delawares indefinitely and that the Delawares would be unable to resist a combined assault from the English and Iroquois. The time seemed ripe to push the Delawares' claims for political independence from the Iroquois and for guarantees of territory. The final circumstance which pushed the Delawares

¹⁰ "Minutes of the Council at Easton, : July 25, 1755, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indians Affairs, 2:97.

¹¹ Wallace, *King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung*, pp.1-2; "Minutes of the Council at Easton," July 28, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:97; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:216.

to treat was the terrible depredations that they had undergone as a result of the disruption of their traditional trading networks. Whites who visited the Delawares agreed that the majority of the them remained set against the English. "Their whole conversation was continually filled with Expressions of Vengeance against the English and resolutions to kill them and lay waste there Country," declared one observer. Yet the threat of starvation compelled the Delawares to consider coming to terms with the English, for as some openly said, "it was better to do so than Starve."¹²

Negotiations finally got underway toward the end of July. Teedyuscung, fearful of being deceived by the Pennsylvanians, demanded his own interpreter instead of relying, as was the custom, on the provincial interpreter to serve both sides. His insistence upset the Pennsylvanians because it violated conference protocol. Reluctantly, Morris acquiesced to the demand.¹³

Teedyuscung's second requirement was recognition of himself as the sole negotiator for the Delawares. He complained that Indian affairs had been thrown into great confusion because the English had dealt with so many different Indian leaders, many of whom had no right to negotiate. "In every tribe of Indians there have been such Pretenders, who

¹² *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 9, 1756; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:243, 357.

¹³ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:204.

have hled treaties some times Publick and sometimes in the Bushes," he declared, "I can assure you that the present Clouds do in great measure owe their rise to this wild and irregular way of doing Business."¹⁴

Teedyuscung's next aim was Pennsylvania recognition of Delaware independence from the Iroquois, whom he claimed had freed the Delawares. "Formerly we were Accounted women, and Employed only in women's business, but now they have made men of us, and as such are now come to this Treaty, having this Authority as a man to make Peace." While this statement was a complete fabrication, Teedyuscung knew that the Iroquois were impotent to enforce their claims of suzerainty and that the Pennsylvanians might be reluctant to investigate his claim too closely.¹⁵

To encourage the Pennsylvanians to continue negotiating, Teedyuscung displayed the Delawares' new-found diplomatic weight. He informed the Pennsylvanians of his negotiations with the French and hinted that, if the English were not prepared to listen to his grievances, the French might. He made his position clear by presenting Governor Morris with a wampum belt portraying the Delawares, the English, and the

¹⁴ Not only did Teedyuscung claim recognition as speaker for the Susquehanna Delawares but he also claimed to speak for the "Ten Nations of Indians." "Minutes of the Council at Easton," H.S.P. Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:97; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:207-210; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 2d Ser., 2:640-645.

¹⁵ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:213.

French. He explained to Morris, "We are in the middle between the French & the English. . . . There are but two Chiefs. . . . Their Attention is fixed to see who are disposed Really for Peace." He warned the side which would "not Comply with the terms of the Peace, the ten Nations will Joyn Against him and strike him."¹⁶

Teedyuscung urged the English to do all in their power to speed the process. He said just two words in closing "Whish Shicksy." Weiser asked what he meant. He replied in a long simile:

Suppose you want to Remove A large Logg of Wood that Requires many Hands, You must take pains to gett as many together as will do the Business; if you fall short of one, tho' ever so weak, all the Rest are to no purpose. . . . Enable us to get every Indian nation we can; put the means into our heads; be sure [to] perform every Promise you have made to us in Particular, do not Pinch matters neither with us nor other Indians. . . . Whish Shiksy, do it Effectually, and do it with all Possible Dispatch."¹⁷

Teedyuscung had made few demands. Morris was prepared to recognize both Teedyuscung's claim to speak for the Delawares and his claim that the Iroquois had renounced their overlordship. But Morris demanded time before concluding a more formal peace so that he could investigate Teedyuscung's claims. Teedyuscung, for his part, also desired an opportunity to broaden the peace process by including more Indians, particularly the Ohio Indians and the francophile

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 7:209.

Senecas. Both sides promised to return to Easton in two months.¹⁸

Soon, however, storm clouds began to gather. The Iroquois and Sir William Johnson were determined to do all in their power to prevent the Delawares from negotiating independently. While Teedyuscung had been treating with Morris in Easton, the Iroquois offered the Delawares some degree of independence if they would halt the talks. They remained non-committal on exact terms, however, and through Johnson told the Delawares to

remember that you are our Women, our Forefathers made you so, and put a Petticoat on you, and charged you to be true to us, and lye with no other Man. But of late you have suffered the String that tied your Petticoat to be cut loose by the French and you lay with them, and so became a common Bawd, in which you did very wrong and deserved Chastisement, but notwithstanding that we have still esteem for you, and as you have throwed off the Cover of your Modesty and become Stark Naked, which is a shame for a Woman, we now give you a Little Prick, and put it in your private Parts, and so let it grow there, that you shall be a compleat Man. We advise you not to act as a Man yet, but be first instructed by us, and do as we bid you and you will become a noted Man.¹⁹

While the Iroquois denied the right of the Delawares to negotiate, Johnson used his power to threaten the Pennsylvanians. He persuaded Lord Loudoun to issue a "peremptory Prohibition on this Governmt. from speaking to or

¹⁸ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:212; "Minutes of a Council at Easton," July 29, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:97; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 2d Ser., 2:640-645.

¹⁹ "Minutes of the Council at Easton," July 31, 1756, H.S.P. Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:97.

trating w[i]th any Indians."²⁰ Despite Iroquois claims and Loudoun's bluster, the Assembly decided that it was in Pennsylvania's interest to continue to negotiate, since the Delawares might take a refusal as a sign of bad faith.²¹

The decision was reinforced by chaos on the frontier. The raids on the western frontier by the Ohio Indians during the summer were particularly heavy and emphasized the need for a rapid settlement. In Cumberland County raiders attacked around Carlisle and McDowell's Mill. Unopposed, they pressed eastward into York County, spreading terror before them.²² Another party struck in the Juniata Valley in the north and pressed on to Fort Granville which they captured on July 30 taking prisoner the garrison and the settlers who had sought safety there. The inhabitants fled in fear abandoning most of the region to the north and west of Carlisle.²³

In response to the raids Governor Morris continued to organize the Pennsylvania forces. During 1755 the Pennsylvania forces had consisted of several independent

²⁰ Richard Peters to Conrad Weiser, October 1756, H.S.P. Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:85.

²¹ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:307-308.

²² Gov. Morris letter, August 20, 1756, H.S.P., Gratz Collection, Case 15, Box 18; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 5, 12, 19, 1756.

²³ George Washington to Adam Stephen, August 5, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:336-338; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:241-242; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 5, 1756; *Maryland Gazette*, August 26, 1756

companies. In the summer of 1756 Morris rationalized them into a regiment of three battalions. The first battalion was stationed east of the Susquehanna under the command of Conrad Weiser. It consisted of nearly four hundred men, scattered along the frontier in small forts. The second battalion under John Armstrong was stationed in Cumberland County. The third battalion under William Clapham was given the task of finishing the construction, and garrisoning of, Fort Augusta at Shamokin.²⁴

The Pennsylvania Regiment quickly reached its authorized strength and in the fall of 1756 went on the offensive. John Armstrong organized an attack on the Indian town of Kittaning, about twenty miles upstream from Fort Duquesne. The town was the home of Shingas and Captain Jacobs, believed to be the chief instigators of the raids on western Pennsylvania, and it was rumored to hold many prisoners whom Armstrong hoped to free.²⁵ The expedition was as much an exercise in public relations as in military strategy. Morris commented it "will be of great use to the Publick as it will raise the spirits of the People and serve to remove that dread and Panick which has seized the generality."²⁶

²⁴ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 5th Ser., 1:41-47.

²⁵ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:230

²⁶ Gov. Morris, letter, September, 1756, H.S.P., Gratz Collection, Case 15, Box 18.

The Kittaning expedition set off from George Croghan's plantation, Fort Shirley, on August 30. Although a lack of competent guides proved a great hindrance and the forces followed an atrocious route, Armstrong did manage to reach Kittaning and attack. The Pennsylvanians burned much of the town and killed many Indians, including, it was rumored, Captain Jacobs, but freed only seven prisoners, many fewer than Armstrong had hoped. On their withdrawal the expedition became divided and was attacked by several parties of Indians who managed to kill seventeen of Armstrong's men, wound thirteen, and capture another nineteen.²⁷

Despite some success, the Pennsylvania Regiment was hamstrung by the disputes between the Assembly and the governor which deprived it of funding. By the end of 1756 the repercussions of these disputes had spread far beyond Pennsylvania. In the summer of 1755 William Smith had published *A Brief State of the Province of Pennsylvania* in Philadelphia. When the work arrived in London the Penns and their allies seized upon Smith's arguments as evidence to exclude Quakers from the Assembly.²⁸ Soon after the

²⁷ John Armstrong to Gov. Denny, September 14, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:100; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 23, 1756.

²⁸ Smith bitterly attacked the Quaker-dominated Assembly for leaving the province open to the wrath of the Indians claiming they were "Possessed of such unrestrained Powers and Privileges, they seem quite intoxicated; and factious, contentious, and disregard the Proprietors and their Governors. Nay they seem to claim a kind of Independency of
(continued...)

publication of Smith's work, the Board of Trade received a petition from Pennsylvania, drafted in October 1755 by Chief Justice William Allen, another leading member of the proprietary faction. The petition asked the crown to "interpose your royal authority that this important province. . . might be put in a posture of defense," by excluding Quakers from government.²⁹ The combination of Smith's heated invective and a petition from many well-respected inhabitants of Pennsylvania convinced the Board to act. In March 1756 it sent a report to the Privy Council attacking the Pennsylvania Assembly for its pacifist stance and suggesting that Quakers should be permanently barred from holding office or sitting in the Assembly because their pacifism was inconsistent with the province's defense.³⁰

The possibility that the Penns might succeed in barring Quakers from politics brought a swift backlash. The Anti-Proprietary faction, which was now led by Benjamin Franklin, quickly organized itself. In the summer of 1756 they commenced a pamphlet war on both sides of the Atlantic

²⁸(...continued)
 their Mother-County." Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, pp.235-237. William Smith, *A Brief State of the Province of Pennsylvania*, (London: R. Griffiths, 1755) p.10.

²⁹ quoted in Marc Egnal, *A Mighty Empire*, p.80.

³⁰ As particular evidence the Board pointed to the many unconstitutional features of the militia established by the Assembly the previous fall. Thayer, *Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 1740-1776*, pp.54-55; Marc Egnal, *A Mighty Empire*, p.80.

mobilizing opposition to the proprietors.³¹ In the fall the Privy Council received a counter petition from Pennsylvania attacking the proprietary faction which, the petition charged, "under the plausible pretence of providing for the Publick Safety aims at nothing less than the Subversion of the present Constitution of Pennsylvania."³²

Franklin's position was strengthened when the London Quakers persuaded their Pennsylvania brethren to refrain from standing in the elections for the Assembly in the fall of 1756. This allowed Franklin to defend the faction from charges of pacifism, for he was anything but a pacifist. It also shifted the debate on the future of Pennsylvania from the pacifism of the Assembly to the restrictions and constitutionality of the proprietors' instructions.³³

³¹ In London they published *An Answer to an invidious Pamphlet, intituled A Brief State of the Province of Pennsylvania* countering Smith's arguments point for point. The work reminded readers of the great efforts the Assembly had made to assist the colony's defense, but which had been rejected by the governor because of the Proprietors' instructions. *An Answer to an invidious Pamphlet, intituled A Brief State of the Province of Pennsylvania*, (London: S. Bladon, 1756).

³² "The Petition of the Inhabitants of Pennsylvania Considered," British Library, Add. Mss., 15,489:47-56; Benjamin H. Newcomb, *Franklin and Galloway: A Political Partnership*, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), pp.28-30.

³³ In the elections for the Assembly on October 14, only eight Quakers and four non-practicing Quakers were returned out of thirty-six seats. Anglicans and Presbyterians held the majority of the seats. James Read, letter, October 7, 1756, H.S.P. Northampton County Records, Miscellaneous Papers, 1:229; "Members of the House of Assembly in Philadelphia as
(continued...)

Many Pennsylvanians hoped that the resignation of Morris and his replacement by William Denny in the summer of 1756 would remove much of this tension. Morris himself commented that "the Assembly seemed at first fond of the Change, as indeed they would have been of any Change, as it gave them a Chance of getting a Man more to their mind, but when they find, that he is steady to his trust, as I hope they will, they will like him as little as they did me." Morris was correct.³⁴

Many did not understand that it was not the character of the governor which had caused the deadlock. An able administrator, Morris was bound by strict instructions from the proprietors. The Assembly for its part, had been given extraordinary powers by William Penn's "Charter of Privileges" in 1701 and was determined to use and, where possible, expand them. In the half century preceding the war, conflicts had been few. But following the descent of the French and Indians upon the frontier, the two sides found themselves deadlocked and neither was prepared to give ground.³⁵

³³(...continued)
they stood October 14 1756," British Library, Add. Mss., 33,029:354; Marc Egnal, *A Mighty Empire*, pp.80-81.

³⁴ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:222; Gov. Morris, Letter, August 20, 1756, H.S.P., Gratz Collection, Case 15, Box 18..

³⁵ Thomas and Richard Penn, unlike their father, were more interested in financial considerations than an experiment in government and were determined to protect their property interests in Pennsylvania at all costs. They thus bound the
(continued...)

Denny, arrived in Philadelphia on August 20 "and was received with great marks of Joy particularly by the Assembly."³⁶ Unlike Morris, Denny was prepared to view his instructions with some flexibility. One of his first actions was to lay his instructions relating to financial affairs before the Assembly so that they could frame their bills accordingly. Morris had always refused to do this, claiming that the instructions were private. However Denny's actions did not prevent a stalemate with the Assembly.³⁷

At the beginning of September the Assembly drafted another supply bill.³⁸ Hoping that the new governor would be more tractable, the Assembly sought to issue £60,000 paper money and to establish a committee to control the funds. Denny refused to approve the bill because he could not accept such a large emission of paper or the Assembly's control of the expenditure of funds. He attempted to persuade the Assembly to raise only £15,000 of paper, repayable over five years. This sum would cover the immediate expenses of defence while the governor and Assembly negotiated a compromise. But

³⁵(...continued)
governors with strict instructions detailing what legislation was acceptable. Newcombe, *Franklin and Galloway*, pp.17-19.

³⁶ Gov. Morris, letter, August 20, 1756, H.S.P., Gratz Collection, Case 15, Box 18.

³⁷ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:222; Gov. Morris, letter, August 20, 1756, H.S.P., Gratz Collection, Case 15, Box 18; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 23, 1756.

³⁸ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser. 2:736, 737.

the Assembly refused to consider his proposal. Instead they launched a bitter attack, identifying the proprietary instructions as the source of Denny's stubbornness and denouncing them as "arbitrary and unjust, an Infraction of our Charter, a total Subversion of our Constitution, and a manifest violation of our Rights, as freeborn Subjects of England."³⁹

Denny and the Assembly remained deadlocked through the fall of 1756. As a result the Pennsylvania Regiment went unfunded. By January 1757 the Assembly estimated that the colony required £127,000 for defense in 1757, yet to date not a penny had been approved. In February the Assembly passed another supply bill. Denny once more rejected the bill, for again the Assembly proposed to emit £45,000 in paper money and to tax proprietary estates.⁴⁰

³⁹ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:249, 251-255, 256-257; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 23, 1756.

⁴⁰ While Denny knew that the colony could not pay the expenses of the war without some paper money, he was convinced that the Privy Council would never approve so large an emission of paper money. The Assembly had hoped that Denny might relent on the taxation of proprietary estates since he had received a letter from the Penns announcing that they were willing to have their estates taxed. But the Penns would accept taxation only in "a Manner that appears... to be reasonable and agreeable to the Land Tax Acts of Parliament." What was not "reasonable" about the bill was that the Assembly established the rates, taxed unimproved lands (including many more proprietary lands), and appointed commissioners to oversee the disbursement of funds. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:418; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:776-777, 780-784; Daniel Clark to James Burd, February 22, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

When the Assembly heard that Denny would not approve the bill, they refused to pass any new measure and returned the original. Denny approached the Council, asking in view of the dire need whether he should accept the Assembly's bill. The Council unanimously agreed that he could not without breaching the proprietors' instructions. Denny informed the Assembly that he would not change his decision. Aghast, the Assembly informed him that they "demand[ed] it of the Governor as our Right, that he give his Assent to the Bill we now present him." Denny, disgusted at "the Incivility of the Expression," remained steadfast.⁴¹

As a result of the deadlock, there was no funding to provide the Pennsylvania Regiment with clothing, supplies, and at times even food. In February 1757 the forces at Fort Augusta ran out of meat, almost ran out of flour, and were within two weeks of exhausting all their other supplies. By the middle of March the situation was desperate. Some provincial troops had not been paid for ten months. Morale plummeted and desertion spread rapidly.⁴²

The problem was the more urgent because the men in the regiment had been recruited for only one year and many terms

⁴¹ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:778; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:401-403, 416-417.

⁴² Thayer, *Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy*, p.55; Edward Shippen to Joseph Shippen, February 6, February 14, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family papers, Vol 2; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:441; William Parsons to Conrad Weiser, March 26, 1757 H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:47.

were about to expire. Particularly at Fort Augusta, where the garrison had been exposed to the worst neglect on the frontier, the men refused to reenlist and threatened to leave the moment their terms expired, leaving the vital frontier fortress "without a Garrison to defend it."⁴³

Not until the middle of June was a solution reached. Denny, attacked on all sides for his failure to defend the colony adequately, capitulated completely and allowed the Assembly to issue £52,000 in paper. He justified his capitulation to the Privy Council by arguing "that the Assembly wou'd not go into any other way of raising Money to maintain the Troops."⁴⁴

The plight of the regiment became more important because in July 1756 the Privy Council had disallowed the militia act passed in the fall of 1755. As a result the colony had only the forces of the regiment.⁴⁵ When news arrived of the rejection, Denny asked the Assembly to frame a new bill. He informed them that in the long-term a militia was "the only permanent Defence which the Inhabitants are capable of supporting." The Assembly declined unless Denny showed them the proprietors' instructions relating to military affairs.

⁴³ "Col. Burd's Journal at Fort Augusta," March, 1757, Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, Pa., Box 2, Folder 13; Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

⁴⁴ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:565-566.

⁴⁵ Thayer, *Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy*, p.55.

He refused and the deadlock continued through the spring of 1757. In March Denny again pressed the Assembly for a militia bill. The Assembly finally agreed, but to Denny's horror the bill, except for the preamble, was exactly the same as the previous bill the Privy Council had rejected. In April 1757 Denny wrote despairingly to William Pitt appealing for parliamentary action to establish a militia in Pennsylvania.⁴⁶

The need for action was made still more pressing because the quest for peace with the Delawares ran into unexpected obstacles. Both the Pennsylvanians and the Delawares remained deeply suspicious of the other's actions. After the conference at Easton in July, Teedyuscung had dallied for over a month at Fort Allen, despite his promise to return in two months with more Indians. Some sources reported rumors that he had remained in Pennsylvania to talk to the Indians at Bethlehem and inform them of a plot to attack the colony.⁴⁷

Teedyuscung was equally suspicious of the Pennsylvanians. At Wyoming he heard rumors that they intended to capture him and he delayed his return for several weeks. He sent

⁴⁶ The bill retained the election of militia officers, which had been the principal reason for the Privy Council's rejection of the previous bill. John Armstrong to James Burd, January 28, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:784-785, 8th Ser., 6:4434, 4426-4437, 4447; Gov. Denny to William Pitt, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 18) 3:186-187.

⁴⁷ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:729-734; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:222; Gov. Morris to the Board of Trade, [September] 1756, H.S.P. Gratz Collection, Case 15, Box 18.

messengers ahead who reported that he would be safe, but many of his men were still reluctant to continue. He was forced to leave them behind and continue to Easton with only a small retinue. Negotiations finally resumed on November 8.⁴⁸

At their previous meeting Teedyuscung had not made clear the reasons for the estrangement of the Delawares. In November Denny pressed to determine the exact reasons for the Delawares joining the French. He asked Teedyuscung outright, "Have we the Governor or People of Pennsylvania, done you any kind of Injury? If you think we have, you shou'd be honest and tell us your Hearts."⁴⁹ Teedyuscung was, not unnaturally, worried about being too frank and would only say that "some things that have passed in former times, both in this and other Governments, were not well pleasing to the Indians."⁵⁰ That explanation was insufficient and Denny pressed Teedyuscung again. Finally Teedyuscung complained that the root of the Delawares' alienation lay in the Proprietors' fraudulent acquisition of their lands. He continued:

I have not far to go for an Instance; this very Ground that is under me. . . was my Land and Inheritance, and is taken from me by fraud. When I say this Ground, I mean all the Land lying between Tohicon Creek and Wioming, on the River Susquahannah. . . When I have sold Lands fairly, I look upon them to be really sold. A bargain is a

⁴⁸ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 21, 1756; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:278, 284-289; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser. 2:742.

⁴⁹ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser. 2:743-745.

⁵⁰ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:323.

bargain. Tho' I have sometimes nothing for the lands I have sold but broken Pipes or such Triffles, Yet when I have sold them. . . I look upon the bargain to be good. Yet I think I should not be ill used on this account by those very people who have such an Advantage in their Purchases, nor be called a Fool for it. Indians are not such Fools as to bear this in their minds. The Proprietaries who have purchased their Lands from us cheap, have sold them dear to poor People, and the Indians have suffered for it.⁵¹

Teedyuscung used the Walking Purchase as a vivid example, since the land on which Easton stood was acquired in that purchase. He did not claim that the Walking Purchase was the only, or primary, cause of the Delaware's alienation. The borders he mentioned included far more territory than Pennsylvania had acquired by the Walking Purchase and he went on to elaborate a series of other grievances, including altering deeds after the fact, fraudulently enlarging the boundaries, and purchasing land from Indians who had no claim to them. Most significantly the Delawares complained that the Iroquois, especially the Mohawks, had used their overlordship to sell land the Delawares did not wish to sell.⁵²

⁵¹ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:324-325.

⁵² Francis Jennings, in particular, stresses the primary importance of the Walking Purchase as the cause of the alienation of the Delawares. Jennings' emphasis on the Walking Purchase is, in many ways, merely a repetition of the claims made by Charles Thomson, a Philadelphia schoolmaster and Teedyuscung's clerk at the Easton Treaty in 1758. In his famous *Enquiry into the Causes of the Alienation of the Delaware and Shawnese Indians from he British Interest*, published in 1759, Thomson emphasized the importance of land-fraud, particularly the Walking Purchase, in the alienation of the Delawares. While Thomson was not as "patently biased" a witness as A.F.C. Wallace has claimed, he was a supporter of
(continued...)

In reply to Teedyuscung's complaints, Denny asked "what will satisfy you for the Injustice you suppose has been done you in the purchase of Lands in this Province." He offered to compensate the Delawares for their lands. But Teedyuscung replied that he needed to consult with other members of the tribe before he could accept terms and would return again in the spring. Denny also felt the need to investigate the actions of Teedyuscung further. So it was agreed to hold another conference in the spring of 1757.⁵³

The accusation of land fraud provided much ammunition for the anti-proprietary faction's struggle against the Penns. While Teedyuscung was making his claims in Easton, in London the Privy Council and Board of Trade were hearing arguments about royalization of the colony. Those who opposed the

⁵²(...continued)

the Quaker faction and the Friendly Association which induced him to portray the origins of the conflict in a manner not in conflict with that of his Quaker friends. However, Thomson's misrepresentation of the importance of the purchase is largely the result of his failure to perceive the abhorrence that the Susquehanna Delawares felt for their Iroquois overlords. Thomson was aware that the Delawares complained of land-fraud, but, as he was unable to comprehend the Delawares' interpretation that the purchase of their lands from the Iroquois was fraudulent, the Walking Purchase seemed the most glaring example. Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, p.279; Wallace, *King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung*, pp.250-251; Charles Thomson, *An Enquiry into the Causes of the Alienation of the Delaware and Shawnese Indians*, (London: J. Wilkie, 1759); *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:325; "Interview of Tatamy, Pamshire, and Teedyuscung, with Conrad Weiser," November 26, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:106.

⁵³ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:749; George Croghan to Gov. Denny, December 13, 1756, H.S.P., Cadwallader Collection: Trent-Croghan Papers, 5:20.

proprietors levelled Teedyuscung's charges directly against the Penns. The petition presented to the Privy Council in the fall by the anti-proprietary faction claimed that alienation of the Delawares was the result of "some Suspicions in His [Penn's] Manner of dealing with the Indians." In Philadelphia the Quakers pressed to see the Minutes of the Governor and Council to examine Indian claims for evidence to bolster their case. Richard Peters, the Provincial Secretary informed them brusquely that the minutes were private because they contained "the most important Affairs of Government" and would not allow them to see them.⁵⁴

Charges against the Penns also came from another direction, from Sir William Johnson. In the fall of 1756 Johnson, stung by the failure of the Iroquois to control the Delawares and his own inability to negotiate a peace, wrote to the Board of Trade claiming that the Delawares had been alienated solely because of Pennsylvania land purchases and the stationing of troops on the Susquehanna. The Penns were horrified and in turn tried to deflect blame to Virginia land purchases on the Ohio.⁵⁵

On his return to Philadelphia Denny asked the Council to examine proprietary dealings with the Indians, particularly

⁵⁴ "The Petition of the Inhabitants of Pennsylvania Considered," British Library Add. Mss., 15,489, 47-56; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:394-395, 397-398.

⁵⁵ "Proprietors of Pennsylvania's Observations on Sir William Johnson's Letter," December 11, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:108.

the Walking Purchase. The Penns themselves were not totally opposed to unearthing the truth. Indeed, Thomas Penn later wrote to Peters asking him to try to recover an original copy of the Walking Purchase deed so that he could show that Teedyuscung's charges were false. The Penn's version of the truth, of course, might be very different from that of others.⁵⁶

There were others who sought to deflect attention from the issue of land fraud. Both Conrad Weiser and Richard Peters stressed that the Delawares had only alleged that land fraud was "the cause why the Blow came the harder on us": land fraud had encouraged the Delawares to attack the colony with ferocity once the fighting had commenced, but had not caused the Delawares to go to war. Both Weiser and Peters acted out of self-interest rather than as part of a conspiracy to hide the details of the Walking Purchase. Weiser lacked influence among the Delawares. His influence lay in his position as Pennsylvania's interpreter with the Iroquois. If the colony recognized Delaware independence from the Iroquois, by admitting that land purchases from the Iroquois were invalid, Weiser lost his power and influence. As the confidant and close ally of the Penns, Peters' future depended on their influence. If the Penns' intrigues with the Iroquois to obtain Delaware lands were seen in too unfavorable a light in

⁵⁶ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:354-355; Thomas Penn to Richard Peters, December 10, 1757, H.S.P., Peters Papers, 5:6.

London, the Penns' power, and consequently Peters' power, would be eclipsed. Both Weiser and Peters thus sought to direct the investigation of the alienation of the Delawares away from the issue of land fraud.⁵⁷

Weiser and Peters pursued separate strategies. Weiser claimed it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine Teedyuscung's claims as any Indians who might have been defrauded were "either dead or gone. . . to other places."⁵⁸

He pointed out that the Delawares had previously brought their complaints before the Iroquois who had dismissed them. He also advised Denny against promising Teedyuscung that the government would investigate his complaints since as the provincial commissioners agreed, "such Promises had frequently been made. . . by the Governors of other Provinces and not performed, and these people might consider them now as made with a Design to evade giving them redress." Avoiding any commitment would, of course, also mean that the government would be under less pressure to examine Teedyuscung's claims in detail.⁵⁹

Peters followed different tactics. He made no attempt to discredit Teedyuscung's allegations but emphasized that his

⁵⁷ Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, pp.278-279; "Pennsylvania Assembly Committee: Report on the Easton Conference," January 29, 1757, Leonard W. Labaree, ed., *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959-), 28 Vols. 7:111-114; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:847-848.

⁵⁸ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania* 7:326-327.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 7:327.

motivation for making such claims came from elsewhere. Peters stressed that francophile Indians had initially corrupted the Delawares, while the Quakers had fabricated the charge of proprietary land fraud and put it into the heads of the Delawares during the conference at Easton in order to have ammunition against the proprietary government.⁶⁰

Suspicious about the integrity of Teedyuscung himself further undermined the quest for peace. During the negotiations at Easton in November small groups of renegade Delawares, opposed to Teedyuscung's peace endeavors, continued to raid in Lancaster and Berks counties. At the beginning of December other Delaware parties devastated the frontier of Northampton and Berks Counties. The Ohio Indians meanwhile subjected the western frontier to heavy raids. At the beginning of November they attacked Cumberland County near McDowell's mill, killing eleven and capturing eight.⁶¹

The raids continued during the winter, although they were more sporadic because of the difficulty of traveling through the winter snows. The winter raiders were predominantly Ohio Indians, most of whom were sent out from Fort Duquesne for the French sought to maintain pressure on the English while using diplomacy with the Delawares to prevent them concluding a peace. During January and February 1757 raiders continued to

⁶⁰ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:758.

⁶¹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 12, 28, November 11, 18, 1756; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:302-303, 303-304, 357.

harass the rear of Fort Cumberland, and several small parties forayed around the fort itself and along the Potomac River.⁶²

When Spring arrived the Indians renewed their attack upon the frontier in full force. A large party of Ohio Indians, reinforced by Potawatomis and Ottawas attacked near Chambersburg and pressed on to ravage the Conococheague. Several smaller parties scouted around Fort Cumberland killing several guardsmen.⁶³ Simultaneously a large party of Senecas and Cayugas attacked Northampton County. From Northampton County they pressed west into Berks County and in early May raided Swataro Creek killing fourteen settlers.⁶⁴ The raids soon spread into the Susquehanna Valley where the Senecas and

⁶² Vaudreuil to Antoine Louis Rouille, Count de Jouy, July 12, 1757, Stevens and Kent, eds., *Wilderness Chronicles*, pp.98-104; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, January 6, 13, 27, March 10, 1757.

⁶³ Thomas Barton to Richard Peters, April 4, 1757, H.S.P., Peters Papers, 4:85; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 7, 14, 28, May 5, 1757; *Maryland Gazette*, April 7, 1757; "Col. Burd's Journal at Fort Augusta," March 1757, Pennsylvania State Archives, Edward Shippen-Thompson Family Papers, Box 2, Folder 13; Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, March 4, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; Montcalm to M. de Paulmy, July 11, 1757, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:581.

⁶⁴ Montcalm to M. de Paulmy, July 11, 1757, Vaudreuil to M. de Moras, July 13, 1757, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:581, 590; Vaudreuil to Antoine Louis Rouille, Count de Jouy, July 12, 1757, Stevens, ed., *Wilderness Chronicles*, 94-104; "George Croghan's Report on the Proceedings with the Iroquois at Lancaster," April & May, 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:5-9; Gov. Denny to Thomas Penn, April 8, 1757, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 18) 3:216-217; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:492-494; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 12, 1757.

Cayugas coalesced with a group of Ohio Indians, under French commander Chauvignerie, attacking from the west. The raids devastated a large area along the Susquehanna, and by the middle of May the region along the river had again been abandoned. In June yet another party of Ohio Indians assaulted Cumberland County, penetrating as far as the Great and Little Coves where they caused great damage.⁶⁵

The raids caused many Pennsylvanians to demand that the government seek a military rather than diplomatic solution. They also provided an opportunity for those opposed to Teedyuscung to disparage him. At the beginning of December Peters openly claimed that it was Teedyuscung's followers who were raiding the frontier. Denny, however, was determined to continue negotiations. He proposed holding a general conference in March with the Delawares, Iroquois, and Ohio Indians. He sent George Croghan to Harris' Ferry to persuade some of the anglophile Conestoga Indians to inform the Ohio Indians of the conference and asked Sir William Johnson to use his influence to persuade as many Iroquois as possible to attend.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Daniel Clark to James Burd, May 21, 1757, Bartram Galbreath to James Burd, May 23, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; Vaudreuil to M. de Moras, July 11, 1757, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:589; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:538-539; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 26, June 16, 23, 1757.

⁶⁶ Richard Peters to Conrad Weiser, December 7, 1756, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:91; William Johnson to Gov. Denny, February 16, 1757, Almon W. Lauber, ed., *The Papers of* (continued...)

The Iroquois arrived for the conference in great numbers at the end of March.⁶⁷ Denny wanted the conference held in Philadelphia, but the Iroquois, afraid of the smallpox epidemic which was then ravaging Pennsylvania, refused to go so far into the colony. They did agree to continue on to Lancaster where they arrived on April 7. There they awaited the arrival of the other participants. It soon became apparent that few Ohio Indians would attend. The only Shawnees and Delawares present were a few refugees who had been living at Aughwick, George Croghan's plantation on the Juniata River. But the Ohio Indians were not the only ones not to appear. By the middle of April Teedyuscung had still not appeared. Rumors circulated that he would not arrive for several weeks. The only message had been a request that food and provisions be prepared for his arrival, but he had given no hint of when that would be.⁶⁸

The end of April arrived. The Iroquois grew increasingly restless. They threatened to leave, complaining "we have been

⁶⁶(...continued)

Sir William Johnson, (Albany: The University of the State of New York, 1939), 12 Vols., 9:607-608; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:384, 403, 434-435; "Instructions to George Croghan," February 16, 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:2; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 2:770.

⁶⁷ 160 Iroquois attended. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:465.

⁶⁸ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:465-466; 474-477, 510; George Croghan to James Burd, April 3, 1756, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; William Parsons to Conrad Weiser, April 16, 1757, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:49; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:788-789.

here a great while and the Spring is coming on Fast it is Time for us to think of going Home to Plant."⁶⁹ The Pennsylvanians were horrified. The commissioners hurried up to Lancaster before the Iroquois delegates could leave, arriving on May 9. Still hoping that Teedyuscung would appear, they made hurried preparations for a meeting between Denny and the Iroquois.⁷⁰ The Iroquois were not prepared to wait any longer. Many of their warriors had contracted smallpox and were dangerously ill and they wished to leave Lancaster as soon as possible.⁷¹

On May 12 the conference convened in Lancaster without Teedyuscung. The reasons for the failure of the Delawares to arrive soon became apparent. One of the first actions of the Iroquois was to deny the right of the Delawares to negotiate directly with the Pennsylvanians. They informed Denny that the Delawares had told them that "they looked upon themselves as Men, and wou'd acknowledge no Superiority that any other Nation had over them" and had even threatened the Iroquois to "say no more to us on that Head, lest we cut off your private Parts and make Women of you." The Iroquois repudiated the

⁶⁹ George Croghan's report on proceedings with the Iroquois at Lancaster, April & May 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:5-9; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:484-488.

⁷⁰ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:513.

⁷¹The darkest news of the conference was the death of Scarouady of smallpox. The English had lost a major ally, although by 1757 he had lost most of his influence amongst the Indians. John Harris to James Burd, June 6, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:498-499.

claims of the Delawares, maintaining simply that "In former Times, our Forefathers conquer'd the Delawares, and put Petticoats on them" and they had no intention of changing that status.⁷²

The Iroquois brushed aside the Delawares' assertion of land fraud and claimed, rather absurdly, that the Delaware raids had merely been the acts "of Drunken Men."⁷³ Denying any liability for the Delawares' alienation, they claimed that they had removed the Delawares to "Lands to plant and Hunt on, at Wyoming and Juniata, on Susquehannah." It had been the Pennsylvanians who "Covetous of Land, made Plantations there & spoiled their Hunting Grounds" and drove the Delawares into the arms of the French.⁷⁴

However, the Iroquois did not wish their claim of authority over the Delawares to be publicly tested. In an attempt to hasten the peace process without undermining their pretense of overlordship, they advised the Pennsylvanians that it would be better to "give up some Points to them than to contend." If the Pennsylvanians would restore some lands to

⁷² *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:518-520, 521-528, 540.

⁷³ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:798-799; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:521, 536.

⁷⁴ George Croghan's report on proceedings with the Iroquois at Lancaster, April & May 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:5-9; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:540-541.

the Delawares perhaps the Delawares would cease their hostilities and the Iroquois might claim some of the credit.⁷⁵

While Croghan and Denny were meeting with the Iroquois at Lancaster, Teedyuscung remained on the Susquehanna at Diahoga afraid to confront the Iroquois, especially the Mohawks, with his accusations. He was not completely inactive, however, for he sent representatives to the Senecas, the most francophile of the Six Nations, seeking their support. He also journeyed himself to Niagara and spoke to Governor Vaudreuil, promising to send some warriors to aid in the French attack on Fort William Henry.⁷⁶

The Delawares had kept a line of communication open with the French. In the fall of 1756 the Delawares had met with Ligneris, the commander at Fort Duquesne, and informed him that they were "firmly resolved to abandon the English forever." So firm did their resolution appear that the French doubted the reports of negotiations at Easton.⁷⁷ As soon as the French received confirmation of the negotiations, Vaudreuil attempted to bolster Delaware support for the French

⁷⁵ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:542.

⁷⁶ There is no evidence that Teedyuscung ever sent any aid. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:465; Vaudreuil to M. de Moras, July 13, 1757, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:589-590.

⁷⁷ de Ligneris replaced Dumas as commander of Fort Duquesne in November 1756. Vaudreuil to Antoine Louis Rouille, Count de Jouy, July 12, 1757, Stevens and Kent, eds., *Wilderness Chronicles*, pp.98-104; Montcalm to M. de Paulmy, July 11, 1757, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:582.

and sent wampum belts to Diahoga reminding the Delawares of their former friendship and promising that if they would resettle in the vicinity of Presqu'Isle they would be well provided for. Vaudreuil's belts may have had some effect, for the French continued to receive reports that the Delawares were deeply divided over the prudence of negotiating with the English, and many Delawares continued to attack the Pennsylvania frontier despite the onset of negotiations.⁷⁸

While many Delawares may have been inclined to continue supporting the French, the French were unable to supply them with the supplies they needed, particularly arms, ammunition, and food. Without ammunition not only were the Delawares unable to maintain their assaults on the frontier, but they could not hunt for skins and meat. At the same time, uncertain about the future, many were reluctant to plant a corn crop in the spring of 1757. By the summer of 1757 Canada itself was extremely short of supplies. Montcalm feared that "the extreme scarcity we are suffering, only too severely, in the interior of the Colony, will not fail to make itself felt. . . on the Beautiful River [the Ohio.]" For 1757 the French were able to secure supplies for the Ohio from Illinois

⁷⁸ Vaudreuil to M. de Moras, July 13, 1757, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:582.

and Louisiana, but their own situation for 1758 was uncertain, and provisions for their Indian allies all but non-existent.⁷⁹

What Teedyuscung saw at Niagara in the spring of 1757 convinced him that the Delawares had to continue to negotiate with the Pennsylvanians. When it was clear that the Iroquois had left the colony, Teedyuscung appeared in Easton at the end of June.⁸⁰

Before Denny's departure to meet Teedyuscung several members of the Friendly Association came before the Council requesting permission to inspect the Council's minutes relating to Indian purchases to lay before the conference. Denny disapproved and issued a thinly veiled threat that they "wou'd do well to decline appearing at the ensuing Treaty in a Body."⁸¹ Rather bluntly they replied that Teedyuscung had "repeatedly inform'd us of the Necessity of our Personal Attendance" at Easton and had "express'd his Regards for & Confidence in the Quakers & declar'd he would not proceed to any Business unless we were Present."⁸² They threatened to

⁷⁹ Montcalm to M. de Paulmy, July 11, 1757, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:583.

⁸⁰ Extract from Conrad Weiser's Journal, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:77; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:835.

⁸¹ Another groups of Quakers had sought access to the Council's minutes in the fall. See p.228. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:637-638; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:837.

⁸² "Address of the Friendly Association to Gov. Denny," July 14, 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:17-18.

publish all the accusations about the proprietary government's mismanagement of Indian affairs if Denny prevented them from attending.⁸³

Denny was in an awkward situation. Following the negotiations at Easton in the fall of 1756, the Earl of Halifax complained to him about the influence of the Friendly Association amongst the Indians. Halifax had attacked their actions as a clear breach of prerogative and ordered Denny "not to suffer those People, or any other. . . Body or Society in Pennsylvania, to concern themselves in any Treaty with the Indians."⁸⁴ Denny was thus forced to prevent the Association's attendance, though he could not prevent private individuals from attending.

The members of the Friendly Association were disturbed by these accusations. Having a genuine desire to end the war and not simply to stir up trouble, the Quakers protested that they never intended to interfere in government affairs, but merely to seek a peaceful settlement.⁸⁵

The 1750s saw a Quaker revival which had fostered a renewed sense of the Quaker mission and of the importance of Quaker pacifism. The frontier raids generated deep divisions

⁸³ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:837-838.

⁸⁴ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:634-635; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:836-837.

⁸⁵ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:638-646; "Address of the Friendly Association to Gov. Denny," July 14, 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:17-18.

among the Pennsylvania Quaker community: Some Quakers refused to compromise their pacifism at all and would not tolerate any involvement of the colony in warfare; others were prepared to allow the expenditure of the colony's funds on non-military supplies; a final group, the "defense Quakers," were prepared to support defensive measures by the colony as long as they were not compelled to fight themselves. The Quakers' problems were heightened by criticisms from London where they provided an obvious scapegoat for the failure of the colony's war effort. The Pennsylvania Quakers, riven by deep divisions within which deepened as the war progressed and threatened by attacks from outside, sought to end the war as quickly as possible.⁸⁶

As soon as the conference convened, Teedyuscung demanded the right to have his own clerk. Denny adamantly refused. What made the request offensive to Denny was his belief that the Quakers present at Easton, particularly Israel Pemberton, had given Teedyuscung the idea.⁸⁷ Teedyuscung repeated his

⁸⁶ Illick, *Colonial Pennsylvania*, pp.222-224.

⁸⁷ This belief was not totally unfounded. Despite Denny's refusal to allow the Friendly Association to attend the conference many of the leading Philadelphia Quakers came either as provincial commissioners or as private citizens. Many Quakers believed that Teedyuscung would be more trusting of the negotiations if he could have his own independent clerk to record the transactions for the Indians. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:649-652, 654, 656-657; "Minutes of a Council at Easton," Jul & August, 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:19-22; Gov. Denny to George Croghan, July 23, 1757, H.S.P., Cadwallader Collection: Trent-Croghan Papers, 6:1.

demand and threatened that if Denny would not acquiesce "he was determined to give over prosecuting the good Work he was ready and willing to accomplish with the English, and go home." Denny bitterly rebuked him. "Brother, I am afraid by your showing so little Confidence in me and the King's Deputy Agent, [George Croghan] that you have hearkened to idle Stories." But Denny knew when he had no choice and grudgingly granted Teedyuscung his wish.⁸⁸

Negotiations finally started at the end of July. Teedyuscung repeated his claims of the previous year that:

some Lands have been bought by the Proprietary. . . from Indians who had not a Right to sell, and to whom the Lands did not belong. . . Also when some Lands have been sold to the Proprietary by Indians who had a right to sell to a certain place. . . then the Proprietaries have, contrary to agreement or bargain, taken in more Lands than they ought to have done.⁸⁹

Teedyuscung asked the Pennsylvanians to examine their records to see if any lands had been bought from Indians to whom they did not belong and, if such was the case, to recompense the Indians who had lost their lands. This was a clever ploy, as Croghan observed, for if the English agreed the Delawares could demonstrate that many of the lands

⁸⁸ The clerk Teedyuscung chose was Charles Thompson, master of the Quaker School in Philadelphia, but himself a Presbyterian. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:663-665; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:844-845; "Minutes of a Council at Easton," July & August 1757, Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:19-22; Jennings *Empire of Fortune*, p.343.

⁸⁹ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:677.

purchased by Pennsylvania had been sold by the Iroquois and not by the Delawares themselves.⁹⁰

Still many Pennsylvanians remained unable to understand how their purchase of lands from the Iroquois could be fraudulent. Denny specifically instructed Croghan to ask Teedyuscung whether he meant "to renew the Complaints set forth in the former Treaty," or whether he would to drop them "only to charge upon the Proprietors, as an Act of Injustice, their having made such large Purchases of the Indians as to leave them no Habitation or place of Settlement."⁹¹

The Delawares stated explicitly that they felt "the Proprietaries had made fair purchases of the Lands from the Six Nations; but these they said were not the rightful owners of these Lands," and they would not recognize "any Deeds made by the Six Nation Indians to be good." This forthright statement worried Croghan who informed Denny "that if the Delawares shou'd persist in this manner of proceeding it would occasion a Breach between the Six Nations & them, of which the Consequences at this time might be very fatal."⁹²

The next logical step was to allow Teedyuscung to examine the deeds. Instead Richard Peters informed Teedyuscung that he had care of the deeds as a private individual and had

⁹⁰ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:677; "Minutes of a Council at Easton," July & August, 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:19-22.

⁹¹ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:853-854.

⁹² *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:683.

instructions from the Penns not to open the files while Sir William Johnson investigated the matter, as the government in London ordered.⁹³ This refusal was a terrible blow to the Delawares. They could not expect their concerns to be listened to openly if Johnson, the patron of the Iroquois and confederate of their arch-enemies the Mohawks, was to hear them. Teedyuscung asked the conference, "Why should we be obliged to go to Sir William Johnson to have the Proof of Lands and Deeds examined by him, when there is nothing in the way. . . [of] our making a League of Friendship." He added openly "we are sensible that some of the Nations are there that have been instrumental in this Misunderstanding in selling Lands in this Province, having in former Years taken us by the Foretop and throw[n] us aside as Women." Finally, in complete disgust Teedyuscung demanded to see a copy of the ministry's orders that he must negotiate with Johnson only.⁹⁴

James Logan spoke out in support of Teedyuscung, warning that it would "be of the most Dangerous Consequences to the Peace and safety of the Inhabitants of the Province. . . to refuse to gratify Teedyuscung. . . in his desire of

⁹³ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:687; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:855-859; "Minutes of a Council at easton," July & August, 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:19-22.

⁹⁴ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:689-691; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:859-861.

seeing. . . the several Deeds."⁹⁵ He was supported by Denny and all the members of the Council who were present with the notable exception of Peters. But Peters felt secure since only he had access to the deeds. But much to his horror, the provincial commissioners announced that they had brought copies of the deeds which they would show to the Delawares. Denny, too, was aghast. He attacked the commissioners for interfering in the negotiations, invading the proprietors' prerogative. The commissioners agreed that control of Indian affairs and particularly the purchase of Indian lands had been given to the proprietors. They added that they did not claim the power to make war and peace, but that it was in their interest to attempt to prevent their fellow citizens from being murdered.⁹⁶

On August 3 Denny again addressed the Delawares. He informed them that they could at last look at the deeds, and that Johnson would pass on their complaints for the crown to judge. This announcement was a masterful stroke, for it bypassed Johnson without affronting him, and was sufficient to appease the Delawares without offending the government in London.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ "Minutes of a Council at Easton," July & August, 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 7:687-689.

⁹⁶ "Minutes of a Council at Easton," H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:19-22; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:687-689, 694-697.

⁹⁷ Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 7:308-309.

Teedyuscung had all but won his way. The Pennsylvanians agreed to have his complaints of land fraud examined, to construct a settlement for the Delawares at Wyoming, and to establish a trading house at Fort Augusta to supply them. But Teedyuscung and Denny both knew that any peace would have to be spread farther than the Susquehanna Delawares alone. Teedyuscung promised to send messages to the Ohio Indians. He also promised to send some of his men to fight for the English as proof of his good faith.⁹⁸

The need for the peace process to be spread more widely, and for Delaware warriors to assist Pennsylvania, was made more pressing by the continuing destruction of the raids. Raiding parties continued to harass the frontier throughout the summer and fall. Many of these parties were composed of Delawares opposed to Teedyuscung's negotiations who joined with Ohio Indians the French sent to disrupt the Peace process. However, as the shortage of supplies on the Ohio bit more deeply into the French war effort, the French found it increasingly difficult to mass raiding parties at Fort Duquesne. The raids hit the area east of the Susquehanna particularly hard. In late June the raiders struck Lancaster

⁹⁸ Despite Teedyuscung's promise Denny refused to give his men a scalp bounty or to provide the Delawares with any ammunition. He did, however, agree to his request that Delaware warriors should fight under their own commanders. George Croghan to Gov. Denny, July 30, 1757, Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:21; Minutes of the Treaty at Easton, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 7:305; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:705-708, 713-714; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:863-864.

County and pressed on unopposed deep into Berks County. In early July another raiding party attacked Berks County, within a few miles of Reading. At the beginning of August another group assaulted Lancaster County and pushed down the eastern bank of the Susquehanna River. Edward Shippen warned that all Paxton Township would soon be abandoned while a report in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* maintained that "there has been nothing but Murdering and Captivating. . . by the Indians."⁹⁹

As the harvest approached, planters in the open fields offered a tempting target to raiding parties. Some of the Cumberland County residents organized themselves into large reaping parties to protect themselves. However, the parties proved more of a target than a protection. On July 18 the raiders attacked a party of twenty reapers outside Carlisle. Throughout the late summer and early fall the attacks on Cumberland and York counties continued.¹⁰⁰

During the fall raiding parties continued to harass the entire frontier. The parties were small and the damage from individual raids slight, but together they inspired fear amongst the settlers. Some of the parties spied upon the frontier posts in Northampton and Berks counties, arousing fears of a large-scale assault. Many of the settlers

⁹⁹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 7, 14, August 4, 11, 18, September 1, 15, 22, 29, 1757; Edward Shippen to James Burd, August 23, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3.

¹⁰⁰ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 4, 11, September 8, 15, 22, 29, 1757.

complained that they had thought that after peace had been made with Teedyuscung they could return home, but now they had been forced to flee again. A report in October stated that "the Frontiers are almost without Inhabitants."¹⁰¹

The misery caused by the raids was heightened by the spread of smallpox throughout the colony. As settlers fled from the devastated frontier, they spread the disease with them. In Cumberland County the situation was especially dire. Many of the inhabitants were "afflicted with a sever Sickness and die fast; so that in many places they are neither able to defend themselves when attacked, nor to run away." Smallpox also ravaged many of the Pennsylvania Regiment's garrisons, lowering morale and the number of men fit for duty.¹⁰²

As the raids continued, it became apparent that the Ohio Indians had to be drawn into the peace process. At the end of August there were grounds to be hopeful when Teedyuscung returned and informed the Pennsylvanians that messengers from the Ohio Indians maintained that they were now prepared to make peace with the English. Denny used Teedyuscung's presence as an opportunity to execute some of the agreements concluded at Easton. He persuaded the Assembly to cede lands in the Wyoming Valley to the Delawares in perpetuity, as

¹⁰¹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 6, 13, 1757; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 2:870-872; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:757.

¹⁰² *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 8, 1757; Thomas Lloyd to James Burd, October 8, 19, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3.

agreed at Easton. At the beginning of November Peters penned a draft surrendering all lands north of the Allegheny Mountains. Meanwhile, Denny set about organizing the construction of a settlement at Wyoming.¹⁰³

However, disputes which broke out again between Denny and the Assembly made implementing the agreements at Easton more difficult. Although Denny had promised to establish a trading house at Fort Augusta for the Delawares and in theory Pennsylvania had set up a trading house there, nothing was done to ensure that the necessary supplies and trade goods were laid in nor to regulate the Indian trade. In September, thirty Delawares came to the post expecting to sell their skins. But there were no goods for them and they left with bitter complaints.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ A permanent cession of lands was made easier when Thomas Penn empowered Richard Peters to cede lands back to the Indians. At the beginning of October Denny provided a commission to Hughes, Shippen, Galbreath, and Beatty to construct a fort and cabins for the Indians at Wyoming. He ordered men from Armstrong's battalion to protect the expedition. The expedition was forced to wait for Armstrong's escort to arrive and when the commissioners finally arrived at Wyoming there was no food for them there. As a result Teedyuscung asked them to return again in the spring. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:725-729, 770-771; Capt. Lloyd to James Burd, August 8, 1757, Joseph Shippen to James Burd, October 23, October 25, 1757, Edward Shippen to Gov. Denny, October 26, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3; "Draft of Surrender of Land Back to the Indians," November 3, 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:33-36; Thomas Penn to Richard Peters, November 7, 1757, H.S.P., Peters Papers, 4:117; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:878-879.

¹⁰⁴ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:734; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:872.

Denny thus approached the Assembly to pass a bill to encourage the development of the Indian trade. The Assembly agreed, but reserved the right to appoint the commissioners for Indian affairs and selected several assemblymen who were already provincial commissioners. Denny attacked the Assembly's selection, claiming that they had been motivated by a "thirst of Power, and Fondness to Monopolise all Offices of Trust and Profit." The Assembly replied that it was their "undoubted Right" to select whoever they chose and refused to alter the bill. As a result, for some time the trading house at Fort Augusta had few supplies. As the Delawares had been won over to the English, at least in part, because of their desperate need for supplies, this failure threatened the outcome of Pennsylvania's Indian diplomacy.¹⁰⁵

A new Assembly was elected in October. Denny asked them to pass a new trade bill, and they did. But it was exactly the same one Denny had previously rejected. The Assembly pointed out that if Denny were to reject it again, "the Postponing of this necessary Bill may be attended with the total alienation of the Indians from the British Interest." Denny would not relent.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:873-876; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 6, 1757; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:751-752.

¹⁰⁶ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:759-762; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:800-802, 8th Ser., 5:4670.

As the winter of 1757-1758 approached Pennsylvania seemed to have made some progress towards ending the war. The Susquehanna Delawares were slowly curtailing their attacks. However, their attachment to the English was not strong and seemed jeopardized by the deadlock between Denny and the Assembly. Meanwhile the French and the Ohio Indians continued to subject the frontier to devastating raids. The conclusion of a peace was a long way off. The Ohio Indians either had to be militarily forced to cease raiding, or brought into the peace process. Both would occur during 1758.

Chapter VI
Defeat in Victory

*Blessed be God, the long look'd for Day is arrived, that has now fixed us. . . in the quiet and peaceable Possession of the finest and most fertile Country of America. . . [the conquest of the Ohio] lays open to all his Majesty's Subjects a Vein of Treasure.*¹

During the winter of 1758 a council of war in New York instructed General John Forbes to prepare an expedition to assault the Ohio. The council concluded that an Ohio campaign would be "of the utmost consequence. . . by cutting off in a great measure the Communication between Canada & Louisiana, by which. . . the Country must fall."² Three years after Braddock's defeat the British were to make another attempt to drive the French from the forks of the Ohio.

Forbes planned to begin collecting his force at Fort Loudoun, at the head of the Conococheague Valley in Pennsylvania, on April 20, 1758. He would then assault the Ohio in the summer. He faced an immense task. Unlike Braddock, Forbes determined to secure his route by

¹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, December 14, 1758.

² "Plan of Operation on the Mississippi, Ohio &ca," February 1, 1758, Alfred Proctor James, ed., *The Writings of General John Forbes Relating to his Service in North America*, (Menasha, Wisc.: The Collegiate Press, 1938), p.35.

establishing defensive posts as the army advanced and to create a substantial supply network to ensure that the army was well fed and equipped and, in case the siege of Fort Duquesne should prove lengthy, to keep the army provisioned over the winter. To this end he needed plenty of money, men, equipment and provisions.³

Sensing the importance of the campaign, the Pennsylvania Assembly, quickly agreed to raise 2,000 troops. They provided a £5 bounty and a £7 advance for new recruits to encourage enlistment and the officers soon reported that they were "recruiting fast."⁴ The Assembly was less forward in providing additional money for the expenses of the war, including the payment of the men whose recruitment they had authorized, for they again ran into disputes with the governor. Because of their previous disputes with Morris and Denny, the Assembly was reluctant to contemplate any action towards providing a supply and had been in session for three months before it would even consider a bill. It took another month to pass the bill, which taxed both proprietary lands and unimproved lands and created commissioners to oversee the disbursement of the funds, all points Denny had refused to accept previously. But with the prospect of a frontier victory that would end the war, Denny capitulated completely,

³ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:59.

⁴ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:52; Joseph Shippen to James Burd, April 30, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family papers, Vol. 3.

although not without "a solemn Protestation to all the World, that it is Contrary to my Conscience, and in Violation of Truth."⁵

Governor Fauquier summoned the Virginia House of Burgesses to meet in late March. The House speedily voted additional money to increase the size of the provincial forces, almost doubling the number of troops and creating a second Virginia Regiment under the command of William Byrd III, and approved the continuation of the mutiny act for another year.⁶

During the early spring Forbes began preparing for the expedition. He needed not only troops but also auxiliaries. To conduct a campaign with an army of this size in the "wilderness" of western Pennsylvania the army would need to be largely self-sufficient and Forbes set out to recruit "Carpenters, Joyners, Bricklayers, Masons, Oven Makers, Saddlers, Millrights, Coalmakers, Coopers, Tin Men, Sawyers, [and] Mealmakers."⁷

⁵ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:926-929, 8th Ser. 9:928-929; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:80.

⁶ George Washington to Maj. Andrew Lewis. April 21, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:134; Gov. Fauquier to the Board of Trade, June 11, 1758, Reese, ed., *Papers of Francis Fauquier*, 1:23-24; McIlwaine, *Journal of the House of Burgesses, 1752/55-1756/58*, pp.495-506; Henning, *Statutes of Virginia*, 7:463-470.

⁷ Henry Bouquet, *Orderly Book*, July 2, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:661.

Forbes' greatest need was for wagoners to haul the army's supplies to the forward posts. Bouquet estimated that the expedition needed at least 180 wagons and teams, and as the forward posts were built farther and farther from the inhabited parts of the province that number rose.⁸ Desperately short of wagons, in mid-May Forbes placed advertisements throughout Pennsylvania appealing for wagons and offering to pay fifteen shillings per day for wagon, team, and wagon master. Despite such offers few people came forward and the lack of wagons retarded Forbes' preparations. Forbes soon resorted to issuing veiled threats. At the end of May he informed the inhabitants of Cumberland County that the sheriff had provided Bouquet with a list of all the people who had wagons and horses but had not come forward with them. Forbes advised them to come forward immediately "in order to prevent any Damage that might happen on acco[un]t of Soldiers being turn'd loose amongst y[o]u"⁹

But Forbes' threats had little effect. A few days later, after spending four days procuring only four wagons, Bouquet reported to Forbes that "Civil Authority is. . . completely nonexistent in this County." He added that "as the farmers

⁸ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:59, 60; Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, May 22, 1758, Kent ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 1:350.

⁹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 11, 1758; Forbes Advertisement for Wagons, Horses, Drivers, etc, James, ed, *Writings of General John Forbes*, pp.88-89; Notice to Wagoners, May 28, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 1:378.

ignored the orders of the sheriff and his constables I appealed. . . to the magistrates for press warrants."¹⁰ But the magistrates refused to issue them. Bouquet fumed. He threatened Lancaster County justice Edward Shippen that "I must have wagons without delay, wither by contract, or impressing." Eventually, Denny, harassed by both Forbes and Bouquet, agreed to instruct the magistrates to issue warrants for impressment.¹¹

Several experiences contributed to the reluctance of the settlers to provide the army with wagons. The main reason was "some Unfair Usage, which they alledge, some of 'em have formerly rec'd from Officers in the Army." Backcountry settlers remembered the manner in which Dunbar had abandoned their wagons in his flight from the Monongahela in 1755, and the difficulty they had faced in getting recompense for their losses. Their distrust of the army was further heightened when provincial officials agreed to pay wagoners more than Forbes had promised. When the wagoners joined the army and discovered the real terms, some turned their wagons around and left spreading tales of the army's uncertain credibility.¹²

¹⁰ Bouquet to Forbes, May 29-30, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 1:386.

¹¹ Henry Bouquet to Edward Shippen, June 3, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3; Gov. Denny's Press Warrant, May 31, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 1:405.

¹² Edward Shippen in particular promised the wagoners that they would receive forage for the entire journey, Bouquet had only allowed ten days forage. George Stevenson to Henry
(continued...)

When farmers complied, their wagons were often unfit for the service expected of them. In mid-July Bouquet wrote to Forbes complaining about the teams the settlers had provided. Some of the settlers "who had good horses when they were appraised, kept them and sent nags who were unable to drag themselves along." However, by the beginning of June the threat of impressment and the exhortations of many of the local gentry managed to exact enough wagons for the expedition to commence.¹³

Forbes also sought to obtain Cherokee auxiliaries to act as scouts and guides and to harass the Indian settlements on the Ohio to lessen the possibility of attacks on his advancing column. In the early spring he sent William Byrd III to Cherokee country to encourage the Cherokees to send warriors to support the expedition. Byrd had considerable success. By the beginning of April five hundred Indians had arrived, or were soon expected, at Winchester.¹⁴

¹²(...continued)

Bouquet, May 31, 1757, Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, June 3, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 1:399, 2:18.

¹³ Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, June 7, July 11, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:47, 180-181.

¹⁴ The largest parties were commanded by Captain Bullen and Wahatchee. George Washington to John Blair, April 9, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:113-114; Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, June 3, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:15; William Byrd III to Gov. Lyttelton, April 10, 1758, Marion Tinling, ed., *The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds of Westover Virginia, 1684-1776*, 2 Vols. (Charlottesville VA: University Press of Virginia, 1977), 2:647.

As Forbes began his preparations the French anxiously sought a response. This response came in the form of several raiding parties of western Indians from Fort Duquense who descended on the frontier in April. On the fifth one party attacked into York County, killing or capturing eleven people. Two days later other small parties descended on the Lancaster and Northampton County frontiers.¹⁵ The inhabitants, terrified at the renewal of the raids, petitioned the Council begging for protection and forcing Forbes to send some of his troops to the Berks County frontier. The French had also intended the raids to sow doubts about Teedyuscung, and as they had hoped, many of the frontier inhabitants openly accused Teedyuscung and his supporters of committing the attacks.¹⁶

The French launched another raid on southwestern Virginia a few weeks later. The attack devastated a large area, killing or capturing over fifty people in Augusta, Bedford,

¹⁵ During the winter and spring there were few raids on the frontier. Denny falsely attributed this to the Indians changing allegiance. After the raids had recommenced several rafts used by the Indians to cross the Susquehanna were found floating on the river. *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:914-916; Gov. Denny to George Washington, March 25, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:106-108; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 13, 20, 1758.

¹⁶ To reassure the colonists Teedyuscung agreed to send a party of Susquehanna Delawares after the raiders. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:84-85, 99, 110; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 20, 1758.

Halifax and Albemarle counties.¹⁷ The French intended these raids to hinder communications between Virginia and the Cherokees and they succeeded better than they could have hoped. Since some of the Ohio Indians claimed to be Cherokees, and the settlers were incapable of distinguishing between their allies and their enemies, the raids caused settlers to be suspicious of any Indian party. They viewed Cherokee parties journeying through Virginia to reach Forbes' army with intense distrust. One militia commander even accused the Cherokees of "vilinously Robing & stealing[,] Plundering houses[,] Puling men of[f] their horses[,] striping [sic] & whiping[,] Beating with tomahoaks[,] & stoning many People." The Cherokee parties quickly became alarmed at the hostility displayed towards them, and by mid-May the Cherokees and the Virginians had clashed in several skirmishes.¹⁸

The French attacks slowed preparations for Forbes' expedition as wagoners and planters became wary of venturing too far west without a military escort. Many other circumstances also conspired to delay his advance. Forbes discovered that many of the provincial troops had no arms, and

¹⁷ George Washington to John Blair, April 24, May 4[-10], 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:139-141, 156-160; *Maryland Gazette*, May 4, 18, 1758; *Journal of the Council* 6:95.

¹⁸ William Callaway to George Washington, May 15, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:183-184; *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, May 20, 1758; Lachlin Mackintosh to William Byrd, III, May 12, 1758, Tinling, ed., *Correspondence of the Three William Byrds*, 2:653.

it proved difficult to acquire more.¹⁹ Forbes approached Governor Denny to provide some light arms from the provincial magazine. Denny refused, fearing it would leave the provincial forces still guarding the frontier east of the Susquehanna without weapons. Only after considerable pressure from the general did the governor relent.²⁰ The Virginia Council refused to allow the Virginia Regiment to use the arms decorating the entrance hall in the Governor's Palace in Williamsburg. Instead the Council agreed to pay a special bounty to men who enlisted with their own weapons and promised compensation if the rigors of war damaged them. But the bounty attracted few additional arms and those of mostly poor quality.²¹

The provincial forces lacked not only arms but other essential equipment. The Pennsylvania forces had no blankets. The First Virginia Regiment lacked adequate uniforms since the colony had not provided them with new clothes or shoes for over two years, and many men complained of "being naked." Both Virginia Regiments were short of "Tents, and other sorts of Field Equipage." Any attempt to begin the campaign with

¹⁹ Gen. Forbes to Henry Bouquet, May 29, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 1:379.

²⁰ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:79, 82, 83-84.

²¹ Sir John St. Clair to Bouquet, May 31, 1758, Kent, ed., *Bouquet Papers*, 1:403; *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 6:87-88.

the soldiers so poorly provisioned would have been disastrous.²²

Forbes also required a mass of other equipment to construct the road and fortify the camps. He needed "Falling Axes, Broad Axes, Horse Gearse [sic] Collers [sic] and Bells, Horse Shoes, and Nails, Drawing Knives. . . Chissels[,], Goudges, and Augers--Brass Kittles, Crescent Saws, hand saws, Trowels, Addges, Hinges, hammers and Gimbletts, Locks Files[,], saw sets and sundry other things."²³ Consequently Forbes delayed while Bouquet and St. Clair scoured the backcountry for supplies and equipment.

When Forbes finally began to assemble the troops, he faced a new problem. The troops, particularly the provincial forces, deserted in huge numbers. Some men left because they had previously absconded from provincial troops to join the Royal Americans and were concerned that, when the regular forces joined with the provincial forces, their former officers would discover them. Desertion for this reason was so extensive that Bouquet offered a pardon to all men who came forward and confessed to their crime. Twenty did immediately.

²² Henry Bouquet to George Stevenson, June 3, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:27-29; *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 6:105-106; George Washington to John Blair, May 28, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:199-203; George Washington to Gov. Fauquier, June 17, 1758, Reese ed., *The Official Papers of Francis Fauquier*, 1:30-31.

²³ John Hughes to Commissioners, May 8, 1758, H.S.P., *Shippen Family Papers*, Vol. 3.

Forbes extended this amnesty and threatened that, if the men had not returned to camp by June 12, he would have them hunted them down and tried "without Mercy." He also threatened that he would heavily fine civilians who aided deserters in their flight.²⁴

The expedition was also delayed when smallpox and dysentery swept through the army. Dysentery overwhelmed Forbes himself so badly in July that he was not "in a Condition, either to write, or think." He never fully recovered. Dysentery also laid low William Byrd at the end of August. In the middle of August Bouquet fretted to Forbes that "Sickness has weakened the army so much that I do not see how you can furnish the necessary escorts nor guard the communication."²⁵ The carelessness of the provincial troops who would clean meat and clothes in the same streams from which the drinking water was taken was a main cause of the dysentery. Most important, they made no effort to locate

²⁴ Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, May 29-30, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 1:389; Forbes Advertisement About Deserters, June 1, 1758, James, ed., *Writings of General John Forbes*, pp.104-105; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 1, 1758.

²⁵ Robert Rutherford to George Washington, Adam Stephen to George Washington, August 2, 1758, July 20, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:305, 363; Gen. Forbes to Henry Bouquet, July 23, 1758, Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, July 31, August 20, 1758, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:264, 293, 398; George Washington to Thomas Walker, September 2, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:446; George Washington to Gov. Fauquier, September 2, 1758, Reese, ed., *The Official Papers of Francis Fauquier*, 1:68.

their latrines at a proper distance from camp and would relieve themselves around the camp.²⁶

At the beginning of June the expedition finally had sufficient wagons and supplies to begin its advance.²⁷ Since Bouquet had already established an advanced post at Raystown, at the beginning of June Forbes sent out detachments to begin building the road from Lancaster, through Shippensburg and Fort Loudoun, to Raystown. At the end of June Forbes assembled the Pennsylvania forces in Raystown, withdrawing the men from the frontier posts and leaving behind skeleton garrisons largely of the sick and wounded. Peter Burd lamented that the Fort Augusta "Garrison cuts a drole Figure to what it formerly did." He added that the new troops "look more like a detachment from the dead than the Liveing."²⁸ On June 24 the First Virginia Regiment began its march from Winchester to Fort Cumberland. The Second Virginia Regiment followed two days later. Washington then began construction

²⁶ Henry Bouquet, *Standing Orders During the Campaign, "Orderly Book,"* July 3, 11, August 1, 24, 1758, Kent, ed., *Bouquet Papers*, 2:658-659, 662, 664, 669, 681.

²⁷ Adam Hoops had contracted 160 wagons in Lancaster and York Counties alone. Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, June 3, 1758, Adam Hoops to Henry Bouquet, June 17, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:15-20, 105-106.

²⁸ Henry Bouquet to Sir John St.Clair, May 31, 1758, "Forbes Memoranda," [c. June 1, 1758], Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, June 3, 28, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 1:400, 2:1, 15-19, 142; Peter Burd to James Burd, July 20, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3; Gen. Forbes to James Abercromby, June 27, 1758, James, ed., *Writings of General Forbes*, p.126.

of a road forty miles from Fort Cumberland to Raystown. By early August both Virginia Regiments were in Raystown.²⁹

Moving the troops forward was a painfully slow business. Bouquet warned Forbes that there would even be delays in marching the troops from Philadelphia to Lancaster because the roads were unable to handle the volume of traffic. Roads out of the backcountry towards Fort Loudoun were even worse. John Armstrong complained that his march from Shippensburg to Fort Loudoun had been "tedious, and Subject to One tryfleing Accident & another." He added that the wagons were so decrepit that he had "never met with any thing like it & too much pains cannot be taken to get them forward." The problem grew worse because early June saw heavy rains which made the roads a quagmire and swelled the rivers. Because of the high water, it took three days to ferry just thirty wagons across the Susquehanna River.³⁰

Besides slowing the progress of the expedition, the poor roads also destroyed the wagons which had been so painfully acquired. Of the first 73 wagons to arrive at Fort Littleton, halfway between Fort Loudoun and Raystown, 33 could continue

²⁹ George Washington's Orders, June 13, 1758, George Washington to Gov. Fauquier, August 5, 1758, Reese ed., *The Official Papers of Francis Fauquier*, 1:32, 57-58; Henry Bouquet to George Washington, June 27, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:246.

³⁰ Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, May 22, May 25, 1758, Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, June 7, 1758, John Armstrong to Henry Bouquet, July 25, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 1:351, 361, 2:47, 272.

no farther. Bouquet commented that "The roads are strewn with broken wagons." At the beginning of July Lewis Ourry, the commander at Fort Loudoun, wrote to Bouquet complaining that he had "neither Blacksmiths, Farriers, nor Waggon Makers nor Tools for either, and every Day Waggons breaking to pieces, & Horses wanting Shoes."³¹

Many of the expedition's problems, especially the lack of wagons and the poor state of the road, stemmed from Sir John St. Clair's inefficiency and incompetence. Forbes complained that St. Clair had not "taken the smallest pains, or. . . made the least inquiry" into examining the problems. He failed to make provision for forage for the horses along the route, and where forage was readily available in abandoned plantations, he made no effort to gather it.³² St. Clair paid little attention to selecting the best route for the road. Several times workers had already cleared a section of road over the rough terrain when surveyors reported a substantially better passage. At Loyalhanna, the most advanced of the posts along the route, St. Clair approved the location for a major fort and ordered construction to begin. When Bouquet arrived, he

³¹ Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, June 21, July 11, 1758, Lewis Ourry to Henry Bouquet, July 4, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:121-122, 160-161, 180-181.

³² Gen. Forbes to Henry Bouquet, July 14, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:207-208.

discovered that a hill overlooked the site and rendered it completely useless.³³

St. Clair also managed to alienate many of the other officers and generated much tension. Some of the officers complained that he gave orders "in a very Odd Manner." Others complained of "His imperious & insulting manner of communicating his intention." On one occasion when St. Clair heard that some of the officers were unhappy, "He bellow'd out Mutiny; & appearing to be in the greatest dilemma! roard out what shall I do; shall I fire upon them!"³⁴ The most infamous occasion occurred when St. Clair lost his temper with Lieutenant-Colonel Adam Stephen of the Virginia Regiment. When St. Clair heard that Stephen, the ranking officer at Quemahoning camp, had issued orders after St. Clair had declined to, "he flew in a passion." The incident concluded with St. Clair throwing Stephen into jail, claiming that he was trying to incite "a genl mutiny amongst both Officers and Men of the Virginians." This action mortified Bouquet who warned St. Clair that he would "have a good deal to do to justify the necessity of Such a violent measure against an officer of his Ranck." Bouquet reminded St. Clair of Forbes'

³³ Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, August 26, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:423.

³⁴ Adam Stephen to Henry Bouquet, August 26, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:430-431.

instruction "to establish and preserve good harmony with the Provincial Troops."³⁵

The delays in the expedition created yet another predicament--the defection of the Cherokees and southern Indians. French encouragement of the Chickasaws to attack the Cherokees made the Cherokees reluctant to send warriors. Their reluctance increased when their "conjurors" suggested that the Cherokees would suffer disaster if they joined the British in war. As a result of the reception they received from the British and the threats of the French and their shamans, the flow of Cherokees joining the English ceased by the late spring.³⁶

The cessation of new arrivals would not have been a problem if the expedition was already well en route and the Indians who had previously joined the army had been content. But the expedition had made little progress. Washington was concerned that the inactivity of the British would encourage the Cherokees to quit and "no words can tell how much they will be missed." In mid-May he warned that "unless they see

³⁵ Adam Stephen to Henry Bouquet, August 26, 1758, Sir John St.Clair to Henry Bouquet, August 27, 1758, Henry Bouquet to Sir. John St.Clair, August 28, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:432, 434, 435-436.

³⁶ Speech of Attakullaculla [The "Little Carpenter"] to William Byrd, May 27, 1758, George Turner to William Byrd III, August 4, 1758, Tinling, ed., *The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds*, 2:656, 664-665.

the Troops assemble soon, it will be very difficult. . . to retain any number of the Cherokees."³⁷

Not only were the Cherokees alienated by the endless delays, but they were also dismayed that they received no gifts for their services. In April Washington had written to General Stanwix asking him to ensure that army secured "a supply of proper Goods" for the Cherokees. He warned that "the Indians are mercenary, every service of theirs must be purchased: and they are easily offended, being thoroughly sensible of their own importance." Forbes applied to the Pennsylvania provincial commissioners for money to buy the Indians goods and presents, but they informed him that they had insufficient money and could not help him.³⁸ Forbes attempted to get gifts and wampum elsewhere, but his problems were exacerbated because no one accompanying the army had the necessary authority to control and reward the Indians. Forbes complained to Stanwix that he had "no mortal of Consequence" to oversee the Indians for both Atkin and Johnson, the superintendents of Indian Affairs, had neither "come themselves, nor have they sent any one person to look after those Indians, altho repeated applications have been made to

³⁷ George Washington to Gen. Stanwix, April 10, 1758, George Washington to Francis Halkett, May 11, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:117, 176-177.

³⁸ George Washington to Gen. Stanwix, April 10, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:117; Gen. Forbes to William Pitt, May 19, 1758, James, ed., *Writings of General John Forbes*, p.92.

both those gentlemen." He wrote to London complaining that "I do not know how to account for the behaviour of Sir W[illia]m Johnston and Mr Atkin upon so Criticall and urgent an occasion as this is." Frustrated and impatient, Bouquet deliberately withheld the Cherokees' gifts in an attempt to bring them back into order. But this action only had the opposite effect.³⁹

By early June Washington's worst fears became reality when the Cherokees at Fort Loudoun informed William Trent that they intended to return home because they had not received any gifts. They warned Trent that if he did not immediately give them a "large Present to Carry home with them they would Rob all the English Houses they met with in their way home."⁴⁰

While the Indians steadily defected, the commanders and colonists squabbled. Bouquet and Forbes refrained until they had detailed surveyors' reports from making a decision on whether the army should advance to Fort Duquesne on the road cut in 1755 by General Braddock, or on a new route to be cut directly from Fort Loudoun to Fort Duquesne. While Braddock's route had already been blazed, it was considerably longer than the Pennsylvania route, had to cross many rivers and creeks, and had three years growth of underbrush to be cleared. The

³⁹ Gen. Forbes to John Stanwix, May 29, 1758, Gen. Forbes to James Abercromby, June 7, 1758, James, ed., *Writings of General Forbes*, pp.102-103, 109; Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, June 3, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:15.

⁴⁰ George Washington to Gen. Stanwix, April 10, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:117; William Trent to Henry Bouquet, June 5, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:36-37.

Pennsylvania route, however, had to be constructed over rougher and more uncertain terrain and had to cross the barrier of Laurel Ridge.⁴¹

Toward the end of July the surveyors reported that they had found a route across Laurel Ridge. Bouquet and Forbes then concluded that the advantages of the Pennsylvania route outweighed its disadvantages. But the Virginians, particularly Washington, argued vehemently that the expedition should follow Braddock's route. The issue became a heated dispute, for after the war the road would serve as the route for settlers and merchants traveling to the Ohio and bring great profits to traders and land-speculators alike.⁴²

Forbes' decision to use the Pennsylvania route was immediately condemned by the Virginians. They derided the Pennsylvanians, claiming that "The invariable attention, indefatigably pursued by the Pennsylvanians, without regard to the common interest, for advancing their private fortunes-- have long been glaring proofs of a Selfish & Sordid principle." Forbes saw circumstances rather differently and commented that "I. . . cannot Conceive what the Virginia folks would be att, for to me it appears to be them, and them only, that want to drive us into the Road by Fort Cumberland."

⁴¹ George Washington to Henry Bouquet, July 7, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:267; Gen. Forbes to William Pitt, July 10, 1758, James, *Writings of General Forbes*, p.141.

⁴² Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, July 11, 21, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:179, 251-252.

Washington refused to accept the decision. In early August, supported wholeheartedly by the Virginia Council, he sent a formal representation to Forbes protesting the choice of route and claiming that there was no time to build a new road.⁴³

The failure to use the Virginia route embittered Washington against the entire expedition. At the beginning of September he wrote to John Robinson, the Speaker of the House of Burgesses, attacking both Forbes and Bouquet. "We seem then--to act under an evil Geni--the conduct of our Leaders. . . is tempered with something--I don't care to give a name to--indeed I will go further and say they are d[evil]s or something worse. . . to whose selfish views I attribute the miscarriage of this Expedition."⁴⁴

Forbes' problems grew worse, for as the Virginia troops were withdrawn from the frontier they were replaced by militia units. The militia proved no more reliable in 1758 than previously. For example, Washington ordered the Prince William County militia to replace two companies of the first Virginia Regiment stationed on the South Branch. He expected

⁴³ Washington also maintained that the differences in distance were not that great. But he greatly underestimated the distance from Carlisle to Fort Duquesne via Braddock's route. John Kirkpatrick to George Washington, July 21, 1758, George Washington to Henry Bouquet, August 2, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:314, 355-357; *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, August 17, 1758; Gen Forbes to Henry Bouquet, July 23, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:264-265.

⁴⁴ George Washington to John Robinson, September 1, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:432.

over one hundred men, but only 73 assembled, without weapons.⁴⁵

Upon hearing that the militia was to replace the provincial forces, the frontier inhabitants complained bitterly. One frontiersman angrily wrote to Washington that it gave "the Greatest uneasiness to the Inhabitants" to have the militia posted locally. He added that they could not "Expect to Receive So much Satisfaction from the hole Company of Melitia as we should Do from Them Twenty Men" of the Virginia Regiment. Some inhabitants even prepared to abandon the frontier, forcing Byrd to leave several companies of the Second Virginia Regiment at Edward's and Pearsall's on the South Branch.⁴⁶ Washington also resorted to using the ranger companies to garrison the fort in Winchester. However, such an assignment dismayed the settlers that they had been protecting. The commander of one ranger detachment, Robert Rutherford, wrote to Washington complaining that the posting of his company in Winchester had caused such discontent amongst the settlers "that it obliges me to apply to you to

⁴⁵ In other counties the militia were again "mutinous" and refused to muster at all, unless they were allowed to choose their own officers. Gov. Fauquier to Sir John St. Clair, June 6, 1758, George Washington to Gov. Fauquier, June 19, 1758, Gov. Fauquier to George Washington, June 25, 1758, Reese, ed., *The Official Papers of Francis Fauquier*, 1:14-15, 35-36, 41-42.

⁴⁶ Jacob Hite to George Washington, June 29, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:250; George Washington to William Byrd, Tinsling, ed., *The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds*, 2:661.

Countermand the orders." Rutherford claimed that the settlers' were so enraged that he was "almost Liable to be Stoned" if he went out in public. The inhabitants were not alone in their disgust: the rangers themselves detested their new duty and refused to perform garrison duty. When forced, some even deserted so abhorrent did they find the task.⁴⁷

As the Virginia Regiment withdrew and militia units replaced it, weakening the frontier defenses, Indian parties again struck Virginia. At the end of June a party attacked Hampshire County, crossed the South Branch, and pressed on into the Shenandoah Valley, raiding around the Masanutten Mountain. On June 27 they killed nine settlers, and captured six more. The raiders then pressed on down the valley, killing or capturing a total of twenty-six and causing several hundred to flee. The raids produced great alarm and caused many Virginians to grumble about Forbes' judgment in withdrawing the Virginia Regiment for an expedition which seemed doomed to failure.⁴⁸

By August Forbes had massed over 2,500 men in Raystown. They included regiments from Britain, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, and four Maryland and three North Carolina

⁴⁷ George Washington to Charles Smith, June 24, 1758, George Washington to Robert Rutherford, June 24, 1758, Charles Smith to George Washington, July 1, 1758, Robert Rutherford to George Washington, July 2, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:238, 239, 252-253, 255.

⁴⁸ John Hite to George Washington, July 2, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:254; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 27, 1758.

companies. Forbes had also overseen the supervision of a road to Loyalhanna, only fifty-six miles from Fort Duquesne, over difficult terrain. Constructing this route was a great logistical achievement. But the quality of the road was considerably lower than Forbes had hoped. When Bouquet finally traveled to Loyalhanna in September he described the road as "abominable." He added that "no trouble had been taken to go around the hills, to remove or break the stones, and the bridges are worthless." When the weather deteriorated in early October, streams flowed along some of the roads and washed out some of the bridges. Bouquet commented that "To my great regret it is a job which must be done over." The construction of the road had taken considerable time. Watching the days pass, Bouquet fretted to Forbes that the expedition looked doomed to failure. The first frost could come in late September and "destroy the grass on which our cattle feed, and if we have no pork, on what shall we live?"⁴⁹

The atrocious state of the road had also caused the destruction of many of the wagons, and by September the expedition had an insufficient number to move all the army's supplies forward. Bouquet asked Forbes to attempt to secure more, but Forbes could only inform him that "the Magistrates. . . all agree in the great difficulty of getting

⁴⁹ Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, August 15, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3; Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, August 8, September 11, 1758, October 20, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:335, 492-494, 578-580.

fresh Waggon or Horses, saying the Farmers complain their Horses were starved for want of forage." He added simply that "we must make the best of what we have." Bouquet warned Forbes that the army had only a month's provisions and "little certainty of getting enough wagons to sustain us and to push ahead." He asked if they should now consider abandoning their attempt to reach the Forks and concentrate instead on improving the route and strengthening their posts.⁵⁰

Bouquet believed that the army should push on, for it would force the French to maintain their Indian allies, depriving them of much needed supplies, and, if the army were successful, it would immeasurably strengthen their hand in negotiating a peace with the Ohio Indians. Bouquet was also worried that the army was becoming "visibly bored and impatient." He added that "their ardor is cooling, and I am afraid that the discontent may very soon be followed by murmurs and other annoying consequences."⁵¹

As the delay continued, the loyalty of the few remaining Indians also evaporated. In mid-August Forbes reported to Governor Fauquier that the Cherokees were behaving "like a parcell of Scoundrells" and most had left for home. Matters were made worse when the only interpreter in Raystown fell ill

⁵⁰ Gen. Forbes to Henry Bouquet, September 2, 1758, Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, September 4, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:462, 471-474.

⁵¹ Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, September 4, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:471.

and Bouquet was unable to communicate with the remaining Indians. The final blow came when a raiding party killed the two most anglophile Catawbas "Captain Bullen" and "Captain French," who had used their influence to persuade many Indians to remain, while on their way from Winchester to Fort Cumberland. By October only about thirty Cherokees and thirty Catawbas continued with the expedition. The loss of Indian auxiliaries left the expedition dangerously exposed to surprise raids.⁵²

The French were aware that the British were mounting a major assault but were unaware of the route. To heighten their confusion, Bouquet ordered Washington to send parties back and forth along Braddock's road to mislead the French into thinking that the army was advancing by that route. Yet at the beginning of August, a party of francophile Indians discovered the army and attacked one of the supply convoys. Soon after, several parties of French and Indians scouted along the route, forcing Bouquet to provide all the supply convoys with an escort and diverting men from constructing the road and fortifying the camps.⁵³

⁵² Gen. Forbes to Gov. Fauquier, Reese, ed., *The Official Papers of Francis Fauquier*, 1:59-60; Henry Bouquet, to Gen. Forbes, August 26, 1758, Abraham Bosomworth to Henry Bouquet, September 10, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:423, 486; Henry Bouquet to James Burd, October 16, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3.

⁵³ Henry Bouquet to George Washington, August 17, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 5:394-395; Abraham Bosommworth to George Washington, August 9, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:382-383.

By the middle of August Bouquet reported that "The Woods about us are full of little Partys of Indians and I know that they have discovered our New Road." Several parties also attacked the Virginia forces around Fort Cumberland. Another raiding party attacked the rear of the army, close to the start of Forbes' road, in Cumberland County near Shippensburg, threatening the tenuous supply line. At the beginning of September Forbes warned that he believed the French might attempt an assault on one of the advanced posts before the Ohio Indians returned home for the winter; in particular the safety of Loyalhanna deeply concerned him.⁵⁴

In view of the threat of raids upon the advancing column, Bouquet asked Washington if it would be possible to organize some expeditions to attack Indian towns on the Ohio. Bouquet felt that if the Ohio Indians' "houses and familis were in danger" it would be "a great inducemnt for them to provide for their immediate defence and leave to the french their own quarrels to fight." Washington informed him that he had been keeping small parties out to harass the enemy, but a larger raid was impracticable because the French and their Indian allies would detect it before it could get to the Ohio.

⁵⁴ Henry Bouquet to George Washington, August 17, 1758, George Washington to Henry Bouquet, August 18, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:394-395, 397-399; Francis Halkett to Henry Bouquet, August 26, 1758, Gen. Forbes to Henry Bouquet, September 2, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:427-428, 461.

Without Indian auxiliaries, francophile Indians could easily surround the party and defeat it.⁵⁵

When the column neared Fort Duquesne Forbes, decided to send an advanced party under the command of James Grant to destroy supplies, outbuildings, and an Indian camp outside the French fort. If Grant could destroy the supplies at the fort, he might force the Ohio Indians to return to their homes. Grant left Loyalhanna on September 12 with 750 men, composed of a party of Highlanders and some Pennsylvania and Virginia troops. It took the force longer to march than Grant had expected, they did not reach the fort until the middle of the night. Grant immediately sent Major Andrew Lewis with the Virginians to attack, while he remained behind covering the retreat. Unbeknownst to Grant, his forces had taken the French by surprise; their commander commented that the English had taken an unexpected route and could have attacked the fort itself if they had not started to make much noise and set fire to a barn.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ While there were still Indians with the English, a typical party was commanded by an English officer but composed mainly of Cherokees or Catawbas, an identical arrangement to the French parties. Henry Bouquet to George Washington, July 14, 1758, George Washington to Henry Bouquet, July 16, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:286-287, 291-293.

⁵⁶ George Washington to Gov. Fauquier, September 25, 1758, Reese, ed., *Papers of Francis Fauquier*, 1:79; John Dagworthy to Henry Bouquet, September 14, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:499; James Burd to Col. Bouquet, September 16, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers: Letter Book of Col. James Burd, 1756-1758, ff.182-183; Daine to Marsall de Bell
(continued...)

Lewis returned before he had done more than burn a few of the Indian camp's outbuildings. He claimed that he was unable to attack closer to the fort because the terrain was too rough for a night assault. Grant was upset at Lewis for "Overturning a long projected Scheme." Believing that the French had not yet detected his men, Grant attempted to organize another assault, but found the troops "in the greatest confusion I ever saw Men in." As he was attempting to regroup them, just after daybreak, the French and Ohio Indians attacked. The unexpected counterattack threw Grant's force into complete confusion. The Pennsylvania troops guarding the flanks fled. Grant later informed Forbes, "in less than half an Hour all was in Confusion. . . Fear had then got the better of every other passion & I hope I shall never see again such a Pannick among Troops." The French routed Grant's force. British losses were heavy. The French and Ohio Indians killed or captured over twenty officers, including Grant himself, and 271 men, over a third of the force. Another forty returned to Loyalhanna seriously wounded.⁵⁷

⁵⁶(...continued)

Isle, November 3, 1758, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:884-885.

⁵⁷ Only 490 men of the 750 returned unwounded. List of Killed & Wounded at Ft. Duquesne, September 14, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers: Military Notebook No. 7; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 28, 1758; John Dagworthy to Henry Bouquet, September 14, 1758, Maj. Grant to Gen. Forbes [c. September 14, 1758,] Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:499, 499-504.

Grant lost almost as many men as had Braddock three years earlier. The flight of the survivors was as chaotic. But, surprisingly, the rout did not seriously weaken British morale. Bouquet commented that "Contrary to my expectation, the troops do not seem at all depressed by this setback, and if everything were ready, moreover, they would be more disposed than ever to go forward." Joseph Shippen agreed with Bouquet, commenting that the rout made the forces seek revenge upon the French.⁵⁸

To follow up on their success on the Ohio, the French believed that it might be possible to drive Forbes' army back to Philadelphia in the same manner that Dunbar had fled. On October 12, as Forbes had feared, a French and Indian party attacked the forward camp at Loyalhanna. James Burd, the camp's commander, immediately organized a reconnaissance party of five hundred men, but the attack was so fierce that they forced Burd to retreat hastily into camp. After a fierce two-hour assault, the attackers withdrew. The British had lost 62 men and five officers, French casualties were unknown, but they were certainly light. Most ominously the raiders retired with many of the expedition's horses and cattle which had been grazing outside the fort.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, September 17, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:520; Joseph Shippen to James Burd, September 20, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol.3.

⁵⁹ James Burd to Sarah Burd, H.S.P., Shippen Family
(continued...)

Some of the British officers viewed the battle at Loyalhanna as a victory. But at best it was a pyrrhic victory. Henry Bouquet commented ruefully that "A thousand men keep more than 1500 blockaded, carry off all their horses, and retire undisturbed with all their wounded and perhaps ours, after burying their dead. This enterprise which should have cost the enemy dearly shows a great deal of contempt for us, and the behaviour of our troops in the woods justifies their idea only too well."⁶⁰

The expedition was at a critical juncture. Although within attacking distance of Fort Duquesne, the British were critically short of horses and wagons, and if the weather turned inclement they could lose many lives and most of their munitions and supplies. But there were many reasons to press forward. Governor Fauquier doubted whether the Virginia House of Burgesses would continue to support the campaign into 1759 because their enthusiasm had been "a little stifled by the inactivity of this Campaign." He informed the Board of Trade that Virginians were very critical of Forbes' campaign and "this Inactivity as it is here call'd, and the long Delay before they set forward, has raised a Doubt whether the Attack

⁵⁹(...continued)
Papers, October 14, 1758, Vol. 3. James Burd to Henry Bouquet, October 12, 1758, Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, October 15, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:552-553, 560.

⁶⁰ Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, October 15, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:560.

can be attempted this year which has so much soured some of the Members of the assembly that they are unwilling to grant any more Money towards carrying on the Expedition."⁶¹ So disturbed were the Burgesses that they ordered the First Virginia Regiment to return to Virginia to protect the frontiers by December 1, or else the colony would cease to pay for it.⁶² It was not only in the House of Burgesses that criticism of the expedition was widespread. Within the army itself officers began to complain sharply about the progress of the campaign.⁶³

On November 6 Governor Denny received a depressing letter from General Forbes, still encamped at Raystown, detailing the misfortunes of the expedition, recommending steps that the colony should take to garrison the frontier over the winter, and suggesting that Pennsylvania should provide 1,200 men for garrison duty. Dismayed, Denny called the Assembly to meet on November 15. He informed them that "the advanced Season and late heavy Rains render it doubtful whether the General will

⁶¹ Gov. Fauquier to George Washington, September 16, 1758, *Fauquier Papers*, 1:72-73; Gov. Fauquier to the Board of Trade, September 23, 1758, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol.1329) 12:66.

⁶² Fauquier managed to persuade the House to extend this date to January 1. Gov. Fauquier to George Washington, November 4, 1758, November 12, 1758, Reese, ed., *Papers of Francis Fauquier*, 1:99-100, 104-105.

⁶³ Nothing revealed the low morale in the army more than the continual bickering amongst the officers. Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, October 28, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:588-589.

be able to accomplish the Reduction of Fort Duquesne this Campaign." The Assembly was apprehensive at the news and pondered what they should do.⁶⁴

On November 11 Bouquet called his leading officers to a council of war at Loyalhanna.⁶⁵ The council faced the decision of whether the army should continue towards Fort Duquesne or set about fortifying and securing its position for an assault the following spring. The council weighed the advantages of taking the fort, "justifying the expenses of the expedition and the hopes of our Colonies who, ignorant of the difficulties of the enterprise involves, regard the Fort as a very easy objective," against the risks involved, especially losing the ordnance in the bad weather and running out of provisions. The council decided that "the risks being so obviously greater than the advantages, there is no doubt as to the sole course that prudence dictates;" the expedition should halt. General Forbes, however, was eager to press on. Guides had informed him that the route from Loyalhanna to Fort Duquesne was easier after the first few miles, and he ordered

⁶⁴ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:224-225; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:959.

⁶⁵ The British had renamed Loyalhanna Pittsburgh, until the capture of Fort Duquesne. The fort was known more widely as Fort Ligonier.

Bouquet to send a party of scouts towards Fort Duquesne to investigate the terrain.⁶⁶

Meanwhile the French viewed their circumstances in a rather different light. Following Grant's defeat outside the fort, most of the Ohio Indians, feeling that the British would not dare attack again, "retired to hunt." With the approach of winter, dangerously short of supplies, and believing that "Fort Duquesne is safe for this autumn and winter, and that the enemy will also think of going into winter quarters, and content themselves with preserving their new establishment," the French sent many of their regular troops and Louisiana militia who had been garrisoning the fort to Illinois where there was an abundance of provisions. Fort Duquesne lay dangerously exposed.⁶⁷

Forbes' advance, albeit painfully slow, also strengthened the hand of Pennsylvania as the colony negotiated with the Delawares. Following the meeting at Easton in the fall of 1757, Teedyuscung had promised to spread the news of the negotiations to the Ohio Indians. Almost immediately, he sent a belt of wampum inviting them to peace talks. In January 1758 Teedyuscung came before the Pennsylvania Council to ask them to ensure that he had sufficient supplies and gift to

⁶⁶ Council of War, November 11, 1758, Gen. Forbes to Henry Bouquet, November 22, 1758, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:600-601, 606-607.

⁶⁷ Montcalm to Marshal de Belle Isle, November 15, 1758, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:900-901.

bring the Ohio Indians into the peace process. He begged them "to enable me to make the Fire that was kindled at Easton blaze up high, that it may be better seen by all the Indians, and that they may be brought to join in this good Work, which will be attended with Expençe." However, the Ohio Indians never received Teedyuscung's "Peace Belt," for the Iroquois halted its progress. The Iroquois feared that if Teedyuscung was able to place himself at the head of a confederation of Susquehanna and Ohio Delawares seeking peace, they would be unable to reassert their overlordship over the Delawares. They detained the belt for almost a year in Iroquoia and halted its progress again in Secaughkung, a Delaware town under strong Iroquois influence.⁶⁸

Denny and the Susquehanna Delawares were also concerned that, as the southern Indians became involved in the conflict, they might endanger the peace process on the Susquehanna by attacking the Susquehanna Delawares. They were not alone. In early June the Cherokees sent a messenger to inform the Delawares about their support for the English and requesting that they keep away from the Ohio in order to avoid any misunderstanding. The Cherokee messenger fell dangerously ill in Philadelphia. Denny thus decided to dispatch Moravian

⁶⁸ Minutes of the Treaty at Easton, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 7:305; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:705-708, 713-714, 8:9-10, 200; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:863-864.

missionary, Frederick Christian Post, to carry the message to Teedyuscung and the Susquehanna Delawares.⁶⁹

At Wyoming, Post discovered that several Ohio Delawares, Newcommen, Kustuloga, and Pisquitomen, had come to speak to their Susquehanna brethren to find out if the rumors of peace negotiations were true. The presence of Pisquitomen was especially encouraging to the Pennsylvanians because he was the brother of the Beaver and Shingas, the two most feared leaders of the Ohio Delawares.⁷⁰

Post immediately informed Denny and the Council of their presence and their desire to know more about the negotiations between Pennsylvania and the Delawares. Denny and the Council decided to send Post to the Ohio to ascertain what the stance of the Ohio Indians was, and to encourage them to become involved in the peace process. General Forbes, who had been kept informed of Post's missions, also wanted Post to discover from the Ohio Indians the strength of French forces on the Ohio in order that he might plan his assault accordingly.⁷¹

⁶⁹ "Report of Charles Thompson and Christian Frederick Post," June 1758, "Journal of Frederick Post," June 1758, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:49-51, 52; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser 2:932-938; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:135-137.

⁷⁰ Gen. Forbes to Henry Bouquet, August 9, 1758, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:306n. 344-345; Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, p.385.

⁷¹ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:187; Gen. Forbes to Henry Bouquet, July 20, 1758, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:232; Gen. Forbes to Henry Bouquet, August 9, 1758, James, ed., *Writings of General John Forbes*, p.170-171; Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, p.384.

Post set out from Philadelphia on July 15. In less than a month he had arrived at the Ohio Delaware town of Kuskusky. There Post conferred with many of the leaders of the Ohio Indians, including Shingas and the Beaver. The Ohio Indians claimed that they now "long[ed] for that peace and Friendship [which] we had formerly." Post informed them that the English, for their part, "assure you of our love towards you," and added that "the great king of England does not incline to have war with the Indians; but he wants to live in peace and love with them, if they will lay down the hatchet, and leave off war against him."⁷²

The Ohio Indians assured Post that "all the Indians" on the Ohio wanted peace "and have desired us. . . if we see the English incline a peace, to hold it fast." However, seeking peace with the British was difficult, for the Ohio Indians retained deep doubts about British sincerity. Many still believed that the British planned "to drive us away, and settle the country; or else, why do you come to fight in the land that God has given us?" They asked "why do not you and

⁷² Post was fortunate that upon his arrival he fell in with a group of Delawares prepared to risk their own lives to protect his, as they did on several occasions. The most notable of these rescues occurred while visiting an Indian town near Fort Duquesne, when the French demanded that the Indians turn him over so they could "blind his eyes, and lead him into the fort." But his companions protected him and smuggled him out of the town. "The Journal of Christian Frederick Post," Reuben Golf Thwaites, ed., *Early Western Travels, 1748-1846*, 13 Vols (Cleveland, Ohio: Arthur H. Clark, 1904-1907), 1:185, 193, 198-199, 202-203, 205, 207. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:188.

the French fight in the old country, and on the sea? Why do you come to fight on our land? This makes every body believe, you want to take the land from us by force, and settle it."⁷³

Despite these fears the Ohio Indians had little choice but to seek peace, for the war had destroyed their trade patterns. The Indians boasted that "they get a great deal of goods from the French; and that the French cloath the Indians every year. . . and give them as much powder and lead as they want."⁷⁴ But as the French depleted their supplies they could not continue to supply the Indians. By the fall of 1758 food, clothing, and weapons were scarce on the Ohio. In addition, the Ohio Indians were well aware that a large army was marching towards them. Post could not persuade them to send aid to the British, as Forbes had hoped, nor would they send a large deputation to the negotiations at Easton. But they did agree to send Pisquitomen with Post to attend the treaty at Easton and asked that they should return with news of the negotiations.⁷⁵

Denny and the Councilors arrived in Easton on the morning of October 7. The throng in the town was impressive. There were six Councilors and eight Assemblymen in attendance, along with several representatives of the Friendly Association.

⁷³ "Post's Journal," Thwaites ed., *Early Western Travels*, 1:198-199, 213-214.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 1:195.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 1:224-225.

George Croghan, Conrad Weiser, and Henry Montour acted as interpreters. There were over five hundred Indians present, representing several Indian tribes: the Iroquois, Nanticokes, Delawares, and Minisinks.⁷⁶

The meeting faced the problem of reconciling three conflicting aims: the Iroquois sought to recover their lordship over the Delawares; the Susquehanna Delawares sought guarantees of their tribal territory from encroachment by anyone; and the Ohio Indians desired peace with a guarantee that the English would not settle their lands. The unfolding of the meeting reflected the shifting power balance in Pennsylvania. As Forbes pressed farther west and the French exhausted their supplies, Teedyuscung and the Susquehanna Delawares discovered that their negotiating position had grown weaker.

Before the proceedings officially convened, the Indians spent two days in private council "deliberating on Matters necessary to be adjusted before the meeting." According to Charles Thomson, "the Subject in Debate these two Days, [was] Whether what Teedyuscung has done shall stand, or they are to begin anew." However, in "warm" debates "Teedyuscung, and his

⁷⁶ The Assembly appointed Norris, Fox, Hughes, Roberdau, Galloway, Masters, Strickland & Gibbons, to attend the Treaty at Easton as their representatives. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:170, 175-176; Charles Thomson to Benjamin Franklin, December 10, 1758, Labaree, ed., *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, 8:200.

People, absolutely refuse[d] to retract any Thing they have said."⁷⁷

Teedyuscung opened the conference simply and briefly on the afternoon of October 11. He informed the delegates merely: "I sit by only to hear and see what you have to say to one another, for I have said what I have to say to the Governor of Pennsylvania who sits here; he knows what has passed between us. I have made known to him the Reason why I struck him." Governor Denny then informed the council that Teedyuscung had informed them "that the Cause of the War was, their foolish Young Men had been perswaded by the Falsehearted French King to strike their Brethren, the English; and one Reason why the Blow came harder was, that the Proprietaries of this Province had taken [land] from them, by Fraud."⁷⁸

The Iroquois, however, refused to listen to Teedyuscung and questioned his authority to speak for the Delawares. Nihas, a Mohawk, informed the council that the Iroquois desired "some private discourse about our Nephew, Teedyuscung." Nihas added, "You all know that he gives out he is a great Man, and Chief of Ten Nations. . . Now I, on behalf of the Mohawks, say we do not know he is such a great Man. If he is such a great man we desire to know who made him so."

⁷⁷ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:178; Charles Thomson to Benjamin Franklin, December 10, 1758, Labaree, ed., *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, 8:201.

⁷⁸ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:180, 186.

Representatives of all the Iroquois nations then rose and repeated Nihas's question.⁷⁹

Denny told the Iroquois that "after the Delawares had Struck us, you. . . advised them to sit still and do us no more mischief; and that soon after this we invited the Delawares to meet us. . . We received an Answer to our Message from Teedyuscung." Denny pointed out that Teedyuscung had claimed to represent the "Ten Nations" which included the Iroquois, but while he had acted as "Chief Man" for the Delawares, he had claimed only to be "a Messenger" for the Iroquois. He added that he "never made Teedyuscung this great Man, nor did I ever pretend to give him any Authority over you; and I must do him Justice to declare to you that at our former publick Treaties Teedyuscung never assumed any such Power; but on many Occasions when he spoke of you called you his Uncles and Superiors."⁸⁰

Denny now turned the tables on the Iroquois. He pushed them to explain their reasons for the war, especially the reasons that some Iroquois warriors had participated in the attacks on the Pennsylvania frontier. This demand placed the Iroquois in an awkward predicament. When they replied, Thomson commented that "they gave us a Specimen of their Finesse in Politics." The Iroquois informed the Pennsylvanians that they "disclaimed all Concern in it [the

⁷⁹ Ibid., 8:190-192.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 8:192, 193.

war], and declared that it was not done by the Advice or Consent of the Public Council of the Nations, tho' they frankly owned some of their young Men had been concerned in it." They would let their warriors explain their involvement.⁸¹ The warriors, for their part, tried to blame the English for the war, claiming "that you gave the first Offence." They claimed that the principal cause was the arrest of several Shawnees, which had distressed the Ohio Indians and had provided propoganda for French use. Then the Virginians had attacked some Seneca warriors traveling through the colony in 1755 causing many Senecas to join the French. Finally, they added, when the French first came to the Ohio, the Indians had appealed to Virginia and Pennsylvania for aid, "but these Governors did not attend to our Message." As a result, the French moved to the Ohio, "and you neither coming yourselves, nor assisting us with Warlike Stores. . . we were obliged to Trade with them for what we Wanted, as your Traders had left the Country. The Governor of Virginia took care to settle our Lands for his own Benefit; but when we wanted his assistance against the French, he disregarded us."⁸²

Denny had seemingly supported Teedyuscung on the issue of his authority to speak for the Delawares, but when, after ten days of negotiations, the delegates finally began to consider

⁸¹ Charles Thomson to Benjamin Franklin, December 10, 1758, Labaree, ed., *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, 8:207.

⁸² *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:197-198.

the question of land, his support evaporated. Thomas King, an Oneida, reminded the Pennsylvanians that they had bought a huge tract of land at Albany extending from the Mouth of Penn's Creek to the Ohio. The proprietors' agents had only paid for a part of the area. King informed the Pennsylvanians that "the other Part that we have not received Payment for, that we re-claim." He explained that "Our Warriors or Hunters, when they heard that we had sold such a Large Tract of Land, disapproved our Conduct in Council, so now we acquaint you that we are determined not to confirm any more, than such of the Lands as the Consideration was paid for."⁸³

The Iroquois sought to reclaim all lands which Pennsylvanians had not settled in 1754, but Weiser and Peters pressured them to reclaim only lands west of the Alleghenies, a much smaller area. Reluctantly, the Iroquois agreed. The Penns had already given Peters permission to release most of the lands purchased at Albany, and on October 24 Peters and Weiser formally released to the Iroquois lands to the west of the Alleghenies.⁸⁴

⁸³ Charles Thomson commented at this statement, "You see by Tomas King's Speech, that what was conjectured in the Enquiry relating to the Purchase of 1754, was not groundless, and that that Purchase was one main Cause of the War." *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:199; Charles Thomson to Benjamin Franklin, December 10, 1758, Labaree, ed., *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, 8:207.

⁸⁴ Charles Thomson to Benjamin Franklin, December 10, 1758, Labaree, ed., *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, 8:210-211; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:218-219.

Returning the land acquired at Albany was a tacit acceptance of Iroquois lordship over the Delawares, for the land included most of the Delawares' land. Teedyuscung realized that the Pennsylvanians and Iroquois had outmaneuvered him and made a new attempt to secure the Delawares' lands. He informed the conference: "I did let you know formerly what my Grievance was. I told you that from Tohicon, as far as the Delawares owned, the Proprietors had wronged me. Then you and I agreed that it should be laid before the King of England, and Likewise you told me you would let me know as soon as ever he saw it." He then pleaded, "Let us not alter what you and I have agreed. Let me know if King George had decided the Matter between you and me."⁸⁵

Teedyuscung attempted to woo the Iroquois by admitting that "All Lands lying on the Waters that fall into the Susquehannah belong to our Uncles." But he then rebuked them, reminding them "that you have placed us at Wioming and Shamokin. . . Now I hear that you have sold that Land to our brethren the English." In final desperation he pressed the Iroquois to provide the Delawares with a deed for that land at Wyoming and a guarantee that the Delawares would be able to remain there.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Significantly Teedyuscung's claim still included much more land than the Proprietors had acquired in the Walking Purchase alone. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:201.

⁸⁶ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:201, 203.

Teedyuscung may have hoped for support from Denny on the issue, but Denny washed his hands of it. He merely informed the Iroquois that "there is an old agreement between the Proprietaries and you, that you will not sell any of the Lands lying within this Province to any but them, and they never take Possession of Lands till they have bought them of the Indians. You know, also, that the United Nations have sold Lands to the Proprietaries which your Nephews, the Delawares now claim as their Right." Denny then went to the heart of the problem: "The Proprietaries are desirous to do Strict Justice to all Indians, but it cannot be supposed they can know in which of you the Right was vested." He then dismissed the matter, simply saying that "it is a matter that must be settled among yourselves."⁸⁷

On October 21 the Iroquois and Delawares again met face to face. Several Quakers attended "at this particular Request of the Delawares." Teedyuscung addressed the Iroquois for the last time. He informed them that "We have gone so far at this Treaty, as to talk of Lands; I, therefore, thought proper to meet you here, to let you know that I have consulted with all my Brethren, your Cousins, here present, about the Deed you, our Uncles, signed, to the Proprietaries of Pennsylvania, shewn to us Yesterday, for the Lands beyond the Kittocktinny Hills. We have seen the Deed, and know it well. . . We give it up, and now confirm it. . . This is not the Land I have

⁸⁷ Ibid., 8:204, 205.

disputed with my Brethren, the English. That Land lies between Tohiccon Creek and the Kittochtinny Hills."⁸⁸

Teedyuscung had realized that the Pennsylvanians were determined to hand over control of the land at Wyoming to the Iroquois, not to the Delawares. He would have to press the Iroquois, not the Pennsylvanians, to guarantee that land. There was still the issue of lands on the Delaware, most of which the proprietors had acquired in the Walking Purchase. The Pennsylvanians controlled those and had not receded them to the Iroquois. The fraud at issue with the Walking Purchase was not that they had acquired lands from the Iroquois, which seemed a difficult issue to argue in light of the agreement between Pennsylvania and the Iroquois, but that the Pennsylvanians had counterfeited the deed. Teedyuscung, perhaps encouraged by the Quakers, hoped that he might at least get compensation for those lands. Israel Pemberton commented to Franklin that "Teedyuscung confirmed the Purchase of 1749; his Motives for this Confirmation, were to engage the Six Nations to confirm the Wyoming Lands to him and his People; but such Measures were pursued by our proprietary Managers, to prevent it, and to set the Indians at variance with each other, that all our Arguments, Persuasions and

⁸⁸ Ibid., 8:211-212.

Presents were scarce sufficient to keep them from an open Rupture."⁸⁹

It was not until the end of the conference that the Iroquois finally addressed Teedyuscung's claim for a deed to the lands at Wyoming. Pemberton commented to Franklin "The Business was shamefully delayed from Day to Day. . . it [is] well known to us who attended, that the Time was spent in attempting Teedyuscung's Downfal, and silencing or contracting the Complaints he had made."⁹⁰ Finally, Thomas King, an Oneida, addressed the Delawares. Teedyuscung himself, perhaps knowing what King intended to say, was not present. King simply informed the Delawares that "Teedyuscung desired us to make you the Owners of the Lands at Wioming, Shamokin, and other places on the Susquehannah River; in answer to which, we, who are present, say that we have no power to convey Lands to any one." King would promise only that they would take Teedyuscung's "Request to the great Council Fire for their Sentiments. . . in the mean time you may make use of those Lands in Conjunction with our People, and all the rest of our Relations."⁹¹

⁸⁹ Israel Pemberton to Benjamin Franklin, December 11, 1758, Labaree, ed., *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, 8:211-212.

⁹⁰ Israel Pemberton to Benjamin Franklin, December 11, 1758, Labaree, ed., *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, 8:212.

⁹¹ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:221.

Teedyuscung had lost his struggle. The Pennsylvanians, as victory on the Ohio loomed, were loath to abandon their traditional understanding with the Iroquois. Indeed, they mostly remained unaware that giving the land back to the Iroquois meant the Delawares' subjection to the Iroquois and the forfeiture of Delaware lands. While the agreement to cede to the Iroquois the lands west of the Alleghenies laid the foundation for the Proclamation Line of 1763, it was not a victory for Indians generally, but a victory for one particularly self-interested group, the Iroquois, and a terrible defeat for the Delawares. After three years of war the Delawares had gained nothing.

As the delegates prepared to leave Easton, Forbes was preparing for his final assault on Fort Duquesne. On November 20 Bouquet set out with a large party from Loyalhanna towards the French fort. When de Ligneris, the French commander, discovered that the British intended to attack the fort he realized that his weakened garrison would be unable to resist and prepared to evacuate and destroy the fort to prevent it from falling into English hands. On the evening of November 24 scouts from Bouquet's column reported that "they had discovered a very thick smoak from the Fort extending in the bottom along the Ohio." The following morning advance units

of Forbes' expedition came in sight of the fort. They found it burned to the ground.⁹²

Washington predicted to Governor Fauquier that "the unexpected success of our Arms, will be attended with happy effects. The Delawares are suing for Peace; and I doubt not that other Tribes on the Ohio will follow their example."⁹³ The *Pennsylvania Gazette* informed its readers "Blessed be God, the long look'd for Day is arrived, that has now fixed us. . . in the quiet and peaceable Possession of the finest and most fertile Country of America." It continued that the conquest of the Ohio "lays open to all his Majesty's Subjects a Vein of Treasure."⁹⁴

While the *Pennsylvania Gazette* celebrated the victory of British arms, its report revealed underlying contradictions in British and Pennsylvania policy. The *Gazette* had promised readers that Pennsylvania was now in "Possession" of the Ohio for "all his Majesty's Subjects." But at the same time the Pennsylvanians had promised the Iroquois and the Ohio Delawares that they had no intention of expanding British settlement into Indian lands.

⁹² Henry Bouquet to John Stanwix, November 25, 1758, Henry Bouquet to William Allen, November 25, 1758, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:609, 610; M. Daine to Marshall de Belle Isle, November 3, 1758, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:884-885.

⁹³ George Washington to Gov. Fauquier, November 28, 1758, Reese, ed., *Papers of Francis Fauquier*, 1:115-116.

⁹⁴ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, December 14, 1758.

Chapter VII

"And Some Drink Bumbo": The Failure of the War Effort

*But Soldiers differ; some will shed their Blood,
And some drink Bumbo--for their Country's Good.
Some in the Field will nobly risque their Lives;
Some Hero Like, will swear, or play at Fives.
Some shew themselves the genuine Sons of Mars;
Some brave in Venus' or in Bacchus' Wars
Can shew their letcherous and drunken Scars.
-- The "Virginia Centinel," 1756¹*

In every battle between regular troops fought on the frontier between the French and their Indian allies on one side, and the British and their colonists on the other, the French routed the British: at Washington's surrender at Fort Necessity in 1754, at Braddock's defeat on the Monongahela in 1755, and again at Grant's defeat outside Fort Duquesne in October 1758. Frontier raids paralysed Virginia and Pennsylvania. Both colonies focused their military and economic strength on the defense of the frontier and did not contribute to the war farther north. Each colony surpassed the population and economic production of New France. But even though the French committed only a small portion of their available resources to the Ohio theater, never posting more than a few hundred men on the Ohio, Virginia and Pennsylvania

¹ *Maryland Gazette*, November 25, 1756

found it all but impossible to halt the raids. The war on the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier, despite its outcome, was an outstanding success for the French and a disaster for the British.

The military failure created an upsurge of opposition in Virginia and Pennsylvania to the conduct of the war. In the summer of 1755, despite Braddock's defeat, Virginians had taken pride in the newly created Virginia Regiment, referring to them as "our Brave Blues."² However, during the fall and winter of 1755, as the raiders devastated the colony's frontiers, Virginians expressed doubts about the regiment's capabilities. Many claimed that "the greatest Immoralities," the spread of "Gaming, drinking, swearing, and irregularities of every other kind," had enfeebled the troops. Outraged at the criticism of his regiment, Washington informed Dinwiddie that if the attacks continued he would consider resigning his commission. Only after assurances from Landon Carter that the critics had not directed their slights at him, and that his resignation would only serve their wishes, did Washington agree to retain command.³

² John Martin to George Washington, August 30, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:11-12.

³ Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, April 8, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:381; John Robinson to George Washington, April 17, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 17, 1756, George Washington to John Robinson, [c. April 18, 1756], Landon Carter to George Washington, April 21, 1756, George Washington (continued...)

The attacks did continue. In the fall of 1756 the *Virginia Gazette* published a still more stinging rebuke of the regiment. The "Virginia Centinel" reprov'd all aspects of the regiment's conduct. The Centinel continued to attack the regiment's morality, but also attacked its military prowess. The commentary claimed that the regiment had done little more than hide "skulking in Forts, and there dissolving in Pleasure, till alarmed by the Approach of the Enemy." It continued, "instead of searching out the Enemy, waylaying and surprising them, obstructing their Marches, and preventing their Incursions," the troops merely "tempt them by their Security and Laziness, to come in Quest of them, and attack them in their Fortifications." It concluded by asking readers "what useless Lumber, what an Incumbrance, is the Soldiery?"⁴

This attack on their honor horrified the regiment's officers who threatened to resign en masse, "no longer to serve a Country that is guilty of the basest Ingratitude to a Sett of Men who have made it their Study to defend & protect it at all Times." They insisted that "Nothing less will be suffic[ien]t than the Thanks of the Assembly in the publick prints for what We have already done." The House had adjourned before it could consider their complaint. However,

³(...continued)
to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 22, 1756, Landon Carter to George Washington, April 22, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:12, 13-14, 15-16, 30-31, 33-34, 36-37.

⁴ *Virginia Gazette*, September 3, 1756.

the Speaker, John Robinson, wrote a soothing letter denouncing the Centinel as "a vile and Ignorant Scribler," and reminding the officers "of what fatal Consequence to your Country your resigning the Command at this time may be."⁵

Pennsylvanians expressed a similar dissatisfaction with the performance of the Pennsylvania Regiment, although the attacks were less severe because the colony had no claim to a military heritage. In the summer of 1756 rumors circulated in Philadelphia of rampant immorality in the regiment. The regiment's detractors maintained that the three hundred men garrisoning Fort Augusta had over one hundred women in camp to serve their every need.⁶ Rumors of immorality grew into criticism of the regiment's military performance in the fall of 1757, when the Assembly censured the regiment for its failure to protect the frontier. The Assembly claimed that "our Frontier Inhabitants have received so little Protection from the Provincial Forces, under their present Management, that. . . they are obliged to keep Watch, for the Defence of their Lives and Properties, at their own Expence." John Armstrong, one of the regiment's commanders, denounced the rebuke, claiming that it was "so unjust and Severe, as not to

⁵ John Kirkpatrick to George Washington, September 22, 1756, William Ramsay to George Washington, September 22, 1756, William Peachey et al. to Washington, November 12 1756, John Robinson to Washington, November 16, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:409-411, 412-413, 4:18-20, 28-29.

⁶ Peter Burd to Governor Morris, August 8, 1756, H.S.P., Gratz Collection, Case 15, Box 18.

be pass'd with Silence, for which reason I have on behalf of my Officers & Soldiers under my Command Sent to the Press a Modest Vindication from the unnatural Charge of the As---y."⁷

The colonies' military failure stemmed from several sources. The task faced by the colonial military commanders, George Washington, and initially Conrad Weiser, William Clapham, and John Armstrong in Pennsylvania, was all but impossible. The inhabitants expected the provincial forces, of only a few hundred men, to protect settlers on an exposed frontier several hundred miles long. In the fall and winter of 1755 raiding parties struck at will. After the construction of a chain of frontier posts, the task became more demanding. But the raiders could bypass the forts with little difficulty to reach isolated plantations or straggling travelers. To combat the problem, Washington suggested evacuating the settlers into fortified townships where the regiment could guard them, only allowing them to work on their plantations in large groups protected by military detachments. Edward Shippen proposed a similar solution in Pennsylvania. But such proposals were totally unacceptable to the backcountry inhabitants.⁸

⁷ John Armstrong to James Burd, September 13, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 8th Ser., 6:4612.

⁸ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, [April 7, 1756], Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:333-334; Edward Shippen to William Allen, July 4, 1755, *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:459.

The task of the Pennsylvania Regiment was additionally hampered because the Assembly vested substantial control of the force in the hands of the provincial commissioners who provided the regiment with its money and supplies. The commissioners used this power in an attempt to influence various military decisions. But, the titular head of the regiment was the governor. Split into three separate battalions, with command divided between the governor and the commissioners, the Pennsylvania Regiment lacked central command.

Not only was the task of protecting the frontier all but impossible, but both Virginia's and Pennsylvania's forces were ill-equipped to fight in the backcountry and on the frontier. Despite the myth of the colonial backwoodsman as a skilled rifleman, tracker, and hunter, the colonial forces were poorly prepared to fight in the backwoods. Dinwiddie informed Whitehall in the fall of 1755 that "neither the Regulars or Provincials are accustom'd to fight'g in the Method that the Ind's do." Both Dinwiddie and Washington felt that "Indians are only a match for Indians: and without these we shall ever fight upon unequal terms."⁹ Only after the Virginians had gained the support of a substantial number of Cherokees and other southern Indian allies who could threaten the Ohio

⁹ Gov. Dinwiddie to Thomas Robinson, November 15, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:267; George Washington to John Robinson, April 7, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:338.

Indians' towns, and the French had exhausted their supplies, did the task of raiding the frontier become demanding for the French and their Indian allies.

Virginians had expected the colony's militia to form the backbone of its defense. The militia was ill-equipped for such a task. Eighteenth-century militia musters had become social events rather than opportunities for inculcating military discipline. Dinwiddie had hoped that as soon as the alarm was raised he could muster the militia to repulse the attackers. But the militia was so slow to assemble that the attackers had moved elsewhere by the time it was ready. The militia was untrained, unarmed, and poorly led. Lacking insight into the principles of war and military discipline, militia commanders were unwilling to take any initiative without direct advice. Fewer than half the militia who mustered carried arms. Those who carried arms had weapons of different bores, making the provision of ammunition all but impossible. Instead of ranging stealthily through the woods in an attempt to intercept the enemy, they would dash "hooping" and "halloeing" warning any nearby raiders of their presence.¹⁰

¹⁰ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, November 9, 1756, George Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:1, 87; Gov. Dinwiddie to the Board of Trade, February 23, 1756, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1328) 11:1048.

More alarming than the militia's unreadiness was its refusal to serve. On occasion when raiders devastated the backcountry, the militia refused to muster. During the first major raid on the Virginia frontier in October 1755, one commander refused to summon his troops, maintaining "that his Wife, Family and Corn were at Stake, so were those of his Soldiers, therefore it was not possible for him to come." In the spring of 1756 Washington posted the militia from Louisa and Stafford counties at two forts on the South Branch. When the militia heard that a raiding party was nearby, "all the Militia. . . save 6 of the first & 8 of the latter deserted."¹¹

When the militia did muster, it neither hurried to its station nor remained in service for any length of time. In the summer of 1755 it took one detachment twenty-two days to march six miles. As the militia expected to be on duty for only one month at a time when the men arrived at their post, they felt that they had served long enough and would disband. In May 1756 Dinwiddie called up the northern Virginia militia to defend Frederick and Hampshire counties against an intense Indian attack. Many of the men deserted en route. The few who arrived at their post refused to serve any longer, claiming that they had done their duty merely by marching to

¹¹ "Memorandum respecting the Militia," May 17, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:145; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:239.

the frontier. On several occasions entire militia companies decided that they had served a sufficient time and abandoned their posts, leaving important positions unmanned.¹²

The militia also habitually refused to leave their home county. The Frederick County militia refused to march into Hampshire County, even though raiders were passing through Hampshire to get to Frederick. The House of Burgesses increased this difficulty by specifying that the militia could not march more than five miles beyond the furthest settled part of the colony, a restriction that prevented the militia from garrisoning the advanced frontier posts.¹³

The militia officers were the source of many other problems. The militia elected their officers, and as a result the officers were reluctant to execute an order which might prove unpopular. As the election of an officer was more a reflection of social status than military prowess, militia officers were especially sensitive about their rank, and

¹² McIlwaine, ed., *Journal of the House of Burgesses, 1752-1755, 1756-1758*, pp.161, 449; Gov. Dinwiddie to Lieutenant William Wright, July 8, 1755, Brock ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:92; "Memorandum respecting the Militia," May 7, 12, 13, 17, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 10, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, November 9, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:97, 119, 122, 145-146, 432-433, 4:1.

¹³ The House of Burgesses also specified that the militia of Norfolk and Williamsburg did not have to serve outside their corporations' limits. Adam Stephen to George Washington, October 4, 1755, Washington to Thomas, Lord Fairfax, August 29, 1756, Abbot & Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:72-73, 3:380-381; Henning, *Statutes*, 6:541, 548.

Washington complained several times that "every petty Person must assume Command, direct and advise."¹⁴ Even the ranks were conscious of their status. When Washington attempted to use the militia to construct defenses at frontier posts, the men refused to do such service unless they received additional pay. On occasion, even when offered additional pay, they still refused to lower themselves to such menial service.¹⁵

Many of the militia officers saw their commission more as an opportunity for profit than as a service for their country. They presented the House of Burgesses with inflated accounts of their costs and requested pay for more men than had served, pocketing the difference. They also aided their friends and neighbors when impressing provisions by leaving the valuation to their "ignorant and indifferent neighbours. . . [who] exact high prices."¹⁶

Most troublesome was the tendency for the militia's recalcitrance to spread to units of the Virginia Regiment with

¹⁴ Gov. Dinwiddie to Maj. Andrew Lewis, December 23, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:569; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, November 9, 1756, George Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:2, 87.

¹⁵ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 10, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 26, 1757, George Washington to John Stanwix, June 28, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:430, 4:264-266, 4:269-271.

¹⁶ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, November 9, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:2; Gov. Dinwiddie to Captain Hogg, November 1, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:537.

whom they were posted. Sensing this, in the spring of 1756, Dinwiddie purposefully countermanded an order to assemble the militia alongside provincial troops in Winchester, fearing they would "be a bad Example" to the regiment.¹⁷

As a result of the militia's failure, Virginia created a permanent professional military establishment, the Virginia Regiment. Pennsylvania also resorted to the formation of a permanent military establishment, the Pennsylvania Regiment, because the colony had no militia to defend it and the Assembly and Governor were unable to agree on the terms for the creation of a provincial militia.

The creation of these professional military units created new obstacles, particularly the difficulty of persuading men to enlist. In Virginia in the fall of 1755 it took the officers three months to recruit only five hundred men, half the required number. Officers needed to obtain a specific number of recruits before the governor confirmed their commissions.¹⁸ This had unforeseen consequences. Some officers created phantom companies. Dinwiddie complained about companies supposedly at full-strength but actually

¹⁷ Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, May 27, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:422-423; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, May 23, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:171.

¹⁸ Captain's were required to recruit thirty men, Lieutenants eighteen, and ensigns twelve. "General Instructions for Recruiting," September 1-3, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:13; Gov. Dinwiddie to Gen. Shirley, January 24, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:328-331.

short-handed. In November 1756 Washington informed Dinwiddie of his suspicions that many officers had produced "a list. . . of sundry persons who are willing to serve under them, one part of those, it is said, are fictitious names another, the names of persons who never saw the list and the remainder are persons drawn into it by fallacious promises." Several officers informed potential recruits that they would serve only until the end of the war, which might come within a few months. When the war showed no sign of ending the men grew restless. Washington connived in such practices and dismissed them as "nothing more than one of those little subterfuges which, from the disagreeable nature of the Recruiting service, has, at some junctures been considered necessary." Other officers coerced men to enlist. The most infamous case was that of Denis McCarty who was discovered "forcibly taking, confining and torturing those, who would not voluntarily enlist."¹⁹

These practices increased the poor reputation of the regiment and made men less likely to enlist voluntarily. To alleviate this problem, both colonies eventually permitted the recruitment of indentured servants, who soon comprised a

¹⁹ Gov. Dinwiddie to the Captains of the Virginia Forces, August 25, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:177; George Washington to Denis McCarty, [November 22, 1755], George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, November 9, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Sharpe, July 20, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:176, 4:4, 319.

substantial proportion of the recruits.²⁰ In December 1756 Dinwiddie reported that over 200 indentured servants had enlisted in the Virginia Regiment. The number in the Pennsylvania Regiment was much higher. However, recruiting indentured servants alone could not meet the need for recruits. So great was the demand that Virginia even allowed free blacks to enlist and serve alongside whites. By the end of the war Virginia authorities even resorted to purchasing convicts from Britain to complete their quotas. The demand for recruits forced the House of Burgesses to move toward drafting men. In 1756 the House passed a law impressing vagrants. But the measure made recruiting more difficult, as Washington explained, "for compelling these abandon'd Miscreants into the Service, who only waited time and opportunity to effect their escape, gave loose to all their

²⁰ In 1755 both colonies had forbidden the recruiting of indentured servants. But as the number of recruits lagged behind requirements the restrictions were abandoned. At first, in early 1756, indentured servants were recruited only to complete the regular regiments, by command of General Shirley. This practice caused many complaints, particularly in Pennsylvania. However, once the Pennsylvania authorities observed how many servants came forward, and their masters were appeased by the payments they received, recruiting of servants was extended to both the Virginia and Pennsylvania forces. George Washington to Robert Stewart, November 18, 1755, George Washington to George Fraser, November 18, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:169, 170; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:37-39, 45; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Ser., 2:582-584.

vicious Principles, and invented the most unheard of storys to palliate Desertion."²¹

Eventually Virginia resorted to drafting single white men from the militia. This task was left to the county lieutenants and justices of the peace and was very unpopular. In Augusta County drafting men prompted a riot in 1756. The justices thereafter found many excuses to avoid the task whenever they could. Dinwiddie attributed the justices' reluctance to the fact that "most of the People are Freeholders, in course [they] have votes for choosing Assembly Men, in w'ch they strenuously insist on their Privileges." However, even when the justices enforced the draft, most men could avoid service by hiring a replacement or paying a £10 fine.²²

²¹ Gov. Dinwiddie to the Board of Trade, February 23, 1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to John McNeil, December 25, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:339, 571; Francis Fauquier to the Board of Trade, August 2, 1759, Boehm ed., *British Public Record Office, Class 5 Files, Part 1, Westward Expansion*, (Vol. 1329) 12:94-95; Peter Hog to George Washington, November 29, 1755, George Washington to Peter Hog, December 27, 1755, George Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:188, 236, 4:79-81.

²² "Account of William Preston with the Assembly," July-November, 1755, Preston Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, 164; Edmund Pendleton letter, May 12, 1756, "Council of War of Officers of Militia of Augusta County," May 20, 1756, Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, University of Wisconsin, 100:126-128, 130; H.R. McIlwaine, ed., *Journal of the House of Burgesses, 1752-1755, 1756-1758*, 381; Gov. Dinwiddie to Lord Loudoun, October 28, 1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to Col. Fontaine, August 24, 1757, Gov. Dinwiddie to Col. Bland, August 24, 1757, Brock ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:532, 687, 688; Gov. Dinwiddie to the Board of
(continued...)

Civil officers resorted to nefarious means to get men into the regiment. Butts Roberts of Lancaster County, for example, had traveled to Maryland upon business. When he returned, he discovered that the justices had drafted him in his absence. In other cases justices coerced militia deserters to enlist in return for a pardon for their desertion.²³ Finally, the justices resorted to drafting those who had little voice in the community and whose presence would not be missed, the "dregs" of society, particularly the landless and recent immigrants. Indeed, the House of Burgesses ordered the justices to draft all men

found loitering and neglecting to labor for reasonable wages; all who run from their habitations, leaving wives or children without suitable means for their subsistence, and all other idle, vagrant, or dissolute persons, wandering abroad without betaking themselves to some lawful employment.²⁴

Half the men who served in the Virginia Regiment were born in Britain or Europe, and almost half described their pre-enlistment occupation as some manual craft or simply as a "Labourer," an unusual circumstance for an almost exclusively agricultural society. Many of these men from the lowest

²²(...continued)
Trade, February 23, 1756, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1328) 11:1050; Henning, *Statutes*, 6:527, 7:15.

²³ "Orders for the Militia" May 15, 1756, "Memorandum respecting the Militia," May 18, 1756, Robert Carter Nicholas to George Washington, August 18, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:136, 151, 356-357.

²⁴ Henning, *Statutes*, 7:70.

levels of society even volunteered for service, attracted by the exemption from prosecution for civil suits granted to all members of the Virginia Regiment.²⁵

Recruiting was easier in Pennsylvania because the colony had a larger pool of willing recruits. Enlistment appealed, in particular, to indentured servants and to the many recently released servants who had not yet acquired property. To encourage servants to enlist, the colony agreed to recompense masters for their loss from the servants' pay.²⁶ In Pennsylvania, as the war continued and tales spread of the colony's failure to pay its troops and to provide adequate clothing, shelter, and provisions, recruiting became more difficult. In 1757 Daniel Clark spent several weeks in Cumberland County enlisting only eight men, one of whom deserted immediately.²⁷

Not all who enlisted served for long. Desertion was endemic in both colonies' forces. Not all deserters were men seeking freedom from the rigors of military life and returning to their homes: many men enlisted several times, each time

²⁵ William Waller Henning, ed., *Statutes at Large*, 13 Vols. (Richmond, Va.: Published by the state, 1820-1823), 7:31. See Appendix I

²⁶ In 1757 Captain Thomas Lloyd reported recruiting several indentured servants, recompensing their masters up to £14 each. Capt. Lloyd to James Burd, July 26, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; Joseph Shippen, Account Book, 1756, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers: Account Book of Joseph Shippen's Company, 1756.

²⁷ Daniel Clark to James Burd, June 11, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

receiving an enlisting bounty. In 1757 Joseph Shippen complained that he had unwittingly enlisted a man who had used aliases to enlist in several regiments. The recruit had deserted from Captain Shaw's Company of the New Jersey provincials. He then joined Herbert's Regiment of the Royal Americans, then deserted to enlist with another officer in the same regiment from whom he deserted again. Shippen made his discovery too late, for the recruit had already received his bounty and deserted again!²⁸

Other men developed the practice of enlisting in both the Virginia and Pennsylvania Regiments, and then in the Royal Americans. The intense rivalry between the colonial forces aided this practice. On occasion, when an officer discovered that a recruit had previously deserted from another regiment he might still enlist him. So common was the practice of multiple-enlisting that when General Forbes amassed the Pennsylvania, Virginia, and British forces for his attack on Fort Duquesne in the summer of 1758 there was widespread desertion as men feared that their former companions would recognize them. As a result, Forbes offered an amnesty promising that he would not punish men who came forward and agreed to continue in service.²⁹

²⁸ Joseph Shippen letter, June 6, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers: Military Letter Book of Joseph Shippen 1756-1758, ff.59-61.

²⁹ George Washington to Abraham Bosomworth, December 8, 1756, Robert Stewart to George Washington, September 27, 1757, (continued...)

On occasion there were mass desertions, particularly in Virginia. When Dinwiddie assembled the Virginia troops at Fredericksburg for Braddock's campaign in the spring of 1755, the men deserted in droves. The men whom Dunbar left at Fort Cumberland following Braddock's defeat deserted at the rate of ten or twelve per day until there was virtually no garrison remaining.³⁰ In December 1756 Denis McCarty encouraged eighteen men to desert from Fort Loudoun at Winchester, hoping that he could encourage them to enlist under him in the Royal Americans.³¹ The largest mass desertion occurred in the summer of 1757 following the attempt to draught men from the

²⁹(...continued)

Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:45, 423-424; Henry Bouquet to John Forbes, May 29-30, 1758, Donald H. Kent, S.K. Stevens, & Autumn L. Leonard, eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet*, 5 Vols. (Harrisburg, PA., The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1951-1972), 1:389; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 1, 1758.

³⁰ Gov. Dinwiddie to Captains Mercer, Waggener and Stewart, January 15, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Capt. Stewart, January 15, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, August 20, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Henry Fox, August 20, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 1:462, 464, 2:163, 164; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:602.

³¹ McCarty also ensured that the soldiers were aware that as the colony had no mutiny act at the time they could not be punished severely. "Orders" December 3, 4, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, December 4, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, December 10, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, December 17, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:40, 40-41, 48-49, 62-66; Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, December 10, 1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to Dennis McCarty, December 10, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:559-562, 562.

militia into the provincial forces. Within two months almost half the recruits--two hundred men--had deserted.³²

Many of the men headed for Maryland, North Carolina, or Pennsylvania where their recapture was unlikely. Some attempted to reach Fort Duquesne and join the French, while others sought refuge among neighboring Indian tribes. Washington raised road-blocks and sent out parties to intercept them before they reached safety. But, having just escaped from the regiment, the deserters would not allow themselves to be taken without a struggle. In December 1755 a party of deserters assaulted an officer of Peter Hog's company. The officer bettered his opponents and "was Amply revenged by Cutting off the Arm of one." In July 1757, when the guard halted a party of deserters at a road-block near Maidstone, the deserters attacked. One man was killed and several others injured.³³

The Pennsylvania Regiment was also weakened by constant desertion. However, in Pennsylvania the proportion of deserters was smaller than in Virginia. The major reason for

³² George Washington to John Stanwix, July 15, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:306.

³³ Vaudreuil to Antoine Louis Rouille, Count de Jouy, August 8, 1756, Stevens, ed., *Wilderness Chronicles*, pp.93-98; Gov. Dinwiddie to Adam Stephen, October 3, 1755, Gov Dinwiddie to Sir Charles Hardy, July 1, 1756, Brock ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:233, 453; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 2, 1756; Peter Hog to George Washington, December 11, 1755, George Washington to David Bell, January 10, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, July 11, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:219, 271, 4:295-296.

the lower rate of desertion was that the Pennsylvania Regiment was an entirely volunteer regiment. In addition, because recruiting was easier in Pennsylvania than Virginia, deserters could be replaced more easily and thus the loss of deserters was less of a military handicap.³⁴

Men were encouraged to desert by their family, militia officers, and other troops. In the summer of 1757 the threat of desertion forced Washington to reassign the troops stationed at Maidstone on the Potomac River. The men had been enlisted mainly in Maryland and, "under the immediate influence and perswasion of their friends," deserted in large numbers. James Fitzpatrick, a former soldier in the regiment, warned some of the 1757 drafts that "if they knew as much as he did they wou'd sooner cut their own Throats than come to Winchester," and promised them that he would help them escape. Colonel Paramour of the Accomac County militia informed the men he drafted, doubtless to encourage them to report to the regiment and ease his task, that "when they were draughted they might desert with Impunity after they were delivered to the military Officers."³⁵ Not surprisingly,

³⁴ Joseph Shippen to James Burd, September 12, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3; John Stanwix to George Washington, September 19, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:415-416; *Maryland Gazette*, November 17, 1757.

³⁵ "General Court Martial," July 25-26, 1757, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:194, 333.

urged on by their peers, family, and superiors, the men showed no reluctance to desert.

Desertion was only one facet of the disobedience which permeated the provincial forces. Mutiny and embezzlement of supplies were also common. Mutiny was most common in isolated frontier posts. Fort Augusta, secluded at the forks of the Susquehanna and often lacking supplies, was the scene of recurrent mutinies. In the spring of 1757 the men mutinied when the commander attempted to retain them in the service after their terms of enlistment had expired until a new garrison arrived. In January 1760 there was "a General Mutiny" when they heard a rumor "that they were to receive no pay" and "almost to a Man" they refused to do duty. The garrison commander, Joseph Shippen, confined one of the ringleaders but "the Men ran out of their Barracks & rescued him." Shippen had to march with his "Sword drawn" to restore order.³⁶

Matters were little better at other posts. In August 1756 one of Captain Jacob Arndt's subordinates, Lieutenant Miller, posted at Tucker's Mill, refused to obey Arndt's orders. Arndt sent out a detachment with directions to seize the post and send Miller back to Fort Norris for court martial. But Miller told them "that he would not go

³⁶ Col. Burd's Journal At Fort Augusta, March 1757, Pennsylvania State Archives, Edward Shippen Thompson Family Papers, Box 2 Folder 13; Joseph Shippen to James Burd, January 21, 1760, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 5.

absolutely, and the first man that would touch him, he would cut an arm from his body. . . and he would see how they would bring him away." Arndt sent out a larger detachment to arrest Miller, but when they arrived at the post he had already fled.³⁷

Just a few days later another mutiny broke out at Fort Norris. One of the troopers refused to do sentry duty. Arndt arrested him "but the guard rebelled against me, and told me they would all stand together." Arndt begged his commander, Conrad Weiser, to send him help, for the men "do what they think suits them best, and I must live like a prisoner here amongst them at this Fort." He warned that if he did not receive assistance quickly he was "afraid there might happen a great destruction, for I have no commissioned Officer with me here, and I am in a very great trouble."³⁸

Several mutinies also broke out in Virginia. In the winter of 1756-1757 there was a general mutiny on the South Branch when Dinwiddie ordered Washington to transfer his men from the forts there to the isolated and exposed Fort Cumberland. Upon hearing the news many of the men refused to leave and threatened to desert. When Washington pressed on

³⁷ The detachment returned to Fort Norris to get reinforcements and when they returned to Tucker's Mill Miller had fled before he could be arrested. Jacob Arndt to William Parsons, August 17, 1756, H.S.P., Northampton County Records: Miscellaneous Papers, 1:183.

³⁸ Jacob Arndt to Conrad Weiser, August 26, 1756, H.S.P., Northampton County Records: Miscellaneous Papers, 1:183

with his decision, large numbers of men abandoned their posts and fled for Pennsylvania. During the Sandy Creek Expedition the men refused to obey Major Andrew Lewis' orders and deserted the expedition, forcing Lewis to abandon the project. In 1758 when Washington ordered some of the rangers to garrison frontier forts while the regiment was in Pennsylvania, the men refused to do the duty and threatened to desert if they were compelled to. When Washington refused to countermand his order, almost half the men in the ranger company feigned sickness to avoid duty, deserted, or simply refused to obey orders.³⁹

Mutiny was not the only way in which troops were able to avoid work. The men compelled to labor on the construction of Fort Loudoun at Winchester in the summer of 1756 used "counterfeit sickness" to avoid duty. This practice forced Washington to issue orders that all men who claimed to be ill must report to the camp's surgeon for examination. If he decided that the soldier was feigning illness, the culprit was to receive fifty lashes as punishment.⁴⁰

³⁹ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, December 17, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, January 12, 1757, Charles Smith to Washington, July 1, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:462-63, 93-94, 5:253; Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, January 26, 1757, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:584-585.

⁴⁰ "Orders" August 30, 31, September 1, 1756, "Orders" October 23, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:382-383, 439.

Soldiers hampered the war effort in several other ways. The constant pilfering of supplies was endemic amongst the colonial forces. Following Braddock's defeat in 1755 many troops purloined supplies in the flight and sold them to unscrupulous frontiersmen. Following the fall of Fort Duquesne there was an orgy of looting of military supplies in all the Pennsylvania forts. One commander complained to Bouquet that it was impossible to protect the stores from "the plundering Hands of unjust & ungratefull Men, who receive the King's Pay to guard & protect the very Effects, they Steal & embezzle: Nothing is spared, Horses, Saddles, Waggon, Provisions, Hay, Planks, all these & many other Articles, are every Day, Night, & Hour, Stolen." At Fort Ligonier the men even looted the officers' baggage.⁴¹

The men also stole the army's horses and cattle. Following Forbes' campaign the theft of horses for resale to civilians was so widespread that it prompted General Stanwix to warn that "if. . . any such Horse is discovered in the Possession of any Person, under any Pretence whatever, the Offender may depend upon being Prosecuted, as the law directs against Horse-Stealers."⁴²

⁴¹ *Virginia Gazette*, September 5, 1755; John Armstrong to Henry Bouquet, December 13, 1758, December 27, 1758, Lewis Ourry to Henry Bouquet, December 20, 1758, Kent, ed., *Papers of Henry Bouquet*, 2:631, 638, 646; Proclamation of John Stanwix, June 22, 1759, Edward Biddle to James Burd, August 5, 1759, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 4.

⁴² Proclamation of John Stanwix, June 22, 1759, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 4.

The horses and cattle at abandoned plantations also offered a tempting opportunity. Frontiersmen repeatedly complained that the men scouting from Fort Augusta drove away the cattle and horses from abandoned plantations. In the fall of 1756 some of the garrison "dishonourably drove from their Walks. . . a Number of Horses & Mares said to belong to the poor Scatter'd Inhabitants." These they then "sold at Vandue." Fort Cumberland was another prime location for looting the horses and cattle of Hampshire and Cumberland counties.⁴³

Not only did the men drive away cattle from abandoned plantations, the troops often made use of the chaos of war to pillage and plunder occupied farms and homesteads. In October 1755 Washington received several complaints about his troops "pilaging and plundering of Houses" on "all the Roads they have marched." The complaints compelled him to give strict orders to ensure that "the men are not allowed to pillage the Country." However, in the spring of 1756 another planter complained that the troops billeted at his plantation had "killed his Fowls, pulled down one of his Houses for firewood; turned the Horses into his meadow and corn; [and] destroyed them and his Fences." Matters were no better in Pennsylvania.

⁴³ "Orderly Book of Captain Thomas Hamilton's Company," October 5, 1759, Cumberland County Historical Society, Carlisle, Pa., 9:22; John Armstrong to James Burd, September 13, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; Henry Bouquet to John Forbes, January 23, 1759, Richard Parris to Henry Bouquet, February 5, 1759, Kent, ed., *Papers of Henry Bouquet*, 3:74-75, 101.

During the winter of 1757 troops in Northampton County, short of provisions, took to attacking the local inhabitants to force them to provide supplies.⁴⁴

Much of the misbehavior stemmed from the repeated drunkenness of the troops. Across Pennsylvania and Virginia soldiers missed duty or performed duty while drunk.⁴⁵ At Fort Allen in the summer of 1756 the whole garrison celebrated the arrival of Teedyuscung by heavy drinking. The men, who had been isolated in the garrison for several months, soon "got ajoking" with the women Teedyuscung had brought with him. They then took the "Rum & Water, and washed their parts with it, for fear of getting some distemper of the Squaws" and soon "got in earnest." The commander, who himself was drunk, attempted to stop the proceedings. He threatened to shoot the men, but they "began to lay on him with sticks." Another group, worried by the chaos, decided to set out for help, but they were too drunk to get far and soon returned. The behavior of the garrison paralyzed the fort during a period of many raids and jeopardized important Indian diplomacy.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ "Orders," October 23, 1755, George Washington to Adam Stephen, October 29, 1755, George Washington to Robert Spotswood, October 31, 1755, George Washington to Henry Woodward, May 5, 1756, "Orders," July 21, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:135, 147, 150, 3:96, 269; William Parsons to Conrad Weiser, [January], 1757, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:67.

⁴⁵ "Orderly Book of Captain Thomas Hamilton's Company," July 3, 1759, Cumberland County Historical Society, 9:22.

⁴⁶ George Reynolds to Conrad Weiser, August, 1756, H.S.P., Northampton County Records: Miscellaneous Papers, 1:187.

The behavior of the Virginia and Pennsylvania troops contrasts with that of provincial forces in other theaters. In New England the Massachusetts troops, while inadequate soldiers, were at least generally cooperative and often displayed bravery. Although New England troops deserted in small numbers, protested any failure to receive their wages and the lack of food, and at times indulged in drinking and gaming, they did not display the widespread discontent and misbehavior prevalent amongst the Virginia and Pennsylvania troops.⁴⁷

The troops of the Virginia and Pennsylvania regiments had many valid reasons for their behavior. They often went unpaid for long periods. The Virginia troops sent to South Carolina received no pay for over three months. The problem was worse in Pennsylvania where the disputes between the governor and Assembly prevented the colony from putting its regiment's finances on a sound footing. In the spring of 1757 the Pennsylvania forces received no pay for five months, and some of the officers had gone unpaid for ten months.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Anderson, *A People's Army*, Chaps. 3 and 5.

⁴⁸ George Mercer to George Washington, November 2, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:40-42; Jacob Arndt to Timothy Horsefield, February 26, 1756, H.S.P., Northampton County Records: Miscellaneous Papers, 1:181; Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, March 4, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; William Parsons to Conrad Weiser, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:47; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:448.

Recruiters also encouraged men to enlist under "false pretenses." In Pennsylvania in 1757 Captain Hambright discovered that he could only recruit German settlers by guaranteeing, although he had no authority, that they would not do garrison duty at Fort Augusta and that they would not "do any kind of work but to range & scour the Woods continually." Unconcerned at his deceit, since once recruited the men ceased to be his responsibility, Hambright was able to recruit many Germans. Not surprisingly, shortly after Hambright handed over command of the men, Edward Shippen reported that the men were "such a parcel of mutinous Dutch Rascalls, that several of them refuse to go without their own Captain." He added "I have threatened them several times to confine them in Goal [sic] & have them every Soul of them punished for Mutiny: But all will not do, they seem determined to act as they please. I have therefore concluded it most prudent to have nothing more to say to them & not to use any forceable or Military Expedients with them as it might hurt the Recruiting Service."⁴⁹ Across Virginia and Pennsylvania recruiters made promises they knew would not be honored. Not surprisingly the men quickly became disillusioned and were disinclined to obey the orders of their new officers.

The troops also served under appalling conditions. In 1757 Washington maintained that much of the opposition to the

⁴⁹ Joseph Shippen to James Burd, May 31, 1757, Joseph Shippen to James Burd, June 7, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

war had stemmed from the Fort Necessity expedition when the men had not received the proper equipment, tents, or clothes. He added that this lack of support caused "great murmering and discontent" amongst the men which spread as they returned "recounting their Sufferings and want of Pay (which Rags and Poverty sufficiently testified); fixd in the Populace such horrid Impressions of the hardships they had Encountered, that no Arguments could remove their prejudices, or Facilitate the Recruiting Service."⁵⁰

The troops' discontent over clothing was another major cause of disaffection. In August 1756 Washington reported to the House of Burgesses that "Our Soldiers complain that their pay is insufficient even to furnish Shoes, shirts, stockings, &c." Virginia expected the forces to pay for their own shoes and uniforms. Yet the nature of the service meant that these items did not last long. Washington confided to General Loudoun that "I have known a Soldier go upon Command with a new pair of Shoes, which perhaps have cost him from 7/6 to 10/ and return back without any; so much do they wear in wadeing Creeks, Fording Rivers: climbing Mountains." The colony sometimes provided uniforms, deducting the cost from the troops' pay, but the clothing was often substandard. Washington described the uniform that the commissaries provided in 1755 as "a suit of thin sleazy Cloth without

⁵⁰ George Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:80-81.

lining." Worse still, on occasions the troops paid for clothes they never received.⁵¹

Virginians viewed life in the regiment as so appalling that many would risk all to avoid service. In 1758 John Catlet, convicted of stealing a horse, was offered the opportunity to serve in the Virginia Regiment "to free himself from a nauseous Goal and the Sentence of Death which hung over him." No sooner was he freed and handed over to the regiment than he deserted. When recaptured he claimed that "the Mercy extended to him appeared more terrible to him than Death itself[,] and he chose rather to Run the Risque of Suffering an ignominious Death by living with his Wife and Children than to embrace that Mercy which was to deprive him of every Blessing which made life dear to him."⁵²

The conditions under which the Pennsylvania troops served were as bad as or worse than those of Virginia. Pennsylvania troops also lacked clothing and equipment. But the Pennsylvania forces regularly went without adequate food. In April 1759 Samuel Weiser wrote to his father describing the conditions at Fort Mifflin. "There are not 25 men in this Garrison that have not the Scurvy, they die fast, some have

⁵¹ Peter Hog to George Washington, June 26, 1756, George Washington to John Robinson, August 5, 1756, George Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:227-228, 327-329, 4:86-87.

⁵² Petition of John Catlet, [ca. 1759,] Reese, ed., *Papers of Francis Fauquier*, 1:140-141.

shrivelled limbs [and] can neither move back nor forwards." He continued that "we had in four months past not a bit of meat but rotten, and hard salted pork, and the flour is all in balls and the bread. . . quite bitter." He feared that if the men stayed in the fort much longer "they will all die without Exception god knows that no body cares for us, we are abused in all respects." Following Forbes' campaign Thomas Lloyd described the Pennsylvania troops as "hardly worth writing about[,] the grave yard has the most of them[,] exhausted as they were with the Fatigues of a most unmerciful Campaign twas impossible they shou'd stand the united Effects of Sickness and hard Duty." He added "The scurvy has been fatal to them."⁵³

The troops at Fort Augusta suffered particularly badly. The garrison endured scurvy during the winter and during the summer was struck by malaria. Joseph Shippen reported in the summer of 1757 that of the garrison of 380 men sixty were "ill with bad Fevers, which have reduced many of them to mere Skeletons." A few months later dysentery, or "the bloody flux," decimated the garrison still further. No sooner had

⁵³ Thomas Lloyd to James Burd, July 26, 1757, Thomas Lloyd to James Burd, April 14, 1759, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vols. 3 & 4; William Parsons to Conrad Weiser, March 26, 1757, Samuel Weiser to Conrad Weiser, April 1, 1759, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:47, 151.

the men begun to recover from dysentery than smallpox broke out.⁵⁴

Illness was not restricted to Fort Augusta. In the fall of 1757 John Armstrong reported that his troops in Carlisle were ill and that he had "lost some good Men, [and] Many are sickly." During Forbes' Campaign dysentery was rife in the posts on the route to Fort Duquesne. Smallpox also attacked the army. There were other diseases that concerned the commanders. Forbes ordered that "Any woman suspected to be infected with the Venial Destemper to be sent to the Hospital to be examind & those who are found disorderd are either to be kept in the Hospital till Cur'd or Turnd out of Camp."⁵⁵

To reduce the threat of disease the officers made great efforts to encourage cleanliness in the camps, but to little effect. The men were reluctant to shave and keep clean and had to be ordered to wash themselves and their clothes. When they did wash, it was in the same springs and streams from

⁵⁴ Shippen reported to his father that he had taken "a few doses of the Bark" to recover, suggesting that he was taking quinine and the disease was malaria. Edward Shippen to Joseph Shippen, February 19, 1757, Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, August 10, 1757, James Young to James Burd, October 3, 1757, Thomas Lloyd to James Burd, October 8, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vols. 2-3; Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, August 23, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Military Letter Book of Joseph Shippen 1756-1758, ff.76-78.

⁵⁵ John Armstrong to James Burd, September 13, 1757, Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, August 15, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3; Francis Halkett to George Washington, August 2, 1758, Henry Bouquet to George Washington, August 10, 1758, "Orderly Book," October 4, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:362, 384-386, 6:60.

which the drinking water was taken. Such behavior forced Forbes to issue standing orders that "Cleanliness in Camp is particularly to be taken Care of, by sweeping the Streets and Communications twice a day." Sweeping the streets was especially important as the street cleaners had to ensure "that the Camp is kept clean & free off all Dead Carcasses & Deseased Horses." But the refuse exuded by the army was still so great that the army attracted packs of wild dogs, forcing Bouquet to issue orders that each camp's provost should track and kill all the stray dogs that he could find.⁵⁶

The greatest source of disease, however, was the excrement of the troops themselves. Provincial troops, unused to military necessity, were reluctant to use the "necessary houses." Bouquet issued standing orders that "No Man [should] presume to ease himself any where near the Camp, but in the House of Office." James Burd reissued the order the following year to the Pennsylvania Regiment, adding that "The Sentries [are] to call upon the Guard[,] who is to Confine those the[y] See Disobeying this Orders."⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Orderly Book of Captain Thomas Hamilton's Company, September 30, 1759, Cumberland County Historical Society, 9:22; Henry Bouquet Orderly Book, July 3, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet*, 2:662; Orders, Carlisle, July 5, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers: Orderly Book of Joseph Shippen's Company, 1758; George Washington's Orderly Book, September 22, 1758, November 24, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 6:32, 156-157.

⁵⁷ Henry Bouquet Orderly Book, July 11, August 1, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet*, 2:664, 669; Orders, Carlisle, July 5, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers: Orderly
(continued...)

Even when the men used the necessary houses, there were problems because they were built too close to the camp and were allowed to overflow. In 1759 Burd issued explicit orders that the necessary houses must be built at least one hundred yards from the camp, and threatened to court-martial any officer who should disobey the orders.⁵⁸

Racked by disease and hunger, often without pay and adequate clothing, the lot of the provincial soldiers was miserable. However, their misbehavior cannot be attributed to their sufferings alone. The provincial forces of Massachusetts suffered similar hardships during the war yet their behavior was remarkably different.⁵⁹

Washington attributed the disorderliness of the Virginians to the lack of punishment for insubordination. He complained that the lenity of the laws punishing deserters resulted in the "growing Insolence of the Soldiers, the Indolence and Inactivity of the Officers, who are all sensible how confin'd their punishments are, in regard to what they ought to be." He was particularly dismayed by the refusal of

⁵⁷(...continued)

Book of Joseph Shippen's Company, 1758; Orders, July 2, 1759, Orderly Book of Capt. Thomas Hamilton's Co. 9-22, Cumberland County Historical Society, Carlisle.

⁵⁸ Orders, Carlisle, July 5, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers: Orderly Book of Joseph Shippen's Company, 1758; Orders, July 2, 1759, Orderly Book of Capt. Thomas Hamilton's Company, Cumberland County Historical Society, 9:22.

⁵⁹ Fred Anderson portrays the Massachusetts provincial forces as generally submissive and orderly. Anderson, *A People's Army*, pp.65-110.

the House of Burgesses to grant him power to execute deserters and mutineers and expressed surprise "that we alone shou'd be so tenacious of Liberty as not to invest a power, where Interest, and Politicks so unanswerably demand it."⁶⁰

Washington's claim that it was the lack of penalties which encouraged insubordination is difficult to substantiate, especially since he had power during much of the war to execute troops when necessary. The Massachusetts assembly refused to give officers that power. Generally, the punishments inflicted on Massachusetts forces were very lenient. The most common punishment was a public whipping which never exceeded thirty lashes. Other offenders were forced to straddle "the wooden horse," two planks of wood nailed together in an inverted "V."⁶¹ Compared with these punishments, those imposed on Virginian and Pennsylvanian troops were severe.

The penalty for desertion was execution by firing squad. However, in July 1757 in an attempt to halt the mass desertions from the provincial forces, Washington chose to hang some of the deserters on a forty-foot-high gallows in the camp at Winchester because "it conveyed much more terror to others; and it was for example sake, we did it." Even the

⁶⁰ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, George Washington to Governor Dinwiddie, July 10, 1757, July 11, 1757, George Washington to John Stanwix, July 15, 1757, *Abbot and Twohig, The Papers of George Washington*, 2:102-103, 4:291-292, 295-297, 306-307.

⁶¹ Anderson, *A People's Army* pp.127-128.

Pennsylvanian authorities resorted to hanging deserters as a deterrent.⁶²

Troops were also executed for other offenses. In 1756 Washington had Sergeant Nathan Lewis executed in front of the Virginia Regiment for cowardice when he retreated his men during a skirmish with Indian raiders. Washington purposefully delayed his execution until the new recruits had arrived in the camp so that he could make Lewis "a publick Example to deterr others from such like Offenses."⁶³

Only a few of the many deserters were finally executed, but those who had their sentences commuted were still severely punished. Adam Stephen apprehended two men attempting to desert in July 1756. He "wheal'd them 'till they pissed themselves and the Spectators Shed tears for them--which will I hope answer the End of punishment." Many of the deserters in the summer of 1757 were likewise punished with sentences typically of several hundred lashes and even over a thousand. During the months when the House of Burgesses refused to grant

⁶² George Washington to John Stanwix, July 15, 1757, General Court Martial, July 25-26, 1757, George Washington to Governor Dinwiddie, August 3, 1757, "Orderly Book," September 24, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:306-307, 329-334, 360, 6:36; Orderly Book of Captain Thomas Hamilton's Company, July 19, 1759, Cumberland County Historical Society, 9:22.

⁶³ Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, May 8, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:407; "Court Martial," May 3, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, May 3, 1756, "After Orders," May 18, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:77-79, 84, 154.

Washington the power of execution, he still harshly punished the troops. A court martial in the summer of 1756 gave deserters punishments ranging from 250 to 1,000 lashes. Washington ordered that they should in one beating "receive as much of their punishment as the Surgeon (who must attend upon this occasion) shall judge they are able to bear."⁶⁴

For lesser crimes punishments were also severe. During Forbes' campaign a court martial sentenced several Pennsylvania troops, who had refused to continue building Forbes' road until they received their pay and more food, to between 600 and 1,000 lashes. For leaving the camp without permission and for selling regimental supplies soldiers received between 500 and 1,000 lashes. For insolence to a senior officer men received 100 lashes.⁶⁵

It was not the lack of punishments that caused provincial troops to behave so defiantly. Anderson argues that the leadership capabilities of the Massachusetts officers determined the manner in which they associated with their men. In particular, the sharing of the hardships and deprivations

⁶⁴ Orders, [July 6, 7, 8, 1756], Adam Stephen to George Washington, July 25, 1756, "Court Martial," June 19, 1757, "General Court Martial," July 25-26, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:238-241, 294, 4:230-231, 329-334.

⁶⁵ Proceedings of Court Martial at Raystown, August 30, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3; "Orders," August 1, 1756, "Court Martial," June 19, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:305, 4:230-231.

experienced by the men gave a sense of common cause.⁶⁶ In Virginia and Pennsylvania this was not the case. The Virginia and Pennsylvania officers were reluctant to lower their style of living. Washington complained that despite the shortages of supplies it was impossible to get officers to restrict their consumption. The most notorious case was that of William Clapham, the commander at Fort Augusta. Edward Shippen described dinner with him: "we generally had choice Beef, both Roast & Boiled. . . We had Good Table Beer et une bouteille ou deux d'excellent Vin." After dinner "the Collo[nel] ordered three Musicians (his own Soldiers) to stand under a Tree at a Proper Distance & Play us a few Tunes on the Claronette, Violin and Fife." This excess occurred at the same time that many of the men in the fort were going hungry because of a shortage of supplies⁶⁷

Officers were reluctant to restrict their consumption because they were exceptionally conscious of their social status. Virginia gentlemen besieged Washington with requests for commissions in the regiment. Many gentlemen even complained that they did not have the rank they believed they deserved, causing Dinwiddie to remind them that were they in the British army they "might have served twenty Years before. . . [they] had a Co[mpany], and then, with a large

⁶⁶ Anderson, *A People's Army*, pp.161-164.

⁶⁷ Edward Shippen to William Peters, July 22, 1756, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

Purchase." As a result of this pressure for commissions, the Virginia Regiment was top-heavy in officers. The regiment was initially divided into seventeen companies, each with a captain, a lieutenant, and an ensign, as in the regular service. If the regiment had achieved full-strength, each company would have contained only about sixty men, whereas a British company typically numbered around one hundred. Because of slow recruitment, the companies had even fewer men compared with the number of officers. As the expenses of the war mounted, some Virginians began to raise "Great Clamours. . . ag'st the many officers in Commiss'n to command so few Men."⁶⁸

In May 1757 the House of Burgesses intervened. "Having consider'd the great Expence the Virg'a Regim't has cost the Country from the No. of Companys it has consisted of, and those Companys not half compleat in proportion to the vast Charges of Officers," the House reduced the number of companies to seven. This reduction forced several officers to resign their commissions to avoid the insult of demotion and deeply embittered many of them. William Peachey, who resigned

⁶⁸ Anthony Strother to George Washington, July 9, 1755, Landon Carter to George Washington, September 25, 1755, Landon Carter to George Washington, February 26, 1756, "Orders," July 12, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 1:333, 2:61, 3:251-253, 319; Gov. Dinwiddie to Adam Stephen, January 1, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Captain Mercer, January 15, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, December 14, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, January 26, 1757, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 1:446, 462-463, 2:291-292.

his commission, commented that to serve in the regiment "a Man must either push himself into the jaws of Death, & that too without the least hopes of Redemption, or be subject to the Calumnious Tongues of a Sett of base Traducers."⁶⁹

Because of their sensibility of rank, officers were very reluctant to submit to any order which could be construed as inappropriate, and disputes over command were frequent. Washington complained in 1757 that if an officer was not consulted "he takes huff[,] thinks his wisdom and merit affronted, and so Marches off in high Indignation, and great contempt of every Social Law." James Burd likewise complained about the "paultry Behaviour of some of the Officers" of the Pennsylvania Regiment. He added that "I can't help taking notice that their Self Sufficient Opinion of themselves only tends to expose their Folly, and it is with Regret that I see them too wise to be taught."⁷⁰

In August 1758 at Fort Augusta Captain Humphries refused to take orders from Captain Thomas Lloyd, claiming he would only take orders directly from Colonel Conrad Weiser.

⁶⁹ Gov. Dinwiddie's Instructions to George Washington, May 16, 1757, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:622; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, May 24, 1757, William Peachey to George Washington, November 14, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:162, 5:54.

⁷⁰ George Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:87; James Burd to John Armstrong, September 6, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Papers, Letter Book of Col. James Burd, 1756-1758, ff.176-178.

Humphries had no argument with Lloyd's orders, but felt insulted to accept orders from another captain. Humphries informed Lloyd, in front of the entire garrison, that he would rather be arrested than submit to Lloyd's orders. For his part, Lloyd felt that Humphries had publicly humiliated him and promptly resigned his commission.⁷¹

The most infamous dispute was over Colonel William Clapham and paralyzed Fort Augusta. Clapham was a skilled military tactician. Edward Shippen described him as "a sensible Man, with the most knowledge & Experience in the Indian Manner of Fighting of any Man in America." After he left Pennsylvania his military acumen was sufficiently respected that Lord Loudoun offered him the command of Fort William Henry.⁷² Despite his military skills, many of the officers felt that Clapham came from too low a social rank to hold command. A year after he had praised Clapham's military skill Edward Shippen commented

It was always my opinion that if a Man had the natural of an Indian or a negroe Prince & their Education, nay were he ever so famous a General among them; nay until he changed his manners & Savage nature and became like one of us, & had the advantage of keeping Gentlemen's Company, I say unless those changes had been wrought in him he was

⁷¹ Thomas Lloyd to Col. Burd, August 31, 1758, Pennsylvania State Archives, Edward Shippen Thompson Family Papers, Box 1, Folder 3.

⁷² Edward Shippen Jr. to Edward Shippen Sr., April 8, 1756, Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, January 19, 1757, Edward Shippen to Joseph Shippen, April 5, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

as fit to command a Battalion belonging to the King of England as Shingas or Jacobs were.⁷³

Shippen continued complaining that Clapham was "like all your low life upstarts." He added "its well for him that he never understood Latin, Greek and French." Such knowledge would only have made matters worse as he had never been "at the University of good manners, and afterwards initiated into the Company of Gentlemen of great politeness." Shippen's comments were typical of many made by Clapham's fellow officers and subordinates. The pressure upon Clapham was so great that it forced him to resign his commission in March 1757.⁷⁴

A similar dispute occurred in Virginia in 1758 when the officers at Winchester refused to rank with Lieutenant Steenbergen, feeling that he had lowered his social status by engaging in various business activities "below the Dignity of an Officer," and "sufficient to give the whole Corps, the most indifferent opinion of his morals." His heinous activities included acting as deputy-commissary and keeping a "Sutteling Shop." When challenged by his fellow officers, Steenbergen "made answer that he made more money by doing so than by his

⁷³ Edward Shippen to James Burd, March 26, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

⁷⁴ Edward Shippen to Joseph, April 5, 1757, Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, April 23, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

Commission, & that he would take the first opportunity of throwing it up."⁷⁵

Steenbergen's behavior was not unusual. While some officers saw their commissions as a means of gaining social status, others saw them as an opportunity for personal profit. Lieutenant Mercer in Captain Stewart's Company made money by selling horses to his men at a substantial profit. Many of the officers embezzled the funds the colony provided them for recruiting. Even Andrew Lewis and Conrad Weiser profited from the service. Lewis arranged for the wagons carrying Virginia's gifts for the Cherokees to stop at his plantation to carry his own provisions and trade goods, while Weiser was accused of misappropriating provincial supplies and selling them to his men. Even George Washington benefitted from the two percent commission he collected on regimental funds that passed through his hands.⁷⁶

The cohesion and esteem of the officer corps was further undermined by disputes among officers and between different colonial forces. The Virginia militia and regular forces

⁷⁵ Court of Inquiry, May 4-8, 1758, George Washington to John Blair, May 28, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:162-163, 199-203.

⁷⁶ Gov. Dinwiddie to Hugh Rose, June 16, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Robert Stewart, July 4, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Andrew Lewis, June, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:66, 81, 262; "Memorandum from Committee to Supervise Military Expenditures," November 8-11, 1755, "Orders," January 9, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:163-164, 262, 4:251fn. Richard Peters to Conrad Weiser, November 9, 1757, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:101.

detested each other. The militia felt that the regiment was a collection of debauched scoundrels. In May 1756, when the militia from the Piedmont were mustered in Winchester, they "made use of every mean's to treat not only the Private Soldiers but the Officer's of the Virga Regt ill." Washington ordered one of the militia arrested and held in the guardhouse overnight for his behavior. But the militia officers gathered their men, attacked the guardhouse, and released the prisoner.⁷⁷

The men in the Virginia Rangers also detested the Virginia Regiment, while the regimental troops looked down on the rangers. On several occasions Washington found it necessary to guarantee that he would not incorporate the ranger companies into the regiment. In 1758 Robert Stewart, a captain in the regiment, received information that Washington might reassign him as captain of a ranger company. He beseeched Washington that "the very name of Ranger is horrible. its Duty if well executed insupportable by at least 9/10ths of the Human Species, it's nature inconsistent with order & Discipline."⁷⁸

⁷⁷ George Washington to John Robinson, April 16, c. April 18, 1756, John Robinson to George Washington, April 17, 1756, "Memorandum respecting the Militia," May 8, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:6-8, 12, 15-17, 99.

⁷⁸ Andrew Lewis to William Preston, November 19, 1757, Draper Mss.: William Preston Papers, 1QQ:164; George Washington to Robert Stewart, December 17, 1756, Robert Stewart to George Washington, November 24, 1757, December 12, (continued...)

Meanwhile, in Pennsylvania there were similar tensions. In November 1757 in Reading there was a skirmish between some of the local volunteers and the regular troops of the Pennsylvania Regiment in which several men were wounded. There were also ethnic tensions between the different units, the Germans and Irish, in particular, detesting one another.⁷⁹

Different companies within the same regiment also bickered with one another. In January 1757 there was a bitter dispute at Fort Allen between Captain Orndt's company and Captain Reynolds' company. Weiser had transferred Orndt's company from Fort Norris. Upon their arrival at Fort Allen they were horrified to find that Reynolds' men had not kept the post orderly. They complained that it was "something nasty, at least not so clean as they used to keep." For their part, Reynolds' men "were very angry at being. . . [addressed] as a Company [of] Dirty Idle [fellows]." The ill-feeling between the two companies was so great that it forced Weiser to transfer Reynolds' men out of the fort and replace them with another company.⁸⁰

⁷⁸(...continued)
1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:61, 5:58, 6:169.

⁷⁹ Many Pennsylvania units consisted of men primarily of one ethnic background. Conrad Weiser to Governor Denny, November 10, 1757, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:103; Conrad Weiser to James Burd, June 7, 1757, Joseph Shippen to James Burd, June 7, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

⁸⁰ William Parsons to Conrad Weiser, January 28, 1757, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:30.

The different colonial forces also bickered with each other. At Fort Frederick, Maryland, the officers of the Virginia and Maryland forces disputed the command of the post. At Fort Cumberland, from the fall of 1755 to the spring of 1756, the disputes were even more intense. The fort was located on the Potomac River in Maryland, and several of the Maryland officers had received commissions in independent companies from the Crown. The Maryland officers therefore claimed that they had precedence over the Virginia Officers and asserted that they had the right to consume Virginia's stores and supplies as they saw fit. However, over three quarters of the forces in the fort were from Virginia, which had constructed and supplied the fort as well. The Virginia officers refused to cooperate and countermanded the orders of the Maryland officers. At the height of the enemy assault, internal bickering paralysed this key frontier post.⁸¹

There were also bitter disputes between the officers of the British regular forces and the provincial officers. Henry Bouquet described the provincial officers as "without knowledge & Experiences. . . They are all a cruel Incumbrance upon us." Provincial officers constantly sniped at Bouquet

⁸¹ Adam Stephen to George Washington, May 19, 1756, George Washington to Joshua Beall, November 1, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:165-166, 5:37-38.

and complained of the haughty and imperious behavior of the British officers.⁸²

The behavior of the Virginia and Pennsylvania officers contrasted sharply with that of the Massachusetts officers. This may explain in part the great differences in the behavior of the forces. The most important influence on the behavior of the forces was not the difference in their treatment or their commanders, but rather the different composition of the forces.

Anderson maintains that the Massachusetts forces were a mirror of provincial society, composed largely of the sons of farmers awaiting their "portions" when their father's estate was divided at his death or when old age forced him to rely on his children for support. Until they received their portion, and after that if they were younger sons and received only a small portion, Massachusetts men had insufficient funds to establish an independent household. These men joined the Massachusetts forces to accumulate a lump sum with which to begin their independent lives. The men who joined the Massachusetts forces were typically young. Although they represented what was in some ways a "surplus population," they were not permanently poor, or permanently in surplus supply, and were not part of an "agricultural proletariat."⁸³

⁸² Henry Bouquet to John Forbes, August 30, 1758, Henry Bouquet to John Forbes, October 28, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet*, 2:450, 588-589.

⁸³ Anderson, *A People's Army*, pp.33-35, 38.

Virginia and Pennsylvania forces, by comparison, represented rather more the permanently poor and surplus population of their societies. Virginia recruited convicts, deserters, and vagrants. Pennsylvania recruited indentured servants. Part of the reason for the difference in the composition of the forces lies in the different opportunities that the army offered. In Massachusetts, joining the provincial forces was, in Anderson's words, "a reasonably lucrative proposition, providing cash income to hasten. . . [the] attainment of independence."⁸⁴ The war in Massachusetts depressed the economy, as the embargo on trade reduced the demand for seamen and laborers. As the fighting occurred far from the colony's soil, the army's demands for labor and supplies had a limited effect on the colony's economy. With few prospects at home, Massachusetts men viewed a term in the provincial forces as attractive. They could expect to serve for one campaign, (about eight months,) receive a generous bounty upon enlistment which would provide for them during the campaign, and then at the end of the campaign receive their pay, which averaged £1 12s per month, giving them a sum of around £8 with which to return home.⁸⁵

In Pennsylvania and Virginia joining the provincial forces was far less attractive. While the pay of the troops

⁸⁴ Ibid., p.39. See Appendix I.

⁸⁵ Unlike the Virginia and Pennsylvania troops the Massachusetts forces generally received their pay in a timely fashion. Anderson, *A People's Army*, p.67.

was comparable to Massachusetts--Pennsylvania privates received £2 per month⁸⁶ and Virginia privates about £1--Virginia and Pennsylvania troops received smaller bounties, had to pay for their uniforms, received their pay monthly (at least in theory,) and tended to fritter their pay away on liquor and gambling. As a result they could not expect to leave the army with a large lump sum. Still more important, in Virginia and Pennsylvania men enlisted for at least one year, and from 1756 onward in both colonies men enlisted for at least three years.⁸⁷

In Virginia and Pennsylvania the war also opened new opportunities. The army demanded labor and supplies which could be met by an enterprising civilian. The raids drove settlers from large tracts of desirable cleared land, which could be available for a brave man who was prepared to risk the raids. The availability of land in these two colonies also meant that there was not the large number of young men awaiting their fathers' demise. Young adult males enjoyed

⁸⁶ Initially Pennsylvania privates received only 3s per month. Orders & Instructions to James Burd, January 17, 1756, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:448.

⁸⁷ Gov. Dinwiddie to Gen Shirley, April 28, 1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, August 19, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:395, 481; Joseph Shippen to James Burd, May 19, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

more opportunity on the frontier, and the provincial service was only one, rather unattractive option.⁸⁸

There were other important differences in the composition of the forces. Virginia and Pennsylvania troops tended to be older than their Massachusetts counterparts; the Virginia and Pennsylvania forces lacked the higher proportion of young men aged sixteen to twenty who joined the Massachusetts forces. Virginia and Pennsylvania troops also lacked ties to the colony. Whereas half the Virginia forces, and three-quarters of the Pennsylvania forces, had been born in Europe, eight out of ten troops in the Massachusetts forces had been born in Massachusetts. These ties of origin were further strengthened because most of the Massachusetts troops in each regiment came from a relatively small area, just one or two counties. Massachusetts troops knew one another before recruitment, and such ties played an important role in the recruiting process in Massachusetts. Virginia and Pennsylvania forces were recruited from all over the colony and from neighboring colonies, and the troops were more likely to be strangers to one another.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ See Chapter VIII for more detail on the opportunities offered by the Seven Years' War.

⁸⁹ Anderson, *A People's Army*, p.239. See Appendix I. For a fuller discussion of the composition of the Virginia forces see John Ferling, "Soldiers for Virginia: Who Served in the French and Indian War?" *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, 94 (1986) 307-328; James Titus, *The Old Dominion at War: Society, Politics and Warfare in Late Colonial Virginia*, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), pp. (continued...)

The Massachusetts forces represented the communities they came from, and the ties of kinship and authority in those communities were transferred to the army. This characteristic was not the case in the Virginia and Pennsylvania forces. Their composition was not likely to enhance respect for the social order and the social hierarchy. The elements of Virginia and Pennsylvania society which were transferred to the army were themselves the source of much of the discontent. Virginia and Pennsylvania troops brought with them a sense of independence and disregard for hierarchy which characterized backcountry society. This attitude was hardly a basis upon which to build military discipline.

As a military struggle, the Seven Years' War on the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier was a disaster for the British colonial and imperial authorities. Regular and provincial troops and the colonial militia proved themselves singularly inept at waging war in the forests and mountains of North America. However, the failure of the war effort cannot be blamed entirely on the shortcomings of the military forces: the colonists themselves contributed to the failure by their refusal to cooperate with the war effort.

⁸⁹(...continued)

78-88. Ferling argues strongly that the Virginia Regiment was "far more representative of the colony's society than historians hitherto have realized." Titus, on the other hand, maintains that the troops in the regiment "fell outside the mainstream of Virginia Society."

Chapter VIII

"Discontent, Dissatisfaction, and Clamours of All Ranks": The War and Frontier Society

If the Fate of our Country be approaching, and this favourable Spot of the Globe, this Land of Plenty and Liberty, shall become a conquered enslaved Province of France, and the Range of the Indian Savages, it will be principally owing to the Security or Cowardice of its present Inhabitants.

-- "The Virginia Centinel" 1756¹

The Seven Years' War was a catastrophe for many of the settlers of the Virginia and Pennsylvania backcountry. In the spring of 1756 Governor Morris wrote despairingly to Sir William Johnson, "You cannot conceive what Havock has been made by the Enemy. . . nor what Numbers of Murders they have committed; what a vast Tract of Territory they have laid waste, and what a Multitude of Inhabitants. . . they have carried into Captivity."²

Over two thousand British subjects, civilian and military, died on the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier between 1754 and 1758. The raiders killed almost 1,500 settlers. Frederick, Hampshire, and Cumberland counties were particularly hard hit, but the raiders penetrated everywhere deep into the backcountry of both Virginia and Pennsylvania.

¹ *Maryland Gazette*, August 12, 1756.

² *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:97.

In Virginia, raiders attacked Bedford, Halifax, and Albemarle counties, while in Pennsylvania they attacked almost as far into the settled parts of the colony as Reading, only forty miles from Philadelphia. Besides civilian casualties, the French and their Indian allies killed about six hundred soldiers, both provincials and regulars.³

The raids also devastated a huge swath of countryside. George Washington reported in the fall of 1756 that "the ruinous state of the frontiers, and the vast extent of land we have lost. . . must appear incredible to those who are not eye-witnesses of the desolation. Upwards of fifty miles of a rich and (once) thick settled country is now quite deserted & abandoned." Adam Stephen reported that around Fort Cumberland "The Smouk of the Burning Plantations darken the day, and hide the neighbouring mountains from our Sight."⁴

³ See Appendix II for details. Accounts record slightly over 1,200 deaths resulting from raiding parties. In clashes involving regular forces thirty persons were killed and seventy wounded at Fort Necessity; about 300 men were killed in Braddock's defeat and 300 wounded; twenty officers and 271 men were killed or captured at Grant's defeat outside Fort Duquesne; 67 men were killed in the French raid on Loyalhanna in 1758; "Account by George Washington and James Mackay of the Capitulation of Fort Necessity," July 19, 1754, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, July 18, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 1:160, 340; List of Killed and Wounded at Fort Duquesne, September 14, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers: Military Notebook No. 7.; James Burd to Sarah Burd, October 14, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3.

⁴ Adam Stephen to George Washington, October 4, 1755, George Washington to John Robinson, November 9, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:72, 4:16-17.

The raiders plundered most of the plantations they attacked, seizing food, guns, ammunition, and valuables before setting fire to the buildings. They often returned to the Ohio or Susquehanna with the settlers' cattle and horses, having killed those they could not capture. In a typical raid on Cumberland County and along the Potomac River in April 1756, the French reported that "all the oxen and cows having been collected together were killed; a hundred and twenty horses. . . served to carry the large quantity of plunder the Indians got, and in returning they set fire to all the settlements they had left." Virginians reported that the Ohio Indians drove away over five hundred cattle after a raid on the Greenbrier River in Virginia in the fall of 1755.⁵

The greatest fear of most of the backcountry inhabitants was capture by the Indians. They had good reason, for enemy Indians captured nearly one thousand prisoners on the frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania.⁶ The captives lived throughout the Ohio and Susquehanna valleys, Iroquoia, and much of the Great Lakes region. In 1756 Governor Morris maintained that there were British prisoners in all the Indian towns from the Delaware to the Ohio. All British prisoners

⁵ "Abstract of Despatches from Canada," June 4, 1756, "Abstract of Despatches from America, August 30, 1756," Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:408, 486-487; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 31, 1755, March 11, 1756; Gov. Morris letter, September 1756, H.S.P., Gratz Collection, 15:18; *Virginia Gazette*, September 19, 1755.

⁶ See Appendix C.

who returned to their homes reported that they had encountered many other prisoners during their captivity. John Baker, who escaped from Kitanning, estimated that the Indians held over one hundred prisoners in that town. In the wake of the "Articles of Agreement" concluded between the British and the Ohio tribes at Fort Pitt in 1764, the Shawnees and Ohio Delawares alone handed over 260 captives to Henry Bouquet in six months. Other Indian groups returned large numbers of captives at Easton from 1757 onward, and at various times at Albany, Fort Niagara, and Detroit, while throughout the war the French routinely returned small numbers of captives whom they had purchased from the Indians.⁷

The colonists had lurid notions of what would happen to them if captured, particularly what would happen to any woman whom the Indians captured. James Burd related that "they put their Prisoners to Death in a most unhuman Manner." Adam Stephen maintained that the Indians "Spare the Lives of Young Women, and Carry them away to gratify the Brutal passions of Lawless Savages."⁸

⁷ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:97-98; "Examination of John Baker," March 31, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:78; William S. Ewing, "Indian Captives Released by Colonel Bouquet," *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine*, (1956) 39:187-201.

⁸ James Burd letter, December 20, 1756, P.S.A., Edward Shippen Thompson Family Papers, Box 1, Folder 3; Adam Stephen to George Washington, October 4, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:72.

While the frontier settlers had reason to fear captivity based on the number of captives, their notion of what they would experience after capture was grossly distorted. The Indians sought prisoners primarily for adoption into their tribes and treated their prisoners well. As a result of this motivation, most of the captives were women and children, particularly children, whom the Indians felt could be most easily integrated into their tribes.⁹

When seeking prisoners and booty the raiders sought lightly guarded plantations where there were many women and children. Any "battle" was typically short. The raiders attempted to surprise the guards before descending on the plantation itself. There they quickly seized prisoners and plunder, and retreated swiftly before a rescue party could intercept them. Sometimes the raiders were in such haste to evade pursuers that they retreated without stopping for food or water until nightfall.¹⁰

⁹ The treatment of captives is not surprising. Despite the popular view of the horrors of captivity and brutality of Indian ritualistic torture, historians have long realized the fallacy of this view. For a more detailed discussion of the treatment of Indian captives see James Axtell, *The European and the Indian*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp.168-200, and *The Invasion Within*, (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp.302-327. Between 1754 and 1758 there are reports of the raiders taking 755 captives. Of those the sex and age is known for 457. Of these 250 were children, 118 men, and 89 women. However, from contemporary accounts the percentage of women was probably much higher. See Appendix II.

¹⁰ James E. Seaver, *A Narrative of the Life of Mrs Mary Jemison*, (Canandaigua, N.Y.: J.D. Bemis and Co., 1824), pp.25-26.

The primary goal of the raiders was to escape interception. If threatened by a party attempting to rescue the captives, the raiders did anything necessary to escape. If a captive had suffered wounds and could not travel, the Indians might kill him or her. Abraham Miller, captured in May 1757 on the Northampton County frontier, described how his captors killed his mother and a girl with him because of their wounds. Under other circumstances it was highly unusual for the Indians to kill women and children. Thus, it is ironic that women and children were in the greatest danger of losing their lives when parties set out to rescue them.¹¹

If any men were disruptive and refused to comply with their captors' wishes, the Indians might also kill them as they fled. During flight any killing was generally quick and without torture. William Flemming described how, after his capture Captain Jacobs, the leader of the raiding party, informed him that he "looked young and lusty, [and] they would not hurt me, provided I was willing to go with them." When ordered to do various tasks, Fleming did them with "my usual submission." Flemming was treated well, but not long after they had captured him the Indians captured another young man

¹¹ Conrad Weiser described how a detachment he had sent out to intercept a raiding party discovered the bodies of some women and children just as they thought they were close to reaching the party. Conrad Weiser to Gov. Morris, November 18, 1755, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:60; "Depositions of those who had been taken prisoners by the Indians," June 20, 1757, H.S.P., Northampton County Records: Miscellaneous Papers, 1:253; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 30, 1757, December 22, 1757.

from a neighboring plantation. He was rather less compliant and shortly the Indians killed him "with several tomahawk blows."¹²

When the captors finally halted, they bound their prisoners and often forced them to strip, making any attempt to escape more difficult. After John Craig's capture, the Indians "immediately stripped him[,] tied a Rope around his Neck and drove him before them." When the raiding party finally stopped, for the night they frequently tied the prisoners to trees to prevent escape. Craig reported that when they stopped at night the prisoners "were stripp'd stark naked and their Limbs stretched out to the utmost Extent and tied to a Post and Trees." En route to the Ohio, Christian Post came across "poles, painted red. . . stuck in the ground by Indians, to which they tye the prisoners when they stop at night in their return from their incursions."¹³

After a few days several raiding parties assembled at a prearranged location. There they divided the prisoners and booty between the different groups. At this point the raiders might kill and ceremonially torture some of the captives, particularly soldiers in the provincial forces or the British

¹² *Maryland Gazette*, April 1, 1756.

¹³ Craig was captured in 1756 near McDowell's Mill, "Deposition of John Craig," March 30, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:78; "Deposition of George Hutchinson," November 15, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 17) 2:728-730; "Post's Journal," Thwaites ed., *Early Western Travels*, 1:190.

army. Peter Lewney described how his captors tortured one of the Virginia rangers they had captured. "They roasted [him] alive and tormented [him] for a whole Night before he expired, cutting pieces of Flesh off of his Body, and eating it."¹⁴

When the party neared the home town of the raiders the captives were, as was traditional in many Indian societies, be whipped and had to "run the gauntlet" before their adoption into the tribe. At this point, other male captives, again normally captured soldiers, might be ceremonially tortured and killed. John Cox reported that during his captivity at Kitanning Shingas and Captain Jacobs had returned with several prisoners. They "made an example" of one of the prisoners. Calling "all the Prisoners to be Witnesses to this Scene," they beat him "for half an hour with Clubs and Tomahawks, and afterwards fastening him to a Post, cropt his Ears close to his Head; after which an Indian chopt off his Fingers, and another, with a red hot iron, burnt him all over his Belly." Eventually they "Shot him full of Arrows, and at last killed and scalped him."¹⁵

¹⁴ Lewney continued that he had been very well treated by his captors. "Deposition of John Craig," March 30, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:78; George Mercer to John Fenton Mercer, April 15, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:354-355; *Maryland Gazette*, September 2, 1756; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 2, 1756. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 28, 1757.

¹⁵ *Maryland Gazette*, March 18, October 7, 1756; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 9, 1756, October 14, 21, 1756; "Deposition of John Craig, : March 30, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:78; John Ingles, *The Story of Mary Draper* (continued...)

The Indians generally kept the children they had captured and adopted them into their families, but on occasion, sold adults, especially any elderly they had taken, to the French. The Ohio Indians captured Charles Stewart and his family in the Great Cove in Cumberland County in 1755. They took Stewart and his family to Kittaning, where they divided the prisoners among the various raiding groups. There they separated Stewart and his wife from their children. They took the two adults to Detroit and sold them to a French missionary, who arranged for their transport to France, from whence they finally sailed back to Pennsylvania.¹⁶

Nearly all the prisoners agreed that they had been well treated during their captivity, and most reported that the Indians had treated them "very kindly." When Christian Post met with the Delaware leaders on the Ohio in 1758, Shingas assured him that he "was always very kind to any prisoners that were brought in." Others informed Post "when we take any prisoners from you, we treat them as our own children. We are

¹⁵(...continued)

Ingles and Her Son Thomas Ingles, (Radford, Va: Commonwealth Press Incorporated, 1969,) p.10; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:241-245. For a more detailed discussion of the Shawnees' treatment of captives see James H. Howard, *Shawnee! The Ceremonialism of a Native Indian Tribe and Its Cultural Background*, (Athens Oh.: Ohio University Press, 1981), pp.119-125.

¹⁶ "Examination of John Baker," March 31, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:78; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, December 22, 1757.

poor, and yet we clothe them as well as we can, though you see our children are as naked as at the first."¹⁷

The Indians generally adopted the prisoners into their families and treated them as full members of the tribe. One of the Indian leaders at Detroit adopted Peter Lewney. He "was often with them at their Councils with the French, being dressed and painted as the Indians were, and not known by the French but as an Indian, living in every Respect as they did." Many of the captives who escaped were able to do so because their captors had treated them as full family members and had even provided them with weapons to hunt and allowed them to venture out alone.¹⁸

Because of the good treatment they received and the great length of their captivity, many of the captives came to view the Indians as their family and were reluctant to return to the British after the war. David Boyd reported that when he returned to Virginia and his family he was very unhappy for "he had grown fond of the wild and free life of the forest and

¹⁷ Examination of Daniel McMullen, September 22, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:101; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 2, 1756, July 28, 1757; *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 6:24; "Narrative of the Captivity of Mrs. Jane Frazier," *The Garland Library of Narratives of North American Captives*, (New York, Garland Publishing, 1977), 109:6; "Post's Journal," Thwaites ed., *Early Western Travels*, 1:212, 214.

¹⁸ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 28, 1757; "Captivity of Peter Looney," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 1928-1929, 15:95-96; "Examination of John Baker," March 31, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:78; *Maryland Gazette*, March 18, 1756; "Examination of John Hochtattler, [May 5?, 1758,] Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 1:391-393..

was greatly dissatisfied by his new surroundings." He considered escaping and returning to the Indians and "had to be closely guarded for weeks before he relinquished his plan." Thomas Ingles, who returned to Virginia after thirteen years amongst the Shawnees, "became very restless & uneasy," and likewise had to be closely watched. A young girl whom the Susquehanna Delawares returned to the British in 1758 "was obstinate, [and] would neither tell her name nor Speak a Word, and made great resistance to her being delivered up."¹⁹

Many others did remain with their captors. Mary Jemison, captured in Cumberland County in 1758, remained with the Senecas until her death in 1833 even though some of her family survived the raid and lived in Virginia. Several captives rose to prominence among their adopted tribes. George Brown, rose to "become one of the chief Men among the Shawnese" and Joshua Renick became a Miami leader.²⁰

Several "captives" actively aided the Indians in their struggle against the English, acting as guides for raiding

¹⁹ Mrs. Elvert M. Davis, ed., "History of the Capture and Captivity of David Boyd from Cumberland County Pennsylvania, 1756," *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine*, 1931, 14:39; John Ingles, *The Story of Mary Draper Ingles and Her Son Thomas Ingles*, (Radford, Va: Commonwealth Press Incorporated, 1969,) p.27; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:147.

²⁰ Harry S. Douglas, "The Immortal Mary Jemison," *Historical Wyoming*, January 1958 9:33-46; Seaver, ed., *Life of Mary Jemison*, p.25; *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 6:25; Chester Raymond Young, "The Effects of the French and Indian War on Civilian Life in the Frontier Counties of Virginia, 1754-1763," Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1969, p.133.

parties. William Johnson, captured in Frederick County, Maryland in 1754, reported that "several of our late Inhabitants who have been taken and carried back associated with the Indians, and as often as they make Incursions, come down and serve them as Guides."²¹ On several occasions, settlers even reported hearing Indians who were raiding speaking in English or German.²²

Despite the actual treatment received by captives, the fear of capture terrified many backcountry settlers and was responsible for much of the panic that settlers felt when they heard rumors of nearby raids. A report in December 1755 maintained that "such shocking Descriptions are given by those who have escaped of the horrid Cruelties and indecencies committed by those merciless Savages on the Bodies of the unhappy wretches who fell into their hands" that reports "struck so great a Pannick and Damp upon the Spirits of the people, that hitherto they have not been able to make any considerable resistance or stand against the Indians."²³

Fear of the Indians caused many tens of thousands of settlers to flee their homes and seek safety in the east. Following Braddock's defeat, frontiersmen complained to the Council of Pennsylvania that "their Wives and Children are

²¹ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:341.

²² *Pennsylvania Gazette*, January 15, 1756; James Young to James Burd, October 3, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3.

²³ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:767-768.

terrified to death with every. . . most trifling story, and are with difficulty persuaded to stay and do the Duty of their Families." Many families quit their homes and headed to the east, North Carolina, or New Jersey.²⁴

When raiders struck, hysteria erupted. After the fall of Fort Vause in Augusta County in 1756, William Preston lamented that "to describe the Confusion and Disorder [of] the Poor People. . . is Impossible. . . Mothers with [a] train of helpless Children at their heels stragglng through woods & mountains to escape the fury of those merciless savages." Throngs of covered wagons, loaded with the belongings of families heading for safety, packed the roads. James Maury reported in southwestern Virginia that "From the waters of Potomac, James River, and Roanoake. . . from the side of the Blue Ridge, hundreds of families have, within these few months past, removed, deserted their habitations, and conveyed themselves and their most valuable movables into other governments." He added that "by Bedford Court House, in one week. . . near three hundred persons. . . passed on their way to Carolina. And I have it from good authors, that. . . five thousand more had crossed [the] James River. . . at Goochland Court House." Those fleeing were "not the idler and the

²⁴ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:590; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 28, 1755.

vagrant. . . but the honest and industrious, men of worth and property."²⁵

Not everyone was free to evacuate. The departure of a prominent settler's family might prompt a widespread panic. James Burd confided to Edward Shippen in August 1755 that he was thinking of evacuating his wife and children, but he had "been plagued with the Solicitations of the People in this County not to Carry my Family to Lancaster." After the raids had begun, Conrad Weiser complained to Governor Morris that "I must stand my ground or my neighbours will all go away and leave their habitations to be destroyed by the Enemy." In May 1756 James Wood, the founder of Winchester, decided to move from his plantation near the town. His decision created a panic and "caused many to think their Case desperate."²⁶

Life for the refugees was indeed desperate. Having abandoned their plantations and possessions, they lacked any means of earning a living. Most lost their crops and livestock. They had nowhere to live and lodged in what amounted to refugee camps in backcountry towns near military

²⁵ ["Memorandum" July, 1756] Draper Mss.: Preston Papers, 1QQ:132; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:105; Conrad Weiser to Gov. Denny, June, 1757, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:73; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 2:767-768; Ann Maury, *Memoirs of a Huguenot Family*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1852), p.432.

²⁶ James Burd to Edward Shippen, August 24, 1755, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; Conrad Weiser to Gov. Morris, November 18, 1755, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:60; William Fairfax to George Washington, May 20, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:167.

garrisons such as Lancaster, York, and Winchester. There they lived in barns and stables, "Men, Women and Children who had lately lived in great Affluence and Plenty reduced to the most extreme Poverty and Distress. . . and in want of the Common Necessaries of Life." The refugees were short of food and clothing. Several times their need compelled Washington to provide them with supplies, lamenting that he was forced "to hear the cries of the hungry, who have fled for refuge to these places, with nothing more than they carried on their backs."²⁷

Settlers abandoned a vast area of the frontier. Hampshire County was completely abandoned. The county court did not meet from mid-1755 to the end of 1757, and the House of Burgesses even considered merging the county again with Frederick County from which it had been formed in 1752. An area running along the frontier from the Delaware River to the James River between fifty and one hundred miles wide was deserted. The population of Augusta County fell by nearly half from 1754 to 1758 and did not recover to prewar levels until 1764. The population of Frederick County fell by almost a third, although it had recovered to pre-war levels by 1760.

²⁷ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, January 1, 1756; "Report of Chew, Stedman, West and Shippen," April 21, 1756, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 2:80; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 27, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:60; Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, May 3, 1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, June 24, 1757, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:401-402, 654.

Bedford and Halifax counties both lost population in years of heaviest raiding, and other backcountry counties in the interior found their population growth stalled as existing settlers moved out at the same rate that new settlers arrived.²⁸

To encourage settlers to remain, the colonies posted military units on the frontier, often with regard only to protecting valuable settlements such as the South Branch of the Potomac. Some settlers did remain on their plantations despite the danger. For them life was no less desperate. They attempted to protect their farms by fortifying them, turning them into strongholds, such as Henry Enoch's plantation and Job Pearsall's in Hampshire County. By the end of 1756 there were at least 68 non-military fortified posts on the Virginia frontier. Pennsylvania had almost fifty such posts. Some of these were even constructed under the auspices of the county authorities. In Cumberland County a mass meeting of the inhabitants decided to build five forts

²⁸ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 24, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:45; Henning, *Statutes*, 7:67; McIlwaine, *Journal of the House of Burgesses, 1758-1761*, p.110; Chester Raymond Young has used county records to estimate the changes in population of the frontier and backcountry counties of Virginia. Chester Raymond Young, "The Effects of the French and Indian War on Civilian Life in the Frontier Counties of Virginia, 1754-1763," Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1969, p.207; See Appendix B.

across the county to which they could evacuate their wives and children.²⁹

Isolated in their forts, the frontier inhabitants lacked arms and provisions. The forts were open to attack and their occupants had to keep constant guard. Afraid, hungry, and strained by keeping a continual watch, those confined in these small outposts grew increasingly temperamental.³⁰ In 1757 Robert Armstrong complained that a local settler wanted shelter in his fort. Armstrong protested that "it is much Contrary to My Interest as I have found by Experience when he lived here last Summer--for at that time my wife and Children could not pas [sic] or Repas With out Receiving Some immodert [sic] and insulting affronts." He added

besides I look upon it to be hard Usage to bring familyes with their stocks upon My plantation, Not but that I should Willingly put up with Disconveniencies of this kind were they poore honest people such as were Not fully able to Work

²⁹ On occasion the provincial forces even aided in the construction and defence of these outposts. George Washington to William Cocks and John Ashby, October 27, 1755, George Washington to Adam Stephen, January 9, 1756, George Washington to Thomas Waggener, January 9, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:141, 263-264, 265-266; Andrew Lewis to William Preston, February 26, 1757, Draper Mss.: William Preston Papers, 1QQ:150-151; Young, "The Effects of the French and Indian War on Civilian Life," p.205; William A. Hunter, *Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1753-1758*, (Harrisburg Pa.: The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1960), pp.548-564; "Meeting of the General Council of Cumberland Council," October 30, 1755, H.S.P., Lamberton Scotch-Irish Collection, 1:23.

³⁰ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 27, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:60; "Deposition of Robert Brown," August, 1756, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:79.

for their living but as he has always been known to be an Idle [man]. . . that never Would Work as an honest Man ought I think he has less [right] to be supported by a fort.³¹

The progress of the war greatly dismayed those settlers who remained. They bitterly reproved the provincial authorities for their failure to protect them. After the first raids upon Pennsylvania, Conrad Weiser was lucky to escape death from a mob of angry settlers who swarmed around his home, demanded guns and ammunition, and denounced him as a traitor because of his association with the Indians. In Virginia Dunbar's flight produced the greatest outpouring of wrath. The bitter sentiments of the backcountry settlers horrified Governor Dinwiddie, who informed General Shirley that he could not "in strong enough Colours represent to You the Dissatisfact'n, Discontent and Clamours of All ranks of People here."³²

Some backcountry inhabitants may even have considered capitulating to the French. Washington reported to Dinwiddie that "numbers. . . hold Councils and Cabals to very dishonourable purposes. . . Despairing of assistance and protection. . . they talk of capitulating and coming upon terms with the French and Indians; rather than lose their

³¹ Robert Armstrong to James Burd, April 18, 1757, Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, Edward Shippen Thompson Family Papers, Box 1, Folder 3.

³² Conrad Weiser to Gov. Morris, November 19, 1755, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:34; Gov. Dinwiddie to Gen. Shirley, October 18, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:245.

lives and Fortunes through obstinancy." Other backcountry inhabitants provided the French with important intelligence. Whatever action the provincial authorities undertook displeased the backcountry settlers. Morris commented sourly to the Board of Trade that "the people are not satisfied, nor. . . would they be unless every man[']s house was protected by a Fort and a company of soldiers and themselves paid for staying at Home and doing nothing."³³

Especially in Pennsylvania, relations between the military and civilians became very tense. When Henry Bouquet arrived in Philadelphia in December 1756 he reported that "while entering the city on horseback at the head of the battalion, a farmer rogue mounted on a nag lashed at me with his whip, which missed me fortunately for him. He was at once beaten up and taken to prison where he still is." The incident by itself was not particularly remarkable, but it was "the third incident of this kind to occur." Bouquet for his part denounced the civilian population as "riffraff" and added "I hope we shall succeed in inspiring them with fear of the red coats. Everything most abominable that nature has produced, and everything most detestable that corruption can

³³ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 24, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:46; Gov. Dinwiddie to Clement Reed, January 13, 1757, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:582; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:399; Gov. Morris to the Board of Trade, January 5, 1756, H.S.P., Gratz Collection, 15:18.

add to it, such are the honest inhabitants of this province."³⁴

Most Pennsylvanians were not so forward in their opposition to the army, nor was opposition restricted to Pennsylvania alone. Virginians and Pennsylvanians were reluctant to provide the army with needed supplies and equipment. Both Braddock and Forbes found that the reluctance of the settlers to aid the army made organizing a major expedition from the backcountry all but impossible.³⁵ Washington discovered that the Virginia backcountry settlers were reluctant even to aid in the construction of fortresses to defend them. One of his commanders, Robert Stewart, who encountered little enthusiasm from the inhabitants of Maidstone for construction of a fort there, complained that "unerring Experience has convinc'd us that we can neither Buy Hire or Borrow any [tools] from the Country people."³⁶

³⁴ Bouquet to Lt. Col. John Young, December 15, 1756, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 1:37.

³⁵ Gen. Braddock to the Duke of Newcastle, June 5, 1755, "Papers Relating to the Supplying of His Majesties Forces in North America," [1756] BL, Additional Mss., 32,855:336-337, 35,909:246-254; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:368-369, 7:602-603; Robert Stewart to George Washington, July 23, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:289-290; Henry Bouquet to Sir John St. Clair, May 31, 1758, Edward Shippen to Henry Bouquet, June 4, 1758, Bouquet to Magistrates of Berks County, June 5, 1758, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 1:400-401, 2:30-31, 31-32.

³⁶ George Washington to Thomas Waggener, January 9, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 25, 1756, Robert Stewart to George Washington, July 3, 1756, Robert Stewart to Washington, July 23, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:265-266, 3:223, 235, 289-290.

Yet more troublesome than the reluctance of the settlers to aid the war effort was their resistance to the war. Settlers actively hindered all aspects of the war and refused to cooperate with military authorities. Washington complained frequently of "the villainy and ill-judged compassion of the country-people; who deem it a merit to assist Deserters." Settlers hid deserters from the army and developed what amounted to an eighteenth century "underground railroad" to speed them to the safety of neighboring colonies.³⁷

Backcountry settlers were sometimes willing to supply the army. However, rarely did they provide supplies of the type or at a cost that the military desired. Selling liquor at a fort was a particularly profitable activity, and company commanders on occasion sought the privilege of a sutling license for their friends and relatives. In November 1757 William Allen asked James Burd to allow Joseph Yeats to sell beer at Fort Augusta. Yeats was an old friend "who has gone through various flaws in life, and has been reduced by misfortunes."³⁸

Sutlers flocked to military encampments, with the result that liquor was often more available than any other commodity,

³⁷ William Fairfax to George Washington, August 13-16, 1756, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 10, 1757, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, July 11, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:346-348, 4:193-194, 295-296; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 11, 1755.

³⁸ William Allen to James Burd, November 1, 1757, Pennsylvania State Archives, Edward Shippen Thompson Papers, Box 1, Folder 3.

including food. In the spring of 1757, although the soldiers at Fort Augusta were starving and cut off from the rest of Pennsylvania by raiding parties, sutlers still managed to smuggle large supplies of liquor to them. When the soldiers had no money to pay for their liquor, the sutlers sold it on credit. When the men finally received their pay, the sutlers seized the money to collect their debts, leaving the men penniless.³⁹

Military authorities made repeated attempts to restrict the availability of liquor, but to no avail. With little effort, sutlers were able to hide their activities. In July 1758 a sutler set up business only half a mile from Fort Loudoun and operated successfully for several months before the garrison commander discovered him.⁴⁰

Discovery did not necessarily halt a sutler's activities. In June 1756 Robert Stewart, one of Washington's commanders, attempted to shut a tippling house in Maidstone where his men got drunk and received encouragement to desert. Stewart ordered the tippling house to close, but the owner refused. Stewart posted a guard, but the owner bribed the guards "by his giving them liquor for liberty to supply others." Stewart then tried to get the local magistrate to close the tavern.

³⁹ James Burd letter, April 23, 1757, Gov. Denny to James Burd, October 19, 1757, Shippen Family Papers, H.S.P., Vols. 2 & 3.

⁴⁰ Lewis Ourry to Henry Bouquet, July 4, 1758, Kent, ed., *Papers of Henry Bouquet*, 2:162.

The magistrate was reluctant and took his time. When he finally issued a warrant, the owner ignored it. Stewart then sought to have the magistrate arrest the owner, but the magistrate replied that he would need two other justices and since they were not in town, he could do nothing.⁴¹ Stewart in desperation ordered his officers to patrol through the house every evening to insure that, if nothing else, the men returned to camp. The owner was so incensed at this action that he began a brawl with one of the officers and threatened to have Stewart demoted and reassigned from the post. For several months the tavernkeeper successfully flouted all military authority.⁴²

It was not only civilians who sold liquor to the troops. In Winchester in 1758 an officer of the Virginia Regiment established his own profitable tavern. Nowhere was the situation worse than in Winchester Virginia, the headquarters of the Virginia Regiment. Washington ran a constant campaign to limit the number of innkeepers and tippling houses in the

⁴¹ Robert Stewart to George Washington, June 20, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:207-209.

⁴² Robert Stewart to Washington, June 23, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:214-215.

town, but to no avail.⁴³ In October 1757 Washington complained to Governor Dinwiddie that he

cou'd give your Honor such instances of the villainous Behaviour of those Tippling-house-keeper's, as wou'd astonish any person. . . it is impossible to maintain that discipline and do that Service with a garrison thus corrupted by a sett of people, whose conduct looks like the effect of a combination to obstruct the Service. . . these are the people of a country whose bowels are at this juncture torn by the most horrid devastations of the most cruel and barbarous enemy.⁴⁴

Selling liquor was not the only avenue for profit the war offered. Army supplies provided another. In 1756 a Winchester merchant persuaded several of the Virginia Regiment's guards to provide him with flour in return for liquor. He then sold the flour back to the army. Civilians also developed an extensive "black market" in military equipment. Unscrupulous merchants persuaded many troops to part with their clothing, equipment, and even arms in return for liquor. They may have been only imitating the example of the Virginia Regiment's quarter-master general, John Hamilton, who made a substantial profit by selling regimental supplies. When Washington halted the scheme, Hamilton fled, although the Frederick County justices refused to press charges against the

⁴³ Robert Stewart to Washington, June 23, 1756, "Orders" August 5-9, 1756, "Court of Inquiry," May 4-8, 1758, William Woodford to George Washington, May 17, 1758, Thomas Waggener to George Washington, May 20, 1758, George Washington to John Blair, May 28, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:214-215, 338-340, 5:162-163, 187, 188, 199-203.

⁴⁴ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 9, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:12.

merchants and were even reluctant to supply a warrant to search Hamilton's home.⁴⁵

Civilians took advantage of opportunities provided by the chaos of war in other ways as well. Sometimes their actions took the form of pillaging and plundering. In October 1755, after a large raid on Penn's Creek, Pennsylvania, many of the inhabitants began "plundering the Houses, & mak[ing] the best of other people's Misfortune." On occasion frontiersmen even disguised themselves as Indians so they could ransack plantations with impunity. Indian disguise could provide other opportunities for frontiersmen. During 1758 several frontiersmen dressed as Indians successfully received presents from the English designed for the Indians.⁴⁶

Even within the law there were many areas where civilians could profit from the war. The demands of the military for supplies and equipment allowed farmers and

⁴⁵ Gov. Dinwiddie to Andrew Lewis, May 5, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:403-404; William Hughes to Robert Stewart, February 12, 1756, "Evening Orders," May 26, 1756, "Orders," August 11, August 12, 1756, Robert Stewart to George Washington, September 27, 1757, Gabriel Jones to George Washington, October 6, 1757, George Washington to General Stanwix, October 8, 1757, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 9, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:177-178, 211, 343, 4:423-424, 5:7-8, 8-9, 10-13.

⁴⁶ Conrad Weiser, to Gov. Morris, October 26, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (17) 2:831; McIlwaine, *Journal of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 1752-1755, 1756-1758*, 6:350; William Fairfax to George Washington, October 20, 1755, Charles Smith to George Washington, August 15, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:132, 5:392.

planters to charge a premium for their goods. The receipt books of John Harris, a frontier merchant settled on the Susquehanna River, reveal the greatly increased demand for goods and provisions as a result of military activities. Planters made full use of this opportunity to charge inflated prices for their produce and on occasion even conspired to fix minimum prices below which they agreed not to sell.⁴⁷

These premiums alone did not satisfy the backcountry farmers and planters. In many cases they defrauded the army by sending sub-standard animals. After commissioners inspected the animals to value them, the farmers substituted other animals. Bouquet described the horses supplied to Forbes' Expedition as "nags who were unable to drag themselves along," while the cattle were "small, lean, and poor as they could be."⁴⁸

Food the settlers provided was often inedible. In 1755 Thomas Cressap, one of the most respected Maryland frontiersmen, supplied Braddock's expedition with beef so rotten the troops had to bury it. In 1757 nearly all the beef collected at Fort Cumberland was inedible and of 140 barrels of pork collected for Forbes' expedition, only 60 were fit for

⁴⁷ "Receipt Book" of John Harris II, 1749-1769, Harris-Fischer Family Papers, Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, Box 1; Thomas Walker to George Washington, December 4, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:199. See Appendix B.

⁴⁸ Henry Bouquet to John Forbes, July 11, 1758, Henry Bouquet to John Forbes, August 26, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:180, 424.

consumption. Even when the produce met standards, civilians found other ways to defraud the army, such as using fraudulent weights and measures. In the summer of 1758 one of the commissaries was discovered using weights which were light by $12\frac{1}{2}\%$.⁴⁹

The potential for profit lured large numbers of camp-followers who served as washerwomen, cooks or whores. To control their numbers, Forbes issued standing orders that "All Sutlers must have Licenses and must attach themselves to some particular Corps, or to the Head Quarters, as the Commanding Officers of [the] Corps will be made answerable for the Behaviour of those Sutlers, that they allow to follow their Regiment." He also attempted to control the sutlers by establishing regulated markets in the camps, setting prices, and forbidding the sale of goods on credit. His attempts failed, and swarms of peddlers and vendors continued to pursue the army in their quest for profit.⁵⁰

Local civil authorities played a major role in the consolidation of frontier resistance to military authority.

⁴⁹ John Billings to Henry Bouquet, June 9, 1758, Adam Stephen to Henry Bouquet, August 18, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:57, 386-387; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 10, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:194; Robert Orme, "Journal of General Braddock's Expedition," BL, King's Mss., 212:44.

⁵⁰ Orderly Book of Captain Thomas Hamilton's Company, October 18, 1759, Cumberland County Historical Society, 9:22; George Washington's Orderly Book, September 22, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 6:32; Orders, Carlisle, June 5, 1758, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers: Orderly Book of Joseph Shippen's Company, 1758.

The primary reason for the failure to suppress the illegal liquor trade was that the civil courts refused to prosecute offenders while the military authorities had no right to take direct action against civilians. County justices refused to issue warrants to search for embezzled supplies. Some magistrates warned merchants that they were going to search, allowing them ample opportunity to hide any illegal supplies. County justices refused to draft men, to punish deserters, to impress needed equipment and supplies, and to enforce military authority over civilians. Some even offered to defend deserters in court.⁵¹

In October 1755 Governor Dinwiddie complained to the Virginia House of Burgesses "of the great Obstruct's given to the Service by many of the Magistrates and other civil Officers, some of whom have even given Protect'n to those who have shamefully deserted with their Arms. . . and others with an unparrallel'd and most criminal Undutifulness to their Country have discouraged and prevented the Enlist'g [of] Men, tho' to protect themselves." But the House of Burgesses was reluctant to increase military authority. Dinwiddie thus

⁵¹ William Hughes to Robert Stewart, February 12, 1756, Robert Stewart to George Washington, June 23, 1756, Thomas Walker to George Washington, June 30, 1756, "Orders" August 5-9, 1756, Gabriel Jones to George Washington, October 6, 1757, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 9, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:211, 214-215, 231, 338-340, 5:7-8, 10-13; Henry Bouquet to John Forbes, May 25, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 1:363

resorted to issuing new commissions of the peace, but even this action failed to provide more reliable justices.⁵²

On the occasions when magistrates and local officials did cooperate, it was rarely as desired. They often authorized higher compensation for the hire of wagons and other equipment than the army had authorized. When military authorities refused to pay, the wagoners complained bitterly, blaming the military officials rather than their local justices. Particularly during Forbes' expedition the justices either refused to cooperate in the hiring of wagons and the purchase of equipment, or agreed to pay exorbitant rates. The reluctance of the justices to cooperate with military authorities stemmed mainly from their own self-interest, causing Henry Bouquet to comment bitterly that every Pennsylvania justice "wishes to be popular, and build his career at the expense of the government."⁵³

When there was a direct conflict between civil and military authority, justices gave precedence to the civil. In 1758 county justices in York, Pennsylvania, arrested some troops in Forbes' army for brawling with civilians. They refused to release them to military authorities, despite assurances that the army would punish them and pleas that they

⁵² Address of Gov. Dinwiddie to the Assembly, October 27, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, August 19, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:254, 483.

⁵³ Henry Bouquet to John Forbes, June 3, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:18.

were needed for the expedition against Fort Duquesne, and held them for a civil trial.⁵⁴

In Virginia and Pennsylvania, military officials repeatedly clashed with civil authorities whose refusal to cooperate infuriated many officials. Washington complained that "In all things I meet with the greatest opposition[;] no orders are obey'd but what a Party of Soldier's or my own drawn Sword Enforces; without this a single horse for the most urgent occasion cannot be had."⁵⁵

The failure of the Virginia and Pennsylvania settlers to participate in their own defense seems perverse. Yet there were compelling considerations that prevented them from doing so. Military authorities failed to comprehend the roots of the conflict between military and civilian officials. American colonists demanded the right to be treated as full British citizens, yet there were no British precedents to guide the conduct of war amongst a civilian population. Britain had not seen a major foreign invasion since 1066, and only during the civil war in the mid-seventeenth century had civilians been in close contact with campaigning armies. In Britain the government had not been forced to resolve problems of impressing supplies and equipment. Troops could be lodged in

⁵⁴ George Stevenson to Henry Bouquet, May 30, 1758, Kent, ed., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet*, 1:398.

⁵⁵ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, Abbot & Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:101-102.

barracks without inconvenience, supplies could be obtained from contractors without dispute.⁵⁶ The recalcitrance of the frontiersmen infuriated Braddock, Washington, and Forbes. But to frontiersmen the demands of the army seemed unreasonable.

The reluctance of the settlers to aid the army can, in part, be explained by the difficulties they encountered. The army generally paid on credit rather than by cash, and as a result many colonists had difficulty obtaining repayment for wartime expenses. Following Braddock's defeat, Dunbar refused to pay many of the settlers who had supplied the army with cattle. Many of the receipts had been lost with the defeat of the army and Dunbar was, rightly, afraid that many settlers would use the opportunity to make fraudulent claims. The Virginia and Pennsylvania assemblies would only settle debts if claimants brought their accounts to Williamsburg and Philadelphia. As most of the claimants lived in the

⁵⁶ Many of the problems faced by the royalist and parliamentary forces during the Civil War are reminiscent of those encountered in North America. In mid-seventeenth-century England, some civilians were so opposed to military authority that they organized themselves into bands of "clubmen" to resist forcibly. For a discussion of anti-military sentiment in England in the mid-seventeenth century see J.S. Morrill, *The Revolt of the Provinces: Conservatives and Radicals in the English Civil War, 1630-1650*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976). For a discussion of the problems faced by the British and colonial authorities in North America during the Seven Years' War, see Alan Rogers, *Empire and Liberty: American Resistance to British Authority, 1753-1763*, (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1974); Douglas Edward Leach, *Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677-1763*, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1986.)

backcountry, traveling to the colonial capitals was a great undertaking.⁵⁷

The Virginia House of Burgesses established a committee of the House to investigate all claims against the colony. So rigid were their demands for precise accounts that they often refused to pay the officers' expenses. The commissary, Charles Dick, resigned in disgust at the House's failure to reimburse him. If the officers and commissary could not get their accounts approved, a backcountry farmer stood little chance.⁵⁸ In the fall of 1757, when Washington announced that he was going to Williamsburg to meet with the committee, many of the backcountry settlers brought their accounts to him, begging him to settle them for them and reminding him of "the vast hardships many of the poor people groan under here, having been so long kept out of the money which the country owes them."⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Gov. Dinwiddie to Charles Dick, August 11, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Charles Dick, September 2, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Shirley, January 24, 1756, Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Shirley, March 13, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:150, 183, 330, 369.

⁵⁸ George Washington to Charles Dick, September 6, 1755, Charles Dick to George Washington, September 6, 1755, George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, December 5, 1755, Thomas Walker to George Washington, April 14, 1756, John Robinson to George Washington, August 19, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:21-22, 25-26, 2:200-202, 353, 3:365-367; Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, September 17, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:201.

⁵⁹ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:45-46.

Pennsylvania handed control of war finances to the provincial commissioners. They were as fastidious as the Virginians. Conrad Weiser complained in 1758 that he had found it impossible to get his accounts settled. He added "I have found by Experience, that new debts are Suffered to grow Old ones, and old ones are never paid, which is but poor encouragement for faithfull Servants of the Government."⁶⁰

The difficulties settlers encountered in recovering their debts cannot fully justify their behavior: this problem might explain the settlers' reluctance to participate in the war, but cannot account for their active hindrance of the war effort. Settlers embezzled supplies, hid deserters and ignored military authority on one hand, and rushed to provide the army with supplies when the opportunity seemed profitable on the other.

The reason for this seemingly self-destructive behavior lay in the nature of backcountry and frontier society. Frontier society lacked a sense of community which would have induced settlers to protect one another and to view the war in a wider context. An intense sense of individualism dominated frontier society. This individualism was further heightened by the substantial rate of mobility which characterized frontier settlements. George Franz estimates that during this period in Paxton, Derry, and Donegal townships, on the

⁶⁰ Conrad Weiser to Richard Peters, December 16, 1758, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:141.

frontier of Lancaster County, mobility rates averaged around 50% per annum, an incredibly high figure creating what he terms "a community of strangers."⁶¹

The development of community was further weakened by the deep ethnic and religious divisions in the backcountry, and more especially between the backcountry and the older eastern settlements. The frontier region was peopled by polyglot settlers, many of whom were recent immigrants who tended to associate within their ethnic groups. The largest single group throughout the backcountry was the Scotch-Irish, but there were substantial minorities of Catholic Irish, Germans, Scottish, Welsh and English, with smaller numbers of French Huguenots and Swiss.⁶² While ethnic divisions weakened the development of community on the frontier, it is not possible to assign responsibility for the resistance to authority and unrest on the frontier to any one particular ethnic group.⁶³

⁶¹ George Franz, "Paxton: A Study of Community Structure and Mobility in the Colonial Pennsylvania Backcountry," Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University, 1974, pp.209, 236-242.

⁶² Illick, *Colonial Pennsylvania*, pp.172-173; Mitchell, *Commercialism and Frontier*, pp. 104-106; Gregory H. Nobles, "Breaking into the Backcountry: New Approaches to the Early American Frontier, 1750-1800," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d Ser., (1989) 46:650-653.

⁶³ David Hackett Fischer in particular attributes much of the violence and unrest endemic in the eighteenth century southern backcountry to the predominance of Scotch-Irish settlers. David Hackett Fischer, *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America*, (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.605-782, passim.

Frontier society was dominated by a sense of individualism which cut through many traditional social barriers. Frontier and backcountry settlers viewed the war only as a threat to their immediate family and an opportunity for individual profit or loss. Frontier settlers were unable to see the benefit of supporting a large military garrison to protect them, although they might band together with their immediate neighbors to construct small fortified outposts. Indeed, the sense of individualism and self-preservation may have cut through the bonds of marriage. When a raiding party captured William Fleming near the Conococheague in November 1755, in an effort to save his own scalp, Flemming guided the party back to his home to capture his wife.⁶⁴

But perhaps the greatest element undermining the frontier community was the motivation of the settlers for migrating to the region. Settlers came to the frontier in search of personal independence and economic opportunity. The frontier they moved to was not a region of self-sufficient farmers, but rather of aggressive commercialism and questing for economic opportunity.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ *Maryland Gazette*, April 1, 1756.

⁶⁵ Jack Greene, "Independence, Improvement, and Authority: Toward a Framework for Understanding the Histories of the Southern Backcountry during the Era of the American Revolution," in Hoffman, et al., eds., *An Uncivil War*, pp.12-13; Robert D. Mitchell, *Commercialism and Frontier: Perspectives on the Early Shenandoah Valley*. (Charlottesville, Va: University of Virginia Press, 1977), pp.1-8. Mitchell maintains "Commercial tendencies were present from the
(continued...)

Frontier settlers resisted any development which might hinder their own advancement. The war simultaneously threatened to destroy their aspirations and opened new avenues for profit. Abandoned plantations awaited new owners. In 1755 Dinwiddie commented after a fierce raid on Augusta County that "I cannot help the Families des'rting their Habitat's. If they will run away from themselves and desert their Int[erest]ts[,] those that y't rema. to defend the Co'ty may hereafter be tho't worthy of enjoying their Plantat's." Settlers might claim lands cleared but then abandoned by squatters, or purchase lands from an owner who had fled east willing to take whatever capital he could.⁶⁶ If a settler could not find abandoned land, he could recover property abandoned in the haste of flight or claim stray horses and cattle. Large numbers of butchers came down from Philadelphia to scour the Virginia backcountry for abandoned cattle, which they then drove back to Pennsylvania for sale.⁶⁷

The war opened other lucrative opportunities. A settler, acting within the law, could profit by supplying the army with cattle, grain, or other necessaries. Because of its desperate

⁶⁵(...continued)
beginnings of permanent settlement, and were the most dynamic element in the emerging pioneer economy."

⁶⁶ Gov. Dinwiddie to Colonel John Buchanan, August 11, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:154-155.

⁶⁷ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, September 8, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:397; *Maryland Gazette*, July 28, 1757.

need, the army would pay high prices for needed supplies, allowing sutlers to charge a 25% markup on goods at Raystown and a 75% markup on goods at Pittsburgh.⁶⁸

Even if a settler had no provisions to sell, the army needed laborers. While Bouquet was unable to hire wagoners to haul supplies to Raystown even though he offered 15s per day, the wagoners were only too willing to haul goods all the way to the Ohio, for profits were greater. The army also required blacksmiths and farriers, "Carpenters, Joyners, Bricklayers, Masons, Oven Makers, Sadlers, Millrights, Coalmakers, Coopers, Tin Men, Sawyers, [and] Mealmakers," who were all well rewarded. Even unskilled laborers received 2/6d per day. There were even opportunities for women to work as nurses, cooks, and washerwomen, as well as the disrespectable, but more lucrative, demand for prostitutes.⁶⁹

The Seven Years' War opened great opportunities for those who were prepared to brave the risks of remaining on the frontier. The decision to remain while others fled was a desperate gamble in the quest for economic advantage, and for this reason settlers paid little attention to the greater

⁶⁸ "Rates and Prices at Raystown," August 10, 1758, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:352-353.

⁶⁹ Edward Shippen to Henry Bouquet, June 9, 1758, Bouquet Orderly Book, July 2, 1758, Lewis Ourry to Henry Bouquet, July 4, 1758, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:63, 160, 661; James Burd to Edward Shippen, April 27, 1755, James Burd to Sarah Burd, May 15, 1755, H.S.P. Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 1; Peter Burd to Gov. Morris, August 8, 1756, H.S.P., Gratz Collection, 15:18.

needs of the army and their province. The activities of embezzlers and profiteers merely reflect this individualism: they were unable to see how their benefitting from the distress of others could be iniquitous. In 1756 Governor Dinwiddie complained that the backcountry inhabitants "appear to me to endeavor to make Money unjustly from the Distress of the Co'try." His opinions were echoed two years later by Henry Bouquet who commented that "no one in this country can be relied on. At all times, private interests outweigh the general welfare."⁷⁰

These characteristics of individualism and the quest for improvement made it difficult, if not impossible, for provincial and imperial authorities to govern and control the frontier settlers, a fact that was central to Whitehall's desire for an Indian "reservation" west of the Appalachians. Frontier settlers could not be brought to accept any outside interference or advice which might hinder their progress. During the war the cool reception frontier settlers gave to their Cherokee allies had partly served to alienate the Indians, and from 1759 to 1761 the Cherokees waged another bitter war against the Virginia backcountry. Following the fall of Fort Duquesne, frontier settlers ignored the advice of the bureaucrats in Whitehall who threatened to block their

⁷⁰ Gov. Dinwiddie to Clement Read, September 8, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:504; Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, June 11, 1758, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:73.

access to the west. The settlers paid for their impudence when the Ohio Indians again descended upon the frontier in Pontiac's uprising in 1763.

Chapter IX

Dénouement

The fall of Fort Duquesne did not mark the end of the Seven Years' War on the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier. Rather, it spelled only the end of a phase of the struggle; its fall ended the descent on the frontier of raiding parties composed of Ohio Indians and Susquehanna Delawares. The end of the frontier raids was not the result of successful British policy but of the failure of the French war effort. Open Indian support for the French declined precipitously on the Ohio once they were unable to provide supplies and trade goods. Any Ohio Indians who still openly supported the French, rather than raiding the frontier settlements, now sought to isolate and destroy Fort Pitt. For the French themselves the prime strategy in the Ohio theater also shifted, from paralysing Virginia and Pennsylvania, to attempting to stave off the British onslaught on the Ohio Valley and on New France itself.

In the spring of 1759 the French had many reasons to be optimistic. While British and colonial administrations attempted to forge a policy to win the support of wavering Indians, the backcountry settlers hindered their efforts towards peace. In the same manner in which, during the raids,

they had been unable to comprehend why they should aid central authority, in the years following the war they were unable to understand why they should restrain their land hunger and animosity towards the Indians for the benefit of central government.

The military outlook was also desperate for the British. Forbes had left only a small garrison at Pittsburgh and withdrew most of his troops east for the winter. Hugh Mercer, the commander at the fort, sent Forbes and Bouquet repeated reports of its precarious condition; a concerted assault could bring its fall. In preparation for a spring assault, small parties of francophile Ohio Indians attacked convoys en route to the fort.¹ At the end of May a party attacked a convoy of fifteen wagons traveling from Bedford to Ligonier escorted by one hundred men. The Indians killed forty troops, destroyed five wagons, and damaged several others. These raids threatened the extended British supply lines. Upon his arrival at Pittsburgh, Adam Hoops was horrified to find the garrison "in such Extremity," while Bouquet deplored "the

¹ Hugh Mercer to Gen. Forbes, January 8, 1759, Hugh Mercer to Henry Bouquet, February 17, 1759, Hugh Mercer, *Indian Intelligence*, April-May, 1759, Hugh Mercer to Henry Bouquet, May 23, 1759, Thomas Lloyd to Gen. Stanwix, May 25, 1759, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 3:26, 130-131, 278-280, 304-306, 3:315-317.

Extraordinary activity of the Enemy and the Continual Success they have had in their Attempts."²

More worrying than the shortages experienced by the garrison itself was the danger that the post would run out of Indian goods to bolster the wavering support of the local tribes. The Ohio Indians, starved of European goods for several years, rushed to Fort Pitt to acquire necessities. The ability of the British to supply them with goods could ensure that many would pursue a strict neutrality in the conflict. Any sign that the British might not be able to supply them could shift their support to the French.³

The shortage of trade goods prompted a desperate exchange between Mercer and his commanders. In early January he wrote to General Forbes begging him to send "a large quantity of Indian Goods." He added that "the Constant Sollicitations of all our friends obliges me again to repeat it, as a measure equally necessary to gain the Indian Interest, as a Body of Troops is to Secure the Country." But the long supply lines, bad winter weather, and continuing raids on convoys made the provision of large quantities of Indian goods impossible.⁴

² Thomas Lloyd to Gen. Stanwix, May 23, 1759, Adam Stephen to Gen. Stanwix, May 25, 1759, Adam Hoops to Henry Bouquet, May 30, 1759, Henry Bouquet to Hugh Mercer, June 1, 1759, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 3:309-311, 318-319, 334, 357.

³ Hugh Mercer to Henry Bouquet, March 18, 1759, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 3:210.

⁴ Hugh Mercer to Gen. Forbes, January 8, 1759, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 3:26.

While Mercer was trying to secure trade goods, Lignery was ready to attack. He had massed 700 French troops and 900 Indians at Venango to strike at Fort Pitt. Outnumbered and with their supply lines stretched to a maximum, the British seemd to have little chance of holding on to Fort Pitt.⁵

Events farther north saved the British. While Lignery was marching his troops towards Fort Pitt General Prideaux captured Fort Niagara for the British. The loss of this key fort horrified the French. They had not suspected an attack in that quarter and the fort's loss cut communication between Canada and the Ohio and Mississippi. In dismay Montcalm ordered Lignery to cancel his attack on Fort Pitt and to speed his troops towards the St. Lawrence where he desperately needed them.⁶

The loss of Niagara deprived the French of the Ohio. However, it did not secure it for the British, since the Ohio Indians were no more prone to support the British in 1759 than they had been in 1755, and they remained deeply concerned about British intentions to occupy their homeland. Seeking reassurance about British plans in the wake of the French

⁵ Henry Bouquet to Gen. Forbes, January 15, 1759, Hugh Mercer to Henry Bouquet, January 19, 1756, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 52-54, 58-60; Frégault, *Canada: The War of the Conquest*, p.257.

⁶ John Tulleken to Bouquet, July 21, 1759, George Croghan to Henry Bouquet, July 11, 1759, Hugh Mercer to Henry Bouquet, July 11, 1759 George Croghan to Gen. Stanwix, July 15, 1759, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 3:398, 399, 416-417 433; Fregault, *Canada: The War of the Conquest*, p.258.

withdrawal, many Indian parties came to Pittsburgh to open negotiations. Some openly expressed their hopes that both sides would now withdraw from the Ohio Valley. The Mingo, for example, openly claimed that they hoped that both the British and the French would "Fight as formerly, over the great Water, without Disturbing their Country that they Might live in Peace with both, and that the English should return home."⁷

Both the British and the French sensed the Indians' uneasiness. From Canada the French continued to send the Ohio Indians messages "to engage them to persevere in their good dispositions." French communications had the desired effect. As Mercer perceived, while "the Indians are generally disposed to make peace," they were "kept back by the Insinuations of the French, that we come to rob them of their Lands and cut their Throats."⁸

The British attempted to reassure the Ohio Indians that they "had no Intention to Make Settlements in their Hunting

⁷ Hugh Mercer, Indian Intelligence, March 17, 1759, Hugh Mercer to Henry Bouquet, July 22, 1759, Hugh Mercer to Gen. Stanwix, July 22, 1759, Henry Bouquet to Hugh Mercer, July 23, 1759, Hugh Mercer to Gen. Stanwix, July 28, 1759, George Croghan: Indian Intelligence, [July 31, 1759], Indian Intelligence, August 4, 1759, George Croghan to Gen. Stanwix, August 6, 1759, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 3:205, 437, 440, 445-446., 461-462, 470. 493-494, 502; Vaudreuil to Berryer, June 24, 1760, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:1092.

⁸ Vaudreuil to Berryer, June 24, 1760, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:1092; Extract from Hugh Mercer's Journal, April 5, 1759, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 3:234.

Country beyond the Allegheny Hills: Unless they should be desired, for the conveniency of the Indians, to erect Store-Houses in order to establish and carry on a Trade." They assured the Indians that "your Bretheren the English will never violate their engagement." Throughout 1759 the British repeated such guarantees.⁹

Such reassurances did not calm the Indians' fears. In particular the caveat "unless they should be desired, for the conveniency of the Indians" disturbed them. It sounded too much like the reassurances the British had made ten years earlier over the construction of a fort at the forks. Indeed, in familiar fashion, British promises slowly changed: settlers pressed for the opening of bottom lands on the Ohio for settlement; military officers pressed for the construction of new posts and garrisons. In August 1760 General Monckton told Ohio Indians that the British "mean not to take away any of your Lands; But. . . the necessity of his Majesty's Service obliges me to. . . build Forts in some parts of your Country, to protect our Trade w[i]th you, and prevent the Enemy from taking your Lands and hurting both you and us." Monckton merely guaranteed that "no part whatever of your Lands joining the said Forts shall be taken from you, nor any of our people be permitted to hunt or settle upon them: but they shall

⁹ "A Narrative of what hath passed between the King's Generals, Governors etc. and the Indians in relation to Lands," [June 1761], Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1330) 12:174-176; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:268-269.

remain in your absolute property." But almost immediately Monckton added that the British intended to take "a space of Ground adjoining every Fort to raise Corn."¹⁰

As ominously for the Indians the British made their offers wholly conditional on the Indians remaining "Good and Faithful Allies." With many Indians on the Ohio still supporting the French, even anglophile Indians realized that the British would not find it difficult to discover an excuse to renege on their agreements and to seize the entire Ohio Valley.¹¹

The Ohio Indians also watched with anxiety the renewed westward push of British settlements. In Cumberland County settlers soon began to occupy lands which the Treaty of Easton had reserved for the Indians. Disputes quickly broke out between Indians and frontiersmen. They reached a head in the winter of 1760-1761 when Pennsylvania settlers killed several Indians who were hunting on the Cumberland County frontier. By the fall of 1761 crowds of British hunters and settlers had moved into the Monongahela Valley and onto the New and Greenbrier Rivers in southwestern Virginia.¹²

¹⁰ "A Narrative of what hath passed between the King's Generals, Governors etc. and the Indians in relation to Lands," [June 1761], Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1330) 12:177-178.

¹¹ McConnell, "The Search for Security," p.305.

¹² Richard Peters to Conrad Weiser, February 21, 1760, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:169; Gov. Fauquier to the Board of Trade, July 8, 1763, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1330) 12:184-185;

The Ohio and Susquehanna Indians watched these developments with dismay and could not fail to wonder whether the British would honor their promises. They had further reason to worry for even the colonial governments complained about the promises made to the Indians. Governor Fauquier wrote bitterly to the Board of Trade that "the two great points in View, in driving the French from this Country, was I conceive, to stop the Communication between Canada and New Orleans on this Side the Lakes, and to get possession of the fertile Lands on the Ohio." He asked the board why then he should not allow settlers to cross the Appalachians.¹³ Fauquier's arguments were made more pressing because his predecessor, Governor Dinwiddie, had encouraged men to enlist in the Virginia Regiment in the early stages of the war by promising them lands around the forks of the Ohio. Now that the British had captured the Ohio, these veterans were clamoring for their land.¹⁴

From 1760 to 1763 the British slowly extended their military control of the Ohio Valley, but that control remained weak. The British occupied posts and key fortresses, but failed to win the support of the Ohio Indians. General

McConnel, "The Search for Security," p.351.

¹³ Gov. Fauquier to Board of Trade, March 13, 1760, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1329) 12:107.

¹⁴ Gov. Fauquier to Board of Trade, May 7, 1760, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1329) 12:145-46.

Amherst and Sir William Johnson, who took over control of Indian affairs on the Ohio, spoke in terms of "managing Indians" and of "keeping them in Subjection." Amherst, in particular, had little respect for the Indians and paid no heed to their objections to the establishment of new forts and posts amongst them, despite the previous promises at Easton and Pittsburgh.¹⁵

Amherst felt that he could best manage the Ohio Indians by restricting their access to European trade goods, in the belief that it would make them more pliable. He ordered the traders to cease supplying the Indians with weapons and ammunition, and soon extended that ban to include even knives and razors. Simultaneously, he moved to restrict the flow of gifts and presents to the Indians, part of traditional diplomacy.¹⁶

The Ohio Indians depended on trade to supply their needs. The collapse of the French supply network had precipitated their abandoning their former ally. They had been drawn even deeper into dependence on European goods after the establishment of the first British posts: British garrisons, short of supplies, had purchased meat and corn from the Indians in return for ammunition or even hard currency which the Indians could use elsewhere to purchase their own

¹⁵ McConnell, "Search for Security," pp.189-194.

¹⁶ Amherst sought to both place pressure on the Indians and to cut costs. McConnel, "The Search for Security," pp.200-201.

supplies. Lacking the means to obtain weapons and knives, with the British refusing to provide gifts, the Ohio Indians, "whose squaws hitherto had pretty easily obtained whatever they wanted, whilst waging war," found it difficult even to hunt. Still more ominous for some of the western Indians was their interpretation that changes in British trade and gift policy were an attempt to weaken them before the British attacked in revenge for their previous alliance with the French.¹⁷

The Ohio Indians' hostility to the British grew steadily. Many still hoped that the French would ultimately return to aid them and bided their time. But by the end of 1761 the Indians perceived that the British intended to exclude the French permanently from the region and their fears mounted. Their fears seemed justified by the ever-increasing number of British forts. The construction of a fort at Sandusky was particularly worrisome because it threatened to cut the traditional route between the Iroquois and the settlements at Detroit and on the upper Great Lakes. In 1761 several Ohio Indians journeyed to Pittsburgh to beg the British to halt the construction of further forts and to complain that "we. . . are penned up like Hogs; there are Forts all around us, and therefore we are apprehensive that Death is coming upon us."

¹⁷ McConnel, "The Quest for Security," pp.324, 385; Vaudreuil to Berryer, June 24, 1760, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:1092.

British settlements around Fort Niagara alienated even the Iroquois.¹⁸

Farther east, on the Susquehanna River, tensions also smoldered. In January 1759 the Pennsylvania Council's committee appointed to inquire into the Delawares' complaints presented its findings and dismissed the claims of the Delawares with almost unseemly haste. The committee claimed that the province had not defrauded the Indians, but had treated them instead "with great Justice, Candour, and Fairness." Point by point, the committee's report proceeded to answer the Delawares' complaints and to prove the propriety of the colony's actions. Finally, the committee concluded that the Delaware Indians had previously been conquered by the Iroquois "and continued ever since, their Tributaries and dependents, and were looked upon to have no Right to sell any lands within this Province."¹⁹

¹⁸ McConnell, "The Quest for Security," p.350; Gipson, *The British Empire before the American Revolution*, 9:89; Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, p.440.

¹⁹ The committee also dismissed the Indians' complaint that they had not received enough payment for their land maintaining that the lands were not worth much because they were wilderness and had only gained value after they were settled. The committee's findings also summarily dismissed Teedyuscung's charges of the falsification of deeds. The committee specifically pointed out "that the Indians being utterly unacquainted with reading and Writing, keep no Records of their Sales of Land, or other Transactions." The report concluded "Upon the Whole it is very evident to us, and so we presume it must appear to all unprejudiced Persons, that there is not the least Shadow of Foundation for any part of the Complaint made by Teedyuscung, on behalf of the Indians against the Proprietaries, we must, therefore, attribute his exhibiting that false and groundless Charge against them to

In the wake of the collapse of the Delawares' bid for freedom and sovereignty, many Susquehanna Delawares wondered what their future would hold. Developments on the Ohio heightened this concern as they foresaw the prospect of an anti-British alliance between the Ohio Indians and the Iroquois. Besides their uncertain political status, the Susquehanna Delawares faced the same acute shortages of supplies and provisions following Amherst's decree that beset their Ohio brethren. The crisis grew deeper in the fall of 1762 when representatives from the Susquehannah Company arrived near the Delaware settlements and began clearing land for planting in the following spring. Soon there were over 150 company settlers along the East Branch of the Susquehanna.²⁰

Teedyuscung rushed to Philadelphia to voice his complaints to the Pennsylvanians and to appeal for help. But his complaints fell on deaf ears. The Pennsylvania authorities were prepared to use political pressure to remove the Connecticut settlers, but not military action. Faced with renewed submission to the Iroquois, an acute shortage of supplies, and the theft of their lands by the Susquehannah

some undue Influence, or to the Difficulty he was under to invent any other plausible Excuse for the cruel Murders and horrid Devastations committed by them on our back Inhabitants, and for their base ungreatful [sic] Breach of Faith." *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 8:246-259.

²⁰ Boyd, *The Susquehannah Company Papers*, 2:166-169, 180-183; Wallace, *King of the Delawares*, pp.221, 232-233, 254-256.

Company, many Susquehanna Delawares evacuated the region, moving north closer to the Iroquois, or to the Ohio Valley.²¹

Unrest on the Ohio and Susquehanna was foreshadowed by unrest amongst the Cherokees. As with the Ohio Indians, British actions propelled the Cherokees towards war. During the later years of the war the Cherokees had shown increasing dissatisfaction at their treatment by the Virginians. During 1758 the death of several Cherokee warriors at the hands of Virginians prompted calls from many Cherokees for attacks upon British colonists to revenge the deaths of their fellows. In May 1759 some of the Lower Townsmen took action and attacked settlements in North Carolina on the Yadkin and Catawba rivers. This prompted a speedy response from the British who imposed a trade embargo on the tribe.²²

Governor Fauquier sent William Byrd to negotiate with the Cherokees in an attempt to forestall war. Byrd sought guarantees that the Cherokees would hand over all warriors who had committed atrocities in Virginia. He promised to supply the Cherokees with trade goods, but warned that "if they fail'd in their Engagements we would fall on them w[i]th all our Force."²³

²¹ Boyd, *The Susquehannah Company Papers*, 2:180-183; Wallace, *King of the Delawares*, p.257.

²² Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, pp.163, 165, 172

²³ Gov. Fauquier to the Board of Trade, August 30, 1759, Boehm, ed., *BPRO CO5, Part 1, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1329) 12:96-97.

While Byrd believed that the Cherokees were prepared to negotiate, he failed to realize that the tribe was deeply divided between a peace party, centered in the Overhill settlements and led by the Little Carpenter, and a war faction centered in the Lower Towns.²⁴ The Little Carpenter was unable to pacify the pro-war faction and throughout the fall of 1759 small Cherokee parties raided the North Carolina frontier. In September several of the war faction even attempted to assassinate superintendant Edmund Atkin as he negotiated with the tribe. In desperation Governor Lyttelton of South Carolina marched into Cherokee country and seized twenty-eight Cherokee warriors as hostages until the tribe handed over all those suspected of attacking colonists and ceased the war. For the Cherokee peace party this was an impossible demand. The warriors had acted within Cherokee tradition, by revenging the deaths of those who had died in Virginia, and were supported by the pro-war faction. Lyttelton's action thus served only to strengthen the hand of those who favored open conflict with the English.²⁵

At the beginning of 1760 the Cherokee war spread. Many parties descended upon the backcountry from Georgia to Virginia. Augusta, Bedford, and Halifax counties in Virginia

²⁴ Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, pp.163

²⁵ Fauquier to Board of Trade, December 17, 1759, Boehm ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1329) 12:99-103; Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, pp.173, 176, 185-188.

were particularly hard hit. The British replied with force. In June Colonel Archibald Montgomery advanced from Fort Prince George in South Carolina into Lower Cherokee country burning all the Indian towns in the region. However, instead of Montgomery's action subduing the Cherokees, they viewed his heavy casualties and his eventual retreat from the region as evidence of a Cherokee victory. They achieved a greater victory farther north, where, on August 7, despairing of relief from William Byrd who was advancing from Virginia with nine hundred men, the garrison of Fort Loudoun surrendered.²⁶

Throughout the winter of 1760-1761 the Cherokee peace party managed to restrain the bellicose warriors. But attacks recommenced in the spring. In May 1761 another force under the command of Major Grant advanced into the Middle Cherokee towns and destroyed them. With over half their towns destroyed, the Cherokees sought peace. The Carolinians felt sufficiently revenged and they too were prepared to talk peace

²⁶ The Cherokees promised the garrison safe passage upon their surrender. But soon after the men had evacuated the fort they were attacked by the Cherokees. Many men were killed, the remainder taken captive. Corkran points out that the number killed was almost the same as the number of Cherokee hostages the South Carolinians had taken at Fort Prince George and who had been put to death at the start of the hostilities. Gov. Fauquier to Board of Trade, September 17, 1760, Articles of Capitulation of Fort Loudoun, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1330) 12:140-141, 143-144; Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, pp. 193-196, 208-215, 219, 223.

and through the fall they negotiated a final settlement with the Little Carpenter.²⁷

While the Cherokees were negotiating a peace, opposition began to surface in the west. In the summer of 1761 the Senecas circulated a war-belt amongst the Ohio Indians to encourage them to participate in a concerted attack on all the new British posts in the region. Throughout the winter and spring of 1761-1762 rumors circulated throughout the Ohio of planned uprisings. Yet nothing surfaced. The Ohio Indians used the delay to continue to seek support from French outposts in the west. Several Shawnee leaders traveled to Illinois "to demand. . . their most urgent necessities." But the French could not adequately supply them, although "in view of the circumstances and their dispositions to continue the war against the English," they provided them with token gifts.²⁸

In the summer of 1763 Indian outrage broke into violence.

In early May the Ottawa, Potawatomi, and Huron Indians, led by their local leader, Pontiac, after whom later historians have named the uprising, attacked the British garrison at Detroit. Only a warning by one of Pontiac's men to the

²⁷ Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier*, pp. 225, 228, 240, 250-254, 261-265.

²⁸ M. de St. Ange to M. d'Abbadie, November 9, 1764, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:1158; McConnel, "The Quest for Security," pp.362-369, 373; Gipson, *The British Empire before the American Revolution* 9:92.

garrison commander prevented the fort's capture. Pontiac besieged the fort from May to September, but the British were able to keep it supplied by shipments from Niagara by lake and river.²⁹

As news spread of the siege of Detroit, other Ohio and western Indians seized the opportunity to vent their own grievances against the occupying British forces. Between May 16 and June 2 the Indians overwhelmed and destroyed the remaining British posts in the west from Michilimackinac to Sandusky. In June the uprising spread east. The Ohio Indians, aided by the Senecas, seized the forts from the Allegheny to Lake Erie. Only Fort Pitt remained and by mid-June it too was under siege. From Fort Pitt the violence spread east to the Cumberland County frontier. During late June and July bands of Indians descended on the reestablished frontier settlements, particularly on the Juniata River, wreaking havoc.³⁰

From the Juniata the unrest quickly spread east of the Susquehanna River. The Susquehanna Delawares were all too willing to rise up against the British, for on April 19, 1763 the final blow befell them. On that morning representatives

²⁹ Gipson, *The British Empire before the American Revolution*, 9:96-99, 103; Howard Peckham, *Pontiac and the Indian Uprising*, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947), pp.130-140.

³⁰ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 9:32; Peckham, *Pontiac and the Indian Uprising*, pp.156-170, 214-217; Gipson, *The British Empire before the American Revolution*, 9:99-102.

of the Susquehannah Company burned and destroyed the Delaware settlement at Wyoming. All that remained of the town was the charred remains of the Indian cabins. Inside one of the ruins lay the burned body of Teedyuscung. The uprising on the Ohio provided the Susquehanna Delawares with a final chance for revenge. In October they descended on the Susquehannah Company settlers and destroyed all their settlements before retreating to the Ohio. Other Delaware raiding parties descended upon Northampton and Berks counties.³¹

In the wake of the uprising the British restored their control only gradually. At the beginning of August 1763 Henry Bouquet managed to get reinforcements to Fort Pitt, after forcing his way past the Indian besiegers at Bushy Run. With Fort Pitt reinforced and resupplied, Fort Detroit resisting all the assaults of Pontiac's men, and several of their leaders killed in battle, many Ohio Indians rapidly lost hope in their chances of driving the British from the Ohio. It was not until 1764, however, that the British had the Ohio Valley back under control and not until the construction of a series of posts in the Iroquois territory in 1765 and 1766 did the British secure their control over the entire region.³²

³¹ Boyd *The Susquehannah Company Papers*, 2:276-278; Wallace, *King of the Delawares*, pp.258, 261.

³² Gipson, *The British Empire before the American Revolution*, 9:111-113; Peckham, *Pontiac and the Indian Uprising*, pp.265-287.

Some Ohio Indians continued to resist the British advance fancifully believing that the French in the Illinois country would come to their aid, unable to envision that the French would surrender all North America to the British. As late as March 1765 a group of Shawnees traveled to Fort Chartres to seek succor from the French commander who was awaiting the arrival of British forces to take over command of the fort. Pathetically the Shawnees informed him that there were forty-seven "villages who are willing to die in alliance with the French, defending their lands to the last drop of their blood." They pleaded with the commander, telling him that "the English are coming and saying the land is theirs and that it is the French who have sold it to them." They begged "aid. . . to continue the war, and to know what you want us to do," informing the French that they had "adopted you as our Father and will never hearken save to your word."³³

All the commander could do was to attempt to assuage the Shawnees' fears. He told them that now "the English and French were friends and that the Red men. . . should look on each other as brothers." He asked them "Why, children, do you continue the war. . . Peace will bring you back plenty to your

³³ M. de St. Ange to M. d'Abbadie, November 9, 1764, Conference between M. d'Abbadie and the Shawnees, March, 1765, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:1157-1158, 1159-1160; Peckham, *Pontiac and the Indian Uprising*, pp.263-269.

villages, and the English themselves will hasten with goods to supply your wants."³⁴

However, as the Ohio and Susquehanna Indians knew only too well, the British did not hearken to the Indians fears and wishes. Frontier settlers continued to refuse to obey colonial and imperial decrees. In 1758 the British had made promises to the Iroquois not to settle west of the Appalachians. In 1763, while the Ohio Indians were preparing to rise against the British, the Board of Trade prepared general instructions to the colonial governments to forbid settlement west of the Appalachians. Despite these agreements and instructions, colonial authorities were unable or unwilling to restrain frontier settlers from moving west. To these settlers the only solution to the conflict was the removal of the Indians.³⁵

In 1765 Fauquier worriedly informed the Board of Trade that he believed that "the people on our Frontier are rather desirous that we should be at War than in peace with the Indians."³⁶ Indeed, the backcountry settlers soon responded

³⁴ Conference between M. d'Abbadie & Shawnees, March, 1765, Brodhead, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 10:1160-1161.

³⁵ Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, 9:51. Jack Sosin, *Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775*, (Lincoln Ne.: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), pp.52-78.

³⁶ Gov. Fauquier to Board of Trade, May 26, 1765, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1331) 12:278-279.

with violence. On both the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontiers, settlers attacked and massacred Indians. In December 1763 in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania a band of settlers from Paxton Township attacked some of the local Conestoga Indians. Not satisfied with killing six warriors a few days later they returned and attacked the survivors of the raid who had taken shelter in the county jail. The band, popularly called the Paxton Boys, even marched on Philadelphia to demand the end of colonial support for Indian refugees and improved representation for the backcountry in the Assembly.³⁷

Eighteen months later, in May 1765, a party of Augusta County ruffians attacked and burned a barn in which ten Cherokees warriors had taken shelter. Most of the Indians were burned alive; those who fled they pursued through the woods. The local magistrates arrested the ringleaders, but a mob, who styled themselves the "Augusta Boys," stormed the country jail and freed them. Fauquier advised local justice Andrew Lewis to use "a little patience" to allow the unrest to calm down.³⁸ However, the unrest remained. Only a few weeks later the Augusta Boys threatened to kill the Little Carpenter as he returned to Cherokee country from negotiations with

³⁷ Slaughter, *The Whiskey Rebellion*, pp.28-29; James Kiby Martin, "The Return of the Paxton Boys and the Historical State of the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1764-1774," *Pennsylvania History*, 38 (1971) 117-133.

³⁸ Andrew Lewis to Gov. Fauquier, May 9, 1765, Gov. Fauquier to Andrew Lewis, June 14, 1765, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1331) 12:285-287, 312.

Fauquier. On the Pennsylvania frontier tensions remained high until the Revolution. Such was the power of these "boys" that neither the Augustas nor the Paxtons were ever prosecuted.³⁹

In the years following, the frontier remained a center of unrest and instability. The frontier environment of opportunity and mobility made it impossible for frontier settlers to comprehend a reality beyond their personal needs and quest for improvement. During the Revolution the Virginia backcountry was the center of much loyalist agitation as backcountry settlers failed to comprehend why they should transfer their loyalties to Richmond. In the early republic southwestern Pennsylvania was the scene of the Whisky Rebellion as settlers failed to see why they should sacrifice their profits to support a government in Washington.⁴⁰ Only the eventual removal of both the Indians and the frontier environment created a degree of stability in the region.

³⁹ Gov. Fauquier to Board of Trade, August 1, 1765, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 1331) 12:302-304; James Kirby Martin, "The Return of the Paxton Boys and the Historical State of the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1764-1774," *Pennsylvania History*, 38 (1971) 117-133.

⁴⁰ Slaughter, *The Whiskey Rebellion*; James Kirkby Martin, "The Paxton Boys and the Historical State of the Pennsylvania Frontier," *Pennsylvania History*, 38 (1971) 117-133; Albert Tilson, "Political Culture and Social Conflict in the Upper Valley of Virginia, 1740-1789," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Texas, 1986; Albert Tilson, "The Militia and Popular Culture in the Upper Valley of Virginia, 1740-1775," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 94 (1986) 285-306.

Appendix A
The Composition of the Colonial Forces

The table below lists the average ages of privates in the provincial forces. Figures for Virginia are taken from the size rolls for 1755-1758 in the George Washington Papers. Figures for Pennsylvania are compiled from the lists of Pennsylvania troops from 1755-1758 in *Pennsylvania Archives*. Figures for Massachusetts have been compiled from Fred Anderson, *A Peoples' Army*.¹

The mean age of privates in the Massachusetts forces was 25.8 years.

Table I Average Age of Privates in Provincial Forces

COLONY	N	Mean	Median	Mode
Massachusetts	1734	25.8	22	18
Pennsylvania	788	25.2	23	22
Virginia	1540	26.5	25	24

However, as Anderson points out "the presence of a small group of older men" raised this figure. The mean age of Virginia and Pennsylvania troops was not notably different. However the modal and median ages of the forces were rather different. The median age of the Massachusetts forces was 22, whereas the Pennsylvania forces were somewhat older, 23 and 25 respectively. This difference is revealed even more clearly by the modal ages of the forces: 18 for Massachusetts, 22 for Pennsylvania and 24 for Virginia. Whereas 24.7% of the Massachusetts troops were aged 19 or less, in Virginia and Pennsylvania only 10% and 13.8%, respectively, were that young. Almost two-thirds of the Virginia and Pennsylvania forces were in their twenties.

This contrast of an army with a large number of teenagers, compared to an army with much larger numbers of men

¹ Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, Presidential papers Microfilm, (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 1961), Series 4, Reels 29-31; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 2d Ser., 2:419-528; Anderson, *A People's Army*, pp.225-237.

in their twenties may, in part, account for some of the reluctance of the troops to obey their superiors. Unfortunately samples are not large enough for the Virginia and Pennsylvania forces to get a meaningful picture of the profile of the officer corps.

Table II: Age Cohorts for All ranks of Provincial Troops

Age Group	Massachusetts		Virginia		Pennsylvania	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
14-19	591	24.7	154	10.0	113	13.8
20-24	758	31.7	645	41.9	337	41.2
25-29	395	16.5	344	22.4	182	22.3
30-34	208	8.7	182	11.8	100	12.2
35-39	158	6.6	61	4.0	55	6.7
41-44	117	4.9	82	5.3	24	2.9
45-49	87	3.6	52	3.4	6	0.7
50-54	48	2.0	12	0.8	0	0.0
55 +	29	1.2	6	0.4	0	0.0

Even more striking is the variance of birthplace among the different recruits. Over 90% of Massachusetts troops were born in Massachusetts itself or in other New England colonies. By comparison only about half the Virginia troops and less

Table III: Birthplace of Privates in the Provincial Forces

Birthplace	Massachusetts		Virginia		Pennsylvania	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Same Colony	2,013	82.4	635	41.2	128	15.8
Neighboring Colony	183	7.8	82	5.3	66	8.2
Other N. American	22	0.9	56	3.6	12	1.5
Other G.B. Colony	12	0.5	1	0.1	4	0.5
Great Britain	193	7.9	724	47.0	430	53.2
Continental Europe	19	0.8	42	2.7	167	20.6

than a quarter of the Pennsylvania troops were born in Virginia and Pennsylvania respectively, and over half were born in Great Britain. A substantial number of the Pennsylvania forces were born in continental Europe, predominantly Germany. Thus whereas the Massachusetts forces were predominantly native, the Virginia and Pennsylvania forces were predominantly composed of immigrants. This is a

significant difference, for men born abroad would have less emotional attachment to the colony for which they were fighting and would be less tolerant of the failure of the province to provide them with pay and necessary supplies.

The divergence of birthplace also reflects the divergence in social status of the troops from the different colonies. This is also revealed in the pre-war occupations of the troops. 86.6% of the Virginia forces were "farmers" or "artisans" while 92.1% of the Pennsylvania forces were laborers or artisans. The Massachusetts forces troops came from a wider-range of occupations. The categories for occupational breakdown are taken from Anderson to ensure

Table IV Pre-enlistment Occupations of Privates in the Provincial Forces

Occupation	Massachusetts		Virginia		Pennsylvania	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Farmer	335	20.7	625	45.9	11	1.7
Laborer	621	38.4	62	4.6	304	46.8
Artisan	579	35.7	554	40.7	294	45.3
Seafarer	62	3.8	72	5.3	33	5.1
Non-manual	21	1.3	48	3.5	7	1.1


comparability of the results. The description "artisan" includes a particularly wide range of occupations from blacksmith to tailor, and including some more unusual occupations such as an armorer and "perukemaker." The largest categories were tailor, shoemaker, carpenter and weaver. The category "Non-manual" includes school-teachers and soldiers.

The age, birthplace, and occupations of the troops, as revealed from the muster and size rolls of the provincial forces suggest that there were differences in the nature of the colonial forces. This information, while far from conclusive in itself, provides important corroborating evidence for statements by contemporaries about the low status of the provincial forces.

Appendix B
The Impact of the Raids

Figure 4 illustrates the economic impact the raids had upon the merchant John Harris, who lived upon the Susquehanna

Figure 4:: The Economic Impact of the Raids. Number of Entries per season, in John Harris' Receipt Book, 1752-1760. Receipt Book of John Harris II, 1749-1769, Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, Box 1.




River at Harris' Ferry. The economic dislocation is very clear as the number of entries dropped to zero during early 1756. Equally clear are the economic opportunities opened by Braddock's expedition and Forbes' expedition, as the number of entries peaked in mid 1755 and 1758.

Figure 5 illustrates the impact of the raids upon the civilian population of Frederick and Augusta Counties taken

from those compiled by Chester Raymond Young.¹ Comparable figures are not available for Hampshire County as the county court ceased operation. However, this suggests, and sources confirm, that the county was all but abandoned.² Sources are also unreliable for the Pennsylvania frontier counties and it is impossible to compile any meaningful figures for population changes in those counties.

Figure 5 reveals the continuing impact of the raids until 1758. Frederick County probably suffered less population loss

Figure 5:: The Impact of the raids on the population of Frederick and Augusta Counties, Virginia. The estimated annual population of the counties. (From: Young, "The Impact of the French and Indian War on the Civilian Population of Virginia," p.207.)



¹ Chester Raymond Young, "The Impact of the French and Indian War on the Civilian Population of Virginia," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1969 p.207.

² McIlwaine, *Journal of the House of Burgesses, 1758-1761*, p.110.

than Augusta because the majority of the Virginia Regiment was stationed in Frederick County, offering some degree of protection to the inhabitants. In addition, the presence of the regiment itself spurred some growth. The town of Winchester, in particular, benefitted from the large number of troops stationed there.

Appendix C
The Casualties of the Raids

Chester Raymond Young's work gives insight into the population changes on the Virginia frontier during the Seven Years' War. What Young's work cannot show is the number of settlers who were killed, the number captured, and the number who fled. The only means of discovering the numbers who were killed and captured is by examining casualty figures for the individual raids.¹

Table V lists every French and Indian raid, reported in examined sources, upon the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier from 1754 until the end of 1758. The primary sources are the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, *Maryland Gazette*, the lists of casualty figures in the Conrad Weiser Papers, and the "Register" of casualties in the Preston Papers. Where different sources cite conflicting casualty figures, the lower rate has been accepted, unless there is reason to suspect a higher number may be more accurate, such as when a source provides a list of the names of the casualties. Every attempt has been made to ensure that the same raid has not been included twice. In most cases it is possible to cross-check the date of a raid with the location, and if there is still doubt, with the names of the casualties. Where figures are estimates, for instance where several sources merely record that "fifty or sixty were killed or captured," the number in the table is italicized, (an explanation of the estimate can be found in the footnotes.) When the number is completely unknown, question marks are shown and the entry has been counted as zero for the purposes of calculating the total.

As a result, the figures below for individual raids probably underestimate casualties. Some attacks appear to have been much larger than the reports suggest. For example, there was a raid on the northern Virginia frontier in early April 1756. The only casualty reports are for an attack on Cox's Fort, where five were killed and two captured. Nevertheless, Washington reported that the French and their Indian allies had "committed several murders not far from Winchester" and expressed a belief that the Indians intended to rendezvous with their prisoners at the back of Warm-Spring

¹ Chester Raymond Young, "The Effects of the French and Indian War on Civilian Life in the Frontier Counties of Virginia, 1754-1763." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1969.

Mountain, on the boundary of Frederick and Hampshire counties. These statements suggest a much larger raid than the specific figures indicate.² On other occasions reports similarly refer to great devastation whereas specific casualty numbers reported are small. In July 1758 there was a raid on Frederick County. The only specific toll lists nine deaths and six people captured around the Massanutten Mountain, whereas the *Pennsylvania Gazette* and *Maryland Gazette* had reported twenty-six people killed or captured between Winchester and Augusta Court House and other reports refer to the people abandoning a large swathe of territory between those places.³

As well as the fact that extant records underestimate the number of casualties in specific raids, there is good reason to believe that many raids were omitted from reports. In particular the *Pennsylvania Gazette* and *Maryland Gazette* gave great detail of the early raids, and early raids were likely to appear in corroborating sources. However, the reporting of raids declined as the war progressed, probably because a small raid was not as sensational in 1757 as it had been in 1755. The opposite tendency can be seen in the reports of casualties provided to Conrad Weiser: the reports become more accurate as the war progresses. One of Weiser's informants, Jacob Morgan, admitted that his recent figures were relatively accurate but for earlier figures he was "not certain, but got the best information [he] could."⁴

In addition to the varying reliability of the sources over time, geographic coverage is also variable. Coverage of the raids in eastern Pennsylvania, Northampton, Berks, and Lancaster Counties is very thorough. Coverage for Augusta County, primarily because of the "Register" in the Preston Papers is also adequate although not as thorough as for eastern Pennsylvania. However, coverage for Frederick and Hampshire Counties in Virginia, and Cumberland and York Counties in Pennsylvania, is less adequate. As these counties were the most exposed to assaults from the Ohio Indians, it seem reasonable to conclude that figures for these counties are underestimates.

² George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 7, 1756, George Mercer to John Fenton Mercer, April 15, 1756, George Washington to John Robinson, April 16, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:333, 354, 3:6.

³ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 27, 1758; *Maryland Gazette*, July 27, 1758; John Hite to George Washington, July 2, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:254.

⁴ List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.

Finally it is likely that in the disorder of the frontier, many small raids went unnoticed. The disappearance of a peddler attacked and captured or his body dumped in the woods, would have gone unremarked. Many might have presumed a planter who disappeared had simply fled rather than been captured by the Indians.

For these reasons it seems likely that the real figures are higher than the final figures for this table. The French and their Indian allies probable killed around 1,500 settlers and took 1,000 prisoners.

Table V: Casualties of the Raids in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754-1758.

Date	Location	Deaths	Capt.	Men/Women/ children captured	Other Information
1754					
July	Holston's River, Augusta County	?	?	??/? ⁵	
August	Pennsylvania Frontier	?	?	??/? ⁶	
October	Monongahela River, Augusta County	7	0	0/0/0 ⁷	
October	Holston's River	3	1	??/? ⁸	
December	Frederick County, Virginia	?	?	??/? ⁹	

⁵ Gov. Dinwiddie to Richard Pearis, August 2, [1754], R.A. Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758*, 2 Vols., (Richmond, VA: Virginia Historical Society Collections, Vols. 3 & 4) 1901-1902, 1:266-268.

⁶ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:133-136.

⁷ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

⁸ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

⁹ Capt. Rutherford to Gov. Dinwiddie, December 27, 1754, Boehm ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 15) 2:141-142.

1755					
May	Virginia Frontier	17	11	??/? ¹⁰	
Mid-May	Juniata & Kishacoquillis Valleys	0	0	0/0/0	Settlers driven off. ¹¹
June 18	Holston's River	4	2	2/0/0 ¹²	
June 22	Around Will's Creek	3	8	1/1/6 ¹³	
June 24	Patterson's Creek	14	19	??/?	Two large Parties of 130 French & Indians ¹⁴
June 28	North Branch	21 ¹⁵	?	??/? ¹⁶	
Early July	Road builders in Cumberland County	1	1	0/0/1 ¹⁷	
Early July	Around Shippensburg	9	14	??/?	9 <u>men</u> killed, 15 or 20 men, women, & children missing ¹⁸

¹⁰ Kent, ed., *Wilderness Chronicles*, pp.88-90.

¹¹ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:402.

¹² "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

¹³ Gov. Sharpe to Sir Thomas Robinson, June 28, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (16) 1:361-362; *Maryland Gazette*, July 3, 1755; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:456, 457.

¹⁴ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:456, 457, 465; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 3, 1755; *Maryland Gazette*, July 3, 1755; Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Sharpe, July 5, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:85-86.

¹⁵ Dinwiddie reported to Sir Thomas Robinson on July 4 that about thirty-five people had been murdered on the Virginia frontier. Gov. Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 16) 2:344-345.

¹⁶ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 3, 1755

¹⁷ The captive was described as a "boy" aged 16. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:466-467

Early July	Holston's River	3	6	??/? ¹⁹ (1/1/0)	Several Prisoners ²⁰
Early July	Near Fort Cumberland	6	0	0/0/0	Killed as they fled to the fort for safety ²¹
Early July	Raystown, Pennsylvania	9	0	0/0/0	Adam Hoops' men guarding provisions were attacked. ²²
July 3	New River	7	10	2/1/7 ²³	
July 12	Reed Creek, (branch of New River)	3	0	0/0/0 ²⁴	
Mid July	Juniata River	4	?	??/?	2 families murdered ²⁵
July 31	Augusta County, Head of Roanoake River	3	7	1/3/3 ²⁶	Col. Patton's detachment attacked

¹⁸(...continued)

¹⁸ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:455-456, 459-461; Edward Shippen to William Allen, July 4, 1755, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 1.

¹⁹"killed three men" [emphasis mine], Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Dobbs, July 8, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:90; Captain Stallnicker and his wife were captured, *Virginia Gazette*, July 11, 1755.

²⁰ Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Dobbs, July 8, 1755, Gov. Dinwiddie to Capt. Lewis, July 8, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:90-91, 91; *Virginia Gazette*, July 11, 1755; *Maryland Gazette*, July 24, 1755.

²¹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 10, 1755.

²² *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 17, 1755, *Maryland Gazette*, July 24, 1755.

²³"Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

²⁴ Allan Macrae to George Washington, May 13, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 1:270n; "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

²⁵ John Harris to Richard Peters, July 26, 1755, H.S.P., Peters Papers, 4:34; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 31, 1757.

²⁶ Colonel Patton and eight men, women and children were killed or captured. *Virginia Gazette*, August 8, 1755; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 21, 1755; "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

Early August	Halifax County, Near Smith's Mountain	7 ²⁷	?	??/?	
August 12	Vause's Fort	0	1	1/0/0 ²⁸	
Early September	South Branch, Frederick County	0	2	0/2/0 ²⁹	
Early September	Greenbrier River	12 ³⁰	8 ³¹	0/2/6	50 Shawnees drove off 500 cattle & besieged 59 people in a fort for 4 days. ³²
September	Fort Cumberland	0	1	1/0/0	Supply trains attacked. ³³
Late September	Augusta County	1	0	0/0/0	Skirmish with Indians, several Indians killed or wounded. ³⁴
October 1	Patterson's Creek	42 ³⁵	28	??/?	150 Indians raiding ³⁶

²⁷ Reports stated seven or eight people had been killed in Halifax County. *Virginia Gazette*, August 8, 1755; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 21, 1755.

²⁸ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

²⁹ *Maryland Gazette*, September 11, 25, 1755; "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

³⁰ Dinwiddie reported to Andrew Lewis that 13 people had been killed on the Greenbrier. Gov. Dinwiddie to Andrew Lewis, September 15, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:198 "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

³¹ Reports stated about 15 killed or captured. *Virginia Gazette*, September 29, 1755; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 9, 1757; *Maryland Gazette*, October 2, 1755; "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

³² Gov. Dinwiddie to John McNeil, September 27, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:218; *Maryland Gazette*, October 2, 1755.

³³ *Maryland Gazette*, October 2, 1755.

³⁴ *Virginia Gazette*, October 3, 1755.

Early October	Near Fort Cumberland	2	12	2/3/7 ³⁷	
October	Berks County	8	1	0/0/1 ³⁸	
October 16	Penns Creek, Pa.	13	12	?/?/? ³⁹	
October 24-25	"From McKee's to Hunter's Mill" (along Susquehanna River.)	8 ⁴⁰	10	?/?/?	"killed a great many people." ⁴¹

³⁵ (...continued)

³⁵ William Trent reported to James Burd that 42 people had been buried at Patterson's Creek. Washington reported to Dinwiddie that about 70 had been killed or captured in this raid "no so great... as was at first reported." Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Morris, October 31, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:259; George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:104.

³⁶ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:643; Adam Stephen to George Washington, October 4, 1755, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 2:72-73; *Virginia Gazette*, October 10, 1755; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 16, 30, 1755; Gov. Dinwiddie to Gov. Dobbs., October 10, 1755, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:235.

³⁷ The men killed were troops going to Fort Cumberland. *Maryland Gazette*, October 9, 1755 lists 2 killed, 3 captured, 10 killed or captured. More details are in the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 16, 1755.

³⁸ List of People Killed or Captured in South-West Side of Schuylkill River, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.

³⁹ A petition of the survivors from Penn's Creek reported that most of the bodies found "were men and elderly women, & one Child of two weeks old, the rest being young Women & Children we suppose to be carried away Prisoners." "Petition of the Inhabitants of Penn's Creek," October 20, 1755, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs 2:32; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:645, 647

⁴⁰ "Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster County" lists 8 men as killed in Paxton Township alone on this date. Some of the attacks were also on the western side of the Susquehanna. 8 is thus a minimum estimate of the numbers killed. H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89.

⁴¹ James Reed to Conrad Weiser, October 26, 1755, Gov. Morris to Sir Thomas Robinson, October 28, 1755, Boehm, ed., (continued...)

October 25	Mouth of Mahoney River	8 ⁴²	0	0/0/0	Party burying dead at Penn's Creek attacked, ⁴³
End of October	Swatarro Creek	2	5	0/1/4 ⁴⁴	
November	Berks County	17	0	0/0/0 ⁴⁵	Most of these attacks were on the Kittaning Hill.
November	Northampton County	8	0	0/0/0 ⁴⁶	
November 1	Great Cove	5	13	?/?/? ⁴⁷	Same party which attacked Patterson's Creek ⁴⁸
November 2-3	Little Cove & Canalways	10 ⁴⁹	19	?/?/?	

⁴¹(...continued)

BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 16) 2:647-648, (Vol. 17) 2:815-816; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:650-651, 656.

⁴² 4 killed by Indians, 4 drowned.

⁴³ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:654-655; William Buchanan and John Armstrong to James Burd, October 27, 1755, William Buchanan to George Croghan, November 2, 1755, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

⁴⁴ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, November 6, 1755.

⁴⁵ List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.

⁴⁶ Lombard Boss, Goldon, Hans von Flary, a negro man, James Caull. Richard Thomas, & Williams killed. The entry then maintains a total of eight were killed, List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

⁴⁷ Some women and children taken captive.

⁴⁸ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:673-674, 676; William West to Thomas Penn, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 17) 2:769; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, November 13, 1755.

Early November	Juniata, Tuscarora, & Sherman's Valley	4	5	??/?	Killed some and took 5 prisoners ⁵⁰
November 15	Tulpehocken	15 ⁵¹	3	0/1/2 ⁵²	
November 24	Gnadenhutten	11 ⁵³	?	??/?	
December	Northampton County	7	11	??/? 3/1/0 ⁵⁴	
December	Northampton County	13	3	0/0/3 ⁵⁵	
December	Linn Township, Berks County	2	0	0/0/0 ⁵⁶	

⁴⁹(...continued)

⁴⁹ The sheriff of Cumberland County reported that 47 had been killed or captured in Coves and Canalways. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:706-707.

⁵⁰ "40 killed" on the Pennsylvania frontier; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:673-674, 704-705; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, November 13, 1755.

⁵¹ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:703, 704-705; Conrad Weiser to Gov. Morris, November 18, 1755, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 1:60.

⁵² List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

⁵³ David Zeisburger reported that the Indians had "Killed the most part of the people," *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:736, 737; Timothy Horsefield to William Parsons, November 25, 1755, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 17) 2:736-737; List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

⁵⁴ Nicholas Weiser & Peter Hass & 3 more killed & Henry Hass & Lanord Weiser & one man were captured; Benjamin Deetz & one other man were killed, his wife & 7 more were captured. List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

⁵⁵ Those killed were Gist von Camp and his wife and child; John Worly Sr. and his wife; John Worly Jr. and his wife and family of seven children; 3 children were captured. List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

Early-Mid December	Northampton County	62 ⁵⁷	6 ⁵⁸	0/1/5	
December 12	Bethel Township, Lancaster County	1	0	0/0/0 ⁵⁹	
Late December	"Above Depuys," Northampton County	19 ⁶⁰	?	??/?	
1756					
January	Northampton County	2	1	0/1/0 ⁶¹	
January	Northampton County	5	1	??/?	At "Fox's" ⁶²

⁵⁶(...continued)

⁵⁶ List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the River Lecky and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Manuscripts, 2:119.

⁵⁷ From the accounts in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* and in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania those killed were: Hans Bush & Family; Lambert Bush; Benjamin Tidd & family; Matthew Roe; Daniel Williams & family; [Williams Wife was reported in the "List" as being captured with her six five children]; Piercenwall Golden; Frederick Hoeth & Family; Cornelius Vanaker; Guilbert Van Camp & family; Hans Bush, Bush's wife & son; John Drake; William Kennedy; Nathan Parks; -----Goulding; William Roe; Abram Miller; Hans Van Flesa; Adam Snell & his family. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, December 11, 18, 1755; "List of Inhabitants Killed in Northampton County," December 19, 1755, H.S.P., Penn Mss. : Indian Affairs, 2:52; List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115. The *Pennsylvania Gazette*, of December 25 reported over 100 killed in Northampton County.

⁵⁸ It was thought that one woman and three children had been captured but a rescue party later found their bodies. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 758-759; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, December 4, 1755, January 8, 1756.

⁵⁹ List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.

⁶⁰ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, January 1, 1756. The *Gazette* lists those killed as Brewer Decker and Family, John Worley and Family, and Peter Van Godfrey and his three sons.

⁶¹ List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

January	Plainfield Township, Northampton County	3	0	0/0/0 ⁶³	
January 1	Nazareth	1	0	0/0/0 ⁶⁴	
Early January	Gnadenhutten	11	0	0/0/0	Those attacked were a force of 52 men "mostly labourers" sent to guard the village ⁶⁵
January 8	Albany Township, Berks County	3	0	0/0/0 ⁶⁶	
January 15	Northampton County	8	2	0/0/2 ⁶⁷	
January 17	Smithfield Township, Northampton County	3	0	0/0/0 ⁶⁸	
January 18	Northampton County, near Wind Gap	15	?	?/?/? ⁶⁹	
January 27	Juniata River	12	6 ⁷⁰	0/1/5	

⁶²(...continued)

⁶² List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

⁶³ List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

⁶⁴ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, January 22, 1756.

⁶⁵ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 6:772; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, January 8, 15, 1756; List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

⁶⁶ List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the River Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Manuscripts, 2:119.

⁶⁷ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, January 29, 1756; List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

⁶⁸ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, January 29, 1756.

⁶⁹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, February 5, 1756.

⁷⁰ The *Pennsylvania Gazette*, for February 5, 1756, provides the names of four of those killed, and the names of six who were captured, although it added that a total of
(continued...)

January 28	Canalways, Cumberland County	3	2	0/0/2 ⁷¹	
February	Berks County	5	2	0/0/2 ⁷²	
February	Northampton County	0	1	1/0/0 ⁷³	
Early February	Around Fort Cumberland	3	3 ⁷⁴	?/?/?	
February	Lower Smithfield Township, Northampton County	3	0	0/0/0 ⁷⁵	
February	Reed Creek	2	0	0/0/0 ⁷⁶	
February 7	Berks County	11	0	0/0/0 ⁷⁷	
February 11	Near McDowell's Mill	0	3	3/0/0 ⁷⁸	

⁷⁰(...continued)

fifteen were killed or captured. The gazette a week later added the names of eight more. Only those whose names were given have been counted. Robert Morris to James Burd, February 7, 1756, H.S.P.: Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

⁷¹*Pennsylvania Gazette*, February 12, 1756.

⁷² List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the River Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:119.

⁷³ List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

⁷⁴ It was reported that the French and their Indian allies "had picked up several of the Men belonging to the Fort." *Pennsylvania Gazette*, February 26, 1756.

⁷⁵ List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

⁷⁶ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

⁷⁷ List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the River Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:119.

⁷⁸ Two of the three men were Widow Coxe's sons, described as "young men." Hugh Mercer to James Burd, February 17, 1756, H.S.P, Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, February 19, 1756.

February 14	Allemingle, Berks County	11	0	0/0/0 ⁷⁹	
February 19	Lynn Township, Northampton County	3	1	1/0/0 ⁸⁰	
February 29	Little Cove	4	4	?/?/? ⁸¹	
February 29	Near McDowell's Mill	3	0	0/0/0 ⁸²	
Early March	Berks County	2	1	0/0/1 ⁸³	
March	Berks County	8	0	0/0/0 ⁸⁴	
March	Augusta County	3	1	1/0/0 ⁸⁵	
March	New River	4	0	0/0/0 ⁸⁶	
March 1	Northampton County, between Forts Norris and Hamilton	3	0	0/0/0 ⁸⁷	
March 6	Cumberland County	14	0	0/0/0 ⁸⁸	

⁷⁹ List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.

⁸⁰ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, February 19, 1756.

⁸¹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, March 18, 1756.

⁸² Benjamin McGill to James Burd, March 5, 1756, James Patterson to James Burd, March 7, 1756, H.S.P., Shippen Family papers, Vol. 2; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, March 18, 1756.

⁸³ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, March 11, 1756; List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.

⁸⁴ List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the River Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:119.

⁸⁵ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

⁸⁶ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

⁸⁷ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, March 11, 1756.

⁸⁸ James Patterson to James Burd, March 7, 1756, H.S.P., Shippen Family papers, Vol. 2.

March 6	Berks County	4	0	0/0/0 ⁸⁹	
Early March	Williams Fort VA, 30 miles from Ft. Cumberland	7	7	0/1/0 ⁹⁰	
March 18	Near McDowell's Mill	1	1	1/0/0 ⁹¹	
March 22	Berks County	2	0	0/0/0 ⁹²	At Baumgartner's Plantation
March 24	Berks County	6	0	0/0/0 ⁹³	At Cluck's and Linderman's Plantations
March 24	Hereford Township, Berks County	2	1	0/0/1 ⁹⁴	
March 24	Near Allemingle, Berks County.	5	0	0/0/0 ⁹⁵	
April	Berks County	2	0	0/0/0 ⁹⁶	
April 1	Cox's Fort, VA	5	2	2/0/0 ⁹⁷	

⁸⁹ List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.

⁹⁰ William's Fort was near the Potomac River thirty miles downstream from Fort Cumberland. Edward Shippen reported that thirty-three had been killed. However the *Maryland Gazette* of April 8 reported that there were 18 inside the fort when it was attacked and burned. Some of those inside were killed, some captured, and two men and three women escaped. Edward Shippen to James Burd, March 24, 1756, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

⁹¹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 1, 1756.

⁹² List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.

⁹³ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 1, 1756; List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.

⁹⁴ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 1, 1756.

⁹⁵ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 1, 1756.

⁹⁶ List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.

Early April	McCord's Fort, PA	15	12 ⁹⁸	??/?	
Early April	Near Fort Cumberland	1	0	0/0/0 ⁹⁹	
Early April	Patterson's Fort on Juniata River	0	1	1/0/0 ¹⁰⁰	
Early April	Near Sideling Hill, PA	20	0	0/0/0	Indians attacked a party sent to intercept them. ¹⁰¹
April 4	Northants County	3	2	0/0/2 ¹⁰²	
April 15	Patterson's Creek	1	0	0/0/0	Party under command of John Fenton Mercer attacked. ¹⁰³
April 18	Patterson's Creek	17	0	0/0/0	John Fenton Mercer's party attacked again. Mercer was killed. ¹⁰⁴

⁹⁷(...continued)

⁹⁷ The men captured were described as the "sons" of Michael Teabol. *Maryland Gazette*, April 8, 1756; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 15, 1756.

⁹⁸ The *Maryland Gazette* for April 8, 1756 reported that thirty people at McCord's Fort had been killed or taken captive; the *Pennsylvania Gazette* for the same date reported only twenty-seven. A letter from Hance Hamilton maintained that the Indians took many captives from the fort. *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:77.

⁹⁹ *Maryland Gazette*, April 8, 1756.

¹⁰⁰ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 8, 1756.

¹⁰¹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 15, 22, 1756; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:77.

¹⁰² List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

¹⁰³ John Fenton Mercer to George Washington, April 17, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:11.

¹⁰⁴ William Stark to George Washington, April 18, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:17-18.

April 21	Hanover Township, Lancaster County	1	1	0/0/1 ¹⁰⁵	
April 22	Near Winchester	10 ¹⁰⁶	0	0/0/0	
April 22	Near Cunningham's Fort	1	7	0/1/6 ¹⁰⁷	
April 24	Edward's Fort, Frederick County, VA	4 ¹⁰⁸	0	0/0/0	
Mid-May	Patterson's Creek	0	1 ¹⁰⁹	??/?	
May 20	Near McDowell's Mill	1	1	0/1/0 ¹¹⁰	
May 25	Bear Camp, (beyond Ft. Cumberland)	3	0	0/0/0	This was a Maryland Party under Cressap sent out to raid the Ohio. ¹¹¹
May 26	Peters Township, Cumberland County	1	1	0/1/0 ¹¹²	

¹⁰⁵ Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89.

¹⁰⁶ Three families were killed. George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:45.

¹⁰⁷ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 13, 1756.

¹⁰⁸ One family killed. Washington to Henry Harrison, April 26, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:53.

¹⁰⁹ "Memorandum respecting the militia," May 17, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:145.

¹¹⁰ John Armstrong to James Burd, May 23, 1756, Pennsylvania State Archives, Edward Shippen Thompson Family Papers, Box 1, Folder 3.

¹¹¹ *Maryland Gazette*, June 10, 1756.

¹¹² *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 10, 1756.

May 28	Cox's Fort, VA	2	1	1/0/0 ¹¹³	
June	Roanoake River	0	1	1/0/0 ¹¹⁴	
June 8	Bethel Township, Lancaster County	1	4	0/3/1 ¹¹⁵	
June 8	Berks County	1	1	0/0/1 ¹¹⁶	
June 10	Bigham's Fort, Cumberland County	17	6	1/3/2 ¹¹⁷	
June 19	Bethel Township, Lancaster County	4	0	0/0/0 ¹¹⁸	
June 25	Vause's Fort, Augusta County	9	19	8/6/5 ¹¹⁹	
June 28	Near Fort Cumberland	1	1	0/0/1 ¹²⁰	

¹¹³ *Maryland Gazette*, July 1, 1756; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 1, 1756.

¹¹⁴ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

¹¹⁵ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 17, 1756; List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.

¹¹⁶ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 17, June 24, 1756; List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.

¹¹⁷ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 17, 24, 1756.

¹¹⁸ List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.

¹¹⁹ Peter Looney who escaped from captivity in the summer of 1757 reported that the French had captured 8 men, 6, women, and 5 children. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 29, 1756, July 28, 1757; Memorandum, July 1756, William Preston Letter, August 24, 1756, Draper Mss: William Preston Papers, 1QQ:131, 134-135; Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:260n; "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

¹²⁰ A "boy" was taken prisoner. *Maryland Gazette*, July 8, 1756.

June 30	Frederick County, MD	4	1	?/?/? ¹²¹	
Late June	Augusta County	10	0	0/0/0 ¹²²	
Early July	Bethel Township, Cumberland County	2	0	0/0/0 ¹²³	
July 7	Near Fort Cumberland	4	0	0/0/0 ¹²⁴	
July 19	Near Fort Cumberland	1	0	0/0/0 ¹²⁵	
July 20	Near McDowell's Mill	1	2	2/0/0 ¹²⁶	
July 20	Conococheague	2	0	0/0/0 ¹²⁷	
July 21	Near McClure's Gap, Cumberland County	1	2	0/0/2 ¹²⁸	
July 24	Juniata River	1	7 ¹²⁹	?/?/?	

¹²¹ *Maryland Gazette*, July 8, 1756

¹²² Gov. Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, July 24, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:467.

¹²³ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 8, 1756; List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.

¹²⁴ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 15, 1756.

¹²⁵ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 29, 1756.

¹²⁶ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 29, 1756; *Maryland Gazette*, August 5, 1756.

¹²⁷ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 29, August, 12, 1756; *Maryland Gazette*, August 5, 1756.

¹²⁸ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 29, 1756; *Maryland Gazette*, August 5, 1756.

¹²⁹ Report stated that two families were captured. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 5, 1756.

July 30	Fort Granville	8	23	15/3/5 ¹³⁰	
July 31	Near Maidstone, VA	1	2	2/0/0 ¹³¹	
Early August	Conococheague	4	4 ¹³²	?/?/?	
August 5-8	McDowell's Mill	4	5	0/0/5 ¹³³	
August 9	South Branch	1	2	2/0/0 ¹³⁴	
August 11	Cacapon	2	0	0/0/0 ¹³⁵	
August 20	Conococheague	15	0	0/0/0 ¹³⁶	
August 21	Fort Pleasant, VA	2	0	0/0/0 ¹³⁷	
August 21	Conococheague	4	1	1/0/0 ¹³⁸	

¹³⁰ The Indians took possession of the older men and women and children, the French of the younger men and women. The *Maryland Gazette* for August 26, 1756 reported that several of the soldiers in the fort had been killed but gave no exact figures. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 19, 1756.

¹³¹ Robert Stewart to George Washington, July 31, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:304.

¹³² A report in the *Maryland Gazette* on August 26 stated that the Conococheague had been attacked by the Indians returning from Fort Granville. Washington wrote to Lord Fairfax that as a result of the raid "the whole Settlement of Conogochieg in maryland is fled."

¹³³ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 19, 1756.

¹³⁴ Thomas Waggener to George Washington, August 10, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:340.

¹³⁵ *Virginia Gazette*, August 27, 1756.

¹³⁶ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 2, 1756.

¹³⁷ Thomas Waggener to George Washington, August 21, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:373-374.

¹³⁸ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 2, 1756.

August 21	"Salisbury Plain"	9	4	4/0/0 ¹³⁹	
August 21	South Mountain, Cumberland County	4	0	0/0/0 ¹⁴⁰	
August 25	Lancaster County	2	4	0/1/3 ¹⁴¹	
September	Berks County	0	1	0/0/1 ¹⁴²	
September 1	South Mountain, Cumberland County	3	0	0/0/0 ¹⁴³	Murders and raids reported all along the frontier.
September 11-14	Jackson's River	13	29 ¹⁴⁴	2/4/23 ¹⁴⁵	
September 20	Conococheague	1	3	0/1/2 ¹⁴⁶	

¹³⁹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 2, 1756.

¹⁴⁰ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 2, 1756.

¹⁴¹ Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89.

¹⁴² List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the River Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:119.

¹⁴³ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 9, 1756.

¹⁴⁴ Reports in *Pennsylvania Gazette* for October 7, 1756, maintained that over fifty people had been killed or captured. At the end of September Washington maintained that the South Branch had been "constantly pestered" by Indian raids while Dinwiddie reported to the Earl of Halifax that "Flying Parties... continue harassing our Frontiers." George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, September 28, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:422; Dinwiddie to the Earl of Halifax, September 24, 1756, Boehm, ed., BPRO CO5, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol 1329) 12:21.

¹⁴⁵ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

¹⁴⁶ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 7, 1756.

October	Tulpehocken	2	1	1/0/0 ¹⁴⁷	
Early October	Preston's Fort, on Catawba River	?	?	?	Attacked by the Indians. ¹⁴⁸
Early October	Augusta County	2	0	0/0/0 ¹⁴⁹	
October 7-8	Lancaster County	3	1	0/0/1 ¹⁵⁰	
October 12	Vause's Fort	1	1	1/0/0 ¹⁵¹	
October 12	Hanover Township, Lancaster County	1	3	0/0/3 ¹⁵²	
October 15	Berks County	0	1	1/0/0 ¹⁵³	
October 18	Berks County	3	3	0/1/2 ¹⁵⁴	
October 18	Bethel Township, Lancaster County	6	0	0/0/0 ¹⁵⁵	

¹⁴⁷ List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.

¹⁴⁸ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 10, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:431.

¹⁴⁹ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, October 10, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 3:432.

¹⁵⁰ Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser papers, 2:89.

¹⁵¹ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

¹⁵² *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:303; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 21, 1756.

¹⁵³ List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.

¹⁵⁴ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:302; List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.

¹⁵⁵ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:303.

October 21-23	Hanover Township, Lancaster County	4	1	0/0/1 ¹⁵⁶	
October 24	Bethel Township, Lancaster County	3	1	0/1/0 ¹⁵⁷	
Mid-October	Frederick County, Virginia and Maryland	?	?	??/?	"The Enemy ravaging the country about Conogochieg, stony-run, and South-Branch." ¹⁵⁸
November	Berks County	1	1	0/0/1 ¹⁵⁹	
November 2-3	Bern Township, Berks County	2	2	??/? 0/0/1 ¹⁶⁰	
November 3	Near McDowell's Mill	11	8	2/0/6 ¹⁶¹	
November 3	Lebanon Township, Berks County	5	4	0/1/3 ¹⁶²	
November 3	Bethel Township, Lancaster County	1	0	0/0/0 ¹⁶³	

¹⁵⁶ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 28, 1756.

¹⁵⁷ List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.

¹⁵⁸ Stony Run was southwest of Winchester. George Washington to Adam Stephen, October 23, 1756, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:440. Dinwiddie reported in November "The Enemy, in fly'g parties have infested our frontiers this fall and committed some few Murders." Gov. Dinwiddie to Henry Fox, November 9, 1756, Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2:540.

¹⁵⁹ List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the River Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:119.

¹⁶⁰ List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.

¹⁶¹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, November 11, 1756.

¹⁶² *Pennsylvania Gazette*, November 11, 1756; List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.

¹⁶³ List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.

November 6	Near Allamingle, Berks County	0	6	1/1/4 ¹⁶⁴	
November 28	Northampton County	1	1	0/0/1 ¹⁶⁵	
Early December	Cumberland County, Near Maryland boundary	2	0	0/0/0 ¹⁶⁶	
December 10	Berks County	1	1	0/1/0 ¹⁶⁷	
December 10	Frederick County, Maryland	1	0	0/0/0 ¹⁶⁸	
1757					
January 15	Berks County	1	0	0/0/0 ¹⁶⁹	
Late February	South Branch	0	6	0/0/6 ¹⁷⁰	
March	Craigs Creek, Augusta County	0	2	1/0/1 ¹⁷¹	
March 30	Near Chambersburg, on Conococheague	1	11	0/1/10 ¹⁷²	

¹⁶⁴ The "List" includes an additional captive. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, November 18, 1756; List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the River Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:119.

¹⁶⁵ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, December 9, 1756.

¹⁶⁶ *Maryland Gazette*, December 23, 1756.

¹⁶⁷ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, December 23, 1756; List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.

¹⁶⁸ *Maryland Gazette*, December 23, 1756.

¹⁶⁹ List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the River Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:119.

¹⁷⁰ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, March 10, 1757; "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

¹⁷¹ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

April	Northampton County	6	6	??/? 1/1/1 ¹⁷³	At "Boserd's" settlement.
April	Tulpehocken, Berks County	0	1	0/1/0 ¹⁷⁴	
April	Bethel Township, Lancaster County	1	0	0/0/0 ¹⁷⁵	
April 2	Conococheague	2	0	0/0/0 ¹⁷⁶	
Early April	Northampton County, near Blue Mountain	1	2	0/1/1 ¹⁷⁷	
Early April	Berks County	1	1	0/0/1 ¹⁷⁸	
April 10	Near mouth of Conococheague	13	0	0/0/0 ¹⁷⁹	
Early April	Fort Cumberland	2	0	0/0/0	Two Catawba Indians were scalped outside the fort. ¹⁸⁰

¹⁷² (...continued)

¹⁷² The *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 14, 1757 reported that only one woman was killed, not three people as had previously been maintained; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 7, 1757, *Maryland Gazette*, April 7, 1757; Thomas Barton to Richard Peters, April 4, 1757, H.S.P., Peters Papers, 4:85,

¹⁷³ List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

¹⁷⁴ List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.

¹⁷⁵ List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.

¹⁷⁶ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 14, 1757.

¹⁷⁷ Gov. Denny to Thomas Penn, April 8, 1757, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 18) 3:215-216.

¹⁷⁸ Gov. Denny to Thomas Penn, April 8, 1757, Boehm, ed., BPRO C05, Part 1, *Westward Expansion, 1700-1783*, (Vol. 18) 3:216; List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the River Lecky and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:119.

¹⁷⁹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 28, 1757; John Armstrong to James Burd, April 30, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

April 16	Fort Frederick, Maryland	1	0	0/0/0 ¹⁸¹	
April 16	Fort Cumberland	2	1	1/0/0 ¹⁸²	
April 20-23	Northampton County	3	1	0/0/1 ¹⁸³	
April 23	Conococheague	2	0	0/0/0 ¹⁸⁴	
Late April	Fort Lebanon, Berks County	1	0	0/0/0 ¹⁸⁵	
April 28	Berks County	1	0	0/0/0 ¹⁸⁶	
Late April	40 miles from Fort Cumberland	4	0	0/0/0	Surprise attack on Virginia troops ¹⁸⁷
May	Northampton County	0	1	0/1/0 ¹⁸⁸	
May 2	Northampton County	17	2	2/0/0 ¹⁸⁹	

¹⁸⁰ (...continued)

¹⁸⁰ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, April 16, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:135; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 5, 1757.

¹⁸¹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 28, 1757.

¹⁸² George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:135; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 5, 1757.

¹⁸³ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 28, 1757; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:493-494.

¹⁸⁴ John Armstrong to James Burd, April 30, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

¹⁸⁵ Charles Macelraine, a wagoner, was killed. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 5, 1757.

¹⁸⁶ John Adam Miller was killed. List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.

¹⁸⁷ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 19, 1757; *Maryland Gazette*, May 19, 1757.

¹⁸⁸ List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

¹⁸⁹ The *Pennsylvania Gazette* reported that 14 people were killed at the home of a Mr. Buffet where they had taken
(continued...)

Early May	McCormack's Fort, Cumberland County	1	1	0/0/1 ¹⁹⁰	
May 6	Bethel Township, Lancaster County	5	0	0/0/0 ¹⁹¹	
May 14	Calf Pasture, Augusta County	3	?	?/?/? ¹⁹²	
May 14	Jacksons River	2	0	0/0/0 ¹⁹³	
May 16	Cowpasture, Augusta County	1	6	0/1/5 ¹⁹⁴	
May 16	South Branch	7	0	0/0/0 ¹⁹⁵	
May 17	Swatarro Creek	4	0	0/0/0 ¹⁹⁶	

¹⁸⁹(...continued)

shelter. The deposition of George Ebert, who was taken prisoner during the raid, describes an attack at Conrad Bittenbender's. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 12, 1757; "Deposition of those who had been taken prisoners by the Indians, June 20, 1757," H.S.P., Northampton County Records: Miscellaneous Papers, 1:253; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:620-621.

¹⁹⁰ The captive was described as a "servant girl." *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 26, 1757.

¹⁹¹ List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.

¹⁹² *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 2, 1757; *Maryland Gazette*, June 2, 1757.

¹⁹³ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

¹⁹⁴ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

¹⁹⁵ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

¹⁹⁶ George Croghan on Proceedings with the Iroquois at Lancaster, April and May 1757, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:5-9; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 26, 1757.

Mid May	Lancaster County	20	10	?/?/? ¹⁹⁷	
Late May	Lynn Township, Northampton County	1	1	0/0/1 ¹⁹⁸	
June	Bern Township, Berks County	2	3	0/0/3 ¹⁹⁹	
June 1	Northampton County	3	0	0/0/0 ²⁰⁰	
June 1	Bethel Township, Lancaster County	7	0	0/0/0 ²⁰¹	
Early June	Berks County	4	4	?/2/2 ²⁰²	
Early June	Big Cove	3	3 ²⁰³	3/0/0	

¹⁹⁷ An account in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* on May 26, maintained at least twenty people had been killed and more taken prisoner, while Bartram Galbreath maintained that "the whole Frontier about Seven or Eight Miles into the Inhabitants are Laid Waist." Bartram Galbreath to James Burd, May 23, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; The numbers contained in "List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township Lancaster County," "List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill," are slightly lower. H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107, 109.

¹⁹⁸ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 2, 1757.

¹⁹⁹ List of People Killed or Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109.

²⁰⁰ List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

²⁰¹ List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.

²⁰² Conrad Weiser reported that all those killed and captured were women and children. Conrad Weiser to Gov. Denny, June, 1757, H.S.P.: Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:73.

²⁰³ The report stated seven men were killed or captured. George Croghan's Journal, H.S.P., Penn Mss.: Indian Affairs, 3:11-13.

Early June	Fort Augusta	4	0	0/0/0 ²⁰⁴	
June 9	Cumberland County, near Great Cove	4	4	4/0/0 ²⁰⁵	A party of troops commanded by Lieut. Holliday were attacked.
June 6	Near Shippensburg, Cumberland County	2	3	3/0/0 ²⁰⁶	
June 9	Near Fort Frederick, Maryland	2	0	0/0/0	Two wagoners were killed. ²⁰⁷
June 11	Cumberland County	0	1	0/1/0 ²⁰⁸	
June 23	Allemingle, Berks County	1	0	0/0/0 ²⁰⁹	
June 23	Cunningham's Fort, near Winchester	0	3	0/0/3 ²¹⁰	
June 24	Near Henry Paulins	1	2	0/0/2 ²¹¹	
June 24	Fort Littleton	1	0	0/0/0 ²¹²	

²⁰⁴ Daniel Clark to James Burd, June 5, 1757, H.S.P.: Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

²⁰⁵ Clark maintained that fifteen men and the commander were killed. A later report maintained that only 4 were killed and four captured. Daniel Clark to James Burd, June 11, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 23, 1757.

²⁰⁶ Daniel Clark to James Burd, June 11, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 16, 1757.

²⁰⁷ *Maryland Gazette*, June 16, 23, 1757.

²⁰⁸ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 23, 1757.

²⁰⁹ List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.

²¹⁰ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 27, 1757; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:632.

²¹¹ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:632.

²¹² *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:632.

Late June	Conococheague	3	0	0/0/0 ²¹³	
June 23-25	Northampton County	2	0	0/0/0 ²¹⁴	
June 29	Bern Township, Berks County	2	3	0/0/3 ²¹⁵	
Late June	Antrim Township, Cumberland County	1	2	0/0/2 ²¹⁶	
Late June	Sherman's Valley	1	0	0/0/0 ²¹⁷	
July	Berks County	10	0	0/0/0 ²¹⁸	
July	Northampton County	1	0	0/0/0 ²¹⁹	At William Maks
July	Jackson's River	2	0	0/0/0 ²²⁰	
July 1	Tulpehocken	7	0	0/0/0 ²²¹	

²¹³ Washington reported that the whole frontier was infested with parties of French and their Indian allies. They had killed "several" people on the Conococheague. David Jameson also reported that the Indians had killed several people in Cumberland County including John Muffit. George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, June 27, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:264; David Jameson to James Burd, July 1, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 2.

²¹⁴ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:621; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 20, 1757.

²¹⁵ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 7, 1757.

²¹⁶ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 14, 1757.

²¹⁷ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 14, 1757.

²¹⁸ List of People Killed and Taken Prisoner from the River Lechy and Westwards, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:119.

²¹⁹ List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

²²⁰ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

²²¹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 7, 1757.

July 2	York County	0	4	0/1/3 ²²²	
July 8	Berks County	2	5	0/0/5 ²²³	
July 8	Lancaster County	4	3	0/0/3 ²²⁴	
July 9	Lynn Township, Northampton County	8	0	0/0/0 ²²⁵	
Mid July	Antietam Creek	1	0	0/0/0 ²²⁶	
July 18	Cumberland County	9	4	0/3/1 ²²⁷	
July 20	Bethel Township, Lancaster County	1	4	1/3/0 ²²⁸	
July 25	Augusta, Halifax and Bedford Counties	7	11	?/?/? (0/2/7) ²²⁹	
July 27	Frederick County, Maryland	1	1	1/0/0 ²³⁰	

²²² *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 14, 1757; *Maryland Gazette*, July 7, 1757.

²²³ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 14, 1757.

²²⁴ Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89.

²²⁵ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 14, 1757.

²²⁶ *Maryland Gazette*, August 4, 1757.

²²⁷ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 4, 1757.

²²⁸ List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.

²²⁹ Washington reported raids on the southern part of Augusta, while Dinwiddie maintained there had been several murders committed there. George Washington to John Stanwix, July 30, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:354; *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 6:59-60; Gov. Dinwiddie to George Washington, August 9, 1757; "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

²³⁰ The prisoner was the son of the man killed. *Maryland Gazette*, August 4, 1757.

July 28	Marsh Creek, York County.	0	1	0/0/1 ²³¹	
Early August	South Branch	0	5	5/0/0 ²³²	
August	Northampton County	1	0	0/0/0 ²³³	
August 2	Hanover Township, Lancaster County	1	2	0/1/1 ²³⁴	
August 4	Between Tolhas and Monaidy?	1	4	0/4/0 ²³⁵	
August 5	Bethel Township, Lancaster County	1	0	0/0/0 ²³⁶	
August 6	Hanover Township, Lancaster County	1	2	??/? ²³⁷	
August 13	Bethel Township, Lancaster County	2	0	0/0/0 ²³⁸	
August 10	Hanover Township, Lancaster County	2	1	0/1/0 ²³⁹	

²³¹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 11, 1757.

²³² George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, August 3, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:360.

²³³ List of People Killed or Captured eastwards of River Lecky, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:115.

²³⁴ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 11, 1757.

²³⁵ *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:706.

²³⁶ List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.

²³⁷ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 11, 1757; this is probably also the incident listed for August 17 in Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89.

²³⁸ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 11, 1757.

²³⁹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 18, 1757.

August 11	Hanover Township, Lancaster County	0	2	0/1/1 ²⁴⁰	
August 17	Paxton Township, Lancaster County	1	0	0/0/0 ²⁴¹	
August 18	Hanover Township, Lancaster County	1	6	0/2/4 ²⁴²	
August 21	Berks County	0	2	0/1/1 ²⁴³	
Late August- Early September	South Branch	4	2	1/1/0 ²⁴⁴	
August 30	Cumberland County	1	0	0/0/0 ²⁴⁵	
September	Fort Dinwiddie	1	0	0/0/0 ²⁴⁶	
September	Cowpasture	1	4	2/0/2 ²⁴⁷	

²⁴⁰ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 18, 1757; Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89.

²⁴¹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 1, 1757.

²⁴² *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 1, 1757; this attack was referred to as occurring on August 24-25 in Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89.

²⁴³ The *Gazette* reported Semeleke's wife and a neighbor's child missing, the "List" reported three of Peter Smither's Children missing. This is almost certainly the same attack. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 1, 1757; List of People Killed or Captured in Berks County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:117.

²⁴⁴ George Washington to Gov. Dinwiddie, August 27, September 17, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:385, 408.

²⁴⁵ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 8, 1757.

²⁴⁶ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

²⁴⁷ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

September 1	Cumberland County	1	1	1/0/0 ²⁴⁸	
Early September	Cumberland County	3	0	0/0/0 ²⁴⁹	
September 8-9	Paxton Township, Lancaster County	3	3	0/2/1 ²⁵⁰	
September 16	Plainfield Township, Northampton County	0	4	0/1/3 ²⁵¹	
September 18-19	Cumberland County	2	7	0/2/5 ²⁵²	
September 19	Lancaster County	8	1	0/1/0 ²⁵³	
September 24	McClure's Gap, Cumberland County	1	0	0/0/0 ²⁵⁴	
September 27	Hyndshaw's Fort	0	1	0/0/1 ²⁵⁵	
September 28	Bern Township, Berks County	3	4	0/0/4 ²⁵⁶	

²⁴⁸ Two men were reported as either killed or captured. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 8, 1757.

²⁴⁹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 15, 1757.

²⁵⁰ James Watson, James Mullen and Richard Johnston killed. McIlroy's son and two daughters, referred to as a boy and women in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* were captured. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 15, 22, 1757; Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89.

²⁵¹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 22, 1757; *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 7:735.

²⁵² *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 29, 1757.

²⁵³ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 29, 1757; "Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster County" H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89.

²⁵⁴ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 6, 1757.

²⁵⁵ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, November 10, 1757.

²⁵⁶ James Young to James Burd, October 3, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3; List of People Killed or
(continued...)

September 29	Bern Township, Berks County	0	4	1/0/3 ²⁵⁷	
September 30	Lancaster County	0	5	0/0/5 ²⁵⁸	
September 30	Lebanon Township, Berks County	0	4	0/0/4 ²⁵⁹	
Late September	Cedar and Stony Creeks, Frederick County, Virginia	14	20	?/?/? ²⁶⁰	
October	Catawba River	1	1	1/0/0 ²⁶¹	
October 1	Swataro Creek	0	5	0/0/5 ²⁶²	
October 1	Hanover County	1	0	0/0/0 ²⁶³	
October 17	Paxton Township, Lancaster County	2	0	0/0/0	Harvesters were attacked ²⁶⁴

²⁵⁶ (...continued)
 Captured on South-West side of Schuylkill, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:109 .

²⁵⁷ James Young to James Burd, October 3, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3.

²⁵⁸ Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89

²⁵⁹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 6, 1757.

²⁶⁰ Thirty-four inhabitants were reported as either killed or captured. Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:417n; *Maryland Gazette*, October 13, 1757.

²⁶¹ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

²⁶² James Young to James Burd, October 3, 1757, H.S.P., Shippen Family Papers, Vol. 3.

²⁶³ Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89.

²⁶⁴ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 27, 1757; Memorandum of Persons Killed and Captured on the Frontier of Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:89.

November	Brock's Gap	3	2	2/0/0 ²⁶⁵	
November 24-25	Bethel Township, Lancaster County	2	0	0/0/0 ²⁶⁶	
1758					
January	Fort Dinwiddie	0	1	0/0/1 ²⁶⁷	
January	Roanoke River	2	0	0/0/0 ²⁶⁸	
March 19	Brock's Gap	1	0	0/0/0 ²⁶⁹	
March 19	South Branch	3	3	3/0/0 ²⁷⁰	
March 20	Cowpasture	1	2	0/1/1 ²⁷¹	
March 20	Roanoke River	2	2	0/1/1 ²⁷²	
March 20	Catawba River	0	1	0/0/1 ²⁷³	
March-April	Bedford & Halifax Counties, Virginia	30	40	??/?	"many Robberies and Murders." Some of raids were Cherokees returning home ²⁷⁴

²⁶⁵ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

²⁶⁶ List of People Killed or Captured in Bethel Township Lancaster County, H.S.P., Conrad Weiser Papers, 2:107.

²⁶⁷ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

²⁶⁸ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

²⁶⁹ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

²⁷⁰ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

²⁷¹ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

²⁷² "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

²⁷³ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

April 5	York County	4	8	?/?/? ²⁷⁵	
April 7	Shearman's	1	0	0/0/0 ²⁷⁶	
Early April	Swatarro Creek	4	1	0/1/0 ²⁷⁷	
Early April	Tulpehocken	2	0	0/0/0 ²⁷⁸	
Early April	Northkill	4	0	0/0/0 ²⁷⁹	
April 24	Cowpasture	0	2	2/0/0 ²⁸⁰	
April 27	Upper Tract, South Branch	23	0	0/0/0 ²⁸¹	
April 28	Fort Seybert	17	24	?/?/? ²⁸²	

²⁷⁴ (...continued)

²⁷⁴ *Maryland Gazette* on May 18, 1758 and *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 11, 1758, reported that seventy people had been killed and captured in Halifax and Bedford Counties. John Blair reported to the Council on May 19 that 47 people had been killed or captured in Halifax County alone. He wrote to Washington that "a large party of Indians... spread themselves in smaller Companys many Miles wide and Robb's every Plantation they came at." *Journal of the Council of Virginia*, 6:91-93; John Blair to George Washington, May 24, 1757, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:194-195.

²⁷⁵ One man was killed, eleven others, mainly women and children were "missing." *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 13, 1758.

²⁷⁶ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 13, 1757.

²⁷⁷ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 13, 1758.

²⁷⁸ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 13, 1758.

²⁷⁹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 13, 1758.

²⁸⁰ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

²⁸¹ Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:160n; "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

²⁸² Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 4:160n; "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

May	Jackson's River	0	1	1/0/0 ²⁸³	
May 22	Hanover Township, Lancaster County	1	0	0/0/0 ²⁸⁴	
May 22	Hunters Fort	1	0	0/0/0 ²⁸⁵	
June 1	Conococheague	1	2	0/1/1 ²⁸⁶	
June 14	Northampton County	3	0	0/0/0 ²⁸⁷	
June 18	Berks County	2	3	0/0/3 ²⁸⁸	
June 20-21	Swatarro, Lancaster County	2	0	0/0/0 ²⁸⁹	
June 27	Masanutten, Frederick County, Virginia	9	6	?/?/? ²⁹⁰	
July 10	Near Fort Cumberland	2	1	1/0/0 ²⁹¹	
Early August	Sideling Hill	1	3	3/0/0	A wagon train was attacked ²⁹²

²⁸³ "Register," Draper Mss., William Preston Papers, 1QQ:83.

²⁸⁴ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 1, 1758.

²⁸⁵ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 22, 1758.

²⁸⁶ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 22, 1758.

²⁸⁷ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 28, 1758.

²⁸⁸ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 28, 1758.

²⁸⁹ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 28, 1758.

²⁹⁰ The *Pennsylvania Gazette* reported on July 27, 1758 that 26 people had been killed or captured between Winchester and Augusta Court House. Other accounts gave a lower death toll. John Hite to George Washington, July 2, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:254.

²⁹¹ George Washington to Henry Bouquet, July 13, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:282-283; Abraham Bosomworth to Henry Bouquet, July 14, 1758, Kent ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:204.

²⁹² *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 31, 1758.

Early August	Culbertson's Fort	1	1	0/1/0 ²⁹³	
Early August	Near Shippensburg	1	0	0/0/0 ²⁹⁴	
August 7	Cumberland County	2	2	2/0/0	A wagon train was attacked between Juniata and Fort Lyttleton ²⁹⁵
September 10	Hanover Township, Lancaster County	2	2	2/0/0 ²⁹⁶	
October 1	Swataro Creek	0	3	3/0/0 ²⁹⁷	
October 1	Loyalhanna	2	0	0/0/0	Grass guard at the fort attacked. ²⁹⁸
TOTAL		1217	755	118/89/ 250	

²⁹³ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 31, 1758.

²⁹⁴ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 31, 1758.

²⁹⁵ Henry Bouquet to John Forbes, August 8, 1758, Kent, ed., *Henry Bouquet Papers*, 2:337; Abraham Bosomworth to George Washington, August 9, 1758, Abbot and Twohig, eds., *The Papers of George Washington*, 5:382.

²⁹⁶ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 5, 1758.

²⁹⁷ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 19, 1758.

²⁹⁸ *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 19, 1758.

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